1 Identidad y Autoestima

Copyright © 1995. Sage Publications. All rights reserved.
May not be reproduced in any form without permission from the publisher, except fair uses permitted under U.S.
Identity and Self-Esteem
^ Who am I? Why is it important

for me to like myself?
C a n y o u recall w h e n y o u first b e c a m e a w a r e of y o u r self, t h a t is,

b e c a m e self-conscious? M y earUest m e m o r y is of a n e v e n t t h a t
occurred w h e n I w a s a b o u t 4 years old. A t that p o i n t I w a s already
self-conscious, as are all children. But I d o n o t r e m e m b e r precisely w h e n
I initially b e c a m e self-aware, n o r w h a t t h a t experience w a s like. W h e n -
ever it originated, o u r sense of identity a n d feelings a b o u t o u r self-worth
are essential p a r t s of o u r p r e s e n t selves.
INTRODUCTION
The p e r s o n a l self . . . m i g h t b e treated as the i m m e d i a t e d a -

or applicable copyright law.
t u m in psychology. The universal conscious fact is n o t feelings

a n d t h o u g h t s exist, b u t "I thirvk" a n d "I feel."
William James (1890, Vol. 1, p . 226)
93
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94 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T SELF
This q u o t e from WiUiam James's (1842-1910) classic a n d r e m a r k a b l y

c o n t e m p o r a r y Principles of Psychology suggests t w o significant features
of y o u r consciousness:
1. Your t h o u g h t s a n d feelings are active processes h e l p i n g y o u select

those particular elements of y o u r e n v i r o n m e n t (or yourself) to a t t e n d to.
Your t h o u g h t s a n d feelings d o n o t s i m p l y occur as if y o u w e r e w a t c h i n g
a m o v i e . Rather y o u are the movie—^you p r o d u c e , direct, a n d star in the
m e n t a l scenes taking place in y o u r m i n d .
2. Y o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings are intimately connected to yovir self—
they are n o t just a n y o n e ' s t h o u g h t s or feelings b u t your t h o u g h t s a n d
feelings. It is n o t so m u c h that y o u have t h o u g h t s a n d feelings (in the s a m e
sense that y o u h a v e , say, a wristwatch); it is m o r e t r u e to say t h a t y o u are
y o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings. To h a v e or o w n a physical possession m e a n s
a clear line d e m a r c a t e s the possessor from the possessed. But n o clear
line of d e m a r c a t i o n exists b e t w e e n y o u a n d y o u r t h o u g h t s . A thief m a y
steal y o u r w a t c h b u t h e can't steal y o u r t h o u g h t s . In the expressive
p h r a s e of H a z e l M a r k u s : "Thinking is Ί ' - i n g " (1990, p . 182).
S o m e t i m e s w e direct o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings at ourselves. James

(1890) n o t e s that consciousness of the self h a s special properties t h a t are
n o t f o u n d in consciousness of the e x t e m a l e n v i r o n m e n t . The self is not
s i m p l y o n e of the m a n y ideas w e can t h i n k about: T h e self is the m o s t
i m p o r t a n t a n d d o m i n a n t object of o u r t h o u g h t s . O u r self-concept func-
tions as a stable reference p o i n t — a sort of m e n t a l anchor—^within a n
ever-changing w o r l d . It p r o v i d e s a n invaluable sense of continuity a n d
identity from o n e m o m e n t to the next.
Identity: "Γ' Versus "Me''
Moreover, to b e self-conscious requires a n active, perceiving " I " as w e l l

as a " m e " w h o is the object of the " I " 's attention. James u s e d " I " to
d e n o t e the active, thiiudng self, a n d " m e " to d e n o t e the object of o n e ' s

attention, or self-concept. The self is b o t h the o n e w h o k n o w s (the "I")
a n d the o n e w h o is k n o w n (the " m e " ) . James distinguishes three i m p o r -
tant d i m e n s i o n s of the " m e " or self-concept:
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Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 95
1. The Material Me is o u r self-concept of o u r b o d i e s , o u r possessions,

o u r clothing, a n d o u r family m e m b e r s . W e can realize the psychological
reality of the Material M e b y i m a g i n i n g h o w differently w e w o u l d react
to t w o similar events:
In o n e event, y o u discover a d e n t o n your b r a n d n e w car. H o w m i g h t
y o u r e s p o n d to this m i n o r misfortune? T h e d e n t m i g h t r u i n the rest of
y o u r d a y a n d y o u w o u l d n o t function at y o u r best. Conceivably, t h e d e n t
m i g h t e v e n t u r n into long-lasting rage at the "unfairness of life," m a k i n g
y o u say to yourself over a n d over, "It's just n o t fair!"^
N o w i m a g i n e the s a m e d e n t o n y o u r friend's b r a n d n e w car. H o w
w o u l d y o u r e s p o n d in this case? You m i g h t e m p a t h i z e w i t h y o u r friend's
e m o t i o n a l distress at this m i n o r armoyance. But it is h i g h l y unlikely t h a t
y o u will h a v e the identical reaction to the d e n t in y o u r car. M o r e o v e r ,
y o u r e m p a t h e t i c r e s p o n s e will p r o b a b l y n o t c o n s u m e y o u r conscious
t h o u g h t s for t h e rest of t h e d a y . M o r e likely, y o u r concern for y o u r
friend's feelings—although genuine—^will s o o n b e replaced b y n e w
responses as y o u r attention shifts to the next event in the o n g o i n g d r a m a
of y o u r life. This i m a g i n a t i o n exercise d e m o n s t r a t e s t h a t a l t h o u g h w e d o
n o t get u p s e t at d e n t s in general, o u r egos get d e n t e d w h e n e v e r our
p r i z e d possessions are d a m a g e d , lost, or stolen.
2. The Social Me is o u r self-concept of t h e recognition w e get from other
p e o p l e . James p o i n t s o u t t h a t o u r self-concept varies as w e i m a g i n e
ourselves interacting w i t h distinct g r o u p s of p e o p l e w h o s e o p i n i o n w e
care about. O u r self-concept varies to s o m e extent as w e i m a g i n e o u r -
selves interacting w i t h o u r e m p l o y e r s (conscientious m e ) , close friends
(loyal m e ) , r o m a n t i c p a r t n e r s (loving m e ) , a n d p a r e n t s (responsible m e ) .
To t h e extent that w e consistently s h o w different sides of ourselves to
different p e o p l e , these p e o p l e will recognize a n d r e s p o n d to different
aspects of o u r personality, a n d w e will t h i n k of ourselves as h a v i n g
different social selves.
H a v i n g m u l t i p l e "Social M e ' s " c o u l d b e p r o b l e m a t i c for overall
personality functioning. D o n a h u e , Robins, Roberts, a n d J o h n (1993)
r e p o r t e d that p e o p l e w h o h a v e a different Social M e for different social

roles t e n d to b e m o r e d e p r e s s e d a n d neurotic a n d to h a v e l o w e r self-
esteem t h a n p e o p l e w h o s e Social M e ' s are m o r e similar across their
v a r i o u s social roles. A greatly fragmented social self reflects w h a t James
calls a sick soul.
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96 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T S E L F
3. The Spiritual Me is o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ourselves as p e r s o n s w h o

think, feel, a n d experience life. If h e w e r e w r i t i n g t o d a y , J a m e s w o u l d
p r o b a b l y call this aspect the "Psychological M e , " b e c a u s e t h e Spiritual
M e includes all of the psychological c o m p o n e n t s of o u r self-concept: o u r
u n d e r s t a n d i n g of o u r p e r s o n a l values, d o m i n a n t m o t i v e s , a n d p e r s o n a l -
ity traits.
Finally, James observes t w o other special properties of the self-concept.

First, o u r self-concept, o u r sense of " m e , " separates u s from all t h a t is
" n o t - m e " in the w o r l d . Second, t h e " m e " section of o u r m e n t a l imiverse
interests u s far m o r e t h a n the " n o t - m e " part:
One great splitting of the whole universe is made by each of us: and for each
of us almost all interest attaches to one of the halves; but we all draw the line
of division between them in a different place. When I say that we call the two
halves by the same names, and that those names are "me" and "not-me"
respectively, it will at once be seen what I mean. The altogether unique kind
of interest which each human mind feels in those parts of creation which it
can call "me" or "mine" may be a moral riddle, but it is a fundamental
psychological fact. (1890, Vol. 1, p. 289)
A l t h o u g h James felt quite comfortable describing t h e v a r i o u s d i m e n -

sions of the "self-as-object" or me, h e w a s u n c e r t a i n a n d tentative w h e n
it c a m e to describing the "self-as-knower" or " I . " The " I " is a n elusive
concept, n o t nearly as tractable as " m e . " Explicitly explaining the " I " is
as difficult as defining a n o t h e r elusive concept—time. A n y o n e w h o h a s
a functioning w a t c h can tell y o u w h a t time it is, b u t w h o can tell y o u
w h a t time is in itself? A s Saint A u g u s t i n e p u t it: " W h a t , t h e n , is time? If
n o o n e asks m e , I k n o w w h a t it is. If I w i s h to explain it to h i m w h o asks,
I d o n o t k n o w " (Winokur, 1989). A similar d i l e m m a occurs w h e n t r y i n g
to describe the active " I . "
W i l h a m James w a s n o t the only o n e w h o h a d difficulty defining the
" I . " Try to describe the " I " before r e a d i n g the next p a r a g r a p h . Take as
m u c h time as y o u n e e d to p u t into y o u r o w n w o r d s a n accurate descrip-
tion of y o u r active, k n o w i n g self, without describing y o u r self-concept.

Exactly h o w d o e s y o u r " I " w o r k ?
N o t e t h a t the m o m e n t y o u b e g i n to describe yourself (e.g., I a m "tall,
m a l e , a dentist"), y o u describe y o u r self-as-object. T h e d i l e m m a is t h a t
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as the k n o w e r b e g i n s to reflect o n himself or herself, the "self-as-object,"

the " m e , " d o m i n a t e s the content of consciousness, a n d t h e k n o w i n g " I "
seems to v a n i s h in the mist. Like Saint A u g u s t i n e a n d William James, w e
all k n o w w h a t " t i m e " is a n d w h a t " I " is—ûntil w e h a v e to explain t h e m !
James c o n c l u d e d that the active " I " changes from m o m e n t to m o m e n t :
"It is a Thought, at each m o m e n t different from the last m o m e n t , b u t
appropriative of the latter, together w i t h all t h a t t h e latter called its o w n "
(1890, Vol. 1, p . 401, itaUcs in original). But a l t h o u g h each I - m o m e n t
differs from t h e p r e v i o u s I-moment, b e c a u s e t h e I " a p p r o p r i a t e s " a n d
combines p a s t m o m e n t s w i t h present ones, it constitutes the source of
o u r sense of p e r s o n a l identity. To James, a n essential link exists b e t w e e n
sensing o u r p e r s o n a l identity a n d p r e s e r v i n g o u r m e m o r y of t h e "I-as-
knower." T h u s James's a n s w e r to the question of " w h a t is the I-as-
k n o w e r ? " is a p a r a d o x : T h e I-as-knower of reaUty c h a n g e s from o n e
m o m e n t to the next, a n d yet it nevertheless r e m a i n s t h e basis of o u r sense
of identity.
Self-Esteem
Self-esteem, o u r evaluation of ourselves, can r a n g e b e t w e e n feeling

that w e are w o r t h y a n d valuable m e m b e r s of society to feeling w e are
worthless a n d valueless. Self-esteem reflects the " I ' s " j u d g m e n t of the
" m e , " w h i c h i m m e d i a t e l y affects h o w the " I " experiences itself. Self-
esteem p e r v a d e s b o t h the " I " a n d " m e " aspects of identity.
William James offered a simple yet p r o f o u n d definition:
Self-esteem = Successes/Pretensions
This formula says w e can raise o u r self-esteem in t w o w a y s : b y

a c c u m u l a t i n g successes a n d b y r e d u c i n g o u r pretensions. R e d u c i n g o u r
pretensions m e a n s accepting ourselves for w h o w e are a n d h o l d i n g n o
unrealistic aspirations or expectations. W h e n o u r p r e t e n s i o n s chronically
exceed o u r actual successes, w e often feel dissatisfied w i t h ourselves a n d
experience l o w self-esteem. N o t e that this sort of l o w self-esteem is c o m -

pletely self-induced b y o u r o w n pretensions! But w h e n o u r successes
exceed o u r pretensions, w e feel g o o d a b o u t ourselves, t h a t is, experience
h i g h self-esteem. T h u s , James's formula c o u l d b e restated:
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Self-esteem = Successes a c h i e v e d / S u c c e s s e s expected
This formula a p p h e s to u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w y o u w o u l d react after

getting a g r a d e of " B " o n a n e x a m or t e r m p a p e r . James's formula tells
u s that y o u r reaction d e p e n d s o n yotir expectations: If y o u expected to
receive a n " A , " y o u will b e d i s a p p o i n t e d b y the " B " a n d will experience
( m o m e n t a r y ) l o w e r e d self-esteem. But if y o u expected a " C , " y o u will
feel g o o d a n d experience h i g h e r self-esteem. James's s i m p l e formula
raises the p r o v o c a t i v e q u e s t i o n of h o w often the u l t i m a t e cause of o u r
o w n h a p p i n e s s or s a d n e s s hes w i t h i n o u r o w n expectations for o u r -
selves.
James (1890) further h y p o t h e s i z e d that "staking o u r salvation" o n
those particular aspects of o u r identity contributes the m o s t to o u r
overall level of self-esteem. For e x a m p l e , the s t u d e n t w h o h o p e d to
receive a n " A " m a y h a v e staked h e r salvation o n h e r identity as a n
excellent s t u d e n t . Receiving a g r a d e of " B " w o u l d b e a b i g g e r b l o w to
h e r self-esteem t h a n to a n o t h e r s t u d e n t w h o s e salvation h e s off c a m p u s .
Is J a m e s ' s h y p o t h e s i s correct? Research findings d o s e e m to s u p p o r t
it. Consistent w i t h James's h y p o t h e s i s , Rosenberg (1965) s h o w e d t h a t
adolescents w h o h o l d negative self-concepts are likely to h a v e overall
l o w self-esteem only if they feel their flaws are personally i m p o r t a n t . To
see yourself as a p o o r athlete, for instance, d o e s n o t particularly d a m a g e
y o u r self-esteem if y o u d o n ' t really v a l u e athletic skill. Similarly, P e l h a m
a n d S w a n n (1989) f o u n d a v e r y strong relationship b e t w e e n identity a n d
self-esteem: T h e m o r e p e o p l e v a l u e those skills they excel at, t h e h i g h e r
is their overall self-esteem. A d d i t i o n a l research o n the relationship b e -
t w e e n identity a n d self-esteem will b e p r e s e n t e d later in t h e chapter.
M e t h o d o l o g i c a l Issues i n
Investigations of Self-Esteem
Psychologists a n d n o n p s y c h o l o g i s t s alike place a special sigruficance

o n self-esteem b e c a u s e it is a n i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t of o u r behavior.
C h i l d r e n w h o b e c o m e p r e g n a n t , d r o p o u t of school, or u s e d r u g s are
c o m m o n l y t h o u g h t to d o so, at least in large part, b e c a u s e they h a v e l o w
self-esteem. T h e s a m e behef a p p h e s to a d u l t s w h o maltreat their chil-
d r e n , c o m m i t crimes, are chronically u n e m p l o y e d a n d d e p e n d e n t o n
welfare, or are alcohohcs. But p e o p l e w i t h h i g h self-esteem are b e h e v e d
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to b e unlikely to e n g a g e in s u c h self-defeating or d e v i a n t behavior.

Therefore, it is reasoned, those w h o c o m m i t s u c h d e v i a n t acts m u s t h a v e
n o t felt g o o d a b o u t themselves beforehand.
N u m e r o u s investigators h a v e u s e d this reasoning to test t h e h y p o t h e -
sis t h a t l o w self-esteem is o n e of t h e causes of m a n y social p r o b l e m s . If
this h y p o t h e s i s w e r e s u p p o r t e d b y observations in t h e real w o r l d , p r e -
ventive social m e a s u r e s protecting at-risk children's self-esteem m i g h t
b e enacted to p r e v e n t problematic b e h a v i o r s . Obviously, this is a far from
trivial issue. W h a t h a v e t h e investigators foimd?
The typical o u t c o m e h a s b e e n disheartening. M o s t research in t h e area
has failed to support t h e h y p o t h e s i s that self-esteem is related to p r o b l e m -
atic b e h a v i o r (Mecca, Smelser, & Vasconcellos, 1989). H o w c a n this b e ?
A r e o u r beUef s a b o u t t h e i m p o r t a n c e of self-esteem w r o n g ? O r can it b e
s o m e t h i n g else?
The m o s t plausible explanation for research failures to d e m o n s t r a t e
the social i m p o r t a n c e of self-esteem lies in t h e i n a d e q u a t e m e t h o d s u s e d
b y m o s t investigators. There are three p r o b l e m s w i t h m o s t research
efforts.
First, simple self-report m e a s u r e s of self-concept a n d global self-
esteem (overall, all-inclusive self-esteem) are at b e s t imprecise m e a s u r e -
m e n t devices (see Wylie, 1974,1979 for a full discussion of this point).
Second, self-concept scales u s u a l l y consist of s t a n d a r d q u e s t i o n s t h a t
all subjects answer. A p e r s o n ' s self-esteem score is mechanically deter-
m i n e d b y c o m p u t i n g t h e total favorable self-ratings m i n u s t h e total
unfavorable self-ratings. Because all items are scored t h e s a m e w a y for
all subjects, they are n o t u s u a l l y w e i g h t e d to represent their relative
i m p o r t a n c e to each i n d i v i d u a l subject. T h e typical self-concept a n d
self-esteem scale d o e s n o t identify those specific aspects of t h e self-
concept o n w h i c h t h e p e r s o n "stakes h i s or h e r salvation."
Third, t h e absence of a imiversal, s t a n d a r d i z e d definition of self-
esteem h a s resulted in self-esteem scales m u l t i p l y i n g like rabbits. A t least
200 self-esteem scales are in u s e , m o s t of w h i c h are n o t c o m p a r a b l e t o
o n e another! It is n o w o n d e r that s u c h little progress h a s b e e n m a d e in
d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e relationship of self-esteem to real-world b e h a v i o r s

(Scheff, Retzinger, & Ryan, 1989).
A major issue concerning how w e s h o u l d s t u d y personality is k n o w n
as t h e n o m o t h e t i c v e r s u s idiographic debate. Allport (1961) p o i n t s o u t
that t h e t e r m nomothetic c o m e s from t h e Greek nomothetikos: t h e giving
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or enacting of laws; idiographic derives from the Greek idios: o n e ' s o w n

(as in idiosyncratic).
N o m o t h e t i c research involves testing large n i m i b e r s of subjects a n d
a v e r a g i n g their scores o n the variable or variables of interest. T h e goal
of n o m o t h e t i c research is to discover general l a w s that a p p l y to e v e r y o n e .
Idiosyncratic responses are either i g n o r e d or eliminated from further
analysis.
Idiographic research efforts are d e s i g n e d to discover the i m i q u e p a t -
t e m of traits a n d m o t i v e s t h a t exist w i t h i n a n i n d i v i d u a l p e r s o n . T h e goal
of idiographic research is to u n d e r s t a n d in d e p t h a particular i n d i v i d u a l
in all his or h e r u n i q u e n e s s .
M o s t research efforts t h a t h a v e failed to s h o w the relationship of
self-esteem to b e h a v i o r h a v e b e e n n o m o t h e t i c . H i g h self-esteem indi-
v i d u a l s are identified as those w h o score a b o v e t h e average of all subjects
tested o n that occasion. L o w self-esteem subjects are those w h o s e total
score is b e l o w the g r o u p average. Because m o s t n o r m a l h u m a n s h o l d
overly positive self-evaluations to b e g i n w i t h (Taylor & Brown, 1988),
the g r o u p a v e r a g e o n these tests t e n d s to b e v e r y high. Being b e l o w
average, then, doesn't necessarily m e a n one suffers from low self-esteem—
in aU likelihood, these research subjects suffer from low self-esteem only in
the m i n d of the nomothetically m i n d e d researcher.
Idiographic research that takes the time to s t u d y each i n d i v i d u a l ' s
u n i q u e self-concept a n d d e t e r m i n e his or h e r o w n level of self-esteem
a p a r t from c o m p a r i s o n to a n y g r o u p is far m o r e likely to successfully
d e m o n s t r a t e the i m p o r t a n c e of self-esteem (e.g., the P e l h a m & S w a n n
[1989] s t u d y p r e v i o u s l y m e n t i o n e d ) . Regrettably, s u c h careful, time-
c o n s u m i n g investigations are few a n d far b e t w e e n . Brett P e l h a m ' s (1993)
masterful presentation of the practical a n d theoretical v a l u e s of idio-
graphic research m a y h e l p influence future investigators to a d o p t idio-
graphic m e t h o d s w h e n they are a p p r o p r i a t e .
T H E PSYCHOSOCIAL T H E O R Y OF IDENTITY
The sense of ego identity is the a c c m e d confidence that o n e ' s

ability to maintain inner sameness a n d c o n t i n u i t y . . . is matched
b y the s a m e n e s s a n d continuity of o n e ' s m e a r u n g for others.
Erik Erikson (1959, p . 89)
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The distinction b e t w e e n the " I " as k n o w e r of reality a n d the " m e " as

o n e object of the F s reflections is highly relevant to i m d e r s t a n d i n g h o w
psychoanalysts v i e w the role of identity a n d self-concept in personality.
Beginning w i t h F r e u d ' s concept of " e g o " [Ich, m e a n i n g " I " in the original
G e r m a n ] a n d continuing w i t h alternative psychoanalytic a p p r o a c h e s of
Adler a n d Jimg, it is clear that their definitions of "self" focused almost
entirely o n u n d e r s t a n d i n g the " I " rather t h a n the " m e , " or self-concept
(Erikson, 1982; Ticho, 1982). This w a s p r o b a b l y d u e to their orientation
as therapists. Their p r i m a r y task w a s to h e l p their patients function m o r e
effectively in the w o r l d b y r e d u c i n g their i n t e m a l conflicts (strengthen-
ing their "I") rather t h a n c h a n g i n g their self-concepts p e r se. C o n s e -
quently, there are few direct references to identity, self-concept, a n d
self-esteem a m o n g the early psychoanalysts.
The major theorist from the p s y c h o d y n a m i c tradition stressing the
i m p o r t a n c e of identity is Erik Erikson. Erikson originally trained as a
F r e u d i a n analyst before d e v e l o p i n g his o w n t h e o r y of personality, w h i c h
accepts the major p r e m i s e s of traditional psychoanalysis. Erikson built
o n such F r e u d i a n ideas as u n c o n s c i o u s confUct a n d p s y c h o s e x u a l stages
of d e v e l o p m e n t b y situating the d e v e l o p i n g p e r s o n w i t h i n a social
context. T h u s his a p p r o a c h is called psychosocial because it e m p h a s i z e s
b o t h personality variables within the d e v e l o p i n g p e r s o n as well as those
external social p r e s s u r e s or crises i n d i v i d u a l s m u s t a d a p t to t h r o u g h o u t
the life span.
We r e v i e w e d Erikson's first four stages of d e v e l o p m e n t in C h a p t e r 3.
Table 4.1 s u n u n a r i z e s the i m p o r t a n t elements from Erikson's n e x t three
stages.
In this chapter, w e will describe Erikson's theory r e g a r d i n g t h e next
three stages of adolescence, y o u n g a d u l t h o o d , a n d a d u l t h o o d . We will
cover old age, Erikson's last stage, in C h a p t e r 8.
Adolescence: Identity Versus Identity C o n f u s i o n
Erikson's fifth stage of d e v e l o p m e n t occurs d u r i n g adolescence. T h e

crisis of identity versus identity confusion n e e d s to b e resolved at this time.

Establishing a n identity, in Erikson's view, requires b o t h a n mirapersonal
process (within ourselves) a n d a n inferpersonal process (relating to other
people). T h e intrapersonal process of identity formation involves expe-
riencing i n t e m a l continuity of o n e ' s self over t i m e as well as m e n t a l l y
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TABLE 4.1 Summary of Erikson's Stages of Development
Adaptive Ego Core

Life Stage Psychosocial Crisis Ego Quality Pathology
1. Infanqr (0-2 years) Trust vs. Mistrust Hope Wthdrawal

2. Toddler (2-3 years) Autonomy vs. Shame and Doubt WiU Compulsion
3. Early School Age
(4-5 years) Initiative vs. Guilt Purpose hihibition
4. Middle School Age
(6-12 years) Industry vs. Inferiority Competence Inertia
5. Adolescence Identity vs. Identity Confusion Fidelity Repudiation

6. Young Adulthood Intimacy vs. Isolation Love Exclusivity
7. Adulthood Generativity vs. Stagnation Care Rejectivity
8. Old Age Integrity vs. Despair Wisdom Disdain
SOURCES: Erikson (1963, 1978,1982). Reprinted from THE LIFE CYCLE COMPLETED by Erik H.
Erikson, with the permission of W. W. Norton & Company Inc. Copyright © 1982 by Rikan Enter-
prises, Ltd.
integrating the n e w social roles—occupational, sexual, a n d ideological—

o n e is b e g i n n i n g to play. The interpersonal process involves finding o u r
i n d i v i d u a l niche a m o n g the o p p o r t u n i t i e s offered b y society a n d b e i n g
r e w a r d e d b y society for d o i n g so. T h e p a y c h e c k w e receive for w o r k i n g
symbolizes the w o r t h society places o n the v a l u e of o u r contribution. The
i n d i v i d u a l n e e d s to find his or h e r place in society, a n d the society m u s t
p r o v i d e o p p o r t u n i t i e s to d o so. A n y o n e w h o achieves a stable sense of
identity experiences "a feeling of b e i n g at h o m e in o n e ' s body, a sense of
' k n o w i n g w h e r e o n e is going,' a n d a n inner a s s u r e d n e s s of anticipated
recognition from those w h o c o u n t " (Erikson, 1968, p . 165).
The key to u n d e r s t a n d i n g Erikson's v i e w of the identity crisis is to
recall t h a t h e p r o p o s e s a n epigenetic theory. This m e a n s , in this context,
that h o w t h e adolescent h a n d l e s the issue of w h o h e or she is d e p e n d s
i m p o r t a n t l y o n the o u t c o m e of the four p r i o r life stage crises. In the ideal

case, the four p r i o r stages will result in the four ego strengths of hope, will,
purpose, a n d sense of competence. Because each step is g r o u n d e d in all of
the p r i o r steps, a p e r s o n ' s identity intimately relates to these first four
a d a p t i v e quahties. W h e n the identity crisis m a k e s its conscious a p p e a r -
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ance, the adolescent w h o u s e s these four p r i m a r y ego strengths can

resolve it m o r e favorably t h a n s o m e o n e w h o d o e s n ' t h a v e t h e m at h a n d .
Erikson h o l d s tiaat fidelity is t h e specific ego strength t h a t e m e r g e s as
the adolescent b e g i n s to resolve t h e crisis of identity v e r s u s identity
confusion. The infant's a d a p t i v e quality of trust f o r e s h a d o w s the a d a p -
tive quality of fidelity. Fidelity refers to the adolescent's c o m m i t m e n t to
trust those role models o n e identifies w i t h , the ideologies or social causes
o n e finds worthy, a n d oneself as a c o m p e t e n t , purposeful, intentional
(willful), a n d hopeful p e r s o n . Erikson n o t e s t h a t " h o p e connotes the
m o s t basic quality of T'-ness, w i t h o u t w h i c h life c o u l d n o t b e g i n or
meaningfully e n d " (1982, p . 62). Clearly, in Erikson's thinking, t h e e g o
strength of fidelity is m o r e likely to b e d e v e l o p e d in s o m e o n e w h o s e
earliest stage of life resulted in the ego strength of h o p e .
Does research s u p p o r t Erikson's central p r e m i s e t h a t identity, or a
well-defined self-concept, is i m p o r t a n t for a well-functioning p e r s o n a l -
ity? Unequivocally yes. I n d i v i d u a l s w i t h a strong sense of identity,
c o m p a r e d to those w i t h tentative identities, are better able to regulate
a n d control their o w n feelings a n d actions, set a n d successfully achieve
their goals, h a v e h i g h e r self-esteem, a n d project a consistent a n d socially
desirable self-image to other p e o p l e (for a review, see Sedikides, 1993).
Identity is clearly a key d i m e n s i o n of p e r s o n a l i t y
Does evidence s u p p o r t Erikson's h y p o t h e s e s a b o u t the psychosocial
antecedents of identity? T h e few research findings r e p o r t e d so far are
e n c o u r a g i n g , b u t they are n o t as conclusive as those concerning t h e
overall i m p o r t a n c e of identity. Consistent w i t h Erikson's ideas, research
s h o w s t h a t college s t u d e n t s ' identity formations are related to their
present feelings of competence, trust, a n d a u t o n o m y ( D a m o n , 1983;
Harter, 1990b). To d e m o n s t r a t e that Erikson is correct a b o u t the p r e c u r -
sors of identity, however, longitudinal or prospective studies t h a t b e g i n in
infancy are n e e d e d . Such investigations w o u l d show, if Erikson's t h e o r y
is useful, t h a t children w h o solve the earliest crises favorably h a v e easier
times establishing their identity in adolescence.
That Erikson h o l d s o u r p a s t to b e a n i m p o r t a n t d e t e r m i n a n t of o u r
present functioning is, of course, q u i t e in k e e p i n g w i t h his p s y c h o a n a -
lytic orientation. But the principle of epigenesis also looks to t h e future.
A l t h o u g h the crisis of identity c o m e s to the forefront d u r i n g adolescence,
its ultimate solution e x t e n d s w e l l into a d u l t h o o d : "Epigenetically speak-
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ing, of course, n o b o d y can quite ' k n o w ' w h o h e or she ' i s ' until p r o m i s i n g
p a r t n e r s in w o r k a n d love h a v e b e e n identified" (Erikson, 1982, p . 72).
T h u s t h e adolescent's irutial efforts to find his or h e r place in the w o r l d
represent a starting p o i n t t o w a r d resolving t h e identity crisis. Experience
is n e e d e d before w e can discover w h o a n d w h a t w e love, t h e skills w e
possess, the k i n d s of w o r k w e enjoy, a n d o u r allegiance to particular
ideologies—religious, pohtical, intellectual, a n d economic. By success-
fully resolving the identity v e r s u s identity confusion crisis, w e accrue
the ego strength of fidehty that gives u s t h e n e e d e d strength to h a n d l e
the e n s u i n g psychosocial crises.
Erikson v i e w s identity d e v e l o p m e n t as a process that requires time.
Moreover, it m a y b e a b i m i p y process for m a n y adolescents i m a b l e or
imwilling to c o m m i t themselves to a particular set of self-images. T h e
core p a t h o l o g y associated w i t h role confusion is role repudiation, a n u n -
willingness to identify w i t h a n y of the potential roles offered b y o n e ' s
society. Role r e p u d i a t i o n , Erikson (1982) observes, m a y a p p e a r as diffi-
dence, reflecting a slowness a n d w e a k n e s s in settling o n a n y particular
set of identity images. M o r e seriously, role r e p u d i a t i o n m i g h t result in a
systematic defiance or m a r k e d preference for a negative identity (so-
cially unacceptable yet s t u b b o r n l y h e l d self-images).
Erikson (1968) v i e w s adolescence as a p e r i o d oi psychosocial morato-
rium allowing the y o u n g p e r s o n to e x p e r i m e n t w i t h different social roles
before finding his or h e r niche in society. A s a psychoanalyst, Erikson
does n o t necessarily a s s u m e that w e consciously experience m o r a t o r i u m
as such. O n l y in retrospect d o w e discover that w h a t w e took so seriously
as adolescents w a s in fact a n e e d e d e x p e r i m e n t a t i o n w i t h a particular
identity i m a g e . The m o r a t o r i u m fails only if the y o i m g p e r s o n r e m a i n s
chronically u n w i l l i n g to select a n d affirm particular social roles (identity
confusion) or prematurely settles o n a n identity before taking t h e t i m e to
p l a y w i t h v a r i o u s social roles. S o m e a d u l t s p u t social p r e s s u r e o n teen-
agers b y asking, " W h a t d o y o u w a n t to b e w h e n y o u g r o w u p ? " But this
p r e s s u r e p u s h e s s o m e teenagers to foreclose their identity crises p r e m a -
turely. This m a y b e d o n e b y overidentifying w i t h p a r e n t a l v a l u e s a n d
wishes, s w a l l o w i n g t h e m wholesale, so to speak, as o p p o s e d to t a k i n g

the time to discover w h a t is right for o n e ' s authentic self.
Empirical studies of Erikson's theory of adolescent identity h a v e b e e n
heavily influenced b y James Marcia's (1980) related p r o p o s a l of four
identity status positions. Marcia, in d r a w i n g o n Erikson's theory, h y -
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Chapter 4 Identity and Self-Esteem 105
p o t h e s i z e d that there are t w o essential c o m p o n e n t s to adolescent i d e n -

tity formation: (1) a crisis d u r i n g w h i c h old v a l u e s a n d o l d choices a r e
reexamined, a n d (2) a commitment t o a particular social o r occupational
role a n d i d e o l o g y By c o m b i i u n g these t w o c o m p o n e n t s , four possible
o u t c o m e s are generated:
1. High crisis, high commitment: Following a crisis of identity, t h e p e r s o n

d e e p l y c o m m i t s t o a particular o c c u p a t i o n a n d ideology. This positive
o u t c o m e is called identity achievement
2. High crisis, no commitment: T h e identity crisis r e m a i n s i n p r o g r e s s . This
o u t c o m e is called moratorium,
3. No crisis, high commitment: T h e p e r s o n precludes t h e experience of a n
identity crisis b y p r e m a t u r e l y c o m m i t t i n g t o a n o c c u p a t i o n a n d ideology.
Past decisions a r e n o t r e e v a l u a t e d . This o u t c o m e is called foreclosure.
4. No crisis, no commitment: T h e p e r s o n is n o t p r e s e n t l y e x p e r i e n c i n g a n
identity crisis ( a l t h o u g h o n e m a y h a v e b e e n experienced, b u t n o t resolved,
in t h e past) a n d h a s n o t m a d e a n o c c u p a t i o n a l a n d ideological c o m m i t -
m e n t . This o u t c o m e , u s u a l l y f o u n d v e r y early in t h e process, is called
identity diffusion.
Researchers investigating Marcia's classification s c h e m e h a v e f o u n d

s o m e interesting correlations. For e x a m p l e , t h e h i g h e s t levels of self-
esteem are s o m e t i m e s (but n o t across all studies) f o u n d a m o n g identity
achievers, followed b y t h e m o r a t o r i u m g r o u p , t h e n foreclosure, a n d last
b y those in t h e identity diffusion g r o u p ( D a m o n , 1983). Successful
identity achievers also h a v e b e e n f o u n d to b e less self-preoccupied w i t h
h o w others evaluate t h e m a n d m o r e self-assured t h a n other adolescents
( A d a m s , A b r a h a m , & M a r k s t r o m , 1987).
Berzonsky (1992) foimd t h a t college s t u d e n t s w i t h diffuse identity
styles likely e m p l o y procrastination, wishful thinking, a n d tension r e -
d u c t i o n strategies w h e n faced w i t h stressful situations. T h e y prefer to
cope w i t h their o w n arucious feelings (emotion-focused coping—see next
chapter) rather t h a n directly attack t h e p r o b l e m causing their stress. In
contrast, s t u d e n t s w h o s e identity styles are consistent w i t h Marcia's
identity achieved status are m o r e likely to u s e direct, problem-focused

information to solve their p e r s o n a l p r o b l e m s .
College years are, t o s o m e extent, a continuation of psychosocial
m o r a t o r i u m . So it is n o t surprising that h i g h school g r a d u a t e s w h o w o r k
full-time a n d d o n o t g o to college r e p o r t h i g h e r levels of identity achieve-
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m e n t in establishing stable rehgious a n d pohtical identities t h a n d o

college s t u d e n t s ( M u n r o & A d a m s , 1977). Moreover, in a l o n g i t u d i n a l
study, A d a m s a n d Fitch (1982) f o u n d that it is n o t u n u s u a l for college
s t u d e n t s to regress from identity achievement to m o r a t o r i u m at s o m e
p o i n t d u r i n g their academic careers (consider h o w m a n y s t u d e n t s
c h a n g e their major fields at least once). But for m o s t college s t u d e n t s , t h e
m o r a t o r i u m p e r i o d d o e s n o t last forever. M o s t g r a d u a t e s e m e r g e from
the Ivory Tower w i t h b o t h a college degree in h a n d a n d a firmer identity
in m i n d t h a n they h a d as entering freshmen (Waterman, 1982, 1985).
H a v i n g faith in themselves a n d their ideals, they are n o w r e a d y to enter
the a d u l t w o r l d of love a n d w o r k .
Y o u n g A d u l t h o o d : Intimacy Versus Isolation
Young a d u l t s w h o successfully e m e r g e from adolescence w i t h stable

identities " c a n b e eager a n d willing to fuse identities in m u t u a l i n t i m a c y "
(Erikson, 1982, p . 70). T h e psychosocial crisis of y o u n g a d u l t h o o d is the
crisis of intimacy versus isolation.
Following as it d o e s the e s t a b h s h m e n t of a p e r s o n a l identity a n d a
stable level of self-esteem, intimacy w i t h a n o t h e r d e p e n d s o n y o u n g
a d u l t s ' perceptions of themselves as c o m p e t e n t a n d valuable i n d i v i d u a l s
(the epigenetic principle again). Intimacy m a y b e defined as a f u n d a m e n -
tal s h a r i n g of o u r irmermost b e i n g w i t h a n o t h e r p e r s o n ( M c A d a m s ,
1989). A n intimate relationship b e t w e e n t w o a d u l t s requires b o t h to b e
willing a n d able to recognize a n d e m p a t h i z e w i t h each o t h e r ' s n e e d s .
Barriers to intimacy include all the ego core pathologies t h a t result
from unsuccessfully resolving earher stages of d e v e l o p m e n t : chronic
m i s t r u s t of others a n d t e n d e n c y to w i t h d r a w w h e n stressed; feelings of
s h a m e , guilt, a n d inferiority; a n d identity confusion.
By isolation Erikson m e a n s a fear of r e m a i n i n g s e p a r a t e d a n d u n r e c -
ognized. The greatest d a n g e r associated w i t h chronic isolation is a
continual reliving of the identity confhct a n d potential r e t u m to identity
confusion. Erikson, as s h o w n in Table 4.1, identifies exclusivity as the

extreme core p a t h o l o g y associated w i t h isolation. Exclusivity refers to
a n elitist a t t i t u d e the i n d i v i d u a l u s e s to s h u t o u t others n o t w o r t h y of his
or h e r attention a n d i n v o l v e m e n t in a relationship. A s w i t h t h e o t h e r
Eriksonian stages, the presence of a core p a t h o l o g y p r e v e n t s further
psychosocial g r o w t h .
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Loneliness is a n all too c o m m o n s y m p t o m of isolation. Surveys indi-

cate that as m a n y as 2 5 % of a d u l t s feel v e r y lonely d u r i n g a n y given
30-day p e r i o d (Weiss, 1974). Loneliness m a y b e short-Uved or chronic.
People w h o are chronically lonely are often v e r y socially a n x i o u s a n d
t e n d to select, unintentionally, social strategies that m a k e intimacy w i t h
a n o t h e r p e r s o n difficult to achieve. For e x a m p l e , they are Ukely to
verbally p u t themselves d o w n a n d b e passive in social interactions,
letting others estabUsh the direction a n d p u r p o s e of their joint activities
(Langston & Cantor, 1989). A s we'll see in the next chapter, the t e n d e n c y
to b e self-deprecating can b e u n d e r s t o o d w i t h i n the dispositional orien-
tation as a state of chronic negative affect t h a t can p e r v a d e o n e ' s entire
personaUty.
People w h o constantly p u t themselves d o w n n o t only reveal their l o w
self-esteem, they also m a k e it difficult for others to enjoy their company.
F u r t h e r m o r e , other p e o p l e are h i g h l y unlikely to p r o v i d e direct feedback
concerning their negative reactions. Consequently, l o w self-esteem p e o -
ple " t u r n off" others, yet d o n o t k n o w that they d o so, a n d are d e p r i v e d
of feedback that w o u l d allow t h e m to i m p r o v e their social skills (Swann,
Stein-Seroussi, & McNulty, 1992). Finally, in revealing their l o w self-
esteem, such p e o p l e implicitly d e m o n s t r a t e that they feel tmcomfortable
a b o u t a n d c a n n o t accept themselves—that is, they h a v e a n identity
problem.
Such research findings indirectly s u p p o r t Erikson's assimfiption t h a t
identity resolution relates to o u r ability to resolve the intimacy-isolation
conflict. M o r e direct tests of Erikson's claim, a l t h o u g h few in n u m b e r ,
also t e n d to b e s u p p o r t i v e . Orlofsky, Marcia, a n d Lesser (1973), for
e x a m p l e , f o u n d t h a t the m o r e m a t u r e their m a l e subjects scored o n a test
of identity status, the m o r e m a t u r e they scored o n a m e a s u r e of intimacy
status. A similar positive correlation b e t w e e n identity a n d intimacy, for
b o t h m e n a n d w o m e n , w a s r e p o r t e d b y Tesch a n d W h i t b o u m e (1982).
However, n o t all agree w i t h Erikson o n t h e sequence of identity
followed b y intimacy. Erikson's h y p o t h e s i s that identity m u s t p r e c e d e
intimacy is seen as a male-centered v i e w b y s o m e female psychologists.
Carol GiUigan, for e x a m p l e , a r g u e s that for w o m e n , "identity is defined

in a context of relationship a n d is j u d g e d b y a s t a n d a r d of responsibility
a n d care" (1982, p . 160). A w o m a n , in other w o r d s , is m o r e a p t to define
herself b y h e r intimate relationship w i t h a partner. S u p p o r t i n g Gilligan's
analysis is the observation t h a t m e n ' s self-esteem is associated w i t h
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success in p e r s o n a l achievements, w h e r e a s w o m e n ' s self-esteem d e -

p e n d s to a greater extent o n connections a n d a t t a c h m e n t s to other p e o p l e
(Josephs, M a r k u s , & Tafarodi, 1992). T h u s identity a n d intimacy are n o t
as clearly sequential for w o m e n as they are for m e n .
Consistent w i t h this v i e w are results t h a t romantically i n v o l v e d col-
lege w o m e n feel httle conflict over intimacy a n d s e e m to h a v e few, if any,
p r o b l e m s balancing their identity-pursuits w i t h their intimacy n e e d s
(Cantor, Acker, & Cook-Flanagan, 1992). Yet b e c a u s e these a u t h o r s d i d
n o t include a c o m p a r a b l e s a m p l e of m e n in this study, it is n o t clear to
w h a t extent these observations call for Erikson to distinguish s e p a r a t e
d e v e l o p m e n t a l sequences for m e n a n d w o m e n . Clearly, a d d i t i o n a l re-
search is n e e d e d to resolve this i m p o r t a n t issue.
Erikson postulates love as the e g o strength that d e v e l o p s from a
successful resolution of the intimacy v e r s u s isolation confhct. Erikson
(1978) defines love as the capacity for m u t u a h t y t h a t t r a n s c e n d s child-
h o o d dependency. M u t u a h t y , his key term, refers to a v o l i m t a r y interde-
p e n d e n c e of the h v e s of t w o individuals. The m e a n i n g of love h a s
attracted t h e attention of serious thinkers for t h o u s a n d s of years. It is
w o r t h w h i l e to consider s o m e relatively recent t r e a t m e n t s of this imiver-
sal experience.
What Is Love?
T h e q u e s t i o n of w h e t h e r love is s o m e single, unified process or is

c o m p o s e d of v a r i o u s elements h a s b e e n investigated b y a n e x p a n d i n g
n u m b e r of researchers over the p a s t 25 years or so (see Hatfield, 1988;
H e n d r i c k & H e n d r i c k , 1992; Sternberg, 1986). These researchers all w a n t
to a n s w e r three basic questions: A r e there different k i n d s of love? If so,
w h a t are they? H o w are they related?
A s o n e illustration of this a p p r o a c h , consider the w o r k of J o h n A l a n
Lee. Lee (1973) describes, on t h e basis of extensive interviews of m o r e
t h a n 4,000 a d u l t s , v a r i o u s "colors" of love t h a t reflect different m e a r u n g s
a n d c o n n o t a t i o n s to different p e o p l e . Lee first identifies three " p r i m a r y
colors" of love:
Eros stresses the supreme importance of love in a person's life, is based

strongly on the physical attractiveness of one's partner, and seeks early
sexual relations with that partner.
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Ludus (pronounced loo-dus) is the playhil aspect of love. Ludic love is love
practiced as a game or pastime. Ludic lovers may have more than one
partner at any point in time and do not make deep emotional commitments
to any of them. All ludic lovers, boys as well as girls, just want to have fun.
Storge (pronounced store-gay) is based on the love that grows out of friend-
ship. Storgic lovers enjoy each other's company and share many interests
and activities. The passionate element of love so crucial to erotic and ludic
lovers is simply not that important to storgic lovers.
F r o m these three " p r i m a r y colors" of love, Lee identifies three "secon-

d a r y colors" that represent combinations of t w o p r i m a r y ones: mania is
c o m p o s e d of eros a n d l u d u s , pragma combines l u d u s a n d storge, a n d
agape is c o m p o s e d of eros a n d storge. Lee's major p o i n t is t h a t creating
a m u t u a l l y fulfilling love relationship is " n o t a q u e s t i o n of how much love
the p a r t n e r r e t u r n s , b u t which kind'' (1988, p . 53, italics in original).
Childhood Correlates of Intimacy and Love
Erikson's theory of the psychosocial stages of d e v e l o p m e n t is e x a m -

ined m o s t directly b y research o n the connection of different t y p e s of love
in a d u l t h o o d to the p r i o r c h i l d h o o d a t t a c h m e n t quality. We s a w in
C h a p t e r 3 t h a t early c h i l d h o o d a t t a c h m e n t is o n e of the key ingredients
of personality d e v e l o p m e n t . If w e a s s u m e that securely attached children
are likely to favorably resolve Erikson's first psychosocial crisis—basic
trust v e r s u s basic m i s t r u s t — t h e n d a t a that s h o w the expected connection
b e t w e e n (1) quality of early a t t a c h m e n t to p a r e n t s a n d (2) quality of love
in a d u l t h o o d can b e t a k e n as s u p p o r t for Erikson's epigenetic principle.
For e x a m p l e , from responses to a questionnaire in a n e w s p a p e r "love
quiz," H a z a n a n d Shaver (1987) classified their 620 a d u l t r e s p o n d e n t s
into one of three a t t a c h m e n t styles. People w h o indicated it w a s rela-
tively easy for t h e m to get close to others a n d d i d n o t especially w o r r y
a b o u t b e i n g a b a n d o n e d w e r e classified as " s e c u r e " (56%); those w h o
indicated they felt imcomfortable getting close to others a n d foimd it
difficult to trust t h e m completely w e r e classified as " a v o i d a n t " (25%);
those w h o perceived other p e o p l e b e i n g reluctant to get as close to t h e m

as they w o u l d like a n d w o r r i e d that their p a r t n e r s d i d n o t really love
t h e m w e r e classified as " a n x i o u s / a m b i v a l e n t " (19%).
In c o m p a r i n g these three g r o u p s o n their a n s w e r s to questions a b o u t
their single m o s t i m p o r t a n t love experience, H a z a n a n d Shaver (1987)
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f o u n d distinct differences: Secure lovers described it as h a p p y , friendly,

a n d trusting. T h e y w e r e able to accept their p a r t n e r in spite of the
p a r t n e r ' s faults. Avoidant lovers r e p o r t e d experiencing a fear of inti-
macy, e m o t i o n a l u p s - a n d - d o w n s , a n d jealousy. A n x i o u s / a m b i v a l e n t
lovers described t h a t their relationship involves obsession, desire for
reciprocity, a n d extreme sexual attraction a n d jealousy.
Moreover, t h e three love style g r o u p s w e r e o b s e r v e d to differ in their
self-reported a t t a c h m e n t history in childhood: Secure lovers perceived
their p a r e n t s to h a v e b e e n caring a n d affectionate; s a w their m o t h e r s as
respectful, confident, a n d accepting; a n d r e m e m b e r e d their fathers as
h a v i n g b e e n loving a n d h i m i o r o u s . Avoidant lovers described their
m o t h e r s as cold a n d rejecting, w h e r e a s a n x i o u s / a m b i v a l e n t lovers w e r e
especially likely to r e m e m b e r their fathers as b e i n g unfair.
This observation of a connection b e t w e e n a t t a c h m e n t history a n d
q u a h t y of p r e s e n t romantic relationships h a s b e e n r e p h c a t e d b y other
investigators (CoUins & Read, 1990; Feeney & NoUer, 1990; S i m p s o n ,
1990). Consistent w i t h b o t h Bowlby's a t t a c h m e n t t h e o r y a n d Erikson's
psychosocial theory, p e o p l e w h o r e p o r t a secure a t t a c h m e n t history t e n d
to s h o w greater trust a n d c o m m i t m e n t in their p r e s e n t r o m a n t i c relation-
ships t h a n those w h o s e a t t a c h m e n t histories are insecure (avoidant or
a n x i o u s / ambivalent).
U s i n g a m e t h o d o l o g y similar to their 1987 study, H a z a n a n d Shaver
(1990) r e p o r t e d a n association b e t w e e n a t t a c h m e n t history a n d a t t i t u d e s
t o w a r d w o r k . They f o u n d that secure subjects generally h a v e positive
attitudes t o w a r d w o r k : T h e y are least likely to procrastinate, h a v e least
difficulty c o m p l e t i n g tasks, a n d are n o t likely to fear failure a n d rejection
b a s e d o n their w o r k performance. Avoidant subjects r e p o r t e d feeling
a n x i o u s w h e n n o t w o r k i n g a n d t h a t w o r k t e n d s to interfere w i t h their
h e a l t h a n d interpersonal relationships. A n x i o u s / a m b i v a l e n t subjects
preferred to w o r k w i t h others, felt u n d e r a p p r e c i a t e d , a n d w e r e m o t i -
v a t e d b y getting a p p r o v a l from other p e o p l e .
All of the a b o v e d a t a are consistent w i t h the v i e w s of b o t h Bowlby a n d
Erikson. But w e s h o u l d n o t e t h a t these d a t a d o n o t constitute definitive
proof for either theoretical position, b e c a u s e of their m e t h o d o l o g i c a l

hmitations: The observations d e p e n d o n the a d u l t subject's memory of
his or h e r c h i l d h o o d relationship w i t h the parents. Retrospective s t u d i e s
such as these can yield observations t h a t are at best consistent w i t h
theoretical expectations, b u t t h e observations d o n o t conclusively p r o v e
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the t h e o r y ' s usefulriess. The general principle is straightforward: In

retrospective studies, other variables—ûnmeasured a n d uncontrolled
—can accoimt for the o b s e r v e d correlations. Consequently, w e c a n n o t
interpret these observations as compelling evidence in s u p p o r t of a n y
particular h y p o t h e s i s . A s w i t h the case of the c h i l d h o o d a n t e c e d e n t s of
identity, potentially definitive investigations of the c h i l d h o o d antece-
d e n t s of intimacy in y o u n g a d u l t h o o d h a v e yet to b e r e p o r t e d .
O u t of their love for each other, y o u n g a d u l t p a r t n e r s typically p r o d u c e
o n e or m o r e children. This leads u s to Erikson's s e v e n t h d e v e l o p m e n t a l
stage, a d u l t h o o d .
A d u l t h o o d : Generativity V e r s u s Stagnation
A d u l t h o o d , according to Erikson (1982), is t h e t i m e w h e n the crisis of

generativity versus self-absorption and stagnation m a k e s its epigenetic a p -
p e a r a n c e in o u r Uves. "Generativity . . . e n c o m p a s s e s procreativity, pro-
ductivity, a n d creativity, a n d t h u s the generation of n e w beings as well as
of n e w p r o d u c t s a n d n e w ideas, including a k i n d of self-generation
c o n c e m e d w i t h further identity d e v e l o p m e n t " (Erikson, 1982, p . 67,
italics in original).
We find n e w d i m e n s i o n s to o u r personalities b y caring for others,
w h e t h e r w e n a r r o w l y define others as m e m b e r s of o u r i m m e d i a t e family
or b r o a d l y e m b r a c e the family of m a n k i n d , including the earth w i t h all
its flora a n d fauna. Failure to care a b o u t the n e x t generation l e a d s to
increasing stagnation a n d self-involvement that c o u l d result in t h e e g o
core p a t h o l o g y of rejectivity: a chronic unwillingness to include other
p e o p l e in o n e ' s generative c o n c e m s . This p a t h o l o g y m a y b e s h o w n b y
b e i n g compulsively self-preoccupied a n d obsessively c o n c e m e d w i t h
one's public i m a g e . Feeling they h a d n o t b e e n cared for as children b y
the key a d u l t s in their lives, s u c h i n d i v i d u a l s are u n w i l l i n g as a d u l t s to
b e s t o w care o n others.
A d u l t h o o d , Erikson p o i n t s out, is the time of life lirJdng the p r e s e n t
to t h e future generation. The n e w e g o strength arising from the genera-
tive v e r s u s stagnation crisis is care—a w i d e n i n g c o m m i t m e n t to h e l p a n d

sustain those p e r s o n s , p r o d u c t s , a n d ideas w e h a v e b e g u n to care about.
Erikson (1982) n o t e s that all the e g o strengths from earlier crises are
n e e d e d for the intergenerational task of cultivating strength in the n e x t
generation of y o u n g p e o p l e b y teaching, g u i d i n g , a n d n u r t u r i n g t h e m .
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Generative c o n c e m s m a y first surface w h e n y o i m g a d u l t s b e g i n p l a n -

n i n g for a n d raising their o w n children (Peterson & Stewart, 1993).
Research o n Erikson's v i e w s of generativity h a s b e e n scanty, p a r t l y
b e c a u s e it is difficult to m e a s u r e it accurately. A p r o m i s i n g m e a s u r e of
generativity concems, the Loyola Generativity Scale (LGS), h a s b e e n intro-
d u c e d b y D a n M c A d a m s a n d his colleagues ( M c A d a m s & d e St. A u b i n ,
1992; M c A d a m s , d e St. A u b i n , & Logan, 1993). T h e LGS consists of 20
s t a t e m e n t s that r e s p o n d e n t s evaluate o n a 4-point scale, from 0 (the
s t a t e m e n t n e v e r applies to you) to 3 (the s t a t e m e n t applies to y o u v e r y
often). Scores o n the LGS can t h u s r a n g e b e t w e e n 0 a n d 60. Three
representative items o n the LGS are:
1. I try to p a s s a l o n g t h e k n o w l e d g e I h a v e g a i n e d t h r o u g h m y experience.
2. If I w e r e u n a b l e t o h a v e children, I w o u l d like t o a d o p t children.
3. I feel as t h o u g h m y c o n t r i b u t i o n s will exist after I die.
By u s i n g this m e a s u r e , M c A d a m s a n d d e St. A u b i n (1992) f o u n d in a

s a m p l e of 149 a d u l t s (ages 19 to 68) that m e n w h o are fathers s h o w e d
significantly greater generative c o n c e m s ( m e a n LGS score = 45.2) t h a n
m e n w h o h a v e n e v e r b e e n fathers ( m e a n = 38.2). Generative c o n c e m s in
w o m e n w h o are m o t h e r s ( m e a n = 42.2) w e r e a b o u t the s a m e as in w o m e n
w h o n e v e r h a v e h a d children ( m e a n = 41.5). Does this finding m e a n t h a t
b e c o m i n g a father increases a m a n ' s generativity c o n c e m s ? Or, a l t e m a -
tively, d o e s it m e a n that single m e n w h o w e r e a b o v e a v e r a g e in their
generative c o n c e m s are m o r e hkely to b e c o m e fathers? A n d w h a t are the
a l t e m a t i v e h n p h c a t i o n s for a w o m a n w h o h o p e s to m a r r y a m a n w h o
will s o m e d a y b e c o m e the father of h e r children? A s t h e a u t h o r s p o i n t
out, these a l t e m a t i v e explanations cannot b e d i s t i n g u i s h e d o n t h e basis
of their one-shot correlational s t u d y . Such intriguing q u e s t i o n s can only
b e a n s w e r e d b y d a t a obtained from a l o n g i t u d i n a l investigation.
I'll offer t w o conclusions a b o u t Erikson's psychosocial t h e o r y as it
a p p h e s to u n d e r s t a n d i n g y o u r present self:
1. T h e epigenetic principle t h a t connects y o u r p a s t self to y o u r c u r r e n t

c o n c e m s r e g a r d i n g identity, intimacy, a n d generativity is s u p p o r t e d b y
available data. A 22-year sequential s t u d y tested subjects r a n g i n g from
20 to 42 y e a r s old. A s subjects aged, there w a s increased resolution for
the first seven psychosocial crises, clearly s u p p o r t i n g Erikson's life s p a n
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approach to personality development (Whitboume, Zuschlag, Elliot, &

Waterman, 1992).
2. The numerous hypotheses that can be derived from Erikson's psycho-
social theory are worthy of more full-scale longitudinal investigations.
T H E PERSON-CENTERED APPROACH
T O IDENTITY A N D SELF-ESTEEM
The goal the individual most wishes to achieve, the end which
he knowingly and unknowingly pursues, is to become him-
self.
Cari Rogers (1961, p. 108)
Have y o u ever said to someone, or even thought to yourself, "I'm not

myself today"? We seem to understand intuitively what phrases such as
"wanting to become myself," "trying to find myself," or "I'm not myself"
mean. Still, don't y o u find something o d d about these conunon expres-
sions? When I say, "I'm not myself," am I really saying that an aspect of
myself that "I" don't want to identify as "me" has m a d e an unwanted
appearance? Such phrases raise the question of h o w "I" and "me" ever
got to be such strangers in the first place.
Self-Alienation
There are t w o general answers to h o w self-alienation develops:
1. From a historical perspective, the "self" seems to have first become

a social problem in the early days of this century. Only within the past
100 years or so has there been widespread cultural understanding that
the "self" is an elusive, hidden, inner quality that is not at all identical to
one's pubUc actions (Baumeister, 1987).

2. From the psychological perspective, Carl Rogers (1951,1961) traces
the development of individual self-alienation to the conditions of early
childhood sociaUzation. Our self-concept develops from initial interac-
tions with significant people in our Uves. When our parents praised us
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for b e i n g " g o o d " a n d b l a m e d u s w h e n w e w e r e " b a d , " w e internalized

these experiences into o u r infant sense of ourselves. F u r t h e r m o r e , p l e a s -
ing p o w e r f u l caretakers takes clear p r e c e d e n c e over expressing o u r
authentic b u t contrary feelings a n d p e r c e p t i o n s t h a t m i g h t a n g e r t h e m .
A s a consequence, Rogers notes, infants typically l e a m to e x c l u d e all
t h r e a t e n i n g self-perceptions. These are threats c a u s e d b y discrepancies
b e t w e e n w h a t they really feel (such as anger) a n d w h a t their p a r e n t s find
acceptable for t h e m to feel (such as b e i n g content to b e obedient).
Is self-ahenation inevitable? N o . Rogers (1951) b e h e v e s p a r e n t s w h o

accept their child's w a n t s a n d feelings can accept their o w n feelings
a b o u t the c h i l d ' s u n d e s i r a b l e b e h a v i o r s a n d c o m m u n i c a t e to the child
their acceptance of him or her as a person (as d i s t i n g u i s h e d from their
acceptance of the unacceptable behaviors), t h u s enabling their child to
d e v e l o p h e a l t h y self-esteem as a n integral p a r t of h i s or h e r i m d i v i d e d
self-concept. T h e acceptance of a p e r s o n irrespective of h o w h e or s h e
b e h a v e s is called unconditional positive regard. W e n e e d to n o t e t h a t
accepting the person d o e s n o t i m p l y a b l a n k e t a p p r o v a l of all of t h a t
p e r s o n ' s actions. A m o t h e r can tell h e r child, "I love y o u , b u t w h a t y o u
d i d is w r o n g , " a n d still b e giving h e r child xmconditional positive regard.
F r o m r e p e a t e d experiences of receiving imconditional positive r e g a r d
from his or h e r p a r e n t s , a child l e a m s to feel the s a m e w a y t o w a r d himself
or herself, w h i c h Rogers calls positive self-regard. Positive self-regard is
Rogers's t e r m for self-esteem.
But w h e n a child's self-concept a n d self-esteem d e p e n d heavily o n
p e r f o r m i n g certain b e h a v i o r s , the child l e a m s to seek a p p r o v a l from
a d u l t s for " b e i n g g o o d " a n d a v o i d d i s a p p r o v a l b y n o t " b e i n g b a d . "
Rogers (1959) v i e w s such a child as h a v i n g i n t e m a l i z e d conditions of
worth: the v a l u e s t h a t other p e o p l e (and t h e n the child itself) place o n
specific b e h a v i o r s . C o n d i t i o n s of w o r t h d e v e l o p as children l e a m to feel
they h a v e v a l u e in the eyes of significant a d u l t s only if t h e y b e h a v e t h e
w a y a d u l t s w a n t t h e m to. In other w o r d s , conditions of w o r t h d e v e l o p
o u t of children's experiences of conditional positive regard ("I'll love

y o u only if y o u d o w h a t I say").
So w h a t ' s t h e p r o b l e m ? A r e n ' t m o s t children raised this w a y ? Yes,
a n s w e r s Rogers, a n d that's precisely w h y self-ahenation is s u c h a w i d e -
s p r e a d social p r o b l e m ! Rogers h o l d s t h a t conditions of w o r t h a n d con-
ditional positive r e g a r d d i v i d e a p e r s o n b e t w e e n his or h e r t m e self a n d
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the m a s k h e or she learns to w e a r to get a p p r o v a l from others. Rogers's

v i e w is similar to Erikson's in that h e assimies t h e typical p e r s o n expe-
riences a basic conflict (just one, t h o u g h , n o t eight) b e t w e e n conditions
of w o r t h a n d t h e actuaUzing tendency.
To Rogers, there is o n e f u n d a m e n t a l h i u n a n m o t i v e — t h e actualizing
tendency—^which is " t h e inherent t e n d e n c y of the o r g a n i s m to d e v e l o p
all its capacities in w a y s w h i c h serve to m a i n t a i n or e n h a n c e t h e o r g a n -
i s m " (1959, p . 196). A s a result of the actualizing tendency, infants e n g a g e
in w h a t Rogers calls the organismic valuing process. This is their u s e of
the actualizing t e n d e n c y to decide w h e t h e r to perceive a given experi-
ence as g o o d or b a d .
Rogers m a i n t a i n s t h a t w h a t e v e r the infant perceives is t h e infant's
reality. By trusting o u r o w n experiences, Rogers h o l d s t h a t w e w o u l d
n a t u r a l l y d o w h a t ' s right for o u r o w n g r o w t h . Typically, h o w e v e r , p a r -
ents i m p o s e their values o n the child, restricting h i m or h e r from those
actualizing experiences they j u d g e to b e unsafe, socially unacceptable,
or b a d . If they c o m m i m i c a t e they will n o t love t h e child if h e or s h e
persists in these unacceptable b e h a v i o r s , the child faces a conflict b e -
t w e e n t w o p o w e r f u l realities: the i n t e m a l actuaUzing t e n d e n c y a n d
e x t e m a l conditions of w o r t h . Because all children h a v e a strong n e e d for
positive regard (that is, to b e loved), t h e y solve the confUct b y accepting
the conditions of w o r t h a n d d e n y i n g their organismic v a l u i n g tendency.
The child, at s o m e level of a w a r e n e s s , l e a m s : " O t h e r p e o p l e k n o w better
t h a n I d o w h a t ' s g o o d for m e . " T h u s , Rogers n o t e s that the seeds of
self-aUenation are often p l a n t e d early a n d d e e p .
Self-Concept and Self-Esteem
Rogers u s e s the t e r m s seZ/and self-concept synonymously.^ H e distin-

guishes h o w w e actually see ourselves (actual self-concept) from h o w
w e w o u l d like to see ourselves (ideal self-concept). Rogers n o t e s that if
o u r actual self-concept m a t c h e s or is c o n g m e n t w i t h o u r ideal self-con-
cept, t h e n w e are likely to h a v e a h e a l t h y level of self-esteem a n d b e in
the process of actualizing ourselves. But if o u r actual self-concept is

i n c o n g m e n t w i t h o u r ideal self-concept, t h e n w e are likely to feel anx-
ious, experience l o w self-esteem, a n d / o r feel self-alienated. Rogers
(1954) r e p o r t e d that in o n e case, a particular cUent's self-ratings of h e r
actual a n d ideal self correlated m o r e h i g h l y after a y e a r of t h e r a p y t h a n
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116 P A R T III M Y P R E S E N T S E L F
at the b e g i n n i n g of therapy. This indicates that h e r perceived self m a t c h e s

m o r e w i t h h e r ideal self, a n d she is less self-alienated. It is possible to
generalize b e y o n d this single case. Increases in t h e actual self—îdeal self-
correlations from p r e - to post-therapy—^have b e e n foimd w i t h i n a g r o u p
of 25 chents (Butler & H a i g h , 1954) a n d are interpreted b y Rogers to indi-
cate positive m e n t a l health.^ In C h a p t e r 5 we'll look m o r e closely at t h e
theories of Rogers a n d others a b o u t t h e causes a n d t r e a t m e n t of stress.
Research o u t c o m e s converge o n t h e finding that self-concept a n d
self-esteem are i n d e e d related. P e l h a m a n d S w a n n (1989) foimd t h a t
p e o p l e w h o are certain of their positive self-attributes a n d also perceive
these attributes to b e important are v e r y likely to h a v e h i g h self-esteem,
c o m p a r e d to t h o s e w h o are u n c e r t a i n of their o w n attributes. A l t h o u g h
B a u m g a r d n e r (1990) u s e d a different m e t h o d from that of P e l h a m a n d
S w a n n (1989), s h e nevertheless r e p h c a t e d their positive association of
identity a n d self-esteem. B a u m g a r d n e r a r g u e s t h a t a strong sense of
identity e n c o u r a g e s a p e r s o n to feel in control of his or h e r future
o u t c o m e s ("I k n o w w h a t I w a n t a n d I k n o w I h a v e t h e skills to get it").
T h u s identity p r o m o t e s feeling self-confident a n d g o o d a b o u t oneself.
Similarly, C a m p b e l l (1990) observed that p e o p l e w i t h l o w self-esteem
t e n d to h o l d less clearly defined self-concepts a n d are less certain a b o u t
their o w n attributes t h a n p e o p l e w h o h a v e h i g h self-esteem. People w h o
d o n o t like themselves very m u c h a p p a r e n t l y prefer to h v e w i t h a certain
d e g r e e of m e n t a l fuzziness a b o u t w h o t h e y are, r e m a i n i n g u n c e r t a i n
a b o u t their feared p e r s o n a l inadequacies.
The v i e w of Carl Rogers that w e c a n d i v i d e t h e self into w h o w e t h i n k
w e are (actual self) a n d w h o w e w o u l d like to b e (ideal self) h a s s p a r k e d
t w o c o n t e m p o r a r y research p r o g r a m s p r o b i n g into t h e n a t u r e of t h e
self-concept a n d its connection to self-esteem: self-discrepancy t h e o r y
a n d self-verification theory.
Self-Discrepancy Theory
E. Tory H i g g i n s (1987) w a n t s to u n d e r s t a n d t h e i m p o r t a n c e of t h e
discrepancy b e t w e e n aspects of o u r m e n t a l self-representations. T h e

essence of his self-discrepancy theory is t h a t in a d d i t i o n to a n actml self-
concept a n d a n ideal self-concept, w e all possess a n ought self-concept.
T h e o u g h t self-concept consists of all o u r behefs a b o u t o u r d u t i e s , re-
sponsibihties, a n d o b h g a t i o n s at a n y given time. Self-discrepancy t h e o r y
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predicts a n d finds t h a t t w o different discrepancies are associated w i t h

different e m o t i o n a l states:
1. T h e discrepancy b e t w e e n h o w w e perceive o u r actual self a n d o u r

ideal self (we a r e n o t t h e p e r s o n w e hope to be) causes u s to feel o n e of
the dejection-related emotions: W e feel d i s a p p o i n t e d , a s h a m e d , o r sad. If
w e fail to m a k e t h e h o n o r roll, cheerleading s q u a d , or chess t e a m , w h e n
the h o p e s a n d d r e a m s of o u r ideal self are tied to s u c h o u t c o m e s , w e will
p r o b a b l y feel d e p r e s s e d .
2. T h e discrepancy b e t w e e n perceiving o u r actual self a n d o u r o u g h t
self (i.e., w e are n o t t h e p e r s o n w e thiidc w e should be) causes u s to feel
anxious, guilty, or fearful of receiving p u n i s h m e n t . If w e d o n ' t a t t e n d
class, d o n ' t d o a n y of t h e assignments, a n d d o n ' t s t u d y , w e m i g h t feel
anxious a b o u t s u c h dire o u t c o m e s as failing t h e course, flunking o u t of
school, a n d h a v i n g to w o r k full-time.
Self-discrepancy t h e o r y h a s e x p a n d e d to include y o u r can self, w h i c h

refers to beliefs a b o u t y o u r potential, a n d y o u r future self, w h i c h refers
to beliefs a b o u t t h e t y p e of p e r s o n y o u are likely to b e c o m e . In this
research, subjects' actual, ideal, o u g h t , can, a n d future selves a r e m e a -
sured, a n d a n y discrepancies a m o n g t h e m are n o t e d . It h a s b e e n f o u n d
that t h e m o s t d e p r e s s e d a n d dejected p e o p l e a r e those w h o s e can or
future self is t h e s a m e as their ideal self, hut their actual self chrorucally
disagrees from a n d falls short of their ideal. In other w o r d s , w h e n w e are
n o t t h e p e r s o n w e w o u l d like to b e , yet w e still feel w e could b e t h a t sort
of person, w e feel especially s a d (Higgins, Tykocinski, & Vookles, 1990).
Self-discrepancy t h e o r y h a s b e e n successfully a p p l i e d to increase o u r
i m d e r s t a n d i n g of eating d i s o r d e r s s u c h as bulimia (binge-and-purge
eating) a n d anorexia nervosa (compulsive, u n h e a l t h y dieting) a n d t h e
relationship b e t w e e n n e g a t i v e self-evaluation a n d s u p p r e s s e d i m m u -
nological activity.
S t r a u m a n et al. (1991) tested t h e following h y p o t h e s e s : (a) Because
p e o p l e suffering from b u l i m i a h a v e b e e n found to b e chronically d e -

pressed (e.g., Lee, Rush, & Mitchell, 1985), self-discrepancy t h e o r y p r e -
dicts t h a t bulimics are likely t o s h o w a discrepancy b e t w e e n their actual
a n d ideal self-concepts, (b) Because p e o p l e suffering from anorexia h a v e
b e e n observed to b e anxious, p r o n e to feeling guilty, a n d conscientious
in m e e t i n g t h e d e m a n d s of others (e.g., Bruch, 1973), self-discrepancy
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118 P A R T III M Y P R E S E N T S E L F
theory predicts that anorexics are likely to experience a discrepancy

b e t w e e n their actml a n d ought self-concepts. In a s a m p l e of m e n a n d
w o m e n s t u d e n t s (average age = 19), s u p p o r t w a s f o u n d for b o t h h y -
potheses. People suffering from b u h m i a are likely to feel d e p r e s s e d t h a t
they are n o t w h o they w o u l d like to b e , w h e r e a s those suffering from
anorexia are likely to feel anxious that they are n o t the p e r s o n t h e y t h i n k
they o u g h t to b e .
In a d d i t i o n , b o t h k i n d s of self-discrepancies h a v e b e e n f o u n d to l o w e r
self-esteem a n d decrease the response of the i m m u n e s y s t e m to stress,
w h i c h can possibly increase the risk of catching contagious diseases.
Conversely, other d a t a suggest that positive self-evaluations (caused b y
c o n g r u e n c e b e t w e e n actual-ideal or actual-ought self-concepts) m a y
actually buffer the health-threatening effects of stress b y e n h a n c i n g t h e
i m m i m e r e s p o n s e (Strauman, Lemieux, & Coe, 1993). Self-discrepancy
theory offers a p r o m i s i n g a p p r o a c h to u n d e r s t a n d i n g the relationship of
p e r s o n a h t y to health.
Self-Verification Theory
W i l h a m S w a n n ' s (1987) self-verification theory a s s m n e s w e all prefer

to receive feedback from others that confirms or verifies o u r v i e w of
ourselves. Feedback from y o u t h a t s u p p o r t s m y self-concept allows m e
to predict the course of future social interactions w i t h other p e o p l e . If I
think of myself as socially a d e p t a n d c h a r m i n g , I h o p e y o u agree w i t h
m y self-assessment. If I discover y o u t h i n k I a m a n insensitive oaf, I a m
likely to h a v e t w o reactions: M y feelings will b e h u r t , a n d I wiU b e
u n c e r t a i n a b o u t this aspect of m y self-concept. I m a y n e e d to revise m y
p l a n s for joining the Diplomatic C o r p s .
W h e n e v e r w e receive soc\a\ aisconiira\2iViOTi ϊλ>ονΛ positiOe (ârvd
valued) self-attribute, these t w o reactions are Ukely. But h o w w o u l d y o u
react if y o u received disconfirmation conceming a negative self-attribute?
S u p p o s e y o u t h i n k of yourself as a p o o r dancer. Then, after d a n c i n g w i t h
a n e w partner, y o u are told y o u are a marvelous dancer. W h a t w o u l d y o u
thiruc? Will y o u n o w revise y o u r self-concept a n d start calling yourself

"Twirudetoes"? Or, are y o u m o r e likely to w o n d e r w h a t y o u r p a r t n e r
really w a n t s ixom y o u a n d n o t revise this aspect of y o u r self-concept at all?
Self-verification theory assvimes, as d i d Prescott Lecky's (1945) self-
consistency theory, that o u r n e e d for information verifying or s u p p o r t -
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ing t h e correctness of o u r self-concepts can s o m e t i m e s o v e r r i d e self-

enhancement, t h e t e n d e n c y t o seek favorable information from others. It
feels g o o d w h e n others c o m p l i m e n t u s . But d o w e feel g o o d w h e n w e
k n o w t h e c o m p l i m e n t is n o t true?
Self-verification t h e o r y predicts that w h e n o u r self-views are n e g a t i v e
a b o u t a certain attribute, w e prefer t h a t other p e o p l e confirm t h e s e v i e w s
rather t h a n flatter ( a n d confuse) u s w i t h false information. D a t a consis-
tent w i t h this h y p o t h e s i s h a v e b e e n obtained. M a r r i e d p e o p l e w i t h
negative self-concepts are m o r e c o m m i t t e d t o s p o u s e s w h o thiruc poorly
of t h e m t h a n t o s p o u s e s w h o disconfirm their n e g a t i v e self-concepts b y
thinking h i g h l y of t h e m (Swann, D e La R o n d e , & H i x o n , 1994; S w a n n ,
Hbcon, & D e La R o n d e , 1992).
Self-verification theory focuses o u r attention o n t h e fact t h a t o u r n e e d s
for identity a n d self-enhancement are s o m e t i m e s at o d d s w i t h e a c h other.
Discovering t h e conditions u n d e r w h i c h each n e e d is m o r e i m p o r t a n t ,
w h e n they d o conflict, is a fascinating aspect of this theory. P e l h a m
(1991), for instance, reports d a t a consistent w i t h t h e idea t h a t p e o p l e are
interested in enhancing their important self-concepts a n d verifying self-
concepts they are quite confident about. T h u s o u r desires for self-
verification a n d self-enhancement m a y a p p l y to different aspects of t h e
self-concept ( i m p o r t a n t or central attributes v e r s u s certain b u t less cen-
tral attributes) a n d m a y n o t a l w a y s conflict to t h e extent generally
p r e s u m e d (e.g., see S w a n n , Griffin, P r e d m o r e , & Gaines, 1987).
PERSONAL MYTHS A N D
T H E M A K I N G O F T H E SELF
To create a p e r s o n a l m y t h is to fashion a history of t h e self.
D a n M c A d a m s (1993, p . 102)
D a n M c A d a m s p r o p o s e s a theory of p e r s o n a l identity t h a t centers o n

the p r o p o s i t i o n t h a t each i n d i v i d u a l " c o m e s to k n o w w h o h e or s h e is b y
creating a heroic story of the self" (1993, p . 11). In his view, each of u s con-
structs a special k i n d of story of o u r i n d i v i d u a l life, a story integrating
o u r different aspects of ourselves into a coherent a n d convincing w h o l e .
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M c A d a m s calls these special stories o u r u n i q u e p e r s o n a l m y t h . " A per-

sonal m y t h is a n act of i m a g i n a t i o n t h a t is a p a t t e r n e d integration of o u r
remembered past, perceived present, a n d anticipated future" (1993, p . 12).
We b e g i n to fashion the material for o u r p e r s o n a l m y t h s , according to
M c A d a m s , from o u r earhest c h i l d h o o d experiences. M c A d a m s agrees
w i t h Erik Erikson's idea that infants d e v e l o p imconscious a t t i t u d e s of
h o p e or d e s p a i r o u t of their earhest experiences of love a n d trust w i t h
their caregivers. In M c A d a m s ' s theory, o u r earliest a t t a c h m e n t relation-
ships affect o u r m y t h ' s narrative tone. Securely attached children are
m o r e likely to a d o p t p e r s o n a l m y t h s t h a t are essentially optimistic a n d
hopeful a b o u t the future; insecurely attached children, o n the other h a n d ,
are m o r e likely to a d o p t p e r s o n a l m y t h s that are pessimistic a n d d o u b t f u l
a b o u t the future.
M c A d a m s hypothesizes that unconscious images p e r v a d i n g a n adult's
p e r s o n a l m y t h are b a s e d o n v a r i e d p r e s c h o o l e x p e r i e n c e s . T h e s e i m -
ages are a synthesis of o u r preschool experiences w i t h i n the family, w i t h
o u r c h i l d h o o d friends a n d relatives, a n d from e x p o s u r e to i m a g e s p o r -
t r a y e d in m o v i e s a n d television. M c A d a m s p r o p o s e s that n a r r a t i v e tone
a n d i m a g e r y are the essential contributions of early c h i l d h o o d to a d u l t
identity.
T h e school years also contribute to o u r p e r s o n a l m y t h . M c A d a m s
observes that e l e m e n t a r y school children b e g i n to display the social
m o t i v e s of power, achievement, a n d intimacy as long-term intentions in
g u i d i n g their daily behavior. Take, for e x a m p l e , intimacy m o t i v a t i o n ,
w h i c h M c A d a m s (1993, p . 287) defines as "a recurrent desire for w a r m ,
close, a n d s h a r i n g interactions w i t h other h u m a n b e i n g s . " C h i l d r e n w h o
score high o n fantasy measures of this motive h a v e b e e n observed to h a v e
m o r e e n d u r i n g a n d m o r e stable relationships w i t h their b e s t friends,
c o m p a r e d to children w h o are l o w in the m o t i v e for intimacy ( M c A d a m s
& Losoff, 1984). A l t h o u g h these m o t i v e s from the e l e m e n t a r y school
years m a y c h a n g e in strength as w e age, they nevertheless constitute the
basic b u i l d i n g blocks of o u r p e r s o n a l m y t h : We are w h a t w e w a n t .
In his research o n a d u l t s a n d their p e r s o n a l m y t h s , M c A d a m s (1993)
finds s u p p o r t for t h e idea, p r o p o s e d b y A g n e s H a n k i s s (1981), that p e o -

ple m a y a d o p t o n e of four k i n d s of strategies in constructing their sense
of w h o t h e y are: (l)The dynastic strategy involves a life story w h e r e b y a
g o o d p a s t leads to a g o o d present; (2) t h e antithetical strategy d i s p l a y s a
life story in w h i c h a b a d p a s t gives rise to a g o o d present; (3) t h e
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compensatory strategy reveals a life story in w h i c h a g o o d p a s t leads to a

b a d present; a n d (4) the self-absolutory strategy s h o w s a Ufe story w h e r e b y
a b a d p a s t is followed b y a b a d present.
M c A d a m s h o l d s that w e create, consciously or unconsciously, o u r life
stories, o u r p e r s o n a l m y t h s , t h r o u g h o u t m o s t of o u r a d u l t years, e s p e -
cially d u r i n g p e r i o d s that follow significant life changes. Events s u c h as
getting m a r r i e d or divorced, b e c o m i n g seriously ill or disabled, or losing
o n e ' s s p o u s e or p a r e n t s m a y lead to major changes in o u r identity a n d a
s u b s e q u e n t revision of o u r life story. Personal m y t h s n e e d to integrate
a n d reconcile all of life's twists a n d t u r n s into coherent stories that affirm
the integrity of w h o w e are. This challenging task, M c A d a m s n o t e s ,
c a n n o t b e c o m p l e t e d u n t i l the m i d d l e a d u l t years, a v i e w t h a t is consis-
tent w i t h Carl J u n g ' s idea of i n d i v i d u a t i o n (see C h a p t e r 8).
M c A d a m s (1993) p r o p o s e s that the p r i m a r y benefit of discovering a n d
living o u r p e r s o n a l m y t h is to p r o v i d e o u r life w i t h meaning r a t h e r t h a n
h a p p i n e s s (self-esteem) p e r se. Unlike the other theorists covered in this
chapter, M c A d a m s is less c o n c e m e d w i t h the relationship b e t w e e n iden-
tity a n d self-esteem. To M c A d a m s , a p e r s o n a l m y t h gives u s a sense of
m e a n i n g , unity, a n d p u r p o s e , w h i c h w e u s e to encoimter the e v e n t s —
g o o d a n d bad—of e v e r y d a y life. A s o u r life stories b e c o m e m o r e vitaliz-
ing a n d meaningful, the better is the quaUty of o u r Uves.
SELF-EFFICACY T H E O R Y
There is a g r o w i n g b o d y of evidence that h u m a n a t t a i n m e n t s

a n d positive weU-being require a n optimistic sense of p e r -
sonal efficacy.
Albert B a n d u r a (1989, p . 1176)
B a n d u r a ' s concept of self-efficacy refers to o u r expectation that w e

h a v e the capabiUty to reach o u r goals. Self-efficacy is o u r beUef t h a t w e

h a v e the b e h a v i o r a l skills n e e d e d for success in a particular situation.
Simply possessing the skill to give a n entertaining pubUc speech is n o t
sufficient to effectively d o so. We n e e d to believe w e h a v e the skiU. O u r
efficacy beUefs v a r y for different tasks. H i g h self-efficacy refers to m y
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strong belief that I can execute a particular behavior; l o w self-efficacy

refers to m y belief t h a t I cannot p e r f o r m t h e behavior.
B a n d u r a focuses his attention o n the i n d i v i d u a l as a causal agent in
b r i n g i n g a b o u t (or failing to b r i n g about) desired o u t c o m e s . H i s social
cognitive a p p r o a c h to personality denies t h e validity of d i s t i n g u i s h i n g
w h a t w e first covered in this chapter—^namely, the " Γ ' v e r s u s t h e " m e "
aspects of o u r self-concept. To B a n d u r a (1989), it m a k e s n o difference
w h e t h e r w e are trying to c h a n g e the e n v i r o n m e n t or trying to c h a n g e
ourselves. These t w o differ only as a shift of perspective (looking at t h e
o u t s i d e w o r l d or looking at oneself). T h e i n d i v i d u a l a g e n t w h o p e r f o r m s
t h e actions is t h e s a m e .
B a n d u r a (1977), as w e s a w in C h a p t e r 1, d r a w s a n i m p o r t a n t distinc-
tion b e t w e e n efficacy expectations a n d o u t c o m e expectations. Let's say
Jack w a n t s to g o o n a d a t e w i t h Jill. Jack's positive outcome expectation is
his k n o w l e d g e that a particular action (asking h e r out) can positively
influence the o u t c o m e (she m i g h t say "Yes"). But, alas. Jack is v e r y s h y
a n d c a n n o t b r i n g himself to p e r f o r m the required behavior. H i s efficacy
expectation is too l o w for h i m to ask Jill. A s a consequence, they n e v e r
h a v e a chance at dating. T h u s efficacy a n d o u t c o m e expectations are n o t
the s a m e .
These t w o t y p e s of expectations m i g h t differ in the other direction as
well. I c o u l d h o l d a negative outcome expectancy (the b e h a v i o r will not p r o -
d u c e the desired result) a n d at the s a m e t i m e h a v e h i g h self-efficacy (I
k n o w I can execute the behavior). For e x a m p l e , I k n o w I c a n explain t h e
n u m e r o u s subtle a n d fascinating strategies of baseball to m y wife, b u t
m y o u t c o m e expectation (based o n p a s t experience) is t h a t she will con-
tinue to y a w n . Again, efficacy a n d outcome expectations are n o t the same.
W h e r e d o e s self-efficacy c o m e from? B a n d u r a (1986) identifies four
sources of o u r expectations in o u r b e h a v i o r a l competence:
1. Successes and failures associated with our own past performance: Prior
success leads to self-efficacy; p a s t failures lead to the absence of self-
efficacy in similar situations. Mastery experiences, in w h i c h w e try a n d
t h e n succeed at accompUshing o u r goals, are usually the m o s t i m p o r t a n t

factors in d e t e r m i n i n g self-efficacy.
2. Inferences based on observing the effects of others' actions: O b s e r v i n g
others l e a m to succeed b y executing the necessary b e h a v i o r can lead to
believing that w e also can l e a m to d o these behaviors.
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3. Encouragement and persuasive efforts hy others: Exhortations s u c h as

"You can d o it!" m o s t effectively c h a n g e a n o t h e r p e r s o n ' s self-efficacy
w h e n they are c o m b i n e d w i t h precise information a b o u t how to execute
the behavior. The effect of p e r s u a s i o n b y itself is usually w e a k .
4. Reinterpreting the meaning of physiological arousal: W e m a y interpret
feeling anxious w h i l e d o i n g a n e w b e h a v i o r as a signal t h a t w e are n o t
very masterful at this task, w h i c h can possibly decrease o u r self-efficacy;
task failure therefore b e c o m e s m o r e likely. But if w e reinterpret t h e
s y m p t o m s of anxiety as excitement, or l e a m t h a t " e v e r y o n e in this
situation feels butterflies," the experience of physiological a r o u s a l is less
likely to cause those i n t m s i v e negative t h o u g h t s (e.g., " I ' m just n o g o o d
at d o i n g this") t h a t interfere w i t h the b e h a v i o r ' s execution.
A s a n e x a m p l e of the k i n d of research g e n e r a t e d b y B a n d u r a ' s self-

efficacy a p p r o a c h to identity a n d self-esteem, consider the r e p o r t o n a
p l a n to increase w o m e n ' s e m p o w e r m e n t over t h e threat of physical vio-
lence (Ozer & B a n d u r a , 1990). Forty-three w o m e n , r a n g i n g from 18 to 55
years old (average a g e = 34), enrolled in a self-defense p r o g r a m . These
w o m e n w e r e given training in a m a s t e r y m o d e l p r o g r a m b y a female in-
s t m c t o r w h o t a u g h t t h e m h o w to w a r d off attacks b y m e n . Detailed in-
s t m c t i o n s a n d practice w i t h s i m u l a t e d attacks w e r e p r o v i d e d in 5 w e e k l y
sessions, for a total time of a b o u t 23 h o u r s . Six m o n t h s after the trairung
sessions e n d e d , 35 w o m e n c o m p l e t e d v a r i o u s m e a s u r e s of self-efficacy.
It w a s found t h a t the m a s t e r y m o d e l i n g p r o g r a m e n h a n c e d n u m e r o u s
d i m e n s i o n s of self-efficacy relevant to self-defense. T h e w o m e n p e r -
ceived they c o u l d c o p e better w i t h a n attack. They w e r e better able to
control i n t m s i v e negative t h o u g h t s of failure. T h e y also felt less v u l n e r -
able to physical assault a n d e n g a g e d in m o r e p u b h c activities t h a t they
previously a v o i d e d o u t of fear of attack. O z e r a n d B a n d u r a conclude:
"The results of this s t u d y indicate t h a t e m p o w e r i n g p e o p l e w i t h the
m e a n s to exercise control over social threats to their p e r s o n a l safety
serves b o t h to protect a n d liberate t h e m " (1990, p . 485).
B a n d u r a (1989) s u m m a r i z e s m u c h of t h e g r o w i n g literature o n the

relationship of self-efficacy to other p e r s o n a h t y variables. For e x a m p l e ,
p e o p l e w i t h h i g h self-efficacy persist longer at a task in the face of o b -
stacles, are m o r e inclined to anticipate successful future outcomes, are better
able to "tum off' negative thoughts associated w i t h potential failure, a n d
are m o r e likely to enter risky situations in w h i c h they m i g h t fail e v e n
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Account: s7335389
124 PART III MY PRESENT SELF
t h o u g h they feel just as anxious as their l o w self-efficacy c o u n t e r p a r t s .

Obviously, these are characteristics o n e associates w i t h h i g h self-esteem.
It is clear t h a t B a n d u r a ' s self-efficacy is a n i m p o r t a n t w a y to concep-
tualize identity a n d self-esteem. I n d e e d , self-efficacy s e e m s to b r i d g e
these t w o concepts. By conceiving ourselves as self-efficacious in those
areas of life t h a t w e v a l u e , w e thereby feel in control of o u r fate, at least
to a large extent. We t h u s identify ourselves as c o m p e t e n t . This leads u s
to feel g o o d a b o u t ourselves. Increasing o u r self-efficacy t h u s c h a n g e s
b o t h o u r identity a n d self-esteem.
QUESTIONS T O PONDER
1. H a v e y o u ever b e e n asked, verbally or in writing, to a n s w e r t h e

question, " W h o are y o u ? " D o y o u like or dislike to a n s w e r this question?
W h y ? H a v e y o u ever a n s w e r e d , " W h o w a n t s to k n o w ? "
2. If William James is correct t h a t y o u r self-esteem is s o m e sort of ratio
of y o u r actual successes to y o u r " p r e t e n s i o n s " a b o u t yourself, w h a t are
the t w o w a y s y o u can increase y o u r self-esteem? W h e r e d i d y o u r p r e -
tensions c o m e from in t h e first place? H o w can y o u k n o w w h a t t h e y are
before they adversely affect y o u r self-esteem?
3. In the Declaration of I n d e p e n d e n c e of the U n i t e d States of America,
all i n d i v i d u a l s are p r e s u m e d to h a v e the inalienable right to life, liberty,
a n d the p u r s u i t of h a p p i n e s s . Is the p u r s u i t of h a p p i n e s s t h e s a m e as t h e
p u r s u i t of self-esteem? If not, h o w d o they differ? W o u l d U.S. history b e
a n y different if T h o m a s Jefferson h a d w r i t t e n t h a t all p e o p l e h a v e the
inalienable right to the p u r s u i t of self-esteem?
NOTES
1. For those who typically respond to misfortunes by obsessing on life's basic unfair-
ness, adjustment may occur more readily if you consciously replace "It's not fair!" with the
more direct "I don't like it!" thought. If this applies to you, try it next time and see what
happens.
2. As mentioned in Chapter 1, Rogers is by no means the only personality theorist to
obfuscate the issue by writing as if who we are (our self) is identical to our concept of who
we are. See Westen (1991) on the need to distinguish clearly between the concept of "self"
and the "self-concept."
DE TARAPACA
Account: s7335389
3. It is important to note that the "self-ideal discrepanqr" measure used by Rogers and
his colleagues is now known to be seriously flawed and is no longer used by sophisticated
investigators. A discussion of these flaws takes us beyond the scope of this text. The
interested reader is referred to Cronbach and Furby (1970) and Wylie (1974,1979).
SUGGESTIONS FOR FURTHER READING

Baumeister, R. R (1986). Identity: Cultural change and the struggle for self New York: Oxford
University Press.
Baumeister, R. R (Ed.). (1993). Self-esteem: The puzzle of low self-regard. New York: Plenum.
Erikson, E. (1968). Identity: Youth and crisis. New York: Norton.
Kotre, J. (1984). Outliving the self Generativity and the interpretation of lives. Baltimore, MD:
Johi\s Hopkins University Press.
McAdams, D. P. (1993). The stories we live by: Personal myths and the making of the self New
York: William Morrow.
DE TARAPACA
Account: s7335389

1 Identidad y Autoestima

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1 Identidad y Autoestima

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Copyright © 1995. Sage Publications. All rights reserved.

Identity and Self-Esteem

^ Who am I? Why is it important

C a n y o u recall w h e n y o u first b e c a m e a w a r e of y o u r self, t h a t is,

The p e r s o n a l self . . . m i g h t b e treated as the i m m e d i a t e d a -

t u m in psychology. The universal conscious fact is n o t feelings

William James (1890, Vol. 1, p . 226)

This q u o t e from WiUiam James's (1842-1910) classic a n d r e m a r k a b l y

1. Your t h o u g h t s a n d feelings are active processes h e l p i n g y o u select

S o m e t i m e s w e direct o u r t h o u g h t s a n d feelings at ourselves. James

Identity: "Γ' Versus "Me''

Moreover, to b e self-conscious requires a n active, perceiving " I " as w e l l

d e n o t e the active, thiiudng self, a n d " m e " to d e n o t e the object of o n e ' s

Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 95

1. The Material Me is o u r self-concept of o u r b o d i e s , o u r possessions,

r e p o r t e d that p e o p l e w h o h a v e a different Social M e for different social

3. The Spiritual Me is o u r u n d e r s t a n d i n g of ourselves as p e r s o n s w h o

Finally, James observes t w o other special properties of the self-concept.

A l t h o u g h James felt quite comfortable describing t h e v a r i o u s d i m e n -

tion of y o u r active, k n o w i n g self, without describing y o u r self-concept.

Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 97

as the k n o w e r b e g i n s to reflect o n himself or herself, the "self-as-object,"

Self-esteem, o u r evaluation of ourselves, can r a n g e b e t w e e n feeling

This formula says w e can raise o u r self-esteem in t w o w a y s : b y

experience l o w self-esteem. N o t e that this sort of l o w self-esteem is c o m -

Self-esteem = Successes a c h i e v e d / S u c c e s s e s expected

This formula a p p h e s to u n d e r s t a n d i n g h o w y o u w o u l d react after

Psychologists a n d n o n p s y c h o l o g i s t s alike place a special sigruficance

Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 99

to b e unlikely to e n g a g e in s u c h self-defeating or d e v i a n t behavior.

d e m o n s t r a t i n g t h e relationship of self-esteem to real-world b e h a v i o r s

100 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T SELF

or enacting of laws; idiographic derives from the Greek idios: o n e ' s o w n

The sense of ego identity is the a c c m e d confidence that o n e ' s

Erik Erikson (1959, p . 89)

Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 101

The distinction b e t w e e n the " I " as k n o w e r of reality a n d the " m e " as

Adolescence: Identity Versus Identity C o n f u s i o n

Erikson's fifth stage of d e v e l o p m e n t occurs d u r i n g adolescence. T h e

crisis of identity versus identity confusion n e e d s to b e resolved at this time.

102 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T SELF

TABLE 4.1 Summary of Erikson's Stages of Development

Adaptive Ego Core

1. Infanqr (0-2 years) Trust vs. Mistrust Hope Wthdrawal

5. Adolescence Identity vs. Identity Confusion Fidelity Repudiation

8. Old Age Integrity vs. Despair Wisdom Disdain

integrating the n e w social roles—occupational, sexual, a n d ideological—

i m p o r t a n t l y o n the o u t c o m e of the four p r i o r life stage crises. In the ideal

Chapter 4 Identity a n d Self-Esteem 103

ance, the adolescent w h o u s e s these four p r i m a r y ego strengths can

104 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T SELF

wishes, s w a l l o w i n g t h e m wholesale, so to speak, as o p p o s e d to t a k i n g

Chapter 4 Identity and Self-Esteem 105

p o t h e s i z e d that there are t w o essential c o m p o n e n t s to adolescent i d e n -

1. High crisis, high commitment: Following a crisis of identity, t h e p e r s o n

Researchers investigating Marcia's classification s c h e m e h a v e f o u n d

identity achieved status are m o r e likely to u s e direct, problem-focused

106 P A R T III MY P R E S E N T SELF

m e n t in establishing stable rehgious a n d pohtical identities t h a n d o

Y o u n g A d u l t h o o d : Intimacy Versus Isolation

Young a d u l t s w h o successfully e m e r g e from adolescence w i t h stable

confusion. Erikson, as s h o w n in Table 4.1, identifies exclusivity as the

Chapter 4 Identity and Self-Esteem 107

Loneliness is a n all too c o m m o n s y m p t o m of isolation. Surveys indi-