CANON 6 - THESE CANONS SHALL APPLY TO LAWYERS IN GOVERNMENT SERVICES
IN THE DISCHARGE OF THEIR TASKS. ISSUE: WON he violated Canon 6.02 of CPR
Rule 6.01 - The primary duty of a lawyer engaged in public prosecution is not to convict but to
see that justice is done. The suppression of facts or the concealment of witnesses capable of
establishing the innocence of the accused is highly reprehensible and is cause for disciplinary
action.
Rule 6.02 - A lawyer in the government service shall not use his public position to promote or
advance his private interests, nor allow the latter to interfere with his public duties.
Rule 6.03 - A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service, accept engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened while in said service.
LIM V. BARCELONA 2004
FACTS: On May 9, 2001, Dan Joel V. Lim and Richard C. Tan, both businessmen, filed a
complaint for alleged robbery or extortion and violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt
Practices Act against Atty. Edilberto Barcelona, a lawyer formerly employed with the National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). Complainant Lim alleged that on the first week of August
2000, respondent phoned him and introduced himself as a lawyer and chief of the Public
Assistance Center, NLRC. Respondent informed him that his employees filed a labor complaint
against him in his office and it was necessary for him to see and talk with respondent. From then
on respondent would often call him. Respondent visited him in his office and told him to settle
the case or else his business, Top Gun Billiards, would be shut down. Lim recalled that on
August 14, 2000, at around 7:30 p.m., respondent again visited his establishment and told him to
settle the case for P20,000.00. In support of his allegations, Lim submitted a written complaint of
Arnel E. Ditan and Pilipino Ubante; an endorsement letter dated August 2, 2000 of Atty.
Jonathan F. Baligod of the Presidential Action Center; handwritten calling cards of the
respondent; and an affidavit of desistance executed by Ditan and Ubante.
In their joint affidavit, Ditan and Ubante confirmed the filing of their complaint against their
employer, Lim, and that after some dialogue, the employees executed an affidavit dated August
8, 2000 withdrawing their complaint. According to Ditan and Ubante, they met the respondent in
Top Gun Billiards where the latter often played billiards. One day, respondent gave them a letter
and asked them to sign it. Since they were busy at that time, they signed it without reading and
understanding its contents. Their employer, Lim, asked what it was about and they told him that
they were just made to sign a document without their understanding it. They added, they did not
have any complaint against their employer. Despite such withdrawal, respondent still called Lim
threatening the latter that he would pursue the case, have his establishment closed and he
would be jailed if he did not come up with P20,000.00 as settlement. In the evening of August
14, 2000, respondent reiterated his demand for P20,000.00, again with the threat of closure of
the billiard center and putting Lim in jail. Notably, almost nine months before the filing of his
complaint, or on August 14, 2000, complainant Lim personally submitted a letter to the NBI
requesting the NBI to investigate respondent Atty. Edilberto Barcelona.[4] According to the NBI
report, after due investigation, it decided to conduct an entrapment operation. On August 15,
2000, Special Investigator Marvin de Jemil, sent nine five hundred peso bills and five one
hundred peso bills for fluorescent powder dusting to the NBI Forensic Chemistry Division.
Further, the NBI reported that thru the NBI Identification and Records Division, it found no record
of such person named Edilberto Barcelona. Lim informed the NBI operatives that at around 7:00
p.m. respondent would drop by his pool house to collect the money. At around 6:30 p.m., the
operatives went to the pool house and strategically positioned themselves and posed as pool
players. At about 7:20 p.m., respondent arrived, sat on a plastic chair and talked to complainant
Lim. At around 7:30 p.m., Lim handed the marked money to the respondent who, in turn,
received it. While respondent was counting the money and about to place it inside his bag, he
was immediately arrested. Richard Tan also had the same experience with Atty. Barcelona.
Defense of Barcelona: He was forced by Lim to count the money. And for Tan’s case, he did not
receive any money from Tan.
HELD: Yes, Atty. Barcelona is DISBARRED. Want of moral integrity is to be more severely
condemned in a lawyer who holds a responsible public office. Rule 1.02 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility provides that a lawyer shall not counsel or abet activities aimed at
defiance of the law or at lessening confidence in the legal system. Extortion by a government
lawyer, an outright violation of the law, calls for the corresponding grave sanctions. With the
aforesaid rule a high standard of integrity is demanded of a government lawyer as compared to
a private practitioner because the delinquency of a government lawyer erodes the peoples trust
and confidence in the government. Indeed, the primary objective of administrative cases against
lawyers is not only to punish and discipline the erring individual lawyers, but also to safeguard
the administration of justice by protecting the courts and the public from the misconduct of
lawyers and to remove from the legal profession persons whose utter disregard of the lawyers
oath has proven them unfit to continue discharging the trust reposed in them as members of the
bar. These pronouncements gain practical significance in this case, considering that respondent
is a senior lawyer of the NLRC. It bears stressing also that government lawyers who are
public servants owe fidelity to the public service, a public trust. As such, government
lawyers should be more sensitive to their professional obligations as their disreputable conduct
is more likely to be magnified in the public eye. As a lawyer, who was also a public officer,
respondent miserably failed to cope with the strict demands and high standards of the legal
profession.
GONZALES-AUSTRIA V. ABAYA 1989
FACTS: In a complaint under oath dated July 21, 1986, docketed as Adm. Matter No. R-705-
RTJ, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria, then Branch Clerk of Court charged Judge Emmanuel M.
Abaya with:
1. Estafa through falsification of public or official documents, by verifying official hours rendered
by one employee in the person of Miss Anabelle Cardenas who never reported for duty from
August 1983 to May 1984 by encashing and receiving salaries of said Miss Cardenas through
forgery of payee's signature in the treasury warrants, thus deceiving the government and
defrauding the Government treasury of a big amount of money; - Cardenas and Abaya denied
this. Cardenas said she worked during the time being.
2. Gross dishonesty and corruption by soliciting, demanding, receiving bribed (sic) money in
exchange for favorable resolutions and decisions from different litigants in Branch 52, where
said Judge was temporarily assigned from November 1984 to April 1986 and of which one of the
undersigned complainant (sic), LIGAYA GONZALES-AUSTRIA is the Branch Clerk of Court;
It was alleged that Judge Abaya denied the application for bail of the accused in Criminal Case
No. 5304 entitled "People vs. Henry Arias and Fernando Oniot for murder, in consideration of
the sum of P 2,000.00 given by Mrs. Leonila Fuertes, complainant and mother of the victim in
the aforesaid case. Angel R. Miclat, then acting City Fiscal for Puerto Princess City handling
Criminal Case No. 5304. He testified that Mrs. Fuertes came to him in August of 1986 to inform
him that Judge Abaya was asking P5,000.00 from her so that the bail application of the accused
would be denied. While he advised her to file a complaint against Judge Abaya, he was informed
later on that Mrs. Fuertes gave Judge Abaya not the amount being asked, but only about
P1,200.00.
3. Illegal exaction of portion of the salaries of his subordinate Edgardo Servando as part and
condition of his continued employment in Branch 51, where Judge Abaya is the presiding judge.
upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya, declared a job recommendation was made in
consideration of his agreement to give Judge Abaya Pl,000.00 from his initial salary and
thereafter a monthly amount of P400.00, which undertaking he complied with. However, in
December when the Judge before leaving for Manila for the Christmas vacation asked him for
Pl,000.00 from as fringe benefits, medical allowance and year-end bonus, he was unable to
comply as he did not then have cash, the payment of said benefits having been in checks. A
week later, he received a notice of termination effective at the close of business hours on
December 31, 1984 from the Supreme Court upon the recommendation of Judge Abaya. Nilo
Jamora, a former stenographer of Branch 51 testified that since his employment in said Branch,
Judge Abaya had been exacting from him P350.00 every payday, which exaction ceased only in
March 1986 when Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria filed her charges against Judge Abaya. He
further stated that when he refused to retract his charges against Judge Abaya before the
Sangguniang Panlalawigan despite the Judge's offer of money, the latter demoted him to
process server.
Judge Abaya denied all these charges in his comment dated August 29, 1986, filed in
compliance with the Court Resolution of August 12, 1986. He asserted that these charges were
concocted in retaliation against the administrative complaint docketed as Adm. Matter No. 698-P
he earlier filed on July 18,1986 against one of his accusers, Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-Austria for
dishonesty and grave misconduct in having forged his signature in a probation order in Criminal
Case No. 4995 of the RTC, Branch 52, Puerto Princess, entitled "People of the Philippines vs.
Leonardo Cruz," for attempted murder. Adm. Matter No. 698-P was followed by a petition dated
August 5,1986 docketed as Adm. Case No. 2909 for the disbarment of Atty. Ligaya Gonzales-
Austria based on the same alleged offense.
ISSUE: WON Judge Abaya is guilty of misconduct in connection to Canon 6
HELD: YES, Judge Abaya is GUILTY as charged except that of illegal exaction. He is
DISMISSED FROM SERVICE and all benefits forfeited but he is NOT DISBARRED. We find the
charges against Judge Abaya and Annabelle Cardenas to be supported by substantial evidence.
It is indeed quite intriguing that during the ten-month period under consideration, the court
calendar for Branch 51 never once carried Annabelle Cardenas' name to signify her attendance
at a court session. Moreover, she could not produce any single order, transcript or official
stenographic notes that had been taken by her in any case, civil or criminal. All she presented
were so-called practice notes.
RE 2nd Complaint: We find no improper motive as to why Mrs. Fuertes, a school teacher, would
impute such a serious offense against a judge unless it be the truth. Mrs. Fuertes is not a
disgruntled litigant. Judge Abaya having denied the petition for bail of the suspected killer of Mrs,
Fuertes' son, she should, under normal circumstances be grateful to the Judge. Yet she charged
him with a serious offense, and travelled all the way from Palawan to Manila to testify against the
Judge. Under the circumstances, We cannot accept Judge Abaya's contention that Mrs. Fuertes
perjured herself just to accommodate the vengeanceful ire of Atty. Austria against Judge Abaya.
That would be contrary to the ordinary prompting of men.
RE 3rd Complaint: Judge Abaya likewise denied this charge, labelling the same as sheer
vindictiveness due to Servando's termination and Jamora's demotion, fanned by Atty. Austria's
proddings. He insists that the personnel action taken on Servando and Jamora was due to their
inefficiency. While the investigating officer, Justice Herrera observed that both Servando and
Jamora "testified in a natural and straightforward, albeit in an angry manner without attempting
to conceal their contempt for Judge Abaya he concluded that "the evidence in this regard would
be unable to withstand judicial scrutiny for want of ample corroboration. It would simply be the
word of one against a judge. We are in accord with this observation, for indeed, the charge if
true is so demeaning to an RTC judge that it requires more than a bare allegation to sustain it. In
this regard, we give respondent Judge the benefit of the doubt.
SANTIAGO V. SAGUCIO 2006
FACTS: Ruthie Lim-Santiago is the daughter of Alfonso Lim and Special Administratrix of his
estate. Alfonso Lim is a stockholder and the former President of Taggat Industries, Inc. Atty.
Carlos B. Sagucio was the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat
Industries, Inc. until his appointment as Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Tuguegarao, Cagayan
in 1992. Taggat Industries, Inc. is a domestic corporation engaged in the operation of timber
concessions from the government. The Presidential Commission on Good Government
sequestered it sometime in 1986, 5 and its operations ceased in 1997. Sometime in July 1997,
21 employees of Taggat filed a criminal complaint entitled "Jesus Tagorda, Jr. et al. v. Ruthie
Lim-Santiago. Taggat employees alleged that complainant, who took over the management and
control of Taggat after the death of her father, withheld payment of their salaries and wages
without valid cause from 1 April 1996 to 15 July 1997. Respondent, as Assistant Provincial
Prosecutor, was assigned to conduct the preliminary investigation. He resolved the criminal
complaint by recommending the filing of 651 Informations 10 for violation of Article 288 in
relation to Article 116 12 of the Labor Code of the Philippines.
Complainant now charges respondent with the following violations:
1. Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility
Complainant contends that respondent is guilty of representing conflicting interests. Respondent,
being the former Personnel Manager and Retained Counsel of Taggat, knew the operations of
Taggat very well. Respondent should have inhibited himself from hearing, investigating and
deciding the case filed by Taggat employees. Furthermore, complainant claims that respondent
instigated the filing of the cases and even harassed and threatened Taggat employees to
accede and sign an affidavit to support the complaint.
2. Engaging in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor
Complainant also contends that respondent is guilty of engaging in the private practice of law
while working as a government prosecutor. Complainant presented evidence to prove that
respondent received P10,000 as retainer’s fee for the months of January and February 1995, 16
another P10,000 for the months of April and May 1995, 17 and P5,000 for the month of April
1996.
ISSUE: WON He violated CPR for engaging in unauthorized private practice of profession.
HELD: YES, He is SUSPENDED FOR 6 MOS. The Court exonerates respondent from the
charge of violation of Rule 15.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. However, the Court
finds respondent liable for violation of Rule 1.01, Canon 1 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility against unlawful conduct. Respondent committed unlawful conduct when he
violated Section 7(b)(2) of the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees or Republic Act No. 6713. Canon 6 provides that the Code "shall apply to lawyers in
government service in the discharge of their official duties." A government lawyer is thus bound
by the prohibition "not [to] represent conflicting interests." However, this rule is subject to certain
limitations. The prohibition to represent conflicting interests does not apply when no conflict of
interest exists, when a written consent of all concerned is given after a full disclosure of the facts
or when no true attorney-client relationship exists. Moreover, considering the serious
consequence of the disbarment or suspension of a member of the Bar, clear preponderant
evidence is necessary to justify the imposition of the administrative penalty. Respondent is also
mandated under Rule 1.01 of Canon 1 not to engage in "unlawful conduct." Unlawful conduct
includes violation of the statutory prohibition on a government employee to "engage in the
private practice of [his] profession unless authorized by the Constitution or law, provided, that
such practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with [his] official functions." Complainant’s
evidence failed to substantiate the claim that respondent represented conflicting interests.
Respondent engaged in the private practice of law while working as a government prosecutor.
The Court has defined the practice of law broadly. Respondent admitted that he rendered his
legal services to complainant while working as a government prosecutor. Even the receipts he
signed stated that the payments by Taggat were for "Retainer’s fee." Thus, as correctly pointed
out by complainant, respondent clearly violated the prohibition in RA 6713. However, violations
of RA 6713 are not subject to disciplinary action under the Code of Professional Responsibility
unless the violations also constitute infractions of specific provisions of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Certainly, the IBP has no jurisdiction to investigate violations of RA 6713 – the
Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees – unless the acts
involved also transgress provisions of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
Here, respondent’s violation of RA 6713 also constitutes a violation of Rule 1.01 of Canon 1,
which mandates that "lawyers shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or deceitful
conduct." Respondent’s admission that he received from Taggat fees for legal services while
serving as a government prosecutor is an unlawful conduct, which constitutes a violation of Rule
1.01.
MALIGAYA V. DORONILLA 2006 (NO MENTION OF CANON 6)
FACTS: Civil Case No. Q-99-38778 was an action for damages filed by complainant Renato M.
Maligaya, a doctor and retired colonel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines, against several
military officers for whom Atty. Doronilla stood as counsel. At one point during the February 19,
2002 hearing of the case, Atty. Doronilla said:
And another matter, Your Honor. I was appearing in other cases he
[complainant Maligaya] filed before against the same defendants. We had
an agreement that if we withdraw the case against him, he will also
withdraw all the cases. So, with that understanding, he even retired and he
is now receiving pension.
Considering this to be of some consequence, presiding Judge Reynaldo B. Daway asked a
number of clarificatory questions and thereafter ordered Atty. Doronilla to put his statements in
writing and "file the appropriate pleading." Weeks passed but Atty. Doronilla submitted no such
pleading or anything else to substantiate his averments.
On April 29, 2002, Maligaya filed a complaint against Atty. Doronilla in the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines (IBP) Commission on Bar Discipline.4 The complaint, which charged Atty. Doronilla
with "misleading the court through misrepresentation of facts resulting [in] obstruction of justice,"
was referred to a commissioner6 for investigation. Complainant swore before the investigating
commissioner that he had never entered into any agreement to withdraw his lawsuits.
Doronilla’s defense: his main concern was "to settle the case amicably among comrades in arms
without going to trial"
ISSUE: WON He misled the court in violation of his oath of office and Canon 10
HELD: Yes, He is suspended for 2 mos. By stating untruthfully in open court that complainant
had agreed to withdraw his lawsuits, Atty. Doronilla breached these peremptory tenets of ethical
conduct. Not only that, he violated the lawyer's oath to "do no falsehood, nor consent to the
doing of any in court," of which Canon 10 and Rule 10.01 are but restatements. His act infringed
on every lawyer's duty to "never seek to mislead the judge or any judicial officer by an artifice or
false statement of fact or law." Atty. Doronilla's unethical conduct was compounded, moreover,
by his obstinate refusal to acknowledge the impropriety of what he had done. From the very
beginning of this administrative case, Atty. Doronilla maintained the untenable position that he
had done nothing wrong in the hearing of Civil Case No. Q-99-38778. He persisted in doing so
even after having admitted that he had, in that hearing, spoken of an agreement that did not in
truth exist. Rather than express remorse for that regrettable incident, Atty. Doronilla resorted to
an ill-conceived attempt to evade responsibility, professing that the falsehood had not been
meant for the information of Judge Daway but only as "a sort of question" to complainant
regarding a "pending proposal" to settle the case.
PCGG V. SANDIGANBAYAN 2005
FACTS: This case is prima impressiones and it is weighted with significance for it concerns on
one hand, the efforts of the Bar to upgrade the ethics of lawyers in government service and on
the other, its effect on the right of government to recruit competent counsel to defend its
interests. In 1976, General Bank and Trust Company (GENBANK) encountered financial
difficulties. GENBANK had extended considerable financial support to Filcapital Development
Corporation causing it to incur daily overdrawings on its current account with the Central
Bank.[1] It was later found by the Central Bank that GENBANK had approved various loans to
directors, officers, stockholders and related interests totaling P172.3 million, of which 59% was
classified as doubtful and P0.505 million as uncollectible. As a bailout, the Central Bank
extended emergency loans to GENBANK which reached a total of P310 million. Despite the
mega loans, GENBANK failed to recover from its financial woes. On March 25, 1977, the Central
Bank issued a resolution declaring GENBANK insolvent and unable to resume business with
safety to its depositors, creditors and the general public, and ordering its liquidation. A public
bidding of GENBANKs assets was held from March 26 to 28, 1977, wherein the Lucio Tan group
submitted the winning bid. Subsequently, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza filed a
petition with the then Court of First Instance praying for the assistance and supervision of the
court in GENBANKs liquidation as mandated by Section 29 of Republic Act No. 265.
In February 1986, the EDSA I revolution toppled the Marcos government. One of the first acts of
President Corazon C. Aquino was to establish the Presidential Commission on Good
Government (PCGG) to recover the alleged ill-gotten wealth of former President Ferdinand
Marcos, his family and his cronies. Pursuant to this mandate, the PCGG, on July 17, 1987, filed
with the Sandiganbayan a complaint for reversion, reconveyance, restitution, accounting and
damages against respondents Lucio Tan et al. the PCGG issued several writs of sequestration
on properties allegedly acquired by the Tan et al by taking advantage of their close relationship
and influence with former President Marcos. Respondents Tan, et al. repaired to this Court and
filed petitions for certiorari, prohibition and injunction to nullify, among others, the writs of
sequestration issued by the PCGG. After the filing of the parties comments, this Court referred
the cases to the Sandiganbayan for proper disposition. In all these cases, respondents Tan, et
al. were represented by their counsel, former Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza, who has
then resumed his private practice of law. On February 5, 1991, the PCGG filed motions to
disqualify respondent Mendoza as counsel for respondents Tan, et al. The motions alleged that
respondent Mendoza, as then Solicitor General and counsel to Central Bank, actively intervened
in the liquidation of GENBANK, which was subsequently acquired by respondents Tan, et al. and
became Allied Banking Corporation. Respondent Mendoza allegedly intervened in the
acquisition of GENBANK by respondents Tan, et al. when, in his capacity as then Solicitor
General, he advised the Central Banks officials on the procedure to bring about GENBANKs
liquidation and appeared as counsel for the Central Bank in connection with its petition for
assistance in the liquidation of GENBANK. The motions to disqualify invoked Rule 6.03 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility. Rule 6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from
accepting engagement or employment in connection with any matter in which he had intervened
while in said service.
On April 22, 1991 the Second Division of the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution denying
PCGGs motion to disqualify respondent Mendoza. It found that the PCGG failed to prove the
existence of an inconsistency between respondent Mendoza’s former function as Solicitor
General and his present employment as counsel of the Lucio Tan group. It noted that
respondent Mendoza did not take a position adverse to that taken on behalf of the Central Bank
during his term as Solicitor General. It further ruled that respondent Mendoza’s appearance as
counsel for respondents Tan, et al. was beyond the one-year prohibited period under Section
7(b) of Republic Act No. 6713 since he ceased to be Solicitor General in the year 1986. The said
section prohibits a former public official or employee from practicing his profession in connection
with any matter before the office he used to be with within one year from his resignation,
retirement or separation from public office.
ISSUE: WON Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility applies to respondent
Mendoza.
HELD: No, Petition denied. It goes without saying that Code 6.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility cannot apply to respondent Mendoza because his alleged intervention while a
Solicitor General in Sp. Proc. No. 107812 (Liquidation of Genbank) is an intervention on a matter
different from the matter involved in Civil Case No. 0096 (Defense of unsequestered assets of
Genbank).Further, on June 21, 1988, this Court promulgated the Code of Professional
Responsibility. Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility should be subject to a
prescriptive period. Mr. Justice Tinga opines that the rule cannot apply retroactively to
respondent Mendoza. Obviously, and rightly so, they are disquieted by the fact that (1) when
respondent Mendoza was the Solicitor General, Rule 6.03 has not yet adopted by the IBP and
approved by this Court, and (2) the bid to disqualify respondent Mendoza was made after the
lapse of time whose length cannot, by any standard, qualify as reasonable. At bottom, the point
they make relates to the unfairness of the rule if applied without any prescriptive period and
retroactively, at that.
PNB V. CEDO 1995
FACTS: In a verified letter-complaint dated August 15, 1991, complainant Philippine National
Bank charged respondent Atty. Telesforo S. Cedo, former Asst. Vice-President of the Asset
Management Group of complainant bank with violation of Canon 6, Rule 6.03. By appearing as
counsel for individuals who had transactions with complainant bank in which respondent during
his employment with aforesaid bank, had intervened.
Complainant averred that while respondent was still in its employ, he participated in arranging
the sale of steel sheets (denominated as Lots 54-M and 55-M) in favor of Milagros Ong Siy for
P200,000. He even "noted" the gate passes issued by his subordinate, Mr. Emmanuel Elefan, in
favor of Mrs. Ong Siy authorizing the pull-out of the steel sheets from the DMC Man Division
Compound. When a civil action arose out of this transaction between Mrs. Ong Siy and
complainant bank before the Regional Trial Court of Makati, Branch 146, respondent who had
since left the employ of complainant bank, appeared as one of the counsels of Mrs. Ong Siy.
Similarly, when the same transaction became the subject of an administrative case filed by
complainant bank against his former subordinate Emmanuel Elefan, for grave misconduct and
dishonesty, respondent appeared as counsel for Elefan only to be later disqualified by the Civil
Service Commission. Moreover, while respondent was still the Asst. Vice President of
complainant’s Asset Management Group, he intervened in the handling of the loan account of
the spouses Ponciano and Eufemia Almeda with complainant bank by writing demand letters to
the couple. When a civil action ensued between complainant bank and the Almeda spouses as a
result of this loan account, the latter were represented by the law firm "Cedo, Ferrer, Maynigo &
Associates" of which respondent is one of the Senior Partners.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Cedo violated Canon 6.03 of CPR
HELD: YES, Atty Cedo is SUSPENDED for 3 years. The IBP found a deliberate intent on the
part of respondent to devise ways and means to attract as clients former borrowers of
complainant bank since he was in the best position to see the legal weaknesses of his former
employer, a convincing factor for the said clients to seek his professional service. In sum, the
IBP saw a deliberate sacrifice by respondent of his ethics in consideration of the money he
expected to earn. Further, this Court finds this occasion appropriate to emphasize the
paramount importance of avoiding the representation of conflicting interests. Having been an
executive of complainant bank, respondent now seeks to litigate as counsel for the opposite
side, a case against his former employer involving a transaction which he formerly handled while
still an employee of complainant, in violation of Canon 6 of the Canons of Professional Ethics on
adverse influence and conflicting interests
B. TO THE LEGAL PROFESSION
CANON 7 - A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE INTEGRITY AND DIGNITY OF
THE LEGAL PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE INTEGRATED BAR.
Rule 7.01 - A lawyer shall be answerable for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing
a material fact in connection with his application for admission to the bar.
Rule 7.02 - A lawyer shall not support the application for admission to the bar of any person
known by him to be unqualified in respect to character, education, or other relevant attribute.
Rule 7.03 - A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness to practice
law, nor shall he whether in public or private life, behave in a scandalous manner to the discredit
of the legal profession.
Requirements for application to the Bar
IN RE: GALANG (in connection with IN RE LANUEVO)
FACTS: Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E.
Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-
correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar
Landicho — who flunked in the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%,
65.35% and 67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that
the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar candidate was raised for one reason
or another, before the bar results were released this year" This was confirmed, according to him,
by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent alternations — to raise
the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that this was without any formal motion or
request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may not do so now
when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due process
postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their
grades were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not
afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to
ultimately decide the matter of admission to the bar?"
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International
Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar
candidate with office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed
and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed
that the bar candidate with office code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar
candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a grade
of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and 57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971
bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar examinations.
ISSUE: WON Ramon Galang must be Disbarred for falsehood.
HELD: YES, Atty. Galang is DISBARRED. This is a necessary consequence of the un-
authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and
International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law. The re-evaluation by the
Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as
already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority from the
Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar
Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations and to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is
not clothed with authority to determine whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-
evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is correct.
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing and
withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964,
1966, 1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he
declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the
Court that he had no criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed
unconditionally to take the Bar examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his
oath. That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the
fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation
of his license to practice law.
MORAL FITNESS – RULE 7.03 Id.
BARRIENTOS V. METEORO 2009
FACTS: Before this Court is a complaint for disbarment filed against Atty. Elerizza A. Libiran-
Meteoro for deceit and non-payment of debts. A letter-complaint dated May 21, 2001 was filed
with the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) under the names of Isidra Barrientos and Olivia
C. Mercado, which was signed, however, by Isidra only. It states that: sometime in September of
2000, respondent issued several Equitable PCIBank Checks in favor of both Isidra and Olivia,
amounting to P67,000.00, and in favor of Olivia, totaling P234,000.00, for the payment of a pre-
existing debt; the checks bounced due to insufficient funds thus charges for violation of B.P. 22
were filed by Isidra and Olivia with the City Prosecutor of Cabanatuan; respondent sent text
messages to complainants asking for the deferment of the criminal charges with the promise that
she will pay her debt; respondent however failed to fulfill said promise; on May 16, 2001,
respondent, through her sister-in-law, tried to give complainants a title for a parcel of land in
exchange for the bounced checks which were in the possession of complainants; the title
covered an area of 5,000 square meters located at Bantug, La Torre, Talavera, Nueva Ecija,
registered in the name of Victoria Villamar which was allegedly paid to respondent by a client;
complainants checked the property and discovered that the land belonged to a certain Dra.
Helen Garcia, the sole heir of Victoria Villamar, who merely entrusted said title to respondent
pursuant to a transaction with the Quedancor; complainants tried to get in touch with respondent
over the phone but the latter was always unavailable.
ISSUE: WON Atty Libiran-Meteoro is guilty of gross misconduct.
HELD: Yes, She is SUSPENDED for 6 mos. We have held that deliberate failure to pay just
debts and the issuance of worthless checks constitute gross misconduct, for which a lawyer may
be sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law. They are expected to maintain not only
legal proficiency but also a high standard of morality, honesty, integrity and fair dealing so that
the peoples’ faith and confidence in the judicial system is ensured. Respondent in her answer
initially tried to deny having any obligation towards Isidra Barrientos. Upon appearing before the
IBP-CBD, however, respondent eventually acknowledged her indebtedness to Isidra in the
amount of P134,000.00, promising only to pay in a staggered basis. Her attempt to evade her
financial obligation runs counter to the precepts of the Code of Professional Responsibility,
above quoted, and violates the lawyers oath which imposes upon every member of the bar the
duty to delay no man for money or malice. Mere issuance of worthless checks by a lawyer,
regardless of whether or not the same were issued in his professional capacity to a client, calls
for appropriate disciplinary measures. The general rule is that a lawyer may not be suspended or
disbarred, and the court may not ordinarily assume jurisdiction to discipline him for misconduct in
his non-professional or private capacity. Where, however, the misconduct outside of the lawyers
professional dealings is so gross a character as to show him morally unfit for the office and
unworthy of the privilege which his licenses and the law confer on him, the court may be justified
in suspending or removing him from the office of attorney.
TOLENTINO V. MENDOZA
FACTS: Before us is a complaint filed by Pedro G. Tolentino, Romeo M. Laygo, Solomon M.
Lumalang, Sr., Meliton D. Evangelista, Sr., and Nelson B. Melgar against Atty. Norberto M.
Mendoza for Grossly Immoral Conduct and Gross Misconduct.
Complainants allege in their Affidavit-Complaint that respondent, a former Municipal Trial Court
Judge, abandoned his legal wife, Felicitas V. Valderia in favor of his paramour, Marilyn dela
Fuente, who is, in turn, married to one Ramon G. Marcos; respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente
have been cohabiting openly and publicly as husband and wife in Brgy. Estrella, Naujan,
Oriental Mindoro; respondent had fathered two children by his paramour Marilyn dela Fuente;
respondent and Marilyn dela Fuente declared in the birth certificates of their two daughters that
they were married on May 12, 1986, making it appear that their two children are legitimate, while
in respondents Certificate of Candidacy filed with the COMELEC during the 1995 elections,
respondent declared that his wife is Felicitas V. Valderia; in respondents certificate of candidacy
for the 1998 elections, he declared his civil status as separated; such declarations in the birth
certificates of his children and in his certificate of candidacy are acts constituting falsification of
public documents; and respondents acts betray his lack of good moral character and constitute
grounds for his removal as a member of the bar. Respondent filed his Comment wherein he
states that complainants, who are his political opponents in Naujan, Oriental Mindoro, are merely
filing this case to exact revenge on him for his filing of criminal charges against them;
complainants illegally procured copies of the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela
Fuente Mendoza and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza, in violation of Rule 24,
Administrative Order No. 1, series of 1993, thus, such documents are inadmissible in evidence;
respondent did not participate in the preparation and submission with the local civil registry of
subject birth certificates; respondent never declared that he had two wives, as he has always
declared that he is separated in fact from his wife, Felicitas V. Valderia; and complainants have
used this issue against him during elections and yet, the people of Naujan, Oriental Mindoro still
elected him as Mayor, hence, respondent has not offended the public’s sense of morality.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Mendoza engaged in immoral activities in violation of CPR code 1 Rule 1.01
HELD: YES, Atty. Norberto Mendoza is SUSPENDED INDEFINITELY. Witness Melgars
testimony that respondent had been publicly introducing Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife is
corroborated by the contents of an article in the Naujanews, introducing respondent as one of
Naujans public servants, and stating therein that respondent has been blessed with two beautiful
children with his wife, Marilyn dela Fuente. It should be noted that said publication is under the
control of respondent, he being the Chairman of the Board thereof. Thus, it could be reasonably
concluded that if he contested the truth of the contents of subject article in the Naujanews, or if
he did not wish to publicly present Marilyn dela Fuente as his wife, he could have easily ordered
that the damning portions of said article to be edited out. With regard to respondents argument
that the credibility of witnesses for the complainants is tainted by the fact that they are motivated
by revenge for respondents filing of criminal cases against them, we opine that even if witnesses
Melgar and Laygo are so motivated, the credibility of their testimonies cannot be discounted as
they are fully supported and corroborated by documentary evidence which speak for
themselves. The birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza and Myrra
Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza born on June 16, 1988 and May 22, 1990, respectively,
to Norberto M. Mendoza and Marilyn Dela Fuente; and the Certification from the Office of the
Local Civil Registrar of Bulacan attesting to the existence in its records of an entry of a marriage
between respondent and one Felicitas Valderia celebrated on January 16, 1980, are public
documents and are prima facie evidence of the facts contained therein, as provided for under
Article 410 of the Civil Code of the Philippines.
Verily, the facts stated in the birth certificates of Mara Khrisna Charmina dela Fuente Mendoza
and Myrra Khrisna Normina dela Fuente Mendoza and respondents Certificate of Candidacy
dated March 9, 1995 wherein respondent himself declared he was married to Felicitas Valderia,
were never denied nor rebutted by respondent. Hence, said public documents sufficiently prove
that he fathered two children by Marilyn dela Fuente despite the fact that he was still legally
married to Felicitas Valderia at that time.
Immoral conduct is defined as a conduct which is so willful, flagrant, or shameless as to show
indifference to the opinion of good and respectable members of the community. Furthermore,
such conduct must not only be immoral, but grossly immoral. That is, it must be so corrupt as to
constitute a criminal act or so unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree or committed
under such scandalous or revolting circumstances as to shock the common sense of decency.
The fact that respondent continues to publicly and openly cohabit with a woman who is not his
legal wife, thus, siring children by her, shows his lack of good moral character. Respondent
should keep in mind that the requirement of good moral character is not only a condition
precedent to admission to the Philippine Bar but is also a continuing requirement to maintain
ones good standing in the legal profession.
ARNOBIT V. ARNOBIT 2008
FACTS: Rebecca B. Arnobit, in her affidavit-complaint dated May 11, 1975, prays that the Court
exercise its disciplinary power over her husband, respondent Atty. Ponciano Arnobit, on the
grounds of Immorality and Abandonment. In her complaint, Rebecca alleged that she and
respondent were married on August 20, 1942. Twelve children were born out of this union.
Rebecca further alleged seeing respondent through law school, continuously supporting him
until he passed the bar examinations and became a member of the Philippine bar. Several years
after, however, or in 1968, respondent left the conjugal home and started cohabiting with one
Benita Buenafe Navarro who later bore him four more children. Respondents infidelity, according
to Rebecca, impelled her to file a complaint for legal separation and support. A criminal case for
adultery against Benita and respondent later followed. In his Answer dated July 31, 1975,
respondent admitted that Rebecca is his wedded wife and the mother of their 12 children. He
denied, however, having cohabited with Benita. And he pointed to his complaining wife as the
cause of their separation, stating the observation that she was always traveling all over the
country, ostensibly for business purposes, without his knowledge and consent, thereby
neglecting her obligations toward her family.
Aside from her testimony, Rebecca presented two other witnesses, viz: Venancia M. Barrientos,
her sister, who identified a letter dated August 28, 1970 written by respondent to her, addressing
her as Vending, therein asking for forgiveness for the unhappiness he caused his family; and
Melecio Navarro, husband of Benita, who testified about how respondent took his wife Benita as
a mistress, knowing fully well of their lawful marriage. Rebecca also presented the affidavits of
National Bureau of Investigation agents Eladio C. Velasco and Jose C. Vicente to show the
existence of a prima facie case for adultery. The pictures and baptismal and birth certificates of
Mary Ann, Ma. Luisa, Caridad, and Ponciano Jr., all surnamed Arnobit, were submitted to prove
the fact that respondent sired four illegitimate children out of his illicit cohabitation with Benita.
CBD: That he be SUSPENDED for 3 mos.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Ponciano Arnobit engaged in immoral conduct making him unfit in the
profession.
HELD: YES, Atty. Ponciano is DISBARRED. While the Court concurs with the inculpatory
findings of the IBP on the charge of abandonment, it cannot bring itself to agree that respondent
is liable only for that offense (Adultery). As it were, the charge for gross immoral conduct has
sufficiently been proven. Following established jurisprudence, respondent deserves to be
disbarred. A review of the records readily reveals that despite the protracted delay in the
hearings mainly caused by respondent’s failure to appear, complainant relentlessly pursued this
administrative case against her husband. She was, to be sure, able to establish by clear,
convincing, and preponderant evidence his commission of marital infidelity and abandonment of
his family. Although respondent in his answer denied abandoning complainant and their children
and offered an explanation as to the cause of his and his wifes separation, he opted not to take
the witness stand and be cross- examined on his sworn answer. Neither did he bother to call
and present his alleged paramour, Benita, who could have had disproved an existing adulterous
relationship between them, or, at least, confirm his protestation about the paternity of her four
children. Significantly, Benitas husband, no less, risked personal ridicule by testifying on the illicit
liaison between his wife and respondent.
The fact that respondents philandering ways are far removed from the exercise of his profession
would not save the day for him. For a lawyer may be suspended or disbarred for any misconduct
which, albeit unrelated to the actual practice of his profession, would show him to be unfit for the
office and unworthy of the privileges with which his license and the law invest him.
RANGWANI V. DIO
FACTS: This is an administrative complaint filed against Atty. Ramon S. Dio by Carmelina Y.
Rangwani before this Court. In her complaint, Rangwani alleged that sometime in the years
1995 to 1996, Atty. Dio befriended her. Owing to his status in the community as a good lawyer
and businessman, respondent was able to convince the complainant to part with her title to a
parcel of land located in Dasmarias, Cavite, under Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 2791-
97, Entry 5320-102. After the lapse of five months, complainant demanded the return of her title
from respondent who promised to return the same but failed to do so. After ten months,
respondent was nowhere to be found. Complainant, with the help of an informer, was able to
locate respondent who turned out to have transferred his residence to Makati City. Upon
confrontation, respondent retorted that he could not give back the title to the land. Instead, he
offered to buy the property. Thus, he issued checks to complainant that when they were
deposited, all the checks bounced for the reason closed account.
On 29 August 2001, this Court, acting on the Complaint, issued a resolution requiring the
respondent to comment thereon on the complaint. On 22 November 2001, respondent filed an
Omnibus Motion for Leave of Court to Admit Comment and for a Formal Hearing. In this motion,
he bared that the Courts resolution requiring him to comment was sent to his parents residence.
He claimed he has been living for the past two years in a rented house at Signal Village, Taguig,
Metro Manila, and has been in the province for the last three weeks attending to business
concerns. He said he was not aware that a disbarment complaint has been filed against him.
While he admitted that there were cases previously filed by complainant against him, said cases
had already been withdrawn and the corresponding desistance, waiver and quitclaim had been
signed by her and that complainant had in fact received (already) the monetary claims or their
equivalent involving said cases. He said, he was unaware that warrants for his arrest were
issued.
In a resolution dated 28 January 2002, this Court resolved to grant respondents Omnibus Motion
for Leave of Court to Admit Comment on the administrative complaint and for a Formal Hearing,
and noted the comment therein. The case was referred to the IBP for investigation, report and
recommendation within ninety days from notice. On 02 May 2002, complainant submitted a letter
to the IBP withdrawing the complaint she filed against respondent, stating that after much
reflection and recall of the antecedent facts that led to the filing of the complaint, I have finally
decided to withdraw the same as it arose purely out of misunderstanding and miscommunication
and definitely not warranting any disciplinary action much less disbarment and apologize for
whatever inconvenience the complaint had cause[d] the office.
In an Order dated 19 June 2002, Commissioner Rebecca Villanueva-Maala of the IBP,
Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), to whom the case was assigned for investigation, report
and recommendation, notified the parties to appear for a hearing at said office on 03 July 2002.
Per order dated 03 July 2002 of Commissioner Maala, it appears that when the case was called
for hearing, neither complainant nor respondent appeared. It was not shown, however, whether
they received notices of the scheduled hearing, hence, the same was ordered cancelled and
reset to 17 July 2002.
ISSUE: WON Atty. Ramon Dio is guilty of gross misconduct
HELD: YES, He is SUSPENDED from the practice for 1 year. Respondent’s issuance of
checks in violation of the provisions of B.P. 22 constitutes serious misconduct and in addition
respondent committed gross misconduct when he failed to comply his promise to complainant to
settle the case. Quite conspicuously, despite the opportunities accorded to respondent to refute
the charges against him, he failed to do so or even offer a valid explanation. The record is bereft
of any evidence to show that respondent has presented any countervailing evidence to meet the
charges against him. His nonchalance does not speak well of him as it reflects his utter lack of
respect towards the public officers who were assigned to investigate the cases.
When the integrity of a member of the bar is challenged, it is not enough that he denies the
charges against him. He must meet the issue and overcome the evidence against him. He must
show proof that he still maintains that degree of morality and integrity which at all times is
expected of him.
Respondents act of having borrowed the title to the land of complainant, his presumed use of the
said title for his personal gain, his failure to return the same despite repeated demands and
worse, his issuance of three checks in exchange for the said land title which bounced, constitute
gross misconduct for which he must be disciplined. In this connection Rule 16.04 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility is unequivocal. It states:

Rule 16.04 A lawyer shall not borrow money from his client unless the clients interests
are fully protected by the nature of the case or by independent advice. Neither shall a
lawyer lend money to a client except, when in the interest of justice, he has to
advance necessary expenses in a legal matter he is handling for the client.
The lawyer should refrain from any action whereby for his personal benefit or gain he abuses or
takes advantages of the confidence reposed in him by his client.
Money of the client collected for the client or other trust property coming into the possession of
the lawyer should be reported and accounted for promptly and should not under any
circumstances be commingled with his own or be used by him. Canon 15 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility mandates that a lawyer should observe candor, fairness and loyalty
in all his dealings and transactions with his client. A lawyer may be disciplined for any conduct,
in his professional or private capacity, which renders him unfit to continue to be an officer of the
court. Every lawyer should act and comport himself in such a manner that would promote public
confidence in the integrity of the legal profession. Canon 7 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility commands all lawyers at all times to uphold the dignity and integrity of the legal
profession.
GARRIDO V. GARRIDO
FACTS: Maelotisea Sipin Garrido filed a complaint-affidavit and a supplemental affidavit for
disbarment against the respondents Atty. Angel E. Garrido and Atty. Romana P.Valencia before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) Committee on Discipline charging them with gross
immorality. That Atty. Angel married one Atty Valencia and that He left the conjugal home and
joined Atty. Ramona Paguida Valencia at their residence. In his Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Garrido
denied Maelotiseas charges and imputations. By way of defense, he alleged that Maelotisea
was not his legal wife, as he was already married to Constancia David (Constancia) when he
married Maelotisea. He claimed he married Maelotisea after he and Constancia parted ways. He
further alleged that Maelotisea knew all his escapades and understood his bad boy image before
she married him in 1962. As he and Maelotisea grew apart over the years due to financial
problems, Atty. Garrido met Atty. Valencia. He became close to Atty. Valencia to whom he
confided his difficulties. Together, they resolved his personal problems and his financial
difficulties with his second family. Atty. Garrido denied that he failed to give financial support to
his children with Maelotisea, emphasizing that all his six (6) children were educated in private
schools; all graduated from college except for Arnel Victorino, who finished a special secondary
course. Atty. Garrido alleged that Maelotisea had not been employed and had not practiced her
profession for the past ten (10) years.
Atty. Garrido emphasized that all his marriages were contracted before he became a member of
the bar on May 11, 1979, with the third marriage contracted after the death of Constancia on
December 26, 1977. Likewise, his children with Maelotisea were born before he became a
lawyer. In her Counter-Affidavit, Atty. Valencia denied that she was the mistress of Atty. Garrido.
She explained that Maelotisea was not the legal wife of Atty. Garrido since the marriage
between them was void from the beginning due to the then existing marriage of Atty. Garrido
with Constancia. Atty. Valencia claimed that Maelotisea knew of the romantic relationship
between her and Atty. Garrido, as they (Maelotisea and Atty. Valencia) met in 1978. Maelotisea
kept silent about her relationship with Atty. Garrido and had maintained this silence when she
(Atty. Valencia) financially helped Atty. Garrido build a house for his second family. Atty.
Valencia alleged that Maelotisea was not a proper party to this suit because of her silence; she
kept silent when things were favorable and beneficial to her. Atty. Valencia also alleged that
Maelotisea had no cause of action against her.
IBP: Atty. Garrido is DISBARRED; Case against Atty Valencia is DISMISSED.
ISSUE: WON Atty Garrido and Atty Valencia engaged in immoral conduct and are guilty of gross
immorality.
HELD: SC modified the recommendation of IBP. Atty Garrido and Valencia are BOTH
DISBARRED. Immoral conduct involves acts that are willful, flagrant, or shameless, and that
show a moral indifference to the opinion of the upright and respectable members of the
community. Immoral conduct is gross when it is so corrupt as to constitute a criminal act, or so
unprincipled as to be reprehensible to a high degree, or when committed under such scandalous
or revolting circumstances as to shock the community’s sense of decency. We make these
distinctions as the supreme penalty of disbarment arising from conduct requires grossly immoral,
not simply immoral, conduct.
Atty Garrido
The time that elapsed between the immoral acts charged and the filing of the complaint is not
material in considering the qualification of Atty. Garrido when he applied for admission to the
practice of law, and his continuing qualification to be a member of the legal profession. From this
perspective, it is not important that the acts complained of were committed before Atty. Garrido
was admitted to the practice of law. In marrying Maelotisea, he committed the crime of bigamy,
as he entered this second marriage while his first marriage with Constancia was subsisting. He
openly admitted his bigamy when he filed his petition to nullify his marriage to Maelotisea. He
violated ethical rules of the profession, specifically, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which commands that he shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest, immoral or
deceitful conduct; Canon 7 of the same Code, which demands that [a] lawyer shall at all times
uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal profession; Rule 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility, which provides that, [a] lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects
on his fitness to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.
Atty Valencia
The records show that Atty. Valencia consented to be married in Hongkong, not within the
country. Given that this marriage transpired before the declaration of the nullity of Atty. Garridos
second marriage, we can only call this Hongkong marriage a clandestine marriage, contrary to
the Filipino tradition of celebrating a marriage together with family. Despite Atty. Valencias claim
that she agreed to marry Atty. Garrido only after he showed her proof of his capacity to enter into
a subsequent valid marriage, the celebration of their marriage in Hongkong leads us to the
opposite conclusion; they wanted to marry in Hongkong for the added security of avoiding any
charge of bigamy by entering into the subsequent marriage outside Philippine jurisdiction. In this
regard, we cannot help but note that Atty. Valencia afterwards opted to retain and use her
surname instead of using the surname of her husband. Atty. Valencia, too, did not appear to
mind that her husband did not live and cohabit with her under one roof, but with his second wife
and the family of this marriage. Apparently, Atty. Valencia did not mind at all sharing her
husband with another woman. This, to us, is a clear demonstration of Atty. Valencia’s perverse
sense of moral values.
Measured against the definition of gross immorality, we find Atty. Valencia’s actions grossly
immoral. Her actions were so corrupt as to approximate a criminal act, for she married a man
who, in all appearances, was married to another and with whom he has a family. Her actions
were also unprincipled and reprehensible to a high degree; as the confidante of Atty. Garrido,
she preyed on his vulnerability and engaged in a romantic relationship with him during the
subsistence of his two previous marriages. As already mentioned, Atty. Valencias conduct could
not but be scandalous and revolting to the point of shocking the communitys sense of decency;
while she professed to be the lawfully wedded wife, she helped the second family build a house
prior to her marriage to Atty. Garrido, and did not object to sharing her husband with the woman
of his second marriage.
GALICINAO V. CASTRO 2005
FACTS: This administrative case concerns a lawyer who hurled invectives at a Clerk of Court.
Members of the bar decorum must at all times comfort themselves in a manner befitting their
noble profession. Respondent Atty. Castro was a private practitioner and Vice-President of IBP-
Nueva Vizcaya Chapter. On 5 May 2003, respondent went to complainant’s office to inquire
whether the complete records of Civil Case No. 784, had already been remanded to the court of
origin. It must be noted that respondent was not the counsel of record of either party in Civil
Case No. 784. Complainant informed respondent that the record had not yet been transmitted
since a certified true copy of the decision of the Court of Appeals should first be presented to
serve as basis for the transmittal of the records to the court of origin. To this respondent retorted
scornfully, Who will certify the Court of Appeals Decision, the Court of Appeals? You mean to
say, I would still have to go to Manila to get a certified true copy? Surprised at this outburst,
complainant replied, Sir, its in the Rules but you could show us the copy sent to the party you
claim to be representing. Respondent then replied, Then you should have notified me of the said
requirement. That was two weeks ago and I have been frequenting your office since then, but
you never bothered to notify me. Complainant replied, It is not our duty, Sir, to notify you of the
said requirement. Respondent then answered, You mean to say it is not your duty to remand the
record of the case? Complainant responded, No, Sir, I mean, its not our duty to notify you that
you have to submit a copy of the Court of Appeals decision. Respondent angrily declared in
Ilocano, Kayat mo nga saw-en, awan pakialam yon? Kasdiay? (You mean to say you dont care
anymore? Is that the way it is?) He then turned and left the office, banging the door on his way
out to show his anger. The banging of the door was so loud it was heard by the people at the
adjacent RTC, where a hearing was taking place.
After a few minutes, respondent returned to the office, still enraged, and pointed his finger at
complainant and shouted, Ukinnan, no adda ti unget mo iti kilientek haan mo nga ibales kaniak
ah! (Vulva of your mother! If you are harboring ill feelings against my client, dont turn your ire on
me!) Complainant was shocked at respondents words but still managed to reply, I dont even
know your client, Sir. Respondent left the office and as he passed by complainants window, he
again shouted, Ukinnam nga babai! (Vulva of your mother, you woman!) Complainant suffered
acute embarrassment at the incident, as it happened in her office of which she was, and still is,
the head and in front of her staff. She felt that her credibility had been tarnished and diminished,
eliciting doubt on her ability to command full respect from her staff.
IBP: That he be reprimanded
ISSUE: WON Atty. Castro is guilty of violating the CPR
HELD: YES, Atty. Castro is FINED in the amount of 10K. Had he been counsel of record, it
would have been easy for him to present the required certified true copy of the decision of the
Court of Appeals. He need not have gone to Manila to procure a certified true copy of the
decision since the Court of Appeals furnishes the parties and their counsel of record a duplicate
original or certified true copy of its decision. His explanation that he will enter his appearance in
the case when its records were already transmitted to the MCTC is unacceptable. Not being the
counsel of record and there being no authorization from either the parties to represent them,
respondent had no right to impose his will on the clerk of court.
Through his acts of constantly checking the transmittal of the records of Civil Case No. 784,
respondent deliberately encroached upon the legal functions of the counsel of record of that
case. It does not matter whether he did so in good faith. Moreover, in the course of his
questionable activities relating to Civil Case No. 784, respondent acted rudely towards an officer
of the court. He raised his voice at the clerk of court and uttered at her the most vulgar of
invectives. Not only was it ill-mannered but also unbecoming considering that he did all these to
a woman and in front of her subordinates. Moreover, Canon 8 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility demands that lawyers conduct themselves with courtesy, fairness and candor
toward their fellow lawyers. Lawyers are duty bound to uphold the dignity of the legal profession.
They must act honorably, fairly and candidly towards each other and otherwise conduct
themselves without reproach at all times.
Nonetheless, the penalty to be imposed should be tempered owing to the fact that respondent
had apologized to the complainant and the latter had accepted it. This is not to say, however,
that respondent should be absolved from his actuations. People are accountable for the
consequences of the things they say and do even if they repent afterwards. The fact remains
that things done cannot be undone and words uttered cannot be taken back. Hence, he should
bear the consequences of his actions.
CANON 8 - A LAWYER SHALL CONDUCT HIMSELF WITH COURTESY, FAIRNESS AND
CANDOR TOWARDS HIS PROFESSIONAL COLLEAGUES, AND SHALL AVOID
HARASSING TACTICS AGAINST OPPOSING COUNSEL.
Rule 8.01 - A lawyer shall not, in his professional dealings, use language which is
abusive, offensive or otherwise improper.
Rule 8.02 - A lawyer shall not, directly or indirectly, encroach upon the professional
employment of another lawyer, however, it is the right of any lawyer, without fear or favor,
to give proper advice and assistance to those seeking relief against unfaithful or
neglectful counsel.
QUE V. REVILLA 2009
FACTS: In a complaint for disbarment, Conrado Que accused Atty. Anastacio Revilla, Jr. before
the Integrated Bar of the Philippines Committee on Bar Discipline (IBP Committee on Bar
Discipline or CBD) of committing the following violations of the provisions of the Code of
Professional Responsibility and Rule 138 of the Rules of Court. The respondents abuse of court
remedies and processes by filing a petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals (CA), two
petitions for annulment of title before the Regional Trial Court (RTC), a petition for annulment of
judgment before the RTC and lastly, a petition for declaratory relief before the RTC (collectively,
subject cases) to assail and overturn the final judgments of the Metropolitan Trial Court (MeTC)
and RTC in the unlawful detainer case rendered against the respondents clients. The
respondent in this regard, repeatedly raised the issue of lack of jurisdiction by the MeTC and
RTC knowing fully-well that these courts have jurisdiction over the unlawful detainer case. The
respondent also repeatedly attacked the complainants and his siblings’ titles over the property
subject of the unlawful detainer case;
The respondents commission of forum-shopping by filing the subject cases in order to impede,
obstruct, and frustrate the efficient administration of justice for his own personal gain and to
defeat the right of the complainant and his siblings to execute the MeTC and RTC judgments in
the unlawful detainer case;
The respondents lack of candor and respect towards his adversary and the courts by resorting to
falsehood and deception to misguide, obstruct and impede the due administration of justice. The
respondent asserted falsehood in the motion for reconsideration of the dismissal of the petition
for annulment of judgment by fabricating an imaginary order issued by the presiding judge in
open court which allegedly denied the motion to dismiss filed by the respondents in the said
case. The complainant alleged that the respondent did this to cover up his lack of preparation;
the respondent also deceived his clients (who were all squatters) in supporting the above
falsehood.
The respondents willful and revolting falsehood that unjustly maligned and defamed the good
name and reputation of the late Atty. Alfredo Catolico (Atty. Catolico), the previous counsel of
the respondents clients.
ISSUE: WON the respondent can be held liable for the imputed unethical infractions and
professional misconduct.
HELD: YES, Atty. Anastacio Revilla is DISBARRED. The respondents repeated attempts go
beyond the legitimate means allowed by professional ethical rules in defending the interests of
his client. These are already uncalled for measures to avoid the enforcement of final judgments
of the MeTC and RTC. In these attempts, the respondent violated Rule 10.03, Canon 10 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility which makes it obligatory for a lawyer to observe the rules
of procedure and. . . not [to] misuse them to defeat the ends of justice. By his actions, the
respondent used procedural rules to thwart and obstruct the speedy and efficient administration
of justice, resulting in prejudice to the winning parties in that case.
The respondent also committed falsehood in his motion for reconsideration of the order
dismissing his petition for annulment of judgment where he misrepresented to the court and his
clients what actually transpired in the hearing of June 28, 2002 in this wise:
Likewise, the proceedings on said date of hearing (June 28, 2002) show, that after
both counsel have argued on the aforesaid pending incident, the Honorable Presiding
Judge, in open court, and in the presence and within the hearing distance of all the
plaintiffs and their counsel as well as the counsel of the defendants resolved: TO
DENY THE MOTION TO DISMISS FILED AND DIRECTED DEFENDANTS
COUNSEL TO FILE AN ANSWER TO THE COMPLAINT WITHIN THE REMAINING
PERIOD.
The records, however, disclose that the scheduled hearing for June 28, 2002 was actually for
the respondents application for temporary restraining order and was not a hearing on the
adverse partys motion to dismiss.
To support the charge of extrinsic fraud in his petition for annulment of judgment, the respondent
attacked the name and reputation of the late Atty. Catolico and accused him of deliberate
neglect, corrupt motives and connivance with the counsel for the adverse party. We find it
significant that the respondent failed to demonstrate how he came upon his accusation against
Atty. Catolico. The respondent, by his own admission, only participated in the cases previously
assigned to Atty. Catolico after the latter died. At the same time, the respondents petition for
annulment of judgment also represented that no second motion for reconsideration or appeal
was filed to contest the MeTC and RTC decisions in the unlawful detainer case for the reason
that the respondent believed the said decisions were null and void ab initio. Under these
circumstances, we believe that the respondent has been less than fair in his professional
relationship with Atty. Catolico and is thus liable for violating Canon 8 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility, which obligates a lawyer to conduct himself with courtesy, fairness,
and candor toward his professional colleagues. He was unfair because he imputed wrongdoing
to Atty. Catolico without showing any factual basis therefor; he effectively maligned Atty.
Catolico, who is now dead and unable to defend himself.
BUENASEDA V. FLAVIER, VASQUEZ, NCMH NURSES ASSOC 1993
FACTS: This is a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus, with Prayer for Preliminary
Injunction or Temporary Restraining Order, under Rule 65 of the Revised Rules of Court.
Principally, the petition seeks to nullify the Order of the Ombudsman dated January 7, 1992,
directing the preventive suspension of petitioners, Dr. Brigida S. Buenaseda, Isabelo C. Banez,
Conrado Rey Matias,; Cora C. Solis,; and Enya N. Lopez, all of the National Center for Mental
Health. The petition also asks for an order directing the Ombudsman to disqualify Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, of the Office of the Ombudsman, from participation
in the preliminary investigation of the charges against petitioner. The questioned order was
issued in connection with the administrative complaint filed with the Ombudsman by the private
respondents against the petitioners for violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
According to the petition, the said order was issued upon the recommendation of Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero, without affording petitioners the opportunity to
controvert the charges filed against them. Petitioners had sought to disqualify Director Arnaw
and Investigator Villa-Rosero for manifest partiality and bias.
On Sept 22. TRO was issued. On September 29, 1992, petitioners filed a motion to direct
respondent Secretary of Health to comply with the Resolution dated September 22, 1992. In a
Resolution dated October 1, 1992, this Court required respondent Secretary of Health to
comment on the said motion. On September 29, 1992, in a pleading entitled "Omnibus
Submission," respondent NCMH Nurses Association submitted its Comment to the Petition,
Supplemental Petition and Urgent Supplemental Manifestation. Included in said pleadings were
the motions to hold the lawyers of petitioners in contempt and to disbar them.
The Motion for Disbarment charges the lawyers of petitioners with:
(1) unlawfully advising or otherwise causing or inducing their clients — petitioners Buenaseda, et
al., to openly defy, ignore, disregard, disobey or otherwise violate, maliciously evade their
preventive suspension by Order of July 7, 1992 of the Ombudsman . . ."; (2) "unlawfully
interfering with and obstructing the implementation of the said order and (3) violation of the
Canons of the Code of Professional Responsibility and of unprofessional and unethical conduct
"by foisting blatant lies, malicious falsehood and outrageous deception" and by committing
subornation of perjury, falsification and fabrication in their pleadings.
On December 9, 1992, the Solicitor General, commenting on the Petition, Supplemental Petition
and Supplemental Manifestation, stated that (a) "The authority of the Ombudsman is only to
recommend suspension and he has no direct power to suspend;" and (b) "Assuming the
Ombudsman has the power to directly suspend a government official or employee, there are
conditions required by law for the exercise of such powers; [and] said conditions have not been
met in the instant case"
ISSUE ON PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: WON Petitioners can be preventively suspended by
ombudsman.
ISSUE ON CONTEMPT AND DISBARMENT: WON Petitioner’s lawyers violated Rule 8.01
HELD:
ISSUE ON PREVENTIVE SUSPENSION: Yes, Petition dismissed. TRO Lifted and set aside.
Ombudsman may proceed with the suspension. Being a mere order for preventive suspension,
the questioned order of the Ombudsman was validly issued even without a full-blown hearing
and the formal presentation of evidence by the parties. It cannot be said that Director Raul
Arnaw and Investigator Amy de Villa-Rosero acted with manifest partiality and bias in
recommending the suspension of petitioners. Neither can it be said that the Ombudsman had
acted with grave abuse of discretion in acting favorably on their recommendation.
ISSUE ON CONTEMPT AND DISBARMENT: Complaint for disbarment must be filed
separately (but SC gave its comment on the matter). The Motion for Contempt, which
charges the lawyers of petitioners with unlawfully causing or otherwise inducing their clients to
openly defy and disobey the preventive suspension as ordered by the Ombudsman and the
Secretary of Health cannot prosper. The Motion should be filed, as in fact such a motion was
filed, with the Ombudsman. At any rate, we find that the acts alleged to constitute indirect
contempt were legitimate measures taken by said lawyers to question the validity and propriety
of the preventive suspension of their clients. On the other hand, we take cognizance of the
intemperate language used by counsel for private respondents hurled against petitioners and
their counsel Consolidated: (1) Comment on Private Respondent" "Urgent Motions, etc.; (2)
Adoption of OSG's Comment; and (3) Reply to Private Respondent's Comment and
Supplemental Comment. (Exact words used by counsels not discussed in the case)
A lawyer should not be carried away in espousing his client's cause. The language of a lawyer,
either oral or written, must be respectful and restrained in keeping with the dignity of the legal
profession and with his behavioral attitude toward his brethren in the profession. The use of
abusive language by counsel against the opposing counsel constitutes at the same time a
disrespect to the dignity of the court of justice. Besides, the use of impassioned language in
pleadings, more often than not, creates more heat than light. The Motion for Disbarment has no
place in the instant special civil action, which is confined to questions of jurisdiction or abuse of
discretion for the purpose of relieving persons from the arbitrary acts of judges and quasi-judicial
officers. There is a set of procedure for the discipline of members of the bar separate and apart
from the present special civil action.