Definition Of Double Jeopardy

Sec. 7. Former conviction or acquittal; double jeopardy. – When an

accused has been convicted or acquitted, or the case against him dismissed or
otherwise terminated without his express consent by
a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid complaint or information or other
formal charge sufficient in form and substance
to sustain a conviction and after the accused had pleaded to the charge, the
conviction or acquittal of the accused or the dismissal
of the case shall be a bar to another prosecution for the offense
charged, or for any attempt to commit the same or frustration
thereof, or for any offense which necessarily includes or is necessarily included
in the offense charged in the former complaint or information.
However, the conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another
prosecution for an offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the
former complaint or information under any of the following instances:

(a) the graver offense developed due to supervening facts arising from the same act
or omission constituting the former charge;

(b) the facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information; or

(c) the plea of guilty to the lesser offense was made without the
consent of the prosecutor and of the offended party except as provided in
section 1(f) of Rule 116.

In any of the foregoing cases, where the accused satisfies or serves in whole or
in part the judgment, he shall be credited with the same in the event of conviction for
the graver offense.

WHAT IS JEOPARDY AND WHAT IS THE RULE ON DOUBLE JEOPARDY?

> Jeopardy is the peril in which a person is placed when he is
regularly charged with a crime before a tribunal properly organized and competent
to try him
The rule on double jeopardy means that when a person is charged with an offense and the
case is terminate either by conviction or
acquittal, or in any other manner without the consent of the
accused, the latter cannot again be charged with the same or identical offense

WHAT ARE THE 2 KINDS OF JEOPARDY?

1. That no person shall be put twice in jeopardy for the same offense
2. If an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under
either shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE ACCUSED TO RAISE THE DEFENSE OF
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
1. A first jeopardy must have validly attached prior to the second
2. The first jeopardy must have been validly terminated
3. The second jeopardy must be for the same offense or the second offense includes or is
necessarily included in the offense charged in the first information or is an attempt to commit
the offense or a
frustration thereof

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES FOR THE FIRST JEOPARDY TO ATTACH?

1. There is a valid complaint or information
2. Court of competent jurisdiction
3. Arraignment
4. Plea
5. The defendant is acquitted, convicted, or the case was dismissed or terminated without
his express consent

N.B: The judgment should not only be final and executory but also be promulgated
before there could be a valid jeopardy.

IS THERE AN EXCEPTION TO THE FOREGOING RULE?

> There are two exceptions to the foregoing rule, and double jeopardy may attach
even if the dismissal of the case was with the consent of the accused—
1. If there is insufficiency of evidence to support the charge against him, and
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial

A CRIME WAS COMMITTED IN MAKATI. THE CASE WAS FILED IN

PASAY. WHEN THE PROSECUTION REALIZED THAT THE
COMPLAINT SHOULD HAVE BEEN FILED IN MAKATI, IT FILED THE CASE IN
MAKATI. CAN THE ACCUSED INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the court in Pasay has no jurisdiction, therefore, the accused was in no danger of
being placed in jeopardy
> The first jeopardy didn’t validly attach

FOR PURPOSES OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY, WHEN IS A COMPLAINT OR

INFORMATION VALID?
> A complaint or information is valid if it can support a judgment of conviction
> If the complaint or information is not valid, it would violate the
right of the accused of the nature and cause of the accusation against him
> If he is convicted under this complaint or information, the conviction is null and void
and hence there is no first jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH

QUALIFIED THEFT. X MOVED TO
DISMISS ON THE GROUND OF
INSUFFICIENCY OF
INFORMATION. THE CASE
WAS DISMISSED. SUBSEQUEN
TLY, THE PROSECUTION FILED
A CORRECTED
INFORMATION. CAN X PLEAD
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy didn’t attach because the first information was not valid
X WAS CHARGED WITH THE
FT. DURING THE TRIAL, THE
PROSECUTION WAS ABLE TO
PROVE ESTAFA. X WAS ACQU
ITTED
OF THEFT. CAN X BE PROSE
CUTED FOR ESTAFA LATER WI
THOUT PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> For jeopardy to attach, the basis is the crime charged in the complaint or
information, and the one proved at the trial
> In this case, the crime charged in the first information was
theft. X was therefore placed in jeopardy of being convicted of theft. Since estafa is
not an offense which is included or necessarily includes theft, X can still be prosecuted
for estafa without placing him in double jeopardy

THE ESTAFA CASE

AGAINST C WAS DISMISSED
BUT THE
DISMISSAL CONTAINED A RESE
RVATION OF THE RIGHT TO FI
LE ANOTHER ACTION. CAN
ANOTHER ESTAFA CASE BE
FILED AGAINST X WITHOUT
PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> Yes
> To raise the defense of double jeopardy, the first jeopardy must have been validly
terminated
> This means that there must have been either a conviction or acquittal, or an
unconditional dismissal of the case
> A provisional dismissal, such as this one, doesn’t validly terminate the first jeopardy

NOTE: in the second kind of jeopardy, the first jeopardy can validly only be terminated either
by conviction or acquittal and not by the dismissal of the case without the express consent of
the accused.
X WAS CHARGED WITH
THEFT. ON THE DAY OF THE
TRIUAL, THE PROSECUTOR AND
THE WITNESSES FAILED TO
APPEAR. COUNSEL
FOR ACCUSED MOVED TO D
ISMISS THE CASE. THE CO
URT
DISMISSED THE CASE PROVISI
ONALLY. SUBSEQUENTLY X W
AS CHARGED WITH THEFT
AGAIN. CAN X INVOKE
JEOPARDY?
> No, the case was dismissed upon motion of counsel for the accused, so it wasn’t
dismissed without the express consent
> Moreover, the dismissal was only provisional, which is not a valid termination of the first
jeopardy
> In order to validly terminate the jeopardy, the dismissal must have been
unconditional

X WAS CHARGED WITH SLIGH

T PHYSICAL INJURIES. ON HI
S
MOTION, THE CASE WAS DISMI
SSED DURING TRIAL. ANOTHE
R
CASE FOR ASSAULT UPON A
PERSON IN AUTHORITY WAS F
ILED AGAINST HIM. CAN X
INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy wasn’t terminated through either conviction, acquittal, or dismissal
without the express consent of X
> The first case was dismissed upon the motion of X himself
> Therefore, he cannot invoke double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH THEFT.

DURING TRIAL, THE EVIDENC
E SHOWED THAT THE OFFENSE
COMMITTED WAS ACTUALLY
ESTAFA. WHAT SHOULD THE
JUDGE DO?
> The judge should order the substitution of the complaint for theft with a new one
charging estafa
> Upon filing of the substituted complaint, the judge should dismiss the original
complaint. If it appears at any time before judgment that a mistake has been made in
charging the proper offense, the
court shall dismiss the original complaint or information upon the filing of a new one charging
the proper offense

WHAT ARE THE REQUISITES F

OR A VALID SUBSTITUTION OF
A COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION?
1. No judgment has been rendered
2. The accused cannot be convicted of the offense charged or any other offense
necessarily included in the offense charged
3. The accused will not be placed in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH

HOMICIDE. ON THE FIRST DAY
OF TRIAL,
THE PROSECUTION FAILED TO
APPEAR. THE COURT DISMISS
ED THE CASE ON THE GROUND
OF VIOLATION OF THE RIGHT
OF THE
ACCUSED TO SPEEDY TRIAL.
X WAS LATER CHARGED WITH
MURDER. CAN X INVOKE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, the first jeopardy was not validly terminated
> The judge who has not dismissed the case on the ground of violation of the right
of X to speedy trial committed grave abuse of
discretion in dismissing the case after the prosecution failed to
appear once
> This is not a valid dismissal because it deprives the prosecution of due process
> When the judge gravely abuses the discretion in dismissing a case, the dismissal
is not valid
Therefore, X cannot invoke double jeopardy

DISTINGUISH ACQUITTAL AND

DISMISSAL
> Acquittal is a discharge after a trial, or an attempt to have one,
upon the merits. It is always on the merits. The accused is
acquitted because the evidence doesn’t show his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
> On the other hand, dismissal is when the case is terminated otherwise upon the
merits thereof, as when the dismissal is based
on the allegation that the court has no jurisdiction, either upon
the subject matter or the territory, or that the complaint or
information is not valid or sufficient, or upon any ground that doesn’t decide the merits
of the issue as to whether the accused is
or isn’t guilty of the offense charged

WHEN IS A DISMISSAL OF THE

CASE, EVEN WITH EXPRESS
CONSENT OF THE ACCUSED,
EQUIVALENT TO AN ACQUITTA
L, WHICH WOULD CONSTITUTE A
BAR TO A SECOND JEOPARDY?
> For a dismissal to be a bar under double jeopardy, it must have the effect of acquittal
> As a general rule, dismissal upon motion of the accused or his
counsel negates the application of double jeopardy because the motion of the accused
amounts to an express consent
> However, such a dismissal even with the express consent of the accused may
constitute a bar to double jeopardy in the following cases
1. Where there is insufficiency of evidence given by the prosecution to support the
charge against him
2. Where there has been an unreasonable delay in the proceedings, in violation of the
accused’s right to speedy trial
> Consequently, the dismissal amounts to an acquittal and would bar a second
jeopardy in the cases below
1. Where the dismissal is based on a demurrer to evidence
filed by the accused after the prosecution has rested,
which has the effect of a judgment on the merits and operates as an acquittal
2. Where the dismissal is made, also on motion of the
accused, because of the denial of his right to a speedy trial, which is in effect a failure
to prosecute

WHAT IS MEANT BY NOLLE PR

OSEQUI? IS IT THE SAME AS
AN ACQUITTAL?
> It is the discontinuance of a criminal procedure by the prosecuting officer, with the
consent of the owner
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he
is called on to plead is not equivalent to an acquittal and doesn’t bar a subsequent
prosecution for the same
offense
> It is not a final disposition of the case
> Rather it partakes of the nature of a non-suit or discontinuance in a civil suit and leaves
the matter in the same condition in which it was before the commencement of the
prosecution

MAY THE COURT DISMISS T

HE CASE ON MOTION NOLLE
PROSEQUI?
> The trial court may dismiss a case on a motion nolle prosequi if the accused is
not brought to trial within the prescribed time and is deprived of his right to speedy trial or
disposition of the case on
account of unreasonable or capricious delay caused by the prosecution
> People v. Espidol doctrine

WHY IS THERE A REQUIREME

NT FOR IT TO BE CAPRICIOUS
AND UNREASONABLE?
> There are some delays of the prosecution which are not capricious and unreasonable
> It may be caused by some other valid reasons—prejudicial question, new evidence
or witnesses, etc.

WHEN A CASE IS DISMISSED

UPON MOTION OF THE
ACCUSED, MAY HE STILL BE
PROSECUTED FOR THE SAME
OFFENSE?
> While there have been conflicting rulings of the SC, the prevailing doctrine is that the
accused can still be prosecuted for the same
offense if he moves to dismiss on the grounds of lack of
jurisdiction, or insufficiency of complaint or information because he is deemed to have
waived his right against a second jeopardy,
or that he is estopped from maintaining that the court had no
jurisdiction or that the complaint wasn’t sufficient

WHEN WILL DISMISSAL OR

TERMINATION OF THE FIRST
CASE NOT BAR A SECOND
JEOPARDY?
1. The dismissal must be sought by the defendant personally or through his counsel
2. Such dismissal must not be on the merits and must not necessarily amount to an
acquittal

BEFORE THE PROSECUTION

COULD FINISH PRESENTI
NG EVIDENCE, THE
ACCUSED FILED A DEMURRER
TO EVIDENCE. THE COURT
GRANTED THE MOTION AND
DISMISSED THE CASE ON THE
GROUND OF INSUFFICIENCY OF
EVIDENCE OF THE
PROSECUTION. CAN THE ACCU
SED BE PROSECUTED FOR TH
E SAME OFFENSE AGAIN?
> Yes. There was no double jeopardy because the court has
exceeded its jurisdiction in dismissing the case even before the prosecution could finish
presenting evidence
> It denied the prosecution of its right to due process. Because of this, the dismissal is
null and void and cannot constitute a proper basis for a claim of double jeopardy

THE PROSECUTOR FILED AN

INFORMATION AGAINST X F
OR
HOMICIDE. BEFORE X COULD
BE ARRAIGNED, THE PROSECU
TOR
WITHDREW THE INFORMATION
WITHOUT NOTICE TO X. THE
PROSECUTOR THEN FILED AN
INFORMATION AGAINST X FOR
MURDER. CAN X INVOKE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, there was no arraignment yet under the first information
> Therefore, the first jeopardy didn’t attach. The withdrawal or dismissal of the case
before arraignment is not a bar to the filing of a new information for the same offense.
> There is no double jeopardy where there is yet no arraignment
> A nolle prosequi or dismissal entered before the accused is placed on trial and before he
pleads is not equivalent to an acquittal and doesn’t bar a subsequent prosecution for the
same offense

IF THE ACCUSED FAILS TO OB

JECT TO THE MOTION TO DIS
MISS
THE CASE FILED BY THE PRO
SECUTION, IS HE DEEMED TO
HAVE
CONSENTED TO THE DISMISSA
L? CAN HE STILL INVOKE DO
UBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, silence doesn’t mean consent to the dismissal
> If the accused fails to object or acquiesces to the dismissal of the case, he can still
invoke double jeopardy, since the dismissal was
still without his express consent.
> He is deemed to have waived his right against double jeopardy if he expressly consents
to the dismissal
X WAS CHARGED WITH MURD
ER. THE PROSECUTION MOVE
D TO
DISMISS THE CASE. COUNSEL
FOR X WROTE THE WORDS “
NO
OBJECTION” AT THE BOTTOM
OF THE MOTION TO DISMISS
AND SIGNED IT. CAN X INVOKE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY LATER ON?
> No, X is deemed to have expressly consented to the dismissal of the case when his
counsel wrote “no objection” at the bottom of the motion to dismiss
> Since the case was dismissed with his express consent, X cannot invoke double
jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURD

ER. AFTER THE PROSECUTIO
N PRESENTED ITS EVIDENCE, X
FILED A MOTION TO DISMISS ON
THE
GROUND THAT THE PROSECUT
ION FAILED TO PROVE THAT T
HE CRIME WAS COMMITTED
WITHIN THE TERRITORIAL
JURISDICTION
OF THE COURT. THE COU
RT DISMISSED THE CASE.
THE PROSECUTION
APPEALED? CAN X INVOKE
DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> No, X cannot invoke double jeopardy
> The dismissal was upon his own motion so it was with his express consent
> Since the dismissal was with his express consent, he is deemed to have waived his right
against double jeopardy
> The only time when a dismissal, even with the express consent of the accused, will bar
a double jeopardy is if it is based either on insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to
speedy trial
> These are not grounds invoked by X so he cannot claim double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH

HOMICIDE. X MOVED TO
DISMISS ON THE GROUND THAT
THE COURT HAD NO
JURISDICTION. BELIEVING IT
HAD NO JURISDICTION, THE
JUDGE DISMISSED THE
CASE. SINCE
THE COURT, IN FACT, HAD JU
RISDICTION OVER THE CASE,
THE PROSECUTION FILED
ANOTHER CASE IN THE SAME
COURT. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he was in danger of being convicted during
the first case, since he had himself earlier alleged that the court had no jurisdiction

X WAS CHARGED WITH

HOMICIDE. THE COURT,
BELIEVED IT HAD
NO JURISDICTION, MOTU PROP
IO DISMISSED THE CASE. TH
E
PROSECUTION APPEALED, CLAI
MING THAT THE COURT, IN FA
CT HAD JURISDICTION. CAN X
INVOKE DOUBLE JEOPARDY?
> Yes, when the trial court has jurisdiction but mistakenly dismisses
the complaint or information on the ground of lack of it, the dismissal wasn’t at the
request of the accused, the dismissal is not
appealable because it will place the accused in double jeopardy

X WAS CHARGED WITH RAPE.

X MOVED TO DISMISS ON TH
E
GROUND THAT THE COMPLAIN
T WAS INSUFFICIENT BECAUSE
IT
DID NOT ALLEGE LEWD DESIG
NS. THE COURT DISMISSED T
HE
CASE. LATER, ANOTHER CAS
E FOR RAPE WAS FILED AGAI
NST X. CAN X INVOKE DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> No, X is estopped from claiming that he could have been convicted under the first
complaint
> He himself moved for the dismissal on the ground that the complaint was
insufficient
> He cannot change his position and now claim that he was in danger of being
convicted under the complaint

X WAS CHARGED WITH MURD

ER, ALONG WITH THREE OTHE
R
PEOPLE. X WAS DISCHARGED
AS A STATE WITNESS. CAN
X BE PROSECUTED AGAIN FOR
THE SAME OFFENSE?
> It depends
> As a general rule, an order discharging an accused as state
witness amounts to an acquittal, and he is barred from being prosecuted again for the
same offense
> However, if he fails or refuses to testify against his co-accused in accordance with his
sworn statement constituting the basis for the discharge, he can be prosecuted again

CAN A PERSON ACCUSED O

F ESTAFA BE CHARGED WIT
H
VIOLATION OF BP22 WITHOU
T PLACING HIM IN DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> Yes. Even if the same transaction is involved, the same act may violate two or more
provisions of criminal law and the prosecution under one will not bar the prosecution under
another
> Where 2 different laws defines 2 crimes, prior jeopardy as to one of them is no obstacle
to a prosecution of the other, although both
offenses arise from the same facts, if each crime involves some important act which is
not an essential element of the other

X INSTALLED A JUMPER CABLE

WHICH ALLOWED HIM TO
REDUCE HIS ELECTRICITY
BILL. HE WAS PROSECUTED
AND SUBSEQUENTLY
CONVICTED FOR A MUNI
CIPAL ORDINANCE AGAINS
T
UNAUTHORIZED INSTALLATION
OF A DEVICE. CAN HE STILL
BE PROSECUTED FOR THEFT?
> No, under the second type of jeopardy, when an act is punished by law and an
ordinance, conviction or acquittal under one will bar a prosecution under the other
> The constitutional protection against double jeopardy is available as long as the acts
which constitute or have given rise to the first
offense under a municipal ordinance are the same acts which
constitute or have given rise to the offense charged under the statute

WHAT ARE THE EXCEPTIONS T

O DOUBLE JEOPARDY? WHEN
CAN
THE ACCUSED BE CHARGED
WITH A SECOND OFFENSE WH
ICH
NECESSARILY INCLUDES THE
OFFENSE CHARGED IN THE F
ORMER COMPLAINT OR
INFORMATION?
> The conviction of the accused shall not be a bar to another prosecution for an
offense which necessarily includes the offense charged in the former complaint or
information under any of the
following circumstances:
o The graver offense developed due to supervening facts
arising from the same act or omission constituting the former charge
o The facts constituting the graver charge became known or were discovered only
after a plea was entered in the former complaint or information
o The plea of guilty to a lesser offense was made without the consent of the prosecutor
or offended party except if the offended party fails to appear at arraignment

WHAT IS THE DOCTRINE OF

SUPERVENING EVENT?
> Where after the first prosecution a new fact supervenes for which the defendant is
responsible, which changes the character of the
offense and, together with the facts existing at the time,
constitutes a new and distinct offense, the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy
if indicted for the second offense.

X WAS CHARGED WITH FRUST

RATED HOMICIDE. THERE WA
S NOTHING TO INDICATE THAT
THE VICTIM WAS GOING TO
DIE. X
WAS ARRAIGNED. BEFORE TR
IAL, THE VICTIM DIED. CAN X
BE CHARGED WITH HOMICIDE?
> It depends.
> If the death of the victim can be traced to the acts of X, and the victim didn’t contribute to
his death with his negligence, X can be charged with homicide
> This is a supervening fact
> But if the act of X wasn’t the proximate cause of death, he cannot be charged with
homicide

X WAS CHARGED WITH RECKL

ESS IMPRUDENCE RESULTING
TO
HOMICIDE AND WAS ACQUITTE
D. THE HEIRS OF THE VICTIM
APPEALED THE CIVIL ASPECT OF
THE JUDGMENT. X CLAIMS THAT
THE APPEAL WILL PLACE HIM
IN DOUBLE JEOPARDY. IS X
CORRECT?
> No, there was no second jeopardy. What was elevated on appeal was the civil aspect of
the case, not the criminal aspect.
> The extinction of criminal liability whether by a prescription or by the bar of double
jeopardy doesn’t carry with it the extinction of civil liability arising from the offense charged

X IN A CRIMINAL CASE WAS S

ENTENCED AND REQUIRED TO
PAY
CIVIL LIABILITY. CAN THE OFF
ENDED PARTY APPEAL THE CI
VIL LIABILITY?
> Yes, if there would be appeal for a criminal case, it must pertain solely on the civil
liability.
> An appeal with regard the criminal aspect would violate the accused’s right against
double jeopardy.
> The reason why the offended party can appeal the civil aspect is that double jeopardy
only attaches to the criminal aspect and not the civil aspect. The victim or offended party in
the criminal case
is the State while in its civil aspect, the private offended party.

X WAS
CHARGED WITH MURDER
AND WAS
ACQUITTED. CAN THE
PROSECUTION APPEAL THE
ACQUITTAL?
> No, the prosecution cannot appeal the acquittal, since it would place the accused
in double jeopardy.
> A judgment of acquittal in criminal proceedings is final and unappealable whether it
happens at the trial court level or before the Court of Appeals
> Even if the decision of acquittal was erroneous, the prosecution
cannot still appeal the decision as it would put the accused in double jeopardy.

A JUDGMENT OF ACQUITTAL IN
CRIMINAL PROCEEDINGS IS
FINAL AND UNAPPEALABLE
WHETHER IT HAPPENS AT THE
TRIAL COURT LEVEL OR BEFORE
THE COURT OF APPEALS

WHEN CAN THE PROSECUTION

APPEAL DESPITE THE DISMIS
SAL OR TERMINATION OF THE
CASE?
> As a general rule, the dismissal or termination of the case after arraignment and
plea of the defendant to a valid information shall be a bar to another prosecution for the
same offense, an attempt
or frustration thereof, or one which necessarily includes or is included in the previous
offense.
> However, the prosecution may appeal the order of dismissal in the following instances:
1. If the dismissal of the first case was made upon motion or with the express consent of
the defendant, unless the grounds are insufficiency of evidence or denial of the right to
speedy trial
2. If the dismissal is not an acquittal or based upon consideration of the evidence or
of the merits of the case,
3. And the question to be passed upon by the appellate court is purely legal so that
should the dismissal be found incorrect, the case would have to be remanded to the
court of origin for further proceedings to determine the guilt or innocence of the
accused

WHAT IS THE EFFECT OF THE

APPEAL OF THE ACCUSED?
> If the accused appeals, he waives his right against double jeopardy
> The case is thrown wide open for review and a penalty higher than that of the original
conviction could be imposed upon him

WHAT SHOULD THE ACCUSED

DO IF THE COURT DENIES TH
E MOTION TO QUASH ON THE
GROUND OF DOUBLE
JEOPARDY?
> He should plea not guilty and reiterate his defense of former jeopardy
> In case of conviction, he should appeal from the judgment on the ground of double
jeopardy

CAN AN ACCUSED RAISE THE

DEFENSE OF DOUBLE JEOPAR
DY IN CONTEMPT
PROCEEDINGS?
> No, jeopardy doesn’t attach. Remember the requisites for jeopardy. Jeopardy only
attaches in criminal proceedings.

http://www.lawphil.net/judjuris/juri1950/mar1950/gr_l-3580_1950.html

"No person shall be twice put in jeopardy of punishment for the same offense," according to
article III, section 1 (20) of our constitution. The rule of double jeopardy had a settled
meaning in this jurisdiction at the time our Constitution was promulgated. It meant that when
a person is charged with an offense and the case is terminated either by acquittal or
conviction or in any other manner without the consent of the accused, the latter cannot again
be charged with the same or identical offense. This principle is founded upon the law of
reason, justice and conscience. It is embodied in the maxim of the civil law non bis in idem,
in the common law of England, and undoubtedly in every system of jurisprudence, and
instead of having specific origin it simply always existed. It found expression in the Spanish
Law and in the Constitution of the United States and is now embodied in our own
Constitution as one of the fundamental rights of the citizen.
It must be noticed that the protection of the Constitution inhibition is against a second
jeopardy for the same offense, the only exception being, as stated in the same Constitution,
that "if an act is punished by a law and an ordinance, conviction or acquittal under either
shall constitute a bar to another prosecution for the same act." The phrase same offense,
under the general rule, has always been construed to mean not only the second offense
charged is exactly the same as the one alleged in the first information, but also that the two
offenses are identical. There is identity between the two offenses when the evidence to
support a conviction for one offense would be sufficient to warrant a conviction for the other.
This so called "same-evidence test" which was found to be vague and deficient, was restated
by the Rules of Court in a clearer and more accurate form. Under said Rules there is identity
between two offenses not only when the second offense is exactly the same as the first, but
also when the second offense is an attempt to commit the first or a frustration thereof, or
when it necessary includes or is necessarily included in the offense charged in the first
information. (Rule 113, sec. 9; U.S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; U. S. vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil.,
vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6.) In this connection, an offense may be said to necessarily include
another when some of the essential ingredients of the former as alleged in the information
constitute the latter. And vice-versa, an offense may be said to be necessarily included in
another when all the ingredients of the former constitute a part of the elements constituting
the latter (Rule 116, sec. 5.) In other words, on who has been charged with an offense
cannot be again charged with the same or identical offense though the latter be lesser or
greater than the former. "As the Government cannot be with the highest, and then go down
step to step, bringing the man into jeopardy for every dereliction included therein, neither can
it begin with the lowest and ascend to the highest with precisely the same result." (People vs.
Cox, 107 Mich., 435, quoted with approval in U. S. vs. Lim Suco, 11 Phil., 484; see also U. S.
vs. Ledesma, 29 Phil., 431 and People vs. Martinez, 55 Phil., 6, 10.)

This rule of identity does not apply, however when the second offense was not in existence
at the time of the first prosecution, for the simple reason that in such case there is no
possibility for the accused, during the first prosecution, to be convicted for an offense that
was then inexistent. Thus, where the accused was charged with physical injuries and after
conviction the injured person dies, the charge for homicide against the same accused does
not put him twice in jeopardy. This is the ruling laid down by the Supreme Court of the United
States in the Philippines case of Diaz vs. U. S., 223 U. S. 442, followed by this Court
in People vs. Espino, G. R. No. 46123, 69 Phil., 471, and these two cases are similar to the
instant case. Stating it in another form, the rule is that "where after the first prosecution a
new fact supervenes for which the defendant is responsible, which changes the character of
the offense and, together with the fact existing at the time, constitutes a new and distinct
offense" (15 Am. Jur., 66), the accused cannot be said to be in second jeopardy if indicated
for the new offense.

This is the meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by our constitution for was the one
prevailing in jurisdiction at the time the Constitution was promulgated, and no other meaning
could have been intended by our Rules of Court.

Accordingly, an offense may be said to necessarily include or to be necessarily included in

another offense, for the purpose of determining the existence of double jeopardy, when both
offenses were in existence during the pendency of the first prosecution, for otherwise, if the
second offense was then inexistence, no jeopardy could attach therefor during the first
prosecution, and consequently a subsequent charge for the same cannot constitute second
jeopardy. By the very nature of things there can be no double jeopardy under such
circumstance, and our Rules of Court cannot be construed to recognize the existence of a
condition where such condition in reality does not exist. General terms of a statute or
regulation should be so limited in their application as not to lead to injustice, oppression, or
an absurd consequence. It will always, therefore, be presumed that exceptions have been
intended to their language which would avoid results of this character. (In re Allen, 2 Phil.,
641.)

When the Rules of Court were drafted, there was absolutely no intention of abandoning the
ruling laid down in the Diaz case, and the proof of this is that although the said Rules were
approved on December 1939, yet on January 30, 1940, this Court decided the Espino case
reiterating therein the Diaz doctrine. Had that doctrine been abandoned deliberately by the
Rules of Court as being unwise, unjust or obnoxious, logically it would have likewise been
repudiated in the Espino case by reason if consistency and as a matter of justice to the
accused, who should in consequence have been acquitted instead of being sentenced to a
heavy penalty upon the basis of a doctrine that had already been found to be wrong. There
was absolutely no reason to preclude this Court from repealing the doctrine in the Espino
case, for as a mere doctrine it could be repealed at any time in the decision of any case
where it is invoked, is a clear proof that the mind of the Court, even after the approval of the
Rules, was not against but in favor of said doctrine.
For these reasons we expressly repeal the ruling laid down in People vs. Tarok, 73 Phil.,
260, as followed in People vs. Villasis, 46 Off. Gaz. (Supp. to No. 1), p. 268. Such ruling is
not only contrary to the real meaning of "double jeopardy" as intended by the Constitution
and by the Rules of Court but is also obnoxious to the administration of justice. If, in
obedience to the mandate of the law, the prosecuting officer files an information within six
hours after the accused is arrested, and the accused claiming his constitutional right to a
speedy trial is immediately arraigned, and later on new fact supervenes which, together with
the facts existing at the time, constitutes a more serious offense, under the Tarok ruling, no
way is open by which the accused may be penalized in proportion to the enormity of his guilt.
Furthermore, such a ruling may open the way to suspicions or charges of conclusion
between the prosecuting officers and the accused, to the grave detriment of public interest
and confidence in the administration of justice, which cannot happen under the Diaz ruling.

Before closing, it is well to observe that when a person who has already suffered his penalty
for an offense, is charged with a new and greater offense under the Diaz doctrine herein
reiterated, said penalty may be credited to him in case of conviction for the second offense.