Rule 7 - Parts of a Pleading

CASE NO. 1
SPS. CARLOS MUNSALUD and G.R. No. 167181
WINNIE MUNSALUD,
Petitioners, Present:
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
- versus - AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CHICO-NAZARIO,
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.

NATIONAL HOUSING Promulgated:

AUTHORITY,
Respondent. December 23, 2008

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

REYES, R.T., J.:

INSUFFICIENCY in form and substance, as a ground for dismissal of the complaint,

should not be based on the title or caption, especially when the allegations of the

pleading support an action.

In pursuit of a reversal of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) affirming the order

of dismissal[2] of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) in a complaint for

mandamus,[3] petitioners-spouses Carlos Munsalud and Winnie Munsalud lodged before

this Court a petition for review on certiorari.

1
 The Facts

Laid bare from the records are the following facts:

Petitioner Winnie Munsalud is the daughter and one of the compulsory heirs of the late

Lourdes Bulado (Bulado) who died on December 8, 1985. During the lifetime of Bulado,

respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) awarded her a lot located at 942 R.

Higgins St., CAA Compound, Bgy. 185, Pasay City. The award was made pursuant to

the Land for the Landless program of respondent. She resided at the said property until

her death.

When Bulado died, petitioner Winnie assumed the obligation to pay the monthly

amortizations. Respondent NHA recognized petitioner spouses assumption of

obligations as their names were reflected in the receipts. They were allowed to occupy

the lot up to the present. To prove their occupancy over the lot, petitioners offered as

evidence the following documents, viz.:

1. Tag Card No. 77-02830-03 issued by then Pasay City Mayor Pablo
Cuneta and then NHA General Manager Gaudencio Tobias;
2. Application and Contract for Water Services No. 295319 in the name of
Bulado but the same was signed by petitioner Winnie;

3. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27566 over the land issued by the

Assessors Office of Pasay City in the name of defendant recognizing
its beneficial use in favor of petitioners;

4. Tax Declaration No. B-007-27667 over the residential structure erected

on the land and issued by the Assessors Office of Pasay City in the
names of petitioners;

2
 5. Pagpapatunay dated September 5, 1989 signed by neighbors and
acquaintances of petitioners attesting to their long time residence in
the property;

6. Deposit Receipt No. 286444 dated September 27, 1989 issued by the
Manila Electric Company attesting to the installation of electric service
in the name of petitioner Winnie on the property. [4]

On September 14, 1989, petitioners completed the payments of the amortizations due

on the property. Reflected on the left side portion of the official receipt evidencing full

payment is the annotation full payment. Consequently, petitioners demanded that

respondent NHA issue in their favor a deed of sale and a title over the

property. Respondent, however, refused.

On January 28, 2003, petitioners, by counsel, sent respondent a letter to issue a deed

of sale and title. Despite receipt, respondent did not issue the requested

documents. On March 6, 2003, respondent wrote petitioners informing them that

petitioner Winnies name does not appear as beneficiary. Petitioners replied that Winnie

was representing her mother, the late Lourdes Bulado. Respondent did not respond to

the reply.

Left with no recourse, petitioners instituted a complaint for mandamus before the

court a quo.

RTC Order

On April 22, 2003, the RTC dismissed the complaint for mandamus, disposing thus:
Considering that the petition is insufficient in form and substance,
there being no reference to any law which the respondent by reason of its
office, trust or station is especially enjoined as a duty to perform or any
allegation that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or
enjoying any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to, the
above-entitled petition is hereby DISMISSED, pursuant to Section 3 Rule
65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.

3
 SO ORDERED.[5]

Petitioners moved for reconsideration but they did not succeed. Thus, petitioners

seasonably appealed to the CA.

CA Disposition

On August 23, 2004, the CA affirmed the RTC dismissal of the mandamus petition.

WHEREFORE, the instant appeal is

hereby DISMISSED. Accordingly, the assailed Order of Dismissal
is AFFIRMED.

SO ORDERED.[6]

In agreeing with the court a quo, the appellate court rationalized as follows:

It is essential to the issuance of the writ of mandamus that the

petitioner should have a clear legal right to the thing demanded and it
must be the imperative duty of the respondent to perform the act
required. It is a command to exercise a power already possessed and to
perform a duty already imposed.

It well settled that the legal right of petitioner to the performance of

the particular act which is sought to be compelled must be clear and
complete. A clear legal right within the meaning of the rule means a right
which is clearly founded in, or granted by law; a right which is inferable as
a matter of law. Likewise, mandamus refers only to acts enjoined by
law to be done. The duties to be enforced must be such as are clearly
peremptorily enjoined by law or by reason of official station. However,
appellants failed to point out in their petition the specific law by which
defendant is duty bound to perform the act sought to be performed, as
well as the law which would grant them the clear legal right to the
issuance of the writ of mandamus.

Foregoing discussed, we find no error on the part of the court a

quo in dismissing the petition for mandamus filed by plaintiffs-appellants.

4
 On September 20, 2004, petitioners moved for reconsideration but it was denied

by the CA on February 22, 2005. Hence, the present recourse.

Issues

I.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN AFFIRMING THE ORDERS OF THE HONORABLE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT OF QUEZON CITY DATED APRIL 22, 2003 AND SEPTEMBER
25, 2003 WHERE THE LATTER COURT RELYING UPON THE
APPELLATION AND/OR LABEL THAT PETITIONERS GAVE THEIR
COMPLAINT (I.E., MANDAMUS) IN CIVIL CASE NO. Q-03-
492 DISMISSED THE COMPLAINT THEREIN PURPORTEDLY
BECAUSE THE SAID COMPLAINT FAILED TO COMPLY WITH
SECTION 3, RULE 65 OF THE 1997 RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE.

II.
WHETHER OR NOT THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED
IN DENYING PETITIONERS MOTION FOR RECONSIDERATION OF ITS
DECISION DATED AUGUST 23, 2004.[7] (Underscoring supplied)

Poring over the arguments presented, the focal issue is whether in giving due course to

an action, the court is fenced within the parameters of the title given by plaintiff to the

case without regard to the averments of the pleading.

Elsewise stated, does the trial court have absolute discretion to dismiss an action on

the ground that it is insufficient in form and substance based alone on its designation

when, from the body and the relief prayed for, it could stand as an action sufficient in

form and substance?

5
 Our Ruling

Petitioners action designated as mandamus was dismissed by the trial court on the

ground that it is insufficient in form and substance. This begs the question: when is an

action sufficient in form and when is it sufficient in substance?

To begin with, form is the methodology used to express rules of practice and

procedure.[8] It is the order or method of legal proceedings. [9] It relates to technical

details.[10] It is ordinarily the antithesis of substance.[11] It is an established method of

expression or practice. It is a fixed or formal way of proceeding.[12]

A pleading is sufficient in form when it contains the following:

1. A Caption, setting forth the name of the court, the title of the action
indicating the names of the parties, and the docket number which is
usually left in blank, as the Clerk of Court has to assign yet a docket
number;

2. The Body, reflecting the designation, the allegations of the partys

claims or defenses, the relief prayed for, and the date of the pleading;

3. The Signature and Address of the party or counsel;[13]

4. Verification. This is required to secure an assurance that the

allegations have been made in good faith, or are true and correct and
not merely speculative;[14]

5. A Certificate of Non-forum Shopping, which although not

jurisdictional, the same is obligatory;[15]

6. An Explanation in case the pleading is not filed personally to the

Court. Likewise, for pleading subsequent to the complaint, if the same
is not served personally to the parties affected, there must also be an
explanation why service was not done personally.[16]

6
Likewise, for all other pleadings, not initiatory in nature, there must be:

A Proof of Service, which consists in the written admission of the

party served, or the official return of the server, or the affidavit of the party
serving, containing a full statement of the date, place and manner of
service. If the service is by ordinary mail, proof thereof shall consist of an
affidavit of the person mailing. If service is by registered mail, proof shall
be made by such affidavit and the registry receipt issued by the mailing
office.[17]

In case a party is represented by counsel de parte, additional requirements that

go into the form of the pleading should be incorporated, viz.:

1. The Roll of Attorneys Number;

2. The Current Professional Tax Receipt Number; and
3. The IBP Official Receipt No. or IBP Lifetime Membership Number.[18]
4. MCLE Compliance or Exemption Certificate Number and Date of Issue
(effective January 1, 2009).[19]

In the case at bench, a naked perusal of the complaint docketed as Civil Case No. Q03-

49278 designated by petitioners as mandamus reveals that it is sufficient in

form. It has the caption with the name of the court, the name of the parties, and the

docket number. The complaint contains allegations of petitioners claims. It has a prayer

and the date when it was prepared. The signature page shows the signature and name

of petitioners counsel, the counsels IBP, PTR and Roll of Attorneys Numbers. The

complaint was also verified and accompanied by a certificate of non-forum shopping

and signed by petitioners as plaintiffs. It was filed personally with the office of the clerk

of court.

7
Now, is the petition insufficient in substance?

Substance is that which is essential and is used in opposition to form. [20] It is the most

important element in any existence, the characteristic and essential components of

anything, the main part, the essential import, and the purport.[21] It means not merely

subject of act, but an intelligible abstract or synopsis of its material and substantial

elements, though it may be stated without recital of any details. [22] It goes into matters

which do not sufficiently appear or prejudicially affect the substantial rights of parties

who may be interested therein and not to mere informalities. [23]

As used in reference to substance of common-law actions, substance comprehends all

of the essential or material elements necessary to sufficiently state a good cause of

action invulnerable to attack by general demurrer.[24]

Substance is one which relates to the material allegations in the pleading. It is

determinative of whether or not a cause of action exists. It is the central piece, the core,

and the heart constituting the controversy addressed to the court for its consideration. It

is the embodiment of the essential facts necessary to confer jurisdiction upon the court.

8
The court a quo anchored the dismissal of petitioners complaint on the basis of Rule 65,

Section 3[25] of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure. It found that there was no

reference to any law which respondent NHA, by reason of its office, trust or station, is

specifically enjoined as a duty to perform. It declared that there was no allegation in the

petition below that respondent is unlawfully excluding petitioners from using or enjoying

any right or office which said petitioners are entitled to.

Although the complaint was captioned as Mandamus, petitioners averments, as

well as the relief sought, called for an action for specific performance. Pertinent portions

of the complaint for mandamus provide:

3. Plaintiff Winnie Munsalud is the daughter of the

late Lourdes Bulado, and as such is one of Bulados compulsory heirs. x x
x;

4. During the lifetime of Bulado, she was awarded a parcel of

land at a land for the landless program of the defendant;

xxxx

6. When Bulado died in 1985, Plaintiffs assumed her obligations

over the aforesaid property, particularly the payment of the amortizations
therein;

7. Defendant recognized this assumption of Bulados

obligations by the Plaintiffs considering that in the receipts covering
the amortizations, the names of the Plaintiffs as the ones paying the
Defendant were indicated therein;

8. In fact, Defendant also allowed Plaintiffs to move into,

and occupy, as they continue to occupy up to now, the above
described premises;

xxxx

9
 10. On September 14, 1989, Plaintiffs completed the payment
of the amortizations due over the property in question, and this is
evidenced by an official receipt, numbered 19492, which Defendants
cashier, Yasmin D. Aquino, issued to the Plaintiffs themselves,
although the official name of the payor indicated therein was still that
of the deceased Lourdes Bulado;

xxxx
12. Significantly, that receipt contained the annotation
appearing on the left side thereof, that the amount paid thereon
constituted full payment;

13. Since then, Plaintiffs have been demanding from the

Defendant the issuance of the deed of sale and the title over the
property in question, but, inexplicably, and without any legal
justification whatsoever, Defendant has refused to issue that deed of
sale and title;

14. On January 28, 2003, Plaintiffs, through counsel, sent a

letter to the Defendant seeking the issuance of that deed of sale and
title but, despite receipt thereof, Defendant again refused and failed
[to] act favorably thereon;

xxxx

20. At this point that the lot in question had already been fully
paid for by the Plaintiffs, there is now a need to compel the
Defendant to comply with its duty to issue a deed of sale in favor of
the heirs of the deceased Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs
Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, as well to issue a title over the same
property in favor of the same heirs.

WHEREFORE, it is most respectfully prayed that judgment be

rendered commanding the Defendant, after due notice and hearing, to
issue a deed of sale and/or a title, in favor of the heirs of the deceased
Lourdes Bulado, particularly Plaintiffs Carlos and Winnie Munsalud, over
the property subject of this action.[26] (Underscoring supplied)

A plain reading of the allegations of the complaint reveals that petitioner Winnie

Munsalud assumed the obligations of her deceased mother, the original awardee of

10
respondents Land for the Landless Program. One of the obligations of an

awardee is to pay the monthly amortizations. Petitioners complied with said obligation

and religiously paid the amortizations until these were fully paid.

Indeed, petitioners have complied with what is incumbent upon them under the

program. Hence, it is now the turn of respondent to comply with what is incumbent upon

it.

In a letter dated February 21, 2003,[27] respondent informed petitioners counsel that per

its records, the name of petitioner Winnie Munsalud does not appear as a

beneficiary. For the guidance of respondent, Winnie Munsalud is not actually a

beneficiary. The beneficiary of its program is Lourdes Bulado, her deceased

mother. This fact was made known to respondent when another letter dated March 6,

2003[28] was sent by the counsel of the heirs of Lourdes Bulado. In the same letter,

respondent was informed that petitioner Winnie is representing her deceased mother,

Lourdes Bulado, viz.:

In view of the contents of that letter, we would like to notify you that
Ms. Munsalud is actually representing her deceased mother,Lourdes
Bulado, who, on September 14, 1989 completed her payment for Lot 12,
Block 79 of the Maricaban Estate. A copy of the receipt evidencing that
completed is attached hereto as Annex B for your easy reference.

11
 In view thereof, may we reiterate our request for the issuance of the
title over the aforesaid property in the name
of Lourdes Bulado.[29] (Underscoring supplied)

The letter was received by respondent on March 12, 2003. On account of this second

letter, respondent could have easily verified if the name of Lourdes Bulado appears as a

beneficiary and awardee of its Land for the Landless Program. However, respondent

never responded to the second letter. This left petitioners with no recourse but to bring

the action to the trial court.

Evidently, the action commenced by petitioners before the trial court, although

designated as mandamus, is in reality an action to perform a specific act. The

averments of the complaint are clear. The essential facts are sufficiently alleged as to

apprise the court of the nature of the case. The relief sought to be obtained aims to

compel respondent to issue a deed of sale and the corresponding title over the property

awarded to Bulado. Thus, the Court finds the complaint sufficient in substance.

The designation or caption is not controlling, more than the allegations in the

complaint, for it is not even an indispensable part of the complaint.

Instead of focusing on what an action for mandamus should contain, the court a

quo should have proceeded to examine the essential facts alleged

in petitioners complaint. For what determines the nature of the action and which court

12
has jurisdiction over it are the allegations in the complaint and the character of the relief

sought.[30]

The cause of action in a complaint is not determined by the designation given to it by

the parties. The allegations in the body of the complaint define or describe it. The

designation or caption is not controlling more than the allegations in the complaint. It is

not even an indispensable part of the complaint.[31]

There is no need to make reference to any law which respondent by reason of its office

is enjoined as a duty to perform. Respondents duty arose from its contractual obligation

under the Land for the Landless Program.

The trial court is reminded that the caption of the complaint is not determinative of the

nature of the action.[32] The caption of the pleading should not be the governing factor,

but rather the allegations in it should determine the nature of the action,

because even without the prayer for a specific remedy, the courts may nevertheless

grant the proper relief as may be warranted by the facts alleged in the complaint and the

evidence introduced.[33]

All told, whether or not petitioner Winnie, in her capacity as a compulsory heir of the

awardee, becomes a beneficiary of the program is a question best ventilated during trial

on the merits. The conditions, terms, and provisions of the program in case an awardee

dies are evidentiary and should be presented for determination of the court. Even the

effect and the consequence of the assumption of obligation of the awardee as well as

13
the presence of other compulsory heirs are issues that should be addressed for the

courts evaluation on the basis of the evidence to be laid down before its eyes.

WHEREFORE, the appealed Decision is REVERSED AND SET ASIDE. The case

is REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court which is ORDERED to reinstate the case

and to conduct trial on the merits with dispatch.

No costs.

SO ORDERED.

14
CASE NO. 2

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, G.R. No. 149576

represented by the Land
Registration Authority,
Petitioner, Present:
PUNO, J., Chairman,
SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
GARCIA, JJ.

KENRICK DEVELOPMENT
CORPORATION,
Respondent. Promulgated:
August 8, 2006

x------------------------------------------x

DECISION
CORONA, J.:

The Republic of the Philippines assails the May 31, 2001 decision[1] and August 20,

2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948 in this petition for

review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court.

This case stemmed from the construction by respondent Kenrick Development

Corporation of a concrete perimeter fence around some parcels of land located behind

the Civil Aviation Training Center of the Air Transportation Office (ATO) in 1996. As a

result, the ATO was dispossessed of some 30,228 square meters of prime land.

Respondent justified its action with a claim of ownership over the property. It presented

Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606 issued in its name

and which allegedly originated from TCT No. 17508 registered in the name of one

Alfonso Concepcion.

15
 ATO verified the authenticity of respondents titles with the Land Registration

Authority (LRA). On May 17, 1996, Atty. Jose Loriega, head of the Land Title

Verification Task Force of the LRA, submitted his report. The Registrar of Deeds of

Pasay City had no record of TCT No. 17508 and its ascendant title, TCT No. 5450. The

land allegedly covered by respondents titles was also found to be within Villamor Air

Base (headquarters of the Philippine Air Force) in Pasay City.

By virtue of the report, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), on September 3,

1996, filed a complaint for revocation, annulment and cancellation of certificates of title
in behalf of the Republic of the Philippines (as represented by the LRA) against

respondent and Alfonso Concepcion. It was raffled to Branch 114 of the Regional Trial

Court of Pasay City where it was docketed as Civil Case No. 96-1144.

On December 5, 1996, respondent filed its answer which was purportedly signed

by Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. as counsel for respondent.

Since Alfonso Concepcion could not be located and served with summons, the

trial court ordered the issuance of an alias summons by publication against him on

February 19, 1997.

The case was thereafter punctuated by various incidents relative to modes of

discovery, pre-trial, postponements or continuances, motions to dismiss, motions to

declare defendants in default and other procedural matters.

During the pendency of the case, the Senate Blue Ribbon Committee and

Committee on Justice and Human Rights conducted a hearing in aid of legislation on

the matter of land registration and titling. In particular, the legislative investigation

looked into the issuance of fake titles and focused on how respondent was able to
acquire TCT Nos. 135604, 135605 and 135606.

16
 During the congressional hearing held on November 26, 1998, one of those

summoned was Atty. Garlitos, respondents former counsel. He testified that he

prepared respondents answer and transmitted an unsigned draft to respondents

president, Mr. Victor Ong. The signature appearing above his name was not his. He

authorized no one to sign in his behalf either. And he did not know who finally signed it.

With Atty. Garlitos revelation, the Republic promptly filed an urgent motion on

December 3, 1998 to declare respondent in default, [2] predicated on its failure to file a

valid answer. The Republic argued that, since the person who signed the answer was

neither authorized by Atty. Garlitos nor even known to him, the answer was effectively

an unsigned pleading. Pursuant to Section 3, Rule 7 of the Rules of Court, [3] it was a

mere scrap of paper and produced no legal effect.

On February 19, 1999, the trial court issued a resolution granting the Republics

motion.[4] It found respondents answer to be sham and false and intended to defeat the

purpose of the rules. The trial court ordered the answer stricken from the records,
declared respondent in default and allowed the Republic to present its evidence ex

parte.

The Republic presented its evidence ex parte, after which it rested its case and

formally offered its evidence.

Meanwhile, respondent sought reconsideration of the February 19, 1999

resolution but the trial court denied it.

Aggrieved, respondent elevated the matter to the Court of Appeals via a petition

for certiorari[5] seeking to set aside the February 19, 1999 resolution of the trial court.

Respondent contended that the trial court erred in declaring it in default for failure to file

a valid and timely answer.

17
 On May 31, 2001, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed decision. It found

Atty. Garlitos statements in the legislative hearing to be unreliable since they were not

subjected to cross-examination. The appellate court also scrutinized Atty. Garlitos acts

after the filing of the answer[6] and concluded that he assented to the signing of the

answer by somebody in his stead. This supposedly cured whatever defect the answer

may have had. Hence, the appellate court granted respondents petition for certiorari. It

directed the lifting of the order of default against respondent and ordered the trial court

to proceed to trial with dispatch. The Republic moved for reconsideration but it was

denied. Thus, this petition.

Did the Court of Appeals err in reversing the trial courts order which declared

respondent in default for its failure to file a valid answer? Yes, it did.

A party may, by his words or conduct, voluntarily adopt or ratify anothers

statement.[7] Where it appears that a party clearly and unambiguously assented to or

adopted the statements of another, evidence of those statements is admissible against

him.[8] This is the essence of the principle of adoptive admission.

An adoptive admission is a partys reaction to a statement or action by another person

when it is reasonable to treat the partys reaction as an admission of something stated or

implied by the other person.[9] By adoptive admission, a third persons statement

becomes the admission of the party embracing or espousing it. Adoptive admission may

occur when a party:

(a) expressly agrees to or concurs in an oral statement made by another; [10]

(b) hears a statement and later on essentially repeats it;[11]

(c) utters an acceptance or builds upon the assertion of another; [12]

(d) replies by way of rebuttal to some specific points raised by another but

ignores further points which he or she has heard the other make[13] or

18
 (e) reads and signs a written statement made by another. [14]

Here, respondent accepted the pronouncements of Atty. Garlitos and built its

case on them. At no instance did it ever deny or contradict its former counsels

statements. It went to great lengths to explain Atty. Garlitos testimony as well as its

implications, as follows:

1. While Atty. Garlitos denied signing the answer, the fact was that the answer

was signed. Hence, the pleading could not be considered invalid for being

an unsigned pleading. The fact that the person who signed it was neither

known to Atty. Garlitos nor specifically authorized by him was immaterial.

The important thing was that the answer bore a signature.

2. While the Rules of Court requires that a pleading must be signed by the party

or his counsel, it does not prohibit a counsel from giving a general

authority for any person to sign the answer for him which was what Atty.

Garlitos did. The person who actually signed the pleading was of no

moment as long as counsel knew that it would be signed by another. This

was similar to addressing an authorization letter to whom it may concern

such that any person could act on it even if he or she was not known

beforehand.

3. Atty. Garlitos testified that he prepared the answer; he never disowned its

contents and he resumed acting as counsel for respondent subsequent to

its filing. These circumstances show that Atty. Garlitos conformed to or

ratified the signing of the answer by another.

19
 Respondent repeated these statements of Atty. Garlitos in its motion for

reconsideration of the trial courts February 19, 1999 resolution. And again in the petition

it filed in the Court of Appeals as well as in the comment [15] and memorandum it

submitted to this Court.

Evidently, respondent completely adopted Atty. Garlitos statements as its own.

Respondents adoptive admission constituted a judicial admission which was conclusive

on it.

Contrary to respondents position, a signed pleading is one that is signed either

by the party himself or his counsel. Section 3, Rule 7 is clear on this matter. It requires
that a pleading must be signed by the party or counsel representing him.

Therefore, only the signature of either the party himself or his counsel operates

to validly convert a pleading from one that is unsigned to one that is signed.

Counsels authority and duty to sign a pleading are personal to him. He may not

delegate it to just any person.

The signature of counsel constitutes an assurance by him that he has read the

pleading; that, to the best of his knowledge, information and belief, there is a good

ground to support it; and that it is not interposed for delay. [16] Under the Rules of Court,

it is counsel alone, by affixing his signature, who can certify to these matters.

The preparation and signing of a pleading constitute legal work involving practice

of law which is reserved exclusively for the members of the legal profession. Counsel

may delegate the signing of a pleading to another lawyer[17] but cannot do so

in favor of one who is not. The Code of Professional Responsibility provides:

20
 Rule 9.01 ― A lawyer shall not delegate to any unqualified person
the performance of any task which by law may only be performed by a
member of the Bar in good standing.

Moreover, a signature by agents of a lawyer amounts to signing by unqualified

persons,[18] something the law strongly proscribes.

Therefore, the blanket authority respondent claims Atty. Garlitos entrusted to just

anyone was void. Any act taken pursuant to that authority was likewise void. There was

no way it could have been cured or ratified by Atty. Garlitos subsequent acts.

Moreover, the transcript of the November 26, 1998 Senate hearing shows that

Atty. Garlitos consented to the signing of the answer by another as long as it conformed

to his draft. We give no value whatsoever to such self-serving statement.

No doubt, Atty. Garlitos could not have validly given blanket authority for just

anyone to sign the answer. The trial court correctly ruled that respondents answer was

invalid and of no legal effect as it was an unsigned pleading. Respondent was properly
declared in default and the Republic was rightly allowed to present evidence ex parte.

Respondent insists on the liberal application of the rules. It maintains that even if it were
true that its answer was supposedly an unsigned pleading, the defect was a mere

technicality that could be set aside.

Procedural requirements which have often been disparagingly labeled as mere

technicalities have their own valid raison d etre in the orderly administration of justice.

To summarily brush them aside may result in arbitrariness and injustice. [19]

The Courts pronouncement in Garbo v. Court of Appeals[20] is relevant:

21
 Procedural rules are [tools] designed to facilitate the adjudication
of cases. Courts and litigants alike are thus [enjoined] to abide strictly by
the rules. And while the Court, in some instances, allows a relaxation in
the application of the rules, this, we stress, was never intended to forge a
bastion for erring litigants to violate the rules with impunity. The liberality
in the interpretation and application of the rules applies only in proper
cases and under justifiable causes and circumstances. While it is true
that litigation is not a game of technicalities, it is equally true that every
case must be prosecuted in accordance with the prescribed procedure to
insure an orderly and speedy administration of justice.

Like all rules, procedural rules should be followed except only when, for the most

persuasive of reasons, they may be relaxed to relieve a litigant of an injustice not

commensurate with the degree of his thoughtlessness in not complying with the

prescribed procedure.[21] In this case, respondent failed to show any persuasive reason

why it should be exempted from strictly abiding by the rules.

As a final note, the Court cannot close its eyes to the acts committed by Atty. Garlitos in

violation of the ethics of the legal profession. Thus, he should be made to account for

his possible misconduct.

WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED. The May 31, 2001 decision

and August 20, 2001 resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 52948
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the February 19, 1999 resolution of the Regional

Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 114 declaring respondent in default is

hereby REINSTATED.

Let a copy of this decision be furnished the Commission on Bar Discipline of the

Integrated Bar of the Philippines for the commencement of disbarment proceedings

against Atty. Onofre Garlitos, Jr. for his possible unprofessional conduct not befitting his

position as an officer of the court.

SO ORDERED.

22
CASE NO. 3 G.R. No. 162924

MID-PASIG LAND DEVELOPMENT Present:

CORPORATION,
Petitioner, CARPIO, J.,*
CORONA,
Chairperson,
- versus - VELASCO, JR.,
NACHURA, and
PERALTA, JJ.

MARIO TABLANTE, doing business under

the name and style ECRM
ENTERPRISES;ROCKLAND
CONSTRUCTION COMPANY; Promulgated:
LAURIE LITAM; and MC HOME DEPOT, INC.,
Respondents. February 4, 2010

x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

NACHURA, J.:

Assailed in the instant petition are the two (2) Resolutions[1] of the Court of

Appeals (CA) dated November 20, 2003 and March 22, 2004, dismissing the petition

for certiorari before it on technical grounds and denying the motion for reconsideration

thereof, respectively.

The background facts are as follows:

Petitioner is the registered owner of a piece of land situated in Pasig City,

bounded by Meralco Avenue, Ortigas Avenue, Doa Julia Vargas Avenue, and Valle

Verde Subdivision. On December 6, 1999, petitioner, represented by its Chairman and

23
President, Ronaldo Salonga, and ECRM Enterprises, represented by its proprietor,

Mario P. Tablante, executed an agreement whereby the former would lease to the latter

an area, approximately one (1) hectare, of the aforesaid land, for a period of three (3)

months, to be used as the staging area for the Home and Garden Exhibition Fair. On

March 6, 2000, the date of the expiration of the Lease Agreement, Tablante assigned

all his rights and interests under the said agreement to respondents Laurie M. Litam

and/or Rockland Construction Company, Inc. (Rockland) under a Deed of Assignment

of the same date. Petitioner eventually learned that respondent Tablante had executed

a Contract of Lease with respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. on November 26, 1999 over

the same parcel of land. Thereafter, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. constructed

improvements on the land and subdivided the area into fifty-nine (59) commercial stalls,

which it leased to various entities. Upon the expiration of the lease on March 6, 2000,

petitioner demanded that respondents vacate the land. A final demand was made in a

letter dated December 20, 2000.[2]

In order to forestall ejectment from the premises, respondent Rockland filed a case

for Specific Performance with the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 266, Pasig City,

on January 11, 2001, compelling petitioner to execute a new lease contract for another

three (3) years, commencing in July 2000. This was docketed as Civil Case No.

68213. Petitioner moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground that it was anticipatory

in nature.

24
 Consequently, on August 22, 2001, petitioner filed Civil Case No. 8788 for

unlawful detainer against herein respondents, raffled to the Municipal Trial Court

(MTC), Pasig City, Branch 70. Simultaneously, petitioner filed a supplemental motion to

dismiss Civil Case No. 68213, on the ground of litis pendentia. Petitioners motion to

dismiss was denied. The denial was questioned and eventually elevated to the

Supreme Court.[3]

Meantime, on April 29, 2002, the MTC rendered judgment in the unlawful

detainer (ejectment) case. In the main, the trial court ruled that the issue did not involve

material or physical possession, but rather, whether or not ECRM had the right to

exercise an option to renew its lease contract. The MTC stated that, considering that

this issue was incapable of pecuniary estimation, jurisdiction over the case was vested

in the RTC. The trial court, therefore, disposed, as follows:

WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered DISMISSING the
complaint for lack of merit. In the meantime, the plaintiff is hereby ordered
to pay the defendants attorneys fees and expenses of litigation in the
amount of TWENTY THOUSAND PESOS (P20,000.00).[4]

On appeal, the RTC, Pasig City, Branch 160, affirmed in toto. In its

decision dated July 10, 2003, the RTC ruled that:

Relative to the issue raised by the appellant that the lower court
erred in finding it had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of this case
as the question of whether or not ECRM under the provisions of the lease
agreement (pars. 3 and 13) has the right to exercise an option to renew
its lease contract is one incapable of pecuniary estimation and therefore
jurisdiction is vested in the Regional Trial Court.Republic Act No. 7691
grants Metropolitan Trial Courts the exclusive jurisdiction over cases of
forcible entry and unlawful detainer.Since it has been sufficiently

25
 established under the facts obtaining that the contract of lease has been
renewed before the expiration of the lease period, and the appellant has
consented to the renewal and assignment of the lease, it necessarily
follows that the issue on whether the lower court erred in finding that it did
not have jurisdiction over the subject matter raised by the appellant,
deserves scant consideration and this court need not delve into it
anymore.[5]

A petition for certiorari was consequently filed with the CA.

In the assailed resolution dated November 20, 2003, the CA resolved to dismiss

the petition on the following grounds:

1) The verification and certification against non-forum
shopping was signed by a certain Antonio A. Merelos as General
Manager of the petitioner-corporation without attaching therewith a
Corporate Secretarys certificate or board resolution that he is authorized
to sign for and on behalf of the petitioner; and

2) Lack of pertinent and necessary documents which are

material portions of the record as required by Section 2, Rule 42 of the
Rules of Civil Procedure.[6]

The motion for reconsideration was denied;[7] hence, the instant petition assigning

the following errors:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
HOLDING THAT THE VERIFICATION AND CERTIFICATION AGAINST
FORUM-SHOPPING IN THE PETITION FAILED TO ATTACH THE
BOARD RESOLUTION SHOWING THE AUTHORITY OF THE AFFIANT.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

HOLDING THAT THE PETITION LACKED THE PERTINENT AND
NECESSARY DOCUMENTS REQUIRED BY THE RULES.

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN

DISMISSING THE PETITION THUS EFFECTIVELY UPHOLDING THE
DECISION OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, TO WIT: (a) THAT THE
LEASE AGREEMENT WAS UNILATERALLY RENEWED AND THAT

26
 PETITIONER IS ESTOPPED FROM DENYING SUCH UNILATERAL
RENEWAL; (b) THAT RESPONDENTS TABLANTE/ECRM, ROCKLAND
AND MC HOME DEPOT COULD VALIDLY OCCUPY THE PROPERTY
IN THE ABSENCE OF ANY VALID LEASE AGREEMENT CONSENTED
TO BY PETITIONER; (c) PETITIONER [IS] LIABLE FOR ATTORNEYS
FEES AND COSTS OF SUIT.[8]

The petition is granted.

In Cagayan Valley Drug Corporation v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue,[9] the

Court had occasion to explain that:

It must be borne in mind that Sec. 23, in relation to Sec. 25 of the
Corporation Code, clearly enunciates that all corporate powers are
exercised, all business conducted, and all properties controlled by the
board of directors. A corporation has a separate and distinct personality
from its directors and officers and can only exercise its corporate powers
through the board of directors. Thus, it is clear that an individual corporate
officer cannot solely exercise any corporate power pertaining to the
corporation without authority from the board of directors. This has been
our constant holding in cases instituted by a corporation.

In a slew of cases, however, we have recognized the authority of

some corporate officers to sign the verification and certification against
forum shopping. In Mactan-Cebu International Airport Authority v. CA, we
recognized the authority of a general manager or acting general manager
to sign the verification and certificate against forum shopping; x x x.

In sum, we have held that the following officials or employees

of the company can sign the verification and certification without
need of a board resolution: (1) the Chairperson of the Board of
Directors, (2) the President of a corporation, (3) the General Manager or
Acting General Manager, (4) Personnel Officer, and (5) an Employment
Specialist in a labor case.

While the above cases do not provide a complete listing of

authorized signatories to the verification and certification required by the
rules, the determination of the sufficiency of the authority was done on a
case to case basis. The rationale applied in the foregoing cases is to
justify the authority of corporate officers or representatives of the

27
 corporation to sign the verification or certificate against forum shopping,
being in a position to verify the truthfulness and correctness of the
allegations in the petition.[10]

From the foregoing, it is thus clear that the failure to attach the Secretarys

Certificate, attesting to General Manager Antonio Mereloss authority to sign the

Verification and Certification of Non-Forum Shopping, should not be considered fatal to

the filing of the petition. Nonetheless, the requisite board resolution was subsequently

submitted to the CA, together with the pertinent documents. [11] Considering that

petitioner substantially complied with the rules, the dismissal of the petition was,

therefore, unwarranted. Time and again, we have emphasized that dismissal of an

appeal on a purely technical ground is frowned upon especially if it will result in

unfairness. The rules of procedure ought not to be applied in a very rigid, technical

sense for they have been adopted to help secure, not override, substantial justice. For

this reason, courts must proceed with caution so as not to deprive a party of statutory

appeal; rather, they must ensure that all litigants are granted the amplest opportunity for

the proper and just ventilation of their causes, free from the constraint of

technicalities.[12]

After a finding that the CA erred in dismissing the petition before it, a remand of the case

is in order. However, a perusal of therecords reveals that this is no longer

necessary in light of relevant developments obtaining in the case at bar.

Petitioner, in its Memorandum dated October 28, 2005, alleged that respondents

possessory claims had lapsed and, therefore, had become moot and academic.

28
Respondent Rockland prayed that a three-year lease period be granted to it in order

that it would be able to plan its activities more efficiently. Since the claimed lease

contract had already expired as of July or August 2003, there appears no reason why

respondents should continue to have any claim to further possession of the property. [13]

Respondent Rockland also stated in its Memorandum dated March 16, 2006 that

it was no longer in possession of the subject property considering that:

50. In a Resolution dated 17 September 2004, in the case
of Rockland Construction Company, Inc. vs. Mid-Pasig Land
Development Corporation, et al., docketed as SCA No. 2673, and the
Omnibus Order dated 12 November 2004, affirming the aforesaid
Resolution, Branch 67 Pasig City Regional Trial Court Presiding
Judge Mariano M. Singzon awarded possession (albeit erroneously)
of subject property to Pasig Printing Corporation, an intervenor in the
SCA case.

51. At present, petitioner does not have a cause of action

against herein respondent Rockland. Respondent is not unlawfully
withholding possession of the property in question as in
fact respondent is not in possession of the subject property. The issue
of possession in this ejectment case has therefore been rendered
moot and academic.[14]

This allegation was confirmed by respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. in its

Comment/Memorandum dated May 22, 2007 submitted to the Court. It stated therein

that the passage of time has rendered the issue of possession moot and academic with

respect to respondent Rockland, as the three-year period has long been expired in

2003.[15] Furthermore, respondent MC Home Depot, Inc. asserts that it is in rightful

29
possession of the land on the strength of a Memorandum of Agreement dated

November 22, 2004 between the latter and Pasig Printing Corporation. By petitioners

admission that while it remains the registered owner of the land, possession of the

same had been adjudicated in favor of Pasig Printing Corporation, another entity without

any contractual relationship with petitioner, on the strength of an Order from the RTC of

Pasig City. Considering that Pasig Printing Corporation has the jus possessionis over

the subject property, it granted the MC Home Depot, Inc. actual occupation and

possession of the subject property for a period of four (4) years, renewable for another

four (4) years upon mutual agreement of the parties.[16]

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Resolutions of the Court

of Appeals are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. However, in view of the developments

which have rendered the issue of the right of possession over the subject property moot

and academic, the main case is hereby considered CLOSED AND TERMINATED.

No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.

30