ALFREDO L. AZARCON v.

SANDIGANBAYAN

ONE LINER: One appointed to exercise sovereign functions is not a public officer if the one appointing
does not have the authority.

FACTS: Petitioner Azarcon owned and operated an earth-moving business, and his services were
contracted by Paper Industries Corporation in Mangagoy, Surigao del Sur. Often, he engaged the
services of sub-contractors like Jaime Ancla whose trucks were left at Azarcon’s premises. From this set
of circumstances arose the controversy. The BIR issued a Warrant of Distraint of Personal Property
against the property of Jaime Ancla. The warrant of garnishment was issued to Azarcon ordering him to
keep in his possession as custodian of the BIR the trucks of Ancla. Azarcon signed a receipt of the goods
from BIR and promised to not permit others to remove or dispose said property and to give it up to the
BIR upon demand.
Subsequently, Azarcon wrote BIR stating that Ancla has ceased his operations with him. In connection to
that, he relinquishes whatever responsibilities he may have acquired over the property by virtue of the
receipt he signed. The petitioner also reported that the truck has been taken. After a complaint was
filed, the Sandiganbayan subsequently found out that the truck was again being rented out to PICOP.

Due to this, Jaime Ancla and Azarcon were charged before the Sandiganbayan with the crime of
malversation of public funds or property under Article 217 in relation to Article 222 of the RPC.

Petitioner filed a motion for reinvestigation alleging that he never appeared for the preliminary
investigation and that petitioner was not a public officer. It was granted, but the Ombudsman insisted
on proceeding with the case. A motion to dismiss was filed on the ground of lack of jurisdiction but it
was denied.

ISSUE:
WON the petitioner can be considered a public officer by reason of his being designated by the BIR as
depositary of distrained property? NOPE

RULING: The petition is meritorious.

Azarcon: A Public Officer or A Private Individual

c
The Information does not charge petitioner Azarcon of being a co-principal, accomplice or accessory to a
public officer committing an offense under the Sandiganbayan's jurisdiction. Thus, unless petitioner be
proven a public officer, the Sandiganbayan will have no jurisdiction over the crime charged. Article 203
of the RPC determines who are public officers.

Thus,
"(to) be a public officer, one must be —
(1) Taking part in the performance of public functions in the government, or Performing in said
Government or any of its branches public duties as an employee, agent, or subordinate official, of any
rank or class; and
(2) That his authority to take part in the performance of public functions or to perform public duties
must be —
a. by direct provision of the law, or
b. by popular election, or
c. by appointment by competent authority."

Granting arguendo that the petitioner, in signing the receipt for the truck constructively distrained by
the BIR, commenced to take part in an activity constituting public functions, he obviously may not be
deemed authorized by popular election. The next logical query is whether petitioner's designation by
the BIR as a custodian of distrained property qualifies as appointment by direct provision of law, or by
competent authority. We answer in the negative.

The Solicitor General contends that the BIR, in effecting constructive distraint over the truck allegedly
owned by Jaime Ancla, and in requiring Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon who was in possession thereof to sign
a pro forma receipt for it, effectively "designated" petitioner a depositary and, hence, citing U.S. vs.
Rastrollo, a public officer.

We disagree. The case of U.S. vs. Rastrollo is not applicable to the case before us simply because the
facts therein are not identical, similar or analogous to those obtaining here. While the cited case
involved a judicial deposit of the proceeds of the sale of attached property in the hands of the debtor,
the case at bench dealt with the BIR's administrative act of effecting constructive distraint over alleged
property of taxpayer Ancla in relation to his back taxes, property which was received by Petitioner
Azarcon. In the cited case, it was clearly within the scope of that court's jurisdiction and judicial power
to constitute the judicial deposit and give "the depositary a character equivalent to that of a public
official." However, in the instant case, while the BIR had authority to require Petitioner Azarcon to sign a
receipt for the distrained truck, the NIRC did not grant it power to appoint Azarcon a public officer.

It is axiomatic in our constitutional framework, which mandates a limited government, that its branches
and administrative agencies exercise only that power delegated to them as "defined either in the
Constitution or in legislation or in both." Thus, although the "appointing power is the exclusive
prerogative of the President, . . ." the quantum of powers possessed by an administrative agency
forming part of the executive branch will still be limited to that "conferred expressly or by necessary or
fair implication in its enabling act. Hence, "(a)n administrative officer, it has been held, has only such
powers as are expressly granted to him and those necessarily implied in the exercise thereof."
Corollarily, implied powers "are those which are necessarily included in, and are therefore of lesser
degree than the power granted. It cannot extend to other matters not embraced therein, nor are not
incidental thereto." For to so extend the statutory grant of power "would be an encroachment on
powers expressly lodged in Congress by our Constitution." It is true that Sec. 206 of the NIRC, as pointed
out by the prosecution, authorizes the BIR to effect a constructive distraint by requiring "any person to
preserve a distrained property.

However, we find no provision in the NIRC constituting such person a public officer by reason of such
requirement. The BIR's power authorizing a private individual to act as a depositary cannot be stretched
to include the power to appoint him as a public officer.
"Legislative intent is determined principally from the language of a statute. Where the language of a
statute is clear and unambiguous, the law is applied according to its express terms, and interpretation
would be resorted to only where a literal interpretation would be either impossible or absurd or would
lead to an injustice." This is particularly observed in the interpretation of penal statutes which "must be
construed with such strictness as to carefully safeguard the rights of the defendant . . ." The language of
the foregoing provision is clear. A private individual who has in his charge any of the public funds or
property enumerated therein and commits any of the acts defined in any of the provisions of Chapter
Four, Title Seven of the RPC, should likewise be penalized with the same penalty meted to erring public
officers. Nowhere in this provision is it expressed or implied that a private individual falling under said
Article 222 is to be deemed a public officer.

After a thorough review of the case at bench, the Court thus finds Petitioner Alfredo Azarcon and his co-
accused Jaime Ancla to be both private individuals erroneously charged before and convicted by
Respondent Sandiganbayan which had no jurisdiction over them. The Sandiganbayan's taking
cognizance of this case is of no moment since "(j)urisdiction cannot be conferred by . . . erroneous belief
of the court that it had jurisdiction."