SandiganBayan’s Jurisdiction over Estafa case.

RATIONALE:(1) The rule is well-established in this jurisdiction that statutes should receive a
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari assailing the Resolutionsof the Sandiganbayan, Fifth
Division, denying petitioners motion to quash the information and her motion for
reconsideration.
FACTS
Petitioner Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the UP-Cebu. She was appointed
by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of UP, to serve a
one-year term starting January 1, 2000 and ending on December 31, 2000. On September 4,
2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives, registered with the SEC the Office of the
Student Regent Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI).One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation
of the Vinzons Hall Annex. President Estrada gave P15,000,000.00 to the OSRFI as financial
assistance for the proposed renovation. The source of the funds, according to the information,
was the Office of the President. The renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize.
The succeeding student regent, Kristine Clare Bugayong, and Christine Jill De Guzman,
Secretary General of the KASAMA sa U.P., a system-wide alliance of student councils within
the state university, consequently filed a complaint for Malversation of Public Funds and
Property with the Office of the Ombudsman. The Ombudsman found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa and filed the case to the
Sandiganbayan. Petitioner moved to quash the information. She claimed that the
Sandiganbayan does not have any jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for lack of
merit. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but was denied with finality.
sensible construction so as to avoid an unjust or an absurd conclusion. Every section, provision
or clause of the statute must be expounded by reference to each other in order to arrive at the
effect contemplated by the legislature. Evidently, from the provisions of Section 4(B) of P.D.
No. 1606, the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over other felonies committed by public officials
in relation to their office. Plainly, estafa is one of those other felonies. The jurisdiction is
simply subject to the twin requirements that (a) the offense is committed by public officials
and employees mentioned in Section 4(A) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended, and that (b) the
offense is committed in relation to their office.
(2) NO.
DOCTRINE: While the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27
and higher, its second part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may
not be of Salary Grade 27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the
jurisdiction of the said court.
RATIONALE: Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, even if she does
not have a salary grade 27, as she is placed thereby express provision of law. Section
4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explicitly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.

ISSUE/S of the CASE:

(1) Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over an estafa case?
(2) Whether or not petitioner is a public officer with Salary Grade 27?

SUPREME COURT RULING

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

HELD
(1) NO.
DOCTRINE: Section 4(B) of P.D. No. 1606 which defines the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan reads: “Other offenses or felonies whether simple or complexed with other
crimes committed by the public officials and employees mentioned in subsection (a) of this
section in relation to their office.”

1
Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction over forfeiture case.
G.R. No. 170122-171381 October 12, 2009
CLARITA DEPAKAKIBO GARCIA vs.
SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Nature of the case: Petition for certiorari and mandamus
FACTS
The Office of the Ombudsman filed for a petition for the forfeiture of the properties amounting
to PhP143,052,015.29 allegedly amassed by then Maj. Gen. Carlos Garcia, his wife Clarita and
two children, docketed as Civil Case No. 0193 (Forfeiture Case 1). Another forfeiture case was
subsequently filed to recover funds amounting to PhP 202,005,980.55 docketed as Civil Case
No. 0196 (Forfeiture Case 2), raffled to the 4th Division.
Prior to the filing of Forfeiture II, but subsequent to the filing of Forfeiture I, the OMB charged
the Garcias and three others with violation of RA 7080 (plunder) which placed the value of the
property and funds plundered at PhP 303,272,005.99, docketed as Crim. Case No. 28107,
raffled to the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan.
As per the Sheriff’s return, the corresponding summons involving Forfeiture 1 were issued and
all served on Gen. Garcia at his place of detention. The SB subsequently issued a writ of
attachment in favor of the Republic. The Garcias filed a motion to dismiss on the ground of
SB’s lack of jurisdiction over separate civil actions for forfeiture. The SB denied the Motion to
Dismiss and declared the Garcias in default. Despite the standing default order, the Garcias
moved for the transfer and consolidation of Forfeiture I with the plunder case which were
respectively pending in different divisions of the SB, contending that such consolidation is
mandatory under RA 8249. This motion was denied by the SB. The Garcias filed another
motion to dismiss and/or to quash Forfeiture I on, inter alia, the following grounds: (a) the
filing of the plunder case ousted the SB 4th Division of jurisdiction over the forfeiture case;
and (b) that the consolidation is imperative in order to avoid possible double jeopardy
entanglements. The SB merely noted the motion.
As regards Forfeiture 2, the SB sheriff served the corresponding summons. In his return, the
sheriff stated giving the copies of the summons to the OIC/Custodian of the PNP Detention
Center who in turn handed them to Gen. Garcia. The general signed his receipt of the
summons, but as to those pertaining to the other respondents, Gen. Garcia acknowledged
receiving the same, but with the following qualifying note: “I’m receiving the copies of
Clarita, Ian Carl, Juan Paolo & Timothy – but these copies will not guarantee it being served to
the above-named(sic).”
ISSUE’s of the CASE
1. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over petitioner despite improper service of summons.
2. Whether the SB has jurisdiction over the forfeiture case despite the filing of the plunder
case.
HELD
1. NO. It is basic that a court must acquire jurisdiction over a party for the latter to be bound
by its decision or orders. Valid service of summons, by whatever mode authorized by and
proper under the Rules, is the means by which a court acquires jurisdiction over a person. It is
undisputed that summons for Forfeitures I and II were served personally on Maj. Gen. Carlos
Flores Garcia, who is detained at the PNP Detention Center, who acknowledged receipt thereof
by affixing his signature. It is also undisputed that substituted service of summons for both
Forfeitures I and II were made on petitioner and her children through Maj. Gen. Garcia at the
PNP Detention Center. However, such substituted services of summons were invalid for being
irregular and defective. The requirements for a valid substituted service of summons are:
(1) Impossibility of prompt personal service
(2) Specific details in the return
(3) Substituted service effected on a person of suitable age and discretion residing at
defendant’s house or residence; or on a competent person in charge of defendant’s office or
regular place of business.
From the foregoing requisites, it is apparent that no valid substituted service of summons was
made on petitioner and her children, as the service made through Maj. Gen. Garcia did not
comply with the first two (2) requirements mentioned above for a valid substituted service of
summons.
Also, petitioner’s special appearance to question the court’s jurisdiction is not voluntary
appearance. Thus, a defendant who files a motion to dismiss, assailing the jurisdiction of the
court over his person, together with other grounds raised therein, is not deemed to have
appeared voluntarily before the court.
2. YES, Petitioner’s posture respecting Forfeitures I and II being absorbed by the plunder
case, thus depriving the 4th Division of the SB of jurisdiction over the civil cases, is flawed by
the assumptions holding it together, the first assumption being that the forfeiture cases are the
corresponding civil action for recovery of civil liability ex delicto. As correctly ruled by the
SB 4th Division in its May 20, 2005 resolution, the civil liability for forfeiture cases does not
arise from the commission of a criminal offense as such liability is based on a statute that
safeguards the right of the State to recover unlawfully acquired properties. Secondly, a
forfeiture case under RA 1379 arises out of a cause of action separate and different from a
plunder case, thus negating the notion that the crime of plunder charged in Crim. Case No.
28107 absorbs the forfeiture cases. In a prosecution for plunder, what is sought to be
established is the commission of the criminal acts in furtherance of the acquisition of ill-gotten
wealth. On the other hand, all that the court needs to determine, by preponderance of evidence,
under RA 1379 is the disproportion of respondent’s properties to his legitimate income, it
being unnecessary to prove how he acquired said properties.
2

Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan vis-à-vis of the RTC
G.R. No. 124644; February 5, 2004; CALLEJO, SR., J.
ARNEL ESCOBAL vs. HON. FRANCIS GARCHITORENA, Presiding Justice of the
Sandiganbayan, xxx, Hon. David C. Naval, RTC Judge
Nature of the case: petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and preliminary injunction
FACTS:
Petitioner Escobal is a graduate of the PMA, a member of the AFP and the Philippine
Constabulary, as well as the Intelligence Group of the Philippine National Police. On March
16, 1990, the petitioner was conducting surveillance operations on drug trafficking at a café
bar and restaurant in Naga City when he somehow got involved with a shooting incident that
resulted to the death of Rodney Nueca.
Escobal was preventively suspended from the service. When arraigned, he pleaded not guilty.
Thereafter, he filed a Motion to Quash the Information alleging that the court martial, not the
RTC, had jurisdiction over criminal cases involving PNP members and officers. RTC denied
the motion.
Trial proceeded. The prosecution rested its case and petitioner presented his evidence. On July
20, 1994, the petitioner filed a Motion to Dismiss the case. Citing Republic of the Philippines
v. Asuncion, et al., he argued that since he committed the crime in the performance of his
duties, the Sandiganbayan had exclusive jurisdiction over the case. The RTC dismissed the
motion but ordered the conduct of a preliminary hearing to determine whether or not the crime
charged was committed by the petitioner in relation to his office as a member of the PNP.
On July 31, 1995, the trial court issued an Order declaring that the petitioner committed the
crime charged while not in the performance of his official function. The trial court added that
nonetheless, upon the enactment of R.A. No. 7975, the issue had become moot and academic
since the amendatory law transferred the jurisdiction over the offense charged from the
Sandiganbayan to the RTC. The petitioner did not have a salary grade of "27" as provided for
in or by Section 4(a)(1), (3) thereof.
The trial court nevertheless ordered the prosecution to amend the Information pursuant to the
ruling in Republic v. Asuncion and R.A. No. 7975, and to include therein an allegation that the
offense charged was not committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions, nor in relation to his office.
The petitioner filed a MR of the said order, reiterating that based on his testimony and those of
his witnesses, the offense charged was committed by him in relation to his official functions.
He asserted that R.A. No. 7975, which was enacted on March 30, 1995, could not be applied
retroactively. The RTC ordered the public prosecutor to file a Re-Amended Information and to
allege that the offense charged was committed by the petitioner in the performance of his
duties/functions or in relation to his office; and, conformably to R.A. No. 7975, to thereafter
transmit the same to the Sandiganbayan.
The Sandiganbayan returned the records of the case to the RTC, contending that the latter has
jurisdiction over the case.
ISSUE:
Whether the case falls in the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan or of the RTC
HELD:
The case is within the jurisdiction of the RTC.
Under Section 4(a) of P.D. No. 1606 as amended by P.D. No. 1861, the Sandiganbayan had
exclusive jurisdiction in all cases involving the following:
(1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the
Revised Penal Code;
(2) Other offenses or felonies committed by public officers and employees in relation to their
office, including those employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether
simple or complexed with other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than
prision correccional or imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 ….
For the Sandiganbayan to have exclusive jurisdiction under the said law over crimes
committed by public officers in relation to their office, it is essential that the facts showing the
intimate relation between the office of the offender and the discharge of official duties must be
alleged in the Information. It is not enough to merely allege in the Information that the crime
charged was committed by the offender in relation to his office because that would be a
conclusion of law. The amended Information filed with the RTC against the petitioner does not
contain any allegation showing the intimate relation between his office and the discharge of his
duties. Hence, the RTC had jurisdiction over the offense charged when on November 24, 1995,
it ordered the re-amendment of the Information to include therein an allegation that the
petitioner committed the crime in relation to office. The trial court erred when it ordered the
elevation of the records to the Sandiganbayan. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 amending
P.D. No. 1606 was already in effect.
Under Sec. 2 of said law, even if the offender committed the crime charged in relation to his
office but occupies a position corresponding to a salary grade below "27," the proper Regional
Trial Court or Municipal Trial Court, as the case may be, shall have exclusive jurisdiction over
the case. In this case, the petitioner was a Police Senior Inspector, with salary grade "23." He
was charged with homicide punishable by reclusion temporal. Hence, the RTC had exclusive
jurisdiction over the crime charged conformably to Sections 20 and 32 of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, as amended by Section 2 of R.A. No. 7691.
The petitioner’s contention that R.A. No. 7975 should not be applied retroactively has no legal
basis. It bears stressing that R.A. No. 7975 is a substantive procedural law, which may be
applied retroactively.
3
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
I. Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction
b. Who committed the offense/crime
b-1. Private individuals committing the offense/crime with public officers
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner vs. HENRY T. GO, Respondent
GR No. 168539
March 25, 2014
Ponente: Peralta
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is an appeal from the Resolution of the Third Division of the Sandiganbayan (SB) dated
June 2, 2005 which quashed the Information filed against herein respondent for alleged
violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act No. 3019 (R.A. 3019), otherwise known as the Anti-
Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
FACTS
The Information filed against respondent is an offshoot of this Court's Decision in Agan, Jr. v.
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. which nullified the various contracts awarded
by the Government, through the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
to Philippine Air Terminals, Co., Inc. (PIATCO) for the construction, operation and
maintenance of the Ninoy Aquino International Airport International Passenger Terminal III
(NAIA IPT III).
Subsequent to the above Decision, a certain Ma. Cecilia L. Pesayco filed a complaint with the
Office of the Ombudsman against several individuals for alleged violation of R.A. 3019.
Among those charged was herein respondent, who was then the Chairman and President of
PIATCO, for having supposedly conspired with then DOTC Secretary Arturo Enrile (Secretary
Enrile) in entering into a contract which is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the
government.
The Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for Luzon found probable cause to indict, among
others, herein respondent for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019. While there was likewise
a finding of probable cause against Secretary Enrile, he was no longer indicted because he died
prior to the issuance of the resolution finding probable cause.
The Sandiganbayan issued an Order giving the prosecution 10 days to show cause why the
case should not be dismissed for lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused considering
the accused is a private person and the public official (Enrile), his alleged co-conspirator, is
already deceased, and not an accused in the case.
The prosecution complied with the order contending that SB has already acquired jurisdiction
over the person of the respondent by reason of his voluntary appearance and posting for bail.
They also argued that SB has exclusive jurisdiction even if he is a private person because he
was alleged to have conspired with a public officer.
Respondent filed a Motion to Quash contending that, independently of the deceased Secretary
Enrile, the respondent, who is not a public officer nor was capacitated by any official authority
as a government agent, may not be prosecuted for violation of Section 3 (g) of Republic Act
No. 3019 (R.A. 3019).
The SB though a Resolution granted the Motion to Quash. Hence, the petition.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not herein respondent, a private person, may be indicted for conspiracy in violating
Section 3(g) of R.A. 3019 even if the public officer, with whom he was alleged to have
conspired, has died prior to the filing of the Information
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Sandiganbayan: A Resolution was issued granting the Respondent’s Motion To Quash the
Information, thereby dismissing the case.
Supreme Court: The Resolution of the SB was reversed and set aside.
COURT RATIONALE
At the outset, it bears to reiterate the settled rule that private persons, when acting in
conspiracy with public officers, may be indicted and, if found guilty, held liable for the
pertinent offenses under Section 3 of R.A. 3019, in consonance with the avowed policy of the
anti-graft law to repress certain acts of public officers and private persons alike constituting
graft or corrupt practices act or which may lead thereto. This is the controlling doctrine as
enunciated by this Court in previous cases, among which is a case involving herein private
respondent.
It is true that by reason of Secretary Enrile's death, there is no longer any public officer with
whom respondent can be charged for violation of R.A. 3019. It does not mean, however, that
the allegation of conspiracy between them can no longer be proved or that their alleged
conspiracy is already expunged. The only thing extinguished by the death of Secretary Enrile
is his criminal liability. His death did not extinguish the crime nor did it remove the basis of
the charge of conspiracy between him and private respondent.
The requirement before a private person may be indicted for violation of Section 3(g) of R.A.
3019, among others, is that such private person must be alleged to have acted in conspiracy
with a public officer. The law, however, does not require that such person must, in all
instances, be indicted together with the public officer. If circumstances exist where the public
officer may no longer be charged in court, as in the present case where the public officer has
already died, the private person may be indicted alone.
As a recapitulation, it would not be amiss to point out that the instant case involves a contract
entered into by public officers representing the government. More importantly, the SB is a
special criminal court which has exclusive original jurisdiction in all cases involving violations
of R.A. 3019 committed by certain public officers, as enumerated in P.D. 1606 as amended by
R.A. 8249. This includes private individuals who are charged as co-principals, accomplices or
accessories with the said public officers.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution of the Sandiganbayan dated June 2,
2005, granting respondent's Motion to Quash, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to proceed with deliberate dispatch in the disposition
of Criminal Case No. 28090.
4
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction
Offenses Committed in Relation to the Office
RAMISCAL, JR. vs. SANDIGANBAYAN
BRIG. GEN. (Ret.) JOSE S. RAMISCAl, JR., Petitioner vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents
GR No. 172476-99 September 15, 2010
NATURE OF CASE
Special Civic Action for Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a special civil action for certiorari seeking to annul the 5 April 2006 Resolution of
the SB (4th Division) in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45. The assailed Resolution denied
petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment on 26 February 2006 pending resolution of his
motion for reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him.
FACTS
Petitioner Jose S. Ramiscal, Jr. was a retired officer of the Armed Forces of the Philippines
(AFP), with the rank of Brigadier General. when he served as President of the AFP-Retirement
and Separation Benefits System (AFP-RSBS).
During petitioner’s term as president of AFP-RSBS, the Board of Trustees of AFP-RSBS
approved the acquisition of 15,020 square meters of land situated in General Santos City for
development as housing projects.
AFP-RSBS, represented by petitioner, and Atty. Nilo J. Flaviano, as attorney-in-fact of the 12
individual vendors, executed and signed bilateral deeds of sale over the subject property, at the
agreed price of P10,500.00 per square meter. Petitioner forthwith caused the payment to the
individual vendors.
Subsequently, Flaviano executed and signed unilateral deeds of sale over the same property.
The unilateral deeds of sale reflected a purchase price of only P3,000.00 per square meter
instead of the actual purchase price of P10,500.00 per square meter.
Flaviano presented the unilateral deeds of sale for registration. The unilateral deeds of sale
became the basis of the transfer certificates of title issued by the Register of Deeds of General
Santos City to AFP-RSBS.
Luwalhati R. Antonino, the Congresswoman representing the first district of South Cotabato,
which includes General Santos City, filed in the Ombudsman a complaint-affidavit against
petitioner, along with 27 other respondents, for (1) violation of Republic Act No. 3019,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act; and (2) malversation of public
funds or property through falsification of public documents.
After preliminary investigation, the Ombudsmanfound petitioner probably guilty of violation
of Section 3(e) of RA 3019 and falsification of public documents.
The Ombudsman filed in the Sandiganbayan 12 informations for violation of Section 3(e) of
RA 3019 and 12 informations for falsification of public documents against petitioner and
several other co-accused.
The Office of the Special Prosecutor (OMB-OSP) recommended that petitioner be excluded
from the informations. On review, the Office of Legal Affairs (OMB-OLA) recommended the
contrary, stressing that petitioner participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to
sell, bilateral deeds of sale, and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of
the subject property.
The memoranda of OMB-OSP and OMB-OLA were forwarded for comment to the Office of
the Ombudsman for Military (OMB-Military). The OMB-Military adopted the memorandum
of OMB-OSP recommending the dropping of petitioner’s name from the information. Acting
Ombudsman Margarito Gervacio approved the recommendation of the OMB-Military.
However, the recommendation of the OMB-Military was not manifested before the
Sandiganbayan as a final disposition of petitioner’s first motion for reconsideration.
A panel of prosecutors was tasked to review the records of the case. It found that petitioner
indeed participated in and affixed his signature on the contracts to sell, bilateral deeds of sale,
and various agreements, vouchers, and checks for the purchase of the property at the price of
P10,500.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors posited that petitioner could not feign
ignorance of the execution of the unilateral deeds of sale, which indicated the false purchase
price of P3,000.00 per square meter. The panel of prosecutors concluded that probable cause
existed for petitioner’s continued prosecution.
Ombudsman Ma. Merceditas N. Gutierrez approved the recommendation of the panel of
prosecutors.
The Sandiganbayan pointed out that petitioner’s second motion for reconsideration of the
Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause against him was a prohibited pleading. The
Sandiganbayan explained that whatever defense or evidence petitioner may have should be
ventilated in the trial of the case.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the case
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Sandiganbayan: This court denied the petitioner’s motion to set aside his arraignment
Supreme Court: This Court affirmed the assailed Resolution of the the Sandiganbayan
5

COURT RATIONALE
The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case.36There
being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue
its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
This Court does not ordinarily interfere with the Ombudsman’s finding of probable cause. The
Ombudsman is endowed with a wide latitude of investigatory and prosecutory prerogatives in
the exercise of its power to pass upon criminal complaints.
Significantly, while it is the Ombudsman who has the full discretion to determine whether or
not a criminal case should be filed in the Sandiganbayan, once the case has been filed with said
court, it is the Sandiganbayan, and no longer the Ombudsman, which has full control of the
case.
In this case, petitioner failed to establish that the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when it denied petitioner’s motion to set
aside his arraignment. There is grave abuse of discretion when power is exercised in an
arbitrary, capricious, whimsical, or despotic manner by reason of passion or personal hostility
so patent and gross as to amount to evasion of a positive duty or virtual refusal to perform a
duty enjoined by law.
Absent a showing of grave abuse of discretion, this Court will not interfere with
the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction and control over a case properly filed before it.
The Sandiganbayan is empowered to proceed with the trial of the case in the manner it
determines best conducive to orderly proceedings and speedy termination of the case. There
being no showing of grave abuse of discretion on its part, the Sandiganbayan should continue
its proceedings with all deliberate dispatch.
We remind respondent to abide by this Court’s ruling in Republic v. Sandiganbayan, where we
stated that the mere filing of a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court does
not by itself merit a suspension of the proceedings before the Sandiganbayan, unless a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against
the Sandiganbayan. Section 7, Rule 65 of the Rules of Court so provides:
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, we DENY the petition. We AFFIRM the assailed 5 April 2006 Resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case Nos. 25122-45, which denied petitioner’s motion to set
aside his arraignment. This Decision is immediately executory. Costs against petitioner.
Criminal Jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan (SB)
Original and Exclusive Jurisdiction
Offenses Committed in Relation to the Office
Exception: Libel / Written Defamation Cases
PEOPLE vs. BENIPAYO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and PHOTOKINA MARKETING CORPORATION,
Petitioners vs. ALFREDO L. BENIPAYO, Respondent
GR No. 154473 April 24, 2009
NATURE OF CASE
Two Consolidated Petitions for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the Court are two consolidated petitions for review on certiorari filed under Rules 45
and 122 of the Rules of Court: (1) G.R. No. 154473 assailing the June 18, 2002 and the June
23, 2002 Orders of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 102 in Criminal
Case No. Q-02-109407; and (2) G.R. No. 155573 challenging the June 25, 2002 and the
September 18, 2002 Orders of the RTC of Quezon City, Branch 101 in Criminal Case No. Q-
02-109406.
FACTS
Alfredo Benipayo, then Chairman of the Commission of elections, was charged with libel
before the Office of the City Prosecutor by Photokina Marketing Corporation, which felt
alluded to in a speech made by Alfredo before the Bahay Kalinaw, University of the
Philippines, and in an television interview before “Point Blank”, a show hosted by Ces Orena-
Drilon at ANC.
The Office of the City Prosecutor, in both instances, filed Informations for libel before the
Regional Trial Court. In both instances, Alfredo moved for the dismissal of the case,
considering that at the time he made the alleged utterances, he was an impeachable officer and
the same was made in relation to his duties, therefore, even assuming that he can be charged
with libel, the same should be lodged with the Sandiganbayan. In both instances, the RTC
ruled in his favor, thus Photokina elevated the case to the Supreme Court on question of law on
whether the utterances were made in relation to his office; and that the RTC had no jurisdiction
over the case.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not RTC has the jurisdiction over libel cases to the exclusion of all other courts
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
Regional Trial Court: In both cases, this court dismissed the informations for lack of
jurisdiction over the person of the respondent.
6
Supreme Court: The consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are granted. Criminal
Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are reinstated and remanded to the Regional Trial
Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.
COURT RATIONALE
Uniformly applied is the familiar rule that the jurisdiction of the court to hear and decide a case
is conferred by the law in force at the time of the institution of the action, unless a latter statute
provides for a retroactive application thereof. Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), as
amended by Republic Act No. 4363, is explicit on which court has jurisdiction to try cases of
written defamations, thus:
Since jurisdiction over written defamations exclusively rests in the RTC without qualification,
it is unnecessary and futile for the parties to argue on whether the crime is committed in
relation to office. Thus, the conclusion reached by the trial court that the respondent committed
the alleged libelous acts in relation to his office as former COMELEC chair, and deprives it of
jurisdiction to try the case, is, following the above disquisition, gross error.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the consolidated petitions for review on certiorari are
GRANTED. Criminal Cases Nos. Q-02-109406 and Q-02-109407 are REINSTATED and
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City for further proceedings.

The criminal and civil action for damages in cases of written defamations as provided for in
this chapter, shall be filed simultaneously or separately with the court of first instance [now,
the Regional Trial Court] of the province or city where the libelous article is printed and first
published or where any of the offended parties actually resides at the time of the commission
of the offense xxx.

This exclusive and original jurisdiction of the RTC over written defamations is echoed in
Bocobo v. Estanislao, where the Court further declared that jurisdiction remains with the trial
court even if the libelous act is committed "by similar means," and despite the fact that the
phrase "by similar means" is not repeated in the latter portion of Article 360 of the RPC. In
these cases, and in those that followed, the Court had been unwavering in its pronouncement
that the expanded jurisdiction of the municipal trial courts cannot be exercised over libel cases.
Thus, in Manzano v. Hon. Valera, we explained at length that:

The applicable law is still Article 360 of the Revised Penal Code, which categorically provides
that jurisdiction over libel cases [is] lodged with the Courts of First Instance (now Regional
Trial Courts.

For, although RA 7691 was enacted to decongest the clogged dockets of the Regional Trail
Courts by expanding the jurisdiction of first level courts, said law is of a general character.
Even if it is a later enactment, it does not alter the provision of Article 360 of the RPC, a law
of a special nature. "Laws vesting jurisdiction exclusively with a particular court, are special in
character, and should prevail over the Judiciary Act defining the jurisdiction of other courts
(such as the Court of First Instance) which is a general law." A later enactment like RA 7691
does not automatically override an existing law, because it is a well-settled principle of
construction that, in case of conflict between a general law and a special law, the latter must
prevail regardless of the dates of their enactment. Jurisdiction conferred by a special law on the
RTC must therefore prevail over that granted by a general law on the MTC.

The grant to the Sandiganbayan of jurisdiction over offenses committed in relation to public
office, similar to the expansion of the jurisdiction of the MTCs, did not divest the RTC of its
exclusive and original jurisdiction to try written defamation cases regardless of whether the
offense is committed in relation to office.
7
G.R. No. 128096 January 20, 1999
PANFILO M. LACSON, petitioner, vs. THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE
SANDIGANBAYAN, OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR, THE
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, MYRNA ABALORA, NENITA ALAP-AP, IMELDA
PANCHO MONTERO, and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
ROMEO M. ACOP AND FRANCISCO G. ZUBIA, JR., petitioner-intervenors.
FACTS:
In May 1995, eleven (11) persons believed to be members of the Kuratong Baleleng gang,
reportedly an organized crime syndicate which had been involved in a spate of bank robberies
in Metro Manila, where slain along Commonwealth Avenue in Quezon City by elements of the
Anti-Bank Robbery and Intelligence Task Group (ABRITG) headed by Chief Superintendent
Canson of the Philippine National Police (PNP).
Acting on a media expose of SPO2 delos Reyes, a member of the (CIC) Criminal Investigation
Command, that what actually transpired at dawn of May 18, 1995 was a summary execution
(or a rub out) and not a shoot-out between the Kuratong Baleleng gang members and the
ABRITG. A panel of investigators was created and headed by Deputy Ombudsman Blancaflor
which absolved from any criminal liability all the PNP officers and personal allegedly
involved in May 18, 1995 incident, with a finding that the said incident was a legitimate police
operation. However, Overall Deputy Ombudsman Francisco Villa modified the panel’s
findings and recommended the indictment for multiple murder against twenty-six (26)
respondents, including herein petitioner and intervenors.
Thus, on November 1995, petitioner Panfilo Lacson who headed the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission — Task Force Habagat (PACC-TFH) was among those charged as principal in
eleven (11) information for murder before the Sandiganbayan's Second Division, while
intervenors Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. were among those charged in the same
informations as accessories after-in-the-fact.
After conducting a reinvestigation, the Ombudsman filed amended informations in March
1996 before the Sandiganbayan, wherein petitioner was charged only as an accessory, together
with Romeo Acop and Francisco Zubia, Jr. and other. One of the accused 6 was dropped from
the case.
On March 5-6, 1996, all the accused filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, asserting that under the amended informations, the cases fall within the
jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of Republic
Act No. 7975. They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to
cases where one or more of the "principal accused" are government officials with Salary Grade
(SG) 27 or higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General)
or higher. The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of
only a Chief Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In a Resolution 8 dated May 8, 1996 (promulgated on May 9, 1996), penned by Justice
Demetriou, the Sandiganbayan admitted the amended information and ordered the cases
transferred to the Quezon City Regional Trial Court which has original and exclusive
jurisdiction under R.A. 7975, as none of the principal accused has the rank of Chief
Superintendent or higher
Office of the Special Prosecutor moved for a reconsideration, insisting that the cases should
remain with the Sandiganbayan. This was opposed by petitioner and some of the accused.
While these motion for considerations were pending resolution, House Bill No. 2299 10 and
No. 1094 11 as well as Senate Bill No. 844 12 were introduced in Congress, defining
expanding the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. Specifically, the said bills sought, among
others, to amend the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan by deleting the word "principal" from
the phrase "principal accused" in Section 2 (paragraphs a and c) of R.A. No. 7975. These bills
were consolidated and later approved into law as R.A. No. 8249 13 by the President of the
Philippines on February 5, 1997
Subsequently, on March 5, 1997, the Sandiganbayan promulgated a Resolution 14 denying the
motion for reconsideration of the Special Prosecutor, ruling that it "stands pat in its resolution
dated May 8, 1996." But on same day SB issued an ADDENDUM to its March 5, 1997
resolution considering the pertinent provisions of the new law, Justices Lagman and Demetriou
are now in favor of granting, as they are now granting, the Special Prosecutor's motion for
reconsideration.
Petitioner now questions the constitutionality of Section 4 of R.A. No. 8249, including Section
7 thereof which provides that the said law "shall apply to all cases pending in any court over
which trial has not begun as to the approval hereof." And argue that the passage of the law
may have been timed to overtake such resolution to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate
the exercise of petitioner's vested rights under the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975);
Both the Office of the Ombudsman and the Solicitor-General filed separate pleadings in
support of the constitutionality of the challenged provisions of the law in question and praying
that both the petition and the petition-in-intervention be dismissed.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the multiple murder of the alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng was
committed in relation to the office of the accused PNP officers which is essential to the
determination whether the case falls within the Sandiganbayan’s or Regional Trial Court’s
jurisdiction.
SC RULING:
A perusal of the aforequoted Section 4 of R.A. 8249 reveals that to fall under the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, the following requisites must concur: (1) the
offense committed is a violation of (a) R.A. 3019, as amended (the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act), (b) R.A. 1379 (the law on ill-gotten wealth), (c) Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII,
8
Book II of the Revised Penal Code (the law on bribery), (d) Executive Order Nos. 1, 2, 14, and
14-A, issued in 1986 (sequestration cases), or (e) other offenses or felonies whether simple or
complexed with other crimes; (2) the offender committing the offenses in items (a), (b), (c) and
(e) is a public official or employee holding any of the positions enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4; and (3) the offense committed is in relation to the office.

Under Section 4, par. b of Republic Act 8249, what determines the Sandiganbayan’s
jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender; In enacting Republic Act 8249, the
Congress simply restored the original provisions of Presidential Decree 1606 which does not
mention the criminal participation of the public officer as a requisite to determine the
jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.—Considering that herein petitioner and intervenors are
being charged with murder which is a felony punishable under Title VIII of the Revised Penal
Code, the governing provision on the jurisdictional offense is not paragraph a but paragraph b,
Section 4 of R.A. 8249. This paragraph b pertains to “other offenses or felonies whether
simple or complexed with other crimes committed by the public officials and employees
mentioned in subsection a of [Section 4, R.A. 8249] in relation to their office.” The phrase
“other offenses or felonies” is too broad as to include the crime of murder, provided it was
committed in relation to the accused’s official functions. Thus, under said paragraph b, what
determines the Sandiganbayan’s jurisdiction is the official position or rank of the offender—
that is, whether he is one of those public officers or employees enumerated in paragraph a of
Section 4. The offenses mentioned in paragraphs a, b and c of the same Section 4 do not make
any reference to the criminal participation of the accused public officer as to whether he is
charged as a principal, accomplice or accessory. In enacting R.A. 8249, the Congress simply
restored the original provisions of P.D. 1606 which does not mention the criminal participation
of the public officer as a requisite to determine the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan.

In the aforecited case of People vs. Montejo, it is noteworthy that the phrase “committed in
relation to public office” does not appear in the information, which only signifies that the said
phrase is not what determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. What is controlling is the
specific factual allegations in the information that would indicate the close intimacy between
the discharge of the accused’s official duties and the commission of the offense charged, in
order to qualify the crime as having been committed in relation to public office.

Consequently, for failure to show in the amended informations that the charge of murder was
intimately connected with the discharge of official functions of the accused PNP officers, the
offense charged in the subject criminal cases is plain murder and, therefore, within the
exclusive original jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court, not the Sandiganbayan.

DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the constitutionality of Sections 4 and 7 of R.A. 8249 is hereby sustained. The
Addendum to the March 5, 1997 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan is REVERSED. The
Sandiganbayan is hereby directed to transfer Criminal Cases Nos. 23047 to 23057 (for
multiple murder) to the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City which has exclusive original
jurisdiction over the said cases.
9
G.R. Nos. 111771-77 November 9, 1993
ANTONIO L. SANCHEZ, petitioner, vs. The Honorable HARRIET O. DEMETRIOU
(in her capacity as Presiding Judge of Regional Trial Court, NCR, Branch 70, Pasig), The
Honorable FRANKLIN DRILON (in his capacity as Secretary of Justice), JOVENCITO
R. ZUÑO, LEONARDO C. GUIYAB, CARLOS L. DE LEON, RAMONCITO C.
MISON, REYNALDO J. LUGTU, and RODRIGO P. LORENZO, the last six
respondents in their official capacities as members of the State Prosecutor's Office),
respondents.
Mario E. Ongkiko and Marciano P. Brion, Jr. for petitioner.
The Solicitor General for respondents.
FACTS:
Mayor Antionio L. Sanchez of Calauan, Laguna, was among others, charged in connection of
the rape-slay of Mary Elieen Sarmena and the killing of Allan Gomez of seven (7) counts of
rape with homicide which was requested to be acted upon by the Presidential Anti-Crime
Commission
On August 12, 1993, PNP Commander Rex Piad issued an "invitation" to the petitioner
requesting him to appear for investigation at Camp Vicente Lim in Canlubang, Laguna. It was
served on Sanchez in the morning of August 13,1993, and he was immediately taken to the
said camp.
At a confrontation that same day, Sanchez was positively identified by Aurelio Centeno, and
SPO III Vivencio Malabanan, who both executed confessions implicating him as a principal in
the rape-slay of Sarmenta and the killing of Gomez. The petitioner was then placed on "arrest
status" and taken to the Department of Justice in Manila.
The respondent prosecutors immediately conducted an inquest upon arrival, and after hearing a
warrant of arrest was served. Mayor Sanhez was forthwith taken to the CIS Detention Center,
Camp Crame, where he remains confined. The respondent prosecutors filed with RTC of
Calamba, Laguna, seven informations charging Mayor Sancehz among others, with the rape
and killing of Mary Eileen Sarmaneta. Aftrer several days, the court issued a warrant for the
arrest of all the accused, including Mayor Sanchez, in connection with the said crime.
The respondent Secretary of Justice subsequently expressed his apprehension that the trial of
the said cases might result in a miscarriage of justice because of the tense and partisan
atmosphere in Laguna in favor of the petitioner and the relationship of an employee, in the trial
court with one of the accused. This Court thereupon ordered the transfer of the venue of the
seven cases to Pasig, Metro Manila, where they were raffled to respondent Judge Harriet
Demetriou.
On September 10, 1993, the seven informations were amended to include the killing of Allan
Gomez as an aggravating circumstance. On that same date, the petitioner filed a motion to
quash the informations substantially on the grounds now raised in this petition. On September
13, 1993, after oral arguments, the respondent judge denied the motion. Sanchez then filed
with this Court the instant petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for a temporary
restraining order/writ of injunction.
The petitioner argues that the seven informations filed against him should be quashed because:
1) he was denied the right to present evidence at the preliminary investigation; 2) only the
Ombudsman had the competence to conduct the investigation; 3) his warrantless arrest is
illegal and the court has therefore not acquired jurisdiction over him, 4) he is being charged
with seven homicides arising from the death of only two persons; 5) the informations are
discriminatory because they do not include Teofilo Alqueza and Edgardo Lavadia; and 6) as a
public officer, he can be tried for the offense only by the Sandiganbayan.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there is direct relation between the commission of rape with homicide
and the petitioner’s office as municipal mayor
2. Whether or not the information is correct, wherein seven counts of homicide was
charged which arose from the death of only two persons.
SC RULING:
1. No.
The petitioner argued earlier that since most of the accused were incumbent public officials or
employees at the time of the alleged commission of the crimes, the cases against them should
come under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and not of the regular courts. This
contention was withdrawn in his Reply but we shall discuss it just the same for the guidance of
all those concerned. Section 4, paragraph (a) of P.D. No. 1606, as amended by P.D. No. 1861,
provides: Sec. 4. Jurisdiction.—The Sandiganbayan shall exercise: a) Exclusive original
jurisdiction in all cases involving: (1) Violations of Republic Act No. 3019, as amended,
otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, Republic Act No. 1379, and
Chapter II, Section 2, Title VII of the Revised Penal Code; (2) Other offenses or felonies
committed by public officers and employees in relation to their office, including those
employed in government-owned or controlled corporations, whether simple or complexed with
other crimes, where the penalty prescribed by law is higher than prision correccional or
imprisonment for six (6) years, or a fine of P6,000.00 x x x. (Emphasis supplied)
The crime of rape with homicide with which the petitioner stands charged obviously does not
fall under paragraph (1), which deals with graft and corruption cases. Neither is it covered by
paragraph (2) because it is not an offense committed in relation to the office of the petitioner.
In Montilla v. Hilario, this Court described the “offense committed in relation to the office” as
follows: [T]he relation between the crime and the office contemplated by the Constitution is, in
10
our opinion, direct and not accidental. To fall into the intent of the Constitution, the relation
has to be such that, in the legal sense, the offense cannot exist without the office. In other
words, the office must be a constituent element of the crime as defined in the statute, such as,
for instance, the crimes defined and punished in Chapter Two to Six, Title Seven, of the
Revised Penal Code. Public office is not of the essence of murder. The taking of human life is
either murder or homicide whether done by a private citizen or public servant, and the penalty
is the same except when the perpetrator, being a public functionary, took advantage of his
office, as alleged in this case, in which event the penalty is increased. But the use or abuse of
office does not adhere to the crime as an element; and even as an aggravating circumstance; its
materiality arises, not from the allegations but on the proof, not from the fact that the criminals
are public officials but from the manner of the commission of the crime.
There is no direct relation between the commission of the crime of rape with homicide and the
petitioner’s office as municipal mayor because public office is not an essential element of the
crime charged. The offense can stand indepen dently of the office. Moreover, it is not even
alleged in the information that the commission of the crime charged was intimately connected
with the performance of the petitioner’s official functions to make it fall under the exception
laid down in People v. Montejo.
In that case, a city mayor and several detectives were charged with murder for the death of a
suspect as a result of a "third degree" investigation held at a police substation. The appearance
of a senator as their counsel was questioned by the prosecution on the ground that he was
inhibited by the Constitution from representing them because they were accused of an offense
committed in relation to their office. The Court agreed. It held that even if their position was
not an essential ingredient of the offense, there was nevertheless an intimate connection
between the office and the offense, as alleged in the information, that brought it within the
definition of an offense "committed in relation to the public office."
As Chief Justice Concepcion said:
It is apparent from these allegations that, although public office is not an element of the crime
of murder in abstract, as committed by the main respondents herein, according to the amended
information, the offense therein charged is intimately connected with their respective offices
and was perpetrated while they were in the performance, though improper or irregular, of their
official functions. Indeed they had no personal motive to commit the crime and they would not
have committed it had they not held their aforesaid offices. The co-defendants of respondent
Leroy S. Brown, obeyed his instructions because he was their superior officer, as Mayor of
Basilan City.
We have read the informations in the case at bar and find no allegation therein that the crime
of rape with homicide imputed to the petitioner was connected with the discharge of his
functions as municipal mayor or that there is an "intimate connection" between the offense and
his office. It follows that the said crime, being an ordinary offense, is triable by the regular
courts and not the Sandiganbayan.
2. Yes.
It is clearly provided in Rule 110 of the Rules of Court that: Sec. 13. Duplicity of offense. A
complaint or information must charge but one offense, except only in those cases in which
existing laws prescribe a simple punishment for various offenses.Rape with homicide comes
within the exception under R.A. 2632 and R.A. 4111, amending the Revised Penal Code.The
petitioner and his six co-accused are not charged with only one rape committed by him in
conspiracy with the other six. Each one of the seven accused is charged with having himself
raped Sarmenta instead of simply helping Sanchez in committing only one rape. In other
words, the allegation of the prosecution is that the girl was raped seven times, with each of the
seven accused taking turns in abusing her with the assistance of the other six. Afterwards, their
lust satisfied, all seven of them decided to kill and thus silence Sarmenta.Every one of the
seven accused is being charged separately for actually raping Sarmenta and later killing her
instead of merely assisting the petitioner in raping and then slaying her. The separate
informations filed against each of them allege that each of the seven successive rapes is
complexed by the subsequent slaying of Sarmenta and aggravated by the killing of Allan
Gomez by her seven attackers. The separate rapes were committed in succession by the seven
accused, culminating in the slaying of Sarmenta.It is of course absurd to suggest that Mary
Eileen Sarmenta and Allan Gomez were killed seven times, but the informations do not make
such a suggestion. It is the petitioner who does so and is thus hoist by his own petard.
This argument was correctly refuted by the Solicitor General in this wise:Thus, where there are
two or more offenders who commit rape, the homicide committed on the occasion or by reason
of each rape, must be deemed as a constituent of the special complex crime of rape with
homicide. Therefore, there will be as many crimes of rape with homicide as there are rapes
committed.In effect, the presence of homicide qualifies the crime of rape, thereby raising its
penalty to the highest degree. Thus, homicide committed on the occasion or by reason of rape,
loses its character as an independent offense, but assumes a new character, and functions like a
qualifying circumstance. However, by fiction of law, it merged with rape to constitute a
constituent element of a special complex crime of rape with homicide with a specific penalty
which is in the highest degree, i.e. death.
In the crime of Rape with Homicide, the Homicide partakes the element of force and
intimidation in rape. Hence, the crime of Rape and Homicide are not distinct from each other.
By virtue of this, it does not run afoul the rule on duplicity of suits, although there were only
two counts of death in this case, each one who participated in the crime shall be charged with
one count of Rape with Homicide
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The respondent judge is DIRECTED to continue
with the trial of Criminal Cases Nos. 101141, 101142, 101143, 101144, 101145, 101146 and
101147 and to decide them with deliberate dispatch.
11
G.R. No. 162059 January 22, 2008
HANNAH EUNICE D. SERANA, petitioner, vs. SANDIGANBAYAN and PEOPLE OF
THE PHILIPPINES, respondents.
FACTS:
Hannah Eunice D. Serana was a senior student of the University of the Philippines-Cebu. She
was appointed by then President Joseph Estrada on December 21, 1999 as a student regent of
UP, to serve a one-year term and discussed with the latter the renovation of Vinzons Hall
Annex in UP Diliman. On September 4, 2000, petitioner, with her siblings and relatives,
registered with the Securities and Exchange Commission the Office of the Student Regent
Foundation, Inc. (OSRFI)
One of the projects of the OSRFI was the renovation of the Vinzons Hall. President Estrada
gave Fifteen Million Pesos to the OSRFI as financial assistance for the proposed renovation
which the source of the funds was the Office of the President.
However, the renovation of Vinzons Hall Annex failed to materialize. The succeeding student
regent system-wide alliance of student councils, consequently filed a complaint for
Malversation of Public Funds and Property with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On July 3, 2003, the Ombudsman, after due investigation, found probable cause to indict
petitioner and her brother Jade Ian D. Serana for estafa.
Petitioner posited that the Sandiganbayan had no jurisdiction over her person. As a student
regent, she was not a public officer since she merely represented her peers, in contrast to the
other regents who held their positions in an ex officio capacity. She addeed that she was a
simple student and did not receive any salary as a student regent. Moreover she argued that in
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 3019, as amended by R.A. No. 8249, enumerates the crimes or
offenses over which the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction over the crime of
estafa.
She further contended that she had no power or authority to receive monies or funds. Such
power was vested with the Board of Regents (BOR) as a whole. Since it was not alleged in the
information that it was among her functions or duties to receive funds, or that the crime was
committed in connection with her official functions, the same is beyond the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan citing the case of Soller v. Sandiganbayan.
The Ombudsman opposed the motion and the Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s motion for
lack of merit
ISSUES:
1. Whether the Sandiganbayan has jurisdiction over the offense charged or over her person, in
her capacity as UP student regent
2. Whether the offense charged was committed in relation to public office
SC RULING:
1.Yes. Petitioner UP student regent is a public officer.
Petitioner claims that she is not a public officer with Salary Grade 27; she is, in fact, a regular
tuition fee-paying student. This is likewise bereft of merit. It is not only the salary grade that
determines the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. The Sandiganbayan also has jurisdiction
over other officers enumerated in P.D. No. 1606. In Geduspan v. People,43 We held that while
the first part of Section 4(A) covers only officials with Salary Grade 27 and higher, its second
part specifically includes other executive officials whose positions may not be of Salary Grade
27 and higher but who are by express provision of law placed under the jurisdiction of the said
court. Petitioner falls under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan as she is placed there by
express provision of law.
Section 4(A)(1)(g) of P.D. No. 1606 explictly vested the Sandiganbayan with jurisdiction over
Presidents, directors or trustees, or managers of government-owned or controlled corporations,
state universities or educational institutions or foundations. Petitioner falls under this category.
As the Sandiganbayan pointed out, the BOR performs functions similar to those of a board of
trustees of a non-stock corporation. By express mandate of law, petitioner is, indeed, a public
officer as contemplated by P.D. No. 1606.Moreover, it is well established that compensation is
not an essential element of public office.46 At most, it is merely incidental to the public office.
2. Yes. The offense charged was committed in relation to public office, according to the
Information.
In the case at bench, the information alleged, in no uncertain terms that petitioner, being then a
student regent of U.P., "while in the performance of her official functions, committing the
offense in relation to her office and taking advantage of her position, with intent to gain,
conspiring with her brother, JADE IAN D. SERANA, a private individual, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously defraud the government x x x." Clearly, there was no
grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Sandiganbayan when it did not quash the
information based on this ground.
DECISION:
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.
12
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE ON JURISDICTION (RTC / SPECIAL CYBERCRIME
COURTS)
DISINI JR VS. SECRETARY OF JUSTICE
G.R. No. 203335, February 18, 2014
JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ROWENA S. DISINI, LIANNE IVY P. MEDINA,
JANETTE TORAL AND ERNESTO SONIDO, JR., PETITIONERS, VS. THE
SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF THE
INTERIOR AND LOCAL GOVERNMENT, THE EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR OF THE
INFORMATION AND COMMUNICATIONS TECHNOLOGY OFFICE, THE CHIEF
OF THE PHILIPPINE NATIONAL POLICE AND THE DIRECTOR OF THE
NATIONAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION, RESPONDENTS.
Brief
These consolidated petitions seek to declare several provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) 10175,
the Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012, unconstitutional and void.
The Facts and the Case
The cybercrime law aims to regulate access to and use of the cyberspace. Using his laptop or
computer, a person can connect to the internet, a system that links him to other computers and
enable him, among other things, to:
1. Access virtual libraries and encyclopedias for all kinds of information that he needs for
research, study, amusement, upliftment, or pure curiosity;
2. Post billboard-like notices or messages, including pictures and videos, for the general public
or for special audiences like associates, classmates, or friends and read postings from them;
3. Advertise and promote goods or services and make purchases and payments;
4. Inquire and do business with institutional entities like government agencies, banks, stock
exchanges, trade houses, credit card companies, public utilities, hospitals, and schools; and
5. Communicate in writing or by voice with any person through his e-mail address or
telephone.
But petitioners claim that the means adopted by the cybercrime law for regulating undesirable
cyberspace activities violate certain of their constitutional rights. The government of course
asserts that the law merely seeks to reasonably put order into cyberspace activities, punish
wrongdoings, and prevent hurtful attacks on the system.
The Issues Presented
Petitioners challenge the constitutionality of the following provisions of the cybercrime law
that regard certain acts as crimes and impose penalties for their commission as well as
provisions that would enable the government to track down and penalize violators. These
provisions are:
Section 4(a)(1) on Illegal Access;Section 4(a)(3) on Data Interference;Section 4(a)(6) on
Cyber-squatting;Section 4(b)(3) on Identity Theft;Section 4(c)(1) on Cybersex;Section 4(c)(2)
on Child Pornography;Section 4(c)(3) on Unsolicited Commercial Communications;Section
4(c)(4) on Libel;Section 5 on Aiding or Abetting and Attempt in the Commission of
Cybercrimes;Section 6 on the Penalty of One Degree Higher;Section 7 on the Prosecution
under both the Revised Penal Code (RPC) and R.A. 10175;Section 8 on Penalties;Section 12
on Real-Time Collection of Traffic Data;Section 13 on Preservation of Computer Data;Section
14 on Disclosure of Computer Data;Section 15 on Search, Seizure and Examination of
Computer Data;Section 17 on Destruction of Computer Data;Section 19 on Restricting or
Blocking Access to Computer Data;Section 20 on Obstruction of Justice;Section 24 on
Cybercrime Investigation and Coordinating Center (CICC); andSection 26(a) on CICC’s
Powers and Functions.Some petitioners also raise the constitutionality of related Articles 353,
354, 361, and 362 of the RPC on the crime of libel.
The Rulings of the Court
1. VOID for being UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
Section 4(c)(3) of Republic Act 10175 that penalizes posting of unsolicited
commercial communications; Section 12 that authorizes the collection or recording of
traffic data in real-time; and Section 19 of the same Act that authorizes the
Department of Justice to restrict or block access to suspected Computer Data.
2. VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL:
Section 4(a)(1) that penalizes accessing a computer system without right;Section
4(a)(3) that penalizes data interference, including transmission of viruses;Section
4(a)(6) that penalizes cyber-squatting or acquiring domain name over the internet in
bad faith to the prejudice of others;Section 4(b)(3) that penalizes identity theft or the
use or misuse of identifying information belonging to another;Section 4(c)(1) that
penalizes cybersex or the lascivious exhibition of sexual organs or sexual activity for
favor or consideration;Section 4(c)(2) that penalizes the production of child
pornography;Section 6 that imposes penalties one degree higher when crimes defined
under the Revised Penal Code are committed with the use of information and
communications technologies;Section 8 that prescribes the penalties for
cybercrimes;Section 13 that permits law enforcement authorities to require service
providers to preserve traffic data and subscriber information as well as specified
content data for six months;Section 14 that authorizes the disclosure of computer data
under a court-issued warrant;Section 15 that authorizes the search, seizure, and
examination of computer data under a court-issued warrant;Section 17 that authorizes
the destruction of previously preserved computer data after the expiration of the
prescribed holding periods;Section 20 that penalizes obstruction of justice in relation
to cybercrime investigations; Section 24 that establishes a Cybercrime Investigation
and Coordinating Center (CICC); Section 26(a) that defines the CICC’s Powers and
Functions; and Articles 353, 354, 361, and 362 of the Revised Penal Code that
penalizes libel.
Further, the Court DECLARES:
Section 4(c)(4) that penalizes online libel as VALID and CONSTITUTIONAL with respect
to the original author of the post; but VOID and UNCONSTITUTIONAL with respect to
others who simply receive the post and react to it.
The role of the courts in cybercrime prevention and prosecution
13
Internet has significantly changed the way crimes are committed, and has paved the way for
the emergence of new crimes committed in a totally different plane: from the previous real,
physical world, to the abstract, borderless plane of interconnected computers linked through
the Internet.
The judicial steps in cybercrime prosecution start as early as the investigation of cybercrimes,
through the issuance of warrants. After these, courts also determine the probable cause for the
arrest of suspects accused of committing cybercrimes. The suspect’s arrest would then lead to
a trial that, depending on the suspect’s conviction or acquittal, could then go through the
judiciary appellate process. During trial, pieces of evidence would be presented and
testimonies heard, and trial courts would then exercise their constitutional duty to adjudicate
the cases brought before them.
Judicial involvement in all these processes requires the handling members of the Judiciary to
be computer literate, at the very least. Due to the highly-technical nature of investigating and
prosecuting cybercrimes, as well as the apparent need to expedite our criminal procedure to
make it more responsive to cybercrime law enforcement, SC propose that special cybercrime
courts be designated to specifically handle cases involving cybercrime. In addition, these
cybercrime courts should have their own rules of procedure tailor-fitted to respond to the
technical requirements of cybercrime prosecution and adjudication.
The designation of special cybercrime courts of course is not outside SC’s power to undertake:
Section 21of the Cybercrime Law grants the Regional Trial Courts jurisdiction over any
violation of the Cybercrime Law, and provides that special cybercrime courts manned by
specially trained judges should be designated. Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution,
on the other hand, empowers this Court to promulgate rules on the pleading, practice, and
procedure in all courts.

Section 21 of the Cybercrime Law provides:

Section 21. Jurisdiction. — The Regional Trial Court shall have jurisdiction over any violation
of the provisions of this Act. including any violation committed by a Filipino national
regardless of the place of commission. Jurisdiction shall lie if any of the elements was
committed within the Philippines or committed with the use of any computer system wholly or
partly situated in the country, or when by such commission any damage is caused to a natural
or juridical person who, at the time the offense was committed, was in the Philippines.
There shall be designated special cybercrime courts manned by specially trained judges to
handle cybercrime cases.

Article VIII, Section 5, paragraph 5 of the 1987 Constitution provides:

Section 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
5) Promulgate rules concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights,
pleading, practice, and procedure in all courts, the admission to the practice of law, the
integrated bar, and legal assistance to the under-privileged. Such rules shall provide a
simplified and inexpensive procedure for the speedy disposition of cases, shall be uniform for
all courts of the same grade, and shall not diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights.
Rules of procedure of special courts and quasi-judicial bodies shall remain effective unless
disapproved by the Supreme Court.
14
CRIMINAL PROCEDURE PROSECUTION OF OFFENSES
1. INSTITUTION OF CRIMINAL ACTIONS (SEC. 1)
 WHO IS QUALIFIED TO INSTITUTE
JIMENEZ VS. SORONGON
G.R. No. 178607, December 05, 2012
DANTE LA. JIMENEZ, IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDENT AND
REPRESENTATIVE OF UNLAD SHIPPING & MANAGEMENT CORPORATION,
PETITIONER, VS. HON. EDWIN SORONGON (IN HIS CAPACITY AS PRESIDING
JUDGE OF BRANCH 214 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF
MANDALUYONG CITY), SOCRATES ANTZOULATOS, CARMEN ALAMIL,
MARCELI GAZA AND MARKOS AVGOUSTIS, RESPONDENTS.
The Factual Antecedents
The petitioner is the president of Unlad Shipping & Management Corporation, a local manning
agency, while Carmen Alamil and the other respondents are some of the listed incorporators of
Tsakos Maritime Services, Inc. (TMSI), another local manning agency.
On August 19, 2003, the petitioner filed a complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City
Prosecutor of Mandaluyong City against the respondents for syndicated and large scale illegal
recruitment.
On October 9, 2003, the respondents filed their counter-affidavit denying the complaint-
affidavit’s allegations.
The City Prosecutor approved his recommendation and filed the corresponding criminal
information with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Mandaluyong City.
The RTC ordered the issuance of warrants of arrest against the respondents.
On September 26, 2005, respondent Alamil filed a motion for judicial determination of
probable cause with a request to defer enforcement of the warrants of arrest.
In a September 30, 2005 order,the RTC denied respondent Alamil’s motion for being moot and
academic; it ruled that it had already found probable cause against the respondents in the
August 1, 2005 resolution, which it affirmed in the September 2, 2005 order.
On October 10, 2005, respondent Alamil moved for reconsideration and for the inhibition of
Judge Capco-Umali, for being biased or partial.
In a January 4, 2006 order,Judge Capco-Umali voluntarily inhibited herself from the case and
did not resolve respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration and the petitioner’s motion to
expunge. The case was later re-raffled to Branch 214, presided by Judge Edwin D. Sorongon.
The RTC Rulings
In its March 8, 2006 order,the RTC granted respondent Alamil’s motion for reconsideration. It
treated respondent Alamil’s motion for judicial determination as a motion to dismiss for lack
of probable cause. It found: (1) no evidence on record to indicate that the respondents gave any
false information to secure a license to operate as a recruitment agency from the POEA; and
(2) that respondent Alamil voluntarily submitted to the RTC’s jurisdiction through the filing of
pleadings seeking affirmative relief. Thus, the RTC dismissed the case, and set aside the earlier
issued warrants of arrest.
On May 19, 2006, the petitioner filed a notice of appeal.
In its August 7, 2006 joint order,the RTC denied the petitioner’s notice of appeal since the
petitioner filed it without the conformity of the Solicitor General, who is mandated to represent
the People of the Philippines in criminal actions appealed to the CA. Thus, the RTC ordered
the notice of appeal expunged from the records.
On October 18, 2006, the petitioner elevated his case to the CA via a Rule 65 petition for
certiorari.
The CA Ruling
In its November 23, 2006 resolution,the CA dismissed outright the petitioner’s Rule 65
petition for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of the
Philippines. It noted that only the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) has the legal
personality to represent the People, under Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the
1987 Administrative Code. It also held that the petitioner was not the real party in interest to
institute the case, him not being a victim of the crime charged to the respondents, but a mere
competitor in their recruitment business. The CA deniedthe motion for reconsiderationthat
followed.
Issue
Whether the CA committed a reversible error in dismissing outright the petitioner’s Rule 65
petition for certiorari for lack of legal personality to file the petition on behalf of the People of
the Philippines.
Ruling
It is well-settled that “every action must be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real
party in interest[,]” “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit, or by
the party entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Procedural law basically mandates that “[a]ll criminal actions commenced by complaint or by
information shall be prosecuted under the direction and control of a public prosecutor.” In
appeals of criminal cases before the CA and before this Court, the OSG is the appellate
15
counsel of the People, pursuant to Section 35(1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code. This section explicitly provides:

SEC. 35. Powers and Functions. — The Office of the Solicitor General shall represent the
Government of the Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in
any litigation, proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. . . . It shall
have the following specific powers and functions:

(1) Represent the Government in the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals in all
criminal proceedings;(emphasis supplied)

The People is the real party in interest in a criminal case and only the OSG can represent the
People in criminal proceedings pending in the CA or in this Court. This ruling has been
repeatedly stressed in several casesand continues to be the controlling doctrine.

While there may be rare occasions when the offended party may be allowed to pursue the
criminal action on his own behalf(as when there is a denial of due process), this exceptional
circumstance does not apply in the present case.
In this case, the petitioner has no legal personality to assail the dismissal of the criminal case
since the main issue raised by the petitioner involved the criminal aspect of the case, i.e., the
existence of probable cause. The petitioner did not appeal to protect his alleged pecuniary
interest as an offended party of the crime, but to cause the reinstatement of the criminal action
against the respondents. This involves the right to prosecute which pertains exclusively to the
People, as represented by the OSG.

WHEREFORE, we hereby DENY the appeal. The twin resolutions of the Court of Appeals
dated November 23, 2006 and June 28, 2007 in CA-G.R. SP No. 96584 are AFFIRMED.
Costs against the petitioner.

16
 PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ and
EDWIN VALDEZ, Accused-Appellants.
-------------------------------------------------
G.R. No. 175602 February 13, 2013
Nature of Case:
Final Appeal of Judgement
Brief:
The two accused came to the Court on final appeal of the RTC’s judgment convicting them of
the crime of Murder. Edwin Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Supreme
Court granted on October 10, 2007. The Supreme Court modified the judgement by finding
PO2 Eduardo Valdez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of Homicide.
Subsequently, Edwin Valdez requested the Court for the application to him of the same
judgement despite his withdrawal of the appeal.
Facts:
The Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City charged the two accused in the RTC with
three counts of murder for the killing of Ferdinand Sayson, Moises Sayson, Jr., and Joselito
Sayson. The accused were tried for and convicted of three counts of murder by the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 86, in Quezon City. They were penalized with reclusion perpetua
for each count, and ordered to pay to the heirs’ actual damages civil indemnity, and moral
damages. On appeal, the Court of Appeals (CA) upheld the RTC with some modifications as to
the civil indemnity. The accused came to the Court to seek acquittal. On May 9, 2007 Edwin
Valdez filed a motion to withdraw appeal, which the Court granted, thereby deeming Edwin’s
appeal closed and terminated. Hence, the Court hereby resolves only the appeal of PO2
Eduardo Valdez. In his appeal, PO2 Valdez contends among others that the State did not
establish the qualifying circumstance of treachery. Subsequently, Edwin sent to the Court
Administrator a self-explanatory letter dated March 12, 2012, where he pleaded for the
application to him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 on the ground that the
judgment would be beneficial to him as an accused.
Issue/s:
Whether or not PO2 Valdez may be convicted of murder considering that the attendance of
treachery was not sufficiently allege in the information.
Action/s of the Court:
RTC- Convicted them with three counts of murder
Court of Appeals- Affirmed RTC’s decision subject to modification on the amounts of
damages
Court’s Rationale on the Above Facts:
The real nature of the criminal charge is determined not from the caption or preamble of the
information, or from the specification of the provision of law alleged to have been violated,
which are mere conclusions of law, but by the actual recital of facts in the complaint or
information.
For complaint or information to be sufficient, it must state the name of the accused; the
designation of the offense given by the statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party; the approximate time of the
commission of the offense, and the place wherein the offense was committed. What is
controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the designation of the offense charged or the
particular law or part thereof allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by
the prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular facts therein recited.
Every element of the offense must be stated in the information. What facts and circumstances
are necessary to be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions and
essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the elements of a crime in the
information is to inform the accused of the nature of the accusation against him so as to enable
him to suitably prepare his defense. The presumption is that the accused has no independent
knowledge of the facts that constitute the offense.
The averments of the information to the effect that the two accused “with intent to kill,
qualified with treachery, evident premeditation and abuse of superior strength did xxx assault,
attack and employ personal violence upon” the victims “by then and there shooting them with
a gun, hitting [them]” on various parts of their bodies which were the direct and immediate
cause of their deaths” did not sufficiently set forth the facts and circumstances describing how
treachery attended each of the killings. It should not be difficult to see that merely averring the
killing of a person by shooting him with a gun, without more, did not show how the execution
of the crime was directly and specially ensured without risk to the accused from the defense
that the victim might make. Indeed, the use of the gun as an instrument to kill was not per se
treachery, for there are other instruments that could serve the same lethal purpose. Nor did the
use of the term treachery constitute a sufficient averment, for that term, standing alone, was
nothing but a conclusion of law, not an averment of a fact. In short, the particular acts and
circumstances constituting treachery as an attendant circumstance in murder were missing
from the information.
Wherefore the decision of the Court of Appeals is modified by finding PO2 Eduardo Valdez
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of three counts of HOMICIDE.
Supreme Court Ruling:
ACCORDINGLY, the Court GRANTS the plea of EDWIN VALDEZ for the application to
him of the judgment promulgated on January 18, 2012 finding P02 EDUARDO VALDEZ
guilty of three counts of homicide, and sentencing him to suffer for each count the
indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor as minimum to 17 years of reclusion
temporal as maximum, and to pay to the respective heirs of the late Ferdinand Sayson, the late
Moises Sayson, Jr., and the late Joselito Sayson the amounts ofP50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P50,000.00 as moral damages, and P25,000.00 as temperate damages for each count.
17
 FERNANDO Q. MIGUEL, Petitioner, vs. THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN,
Respondent.
G.R. No. 172035
July 4, 2012
Ponente: BRION, J..:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65
Brief:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 651 filed by Fernando Q. Miguel
(petitioner), assailing the January 25, 2006 and March 27, 2006 resolutions of the
Sandiganbayan. These resolutions (i) ordered the petitioner’s suspension from public office
and (ii) denied the petitioner’s motion for reconsideration of the suspension order.
Facts:
On May 29, 1996, then Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials3 of
Koronadal City, South Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao (Ombudsman) charging the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 3019, in connection with the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the
engineering design, and the construction supervision and management of the proposed
Koronadal City public market (project).
On March 1, 2000, the Ombudsman, after finding probable cause filed the corresponding
informations with the Sandiganbayan.
On July 31, 2001, then Ombudsman Aniano Desierto approved the resolution of the Office of
Special Prosecutor (OSP) declaring that petitioner had waived his right to submit
countervailing evidence (April 25, 2001) resolution after failing to file his counter-affidavit.
After the denial of the petitioner’s motion to quash, the petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded
not guilty in both criminal cases.
On April 28, 2005, the OSP filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. June 27,
2005, the petitioner filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of
the [i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages
was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
On February 2, 2006, the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion, prompting him
to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
The petitioner claims that the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its discretion in ordering his
suspension despite the failure of the information to allege that the giving of unwarranted
benefits and advantages by the petitioner was made through "manifest partiality, evident bad
faith or gross inexcusable negligence." He alleges that the phrases "evident bad faith" and
"manifest partiality" actually refers not to him, but to his co-accused, rendering the information
fatally defective.
Issue/s:
Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid.
Court’s Rationale on the Above Facts:
In deference to the constitutional right of an accused to be informed of the nature and the cause
of the accusation against him, Section 6, Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
(Rules)32 requires, inter alia, that the information shall state the designation of the offense
given by the statute and the acts or omissions imputed which constitute the offense charged.
The test of the information’s sufficiency is whether the crime is described in intelligible terms
and with such particularity with reasonable certainty so that the accused is duly informed of
the offense charged. In particular, whether an information validly charges an offense depends
on whether the material facts alleged in the complaint or information shall establish the
essential elements of the offense charged as defined in the law. The raison d’etre of the
requirement in the Rules is to enable the accused to suitably prepare his defense.
In arguing against the validity of the information, the petitioner appears to go beyond the
standard of a "person of common understanding" in appreciating the import of the phrase
"acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality." A reading of the information clearly
reveals that the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality" was merely a
continuation of the prior allegation of the acts of the petitioner, and that he ultimately acted
with evident bad faith and manifest partiality in giving unwarranted benefits and advantages to
his co-accused private individuals. This is what a plain and non-legalistic reading of the
information would yield.
Notably, in his petition, the petitioner would have the Supreme Court believe that this
elemental phrase was actually omitted in the information when, in his reaction to the OSP’s
comment, what the petitioner actually disputes is simply the clarity of the phrase’s position, in
relation with the other averments in the information. Given the supposed ambiguity of the
subject being qualified by the phrase "acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality,"
the remedy of the petitioner, if at all, is merely to move for a bill of particulars and not for the
quashal of an information which sufficiently alleges the elements of the offense charged.
Supreme Court Ruling:
The Court hereby dismissed the petition for lack of merit.
18
PEOPLE VS SORIA 1. By the death of the convict, as to the personal penalties; and as to pecuniary
penalties, liability therefor is extinguished only when the death of the offender
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff Appellee, vs. BENJAMIN SORIA y occurs before final judgment;
GOMEZ, Accused-Appellant. In People v. Amistoso, this Court encountered a similar situation wherein the accused-
------------------------------------------------- appellant died before his appeal could be resolved. The Court explained the implications of the
G.R. No. 179031 accused-appellant’s demise as follows:
February 24, 2014 “Given the foregoing, it is clear that the death of the accused pending appeal of his
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO J.: conviction extinguishes his criminal liability, as well as his civil liability ex delicto.
Since the criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant
Nature of Case: to stand as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil
Dismissal of the Case liability ex delicto is ipso facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case.”
Likewise, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court finding accused-appellant guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of rape had become irrelevant and ineffectual by reason
Brief:
of his death on August 16, 2012. Consequently, the same must be set aside and the case against
The Supreme Court set aside its decision which was promulgated after the accused-appellant’s
accused-appellant must consequently be dismissed.
death.

Supreme Court Ruling:

Facts:
Accordingly, the November 14, 2012 Decision of this Court is set aside and Criminal Case No.
On November 14, 2012, this Court rendered its Decision1 in this case finding accused-
Q-01-98692 before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 94, is dismissed on
appellant Benjamin Soria y Gomez guilty beyond reasonable doubt of rape.
account of accused-appellant's demise.

The said Decision supposedly became final and executory on December 20, 2012.
Subsequently, however, the Court received a letter from the Bureau of Corrections informing
us of the death of accused-appellant on August 16, 2012. In compliance with our directive, the
Director of the Bureau of Corrections submitted on November 11, 2013, a certified true copy
of the death certificate of accused-appellant.

Clearly, accused-appellant’s demise on August 16, 2012 transpired before the promulgation of
this Court’s Decision on November 14, 2012 or before its finality on December 20, 2012.
Therefore, when accused-appellant died, his appeal before this Court was still pending
resolution.
Issue/s:
Whether the decision should be set aside on account of accused-appellant's demise.

Court’s Rationale on the Above Facts:

Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code pertinently provides:

ART. 89. How criminal liability is totally extinguished. - Criminal liability is totally
extinguished:

19
Rule 110- Place where action is to be instituted Dismissed the petition for certiorari
SC: Dismissed petition
Unionbank of the Philippines and Desi Tomas vs. People
GR No. 192565, February 28, 2012 Ratio:
The place where the Certificate was notarized, the MeTC-Makati City, is the proper venue for
Brief: This is a review under rule 45 for the decision of RTC Branch 65 of Makati. The the criminal action. The criminal act charged was for the execution of an affidavit that
Petitioner seeks to reverse and set aside the RTC’s Decision dismissing the petition for contained a falsity. Art. 183 of the RPC is the applicable provision for this case; and following
certiorari of petitioners Union Bank and Desi Tomas. The RTC found the MTC did not so, the jurisdiction and venue should be determined on the basis of this article which penalizes
commit any grave abuse of discretion in denying the motion to quash the information for one who makes an affidavit upon any material matter before a competent person authorized to
perjury filed by Tomas administer an oath in cases in which the law so requires. The constitutive act of the offense is
the making of an affidavit, so, the criminal act is consummated when the statement containing
Facts: Union bank filed two complaints for sum of money with prayer for a writ of replevin a falsity is subscribed and sworn before a duly authorized person.'
against spouses Eddie and Eliza Tamondong and a John Doe. The first complaint was filed The SC finds the ruling in Sy Tiong as more in accord with Art. 183 of the RPC. The Court
before the RTC, Branch 109, Pasay City on April 13, 1998. The second complaint was filed on ruled that the crime of perjury committed through the making of a false affidavit under Art.
March 15, 2000 and was raffled in the MeTC, Branch 47, Pasay City. In both cases, Desi 183 of the RPC is committed at the time the affiant subscribes and swears to his or her
Tomas executed and signed the Certification against Forum Shopping. Then, she was charged affidavit since it is at that time that all the elements of the crime of perjury are executed. When
of deliberately violating Article 183 of the RPC (perjury) "by falsely declaring under oath in the crime is committed through false testimony under oath in a proceeding that is neither
the Certificate against Forum Shopping in the second complaint that she did not commence criminal nor civil, venue is at the place where the testimony under oath is given.
any other action or proceeding involving the same issue in another tribunal or agency". The If in lieu of or as supplement to the actual testimony made in a proceeding that is neither
Certification was notarized in Makati City but was submitted and used in Pasay City, while the criminal nor civil, a written sown statement is submitted, venue may either be at the place
Information against Union Bank and Tomas was filed in Makati. Tomas filed a Motion to where the sworn statement is submitted or where the oath was taken as the taking of the oath
Quash on the grounds that the venue was improperly laid and that the facts do not constitute an and the submission are both material ingredients of the crime committed. In all cases, the
offense. On the first ground, Tomas argued that since it is the Pasay City Court where the determination of venue shall be based on the acts alleged in the Information to be
Certificate was submitted and used, it should have the jurisdiction over the case against her. constitutive of the crime committed.
The MeTC-Makati City denied the Motion to Quash, ruling that it has jurisdiction over the
case since the Certificate was notarized there and the allegations in the Information sufficiently
charged Tomas with perjury. Her subsequent Motion for Reconsideration was denied. When
the case was elevated to the RTC-Makati City, the petitioners prayed that the ruling of the
MeTC-Makati City be annulled and set aside on the ground of grave abuse of discretion. They
also cited the rulings in US vs. Canet and Ilusorio v. Bildner which state that "venue and
jurisdiction should be in the place where the false document was presented. The petition,
however, was found to have no merit as a recent jurisprudence, Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy. In the
Sy Tiong Shiou case, the high court ruled that the criminal action shall be instituted and tried
in the court of the municipality where the perjury was committed, or where any of its essential
ingredients occured. The petitioners then filed this petition to the Supreme Court to address the
seeming conflict between the rulings in Illusorio v. Bildner and Sy Tiong Shiou v. Sy.
Issue: Where is the proper venue of perjury under Art. 183 of the RPC - the place, where the
Certificate against Forum Shopping was notarized or where the Certification was presented to
the trial court?

Courts’ Ruling:
MTC:
Denied the motion to quash
RTC:
20
Rule 111: Civil liability arising from the offense is deemed instituted
Dr. Fenando Solidum vs. People of the Philippines
GR No. 192123 March 10 2014
Brief:
This appeal was taken by a physician- anesthesiologist who has been pronounced guilty of
reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries the RTC and CA. He had been part
of the team of anesthesiologists during the surgical pull-through operation conducted in a
three-year old patient born with an imperforate anus.
Facts:
Gerald Albert Gercayo (Gerald) was born on June 2, 1992 with an imperforate anus. Two days
after his birth, Gerald underwent colostomy, a surgical procedure to bring one end of the large
intestine out through the abdominal wall, enabling him to excrete through colostomy bag
attached to the side of his body. On May 17, 1995, he was admitted at the Ospital ng Maynila
for a pull-through operation. The Petitioner was the anesthesiologist. During the operation,
Gerald experienced bradycardia, and went into coma. He regained consciousness only after a
month. He could no longer see, hear or move. Agitated by her son’s helpless and unexpected
condition, Ma. Luz Gercayo (mother) lodged a complaint for reckless imprudence resulting to
serious physical injuries with the City Prosecutor’s Office of Manila against Solidum. Upon
finding of probable cause, the prosecutor’s office filed an information against Dr. Solidum.
The case was initially filed in the MTC but was later transferred to RTC pursuant to Section 5
of RA 8369 (the Family Courts Act of 1997).
Issue:
Whether or not Dr. Solidum was liable for criminal negligence? No.
Courts’ Ruling:
MTC and CA:
Guilty beyond reasonable doubt of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries.
Affirmed by the CA.
SC: Reversed decision of RTC and CA
Ratio:
Dr. Solidum was criminally charged for “failing to monitor and regulate properly the levels of
anesthesia administered to Gerald and using 100% halothane and other anesthetic
medications.” However, foregoing circumstances, taken together did not prove beyond
reasonable doubt that Dr. Solidum had been recklessly imprudent in administering the
anesthetic agent to Gerald. Indeed, Dr. Vertido’s findings did not preclude the probability of
other factors related to Gerald’s operation which could or could not necessarily be attributed to
the administration of anesthesia, has caused the hypoxia and had then led Gerald to experience
bradycardia. Dr. Vertido revealing concluded in his report, instead, that “although the
anesthesiologist followed the normal routine and precautionary procedures, still hypoxia and
its corresponding side effects did occur.”
The existence of probability about other factors causing the hypoxia has engendered in the
mind of the court a reasonable doubt as to Solidum’s guilt, and moves us to acquit him of the
crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries. A reasonable doubt is a
doubt growing reasonable out of evidence or the lack of it. It is not a captious doubt; not a
doubt engendered merely by sympathy for the unfortunate position of the defendant, or a
dislike to accept the responsibility of convicting a fellowman. If, having weighed the evidence
on both sides, you reach the conclusion that the defendant is guilty, to that degree of certainty
as would lead you to act on the faith of it in the most important and crucial affairs of your life,
you may properly convict him. Proof beyond reasonable doubt is not proof to mathematical
demonstration. It is not proof beyond the possibility of mistake. We have to clarify that the
acquittal of Dr. Solidum would not immediately exempt him from civil liability. But we cannot
now find him civilly liable because the circumstances that have been establish here do not
present the factual and legal bases for validly doing so. His acquittal did not derive only from
reasonable doubt. There was really no firm and competent showing how the injury to Gerard
had been caused. That meant that the manner of administration of anesthesia by Solidum was
not necessarily the cause of the hypoxia that cause bradycardia experienced by Gerard.
Consequently, to adjudge Solidum civilly liable would be to speculate on the cause of the
hypoxia. We are not allowed to do so, for civil liability must not rest on speculation but on
competent evidence.
Liability of Ospital ng Maynila (ONM).
Although the result now reached has resolved the issue of civil liability, we have to address the
unusual decree of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, of expressly holding ONM civilly liable
jointly and severally with Solidum. The decree was flawed in logic and in law.
In criminal prosecutions, the civil action for the recovery of civil liability that is deemed
instituted with the criminal actions refers only from the offense charged. It is puzzling
therefore, how the RTC and CA could have adjudged ONM jointly and severally liable with
Solidum for the damages despite the obvious fact that ONM, being artificial entity, had not
been charged along with Dr. Solidum. The lower courts thereby acted capriciously and
whimsically, which rendered their judgment against ONM void as the product of grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction. Not surprisingly, the flawed decree raises other
material concerns that the CA and RTC overlooked. We deem it important, then, to express the
following observations for the instruction of the Bench and Bar. For one, Ospital ng Maynila
was not at all a party in the proceedings. Hence, its fundamental right to be heard was not
respected from the outset. The R TC and the CA should have been alert to this fundamental
defect. Verily, no person can be prejudiced by a ruling rendered in an action or proceeding in
which he was not made a party. Such a rule would enforce the constitutional guarantee of due
process of law. Moreover, Ospital ng Maynila could be held civilly liable only when
subsidiary liability would be properly enforceable pursuant to Article 103 of the Revised Penal
Code. But the subsidiary liability seems far-fetched here. The conditions for subsidiary
21
liability to attach to Ospital ng Maynila should first be complied with. Firstly, pursuant to
Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, Ospital ng Maynila must be shown to be a corporation
"engaged in any kind of industry." The term industry means any department or branch of art,
occupation or business, especially one that employs labor and capital, and is engaged in
industry. However, Ospital ng Maynila, being a public hospital, was not engaged in industry
conducted for profit but purely in charitable and humanitarian work.50Secondly, assuming that
Ospital ng Maynila was engaged in industry for profit, Dr. Solidum must be shown to be an
employee of Ospital ng Maynila acting in the discharge of his duties during the operation on
Gerald. Yet, he definitely was not such employee but a consultant of the hospital. And, thirdly,
assuming that civil liability was adjudged against Dr. Solidum as an employee (which did not
happen here), the execution against him was unsatisfied due to his being insolvent.
SC Decision:
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on certiorari; REVERSES AND
SETS ASIDE the decision promulgated on January 20, 2010; ACQUITS Dr. Fernando P.
Solidum of the crime of reckless imprudence resulting to serious physical injuries; and
MAKES no pronouncement on costs of suit.
THE EFFECT OF ACQUITTAL IN A CRIMINAL CASE ON ITS CORRESPONDING
CIVIL LIABILITY
GR. No. 191240, July 30, 2014
CRISTINA B. CASTILLO, Petitioner, vs. PHILLIP R. SALVADOR, Respondent.
PERALTA, J.:
Brief:
This is a petition for review on certiorari which assails the Decision1 dated February 11, 2010
of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151 with respect only to the civil aspect
of the case as respondent Phillip R. Salvador had been acquitted of the crime of estafa.
Facts:
The respondent Phillip R. Salvador was charged with estafa under Article 315, paragraph 2 (a)
of the Revised Penal Code. The Regional Trial Court and the Court of Appeals acquitted him
of the same but the civil aspect of the case remained. Respondent Salvador then filed a petition
for review on Certiorari to the Supreme Court.
Petitioner Cristina B. Castillo is a businesswoman engaged in real estate business, educational
institution, boutique, and trading business. She was then enticed by Salvador and his brother,
Ramon Salvador to engage in freight and remittance business.
As petitioner had deeply fallen in love with respondent Salvador and since she trusted him
very much as he even acted as a father to her children when her annulment was ongoing, she
agreed to embark on the remittance business. She agreed with respondent and Ramon that any
profit derived from the business would be equally divided among them and that respondent
would be in charge of promotion and marketing in Hong Kong, while Ramon would take
charge of the operations of business in the Philippines and she would be financing the
business.
The business has not operated yet as petitioner was still raising the amount of US$100,000.00
as capital for the actual operation. When petitioner already had the money, she handed the
same to respondent Salvador which was witnessed by her disabled half-brother Enrico B. Tan.
However, the proposed business never operated as respondent only stayed in Hong Kong for
three days. When she asked respondent about the money and the business, the latter told her
that the money was deposited in a bank. However, upon further query, respondent confessed
that he used the money to pay for his other obligations. Since then, the US$100,000.00 was not
returned at all.
Issue:
Must the award of damaged be retained despite the acquittal of the accused in the
criminal case? NO
Action of the Courts:
22
RTC:
WHEREFORE, accused PHILLIP SALVADOR is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt
of the crime of Estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (a) of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate sentence of four (4) years, two (2) months and one (1)
day of prisyon (sic) correctional (sic) maximum as minimum to twenty (20) years of reclusion
temporal maximum as maximum and to indemnify the private complainant in the amount of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND DOLLARS (US$100,000.00) or its equivalent in Philippine
currency.
With respect to accused RAMON SALVADOR, he is ACQUITTED for insufficiency of
evidence.
CA:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision of Branch 202 of the RTC of Las
Piñas City, dated April 21, 2006, is hereby REVERSED AND SET ASIDE and accused
appellant PHILLIP R. SALVADOR is ACQUITTED of the crime of Estafa
Supreme Court:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED. The Decision dated February 11, 2010,
of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 30151, is hereby AFFIRMED
Ratio:
The award of damages must be removed. Our law recognizes two kinds of acquittal, with
different effects on the civil liability of the accused. First is an acquittal on the ground that the
accused is not the author of the actor omission complained of. This instance closes the door to
civil liability, for a person who has been found to be not the perpetrator of any act or omission
cannot and can never be held liable for such act or omission. There being no delict, civil
liability ex delicto is out of the question, and the civil action, if any, which may be instituted
must be based on grounds other than the delict complained of. This is the situation
contemplated in Rule III of the Rules of Court. The second instance is an acquittal based on
reasonable doubt on the guilt of the accused. In this case, even if the guilt of the accused has
not been satisfactorily established, he is not exempt from civil liability which may be proved
by preponderance of evidence only. This is the situation contemplated in Article 29 of the
Civil Code, where the civil action for damages is "for the same act or omission.
A reading of the CA decision would show that respondent was acquitted because the
prosecution failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Said the CA:
The evidence for the prosecution being insufficient to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the
crime as charged had been committed by appellant, the general presumption, "that a person is
innocent of the crime or wrong, stands in his favor. The prosecution failed to prove that all the
elements of estafa are present in this case as would overcome the presumption of innocence in
favor of appellant. For in fact, the prosecution's primary witness herself could not even
establish clearly and precisely how appellant committed the alleged fraud. She failed to
convince us that she was deceived through misrepresentations and/or insidious actions, in
venturing into a remittance business. Quite the contrary, the obtaining circumstance in this
case indicate the weakness of her submissions.
Thus, since the acquittal is based on reasonable doubt, respondent is not exempt from civil
liability which may be proved by preponderance of evidence only. In Encinas v. National
Bookstore, Inc., the higher court explained the concept of preponderance of evidence as
follows:
x x x Preponderance of evidence is the weight, credit, and value of the aggregate evidence on
either side and is usually considered to be synonymous with the term "greater weight of the
evidence" or "greater weight of the credible evidence." Preponderance of evidence is a phrase
which, in the last analysis, means probability of the truth. It is evidence which is more
convincing to the court as worthy of belief than that which is offered in opposition thereto.
However, in this case, no such civil liability is proved even by preponderance of evidence.
In discrediting petitioner’s allegation that she gave respondent US$100,000.00 in May 2002,
the CA found that: (1) petitioner failed to show how she was able to raise the money in such a
short period of time and even gave conflicting versions on the source of the same; (2)
petitioner failed to require respondent to sign a receipt so she could have a record of the
transaction and offered no plausible reason why the money was allegedly hand-carried to Hong
Kong; (3) petitioner’s claim of trust as reason for not requiring respondent to sign a receipt
was inconsistent with the way she conducted her previous transactions with him; and (4)
petitioner’s behavior after the alleged fraud perpetrated against her was inconsistent with the
actuation of someone who had been swindled.
The petition for the award of damages is denied.
23
B. Suspension of Civil Action (Sec. 2)
- when suspended; consolidated
- what is the Bar Rule in Amparo and Habeas Data
LILY LIM, petitioner, vs. KOU CO PING a.k.a. CHARLIE CO, respondent.
G.R. No. 175256
August 23, 2012
Ponente: DELCASTILLO, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is an appeal from a decision rendered by the Second and Seventeenth Divisions of the
Court of Appeals (CA) on the issue on forum shopping for a private complaint for specific
performance and damages, while appealing the judgment on the civil aspect of a criminal case
for estafa.
FACTS
In February 1999, FR Cement Corporation (FRCC), owner/operator of a cement
manufacturing plant, issued several withdrawal authorities for the account of cement dealers
and traders, Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt. These withdrawal authorities state the number of
bags that the dealer/trader paid for and can withdraw from the plant. Each withdrawal authority
contained a provision that it is valid for six months from its date of issuance, unless revoked by
FRCC Marketing Department.
Fil-Cement Center and Tigerbilt, through their administrative manager, Gail Borja (Borja),
sold the withdrawal authorities covering 50,000 bags of cement to Co for the amount of P3.15
million or P63.00 per bag.10 On February 15, 1999, Co sold these withdrawal authorities to
Lim allegedly at the price of P64.00 per bag or a total of P3.2 million. Using the withdrawal
authorities, Lim withdrew the cement bags from FRCC on a staggered basis. She successfully
withdrew 2,800 bags of cement, and sold back some of the withdrawal authorities, covering
10,000 bags, to Co.
Sometime in April 1999, FRCC did not allow Lim to withdraw the remaining 37,200 bags
covered by the withdrawal authorities. Lim clarified the matter with Co and Borja, who
explained that the plant implemented a price increase and would only release the goods once
Lim pays for the price difference or agrees to receive a lesser quantity of cement. Lim objected
and maintained that the withdrawal authorities she bought were not subject to price
fluctuations. Lim sought legal recourse after her demands for Co to resolve the problem with
the plant or for the return of her money had failed.
An Information for Estafa through Misappropriation or Conversion was filed against Co before
Branch 154 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig City. The private complainant, Lily
Lim, participated in the criminal proceedings to prove her damages. She prayed for Co to
return her money amounting to P2,380,800.00, foregone profits, and legal interest, and for an
award of moral and exemplary damages, as well as attorney’s fees. However, the RTC
acquitted Co via Demurer to Evidence which was granted by the court. The civil aspect of the
case also rendered Co not civilly liable to Lim. This was brought on appeal by Lim in the CA
and was dismissed because the parties, causes of action, and reliefs prayed for in Lim’s appeal
and in her civil complaint are identical. Both actions seek the same relief, which is the
payment of the value of the 37,200 bags of cement. Thus, the CA Second Division dismissed
Lim’s appeal for forum shopping.
On April 19, 2005, Lim filed a complaint for specific performance and damages before Branch
21 of the RTC of Manila. The Manila RTC held that there was no forum shopping because the
causes of action invoked in the two cases are different. It observed that the civil complaint
before it is based on an obligation arising from contract and quasi-delict, whereas the civil
liability involved in the appeal of the criminal case arose from a felony.
Co filed a petition for certiorari, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 93395, before the appellate
court. He prayed for the nullification of the Manila RTC’s Order in Civil Case No. 05-112396
for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion. The CA Seventeenth Division denied
Co’s petition and remanded the civil complaint to the trial court for further proceedings. The
CA Seventeenth Division agreed with Manila RTC that the elements of litis pendentia and
forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do not share the same cause
of action. The CA denied35 Co’s motion for reconsideration.
Co filed the instant Petition for Review, which was docketed as G.R. No. 179160.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether Lim commit forum shopping in filing the civil case for specific performance and
damages during the pendency of her appeal on the civil aspect of the criminal case for estafa?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC (PASIG): Co was acquitted for the criminal aspect of estafa and not liable for the
civil aspect of the crime.
CA (2nd Div.): Dismissed Lim’s appeals for having committed Forum-shopping in the
filing of appeal and the complaint for specific performance and damages.
RTC (MANILA): No Form-shopping was committed by Lim because the causes of
action invoked in the two cases are different, one for civil liability in a criminal case and
the other for contracts and quasi-delicts.
CA (17th Div.): CA Seventeenth Division agreed with Manila RTC that the elements of
litis pendentia and forum shopping are not met in the two proceedings because they do
not share the same cause of action.
24

SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
A single act or omission that causes damage to an offended party may give rise to two separate
civil liabilities on the part of the offender.―(1) civil liability ex delicto, that is, civil liability
arising from the criminal offense under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code, and (2)
independent civil liability, that is, civil liability that may be pursued independently of the
criminal proceedings. The independent civil liability may be based on “an obligation not
arising from the act or omission complained of as a felony,” as provided in Article 31 of the
Civil Code (such as for breach of contract or for tort). It may also be based on an act or
omission that may constitute felony but, nevertheless, treated independently from the criminal
action by specific provision of Article 33 of the Civil Code (“in cases of defamation, fraud and
physical injuries”).
The civil liability arising from the offense or ex delicto is based on the acts or omissions that
constitute the criminal offense; hence, its trial is inherently intertwined with the criminal
action. For this reason, the civil liability ex delicto is impliedly instituted with the criminal
offense. If the action for the civil liability ex delicto is instituted prior to or subsequent to the
filing of the criminal action, its proceedings are suspended until the final outcome of the
criminal action. The civil liability based on delict is extinguished when the court hearing the
criminal action declares that “the act or omission from which the civil liability may arise did
not exist.”
On the other hand, the independent civil liabilities are separate from the criminal action and
may be pursued independently as provided in Article 31 and 33 of the Civil Code.
Because of the distinct and independent nature of the two kinds of civil liabilities,
jurisprudence holds that the offended party may pursue the two types of civil liabilities
simultaneously or cumulatively, without offending the rules on forum shopping, litis
pendentia, or res judicata. As explained in Cancio, Jr. v. Isip:
One of the elements of res judicata is identity of causes of action. In the instant case,
it must be stressed that the action filed by petitioner is an independent civil action,
which remains separate and distinct from any criminal prosecution based on the
same act. Not being deemed instituted in the criminal action based on culpa criminal,
a ruling on the culpability of the offender will have no bearing on said independent
civil action based on an entirely different cause of action, i.e., culpa contractual.
In the same vein, the filing of the collection case after the dismissal of the estafa cases against
[the offender] did not amount to forum-shopping. The essence of forum shopping is the filing
of multiple suits involving the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously
or successively, to secure a favorable judgment. Although the cases filed by [the offended
party] arose from the same act or omission of [the offender], they are, however, based on
different causes of action. The criminal cases for estafa are based on culpa criminal while the
civil action for collection is anchored on culpa contractual. Moreover, there can be no forum-
shopping in the instant case because the law expressly allows the filing of a separate civil
action which can proceed independently of the criminal action. Since civil liabilities arising
from felonies and those arising from other sources of obligations are authorized by law to
proceed independently of each other, the resolution of the present issue hinges on whether the
two cases herein involve different kinds of civil obligations such that they can proceed
independently of each other. The answer is in the affirmative.
The first action (RTC PASIG) is clearly a civil action ex delicto, it having been instituted
together with the criminal action. On the other hand, the second action (RTC MANILA),
judging by the allegations contained in the complaint, is a civil action arising from a
contractual obligation and for tortious conduct (abuse of rights). In her civil complaint, Lim
basically alleges that she entered into a sale contract with Co under the following terms: that
she bought 37,200 bags of cement at the rate of P64.00 per bag from Co; that, after full
payment, Co delivered to her the withdrawal authorities issued by FRCC corresponding to
these bags of cement; that these withdrawal authorities will be honored by FRCC for six
months from the dates written thereon. Lim then maintains that the defendants breached their
contractual obligations to her under the sale contract and under the withdrawal authorities; that
Co and his co-defendants wanted her to pay more for each bag of cement, contrary to their
agreement to fix the price at P64.00 per bag and to the wording of the withdrawal authorities;
that FRCC did not honor the terms of the withdrawal authorities it issued; and that Co did not
comply with his obligation under the sale contract to deliver the 37,200 bags of cement to Lim.
From the foregoing allegations, it is evident that Lim seeks to enforce the defendants’
contractual obligations, given that she has already performed her obligations. She prays that
the defendants either honor their part of the contract or pay for the damages that their breach
has caused her.
Lim also includes allegations that the actions of the defendants were committed in such
manner as to cause damage to Lim without regard for morals, good customs and public policy.
These allegations, if proven, would constitute tortious conduct (abuse of rights under the
Human Relations provisions of the Civil Code).
Thus, Civil Case No. 05-112396 (RTC MANILA) involves only the obligations arising from
contract and from tort, whereas the appeal in the estafa case involves only the civil obligations
of Co arising from the offense charged. They present different causes of action, which, under
the law, are considered “separate, distinct, and independent” from each other. Both cases can
proceed to their final adjudication, subject to the prohibition on double recovery under Article
2177 of the Civil Code.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Premises considered, Lily Lim’s Petition in G.R. No. 175256 is GRANTED. The assailed
October 20, 2005 Resolution of the Second Division of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85138 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Lily Lim’s appeal in CA-G.R. CV No. 85138 is
ordered REINSTATED and the Court of Appeals is DIRECTED to RESOLVE the same with
DELIBERATE DISPATCH.
25
C. Independent Civil Action (Sec. 3)
- Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176
CASUPANAN VS LAROYA
AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO, petitioners, vs. MARIO LLAVORE
LAROYA, respondent.
G.R. No. 145391
August 26, 2002
Ponente: CARPIO, J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari to set aside the Resolution1 dated December 28, 1999
dismissing the petition for certiorari and the Resolution2 dated August 24, 2000 denying the
motion for reconsideration, both issued by the Regional Trial Court of Capas, Tarlac, Branch
66, in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99). Casupanan vs. Laroya, 388 SCRA 28, G.R. No.
145391 August 26, 2002
FACTS
Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Mario Llavore Laroya (“Laroya” for brevity) and the
other owned by petitioner Roberto Capitulo (“Capitulo” for brevity) and driven by petitioner
Avelino Casupanan (“Casupanan” for brevity), figured in an accident. As a result, two cases
were filed with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court (“MCTC” for brevity) of Capas, Tarlac.
Laroya filed a criminal case against Casupanan for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property, docketed as Criminal Case No. 002-99. On the other hand, Casupanan and Capitulo
filed a civil case against Laroya for quasi-delict, docketed as Civil Case No. 2089.
When the civil case was filed, the criminal case was then at its preliminary investigation stage.
Laroya, defendant in the civil case, filed a motion to dismiss the civil case on the ground of
forum-shopping considering the pendency of the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion
in the Order of March 26, 1999 and dismissed the civil case.
On Motion for Reconsideration, Casupanan and Capitulo insisted that the civil case is a
separate civil action which can proceed independently of the criminal case. The MCTC denied
the motion for reconsideration in the Order of May 7, 1999. Casupanan and Capitulo filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the Regional Trial Court (“Capas RTC” for brevity)
of Capas, Tarlac, Branch 66, assailing the MCTC’s Order of dismissal.
The Capas RTC rendered judgment on December 28, 1999 dismissing the petition for
certiorari for lack of merit. The Capas RTC ruled that the order of dismissal issued by the
MCTC is a final order which disposes of the case and therefore the proper remedy should have
been an appeal. The Capas RTC further held that a special civil action for certiorari is not a
substitute for a lost appeal. Finally, the Capas RTC declared that even on the premise that the
MCTC erred in dismissing the civil case, such error is a pure error of judgment and not an
abuse of discretion.
Casupanan and Capitulo filed a Motion for Reconsideration but the Capas RTC denied the
same in the Resolution of August 24, 2000.
Hence, this petition.
Casupanan and Capitulo assert that Civil Case No. 2089, which the MCTC dismissed on the
ground of forum-shopping, constitutes a counterclaim in the criminal case. Casupanan and
Capitulo argue that if the accused in a criminal case has a counterclaim against the private
complainant, he may file the counterclaim in a separate civil action at the proper time. They
contend that an action on quasi-delict is different from an action resulting from the crime of
reckless imprudence, and an accused in a criminal case can be an aggrieved party in a civil
case arising from the same incident. They maintain that under Articles 31 and 2176 of the Civil
Code, the civil case can proceed independently of the criminal action. Finally, they point out
that Casupanan was not the only one who filed the independent civil action based on quasi-
delict but also Capitulo, the owner-operator of the vehicle, who was not a party in the criminal
case.
In his Comment, Laroya claims that the petition is fatally defective as it does not state the real
antecedents. Laroya further alleges that Casupanan and Capitulo forfeited their right to
question the order of dismissal when they failed to avail of the proper remedy of appeal.
Laroya argues that there is no question of law to be resolved as the order of dismissal is
already final and a petition for certiorari is not a substitute for a lapsed appeal.
In their Reply, Casupanan and Capitulo contend that the petition raises the legal question of
whether there is forum-shopping since they filed only one action—the independent civil action
for quasi-delict against Laroya.
The MCTC dismissed the civil action for quasi-delict on the ground of forum-shopping under
Supreme Court Administrative Circular No. 04-94.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence can validly file,
simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for quasi-delict against the private
complainant in the criminal case?
ACTIONS of the COURT
26
RTC: Dismissed the civil case of Casupunan and Capitulo against Laroya due to the
pendency of the criminal case against Casupunan.
CA: Dismissed Casupunan and Capitulo’s civil case against Laroya because the
MCTC decision was already final as to the institution of this independent civil case
pursued by the petitioners.
SC: The decision of the RTC is annulled and reinstated the independent civil case filed
by the petitioners.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The essence of forum-shopping is the filing of multiple suits involving the same parties for the
same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, to secure a favorable judgment.
Forum-shopping is present when in the two or more cases pending, there is identity of parties,
rights of action and reliefs sought. However, there is no forum-shopping in the instant case
because the law and the rules expressly allow the filing of a separate civil action which can
proceed independently of the criminal action.
Laroya filed the criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting in damage to property based
on the Revised Penal Code while Casupanan and Capitulo filed the civil action for damages
based on Article 2176 of the Civil Code. Although these two actions arose from the same act
or omission, they have different causes of action. The criminal case is based on culpa criminal
punishable under the Revised Penal Code while the civil case is based on culpa aquiliana
actionable under Articles 2176 and 2177 of the Civil Code.
Section 1, Rule 111 of the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure (“1985 Rules” for brevity), as
amended in 1988, allowed the filing of a separate civil action independently of the criminal
action provided the offended party reserved the right to file such civil action. Unless the
offended party reserved the civil action before the presentation of the evidence for the
prosecution, all civil actions arising from the same act or omission were deemed “impliedly
instituted” in the criminal case. These civil actions referred to the recovery of civil liability ex-
delicto, the recovery of damages for quasidelict, and the recovery of damages for violation of
Articles 32, 33 and 34 of the Civil Code on Human Relations.
Thus, to file a separate and independent civil action for quasidelict under the 1985 Rules, the
offended party had to reserve in the criminal action the right to bring such action. Otherwise,
such civil action was deemed “impliedly instituted” in the criminal action. Under Section 1 of
the present Rule 111, what is “deemed instituted” with the criminal action is only the action to
recover civil liability arising from the crime or ex-delicto. All the other civil actions under
Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code are no longer “deemed instituted,” and may be
filed separately and prosecuted independently even without any reservation in the criminal
action. The failure to make a reservation in the criminal action is not a waiver of the right to
file a separate and independent civil action based on these articles of the Civil Code. The
prescriptive period on the civil actions based on these articles of the Civil Code continues to
run even with the filing of the criminal action. Verily, the civil actions based on these articles
of the Civil Code are separate, distinct and independent of the civil action “deemed instituted”
in the criminal action.
Under Section 2, Rule 111 of the amended 1985 Rules, a separate civil action, if reserved in
the criminal action, could not be filed until after final judgment was rendered in the criminal
action. If the separate civil action was filed before the commencement of the criminal action,
the civil action, if still pending, was suspended upon the filing of the criminal action until final
judgment was rendered in the criminal action. This rule applied only to the separate civil
action filed to recover liability ex-delicto. The rule did not apply to independent civil actions
based on Articles 32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code, which could proceed independently
regardless of the filing of the criminal action.
Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or omission he is
accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in paragraph 6, Section 1 of the
present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim of the accused “may be litigated in a
separate civil action.” This is only fair for two reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from
setting up any counterclaim in the civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case.
The accused is therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended
party. If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive period
may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-delict is filed.
Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to invoke Article 2177 of the Civil
Code, in the same way that the offended party can avail of this remedy which is independent of
the criminal action. To disallow the accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict,
while refusing to recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.
Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Casupanan and Capitulo is
proper. The order of dismissal by the MCTC of Civil Case No. 2089 on the ground of forum-
shopping is erroneous.
We make this ruling aware of the possibility that the decision of the trial court in the criminal
case may vary with the decision of the trial court in the independent civil action.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The petition for review on certiorari is hereby GRANTED. The Resolutions dated December
28, 1999 and August 24, 2000 in Special Civil Action No. 17-C (99) are ANNULLED and
Civil Case No. 2089 is REINSTATED.
D. Effect of death on the Civil Action (Sec. 4)
- compare with Secs. 17, 18 and 20 of Rule 3
27
PEOPLE VS ROMERO
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. MARTIN L. ROMERO and
ERNESTO C. RODRIGUEZ, accused-appellants.
G.R. No. 112985
April 21, 1999
Ponente: PARDO, J.
Nature of Case:
APPEAL from a decision of the Regional Trial Court of Butuan City, Br. 2.
BRIEF
The case before the Court is an appeal of accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez
from the Joint Judgment1 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 2, Butuan City, convicting each
of them of estafa under Article 315, par. 2 (d) of the Revised Penal Code, in relation to
Presidential Decree No. 1689, for widescale swindling, and sentencing each of them to suffer
the penalty of life imprisonment and to jointly and severally pay Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount
of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00), with interest at the rate of twelve percent
(12%) per annum, starting September 14, 1989, until fully paid, and to pay ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00), as moral damages
FACTS
On October 25, 1989, Butuan City acting fiscal Ernesto M. Brocoy filed with the Regional
Trial Court, Butuan City, an Information against the two (2) accused for estafa, as follows:
“That on or about September 14, 1989, at Butuan City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused being the General Manager and Operation
Manager which solicit funds from the general public for investment, conspiring, confederating
together and mutually helping one another, by means of deceit and false pretense, did then and
there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously deliberately defraud one Ernesto A. Ruiz by
convincing the latter to invest his money in the amount of P150,000.00 with a promise return
of 800% profit within 21 days and in the process caused the issuance of Butuan City Rural
Rural [sic] Bank Check No. 158181 postdated to October 5, 1989 in the amount of One
Million Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P1,200,000.00) Philippine Currency, that upon
presentation of said check to the drawee bank for payment the same was dishonored and that
notwithstanding repeated demands made on said accused to pay and/or change the check to
cash, they consistently failed and refused and still fail and refuse to pay or redeem the check,
to the damage and prejudice of the complainant in the aforestated amount of P1,200,000.00.”
On the same day, the city fiscal filed with the same court another information against the two
(2) accused for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22, arising from the issuance of the same
check.4
On January 11, 1990, both accused were arraigned before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 5,5
Butuan City, where they pleaded not guilty to both informations.
The prosecution presented its evidence on January 10, 1991, with complainant, Ernesto A.
Ruiz, and Daphne Parrocho, the usher/collector of the corporation being managed by accused,
testifying for the prosecution.
On August 12, 1991, the defense presented its only witness, accused Martin L. Romero.
On November 13, 1992, the parties submitted a joint stipulation of facts, signed only by their
respective counsels. Thereafter, the case was submitted for decision.
On March 30, 1993, the trial court promulgated a Joint Judgment dated March 25, 1993. The
trial court acquitted the accused in Criminal Case No. 38066 based on reasonable doubt, but
convicted them in Criminal Case No. 38087 and accordingly sentenced each of them, as
follows:
“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby renders judgment, finding or declaring—
“(a) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez innocent on reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 3806, for violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22;
“(b) Accused Martin L. Romero and Ernesto C. Rodriguez guilty beyond reasonable doubt in
Criminal Case No. 3808 for estafa under P.D. 1689 for wide scale [sic] swindling and
accordingly sentences them to suffer life imprisonment (Section 1, P.D. 1689) and ordered
jointly and severally to return to Ernesto A. Ruiz the amount of One Hundred Fifty Thousand
Pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at the rate of Twelve percent (12%) per annum
starting from September 14, 1989 until fully paid and to pay the amount of Ten Thousand
Pesos (P10,000.00) as moral damages.
On March 31, 1993, accused filed their notice of appeal, which the trial court gave due course
on April 5, 1993. On March l6, 1994, this Court ordered the accused to file their appellants’
brief.
Accused-appellants filed their brief on October 30, 1995, while the Solicitor General filed the
appellee’s brief on March 8, 1996. During the pendency of the appeal, on November 12, 1997,
accused Ernesto Rodriguez died. As a consequence of his death before final judgment, his
criminal and civil liability ex delicto, were extinguished.
28
In this appeal, both accused did not deny that complainant made an investment with
SAIDECOR in the amount of P150,000.00. However, they denied that deceit was employed in
the transaction. They assigned as errors: (1) their conviction under P.D. 1689 due to the
prosecution’s failure to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt; and (2) the trial court’s
failure to consider the joint stipulation of facts in their favor but the CA found no merit on the
appeal by the accused.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the deceased accused may still be civilly liable in this case?
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Convicted the accused.
CA: Affirmed the conviction of the trial court.
SC: Affirms conviction with modification.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court notes that one of the accused-appellants, Ernesto Rodriguez, died pending appeal.
Pursuant to the doctrine established in People vs. Bayotas, the death of the accused pending
appeal of his conviction extinguishes his criminal liability as well as the civil liability ex
delicto. The criminal action is extinguished inasmuch as there is no longer a defendant to stand
as the accused, the civil action instituted therein for recovery of civil liability ex delicto is ipso
facto extinguished, grounded as it is on the criminal case. Corollarily, the claim for civil
liability survives notwithstanding the death of the accused, if the same may also be predicated
on a source of obligation other than delict.
Thus, the outcome of this appeal pertains only to the remaining accused-appellant, Martin L.
Romero. The trial court considered the swindling involved in this case as having been
committed by a syndicate and sentenced the accused to life imprisonment based on the
provisions of Presidential Decree 1689, which increased the penalty for certain forms of
swindling or estafa.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby AFFIRMS WITH MODIFICATION the appealed judgment.
The Court hereby sentences accused-appellant Martin Romero to suffer an indeterminate
penalty of ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years
and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as maximum, to indemnify Ernesto A. Ruiz in the
amount of one hundred fifty thousand pesos (P150,000.00) with interest thereon at six (6%)
per centum per annum from September 14, 1989, until fully paid, to pay twenty thousand
pesos (P20,000.00) as moral damages and fifteen thousand pesos (P15,000.00), as exemplary
damages, and the costs.
Rule 112 – Preliminary Examination
A. Definition/Description
-when a matter of right
- Distinguish from Preliminary Examination
ROSA H. FENEQUITO, CORAZON E. HERNANDEZ, and LAURO H. RODRIGUEZ,
Petitioners, vs. BERNARDO VERGARA, JR., Respondent.
G.R. No. 172829 July 18, 2012
NATURE OF CASE:
Petition for review on Certiorari
BRIEF
The present petition arose from a criminal complaint for falsification of public documents filed
by herein respondent against herein petitioners with the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Manila.
FACTS:
On February 11, 2004, an information for falsification of public documents was filed with the
Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Manila by the Assistant City Prosecutor of Manila
(representing Bernardo Vergara Jr.) against Rosa Fenequito, Corazon E. Hernandez, and Lauro
H. Rodriquez. On April 23, 2004, Fenequito, et al. filed a Motion to Dismiss the Case Based
on Absence of Probable Cause. The MeTC issued an order granting the said motion. Upon
appeal and with the express conformity by the public prosecutor, the RTC set aside the
MeTC’s order and directed the latter to trial. Fenequito, et al, filed an appeal before the CA,
which subsequent ruled that the RTC’s assailed decision was interlocutory in nature and was
therefore not appealable. Hence, the instant petition for review.
ISSUE:
1. Whether RTC’s decision was interlocutory and can be appealed.
2. Whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding of probable cause.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. RTC’s decision was interlocutory in nature. As such, it cannot be appealed.
One of the grounds for the CA’s outright dismissal of Fenequito et al.’s petition for review
was because of the latter’s failure to submit copies of pleadings and documents relevant
and pertinent to the petition filed, as required under Section 2, Rule 42 of the Rules of
Court.
It is settled rule that the right to appeal is neither a natural right nor a part of due process;
it is merely a statutory privilege, and may be exercised only in the manner and in
29
 accordance with the provisions of law. An appeal being a purely statutory right, an
appealing party must strictly comply with the requisites laid down in the Rules of Court.
The rationale for this strict attitude is not difficult to appreciate as the Rules are designed
to facilities the orderly disposition of appealed cases.
But even if the Court bends its Rules to allow the present petition, the Court still finds no
cogent reason to depart from the assailed ruling of the CA. This is because Fenequito et al.
erroneously assumed that the RTC Decision is final and appealable, when in fact it is
interlocutory. An order is interlocutory if it does not dispose of a case completely, but
leaves something more to be done upon its merits. In contrast, a final order is one that
which dispose of the whole subject matter or terminates a particular proceeding or action,
leaving nothing to be done but to enforce by execution what has been determined.
Granted, the assailed Decision of the RTC set aside the Order of the MeTC and directed
the court a quo to proceed to trial by allowing the prosecution to present its evidence.
Hence, it is clear that the RTC Decision is interlocutory as it did not dispose of the case
completely, but left something more to be done on its merits.
2. There is sufficient evidence.
Probable cause, for the purpose of filing a criminal information, has been defined as such
facts as are sufficient to engender a well-founded belief that a crime has been committed
and that respondent is probably guilty thereof. The term does not mean "actual and
positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and
reasonable belief. Probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is
sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or
omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
A finding of probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that, more likely than
not, a crime has been committed by the suspects. It need not be based on clear and
convincing evidence of guilt, not on evidence establishing guilt beyond reasonable doubt,
and definitely not on evidence establishing absolute certainty of guilt. In determining
probable cause, the average man weighs facts and circumstances without resorting to the
calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on
common sense. What is determined is whether there is sufficient ground to engender a
well-founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the accused is probably
guilty thereof and should be held for trial. It does not require an inquiry as to whether
there is sufficient evidence to secure a conviction.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals,
dated March 9, 2006 and May 22, 2006 in CA-G.R. CR No. 29648, are AFFIRMED.
BURGUNDY REALTY CORPORATION, Petitioner, vs. JOSEFA "JING" C. REYES
and SECRETARY RAUL GONZALEZ of the DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
Respondents.
G.R. No. 181021 December 10, 2012
NATURE OF CASES:
Petition for review
BRIEF:
For resolution of this Court is the Petition for Review on Certiorari, dated February 13, 2008,
of petitioner Burgundy Realty Corporation, seeking to annul and set aside the Decision 1 and
Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA), dated September 14, 2007 and December 20, 2007,
respectively.
FACTS:
Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes is the real estate agent of the petitioner in buying parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna, which are to be developed into a golf course. She informed petitioner that
more or less ten (10) lot owners are her clients who were willing to sell their properties.
Convinced of her representations, petitioner released the amount of P23,423,327.50 in her
favor to be used in buying those parcels of land. Reyes, instead of buying those parcels of land,
converted and misappropriated the money given by petitioner to her personal use and benefit.
Petitioner sent a formal demand for Reyes to return the amount of P23,423,327.50, to no avail
despite her receipt of the said demand. As such, petitioner filed a complaint for the crime of
Estafa against Reyes before the Assistant City Prosecutor's Office of Makati City.
Reyes, while admitting that she acted as a real estate agent for petitioner, denied having
converted or misappropriated the involved amount of money and avers that it is his sub-agent
who misappropriated the funds. Reyes filed a complaint for the crime of estafa against Mateo
Elejorde his sub-broker.
After a preliminary investigation was conducted against Reyes, the Assistant Prosecutor of
Makati City and recommended the indictment of that Reyes be indicted of the crime of estafa.
Thereafter, an Information for the crime of Estafa under was filed against Reyes.
Reyes filed a petition for review with DOJ but was dismissed, aggrieved, she then filed a
motion for reconsideration and said motion was granted. DOJ Sec. in a resolution directed to
cause the withdrawal of the information against Reyes.
ISSUE:
Whether the DOJ erred in not finding a probable cause to charge Reyes with the crime of
estafa.
COURT RATIONALE IN THE ABOVE FACTS:
This Court need not overemphasize that in a preliminary investigation, the public prosecutor
merely determines whether there is probable cause or sufficient ground to engender a well-
30
founded belief that a crime has been committed, and that the respondent is probably guilty
thereof and should be held for trial. It does not call for the application of rules and standards of
proof that a judgment of conviction requires after trial on the merits.15 The complainant need
not present at this stage proof beyond reasonable doubt. A preliminary investigation does not
require a full and exhaustive presentation of the parties' evidence. Precisely, there is a trial to
allow the reception of evidence for both parties to substantiate their respective claims.
A review of the records would show that the investigating prosecutor was correct in finding the
existence of all the elements of the crime of estafa. Reyes did not dispute that she received in
trust the amount of P23,423,327.50 from petitioner as proven by the checks and vouchers to be
used in purchasing the parcels of land. Petitioner wrote a demand letter for Reyes to return the
same amount but was not heeded. Hence, the failure of Reyes to deliver the titles or to return
the entrusted money, despite demand and the duty to do so, constituted prima facie evidence of
misappropriation. The words convert and misappropriate connote the act of using or disposing
of another's property as if it were one's own, or of devoting it to a purpose or use different from
that agreed upon.19 To misappropriate for one's own use includes not only conversion to one's
personal advantage, but also every attempt to dispose of the property of another without
right.20 In proving the element of conversion or misappropriation, a legal presumption of
misappropriation arises when the accused fails to deliver the proceeds of the sale or to return
the items to be sold and fails to give an account of their whereabouts. Thus, the mere
presumption of misappropriation or conversion is enough to conclude that a probable cause
exists for the indictment of Reyes for Estafa. As to whether the presumption can be rebutted by
Reyes is already a matter of defense that can be best presented or offered during a full-blown
trial.
To reiterate, probable cause has been defined as the existence of such facts and circumstances
as would excite the belief in a reasonable mind, acting on the facts within the knowledge of the
prosecutor, that the person charged was guilty of the crime for which he was prosecuted.
Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well founded
on such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of ordinary
caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that a thing is so.
The term does not mean "actual or positive cause" nor does it import absolute certainty. It is
merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of probable cause does not
require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. It is
enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense
charged.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present Petition is hereby GRANTED and,
accordingly, the Decision and Resolution of the Court of Appeals, dated September 14, 2007
and December 20, 2007, respectively, are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Consequently, the Regional Trial Court, Branch 149, Makati City, where the Information was
filed against private respondent Josefa "Jing" C. Reyes, is hereby DIRECTED to proceed with
her arraignment.
RULE 112 – Preliminary Investigation
B. Who may Conduct P.I
CITY PROSECUTOR ARMANDO P. ABANADO, Complainant, vs. JUDGE
ABRAHAM A. BAYONA, Presiding Judge, Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Branch 7,
Bacolod City, Respondent.
A.M. No. MTJ-12-1804
July 30, 2012
NATURE OF CASE:
Administrative Matter
BRIEF
The case now before this Court sprang from Criminal Case No. 09-03-164 7 4, entitled People
of the Philippines v. Cresencio Palo, Sr.1 On March 24, 2009, complainant City Prosecutor
Armando P. Abanado filed the Information2 in the Municipal Trial Court in Cities, Bacolod
City, which was eventually raffled to Branch 7 thereof presided by respondent Judge Abraham
A. Bayona.
FACTS:
The case sprang from a criminal case entitled People of the Philippines vs. Cresencio Palo, Sr.
It was initially handled by Investigating Prosecutor Dennis Jarder who found no probable
cause against Palo. However, complainant, upon review, found that there was a probable cause
against Palo. Thus, complainant disapproved Jarder’s Resolution and filed the Information in
court.
In connection with the issuance of a warrant of arrest against accused Palo, respondent Judge
Bayona issued an order directing complainant Abanado to present (1) a copy of the
Memorandum of Preliminary Investigation, (2) Resolution of the Investigating Prosecutor
Dennis Jarder, (3) Memorandum of the transfer of case assignment from designated
Investigating Prosecutor to the City Prosecutor, and (4) Exhibit to the Court, to enable his
court to evaluate and determine the existence of probable cause.
With respect to item 3, complainant explained in a letter that there was no memorandum of
transfer of the case from Investigating Prosecutor Jarder to him.
Respondent was dissatisfied with the explanation of the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an
Order, respondent stated that the Jarder’s Resolution dismissing the complaint was part and
parcel of the official records of the case and, for this reason, must form part of the records of
the preliminary investigation. He further stated that because there was a conflict between
31
Jarder’s and complainant’s resolutions, those documents were necessary in the evaluation and
appreciation of the evidence to establish probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest
against Palo. He, thus, ordered complainant to complete the records of the case by producing
Jarder’s Resolution. The Office of the City Prosecutor again sent a letter explaining the
impossibility of submitting it to the court. The letter stated that the Resolution was no longer
part of the records of the case as it was disapproved by complainant.
Respondent did not accept the explanations made by the Office of the City Prosecutor. In an
order, he required complainant to explain why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant requested for a ten-day extension to comply with it but respondent denied the
request. He likewise ordered the Clerk of Court to issue a subpoena duces tecum ad
testificandum to Jarder directing him to testify on the existence of his resolution dismissing the
case against Palo and to Office of the City Prosecutor’s Records Officer Myrna Vañegas to
bring the entire record of the preliminary investigation of the Palo case.
Aggrieved, complainant immediately filed a motion for inhibition against respondent and a
petition for certiorari with a prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining order (TRO) to
restrain respondent from proceeding with the hearing of the contempt proceedings.
Complainant’s prayer for a TRO was granted by Presiding Judge Pepito Gellada of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 53, Bacolod City.
Complaint for Disbarment of Prosecutor Abanado, reiterated the importance of the Jarder’s
Resolution in deciding whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
The OCA submitted its report and recommendation. It noted Judge Gellada’s Order which held
that the resolution of the city or provincial prosecutor finding probable cause replaces the
recommendation of the investigating prosecutor. In such case, the resolution recommending
the dismissal is superseded, and no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case and
it need not be annexed to the information filed in court.
ISSUE:
Whether an investigating prosecutor’s resolution of dismissal that had been reversed by the
city prosecutor should still form part of the records to be submitted to the judge.
COURT RATIONALE IN THE ABOVE FACTS:
The conduct of a preliminary investigation is primarily an executive function. Thus, the courts
must consider the rules of procedure of the Department of Justice in conducting preliminary
investigations whenever the actions of a public prosecutor is put in question. The Department
of Justic-National Prosecution Service (DOJ-NPS) Manual states that the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor should be attached to the information only as far as practicable. Such
attachment is not mandatory or required under the rules.

Judge Gellada granted the petition for certiorari holding that when a city or provincial SUPREME COURT RULING:
prosecutor reverses the investigating assisting city or provincial prosecutor, the resolution
finding probable cause replaces the recommendation of the investigating prosecutor ACCORDINGLY, the complaint against Judge Abraham A. Bayona of the Municipal Trial
recommending the dismissal of the case. The result would be that the resolution of dismissal Court in Cities, Bacolod City, Branch 7 is DISMISSED.
no longer forms an integral part of the records of the case. It is no longer required that the The counter-complaint against City Prosecutor Armando P. Abanado is likewise DISMISSED.
complaint or entire records of the case during the preliminary investigation be submitted to and
be examined by the judge. The rationale behind this practice is that the rules do not intend to
unduly burden trial judges by requiring them to go over the complete records of the cases all
the time for the purpose of determining probable cause for the sole purpose of issuing a
warrant of arrest against the accused. What is required, rather, is that the judge must have
sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint, affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn
statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic notes, if any) upon which to make his
independent judgment or, at the very least, upon which to verify the findings of the prosecutor
as to the existence of probable cause.
Complainant executed an administrative complaint and the same was received by the Office of
the Court Administrator (OCA). He alleged that respondent was guilty of gross ignorance of
the law or procedure and gross misconduct. He essentially asserted that respondent unduly
burdened himself by obsessing over the production of the records of the preliminary
investigation, especially Jarder’s Resolution. Respondent, in his Comment with Counter-

32
Quantum of Evidence: Probable Cause vs Prima Facie
PCGG v Navarro-Gutierrez
PRESIDENTIAL COMMISSION ON GOOD GOVERNMENT, Petitioner, vs.
MA. MERCEDITAS NAVARRO-GUTIERREZ (AS THEN OMBUDSMAN), DON M.
FERRY, JOSE R. TENGCO, JR., ROLANDO M. ZOSA, CESAR C. ZALAMEA, OFELIA I.
CASTELL, AND RAFAEL A. SISON, Public Respondents,
RODOLFO M. CUENCA, MANUEL I. TINIO, AND ANTONIO R. ROQUE,
Private Respondents.
G.R. No. 194159
October 21, 2015
Nature of Case:
Petition for Certiorari
Brief:
Before the Court is a petition for certiorari1 assailing the Resolution2 dated May 30, 2007 and
the Order3 dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman (Ombudsman) in OMB-C-C-
03-0500-I, which dismissed the affidavit-complaint4 of petitioner Presidential Commission on
Good Government (PCGG) charging individual respondents Don M. Ferry (Ferry), Jose R.
Tengco, Jr. (Tengco), Rolando M. Zosa (Zosa), Cesar C. Zalamea (Zalamea), Ofelia I. Castell
(Castell), Rafael A. Sison (Sison), Rodolfo M. Cuenca (Cuenca), Manuel I. Tinio (Tinio), and
Antonio R. Roque (Roque) for allegedly violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of Republic Act No.
(RA) 3019,5 for lack of probable cause.
Facts:
An Affidavit-Complaint6 dated July 15, 2003 filed by the PCGG - through Rene B. Gorospe,
the Legal Consultant in-charge of reviewing behest loan cases - against former
officers/directors of the Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP), as well as former
officers/stockholders of National Galleon Shipping Corporation (Galleon), 7 charging them of
violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019. In the Affidavit-Complaint, the PCGG alleged
that on October 8, 1992, then President Fidel V. Ramos (President Ramos) issued
Administrative Order No. 13,8 creating the Presidential Ad Hoc Fact-Finding Committee on
Behest Loans (Ad Hoc Committee) in order to identify various anomalous behest loans entered
into by the Philippine Government in the past. Thereafter, the Ad Hoc Committee, with the
assistance of a Technical Working Group (TWG), examined and studied documents relative to
loan accounts extended by GFIs to various corporations during the regime of the late President
Ferdinand E. Marcos (President Marcos) -one of which is the loan account granted by the DBP
to Galleon.10
After examining the aforesaid loan account, the TWG found, that on September 19, 1979,
DBP, pursuant to its Board Resolution No. 3002, 11 approved guarantees in favor of Galleon in
the aggregate amount of US$90,280,000.00 for the purpose of securing foreign currency
borrowings from financial institutions related to Galleon's acquisition of five (5) brand new
and two (2) secondhand vessels;12 (b) Board Resolution No. 3002 specifically stated that such
accommodation "shall be undertaken at the behest of the Philippine Government;" 13 (c) as a
condition for the grant of the guarantees, Board Resolution No. 3002 required Galleon to raise
its paid up capital to P98.963 Million by 1981, 14 but Galleon was only able to raise its capital
to P46,740.755.00;15 (d) despite Galleon's failure to comply with such condition, DBP still
granted the guarantees; (e) as of June 30, 1981, Galleon's arrearages had already amounted to
P40,684,059.37, while the aggregate DBP obligations of Galleon already totaled
P691,058,027.92;16 (f) despite the outstanding debts, DBP still issued Board Resolution Nos.
400817 and 3001,18 approving further accommodations in Galleon's favor in the form of one-
year foreign currency loans to refinance the latter's arrearages, which amounted to
P58,101,718.89 as of September 30, 1982; 19(g) despite Galleon's arrearages amounting to
P128,182,654.38 and obligations accumulating to P904,277,536.96, DBP still approved the
release of Galleon's two (2) secondhand vessels as collaterals resulting in collateral
deficiency;20 and (h) as of March 31, 1984, Galleon's total obligations to DBP amounted to
P2,039,284,390.85, while the value of its collaterals was only P539,000,000.00. 21 These
findings were then collated in an Executive Summary22 which was submitted to the Ad
Hoc Committee.
Based on the foregoing, the Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the loans/accommodations
obtained by Galleon from DBP possessed positive characteristics of behest loans, considering
that: (a) Galleon was undercapitalized; (b) the loan itself was undercollateralized; (c) the major
stockholders of Galleon were known to be cronies of President Marcos; and (d) certain
documents pertaining to the loan account were found to bear "marginal notes" of President
Marcos himself.23 Resultantly, the PCGG filed the instant criminal complaint against
individual respondents, docketed as OMB-C-C-03-0500-I.
Isue/s:
Whether or not the OMB gravely abused its discretion in finding no probable cause to indict
respondents of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g) of RA 3019.
Court Action/s:
1. Ombudsman found no probable cause against private respondents and, accordingly,
dismissed the criminal complaint against them.
2. SC Overturns Ombudsman’s decision
33
Held:
“The Court finds that the Ombudsman gravely abused its discretion in dismissing the criminal
complaint against individual respondents for lack of probable cause, as will be explained
hereunder.
The Ad Hoc Committee concluded that the accommodations extended by DBP to Galleon
were in the nature of behest loans, which then led to the filing of criminal cases against
individual respondents, who were high-ranking officers and/or directors of either Galleon or
DBP, as evidenced by the various documents on record.
As may be gleaned from the documents on record, it appears that each of these high-ranking
officers and/or directors of DBP had a hand in recommending the approval and/or the actual
approval of the series of accommodations that DBP granted in favor of Galleon, which
constituted the behest loans received by the latter during the regime of the late President
Marcos.
In view of the accusations that they were involved in the grant of behest loans, Roque,
Zalamea, Tengco, and Castell merely denied liability by maintaining that they had no
participation in such grant. Suffice it to say that these are matters of defense that are better
ventilated during the trial proper. On the other hand, Ferry, Zosa, Cuenca, Tinio, and Sison
miserably failed to debunk the charges against them by not filing their respective counter-
affidavits despite due notice. Indubitably, the foregoing establishes probable cause to believe
that individual respondents may have indeed committed acts constituting the crimes charged
against them, and as such they must defend themselves in a full-blown trial on the merits.
Finally, it was error for the Ombudsman to simply discredit the TWG's findings contained in
the Executive Summary which were adopted by the Ad Hoc Committee for being hearsay,
self-serving, and of little probative value. It is noteworthy to point out that owing to the
initiatory nature of preliminary investigations, the technical rules of evidence should not be
applied in the course of its proceedings.63 In the recent case of Estrada v. Ombudsman,64 the
Court declared that hearsay evidence is admissible in determining probable cause in
preliminary investigations because such investigation is merely preliminary, and does not
finally adjudicate rights and obligations of parties.”
Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolution dated May 30, 2007 and the Order
dated April 13, 2009 of the Office of the Ombudsman in OMB-C-C-03-0500-I are
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Office of the Ombudsman
is DIRECTED to issue the proper resolution indicting individual respondents Don M. Ferry,
Jose R. Tengco, Jr., Rolando ML Zosa, Cesar C. Zalamea, Ofelia I. Castell, Rafael A. Sison,
Rodolfo M. Cuenca, Manuel I. Tinio, and Antonio R. Roque of violating Sections 3 (e) and (g)
of Republic Act No. 3019, in accordance with this Decision.
Quantum of Evidence: Probable Cause vs Prima Facie
SECRETARY LEILA DE LIMA, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR STEWART ALLAN A.
MARIANO, ASSISTANT STATE PROSECUTOR VIMAR M. BARCELLANO AND ASSISTANT
STATE PROSECUTOR GERARD E. GAERLAN, Petitioners, v.
MARIO JOEL T. REYES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 194488
February 11, 2015
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
This Petition for Review on Certiorari assails the Decision1 dated March 19, 2013 and
Resolution2 dated September 27, 2013 of the Court of Appeals, which rendered null and void
Department of Justice Order No. 7103 issued by the Secretary of Justice.4 The Department
Order created a second panel of prosecutors to conduct a reinvestigation of a murder case in
view of the first panel of prosecutors' failure to admit the complainant's additional evidence
Facts:
Dr. Ortega, also known as "Doc Gerry," was a veterinarian and anchor of several radio shows
in Palawan. On January 24, 2011, at around 10:30 am, he was shot dead inside the Baguio
Wagwagan Ukay-ukay in San Pedro, Puerto Princesa City, Palawan. 5 After a brief chase with
police officers, Marlon B. Recamata was arrested. On the same day, he made an extrajudicial
confession admitting that he shot Dr. Ortega. He also implicated Rodolfo "Bumar" O. Edrad
(Edrad), Dennis C. Aranas, and Armando "Salbakotah" R. Noel, Jr.On February 6, 2011,
Edrad executed a Sinumpaang Salaysay before the Counter-Terrorism Division of the National
Bureau of Investigation where he alleged that it was former Palawan Governor Mario Joel T.
Reyes (former Governor Reyes) who ordered the killing of Dr. Ortega. 7
On February 7, 2011, Secretary of Justice Leila De Lima issued Department Order No.
0918 creating a special panel of prosecutors (First Panel) to conduct preliminary investigation.
The First Panel was composed of Senior Assistant Prosecutor Edwin S. Dayog, Assistant State
Prosecutor Bryan Jacinto S. Cacha, and Assistant State Prosecutor John Benedict D. Medina. 9
On February 14, 2011, Dr. Patria Gloria Inocencio-Ortega (Dr. Inocencio-Ortega), Dr. Ortega's
wife, filed a Supplemental Affidavit-Complaint implicating former Governor Reyes as the
mastermind of her husband's murder. Former Governor Reyes' brother, Coron Mayor Mario T.
Reyes, Jr., former Marinduque Governor Jose T. Carreon, former Provincial Administrator
Atty. Romeo Seratubias, Marlon Recamata, Dennis Aranas, Valentin Lesias, Arturo D.
Regalado, Armando Noel, Rodolfo O. Edrad, and several John and Jane Does were also
implicated. On June 8, 2011, the First Panel concluded its preliminary investigation and issued
the Resolution11dismissing the Affidavit-Complaint.
On June 28, 2011, Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion to Re-Open Preliminary Investigation,
which, among others, sought the admission of mobile phone communications between former
Governor Reyes and Edrad.12 On July 7, 2011, while the Motion to Re-Open was still pending,
Dr. Inocencio-Ortega filed a Motion for Partial Reconsideration Ad Cautelam of the
Resolution dated June 8, 2011. Both Motions were denied by the First Panel in the
Resolution13 dated September 2, 2011.14
34
On September 7, 2011, the Secretary of Justice issued Department Order No. 710 creating a
new panel of investigators (Second Panel) to conduct a reinvestigation of the case. The Second
Panel was composed of Assistant State Prosecutor Stewart Allan M. Mariano, Assistant State
Prosecutor Vimar M. Barcellano, and Assistant State Prosecutor Gerard E. Gaerlan.
Department Order No. 710 ordered the reinvestigation of the case "in the interest of service
and due process"15 to address the offer of additional evidence denied by the First Panel in its
Resolution dated September 2, 2011. The Department Order also revoked Department Order
No. 091.
Issue/s:
Whether the issuance of Department Order No. 710 was an executive function beyond the
scope of a petition for certiorari or prohibition
Whether the Secretary of Justice is authorized to create motu proprio another panel of
prosecutors in order to conduct a reinvestigation of the case
Whether this Petition for Certiorari has already been rendered moot by the filing of the
information in court, pursuant to Crespo v. Mogul
Court Action/s:
1. DOJ Panel 1 dismissed complaint
2. De Lima established DOJ Panel 2
Held:
Yes. The issuance of the department order was a purely administrative or executive function of
the Secretary of Justice. While the Department of Justice may perform functions similar to that
of a court of law, it is not a quasi-judicial agency.
Yes. Under existing laws, rules of procedure, and jurisprudence, the Secretary of Justice is
authorized to issue Department Order No. 710.
Specifically: Section 4. Power of the Secretary of Justice. - The power vested in the Secretary
of Justice includes authority to act directly on any matter involving national security or a
probable miscarriage of justice within the jurisdiction of the prosecution staff, regional
prosecution office, and the provincial prosecutor or the city prosecutor and to review, reverse,
revise, modify or affirm on appeal or petition for review as the law or the rules of the
Department of Justice (DOJ) may provide, final judgments and orders of the prosecutor
general, regional prosecutors, provincial prosecutors, and city prosecutors.
Yes. The filing of the information and the issuance by the trial court of the respondent's
warrant of arrest has already rendered this Petition moot.
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DISMISSED for being moot. Branch 52 of the Regional Trial
Court of Palawan is DIRECTED to proceed with prosecution of Criminal Case No. 26839.
Warrantless Arrests:
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station/precinct
Saraum v People
AMADO I. SARAUM,Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R. No. 205472,
January 25, 2016
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court (Rules) seeks to
reverse the Decision2 dated September 8, 2011 and Resolution3 dated December 19, 2012 of
the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01199, which affirmed the judgment of
conviction against petitioner Amado I. Saraum (Saraum) rendered by the Regional Trial Court
(ATC), Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No. CBU-77737.
Facts:
That on or about the 17th day of August, 2006, at about 12:45 A.M., in the City of
Cebu, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, and without being authorized by law, did then and
there have in his possession One (1) lighter, One (1) rolled tissue paper, and one (1)
aluminum tin foil which are instruments and/or equipments fit or intended for
smoking, consuming, administering, ingesting, or introducing, any dangerous drug
into the body.
On August 17, 2006, a telephone call was received by PO3 Larrobis regarding the
illegal drug activities in Sitio Camansi, Barangay Lorega, Cebu City. A buy-bust team
was then formed composed of PO3 Larrobis, PO1 Jumalon, PO2 Nathaniel Sta. Ana,
PO1 Roy Cabahug, and PO1 Julius Aniñon against a certain "Pata." PO2 Sta. Ana
was designated as the poseur-buyer accompanied by the informant, PO1 Jumalon as
the back-up of PO2 Sta. Ana, and the rest of the team as the perimeter security. PO1
Aniñon coordinated with the Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency (PDEA) regarding
the operation. After preparing all the necessary documents, such as the pre-operation
report and submitting the same to the PDEA, the team proceeded to the subject area.
During the operation, "Pata" eluded arrest as he tried to run towards his shanty. Inside
35
the house, which was divided with a curtain as partition, the buy-bust team also saw
Saraum and Peter Espcranza, who were holding drug paraphernalia apparently in
preparation to have a "shabu" pot session. They recovered from Saraum's possession a
lighter, rolled tissue paper, and aluminum tin foil (tooter). PO3 Larrobis confiscated
the items, placed them in the plastic pack of misua wrapper, and made initial
markings ("A" for Saraum and "P" for Esperanza). At the police station, PO3 Larrobis
marked as "AIS-08-17-2006" the paraphernalia recovered from Saraum. After the
case was filed, the subject items were turned over to the property custodian of the
Office of City Prosecutor.
Issue/s:
Whether Saraum was committing a crime at the time of his arrest and whether
Saraum’s arrest was valid
paraphernalia.14 There is, thus, no necessity to make a laboratory examination and
finding as to the presence or absence of methamphetamine hydrochloride or any
illegal substances on said items since possession itself is the punishable act.The valid
warrantless arrest gave the officers the right to search the shanty for objects relating
to the crime and seize the drug paraphernalia they found. In the course of their lawful
intrusion, they inadvertently saw the various drug paraphernalia. As these items were
plainly visible, the police officers were justified in seizing them. Considering that
Saraum's arrest was legal, the search and seizure that resulted from it were likewise
lawful. The various drug paraphernalia that the police officers found and seized in the
shanty are, therefore, admissible in evidence for having proceeded from a valid search
and seizure. Since the confiscated drug paraphernalia are the very corpus delicti of the
crime charged, the Court has no choice but to sustain the judgment of conviction.
Supreme Court Ruling:

Court Action/s: WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED. The Decision dated
September 8, 2011 and Resolution dated December 19, 2012 of the Court of Appeals
1. CA denied Saraum’s appeal in CA-G.R. CEB CR No. 01 199, which sustained the judgment of conviction
rendered by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 57, Cebu City, in Criminal Case No.
2. 2. SC affirmed CA CBU-77737, is AFFIRMED.

Held:
Saraum was arrested during the commission of a crime, which instance does not
require a warrant in accordance with Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on
Criminal Procedure.11 In arrest in flagrante delicto, the accused is apprehended at the
very moment he is committing or attempting to commit or has just committed an
offense in the presence of the arresting officer. To constitute a valid in flagrante
delicto arrest, two requisites must concur: (1) the person to be arrested must execute
an overt act indicating that he has just committed, is actually committing, or is
attempting to commit a crime; and (2) such overt act is done in the presence or within
the view of the arresting officer. the Court is unconvinced with Saraum's statement
that he was not committing a crime at the time of his arrest. PO3 Larrobis described
in detail how they were able to apprehend him, who was then holding a disposable
lighter in his right hand and a tin foil and a rolled tissue paper in his left hand, 13 while
they were in the course of arresting somebody. The case is clearly one of hot pursuit
of "Pate," who, in eluding arrest, entered the shanty where Saraum and Esperanza
were incidentally caught in possession of the illegal items. Saraum did not proffer any
satisfactory explanation with regard to his presence at the vicinity of the buy-bust
operation and his possession of the seized items that he claims to have "countless,
lawful uses." On the contrary, the prosecution witnesses have adequately explained
the respective uses of the items to prove that they were indeed drug
36
Warrantless Arrests:
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station/precinct
Comerciante v People
ALVIN COMERCIANTE Y GONZALES, Petitioner,
v.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 205926,
July 22, 2015
_______________________________________
Nature of Case: Petition for Review (Certiorari)
Brief:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated October 20, 2011 and
the Resolution3 dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
32813, which affirmed in toto the Judgment4 dated July 28, 2009 of the Regional Trial Court
of Mandaluyong City, Branch 213 (RTC) in Crim. Case No. MC-03-7242-D convicting
petitioner Alvin Comerciante y Gonzales (Comerciante) of the crime of illegal Possession of
Dangerous Drugs defined and penalized under Section 11, Article II of Republic Act No. (RA)
9165,5 otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002.
Facts:
At around 10 o'clock in the evening of July 30, 2003, Agent Radan of the NARCOTICS group
and PO3 Calag were aboard a motorcycle, patrolling the area while on their way to visit a
friend at Private Road, Barangay Hulo, Mandaluyong City. Cruising at a speed of 30
kilometers per hour along Private Road, they spotted, at a distance of about 10 meters, two (2)
men - later identified as Comerciante and a certain Dasilla - standing and showing "improper
and unpleasant movements," with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. Thinking
that the sachets may contain shabu, they immediately stopped and approached Comerciante
and Dasilla. At a distance of around five (5) meters, PO3 Calag introduced himself as a police
officer, arrested Comerciante and Dasilla, and confiscated two (2) plastic sachets containing
white crystalline substance from them. A laboratory examination later confirmed that said
sachets contained methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
After the prosecution rested its case, Dasilla filed a demurrer to evidence, which was granted
by the RTC, thus his acquittal. However, due to Comerciante's failure to file his own demurrer
to evidence, the RTC considered his right to do so waived and ordered him to present his
evidence. Comerciante averred that PO3 Calag was looking for a certain "Barok", who was a
notorious drug pusher in the area, when suddenly, he and Dasilla, who were just standing in
front of a jeepney along Private Road, were arrested and taken to a police station. There, the
police officers claimed to have confiscated illegal drugs from them and were asked money in
exchange for their release. When they failed to accede to the demand, they were brought to
another police station to undergo inquest proceedings, and thereafter, were charged with illegal
possession of dangerous drugs.
Issue/s:
Whether the CA correctly affirmed Comerciante's conviction for violation of Section 11,
Article II of RA 9165
Whether the warrantless arrest was valid
Court Action/s:
1. RTC convicted petitioner
2. CA affirmed RTC
3. SC overturned CA and RTC
Held:
”A judicious review of the factual milieu of the instant case reveals that there could have been
no lawful warrantless arrest made on Comerciante. PO3 Calag himself admitted that he was
aboard a motorcycle cruising at a speed of around 30 kilometers per hour when he saw
Comerciante and Dasilla standing around and showing "improper and unpleasant movements,"
with one of them handing plastic sachets to the other. the Court finds it highly implausible that
PO3 Calag, even assuming that he has perfect vision, would be able to identify with reasonable
accuracy especially from a distance of around 10 meters, and while aboard a motorcycle
cruising at a speed of 30 kilometers per hour miniscule amounts of white crystalline substance
inside two (2) very small plastic sachets held by Comerciante. The Court also notes that no
other overt act could be properly attributed to Comerciante as to rouse suspicion in the mind of
PO3 Calag that the former had just committed, was committing, or was about to commit a
crime. Verily, the acts of standing around with a companion and handing over something to the
latter cannot in any way be considered criminal acts. In fact, even if Comerciante and his
companion were showing "improper and unpleasant movements" as put by PO3 Calag, the
same would not have been sufficient in order to effect a lawful warrantless arrest under Section
5 (a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. 31 That his reasonable suspicion
bolstered by (a) the fact that he had seen his fellow officers arrest persons in possession
of shabu; and (b) his trainings and seminars on illegal drugs when he was still assigned in the
province are insufficient to create a conclusion that what he purportedly saw in Comerciante
was indeed shabu
Supreme Court Ruling:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Decision dated October 20,
2011 and the Resolution dated February 19, 2013 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32813 are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, petitioner Alvin Comerciante
y Gonzales is hereby ACQUITTED of the crime of violating Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165. The Director of the Bureau of Corrections is ordered to cause his
immediate release, unless he is being lawfully held for any other reason.
37
Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
LUZ V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
Rodel Luz, petitioner vs. People of the Philippines, respondent
GR No. 197788 February 29, 2012
__________________________________________________________________
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
The appellant was convicted of illegal possession of dangerous drugs by the RTC later on
he was acquitted by the Supreme Court.
FACTS:
On March 10, 2003, PO2 Alteza was assigned at the Sub-Station 1 of the Naga City Police
Station as a traffic enforcer. Then he saw the accused, which was coming from the direction of
Panganiban Drive and going to Diversion Road, Naga City, driving a motorcycle without a
helmet. This prompted the police officer to stop Luz for violating a municipal ordinance which
requires all motorcycle drivers to wear helmet while driving the motorcycle. Thereafter the
accused was invited to the police station while in the police station he was issued a citation
ticket by SPO1 Brillante for violation of the said ordinance, he saw the accused was uneasy
and kept on getting something on his jacket and the police officer was alerted and so, he told
the accuse to take out the contents of his jacket. The police officer saw a weapon and a
container take out into his jacket, and then the accused was to open the said container upon the
instruction the police officer, the accused spilled out the content of the container which turned
out to be four plastic sachets; two of which contained suspected shabu while the other two
were empty.
The RTC convicted Luz of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The prosecution shows that
he had been lawfully arrested for a traffic violation and then subjected to a valid search, which
led to the discovery of two plastic sachets contained suspected shabu. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC. The accused, however, contends that the there was no lawful search and
seizure, because there was no lawful arrest. He claims that the finding that there was a lawful
arrest was erroneous, since he was not even issued a citation ticket or charged with violation of
the city ordinance. Even assuming there was a valid arrest, he claims that he had never
consented to the search conducted upon him.
But the RTC held thus: It is beyond dispute that the accused was flagged down and
apprehended in this case by Police Officers Alteza and Brillante for violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012, an ordinance requiring the use of crash helmet by motorcycle drivers
and riders thereon in the City of Naga and prescribing penalties for violation thereof. The
accused himself admitted that he was not wearing a helmet at the time when he was flagged
down by the said police officers, albeit he had a helmet in his possession. Obviously, there is
legal basis on the part of the apprehending officers to flag down and arrest the accused because
the latter was actually committing a crime in their presence, that is, a violation of City
Ordinance No. 98-012. In other words, the accused, being caught in flagrante delicto violating
the said Ordinance, he could therefore be lawfully stopped or arrested by the apprehending
officers.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1) Whether or not there was a valid arrest of the accused?
ACTIONS of the Court:
RTC: The appellant was guilty for illegal possession dangerous drugs.
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
SC: The decision of the CA was reversed the judgment and acquits the appellant.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No, there was no valid arrest of the accused. When he was flagged down for committing a
traffic violation, he was not, ipso facto and solely for this reason, arrested.
Arrest is the taking of a person into custody in order that he or she may be bound to
answer for the commission of an offense. It is effected by an actual restraint of the person to be
arrested or by that persons voluntary submission to the custody of the one making the arrest.
Neither the application of actual force, manual touching of the body, or physical restraint, nor
a formal declaration of arrest, is required. It is enough that there be an intention on the part of
one of the parties to arrest the other, and that there be an intent on the part of the other to
submit, under the belief and impression that submission is necessary.
Under R.A. 4136, or the Land Transportation and Traffic Code, the general procedure
for dealing with a traffic violation is not the arrest of the offender, but the confiscation of the
drivers license of the latter:
SECTION 29. Confiscation of Driver's License. Law enforcement and peace
officers of other agencies duly deputized by the Director shall, in apprehending a
driver for any violation of this Act or any regulations issued pursuant thereto, or of
local traffic rules and regulations not contrary to any provisions of this Act, confiscate
the license of the driver concerned and issue a receipt prescribed and issued by the
38
Bureau therefore which shall authorize the driver to operate a motor vehicle for a
period not exceeding seventy-two hours from the time and date of issue of said
receipt. The period so fixed in the receipt shall not be extended, and shall become
invalid thereafter. Failure of the driver to settle his case within fifteen days from the
date of apprehension will be a ground for the suspension and/or revocation of his
license.
Similarly, the Philippine National Police (PNP) Operations Manual provides
the following procedure for flagging down vehicles during the conduct of
checkpoints:
SECTION 7. Procedure in Flagging Down or Accosting Vehicles While in
Mobile Car. This rule is a general concept and will not apply in hot pursuit
operations. The mobile car crew shall undertake the following, when applicable:
If it concerns traffic violations, immediately issue a Traffic Citation Ticket (TCT) or
Traffic Violation Report (TVR). Never indulge in prolonged, unnecessary
conversation or argument with the driver or any of the vehicles occupants;
At the time that he was waiting for PO3 Alteza to write his citation ticket, petitioner
could not be said to have been under arrest. There was no intention on the part of PO3 Alteza
to arrest him, deprive him of his liberty, or take him into custody. Prior to the issuance of the
ticket, the period during which petitioner was at the police station may be characterized merely
as waiting time. In fact, as found by the trial court, PO3 Alteza himself testified that the only
reason they went to the police sub-station was that petitioner had been flagged down almost in
front of that place. Hence, it was only for the sake of convenience that they were waiting there.
There was no intention to take petitioner into custody.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The 18 February 2011 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32516 affirming the judgment of conviction dated 19 February
2009 of the Regional Trial Court, 5th Judicial Region, Naga City, Branch 21, in Criminal Case
No. RTC 2003-0087, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioner Rodel Luz y Ong is
hereby ACQUITTED and ordered immediately released from detention, unless his continued
confinement is warranted by some other cause or ground.
Warantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
ANTIQUERA V. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
George Antiquera y codes, petitioner,
vs.
People of the Philippines, respondent.
GR No. 180661
December 11, 2013
Ponente: Abad
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
This case is about a supposed warrantless arrest and a subsequent search prompted by the
police officers' chance sighting through an ajar door of the accused engaged in pot session.
FACTS:
On January 13, 2004, the Assistant Prosecutor charged George Antiquera and Corazon
Olivenza Cruz with illegal possession of paraphernalia for dangerous drugs. On February 11,
2004, police officers PO1 Recio, PO1 Cabutihan, P/Inso. Ibon, PO1 Rania and two civilian
operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting police surveillance on David
St, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush out of house number 107-C and
immediately boarded a jeep. Suspecting a crime has been committed, the policemen rush out to
the house where men came out, they saw partially opened door. The two police officers Recio
and Cabutihan saw the accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter
beside him, Cruz was holding an aluminium foil and an improvised burner. They sat facing
each other at the living room. This prompted the police officers to enter the house and arrest
Antiquera and Cruz. Immediately the police officers inspect the area they saw a wooden
jewellery box. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small plastic sachets with
traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused strips of aluminium
foil, they confiscated all of these and brought back to the police station. The substance found
was tested and declared positive for traces of shabu.
The accused Antiquera contended that he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was
roused by knocking on the door. When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced
themselves into the house. One of them shoved him and said “Dyan ka lang, pusher ka.” Then
he was arrested brought him and Cruz to the police station. The RTC rendered a decision
39
against the accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged. The CA affirmed the
decision of the RTC.
ISSUE/S OF THE COURT
1) Whether or not the CA is correct that the accused was guilty of illegal possession of
drug paraphernalia based on the evidence of the police officers that they saw
Antiquera and Cruz in the act of possessing drug paraphernalia.
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: Convicted the appellant for illegal possession of drugs.
SC: Reversed the decision of the RTC and acquitted the appellant.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
No. The prosecution’s theory, upheld by both the RTC and the CA, is that it was a case of
valid warrantless arrest in that the police officers saw accused Antiquera and Cruz through the
door of their house, in the act of having a pot session. That valid warrantless arrest gave the
officers the right as well to search the living room for objects relating to the crime and thus
seize the paraphernalia they found there. Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides that a "peace officer or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a
person when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing,
or is attempting to commit an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act
constituting the crime is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
But the circumstances here do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
1. The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had been
committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the two fleeing
men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle. Running after the
fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave priority to the house
even when they heard no cry for help from it.
2. Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from the
street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened door, they
saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized the
arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant under the above-mentioned rule. Considering that
his arrest was illegal, the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal.
Consequently, the various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the
house and seized are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure. Since
the confiscated drug paraphernalia is the very corpus delicti of the crime charged, the Court
has no choice but to acquit the accused.
One final note. The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is
not enough to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry
with it a waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the Decision dated September 21,
2007 and Resolution dated November 16, 2007 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR 28937
and ACQUITS the accused George Antiquera y Codes of the crime of which he is charged for
lack of evidence sufficient to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt
Warrantless Arrests (Sec. 5)
Procedure: Delivery to the nearest police station or precinct
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
DONALD VASQUEZ y SANDIGAN @ "DON," Accused-Appellant,
People of the Philippines v. Vasquez
GR No. 200304
January 15, 2014
Ponente: Leonardo De-Castro
Nature of the case: Petition for Review (Appeal)
Brief:
The appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal possession
of regulated drugs under Sections 15 and 16 Article III of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
40
FACTS:

That on or about April 3, 1998, the accused Donald Vasquez without being authorize by law to
possess or use any regulated drug, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and knowingly have
in his possession of 4.03 grams of shabu. In the testimony of P/Insp. Fajardo that an informant
went to their office and reported that a certain Donald Vasquez was engaged in illegal drug
activity. Vasquez claimed that he was an employee of the NBI. According to the informant,
alias Don promised him a good commission if he would present a potential buyer of drugs.
Thereafter Fajardo went to her commanding officer to inform him the illegal drug activity of
the accused, and then she was instructed to form a team to capture Vasquez with the help of
the informant. She was able to get a meeting with Vasquez in Welcome Rotonda. Then around
9 PM, Fajardo and her team went to the meeting place wherein Vasquez was around and
confirming that the accused was indeed an employee of the NBI.
At the meeting place, Vasquez was waiting for her outside of the establishment when she
arrived. He asked for the money with her and showed the money to the accused. However,
Vasquez wants to go to a more secure place so they went to his place for the payment of illegal
drugs. Fajardo’s team arrived at the target area, the informant and Fajardo walked towards the
apartment of the accused. The accused and his male companion came out and demanded to see
the money but Fajardo told him to see the drugs first. Then the accused gave him the envelope
he was carrying and Fajardo opened it and saw a plastic sachet containing crystalline
substance, after she checked the contents of the envelope, she assumed that the same was
indeed shabu. She gave the buy bust money to Vasquez and Fajardo signaled her team to
capture Vasquez and his companion. The accused and his companion was arrested and brought
to the police station. The defense belied the prosecution’s version of events. They contended
that Donald Vasquez was a regular employee of the NBI, working as a laboratory aid II. His
duties consists of a being a subpoena clerk, receiving chemistry cases as well as requests from
different police agencies to have their specimens examined by the chemist. On April 3, 1998,
Anatolia Caredo, Donald’s household help, was eating while Donald was asleep. Then she
heard a knocked on the door. Thereafter two police officers opened the door and entered the
house and followed by three police officers then they proceeded to Donald’s room and kicked
down the door and went inside into his room and Donald woke up to see Fajardo pointing her
gun at him. These police officers searched his room, picking up what they could get. Then one
of them opened a cabinet and saw an illegal drug therein. One of the witnesses, the neighbor of
the accused saw the police officers entered Donald’s house and apprehending Donald Vasquez.
The RTC rendered a decision convicting Donald Vasquez for possession of illegal drugs and
ruled the testimonies of the police officers on which the CA affirmed the decision of the RTC
that the prosecution sufficiently proved the elements of the crimes of illegal sale and illegal
possession of shabu. The accused argues that the police officers did not have a search warrant
or a warrant of arrest at the time he was arrested. Further that the evidence obtained by these
police officers was illegal and cannot be used against him or it is inadmissible in court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1) Whether or not there is a valid arrest of the accused without obtaining a warrant of arrest or a
search warrant?
2) Whether or not evidence obtained by these police officers was illegal?
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: rendered a decision against the appellant convicting him for possession of illegal drugs
CA: Affirmed the decision of the RTC.
SC: Denied the petition for appeal of the appellant and affirmed the decision of the CA.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
1) Yes.
Be that as it may, the fact of the matter is that the appellant was caught in flagrante delicto of
selling illegal drugs to an undercover police officer in a buy-bust operation. His arrest, thus,
falls within the ambit of Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
when an arrest made without warrant is deemed lawful. Having established the validity of the
warrantless arrest in this case, the Court holds that the warrantless seizure of the illegal drugs
from the appellant is likewise valid.
2) Yes.
We held in People v. Cabugatan that:
This interdiction against warrantless searches and seizures, however, is not absolute and such
warrantless searches and seizures have long been deemed permissible by jurisprudence in
instances of (1) search of moving vehicles, (2) seizure in plain view, (3) customs searches, (4)
waiver or consented searches, (5) stop and frisk situations (Terry search), and search incidental
to a lawful arrest. The last includes a valid warrantless arrest, for, while as a rule, an arrest is
considered legitimate if effected with a valid warrant of arrest, the Rules of Court recognize
permissible warrantless arrest, to wit: (1) arrest in flagrante delicto, (2) arrest effected in hot
pursuit, and (3) arrest of escaped prisoners.
41
Thus, the appellant cannot seek exculpation by invoking belatedly the invalidity of his arrest A.M. No. RTJ-03-1774
and the subsequent search upon his person.
May 27, 2004
CA RULING:
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The August 6,
2009 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 41 of the City of Manila in Criminal Cases
No. 98-164174-75, finding appellant Donald Vasquez y Sandigan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt for the crimes of Violation of Section 15 and Section 16, Article III of Republic Act No.
6425 is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that in Criminal Case No. 98-164175,
Nature of Case:
appellant is hereby sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of six months of arresto
mayor, as minimum, to two years, four months and one day of prision correccional in its Administrative proceeding
medium period, as maximum.
BRIEF

Dorentino Z. Floresta administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Olongapo

City Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 72 with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of
authority and violations of the Code of Judicial Conduct.

FACTS:

Then Provincial Prosecutor, now Regional Trial Court Judge Dorentino Z. Floresta
administratively charged Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) with
gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority and violations of the Code of Judicial
Conduct in hearingand deciding several cases.

In one of the cases, Judge Floresta faulted Judge Ubiadas for granting, “without giving notice
to the prosecution,” the petition for bail of Jose Mangohig, Jr. who was arrested by virtue of a
warrant issued by the Municipal Trial Court of Subic, Zambales which found probable cause
against him for violation of Section 5(b), Art. III of Republic Act No. 7610 (“Special
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act”). Finally,
he faults Judge Ubiadas for disqualifying petitioner judge from appearing in a criminal case
Right to Bail despite petitioner judge’s designation to handle the prosecution of the case by the
Ombudsman.
Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH
Respondent Judge Ubiadas contends that petitioner has no personality to initiate the complaint
against him as he is not a party to the cases subject thereof.
FLORESTA vs UBIADAS
Respondent Judge Ubiadas informs that the petition for bail of Mangohig who was then under
PROVINVIAL PROSECUTOR DORENTINO Z. FLORESTA, complainant
preliminary investigation, which motion was filed on January 3, 2000 on which same date a
vs. copy of said petition was furnished the public prosecutor, was as set by Mangohig heard on the
morning of January 4, 2000 during which there was no appearance from the Prosecutors
JUDGE ELIODORO G. UBIADAS, respondent

42
Office; and that as the offense for which Mangohig was charged is ordinarily a bailable
offense, respondent granted him bail.
The Office of the Court Administrator stressed that the Rules of Court requires a movant to
serve notice of his motion on all parties concerned at least three days before the hearing
thereof, hence, respondent erred in granting the petition for bail without hearing the
prosecutions side. It accordingly recommended that Ubiadas be FINED P20,000.00.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
Whether or not Judge Ubiadas acted with gross ignorance of the law, grave abuse of authority
when he granted the petition for bail without hearing the prosecution in the case of Mangohig.
ACTIONS of the COURT
SC: Respondent was guilty of Violation of Sec 8 of Rule 40 of the Rules of Court
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes on the grant of bail to the accused Judge Ubiadas acted with gross ignorance of the law.
Whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, and even if no charge has yet been filed in court
against a respondent-suspect-detainee, reasonable notice of hearing is required to be given to
the prosecutor, or at least his recommendation must be sought. So Fortuna v. Penaco-
Sitaca instructs: Admission to bail as a matter of discretion presupposes the exercise thereof in
accordance with law and guided by the applicable legal principles. The prosecution must first
be accorded an opportunity to present evidence because by the very nature of deciding
applications for bail, it is on the basis of such evidence that judicial discretion is weighed
against in determining whether the guilt of the accused is strong. In other words, discretion
must be exercised regularly, legally and within the confines of procedural due process, that
is, after the evaluation of the evidence submitted by the prosecution. Any order issued in the
absence thereof is not a product of sound judicial discretion but of whim and caprice and
outright arbitrariness.
True, a hearing of the petition for bail was conducted in Crim. Case No. 271-99 on January 4,
2000 at 8:30 a.m. Given the filing of the petition only the day before, at close to noontime, it
cannot be said that the prosecution was afforded reasonable notice and opportunity to present
evidence after it received a copy of the petition minutes before it was filed in court. It bears
stressing that the prosecution should be afforded reasonable opportunity to comment on the
application for bail by showing that evidence of guilt is strong. While in Section 18 of Rule
114 on applications for bail, no period is provided as it merely requires the court to give a
reasonable notice of the hearing to the prosecutor or require him to submit his
recommendation, and the general rule on the requirement of a three-day notice for hearing of
motions under Section 4 of Rule 15 allows a court for good cause to set the hearing on shorter
notice, there is, in the case of Mangohig, no showing of good cause to call for hearing his
petition for bail on shorter notice.
Reasonable notice depends of course upon the circumstances of each particular case, taking
into account, inter alia, the offense committed and the imposable penalties, and the evidence
of guilt in the hands of the prosecution. In Crim. Case No. 271-99, Mangohig was arrested for
violation of Sec. 5(b), Art. III of R.A. 7610, which is punishable by reclusion
temporal to reclusion perpetua, and subsequently indicted for statutory rape qualified by
relationship which is punishable by death. Under the circumstances, by respondents assailed
grant of bail, the prosecution was deprived of due process for which he is liable for gross
ignorance of the law or procedure which is a serious charge under Sec. 8 of Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court. The charge carries the penalty of dismissal from the service with forfeiture of
all or part of the benefits or suspension from office without salary and other benefits for more
than 3 but not exceeding 6 months or a fine of more than P20,000 but not exceeding P40,000.
This Court takes this occasion to reiterate the injunction that a judge is called upon to balance
the interests of the accused who is entitled to the presumption of innocence until his guilt is
proven beyond reasonable doubt, and to enable him to prepare his defense without being
subject to punishment prior to conviction, against the right of the State to protect the people
and the peace of the community from dangerous elements. ,
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Eliodoro G. Ubiadas, is found GUILTY of undue delay in
resolving a motion and of gross ignorance of the law or procedure in granting an application
for bail without affording the prosecution due process. He is accordingly FINED in the amount
of P20,000.00, with WARNING that repetition of the same similar acts shall be dealt with
more severely.
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail
43
Right to Bail
Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH
ZUNO vs CABEBE
CHIEF STATE PROSECUTOR JOVENCITO R. ZUNO, complainant
vs.
JUDGE ALEJANDRINO C. CABEBE, respondent
AM OCA No. 03-1800-RTJ
November 26, 2004
Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
Nature of Case:
Administrative proceeding
BRIEF
Chief State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zuno of the Department of Justice complains that Judge
Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Batac, Ilocos
Norte rendered an unjust judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
FACTS:
The instant administrative case stemmed from the sworn complaintof Chief State Prosecutor
Jovencito R. Zuño of the Department of Justice, against Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, then
Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court. The charges are knowingly rendering an unjust
judgment, gross ignorance of the law and partiality.
In his complaint, Chief State Prosecutor Zuño alleged that Criminal Case for illegal possession
of prohibited or regulated drugs was filed with the Regional Trial Court, against Rey Daquep
Arcangel, Victorino Gamet Malabed, William Roxas Villanueva, all police officers, Jocelyn
Malabed Manuel and Pelagio Valencia Manuel. Upon arraignment, all the accused, assisted by
their counsel de parte, pleaded not guilty to the crime charged.
On May 6, 2002, the accused filed a motion to dismiss invoking as ground the right of the
accused to a speedy trial. On November 5, 2002, respondent judge motu propio issued an
Order granting bail to the accused, fixing the bail for each at P70,000.00 in cash or property
bond at P120,000.00, except for accused Evelyn Manuel whose bail was fixed at P20,000.00 in
cash. Respondent judge issued the Order without the accused’s application or motion for bail.
The prosecution then filed a motion for reconsideration. Instead of acting thereon, respondent
judge issued an order inhibiting himself from further proceeding with the case, realizing that
what he did was patently irregular. Complainant thus prays that respondent judge be dismissed
from the service with forfeiture of all benefits and be disbarred from the practice of law.
In his comment, respondent denied the charges. While admitting that he issued the Order
granting bail to the accused without any hearing, “the same was premised on the constitutional
right of the accused to a speedy trial.” The prosecution did not object to the grant of bail to the
accused.
On March 26, 2003, respondent judge compulsorily retired.
In his Report dated July 7, 2003, Deputy Court Administrator Jose P. Perez found
respondent judge liable for gross ignorance of the law and recommended that a fine
ofP20,000.00 be imposed upon him, with a stern warning that a repetition of the same or
similar offense will be dealt with more severely.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the judge is guilty of gross ignorance of the law by granting bail without
hearing.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
SC: Respondent is found GUILTY of violation of Supreme Court Rules
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Under the present Rules, a hearing is mandatory in granting bail whether it is a matter of
right or discretion. It must be stressed that the grant or the denial of bail in cases where bail is
a matter of discretion, hinges on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the
accused is strong, and the determination of whether or not the evidence is strong is a matter of
judicial discretion which remains with the judge. In order for the latter to properly exercise his
discretion, he must first conduct a hearing to determine whether the evidence of guilt is
strong. In fact, even in cases where there is no petition for bail, a hearing should still be held.
There is no question that respondent judge granted bail to the accused without conducting
a hearing, in violation of Sections 8 and 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure.
In Cortes vs. Catral, we laid down the following rules outlining the duties of the judge in
case an application for bail is filed:
44

1. In all cases whether bail is a matter of right or discretion, notify the
prosecutor of the hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit
his recommendation (Section 18, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for
bail regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence
to show that the guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the
court to exercise its sound discretion (Section 7 and 8, id.);
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Alejandrino C. Cabebe, now retired, is found guilty of
violation of Supreme Court Rules and is hereby fined in the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos
(P20,000.00), the same to be deducted from his retirement benefits.
Forfeiture vs. Cancellation of Bail
Right to Bail

Art. 3, Section 13 1987 Constitution-PH

3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of
evidence of the prosecution; GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION vs
OLALIA
4. If the guilt of the accused is not strong, discharge the accused upon the
approval of the bail bond (Section 19, id.); otherwise the petition should be GOVERNMENT OF HONGKONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION, petitioner
denied.
vs.
Based on the above-cited procedure, after the hearing, the court’s order granting or refusing
bail must contain a summary of the evidence of the prosecution and based thereon, the judge JUDGE FELIX OLALIA and JUAN ANTONIO MUNOZ, respondents
should formulate his own conclusion as to whether the evidence so presented is strong enough
to indicate the guilt of the accused. GR NO. 153675

Respondent judge did not follow the above Rules and procedure enumerated in Cortes. He did April 19, 2007
not conduct a hearing before he granted bail to the accused, thus depriving the prosecution of Ponente: SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ, J
an opportunity to interpose objections to the grant of bail. Irrespective of his opinion on the
strength or weakness of evidence to prove the guilt of the accused, he should have conducted a
hearing and thereafter made a summary of the evidence of the prosecution. The importance of
a bail hearing and a summary of evidence cannot be downplayed, these are considered aspects
of procedural due process for both the prosecution and the defense; its absence will invalidate
the grant or denial of bail. Nature of Case:

Respondent’s contention is bereft of merit. There is no indication in the records of the
criminal case that the prosecution has intentionally delayed the trial of the case. Even
assuming there was delay, this does not justify the grant of bail without a hearing. This is
utter disregard of the Rules. The requirement of a bail hearing has been incessantly stressed
by this Court. In the same vein, the Code of Judicial Conduct enjoins judges to be conversant
with the law and the Rules and maintain professional competence; and by the very nature of
his office, should be circumspect in the performance of his duties. He must render justice
without resorting to shortcuts clearly uncalled for. Obviously, respondent failed to live up
to these standards.
Petition for certiorari
BRIEF
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a
prospective extradite in an extradition proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of
Hongkong signed an “Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons”. It
took effect on June 20, 19097.

45

FACTS:
Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of
the offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the
Prevention of Bribery Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of
the offense of conspiracy to defraud, penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants
of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14)
years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a
request for the provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an
Order of Arrest against private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and
detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing,
Judge Bernardo, Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no
Philippine law granting bail in extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight
risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself from further hearing the case, it was then raffled
off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private respondent filed a motion for
reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was granted by
respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent
judge. Hence, the instant petition.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential
extraditee.
ACTIONS of the COURT
SC: Petition is dismissed. Case is Remanded back to RTC
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Bearing in mind the purpose of extradition proceedings, the premise behind the issuance of the
arrest warrant and the "temporary detention" is the possibility of flight of the potential
extraditee. This is based on the assumption that such extraditee is a fugitive from
justice. Given the foregoing, the prospective extraditee thus bears the onus probandi of
showing that he or she is not a flight risk and should be granted bail.
The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold
the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly,
the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the
light of the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion
and protection of human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human
liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not
impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extraditee. Nor is it
a full-blown civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to
prevent the escape of a person accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the
state from which he fled, for the purpose of trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean
that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential
extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights are guaranteed,
not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines is
a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided
that a certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new
standard which he termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in
extradition cases. According to him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond
reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of evidence. The potential extraditee must
prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk and will abide with all the
orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is
not a flight risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine
whether private respondent may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence."
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to
determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing
evidence." If not, the trial court should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his
immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the extradition proceedings with dispatch.
46
47
Rule 114 Bail
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN.
G.R. No. 158754
Nature of Case:
Petition for certiorari under rule 65
BRIEF
The instant petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court seeks to reverse and
set aside the Resolution[1] of herein respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) issued on
March 6, 2003 in Criminal Case No. 26558, granting bail to private respondent Senator
Jose Jinggoy Estrada (hereafter Jinggoy for brevity), as effectively reiterated
in its Resolution[2] of May 30, 2003, denying the petitioners motion for reconsideration.
FACTS
In November 2000, as an offshoot of the impeachment proceedings against Joseph
Ejercito Estrada, then President of the Republic of the Philippines, five criminal
complaints against the former President and members of his family, his associates,
friends and conspirators were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman.
On April 4, 2001, the Ombudsman issued a Joint Resolution finding probable
cause warranting the filing with the Sandiganbayan of several criminal
Informations against the former President and the other respondents therein. One
of the Informations were for the crime of plunder under Republic Act [RA] No.
7080 and among the respondents was herein petitioner Jose Jinggoy Estrada, then
mayor of San Juan, Metro Manila.
The Information was amended and filed on April 18, 2001. Docketed as Criminal
Case No. 26558, the case was assigned to the respondent Third Division of the
Sandiganbayan.
On April 25, 2001, the respondent court issued a warrant of arrest for Jinggoy and
his co-accused. On its basis, Jinggoy and his co-accused were placed in custody of
the law.
On April 30, 2001, Jinggoy filed a Very Urgent Omnibus Motion alleging that: (1)
no probable cause exists to put him on trial and hold him liable for plunder, it
appearing that he was only allegedly involved in illegal gambling and not in a
series or combination of overt or criminal acts as required in R.A. No. 7080; and
(2) he is entitled to bail as a matter of right. He prayed that he be excluded from
the Amended Information . In the alternative, he also prayed that he be allowed to
post bail ..
On June 28, 2001, [he] filed a Motion to Resolve Mayor Jose Jinggoy Estradas
Motion To Fix Bail On Grounds That An Outgoing Mayor Loses Clout An
Incumbent Has And That On Its Face, the Facts Charged In The Information Do
Not Make Out A Non-Bailable Offense As To Him.
On July 9, 2001, respondent Sandiganbayan issued a Resolution denying
[Jinggoys] Motion to Quash and Suspend and Very Urgent Omnibus
Motion. [His] alternative prayer to post bail was set for hearing after arraignment
of all accused.
The following day, July 10, 2001, [Jinggoy] moved for reconsideration of the
Resolution. Respondent court denied the motion and proceeded to arraign
[him]. [He] refused to make his plea prompting respondent court to enter a plea of
not guilty for him.
On February 26, 2002, the Court dismissed Jinggoys petition in G.R. No. 148965, on the
following rationale:
The constitutional mandate makes the grant or denial of bail in capital offenses
hinge on the issue of whether or not the evidence of guilt of the accused is
strong. This requires that the trial court conduct bail hearings. The burden of proof
lies with the prosecution to show strong evidence of guilt
Hence, the present petition on the submission that respondent Special Division of the
Sandiganbayan acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
48

Whether the Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion when it granted bail in
favor of Jinggoy after conducting numerous bail hearings and evaluating the weight of the
prosecutions evidence.
ACTION of the COURT
.
SC: Petition dismissed.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The petitioner assumes that the ruling accorded benefits to respondent Jinggoy that were
inexistent at the start of that case. But no such benefits were extended, as the Court did not
read into the Amended Information, as couched, something not there in the first place.
Respondent Jinggoys participation, if that be the case, in the proceedings involving sub-
paragraphs b, c and d, did not change the legal situation set forth in the aforequoted portion
of the Courts ruling in G.R. No. 148965. For when it passed, in G.R. No. 148965, upon the
inculpatory acts envisaged and ascribed in the Amended Information against Jinggoy, the
Court merely defined what he was indicted and can be penalized for. In legal jargon, the
Court informed him of the nature and cause of the accusation against him, a right
guaranteed an accused under the Constitution.[26] In fine, all that the Court contextually did
in G.R. No. 148965 was no more than to implement his right to be informed of the nature
of the accusation in the light of the filing of the Amended Information as worded. If at all,
the Courts holding in G.R. No. 148965 freed individual respondent from the ill effects of a
wrong interpretation that might be given to the Amended Information.
In all, the Court rules that public respondent Sandiganbayan (Special Division) did not
commit grave abuse of discretion when, after conducting numerous bail hearings and
evaluating the weight of the prosecutions evidence, it determined that the evidence against
individual respondent was not strong and, on the basis of that determination, resolved to
grant him bail.
As a final consideration, the Court notes a statement made by the respondent court which
adds an appropriate dimension to its resolve to grant bail subject of this recourse. Wrote
that court in its assailed resolution of March 6, 2003:
Corollarily, it is not amiss to state that, at this time, there looms the possibility that, in case
of conviction, respondent Jinggoys criminal liability would probably not warrant the death
penalty or reclusion perpetua.
Rule 114 - Bail
OKABE v Gutierrez
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, petitioner, vs. HON. PEDRO DE LEON
GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA, respondents.
GR150185
May 27, 2004
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
Before us is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, that part of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
60732 dismissing her petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, as
amended, for the nullification of the August 25 and 28, 2000 Orders of the respondent
judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749.
FACTS
49

Charged for Estafa, Petitioner filed a verified motion for judicial determination of
probable cause and to defer proceedings/arraignment, alleging that the only documents
appended to the Information submitted by the investigating prosecutor were
respondent Maruyamas affidavit-complaint for estafa and the resolution of the
investigating prosecutor; the affidavits of the witnesses of the complainant, the
respondents counter-affidavit and the other evidence adduced by the parties were not
attached thereto. The petitioner further alleged that the documents submitted by the
investigating prosecutor were not enough on which the trial court could base a finding
of probable cause for estafa against her.
The court denied the petitioners motions on the following grounds:
Based on its personal examination and consideration of the Information, the affidavit-
complaint of respondent Maruyama and the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
duly approved by the city prosecutor, the court found probable cause for the petitioners
arrest. Since the petitioners motion for a determination of probable cause was made
after the court had already found probable cause and issued a warrant for the
petitioners arrest, and after the latter filed a personal bail bond for her provisional
liberty, such motion was a mere surplusage;
In denying her motion for a determination of probable cause, she posits that the
respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to excess or lack of
jurisdiction.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether an application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued
ACTION of the COURT
SC: Petition is granted.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Bail not a bar to objections on illegal arrest, lack of or irregular preliminary
investigation. An application for or admission to bail shall not bar the accused from
challenging the validity of his arrest or the legality of the warrant issued therefor, or
from assailing the regularity or questioning the absence of a preliminary investigation
of the charge against him, provided that he raises them before entering his plea. The
court shall resolve the matter as early as practicable but not later than the start of the
trial of the case.
It bears stressing that Section 26, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal
Procedure is a new one, intended to modify previous rulings of this Court that an
application for bail or the admission to bail by the accused shall be considered as a
waiver of his right to assail the warrant issued for his arrest on the legalities or
irregularities thereon The new rule has reverted to the ruling of this Court in People v.
Red The new rule is curative in nature because precisely, it was designed to supply
defects and curb evils in procedural rules. Hence, the rules governing curative statutes
are applicable. Curative statutes are by their essence retroactive in applicationBesides,
procedural rules as a general rule operate retroactively, even without express
provisions to that effect, to cases pending at the time of their effectivity, in other words
to actions yet undetermined at the time of their effectivity Before the appellate court
rendered its decision on January 31, 2001, the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure
was already in effect. It behooved the appellate court to have applied the same in
resolving the petitioners petition for certiorari and her motion for partial
reconsideration.
Moreover, considering the conduct of the petitioner after posting her personal bail
bond, it cannot be argued that she waived her right to question the finding of probable
cause and to assail the warrant of arrest issued against her by the respondent
judge. There must be clear and convincing proof that the petitioner had an actual
intention to relinquish her right to question the existence of probable cause When the
only proof of intention rests on what a party does, his act should be so manifestly
consistent with, and indicative of, an intent to voluntarily and unequivocally relinquish
the particular right that no other explanation of his conduct is possible In this case, the
records show that a warrant was issued by the respondent judge in Pasay City for the
arrest of the petitioner, a resident of Guiguinto, Bulacan. When the petitioner learned
of the issuance of the said warrant, she posted a personal bail bond to avert her arrest
and secure her provisional liberty. Judge Demetrio B. Macapagal of the RTC of
Quezon City approved the bond and issued an order recalling the warrant of arrest
against the petitioner. Thus, the posting of a personal bail bond was a matter of
imperative necessity to avert her incarceration; it should not be deemed as a waiver of
her right to assail her arrest
If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information
against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that
from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such
certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not binding on
the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a finding of
the existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused
In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court
is first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for
the arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances
50
 which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense
charged in the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the
person sought to be arrested In determining probable cause, the average man weighs
facts and circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of
which he has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense A finding of
probable cause needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a
crime has been committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause
demands more than bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify
conviction.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed
decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The assailed Orders
dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant of Arrest issued by the respondent
judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records are REMANDED
to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent judge is hereby
DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records, as required under Section 8(a),
Rule 112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure.
G.R. NO. 189122, March 17, 2010 Leviste v. CA, et al. Digest Corono, J.:
Leviste V CA
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Levistewas
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporalas maximum
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals.Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
FACTS
Charged with the murder of Rafael de las Alas, petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste was
convicted by the Regional Trial Court of Makati City for the lesser crime of homicide and
sentenced to suffer an indeterminate penalty of six years and one day of prision mayor as
minimum to 12 years and one day of reclusion temporal as maximum.
He appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals. Pending appeal, he filed an urgent
application for admission to bail pending appeal, citing his advanced age and health
condition, and claiming the absence of any risk or possibility of flight on his part.
The Court of Appeals denied petitioner’s application for bail. It invoked the bedrock
principle in the matter of bail pending appeal, that the discretion to extend bail during the
course of appeal should be exercised “with grave caution and only for strong reasons.”
Petitioner’s motion for reconsideration was denied.
Petitioner quotes Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court was present. Petitioner’s theory
is that, where the penalty imposed by the trial court is more than six years but not more
than 20 years and the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5 are
absent, bail must be granted to an appellant pending appeal.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the discretionary of the grant of bail pending appeal mean that bail should
automatically be granted absent any of the circumstances mentioned in third paragraph of
Section 5, Rule 114 rules of court.
ACTION of the COURT
SC: WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
51
Petitioner’s stance is contrary to fundamental considerations of procedural and substantive
rules.
Petitioner actually failed to establish that the Court of Appeals indeed acted with grave
abuse of discretion. He simply relies on his claim that the Court of Appeals should have
granted bail in view of the absence of any of the circumstances enumerated in the third
paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court.
We disagree.
Pending appeal of a conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not punishable by
death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is expressly declared to
be discretionary. Retired Court of Appeals Justice Oscar M. Herrera, another authority in
remedial law, is of the same thinking: Bail is either a matter of right or of discretion. It is a
matter of right when the offense charged is not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or
life imprisonment. On the other hand, upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an
offense not punishable death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, bail becomes a
matter of discretion. Similarly, if the court imposed a penalty of imprisonment exceeding
six (6) years then bail is a matter of discretion, except when any of the enumerated
circumstances under paragraph 3 of Section 5, Rule 114 is present then bail shall be
denied. (emphasis supplied). In the first situation, bail is a matter of sound judicial
discretion. This means that, if none of the circumstances mentioned in the third paragraph
of Section 5, Rule 114 is present, the appellate court has the discretion to grant or deny
bail. On the other hand, in the second situation, the appellate court exercises a more
stringent discretion, that is, to carefully ascertain whether any of the enumerated
circumstances in fact exists. If it so determines, it has no other option except to deny or
revoke bail pending appeal. Given these two distinct scenarios, therefore, any application
for bail pending appeal should be viewed from the perspective of two stages: (1) the
determination of discretion stage, where the appellate court must determine whether any of
the circumstances in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114 is present; this will
establish whether or not the appellate court will exercise sound discretion or stringent
discretion in resolving the application for bail pending appeal and (2) the exercise of
discretion stage where, assuming the appellant’s case falls within the first scenario
allowing the exercise of sound discretion, the appellate court may consider all relevant
circumstances, other than those mentioned in the third paragraph of Section 5, Rule 114,
including the demands of equity and justice; on the basis thereof, it may either allow or
disallow bail. A finding that none of the said circumstances is present will not
automatically result in the grant of bail. Such finding will simply authorize the court to use
the less stringent sound discretion approach. However, judicial discretion has been defined
as “choice.” Choice occurs where, between “two alternatives or among a possibly infinite
number (of options),” there is “more than one possible outcome, with the selection of the
outcome left to the decision maker.” On the other hand, the establishment of a clearly
defined rule of action is the end of discretion. Thus, by severely clipping the appellate
court’s discretion and relegating that tribunal to a mere fact-finding body in applications
for bail pending appeal in all instances where the penalty imposed by the trial court on the
appellant is imprisonment exceeding six years, petitioner’s theory effectively renders
nugatory the provision that “upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail
is discretionary.” The aforementioned provisions were reproduced as Sections 3 to 6, Rule
114 of the 1964 Rules of Criminal Procedure and then of the 1985 Rules of Criminal
Procedure. They were modified in 1988 to read as follows:
Sec. 3. Bail, a matter of right; exception. — All persons in custody, shall before final
conviction be entitled to bail as a matter of right, except those charged with a capital
offense or an offense which, under the law at the time of its commission and at the time of
the application for bail, is punishable by reclusion perpetua, when evidence of guilt is
strong.
Hence, for the guidelines of the bench and bar with respect to future as well as pending
cases before the trial courts, this Court en banc lays down the following policies
concerning theeffectivity of the bail of the accused, to wit:
2) When an accused is charged with a capital offense or an offense which under the law at
the time of its commission and at the time of the application for bail is punishable
by reclusion perpetua and is out on bail, and after trial is convicted by the trial court of a
lesser offense than that charged in the complaint or information, the same rule set forth in
the preceding paragraph shall be applied;
Amendments were further introduced in Administrative Circular No. 12-94 dated August
16, 1994 which brought about important changes in the said rules as follows:
SECTION 5. Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of
an offense not punishable by death, reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, the court, on
application, may admit the accused to bail.
Denial of bail pending appeal is “a matter of wise discretion.”
Section 13, Article II of the Constitution provides:
SEC. 13. All persons, except those charged with offenses punishable
by reclusion perpetua when evidence of guilt is strong, shall, before conviction,
be bailable by sufficient sureties, or be released on recognizance as may be provided by
law.
After conviction by the trial court, the presumption of innocence terminates and,
accordingly, the constitutional right to bail ends. From then on, the grant of bail is subject
to judicial discretion. At the risk of being repetitious, such discretion must be exercised
with grave caution and only for strong reasons.
52
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The Court of Appeals is hereby directed to resolve and decide, on the merits, the appeal of
petitioner Jose Antonio Leviste docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32159, with dispatch.
Rule 114 - Bail
Right to Bail
Sec. 13, Article III 1987 Constitution
ENRILE VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
Juan Ponce Enrile, Petitioner
vs.
Sandiganbayan (Third Division), and People of the Philippines, Respondents.
G.R. No. 213847
August 18, 2015
Ponente: Bersamin, J.
ACTION TAKEN:
Petition for certiorari
BRIEF:
A petition for certiorari was filed to assail and annul the resolutions issued by the
Sandiganbayan (Third Division) in Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238, where Enrile was charged
with plunder along with several others. Enrile insists that the resolutions, which
respectively denied his Motion To Fix Bail and his Motion For Reconsideration, were
issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction.
FACTS:
Senator Juan Ponce Enrile was charged with plunder in the Sandiganbayan on the basis of
his purported involvement in the diversion and misuse of the Priority Development
Assistance Fund (PDAF), his request to post a bail was denied and a warrant of arrest was
issued, leading to Petitioner's voluntary surrender.
Enrile argued that: (a) Prosecution had not yet established that the evidence of his guilt was
strong; (b) that, because of his advanced age and voluntary surrender, the penalty would
only be reclusion temporal, thus allowing for bail and; (c) he is not a flight risk due to his
age and physical condition. Sandiganbayan denied this in its assailed resolution. Motion for
Reconsideration was likewise denied.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not bail may be granted as a matter of right unless the crime charged
is punishable by reclusion perpetua where the evidence of guilt is strong.
2. Whether or not the petitioner is bailable because he is not a flight risk?
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
SANDIGANBAYAN: Motion to Fix Bail Denied
SC: Petition Granted
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ratio:
Primary objective of bail – The strength of the Prosecution's case, albeit a good measure of
the accused's propensity for flight or for causing harm to the public, is subsidiary to the
primary objective of bail, which is to ensure that the accused appears at trial.
Bail is a right and a matter of discretion – Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the
1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7, Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to
wit: “No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by reclusion
perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is strong,
regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.”
1. Yes, Bail as a matter of right – due process and presumption of innocence.
Article III, Sec. 14 (2) of the 1987 Constitution provides that in all criminal prosecutions,
the accused shall be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved. This right is
safeguarded by the constitutional right to be released on bail.
The purpose of bail is to guarantee the appearance of the accused at trial and so the amount
of bail should be high enough to assure the presence of the accused when so required, but
no higher than what may be reasonably calculated to fulfill this purpose.
Bail as a matter of discretion
Right to bail is afforded in Sec. 13, Art III of the 1987 Constitution and repeted in Sec. 7,
Rule 114 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure to wit:
Capital offense of an offense punishable by reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, not
bailable. — No person charged with a capital offense, or an offense punishable by
reclusion perpetua or life imprisonment, shall be admitted to bail when evidence of guilt is
strong, regardless of the stage of the criminal prosecution.
53

The general rule: Any person, before conviction of any criminal offense, shall be bailable.
Exception: Unless he is charged with an offense punishable with reclusion perpetua [or life
imprisonment] and the evidence of his guilt is strong.
Thus, denial of bail should only follow once it has been established that the evidence of
guilt is strong. Where evidence of guilt is not strong, bail may be granted according to
the discretion of the court.
Thus, Sec. 5 of Rule 114 also provides:
Bail, when discretionary. — Upon conviction by the Regional Trial Court of an offense not
punishable by death, reclusion perpetua, or life imprisonment, admission to bail is
discretionary. The application for bail may be filed and acted upon by the trial court despite
the filing of a notice of appeal, provided it has not transmitted the original record to the
appellate court. However, if the decision of the trial court convicting the accused changed
the nature of the offense from non-bailable to bailable, the application for bail can only be
filed with and resolved by the appellate court.
Should the court grant the application, the accused may be allowed to continue on
provisional liberty during the pendency of the appeal under the same bail subject to the
consent of the bondsman.
If the penalty imposed by the trial court is imprisonment exceeding six (6) years, the
accused shall be denied bail, or his bail shall be cancelled upon a showing by the
prosecution, with notice to the accused, of the following or other similar circumstances:
(a) That he is a recidivist, quasi-recidivist, or habitual delinquent, or has committed the
crime aggravated by the circumstance of reiteration;
(b) That he has previously escaped from legal confinement, evaded sentence, or violated
the conditions of his bail without valid justification;
(c) That he committed the offense while under probation, parole, or conditional pardon;
(d) That the circumstances of his case indicate the probability of flight if released on bail;
or
(e) That there is undue risk that he may commit another crime during the pendency of the
appeal.
The appellate court may, motu proprio or on motion of any party, review the resolution of
the Regional Trial Court after notice to the adverse party in either case.
Thus, admission to bail in offenses punished by death or life imprisonment, or reclusion
perpetua subject to judicial discretion. In Concerned Citizens vs. Elma, the court held:
“Such discretion may be exercised only after the hearing called to ascertain the degree of
guilt of the accused for the purpose of whether or not he should be granted provisional
liberty.” Bail hearing with notice is indispensable (Aguirre vs. Belmonte). The hearing
should primarily determine whether the evidence of guilt against the accused is strong.
The procedure for discretionary bail is described in Cortes vs. Catral:
1. In all cases, whether bail is a matter of right or of discretion, notify the prosecutor of the
hearing of the application for bail or require him to submit his recommendation (Section
18, Rule 114 of the Rules of Court as amended);
2. Where bail is a matter of discretion, conduct a hearing of the application for bail
regardless of whether or not the prosecution refuses to present evidence to show that the
guilt of the accused is strong for the purpose of enabling the court to exercise its sound
discretion; (Section 7 and 8, supra)
3. Decide whether the guilt of the accused is strong based on the summary of evidence of
the prosecution;
2. Yes, Petitioner's poor health justifies his admission to bail
The Supreme Court took note of the Philippine's responsibility to the international
community arising from its commitment to the Universal Declaration of Human Rights.
We therefore have the responsibility of protecting and promoting the right of every person
to liberty and due process and for detainees to avail of such remedies which safeguard their
fundamental right to liberty. Quoting from Government of Hong Kong SAR vs. Olalia, the
SC emphasized:
“uphold the fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every
person. This commitment is enshrined in Section II, Article II of our Constitution which
provides: “The State values the dignity of every human person and guarantees full respect
for human rights.” The Philippines, therefore, has the responsibility of protecting and
promoting the right of every person to liberty and due process, ensuring that those detained
or arrested can participate in the proceedings before a court, to enable it to decide without
delay on the legality of the detention and order their release if justified. In other words, the
Philippine authorities are under obligation to make available to every person under
detention such remedies which safeguard their fundamental right to liberty. These remedies
include the right to be admitted to bail.”
54
Sandiganbayan arbitrarily ignored the objective of bail to ensure the appearance of the
accused during the trial and unwarrantedly disregarded the clear showing of the fragile
health and advanced age of Petitioner. As such the Sandiganbayan gravely abused its
discretion in denying the Motion to Fix Bail. It acted whimsically and capriciously and was
so patent and gross as to amount to an evasion of a positive duty [to allow petitioner to post
bail].
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for certiorari and orders the Provisional
Release of Juan Ponce Enrile upon posting of a cash bond of P1,000,000.00 in the
Sandiganbayan; and directs his immediate release from custody unless he is being detained
for some other lawful cause.
Rule 115 – Rights of Accused
a. To be presumed innocent until the contrary is proved beyond reasonable
doubt.
DEL CASTILLO vs. PEOPLE
Ruben Del Castillo @ Boy Castillo, Petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines, Respondent
Pursuant to a confidential information that Del Castillo was engaged in selling shabu,
police officers went to serve a search warrant in search for illegal drugs from the Regional
Trial Court (RTC). Upon arrival, somebody shouted “raid” which prompted the police
officers to immediately disembark from the jeep they were riding and go directly to Del
Castillo’s house and cordoned it off. Police men found nothing incriminating in Del
Castillo’s residence, but one of the barangay tanods was able to confiscate from the hut
several articles including four (4) plastic packs of methamphetamine hydrochloride, or
shabu
An Information was filed before RTC against Del Castillo, charging him with violation of
Section 16, Article III of R.A. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972).
During the arraignment, Del Castillo pleaded not guilty however RTC found Del Castillo
guilty beyond reasonableof the charge against him in the information. The Court of
Appeals (CA) affirmed the decision.
Del Castillo appealed his case to the CA, insisting that there was a violation of his
Constitutional guaranty against unreasonable searches and seizure. On thecontrary, the
Office of the Solicitor General argued that the constitutional guaranty against unreasonable
searches and seizure is applicable only against government authorities. Hence, assuming
that the items seized were found in another place not designated in the search warrant, the
same items should still be admissible as evidence because the one who discovered them
was a barangay tanod who is a private individual.
ISSUE:

G.R. No. 185128 Whether or not CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of illegal
January 30, 2012 possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in possession of
Ponente: Peralta, J. the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut?

ACTION OF THE COURT

ACTION TAKEN: RTC: Guilty beyond reasonable doubt

Petition for Review on Certiorari CA: Decision is AFFIRMED in toto and the appeal is DISMISSED
SC: Decision of CA which affirmed the decision of RTC is hereby reversed and set aside,
BRIEF: petition is granted.

A petition for Review on Certiorati was filed assailing the Decision and Resolution of COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Court of Appeals which affirmed the decision of the Regional Trial Court Branch 12,
finding the petitioner guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section 16, Article III Ratio:
of Republic Act 6425
The accused, in all criminal prosecutions, is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless
FACTS: the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. In considering a criminal case, it is
55
critical to start with the law’s own starting perspective on the status of the accused in all
criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless the contrary is
proven beyond reasonable doubt., proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that quantum of
proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy the
conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the constitutional
presumption of innocence.
The Petitioner claims that the CA erred in finding him guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
illegal possession of prohibited drugs, because he could not be presumed to be in
possession of the same just because they were found inside the nipa hut. Nevertheless, the
OSG dismissed the argument of the petitioner, stating that, when prohibited and regulated
drugs are found in a house or other building belonging to and occupied by a particular
person, the presumption arises that such person is in possession of such drugs in violation
of law, and the fact of finding the same is sufficient to convict.
The present case is about the violation of Section 16 of R.A. 6425. In every prosecution for
the illegal possession of shabu, the following essential elements must be established: (a)
the accused is found in possession of a regulated drug; (b) the person is not authorized by
law or by duly constituted authorities; and (c) the accused has knowledge that the said drug
is a regulated drug.
In People v. Tira the Court explained the concept of possession of regulated drugs, to wit:
This crime is mala prohibita, and, as such, criminal intent is not an essential element.
However, the prosecution must prove that the accused had the intent to possess (animus
posidendi) the drugs. Possession, under the law, includes not only actual possession, but
also constructive possession. Actual possession exists when the drug is in the immediate
physical possession or control of the accused. On the other hand, constructive possession
exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when he has the
right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. Exclusive
possession or control is not necessary. The accused cannot avoid conviction if his right to
exercise control and dominion over the place where the contraband is located, is shared
with another.
While it is not necessary that the property to be searched or seized should be owned by the
person against whom the search warrant is issued, there must be sufficient showing that the
property is under appellants control or possession. The CA, in its Decision, referred to the
possession of regulated drugs by the petitioner as a constructive one. Constructive
possession exists when the drug is under the dominion and control of the accused or when
he has the right to exercise dominion and control over the place where it is found. The
records are void of any evidence to show that petitioner owns the nipa hut in question nor
was it established that he used the said structure as a shop. The RTC, as well as the CA,
merely presumed that petitioner used the said structure due to the presence of electrical
materials, the petitioner being an electrician by profession. The CA, in its Decision, noted a
resolution by the investigating prosecutor, thus:
“As admitted by respondent's wife, her husband is an electrician by occupation. As such,
conclusion could be arrived at that the structure, which housed the electrical equipments is
actually used by the respondent. Being the case, he has control of the things found in said
structure.”
In addition, the testimonies of the witnesses for the prosecution do not also provide proof
as to the ownership of the structure where the seized articles were found. During their
direct testimonies, they just said, without stating their basis, that the same structure was the
shop of petitioner. During the direct testimony of SPO1 Pogoso, he even outrightly
concluded that the electrical shop/nipa hut was owned by petitioner.
Rule 115 provides the accused of his right to be presumed innocent until the contrary is
proved beyond reasonable doubt
Presumption of Innocence means that the presumption must be overcome by evidence of
guilt beyond reasonable doubt. Guilt beyond reasonable doubt means that there is moral
certainty as to the guilt of the accused. Conviction should be based on the strength of the
prosecution and not on the weakness of the defense. The significance of this is that
accusation is not synonymous with guilt.
The exceptions to the constitutional presumption of innocence are as follows:
1. Presumptions – If there is a reasonable connection between the fact presumed and
the fact ultimately proven from such fact
Examples:
a. W h e n a n a c c o u n t a b l e p u b l i c o f f i c e r f a i l s t o a c c o u n t f o r
funds or property that should be in his custody, he is
presumed to be guilty of malversation.
b. Persons in possession of recently stolen goods are presumed guilty of the offense
in connection with the goods.
c. Self-Defense – One who invokes self -defense is presumed guilty. The
burden of proving the elements of self -defense (unlawful aggression,
reasonable necessity of the means used to prevent or repel it; lack of sufficient
provocation on the part of the one defending himself) belongs to the accused.
56
 Ponente: Reyes, JJ.
The prosecution must prove that the petitioner had knowledge of the existence and
presence of the drugs in the place under his control and dominion and the character of the
drugs. With the prosecution's failure to prove that the nipa hut was under petitioner's
control and dominion, there casts a reasonable doubt as to his guilt. In considering a
criminal case, it is critical to start with the law's own starting perspective on the status of
the accused - in all criminal prosecutions, he is presumed innocent of the charge laid unless ACTION TAKEN:
the contrary is proven beyond reasonable doubt. Proof beyond reasonable doubt, or that Petition for Certiorari
quantum of proof sufficient to produce a moral certainty that would convince and satisfy
the conscience of those who act in judgment, is indispensable to overcome the BRIEF:
constitutional presumption of innocence.
A petition for Certiorari was filed assailing the resolutions of the Sandiganbayan. which
SUPREME COURT RULING ordered the petitioners suspension from public office and denied the his motion for
reconsideration of the suspension order.
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals in which affirmed the Decision of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 12, Cebu, is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. FACTS:

Petitioner Ruben del Castillo is ACQUITTED on reasonable doubt.

Vice Mayor Mercelita M. Lucido and other local officials of Koronadal City, South
Cotabato filed a letter-complaint with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao charging
the petitioner, among others, with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, in connection with
the consultancy services for the architectural aspect, the engineering design, and the
construction supervision and management of the proposed Koronadal City publicmarket. In
a resolution, the Ombudsman found probable cause against the petitioner and some private
individuals for violation of R.A. No. 3019 and against the petitioner alone for Falsification
of Public Document under Article 171, par. 4 of the Revised Penal Code. It filed the
corresponding informations with the Sandiganbayan.

Petitioner being the former Municipal Mayor of Koronadal, South Cotabato, and as such
while in the performance of his official functions, committing the offense in relation to his
Rule 115 – Rights of the Accused office, taking advantage of his official position, conspiring and confederating with the
Constitutional Rights of the Accused (Sec. 14, Art III) private [individuals] acting with evident bad faith and manifest partiality, did then and
Right to be Heard there willfully, unlawfully and criminally give unwarranted benefits and advantages to said
[accused], by inviting them to participate in the prequalification of consultants to provide
the Detailed Architectural & Engineering Design and Construction Supervision and
MIGUEL VS. SANDIGANBAYAN Management of the proposed Koronadal Public Market, without causing the publication of
said invitation in a newspaper of general circulation, thereby excluding other consultants
Fernando Q. Miguel, Petitioner from participating in said prequalification.
vs.
The Honorable Sandiganbayan
On motions separately filed by two of the petitioner’s co-accused, the Sandiganbayan
ordered the Office of the Special Prosecutor to conduct a reinvestigation. Later, the
G.R. No. 172035 petitioner, through counsel, followed suit and orally moved for a reinvestigation, which the
July 4, 2012

57
Sandiganbayan likewise granted. The Sandiganbayan gave the petitioner ten (10) days
within which to file his counter-affidavit with the OSP.
Prosecutor Ruiz asked the Sandiganbayan for the arraignment and trial of the petitioner and
of the other accused private individuals. Several extensions sought and granted, the
petitioner filed a Motion to Quash and/or Reinvestigation for the criminal cases against
him. The Sandiganbayan denied the petitioner’s motion because of the pending OSP
reinvestigation – this, despite the OSP’s earlier termination of the reinvestigation for the
petitioner’s continuous failure to submit his counter-affidavit. The petitioner did not
question the denial of his motion.
The petitioner was arraigned; he pleaded not guilty in both criminal cases. Later, the OSP
filed a Motion to Suspend [the petitioner] Pendente Lite. On June 27, 2005, the petitioner
filed his "Vigorous Opposition" based on the "obvious and fatal defect of the
[i]nformation" in failing to allege that the giving of unwarranted benefits and advantages
was done through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence.
The Sandiganbayan promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente
lite. To which the petitioner moved for reconsideration of his suspension order and
demanded for a pre-suspension hearing. The Sandiganbayan denied his motion,prompting
him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the validity of his suspension order.
The petitioner bewails the lack of hearing before the issuance of his suspension order.
Citing Luciano, et al. v. Hon. Mariano, etc., et al. he claims that nowhere in the records of
the case can one see any order or resolution requiring the petitioner to show cause at a
specific date of hearing why he should not be ordered suspended. For the petitioner, the
requirement of a pre-suspension hearing can only be satisfied if the Sandiganbayan ordered
an actual hearing to settle the defect in the information.
ISSUE/S:
Whether the information, charging the petitioner with violation of Section 3(e) of R.A. No.
3019, is valid
Whether or not the absence of an actual pre-suspension hearing renders invalid the
suspension order against the petitioner?
ACTION OF THE COURT
SB: promulgated the assailed resolution suspending the petitioner pendente lite
SB: denied his motion, prompting him to file this certiorari petition to challenge the
validity of his suspension order.
SC: Petition was dismiss for lack of merit
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Ratio:
A pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the proceedings
against him, there’s no hard and fast rule exist in regulating its conduct.
The purpose of the law in requiring a pre-suspension hearing is to determine the validity of the
information so that the trial court can have a basis to either suspend the accused and proceed with the
trial on the merits of the case, withhold the suspension and dismiss the case, or correct any part of the
proceedings that impairs its validity. That hearing is similar to a challenge to the validity of the
information by way of a motion to quash.
While a pre-suspension hearing is aimed at securing for the accused fair and adequate
opportunity to challenge the validity of the information or the regularity of the
proceedings against him, Luciano likewise emphasizes that no hard and fast rule exists in
regulating its conduct. With the purpose of a pre-suspension hearing in mind, the absence
of an actual hearing alone cannot be determinative of the validity of a suspension order.
Constitutional Rights of the Accused (Sec. 14, Art III) provides for:
1. No Person shall be held to answer for a criminal offence without due process
of law
2. In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall be presumed innocent until the
contrary is proved, and shall enjoy the right to be heard by himself and
counsel, to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him,
to have speedy, impartial and public trial, to meet the witness face to face,
and to have compulsory process to secure the attendance of the witnesses and
the production of evidence in his behalf. However, after arraignment, trial
may proceed notified and his failure to appear is unjustifiable
Rule 115 provides for the requirements of procedural due process:
1. There must be an impartial and competent court with judicial power to hear
and determine the matter before it.
2. The jurisdiction must be lawfully acquired over the person of the defendant or
over the property subject of the proceeding;
3. The defendant must be given an opportunity to be heard
4. Judgement must be rendered upon lawful hearing.
In criminal cases the requirements of a procedural due process are as follows:
58
 1. The accused must have been heard by a court of competent jurisdiction
2. He must have been proceeded against under orderly processes of the law
3. He may be punished only after inquiry and investigation
4. There must be notice to the accused
5. The accused must be given an opportunity to be heard
6. Judgment must be rendered within the authority of a constitutional law.
A pre-suspension hearing is basically a due process requirement, when an accused public
official is given an adequate opportunity to be heard on his possible defenses against the
mandatory suspension under R.A. No. 3019, then an accused would have no reason to
complain that no actual hearing was conducted.
It is well settled that to be heard does not only mean oral arguments in court; one may be
heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral arguments
or pleadings, has been accorded, no denial of procedural due process exist. In the present
case, the petitioner (i) filed his Vigorous Opposition (to the OSPs Motion to Suspend
Accused Pendente Lite), and after receiving an adverse ruling from the Sandiganbayan, (ii)
moved for reconsideration of the suspension order issued against him, and (iii) filed a
Reply to the OSPs Opposition to his plea for reconsideration. Given this opportunity, we
find that the petitioners continued demand for the conduct of an actual pre-suspension
hearing based on the same alleged defect in the information, which we have found wanting
has legally nothing to anchor itself on. The nature of Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019; it is not
a penal provision that would call for a liberal interpretation in favor of the accused public
official and a strict construction against the State, thus suspension required under this
provision is not a penalty and not imposed as a result of judicial proceedings; in fact, if
acquitted, the accused official shall be entitled to reinstatement and to the salaries and
benefits which he failed to receive during his suspension. Section 13 of R.A. No. 3019
reinforces the principle enshrined in the Constitution that a public office is a public trust. In
light of the constitutional principle underlying the imposition of preventive suspension of a
public officer charged under a valid information and the nature of this suspension, the
petitioners demand for a trial-type hearing in the present case would only overwhelmingly
frustrate, rather than promote, the orderly and speedy dispensation of justice.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, we hereby DISMISS the petition for lack of merit.
RIGHT TO COUNSEL
PEOPLE VS. LARA
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, vs. ARTURO LARA y
ORBISTA, Accused-Appellant. VILLARAMA, JR.,
G.R. No. 199877
August 13, 2012
Ponente: BIENVENIDO L. REYES
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review
BRIEF
This is an automatic appeal from the Decision1 dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685. The CA affirmed the Decision2 dated October 1,
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Pasig City, Branch 268, finding Arturo Lara
(Lara) guilty beyond reasonable doubt of robbery with homicide.
FACTS
On May 31, 2001 at around 9am in the morning, Enrique Sumulong (accounting staff of
San Sebastian Allied Services, Inc.), withdrew the amount of Php 230,000.00 from the
Metro Bank-Mabini Branch, Pasig City to defray the salaries of the employees of San
Sebastian. Accompanied by three other individuals, Joselito M. Bautista (victim), Atie and
Mancob, Sumulong rode a pick-up and while they were at an intersection the accused,
Arturo Lara, armed with a gun, conspiring and confederating together with one
unidentified person, and both of them mutually helping and aiding one another, with intent
to gain, and by means of force, violence and intimidation, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously take, steal and divest from Joselito M. Bautista the cash money
and shot him to death in the process.
Lara was invited for questioning at the police station after Sumulong identified him as the
culprit. There he was placed in a line-up and was positively identified by Sumulong, Atie
and Manacob.
In Lara’s defense, he stated that he was a plumber and presented his neighbour to
corroborate his alibi that he was working, digging a sewer trench, from 8 in the morning
until 3 in the afternoon.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the identification of Lara during the police line-up is inadmissible as his right to
counsel was violated when the CA ruled that there was no legal compulsion to afford him a
counsel during a police line-up since the latter is not part of custodial investigation.
ACTIONS of the COURT
59
The RTC convicted Lara of robbery with homicide in a Decision, the dispositive portion of
which states:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused ARTURO
LARA Y Orbista GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery with
Homicide, defined and penalized under Article 294 (1) as amended by Republic
Act 7659, and is he reby sentenced to suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
reclusion perpetua, with all the accessory penalties prescribed by law.
Accused is further ordered to indemnify the heirs of the deceased the sum of
Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity and Php230,000.00 representing the money
carted by the said accused.

The CA affirmed Lara’s conviction.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS

Contrary to Lara’s claim, that he was not provided with counsel when he was placed in a
police line-up did not invalidate the proceedings leading to his conviction. That he stood at
the police line-up without the assistance of counsel did not render Sumulong’s
identification of Lara inadmissible. The right to counsel is deemed to have arisen at the PEOPLE VS. SANICO
precise moment custodial investigation begins and being made to stand in a police line-up
is not the starting point or a part of custodial investigation. As this Court previously ruled JOSE “PEPE” SANICO, Petitioner, v. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND
in People v. Amestuzo:22 JENNIFER SON-TENIO, Respondent.
The contention is not meritorious. The guarantees of Sec. 12 (1), Art. III of the 1987
Constitution, or the so-called Miranda rights, may be invoked only by a person while he is G.R. No. 198753
under custodial investigation. Custodial investigation starts when the police investigation is March 25, 2015
no longer a general inquiry into an unsolved crime but has begun to focus on a particular Ponente:
suspect taken into custody by the police who starts the interrogation and propounds
questions to the person to elicit incriminating statements. Police line-up is not part of the Nature of Case:
custodial investigation; hence, the right to counsel guaranteed by the Constitution cannot Petition for Review on Certiorari
yet be invoked at this stage. This was settled in the case of People vs. Lamsing and in the
more recent case of People vs. Salvatierra. The right to be assisted by counsel attaches only BRIEF
during custodial investigation and cannot be claimed by the accused during identification
in a police line-up because it is not part of the custodial investigation process. This is This appeal directly assails the resolution promulgated on April 14, 2011 in C.A.-G.R. CR
because during a police line-up, the process has not yet shifted from the investigatory to the UDK No. 0019 entitled People of the Philippines v. Jose “Pepe” Sanico, et al.,1 whereby
accusatory and it is usually the witness or the complainant who is interrogated and who the Court of Appeals (CA) dismissed the petitioner’s petition to review and undo the
gives a statement in the course of the line-up. dismissal of his appeal by the RTC; and the subsequent resolution promulgated on
September 15, 2011,2 denying his motion for reconsideration.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The assailed decision of the CA is affirmed in all respects. FACTS
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated July 28, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No. 03685 is hereby AFFIRMED. The petitioner, Sanico and Marsito Batiquin were criminally charged for trespassing
(Criminal Case No. 3433-CR) and theft of minerals (Criminal Case No. 3434-CR) in the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Catmon-Carmen-Sogod, Cebu (MCTC). On April 2, 2009,
60
Sanico was then found guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 103 of
Republic Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995. In addition
he was ordered to pay damages.
On April 22, 2009, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC. Consequently,
on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered Sanico to file his
memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply, Hence the RTC ruled to dismissed the
appeal.
On April 26, 2010, one Atty. Dennis Cañete, another lawyer acting for Sanico, filed a
motion for reconsideration7 vis-à-vis the dismissal of the appeal, stating that Sanico had
not filed the memorandum on appeal because he had been beset with problems due to his
wife’s debilitating illness which eventually claimed her life, as well as his counsel, Atty.
Baring’s own medical condition which caused her to forget how she got this case and
whom to contact as principal counsel hereof.
On June 1, 2010, the RTC denied the motion for reconsideration because of its lack of
verification and affidavit of merit; and because the supposed sickness of Sanico’s wife and
the lapses of Atty. Baring were not justifiable reasons.
On June 23, 2010, Sanico, through Atty. Cañete, filed a petition for review in the CA,
contesting his conviction, and assailing the dismissal of his appeal for failure to file the
memorandum on appeal.
On April 14, 2011, the CA denied the petition for review on the following grounds,
namely: (a) the docket fees were not paid; (b) there was no proper proof of service of a
copy of the petition for review on the adverse party; (c) the petitioner did not furnish to the
RTC a copy of the petition for review; (d) there was no affidavit of service; (e) no written
explanation for not resorting to personal filing was filed; (f) the documents appended to the
petition were only plain photocopies of the certified true copies; (g) no copies of pleadings
and other material portions of the record were attached; (h) the verification and
certification of non-forum shopping were defective due to failure to contain a statement
that the allegations therein were based on the petitioner’s personal knowledge; (i) the
verification and certification of non-forum shopping did not contain competent evidence
of identity of the petitioner; and (j) the serial number of the commission of the notary
public and the office address of the notary public were not properly indicated
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the CA erred in holding against him his former counsel’s gross and inexcusable
negligence, thereby depriving him of his right to have the conviction reviewed by the RTC.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MCTC rendered its judgment on April 2, 2009, convicting the accused, disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, and in view of the foregoing judgment is hereby rendered in
Criminal Case No. 3434-CR finding the accused Jose “Pepe” Sanico and Marsito
Batiquin guilty beyond reasonable doubt for Violation of Section 103 of Republic
Act No. 7942 otherwise known as the Philippine Mining Act of 1995, and they are
hereby both sentenced to suffer an imprisonment of Six (6) Months and One (1)
Day of Prision Correccional, as minimum, to Two (2) Years Four (4) Months and
One (1) day of Prision Correccional, as maximum, and to pay a fine of Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) each, with subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency.
The truck with Plate No.GAX-119, as an instrument of the crime is hereby
ordered confiscated in favour of the government.
In addition, both accused are hereby ordered to solidarily pay private
complainant Jennifer S. Tenio actual damages in the amount of Four Million
Forty Two Thousand and Five Hundred Pesos (P4,042,500.00), Moral damages in
the amount of Five Hundred Thousand Pesos (P500,000.00), Exemplary Damages
in the amount of Two Hundred Thousand Pesos (P200,000.00), Attorney’s Fees in
the amount of One Hundred Thousand Pesos (P100,000.00) and Litigation
Expenses in the amount of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00).
In Criminal Case No. 3433-CR Trespassing, the Court finds accused Jose “Pepe”
Sanico and Marsito Batiquin not guilty for failure of the prosecution to prove the
guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. SO ORDERED.
The RTC dismissed the appeal
On April 22, 2009, Sanico’s counsel filed a notice of appeal in the MCTC.4
Consequently, on January 5, 2010, the RTC, Branch 25, in Danao City ordered
Sanico to file his memorandum on appeal. Sanico did not comply; hence, the RTC
ruled on March 16, 2010,5 as follows:
The motion of plaintiff is impressed with merit. The failure of the accused-
appellants to file Memorandum on Appeal is a ground for dismissal of the Appeal.
WHEREFORE, the appeal of the accused is ordered dismissed with prejudice. SO
ORDERED
61
The CA denied the accused motion for reconsideration.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, appellant’s Motion for
Reconsideration with Application for Temporary Restraining Order and
Preliminary injunction dated 31 May 2011 is hereby DENIED. SO ORDERED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The appeal is meritorious.
in Danao City respectively dismissing his appeal, denying his motion for
reconsideration, and denying his omnibus motion to recall the order issued on
March 28, 2011 for the issuance of the entry of judgment and to quash the entry of
judgment; QUASHES and VACATES the entry of judgment dated March 30,
2011 for lack of legal basis; NULLIFIES all acts taken by virtue of the entry of
judgment; REMANDS the records to the Regional Trial Court for further
proceedings as outlined in this decision; and ORDERS the private respondent to
pay the costs of suit.

The parties have argued on whether or not the negligence of the petitioner’s counsel should
be binding on the petitioner. In our view, however, we do not need to belabor the point
with a lengthy discussion. Without doubt, the petitioner could reasonably expect that his
counsel would afford to him competent legal representation. The mere failure of the
counsel to observe a modicum of care and vigilance in the protection of the interests of the
petitioner as the client – as manifested in the multiple defects and shortcomings discovered
in the petition for review – was gross negligence in any language because the defects were
plainly avoidable by the simple application of the relevant guidelines existing in the Rules
of Court. If the incompetence of counsel was so great and the error committed as a result
was so serious that the client was prejudiced by a denial of his day in court, the litigation
ought to be re-opened to give to the client another chance to present his case. The
legitimate interests of the petitioner, particularly the right to have his conviction reviewed
by the RTC as the superior tribunal, should not be sacrificed in the altar of technicalities. RIGHT AGAINST SELF-INCRIMINATION

The Court, remind all lower courts and their judges to be alert in safeguarding the right of PEOPLE VS. AYSON
the parties to appeal. Although the right to appeal is statutory, it must be respected and
observed because it is an essential component of due process. What happened herein was THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner, vs. HON. JUDGE RUBEN
the uncharacteristic oversight of the RTC in the application of the proper governing rules. AYSON, Presiding over Branch 6, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region,
There should have been no difficulty to discern the applicable rules, given the clear Baguio City, and FELIPE RAMOS, respondents. Nelson Lidua for private respondent.
distinction between the civil and the criminal procedures. The alertness could have avoided
the oversight, and prevented the waste of time by the petitioner who had to come all the G.R. No. 85215
way to this Court to safeguard his right to appeal July 7, 1989

SUPREME COURT RULING: Ponente: NARVASA

WHEREFORE, the Court GRANTS the petition for review on Nature of Case:
certiorari; REVERSES and SETS ASIDE the resolutions promulgated on April Petition for Review on Certiorari
14, 2011 and September 15, 2011 by the Court of Appeals in C.A.-G.R. CR UDK
No. 0019 entitled People v. Jose “Pepe: Sanico, et al. respectively dismissing the BRIEF
petitioner’s petition for review assailing the dismissal of his appeal by the Orders of August 9, 1988 and September 14, 1988 are assailed in the petition for certiorari
Regional Trial Court, and denying his motion for and prohibition at bar, filed in this Court by the private prosecutors in the name of the
reconsideration; ANNULS and SETS ASIDE the orders issued on March 16, People of the Philippines
2010, June 1, 2010, and August 22, 2011 by the Regional Trial Court, Branch 25,
62
FACTS
Private respondent Felipe Ramos was a ticket freight clerk of the Philippine Airlines
(PAL), assigned at its Baguio City station. It having allegedly come to light that he was
involved in irregularities in the sales of plane tickets, the PAL management notified him of
an investigation to be conducted into the matter of February 9, 1986. That investigation
was scheduled in accordance with PAL's Code of Conduct and Discipline, and the
Collective Bargaining Agreement signed by it with the Philippine Airlines Employees'
Association (PALEA) to which Ramos pertained. On the day before the investigation,
February 8,1986, Ramos gave to his superiors handwritten notes informing the PAL
management that he is willing to settle irregularities (approx. Php 76,000.00) allegedly
charged against him.
At the investigation of February 9, 1986, conducted by the PAL Branch Manager in Baguio
City, Edgardo R. Cruz, in the presence of Station Agent Antonio Ocampo, Ticket Freight
Clerk Rodolfo Quitasol, and PALEA Shop Steward Cristeta Domingo, Felipe Ramos was
informed "of the finding of the Audit Team." Thereafter, his answers in response to
questions by Cruz, were taken down in writing. Ramos' answers were to the effect inter alia
that he had not indeed made disclosure of the tickets mentioned in the Audit Team's
findings, that the proceeds had been "misused" by him, that although he had planned on
paying back the money, he had been prevented from doing so, "perhaps (by) shame," that
he was still willing to settle his obligation, and proferred a "compromise x x to pay on
staggered basis, (and) the amount would be known in the next investigation;" that he
desired the next investigation to be at the same place, "Baguio CTO," and that he should be
represented therein by "Shop stewardees ITR Nieves Blanco;" and that he was willing to
sign his statement (as he in fact afterwards did). But no compromise agreement was
reached much less consummated.
About two (2) months later, an information was filed against Felipe Ramos charging him
with the crime of estafa allegedly committed in Baguio City during the period from March
12, 1986 to January 29, 1987.
On arraignment on this charge, Felipe Ramos entered a plea of "Not Guilty," and trial
thereafter ensued.
The private prosecutors made a written offer of evidence dated June 21, 1988, 6 which
included "the (above mentioned) statement of accused Felipe J. Ramos taken on February
9, 1986 at PAL Baguio City Ticket Office," which had been marked as Exhibit A, as well
as his "handwritten admission given on February 8, 1986,", which had been marked as
Exhibit K.
The defendants attorney filed a objections/comments to Pal’s evidence. Particularly,
Exhibit A and K, the objection was that "said document, which appears to be a confession,
was taken without the accused being represented by a lawyer."
The respondent, Judge Ayson, declared Exhibit A "inadmissible in evidence”, ruling that it
does not appear that the accused was reminded of this constitutional rights to remain silent
and to have counsel, and that when he waived the same and gave his statement, it was with
the assistance actually of a counsel.
Private prosecutors file a motion for reconsideration but was denied
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether it was grave abuse of discretion for respondent Judge to have excluded the
People's Exhibits A and K and correctly constructing the constitutional right against self-
incrimination.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The court ruled that the right against self-incrimination is accorded to every person who
gives evidence, whether voluntarily or under compulsion of subpoena, in any civil,
criminal, or administrative proceeding. The right is not to "be compelled to be a witness
against himself".
It prescribes an "option of refusal to answer incriminating questions and not a prohibition
of inquiry. “It simply secures to a witness, whether he be a party or not, the right to refuse
to answer any particular incriminatory question, i.e., one the answer to which has a
tendency to incriminate him for some crime. However, the right can be claimed only when
the specific question, incriminatory in character, is actually put to the witness. It cannot be
claimed at any other time. It does not give a witness the right to disregard a subpoena, to
decline to appear before the court at the time appointed, or to refuse to testify altogether.
The witness receiving a subpoena must obey it, appear as required, take the stand, be sworn
and answer questions. It is only when a particular question is addressed to him, the answer
to which may incriminate him for some offense that he may refuse to answer on the
strength of the constitutional guaranty.
It is clear from the undisputed facts of this case that Felipe Ramos was not in any sense
under custodial interrogation, as the term should be properly understood, prior to and
during the administrative inquiry into the discovered irregularities in ticket sales in which
he appeared to have had a hand. The constitutional rights of a person under custodial
interrogation under Section 20, Article IV of the 1973 Constitution did not therefore come
into play, were of no relevance to the inquiry. It is also clear, too, that Ramos had
voluntarily answered questions posed to him on the first day of the administrative
63
investigation, February 9, 1986 and agreed that the proceedings should be recorded, the
record having thereafter been marked during the trial of the criminal action subsequently PEOPLE VS. VILLAREAL
filed against him as Exhibit A, just as it is obvious that the note (later marked as Exhibit K)
that he sent to his superiors on February 8,1986, the day before the investigation, offering G.R. No. 151258 December 1, 2014
to compromise his liability in the alleged irregularities, was a free and even spontaneous ARTEMIO VILLAREAL, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
act on his part. They may not be excluded on the ground that the so-called "Miranda rights" Respondent.
had not been accorded to Ramos. x-----------------------x

His Honor adverts to what he perceives to be the "greater danger x x (of) the violation of
the right of any person against self-incrimination when the investigation is conducted by
the complaining parties, complaining companies, or complaining employers because being
interested parties, unlike the police agencies who have no propriety or pecuniary interest to
protect, they may in their over-eagerness or zealousness bear heavily on their hapless
suspects, whether employees or not, to give statements under an atmosphere of moral
coercion, undue ascendancy and undue influence." It suffices to draw attention to the
specific and peremptory requirement of the law that disciplinary sanctions may not be
imposed on any employee by his employer until and unless the employee has been
accorded due process, by which is meant that the latter must be informed of the offenses
ascribed to him and afforded adequate time and opportunity to explain his side. The
requirement entails the making of statements, oral or written, by the employee under such
administrative investigation in his defense, with opportunity to solicit the assistance of
counsel, or his colleagues and friends. The employee may, of course, refuse to submit any
statement at the investigation that is his privilege. But if he should opt to do so, in his
defense to the accusation against him, it would be absurd to reject his statements, whether
at the administrative investigation, or at a subsequent criminal action brought against him,
because he had not been accorded, prior to his making and presenting them, his "Miranda
rights" (to silence and to counsel and to be informed thereof, etc.) which, to repeat, are
relevant only in custodial investigations. Indeed, it is self-evident that the employee's
statements, whether called "position paper," "answer," etc., are submitted by him precisely
so that they may be admitted and duly considered by the investigating officer or committee,
in negation or mitigation of his liability.
G.R. No. 154954
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, vs.THE HONORABLE COURT OF
APPEALS, ANTONIO MARIANO ALMEDA, DALMACIO LIM, JR., JUNEL
ANTHONY AMA, ERNESTO JOSE MONTECILLO, VINCENT TECSON,
ANTONIO GENERAL, SANTIAGO RANADA III, NELSON VICTORINO, JAIME
MARIA FLORES II, ZOSIMO MENDOZA, MICHAEL MUSNGI, VICENTE
VERDADERO, ETIENNE GUERRERO, JUDE FERNANDEZ, AMANTE
PURISIMA II, EULOGIO SABBAN, PERCIVAL D. BRIGOLA, PAUL ANGELO
SANTOS, JONAS KARL B. PEREZ, RENATO BANTUG, JR., ADEL ABAS,
JOSEPH LLEDO, and RONAN DE GUZMAN, Respondents.
x-----------------------x
G.R. No. 155101
FIDELITO DIZON, Petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
x-----------------------x
G.R. Nos. 178057 & 178080
GERARDA H. VILLA, Petitioner, vs. MANUEL LORENZO ESCALONA II,
MARCUS JOEL CAPELLAN RAMOS, CRISANTO CRUZ SARUCA, JR., and
ANSELMO ADRIANO, Respondents.
PONENTE: SERENO, CJ
Nature of the Case:

SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the writ of certiorari is granted annulling and setting aside the Orders of
the respondent Judge in Criminal Case No. 3488-R, dated August 9, 1988 and September
14, 1988, and he is hereby ordered to admit in evidence Exhibits "A" and "K" of the
prosecution in said Criminal Case No. 3488-R, and thereafter proceed with the trial and
adjudgment thereof. The temporary restraining order of October 26, 1988 having become
functus officio, is now declared of no further force and effect.
BRIEF
G.R. Nos. 178057 and 178080 Villa v. Escalona
Petitioner Villa assails the CAs dismissal of the criminal case involving 4 of the 9 accused,
namely, Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. It was argued that the accused failed to
assert their right to speedy trial within a reasonable period of time and that the prosecution
cannot be faulted for the delay, as the original records and the required evidence were not
at its disposal, but were still in the appellate court.

FACTS
RIGHT TO SPEEDY, IMPARTIAL AND PUBLIC TRIAL
64
In February 1991, seven freshmen law students of the Ateneo de Manila University School
of Law signified their intention to join the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity (Aquila Fraternity).
They were Caesar "Bogs" Asuncion, Samuel "Sam" Belleza, Bienvenido "Bien" Marquez
III, Roberto Francis "Bert" Navera, Geronimo "Randy" Recinto, Felix Sy, Jr., and
Leonardo "Lenny" Villa (neophytes).
The neophytes were subjected to three days initiation rites.
On the first day the neophytes were subjected to the following Aquilan "initiation rites” ;
"Indian Run," which required the neophytes to run a gauntlet of two parallel rows of
Aquilans, each row delivering blows to the neophytes; the "Bicol Express," which obliged
the neophytes to sit on the floor with their backs against the wall and their legs outstretched
while the Aquilans walked, jumped, or ran over their legs; the "Rounds," in which the
neophytes were held at the back of their pants by the "auxiliaries" (the Aquilans charged
with the duty of lending assistance to neophytes during initiation rites), while the latter
were being hit with fist blows on their arms or withknee blows on their thighs by two
Aquilans; and the "Auxies’ Privilege Round," in which the auxiliaries were given the
opportunity to inflict physical pain on the neophytes. During this time, the neophytes were
also indoctrinated with the fraternity principles.
On the morning of their second day – 9 February 1991 – the neophytes were made to
present comic plays and to play rough basketball and were required to memorize and recite
the Aquila Fraternity’s principles and whenever they would give a wrong answer, they
would be hit on their arms or legs. After a few hours the initiation for the day officially
ended but was reopened upon the demand of non-resident or alumni fraternity members
Fidelito Dizon (Dizon) and Artemio Villareal (Villareal). The neophytes were subjected to
"paddling" and to additional rounds of physical pain. Lenny received several paddle blows,
one of which was so strong it sent him sprawling to the ground. The neophytes heard him
complaining of intense pain and difficulty in breathing. After their last session of physical
beatings, Lenny could no longer walk. He had to be carried by the auxiliaries to the carport.
Again, the initiation for the day was officially ended, and the neophytes started eating
dinner. They then slept at the carport.
After an hour of sleep, the neophytes were suddenly roused by Lenny’s shivering and
incoherent mumblings which were initially, dismissed by Villareal and Dizon on the
thought that he was just overacting. When they realized, though, that Lenny was really
feeling cold, some of the Aquilans started helping him, when his condition worsened, the
Aquilans rushed him to the hospital but was pronounced dead on arrival.
Consequently, a criminal case for homicide was filed against 35 Aquilans.
ISSUE of the CASE
Whether the CA committed grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction when it dismissed the case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano for
violation of their right to speedy trial
ACTIONS of the COURT.
On 5 August 2002, the trial court in Criminal Case No. 38340 dismissed the charge against
accused Concepcion on the ground of violation of his right to speedy trial. Meanwhile, on
different dates between the years 2003 and 2005, the trial court denied the respective
Motions to Dismiss of accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano. On 25 October
2006, the CA in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 89060 & 90153 reversed the trial court’s Orders and
dismissed the criminal case against Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano on the basis of
violation of their right to speedy trial.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The right of the accused to a speedy trial has been enshrined in Sections 14(2) and 16,
Article III of the 1987 Constitution. This right requires that there be a trial free from
vexatious, capricious or oppressive delays. The right is deemed violated when the
proceeding is attended with unjustified postponements of trial, or when a long period of
time is allowed to elapse without the case being tried and for no cause or justifiable motive.
In determining the right of the accused to speedy trial, courts should do more than a
mathematical computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of
the case.The conduct of both the prosecution and the defense must be weighed. Also to be
considered are factors such as the length of delay, the assertion or non-assertion of the
right, and the prejudice wrought upon the defendant.
The court ruled in a long line of cases that a dismissal of the case pursuant to the right of
the accused to speedy trial is tantamount to acquittal. As a consequence, an appeal or a
reconsideration of the dismissal would amount to a violation of the principle of double
jeopardy. As we have previously discussed, however, where the dismissal of the case is
capricious, certiorari lies. The rule on double jeopardy is not triggered when a petition
challenges the validity of the order of dismissal instead of the correctness thereof. Rather,
grave abuse of discretion amounts to lack of jurisdiction, and lack of jurisdiction prevents
double jeopardy from attaching.
The absence of the records in the trial court [was] due to the fact that the records of the
case were elevated to the Court of Appeals, and the prosecutions failure to comply with the
order of the court a quo requiring it to secure certified true copies of the same. What is
glaring from the records is the fact that as early as September 21, 1995, the court a quo
already issued an Order requiring the prosecution, through the Department of Justice, to
secure the complete records of the case from the Court of Appeals. The prosecution did not
comply with the said Order as in fact, the same directive was repeated by the court a quo in
65
an Order dated December 27, 1995. Still, there was no compliance on the part of the
prosecution. It is not stated when such order was complied with. It appears, however, that
even until August 5, 2002, the said records were still not at the disposal of the trial court
because the lack of it was made the basis of the said court in granting the motion to dismiss
filed by co-accused Concepcion.

It is likewise noticeable that from December 27, 1995, until August 5, 2002, or for a period
of almost seven years, there was no action at all on the part of the court a quo. Except for
the pleadings filed by both the prosecution and the petitioners, the latest of which was on
January 29, 1996, followed by petitioner Sarucas motion to set case for trial on August 17, Rule 116 Arraignment
1998 which the court did not act upon, the case remained dormant for a considerable length
of time. This prolonged inactivity whatsoever is precisely the kind of delay that the
ARRAIGNMENT AND PLEA; AN INTEGRAL ASPECT OF THE DUE PROCESS
constitution frowns upon.
CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. - Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that the
arraignment should be made in open court by the judge himself or by the clerk of court
SUPREME COURT RULING:
furnishing the accused a copy of the complaint or information with the list of witnesses
stated therein, then reading the same in the language or dialect that is known to him, and
While we are prepared to concede that some of the foregoing factors that
asking him what his plea is to the charge. The requirement that the reading be made in a
contributed to the delay of the trial of the petitioners are justifiable, We
language or dialect that the accused understands and knows is a mandatory requirement,
nonetheless hold that their right to speedy trial has been utterly violated in this
just as the whole of said Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law
case.
affords the accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the accusation
From the foregoing principles, we affirm the ruling of the CA in CA-G.R. SP No.
leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to hoist the necessary
89060 that accused Escalona et al.s right to speedy trial was violated. Since there
defense in rebuttal thereof. It is an integral aspect of the due process clause under the
is nothing in the records that would show that the subject of this Petition includes
Constitution.
accused Ampil, S. Fernandez, Cabangon, and De Vera, the effects of this ruling
shall be limited to accused Escalona, Ramos, Saruca, and Adriano.
REQUIREMENT THAT THE COMPLAINT OR INFORMATION BE READ TO
SO ORDERED. THE ACCUSED IN THE LANGUAGE OR DIALECT KNOWN TO HIM; NOT
COMPLIED WITH BY THE TRIAL COURT IN CASE AT BAR.

THE TRIAL COURT MUST FULLY DISCHARGE ITS DUTY TO CONDUCT

THE REQUISITE SEARCHING INQUIRY IN SUCH A WAY AS TO
INDUBITABLY SHOW THAT THE ACCUSED HAD MADE NOT ONLY A
CLEAR, DEFINITE AND UNCONDITIONAL PLEA, BUT HE DID SO WITH A
WELL INFORMED UNDERSTANDING AND FULL REALIZATION OF THE
CONSEQUENCES THEREOF.

NO VALID JUDGMENT CAN BE RENDERED UPON AN INVALID

ARRAIGNMENT.

66
PEOPLE VS. ESTOMACA 2. No record that the accused and his counsel were furnished a copy of each
complaint.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, 3. Accused was not specifically warned of the consequences on his plea of guilty.
vs. 4. Complaints were supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect."
MELCHOR ESTOMACA y GARQUE, accused-appellant. 5. Duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry

G.R. Nos. 117485-86 ISSUE/S of the CASE

April 22, 1996 Whether the arraignment of accused arraigned validly in pursuant to Rule 116 of the Rules
Ponente: REGALADO, J of Court.

ACTIONS of the COURT – Not Applicable

Nature of Case:
Automatic Review by Supreme Court
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
BRIEF
5 complaints filed against Estomaca for committing rape and sexual assault against his No.
daughter. Court found that lower court improperly followed the procedures regarding
arraignment. Section 1(a) of Rule 116 requires that:
1. Arraignment should be made in open court by judge or by clerk of court
FACTS 2. The accused be furnished a copy of complaint or information with list of
witnesses stated therein
Melchor Estomaca y Garque, was charged by his daughter, Melita Estomaca, of five counts 3. Reading of complaint or information in the language or dialect that is
of rape, committed on different occasions, before the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo, Branch known to him (mandatory requirement)
38, and docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 43567, 43568, 43569, 43570 and 43571. 4. Asking him what his plea is to the charge

During the arraignment on June 15, 1994, accused-appellant entered a plea of guilty to
Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571, and a plea of not guilty to Criminal Cases Nos.
43567, 43569 and 43570.
Trial ensued with respect to Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571. The lower court
imposed upon appellant the penalty of reclusion perpetua for the sexual assault supposedly
perpetrated in December, 1993, and the supreme penalty of death with respect to the rape
allegedly committed on March 6, 1994.
1. It appears to have consisted merely of the bare reading of the five complaints,
synthetically and cryptically reported in the transcript, thus: "(Reading the
information/complaint to the accused in Ilonggo/local dialect)." Since what was
supposed to have been read was stated in the singular, but there were five criminal
complaints against appellant, this Court is then left to speculate on whether all
five criminal complaints were actually read, translated or explained to appellant
on a level within his comprehension, considering his limited education.

The cases were brought to this Court for automatic review. 2. There is no showing whether or not appellant or his counsel de oficio was
furnished a copy of each complaint with the list of witnesses against him, in order
From a perusal of the records of the case, it appears that the procedural rules to be observed that the latter may duly prepare and comply with his responsibilities.
for the validity of the arraignment of the accused were irregularly complied with; similar to
what happened in the case of Alicando.
3. Of more troublous concern is the fact that appellant was not specifically warned
1. The complaints were not read in detail that on his plea of guilty, he would definitely and in any event be given the death
penalty under the "New Law," as the trial court calls Republic Act No. 7659. He
67
 was also not categorically advised that his plea of guilty would not under any SET ASIDE. Said cases are REMANDED to the trial court for further and appropriate
circumstance affect or reduce the death sentence as he may have believed or may proceedings, with instructions that the same be given appropriate priority and the
have been erroneously advised. proceedings therein be conducted with deliberate dispatch and circumspection.

4. Likewise of very serious importance and consequence is the fact that the
complaints were supposedly read to appellant in "Ilonggo/local dialect."
Parenthetically, there was no statement of record that appellant fully understood
that medium of expression.

The requirement that the reading be made in a language or dialect that the accused
understands and knows is a mandatory requirement, just as the whole of said
Section 1 should be strictly followed by trial courts. This the law affords the
accused by way of implementation of the all-important constitutional mandate
regarding the right of an accused to be informed of the precise nature of the
accusation leveled at him and is, therefore, really an avenue for him to be able to
hoist the necessary defense in rebuttal thereof. 14 It is an integral aspect of the due
process clause under the Constitution.

5. The foregoing discussion brings us to the strict injunction that the trial court must
fully discharge its duty to conduct the requisite searching inquiry in such a way as
would indubitably show that appellant had made not only a clear, definite and
unconditional plea, but that he did so with a well-informed understanding and full
realization of the consequences thereof.
The Court therefore, on judicial conscience cannot accept as valid a plea of guilty to a
charge with a mandatory death penalty when entered by an accused with a befuddled
state of mind at an arraignment with reversible lapses in law.
Rule 116 Arraignment
Arraignment is the formal mode and manner of implementing the constitutional right of an
accused to be informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The purpose
of arraignment is, thus, to apprise the accused of the possible loss of freedom, even of his
life, depending on the nature of the crime imputed to him, or at the very least to inform him
of why the prosecuting arm of the State is mobilized against him.

Adverting Alicando, we reiterated therein that pursuant to Binabay vs. People, et al., 24 no
valid judgment can be rendered upon an invalid arraignment. Since in Alicando the
PEOPLE VS. PANGILINAN
arraignment of appellant therein was void, the judgment of conviction rendered against him
was likewise void, hence in fairness to him and in justice to the offended party that case
was remanded to the trial court for further proceedings. The case at bar being on all fours PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
with the aforementioned cases on the particular determinant issue, we have perforce to vs.
yield to the same doctrine and disposition. ALFREDO PANGILINAN y TRINIDAD, Accused-Appellant.

SUPREME COURT RULING: SET ASIDE & REMANDED to trial court. G.R. Nos. 171020
March 14, 2007
The decretal portion reads: Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO

WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo in Criminal Cases Nos. 43568 and 43571
convicting accused-appellant Melchor Estomaca y Garque of two crimes of rape is hereby Nature of Case:
68
Automatic Review by Supreme Court over the person of the Pangilinan when he was arrested on 19 Mar 1997. His
arrest, not his arraignment, conferred on the RTC jurisdiction over his person.
BRIEF
2 complaints filed against Alfredo Pangilinan for committing rape against his daughter.

FACTS 2. Whether Pangilinan’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision?
Two information were filed charging Pangilinan with raping AAA, his daughter.
No. P’s belated arraignment did not prejudice him. This procedural defect
1. 5 May 1997 – P, who was arrested and detained with no bail recommended, filed was cured when his counsel participated in the trial without raising any
a petition for bail. objection that his client had yet to be arraigned.
2. 23 April 1998 – RTC, finding that the evidence against P is strong, denied P’s
petition for bail. In fact, his counsel even cross-examined the prosecution witnesses. His
3. Defense presented its evidence with P as the sole witness. counsel’s active participation in the hearings is a clear indication that he
4. 9 June 1999 – RTC, having discovered that P had not yet been arraigned, was fully aware of the charges against him; otherwise, his counsel would
scheduled his arraignment. have objected and informed the court of this blunder.
5. 17 June 1999, P, with the assistance of counsel de oficio, pleaded not guilty to the
charges against him. Moreover, no protest was made when Pangilinan was subsequently
6. 9 Sep 1999 – RTC convicted Pangilinan of two counts of rape. arraigned. The parties did not question the procedure undertaken by the
RTC. It is only now, after being convicted and sentenced to 2 death
ISSUE/S of the CASE sentences, that P cries that his constitutional right has been violated. It is
already too late to raise this procedural defect.
1. Whether RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person on Pangilinan?
2. Whether Pangilinan’s rights and interests prejudiced by the fact that he was In People v. Cabale and People v. Atienza where the same issue was raised
arraigned only after the case was submitted for decision? under similar circumstances, we held that while the arraignment of accused
was conducted after the cases had been submitted for decision, the error is non-
prejudicial and has been fully cured.
ACTIONS of the COURT

RTC – convicted on two counts of rape and imposed two death sentences
CA - affirmed the death penalties imposed by the trial court but modified the amounts of
damages awarded.
SC- affirmed with modification on the penalty.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. Whether RTC acquire jurisdiction over the person on Pangilinan?
Yes. When the hearings for his petition for bail were conducted, the RTC
had already acquired jurisdiction over his person. Settled is the rule that
jurisdiction over the person of the accused is acquired upon his arrest or
voluntary appearance. In the case at bar, the RTC acquired jurisdiction
SUPREME COURT RULING
The decretal portion reads:
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the decision of the Court of Appeals dated 16
November 2005 finding appellant Alfredo Pangilinan y Trinidad guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of qualified rape is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that each
penalty of death imposed on appellant is reduced to reclusion perpetua without eligibility
for parole pursuant to Republic Act No. 9346. He is also ordered to pay private
complainant AAA, for each count of rape, the amount of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P75,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as exemplary damages. Costs against
appellant.
69

Rule 116 Arraignment / SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense.
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge.
DAAN VS. SANDIGANBAYAN
JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HON. SANDIGANBAYAN Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 163972-77
March 28, 2008
Ponente: AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ
Nature of Case:
Appeal
BRIEF
2 complaints filed against Alfredo Pangilinan for committing rape against his daughter.
FACTS
Joselito Daan together with co-accused Benedicto Kuizon were charged for three counts of
malversation of public funds which they purportedly tried to conceal by falsifying the time
book and payrolls for given period making it appear that some laborers worked on the
construction of the new municipal hall building of Bato, Leyte and collected their
respective salaries thereon when, in truth and in fact, they did not.
Thus, in addition to the charge for malversation, the accused were also indicted for three
counts of falsification of public document by a public officer or employee. The accused
offered withdraw their plea of "not guilty" and substitute the same with a plea of "guilty",
provided, the mitigating circumstances of confession or plea of guilt and voluntary
surrender will be appreciated in their favor.
In the alternative, if such proposal is not acceptable, said accused proposed instead to
substitute their plea of "not guilty" to the crime of falsification of public document by a
public officer or employee with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of falsification of
a public document by a private individual.
On the other hand, in the malversation cases, the accused offered to substitute their plea of
"not guilty" thereto with a plea of "guilty", but to the lesser crime of failure of an
accountable officer to render accounts. The Sandiganbayan denied petitioner’s Motion to
Plea Bargain, despite favorable recommendation by the prosecution, on the main ground
that no cogent reason was presented to justify its approval. Hence, this appeal.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether Whether Sandiganbayan committed grave abuse of discretion in denying
petitioner’s plea bargaining offer.
ACTIONS of the COURT – Not Applicable
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Plea bargaining in criminal cases is a process whereby the accused and the prosecution
work out a mutually satisfactory disposition of the case subject to court approval. It usually
involves the defendant's pleading guilty to a lesser offense or to only one or some of the
counts of a multi-count indictment in return for a lighter sentence than that for the graver
charge.
Plea bargaining is authorized under Section 2, Rule 116 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, to wit:
SEC. 2. Plea of guilty to a lesser offense. — At arraignment, the accused, with the
consent of the offended party and the prosecutor, may be allowed by the trial court
to plead guilty to a lesser offense which is necessarily included in the offense
charged. After arraignment but before trial, the accused may still be allowed to
plead guilty to said lesser offense after withdrawing his plea of not guilty. No
amendment of the complaint or information is necessary. (sec. 4, cir. 38-98)
70
Ordinarily, plea bargaining is made during the pre-trial stage of the proceedings. Sections 1
and 2, Rule 118 of the Rules of Court, require plea bargaining to be considered by the trial
court at the pre-trial conference,8 viz:
SEC. 1. Pre-trial; mandatory in criminal cases. – In all criminal cases cognizable by
the Sandiganbayan, Regional Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court
in Cities, Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court shall, after
arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date the court acquires jurisdiction over
the person of the accused, unless a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars
of the Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the following:
(a) plea bargaining;
(b) stipulation of facts;
(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;
(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;
offense of falsification by private individual defined and penalized under Article 172 of the
Revised Penal Code will strengthen the cases against the principal accused, the Municipal
Mayor Benedicto Kuizon, who appears to be the master mind of these criminal acts. After
all, the movants herein JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN was merely designated as
draftsman detailed as foreman/timekeeper of the Municipality of Bato, Leyte.
In the cases at bar, there is no dispute that JOSELITO RANIERO J. DAAN has already
restituted the total amount of P18,860.00 as per official receipt issued by the provincial
government of Leyte dated February 26, 2002.
In short, the damage caused to the government has already been restituted by the accused.
There is also no dispute that accused DAAN voluntarily surrendered in the instant cases.
Moreover, the accused is also willing to plead guilty to a lesser offense which to our mind,
merits consideration.
Petition granted.

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge but
SUPREME COURT RULING
interposes a lawful defense; and
The decretal portion reads:
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the criminal and
civil aspects of the case. WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions dated March 25, 2004 and
May 31, 2004 are SETASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is hereby ORDERED to grant
SEC. 2. Pre-trial agreement. – All agreements or admissions made or entered during the
petitioner's Motion to Plea Bargain. Let records of this case be REMANDED to
pre-trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
the Sandiganbayan for further proceedings in accordance with this Decision.
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The agreements covering the matters
referred to in section 1 of this Rule shall be approved by the court. (Emphasis supplied)

But it may also be made during the trial proper and even after the
prosecution has finished presenting its evidence and rested its
case. Thus, the Court has held that it is immaterial that plea
bargaining was not made during the pre-trial stage or that it was made
only after the prosecution already presented several witnesses.

Records show that there was a favorable recommendation by the Office of the Special
Prosecutor to approve petitioner's motion to plea bargain. With respect to the falsification
cases earlier mentioned, it appears that the act of the accused in pleading guilty for a lesser
71
 FACTS

This was the case of the Valentine’s Day bombing in 2005 by members of the Abu Sayyaf,
which according to them was a gift to the then Pres. Arroyo. A bomb exploded in the
RRCG bus while the bus was plying the EDSA route fronting the MRT terminal which is
in front of the Makati Commercial Center. Prior to the explosion, at around 6:30 to 7:30 in
the evening, while they were about to move out of the Guadalupe-EDSA southbound bus
stop, the bus conductor noticed two men running after the bus. The two insisted on getting
on the bus, so the conductor obliged and let them in.According to the bus conductor, he
became wary of the two because of its suspicious attitude, sitting apart with each other in
the bus and looked dumb strucked when asked to pay for the fare, the conductor noticed
that both of the accused paid for two fares each. Their eyes were also reddish and the other
man who sat at the back of the bus appeared to be slouching, with his legs stretched out in
front of him and his arms hanging out and hidden from view as if he was tinkering with
Suspension of Arraignment something. Despite the suspicion the conductor never reported to the police. Moreover, the
two men frequently asked the conductor if the bus would stop over Ayala Avenue. Upon
PEOPLE vs. KHADDAFY JANJALANI, et.al reaching the said destination, the both of the accused insisted to alight from the bus even if
it is not yet the proper unloading zone. Suddenly, the bus exploded causing the death of the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee four passengers and more or less 40 persons injured.
vs
KHADDAFY JANJALANI, et.al, accused-appealant The accused indicted in the pre-trial were Trinidad and Baharan and admitted guilt in some
television interviews, later Asali, another accused who turned out to be a state witness,
G.R. No. 188314 gave a tv interview , confessing that he had supplied the explosive devices. On their
January 10, 2011 arraignment for the multiple murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-476), Baharan, Trinidad,
Ponente: Sereno, J and Asali all entered a plea of guilty. On the other hand, upon arraignment for the multiple
frustrated murder charge (Crim. Case No. 05-477), accused Asali pled guilty. Accused
Trinidad and Baharan pled not guilty. , the trial court asked whether accused Baharan and
NATURE OF CASE Trinidad were amenable to changing their not guilty pleas to the charge of multiple
Petition for Review (Appeal) frustrated murder, considering that they pled guilty to the heavier charge ofmultiple
murder, creating an apparent inconsistency in their pleas. The two accused acknowledged
BRIEF the inconsistencies and manifested their readiness for re-arraignment. After the Information
was read to them, Baharan and Trinidad pled guilty to the charge of multiple frustrated
Before the Court is an appeal from the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) dated 30 murder.Later, accused filed an appeal, arguing, among others, that the trial court did not
June 2008, which affirmed the Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Makati City in conduct a searching inquiry after they had changed their plea from not guilty to guilty.
Criminal Case Nos. 05-476 and 05-4777 dated 18 October 2005. The latter Decision
convicted the three accused-appellants – namely, Gamal B. Baharan a.k.a. Tapay, Angelo ISSUE/s of the CASE
Trinidad a.k.a. Abu Khalil, and Rohmat Abdurrohim a.k.a. Abu Jackie or Zaky – of the Whether or not a searching inquiry by the trial court in the re-arraignment is necessary
complex crime of multiple murder and multiple frustrated murder, and sentenced them to before allowing the changing of pleas of the accused?
suffer the penalty of death by lethal injection. The CA modified the sentence to reclusion
perpetua as required by Republic Act No. 9346 (Act Abolishing the Imposition of Death ACTION OF THE COURT
Penalty). SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE CASE

72

The Court ruled that a searching inquiry must have been conducted by the judge in the re-
arraignment. As early as in People v. Apduhan, the Supreme Court has ruled that all trial
judges must refrain from accepting with alacrity an accused's plea of guilty, for while
justice demands a speedy administration, judges are duty bound to be extra solicitous in
seeing to it that when an accused pleads guilty, he understands fully the meaning of his
plea and the import of an inevitable conviction.Thus, trial court judges are required to
observe the following procedure under Section 3, Rule 116 of the Rules of Court. Such
requirement applies in re-arraignment. The Court have reiterated in a long line of cases that
the conduct of a searching inquiry remains the duty of judges, as they are mandated by the
rules to satisfy themselves that the accused had not been under coercion or duress;
mistaken impressions; or a misunderstanding of the significance, effects, and consequences
of their guilty plea.This requirement is stringent and mandatory.
Nevertheless, the court are not unmindful of the context under which the re-
arraignment was conducted or of the factual milieu surrounding the finding of guilt against
the accused. The Court observes that accused Baharan and Trinidad previously pled guilty
to another charge multiple murder based on the same act relied upon in the multiple
frustrated murder charge. The Court further notes that prior to the change of plea to one of
guilt, accused Baharan and Trinidad made two other confessions of guilt one through an
extrajudicial confession (exclusive television interviews), and the other via judicial
admission (pretrial stipulation). Considering the foregoing circumstances, the Court deem
it unnecessary to rule on the sufficiency of the searching inquiry in this instance. However,
the Court still upholds the findings of guilt made by the trial court as affirmed by the Court
of Appeals, in lieu of the sufficient and credible evidence to convict the accused which was
proved in the trial court.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, the Petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Regional Trial Court of
Makati, as affirmed with modification by the Court of Appeals, is hereby AFFIRMED.
Suspension of Arraignment
ABS-CBN vs GOZON
ABS-CBN CORPORATION, Petitioner,
vs
FELIPE GOZON, et al., Respondents.
G.R. No. 195956
March 11, 2015
Ponente: Justice Marvic Leonen
NATURE OF THE CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
Before the court is a petition for Review on Certiorari filed by ABS-CBN Corporation to
assail the November 9, 2010 Decision and the March 3, 2011 Resolution of the Court of
Appeals which reinstated the Department of Justice Resolution dated August 1, 2005 that
ordered the withdrawal of the Information finding probable cause for respondents' violation
of Sections 1774 and 2115 of the Intellectual Property Code. Respondents are officers and
employees of GMA Network, Inc. (GMA-7).
FACTS
On August 13, 2004, petitioner ABS-CBN filed a criminal complaint against respondent
GMA for (alleged) act of copyright infringement under the Intellectual Property Code
because the GMA aired footage of the arrival and homecoming of OFW Angelo dela Cruz
at NAIA from Iraq without the petitioner's consent. ABS-CBN stated that it has an
agreement with Reuter's that the petition will contribute news and content that it owns and
makes to Reuters in exchange of the latter's news and video material, and Reuters will
ensure that ABS-CBN's materials cannot be aired in the country.
The respondent was a subscriber of Reuter's and CNN live feeds. After it received the live
feed of Angelo Dela Cruz's arrival and homecoming from Reuter's, it immediately aired the
video from that news feed. The respondent alleged that its news staff was not aware that
there was (a news embargo) agreement between ABSCBN and Reuters. Respondent
alleged that it was not also aware that it aired petitioner's footage.
On December 3, 2004, Prosecutor Venturanza issued resolution which found probable
cause to indict Dela Pena-Reyes and Manalastas. The respondents appealed the
Prosecutor’s resolution before the DOJ. DOJ Secretary Raul M. Gonzalez ruled in favor of
GMA in his resolution dated 1 August 2005 and held that good faith may be raised as a
defense in the case.
73
Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas motioned to suspend proceedings. The trial court granted
the Motion to Suspend Proceedings filed by Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas on January
19, 2005 saying that Under Section 11 (c), Rule 116 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure,
once a petition for review is filed with the Department of Justice, a suspension of the
criminal proceedings may be allowed by the court.
Meanwhile, DOJ Acting Secretary Alberto C. Agra issued a resolution on which reversed
Sec. Gonzalez's resolution and found probable cause to charge Dela Pena-Reyes,
Manalastas, as well as to indict Gozon, Duavit, Jr., Flores, and Soho for violation of the
Intellectual Property Code (due to copyright infringement).
The Court of Appeals rendered a decision reversing and setting aside DOJ Sec. Agra's
resolution.
The appellate court stated that the ABSCBN has copyright of its news coverage, but
GMA’s act of airing five (5) seconds of the homecoming footage without notice of the “No
Access Philippines” restriction of the live Reuter's video feed, was undeniably attended by
good faith and thus, serves to exculpate from criminal liability under the Intellectual
Property Code.
ISSUE/s Of The CASE:
Whether or not the grant of the trial court on the motion to suspend proceedings was
proper.
ACTIONs Of The COURT
SC: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City is directed to continue with the proceedings
in criminal case.
(b) There exists a prejudicial question; and
(c) A petition for review of the resolution of the prosecutor is pending at either the
Department of Justice, or the Office of the President; provided, that the period of
suspension shall not exceed sixty (60) days counted from the filing of the petition with the
reviewing office.
The trial court should have proceeded with respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas'
arraignment after the 60-day period from the filing of the Petition for Review before the
Department of Justice on March 8, 2005. It was only on September 13, 2010 that the
temporary restraining order was issued by the Court of Appeals. The trial court erred when
it did not act on the criminal case during the interim period. It had full control and direction
of the case. As Judge Mogul reasoned in denying the motion to dismiss in Crespo, failure
to proceed with the arraignment "disregards the requirements of due process [and] erodes
the Court's independence and integrity.
Arraignment & Plea
BILL OF PARTICULARS
ENRILE vs PEOPLE
JUAN PONCE ENRILE, Petitioner,
vs
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, HON. AMPARO M. CABOTAJE-TANG, et
al., Respondents.

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS G.R. No. 213455

August 11, 2015
The trial court granted respondents' Motion to Suspend Proceedings and deferred Ponente: Justice Brion
respondents Dela Peña-Reyes and Manalastas' arraignment for 60 days in view of the
Petition for Review filed before the Department of Justice.

Rule 116, Section 11 (c) of the Rules of Criminal Procedure allows the suspension of the NATURE OF THE CASE
accused's arraignment in certain circumstances only: Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF
SEC. 11. Suspension of arraignment. -Upon motion by the proper party, the arraignment
shall be suspended in the following cases: Before the court is a petition for certiorari with prayers:
(a) The accused appears to be suffering from an unsound mental condition which
(a) for the Court En Banc to act on the petition;
effectively renders him unable to fully understand the charge against him and to plead
(b) to expedite the proceedings and to set the case for oral arguments; and
intelligently thereto. In such case, the court shall order his mental examination and, if
necessary, his confinement for such purpose;
74
 (c) to issue a temporary restraining order to the respondents from holding a pre-trial
and further proceedings in Criminal Case No. SB-14-CRM-0238”1
filed by petitioner Juan Ponce Enrile (Enrile) challenging the July 11, 2014 resolutions2 of
the Sandiganbayan (SB).
FACTS
On June 5, 2014, the Office of the Ombudsman filed an Information for plunder against
Enrile, (Napoles and the PDAF scam) before the Sandiganbayan.
Enrile motion to dismiss for lack of evidence on record to establish probable cause and ad
cautelam motion for bail; and a supplemental opposition to issuance of warrant of arrest
and for dismissal of Information.
The SB heard both motions and denied Enrile’s motions and ordered the issuance of
warrants of arrest on the plunder case against the accused.
Enrile received a notice of hearing informing him that his arraignment will be on July 11,
2014. Before the date of arraignment, Enrile filed a motion for bill of particulars before the
SB but the latter denied Enrile’s motion essentially on the following grounds:
(1) the details that Enrile desires are “substantial reiterations” of the arguments he raised in
his supplemental opposition to the issuance of warrant of arrest and for dismissal of
information; and (2) the details sought are evidentiary in nature and are best ventilated
during trial.
Enrile maintains that the denial was a serious violation of his constitutional right to be
informed of the nature and cause of the accusation against him and alleges that he was left
to speculate on what his specific participation in the crime of plunder had been.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether or not the denial of the motion for bill of particulars because it is just “substantial
reiterations” was proper.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT
SC: SET ASIDE the Sandiganbayan’s resolutions which denied Enrile’s motion for
bill of particulars and his motion for reconsideration of this denial.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
No. The denial was not proper. That every element constituting the offense had been
alleged in the Information does not preclude the accused from requesting for more specific
details of the various acts or omissions he is alleged to have committed. The request for
details is precisely the function of a bill of particulars.
Hence, while the information may be sufficient for purposes of stating the cause and the
crime an accused is charged, the allegations may still be inadequate for purposes of
enabling him to properly plead and prepare for trial.
Section 8 of Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
PEOPLE VS. LACSON
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, ET.AL., petitioners
vs.
PANFILO M. LACSON, respondent
G.R. No. 149453
April 1, 2003
Ponente: Callejo, Sr.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Motion for Reconsideration
BRIEF:
Before the Court is the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration of the Resolution dated May
28, 2002, remanding this case to the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
81, for the determination of several factual issues relative to the application of Section 8 of
Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure on the dismissal of Criminal Cases
Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689 filed against the respondent and his co-accused with the
said court. In the aforesaid criminal cases, the respondent and his co-accused were charged
with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of 11 male persons. The Court granted
the Motion for reconsideration of the petitioners.
FACTS:
In Criminal Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689, respondent and his co-accused were
charged with multiple murder for the shooting and killing of 11 male persons. These cases
were later provisionally dismissed by Judge Agnir, Jr. A new rule states that provisional
dismissal shall become permanent 2 years after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. The Court ruled in the Resolution sought to be reconsidered that the
provisional dismissal of the cases were with the express consent of the respondent as he
himself moved for such when he filed his motion for judicial determination of probable
75
cause and for examination of witnesses. The Court also held that although Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure could be given retroactive effect, there is
still a need to determine whether the requirements for its application are attendant. In
support of their Motion for Reconsideration, the petitioners contend that (a) Section 8, Rule
117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable to Criminal Cases Nos.
Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689; and (b) the time-bar in said rule should not be applied
retroactively. The respondent, on the other hand, insists that, as found by the Court in its
Resolution and Judge Agnir, Jr. in his resolution, the respondent himself moved for the
provisional dismissal of the criminal cases. He cites the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr.
stating that the respondent and the other accused filed separate but identical motions for the
dismissal of the criminal cases should the trial court find no probable cause for the issuance
of warrants of arrest against them. The respondent further asserts that the heirs of the
victims, through the public and private prosecutors, were duly notified of said motion and
the hearing thereof. He contends that it was sufficient that the public prosecutor was
present during the March 22, 1999 hearing on the motion for judicial determination of the
existence of probable cause because criminal actions are always prosecuted in the name of
the People, and the private complainants merely prosecute the civil aspect thereof.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
1. Whether Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is
applicable in the cases.- NO
2. Whether the application of the time-bar under Section 8 Rule 117 be given a
retroactive application without reservations, only and solely on the basis of its
being favorable to the accused. - NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
SC: Motion for reconsideration is granted. The Resolution dated May 28, 2002, is SET
ASIDE. The Decision of the Court of Appeals is REVERSED. The Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
1. Section 8 Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure is not applicable
in Cases Nos. Q-99-81679 to Q-99-81689. The Court has reviewed the records
and has found the contention of the petitioners meritorious.
Section 8, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure reads:
Sec. 8. Provisional dismissal. A case shall not be provisionally dismissed
except with the express consent of the accused and with notice to the
offended party.
The provisional dismissal of offenses punishable by imprisonment not
exceeding six (6) years or a fine of any amount, or both, shall become
permanent one (1) year after issuance of the order without the case
having been revived. With respect to offenses punishable by
imprisonment of more than six (6) years, their provisional dismissal shall
become permanent two (2) years after issuance of the order without the
case having been revived.
Having invoked said rule, the respondent is burdened to establish the essential
requisites of the first paragraph thereof, namely:
a. the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or the accused
moves for a provisional (sin perjuicio) dismissal of the case; or both the
prosecution and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case;
b. the offended party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the
case;
c. the court issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case
provisionally;
d. the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional
dismissal of the case.
The requirements are conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in
the second paragraph of the new rule. The raison d etre for the requirement of the
express consent of the accused to a provisional dismissal of a criminal case is to
bar him from subsequently asserting that the revival of the criminal case will place
him in double jeopardy for the same offense or for an offense necessarily included
therein. The respondent has failed to prove that the first and second requisites of
the first paragraph. The prosecution did not file any motion for the provisional
dismissal of the said criminal cases. For his part, the respondent merely filed a
motion for judicial determination of probable cause and for examination of
prosecution witnesses.
2. The time-bar of 2 years under the new rule should not be applied retroactively
against the State. To apply the time-bar retroactively so that the 2-year period
commenced to run on March 31, 1999 when the public prosecutor received his
copy of the resolution of Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissing the criminal cases is
inconsistent with the intendment of the new rule. Instead of giving the State 2
years to revive provisionally dismissed cases, the State had considerably less than
2 years to do so. Thus, Judge Agnir, Jr. dismissed the cases on March 29, 1999.
The new rule took effect on December 1, 2000. If the Court applied the new time-
bar retroactively, the State would have only 1 year and 3 months or until March
31, 2001 within which to revive these criminal cases. The period is short of the 2-
year period fixed under the new rule. On the other hand, if the time limit is
applied prospectively, the State would have 2 years from December 1, 2000 or
until December 1, 2002 within which to revive the cases. This is in consonance
with the intendment of the new rule in fixing the time-bar and thus prevents
76
 injustice to the State and avoid absurd, unreasonable, oppressive, injurious, and
wrongful results in the administration of justice.

The period from April 1, 1999 to November 30, 1999 should be excluded in the
computation of the 2-year period because the rule prescribing it was not yet in
effect at the time and the State could not be expected to comply with the time-bar.
It cannot even be argued that the State waived its right to revive the criminal cases
against respondent or that it was negligent for not reviving them within the 2-year
period under the new rule. The 2-year period fixed in the new rule is for the
benefit of both the State and the accused. It should not be emasculated and
reduced by an inordinate retroactive application of the time-bar therein provided
merely to benefit the accused. For to do so would cause an injustice of hardship to
the State and adversely affect the administration of justice in general and of
criminal laws in particular.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

IN THE LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the petitioners Motion for Reconsideration
is GRANTED. The Resolution of this Court, dated May 28, 2002, is SET ASIDE. The Prescription for violation of B.P. Blg. 22
Decision of the Court of Appeals, dated August 24, 2001, in CA-G.R. SP No. 65034 is The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
REVERSED. The Petition of the Respondent with the Regional Trial Court in Civil Case person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
No. 01-100933 is DISMISSED for being moot and academic. The Regional Trial Court of constituting jeopardy.
Quezon City, Branch 81, is DIRECTED to forthwith proceed with Criminal Cases Nos. 01-
101102 to 01-101112 with deliberate dispatch. PANAGUITON VS. DOJ

LUIS PANAGUITON, JR., petitioner

vs.
DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, RAMON C. TONGSON and RODRIGO G. CAWILI,
respondents.

G.R. No. 167571

November 25, 2008
Ponente: Tinga, J.

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Petition for Review

BRIEF:
This is a Petition for Review of the resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated 29 October
2004 and 21 March 2005 in CA G.R. SP No. 87119, which dismissed Panaguiton, Jr.'s
(petitioner's) petition for certiorari and his subsequent motion for reconsideration. Petition
is granted by the Court setting aside CA resolutions and ordered DOJ to refile the
information against Tongson.
77
FACTS:
In 1992, Cawili borrowed various sums of money amounting to P1,979,459.00 from
petitioner. Later, Cawili and his business associate Tongson, jointly issued in favor of
petitioner 3 checks in payment. All checks bore the signatures of both Cawili and Tongson.
Upon presentment for payment, the checks were dishonored, either for insufficiency of
funds or by the closure of the account. Petitioner made formal demands to pay the amounts
of the checks upon Cawili and upon Tongson, but to no avail. Petitioner consequently filed
a complaint against Cawili and Tongson for violating B.P. Blg. 22. During the preliminary
investigation, only Tongson appeared and filed his counter-affidavit claiming that he had
been unjustly included as party-respondent in the case since petitioner had lent money to
Cawili in the latter's personal capacity. Tongson averred that he was not Cawili's business
associate; that, he himself had filed several criminal cases against Cawili for violation of
B.P. Blg. 22. Tongson denied that he had issued the bounced checks and pointed out that
his signatures on the said checks had been falsified.
To counter, petitioner presented several documents showing Tongson's signatures which
were purportedly the same as those appearing on the checks. He also showed a copy of an
affidavit of adverse claim wherein Tongson himself had claimed to be Cawili's business
associate.
In a resolution, the City Prosecutor found probable cause only against Cawili. Petitioner
filed a partial appeal before the DOJ even while the case against Cawili was filed before
the proper court. In a letter-resolution dated 11 July 1997, after finding that it was possible
for Tongson to co-sign the bounced checks and that he had deliberately altered his
signature in the pleadings submitted during the preliminary investigation, Chief State
Prosecutor directed the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to conduct a reinvestigation of the
case against Tongson and to refer the questioned signatures to the NBI.
Tongson moved for the reconsideration of the resolution, but his motion was denied for
lack of merit.
Assistant City Prosecutor dismissed the complaint against Tongson without referring the
matter to the NBI per the Chief State Prosecutor's resolution. In her resolution, ACP held
that the case had already prescribed pursuant to Act No. 3326, as amended, which provides
that violations penalized by B.P. Blg. 22 shall prescribe after 4 years. Petitioner appealed to
the DOJ. But the DOJ dismissed the same, stating that the offense had already prescribed
pursuant to Act No. 3326. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the DOJ
resolution.
On 3 April 2003, the DOJ, this time ruled in his favor and declared that the offense had not
prescribed and that the filing of the complaint with the prosecutor's office interrupted the
running of the prescriptive period.
However, the DOJ, presumably acting on a motion for reconsideration filed by Tongson,
ruled that the subject offense had already prescribed and ordered "the withdrawal of the 3
informations for violation of B.P. Blg. 22" against Tongson. In justifying its sudden
turnabout, the DOJ explained that Act No. 3326 applies to violations of special acts that do
not provide for a prescriptive period for the offenses thereunder. Since B.P. Blg. 22, as a
special act, does not provide for the prescription of the offense it defines and punishes, Act
No. 3326 applies to it, and not Art. 90 of the Revised Penal Code which governs the
prescription of offenses penalized thereunder.
Petitioner thus filed a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals assailing the 9
August 2004 resolution of the DOJ. The petition was dismissed by the Court of Appeals in
view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and certification of non-forum
shopping. In the instant petition, petitioner claims that the Court of Appeals committed
grave error in dismissing his petition on technical grounds and in ruling that the petition
before it was patently without merit and the questions are too unsubstantial to require
consideration.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the offense has already prescribed?-NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CA: Case dismissed in view of petitioner's failure to attach a proper verification and
certification of non-forum shopping.
SC: Petition is granted. CA Resolutions were set aside. DOJ’s resolution dated 9 August
2004 is also annulled and set aside. DOJ is ordered to refile the information against the
petitioner.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The Court ruled and held that the offense has not yet prescribed. Petitioner's filing of his
complaint-affidavit before the Office of the City Prosecutor on 24 August 1995 signified
the commencement of the proceedings for the prosecution of the accused and thus
effectively interrupted the prescriptive period for the offenses they had been charged under
B.P. Blg. 22. Moreover, since there is a definite finding of probable cause, with the
debunking of the claim of prescription there is no longer any impediment to the filing of
the information against petitioner.
There is no question that Act No. 3326, appropriately entitled An Act to Establish
Prescription for Violations of Special Acts and Municipal Ordinances and to Provide
When Prescription Shall Begin, is the law applicable to offenses under special laws which
do not provide their own prescriptive periods. The pertinent provisions read:
Section 1. Violations penalized by special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in
such acts, prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) x x x; (b) after
78
 four years for those punished by imprisonment for more than one month, but less
than two years; (c) x x x
Sec. 2. Prescription shall begin to run from the day of the commission of the
violation of the law, and if the same be not known at the time, from the discovery
thereof and the institution of judicial proceedings for its investigation and
punishment.

The prescription shall be interrupted when proceedings are instituted against the guilty
person, and shall begin to run again if the proceedings are dismissed for reasons not
constituting jeopardy. Act. No. 3326 indeed applies to offenses under B.P. Blg. 22. An
offense under B.P. Blg. 22 merits the penalty of imprisonment of not less than 30 days but
not more than 1 year or by a fine, hence, under Act No. 3326, a violation of B.P. Blg. 22
prescribes in 4) years from the commission of the offense or, if the same be not known at
the time, from the discovery thereof. However, we cannot uphold the position that only the
filing of a case in court can toll the running of the prescriptive period.

The historical perspective on the application of Act No. 3326 is illuminating. Act No. 3226
was approved on 4 December 1926 at a time when the function of conducting the
preliminary investigation of criminal offenses was vested in the justices of the peace.

Indeed, to rule otherwise would deprive the injured party the right to obtain vindication on
account of delays that are not under his control. A clear example would be this case,
wherein petitioner filed his complaint-affidavit on 24 August 1995, well within the 4-year
prescriptive period. He likewise timely filed his appeals and his motions for
reconsideration on the dismissal of the charges against Tongson. He went through the
proper channels, within the prescribed periods. However, from the time petitioner filed his
complaint-affidavit with the Office of the City Prosecutor (24 August 1995) up to the time
the DOJ issued the assailed resolution, an aggregate period of 9 years had elapsed. Clearly,
the delay was beyond petitioner's control. After all, he had already initiated the active
prosecution of the case as early as 24 August 1995, only to suffer setbacks because of the
DOJ's flip-flopping resolutions and its misapplication of Act No. 3326. Aggrieved parties,
especially those who do not sleep on their rights and actively pursue their causes, should The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of an
not be allowed to suffer unnecessarily further simply because of circumstances beyond information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically admitted,
their control, like the accused's delaying tactics or the delay and inefficiency of the would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law. Evidencealiunde, or
investigating agencies. matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.
Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The resolutions of the Court of Appeals dated PEOPLE VS. DUMLAO
29 October 2004 and 21 March 2005 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The resolution of
the Department of Justice dated 9 August 2004 is also ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The PEOPLE OF THEPHILIPPINES, petitioner,
Department of Justice is ORDERED to REFILE the information against the petitioner. vs.
HERMENEGILDO DUMLAO y CASTILIANO and EMILIO LAO y GONZALES,
respondents.
79

G.R. No. 168918
March 2, 2009
Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO, J.
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Appeal
BRIEF:
On appeal is the Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699 dated 14
July 2005 which granted the Motion to Dismiss/Quash of respondent Hermenegildo C.
Dumlao and dismissed the case against him. The Sandiganbayan likewise ordered the case
against respondent Emilio G. Lao archived. Petition is granted by the Court and reversed
the Sandiganbayan’s resolution on granting Dismiss/Quash of respondent Dumlao. Further,
it directed the Sandiganbayan to set the case for the reception of evidence for the
prosecution.
FACTS:
On 19 July 1991, an Amended Information was filed before the Sandiganbayan charging
respondents Dumlao, et. al., with violation of Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019, as
amended, otherwise known as the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
That the Dumlao,et.al., being then the members of the Board of Trustees of the GSIS
conspiring and confederating together and mutually helping one another, while in the
performance of their official functions, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
criminally enter into contract of lease-purchase with a private person whereby the GSIS
agreed to sell a GSIS acquired property consisting of 3 parcels of land with an area of 821
square meters together with a 5-storey building situated for the sum of P2,000,000.00 with
a down payment of P200,000.00 with the balance payable in fifteen years at 12% interest
per annum compounded yearly, with a yearly amortization ofP264,278.37 including
principal and interest granting Lao the right to sub-lease the ground floor for his own
account during the period of lease, from which he collected yearly rentals in excess of the
yearly amortization which contract is manifestly and grossly disadvantageous to the
government.
When arraigned, respondent Dumlao, with the assistance of counsel de parte, pleaded not
guilty to the offense charged. As agreed upon by the prosecution and respondent Dumlao, a
Joint Stipulation of Facts and Admission of Exhibits was submitted to the court.
On 21 February 2005, respondent Dumlao filed a Motion to Dismiss/Quash on the ground
that the facts charged do not constitute an offense. He stated that the prosecutions main
thrust against him was the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of Trustees -- of which he
was a member -- of the Lease-Purchase Agreement entered into by and among the GSIS,
the Office of the Government Corporate Counsel (OGCC) and respondent Lao. He argued
that the allegedly approved Board Resolution was not in fact approved by the GSIS Board
of Trustees, contrary to the allegations in the information. Since the signatures of Ver,
Cruz, Canlas and Clave did not appear in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982,
he said it was safe to conclude that these people did not participate in the alleged approval
of the Lease-Purchase Agreement. This being the case, he maintained that there was no
quorum of the board to approve the supposed resolution authorizing the sale of the GSIS
property. There being no approval by the majority of the Board of Trustees, there can be no
resolution approving the Lease-Purchase Agreement. The unapproved resolution, he added,
proved his innocence. He further contended that the person to be charged should be Atty.
Luis Javellana, who sold the subject property to respondent Lao without the proper
authority. He likewise wondered why he alone was charged without including the other
two signatories in the minutes of the meeting held on 23 April 1982.
On 14 July 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued the assailed resolution. On 2 September 2005,
the People of the Philippines, represented by the Office of the Ombudsman, thru the Office
of the Special Prosecutor, filed a petition for certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking the reversal and setting aside of the Sandiganbayan Resolution dismissing the case
against respondent Dumlao.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
1. Whether the court erred in dismissing case after pre-trial and before prosecution
could formally present its evidence. – YES
2. Whether the facts charged in the information actually constitute an offense. – YES
3. Whether insufficiency of evidence is a ground for Motion to Dismiss. – NO
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Sandiganbayan: Motion to Dismiss/Quash granted
SC: The resolution of the Sandiganbayan granting the Motion to Dismiss/Quash of
respondent Dumlao is reversed and set aside.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
1. The Sandiganbayan erred in dismissing the case, because there was evidence, at
that time, when it dismissed the case against respondent Dumlao. The dismissal
by the lower court of the case against respondent Dumlao was indeed premature.
It should have given the prosecution the opportunity to fully present its case and
to establish reasonable doubt on the alleged approval by the GSIS Board of
Trustees of the lease-purchase of the GSIS properties. The Sandiganbayan
violated the prosecutions right to due process. The prosecution was deprived of its
opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accused culpability. The
dismissal was made in a capricious and whimsical manner. The trial court
80
 dismissed the case on a ground not invoked by the respondent. The
Sandiganbayan dismissed the case for insufficiency of evidence, while the ground
invoked by the respondent was that the facts charged did not constitute an offense.
The dismissal was clearly premature, because any dismissal based on
insufficiency of evidence may only be made after the prosecution rests its case
and not at any time before then.[26] A purely capricious dismissal of an
information deprives the State of a fair opportunity to prosecute and convict. It
denies the prosecution a day in court. It is void and cannot be the basis of double
jeopardy.
2. The fundamental test in determining the sufficiency of the material averments of
an information is whether the facts alleged therein, which are hypothetically
admitted, would establish the essentials elements of the crime defined by law.
Evidencealiunde, or matters extrinsic of the Information, are not be considered.
The elements of the crime under Section 3(g) of Republic Act No. 3019 are as
follows: (1) that the accused is a public officer; (2) that he entered into a contract
or transaction on behalf of the government; and (3) that such contract or
transaction is grossly and manifestly disadvantageous to the government. The
facts alleged therein, if hypothetically admitted, will prove all the elements of
Section 3(g) as against respondent Dumlao.
Sec. 23. Demurrer to evidence. After the prosecution rests its case, the
court may dismiss the action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence
(1) on its own initiative after giving the prosecution the opportunity to be
heard or (2) upon demurrer to evidence filed by the accused with or
without leave of court.
The Sandiganbayan dismissed the case against respondent for insufficiency of
evidence, even without giving the prosecution the opportunity to present its
evidence.In so doing, it violated the prosecutions right to due process. It deprived
the prosecution of its opportunity to prosecute its case and to prove the accuseds
culpability.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The resolution of
the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 16699 dated 14 July 2005 granting the Motion to
Dismiss/Quash of respondent Hermenegildo C. Dumlao, is hereby REVERSED and SET
ASIDE. The Sandiganbayan is forthwith DIRECTED to set the case for the reception of
evidence for the prosecution.

3. Insufficiency of evidence is not one of the grounds of a Motion to Quash. The

grounds, as enumerated in Section 3, Rule 117 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure, are as follows:
(a) That the facts charged do not constitute an offense;
(b) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the offense charged;
(c) That the court trying the case has no jurisdiction over the person of the
accused;
(d) That the officer who filed the information had no authority to do so;
(e) That it does not conform substantially to the prescribed form;
(f) That more than one offense is charged except when a singlepunishment for
various offenses is prescribed by law;
(g) That the criminal action or liability has been extinguished;
(h) That it contains averments which, if true, would constitute a legal excuse or
justification; and
(i) That the accused has been previously convicted or acquitted of the offense
charged, or the case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent.

Insufficiency of evidence is a ground for dismissal of an action only after the CEREZO VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
prosecution rests its case. Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides: JOSEPH CEREZO
vs.
81
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
G.R. No. 185230
June 1, 2011
Pontante: NACHURA, J
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review of Certiorari
BRIEF:
This petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to annul
the July 11, 2008 Decision and November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA-G.R. SP No. 99088, which reversed and set aside the October 24, 2006 and the
February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional Trial Court(RTC) of Quezon City, Branch 92.
FACTS:
Petitioner Joseph Cerezo filed a complaint for liber against Juliet Yaneza, Pablo Abunda,
Jr. and Vicente Afulugencia and Oscar Mapalo. The Quezon City Prosecutors Office (OP-
QC) finding probable cause filed corresponding Information before the RTC. Respondents
filed a Motion for Reconsideration and/or Motion to Re-evaluate Prosecutions Evidence
before the OP-QC which later on issued a resolution reversing its decision and thus a
Motion to Dismiss and Withdraw Information was filed before the RTC. However,
respondents were already arraigned to which they all entered a not guilty plea. The RTC
ordered the criminal case dismissed stating that the Court finds merit in the motion of the
Public Prosecutor to dismiss the case. Aggrieved, Petitioner moved for the reconsideration
of the Order stating that the OP-QC resolution dismissing the case did not attain finality
since a Petition for Review was filed before the Department of Justice. With this
information the RTC deferred the action on the said motion waiting for the decision of the
DOJ.
The Secretary of Justice reversed the resolution of the OP-QC and directed to re-file the
information for libel.
With the resolution by the DOJ the RTC granted the petitions motion for reconsideration
stating that the order of dismissal it issued did not yet attained finality as there was a
pending Motion for Reconsideration filed in the DOJ.
The motion for reconsideration of the respondents were denied by the RTC thus a Petition
for Certiorari was filed arguing that the RTC Orders violated their constitutional right
against double jeopardy.
The Court of Appeals found the RTC to have gravely abused its discretion in ordering the
reinstatement of the case. All of the elements of double jeopardy exist, namely:
a. Valid information sufficient in form and substance.
b. The information was filed before a court of competent jurisdiction
c. Termination of the case was not expressly consented to by respondents.
The Court of Appeals also pointed out that the DOJ Secretary has no jurisdiction over the
case as mandated in the DOJ Department Order No. 223 that no appeal shall be entertained
if the accused has already been arraigned or, if the arraignment took place during the
pendency of the appeal.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether there was a valid termination of the case so as to usher in the impregnable wall of
double jeopardy.
ACTION of the COURT:
RTC : Dismissed the criminal case following the withdrawal of Information by
the OP- QC
DOJ : Set aside the decision of the City Prosecutor directing to re-file the
information
RTC : Reversed its decision following the DOJ Resolution
CA : Annulled the RTC Orders ruling that the elements of double jeopardy
exist.
SC : Annulled and Set Aside the Orders of the RTC. The case is
REMANDED to the QC RTC for evaluation on whether probable cause
exists to hold respondents for trial
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
Once a case is filed with the court, any disposition of it rests on the sound discretion of the
court. In thus resolving a motion to dismiss a case or to withdraw an Information, the trial
court should not rely solely and merely on the findings of the public prosecutor or the
Secretary of Justice. It is the courts bounden duty to assess independently the merits of the
motion, and this assessment must be embodied in a written order disposing of the motion.
In this case the RTC both relied on the recommendation of the Public Prosecutor
and the Secretary of Justice in rending the decision without any independent evaluation or
assessment of the merits of the case, thus the Orders were stained with grave abuse of
discretion and violated the complainants’ right to due process. They were void, had no
legal standing, and produced no effect whatsoever.
82
Double jeopardy did not set in. Double jeopardy exists when the following requisites are
present: (1) a first jeopardy attached prior to the second; (2) the first jeopardy has been
validly terminated; and (3) a second jeopardy is for the same offense as in the first. A first
jeopardy attaches only (a) after a valid indictment; (b) before a competent court; (c) after
arraignment; (d) when a valid plea has been entered; and (e) when the accused has been
acquitted or convicted, or the case dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent. Since the motion to dismiss was committed with grave abuse of discretion then
respondents were not acquitted nor was there a valid and legal dismissal or termination of
the case.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE, and the assailed July 11,
2008 Decision and the November 4, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R.
SP No. 99088, and the October 24, 2006 and the February 26, 2007 Orders of the Regional
Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 92, are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the Quezon City RTC, Branch 92, for evaluation on whether
probable cause exists to hold respondents for trial.
CO vs. UY
WILLIAM CO a.k.a. XU QUING HE, Petitioner
vs
NEW PROSPERITY PLASTIC PRODUCTS, represented by ELIZABETH UY,
respondent
G.R. No. 183994
June 30, 2014
Ponented: PERALTA, J
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Revised Rules
on Civil Procedure (Rules) are the April 30, 2008 and August 1, 2008 Resolutions of the
Court of Appeal s (CA) in CA-G.R. SP NO. 102975, which dismissed the petition and
denied the motion for reconsideration, respectively.
FACTS:
Criminal Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634 for violation of BP Bilang 22 was
filed against Petitioner William Co by Respondent Prosperity Plastic Products represented
by Elizabeth Uy. The case was later on provisionally dismissed on June 9, 2003 in an open
court. Ms. Uy received the noticed on July 2, 2003 and her counsel the day later. A
motion to revive the case was filed on July 2, 2004 which was granted, and the motion for
reconsideration filed by Co was dismissed. Co moved for recusation to which the
presiding Judge handling the case move to inhibit, thus the case was raffled to MeTC
branch in Caloocan. Co filed a petition for certiorari and prohibition with prayer for the
issuance of a temporary restraining order/writ of preliminary injuction before he RTC
challenging the revival of the criminal case which was later on denied. Co then filed a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme Court which was also dismissed and
made final and executory after no motion for reconsideration was filed.
Before the MeTC, Co filed a Motion for Permanent Dismissal which was opposed by
respondent Uy raising that the issues were already resolved with finality by the Supreme
Court. However, Judge Gonzaga granted the petition of Co, thus Respondent Uy filed a
petition for certiorari before the RTC of Caloocan which acted favorably, directing MeTC
to proceed with the trial of the criminal cases. Petitioner Co then filed a petition for
certiorari before the CA which was denied thus a petition was filed in the Supreme Court.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
1. Whether or not the dismissal of the criminal cases against petitioner on the
ground of denial of his right to speedy trial constitutes final dismissal of these
cases;
2. Whether or not the MeTC acted with jurisdiction in reviving the criminal
cases against petitioner which were dismissed on the ground of denial of his
right to speedy trial; and
3. Assuming por gratia argumenti the cases were only provisionally dismissed:
a. Whether the one-year time bar of their revival is computed from
issuance of the Order of Provisional Dismissal.
b. Whether the actual number of days in a year is the basis for
computing the one-year time bar;
c. Whether the provisionally dismissed cases against petitioner are
revived ipso facto by the filing of motion to revive these cases
ACTIONS of the COURT
MeTC : Provisionally dismissed the Case
RTC : Affirmed the MeTC for the revival of the case and dismissed the Motion
for Reconsideration filed by Petitioner.
SC : Affirmed the Decision of the RTC
MeTC : Granted the Motion for Permanent Dismissal filed by Petitioner and
Denied the Motion for reconsideration of the Respondent
83
RTC : Granted the Motion for Reconsideration of the Respondent and Ordered
the MeTC to proceed with the trial
CA : Dismissed the Motion for Reconsideration filed by the Petitioner
SC : Denied the Petition
COURT RATIONALE ON THE FACTS:
The Supreme Court noted that the issues raised in the petition were also the meat of the
controversy in Co’s previous petition which was dismissed and the resolution became final
and executory.
a. Denial for a speedy trial
The Supreme Court emphasized that “speedy trial” is a relative term and
necessarily a flexible concept, and in determining accused’s right to
speedy trial was violated the delay should be considered in view of the
entirety of the proceedings. The factors are the following: (a) duration of
the delay; (b) reason therefor; (c) assertion of the right or failure to assert
it; and (d) prejudice caused by such delay. Unjustified postponements
which prolong the trial for an unreasonable length of time are what
offend the right of the accused to speedy trial.
b. Requisites of the first paragraph of Section 8, Rule 117 of the Rules, which are
conditions sine qua non to the application of the time-bar in the second paragraph
thereof, to wit: (1) the prosecution with the express conformity of the accused or
the accused moves for a provisional dismissal of the case; or both the prosecution
and the accused move for a provisional dismissal of the case; (2) the offended
party is notified of the motion for a provisional dismissal of the case; (3) the court
issues an order granting the motion and dismissing the case provisionally; and (4)
the public prosecutor is served with a copy of the order of provisional dismissal of
the case. As noted in the case, no notice of any motion for provisional dismissal
or of the hearing was served on the private complainants at least three days before
said hearing as mandated. Such notice will enable the offended party or the heirs
of the victim the opportunity to seasonably and effectively comment on or object
to the motion on valid grounds, including (a) the collusion between the
prosecution and the accused for the provisional dismissal of a criminal case
thereby depriving the State of its right to due process; (b) attempts to make
witnesses unavailable; or (c) the provisional dismissal of the case with the
consequent release of the accused from detention would enable him to threaten
and kill the offended party or the other prosecution witness or flee from Philippine
Jurisdiction provide opportunity for the destruction or loss of the prosecution’s
physical and other evidence and prejudice the rights of the offended party to
recover on the civil liability of the accused by his concealment or furtive
disposition of his property or the consequent lifting of the writ of preliminary
attachment against his property.
c. The order of dismissal shall become permanent one year after service of the order
of dismissal on the public prosecutor who has control of the prosecution. When a
party is represented by a counsel, notices of all kinds emanating from the court
should be sent to the letter to his/her given address.
d. A year is equivalent to 365 days regardless of whether it is a regular year or a leap
year. A year is composed of 12 calendar months. The number of days is
irrelevant.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Petition is DENIED. The April 30, 2008 and
August 1, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP NO.
102975, which affirmed the January 28, 2008 Decision of the Regional Trial Court, Branch
121 of Caloocan City, annulling and setting aside the Orders dated September 4, 2006 and
November 16, 2006 of the Metropolitan Trial Court, Branch 50 of Caloocan City that
permanently dismissed Crimila Case Nos. 206655-59, 206661-77 and 209634, are hereby
AFFIRMED. Costs of the suit be paid by the petitioner.
The Commission on Bar-Discipline-Integrated Bar of the Philippines is DIRECTED to
investigate Atty. Oscar C. Maglague for his acts that appear to have violated the Lawyer’s
Oath, the Code of Professional Responsibility and the Rule on Forum Shopping.
SORIANO vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
HILARIO P. SORIANO and ROSALINDA ILAGAN
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, BANGKO SENTRAL NG PILIPINAS (BSP), and
PHILIPPINE DEPOSIT INSURANCE CORPORATION (PDIC)
G.R. No. 159517-18
June 30, 2009
Ponente: NACHURA, J
Nature of the Case:
Appeal by Certiorari
BRIEF:
84
Petitioners Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan (petitioners) appeal by certiorari the
August 5, 2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) in the consolidated cases CA-G.R.
SP. Nos. 64648 and 64649
FACTS:
Hilario P. Soriano and Rosalinda Ilagan were the President and General Manager,
respectively, of the Rural Bank of San Miguel (Bulacan), Inc. Petitioners indirectly
obtained loan from RBSM by falsifying the loan applications and other bank records.
The State Prosecutor charged Soriano in the RTC with violation of Section 83 of Republic
Act No. 337 or the General Banking Act, as amended by PD No. 1795 or Violation of the
Director, Officer, Stockholder or Related Interest (DOSRI) Rules in relation to the
information that he indirectly borrow or secure a loan with Rural Bank of San Miguel
amounting to P15 million without the consent and approval of the majority of the directors
of the bank, by using the name of one depositor VIRGILIO J. MALANG who have no
knowledge of the said loan.
On the same day, information for estafa thru falsification of commercial document was
filed against Soriano and Ilagan. It was alleged that Petitioners falsify loan documents by
making it appear that VIRGILIO J. MALANG secured a loan for P15 million.
The information was docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 1719-M-2000 and 1720-M-2000
respectively and were raffled to Branch 14.
Another information for violation of Section 83 of R.A No. 337, as amended, was filed
against Soriano, covering P 15 million loan obtained in the name of ROGELIO MAAOL.
Soriano and Ilagan were also indicted for estafa thru falsification of commercial document
for obtaining the said loan. It was also alleged that Petitioners falsify loan documents to
make it appear that one depositor named ROGELIO MAAOL secured a loan worth P15
million.
The cases were docketed as 1980-M-2000 and 1981-M-2000, respectively and were raffled
to Branch 77.
Petitioners moved to quash all the information filed in Branch 77 and Branch 14 on the
grounds that: (i) more than one (1) offense is charged; and (ii) the facts charged do not
constitute an offense. They argued that Soriano was charged with violation of DOSRI
rules and estafa thru falsification of commercial documents for allegedly securing fictitious
loans, and that the facts alleged in the information do not constitute an offense. The
motion to quash was denied, the Court ruled that accused Hilario P. Soriano was charged in
Criminal Case No. 1980-M-2000 for Violation of Sec. 83 of R.A. NO. 337 as amended by
PD 1795 and Criminal Case No. 19810M-2000 for Estafa Thru Falsification of
Commercial Documents. Thus, each Information charges only one offense.
Petitioners filed a Petition for Certiorari in the Court of Appeals assailing the Orders of
Branch 77 and Branch 14 dismissing their motion to quash. The CA denied the motion to
quash thus the petitioners submit for resolution the same matters to the Supreme Court
arguing that the RTC Branch 14 and 77 abused their discretion in denying their motion to
quash information.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied the motion to
quash on the ground that the information filed constitutes more than one offense in it thus
violating Section 13 of Rule 110 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC : Denied the Motion to Quash
CA : Sustained the denial of Petitoners separate motions to quash
SC : Denied the petition for review and affirmed the decision of the CA
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The term GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, in its juridical sense, connotes capricious,
despotic, oppressive or whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of
jurisdiction. The abuse must be of such degree as to amount to an evasion of positive duty
or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and capricious manner by reason of passion and hostility.
Duplicity of offense in single information is a ground to quash the information under
Section 3(e), Rule 117 of the 1985 Rules of Criminal Procedure. By duplicity of charge
means a single complaint or information that charges more than one offense. In the case,
more than one information and each charges a different offense.
Petitioner argues that he can only be charged with one offense since all are based on a
single act of obtaining fictitious loans. However jurisprudence teems that a single act or
incident might offend two or more entirely distinct and unrelated provisions.
A DOSRI violation consists in the failure to observe and comply with procedural,
reportorial or ceiling requirements prescribed by law in the grant of a loan to a director,
officer, stockholder and other related interest in the bank.
The elements of abuse of confidence, deceit, fraud or false pretense, and damage, which
are essential elements for estafa are not elements of a DOSRI violation.
85
The Court has consistently held that a special civil action for certiorari is not the proper
remedy to assail the denial of a motion to quash information. The proper procedure in such
a case is for the accused to enter a plea, go to trial without prejudice on his part to present
the special defenses he had invoked in his motion to quash and if after trail on the merits,
an adverse decision is rendered, to appeal therefrom in the manner authorized by law.
Thus Petition for review is DENIED.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition for review is DENIED and the assailed Decision of the Court
of Appeals is AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
RULE 117
Section 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. — When an accused has been
convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or otherwise terminated without
his express consent by a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or
information or other formal charge sufficient in form and substance to sustain a conviction
and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the conviction or acquittal of the accused
or the dismissal of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense charged, or
for any attempt to commit the same or frustration thereof, or for any offense which
necessarily includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the former
complaint or information.
People vs De Leon, 754 SCRA 147
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON, DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE
LEON, Accused-Appellants.
G.R. No. 197546
March 23, 2015
Ponente: PEREZ, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
For review is the conviction for the crime of Murder of accused-appellants BAYANI DE
LEON (Bayani), ANTONIO DE LEON (Antonio), DANILO DE LEON (Danilo), and
YOYONG DE LEON (Yoyong) by the Regional Trial Court (RTC),1 in Criminal Case No.
Q-02-113990, which Decision2 was affirmed with modifications by the Court of Appeals.
The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide.
FACTS
The accused-appellants were charged with Robbery with Homicide under an Information
which reads:
86
That on or about the 2nd day of March, 2002, in Quezon City, Philippines, the above-
named accused, conspiring together, confederating with and mutually helping one another,
with intent to gain, by means of violence and/or intimidation against [sic] person, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously rob one EMILIO A. PRASMO, in the
following manner, to wit: on the date and place aforementioned, while victim/deceased
Emilio A. Prasmo was walking along A. Bonifacio Street, Barangay Sta. Lucia,
Novaliches, this City, together with his wife and daughter in-law, accused pursuant to their
conspiracy armed with sumpak, samurai, lead pipe and .38 cal. revolver rob EMILIO A.
PRASMO and took and carried away P7,000.00, Philippine currency, and by reason or on
the occasion thereof, with evident premeditation, abuse of superior strength and treachery,
accused with intent to kill[,] attack, assault and employ personal violence upon EMILIOA.
PRASMO by then and there shooting and hacking the victim with the use of said weapons,
thereby inflicting upon him serious and grave wounds which were the direct and immediate
cause of his untimely death, to the damage and prejudice of the heirs of said Emilio A.
Prasmo.
When arraigned, all the accused-appellants entered a plea of not guilty except accused
Antonio. Thus, the RTC ordered a reverse trial in so far as Antonio is concerned.
The RTC did not find the accused guilty of the crime of robbery with homicide as charged
in the Information, but found all the accused guilty of the crime of murder. According to
the RTC, contrary to the charge of robbery with homicide, the accused is guilty of the
crime of murder because the prosecution failed to establish the crime of robbery. The RTC,
citing People v. Nimo,23 ratiocinated that in order to sustain a conviction for robbery with
homicide, robbery must be proven as conclusively as the killing itself.
On the other hand, the Court of Appeals affirmed with modifications the ruling of the RTC
and found all of the accused guilty of the crime of murder. However, contrary to the
findings of the RTC with regard to the crime of robbery, the Court of Appeals reversed the
ruling of the RTC and found accused Danilo guilty of the separate crime of robbery.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the accused appellant can be convicted for crime of murder which
is different from the crime filed in the information which is robbery with
Homicide. –Yes
2. Whether or not the accused appellant Danilo De Leon was placed in double
jeopardy when the appellate court also found him guilty of robbery based on the
same information filed where he was already found guilty of murder. –Yes
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Accused appelants are found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
MURDER
CA: AFFIRMED in toto with the added MODIFICATION that accused-appellant Danilo
de Leon is also found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of Robbery
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED except for the modification which was aside.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. With regard to the crime charged, accused-appellants are guilty of the crime of
Murder instead of Robbery with Homicide. As borne by the records, the only
intent of the accused-appellants was to kill Emilio. The "accused-appellants had
an axe to grind against Emilio x x x. The means used by the accused-appellants as
well as the nature and number of wounds - debilitating, fatal and multiple –
inflicted by appellants on the deceased manifestly revealed their design to kill
him. The robbery committed by appellant Danilo [was on] the spur of the moment
or [was] a mere afterthought."
As we already held, the nature and location of wounds are considered important
indicators which disprove a plea of self-defense. A perusal of the evidence would
depict the presence of a deliberate onslaught against Emilio. The means used by
accused-appellants as shown by the nature, location and number of wounds
sustained by Emilio are so much more than sufficient to repel or prevent any
alleged attack of Emilio against accused-appellant Antonio. Evidently, the
accused-appellants’ intent to kill was clearly established by the nature and number
of wounds sustained by Emilio. The wounds sustained by Emilio indubitably
reveal that the assault was no longer an act of self-defense but a homicidal
aggression on the part of accused-appellants.
2. We find that the appellate court erred for violating the constitutional right of
Danilo against double jeopardy as enshrined in Section 21, Article III of the 1987
Constitution, to wit:
Section 21. No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same
offense.1âwphi1 If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or
acquittal under either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same
act.24
Double jeopardy attaches if the following elements are present: (1) a valid
complaint or information; (2) a court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the defendant
had pleaded to the charge; and (4) the defendant was acquitted, or convicted or the
87
 case against him was dismissed or otherwise terminated without his express
consent.25

In case at bar, it is undisputed the presence of all the elements of double jeopardy:
(1) a valid Information for robbery with homicide was filed; (2) the Information
was filed in the court of competent jurisdiction; (3) the accused pleaded not guilty
to the charge; and (4) the RTC acquitted Danilo for the crime of robbery for lack
of sufficient evidence, which amounted to an acquittal from which no appeal can
be had. Indeed the conviction for murder was premised on the fact that robbery
was not proven. The RTC Decision which found accused guilty of the crime of
murder and not of robbery with homicide on the ground of insufficiency of
evidence is a judgment of acquittal as to the crime of robbery alone.

As the first jeopardy already attached, the appellate court is precluded from ruling
on the innocence or guilt of Danilo of the crime of robbery. To once again rule on
the innocence or guilt of the accused of the same crime transgresses the
Constitutional prohibition not to put any person "twice x x x in jeopardy of
punishment for the same offense."26 As it stands, the acquittal on the crime of
robbery based on lack of sufficient evidence is immediately final and cannot be
appealed on the ground of double jeopardy.27 A judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. In fact, the Court cannot, even an appeal based on an alleged
misappreciation of evidence, review the verdict of acquittal of the trial court28
due to the constitutional proscription, the purpose of which is to afford the
defendant, who has been acquitted, final repose and safeguard from government
oppression through the abuse of criminal processes.29 The crime of robbery was
not proven during the trial. As we discussed, the acquittal of the accused-
appellant, including Danilo, is not reversible.

SUPREME COURT RULING:

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-Appellants BAYANI DE LEON, ANTONIO DE LEON,
DANILO DE LEON and YOYONG DE LEON are hereby declared guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Murder and are sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua. The accused-appellants are ordered to pay Emilio Prasmo's heirs the
following amounts: P75,000.00 as civil indemnity for Emilio Prasmo's death, P75,000.00
as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as exemplary damages.

All monetary awards shall earn interest at the rate of 6% per annum from the date of
finality until fully paid.

SO ORDERED.

88
RULE 119
Section 17. Discharge of accused to be state witness.
Salvanera vs People, 523 SCRA 147
Rimberto T. Salvanera, petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines and Lucita Parane, responedents
G.R. No. 143093
May 21, 2007
Ponente: Puno, C.J.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
On appeal are the Decision dated April 30, 1999 and the two Resolutions of the Court of
Appeals, dated September 22, 1999 and May 11, 2000, in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945. The
Court of Appeals discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the
Information in Criminal Case No. TM-1730 for Murder, pending before the Regional Trial
Court of Trece Martires City, to become state witnesses. The appellate court likewise
cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Rimberto Salvanera.
FACTS
In an Information1 dated November 30, 1996, petitioner Rimberto Salvanera, together with
Feliciano Abutin, Edgardo Lungcay and Domingo Tampelix, is charged with the murder of
Ruben Parane, committed as follows:
That on or about October 23, 1995, in the Municipality of Gen. Trias, Province of Cavite,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping each other, with treachery and evident
premeditation, then armed with a firearm, did, then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and shoot one RUBEN PARANE Y MAGSAMBOL, inflicting
gunshot wound on his body, resulting to his instantaneous death, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the said victim.
As per theory of the prosecution, petitioner was the alleged mastermind; Lungcay, the hired
hitman; Abutin, the driver of the motorcycle which carried Lungcay to the place of the
commission of the crime; while Tampelix delivered the blood money to the latter. All the
accused have been arrested and detained, except Edgardo Lungcay who remained at-large.
Respondent Lucita Parane is the spouse of victim Ruben Parane.
On January 22, 1997, petitioner applied for bail. The prosecution, on March 4, 1997,
moved for the discharge of accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix, to serve as
state witnesses.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the trial court committed grave abuse of discretion when it denied
the motion to discharge accused Abutin and Tampelix to be state witnesses. -Yes
2. Whether or not the cancellation of bail bond of the petitioner is proper. -Yes
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Granted petitioner’s application for bail and denied the prosecution’s motion for the
discharge of accused Abutin and Tampelix.
CA: Discharged accused Feliciano Abutin and Domingo Tampelix from the Information to
become state witnesses, and cancelled the bail bond of petitioner Salvanera.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
1. In the discharge of an accused in order that he may be a state witness, the following
conditions must be present, namely:
(1) Two or more accused are jointly charged with the commission of an offense;
(2) The motion for discharge is filed by the prosecution before it rests its case;
(3) The prosecution is required to present evidence and the sworn statement of
each proposed state witness at a hearing in support of the discharge;
(4) The accused gives his consent to be a state witness; and
(5) The trial court is satisfied that:
a) There is absolute necessity for the testimony of the accused whose
discharge is requested;
b) There is no other direct evidence available for the proper prosecution
of the offense committed, except the testimony of said accused;
c) The testimony of said accused can be substantially corroborated in its
material points;
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 d) Said accused does not appear to be the most guilty; and, 2. We affirm the ruling of the appellate court in cancelling the bail bond of petitioner. The
grant of petitioner’s application for bail is premature. It has to await the testimony of state
e) Said accused has not at any time been convicted of any offense witnesses Abutin and Tampelix. Their testimonies must be given their proper weight in
involving moral turpitude. determining whether the petitioner is entitled to bail.
The corroborative evidence required by the Rules does not have to consist of the very same
evidence as will be testified on by the proposed state witnesses. We have ruled that "a SUPREME COURT RULING:
conspiracy is more readily proved by the acts of a fellow criminal than by any other IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is DENIED and the Decision and Resolutions of the
method. If it is shown that the statements of the conspirator are corroborated by other Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 46945, dated April 30, 1999, September 22, 1999 and
evidence, then we have convincing proof of veracity. Even if the confirmatory testimony May 11, 2000, respectively, are AFFIRMED in toto.
only applies to some particulars, we can properly infer that the witness has told the truth in
other respects." It is enough that the testimony of a co-conspirator is corroborated by some
other witness or evidence. In the case at bar, we are satisfied from a reading of the records
that the testimonies of Abutin and Tampelix are corroborated on important points by each
other’s testimonies and the circumstances disclosed through the testimonies of the other
prosecution witnesses, and "to such extent that their trustworthiness becomes manifest." As
part of the conspiracy, Abutin and Tampelix can testify on the criminal plan of the
conspirators. Where a crime is contrived in secret, the discharge of one of the conspirators
is essential because only they have knowledge of the crime.8 The other prosecution
witnesses are not eyewitnesses to the crime, as, in fact, there is none. No one except the
conspirators knew and witnessed the murder. The testimonies of the accused and proposed
state witnesses Abutin and Tampelix can directly link petitioner to the commission of the
crime.
The decision to grant immunity from prosecution forms a constituent part of the
prosecution process. It is essentially a tactical decision to forego prosecution of a person
for government to achieve a higher objective. It is a deliberate renunciation of the right of
the State to prosecute all who appear to be guilty of having committed a crime. Its
justification lies in the particular need of the State to obtain the conviction of the more
guilty criminals who, otherwise, will probably elude the long arm of the law. Whether or
not the delicate power should be exercised, who should be extended the privilege, the
timing of its grant, are questions addressed solely to the sound judgment of the prosecution.
The power to prosecute includes the right to determine who shall be prosecuted and the
corollary right to decide whom not to prosecute. In reviewing the exercise of prosecutorial
discretion in these areas, the jurisdiction of the respondent court is limited. For the business
of a court of justice is to be an impartial tribunal, and not to get involved with the success
or failure of the prosecution to prosecute. Every now and then, the prosecution may err in
the selection of its strategies, but such errors are not for neutral courts to rectify, any more
than courts should correct the blunders of the defense. For fairness demands that courts
keep the scales of justice at equipoise between and among all litigants. Due process
demands that courts should strive to maintain the legal playing field perfectly even and
perpetually level.

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RULE 119
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. — When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the order of the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he
may forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
Vda. de Manguerra vs Risos, 563 SCRA 471
CONCEPCION CUENCO VDA. DE MANGUERRA and THE HON. RAMON C.
CODILLA, JR., Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of Cebu City, Branch 19,
petitioners,
vs.
RAUL RISOS, SUSANA YONGCO, LEAH ABARQUEZ and ATTY. GAMALIEL D.B.
BONJE, respondents.
G.R. No. 152643
August 28, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
Nature of Case:
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Court of Appeals (CA) Decision1 dated August 15, 2001 and its Resolution2 dated March
12, 2002. The CA decision set aside the Regional Trial Court (RTC) Orders dated August
25, 20003 granting Concepcion Cuenco Vda. de Manguerra’s (Concepcion’s) motion to
take deposition, and dated November 3, 20004 denying the motion for reconsideration of
respondents Raul G. Risos, Susana Yongco, Leah Abarquez, and Atty. Gamaliel D.B.
Bonje.
FACTS
On November 4, 1999, respondents were charged with Estafa Through Falsification of
Public Document before the RTC of Cebu City, Branch 19, through a criminal information
dated October 27, 1999, which was subsequently amended on November 18, 1999. The
case, docketed as Criminal Case No. CBU-52248,5 arose from the falsification of a deed of
real estate mortgage allegedly committed by respondents where they made it appear that
Concepcion, the owner of the mortgaged property known as the Gorordo property, affixed
her signature to the document. Hence, the criminal case.
Earlier, on September 10, 1999, Concepcion, who was a resident of Cebu City, while on
vacation in Manila, was unexpectedly confined at the Makati Medical Center due to upper
gastro-intestinal bleeding; and was advised to stay in Manila for further treatment.
On November 24, 1999, respondents filed a Motion for Suspension of the Proceedings in
Criminal Case No. CBU-52248 on the ground of prejudicial question. They argued that
Civil Case No. CEB-20359, which was an action for declaration of nullity of the mortgage,
should first be resolved.8 On May 11, 2000, the RTC granted the aforesaid motion.
Concepcion’s motion for reconsideration was denied on June 5, 2000.9
This prompted Concepcion to institute a special civil action for certiorari before the CA
seeking the nullification of the May 11 and June 5 RTC orders. The case was docketed as
CA-G.R. SP No. 60266 and remains pending before the appellate court to date.10
On August 16, 2000, the counsel of Concepcion filed a motion to take the latter’s
deposition. He explained the need to perpetuate Concepcion’s testimony due to her weak
physical condition and old age, which limited her freedom of mobility.
At the outset, the CA observed that there was a defect in the respondents’ petition by not
impleading the People of the Philippines, an indispensable party. This notwithstanding, the
appellate court resolved the matter on its merit, declaring that the examination of
prosecution witnesses, as in the present case, is governed by Section 15, Rule 119 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the Rules of Court. The latter
provision, said the appellate court, only applies to civil cases. Pursuant to the specific
provision of Section 15, Rule 119, Concepcion’s deposition should have been taken before
the judge or the court where the case is pending, which is the RTC of Cebu, and not before
the Clerk of Court of Makati City; and thus, in issuing the assailed order, the RTC clearly
committed grave abuse of discretion.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the examination of prosecution witnesses in the present case is governed by
Section 15, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure and not Rule 23 of the
Rules of Court. –Yes, Rule 119 applies
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: No. RTC granted the motion and directed that Concepcion’s deposition be taken
before the Clerk of Court of Makati City.
CA: Yes. Set aside decision of RTC and any deposition that may have been taken on the
authority of such void orders is similarly declared void.
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SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
It is basic that all witnesses shall give their testimonies at the trial of the case in the
presence of the judge.25 This is especially true in criminal cases in order that the accused
may be afforded the opportunity to cross-examine the witnesses pursuant to his
constitutional right to confront the witnesses face to face.26 It also gives the parties and
their counsel the chance to propound such questions as they deem material and necessary
to support their position or to test the credibility of said witnesses.27 Lastly, this rule
enables the judge to observe the witnesses’ demeanor.28
This rule, however, is not absolute. As exceptions, Rules 23 to 28 of the Rules of Court
provide for the different modes of discovery that may be resorted to by a party to an action.
These rules are adopted either to perpetuate the testimonies of witnesses or as modes of
discovery. In criminal proceedings, Sections 12,29 1330 and 15,31 Rule 119 of the Revised
Rules of Criminal Procedure, which took effect on December 1, 2000, allow the
conditional examination of both the defense and prosecution witnesses.
In the case at bench, in issue is the examination of a prosecution witness, who, according to
the petitioners, was too sick to travel and appear before the trial court. Section 15 of Rule
119 thus comes into play, and it provides:
Section 15. Examination of witness for the prosecution. – When it satisfactorily appears
that a witness for the prosecution is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial as directed by
the court, or has to leave the Philippines with no definite date of returning, he may
forthwith be conditionally examined before the court where the case is pending. Such
examination, in the presence of the accused, or in his absence after reasonable notice to
attend the examination has been served on him, shall be conducted in the same manner as
an examination at the trial. Failure or refusal of the accused to attend the examination after
notice shall be considered a waiver. The statement taken may be admitted in behalf of or
against the accused.
the witness is too sick or infirm to appear at the trial; or 2) if the witness has to leave the
Philippines with no definite date of returning. Thus, when Concepcion moved that her
deposition be taken, had she not been too sick at that time, her motion would have been
denied. Instead of conditionally examining her outside the trial court, she would have been
compelled to appear before the court for examination during the trial proper.
To reiterate, the conditional examination of a prosecution witness for the purpose of taking
his deposition should be made before the court, or at least before the judge, where the case
is pending. Such is the clear mandate of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules. We find no
necessity to depart from, or to relax, this rule. As correctly held by the CA, if the
deposition is made elsewhere, the accused may not be able to attend, as when he is under
detention. More importantly, this requirement ensures that the judge would be able to
observe the witness’ deportment to enable him to properly assess his credibility. This is
especially true when the witness’ testimony is crucial to the prosecution’s case.
While we recognize the prosecution’s right to preserve its witness’ testimony to prove its
case, we cannot disregard rules which are designed mainly for the protection of the
accused’s constitutional rights. The giving of testimony during trial is the general rule. The
conditional examination of a witness outside of the trial is only an exception, and as such,
calls for a strict construction of the rules.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Court of Appeals Decision and
Resolution dated August 25, 2000 and March 12, 2002, respectively, in CA-G.R. SP No.
62551, are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

Petitioners contend that Concepcion’s advanced age and health condition exempt her from
the application of Section 15, Rule 119 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, and thus, calls
for the application of Rule 23 of the Rules of Civil Procedure.

The contention does not persuade.

The very reason offered by the petitioners to exempt Concepcion from the coverage of
Rule 119 is at once the ground which places her squarely within the coverage of the same
provision. Rule 119 specifically states that a witness may be conditionally examined: 1) if
92
 three extensions of time, the last of which was to end on July 28, 2006. Still, the
prosecution did not make the required written offer.
On August 1, 2006 petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss the case, complaining of a
turtle-paced proceeding in the case since his arrest and detention in 2001 and invoking his
right to a speedy trial. Further, he claimed that in the circumstances, the trial court could
not consider any evidence against him that had not been formally offered. He also pointed
out that the prosecution witnesses did not have knowledge of his alleged part in the crime
charged.

Unknown to petitioner Cabador, however, four days earlier or on July 28, 2006 the
TRIAL prosecution asked the RTC for another extension of the period for its formal offer, which
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE offer it eventually made on August 1, 2006, the day Cabador filed his motion to dismiss.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
On August 31, 2006 the RTC issued an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006
motion to dismiss as a demurrer to evidence. And, since he filed his motion without leave
COBADOR VS. PEOPLE of court, the RTC declared him to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense.
The trial court deemed the case submitted for decision insofar as he was concerned.
ANTONIO CABADOR, Petitioner, Cabador filed a motion for reconsideration of this Order but the RTC denied it on February
vs. 19, 2007. Cabador questioned the RTC’s actions before the CA but on August 4, 2008 the
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent. latter denied his petition and affirmed the lower court’s actions. With the CA’s denial of
his motion for reconsideration, on October 28, 2008 petitioner came to this Court via a
G.R. No. 186001 petition for review on certiorari.
October 2, 2009
PONENTE: ABAD. J, ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not petitioner Cabador’s motion to dismiss before the trial court was in fact a
NATURE OF THE CASE: demurrer to evidence filed without leave of court, with the result that he effectively waived
Petition for review on certiorari his right to present evidence in his defense and submitted the case for decision insofar as he
was concerned
BRIEF:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari, assailing the Court of Appeals’ (CA) ACTIONS of the COURT:
Decision of August 4, 2008 and Resolution of October 28, 2008 in CA-G.R. SP 100431 RTC - RTC ISSUED an Order treating petitioner Cabador’s August 1, 2006 motion to
that affirmed the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon dismiss as a demurrer to evidence therefore declaring his waiver to present evidence in his
City. defense
CA - AFFIRMED the August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
FACTS: Quezon City and DENIED the petition.
On June 23, 2000 the public prosecutor accused petitioner Antonio Cabador before the SC - REVERSED and SET ASIDE October 28, 2008 Resolution of the Court of Appeals
RTC of Quezon City in Criminal Case Q-00-93291 of murdering, in conspiracy with in CA-G.R. SP 100431 and NULLIFIED August 31, 2006 Order of the Regional Trial
others, Atty. Jun N. Valerio. On February 13, 2006, after presenting only five witnesses Court of Quezon City, Branch 81
over five years of intermittent trial, the RTC declared at an end the prosecution’s
presentation of evidence and required the prosecution to make a written or formal offer of COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
its documentary evidence within 15 days from notice. But the public prosecutor asked for

93
Tested against the criteria laid down in Enojas, to determine whether the pleading filed is a
demurer to evidence or a motion to dismiss, the Court must consider (1) the allegations in it
made in good faith; (2) the stage of the proceeding at which it is filed; and (3) the primary
objective of the party filing it.

In criminal cases, a motion to dismiss may be filed on the ground of denial of the accused’s
right to speedy trial. This denial is characterized by unreasonable, vexatious, and
oppressive delays without fault of the accused, or by unjustified postponements that
unreasonably prolonged the trial.This was the main thrust of Cabador’s motion to dismiss
and he had the right to bring this up for a ruling by the trial court.

The gaps between proceedings were long, with hearings often postponed because of the
prosecutor’s absence. This was further compounded, Cabador said, by the prosecution’s
repeated motions for extension of time to file its formal offer and its failure to file it within
such time. Cabador then invoked in paragraph 13 above his right to speedy trial. But the
RTC and the CA simply chose to ignore these extensive averments and altogether treated
Cabador’s motion as a demurrer to evidence because of a few observations he made in
paragraphs "11 and 12 regarding the inadequacy of the evidence against him.
The fact is that Cabador did not even bother to do what is so fundamental in any demurrer.
He did not state what evidence the prosecution had presented against him to show in what
respects such evidence failed to meet the elements of the crime charged. His so-called
"demurrer" did not touch on any particular testimony of even one witness. He cited no
documentary exhibit. Indeed, he could not because, he did not know that the prosecution
finally made its formal offer of exhibits on the same date he filed his motion to dismiss. To
say that Cabador filed a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to the proverbial blind man,
touching the side of an elephant, and exclaiming that he had touched a wall.

Besides, a demurrer to evidence assumes that the prosecution has already rested its case.
Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, reads:

Demurrer to evidence. – After the prosecution rests its case, the court may dismiss the TRIAL
action on the ground of insufficiency of evidence (1) on its own initiative after giving the DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
prosecution the opportunity to be heard or (2) upon demurrer to the evidence filed by the Section 23, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
accused with or without leave of court.
PEOPLE vs TAN
Therefore, the Court finds that petitioner Cabador filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
of violation of his right to speedy trial, not a demurrer to evidence. He cannot be declared PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner,
to have waived his right to present evidence in his defense. vs.
DANTE TAN, Respondent.

G.R. No. 167526

July 26, 2010
PONENTE: PERALTA, J.
94

NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for review on certiorari
BRIEF:
Before this Court is a petition for review on certiorari, under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court,
seeking to set aside the June 14, 2004 Resolution and February 24, 2005 Resolution of the
Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 83433.
FACTS:
On December 21, 2000, two Informations for violation of Rule 36 (a)-1, in relation to
Sections 32 (a)-1 and 56 of the Revised Securities Act, were filed by petitioner People of
the Philippines against respondent Dante Tan in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasig
City, Branch 153. These two inforamtions stated that he did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and criminally fail to file with the Securities and Exchange Commission and
with the Philippine Stock Exchange a sworn statement of the amount of all BWRC shares
of which he is the beneficial owner of 84,030,000 Best World Resources Corporation
shares in Criminal Cases No. 119831 and 75,000,000 Best World Resources. They were
docketed as Criminal Cases Nos. 119831 and 119832.
After arraignment, respondent pleaded not guilty to both charges and the trial ensued.
On September 18, 2001, petitioner completed its presentation of evidence and, on the day
after, filed its formal offer of evidence. On January 21, 2002, respondent filed an
opposition to petitioner’s formal offer. Instead of filing a reply as directed by the RTC,
petitioner filed a "Motion to Withdraw Prosecution’s Formal Offer of Evidence and to Re-
open Presentation of Evidence." Said motion was granted by the RTC and petitioner thus
continued its presentation of evidence.
On January 28, 2003, petitioner ended its presentation of additional witnesses and was then
ordered by the RTC to formally offer its exhibits. On February 26, 2003, petitioner filed a
request for marking of certain documents and motion to admit attached formal offer of
evidence. The motion was initially denied by the RTC, but on motion for reconsideration
the same was granted by the RTC. The RTC, thus, ordered petitioner to file anew its formal
offer of evidence. Finally, on November 24, 2003, petitioner filed its Formal Offer of
Evidence.
After respondent filed its Demurer to Evidence, the RTC, in an Order dated January 29,
2004, directed petitioner to file its opposition thereto. On February 18, 2004, petitioner
filed its Opposition to the demurrer.
On March 16, 2004, the RTC issued an Order granting respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
Whether or not the RTC violate petitioner’s right to due process by grave abuse of
discretion in granting the respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence?
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC - GRANT of respondent’s Demurrer to Evidence
CA – DISMISSED the case on the ground that a Demurrer to Evidence is one on the
merits and operates as an acquittal
SC - DENIED petition, AFFIRMED CA’s Resolutions
COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
This Court finds that the RTC did not abuse its discretion in the manner it conducted the
proceedings of the trial, as well as its grant of respondent’s demurrer to evidence.
The rule on double jeopardy, however, is not without exceptions. In People v. Laguio, Jr.,
this Court stated that the only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the
RTC acted with grave abuse of discretion, thus:
x x x The only instance when double jeopardy will not attach is when the trial court acted
with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, such as where
the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or where the trial was a
sham. However, while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous acquittal, the
petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that the trial court
blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very power to
dispense justice.
It is clear that the RTC never prevented petitioner from presenting its case. It even bears to
point out that the RTC even allowed petitioner to withdraw its formal offer of evidence
after having initially rested its case and then continue its presentation by introducing
additional witnesses. Thus, no grave abuse can be attributed to the RTC as petitioner’s
right to due process was not violated. Even Galman finds no application to the case at bar
as clearly such trial cannot be considered a sham based on the abovementioned
considerations.
While it would have been ideal for the RTC to hold in abeyance the resolution of the
demurrer to evidence, nowhere in the rules, however, is it mandated to do so. Furthermore,
even if this Court were to consider the same as an error on the part of the RTC, the same
would merely constitute an error of procedure or of judgment and not an error of
jurisdiction as persistently argued by petitioner. Errors or irregularities, which do not
render the proceedings a nullity, will not defeat a plea of antrefois acquit. We are bound by
the dictum that whatever error may have been committed effecting the dismissal of the case
cannot now be corrected because of the timely plea of double jeopardy. Consequently,
petitioner’s attempt to put in issue the December 11, 2003 and January 27, 2004 Orders of
the RTC which denied admission of certain documentary exhibits in evidence must fail. As
95
correctly manifested by the CA, the said Orders have already been overtaken by the March
16, 2004 Order, which already granted respondent’s demurrer to evidence. Hence, this
Court would be violating the rules on double jeopardy if the twin orders were to be
reviewed after a finding that the CA did not commit any grave abuse of discretion in
granting the demurrer to evidence.
Remedy where accused is not brought to trial within the time limit
Lastly, even if this Court were to review the action taken by the RTC in granting the Law on speedy trial not a bar to provision on speedy trial in the Constitution
demurrer to evidence, no grave abuse can be attributed to it as it appears that the 29-page Section 9 and 10, Rule 119 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
Order granting the demurrer was arrived at after due consideration of the merits thereto. As
correctly observed by the CA, the RTC extensively discussed its position on the various IMPERIAL vs JOSON
issues brought to contention by petitioner. One of the main reasons for the RTC’s decision
NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
to grant the demurrer was the absence of evidence to prove the classes of shares that the
vs.
Best World Resources Corporation stocks were divided into, whether there are preferred
MARICEL M. JOSON, ET AL. Respondents.
shares as well as common shares, or even which type of shares respondent had acquired.

It is very clear from the evidence formally offered, that the foregoing facts were not proven SANTOS FRANCISCO Petitioners,
vs.
or established. These cases were for Violations of RSA Rule 32 (a)-1 and Section 56 of
SPS. GERARD AND MARICEL JOSON Respondents.
Revised Securities Act, however, it is very surprising that the prosecution never presented
in evidence the Article of Incorporation of BW Resources Corporation. This document is NELSON IMPERIAL, ET AL., Petitioners,
very vital and is the key to everything, including the conviction of the accused. Without the vs.
Article of Incorporation, the Court has no way of knowing the capitalization authorized HILARION FELIX, ET AL., Respondents.
capital stock of the BW Resources Corporation, the classes of shares into which its stock is
divided and the exact holdings of Dante Tan in the said corporation. Its not being a G.R. No. 160067
prosecution’s evidence renders impossible the determination of the ten (10%) percent G.R. No. 170410
beneficial ownership of accused Dante Tan, as there is no focal point to base the G.R. No. 171622
computation of his holdings, and the exact date of his becoming an owner of ten (10%) November 17, 2010
percent PONENTE: PEREZ, J.:

NATURE OF THE CASE:

Consolidated petitions for review on certiorari

BRIEF:
Filed pursuant to Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the consolidated petitions
for review on certiorari at bench primarily assail the decisions rendered in the following
cases, viz.: (a) Decision dated 4 September 2003 of the then Tenth Division of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP. No. 74030; (b) Decision dated 26 October 2005 of said
Court’s then Special Eighth Division in CA-G.R. No. 81262; and, (c) Decision dated 17
February 2006 of the same Court’s then Special Sixth Division in CA-G.R. No. 87906.

96
FACTS:
These cases were the products when an Isuzu ten-wheeler truck collided with a Fuso six-
wheeler truck owned by petitioner Nelson Imperial. The Isuzu ten-wheeler truck was then
being driven by petitioner Santos Francisco, while the Fuso six-wheeler truck was driven
by respondent Santiago Giganto, Jr. who was, at the time, accompanied by a helper or
pahinante, respondent Samuel Cubeta. After colliding with the Fuso six-wheeler truck, the
Isuzu ten-wheeler truck further rammed into a Kia Besta Van which was, in turn, being
driven by respondent Arnel Lazo. The KIA Besta Van was owned by Noel Tagle who was
then on board said vehicle, together with the following passengers, namely, Gloria,
Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all surnamed Felix; Marvin, Martin and Jan-
Jon, all surnamed Sadiwa; Antonio Landoy; and, respondents Evelyn Felix, and Jasmin
Galvez.
The accident resulted in the death of Noel Tagle, the owner of the KIA Besta Van, and
seven of its passengers, namely, Gloria, Jonathan, Jaypee, Jervin, Jerald and Lydia, all
surnamed Felix; and, Antonio Landoy. As a consequence of the collisions, a criminal
complaint for Reckless Imprudence Resulting to Multiple Homicide, Multiple Serious
Physical Injuries and Damage to Property was filed against petitioners Santos Francisco
and Noel Imperial on 16 May 2001 before the Municipal Trial Court (MTC) of Sariaya,
Quezon. The Sariaya MTC proceeded to conduct the mandatory pre-trial conference in
Criminal Case No. 01-99 after petitioner Francisco entered a plea of not guilty at the
arraignment scheduled in the case. The Sariaya MTC issued an order which, while denying
petitioner Francisco’s motion for reconsideration, directed that the pre-trial conference be
set anew in view of the reassignment of the case to Prosecutor Francis Sia and the
appearance of a new private prosecutor in the case.23 Dissatisfied, petitioner Francisco
filed on 1 April 2002 the petition for certiorari, prohibition and mandamus docketed as
Civil Case No. 2002-37 before Branch 58 of the Lucena City RTC.
A complaint for damages was also filed by petitioners Francisco and Imperial against
respondents Giganto and Cubeta before Branch 22 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of
Naga City. In turn alleging that the mishap was attributable to the negligence of the driver
of the Isuzu ten-wheeler truck, respondent Giganto joined respondent Maricel Joson and
her husband, respondent Gerard Ferdinand Joson, in filing against petitioners Francisco and
Imperial the complaint for damages docketed as Civil Case No. 8314 before Branch 82 of
the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) of Valenzuela City.
Respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson moved for the dismissal of Civil Case No. 2001-
0296 before the Naga RTC, on the ground of litis pendentia. Invoking the "interest of
justice rule", said respondents argued that Civil Case No. 8314 before the Valenzuela
MeTC should be maintained despite petitioners’ earlier filing of their complaint for
damages before the Naga RTC.
The Naga City RTC issued an order dismissing petitioners’ amended complaint on the
ground that the same was barred by the complaint for damages filed against them before
the Parañaque RTC. Differentiating said pleading from a supplemental pleading which
only serves to bolster or add something to a primary pleading, the Naga RTC ruled that
petitioners’ amended complaint supplanted and did not retroact to the time of their original
complaint.
ISSUE/S of the CASE:
a. G.R. No. 160067 – whether the action of the petitioners to file complaint in Naga
RTC is a cause for the just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of the case instead
of Parañaque RTC calling attention to the lesser case load
b. G.R. No. 170410 – whether he nine postponements of the pre-trial conference in
the case attributable to the prosecution amounted to a violation of his
constitutional right to a speedy trial
c. G.R No. 171622 – whether Parañaque RTC's issuance of order was both
premature and attended with grave abuse of discretion
ACTIONS of the COURT:
 Sariaya MTC- DENIED petitioner Francisco’s motion for reconsideration
 Lucena RTC - DISMISSED petitioner Francisco’s petitions for certiorari,
prohibition and mandamus for lack of merit
 Valenzuela MeTC - DISMISSAL of the complaint filed against them by
respondents Giganto and Spouses Joson
 Naga RTC - DISMISSED petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No.
2001-0296 on the ground of litis pendentia
 RTC of Parañaque City - DISMISSED without prejudice in view of their failure
to attend the same pre-trial conference
 Court of Appeals –
a. NULLIFIED the Valenzuela MeTC's
b. AFFIRMED the 2 August 2002 and 16 September 2002 orders issued by the
Naga RTC which dismissed petitioners' amended complaint in Civil Case No.
2001-0296 on the ground of litis pendentia
c. AFFIRMED the Parañaque RTC's 7 October 2002 order denying petitioners'
motion to dismiss
 SC – DENIED G.R. Nos. 160067 and 170410 and GRANTED petition in G.R.
No. 171622
COURT RATIONALE OF ABOVE FACTS
a. G.R. No. 160067
97

No, the Supreme Court cannot hospitably entertain petitioners’ insistence that the
abatement of the case before said court in favor of the one they filed before the Naga RTC
would promote the expeditious and inexpensive disposition of the parties’ complaints for
damages against each other which are indisputably personal in nature, considering that
majority of the parties live closer to the Parañaque RTC. Under the "interest of justice
rule", moreover, the determination of which court would be "in a better position to serve
the interests of justice" also entails the consideration of the following factors: (a) the nature
of the controversy; (b) the comparative accessibility of the court to the parties; and, (c)
other similar factors.
Even prescinding from the foregoing considerations, our perusal of the record also shows
that, by filing their answer and third-party complaint against respondents Pedraja, Joson,
Giganto and Cubeta in Civil Case No. 01-0325, petitioners have already submitted
themselves to the jurisdiction of the Parañaque RTC. In addition, petitioners have filed
before said court the following motions and incidents, viz.: (a) 17 June 2003 motion for
reconsideration of the 2 June 2003 order directing the payment of the filing and other
docket fees for said third-party complaint; (b) 11 June 2003 opposition to set the case for
hearing;56 and, (c) 2 September 2004 urgent motion for reconsideration and to set aside
order of default. Having filed their third-party complaint as aforesaid and repeatedly sought
positive relief from the Parañaque RTC, it stands to reason that petitioners' should no
longer be allowed to question said court's jurisdiction over Civil Case No. 01-0325 which,
unlike the suit for damages pending before the Naga RTC, additionally involves all the
parties indispensable to the complete resolution of the case.
b. G.R. No. 170410
in computing the time within which trial must commence. In determining the right of an
accused to speedy trial, moreover, courts are "required to do more than a mathematical
computation of the number of postponements of the scheduled hearings of the case" and to
give particular regard to the facts and circumstances peculiar to each case. Viewed in the
context of the above discussed procedural antecedents as well as the further reassignment
of the case to Prosecutor Baligod as a consequence of Prosecutor Sia’s subsequent transfer
to another government office, we find that the CA correctly brushed aside petitioner
Francisco's claim that the postponements of the pre-trial conferences in the case before the
Sariaya MTC were violative of his right to a speedy trial.
c. G.R No. 171622
Yes, the order was both premature and attended with grave abuse of discretion.
The record is, indeed, bereft of any showing that summons were issued requiring
respondents Pedraja, Joson, Giganto and Cubeta to file their answer to the aforesaid
pleading. If only in the interest of the orderly, expeditious and complete disposition of the
parties' complaints for damages against each other, we find that the Parañaque RTC should
have first awaited the full joinder of the issues before its 8 June 2004 grant of the motion to
set the case for hearing filed by respondents Felix, Galvez, Tagle, Lazo and Landoy. Time
and again, the Court has espoused a policy of liberality in setting aside orders of default
which are frowned upon, as a case is best decided when all contending parties are able to
ventilate their respective claims, present their arguments and adduce evidence in support
thereof. Thus, the issuance of the orders of default should be the exception rather than the
rule, to be allowed only in clear cases of obstinate refusal by the defendant to comply with
the orders of the trial court.

No, the constitutional right to a speedy trial of the petitioner was not denied. Designed
to prevent the oppression of the citizen by holding criminal prosecution suspended over
him for an indefinite time and to prevent delays in the administration of justice, said right is
considered violated only when the proceeding is attended by vexatious, capricious and
oppressive delays.

Far from being vexatious, capricious and oppressive, however, the delays entailed by the
postponements of the aforesaid hearings were, to a great extent, attributable to petitioner
Francisco’s own pursuit of extraordinary remedies against the interlocutory orders issued
by the Sariaya MTC and the assignment of at least three public prosecutors to the case,
namely, Prosecutors Rodolfo Zabella, Jr., Francis Sia and Joel Baligod.

Although the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure concededly mandates commencement

of the trial within 30 days from receipt of the pre-trial order71 and the continuous conduct
thereof for a period not exceeding 180 days,72Section 3 a (1), Rule 119 provides that
delays resulting from extraordinary remedies against interlocutory orders shall be excluded
98
 Private respondent counters that the grant of a demurrer to evidence is equivalent to an
acquittal from which the prosecution cannot appeal as it would place the accused in double
jeopardy. Further, assuming that the Sandiganbayan erroneously granted the demurrer, this
would, at most, constitute an error of judgment and not an error of jurisdiction. Thus,
certiorari does not lie to correct the grant of the demurrer to evidence by the
Sandiganbayan.
Demurrer to Evidence
Right against Double Jeopardy
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE
PEOPLE VS SANDIGANBAYAN 1. Whether the granting of the demurrer to evidence has an effect of acquittal.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, petitioner
vs.
HON. SANDIGANBAYAN (THIRD DIVISION), MANUEL G. BARCENAS, ACTIONS of the COURT
respondent. SANDIGANBAYAN: Demurrer to evidence was granted.
SC: Appealed decision is affirmed.
G.R. No. 174504
March 21, 2011
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
An order of dismissal arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence has the effect of an
acquittal unless the order was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
Nature of Case: excess of jurisdiction.
Petition for Review (Appeal)
In criminal cases, the grant of a demurrer is tantamount to an acquittal and the dismissal
BRIEF order may not be appealed because this would place the accused in double jeopardy.
The dismissal order arising from the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an Although the dismissal order is not subject to appeal, it is still reviewable but only through
acquittal and cannot be appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court. For the writ to issue, the trial court must be
The order is reviewable only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion shown to have acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. jurisdiction such as where the prosecution was denied the opportunity to present its case or
where the trial was a sham thus rendering the assailed judgment void.
FACTS
On May 21, 2004, private respondent was charged with violation of Section 89 of In the case at bar, the Sandiganbayan granted the demurrer to evidence on the ground that
Presidential Decree No. 14452 before the Sandiganbayan for failing to liquidate cash the prosecution failed to prove that the government suffered any damage from private
advances amounting to P61, 765.00. Private respondent filed a motion for leave to file respondent’s non-liquidation of the subject cash advance because it was later shown, as
demurrer to evidence which was subsequently granted by the Sandiganbayan. admitted by the prosecution’s witness, that private respondent liquidated the same albeit
belatedly.
Petitioner contends that the prosecution was able to establish all the elements of the offense
defined and penalized under Section 89 of P.D. No. 1445: (1) the private respondent, an
accountable officer, received cash advances in the total amount of P120,000.00, (2) the
purpose of the cash advance has been served, (3) the private respondent settled his cash SUPREME COURT RULING:
However erroneous the order of respondent Court is, and although a miscarriage of justice resulted
advances only in March 1996, (4) the city auditor sent a demand letter to settle the cash
from said order, to paraphrase Justice Alex Reyes in People vs. Nieto, 103 Phil. 1133, such error
advance within 72 hours from receipt thereof, and the private respondent received said
letter on December 22, 1995 but failed to liquidate the same within the aforestated period. cannot now be righted because of the timely plea of double jeopardy.

99
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Ponente: CARPIO, J.

Nature of the case:

Petition for Review (Appeal)

BRIEF
It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court.
FACTS
Benjamin Bangayan, Jr. married Azucena Alegre in September 1973. In February 1982,
Benjamin and Sally lived together as husband and wife. On 7 March 1982, in order to
appease her father, Sally brought Benjamin to an office in Santolan, Pasig City where they
signed a purported marriage contract.
The relationship of Benjamin and Sally ended in 1994. She then filed criminal actions for
bigamy and falsification of public documents against him. Benjamin, in turn, filed a
petition for declaration of a non-existent marriage and/or declaration of nullity of marriage
before the trial court on the ground that his marriage to Sally was bigamous and that it
lacked the formal requisites to a valid marriage.
After Benjamin presented his evidence, Sally filed a demurrer to evidence and
subsequently, a motion for reconsideration which the trial court denied. The trial court gave
Sally several opportunities to present her evidence on 28 February 2008, 10 July 2008, 4
September 2008, 11 September 2008, 2 October 2008, 23 October 2008, and 28 November
2008. Despite repeated warnings from the trial court, Sally still refused to present her
evidence, prompting the trial court to consider the case submitted for decision.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether Sally had waived her right to present evidence.

ACTIONS of the COURT

Waiver of right to present evidence RTC and CA: Ruled that Sally Bangayan waived her right to present evidence.
SC: Decision of the CA is affirmed.

BANGAYAN vs. BANGAYAN

SALLY GO-BANGAYAN, Petitioner, COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
vs. It is well-settled that a grant of a motion for continuance or postponement is not a matter of
BENJAMIN BANGAYAN, JR., Respondent. right but is addressed to the discretion of the trial court. In this case, Sally’s presentation of
evidence was scheduled on28 February 2008. Thereafter, there were six resettings of the
G.R. No. 201061 case.
July 3, 2013
100
Sally could not complain that she had been deprived of her right to present her evidence
because all the postponements were at her instance and she was warned by the trial court
that it would submit the case for decision should she still fail to present her evidence on 28
November 2008.
We agree with the trial court that by her continued refusal to present her evidence, she was
deemed to have waived her right to present them. Sally could not accuse the trial court of
failing to protect marriage as an inviolable institution because the trial court also has the
duty to ensure that trial proceeds despite the deliberate delay and refusal to proceed by one
of the parties.
Demurrer to evidence
PEOPLE vs. JOSE C. GO
BRIEF
The power of courts to grant demurrer in criminal cases should be exercised with great
caution, because not only the rights of the accused - but those of the offended party and the
public interest as well - are involved. Once granted, the accused is acquitted and the
offended party may be left with no recourse. Thus, in the resolution of demurrers, judges
must act with utmost circumspection and must engage in intelligent deliberation and
reflection, drawing on their experience, the law and jurisprudence, and delicately
evaluating the evidence on hand.
FACTS
The Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation (PDIC) conducted an investigation and
allegedly came out with a finding that the loans purportedly in the names of Timmy’s, Inc.
and Asia Textile Mills, Inc. were released in the form of manager’s checks in the name of
Philippine Recycler’s and Zeta International, Inc. These manager’s checks were then
allegedly deposited to the savings account of the private respondent Jose C. Go with OCBC
and, thereafter, were automatically transferred to his current account in order to fund
personal checks issued by him earlier.
PDIC filed a complaint for two counts of Estafa thru Falsification of Commercial
Documents. On January 17, 2007, the private respondents filed their Demurrer to Evidence
praying for the dismissal of the criminal cases instituted against them due to the failure of
the prosecution to establish their guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
On July 2, 2007, an Order was promulgated by the respondent RTC judge finding the
private respondents’ Demurrer to Evidence to be meritorious, dismissing the criminal cases
and acquitting all of the accused in these cases.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Petitioner, The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), filed an original Petition for Certiorari with the
vs. CA assailing the July 2, 2007 Order of the trial court. It claimed that the Order was issued
JOSE C. GO, AIDA C. DELA ROSA, and FELECITAS D. NECOMEDES, Respondents. with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction; that it was
issued with partiality; that the prosecution was deprived of its day in court; and that the
trial court disregarded the evidence presented, which undoubtedly showed that respondents
committed the crime of estafa through falsification of commercial documents.
G.R. No. 191015
August 6, 2014 Respondents submit that petitioner was not deprived of its day in court; the grant of their
Ponente: DEL CASTILLO, J. demurrer to evidence is based on a fair and judicious determination of the facts and
evidence by the trial court, leading it to conclude that the prosecution failed to meet the
quantum of proof required to sustain a finding of guilt on the part of respondents.
Nature of the case: ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether or not the granting of the Demurrer to Evidence is proper.
Petition for Review (Appeal)
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: Granted the Demurrer to Evidence; Dismissed the Case.
101
CA: Affirmed the Ruling of the Trial Court.
SC: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court grants the Petition. Demurrer to the evidence is an objection by one of the
parties in an action, to the effect that the evidence which his adversary produced is
insufficient in point of law, whether true or not, to make out a case or sustain the issue. The
party demurring challenges the sufficiency of the whole evidence to sustain a verdict. The
court, in passing upon the sufficiency of the evidence raised in a demurrer, is merely
required to ascertain whether there is competent or sufficient evidence to sustain the
indictment or to support a verdict of guilt. Thus, when the accused files a demurrer, the
court must evaluate whether the prosecution evidence is sufficient enough to warrant the
conviction of the accused beyond reasonable doubt.
As to effect, "the grant of a demurrer to evidence amounts to an acquittal and cannot be
appealed because it would place the accused in double jeopardy. The order is reviewable
only by certiorari if it was issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction." When grave abuse of discretion is present, an order granting a
demurrer becomes null and void.
In the instant case, having affirmed the CA finding grave abuse of discretion on the part of
the trial court when it granted the accused’s demurrer to evidence, we deem its consequent
order of acquittal void.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, the Court declares that the CA grossly erred in
affirming the trial court’s July 2, 2007 Order granting the respondent’s demurrer, which
Order was patently null and void for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
An act of a court or tribunal may only be considered as committed in grave abuse of
discretion when the same was performed in a capricious or whimsical exercise of judgment
which is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and
gross as to amount to an evasion of positive duty or to a virtual refusal to perform a duty
enjoined by law, or to act at all in contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in
an arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and personal hostility.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The Resolutions of the Court of Appeals are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Orders of the Regional Trial Court of Manila are
declared null and void, and the said cases are ordered REINSTATED for the continuation
of proceedings.
People vs. Pepino
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs
JERRY R. PEPINO and DAISY M. BALAAN, Appellants.
G.R. No. 183479
June 29, 2010
Ponente: Carpio Morales
Brief:
Appellants Jerry R. Pepino (Pepino) and Daisy M. Balaan (Daisy), along with Alfredo R.
Pelenio (Pelenio), were indicted before the Quezon City Regional Trial Court (RTC) for
Kidnapping for Ransom with Serious Illegal Detention, as amended by Republic Act (RA)
No. 7659
FACTS:
Anita Ching (the victim) left her Goldline Tours office in Quezon City on board her car
driven by Alejandro Soriano, together with her are other employees Policarpio Guinto
(Guinto) and Eva Guinto. The victim and company had barely left the office when they
were blocked by a vehicle from which four armed men poked their firearms at them and
forcibly took the victim and boarded her on their vehicle. Two of the armed men were
Pepino and Pelenio as recognized by the victim and Guinto, who take the victim to a
safehouse where she was detained for 19 days.
During the victim’s captivity, ten persons alternately guarded her. Daisy, one of two female
member of the group, warned her not to escape, otherwise, she would be hanged. The
group initially asked for a P30 million ransom but the amount was eventually negotiated
down to P500,000.00 which was paid to the group. The victim was released and dropped
near a drugstore along Bonifacio Avenue in Quezon City by Pelenio and Daisy
Pelenio escaped from detention. He was eventually recaptured in Cebu City but was killed
in a shootout with the police. Before his death, Pelenio sent a letter to the presiding judge
of the trial court asking for forgiveness for his escape and admitting his complicity with
102
Pepino in the crime. Sr./Insp. Vicente Arnado, who was called as a hostile witness for the
defense, identified Pepino as the leader of a notorious kidnap-for-ransom group.
Without presenting evidence, Pepino merely challenged his warrantless arrest for
kidnapping as illegal, insisting that he was arrested not for said crime but as an incident of
his arrest for illegal possession of firearms. Daisy who claimed to have been arrested with
her uncle Pelenio, denied having met the victim at the safehouse, alleging that she only met
the victim when she was presented at the Department of Justice.
The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered its decision founding Pepino and Daisy
guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accomplice. The case against Alfredo
Pelinio, who appears to have died during the pendency of this case, is hereby
considered closed.Failure of Daisy to attend the promulgation of judgement, a warrant for
her was issued. Despite her flight, she moved for reconsideration of the decision which the
trial court denied. She thereafter filed a notice of appeal which was given due course by the
trial court
The case was brought to the Court of Appelas for automatic review due to the death
penalty imposed to Pepino for action and disposition. It appears that Pepinos appeal was
consolidated with that of Daisy’s. The Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision
and denied the motion for reconsideration.
SEC. 6. Promulgation of judgment.The judgment is promulgated by reading it in the
presence of the accused and any judge of the court in which it was rendered. However, if
the conviction is for a light offense, the judgment may be pronounced in the presence of his
counsel or representative. When the judge is absent or outside the province or city, the
judgment may be promulgated by the clerk of court.
If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear was without
justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in these Rules against the judgment
and the court shall order his arrest. Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of
judgment, however, the accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail
of these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled promulgation
and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable cause, he shall be allowed to avail of
said remedies within fifteen (15) days from notice.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The appeal of appellant DAISY M. BALAAN is DENIED in accordance with Section 6,
Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure.

ISSUE OF THE CASE:

Whether the motion for reconsideration shall be granted.

ACTIONS OF THE COURT:

RTC: The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City rendered its decision founding Pepino and
Daisy guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal and accomplice.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC. Denied motion for reconsideration.
SC: Denied the appeal in accordance with Section 6, Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure.

COURT RATIONALE:
No. Since Daisy, without proferring any justifiable cause, failed to attend the promulgation
of judgment and continues to be a fugitive from justice to date, her appeal must be
dismissed. So Section 6 of Rule 120 of the Revised Rules of Court instructs:
103
RULE 120 - JUDGEMENT
Nature of Judgement in Criminal Cases
Llamas vs. CA
FRANCISCO R. LLAMAS and CARMELITA C. LLAMAS, Petitioners, vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, BRANCH 66 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL
COURT IN MAKATI CITY and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondents.
G.R. No. 149588
September 29, 2009
Ponente: Nachura
Nature of Case:
Petition for Annulment of Judgment and Certiorari, with Preliminary Injunction
Brief:
Francisco R. Llamas and Carmelita C. Llamas were convicted of “other forms of
swindling”. Petitioners assailed the jurisdiction of the court after they have been convicted,
and moved that the proceedings be annulled
FACTS:
Petitioners, Francisco and Carmelita Lllamas, were charged before the Regional Trial
Court of Makati with the crime of "other forms of swindling. The petitioners conspiring
and confederating together sold their property in Parañaque to Conrado P. Avila,
representing the said property to be free from all liens and encumbrances while it was
mortgaged to the Rural Bank of Imus. The RTC then rendered its decision finding the
petitioners guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime charged.
On appeal, Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, and denied petitioners’
motion for reconsideration. Then the petitioners filed a petition for review, however it was
rejected by the Supreme Court for failure to state material dates. Since the Supreme Court
denied the subsequent motion for reconsideration, judgment of conviction became final and
executory. With the consequent issuance by the trial court of the Warrant of Arrest, the
police arrested Carmelita Llamas for her to serve her 2-month jail term but the police failed
to arrest petitioner Francisco Llamas because he was nowhere to be found. Francisco
moved for the lifting or recall of the warrant of arrest, raising for the first time the issue
that the trial court had no jurisdiction over the offense charged. There being no action taken
by the trial court on the motion, petitioners instituted, on the instant proceedings for the
annulment of the trial and the appellate courts’ decisions. The Court initially dismissed on
technical grounds the petition in the resolution, but reinstated the same, on motion for
reconsideration. After evaluating the petitioners’ arguments, the court denies the petition.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the petitioners can institute an annulment of the RTC and CA decision since the
courts did not take any action when they raised the issue of jurisdiction
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: Petitioners were charged before the RTC of Makati with the crime of "other forms
of swindling" penalized by Article 316, par. 2, of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC
SC: Rejected the petition for review for failure to state material dates
COURT RATIONALE:
No.
The Court explained that the remedy of annulment of judgment cannot be availed of in
criminal cases. In People v. Bitanga, the Court explained that the remedy of annulment of
judgment cannot be availed of in criminal cases:
Section 1, Rule 47 of the Rules of Court, limits the scope of the remedy of annulment of
judgment. The remedy cannot be resorted to when the RTC judgment being questioned was
rendered in a criminal case.
The 2000 Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure itself does not permit such recourse, for it
excluded Rule 47 from the enumeration of the provisions of the 1997 Revised Rules
of Civil Procedure which have suppletory application to criminal cases.
Section 1. Coverage. — This Rule shall govern the annulment by the Court of Appeals of
judgments or final orders and resolutions in civil actions of Regional Trial Courts for
104
which the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal, petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies are no longer available through no fault of the petitioner.
Sec. 18. Rule 124 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure Application of certain rules
in civil procedure to criminal cases. – The provisions of Rules 42, 44 to 46 and 48 to 56
relating to procedure in the Court of Appeals and in the Supreme Court in original and
appealed civil cases shall be applied to criminal cases insofar as they are applicable and not
inconsistent with the provisions of this Rule.
Section 20. Jurisdiction in criminal cases. — Regional Trial Courts shall exercise exclusive
original jurisdiction in all criminal cases not within the exclusive jurisdiction of any court,
tribunal or body, except those now falling under the exclusive and concurrent jurisdiction
of the Sandiganbayan which shall hereafter be exclusively taken cognizance of by the
latter.
xxxx
Section 32. Jurisdiction of Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in criminal cases. — Except in cases falling within the RULE 120 – JUDGEMENT
exclusive original jurisdiction of Regional Trial Courts and of the Sandiganbayan, the
Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and Municipal Circuit Trial Courts shall People vs. Montesclaros
exercise:
People of the Philippines, Plaintiff-Appellee,
xxx
vs
(2) Exclusive original jurisdiction over all offenses punishable with imprisonment of not
Bartolome Tampus and Ida Montesclaros, Defendants.
exceeding four years and two months, or a fine of not more than four thousand pesos, or
both such fine and imprisonment, regardless of other imposable accessory or other IDA MONTESCLAROS, Appellant.
penalties, including the civil liability arising from such offenses or predicated thereon,
irrespective of kind, nature, value, or amount thereof: Provided, however, That in offenses
involving damage to property through criminal negligence they shall have exclusive
original jurisdiction where the imposable fine does not exceed twenty thousand pesos G.R. No. 181084
June 16, 2009

SUPREME COURT RULING: Ponente: Puno

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is DENIED.

Nature of Case:
It is an appeal on the decision of Court of Appeals Visayas affirming with modification the
decision of Regional Trial Court of Lapu – Lapu City in finding Ida Montesclaros guilty as
an accomplice of rape.
Brief:

105
RTC convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as an
accomplice in one of criminal cases. They appealed the said decision.
FACTS:
Two informations were filed charging Bartolome Tampus of raping ABC, 13 years old, and
Ida Montesclaros, mother of ABC, for giving permission to Tampus to rape ABC. The first
information states that, on april 1, 1995 about 4:30pm in Lapulapu city with the jurisdiction
of the RTC Lapu-Lapu, the accused Tampus was in deep slumber due to drunkenness did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with the then
13 yer old victim against her will in conspiracy with Ida Montesclaros who gave
permission to Tampus to rape the minor. On the second information, it stated that on April
3, 1995 at about 1am, Tampus was armed with a wooden club and by means of threat and
intimidation did willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with then 13
year old against her will.
The offended party is the daughter of Montesclaros. Montesclaros started o rent a room in a
house owned by Tampus, a barangay tanod. The minor testified that she was in the house
with her mother and Tampus on April 1, 1995, that the two adults were drinking beer and
forced her to drink too. After having 3 bottles then she got sleepy and was lying on the
floor when she overheard Tampus requesting her mother to be permitted to have sexual
intercourse with the minor. Montesclaros agreed and told Tampus to leave as soon as he is
finish with her daughter. Montesclaros then left for work and left the minor along with
Tampus. The minor fell asleep and have woken up with pain and blood on her genitals. The
minor cried to her mother but was ignored by Montesclaros.
The abused was repeated, that then made her to seek from her aunt Nellie Montesclaros
about the rape and that her mother sold her. Her aunt Nellie was the one who reported the
incident to the police. The head of the medico-legal branch of the Philippine National
Crime Laboratory Services, conducted a physical examination of the minor and testified
that the result of the examination revealed a deep healed laceration.
The minor filed 2 complaints against Tampus on rape and against Montesclaros on
conspiracy to the rape. Tampus denied the rape with alibis that Ida always bring her
daughter to the beer house with her and his duties to the barangay tanod post would prevent
the incident of the minor having left at home alone with him. Then the head of Dept.
Psychiatry issued a medical certification which showed that Ida was treated as an
outpatient diagnosed with Schizophrenia. Trial court convicted Tampus of 2 rapes and Ida
as accomplice. Ida's illness was then appreciated which would diminish the exercise of
will-power without depriving her of the consciousness of her acts, pursuant to Article 13(9)
of the RPC and in effect mitigated her penalty.
Pending resolution of the appeal before the Court of Appeals, Tampus died and his appeal
was dismissed. Thus, the appeal before the Court of Appeals dealt only with that of Ida.
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court’s decision with modification. It appreciated the
mitigating circumstance of illness in favor of Ida, but found that Ida failed to prove that she
was completely deprived of intelligence. On the basis of the medical report and the
testimony of the attending physician, Ida’s schizophrenia was determined by both the trial
court and the Court of Appeals to have diminished the exercise of her will-power though it
did not deprive her of the consciousness of her acts.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether the aggravating circumstance of relationship may be appreciated although the
same was not alleged in the information.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: Convicted Tampus of 2 counts of rape, as principal. Ida was found guilty as an
accomplice in one of criminal cases.
CA: Affirmed the decision of RTC with modification.
SC: Affirmed the decision of CA with modification.
COURT RATIONALE:
No. The undisputed fact that Ida is the mother of ABC—who was 13 years old at the time
of the incident—could have been considered as a special qualifying circumstance which
would have increased the imposable penalty to death, under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Both the circumstances of the minority and the relationship of the offender to the victim,
either as the victim’s parent, ascendant, step-parent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or
affinity within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse of the parent of the victim,
must be alleged in the information and proved during the trial in order for them to serve as
qualifying circumstances under Article 266-B of the RPC.
Although the victim's minority was alleged and established, her relationship with the
accused as the latter's daughter was not properly alleged in the Information, and even
though this was proven during trial and not refuted by the accused, it cannot be considered
as a special qualifying circumstance that would serve to increase the penalty of the
offender. Under the 2000 Rules of Criminal Procedure, which should be given retroactive
effect following the rule that statutes governing court proceedings will be construed as
applicable to actions pending and undetermined at the time of their passage, every
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Information must state the qualifying and the aggravating circumstances attending the
commission of the crime for them to be considered in the imposition of the penalty. Since
in the case at bar, the Information did not state that Ida is the mother of ABC, this
circumstance could not be appreciated as a special qualifying circumstance. Ida may only
be convicted as an accomplice in the crime of simple rape, which is punishable by
reclusion perpetua. In any event, Republic Act No. 9346, entitled an "An Act Prohibiting
the Imposition of Death Penalty in the Philippines," which was signed into law on June 24,
2006 prohibits the imposition of the death penalty.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the Decision of the Court of Appeals, Visayas Station, finding
appellant Ida Montesclaros guilty beyond reasonable doubt as accomplice in the crime of
rape and sentencing her to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years and one (1)
day of prision mayor, as minimum, to twelve (12) years and one (1) day of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATION.
Rule 120 – Judgment
HIPOS vs BAY
NILO HIPOS, SR. REPRESENTING DARRYL HIPOS, BENJAMIN CORSIO
REPRESENTING JAYCEE CORSIO, and ERLINDA VILLARUEL REPRESENTING
ARTHUR VILLARUEL,
Petitioners,
- versus -
HONORABLE RTC JUDGETEODORO A. BAY, Presiding Judge, RTC, Hall of
Justice, Quezon City, Branch 86,
Respondent.
NATURE OF THE CASE: Petition for Mandamus
FACTS:
Two Informations for the crime of rape and one Information for the
crime of acts of lasciviousness were filed against petitioners Darryl Hipos et al.,
before Branch 86 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. Petitioners filed
their Joint Memorandum to Dismiss the Case[s] before the City Prosecutor. They
claimed that there was no probable cause to hold them liable for the crimes
charged. The Office of the City Prosecutor issued a Resolution on the
reinvestigation affirming the Informations.
2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Lamberto C. de Vera, treating the Joint
Memorandum to Dismiss the Case as an appeal of the 10 August 2004 Resolution,
reversed the Resolution dated 10 August 2004, holding that there was lack of
probable cause. On the same date, the City Prosecutor filed a Motion to Withdraw
Informations before Judge Bay. Judge Bay denied the Motion to Withdraw
Informations in an Order of even date.
ISSUE:
CAN THE HON. SUPREME COURT COMPEL RESPONDENT
JUDGE BAY TO DISMISS THE CASE THROUGH A WRIT OF MANDAMUS
ON THE GROUND THAT BY VIRTUE OF RESOLUTION THE OFFICE OF
THE CITY PROSECUTOR OF QUEZON CITY FINDS NO PROBABLE
CAUSE AGAINST THE ACCUSED AND SUBSEQUENTLY FILING A
MOTION TO WITHDRAW INFORMATION?
HELD:
Mandamus is an extraordinary writ commanding a tribunal, corporation, board,
officer or person, immediately or at some other specified time, to do the act required to be
done, when the respondent unlawfully neglects the performance of an act which the law
specifically enjoins as a duty resulting from an office, trust, or station; or when the
107
respondent excludes another from the use and enjoyment of a right or office to which the
latter is entitled, and there is no other plain, speedy and adequate remedy in the ordinary
course of law.

As an extraordinary writ, the remedy of mandamus lies only to compel an officer

to perform a ministerial duty, not a discretionary one; mandamus will not issue to control
the exercise of discretion by a public officer where the law imposes upon him the duty to
exercise his judgment in reference to any manner in which he is required to act, because it
is his judgment that is to be exercised and not that of the court.

There is indeed an exception to the rule that matters involving judgment and
discretion are beyond the reach of a writ of mandamus, for such writ may be issued to
compel action in those matters, when refused. However, mandamus is never available to
direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the retraction or
reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. In other words, while a
judge refusing to act on a Motion to Withdraw Informations can be compelled
by mandamus to act on the same, he cannot be compelled to act in a certain way, i.e., to
grant or deny such Motion. In the case at bar, Judge Bay did not refuse to act on the Motion
to Withdraw Informations; he had already acted on it by denying the
same. Accordingly, mandamus is not available anymore. If petitioners believed
that Judge Bay committed grave abuse of discretion in the issuance of such Order denying PEOPLE V LORENZO
the Motion to Withdraw Informations, the proper remedy of petitioners should have been
to file a Petition for Certiorari against the assailed Order of Judge Bay. People of the Philippines, plaintif-appellee
In sum, petitioners resort to a Petition for Mandamus to compel the trial judge to vs
grant their Motion to Withdraw Informations is improper. While mandamus is available to Paterno Lorenzo y Casas, defendant-appellant
compel action on matters involving judgment and discretion when refused, it is never
available to direct the exercise of judgment or discretion in a particular way or the
retraction or reversal of an action already taken in the exercise of either. Brief:
The Court find that they are in agreement with the trial court, that there is indeed Assailed in this appeal via Notice of Appeal is the 14 June 2007 Decision of the Court of
probable cause against the petitioners sufficient to hold them for trial. Appeals in CA-GR HC No. 02184 which affirmed the 05 October 2005
Decision promulgated by the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of San Mateo, Rizal, in Criminal
Case Nos. 6991-93, finding accused-appellant Paterno Lorenzo y Casas guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Sections 5 and 11, Article II, of Republic Act No. 9165,
otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002

Facts:
Accused-appellant was arrested and charged following a buy-bust operation.
On 12 September 2003, two (2) Informations were filed against accused-appellant
Paterno Lorenzo y Casas (Lorenzo) charging him with violating Sections 5 and 11, Article
II of Republic Act No. 9165. The cases were raffled to Branch 76 of the RTC of San
Mateo, Rizal and docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 6992-93.
One Conrado Estanislao y Javier (Estanislao) was similarly charged in a different
Information, which case was docketed as Criminal Case No. 6991. Estanislao was accused
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of possessing illegal drugs in violation of the provisions of Section 11, Article II of
Republic Act No. 9165
On arraignment, both accused, with the assistance of counsel, entered NOT
GUILTY pleas.
The three (3) cases having been consolidated, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The prosecution presented as its lone witness, Police Officer 1 (PO1) Noel P.
Pineda, who was a member of the buy-bust team.
The evidence for the prosecution sought to establish that on 9 September 2003,
upon a series of reports relayed by a confidential informant that a certain Paterno Lorenzo
was peddling shabu in the Barangay Dulongbayan area, the team of PO3 Pineda embarked
on a buy-bust operation against said drug peddler.
Upon being arrested, Lorenzo was bodily searched and PO1 Pineda was able to
retrieve the marked money and 2 other sachets of shabu from him. Seeing what had
happened to Lorenzo, the man he was talking to and later on identified as a certain
Estanislao, attempted to escape the police officers and ran, but he was soon accosted by
PO3 Tougan. A search of his pockets yielded one (1) sachet of shabu.
After the buy-bust operation, Lorenzo and Estanislao were taken to the police
station where the incident was recorded in the police blotter. The plastic sachets containing
2.04 and 0.20 grams of white crystalline substance bought from Lorenzo was sent to the
PNP Crime Laboratory for laboratory examination. The results as contained in Chemistry
Report no. D-1741-03E showed that the substance sold by Lorenzo was positive for
Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
Interposing the twin defenses of denial and frame-up, accused-appellant Lorenzo
and Estanislao stood before the witness stand and presented their version of the facts.
On 5 October 2005, the RTC rendered a Decision convicting Lorenzo for illegal
possession and sale of dangerous drugs, but acquitting Estanislao
Invoking his innocence, Lorenzo appealed his conviction to the Court of Appeals,
questioning the procedure followed by the police operatives in the seizure and custody of
the evidence against him.
On 14 June 2007, the Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment of conviction
rendered by the RTC, disposing to wit
ISSUES:
1. Whether the court a quo erred in finding accused-appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt
2. Whether the court a quo gravely erred in not giving weight and credence to
accused-appellants defense or denial
HELD:
The presumption of innocence of an accused in a criminal case is a basic
constitutional principle, fleshed out by procedural rules which place on the prosecution the
burden of proving that an accused is guilty of the offense charged by proof beyond
reasonable doubt. Corollary thereto, conviction must rest on the strength of the
prosecutions evidence and not on the weakness of the defense.
In fact, if the prosecution fails to meet the required quantum of evidence, the
defense may logically not even present evidence on its behalf. In which case, the
presumption of innocence shall prevail and, hence, the accused shall be
acquitted. However, once the presumption of innocence is overcome, the defense bears the
burden of evidence to show reasonable doubt as to the guilt of the accused.
Essentially, Lorenzo questions his conviction on the basis of reasonable doubt.
The defense anchors its claim on the failure of the prosecution to adopt the required
procedure under Section 21, Article II, Republic Act No. 9165, on the custody and
disposition of confiscated, seized, or surrendered dangerous drugs. According to the
defense, this alleged failure to follow proper procedure, i.e. inventory and photographing
of the retrieved evidence, raises doubts as to whether the specimen examined by the
forensic chemist and presented in court were indeed retrieved from accused-appellant. The
defense also faults the police operatives for not having coordinated with the PDEA
regarding the buy-bust.
Thus, for resolution by this Court is the sole issue of whether the prosecution
discharged its burden of proving Lorenzos guilt beyond reasonable doubt for the crime
charged. The court rule in negative. The prosecutions case fails for failure to establish the
identity of the prohibited drug with moral certainty.
In order to successfully prosecute an accused for illegal sale of drugs, the
prosecution must be able to prove the following elements: (1) identities of the buyer and
seller, the object, and the consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold and the
payment therefore. Material to the prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the
proof that the transaction or sale had actually taken place, coupled with the presentation in
court of evidence of corpus delicti. The term corpus delicti means the actual commission
by someone of the particular crime charged.
On the other hand, in illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are: (1)
the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and consciously
possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti must be
established beyond doubt.
In both illegal sale and illegal possession of prohibited drugs, conviction cannot
be sustained if there is a persistent doubt on the identity of the drug. The identity of the
prohibited drug must be established with moral certainty. Apart from showing that the
elements of possession or sale are present, the fact that the substance illegally possessed
and sold in the first place is the same substance offered in court as exhibit must likewise be
established with the same degree of certitude as that needed to sustain a guilty verdict.
The procedure for the custody and disposition of confiscated, seized and/or
surrendered dangerous drugs, among others, is provided under Section 21 (a), paragraph 1
of Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, to wit:
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 (a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, meters away from where accused-appellant and the poseur-buyer were. From this distance,
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and it was impossible for him to hear the conversation between accused-appellant and the
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from poseur-buyer.
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice The foregoing facts and circumstances create doubt as to whether the sachets
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies of shabu allegedly seized from accused-appellant were the same ones that were released
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; to CampCrame and submitted for laboratory examination. The court therefore finds that
this failure to establish the evidences chain of custody is damaging to the prosecutions
Section 21 (a), Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of Republic case.
Act No. 9165, which implements said provision, reads:
In sum, the totality of the evidence presented in the instant case failed to support
(a) The apprehending team having initial custody and control of the drugs shall, accused-appellants conviction for violation of Sections 5 and 11, Article II, Republic Act
immediately after seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and No. 9165, since the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or the person/s from the offense.
whom such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her representative or
counsel, a representative from the media and the Department of Justice Accordingly, the presumption of innocence should prevail.
(DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be required to sign the copies
of the inventory and be given a copy thereof; Provided, further that non-
compliance with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers/team, shall not render void and invalid such
seizures of and custody over said items.

Section 21(a), Article II of the IRR offers some flexibility in complying with the
express requirements. Indeed, the evident purpose of the procedure is the PEOPLE V BARON
preservation of the integrity and evidentiary value of the seized items, as the
same would be utilized in the determination of the guilt of or innocence of the G.R. No. 185209
accused. Thus, the proviso stating that non-compliance with the stipulated
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
procedure, under justifiable grounds, shall not render void and invalid such
vs.
seizures of and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
RENE BARON y TANGAROCAN, Appellant.
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved by the
REY VILLATIMA and alias "DEDONG" BARGO, Accused.
apprehending officers.

PO1 Pineda testified that it was their confidential agent who purchased
the shabu from accused-appellant and that he only retrieved it from said informant. He
Facts:
further testified that he marked the retrieved sachet of shabu together with the two other
sachets of shabu that were allegedly seized from the accused, but it was not certain when
On July 19, 1995, an Information was filed before the Regional Trial Court of Cadiz City, Negros
and where the said marking was done nor who had specifically received and had custody of
Occidental, charging Rene Baron y Tangarocan (appellant), Rey Villatima (Villatima), and alias
the specimens thereafter.
Dedong Bargo (Bargo) with the special complex crime of robbery with homicide committed against
The Court also observes that the prosecution did not present the poseur-buyer who Juanito Berallo (Berallo). The Information contained the following accusatory allegations:
had personal knowledge of the transaction. The lone prosecution witness was at least four
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 That on or about 9 oclock in the evening of June 28, 1995 at Hda. Sta.
Ana, Brgy. Burgos, Cadiz City, Negros Occidental, Philippines and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, conspiring,
confederating and helping one another with evident premeditation and treachery
and with intent to kill, did then and there, willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
assault, attack and stab to death one Juanito Berallo in order to rob, steal and
take away things and money which is enumerated in the case and inflicting upon
the person of Juanito Berallo the injuries which is also enumerated in the case.,
CAUSE OF DEATH: Severe hemorrhage due to Multiple Stabbed wounds,
which directly caused the death of the victim Juanito Berallo, to the damage and
prejudice of the heirs of the victim in the amount, to wit:
P 50, 000.00 - as indemnity for the death of the victim.
P 150, 000.00 - as indemnity for the loss of earning capacity, or such
amount to be fixed by the court.
ACT CONTRARY TO LAW.
Only the appellant was arrested. Villatima and Bargo remain at-large to date. Appellant
entered a plea of not guilty when arraigned. After the termination of the pre-trial conference, trial
ensued.
The Prosecutions Version
Culled from the evidence presented by the prosecution, the case against the appellant is as
follows:
Ernesto Joquino, Jr. (Joquino), a tricycle driver, was having a conversation with Canni
Ballesteros (Ballesteros) in front of Julies Bakeshop at Magsaysay St., Cadiz City. Berallo arrived
and parked his tricycle in front of the bakeshop. The appellant approached Berallo and asked if he
could take him and his companions to Hacienda Caridad for P30.00. When Berallo agreed, the
appellant called Villatima, then wearing a fatigue jacket, and Bargo. They then rode Berallos tricycle.
Pacita Caratao, a dressmaker, was also in Julies Bakeshop at around the same time Joquino
and Ballesteros were in front of the premises. She noticed Berallo sitting on a parked tricycle while
the appellant was seated behind him. After buying bread, she approached Berallo and asked if he was
going home to Lag-asan, hoping that she could ride with him. However, Berallo replied that he still
had to ferry passengers. She thus decided to cross the street and take a passenger jeep. While inside
the jeep, she saw two more persons boarding Berallos tricycle.
On June 29, 1995, SPO2 Jude dela Rama received a report of a robbery with homicide
incident. Together with other policemen, he proceeded to Hacienda Sta. Ana, Cadiz City, where he
saw Berallo lying dead in a sugarcane plantation about 20 meters away from the highway. They also
noticed several traces of footprints near Berallos body and a tricycle sidecar in a canal beside
the Martesan Bridge. Beside the sidecar was a fatigue jacket.
Dr. Merle Jane B. Regalado conducted the post-mortem examination on the cadaver of
Berallo. She found that the victim sustained 15 stab wounds and died of severe hemorrhage due to
multiple stab wounds. Five of them were considered as fatal and caused the immediate death of
Berallo. The wounds also indicated that they could have been inflicted by more than one person.
The follow-up investigation of the police team identified the appellant as one of the
suspects. After having been apprised of his rights, appellant admitted that he and his co-accused took
Berallos tricycle and, after detaching the motorcycle from the sidecar, brought the motorcycle
to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan, Negros Occidental and left the same at the house of Villatimas
aunt, Natividad Camparicio (Natividad).
Natividad denied knowledge of the incident but admitted that her nephew Villatima,
together with the appellant, and another companion, were the ones who brought the motorcycle to
her house in Kabankalan.
Nemia Berallo (Nemia) identified the motorcycle recovered from the house of Natividad as
the one stolen from her deceased husband. She also testified on the sum of money and the value of
the personal property stolen from her husband. She allegedly spent the sum of P2,400.00 for the
purchase of the burial lot.
The Version of the Defense
Appellant denied any participation in the crime. He claimed that on June 28, 1995, at
around 7 oclock in the evening, he bought rice and other necessities for his family and proceeded to
the public transport terminal to get a ride home. A tricycle with two passengers passed by and its
driver inquired if he wanted a ride up to Segundo Diez. He boarded the tricycle and told the driver
that he would alight at Canibugan, but the driver requested him to accompany them up to Segundo
Diez. He agreed out of concern for the safety of the driver. Upon reaching Bangga Doldol, however,
the passengers announced a hold-up. Armed with guns, the passengers told him and the driver not to
make any wrong move, or they would be killed.Thereafter, the passengers tied the hands of the driver
and dragged him towards the sugarcane fields. He no longer knew what happened to the driver since
he remained in the tricycle. However, he suspected that the driver was killed by the two passengers.
Thereafter, the passengers went to Taytay Martesan and detached the sidecar of the
tricycle. They then took him to a house at Barangay Oringao and did not allow him to leave the
premises. The following morning, they returned to Cadiz City. The two passengers even
accompanied him to his house and threatened him and his wife at gunpoint not to report the incident
to the police authorities.
On June 30, 1995, at around 10:00 oclock in the evening, policemen came to his house and
asked where the motorcycle was taken. He told them of the location of the vehicle and insisted that
he had nothing to do with the incident. He stressed that the two passengers whose names he did not
know, were responsible for the crime committed.
ISSUE: WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THE ACCUSED-
APPELLANT GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT OF THE CRIME CHARGED
HELD: The trial court did not gravely erred in their Judgment. In this case, the prosecution
successfully adduced proof beyond reasonable doubt that the real intention of the appellant and his
111
companions was to rob the victim. The appellant and his companions boarded the tricycle of the
victim pretending to be passengers. Midway to their destination, one of the accused declared a hold-
up and at gun point, tied the hands of the victim and brought him towards the sugarcane field where
he was stabbed to death. The victim was divested of his wallet containing P1,250.00, a wrist watch
and ring. Emerging from the sugarcane plantation, they boarded the tricycle of the victim, detached
the sidecar and dumped the same in a canal beside the Martesan Bridge with the fatigue jacket of one
of the accused.They proceeded to Barangay Oringao, Kabankalan and hid the motorcycle in the
house of Villatimas aunt, Natividad.
Concededly, there is no direct evidence proving that the appellant conspired and
participated in committing the crime. However, his complicity may be proved by circumstantial
evidence, which consists of proof of collateral facts and circumstances from which the existence of
the main fact may be inferred according to reason and common experience.[7] Circumstantial
evidence is sufficient to sustain conviction if: (a) there is more than one circumstance; (b) the facts
from which the inferences are derived have been established; (c) the combination of all
circumstances is such as to warrant a finding of guilt beyond reasonable doubt.[8] A judgment of
conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be sustained when the circumstances proved form
an unbroken chain that results to a fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the
exclusion of all others, as the perpetrator.[9]
RULE 120 – JUDGEMENT
ABELLANA VS PEOPLE 655 SCRA 683
FELIXBERTO A. ABELLANA, petitioner, vs. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and
Spouses SAAPIA B. ALONTO and DIAGA ALONTO, respondents.
G.R. No. 174654. August 17, 2011.
Ponente: Del Castillo, J.
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review
BRIEF:
Assailed before this Court are the February 22, 2006 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution2 denying the
motion for reconsideration thereto. The assailed CA Decision set aside the May 21, 2003
Decision3 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cebu City, Branch 13, in Criminal Case
No. CBU-51385 and acquitted the petitioner of the crime of falsification of public
document by a private individual because the Information charged him with a different
offense which is estafa through falsification of a public document.4 However, the CA still
adjudged him civilly liable.
FACTS:
In 1985, petitioner extended a loan to private respondents spouses Diaga and
SaapiaAlonto (spouses Alonto),6 secured by a Deed of Real Estate Mortgage over Lot Nos.
6471 and 6472 located in Cebu City.7 Subsequently, or in 1987, petitioner prepared a Deed
of Absolute Sale conveying said lots to him. The Deed of Absolute Sale was signed by
spouses Alonto in Manila. However, it was notarized in Cebu City allegedly without the
spouses Alonto appearing before the notary public.8 Thereafter, petitioner caused the
transfer of the titles to his name and sold the lots to third persons.
On August 12, 1999, an Information10 was filed charging petitioner with Estafa
through Falsification of Public Document, the accusatory portion of which reads:
“That on or about the 9th day of July, 1987, in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused, with deliberate intent, and with
intent to defraud, did then and there falsify a public document consisting of a Deed of
Absolute Sale of a parcel of land consisting of 803 square meters executed before Notary
Public Gines N. Abellana per Doc. No. 383, Page No. 77, Book No. XXIII, Series of 1987
of the latter’s Notarial Register showing that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto
sold their parcel of land located at Pardo, Cebu City, for a consideration of P130,000.00 in
favor of accused by imitating, counterfeiting, signing or [causing] to be imitated or
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counterfeited the signature[s] of spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto above their
typewritten names in said document as vendor[s], when in truth and in fact as the accused
very well knew that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto did not sell their
aforestateddescri[b]ed property and that the signature[s] appearing in said document are not
their signature[s], thus causing it to appear that spouses Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto
participated in the execution of said document when they did not so participate[. Once] said
document was falsified, accused did then and there cause the transfer of the titles of said
land to his name using the said falsified document, to the damage and prejudice of spouses
Saapia B. Alonto and DiagaAlonto in the amount of P130,000.00, the value of the land.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
Whether or not the petitioner committed the crime of estafa through falsification
of public document.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: FelixbertoAbellana GUILTY of the crime of falsification of public document by
private individuals
CA: Resolve to set aside the Decision dated May 21, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, 7th
Judicial Region, Branch 13, Cebu City only insofar as it found the petitioner guilty of a
crime that is different from that charged in the Information. The civil liability
determinations are affirmed.
petitioner’s conviction cannot be sustained because it infringed on his right to be informed
of the nature and cause of the accusation against him. The CA, however, found no
reversible error on the civil liability of petitioner as determined by the trial court and thus
sustained the same. We do not agree. Based on the records of the case, we find that the acts
allegedly committed by the petitioner did not cause any damage to spouses Alonto.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
The petition is GRANTED. The February 22, 2006 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 78644 and its August 15, 2006 Resolution are AFFIRMED
insofar as they set aside the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of falsification of
public document. The portion which affirmed the imposition of civil liabilities on the
petitioner, i.e., the restoration of ownership and possession, the payment of P1,103,000.00
representing the value of the property, and the payment of nominal and exemplary
damages, attorney’s fees and litigation expenses, is deleted for lack of factual and legal
basis.
RULE 120 – JUDGMENT
PEOPLE VS ASIS 629 SCRA 250

SC: Petition is meritorious

COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,Petitioner,

It is an established rule in criminal procedure that a judgment of acquittal shall - versus -

state whether the evidence of the prosecution absolutely failed to prove the guilt of the Hon. ENRIQUE C. ASIS, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the Regional Trial Court of
accused or merely failed to prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. In either case, the Biliran Province, Branch 16, and JAIME ABORDO,
judgment shall determine if the act or omission from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist. When the exoneration is merely due to the failure to prove the guilt of the Respondents.
accused beyond reasonable doubt, the court should award the civil liability in favor of the
offended party in the same criminal action. In other words, the “extinction of the penal G.R. No. 173089
action does not carry with it the extinction of civil liability unless the extinction proceeds
August 25, 2010
from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil [liability] might
arise did not exist.” Ponente: Mendoza, J.
Here, the CA set aside the trial court’s Decision because it convicted petitioner of
an offense different from or not included in the crime charged in the Information. To recall,
petitioner was charged with estafa through falsification of public document. However, the Nature of the Case:
RTC found that the spouses Alonto actually signed the document although they did not
Petition for Review on Certiorari before the CA
personally appear before the notary public for its notarization. Hence, the RTC instead
convicted petitioner of falsification of public document. On appeal, the CA held that
113
BRIEF:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 filed by the Office of the
Solicitor General (OSG), representing the State, seeking to reverse and set aside the June 7,
2006 Resolutionof the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, which dismissed
outright its petition for certiorari under Rule 65 for being the wrong remedy.
FACTS:
On October 7, 2002, at 12:30 oclock in the morning, respondent Jaime Abordo
(Abordo) was riding his motorcycle on his way home. He was met by private complainants
Kennard Majait (Majait), Joeniel Calvez (Calvez) and Jose Montes (Montes). An
altercation ensued between them. Abordo shot Majait in the leg while Calvez was hit in the
lower left side of his abdomen. Montes escaped unhurt.
Abordo was charged with two (2) counts of attempted murder in Criminal Case
Nos. N-2212 and N-2213 and one (1) count of frustrated murder in Criminal Case No. N-
2211 before the Regional Trial Court, Biliran Province, Branch 16 (RTC). The trial court
found no treachery and evident premeditation. Thus, in its August 29, 2005 Decision,[2]
the RTC held Abordo liable only for Serious Physical Injuries for shooting Calvez and
Less Serious Physical Injuries with regard to Majait. It also appreciated four (4) generic
mitigating circumstances in favor of Abordo. With respect to the complaint of Montes,
Abordo was acquitted.
All three complainants moved for a reconsideration regarding the civil aspect.
They filed a supplemental motion to include moral damages. Calvez without the
conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor, filed a notice of appeal for both the civil and the
criminal aspects. For said reason, Calvez later sought withdrawal of his motion for
reconsideration and its supplement.
On October 24, 2005, the trial court dismissed Majaits motion for reconsideration
while Calvezs motion to withdraw was granted. On said date, the trial court also dismissed
Calvez appeal for not bearing the conformity of the Provincial Prosecutor. Acting on Chief
State Prosecutor Jovencito R. Zunos Indorsement of the October 11, 2005 letter of
Assistant City Prosecutor Nida C. Tabuldan-Gravino, a relative of Calvez, the OSG filed a
petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the CA.
ISSUE OF THE CASE:
Whether or not the respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in finding that private respondent had no intent
to kill, in holding him guilty of only serious physical injuries and less serious physical
injuries instead of frustrated murder and attempted murder in criminal case nos. n-2211
and n-2212, respectively, and in acquitting him of the crime charged in criminal case no. n-
2213
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CA: Dismissed the Petition
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
On January 19, 2009, the petition was given due course and the parties were
ordered to submit their respective memoranda. The parties complied with the order. We
find that the appellate court erred in dismissing the petition outright.
A petition for certiorari under Rule 65, not appeal, is the remedy to question a
verdict of acquittal whether at the trial court or at the appellate level. In our jurisdiction,
We adhere to the finality-of-acquittal doctrine, that is, a judgment of acquittal is final and
unappealable. The rule, however, is not without exception. In several cases, the Court has
entertained petitions for certiorari questioning the acquittal of the accused in, or the
dismissals of, criminal cases. Thus, in People v. Louel Uy, the Court has held:
Like any other rule, however, the above said rule is not absolute.
By way of exception, a judgment of acquittal in a criminal case may be
assailed in a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
upon clear showing by the petitioner that the lower court, in acquitting
the accused, committed not merely reversible errors of judgment but
also grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction or a denial of due process, thus rendering the assailed
judgment void. [Emphases and underscoring supplied]
In People v. Laguio, Jr., where the acquittal of the accused was via the grant of
his demurrer to evidence, We pointed out the propriety of resorting to a petition
for certiorari. Thus:
By this time, it is settled that the appellate court may review
dismissal orders of trial courts granting an accuseds demurrer to
evidence. This may be done via the special civil action of certiorari
under Rule 65 based on the ground of grave abuse of discretion,
amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Such dismissal order, being
considered void judgment, does not result in jeopardy. Thus, when the
order of dismissal is annulled or set aside by an appellate court in an
original special civil action via certiorari, the right of the
accused against double jeopardy is not violated. [Emphases supplied]
In this petition, the OSG claims that Abordos acquittal in Criminal Case No. N-
2213 was improper. Since appeal could not be taken without violating Abordos
114
constitutionally guaranteed right against double jeopardy, the OSG was correct in pursuing
its cause via a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 before the appellate court. It was a
serious error by the CA to have deprived the petitioner of its right to avail of that remedy.

As the case was summarily dismissed on a technicality, the merits of the petition
for certiorari were not at all discussed. Thus, the proper recourse would be a remand to the
CA.

A review of the records, however, shows that the case need not be remanded to
the CA for appropriate proceedings. The OSGs petition for certiorari, which forms part of
the records, would not merit a favorable review even if it would be given due course
simply because it is bereft of merit. For said reason, We deem that a remand of the case
would only prolong the disposition of the case. It is not without precedent. On many
occasions, the Court, in the interest of public service and for the expeditious administration
of justice, has resolved actions on the merits, instead of remanding them for further
proceedings, as where the ends of justice would not be sub-served by the remand of the
case.

The rule is that while certiorari may be availed of to correct an erroneous

acquittal, the petitioner in such an extraordinary proceeding must clearly demonstrate that
the trial court blatantly abused its authority to a point so grave as to deprive it of its very
power to dispense justice.The case of Galman v. Sandiganbayan, presents an instructive
exception to the rule on double jeopardy, that is, when the prosecution has been denied due
process of law. The rationale behind this exception is that a judgment rendered by the trial
court with grave abuse of discretion was issued without jurisdiction. It is, for this reason,
void. Consequently, there is no double jeopardy.
Summing them all up, the CA clearly erred in dismissing the petition
for certiorari filed before it by the OSG on the ground that it was the wrong remedy. There
is, however, no need for the remand of the case to the CA as the petition for certiorari, on
its face, cannot be given due course. RULE 120 – JUDGMENT

BASILONIA VS VILLARUZ 765 SCRA 489

SUPREME COURT RULING
The petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The June 7, 2006 Resolution of the
RODOLFO BASILONIA, LEODEGARIO CATALAN AND JOHN BASILONIA,
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 01289, dismissing the petition for certiorari for being
petioner,
the wrong remedy is SET ASIDE. Acting on the petition for certiorari, the Court resolves
to DENY the same for lack of merit. -versus-
HON. DELANO F. VILLARUZ, acting in his capacity as Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Roxas City, Branch 16 and DIXON ROBLETE

115
Gr. Nos. 191370-71
August 10, 2015
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Certiorari
BRIEF:
This is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil
Procedure (Rules) with prayer for the issuance of preliminary injunction and/or temporary
restraining order is the applicability of Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules in criminal cases.
FACTS:
On June 19, 1987, a Decision was promulgated against petitioners in Criminal
Case Nos. 1773, 1774 and 1775, the dispositive portion of which states: WHEREFORE,
and in view of the foregoing considerations, this court finds the [accused] Rodolfo
Basilonia, Leodegario Catalan, and John “Jojo” Basilonia, GUILTY BEYOND
REASONABLE DOUBT, as principals in Criminal Case No. 1773 for the murder of Atty.
Isagani Roblete on September 15, 1983 in Roxas City, Philippines, defined under Article
248 of the Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, without any aggravating or mitigating
circumstance, and sentences the said [accused] to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 12
years, 1 month and 1 day of reclusion temporal as minimum, to 20 years, and 1 day of
reclusion temporal as maximum, and the accessory penalties thereto; to pay and
[indemnify], jointly and severally, the heirs of the deceased Atty. Isagani Roblete the sum
of P32,100.00 representing funeral expenses, tomb, burial, and expenses for wake; the sum
of P30,000.00 as indemnity for the death of Atty. Isagani Roblete; the amount of lost
income cannot be determined as the net income of the deceased cannot be ascertained; and
to pay the costs of suit. [Accused] Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for
lack of evidence. In Criminal Case No. 1775 for Frustrated Murder, this court finds the
accused John “Jojo” Basilonia GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT of the crime
of Frustrated Homicide, as principal, committed against the person of Rene Gonzales on
September 15, 1983, defined under Article 249, in relation to Articles 6 and 50 of the
Revised Penal Code and sentences the said accused to suffer an indeterminate sentence of 2
years, 4 months and 1 day of prision [correccional] as minimum, to 6 years, and 1 day of
prision mayor as maximum; and to pay the costs. [Accused] Rodolfo Basilonia, Leodegario
Catalan, Vicente Catalan and Jory Catalan are ACQUITTED for lack of evidence. In
Criminal Case No. 1774 for Illegal Possession of Firearm, all [accused] are ACQUITTED
for insufficiency of evidence.
ISSUE OF THE CASE
Whether or not a trial court have jurisdiction to grant a motion for execution
which was filed almost twenty (20) years after the date of entry of judgment.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
CA: Dismissed the appeal
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS:
The determination of whether respondent trial court committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in granting a motion for execution
which was filed almost twenty (20) years after a judgment in a criminal case became final
and executory necessarily calls for the resolution of the twin issues of whether the penalty
of imprisonment already prescribed and the civil liability arising from the crime already
extinguished. In both issues, petitioners vehemently assert that respondent trial court has no
more jurisdiction to order the execution of judgment on the basis of Section 6, Rule 39 of
the Rules. We consider the issues separately.
As to Prescription of Penalty, applying existing jurisprudence in this case, the
Court, therefore, rules against petitioners. For the longest time, they were never brought to
prison or placed in confinement despite being sentenced to imprisonment by final
judgment. Prescription of penalty of imprisonment does not run in their favor. Needless to
state, respondent trial court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in assuming
jurisdiction over the motion for execution and in eventually granting the same.
As to the extinction of Civil Liability The treatment of petitioners’ civil liability arising
from the offense committed is different. Elementary is the rule that every person criminally
liable for a felony is also civilly liable. An action for revival of judgment is not intended to
reopen any issue affecting the merits of the case or the propriety or correctness of the first
judgment. The purpose is not to re-examine and re-try issues already decided but to revive
the judgment; its cause of action is the judgment itself and not the merits of the original
action. However, being a mere right of action, the judgment sought to be revived is subject
to defenses and counterclaims like matters of jurisdiction and those arising after the finality
of the first judgment or which may have arisen subsequent to the date it became effective
such as prescription, payment, or counterclaims arising out of transactions not connected
with the former controversy. Once a judgment becomes final, the prevailing party is
entitled as a matter of right to a writ of execution the issuance of which is the trial court's
ministerial duty, compellable by mandamus. Yet, a writ issued after the expiration of the
period is null and void. The limitation that a judgment be enforced by execution within the
stated period, otherwise it loses efficacy, goes to the very jurisdiction of the court. Failure
to object to a writ issued after such period does not validate it, for the reason that
jurisdiction of courts is solely conferred by law and not by express or implied will of the
parties. In so far as the civil liability arising from the offense is concerned, a motion for
execution should be filed in accordance with Section 6, Rule 39 of the Rules and existing
jurisprudence.
116
SUPREME COURT RULING Rule 120 – Judgment
The instant petition for certiorari is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The Orders dated ARMILYN MORILLO, Petitioner,
December 3, 2009 and January 25, 2010 of Presiding Judge Delano F. Villaruz, Regional - versus -
Trial Court, Roxas City, Branch 16, are AFFIRMED IN PART only insofar as to the PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and RICHARD NATIVIDAD, Respondents.
execution of the penalty of imprisonment is concerned. Let the records of this case be
REMANDED to the trial court for the immediate issuance of mittimus, pursuant to OCA G.R. No. 198270
Circular No. 40-2013, in relation to OCA Circular No. 4-92-A. December 9, 2015
Ponente: Associate Justice Diosdado M. Peralta

NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari

BRIEF

Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated
August 9, 2011 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 32723 which reversed
and set aside the Decision dated February 23, 2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Criminal Case Nos. 08-1876-77, which, in turn, affirmed
the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC) in
Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.

FACTS

Sometime in July 2003, respondent Richard Natividad, Milo Malong and Bing Nanquil,
introducing themselves as contractors doing business in Pampanga City under the name
and style of RB Custodio Construction, purchased construction materials for their project
inside the Subic Freeport Zone from petitioner Armilyn Morillo, owner of Amasea General
Merchandize and Construction Supplies. The parties agreed that twenty percent (20%) of
the purchases shall be paid within seven (7) days after the first delivery and the remaining
eighty percent (80%) to be paid within thirty-five (35) days after the last delivery, all of
which shall be via postdated checks.

Pursuant to the agreement, petitioner delivered construction materials amounting to a total

of P500,054.00 at the construction site where respondent and his partners were undertaking
their project. After the last delivery, respondent paid P20,000.00 in cash and issued two (2)
post-dated checks, drawn from Metrobank, Pampanga branch, in the amounts of
P393,000.00 and P87,054.00. Upon maturity, petitioner attempted to deposit the checks in
her savings account at Equitable PCIBank, San Lorenzo, Makati City. They were, however,
dishonored by the drawee bank. Immediately thereafter, petitioner communicated the
dishonor to respondent and his partners and demanded for payment. Again, respondent
117
issued two (2) post-dated Metrobank checks and assured petitioner that they will be
honored upon maturity. Upon deposit in her savings account at Equitable PCIBank, Makati
Branch, the checks were once again dishonored for the reason that the account from which
they were drawn was already a closed account. Consequently, petitioner made several
demands from respondent and his partners, but to no avail, prompting her to file a
complaint with the City Prosecution Office, Makati City. Thus, on August 12, 2004, two
(2) Informations were filed against respondent and Milo Malong.
On September 15, 2004, the Assistant City Prosecutor issued a Resolution recommending
that respondent and his partners be charged in court with the crime of Estafa under Article
315, paragraph 2(d) of the Revised Penal Code as well as for Violation of Batas Pambansa
No. 22 (BP 22), which was later docketed as Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03.
On September 3, 2008, the MeTC rendered its Joint Decision, finding that the prosecution
had proven all the elements of violation of BP 22 as against respondent.
Respondent appealed the decision of the MeTC to the RTC arguing that the MeTC of
Makati City had no jurisdiction over the case. He asserted that since the subject checks
were issued, drawn, and delivered to petitioner in Subic, the venue of the action was
improperly laid for none of the elements of the offense actually transpired in Makati City.
Respondent also pointed out that during the retaking of petitioner’s testimony on March 14,
2008, the records of the case did not show that the public prosecutor manifested his
presence in court and that he delegated the prosecution of the case to the private
prosecutor. Thus, since there was no appearance for the public prosecutor, nor was there a
proper delegation of authority, the proceedings should be declared null and void.
On appeal, however, the Court of Appeals, in its January 18, 2011 Decision, reversed the
lower courts’ rulings and dismissed the case without prejudice to its refiling in the proper
venue.
Aggrieved, the petitioner filed the instant action.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
Whether the Court of Appeals gravely erred when it ruled that the Metropolitan Trial Court
of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the case despite a clear showing that the
offense was committed within the jurisdiction of said court.
ACTIONS of the COURT
MeTC:
The MeTC found the accused RICHARD NATIVIDAD, GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the offense of Violation of Batas Pambansa Blg. 22.
RTC:
The RTC affirmed the MeTC ruling.
CA:
The CA reversed the lower courts’ rulings and dismissed the case.
.
SC:
The petition is GRANTED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
It is well settled that violations of BP 22 cases are categorized as transitory or continuing
crimes, meaning that some acts material and essential thereto and requisite in their
consummation occur in one municipality or territory, while some occur in another. In such
cases, the court wherein any of the crime’s essential and material acts have been committed
maintains jurisdiction to try the case; it being understood that the first court taking
cognizance of the same excludes the other. Thus, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the offense was
in part committed.
In the more recent Yalong v. People, wherein the modes of appeal and rules of procedure
were the issues at hand, the Court similarly inferred:
Besides, even discounting the above-discussed considerations, Yalong’s appeal
still remains dismissible on the ground that, inter alia, the MTCC had properly
acquired jurisdiction over Criminal Case No. 45414. It is well-settled that
violation of BP 22 cases is categorized as transitory or continuing crimes, which
means that the acts material and essential thereto occur in one municipality or
territory, while some occur in another. Accordingly, the court wherein any of the
crime’s essential and material acts have been committed maintains jurisdiction to
try the case; it being understood that the first court taking cognizance of the same
excludes the other. Stated differently, a person charged with a continuing or
transitory crime may be validly tried in any municipality or territory where the
offense was in part committed. Applying these principles, a criminal case for
violation of BP 22 may be filed in any of the places where any of its elements
occurred – in particular, the place where the check is drawn, issued, delivered, or
dishonored.
Guided by the foregoing pronouncements, there is no denying, therefore, that the court of
the place where the check was deposited or presented for encashment can be vested with
jurisdiction to try cases involving violations of BP 22. Thus, the fact that the check subject
118
of the instant case was drawn, issued, and delivered in Pampanga does not strip off the
Makati MeTC of its jurisdiction over the instant case for it is undisputed that the subject
check was deposited and presented for encashment at the Makati Branch of Equitable
PCIBank. The MeTC of Makati, therefore, correctly took cognizance of the instant case
and rendered its decision in the proper exercise of its jurisdiction.
It may be argued, however, that the instant petition ought to be dismissed outright due to
certain procedural infirmities. Section 35 (1), Chapter 12, Title III, Book IV of the 1987
Administrative Code provides that the OSG shall represent the Government of the
Philippines, its agencies and instrumentalities and its officials and agents in any litigation,
proceeding, investigation or matter requiring the services of lawyers. Thus, as a general
rule, if a criminal case is dismissed by the trial court or if there is an acquittal, the appeal
on the criminal aspect of the case must be instituted by the Solicitor General on behalf of
the State.
There have been instances, however, where the Court permitted an offended party to file an
appeal without the intervention of the OSG, such as when the offended party questions the
civil aspect of a decision of a lower court, when there is denial of due process of law to the
prosecution and the State or its agents refuse to act on the case to the prejudice of the State
and the private offended party, when there is grave error committed by the judge, or when
the interest of substantial justice so requires.
Corollary, a judgment of acquittal may be assailed through a petition for certiorari under
Rule 65 of the Rules of Court showing that the lower court, in acquitting the accused,
committed not merely reversible errors of judgment, but also exercised grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction, or a denial of due process, thereby
rendering the assailed judgment null and void. If there is grave abuse of discretion,
granting the aggrieved party’s prayer is not tantamount to putting the accused in double
jeopardy, in violation of the general rule that the prosecution cannot appeal or bring error
proceedings from a judgment rendered in favor of the defendant in a criminal case. This is
because a judgment of acquittal is immediately final and executory, and the prosecution is
barred from appealing lest the constitutional prohibition against double jeopardy be
violated.
beginning and re-file her complaint before the same court which already had jurisdiction in
the first place.
Thus, when there exists meritorious grounds to overlook strict procedural matters, the
Court cannot turn a blind eye thereto lest the administration of justice be derailed by an
overly stringent application of the rules. Rules of procedure are meant to be tools to
facilitate a fair and orderly conduct of proceedings. Strict adherence thereto must not get in
the way of achieving substantial justice. As long as their purpose is sufficiently met and no
violation of due process and fair play takes place, the rules should be liberally construed.
Dismissal of appeals purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the policy of the
court is to encourage hearings of appeals on their merits and the rules of procedure ought
not to be applied in a very rigid, technical sense; rules of procedure are used only to help
secure, not override substantial justice.
SUPREME COURT RULING
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition is GRANTED. The Decision
dated January 18, 2011 and Resolution dated August 9, 2011 of the Court Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR No. 32723 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated February 23,
2009 and Order dated July 13, 2009, of the Regional Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 08-
1876-77, which affirmed the Joint Decision dated September 3, 2008 of the Metropolitan
Trial Court in Criminal Case Nos. 337902-03 are hereby REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.

The unique and exceptional circumstances in the instant case demand that the Court forego
a rigid application of the technicalities under the law so as to prevent petitioner from
suffering a grave injustice. In fact, after having sufficiently proven to the satisfaction of
both the MeTC and the RTC her right allegedly violated by respondent, the CA simply
dismissed, albeit without prejudice to the re-filing of the case with the appropriate court,
her action for the incorrect ground of wrong venue. On the mistaken reasoning that the
MeTC of Makati City did not have jurisdiction over the instant case, the CA, without
providing any legal or jurisprudential basis, would have petitioner start from the very

119

Rule 121 – New Trial or reconsideration
MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, Petitioners,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 163957-58
x--------------------------------------------x
ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. Nos. 164009-11
April 7, 2009
Ponente: Associate Justice Presbitero J. Velasco, Jr.
Nature of Case:
Petition for Review (Appeal)
BRIEF
For review before the Court under Rule 45 are the April 16, 2004 Decision and June 14,
2004 Resolution of the Sandiganbayan in the consolidated Criminal Case Nos. 26192 and
26193 entitled People of the Philippines v. Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera. In
G.R. Nos. 163957-58, petitioners Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera appeal their
conviction of violation of Section 3(e), Republic Act No. (RA) 3019 or theAnti-Graft and
Corrupt Practices Act for failure to pay the Representation and Transportation Allowance
(RATA) of the provincial government employees of Sulu. In G.R. Nos. 164009-11,
petitioner Pescadera alone appeals his conviction of malversation of public funds under
Article 217 of the Revised Penal Code for failure to remit the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) contributions of the provincial government employees amounting
to PhP 4,820,365.30. In these consolidated appeals, petitioners pray for their acquittal.
FACTS
Estino was elected Vice-Governor of Sulu in the May 1998 elections along with Gov.
Abdusakur Tan. On June 23, 1998, the Court issued a status quo order, suspending the
effects of the proclamation of Gov. Tan and ordering Vice-Gov. Estino to assume the
position of Governor until further orders. Thus, Estino acted as Governor of Sulu from July
27, 1998 up to May 23, 1999 when the Court lifted the suspension order against Gov.
Tan. Ernesto G. Pescadera, on the other hand, was Provincial Treasurer of Sulu during
Estinos stint as Acting Governor.
Pursuant to Commission on Audit (COA)-ARMM Office Order No. 99-165 dated August
26, 1999, a special audit team was created upon the request of the Provincial Government
of Sulu. An audit of the disbursement vouchers and payrolls for the period starting July 27,
1998 up to May 23, 1999 was then conducted by COA State Auditor II Mona U. Balabaran
and her team. The COA Special Audit Report stated that there were anomalies in the
payment of salary differentials, allowances, and benefits, among others. The Ombudsman
then filed three informations against petitioners, as follows:
a. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26192
That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, failed to pay them their salary
differentials, Additional Compensation Allowance (ACA), Personal Emergency and
Representation Allowance (PERA), Representation and Travel Allowance (RATA), Mid-
year Bonus, Cash Gift and Clothing Allowance in the total amount of P8,435,625.34.
b. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26193
That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, misappropriated the GSIS
monthly contributions and loan amortizations collected from the provincial employees in
the amount of P4,820,365.30 for their own personal benefit or advantage to the damage and
prejudice of the said employees and the government as well.
c. CRIMINAL CASE NO. 26194
That accused Munib S. Estino and Ernesto G. Pescadera, withdraw from Philippine
National Bank-Jolo Branch the amount of P21.5 million on 07 May 1999 out of the
Internal Revenue Allotment of P28,268,578.00 which was deposited to the account of Sulu
Provincial Government on the same day and using the said amount to pay various expenses
without, however, specifying what the expenses are in violation of existing government
accounting rules.
Petitioners pleaded not guilty to the offenses charged in the informations.
120
Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration and a Supplemental Motion for
Reconsideration and New Trial which were denied in the June 14, 2004 Sandiganbayan
Resolution. Thus, they filed these petitions.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not petitioners failed to pay the rata and are thus guilty of violating Sec.
3(e) of RA 3019
2. Whether or not petitioner Pescadera is guilty of malversation of public funds for
failure to remit the GSIS contributions
ACTIONS of the COURT
Sandiganbayan:
1. In Criminal Case No. 26192, the Court finds accused MUNIB S.
ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA, both GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt,
for violation of Sec. 3(e) of R.A. 3019, and pursuant to Section 9 thereof.
2. In Criminal Case No. 26193, this Court finds accused ERNESTO G. PESCADERA,
GUILTY, beyond reasonable doubt, of the crime of malversation of public funds and
accused PESCADERA is likewise ordered to restitute the amount of FOUR MILLION
EIGHT HUNDRED TWENTY THOUSAND THREE HUNDRED SIXTY-FIVE
PESOS AND THIRTY CENTAVOS (Php4,820,365.30) to the Provincial Government
of Sulu. With respect to MUNIB S. ESTINO, for failure of the Prosecution to prove
his [guilt] beyond reasonable doubt, he is hereby ordered ACQUITTED of the crime
of malversation of public funds.
3. In Criminal Case No. 26194, for failure of the Prosecution to prove the guilt of
accused MUNIB S. ESTINO and ERNESTO G. PESCADERA beyond reasonable
doubt, both accused are hereby ordered ACQUITTED.
. Balabaran which budget she was referring to Balaraban, however, made it very clear that
SC:
1. SET ASIDE the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26192 and
REMANDED the case to the Sandiganbayan for new trial on the alleged nonpayment
of RATA.
2. REVERSED and SET ASIDE the Decision of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26193 and ACQUITTED Ernesto G. Pescadera of the charge against him.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Case Should be remanded to the Sandiganbayan.
Petitioners defense is anchored on their payment of RATA, and for this purpose, they
submitted documents which allegedly show that they paid the RATA under the 1998
reenacted budget. They also claim that the COA Report did not sufficiently prove that they
did not pay the RATA because the alleged disbursement vouchers, which were supposed to
be annexed to the COA Report as proof of nonpayment of RATA, were not submitted with
said report.
The Court resolved to grant petitioners a chance to prove their innocence by remanding the
case to the Sandiganbayan for a new trial of Criminal Case No. 26192. Rule 121 of the
Rules of Court allows the conduct of a new trial before a judgment of conviction becomes
final when new and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not
with reasonable diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced
and admitted would probably change the judgment. Although the documents offered by
petitioners are strictly not newly discovered, it appears to that petitioners were mistaken in
their belief that its production during trial was unnecessary. In their Supplemental Motion
and/or Motion for New Trial, they stressed that they no longer presented the evidence of
payment of RATA because Balabaran testified that the subject of the charge was the
nonpayment of benefits under the 1999 budget, without mention of the RATA nor the 1998
reenacted budget. It seems that they were misled during trial. They were precluded from
presenting pieces of evidence that may prove actual payment of the RATA under the 1998
reenacted budget because the prosecution’s evidence was confined to alleged nonpayment
of RATA under the 1999 budget.
The Court were inclined to give a more lenient interpretation of Rule 121, Sec. 2 on new
trial in view of the special circumstances sufficient to cast doubt as to the truth of the
charges against petitioners. The situation of the petitioners is peculiar, since they were
precluded from presenting exculpatory evidence during trial upon the honest belief that
they were being tried for nonpayment of RATA under the 1999 budget. This belief was
based on no less than the testimony of the prosecutions lone witness, COA Auditor Mona
Balabaran. Even Associate Justice Palattao of the Sandiganbayan had to clarify from
the unpaid benefits were those provided under the 1999 budget.
In granting petitioners motion for new trial, the Court reiterated the pronouncement
in Cano v. People:
It is x x x equally settled that rules of procedure are not to be applied in a very rigid,
technical sense and are used only to help secure substantial justice. If a technical and rigid
enforcement of the rules is made, their aim would be defeated. They should beliberally
construed so that litigants can have ample opportunity to prove their claims and thus
prevent a denial of justice due to technicalities.
121
More importantly, the Court have settled that procedural rules can be suspended if matters
of life, liberty, honor, and property are at stake, thus:
In Ginete vs. Court of Appeals, it specifically laid down the range of reasons which may
provide justifications for a court to resist a strict adherence to procedure and suspend the
enforcement of procedural rules. Among such reasons x x x are: (1) matters of life, liberty,
honor or property; (2) counsels negligence without any participatory negligence on the part
of the client; (3) the existence of special or compelling circumstances; (4) the merits of the
case; (5) a cause not entirely attributable to the fault or negligence of the party favored by
the suspension of the rules; and (6) a lack of any showing that the review sought is merely
frivolous and dilatory.
The Court also held that:
Unquestionably, the Court has the power to suspend procedural rules in the exercise of its
inherent power, as expressly recognized in the Constitution, to promulgate rules concerning
pleading, practice and procedure in all courts. In proper cases, procedural rules may be
relaxed or suspended in the interest of substantial justice, which otherwise may be
miscarried because of a rigid and formalistic adherence to such rules. x x x
SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT FINDINGS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
The Court agreed with Pescadera that this is not the demand contemplated by law. The
demand to account for public funds must be addressed to the accountable officer. Nowhere
in the pleadings did the Special Prosecutor refute the lack of a formal demand upon
Pescadera to account for the GSIS premiums. Pescadera even denies being informed of the
conduct of the audit, an assertion which was not refuted by the prosecution. It can be
concluded then that Pescadera was not given an opportunity to explain why the GSIS
premiums were not remitted. Without a formal demand, the prima facie presumption of
conversion under Art. 217 cannot be applied.
There is no proof that Pescadera used the GSIS contributions for his personal benefit. The
prosecution merely relied on the presumption of malversation which we have already
disproved due to lack of notice. Hence, the prosecution should have proven actual
misappropriation by the accused.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
WHEREFORE, the Decision dated April 16, 2004 of the Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case
No. 26192 is SET ASIDE and the case is REMANDED to the Sandiganbayan for new trial
on the alleged nonpayment of RATA. The Decision dated April 16, 2004 of the
Sandiganbayan in Criminal Case No. 26193 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and Ernesto
G. Pescadera is ACQUITTED of the charge against him. Costs against petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Rule 121 – New Trial or reconsideration
ROMMEL C. BRIONES, Petitioner,
- versus -
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
G.R. No. 156009
June 5, 2009
Ponente: Associate Justice Arturo D. Brion
NATURE OF CASE
Petition for Review on Certiorari
BRIEF
This is a Rule 45 petition for review on certiorari of the decision dated July 17, 2002 and
the resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR No.
24127 finding petitioner Rommel C. Briones (Briones) guilty of the crime of robbery.
FACTS
S/G Dabbin Molina is a security guard of Fuentes Security and Allied Services owned by
Johnny Fuentes; in the course of his employment with the security agency, S/G Molina was
issued a .38 caliber revolver (firearm).
On January 6, 1998, at around 11:00 p.m., S/G Molina and S/G George Gual were manning
the northwest gate of BF Homes Northwest, Paranaque. Somewhere on Jakarta Street, they
noticed Romulo Bersamina, a homeowner, being mauled by four (4) individuals, two (2) of
whom were later identified as Briones and his brother, Vicente Briones (Vicente), who
were both residents of BF Homes. S/G Molina and S/G Gual approached the group to stop
the mauling; it was at this point that S/G Molina lost his firearm to Briones. How he lost it
whether there was accompanying violence or intimidation is the submitted issue in this
case. S/G Molina subsequently reported the incident to his supervisor, Arthur Alonzo, and
to SPO1 Manuel Plete. The police arrested Briones after conducting an investigation.
122
Briones denied any participation in the mauling and the firearm grabbing, and claimed that
he was in his house when the incident happened.
The RTC ruled that Briones can only be held liable for simple theft, as the elements of
violence and intimidation the attendant circumstances that must be present in the crime of
robbery were not duly proven. The RTC found that the principal prosecution witness,
S/G Gual, merely testified that he (Briones) grabbed the firearm of S/G Molina.
On appeal to the CA, Briones argued that: (1) his conviction was based solely on the
testimony of S/G Gual who was not present at the scene and did not really see what
happened; and (2) he cannot be convicted of simple theft under a criminal charge of
robbery.
The CA turned down these arguments and ruled that S/G Guals testimony is a credible
eyewitness account of the incident. S/G Gual was also categorical in his testimony; the
defense did not even try to impugn his credibility as a witness since it opted not to cross-
examine him.
Briones thereafter filed an Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for New Trial and
Motion to Dismiss, and Supplemental Omnibus Motion for Reconsideration, Motion for
New Trial and Motion to Dismiss (collectively, Omnibus Motion) with the CA where he
confessed his physical presence and participation on the alleged robbery of the firearm, but
claimed that he was merely protecting his brother, Vicente, when he took the firearm. The
CA denied the Omnibus Motion; hence, this petition.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
(1) Whether there are factual and legal bases to support his conviction of the crime of
robbery; and
(2) Whether a new trial is justified under the circumstances.
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC:
The RTC found Briones guilty of simple theft under paragraph 3, Article 309 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended (Code).
CA:
The CA found Briones guilty of robbery under Article 293, in relation to paragraph 5 of
Article 294, of the Code, and not of theft; the CA ruled that force and intimidation attended
the taking of S/G Molinas firearm, as Briones approached S/G Molina with the intent of
taking his firearm away.
.
SC:
The SC partly granted the petition and sustained Briones conviction for the crime of theft,
not robbery.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Court observed that the petition raises factual issues that call for a re-weighing of the
evidence on record. As a rule, this is not allowed under Rule 45, as only questions of law
are covered in a petition for review on certiorari. In this case, the Court is not a trier of
facts, and thus, it is not tasked to make its own assessment and give its independent
evaluation of the probative value of the evidence adduced by the parties in the
proceedings. However, the above rule admits of exceptions; one of them is when there is a
conflict in the factual findings of the lower courts. When this happens, no reason exists for
the lower courts factual findings to be conclusive and the Court carries the burden of
reviewing the evidence on hand.
The Court noted in this regard that the conflict in the factual findings of the RTC and CA
does not relate to Briones criminal culpability both courts found his conviction under the
criminal information to be supported by sufficient evidence. The conflict rather centers on
the factual question of how the taking took place which must necessarily affect the
characterization of the crime committed.
In this regard, we give special significance to the RTCs unique position in assessing the
credibility of witnesses, as the RTC has the unrestricted opportunity to observe firsthand
the conduct and demeanor of witnesses at the trial. Unless the trial judge plainly
overlooked certain facts whose substance and value may affect the result of the case, we
respect his assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. From our own reading of the
records, we find that S/G Gual gave clear and precise answers; no inconsistencies existed
materially affecting their veracity. Neither was it shown that S/G Gual was driven by any
improper motive to falsely testify against Briones.
As against this credible and positive testimony of S/G Gual, Briones could only set up
denial and alibi as his defenses. We have previously ruled that for these defenses to deserve
merit, they must be substantiated by clear and convincing proof. Under the present facts,
these defenses were without corroboration. On the contrary, Briones and his new counsel
desperately now move to try the case again at the expense of Briones former counsel; based
on allegedly newly discovered evidence. They blame the former counsels allegedly
erroneous legal strategy when he raised denial and alibi as Briones defenses, instead of
invoking self-defense or defense of a relative. They also now foist on this Court an
Affidavit of Desistance dated July 29, 2002 executed by Fuentes, as well as an Affidavit
dated July 22, 2002 executed by one Oskar Salud. These documents allegedly prove that
123
Briones had no intent to gain and, in fact, threw away the firearm after grabbing it from
S/G Molina.
A change of Briones' defense from denial and alibi to self-defense or defense of a relative
is effectively a change of theory of the case brought only during appeal. Law and fairness
to the adverse party demand that when a party adopts a particular theory and the case is
tried and decided on the basis of that theory in the court below, neither party can change
his or her theory on appeal. While this rule is not absolute, no exceptional reasons in this
case exist to justify a deviation.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The Decision
dated July 17, 2002 and Resolution dated November 13, 2002 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR No. 24127 are hereby MODIFIED. Petitioner Rommel Briones is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of THEFT under Article 308 of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended. He is sentenced to suffer a straight penalty of
imprisonment of four (4) months of arresto mayor.
SO ORDERED.

Additionally, an error or mistake committed by a counsel in the course of judicial

proceedings is not a ground for new trial. In People v. Mercado, we declared:

It has been repeatedly enunciated that a client is bound by the action of his
counsel in the conduct of a case and cannot be heard to complain that the result
might have been different if he proceeded differently. A client is bound by the
mistakes of his lawyer. If such grounds were to be admitted as reasons for
reopening cases, there would never be an end to a suit so long as new counsel
could be employed who would allege and show that prior counsel had not been
sufficiently diligent or experienced or learned. x x x Mistakes of attorneys as to
the competency of a witness, the sufficiency, relevancy or irrelevancy of certain
evidence, the proper defense, or the burden of proof, x x x failure to introduce
certain evidence, to summon witnesses, and to argue the case are not proper
RULE 121
grounds for a new trial, unless the incompetency of counsel is so great that his
client is prejudiced and prevented from properly presenting his case. [Emphasis
Republic of the Philippines
supplied]
Supreme Court
From the facts, it does not appear that Briones was denied competent legal representation
in the proceedings before the RTC.
Baguio City

THIRD DIVISION
Lastly, for new trial to be granted on the ground of newly discovered evidence, the
concurrence of the following conditions must obtain: (a) the evidence must have been QUINTIN B. SALUDAGA
discovered after trial; (b) the evidence could not have been discovered at the trial even with
the exercise of reasonable diligence; (c) the evidence is material, not merely cumulative, and SPO2 FIEL E. GENIO ,
corroborative, or impeaching; and (d) the evidence must affect the merits of the case and
produce a different result if admitted.[26] In this case, although the firearm surfaced after
Petitioners,
the trial, the other conditions were not established.

SUPREME COURT RULING - versus -

THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN

124
4TH DIVISION Considering such, there are two (2) different modes of committing the offense: either by
causing undue injury or by giving private person unwarranted benefit. With that, the
and THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, accused may be charged either through the two modes. Hence, a new preliminary
investigation is unnecessary.

Facts:

Quintin Saludaga and Fiel Genio entered into a Pakyaw Contract for the construction of
Barangay Day Care Centers for Barangays Mac-arthur and Urdaneta, Lavezares, Northern
Samar without conducting a competitive public bidding, thus depriving the government the
chance to obtain the best, if not, the most reasonable price, and thereby awarding said
contracts to Olimpio Legua, a non-license contractor and non-accredited NGO, in violation
of Sec. 356 of Republic Act No. 7160 (The Local Government Code) and COA Circular
No. 91-368. An information was filed for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA 3019 by causing
undue injury to the Government. The information was quashed for failure to prove the LENIDO LUMANOG and AUGUSTO SANTOS
actual damage, therefore a new information was filed, for violation of Sec. 3 (e) of RA
vs.
3019 by giving unwarranted benefit to a private person. The accused moved for a new
preliminary investigation to be conducted on the ground that there is substitution and/or PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
substantial amendment of the first information.
CESAR FORTUNA
Issue:
Whether or not there is substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that vs.
would warrant a new preliminary investigation.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES;
Held: PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES
No, there is no substitution and/or substantial amendment of the information that would
warrant a new preliminary investigation vs.

Section 3. Corrupt practices of public officers. In addition to acts or omissions of public CESAR FORTUNA, ET AL.
officers already penalized by existing law, the following shall constitute corrupt practices
of any public officer and are hereby declared to be unlawful: FACTS:

xxxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private
party any unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official
administrative or judicial functions through manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to officers and employees of offices or
government corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits or other
concessions.
Lumanog, Santos, Fortuna and De Jesus were convicted for the crime of murder for the
death of Col. Rolando Abadilla. With that, Lumanog and Santos separately filed their
motions for reconsideration seeking the reversal of their conviction. They contested the
credence accorded to the identification of the accused by the lone eyewitness presented by
the prosecution, security guard Freddie Alejo.
Fortuna submitted an Affidavit executed by a certain Orencio Jurado, Jr. who claimed to be
one of the police officers initially assigned to investigate the case. Fortuna contended that
said belated statement would certainly cast doubt on the procedures undertaken by the
police authorities.

125
 THIRD DIVISION
[G.R. No. 151911 : July 25, 2011]
EDGAR PAYUMO, REYNALDO RUANTO, CRISANTO RUANTO,
APOLINARIO RUANTO, AND EXEQUIEL BONDE, PETITIONERS, VS.
HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, AND OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL
PROSECUTOR, DOMICIANO CABIGAO, NESTOR DOMACENA,
ROLANDO DOBLADO, ERNESTO PAMPUAN, EDGARDO PRADO,
ROMEO DOMINICO, RAMON GARCIA, AND CARLOS PACHECO,
RESPONDENTS.
[G.R. NO. 154535]
NESTOR DOMACENA, PETITIONER, VS. HONORABLE
SANDIGANBAYAN, PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, AND EDGAR
PAYUMO, REYNALDO RUANTO, CRISANTO RUANTO, APOLINARIO
RUANTO, AND EXEQUIEL BONDE, RESPONDENTS.
ISSUE:
Whether or not introduction of additional evidence after the trial is valid to justify new trial
HELD:
No. Introduction of additional evidence after the trial is not valid to justify new trial.
Evidently, Fortuna seeks the introduction of additional evidence to support the defense
argument that there was no positive identification of Abadilla’s killers. To justify a new
trial or setting aside of the judgment of conviction on the basis of such evidence, it must be
shown that the evidence was “newly discovered” pursuant to Section 2, Rule 121 of the
Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, as amended. Evidence, to be considered newly
discovered, must be one that could not, by the exercise of due diligence, have been
discovered before the trial in the court below.
Movant failed to show that the defense exerted efforts during the trial to secure testimonies
from police officers like Jurado, or other persons involved in the investigation, who
questioned or objected to the apprehension of the accused in this case. Hence, the belatedly
executed affidavit of Jurado does not qualify as newly discovered evidence that will justify
re-opening of the trial and/or vacating the judgment. In any case, the Supreme Court ruled
that whatever flaw that may have initially attended the out-of-court identification of the
accused, the same was cured when all the accused-appellants were positively identified by
the prosecution eyewitness during the trial.
FACTS:
A shooting incident occurred on February 26, 1980 in Sitio Aluag, Barangay Sta. Barbara,
Iba, Zambales. A composite team of Philippine Constabulary (PC) and Integrated National
Police (INP) units allegedly fired at a group of civilians instantly killing one and wounding
several others. The accused were accused for Murder with Multiple Frustrated and
Attempted Murder before the Sandiganbayan.After four years of trial, the Second Division
of the Sandiganbayan rendered its Decision, convicting the accused as co- principals in the
crime of Murder with Multiple Frustrated and Attempted Murder. On January'11, 1985, the
accused filed their Motion for New Trial, which was denied. The accused elevated the case
to the Supreme Court, which set aside the October 5, 1984 Decision of the Sandiganbayan
and remanding the case for a new trial. Thus, Criminal Case No. 4219 was remanded to the
Sandiganbayan and was raffled to the First Division. he The First Division received anew
all the evidence of the parties, both testimonial and documentary. Later, with the creation
of the Fourth and Fifth divisions, Criminal Case No. 4219 was transferred to the Fifth
Division. On February 23, 1999, the Fifth Division promulgated judgment, convicting the
accused of the crime of Murder with Multiple Attempted Murder. The accused filed their
Omnibus Motion to Set Aside Judgment and for New Trial. Since the Fifth Division could
not reach unanimity in resolving the aforesaid omnibus motion, a Special Fifth Division
was constituted pursuant to Section 1 (b) of Rule XVIII of the 1984 Revised Rules of the
Sandiganbayan. On September 27, 2001, Special Fifth Division, voting 3-2, issued the
subject Resolution promulgated on October 24, 2001, setting aside the November 27, 1998
Decision and granting a second new trial of the case.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Sandiganbayan acted in excess of its jurisdiction when it granted a new
trial for the said Criminal Case.
HELD:
Yes. The Court finds and so rules that the Sandiganbayan Special Fifth Division acted in
excess of its jurisdiction when it nullified the November 27, 1998 Decision and granted a
new trial for Criminal Case No. 4219.
On the propriety of the grant by the Special Fifth Division of the motion for new trial in
Criminal Case No. 4219, the Court finds the same to be devoid of any legal and factual
126
basis. Rule 121, Section 2(b) of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure provides that: new
and material evidence has been discovered which the accused could not with reasonable
diligence have discovered and produced at the trial and which if introduced and admitted
would probably change the judgment, as one of the grounds to grant a new trial. In this
case, the records of the JAGO relative to the February 26, 1980 incident do not meet the
criteria for newly discovered evidence that would merit a new trial. A motion for new trial
based on newly-discovered evidence may be granted only if the following requisites are
met: (a) that the evidence was discovered after trial; (b) that said evidence could not have
been discovered and produced at the trial even with the exercise of reasonable diligence;
(c) that it is material, not merely cumulative, corroborative or impeaching; and (d) that the
evidence is of such weight that, if admitted, would probably change the judgment. It is
essential that the offering party exercised reasonable diligence in seeking to locate the
evidence before or during trial but nonetheless failed to secure it. In this case, however,
such records could have been easily obtained by the accused and could have been
presented during the trial with the exercise of reasonable diligence. Hence, the JAGO
records cannot be considered as newly discovered evidence. There is excess of jurisdiction
where the respondent court, being clothed with the power to determine the case, oversteps
its authority as determined by law.
APPEALS
RULE 122-125
Rules of Court
MACAPAGAL v PEOPLE
CORAZON MACAPAGAL, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent
G.R No 193217
February 26, 2014
Ponente: J. Peralta
_____________________________________________________________
BRIEF:
This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court assailing the
Regional Trial Court (RTC) Decision dated November 25, 2008 convicting petitioner
Corazon Macapagal of the crime of Estafa; the Order denying her Motion for
Reconsideration and/or New Trial; and the Order4 dated June 29, 2010 denying her Notice
of Appeal, in Criminal Case No. 98-166722
FACTS:
On November 25, 2008, the RTC rendered a decision finding petitioner guilty of the crime
of Estafa for misappropriating, for her own benefit, the total amount of P800, 000.00,
which is the value of the unreturned and unsold pieces of jewelry. Petitioner received the
decision on January 13, 2009 then she timely moved for reconsideration, but was likewise
denied in an Order dated May 20, 2009 which the petitioner allegedly received on July 31,
2009. She supposedly filed a Notice of Appeal on August 3, 2009, but the same was denied
on June 29, 2010 for having been filed out of time.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in denying the Notice of Appeal filed by
the herein Petitioner-Appellant.
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in convicting the herein Petitioner-
Appellant of the crime of Estafa.
WON the RTC of Manila, Branch 9, gravely erred in denying the Motion for
Reconsideration and/or new trial filed by the herein Petitioner-Appellant.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
Supreme Court: Petition is DENIED for Lack of Merit.
COURT RATIONALE:
The Court notes that the instant case suffers from various procedural infirmities which this
court cannot ignore and are fatal to petitioner’s cause. It appears that petitioner assails not
only the denial by the RTC of her notice of appeal but likewise seeks the reversal of her
127
conviction for estafa. For reasons that will be discussed below, the petition is bound to fail,
because of petitioner’s complete disregard of the procedural rules and the orders of the
Court.
First, petitioner availed of the wrong mode of assailing the trial court’s denial of her notice
of appeal. Sections 2 and 3, Rule 122 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure lay down
the rules on where, how and when appeal is taken, to wit:
SEC. 2. Where to appeal. – The appeal may be taken as follows:
xxxx
(b) To the Court of Appeals or to the Supreme Court in the proper cases provided by law,
in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court; and
xxxx
SEC. 3. How appeal taken. – (a) The appeal to the Regional Trial Court or to the Court of
Appeals in cases decided by the Regional Trial Court in the exercise of its original
jurisdiction, shall be taken by filing a notice of appeal filed with the court which rendered
the judgment or final order appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the adverse
party.
SEC. 6. When appeal to be taken. – An appeal must be taken within fifteen days from
promulgation of the judgment or from notice of the final order appealed from x x x.
Consequently, the disallowance of the notice of appeal signifies the disallowance of the
appeal itself. A petition for review under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is a mode of appeal
of a lower court’s decision or final order direct to the Supreme Court. However, the
questioned Order denying her notice of appeal is not a decision or final order from which
an appeal may be taken. The Rules of Court specifically provides that no appeal shall be
taken from an order disallowing or dismissing an appeal. Rather, the aggrieved party can
elevate the matter through a special civil action under Rule 65. Thus, in availing of the
wrong mode of appeal in this petition under Rule 45 instead of the appropriate remedy of
Rule 65, the petition merits an outright dismissal.
The Court has often admonished litigants for unnecessarily burdening it with the task of
determining under which rule a petition should fall. It has likewise warned lawyers to
follow the requisites for appeal prescribed by law, ever aware that any error or imprecision
in compliance may well be fatal to the client’s cause.
Second, even if we treat this petition as one for certiorari under Rule 65, it is still
dismissible for violation of the hierarchy of courts. Although the Supreme Court has
concurrent jurisdiction with the RTC and the CA to issue writs of certiorari, this should not
be taken as granting parties the absolute and unrestrained freedom of choice of the court to
which an application will be directed. Direct resort to this Court is allowed only if there are
special, important and compelling reasons clearly and specifically spelled out in the
petition, which are not present in this case.
Third, even if we ignore the above non-compliance and consider the petition as an appeal
of the trial court’s decision convicting her of estafa, again, we cannot do so for yet another
fatal procedural shortcoming committed by petitioner. As stated earlier, petitioner elevated
to this Court not only the Order denying her notice of appeal but also the Decision
convicting her of estafa and the Order denying her motion for reconsideration. In utter
disregard of the rules of procedure, petitioner attached to the petition only the June 29,
2010 RTC Order denying her notice of appeal but she failed to attach a clearly legible
duplicate original or a certified true copy of the assailed decision convicting her of estafa
and the order denying her motion for reconsideration. A petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court must contain a certified true copy or duplicate original
of the assailed decision, final order or judgment. Failure to comply with such requirement
shall be sufficient ground for the dismissal of the petition.
The main reason for the prescribed attachments is to facilitate the review and evaluation of
the petition by making readily available to the Court all the orders, resolutions, decisions,
pleadings, transcripts, documents, and pieces of evidence that are material and relevant to
the issues presented in the petition without relying on the case records of the lower court.
Lastly, this petition is bound to fail because of petitioner’s repeated disregard of the Rules
and the Court’s lawful orders.1avvphi1 In a Resolution dated September 15, 2010, the
Court required petitioner to fully comply with the Rules of Court, the pertinent portion of
which reads:
xxxx
2. petitioner to FULLY COMPLY with the Rules by submitting: (a) an affidavit of service
on the RTC and on the Office of the Solicitor General; (b) a proper verification in
accordance with Section 1, Rule 45 in relation to Section 4, Rule 7 of the Rules, and a valid
certification of non-forum shopping in accordance with Section 5, Rule 7, with properly
accomplished jurat showing that the affiant exhibited before the notary public at least one
current identification document issued by an official agency bearing the photograph and
signature of the affiant as required under Sections 6 and 12, Rule II of the 2004 Rules on
Notarial Practice, as amended by Court En Banc Resolution dated 19 February 2008 in
A.M. No. 02-8-13-SC; and (c) her counsel’s contact details pursuant to the En Banc
Resolution dated 10 July 2007 in A.M. No. 07-6-5-SC, all within five (5) days from notice.
xxx
128
Despite the directive, no such compliance was made prompting the Court to require her
counsel to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for non-compliance.
Records likewise show that petitioner also failed to file a Reply to respondent’s Comment
to the petition.
On August 2, 2011, petitioner’s counsel submitted his explanation for non-compliance and
asked for more time within which to comply with the Court’s resolution, because of heavy
workload and his failure to contact petitioner who apparently transferred residence. In a
Resolution dated August 31, 2011, the Court, while granting the motion for extension
requested, admonished petitioner’s counsel for the unsatisfactory explanation. Yet again,
petitioner failed to file the required Reply prompting the Court again to ask for the
counsel’s explanation why he should not be disciplinary dealt with. Petitioner’s counsel
claimed that he could not prepare the required reply because the documents needed had
been destroyed by typhoon "Pedring." He, likewise, pointed out that he exerted earnest
efforts to locate petitioner but he could not do so at that point. After the Court required him
again to show cause why he should not be disciplinary dealt with for not complying with
the Court’s resolutions, and since his efforts to communicate with his client proved futile,
he asked the Court that he be relieved of all his duties and responsibilities as counsel on
record. In a Resolution dated December 10, 2012, we required petitioner herself to
comment thereon, but no such compliance was made to date.
Indeed, cases should be determined on the merits after full opportunity to all parties for
ventilation of their causes and defenses, rather than on technicality or some procedural
imperfections in order to serve better the ends of justice. It is the duty of the counsel to
make sure of the nature of the errors he proposes to assign, to determine which court has
appellate jurisdiction, and to follow the requisites for appeal. Any error in compliance may
be fatal to the client's cause. It should be stressed that the right to appeal is neither a natural
right nor a part of due process. It is merely a procedural remedy of statutory origin and may
be exercised only in the manner prescribed by the provisions of law authorizing its
exercise. The requirements of the rules on appeal cannot be considered as merely harmless
and trivial technicalities that can be discarded at whim. In these times when court dockets
are clogged with numerous litigations, parties have to abide by these rules with greater
fidelity in order to facilitate the orderly and expeditious disposition of cases.
APPEALS
RULE 122-125
Rules of Court
People v Morales
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
ROLDAN MORALES y MIDARASA, Appellant.
G.R No 172873
March 19, 2010
Ponente: J. Del Castillo
_____________________________________________________________
BRIEF:
On appeal is the Decision of the Court of Appeals (CA) promulgated on April 24, 2006
affirming in toto the Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City, Branch
103 finding appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa guilty of the crimes of possession and
sale of dangerous drugs.
FACTS:
Appellant was charged in two separate Information before the RTC with possession and
sale of methylamphetamine hydrochloride (shabu). Upon arraignment, appellant, assisted
by counsel, pleaded not guilty to both charges read in Filipino, a language known and
understood by him. On motion of the City Prosecutor, the cases were consolidated for joint
trial. Trial on the merits ensued thereafter.
The testimonies of PO1 Eduardo Roy (PO1 Roy) and PO3 Armando Rivera (PO3 Rivera)
were presented by the prosecution were they made a pre-operation report on a buy-bust
operation to be conducted on the herein appellant. A poseur-buyer was instructed to carry
out the operation. Shortly, after the pre-arranged signal, Morales was arrested. Upon
conducting the body search, he found another sachet which he suspected to be "shabu" and
two aluminum foils. Appellant was brought to the Police Station for detention, while the
items seized from him were brought to the Crime Laboratory for examination. The two
sachets tested positive for Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride (shabu) while the aluminum
foil sheets tested negative of the aforementioned substance.
Both PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera identified a Joint Affidavit dated January 3, 2003 during
their respective testimonies, which they acknowledged to have executed subsequent to the
buy-bust operation.
129
The defense presented the testimonies of their witnesses. The appellant denied the charges
against him, testified that he was in Manila at that time to bring money for his parents who
live at Cruz na Ligas, and that he did not receive the mark money.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the appellant should not be convicted of the offenses charged against him since
his guilt has not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: The trial court rendered a Decision finding the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of illegal possession and illegal sale of dangerous drugs. The trial court held that the
prosecution witnesses positively identified the appellant as the person who possessed and
sold to the poseur-buyer the "shabu" subject of this case, during the buy-bust operation
conducted in the afternoon of January 2, 2003.
Court of Appeals: The CA affirmed the Decision of the trial court in toto. It found that
contrary to the allegations of the appellant, there was no instigation that took place. Rather,
a buy-bust operation was employed by the police officers to apprehend the appellant while
in the act of unlawfully selling drugs. The appellate court further held that what is material
in a prosecution for illegal sale of prohibited drugs is the proof that the transaction or sale
actually took place, coupled with the presentation in court of the corpus delicti.
Supreme Court: The Decision of the Court of Appeals dated April 24, 2006 in CA-G.R.
CR-H.C. No. 00037 affirming the judgment of conviction of the Regional Trial Court of
Quezon City, Branch 103 dated April 29, 2004 is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE.
Appellant Roldan Morales y Midarasa is ACQUITTED based on reasonable doubt, and is
ordered to be immediately RELEASED from detention, unless he is confined for any other
lawful cause.
COURT RATIONALE:
Appellant claims that he should not be convicted of the offenses charged since his guilt has
not been proven by the prosecution beyond reasonable doubt. In support of his contention,
appellant alleges that the arresting officers did not even place the proper markings on the
alleged shabu and paraphernalia at the time and place of the alleged buy-bust operation.
The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, insists that the direct testimony of
the two arresting officers sufficiently established the elements of illegal sale and possession
of shabu.
At the outset, we draw attention to the unique nature of an appeal in a criminal case:
the appeal throws the whole case open for review and it is the duty of the appellate
court to correct, cite and appreciate errors in the appealed judgment whether they
are assigned or unassigned. On the basis of such review, we find the present appeal
meritorious.
Prevailing jurisprudence uniformly hold that the trial court’s findings of fact,
especially when affirmed by the CA, are, as a general rule, entitled to great weight
and will not be disturbed on appeal. However, this rule admits of exceptions and does
not apply where facts of weight and substance with direct and material bearing on the
final outcome of the case have been overlooked, misapprehended or misapplied. After
due consideration of the records of this case, evidence presented and relevant law and
jurisprudence, we hold that this case falls under the exception.
In actions involving the illegal sale of dangerous drugs, the following elements must first
be established: (1) proof that the transaction or sale took place and (2) the presentation in
court of the corpus delicti or the illicit drug as evidence. On the other hand, in prosecutions
for illegal possession of a dangerous drug, it must be shown that (1) the accused was in
possession of an item or an object identified to be a prohibited or regulated drug, (2) such
possession is not authorized by law, and (3) the accused was freely and consciously aware
of being in possession of the drug. Similarly, in this case, the evidence of the corpus delicti
must be established beyond reasonable doubt.
In the instant case, it is indisputable that the procedures for the custody and disposition of
confiscated dangerous drugs, as mandated in Section 21 of RA 9165, were not observed.
The records utterly failed to show that the buy-bust team complied with these procedures
despite their mandatory nature as indicated by the use of "shall" in the directives of the law.
The procedural lapse is plainly evident from the testimonies of the two police officers
presented by the prosecution, namely: PO1 Roy and PO3 Rivera.
PO1 Roy, in his testimony, failed to concretely identify the items seized from the appellant.
Moreover, he confirmed that they did not make a list of the items seized. The patent lack of
adherence to the procedural mandate of RA 9165 is manifest in his testimony.
The procedural lapses in the handling and identification of the seized items collectively
raise doubts as to whether the items presented in court were the exact same items that were
confiscated from appellant when he was apprehended.
130
While this Court recognizes that non-compliance by the buy-bust team with Section 21 of
RA 9165 is not fatal as long as there is a justifiable ground therefor, for and as long as the
integrity and the evidentiary value of the siezed items are properly preserved by the
apprehending team, these conditions were not met in the case at bar. No explanation was
offered by the testifying police officers for their failure to observe the rule. In this respect,
we cannot fault the apprehending policemen either, as PO1 Roy admitted that he was not a
PDEA operative and the other witness, PO3 Rivera, testified that he was not aware of the
procedure involved in the conduct of anti-drug operations by the PNP. In fine, there is
serious doubt whether the drug presented in court was the same drug recovered from the
appellant. Consequently, the prosecution failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt the
identity of the corpus delicti.1avvphi1

Furthermore, the evidence presented by the prosecution failed to reveal the identity of the
APPEALS
person who had custody and safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending
RULE 122-125
presentation in court. Thus, the prosecution likewise failed to establish the chain of custody
Rules of Court
which is fatal to its cause.1avvphi1
Quidet v People
In fine, the identity of the corpus delicti in this case was not proven beyond reasonable
doubt. There was likewise a break in the chain of custody which proves fatal to the ROSIE QUIDET, Petitioner,
prosecution’s case. Thus, since the prosecution has failed to establish the element of corpus vs.
delicti with the prescribed degree of proof required for successful prosecution of both PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.G.R No
possession and sale of prohibited drugs, we resolve to ACQUIT Roldan Morales y
Midarasa. GR No. 170289
April 8, 2010
Ponente: J. Del Castillo

_____________________________________________________________

BRIEF:

Conspiracy must be proved as clearly and convincingly as the commission of the offense
itself for it is a facile device by which an accused may be ensnared and kept within the
penal fold. In case of reasonable doubt as to its existence, the balance tips in favor of the
milder form of criminal liability as what is at stake is the accused’s liberty. We apply these
principles in this case.

This Petition for Review on Certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the Court of Appeal’s
(CA) July 22, 2005 Decision in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 which affirmed with modifications
the March 11, 1999 Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de Oro City,
Branch 20 in Criminal Case Nos. 92-079 and 92-080.

FACTS:

131
On January 13, 1992, petitioner Rosie Quidet (petitioner), Feliciano Taban, Jr. (Taban),
and Aurelio Tubo (Tubo) were charged with homicide in Criminal Case No. 92-079 for the
death of Jimmy Tagarda (Jimmy) were charged with frustrated homicide in Criminal Case
No. 92-080 for the stab wounds sustained by Jimmy’s cousin, Andrew Tagarda (Andrew),
arising from the same incident. Upon arraignment, all the accused entered a plea of not
guilty in Criminal Case No. 92-080 (frustrated homicide). Meanwhile, in Criminal Case
No. 92-079 (homicide), Taban entered a voluntary plea of guilt while petitioner and Tubo
maintained their innocence.
ISSUE/S OF THE CASE:
Whether the favorable appeal of Quidet will extend to the other two accused who did not
appeal.
ACTIONS OF THE COURT:
RTC: On May 16, 1995, the RTC rendered a judgment finding petitioner and Tubo guilty
of homicide and all three accused (petitioner, Tubo and Taban) guilty of frustrated
homicide. The period of preventive imprisonment during which the accused were detained
pending the trial of these cases shall be credited in full in favor of all the accused. The trial
court found that the stabbing of Jimmy and Andrew was previously planned by the
accused. The active participation of all three accused proved conspiracy in the commission
of the crimes. Furthermore, the positive identification of the accused by the prosecution
witnesses cannot be offset by the defense of plain denial.
From this judgment, only petitioner appealed to the CA.
Court of Appeals: The CA dismissed the instant appeal for lack of merit. The assailed
decision is hereby AFFIRMED with the following modifications: (a) That in Criminal
Case No. 92-080 the crime is only Attempted Homicide; and (b) the civil indemnity in the
amount of ten thousand (P10,000.00) pesos which was awarded to the heirs of Andrew
Tagarda be deleted as the same has not been fully substantiated. In upholding the
conviction of the accused for homicide, the CA held that conspiracy was duly established
as shown by the concerted acts of the accused in inflicting mortal wounds on Jimmy.
Hence, all of the accused are guilty of homicide for the death of Jimmy.
The CA, however, disagreed with the trial court’s finding that the accused are liable for
frustrated homicide with respect to the injuries sustained by Andrew. According to the CA,
the accused failed to inflict mortal wounds on Andrew because the latter successfully
deflected the attack. Andrew suffered only minor injuries which could have healed within
five to seven days even without medical treatment. The crime committed, therefore, is
merely attempted homicide.
The CA also deleted the award of civil indemnity to the heirs of Andrew because the same
was not fully substantiated.
Supreme Court: the petition is PARTIALLY GRANTED. The July 22, 2005 Decision of
the Court of Appeal’s in CA-G.R. CR No. 23351 is AFFIRMED with the
following MODIFICATIONS:
1) In Criminal Case No. 92-079, Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto menor. He
is ordered to pay the heirs of Jimmy Tagarda P5,0000.00 as moral damages. Feliciano
Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are ordered to solidarily pay the heirs of Jimmy
Tagarda P50,0000 as civil indemnity, P50,000.00 as moral damages and P25,000.00 as
temperate damages.
2) In Criminal Case No. 92-080, Feliciano Taban, Jr. and Aurelio Tubo are found guilty
beyond reasonable doubt of attempted homicide and are meted the sentence of four (4)
months of arresto mayor in its medium period as minimum to four (4) years of prision
correccional in its medium period as maximum. They are ordered to solidarily pay Andrew
Tagarda P30,000.00 as moral damages. Rosie Quidet is found guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of slight physical injuries and is meted the sentence of fifteen (15) days of arresto
menor. He is ordered to pay Andrew Tagrda P5,000.00 as moral damages
3) The period of preventive imprisonment of Feliciano Taban, Jr., Aurelio Tubo and Rosie
Quidet shall be credited in their favor in accordance with Article 29 of the Revised Penal
Code.
4) The bail bond of Rosie Quidet is cancelled.
COURT RATIONALE:
The existence of conspiracy was not proved beyond reasonable doubt. Thus, petitioner is
criminally liable only for his individual acts.
Conspiracy exists when two or more persons come to an agreement concerning the
commission of a felony and decide to commit it. The essence of conspiracy is the unity of
action and purpose. Its elements, like the physical acts constituting the crime itself, must be
proved beyond reasonable doubt. When there is conspiracy, the act of one is the act of all.
To determine if petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo, the focus of the inquiry should
necessarily be the overt acts of petitioner before, during and after the stabbing incident.
From this viewpoint, we find several facts of substance which militate against the finding
that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo.
132
First, there is no evidence that petitioner, Taban or Tubo had any grudge or enmity against
Jimmy or Andrew. The prosecution eyewitnesses (Andrew and Balani) as well as the three
accused were one in testifying that there was no misunderstanding between the two groups
prior to the stabbing incident.

Second, the stabbing incident appears to have arisen from a purely accidental encounter
between Taban’s and Andrew’s groups with both having had a drinking session.

Third, unlike Taban and Tubo, petitioner was unarmed during the incident, thus, negating
his intent to kill the victims. By the prosecution witnesses’ account, petitioner’s
participation was limited to boxing Andrew and Jimmy after Taban and Tubo had stabbed
the victims. His acts were neither necessary nor indispensable to the commission of the
crimes as they were done after the stabbing. Thus, petitioner’s act of boxing the victims can
be interpreted as a mere show of sympathy to or camaraderie with his two co-accused.

Taken together, the evidence of the prosecution does not meet the test of moral certainty in
order to establish that petitioner conspired with Taban and Tubo to commit the crimes of
homicide and attempted homicide.

For failure of the prosecution to prove conspiracy beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner’s
liability is separate and individual. Considering that it was duly established that petitioner
boxed Jimmy and Andrew and absent proof of the extent of the injuries sustained by the
latter from these acts, petitioner should only be made liable for two counts of slight
physical injuries. In addition, he should pay P5,000.00 as moral damages to the heirs of
Jimmy and another P5,000.00 as moral damages to Andrew. Actual damages arising from
said acts cannot, however, be awarded for failure to prove the same.
Anent the penalty imposed on Taban and Tubo, in Criminal Case No. 92-080, the CA
correctly modified the same. The crime committed was attempted homicide and not
frustrated homicide because the stab wounds that Andrew sustained were not life-
threatening. Although Taban and Tubo did not appeal their conviction, this part of
the appellate court’s judgment is favorable to them, thus, they are entitled to a
reduction of their prison terms. The rule is that an appeal taken by one or more of
several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal except insofar as the
judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter.
IRENORIO B. BALABA, petitioner,
VS.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, respondent.
G.R. No. 169519, July 17, 2009
FACTS
 On Oct. 18-19, 1993, the State Auditors Arlene Mandin and Loila Laga
discovered a total cash shortage of P 114,186.34 upon conducting an examination
of cash and accounts of the accountable officers of the Municipality of
Guindalman, Bohol.
 3 demands letters were sent to Balaba asking him to explain the discrepancy in the
accounts. Unsatisfied with Balbala’s explanation, Graft Investigation Officer I
Miguel P. Ricamora recommended that an information for Malversation of Public
Funds as defined and penalized under Art. 217 of the RPC, be filed against Balaba
with the Sandiganbayan.
 The Office of the Special Prosecutor filed an Information with the Sandiganbayan
on April 26, 1995 but was subsequently transferred to the trial court on June 30,
1995 upon the effectivity of RA 7975.
 On Dec. 9, 2002, the trial court found Balaba guilty and sentenced him to
indeterminate sentence of 10 years and 1 day as minimum, to 17 years, 4 months
and 1 day of Reclusion Temporal as maximum. He shall suffer the penalty of
133
 perpetual special disqualification and a fine equal to the amount of the funds
malversed.
 On Jan.14, 2003, Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal, where he indicated that he
would file his appeal before the Court of Appeals. On Aug. 6, 2003 Balaba filed
his Appellant’s Brief.
 The Office of the Solicitor General, instead of filing an Appellee’s Brief, filed a
Manifestation and Motion praying for the dismissal of the appeal for being
improper since the Sandiganbayan has exclusive jurisdiction over the appeal.
 On Dec. 15, 2004, Court of Appeals dismissed Balaba’s appeal and declared that
it had no jurisdiction to act on the appeal because the Sandiganbayan exclusive
appellate jurisdiction over the case.
 On Jan. 27, 2005, Babala filed a Motion for Reconsideration and asked that he be
allowed to pursue his appeal before the proper court, the Sandiganbayan. Court of
Appeals denied Balbala’s motion in its resolution on Aug. 24, 2004.
 On Oct. 7, 2005, Balbala filed a Motion this present petition before this court.
ISSUE
 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in dismissing his appeal instead of certifying
the case to the proper court.
HELD
 The Court of Appeals is bereft of any jurisdiction to review the judgment Balaba
seeks to appeal. Upon Balaba’s conviction by the trial court, his remedy should
have been an appeal to the Sandiganbayan. Paragraph 3, Section 4(c) of Republic
Act No. 8249 (RA 8249), which further defined the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, reads: The Sandiganbayan shall exercise exclusive appellate
jurisdiction over final judgments, resolutions or orders of the regional trial courts
whether in the exercise of their own original jurisdiction or of their appellate
jurisdiction as herein provided. There is nothing in said paragraph which can
conceivably justify the filing of Balaba’s appeal before the Court of Appeals
instead of the Sandiganbayan.
 The Court of Appeals did not commit any error when it dismissed Balaba’s appeal
because of lack of jurisdiction.In Melencion v. Sandiganbayan it was ruled: An
error in designating the appellate court is not fatal to the appeal. However, the
correction in designating the proper appellate court should be made within the 15-
day period to appeal. Once made within the said period, the designation of the
correct appellate court may be allowed even if the records of the case are
forwarded to the Court of Appeals. Otherwise, the second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of court would apply. The second paragraph of Section 2,
Rule 50 of the Rules of Court reads: “An appeal erroneously taken to the Court of
Appeals shall not be transferred to the appropriate court but shall be dismissed
outright.” In this case, Balaba sought the correction of the error in filing the
appeal only after the expiration of the period to appeal. The trial court
promulgated its Decision on December 9, 2002. Balaba filed his Notice of Appeal
on 14 January 2003. The Court of Appeals issued the Decision declaring its lack
of jurisdiction on 15 December 2004. Balaba tried to correct the error only on
January 27, 2005, clearly beyond the 15-day period to appeal from the decision of
the trial court.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, appellee
VS.
CHARMEN OLIVO ALONG, NELSON DANDA Y SAMBUTO AND JOEY ZAFRA
Y. REYES
G.R. No. 177768, July 27, 2009
FACTS
 On November 21, 2000, Maricel Permejo was tending the store of the victim,
Mariano Constantino in Bagong Silangan, Quezon City. Suddenly, 3armed men
entered the store and demanded money. When Maricel did not accede to the
demand, Nelson Danda kicked her in the leg while his Joey Zafra got money from
the cash register. When the store owner, Mariano Constantino, went inside the
store and shouted, the Charmen Olivo poked a gun at him. Mariano ran towards
the back of the house but appellant Olivo nevertheless chased him. Thereafter,
Maricel heard successive shots and saw appellants Danda and Zafra going out of
the store while the bloodied body of Mariano was lying at the stairway of the
house. The victim was taken to the hospital where he died upon arrival. RTC
rendered a decision convicting accused-appellants of the crime of robbery with
homicide.
 Accused-appellants Olivo and Danda appealed to the Court of Appeals. They
argue that in criminal prosecutions, the State has the burden of proving the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt. It has to prove the identity of the accused as
the malefactor, as well as the fact of the commission of the crime for which he is
allegedly responsible. They argue that it can be gleaned from the records of the
case that the prosecution relied mainly on the testimony of the alleged eyewitness
Maricel Permejo, but her testimony leaves much to be desired. They argue that
Maricel Permejo did not point to them as the malefactors and she only did so upon
the instruction given in Camp Karingal. They point out that they were invited
allegedly for violation of the anti-drugs law and were appalled to learn that they
were charged with a different crime and the alleged witness was coached to
identify them. Evidently, they stress, their guilt has not been proved with the
required quantum of evidence. The appellants further argue that while the alleged
eyewitness claimed she saw the accused-appellant Joey Zafra take the money
from the cash register, she did not see how and who killed Mariano Constantino.
She merely claimed that she saw the accused-appellants armed and chased the
deceased outside the store. They conclude that whether or not the accused-
134
 appellants indeed committed homicide on the occasion of the robbery is a matter similar conditions and on the same ratiocination, Section 11(a), Rule 122 of the
that has not been proven with the required moral certainty of guilt. Rules of Court has justified the extension of our judgment of acquittal to the co-
 On the other hand, the prosecution, through the Office of the Solicitor General, accused who failed to appeal from the judgment of the trial court which we
argues that findings of fact of the trial court are generally upheld on appeal and subsequently reversed.
the accused-appellants are assailing the correctness of the findings of fact of the
trial court by impugning the credibility of the prosecution witness Maricel
Permejo. The prosecution claims that contrary to the accused-appellants’ claim
that the police officers taught the witness Maricel Permejo to point to them as the
perpetrators, her testimony is straightforward and direct.

ISSUE
 Whether the lower court has committed grave abuse of discretion in convicting
the accused.
 Whether the co-accused Joey Zafra who did not appeal is entitled also to acquittal.

HELD
 It is settled that when the issue is the evaluation of the testimony of a witness or
his credibility, this Court accords the highest respect and even finality to the
findings of the trial court, absent any showing that it committed palpable mistake,
misappreciation of facts or grave abuse of discretion. It is the trial court which has
the unique advantage of observing first-hand the facial expressions, gestures and
the tone of voice of a witness while testifying. The well-entrenched rule is that
findings of the trial court affirmed by the appellate court are accorded high
respect, if not conclusive effect, by this Court, absent clear and convincing
evidence that the tribunals ignored, misconstrued or misapplied facts and
circumstances of substances such that, if considered, the same will warrant the
modification or reversal of the outcome of the case. Factual findings of trial
courts, when substantiated by the evidence on record, command great weight and
respect on appeal, save only when certain material facts and circumstances were
overlooked and which, if duly considered, may vary the outcome of the case.
 The present rule is that an appeal taken by one or more several accused shall not
affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as the judgment of the appellate
court is favorable and applicable to the latter.— One final note. The other
accused, Joey Zafra, who is identically circumstanced as the other appellants and
who was likewise convicted on the same evidence, does not appear to have
perfected an appeal from the trial court’s judgment. The record does not show the
reason therefor. Be that as it may, the present rule is that an appeal taken by one or
more several accused shall not affect those who did not appeal, except insofar as
the judgment of the appellate court is favorable and applicable to the latter. Our
pronouncements here with respect to the insufficiency of the prosecution evidence
to convict appellants beyond reasonable doubt are definitely favorable and
applicable to accused Joey Zafra. He should not therefore be treated as the odd
man out and should benefit from the acquittal of his co-accused. In fact, under
135

MERCEDITA T. GUASCH, petitioner
VS.
ARNALDO DELA CRUZ, respondent
G.R. No. 176015, June16, 2009
FACTS
 On Nov. 10, 2000 Arnaldo dela Cruz file a Complaint-Affidavit against Mercedita
T. Guash with the City Prosecutor of Manila. He alleged that petitioner went to
his residence requesting him to exchange her check with cash of P3,300,000.00.
Initially, he refused. However, petitioner returned the next day and was able to
convince him to give her P3,300,000.00 in cash in exchange for her Insular
Savings Bank Check No. 0032082 dated January 31, 2000 upon her assurance that
she will have the funds and bank deposit to cover the said check by January 2000.
On the date of maturity and upon presentment, however, the check was
dishonored for the reason that the account against which it was drawn was already
closed.
 On February 7, 2002, the City Prosecutor of Manila filed an Information for estafa
against petitioner. After petitioner entered her plea of not guilty and after the
prosecution rested its case, petitioner filed a Motion with Leave to Admit
Demurrer to Evidence with attached Demurrer to Evidence on April 1, 2005.
 The trial court issued an Order dated June 16, 2005 granting the demurrer to
evidence and dismissing the case. The trial court found that respondent’s assertion
of misrepresentation by petitioner that her check will be fully funded on the
maturity date was not supported by the evidence on record. Accordingly, her guilt
not having been proven beyond reasonable doubt, petitioner was acquitted.
 On June 28, 2005, respondent received a copy of the said order. On July 14, 2005,
respondent filed a Manifestation with attached Motion to Amend Order dated June
16, 2005 to include a finding of civil liability of petitioner. In the Manifestation,
respondent’s counsel justified his failure to file the motion within the
reglementary period of 15 days because all postal offices in Metro Manila were
allegedly ordered closed in the afternoon due to the rally staged on Ayala Avenue.
 Meantime, on Aug. 30, 2005, respondent filed a Petition for Certiorari with the
Court of Appeals praying that the trial court’s Order dated June 16, 2005 granting
the demurrer to evidence be set aside.
 The trial court denied respondent’s Motion to Amend in its Order dated Sept. 20,
2005 finding that counsel for respondent was inexcusably negligent; hence, the
Order dated June 16, 2005 has become final and executory. Respondent filed a
Motion for Reconsideration but the same was denied by the trial court in its Order
dated Nov. 7, 2005.
 On Dec.7, 2005, respondent filed a Notice of Appeal informing the trial court that
he was appealing the Order dated Sept. 20, 2005 and the Order dated Nov. 7,
2005. The trial court likewise denied the notice of appeal in an Order dated Dec
13, 2005.
 Consequently, on February 13, 2006, respondent filed a Supplemental Petition for
Certiorari with the Court of Appeals to set aside the Order dated Sept. 20, 2005,
the Order dated Nov. 7, 2005, and the Order dated Dece13, 2005. On August 31,
2006, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed Decision.
ISSUE
 Whether the Court of Appeals erred in holding that the trial court committed grave
abuse of discretion when it denied respondent’s Motion to Amend.
HELD
 Motion for Reconsideration; As a general rule, the statutory requirement that
when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the reglementary period, the
decision attains finality and becomes executory in due course must be strictly
enforced; Purposes for such Statutory Requirement.—As a general rule, the
statutory requirement that when no motion for reconsideration is filed within the
reglementary period, the decision attains finality and becomes executory in due
course must be strictly enforced as they are considered indispensable interdictions
against needless delays and for orderly discharge of judicial business. The
purposes for such statutory requirement are twofold: first, to avoid delay in the
136
 administration of justice and thus, procedurally, to make orderly the discharge of People vs. Taruc
judicial business, and, second, to put an end to judicial controversies, at the risk of PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee
occasional errors, which are precisely why courts exist. Controversies cannot drag vs.
on indefinitely. The rights and obligations of every litigant must not hang in
FRANCISCO TARUC, accused-appellant.
suspense for an indefinite period of time.
 In exceptional cases, substantial justice and equity considerations warrant the G.R. No. 185202
giving of due course to an appeal by suspending the enforcement of statutory and February 18, 2009
mandatory rules of procedure. Certain elements are considered for the appeal to be Ponente: CHICO-NAZARIO
given due course, such as: (1) the existence of special or compelling
circumstances, (2) the merits of the case, (3) a cause not entirely attributable to the
fault or negligence of the party favored by the suspension of the rules, (4) lack of
any showing that the review sought is merely frivolous and dilatory, and (5) the
Nature of Case:
other party will not be unduly prejudiced thereby.
Petition for Review

BRIEF
A Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, as amended,
assailing the Decision of the Court of Appeals dated 27 February 2008 in CA-G.R. CR
H.C. No. 01638 entitled, People of the Philippines v. Francisco Taruc @ Taruc, which
affirmed with modification the Decision dated 29 June 2005 of the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal Case No. 8010 for murder.

FACTS

The accused-appellant was convicted before the RTC of Bataan, Branch 3, on 29 June
2005 with the crime of murder with the attending aggravating circumstance of treachery in
connection with the death of Emelito Sualog, and sentenced to suffer death and pay
amounts of P49,225.00 in actual damages, P50,000.00 in civil indemnity and P30,000.00 in
moral damages.

The case was brought for automatic review in the Court of Appeals pursuant to A.M. No.
00-5-03-SC.

On 13 January 2006, accused-appellant, through the PAO, filed a Motion for Extension of
Time to File Appellants Brief. However, it was returned, and the court ordered the counsel
for the accused-appellant to furnish it with the present and complete address of his client
within five days from notice.

The PAO lawyer informed the court that the accused-appellant escaped from prison on 23
August 2002, which was later confirmed by the warden of the Bataan Provincial Jail.

The motion was later granted by the court, even in the absence of the accused-appellant.
Appeal
Following lapse of the period and a subsequent valid explanation supplemented by the
Rule 124, Section 8 and Rule 125, Section 1
137
PAO lawyer for the delay of the filing of the brief, the Court of appeals affirmed the
decision and modifying the iposed penalty from death to reclusion perpetua, in pursuance This rule was extended to the Supreme Court by Rule 125, Section 1 of the Revised Rules
to R.A. No. 9346. of Criminal Procedure.

On 13 March 2008, the accused-appellant, through his counsel, filed a Notice of Appeal for Failure to attend the promulgation by the RTC of its decision and failure to
the decision of the Court of Appeals to the Supreme Court. surrender and file the required motion within the prescribed period, the accused-
appellant impliedly waived any remedy against said judgment of conviction
ISSUE/S of the CASE available under the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure, including the right to
1. Whether or not the accused-appellant lost his right to appeal his conviction by appeal the same.
escaping prison.
By putting himself beyond the reach and application of the legal processes of the
ACTIONS of the COURT land, accused-appellant revealed his contempt of the law and placed himself in a
position to speculate, at his pleasure on his chances for a reversal. In the process,
RTC: Accused-appellant was convicted of murder with the attendance of treachery he kept himself out of the reach of justice, but hoped to render the judgment
CA: The decision of the RTC was affirmed with modifications nugatory at his option. Such conduct is intolerable and does not invite leniency on
the part of the appellate court.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Yes, the accused-appellant has lost his right to appeal his conviction by escaping prison and
evading arrest. WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED. Let the records of this case be remanded to
the trial court for the issuance of the mittimus.
An accused is required to be present before the trial court at the promulgation of the
judgment in a criminal case.If the accused fails to appear before the trial court,
promulgation of judgment shall be made in accordance with Rule 120, Section 6,
paragraphs 4 and 5 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure:
In case the accused fails to appear at the scheduled date of promulgation of judgment
despite notice, the promulgation shall be made by recording the judgment in the criminal
docket and serving him a copy thereof at his last known address or thru his counsel.

If the judgment is for conviction and the failure of the accused to appear
was without justifiable cause, he shall lose the remedies available in
these Rules against the judgment and the court shall order his arrest.
Within fifteen (15) days from promulgation of judgment, however, the
accused may surrender and file a motion for leave of court to avail of
these remedies. He shall state the reasons for his absence at the scheduled
promulgation and if he proves that his absence was for a justifiable
cause, he shall be allowed to avail of said remedies within fifteen (15)
days from notice

Consistently, Rule 124, Section 8, paragraph 2 of the same Rules allows the Court
of Appeals, upon motion of the appellee or motu proprio, to dismiss the appeal of
the accused-appellant who eludes the jurisdiction of the courts over his person.
138
Appeal Tiu filed a petition for certiorari with RTC of Pasay City that declared the decision
Rule 122, Section 1 by the MeTC void.
Tiu vs. CA
Postanes filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for certiorari following denial
DAVID TIU, petitioner of his motion for reconsiderayion in the RTC.
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and Promulgated: Motions and petitions filed by both parties were granted, the MeTC issued an
EDGARDO POSTANES, respondents Order granting Postanes motion to suspend the proceeding while presiding Judge
Estrellita M. Paas inhibited herself from further hearing the case.
G.R. No. 162370 A motion to dismiss on the ground of forum shopping was also file by the
April 21, 2009 petitioner in the Cort of Appeals.
Ponente: Carpio
The Court of Appeals, on 29 October 2003, reversed the decision of the RTC and
affirmed the dismissal of the said case.

Nature of Case: On 24 February 2004, the Court of Appeals denied Tius motion for
Petition for Review reconsideration.

BRIEF ISSUE/S of the CASE

This is a petition for review assailing the 29 October 2003 Decision and 24
February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals that annulled the 6 November
2000 Decisionof the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 115, Pasay City on the
ground of violation of the right of the accused against double jeopardy. The RTC
declared void the acquittal by the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC), Branch 44,
Pasay City, of respondent Edgardo Postanes for the crime of grave threats.
FACTS
The issue stemmed from the consolidated charges filed by Edgardo Postanes
against Remigio Pasion and David Tiu, petitioner, against Edgardo Postanes, for
crimes of slight physical injuries and grave threats, respectively.
The case was dismissed by the MeTC on 26 January 1999 due to insufficiency of
evidence.
A motion for was filed by the petitioner and was subsequently denied by the
MeTC.
Whether there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari
questioning the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC
ACTIONS of the COURT
RTC: The decision of the MeTC that dismissed the criminal case against
Postanes was declared void
CA: The decision of the RTC was reversed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
Yes, there was double jeopardy when Tiu filed a petition for certiorari questioning
the acquittal of Postanes by the MeTC.
All the elements of double jeopardy are present in the case: (1) the Information
filed in Criminal Case No. 96-413 against Postanes was sufficient in form and
substance to sustain a conviction; (2) the MeTC had jurisdiction over Criminal
Case No. 96-413; (3) Postanes was arraigned and entered a non-guilty plea; and
(4) the MeTC dismissed Criminal Case No. 96-413 on the ground of insufficiency

139
of evidence amounting to an acquittal from which no appeal can be had. Also, Doctrine: Eligibility for Probation Even After Appealing From an Erroneous
there is no showing that the court lost or lacked jurisdiction that would have Judgment
allowed the an appeal.
COLINARES VS. PEOPLE
The Supreme Court also stated that the present petition by Tiu is defective since
the filing was not made by the Solicitor General. Arnel Colinares, Petitioner

vs.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
People of the Philippines, Respondent

G.R. No. 182748,

WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition. The Court AFFIRMS the 29
October 2003 Decision and 24 February 2004 Resolution of the Court of Appeals December 13, 2011
in CA-G.R. SP No. 64783. Costs against petitioner.
NATURE OF THE CASE:

Appeal

BRIEF

This case is about a) the need, when invoking self-defense, to prove all that it
takes; b) what distinguishes frustrated homicide from attempted homicide; and c)
when an accused who appeals may still apply for probation on remand of the case
to the trial court.

THE FACTS

Accused-appellant Arnel Colinares (Arnel) was charged with frustrated

homicide for hitting the head of the private complainant with a piece of stone. He
alleged self-defense but the trial court found him guilty of the crime charged and
sentenced him to suffer imprisonment from 2 years and 4 months
of prision correccional, as minimum, to 6 years and 1 day of prision mayor, as
maximum. Since the maximum probationable imprisonment under the law was
only up to 6 years, Arnel did not qualify for probation.

Arnel appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), invoking self-defense and,

alternatively, seeking conviction for the lesser crime of attempted homicide with
the consequent reduction of the penalty imposed on him. His conviction was
affirmed by the CA. Hence, this appeal to the Supreme Court.

140
THE ISSUES
Given a finding that Arnel is entitled to conviction for a lower [lesser]
offense [of attempted homicide] and a reduced probationable penalty, may he may
still apply for probation on remand of the case to the trial court?
THE RULING
The Supreme Court voted to PARTIALLY GRANT the appeal,
MODIFIED the CA decision and found Arnel GUILTY of ATTEMPTED (not
frustrated) HOMICIDE and SENTENCED him to and indeterminate but
PROBATIONABLE penalty of 4 months of arresto mayor as minimum and 2
years and 4 months of prision correccional as maximum. The Court also voted 8-7
to allow Arnel to APPLY FOR PROBATION within 15 days from notice that
the record of the case has been remanded for execution to trial court.
YES, Arnel may still apply for probation on remand of the case to
the trial court.
Ordinarily, Arnel would no longer be entitled to apply for probation, he
having appealed from the judgment of the RTC convicting him for frustrated
homicide. But, the Court finds Arnel guilty only of the lesser crime of attempted
homicide and holds that the maximum of the penalty imposed on him should be
lowered to imprisonment of four months of arresto mayor, as minimum, to two
years and four months of prision correccional, as maximum. With this new
penalty, it would be but fair to allow him the right to apply for probation upon
remand of the case to the RTC.
[W]hile it is true that probation is a mere privilege, the point is not that
Arnel has the right to such privilege; he certainly does not have. What he has is
the right to apply for that privilege. The Court finds that his maximum jail term
should only be 2 years and 4 months. If the Court allows him to apply for
probation because of the lowered penalty, it is still up to the trial judge to decide
whether or not to grant him the privilege of probation, taking into account the full
circumstances of his case.
If the Court chooses to go by the dissenting opinion’s hard position, it
will apply the probation law on Arnel based on the trial court’s annulled judgment
against him. He will not be entitled to probation because of the severe penalty
that such judgment imposed on him. More, the Supreme Court’s judgment of
conviction for a lesser offense and a lighter penalty will also have to bend over to
the trial court’s judgment—even if this has been found in error. And, worse,
Arnel will now also be made to pay for the trial court’s erroneous judgment with
the forfeiture of his right to apply for probation
Here, Arnel did not appeal from a judgment that would have allowed him
to apply for probation. He did not have a choice between appeal and
probation. He was not in a position to say, “By taking this appeal, I choose not to
apply for probation.” The stiff penalty that the trial court imposed on him denied
him that choice. Thus, a ruling that would allow Arnel to now seek probation
under this Court’s greatly diminished penalty will not dilute the sound ruling
in Francisco. It remains that those who will appeal from judgments of conviction,
when they have the option to try for probation, forfeit their right to apply for that
privilege.
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not of frustrated
homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is an original conviction that for the
first time imposes on him a probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right
from the start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense and imposed
on him the right penalty of two years and four months maximum. This would
have afforded Arnel the right to apply for probation.
141
VILLAREAL VS. PEOPLE
Artemio Villareal, Petitioner
vs.
People of the Philippines, Respondent
G.R. No. 151258
February 1, 2012
NATURE OF THE CASE:
Petition for Review on Certiorari under Rule 45.
BRIEF
The Petition raises two reversible errors allegedly committed by the CA in its
Decision dated 10 January 2002 in CA-G.R. No. 15520 first, denial of due
process; and, second, conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. While the
Petition was pending before this Court, counsel for petitioner Villareal filed a
Notice of Death of Party on 10 August 2011. According to the Notice, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011. Counsel thus asserts that the subject matter of
the Petition previously filed by petitioner does not survive the death of the
accused.
THE FACTS
Seven Freshmen Law students of Ateneo de Manila University School of Law
have been initiated by the Aquila Legis Juris Fraternity on February 1991. The
initiation rites started when the neophytes were met by some members of the
mentioned fraternity at the lobby of the Ateneo Law School. They were
consequently brought to a house and briefed on what will be happening during the
days when they will be initiated. They were informed that there will be physical
beatings and that the neophytes can quit anytime they want. They were brought to
another house to commence their initiation.
The neophytes were insulted and threatened even before they got off the van.
Members of the fraternity delivered blows to the neophytes as they alighted from
the van. Several initiation rites were experienced by the neophytes like the Indian
run, Bicol express and rounds. They were asked to recite provisions and principles
of the fraternity and were hit everytime they made a mistake.
Accused fraternity members, Dizon and Villareal, asked the head of the initiation
rites (Victorino) to reopen the initiation. Fraternity members subjected neophytes
to paddling and additional hours of physical pain. After the last session of
beatings, Lenny Villa could not walk. Later that night, he was feeling cold and his
condition worsened. He was brought to the hospital but was declared dead on
arrival.
Criminal case was filed against 26 fraternity members and was subsequently
found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide and penalized
with reclusion perpetua.
On January 10 2002, CA modified the criminal liability of each of the accused
according to individual participation. 19 of the the accused were acquitted, 4 of
the appellants were found guilty of slight physical injuries, and 2 of the accused-
appellants (Dizon and Villareal) were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
crime of homicide.
Accused Villareal petitioned for review on Certriori under Rue 45 on the grounds
that the CA made 2 reversible errors: first, denial of due process and second,
conviction absent proof beyond reasonable doubt. Consequently, petitioner
Villareal died on 13 March 2011 and filed a Notice of Death of Party on 10
August 2011.
THE ISSUE
Whether or not criminal liability for personal penalties of the accused is
extinguished by death
THE RULING
Yes, criminal liability of the accused is extinguished by death. The Court took
note of counsel for petitioner’s Notice of Death when it has been received while
the petition was pending resolution. Personal penalties refer to the service of
142
personal or imprisonment penalties, while pecuniary penalties refer to fines, costs, Rules 126 Search and Seizure
civil liability. Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code states that the criminal
liability of a convict for personal penalties is totally extinguished by death of the Abraham Miclat Jr. y Cerbo, Petitioner
convict. His pecuniary penalty has been extinguished since the death of the Vs.
accused happened before his final judgment. Therefore, the death of the petitioner
for both personal and pecuniary penalties including his civil liability has ended. People of the Philippines, Respondent
His petition has also been dismissed and the criminal case against him has been
G. R. No. 176077
closed and terminated.
August 31, 2011

PERALTA, J;

Nature of the Case:

Petition for Review on Certiorari

Facts:

Police operatives including PDEA conducted a surveillance of drug trafficking in

Palmera Spring II, Bagumbong, Caloocan City. The informant of the police
directed them to the residence of a certain “ABE” PO3 Antonio then positioned
himself at the perimeter of the house, while the rest of the members of the group
deployed themselves nearby. Through a small opening in the curtain-covered
window, PO3 Antonio peeped inside and there at a distance of 1½ meters, he saw
“Abe” arranging several pieces of small plastic sachets which he believed to be
containing shabu. At the same instance they arrested the petitioner. However, the
version of the petitioner is that, together with her father and sister while watching
television the police operatives barrage themselves into their house and that the
shabu was later planted to the petitioner while travelling to the police station.

The trial court rendered the decision finding the petitioner guilty of Violation of
Section 11, Article II of RA No. 9165. The CA subsequently affirmed the trial
court decision. Hence, this appeal.

Issue:

1.WHETHER OR NOT PEEPING THROUGH A CURTAIN-COVERED

WINDOW IS WITHIN THE MEANING OF “PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE” FOR
A WARRANTLESS SEIZURE TO BE LAWFUL.

143
WHETHER OR NOT PETITIONER WAS PROPERLY APPRAISED (SIC) OF
HIS CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS TO BE INFORMED OF THE CAUSE AND
NATURE OF HIS ARREST AND RIGHT TO BE ASSISTED BY COUNSEL
DURING THE PERIOD OF HIS ARREST AND CONTINUED DETENTION.
WHETHER OR NOT ARRANGING FOUR (4) PIECES OF PLASTIC
SACHETS CONSTITUTE AS A CRIME WITHIN THE MEANING OF
SECTION 5 (3), RULE 113 OF THE RULES OF COURT.
(1) the person to be arrested must execute an overt act indicating that he has just
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit a crime; and
(2) Such overt act is done in the presence or within the view of the arresting
officer.
For conviction of illegal possession of a prohibited drug to lie, the following
elements must be established:

Ruling: (1) The accused was in possession of an item or an object identified to be a

Supreme Court ruled that at the time of petitioner’s arraignment, there was no
objection raised as to the irregularity of his arrest. Thereafter, he actively
participated in the proceedings before the trial court. In effect, he is deemed to
have waived any perceived defect in his arrest and effectively submitted himself
to the jurisdiction of the court trying his case. At any rate, the illegal arrest of an
accused is not sufficient cause for setting aside a valid judgment rendered upon a
sufficient complaint after a trial free from error. It will not even negate the
validity of the conviction of the accused.
While it is true that Sec. 2 of the bill of rights preserves the rights of individuals of
illegal search and seizure. However, a settled exception to the right guaranteed by
the above-stated provision is that of an arrest made during the commission of a
crime, which does not require a previously issued warrant. Such warrantless
arrest is considered reasonable and valid under Section 5 (a), Rule 113 of the
Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure, to wit:
prohibited or regulated drug;
(2) Such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) The accused was freely and consciously aware of being in possession of the
drug.
Supreme Court ruled there is no compelling reason to reverse the findings of fact
of the trial court. No evidence exist that shows any apparent inconsistencies in the
narration of the prosecution witnesses of the events which transpired and led to
the arrest of petitioner. After a careful evaluation of the records, We find no error
was committed by the RTC and the CA to disregard their factual findings that
petitioner committed the crime charged against him.

Sec. 5. Arrest without warrant; when lawful. a peace office of a private person
may, without a warrant, arrest a person:

(a) When, in his presence, the person to be arrested has committed, is actually
committing, or is attempting to commit an offense;

For the exception in Section 5

(a), Rule 113 to operate, this Court has ruled that two (2) elements must be
present:

144
Rules 126 Search and Seizure
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee
Vs.
BELEN MARIACOS, Appellant
G..R. No. 188611
June 16 2010
Nachura, J;
Nature of the Case:
Petition for Review
Facts:
October 27, 2005 in Brgy Balbalayang, PO2 Pallayoc met with secret agent of the
Barangay Intelligence Network who informed him that a baggage of marijuana
had been loaded in a passenger jeepney that was about to leave for the poblacion.
The agent mentioned 3 bags and 1 plastic bag. Further, the agent described a
backpack bag with O.K. marking. PO2 Pallayoc boarded the said jeepney and
positioned himself on top thereof. He found bricks of marijuana wrapped in
newspapers. He them asked the other passengers about the owner of the bag, but
no one know.
When the jeepney reached the poblacion, PO2 Pallayoc alighted together with
other passengers. Unfortunately, he did not notice who took the black backpack
from atop the jeepney. He only realized a few moments later that the said bag and
3 other bags were already being carried away by two (2) women. He caught up
with the women and introduced himself as a policeman. He told them that they
were under arrest, but one the women got away.
PO2 Pallayoc brought the woman, who was later identified as herein accused
appellant Belen Mariacos, and the bags to the police station. at the police station,
the investigators contacted Mayor of San Gabriel to witness the opening of the
bag . When the mayor arrived 15 minutes later, the bags were open and the 3
bricks of marijuana fruiting tops, all wrapped in news paper, were recoverd.
There after the investigatir marked invetored and forwarded the confiscated
marijuana to the crime laboratory for examination. The laboratory examination
showed that the stuff found in bags all tested positive for marijuana a dangerous
drug.
RTC: Found Guity
Issue:
Whether or not the apellants constitutional right against unreasonable searches
was flagrantly violated by the apprehending officer;
Ruling:
CA Affirmed
The search of moving vehicle is one of the doctrinally accepted exceptions to the
Constitutional mandate that no search of seizure shall be made except by the
virtue of warrant issued by a judge after personally determining the existence of
probable cause.
The constitutional proscrition against warrantless searches and seizure admits
certain exceptions. Aside from search incident to a lawful arrest , a warrantless
search had been upheld in cases of a moving vehicle , and the seizure of evidence
in plain view.
With regard to the search of moving vehicle, this had been justified on the ground
that the mobility of motor vehicle makes it possible for the vehicle to be searched
to move out to the locality or jurisdiction in which the warrant must be sought.
Given the discussion above, it is readily apparent that the search and seizure in
this case is valid. The vehicle that carried the contraband or prohibited drugs was
145
about to leave. PO2 Pallayoc had to make a quick decision and act fast. It would
be unreasonable to require him to procure a warrant before conduction the search
under the circumstance. Time was of the essence in this case. The searching
officer had no time to obtain warrant. Indeed, he only had enough time to board
the vehicle before the same left for its destination.
DOCTRINES
ARTICLE III, SECTION 2 OF THE PHILIPPINE CONSTITUTION
PROVIDES: The right of the People to be secure in their persons, houses, papers,
and effects against unreasonable searches and seizures of whatever nature and for
any purpose shall be inviolable, and no search warrant or warrant of arrest shall
issue except upon probable cause to be determined personally by the Judge after
examination under oath or affirmation of the complainant and the witnesses he
may produce, and particularly describing the place to be searched and the persons
or things to be seized.
Purpose: MOVING VEHICLE (WARRANTLESS SEARCH)
This has been justified on the ground that the mobility of motor vehicles makes it
possible for the vehicle to be searched to move out of the locality or jurisdiction in
which the warrant must be sought.
This is no way, however, gives the police officers unlimited discretion to conduct
warrantless searches of automobiles in the absence of probable cause when a
vehicle is stopped and subjected to an extension search, such a warrantless search
has been held to be valid only as long as officers conducting the search have
reasonable or probable cause to believe before the search that they will find the
instrumentality or evidence pertaining to a crime, in the vehicle to be searched.
MALUM PROHIBITUM
When an accused is charged with illegal possession or transportation of prohibited
drugs, the ownership thereof is immaterial. Consequently, proof of ownership of
the confiscated marijuana is not necessary.
Appellant’s alleged lack of knowledge does not constitute a valid defence. Lack
ofcriminal intent and good faith are not exempting circumstances where the crime
charge is malum prohibitum
146
DOCTRINE: Sec. 4 Requisites for issuing a Warrant -
“Warrant issued must particularly describe the place to be searched.”
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness.
______________________________________________________________
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
versus
ESTELA TUAN y BALUDDA,
Accused-Appellant.
G.R. No. 176066
August 11, 2010
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
BRIEF: For review is the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-H.C. No. 00381, which affirmed with modification the
Decision dated April 9, 2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 6,
Baguio City, finding accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda guilty in Criminal
Case No. 17619-R, of illegal possession of marijuana under Article II, Section 8
of Republic Act No. 6425, otherwise known as The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972, as amended; and in Criminal Case No. 17620-R, of violating Presidential
Decree No. 1866, otherwise known as the Illegal Possession of Firearms, as
amended.
FACTS:
At around nine o’clock in the morning on January 24, 2000, two male
informants namely, Jerry Tudlong (Tudlong) and Frank Lad-ing (Lad-ing) arrived
at the office of the 14th Regional CIDG (Criminal Investigation and Detention
Group) at DPS Compound, Marcoville, Baguio City, and reported to SPO2
Fernandez, Chief of the Station Drug Enforcement Unit (SDEU), that a certain
Estela Tuan had been selling marijuana at Barangay Gabriela Silang, Baguio
City. Present at that time were Police Superintendent Isagani Neres, Regional
Officer of the 14th Regional CIDG; Chief Inspector Reynaldo Piay, Deputy
Regional Officer; and other police officers.
SPO2 Fernandez set out to verify the report of Tudlong and Lad-ing. At around
one o’clock in the afternoon of the same day, he gave Tudlong and Lad-
ing P300.00 to buy marijuana, and then accompanied the two informants to the
accused-appellants house. Tudlong and Lad-ing entered accused-appellants house,
while SPO2 Fernandez waited at the adjacent house. After thirty minutes, Tudlong
and Lad-ing came out of accused-appellants house and showed SPO2 Fernandez
the marijuana leaves they bought. After returning to the CIDG regional office,
SPO2 Fernandez requested the laboratory examination of the leaves bought from
accused-appellant. When said laboratory examination yielded positive results for
marijuana, SPO2 Fernandez prepared an Application for Search Warrant for
accused-appellants house.
SPO2 Fernandez, together with Tudlong and Lad-ing, filed the Application for a
Search Warrant before Judge Iluminada Cabato-Cortes (Judge Cortes) of the
Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC), Baguio City, Branch IV, at about one
o’clock in the afternoon on January 25, 2000. Two hours later, at around three
o’clock, Judge Cortes personally examined SPO2 Fernandez, Tudlong, and Lad-
ing, after which, she issued a Search Warrant, being satisfied of the existence of
probable cause.
Upon receipt of the Search Warrant, SPO2 Fernandez, his team supervisor Police
Senior Inspector Rodolfo Castel, SPO1 Carrera, Police Senior Inspector Ricarte
Marquez and PO2 Chavez implemented the warrant. Before going to the accused-
appellants house, SPO2 Fernandez invited barangay officials to be present when
the Search Warrant was to be served, but since no one was available, he requested
one Eliza Pascual (Pascual), accused-appellants neighbor, to come along.
The CIDG team thereafter proceeded to accused-appellants house. Even though
accused-appellant was not around, the CIDG team was allowed entry into the
house by Magno Baludda (Magno), accused-appellants father, after he was shown
a copy of the Search Warrant. SPO2 Fernandez and Police Senior Inspector
147
Ricarte Marquez guarded the surroundings of the house, while SPO1 Carrera and
PO2 Chavez searched inside.
SPO1 Carrera and PO2 Chavez began searching the rooms on the first floor in the
presence of Magno and Pascual. They continued their search on the second
floor. They saw a movable cabinet in accused-appellants room, below which they
found a brick of marijuana and a firearm. At around six o’clock that evening,
accused-appellant arrived with her son. The police officers asked accused-
appellant to open a built-in cabinet, in which they saw eight more bricks of
marijuana. PO2 Chavez issued a receipt for the items confiscated from accused-
appellant and a certification stating that the items were confiscated and recovered
from the house and in accused-appellants presence.
The nine bricks of marijuana were brought to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) for examination.
On April 5, 2000, two separate Informations were filed before the RTC against
accused-appellant for illegal possession of marijuana and illegal possession of
firearm.
Upon her arraignment on April 18, 2000, accused-appellant, assisted by her
counsel de parte, pleaded NOT GUILTY to both charges. Pre-trial and trial proper
then ensued.
ISSUE: Whether or not the Search Warrant was invalid for not describing with
particularity the place to be searched
ACTIONS OF THE COURTS:
RTC: The trial court found the accused-appellant Estela Tuan y Baludda
GUILTY of illegal possession of marijuana and Illegal Possession of Firearms
CA: The appellate court PARTLY GRANTED the instant appeal. The Court of
Appeals affirmed the conviction of accused-appellant for illegal possession of
marijuana. However, it MODIFIED the appealed RTC judgment by acquitting
accused-appellant of the charge for illegal possession of firearm.
SC: AFFIRMED the decision of the Court of Appeals.
HELD:
No. Equally without merit is accused-appellants assertion that the Search Warrant
did not describe with particularity the place to be searched.
A description of the place to be searched is sufficient if the officer serving the
warrant can, with reasonable effort, ascertain and identify the place intended and
distinguish it from other places in the community. A designation or description
that points out the place to be searched to the exclusion of all others, and on
inquiry unerringly leads the peace officers to it, satisfies the constitutional
requirement of definiteness. In the case at bar, the address and description of
the place to be searched in the Search Warrant was specific enough. There
was only one house located at the stated address, which was accused-
appellants residence, consisting of a structure with two floors and composed
of several rooms.
In view of the foregoing, the Court upholds the validity of the Search Warrant
for accused-appellants house issued by MTCC Judge Cortes, and any items seized
as a result of the search conducted by virtue thereof, may be presented as evidence
against the accused-appellant.
Pursuant to Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as amended, illegal
possession of 750 grams or more of the prohibited drug marijuana is punishable
by reclusion perpetua to death. Accused-appellant had in her possession a total
of 19,050 grams of marijuana, for which she was properly sentenced to reclusion
perpetua by the RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals.
In the same vein, the fine of P500,000.00 imposed upon accused-appellant by the
RTC, affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is also correct, as the same is still within
the range of fines imposable on any person who possessed prohibited drugs
without any authority, under Article II, Section 8 of Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended.
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: WHEREFORE, premises considered,
the Decision dated September 21, 2006 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR.-
H.C. No. 00381, is hereby AFFIRMED in toto. No costs.
148
DOCTRINE: When searches and seizures allowed without warrants –
“STOP-AND-FRISK RULE”
What is, therefore, essential is that a genuine reason must exist, in light of the
police officer's experience and surrounding conditions, to warrant the belief that
the person who manifests unusual suspicious conduct has weapons or contraband
concealed about him. Such a "stop-and-frisk" practice serves a dual purpose:
(1) the general interest of effective crime prevention and detection, which
underlies the recognition that a police officer may, under
appropriate circumstances and in an appropriate manner, approach a person for
purposes of investigating possible criminal behavior even without probable
cause; and (2) the more pressing interest of safety and self-preservation which
permit the police officer to take steps to assure himself that the person with whom
he deals is not armed with a deadly weapon that could unexpectedly and fatally be
used against the police officer.
______________________________________________________________
SUSAN ESQUILLO Y ROMINES, PETITIONER,
VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, RESPONDENT.
G.R. No. 182010
August 25, 2010
Ponente: CARPIO MORALES, J.:
BRIEF: Via petition erroneously captioned as one for Certiorari, Susan Esquillo y
Romines (petitioner) challenges the November 27, 2007 Decision of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 27894 which affirmed the July 28, 2003 Decision of
Branch 116 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay City in Criminal Case No.
02-2297 convicting Susan Esquillo y Romines (petitioner) for violating Section
11, Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9165 (the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002) - possession of methamphetamine hydrochloride or shabu.
FACTS:
On the basis of an informant's tip, PO1 Cruzin, together with PO2 Angel Aguas
(PO2 Aguas), proceeded at around 4:00 p.m. on December 10, 2002 to Bayanihan
St., Malibay, Pasay City to conduct surveillance on the activities of an alleged
notorious snatcher operating in the area known only as “Ryan”.
As PO1 Cruzin alighted from the private vehicle that brought him and PO2 Aguas
to the target area, he glanced in the direction of petitioner who was standing three
meters away and seen placing inside a yellow cigarette case what appeared to be a
small heat-sealed transparent plastic sachet containing white substance. While
PO1 Cruz was not sure what the plastic sachet contained, he became suspicious
when petitioner started acting strangely as he began to approach her. He then
introduced himself as a police officer to petitioner and inquired about the plastic
sachet she was placing inside her cigarette case. Instead of replying, however,
petitioner attempted to flee to her house nearby but was timely restrained by PO1
Cruzin who then requested her to take out the transparent plastic sachet from the
cigarette case.
After apprising petitioner of her constitutional rights, PO1 Cruzin confiscated the
plastic sachet on which he marked her initials "SRE." With the seized item,
petitioner was brought for investigation to a Pasay City Police Station where
P/Insp. Aquilino E. Almanza, Chief of the Drug Enforcement Unit, prepared a
memorandum dated December 10, 2002 addressed to the Chief Forensic Chemist
of the NBI in Manila requesting for: 1) a laboratory examination of the substance
contained in the plastic sachet to determine the presence of shabu, and 2) the
conduct of a drug test on the person of petitioner. PO1 Cruzin and PO2 Aguas
soon executed a Joint Affidavit of Apprehension recounting the details of their
intended surveillance and the circumstances leading to petitioner's arrest.
Results of the laboratory examination of the contents of the sachet in Dangerous
Drugs Report No. DD-02-613, viz:
xxxx
F I N D I N G S:
Net Weight of specimen = 0.1224 gram
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for METHAMPHETAMINE HYDROCHLORIDE,
149
 a dangerous drug. x x x ACTIONS OF THE COURTS:

xxxx RTC: By Decision of July 28, 2003, the trial court found petitioner GUILTY of
illegal possession of Methylamphetamine Hydrochloride or shabu.
With respect to the examination of the urine of petitioner, de Belen recorded the
results thereof in Toxicology Report No. TDD-02-4128 reading: CA: The appellate court AFFIRMED the trial court's decision.

xxxx SC: The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with
the MODIFICATION that the penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12)
F I N D I N G S: years and one (1) day, as minimum, to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all
other respects, the decision of the RTC in Criminal Case No. 02-2297
Volume of urine = 60 mL. is AFFIRMED.
pH of urine = 5.0
Appearance = yellow orange, turbid
HELD:
Examinations conducted on the above-mentioned specimen
gave POSITIVE RESULTS for the presence of METHAMPHETAMINE Yes. The Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers constituted a
HYDROCHLORIDE, and its metaboliteAMPHETAMINE. x x x valid "stop-and-frisk" operation.
xxx
Appellant's conviction stands.
On the other hand, petitioner claimed that the evidence against her was "planted,"
stemming from an all too obvious attempt by the police officers to extort money
Petitioner did not question early on her warrantless arrest - before her
from her and her family.
arraignment. Neither did she take steps to quash the Information on such
ground. Verily, she raised the issue of warrantless arrest - as well as the
Two other witnesses for the defense, petitioner's daughter Josan Lee and family
inadmissibility of evidence acquired on the occasion thereof- for the first time
friend Ma. Stella Tolentino, corroborated petitioner's account. They went on to
only on appeal before the appellate court. By such omissions, she is deemed to
relate that the police officers never informed them of the reason why they were
have waived any objections on the legality of her arrest.
taking custody of petitioner.
Be that as it may, the circumstances under which petitioner was arrested indeed
In her present petition, petitioner assails the appellate court's application of the
engender the belief that a search on her was warranted. Recall that the police
"stop-and-frisk" principle in light of PO1 Cruzin's failure to justify his suspicion
officers were on a surveillance operation as part of their law enforcement efforts.
that a crime was being committed, he having merely noticed her placing
When PO1 Cruzin saw petitioner placing a plastic sachet containing white
something inside a cigarette case which could hardly be deemed suspicious. To
crystalline substance into her cigarette case, it was in his plain view. Given his
petitioner, such legal principle could only be invoked if there were overt acts
training as a law enforcement officer, it was instinctive on his part to be drawn to
constituting unusual conduct that would arouse the suspicion.
curiosity and to approach her. That petitioner reacted by attempting to flee after he
introduced himself as a police officer and inquired about the contents of the
plastic sachet all the more pricked his curiosity.
ISSUE: Whether or not the warrantless arrest of the accused was valid under the
“stop-and-frisk principle”.

150
That a search may be conducted by law enforcers only on the strength of a valid
search warrant is settled. The same, however, admits of exceptions, viz:
(1) consented searches; (2) as an incident to a lawful arrest; (3) searches of
vessels and aircraft for violation of immigration, customs, and drug laws; (4)
searches of moving vehicles; (5) searches of automobiles at borders or
constructive borders; (6) where the prohibited articles are in "plain view;" (7)
searches of buildings and premises to enforce fire, sanitary, and building
regulations; and (8) "stop and frisk" operations.
In the instances where a warrant is not necessary to effect a valid search or
seizure, the determination of what constitutes a reasonable or unreasonable search
or seizure is purely a judicial question, taking into account, among other things,
the uniqueness of the circumstances involved including the purpose of the search
or seizure, the presence or absence of probable cause, the manner in which the
search and seizure was made, the place or thing searched, and the character of the
articles procured.
xxx
From these standards, the Court finds that the questioned act of the police officers
constituted a valid "stop-and-frisk" operation. The search/seizure of the
suspected shabu initially noticed in petitioner's possession - later voluntarily
exhibited to the police operative - was undertaken after she was interrogated on
what she placed inside a cigarette case, and after PO1 Cruzin introduced himself
to petitioner as a police officer. And, at the time of her arrest, petitioner was
exhibiting suspicious behavior and in fact attempted to flee after the police officer
had identified himself.
It bears recalling that petitioner admitted the genuineness and due execution of the
Dangerous Drugs and Toxicology Reports, subject, however, to whatever
available defenses she would raise. While such admissions do not necessarily
control in determining the validity of a warrantless search or seizure, they
nevertheless provide a reasonable gauge by which petitioner's credibility as a
witness can be measured, or her defense tested.
It has not escaped the Court's attention that petitioner seeks exculpation by
adopting two completely inconsistent or incompatible lines of defense. On one
hand, she argues that the "stop-and-frisk" search upon her person and personal
effects was unjustified as it constituted a warrantless search in violation of the
Constitution. In the same breadth, however, she denies culpability by holding fast
to her version that she was at home resting on the date in question and had been
forcibly dragged out of the house by the police operatives and brought to the
police station, for no apparent reason than to try and extort money from her. That
her two witnesses - a daughter and a friend - who were allegedly present at the
time of her arrest did not do anything to report it despite their claim that they were
not informed why she was being arrested, should dent the credibility of their
testimony.
Courts have tended to look with disfavor on claims of accused, such as those of
petitioner's, that they are victims of a frame-up. The defense of frame-up, like
alibi, has been held as a shop-worn defense of the accused in drug-related cases,
the allegation being easily concocted or contrived. For this claim to prosper, the
defense must adduce clear and convincing evidence to overcome the presumption
of regularity of official acts of government officials. This it failed to do.
Absent any proof of motive to falsely accuse petitioner of such a grave offense,
the presumption of regularity in the performance of official duty and the findings
of the trial court with respect to the credibility of witnesses prevail over that of
petitioner
RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT: WHEREFORE, the assailed decision
of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED, with the MODIFICATION that the
penalty of imprisonment shall be twelve (12) years and one (1) day, as minimum,
to fourteen (14) years, as maximum. In all other respects, the decision of the RTC
in Criminal Case No. 02-2297 is AFFIRMED.
151
SEARCH AND SEIZURE
MARIMLA vs People
SPOUSES JOEL AND MARIETTA MARIMLA, Petitioners,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES AND HON. OMAR T. VIOLA, RTC
Judge, Branch 57, Angeles City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 158467
October 16, 2009
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J
Nature of Case: petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court
1
Brief: It seeks to annul the Order dated September 6, 2002 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Angeles City, Branch 57, denying petitioner spouses Joel and
Marietta Marimla’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Suppress Evidence
Illegally Seized, and the Order2 dated April 21, 2003 denying the Motion for
Reconsideration thereof.
FACTS:
Special Investigator (SI) Ray C. Lagasca of the NBI Anti-Organized Crime
Division filed two (2) applications for search warrant with the RTC of Manila
seeking permission to search: (1) petitioners’ house located on RD Reyes St.,
Brgy. Sta. Trinidad, Angeles City and (2) the premises on Maria Aquino St.,
Purok V, Brgy. Sta. Cruz, Porac, Pampanga, both for Violation of Section 16,
Article III of Republic Act(R.A.) No. 6425, as amended. The said applications
uniformly alleged that SI Lagasca’s request for the issuance of the search warrants
was founded on his personal knowledge as well as that of witness Roland D.
Fernandez (Fernandez), obtained after a series of surveillance operations and a
test buy made at petitioners’ house. The purpose of the application for search
warrants was to seize Shabu, Marijuana weighing scale, plastic sachets, tooters,
burner, rolling papers, and paraphernalia. Juadge Guarina found probable cause to
issue the search warrant. The officers conducted a search and found separate dried
flowering tops in different containers. The petitioners filed a Motion to Quash the
Search Warrant for it was allegedly filed outside the territorial jurisdiction and
judicial region of the court where the crime is committed
ISSUE:
Whether or not the Court has jurisdiction to issue the warrant
ACTIONS of the COURT:
RTC: Denied petitioner’s Motion to Quash Search Warrant and to Supress
Evidence Illegally Seized for lack of Merit
CA: Denied Motion for Consideration
SC: The decision of the RTC is affirmed
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
The Public Prosecutor was able to point out that the search warrant issued by
Judge Mario Guaria III, the Executive Judge of the Manila Regional Trial Court,
is in order. A.M. No. 99-10-09-SC allows or authorizes executive judges of the
RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue warrants which may be served in places
outside territorial jurisdiction in cases where the same was filed and among others
by the NBI.
The general rule is that a party is mandated to follow the hierarchy of courts.
However, in exceptional cases, the Court, for compelling reasons or if warranted
by the nature of the issues raised, may take cognizance of petitions filed directly
before it. In this case, the Court opts to take cognizance of the petition, as it
involves the application of the rules promulgated by this Court in the exercise of
its rule-making power under the Constitution. Rule 126 of the Criminal
Procedures on Search and Seizure states that:
“ Sec. 2.Court where application for search warrant shall be filed. – An
application for search warrant shall be filed with the following: (a) Any court
152
within whose territorial jurisdiction a crime was committed, (b) For compelling Rule 126 – Search and Seizure
reasons stated in the application, any court within the judicial region where the Sec. 2. Court where application of Search warrant shall be filled
crime was committed if the place of the commission of the crime is known, or any Sec. 4. Requisites for issuing search warrant
court within the judicial region where the warrant shall be enforced.” Sec. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses
However, if the criminal action has already been filed, the application shall only
be made in the court where the criminal action is pending. Nothing in A.M. No. PEOPLE VS. PUNZALAN
99-10-09-SC prohibits the heads of the PNP, NBI, PAOC-TF and REACT-TF
from delegating their ministerial duty of endorsing the application for search PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff - appellee
warrant to their assistant heads. Under Section 31, Chapter 6, Book IV of the vs.
Administrative Code of 1987, an assistant head or other subordinate in every JERRY PUNZALAN AND PATRICIA PUNZALAN, accused - appellants
The Solicitor General for plaintiff – appellee
bureau may perform such duties as may be specified by their superior or head, as
Atty. not indicated for accused – appellants
long as it is not inconsistent with law. We cannot find any irregularity or abuse of
discretion on the part of Judge Omar T. Viola for denying petitioners’ Motion to G.R. No. 199087
Quash Search Warrant.” November 11, 2015
Ponente: VILLARAMA, JR.
SUPREME COURT RULING:
Nature of Case:
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is hereby DISMISSED. The Order Petition for Review (Appeal)
s dated
September 6, 2002 and April 21, 2003, both issued by respondent Judge O BRIEF
mar Viola of the RTC of Angeles City, Branch 57, are hereby AFFIRMED. This is an appeal for the reversion of the decision of the Court of Appeals (CA)
which affirmed the Joint Decision of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City, Branch 116 convicting accused-appellants of violation of Section 11, Article
II of Republic Act 9162, otherwise known as the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002.

FACTS
On November 3, 2009, at around 4:30 in the morning, the Philippine Drug
Enforcement Agency (PDEA) Team headed by Intelligence Agent I Liwanag
Sandaan and other agents implemented a search warrant issued on October 28,
2009 by then Manila RTC Judge Eduardo B. Peralta, Jr. to (i) make an immediate
search of the premises/house of accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan,
Vima Punzalan, Jaime Punzalan, Arlene Punzalan-Razon and Felix Razon who
are all residents of 704 Apelo Cruz Compound, Barangay 175, Malibay, Pasay
City; and (ii) to seize and take possession of an undetermined quantity of assorted

153
dangerous drugs, including the proceeds or fruits and bring said property to the
court.
Since there are three houses or structures inside the compound believed to be
occupied by the accused-appellants, a sketch6 of the compound describing the
house to be searched was prepared and attached to the search warrant.
Before proceeding to the target area, they passed by the barangay hall to
coordinate with Barangay Chairman Reynaldo Flores, Kagawad Larry Fabella and
Kagawad Edwin Razon. The team likewise brought with them a media
representative affiliated with "Sunshine Radio" to cover the operation. From the
barangay hall, they walked toward the target place using as a guide the sketch they
prepared.
When they were already outside the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan, which is
a three-storey structure, IA1 Sandaan knocked on the door. A woman, later
identified as accused-appellant Patricia Punzalan, slightly opened the door. When
they introduced themselves as PDEA agents and informed the occupant that they
have a search warrant, Patricia immediately tried to close the door but was not
successful since the PDEA agents pushed the door open. The team was able to
enter the house of Jerry and Patricia Punzalan who were both surprised when
found inside the house. IO1 Pagaragan showed and read the search warrant infront
of accused-appellants.
Inside the house, the team immediately saw plastic sachets placed on top of the
table. 101 Pagaragan was able to seize nine (9) heat-sealed plastic sachets, two (2)
square-shaped transparent plastic containers and a small round plastic container.
All three (3) plastic containers contained smaller heat-sealed plastic sachets of
white crystalline substance of suspected shabu. There were also other
paraphernalia, guns, money and a digital weighing scale. Accordingly, SI2
Esteban and IO2 Alvarado effected the arrest of accused-appellants Jerry and
Patricia Punzalan after informing them of their constitutional rights. 101
Pagaragan immediately marked the seized items by placing the marking "ADP".
After searching and marking the evidence found on the first floor, the team,
together with the barangay officials and accused-appellants, proceeded to, and
conducted the search on the second and third floors but found nothing. They went
downstairs where they conducted the inventory of recovered items. 101 Pagaragan
prepared the Receipt/Inventory of Property Seized and a Certification of Orderly
Search which were later signed by the barangay officials.
After their arrest, accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan were brought to
the PDEA Office in Quezon City for investigation. IO1 Pagaragan presented the
seized evidence to Atty. Benjamin Gaspe, who prepared the Booking Sheet and
Arrest Report, Request for Drug Test/Physical and Medical Examination. They
likewise caused the preparation of their respective affidavits. Photographs were
also taken during the actual search and inventory. Laboratory examination of the
seized pieces of drug evidence gave positive results for the presence of
methamphetamine hydrochloride, otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
Thereafter, the accused-appellants were charged with violation of Section 11,
Article II of R.A. No. 9165 for illegal possession of 40.78 grams of
methamphetamine hydrochloride otherwise known as shabu, a dangerous drug.
The accused-appellants denied the charged whereby they presented witnesses and
questioned the validity of the search conducted in their premises.
The trial court held that the issuance of a search warrant against the premises of
different persons named therein is valid as there is no requirement that only one
search warrant for one premise to be searched is necessary for its validity. Also,
the address of the accused-appellants Jerry and Patricia Punzalan was clearly and
adequately described. A sketch that specifically identifies the places to be
searched was attached to the records and such description of the place was
unquestionably accurate that the PDEA agents were led to, and were able to
successfully conduct their operation in the premises described in the search
warrant.
The trial court also ruled that the implementation of the search warrant
sufficiently complied with the requirements of the law.
The decision of the trial court was affirmed by the CA, thus, the appeal of the
accused-appellants alleging errors committed by the CA.
ISSUE/S of the CASE
1. Whether or not the search warrant issued by RTC of Manila, Branch 17, to
search the premises in Pasay is valid.
2. Whether or not there is probable cause for the issuance of the search warrant.
154
3. Whether or not there is a violation of the two witnesses rule in this case.
ACTION of the COURT
RTC: Appellants were convicted for violation of Section 11, Article II of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drug Act of 2002 or R.A. No. 9165.
CA: The decision of the RTC is AFFIRMED.
SC: The decision of the CA is AFFIRMED.
COURT RATIONALE ON THE ABOVE FACTS
On the first issue
In assailing the validity of the search warrant, accused-appellants claim that the
PDEA agents who applied for a search warrant failed to comply with the
requirements for the procurement of a search warrant particularly the approval of
the PDEA Director General. Accused-appellants also contended that the court
which issued the search warrant, the RTC of Manila, Branch 17, had no authority
to issue the search warrant since the place where the search is supposed to be
conducted is outside its territorial jurisdiction.
We are not persuaded. A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC, entitled "Guidelines on the
Selection and Appointment of Executive Judges and Defining their Powers,
Prerogatives and Duties" as approved by the Court in its Resolution of January 27,
2004, as amended, provides:
SEC. 12. Issuance of search warrants in special criminal cases by the Regional
Trial Courts of Manila and Quezon City. - The Executive Judges and, whenever
they are on official leave of absence or are not physically present in the station,
the Vice-Executive Judges of the RTCs of Manila and Quezon City shall have
authority to act on applications filed by the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI), the Philippine National Police (PNP) and the Anti-Crime Task Force
(ACTAF), for search warrants involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal
possession of firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the
Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the Intellectual Property Code, the
Anti-Money Laundering Act of 2001, the Tariff and Customs Code, as amended,
and other relevant laws that may hereafter be enacted by Congress, and included
herein by the Supreme Court.
The applications shall be endorsed by the heads of such agencies or their
respective duly authorized officials and shall particularly describe therein the
places to be searched and/or the property or things to be seized as prescribed in
the Rules of Court. The Executive Judges and Vice-Executive Judges concerned
shall issue the warrants, if justified, which may be served outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the said courts.
xxxx
In the instant case, aside from their bare allegation, accused-appellants failed to
show that the application for search war
rant of the subject premises was not approved by the PDEA Regional Director or
his authorized representative. On the contrary, the search warrant issued by the
RTC of Manila, Branch 17 satisfactorily complies with the requirements for the
issuance thereof as determined by the issuing court, thus:
Pursuant to Section 2, Article 3 of the 1987 Constitution, Sections 2 to 5, Rule
126 of the 2000 Rules on Criminal Procedure, modified by Section 12 of Supreme
Court En Bane Resolution in A.M. No. 03-08-02-SC dated January 27, 2004, and
Certification dated October 28, 2009, it appearing to the satisfaction of the
undersigned after personally examining under oath Agent Liwanag B. Sandaan
and Agent Derween Reed both of Philippine Drug Enforcement Agency Metro
Manila Regional Office, that there is probable cause, there are good and sufficient
reasons, to believe that undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs,
particularly shabu, including the proceeds or fruits and those used or intended to
be used by the respondents as a means of committing the offense, you are hereby
commanded to make an immediate search at any time in the day or night of the
premises above described and forthwith seize and take possession of the
undetermined quantity of assorted dangerous drugs including the proceeds 01
fruits and bring said property to the undersigned to be dealt with as the law
directs.19cralawlawlibrary
Moreover, we find no merit in accused-appellants' claim that the RTC of Manila,
Branch 17, had no authority to issue the assailed search warrant since the place to
be searched is outside its territorial jurisdiction. As aforecited, Section 12, Chapter
V of A.M. No. 03-8-02-SC clearly authorizes the Executive Judges and the Vice-
Executive Judges of the RTC of Manila and Quezon City to issue search warrants
to be served in places outside their territorial jurisdiction in special criminal cases
such as those involving heinous crimes, illegal gambling, illegal possession of
firearms and ammunitions as well as violations of the Comprehensive Dangerous
Drugs Act of 2002, as in this case, for as long as the parameters under the said
155
section have been complied with. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant appeal is DISMISSED. The
Decision dated October 28, 2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR HC No.
On the second issue 04557 is hereby AFFIRMED.
In the issuance of a search warrant, probable cause requires such facts and
circumstances that would lead a reasonably prudent man to believe that an offense With costs against the accused-appellants.
has been committed and the objects sought in connection with that offense are in
the place to be searched. There is no exact test for the determination of probable SO ORDERED.
cause in the issuance of search warrants. It is a matter wholly dependent on the
finding of trial judges in the process of exercising their judicial function. When a
finding of probable cause for the issuance of a search warrant is made by a trial
judge, the finding is accorded respect by reviewing courts.

xxx

On the third issue

Notably, Section 8, Rule 126 of the Revised Rules of Criminal
Procedure provides:
SEC. 8. Search of house, room, or premises to be made in presence of two
witnesses. - No search of a house, room, or any other premises shall be made
except in the presence of the lawful occupant thereof or any member of his family
or in the absence of the latter, two witnesses of sufficient age and discretion
residing in the same locality.

As correctly ruled by the CA, even if the barangay officials were not present
during the initial search, the search was witnessed by accused-appellants
themselves, hence, the search was valid since the rule that "two witnesses of
sufficient age and discretion residing in the same locality" must be present applies
only in the absence of either the lawful occupant of the premises or any member
of his family.

xxx

In fine, we find no error on the part of the CA in affirming the trial court's
conviction of accused-appellants of illegal possession of dangerous drugs. The
prosecution has proven beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellants
Jerry Punzalan and Patricia Punzalan of the crime charged. We likewise find
proper the modification by the trial court of the penalty imposed to life
imprisonment and a fine of P400,000.00

156