Professional Documents
Culture Documents
14 More
specifically, she pointed out the following items reflected therein:
MARYNETTE R. GAMBOA, Petitioner,
vs. (a) The Report cited the PNP as its source for the portion regarding
P/SSUPT. MARLOU C. CHAN, in his capacity as the PNP-Provincial Director of the status of PAGs in the Philippines.15
Ilocos Norte, and P/SUPT. WILLIAM 0. FANG, in his capacity as Chief,
Intelligence Division, PNP Provincial Office, Ilocos Norte,Respondents.
(b) The Report stated that "x x x the PNP organized one dedicated
Special Task Group (STG) for each private armed group (PAG) to
DECISION monitor and counteract their activities."16
SERENO, J.: (c) Attached as Appendix "F" of the Report is a tabulation generated
by the PNP and captioned as "Status of PAGs Monitoring by STGs as
of April 19, 2010," which classifies PAGs in the country according to
Before this Court is an Appeal by Certiorari (Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court)
region, indicates their identity, and lists the prominent personalities
filed pursuant to Rule 191 of the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data,2 seeking a
with whom these groups are associated.17 The first entry in the table
review of the 9 September 2010 Decision in Special Proc. No. 14979 of the
names a PAG, known as the Gamboa Group, linked to herein
Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, Laoag City, Branch 13 (RTC Br.
petitioner Gamboa.18
13).3 The questioned Decision denied petitioner the privilege of the writ of
habeas data.4
(d) Statistics on the status of PAGs were based on data from the PNP,
to wit:
At the time the present Petition was filed, petitioner Marynette R. Gamboa
(Gamboa) was the Mayor of Dingras, Ilocos Norte.5 Meanwhile, respondent
Police Senior Superintendent (P/SSUPT.) Marlou C. Chan was the Officer-in- The resolutions were the subject of a national press conference held
Charge, and respondent Police Superintendent (P/SUPT.) William O. Fang was in Malacañang on March 24, 2010 at which time, the Commission
the Chief of the Provincial Investigation and Detective Management Branch, was also asked to comment on the PNP report that out of one
both of the Ilocos Norte Police Provincial Office.6 hundred seventeen (117) partisan armed groups validated, twenty-
four (24) had been dismantled with sixty-seven (67) members
apprehended and more than eighty-six (86) firearms confiscated.
On 8 December 2009, former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo issued
Administrative Order No. 275 (A.O. 275), "Creating an Independent
Commission to Address the Alleged Existence of Private Armies in the Commissioner Herman Basbaño qualified that said statistics were
Country."7The body, which was later on referred to as the Zeñarosa based on PNP data but that the more significant fact from his report
Commission,8 was formed to investigate the existence of private army groups is that the PNP has been vigilant in monitoring the activities of these
(PAGs) in the country with a view to eliminating them before the 10 May 2010 armed groups and this vigilance is largely due to the existence of the
elections and dismantling them permanently in the future.9 Upon the Commission which has continued communicating with the Armed
conclusion of its investigation, the Zeñarosa Commission released and Forces of the Philippines (AFP) and PNP personnel in the field to
submitted to the Office of the President a confidential report entitled "A constantly provide data on the activities of the PAGs. Commissioner
Journey Towards H.O.P.E.: The Independent Commission Against Private Basbaño stressed that the Commission’s efforts have preempted the
Armies’ Report to the President" (the Report).10 formation of the PAGs because now everyone is aware that there is a
body monitoring the PAGs movement through the PNP.
Commissioner Lieutenant General Edilberto Pardo Adan also clarified
Gamboa alleged that the Philippine National Police in Ilocos Norte (PNP–Ilocos
that the PAGs are being destabilized so that their ability to threaten
Norte) conducted a series of surveillance operations against her and her
and sow fear during the election has been considerably weakened.19
aides,11 and classified her as someone who keeps a PAG.12Purportedly without
the benefit of data verification, PNP–Ilocos Norte forwarded the information
gathered on her to the Zeñarosa Commission,13 thereby causing her inclusion (e) The Report briefly touched upon the validation system of the PNP:
Also, in order to provide the Commission with accurate data which is truly person in authority, as well as indirect assault and multiple attempted murder,
reflective of the situation in the field, the PNP complied with the Commission’s docketed as NPS DOCKET No. 1-04-INV-10-A-00009.30
recommendation that they revise their validation system to include those PAGs
previously listed as dormant. In the most recent briefing provided by the PNP
Respondents likewise asserted that the Petition was incomplete for failing to
on April 26, 2010, there are one hundred seven (107) existing PAGs. Of these
comply with the following requisites under the Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data:
groups, the PNP reported that seven (7) PAGs have been reorganized.20
(a) the manner in which the right to privacy was violated or threatened with
violation and how it affected the right to life, liberty or security of Gamboa; (b)
On 6 and 7 July 2010, ABS-CBN broadcasted on its evening news program the the actions and recourses she took to secure the data or information; and (c)
portion of the Report naming Gamboa as one of the politicians alleged to be the location of the files, registers or databases, the government office, and the
maintaining a PAG.21 Gamboa averred that her association with a PAG also person in charge, in possession or in control of the data or information.31 They
appeared on print media.22 Thus, she was publicly tagged as someone who also contended that the Petition for Writ of Habeas Data, being limited to
maintains a PAG on the basis of the unverified information that the PNP-Ilocos cases of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, was not the
Norte gathered and forwarded to the Zeñarosa Commission.23 As a result, she proper remedy to address the alleged besmirching of the reputation of
claimed that her malicious or reckless inclusion in the enumeration of Gamboa.32
personalities maintaining a PAG as published in the Report also made her, as
well as her supporters and other people identified with her, susceptible to
RTC Br. 13, in its assailed Decision dated 9 September 2010, dismissed the
harassment and police surveillance operations.24
Petition.33 The trial court categorically ruled that the inclusion of Gamboa in
the list of persons maintaining PAGs, as published in the Report, constituted a
Contending that her right to privacy was violated and her reputation violation of her right to privacy, to wit:
maligned and destroyed, Gamboa filed a Petition dated 9 July 2010 for the
issuance of a writ of habeas data against respondents in their capacities as
In this light, it cannot also be disputed that by her inclusion in the list of persons
officials of the PNP-Ilocos Norte.25 In her Petition, she prayed for the following
maintaining PAGs, Gamboa’s right to privacy indubitably has been violated.
reliefs: (a) destruction of the unverified reports from the PNP-Ilocos Norte
The violation understandably affects her life, liberty and security enormously.
database; (b) withdrawal of all information forwarded to higher PNP officials;
The untold misery that comes with the tag of having a PAG could even be
(c) rectification of the damage done to her honor; (d) ordering respondents to
insurmountable. As she essentially alleged in her petition, she fears for her
refrain from forwarding unverified reports against her; and (e) restraining
security that at any time of the day the unlimited powers of respondents may
respondents from making baseless reports.26
likely be exercised to further malign and destroy her reputation and to
transgress her right to life.
The case was docketed as Special Proc. No. 14979 and was raffled to RTC Br.
13, which issued the corresponding writ on 14 July 2010 after finding the
By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, it is likewise undisputed
Petition meritorious on its face.27 Thus, the trial court (a) instructed respondents
that there was certainly intrusion into Gamboa’s activities. It cannot be denied
to submit all information and reports forwarded to and used by the Zeñarosa
that information was gathered as basis therefor. After all, under Administrative
Commission as basis to include her in the list of persons maintaining PAGs; (b)
Order No. 275, the Zeñarosa Commission was tasked to investigate the
directed respondents, and any person acting on their behalf, to cease and
existence of private armies in the country, with all the powers of an
desist from forwarding to the Zeñarosa Commission, or to any other
investigative body under Section 37, Chapter 9, Book I of the Administrative
government entity, information that they may have gathered against her
Code of 1987.
without the approval of the court; (c) ordered respondents to make a written
return of the writ together with supporting affidavits; and (d) scheduled the
summary hearing of the case on 23 July 2010.28 xxx xxx xxx
In their Return of the Writ, respondents alleged that they had acted within the By her inclusion in the list of persons maintaining PAGs, Gamboa alleged as she
bounds of their mandate in conducting the investigation and surveillance of accused respondents, who are public officials, of having gathered and
Gamboa.29 The information stored in their database supposedly pertained to provided information that made the Zeñarosa Commission to include her in
two criminal cases in which she was implicated, namely: (a) a Complaint for the list. Obviously, it was this gathering and forwarding of information
murder and frustrated murder docketed as NPS DOC No. 1-04-INQ-091-00077, supposedly by respondents that petitioner barks at as unlawful. x x x.34
and (b) a Complaint for murder, frustrated murder and direct assault upon a
Despite the foregoing findings, RTC Br. 13 nevertheless dismissed the Petition on In determining whether Gamboa should be granted the privilege of the writ of
the ground that Gamboa failed to prove through substantial evidence that habeas data, this Court is called upon to, first, unpack the concept of the right
the subject information originated from respondents, and that they forwarded to privacy; second, explain the writ of habeas data as an extraordinary
this database to the Zeñarosa Commission without the benefit of prior remedy that seeks to protect the right to informational privacy; and finally,
verification.35 The trial court also ruled that even before respondents assumed contextualize the right to privacy vis-à-vis the state interest involved in the case
their official positions, information on her may have already been at bar.
acquired.36 Finally, it held that the Zeñarosa Commission, as the body tasked to
gather information on PAGs and authorized to disclose information on her,
The Right to Privacy
should have been impleaded as a necessary if not a compulsory party to the
Petition.37
The right to privacy, as an inherent concept of liberty, has long been
recognized as a constitutional right. This Court, in Morfe v. Mutuc,43 thus
Gamboa then filed the instant Appeal by Certiorari dated 24 September
enunciated:
2010,38 raising the following assignment of errors:
5. The trial court erred in making a point that respondents are distinct
xxx xxx xxx
to PNP as an agency.39
In Ople v. Torres,45 this Court traced the constitutional and statutory bases of Zones of privacy are likewise recognized and protected in our laws. The Civil
the right to privacy in Philippine jurisdiction, to wit: Code provides that "every person shall respect the dignity, personality, privacy
and peace of mind of his neighbors and other persons" and punishes as
actionable torts several acts by a person of meddling and prying into the
Indeed, if we extend our judicial gaze we will find that the right of privacy is privacy of another. It also holds a public officer or employee or any private
recognized and enshrined in several provisions of our Constitution. It is expressly individual liable for damages for any violation of the rights and liberties of
recognized in section 3 (1) of the Bill of Rights: another person, and recognizes the privacy of letters and other private
communications. The Revised Penal Code makes a crime the violation of
Sec. 3. (1) The privacy of communication and correspondence shall be secrets by an officer, the revelation of trade and industrial secrets, and trespass
inviolable except upon lawful order of the court, or when public safety or order to dwelling. Invasion of privacy is an offense in special laws like the Anti-
requires otherwise as prescribed by law. Wiretapping Law, the Secrecy of Bank Deposits Act and the Intellectual
Property Code. The Rules of Court on privileged communication likewise
recognize the privacy of certain information.
Other facets of the right to privacy are protected in various provisions of the Bill
of Rights, viz:
Unlike the dissenters, we prescind from the premise that the right to privacy is a
fundamental right guaranteed by the Constitution, hence, it is the burden of
Sec. 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due
government to show that A.O. No. 308 is justified by some compelling state
process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the
interest and that it is narrowly drawn. x x x.46 (Emphases supplied)
laws.
Therefore, when the right to privacy finds tension with a competing state The ECHR ruled that the storage in the secret police register of information
objective, the courts are required to weigh both notions. In these cases, relating to the private life of Leander, coupled with the refusal to allow him the
although considered a fundamental right, the right to privacy may opportunity to refute the same, amounted to an interference in his right to
nevertheless succumb to an opposing or overriding state interest deemed respect for private life.57 However, the ECHR held that the interference was
legitimate and compelling. justified on the following grounds: (a) the personnel control system had a
legitimate aim, which was the protection of national security,58 and (b) the
Personnel Control Ordinance gave the citizens adequate indication as to the
The Writ of Habeas Data
scope and the manner of exercising discretion in the collection, recording and
release of information by the authorities.59 The following statements of the
The writ of habeas data is an independent and summary remedy designed to ECHR must be emphasized:
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of
an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to
58. The notion of necessity implies that the interference corresponds
informational privacy.49 It seeks to protect a person’s right to control
to a pressing social need and, in particular, that it is proportionate to
information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
the legitimate aim pursued (see, inter alia, the Gillow judgment of 24
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve
November 1986, Series A no. 109, p. 22, § 55).
unlawful ends.50 It must be emphasized that in order for the privilege of the writ
to be granted, there must exist a nexus between the right to privacy on the
one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Section 1 of the 59. However, the Court recognises that the national authorities enjoy
Rule on the Writ of Habeas Data reads: a margin of appreciation, the scope of which will depend not only on
the nature of the legitimate aim pursued but also on the particular
nature of the interference involved. In the instant case, the interest of
Habeas data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person
the respondent State in protecting its national security must be
whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an
balanced against the seriousness of the interference with the
unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
applicant’s right to respect for his private life.
individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the
aggrieved party. There can be no doubt as to the necessity, for the purpose of protecting
national security, for the Contracting States to have laws granting the
competent domestic authorities power, firstly, to collect and store in registers
The notion of informational privacy is still developing in Philippine law and
not accessible to the public information on persons and, secondly, to use this
jurisprudence. Considering that even the Latin American habeas data, on
information when assessing the suitability of candidates for employment in Leander illustrates how the right to informational privacy, as a specific
posts of importance for national security. component of the right to privacy, may yield to an overriding legitimate state
interest. In similar fashion, the determination of whether the privilege of the writ
of habeas data, being an extraordinary remedy, may be granted in this case
Admittedly, the contested interference adversely affected Mr. Leander’s
entails a delicate balancing of the alleged intrusion upon the private life of
legitimate interests through the consequences it had on his possibilities of
Gamboa and the relevant state interest involved.
access to certain sensitive posts within the public service. On the other hand,
the right of access to public service is not as such enshrined in the Convention
(see, inter alia, the Kosiek judgment of 28 August 1986, Series A no. 105, p. 20, The collection and forwarding of information by the PNP vis-à-vis the interest of
§§ 34-35), and, apart from those consequences, the interference did not the state to dismantle private armies.
constitute an obstacle to his leading a private life of his own choosing.
The Constitution explicitly mandates the dismantling of private armies and
In these circumstances, the Court accepts that the margin of appreciation other armed groups not recognized by the duly constituted authority.60 It also
available to the respondent State in assessing the pressing social need in the provides for the establishment of one police force that is national in scope and
present case, and in particular in choosing the means for achieving the civilian in character, and is controlled and administered by a national police
legitimate aim of protecting national security, was a wide one. commission.61
xxx xxx xxx Taking into account these constitutional fiats, it is clear that the issuance of
A.O. 275 articulates a legitimate state aim, which is to investigate the existence
of PAGs with the ultimate objective of dismantling them permanently.
66. The fact that the information released to the military authorities was not
communicated to Mr. Leander cannot by itself warrant the conclusion that the
interference was not "necessary in a democratic society in the interests of To enable the Zeñarosa Commission to achieve its goals, A.O. 275 clothed it
national security", as it is the very absence of such communication which, at with the powers of an investigative body, including the power to summon
least partly, ensures the efficacy of the personnel control procedure (see, witnesses, administer oaths, take testimony or evidence relevant to the
mutatis mutandis, the above-mentioned Klass and Others judgment, Series A investigation and use compulsory processes to produce documents, books,
no. 28, p. 27, § 58). and records.62 A.O. 275 likewise authorized the Zeñarosa Commission to
deputize the Armed Forces of the Philippines, the National Bureau of
Investigation, the Department of Justice, the PNP, and any other law
The Court notes, however, that various authorities consulted before the issue of
enforcement agency to assist the commission in the performance of its
the Ordinance of 1969, including the Chancellor of Justice and the
functions.63
Parliamentary Ombudsman, considered it desirable that the rule of
communication to the person concerned, as contained in section 13 of the
Ordinance, should be effectively applied in so far as it did not jeopardise the Meanwhile, the PNP, as the national police force, is empowered by law to (a)
purpose of the control (see paragraph 31 above). enforce all laws and ordinances relative to the protection of lives and
properties; (b) maintain peace and order and take all necessary steps to
ensure public safety; and (c) investigate and prevent crimes.64
67. The Court, like the Commission, thus reaches the conclusion that the
safeguards contained in the Swedish personnel control system meet the
requirements of paragraph 2 of Article 8 (art. 8-2). Having regard to the wide Pursuant to the state interest of dismantling PAGs, as well as the foregoing
margin of appreciation available to it, the respondent State was entitled to powers and functions accorded to the Zeñarosa Commission and the PNP, the
consider that in the present case the interests of national security prevailed latter collected information on individuals suspected of maintaining PAGs,
over the individual interests of the applicant (see paragraph 59 above). The monitored them and counteracted their activities.65 One of those individuals is
interference to which Mr. Leander was subjected cannot therefore be said to herein petitioner Gamboa.
have been disproportionate to the legitimate aim pursued. (Emphases
supplied)
This Court holds that Gamboa was able to sufficiently establish that the data
contained in the Report listing her as a PAG coddler came from the PNP.
Contrary to the ruling of the trial court, however, the forwarding of information
by the PNP to the Zeñarosa Commission was not an unlawful act that violated Finally, this Court rules that Gamboa was unable to prove through substantial
or threatened her right to privacy in life, liberty or security. evidence that her inclusion in the list of individuals maintaining PAGs made her
and her supporters susceptible to harassment and to increased police
surveillance. In this regard, respondents sufficiently explained that the
The PNP was rationally expected to forward and share intelligence regarding
investigations conducted against her were in relation to the criminal cases in
PAGs with the body specifically created for the purpose of investigating the
which she was implicated. As public officials, they enjoy the presumption of
existence of these notorious groups. Moreover, the Zeñarosa Commission was
regularity, which she failed to overcome.
explicitly authorized to deputize the police force in the fulfillment of the
former’s mandate, and thus had the power to request assistance from the
latter. It is clear from the foregoing discussion that the state interest of dismantling
PAGs far outweighs the alleged intrusion on the private life of Gamboa,
especially when the collection and forwarding by the PNP of information
Following the pronouncements of the ECHR in Leander, the fact that the PNP
against her was pursuant to a lawful mandate. Therefore, the privilege of the
released information to the Zeñarosa Commission without prior communication
writ of habeas data must be denied.
to Gamboa and without affording her the opportunity to refute the same
cannot be interpreted as a violation or threat to her right to privacy since that
act is an inherent and crucial component of intelligence-gathering and WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review is DENIED. The assailed Decision in
investigation.1âwphi1 Additionally, Gamboa herself admitted that the PNP Special Proc. No. 14979 dated 9 September 2010 of the Regional Trial Court,
had a validation system, which was used to update information on individuals Laoag City, Br. 13, insofar as it denies Gamboa the privilege of the writ of
associated with PAGs and to ensure that the data mirrored the situation on the habeas data, is AFFIRMED.
field.66 Thus, safeguards were put in place to make sure that the information
collected maintained its integrity and accuracy.
SO ORDERED.
However, to accord the right to privacy with the kind of protection established
in existing law and jurisprudence, this Court nonetheless deems it necessary to
caution these investigating entities that information-sharing must observe strict
confidentiality. Intelligence gathered must be released exclusively to the
authorities empowered to receive the relevant information. After all, inherent
to the right to privacy is the freedom from "unwarranted exploitation of one’s
person or from intrusion into one’s private activities in such a way as to cause
humiliation to a person’s ordinary sensibilities."67
Complainant,
Promulgated:
x-----------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
Respondent. This administrative complaint against Judge Victor A. Canoy (Judge Canoy) of
the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 29 in Surigao City stems from a
complaint filed by Gaudencio Pantilo III (Pantilo), charging Judge Canoy with
several counts of gross ignorance of the law and/or procedures, grave abuse
A.M. No. RTJ-11-2262 of authority, and appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial
Conduct). Pantilo prays for Judge Canoys disbarment in relation to Criminal
[Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. Case No. 8072 for Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Homicide entitled People
of the Philippines v. Leonardo Luzon Melgazo.
08-3056-RTJ]
The facts of the case, as gathered from the records, are as follows:
Present:
The complainant, Pantilo, the brother of the homicide victim in the above-
CORONA, C.J., Chairperson,
mentioned criminal case, recounts in his letter-complaint that, on September 3,
2008, at around 5 oclock in the afternoon, he, along with police officers
VELASCO, JR.,
Ronald C. Perocho (Perocho) and Santiago B. Lamanilao, Jr. (Lamanilao),
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, acting as escorts of Leonardo Luzon Melgazo (Melgazo), the accused in
Criminal Case No. 8072, went to the City Prosecutors Office, Surigao City, to
DEL CASTILLO, and attend the inquest proceedings.[1] Later, at around 8 oclock in the evening,
Pantilo was informed by Perocho that Melgazo had been released from Nevertheless, Judge Canoy issued an Order dated September 5, 2008,
detention.[2] directing Assistant City Prosecutor Robert Gonzaga (Prosecutor Gonzaga), the
prosecutor-in-charge of the case, to give his comment on the said motion
within three (3) days upon receipt of the Order. Three (3) days later, Prosecutor
Gonzaga submitted his comment. And despite his opposition, Judge Canoy
The following day, September 4, 2008, Pantilo went to the Surigao City Police granted Melgazos motion.[8]
Station to verify the information. Upon arriving there, Custodial Officer Anecito
T. Undangan told him that Melgazo had indeed been released at around 6:30
p.m. on September 3, 2008, as shown in the Police Logbook of Detention
Prisoners and as authorized by Chief of Police Supt. Ramer Perlito P. Perlas.[3] Subsequently, Pantilo filed a motion for inhibition of Judge Canoy which was
Further, the logbook showed that Melgazo was temporarily released upon the later denied.
order of Judge Canoy after he posted bail in the amount of thirty thousand
pesos (PhP 30,000), as evidenced by O.R. No. 0291794 dated September 3,
2008.[4]
Aggrieved, Pantilo filed a letter-complaint dated November 3, 2008 before the
Office of the Court Administrator charging Judge Canoy with (1) gross
ignorance of the law and procedures; (2) grave abuse of authority; and (3)
Pantilo proceeded to the Office of the Clerk of Court to request a copy of the appearance of impropriety (Canon 2, Code of Judicial Conduct). Pantilo also
Information, only to find out that none had yet been filed by the Surigao City prays for Judge Canoys disbarment.
Prosecutors Office.[5] Puzzled, he inquired from the City Prosecutors Office the
details surrounding the release of Melgazo. He learned that no Information
had yet been filed in Court that would serve as the basis for the approval of
the bail. Likewise, he also learned from the City Police Station that no written On January 5, 2009, the Court Administrator required respondent judge to
Order of Release had been issued but only a verbal order directing the police comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from receipt.
officers to release Melgazo from his detention cell.[6] One of the police officers
even said that Judge Canoy assured him that a written Order of Release
would be available the following day or on September 4, 2008 after the
Accordingly, on February 5, 2009, Judge Canoy filed his comment, arguing
Information is filed in Court.
that the facts in this case were exceptional. In his comment, he admitted that
the inquest proceedings of Melgazo before Prosecutor Gonzaga concluded
around 5:00 p.m. on September 3, 2008, after which, Melgazo, with his counsel,
On September 5, 2008, Melgazo filed a Motion for the Release of his Atty. Cacel Azarcon, went to his office to post bail for Melgazos provisional
impounded vehicle as physical evidence pending the trial of the case.[7] The liberty.[9] He noted that because of the time, most of the clerks in his office
motion was received by the Office of the Clerk of Court at 8:30 a.m. that day and the Office of the Clerk of Court had already gone home. Thus, it was no
and was subsequently raffled in the afternoon. In the Notice of Hearing of the longer possible to process the posting of bail and all the necessary papers
said motion, Melgazo prayed that it be heard on September 5, 2008 at 8:30 needed for the release of Melgazo.
a.m. According to Pantilo, this clearly violated the rules which require that the
other party must be served a copy of the motion at least three (3) days before
the hearing.
Bearing in mind the constitutional right of the accused to bail and coupled
with the insistence of Melgazos counsel, Judge Canoy summoned Prosecutor
Gonzaga and inquired about the result of the inquest proceedings.
Thereupon, Prosecutor Gonzaga relayed to him that the charge against
Melgazo was for Reckless Imprudence with Homicide and the recommended
bail bond was thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000). However, since it was Similarly, he denied the motion for inhibition filed by Pantilo owing to the
already past 5:00 p.m., Prosecutor Gonzaga claimed that he could no longer absence of an express imprimatur of the prosecutor handling the case.
file the Information and that it would have to be filed the next day.[10]
On February 9, 2009, Pantilo filed his Reply to the Comment arguing that there
Despite all this, Judge Canoy informed Prosecutor Gonzaga that he would is no such thing as constructive bail under the rules. He adds that, while he
allow Melgazo to post bail in the amount recommended. He then called Mrs. does not dispute the accuseds right to post bail, the granting of such should
Ruth O. Suriaga (Suriaga), Clerk IV, Office of the Clerk of Court, RTC, Surigao be in harmony with the rules, i.e., an application or motion to that effect and a
City, to accept as deposit for bail the thirty thousand pesos (PhP 30,000) from corresponding order from the court granting the motion.
Melgazo.[11] Likewise, he instructed Suriaga to earmark an official receipt
which would have to be dated the following day or September 4, 2008.
On October 18, 2010, Court Administrator Jose Midas P. Marquez issued his
evaluation and recommendation on the case. In his evaluation, the Court
Accordingly, he summoned the escorting police officers, Perocho and Administrator found that respondent judge failed to comply with the
Lamanilao, and verbally ordered them to release Melgazo from detention. He documents required by the rules to discharge an accused on bail. Further, the
also said that the written order would be issued the following day.[12] Court Administrator noted that Judge Canoy also has another pending case
(but filed on a later date, September 3, 2009): OCA-IPI No. 09-3254-RTJ, entitled
Cristita Conjurado Vda. de Tolibas v. Judge Victor A. Canoy for Gross
Ignorance of the Law and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest of Service.
In his defense, Judge Canoy invokes the constitutional right of the accused to
bail and Section 17(c), Rule 114 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure,
which does not require that a person be charged in court before he or she
may apply for bail.[13] To his mind, there was already a constructive bail given Consequently, he recommended the following: (1) the instant complaint be
that only the papers were needed to formalize it.[14] It would be unreasonable re-docketed as a regular administrative matter; and (2) Judge Canoy be fined
and unjustifiable to further delay the release of the accused. Nevertheless, he forty thousand pesos (PhP 40,000) with a stern warning that a commission of
submits that if he would be faulted for such act, he does humbly concede but similar acts in the future will be dealt with more severely.
he merely acted in accordance with what he deemed best for the moment x
x x.[15]
As to his Order dated September 8, 2008 directing the release of the vehicle
subject of the case, he contends that there was no deliberate intent to
disregard rules and procedure. In fact, he points out that the prosecution was We find the evaluation and recommendations of the Court Administrator well-
given three (3) days within which to file its comment on the motion of the founded.
accused. The grounds raised by both parties were well taken into
consideration, but he found the grounds raised by Melgazo to be more
reasonable and practical and, hence, he granted the motion.
It is settled that an accused in a criminal case has the constitutional right to (a) The undertaking shall be effective upon approval, and unless cancelled,
bail,[16] more so in this case when the charge against Melgazo, Reckless shall remain in form at all stages of the case until promulgation of the
Imprudence Resulting in Homicide, is a non-capital offense. However, the judgment of the Regional Trial Court, irrespective of whether the case was
letter-complaint focuses on the manner of Melgazos release from detention. originally filed in or appealed to it;
(b) The accused shall appear before the proper court whenever required by
the court or these Rules;
Sec. 17, Rule 114 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure allows that any
person in custody who is not yet charged in court may apply for bail with any
court in the province, city or municipality where he is held. In the case at bar,
Melgazo did not file any application or petition for the grant of bail with the (c) The failure of the accused to appear at the trial without justification and
Surigao City RTC, Branch 29. Despite the absence of any written application, despite due notice shall be deemed a waiver of his right to be present thereat.
respondent judge verbally granted bail to Melgazo. This is a clear deviation In such case, the trial may proceed in absentia; and
from the procedure laid down in Sec. 17 of Rule 114.
(d) The bondsman shall surrender the accused to the court for execution of
In addition to a written application for bail, Rule 114 of the Rules prescribes the final execution.
other requirements for the release of the accused:
The original papers shall state the full name and address of the accused, the
SEC. 14. Deposit of cash as bail.The accused or any person acting in his behalf amount of the undertaking and the conditions required by this section.
may deposit in cash with the nearest collector of internal revenue or Photographs (passport size) taken within the last six (6) months showing the
provincial, city, or municipal treasurer the amount of bail fixed by the court, or face, left and right profiles of the accused must be attached to the bail.
recommended by the prosecutor who investigated or filed the case. Upon
submission of a proper certificate of deposit and a written undertaking
showing compliance with the requirements of section 2 of this Rule, the
accused shall be discharged from custody. The money deposited shall be In the case at bar, Melgazo or any person acting in his behalf did not deposit
considered as bail and applied to the payment of fine and costs while the the amount of bail recommended by Prosecutor Gonzaga with the nearest
excess, if any, shall be returned to the accused or to whoever made the collector of internal revenue or provincial, city or municipal treasurer. In clear
deposit. departure from Sec. 14 of Rule 114, Judge Canoy instead verbally ordered
Clerk IV Suriaga of the Surigao City RTC, Office of the Clerk of Court, to accept
the cash deposit as bail, to earmark an official receipt for the cash deposit,
and to date it the following day. Worse, respondent judge did not require
SEC. 2. Conditions of the bail; requirements.All kinds of bail are subject to the Melgazo to sign a written undertaking containing the conditions of the bail
following conditions: under Sec. 2, Rule 114 to be complied with by Melgazo. Immediately upon
receipt by Suriaga of the cash deposit of PhP 30,000 from Melgazo, Judge
Canoy ordered the police escorts to release Melgazo without any written
order of release. In sum, there was no written application for bail, no certificate
of deposit from the BIR collector or provincial, city or municipal treasurer, no DR. JOY MARGATE LEE, Petitioner, v. P/SUPT. NERI A. ILAGAN, Respondent.
written undertaking signed by Melgazo, and no written release order.
DECISION
As regards the insistence of Judge Canoy that such may be considered as
constructive bail, there is no such species of bail under the Rules. Despite the
noblest of reasons, the Rules of Court may not be ignored at will and at
random to the prejudice of the rights of another. PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
In BPI v. Court of Appeals, We underscored that procedural rules have their Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari1 assailing the Decision2
own wholesome rationale in the orderly administration of justice. Justice has to dated August 30, 2012 of the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224
be administered according to the Rules in order to obviate arbitrariness, (RTC) in SP No. 12-71527, which extended the privilege of the writ of habeas
caprice, or whimsicality.[17] In other words, [r]ules of procedure are intended data in favor of respondent Police Superintendent Neri A. Ilagan (Ilagan).
to ensure the orderly administration of justice and the protection of substantive
rights in judicial and extrajudicial proceedings.[18] In this case, the reason of
Judge Canoy is hardly persuasive enough to disregard the Rules.[19]
The Facts
From the foregoing, the Court finds Judge Canoy guilty of a less serious charge
In his Petition for Issuance of the Writ of Habeas Data3 dated June 22, 2012,
of violation of Supreme Court rules, directives and circulars under Sec. 9, Rule
Ilagan alleged that he and petitioner Dr. Joy Margate Lee (Lee) were former
140 for which a fine of more than PhP 10,000 but not exceeding PhP 20,000 is
common law partners. Sometime in July 2011, he visited Lee at the latter’s
the imposable penalty under Sec. 11(b), Rule 140 of the Rules of Court. A fine
condominium, rested for a while and thereafter,proceeded to his office. Upon
of PhP 11,000 would be the appropriate penalty under the circumstances of
arrival, Ilagan noticed that his digital camera was missing.4 On August 23,
the case.
2011, Lee confronted Ilagan at the latter’s office regarding a purported sex
video (subject video) she discovered from the aforesaid camera involving
Ilagan and another woman. Ilagan denied the video and demanded Lee to
WHEREFORE, respondent Judge Victor A. Canoy is found GUILTY of violation of return the camera, but to no avail.5 During the confrontation, Ilagan allegedly
Supreme Court rules, directives, and circulars. He is meted the penalty of a slammed Lee’s head against a wall inside his office and walked
FINE of eleven thousand pesos (PhP 11,000). He is STERNLY WARNED that a away.6Subsequently, Lee utilized the said video as evidence in filing various
repetition of similar or analogous infractions in the future shall be dealt with complaints against Ilagan, namely: (a) a criminal complaint for violation of
more severely. Republic Act No. 9262,7otherwise known as the “Anti-Violence Against Women
and Their Children Act of 2004,” before the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Makati; and (b) an administrative complaint for grave misconduct before the
National Police Commission (NAPOLCOM).8 Ilagan claimed that Lee’s acts of
SO ORDERED. reproducing the subject video and threatening to distribute the same to the
upper echelons of the NAPOLCOM and uploading it to the internet violated
not only his right to life, liberty, security, and privacy but also that of the other
woman, and thus, the issuance of a writ of habeas data in his favor is caused him to suffer humiliation and mental anguish. In this relation, the RTC
warranted.9 opined that Lee’s use of the subject video as evidence in the various cases she
filed against Ilagan is not enough justification for its reproduction. Nevertheless,
the RTC clarified that it is only ruling on the return of the aforesaid video and
not on its admissibility before other tribunals.15
Finding the petition prima facie meritorious, the RTC issued a Writ of Habeas
Data10 dated June 25, 2012, directing Lee to appear before the court a quo,
and to produce Ilagan’s digital camera, as well as the negative and/or
original of the subject video and copies thereof, and to file a verified written Dissatisfied, Lee filed this petition.
return within five (5) working days from date of receipt thereof.
The RTC did not give credence to Lee’s defense that she is not engaged in the
As defined in Section 1 of the Habeas Data Rule, the writ of habeas data now
gathering, collecting or storing of data regarding the person of Ilagan, finding
stands as “a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life,
that her acts of reproducing the subject video and showing it to other people,
liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a
i.e., the NAPOLCOM officers, violated the latter’s right to privacy in life and
public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the
gathering, collecting or storing of data or information regarding the person, instance, to spread it to the public so as to ruin Ilagan’s reputation.
family, home, and correspondence of the aggrieved party.” Thus, in order to Contrastingly, Lee even made it clear in her testimony that the only reason
support a petition for the issuance of such writ, Section 6 of the Habeas Data why she reproduced the subject video was to legitimately utilize the same as
Rule essentially requires that the petition sufficiently alleges, among others, evidence in the criminal and administrative cases that she filed against
“[t]he manner the right to privacy is violated or threatened and how it affects Ilagan.23 Hence, due to the insufficiency of the allegations as well as the
the right to life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.” In other words, the glaring absence of substantial evidence, the Court finds it proper to reverse
petition must adequately show that there exists a nexus between the right to the RTC Decision and dismiss the habeas data petition.
privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other
.19 Corollarily, the allegations in the petition must be supported by substantial
evidence showing an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
life, liberty or security of the victim.20 In this relation, it bears pointing out that WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Decision dated August 30, 2012 of
the writ of habeas data will not issue to protect purely property or commercial the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 224 in SP No. 12-71527is hereby
concerns nor when the grounds invoked in support of the petitions therefor are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Accordingly, the Petition for Issuance of the Writ of
vague and doubtful.21 Habeas Data filed by respondent P/Supt. Neri A. Ilagan is DISMISSED for lack of
merit.
In this case, the Court finds that Ilagan was not able to sufficiently allege that
his right to privacy in life, liberty or security was or would be violated through SO ORDERED.
the supposed reproduction and threatened dissemination of the subject sex
video. While Ilagan purports a privacy interest in the suppression of this video –
which he fears would somehow find its way to Quiapo or be uploaded in the
internet for public consumption – he failed to explain the connection between
such interest and any violation of his right to life, liberty or security. Indeed,
courts cannot speculate or contrive versions of possible transgressions. As the
rules and existing jurisprudence on the matter evoke, alleging and eventually
proving the nexus between one’s privacy right to the cogent rights to life,
liberty or security are crucial in habeas data cases, so much so that a failure
on either account certainly renders a habeas data petition dismissible, as in
this case.
In fact, even discounting the insufficiency of the allegations, the petition would
equally be dismissible due to the inadequacy of the evidence presented. As
the records show, all that Ilagan submitted in support of his petition was his self-
serving testimony which hardly meets the substantial evidence requirement as
prescribed by the Habeas Data Rule. This is because nothing therein would
indicate that Lee actually proceeded to commit any overt act towards the
end of violating Ilagan’s right to privacy in life, liberty or security. Nor would
anything on record even lead a reasonable mind to conclude22 that Lee was
going to use the subject video in order to achieve unlawful ends – say for
A.M. No. 11-10-03-O July 30, 2013 In her letter4 dated April 18, 2011 to the OCA, Atty. Acosta maintained that,
while sheriff’s expenses may not be strictly considered as a legal fee, they are
nevertheless considered as a fee which is incidental to the filing of an action in
court and, hence, should not be exacted from PAO’s clients. She pointed out
RE: LETTER DATED APRIL 18, 2011 OF CHIEF PUBLIC ATTORNEY PERSIDA RUEDA- that the imposition of sheriff’s expenses on PAO’s clients would render the
COSTA REQUESTING EXEMPTION FROM THE PAYMENT OF SHERIFF'S EXPENSES latter’s exemption from payment of docket and other fees under Section 6 of
R.A. No. 9406 nugatory. Considering that the matter involves an interpretation
of R.A. No. 9406, Atty. Acosta requested that the same be referred to the
Court en banc for resolution.
RESOLUTION
In its report and recommendation5 dated September 14, 2011, the OCA
REYES, J.:
maintained its position that PAO’s clients are not exempted from the payment
of sheriff’s expenses; it stressed that the P1,000.00 sheriff’s expenses are not the
same as the sheriff’s fee fixed by Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court and,
This case stemmed from the February 7, 2011 letter1 of Attorney Persida V. hence, not covered by the exemption granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No.
Rueda-Acosta (Atty. Acosta), Chief Public Attorney of the Public Attorney's 9406. The OCA further alleged that the grant of exemption to PAO’s clients
Office (PAO), to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). In the said letter, from the payment of sheriff’s expenses amounts to disbursement of public
Atty. Acosta sought a clarification as to the exemption of PAO's clients from funds for the protection of private interests. Accordingly, the OCA
the payment of sheriffs expenses, alleging that PAO's clients in its Regional recommended that Atty. Acosta’s request for exemption of PAO’s clients from
Office in Region VII are being charged with the payment of sheriff’s expenses payment of sheriff’s expenses be denied.
in the amount of P1,000.00 upon the filing of a civil action in court. She claimed
that sheriff’s expenses should not be exacted from PAO’s clients since Section
6 of Republic Act No. 94062 (R.A. No. 9406) specifically exempts them from the
Adopting the recommendation of the OCA, the Court en banc issued
payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court
Resolution6 dated November 22, 2011 which denied Atty. Acosta’s request for
and other quasi-judicial bodies.
exemption from the payment of sheriff’s expenses.
In its letter3 dated March 23, 2011 to Atty. Acosta, the OCA clarified that PAO’s
On January 2, 2012, Atty. Acosta sought a reconsideration7 of the Court’s
clients, notwithstanding their exemption under Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 from
Resolution dated November 22, 2011, which the Court en banc referred to the
payment of "docket and other fees incidental to instituting an action in court,"
OCA for appropriate action. In its report and recommendation8 dated March
are not exempted from the payment of sheriff’s expenses. The OCA explained
22, 2012, the OCA averred that the exemption of PAO’s clients from payment
that sheriff’s expenses, strictly speaking, are not considered as "legal fees"
of legal fees is not an absolute rule and that the Court is not precluded from
under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court since they are not payable to the
providing limitations thereto. Thus, the OCA recommended the denial of Atty.
government; they are payable to the sheriff/process server to defray his travel
Acosta’s motion for reconsideration.
expenses in serving court processes in relation to the litigant’s case.
On April 24, 2012, the Court en banc issued a Resolution9 which denied the In any case, it bears stressing that what is involved in this case is the Court’s
Motion for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Acosta. administrative power to determine its policy vis-à-vis the exaction of legal fees
from the litigants. The Court’s policy determination respecting administrative
matters must not be unnecessarily bound by procedural considerations. Surely,
a rule of procedure may not debilitate the Court and render inutile its power of
Unperturbed, Atty. Acosta filed a motion for leave to file a second motion for administration and supervision over court procedures.
reconsideration10 and a Second Motion for Reconsideration11 of the Court’s
Resolution dated April 24, 2012, alleging that the imposition of sheriff’s
expenses on PAO’s clients is contrary to the language, intent and spirit of
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406 since sheriff’s expenses are considered as fees At the core of this case is the proper interpretation of Section 6 of R.A. No. 9406
"incidental to instituting an action in court." Further, she claimed that the said which, in part, reads:
imposition on PAO’s clients would hinder their access to the courts contrary to
the mandate of Section 11, Article III of the Constitution.
Sec. 6. New sections are hereby inserted in Chapter 5, Title III, Book IV of
Executive Order No. 292, to read as follows:
After a conscientious review of the contrasting legal disquisitions set forth in this
case, the Court still finds the instant petition devoid of merit.
xxxx
At the outset, it bears stressing that this is already the third attempt of Atty.
Acosta to obtain from this Court a declaration exempting PAO’s clients from
the payment of sheriff’s fees – the initial request therefor and the subsequent Sec. 16-D. Exemption from Fees and Costs of the Suit – The clients of PAO shall
motion for reconsideration having been denied by this Court. be exempt from payment of docket and other fees incidental to instituting an
action in court and other quasi-judicial bodies, as an original proceeding or on
appeal.
Ordinarily, the Court would have dismissed outright Atty. Acosta’s second
motion for reconsideration. However, for reasons to be discussed at length
later, there is a need to give due course to the instant petition in order to The OCA maintains that sheriff’s expenses are not covered by the exemption
reassess and clarify the Court’s pronouncement in our Resolutions dated granted to PAO’s clients under R.A. No. 9406 since the same are not
November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012. considered as a legal fee under Rule 141 of the Rules of Court. Stated
differently, the OCA asserts that the exemption provided for under R.A. No.
9406 only covers the legal fees enumerated under Rule 141 of the Rules of Sheriff’s expenses are provided for under Section 10, Rule 141 of the Rules of
Court. Court, viz:
The court agrees. Sec. 10. Sheriffs, PROCESS SERVERS and other persons serving processes.–
Free access to the courts and adequate legal assistance are among the
fundamental rights which the Constitution extends to the less privileged. Thus, WHEREFORE, in consideration of the foregoing disquisitions, the Second Motion
Section 11, Article III of the 1987 Constitution mandates that "free access to the for Reconsideration filed by Atty. Persida V. Rueda-Acosta is DENIED. The
courts and quasi-judicial bodies and adequate legal assistance shall not be Court's Resolutions dated November 22, 2011 and April 24, 2012 are hereby
denied to any person by reason of poverty." The Constitution affords litigants— AFFIRMED. The request of Atty. Persida V. RuedaAcosta for the exemption of
moneyed or poor—equal access to the courts; moreover, it specifically the clients of the Public Attorney's Office from the payment of sheriff's
provides that poverty shall not bar any person from having access to the expenses is DENIED.
courts. Accordingly, laws and rules must be formulated, interpreted, and
implemented pursuant to the intent and spirit of this constitutional provision.20
Nevertheless, the officials and employees of the Public Attorney's Office are
hereby AUTHORIZED to serve summons, subpoenas and other court processes
in behalf of their clients pursuant to Section 3, Rule 14 of the Rules of Court, in G.R. No. 197442 October 22, 2014
coordination with the concerned court. The amount to be defrayed in serving
the summons, subpoenas and other court processes could
be taken from the operating expenses of the Public Attorney's Office which, in vs.
turn, may be taken from the amount recovered by it from the adversaries of
PAO's clients as costs of suit, attorney's fees or contingent fees prior to the JOSE D. TITO, Respondent.
deposit thereof in the National Treasury, or damages that said clients may be
decreed as entitled to in case of the success of P AO' s indigent clients.
x-----------------------x
SO ORDERED.
vs.
BIENVENIDO L. REYES
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Assailed in this petition for review on certiorari1 are the Decision2 dated
October 30, 2008 and the Resolution3 dated June 22, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CV. No. 81814, which reversed and set aside the
Order4 dated July 28, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court of Pasig City, Branch 67
(RTC) in Civil Case No. 27958, and remanded the case to the court a quo for
further proceedings.
The Facts On August 16, 1979, the CFI allowed the intervention of Sps. Nazal in the
annulment case,16 which order eventually attained finality as shown by the
entry of judgment issued by the Court on August 29, 1985 in G.R. No. L-69353.17
In the interim, the proceedings in the annulment case were indefinitely
Petitioner Majestic Finance and Investment Co., Inc. (Majestic) was the suspended.18
judgment obligee in Civil Case No. 20538, a case for rescission of contract
(rescission case) filed before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch 21 (CFI),
now the RTC. In order to satisfy the judgment by default, the Sheriff levied upon
the property of the judgment obligor, Thomas D. Cort (Cort), covered by On December 9, 1987, Sps. Nazal moved that the annulment case be set for
Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 1104725 (subject property), and sold the pre-trial but the motion was not acted upon.19 It appears that the records
same at a public auction to Paulina Cruz (Cruz), the highest bidder, for a total were among those gutted by fire on June 11, 1988, and none of the parties or
bid price of 54,460.00. After the redemption period had lapsed, Cruz secured the court did anything for a period of almost eleven (11) years.20 Meanwhile,
TCT No. 241118 on January 4, 1978 in her name and, thereafter, soldthe subject Sps. Nazal remained in possession of the subject property.21 Sometime in 1998,
property to Cornelio Mendoza (Mendoza) who was issued TCT No. 241177 on Sps. Nazal received summons in an unlawful detainer case filed by the new
January 9, 1978.6 registered owners of the subject property, spouses Mariano and Rhodora Lim
(Sps. Lim),22 which apparently prompted Sps. Nazal to set the annulment case
for hearing. Learning of the loss of the records, Sps. Nazal moved for
reconstitution23 of judicial records and for revival24 of the proceedings in the
On November 21, 1977, respondent Jose D. Tito (Tito) filed with the same CFI annulment case, which was opposed by Majestic. Later, Majestic filed an
against Majestic a petition to declare the proceedings and the Decision in the Urgent Motion to Declare Case as already Closed and Terminated with
rescission case null and void, docketed as Civil Case No. 27958 (annulment Opposition to Revive the Case,25 contending, among others, that Tito, the
case).7 He contended that the court did not acquire jurisdiction over the principal petitioner in the annulment case, had lost interest in prosecuting the
person of his predecessor-in-interest, Cort,8 who had passed away on July 9, case and that Sps. Nazal have no personality to further prosecute the same.26
1970, or almost five years (5) prior to the filing of the rescission case on January
5, 1975.9 His standing to file the annulment case was based on his purported
ownership of the subject property, which he allegedly inherited from Cort by
way of a devise under his Last Will and Testament dated June 4, 197010 that In another proceeding, Sps. Nazal opposed the unlawful detainer case filed by
was later probated and allowed in Westmoreland County, Pennsylvania, Sps. Lim all the way tothe Court, but to no avail.27
United States of America.11
Dissatisfied, Majestic moved for reconsideration35 on September 27, 2002, The essential issue for the Court’s resolution is whether or not the CA erred in
which was granted in an Order36 dated July 28, 2003 (July 28, 2003 Order), allowing Sps. Nazal to prosecute their claim against Majestic.
declaring the February 2, 2000 Order to be final and executory. The RTC ruled
that an intervention is regarded as mere collateral or accessory, or ancillary to
the original action, suchthat the dismissal of the original case necessarily
The Court’s Ruling
includes that of the petition-in-intervention.37 It further held that even if Sps.
Nazal were to be consideredas real parties-in-interest, the better remedy for
them is to file a separate action, as principal plaintiffs, against Majestic.38
The petition is meritorious.
Furthermore, the Court has perused the records and found no sufficient
justification for Sps. Nazal's inordinately long inaction over the annulment case.
Other than the allegation that their counsel assured them that their claim of
ownership was well-founded,55 they failed to even offer an explanation as to
why they had to wait for more than a decade to proceed with the case. As
the Court sees it, this is an unreasonably long time for the defendant to wait for
the outcome of a trial that has yet to commence, especially as the case had
been filed by their predecessor-in-interest, Tito, as early as November 21,
1977.56