Suntay III v. Cojuangco-Suntay, G.R. No.

183053, 16 June 2010

FACTS

Petitioner argues that Article 992 of the Civil Code, the successional bar between the legitimate and
illegitimate relatives of a decedent, does not apply in this instance where facts indubitably demonstrate
the contrary – Emilio III, an illegitimate grandchild of the decedent, was actually treated by the decedent
and her husband as their own son, reared from infancy, educated and trained in their businesses, and
eventually legally adopted by decedent’s husband, the original oppositor to respondent’s petition for
letters of administration.

ISSUE

Whether or not the illegitimate child may inherit from the grandparent, who treated the former like his
own son, notwithstanding Article 992 of the Civil Code.

RULING

YES. The factual antecedents of this case accurately reflect the basis of intestate succession, i.e., love first
descends, for the decedent, Cristina, did not distinguish between her legitimate and illegitimate
grandchildren. Neither did her husband, Federico, who, in fact, legally raised the status of Emilio III from
an illegitimate grandchild to that of a legitimate child. The peculiar circumstances of this case,
painstakingly pointed out by counsel for petitioner, overthrow the legal presumption in Article 992 of the
Civil Code that there exist animosity and antagonism between legitimate and illegitimate descendants of a
deceased.
ARELLANO v. PASCUAL

G.R. No. 189776 December 15, 2010

Angel N. Pascual Jr. died intestate on January 2, 1999 leaving as heirs his siblings, namely: petitioner
Amelia P. Arellano who is represented by her daughters Agnes P. Arellano (Agnes) and Nona P.
Arellano, and respondents Francisco Pascual and Miguel N. Pascual. In a petition for “Judicial Settlement
of Intestate Estate and Issuance of Letters of Administration” filed by respondents on April 28, 2000,
respondents alleged, inter alia, that a parcel of land (the donated property) located in Teresa Village,
Makati, which was, by Deed of Donation, transferred by the decedent to petitioner the validity of which
donation respondents assailed, “may be considered as an advance legitime” of petitioner. Respecting the
donated property, now covered in the name of petitioner by Transfer Certificate of Title No. 181889 of
the Register of Deeds of Makati, which respondents assailed but which they, in any event, posited that it
“may be considered as an advance legitime” to petitioner, the trial court, acting as probate court, held that
it was precluded from determining the validity of the donation.

ISSUE: WON the property is subject of collation.

NO. The purposes of collation are to secure equality among the compulsory heirs in so far as is possible,
and to determine the free portion, after finding the legitime, so that inofficious donations may be reduced.
Collation takes place when there are compulsory heirs, one of its purposes being to determine the legitime
and the free portion. If there is no compulsory heir, there is no legitime to be safeguarded. The records do
not show that the decedent left any primary, secondary, or concurring compulsory heirs. He was only
survived by his siblings, who are his collateral relatives and, therefore, are not entitled to any legitime –
that part of the testator’s property which he cannot dispose of because the law has reserved it for
compulsory heirs.The decedent not having left any compulsory heir who is entitled to any legitime, he
was at liberty to donate all his properties, even if nothing was left for his siblings-collateral relatives to
inherit. His donation to petitioner, assuming that it was valid, is deemed as donation made to a “stranger,”
chargeable against the free portion of the estate. There being no compulsory heir, however, the donated
property is not subject to collation.
MANUEL A. ECHAVEZ v. DOZEN CONSTRUCTION +

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of several lots in Cebu City, which includes Lot No.
1956-A and Lot No. 1959 (subject lots). On September 7, 1985, Vicente donated the subject lots to
petitioner Manuel Echavez (Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.[1] Manuel accepted the
donation. In March 1986, Vicente executed a Contract to Sell over the same lots in favor of Dozen
Construction and Development Corporation (Dozen Corporation). In October 1986, they executed two
Deeds of Absolute Sale over the same properties covered by the previous Contract to Sell.

On November 6, 1986, Vicente died. Emiliano Cabanig, Vicente's nephew, filed a petition for the
settlement of Vicente's intestate estate. On the other hand, Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente's
donation mortis causa in his favor and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of
Dozen Corporation. These cases were jointly heard.

The Regional Trial Court (RTC) dismissed Manuel's petition to approve the donation and his action for
annulment of the contracts of sale.[2] The RTC found that the execution of a Contract to Sell in favor of
Dozen Corporation, after Vicente had donated the lots to Manuel, was an equivocal act that revoked the
donation. The Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC's decision.[3] The CA held that since the
donation in favor of Manuel was a donation mortis causa, compliance with the formalities for the validity
of wills should have been observed. The CA found that the deed of donation did not contain an attestation
clause and was therefore void.

The Petition for Review on Certiorari

Manuel claims that the CA should have applied the rule on substantial compliance in the construction of a
will to Vicente's donation mortis causa. He insists that the strict construction of a will was not warranted
in the absence of any indication of bad faith, fraud, or substitution in the execution of the Deed of
Donation Mortis Causa. He argues that the CA ignored the Acknowledgment portion of the deed of
donation, which contains the "import and purpose" of the attestation clause required in the execution of
wills. The Acknowledgment reads:

BEFORE ME, Notary Public, this 7th day of September 1985 at Talisay, Cebu, personally appeared
VICENTE S. Echavez with Res. Cert. No. 16866094 issued on April 10, 1985 at [sic] Talisay, Cebu
known to me to be the same person who executed the foregoing instrument of Deed of Donartion Mortis
Causa before the Notary Public and in the presence of the foregoing three (3) witnesses who signed this
instrument before and in the presence of each other and of the Notary Public and all of them
acknowledge to me that the same is their voluntary act and deed. [Emphasis in the original.]

THE COURT'S RULING

The CA correctly declared that a donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by
law for the validity of wills,[4] "otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect." [5]
Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have been applied.
As the CA correctly found, the purported attestation clause embodied in the Acknowledgment portion
does not contain the number of pages on which the deed was written. The exception to this rule in
Singson v. Florentino[6] and Taboada v. Hon. Rosal,[7] cannot be applied to the present case, as the facts
of this case are not similar with those of Singson and Taboada. In those cases, the Court found that
although the attestation clause failed to state the number of pages upon which the will was written, the
number of pages was stated in one portion of the will. This is not the factual situation in the present case.

Even granting that the Acknowledgment embodies what the attestation clause requires, we are not
prepared to hold that an attestation clause and an acknowledgment can be merged in one statement.

That the requirements of attestation and acknowledgment are embodied in two separate provisions of the
Civil Code (Articles 805 and 806, respectively) indicates that the law contemplates two distinct acts that
serve different purposes. An acknowledgment is made by one executing a deed, declaring before a
competent officer or court that the deed or act is his own. On the other hand, the attestation of a will
refers to the act of the instrumental witnesses themselves who certify to the execution of the instrument
before them and to the manner of its execution.[8]

Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation Mortis
Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to
the execution of a decedent's will. An attestation must state all the details the third paragraph of Article
805 requires. In the absence of the required avowal by the witnesses themselves, no attestation clause can
be deemed embodied in the Acknowledgement of the Deed of Donation Mortis Causa.

Finding no reversible error committed by the CA, the Court hereby DENIES Manuel's petition for review
on certiorari.

FACTS

Vicente Echavez (Vicente) was the absolute owner of the subject lots donated to petitioner Manuel Echavez
(Manuel) through a Deed of Donation Mortis Causa, sans attestation clause, acknowledged before a notary public.
Manuel accepted the donation. Vicente sold the same lots in favor of Dozen Construction and Development
Corporation (Dozen Corporation). Manuel filed a petition to approve Vicente’s donation mortis causa in his favor
and an action to annul the contracts of sale Vicente executed in favor of Dozen Corporation.

ISSUE

Whether or not the donation mortis causa is valid despite the non-conformity with the formalities of a will.

RULINGNO. A donation mortis causa must comply with the formalities prescribed by law for the validity of wills,
“otherwise, the donation is void and would produce no effect.” Articles 805 and 806 of the Civil Code should have
been applied. Although the witnesses in the present case acknowledged the execution of the Deed of Donation
Mortis Causa before the notary public, this is not the avowal the law requires from the instrumental witnesses to the
execution of a decedent’s will. Hence, the donation is void, while the sale to Dozen Construction is valid.

G.R. No. 173292 September 1, 2010

MEMORACION Z. CRUZ, represented by EDGARDO Z. CRUZ, Petitioner, vs. OSWALDO Z. CRUZ,
Respondent. Preliminaries: This is a petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ (CA) Decision
dismissing the case filed by the petitioner representing her deceased mother who instituted this action for
reconveyance of a parcel of lot that action was dismissed upon the death of the original petitioner.

Facts: Sometime in October 1993, Memoracion Z. Cruz filed with the Regional Trial Court in Manila a
Complaint against her son, defendant-appellee Oswaldo Z. Cruz, for "Annulment of Sale, Reconveyance
and Damages. Memoracion claimed that during her union with her common-law husband (deceased)
Architect Guido M. Cruz, she acquired a parcel of land located at Bo. Obrero, Tondo Manila, that the said
lot was registered in her name and was registered at the Register of Deeds of Manila, that sometime in
July 1992, she discovered that the title to the said property was transferred by appellee and the latter’s
wife in their names in August 1991 by virtue of a Deed of Sale dated February 12, 1973, that the said
deed was executed through fraud, forgery, misrepresentation and simulation, hence, null and void, that
she, with the help of her husband’s relatives, asked appellee to settle the problem, that despite repeated
pleas and demands, appellee refused to reconvey to her the said property and because of this she filed a
complaint against appellee before the office of the Barangay having jurisdiction over the subject property
and since the matter was unsettled, the barangay issued a certification to file action in court, now the
subject of controversy. After Memoracion finished presenting her evidence in chief, she died on October
30, 1996. Through a Manifestation, Memoracion’s counsel, Atty. Roberto T. Neri, notified the trial court
on January 13, 1997 of the fact of such death, evidenced by a certificate thereof.

11 For his part, appellee filed a Motion to Dismiss on the grounds that the plaintiff’s reconveyance action
is a personal action which does not survive a party’s death which was then granted without prejudice to
the prosecution thereof in the proper estate proceedings. Memoracion’s son-heir, Edgardo Z. Cruz,
manifested to the trial court that he is retaining the services of Atty. Neri for the plaintiff. Simultaneously,
Atty. Neri filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the Order. However, the said motion was subsequently
denied. And then he appealed the said decision to the CA but likewise denied the appeal. Hence, this
appeal to the SC.

Issue: Whether or not an action which affects primarily and principally property and property rights is a
transmissible right and survives the death of the original plaintiff?

Held: The Court in is decision states that, the criterion for determining whether an action survives the
death of a petitioner as elucidated in Bonilla v. Barcena, the question as to whether an action survives or
not depends on the nature of the action and the damage sued for. In the causes of action which survive,
the wrong complained of affects primarily and principally property and property rights, the injuries to the
person being merely incidental, while in the causes of action which do not survive, the injury complained
of is to the person, the property and rights of property affected being incidental. If the case affects
primarily and principally property and property rights, then it survives the death of the plaintiff or petitioner.
In another case, the SC held that a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Deed of Sale of Real Property is one relating to property
and property rights, and therefore, survives the death of the petitioner. Accordingly, the instant case for annulment of sale of real
property merits survival despite the death of petitioner Memoracion Z. Cruz.

Johnny Rabadilla vs Court of Appeals

334 SCRA 522 – Civil Law – Succession – Transmissible Obligations

A certain Aleja Belleza died but he instituted in his will Dr. Jorge Rabadilla as a devisee to a 511,
855 hectare land. A condition was however imposed to the effect that:
1. the naked ownership shall transfer to Dr. Rabadilla;
2. he shall deliver the fruits of said land to Maria Belleza, sister of Aleja, during the lifetime of said
Maria Belleza;
3. that in case Dr. Rabadilla shall die before Maria Belleza, the near descendants, shall continue
delivering the fruits to Maria Belleza;
4. that the said land may only be encumbered, mortgaged, or sold only to a relative of Belleza.
In 1983, Dr. Rabadilla died. He was survived by Johnny Rabadilla.
In 1989, Maria Belleza sued Johnny Rabadilla in order to compel Johnny to reconvey the said land to
the estate of Aleja Belleza because it is alleged that Johnny failed to comply with the terms of the
will; that since 1985, Johnny failed to deliver the fruits; and that the the land was mortgaged to the
Philippine National Bank, which is a violation of the will.
In his defense, Johnny avers that the term “near descendants” in the will of Aleja pertains to the near
descendants of Aleja and not to the near descendants of Dr. Rabadilla, hence, since Aleja had no near
descendants at the time of his death, no can substitute Dr. Rabadilla on the obligation to deliver the
fruits of the devised land.
ISSUE: Whether or not Johnny Rabadilla is not obliged to comply with the terms of the Will left by
Aleja Belleza.
HELD: No. The contention of Johnny Rabadilla is bereft of merit. The “near descendants” being
referred to in the will are the heirs of Dr. Rabadilla. Ownership over the devised property was
already transferred to Dr. Rabadilla when Aleja died. Hence, when Dr. Rabadilla himself died,
ownership over the same property was transmitted to Johnny Rabadilla by virtue of succession.
Under Article 776 of the Civil Code, inheritance includes all the property, rights and obligations of a
person, not extinguished by his death. Conformably, whatever rights Dr. Rabadilla had by virtue of
the Will were transmitted to his forced heirs, at the time of his death. And since obligations not
extinguished by death also form part of the estate of the decedent; corollarily, the obligations
imposed by the Will on the deceased Dr. Jorge Rabadilla, were likewise transmitted to his
compulsory heirs upon his death. It is clear therefore, that Johnny should have continued complying
with the terms of the Will. His failure to do so shall give rise to an obligation for him to reconvey the
property to the estate of Aleja.
URETA v. URETA
G.R. No. 165748, 14 September 2011Mendoza, J.:
FACTS
In his lifetime, Alfonso Ureta begot 14 children, namely, Policronio, Liberato,
Narciso,Prudencia, Vicente, Francisco, Inocensio, Roque, Adela, Wenefreda, Merlinda,
Benedicto, Jorge,
and Andres. The children of Policronio (Heirs of Policronio), are opposed to the rest
of Alfonso’s
children and their descendants.Alfonso was financially well-off during his lifetime. He owned
several fishpens, a fishpond, asari-sari store, a passenger jeep, and was engaged in the buying
and selling of copra. Policronio,the eldest, was the only child of Alfonso who failed to finish
schooling and instead worked on
his father’s lands.
Sometime in October 1969, Alfonso and four of his children, namely, Policronio,
Liberato,Prudencia, and Francisco, met at the house of Liberato. Francisco, who was then a
municipal judge, suggested that in order to reduce the inheritance taxes, their father should make
itappear that he had sold some of his lands to his children. Accordingly, Alfonso executed four
(4)Deeds of Sale covering several parcels of land in favor of Policronio, Liberato, Prudencia, and
hiscommon-law wife, Valeriana Dela Cruz. The Deed of Sale executed on October 25, 1969,
infavor of Policronio, covered six parcels of land, which are the properties in dispute in this
case.Since the sales were only made for taxation purposes and no monetary consideration
wasgiven, Alfonso continued to own, possess and enjoy the lands and their produce.
When Alfonso died on October 11, 1972, Liberato acted as the administrator of his father’s
estate. He was later succeeded by his sister Prudencia, and then by her daughter,
CarmencitaPerlas. Except for a portion of parcel 5, the rest of the parcels transferred
to Policronio weretenanted by the Fernandez Family. These tenants never turned over the
produce of the lands toPolicronio or any of his heirs, but to Alfonso and, later, to the
administrators of his estate.Policronio died on November 22, 1974. Except for the said portion of
parcel 5, neitherPolicronio nor his heirs ever took possession of the subject lands.
On April 19, 1989, Alfonso’s heirs executed a Deed of Extra
-Judicial Partition, which included allthe lands that were covered by the four (4) deeds of sale
that were previously executed by
Alfonso for taxation purposes. Conrado, Policronio’s eldest son, representing the Heirs of
Policronio, signed the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in behalf of his co-heirs.
After their father’s death, the Heirs of Policronio found tax declarations in his name coveringthe
six parcels of land. On June 15, 1995, they obtained a copy of the Deed of Sale executed
onOctober 25, 1969 by Alfonso in favor of Policronio.Not long after, on July 30, 1995, the Heirs
of Policronio allegedly learned about the Deed of Extra-
Judicial Partition involving Alfonso’s estate when it was published in the July 19, 1995
issue of the Aklan Reporter.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition was valid.

RULING
Yes.It has been held in several cases that partition among heirs is not legally deemed a
conveyanceof real property resulting in change of ownership. It is not a transfer of property from
one tothe other, but rather, it is a confirmation or ratification of title or right of property that an
heiris renouncing in favor of another heir who accepts and receives the inheritance. It is merely
adesignation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir. The Deed of Extra-
JudicialPartition cannot, therefore, be considered as an act of strict dominion. Hence, a special
powerof attorney is not necessary.In fact, as between the parties, even an oral partition by the
heirs is valid if no creditors areaffected. The requirement of a written memorandum under the
statute of frauds does notapply to partitions effected by the heirs where no creditors are involved
considering that suchtransaction is not a conveyance of property resulting in change of
ownership but merely adesignation and segregation of that part which belongs to each heir.A
contract entered into in the name of another by one who has no authority or legalrepresentation,
or who has acted beyond his powers, shall be unenforceable, unless it isratified, expressly or
impliedly, by the person on whose behalf it has been executed, before it isrevoked by the
other contracting party.
Therefore, Conrado’s failure to obtain authority from his co
-heirs to sign the Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition in their behalf did not result in his incapacity to
give consent so as to renderthe contract voidable, but rather, it rendered the contract valid but
unenforceable against
Conrado’s co
-heirs for having been entered into without their authority
Sandejas v Lina

Doctrine: . In settling the estate of the deceased, a probate court has jurisdiction over matters
incidental and collateral to the exercise of its recognized powers. Such matters include selling,
mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty belonging to the estate.

Facts:

On February 17, 1981, Eliodoro Sandejas, Sr. filed a petition in the lower court praying that
letters of administration be issued in his favor for the settlement of the estate of his wife,
REMEDIOS R. SANDEJAS. Letters of Administration were issued by the lower court
appointing Eliodoro as administrator.

On November 19, 1981, the 4th floor of Manila City Hall was burned and among the records
burned were the records of the Court where Sandejas filed his petition.

On April 19, 1983, an Omnibus Pleading for motion to intervene and petition-in-intervention
was filed by Alex A. Lina alleging that Sandejas, in his capacity as seller, obligated to sell to
Lina 4 parcels of land.

Eliodoro died sometime in November 1984 in Canada His counsel is still waiting for official
word on the fact of the death of the administrator. He also alleged that the matter of the claim of
Alex becomes a money claim to be filed in Eliodoro's estate. the lower court issued an order
directing the other heirs of Sandejas to move for the appointment of a new administrator within
15 days from receipt of the order.

On January 1986, Alex filed a Motion for his appointment as a new administrator of the Intestate
Estate of Remedios R. Sandejas on the following reasons: that Alex has not received any motion
for the appointment of an administrator in place of Eliodoro; that his appointment would be
beneficial to the heirs; that he is willing to give away his being an administrator as long as the
heirs has found one. The heirs chose Sixto Sandejas as new administrator. They were reasoning
out that it was only at a later date that Sixto accepted the appointment. The lower court
substituted Alex Lina with Sixto Sandejas as administrator.

On November 1993, Alex filed an Omnibus Motion to approve the deed of conditional sale
executed between Alex A. Lina and Elidioro and to compel the heirs to execute a deed of
absolute sale in favor of Alex. The lower court granted Alex's motion.

Overturning the RTC ruling, the CA held that the contract between Eliodoro Sandejas Sr. and
respondent was merely a contract to sell, not a perfected contract of sale. It ruled that the
ownership of the four lots was to remain in the intestate estate of Remedios until the approval of
the sale was obtained from the settlement court.
Issue

What is the settlement court's jurisdiction?

Held:

Court approval is required in any disposition of the decedent's estate per Rule 89 of the Rules of
Court. One can sell their rights, interests or participation in the property under administration. A
stipulation requiring court approval does not affect the validity and the effectivity of the sale as
regards the selling heirs. It merely implies that the property may be taken out of custodia legis,
but only with the court's permission.

Section 8 of Rule 89 allows this action to proceed. The factual differences have no bearing on the
intestate court's jurisdiction over the approval of the subject conditional sale. Probate jurisdiction
covers all matters relating to the settlement of estates (Rules 74 & 86-91) and the probate of wills
(Rules 75-77) of deceased persons, including the appointment and the removal of administrators
and executors (Rules 78-85). It also extends to matters incidental and collateral to the exercise of
a probate court's recognized powers such as selling, mortgaging or otherwise encumbering realty
belonging to the estate. Indeed, the rules on this point are intended to settle the estate in a speedy
manner, so that the benefits that may flow from such settlement may be immediately enjoyed by
the heirs and the beneficiaries.

In the present case, the Motion was meant to settle the decedent's obligation to Alex; hence, that
obligation clearly falls under the jurisdiction of the settlement court. To require respondent to file
a separate action -- on whether petitioners should convey the title to Eliodoro Sr.'s share of the
disputed realty -- will unnecessarily prolong the settlement of the intestate estates of the deceased
spouses.

* Re: Intervenor's Standing

Petitioners contend that under said Rule 89, only the executor or administrator is authorized to
apply for the approval of a sale of realty under administration. Hence, the settlement court
allegedly erred in entertaining and granting respondent's Motion for Approval.

There is no such limitation. Section 8, Rule 89 of the Rules of Court, provides:

"SEC. 8. When court may authorize conveyance of realty which deceased contracted to convey.
Notice. Effect of deed. -- Where the deceased was in his lifetime under contract, binding in law,
to deed real property, or an interest therein, the court having jurisdiction of the estate may, on
application for that purpose, authorize the executor or administrator to convey such property
according to such contract, or with such modifications as are agreed upon by the parties and
approved by the court; and if the contract is to convey real property to the executor or
administrator, the clerk of the court shall execute the deed. "
This provision should be differentiated from Sections 2 and 4 of the same Rule, specifically
requiring only the executor or administrator to file the application for authority to sell, mortgage
or otherwise encumber real estate for the purpose of paying debts, expenses and legacies
(Section 2);or for authority to sell real or personal estate beneficial to the heirs, devisees or
legatees and other interested persons, although such authority is not necessary to pay debts,
legacies or expenses of administration (Section 4).

Section 8 mentions only an application to authorize the conveyance of realty under a contract
that the deceased entered into while still alive. While this Rule does not specify who should file
the application, it stands to reason that the proper party must be one .who is to be benefited or
injured by the judgment, or one who is to be entitled to the avails of the suit.
IN RE: PALAGANAS v. ERNESTO PALAGANASG.R. No. 169144, 26 January 2011Abad, J.:

FACTS

On November 8, 2001 Ruperta C. Palaganas, a Filipino who became a naturalized United States
citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California, she
designated her brother, Sergio C. Palaganas, as the executor of her will for she had left properties
in the Philippines and in the US. On May 19, 2003 respondent Ernesto C. Palaganas, another
brother of Ruperta, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, a petition for the
probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator of her estate. On
October 15, 2003,however, petitioners Manuel Miguel Palaganas and Benjamin Gregorio
Palaganas, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should
not be probated in the Philippines but in the U.S. where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin
added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines, it is invalid nonetheless
for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the
consequences of such act. Ernesto, they claimed, is also not qualified to act as administrator of
the estate. Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign-based siblings, Gloria Villaluz and Sergio, were on
separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, respondent Ernesto filed a motionwith the
RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. On April, 13, 2004 the RTC directed
the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of whether or not Ruperta’s U.S. will may
be probated in and allowed by a court in the Philippines. On June 17, 2004 the RTC issued an
order: (a) admitting to probate Ruperta’s last will; (b) appointing respondent Ernesto as special
administrator at the request of Sergio, the U.S.-based executor designated in the will; and (c)
issuing the Letters of Special Administration to Ernesto. Aggrieved by the RTC’s order,
petitioner nephews Manuel and Benjamin appealed to the Court of Appeals (CA), arguing that an
unprobated will executed by an American citizen in the U.S. cannot be probated for the first time
in the Philippines. On July 29, 2005 the CA rendered a decision, affirming the assailed order of
the RTC, holding that the RTC properly allowed the probate of the will, subject to respondent
Ernesto’s submission of the authenticated copies of the documents specified in the order and his
posting of required bond. The CA pointed out that Section 2, Rule 76 of the Rules of Court does
not require prior probate and allowance of the will in the countryof its execution, before it can be
probated in the Philippines. The present case, said theCA, is different from reprobate, which
refers to a will already probated and allowed

abroad. Reprobate is governed by different rules or procedures. Unsatisfied with the decision,
Manuel and Benjamin came to this Court.

ISSUE Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the
Philippinesalthough it has not been previously probated and allowed in the country where it was
executed.
RULING Yes.Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad
although thesame have not as yet been probated and allowed in the countries of their execution.
A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states
that the will of an alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made inaccordance
with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides, or according to the
formalities observed in his country. In insisting that Ruperta’s will should have been first
probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously
have in mind the procedure forthe reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or
re-authentication of a willalready probated and allowed in a foreign country is different from that
probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specificallygoverned by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners’ stance, since this
latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it cannot be made to apply to the present case. In
reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court
provided its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.
Romero vs. CA GR. No. 188921, April 18, 2012

Facts: On 1974, when Judge Romero died his wife, Aurora was appointed as legalguardian.
During the pendency of Settlement Proceedings of the estate of theirdeceased father, Leo and
David Romero filed a Complaint for Annulment of Sale, Nullification of Title, and Conveyance
of Title against their mother Aurora C.Romero and brother Vittorio C. Romero alleging that their
brother Vittorio through fraud, misrepresentation and duress succeeded in registering the
several properties in his name through of Deeds of Sale executed by their mother, Aurora.The
RTC dismissed the complaint. Likewise, the RTC denied their MR, citingSection 3, Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court which bars an heir or a devisee frommaintaining an action to recover the
title or possession of lands until such landshave actually been assigned. The court ruled
that “plaintiffs must first cause the termination of settlement proceedings to its logical conclusion
before their casecould be entertained by the Court. Leo and David filed Petition for
Certiorari before the CA alleging grave abuse of discretion in the Resolutions issued by theRTC
of Lingayen, Pangasinan. The CA dismissed the petition. Petitioners assertthat the jurisdiction of
the RTC sitting as a probate or intestate court relates only tomatters having to do with
the settlement of the estate of deceased persons or theappointment of executors, but does not
extend to the determination of questions ofownership that arise during the proceedings. Hence
this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not a separate civil action for annulment of sale andreconveyance of title,
despite the pendency of the settlement proceedings for theestate of the late Judge Dante Y.
Romero may prosper.

Ruling : NO.
Section 3, Rule 87 bars petitioners from filing the present action.
The said provision states that:
Sec. 3.
Heir may not sue until share assigned.
When an executor oradministrator is appointed and assumes the trust, no action to recover the
title or possession of lands or for damages done to such lands shall be maintained againsthim by
an heir or devisee until there is an order of the court assigning such lands tosuch heir or devisee
or until the time allowed for paying debts has expired.
”
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES VS MA. IMELDA
“IMEE”
R. MARCOS-MANOTOC
G.R. No. 171701. February 8, 2012Succession; Hereditary estate transmitted to heirs immediately after death of
decedent.
DOCTRINE:
Under the rules of succession, the heirs instantaneously became co-owners of theMarcos properties upon the death
of the President. The property rights and obligations tothe extent of the value of the inheritance of a person are
transmitted to another through the
decedent’s death. In this concept, nothing prevents the heirs from exercising their right to
transfer or dispose of the properties that constitute their legitimes, even absent their declaration or absent the
partition or the distribution of the estate. In Jakosalem v. Rafols,
the Supreme Court said: “Article 440 of the Civil Code provides that “the possession of
hereditary property is deemed to be transmitted to the heir without interruption from theinstant of the death of the
decedent, in case
the inheritance be accepted.” And Manresawith reason states that upon the death of a person, each of his heirs
“becomes the
undivided owner of the whole estate left with respect to the part or portion which might beadjudicated to him, a
community of ownership being thus formed among the coowners of
the estate while it remains undivided.” (3 Manresa, 357; Alcala vs. Alcala, 35 Phil. 679.)
And according to article 399 of the Civil Code, every part owner may assign or mortgage hispart
in the common property, and the effect of such assignment or mortgage shall be limitedto the portion which may
be allotted him in the partition upon the dissolution of thecommunity

.
FACTS:
After the People Power Revolution in 1986, President Corazon C. Aquino created the Presidential
Commission on Good Government (PCGG) that was primarily tasked to investigate and recover the
alleged ill-gotten wealth amassed by the then President Ferdinand E. Marcos, his immediate family,
relatives and associates.
On 16 July 1987, the PCGG, acting on behalf of the Republic with the Office of the Solicitor General
(OSG), filed a Complaint for Reversion, Reconveyance, Restitution, Accounting and Damages against
Ferdinand E. Marcos, who was later substituted by his estate upon his death; Imelda R. Marcos; and
herein respondents Imee Marcos-Manotoc, Irene Marcos-Araneta, Bongbong Marcos, Tomas Manotoc,
and Gregorio Araneta III.
Four amended Complaints were thereafter filed imputingactive participation and collaboration of another
persons, viz. Nemesio G. Co and Yeungs (Kam, Ho and Fan) of Glorious Sun Fashion Manufacturing
Corporation Phils.; and, Imelda Cojuangco for the estate of Ramon Cojuangco and Prime Holdings, in the
alleged illegal activities and undertakings of the Marcoses in relation to the ₱200 Billion Pesos ill-gotten
wealth allegation.
Petitioner presented and formally offered its evidence against herein respondents. However, the latter
objected on the ground that the documents were unauthenticated and mere photocopies.
On 2002, the Sandiganbayan issued a RESOLUTION ADMITTING all the documentary exhibits
formally offered by the prosecution; however, their evidentiary value was left to the determination of the
Court.
Subsequently, Imelda R. Marcos, Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr.; Irene Marcos-
Araneta and Gregorio Ma. Araneta III;Yeung Chun Kam, Yeung Chun Ho and Yeung Chun Fan; and the
PEA-PTGWO filed their respective Demurrers to Evidence.

On 2005, the Sandiganbayan issued a resolution, granting all the demurrers to evidence except the one
filed by Imelda R. Marcos. The sequestration orders on the properties in the name of Gregorio Maria
AranetaIII are accordingly lifted.

With regard to Imee Marcos-Manotoc and Bongbong Marcos, Jr., Irene Marcos and Gregorio Araneta III,
the court noted that their involvement in the alleged illegal activities was never established; neither did
the documentary evidence pinpoint their involvement therein. The court held that all presented evidence
are hearsay, for being merely photocopies and that the originals were not presented in court, nor were
they authenticated by the persons who executed them. Furthermore, the court pointed out that petitioner
failed to provide any valid reason why it did not present the originals in court. These exhibits were
supposed to show the interests of Imee Marcos-Manotoc in the media networks IBC-13, BBC-2 and
RPN-9, all three of which she had allegedly acquired illegally, her alleged participation in dollar salting
through De Soleil Apparel and to prove how the Marcoses used the Potencianos as dummies in acquiring
and operating the bus company PANTRANCO.

Meanwhile, as far as the YEUNGS were concerned, the court found the allegations against them baseless.
Petitioner failed to demonstrate howGlorious Sunwas used as a vehicle for dollar salting; or to show that
they were dummies of the Marcoses. Again, the court held that the documentary evidence relevant to this
allegation was INADMISSIBLE for being mere photocopies, and that the affiants had not been presented
as witnesses. Issue and decision ti court ibase mo jay doctrine criminal case gamin nature na
BALTAZAR vs. LAXA | G.R. No. 174489 | April 11, 2012 | Del Castillo, J.:

FACTS: Paciencia was a 78 y/o spinster when she made her last will and testament in the
Pampango dialect on Sept. 13, 1981. The will, executed in the house of retired Judge Limpin,
was read to Paciencia twice. After which, Paciencia expressed in the presence of the instrumental
witnesses that the document is her last will and testament. She thereafter affixed her signature at
te end of the said document on page 3 and then on the left margin of pages 1, 2 and 4 thereof.

Childless and without any brothers or sisters, Paciencia bequeathed all her properties to
respondent Lorenzo Laxa and his wife Corazon Laza and their children Luna and Katherine.
Lorenzo is Paciencia’s nephew whom she treated as her own son. Conversely, Lorenzo came to
know and treated Paciencia as his own mother.

Six days after the execution of the Will (Sept. 19, 1981), Paciencia left for USA. There, she
resided with Lorenzo and his family until her death on Jan. 4, 1996. In the interim, the Will
remained in the custody of Judge Limpin.

More than 4 years after the death of Paciencia or on Apr. 27, 2000, Lorenzo filed a petition with
the RTC of Guagua, Pampanga for the probate of the Will of Paciencia and for the issuance of
Letters of Administration in his favor.

On Jun 23, 2000 one of petitioners, Antonio Baltazar filed an opposition to Lorenzo’s petition.
Antonio averred that the properties subject of Paciencia’s Will belong to Nicomeda
Mangalindan, his predecessor-in-interest; hence, Paciencia had no right to bequeath them to
Lorenzo. Also, one of the petitioners, Rosie Mateo testified that Paciencia is in the state of being
“mangulyan” or forgetful making her unfit for executing a will and that the execution of the will
had been procured by undue and improper pressure and influence.

Petitioners also opposed the issuance of the Letters of Administration in Lorenzo’s favor arguing
that Lorenzo was disqualified to be appointed as such, he being a citizen and resident of the
USA. Petitioners prayed that Letters of Administration be instead issued in favor of Antonio.

RTC denies the petition for probate of the will and concluded that when Paciencia signed the
will, she was no longer possessed of the sufficient reason or strength of mind to have the
testamentary capacity. On appeal, CA reversed the decision of the RTC and granted the probate
of the will. The petitioner went up to SC for a petition for review on Certiorari.

ISSUE: Whether the authenticity and due execution of the will was sufficiently established to
warrant its allowance for probate.

HELD: Yes. A careful examination of the face of the Will shows faithful compliance with the
formalities laid down by law. The signatures of the testatrix, Paciencia, her instrumental
witnesses and the notary public, are all present and evident on the Will. Further, the attestation
clause explicitly states the critical requirement that the testatrix and her instrumental witnesses
attested and subscribed to the Will in the presence of the testator and of one another. In fact, even
the petitioners acceded that the signature of Paciencia in the Will may be authentic although they
question of her state of mind when she signed the same as well as the voluntary nature of said
act.

The burden to prove that Paciencia was of unsound mind at the time of the execution of the will
lies on the shoulders of the petitioners. The SC agree with the position of the CA that the state of
being forgetful does not necessarily make a person mentally unsound so as to render him unfit to
execute a Will. Forgetfulness is not equivalent to being of unsound mind. Besides, Art. 799 of
the NCC states: “To be of unsound mind, it is not necessary that the testator be in full possession
of all his reasoning faculties, or that his mind be wholly unbroken, unimpaired, or unshattered by
disease, injury or other cause. It shall be sufficient if the testator was able at the time of making
the Will to know the nature of the estate to be disposed of, the proper objects of his bounty, and
the character of the testamentary act.”