Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC

BAR MATTER No. 914 October 1, 1999

RE: APPLICATION FOR ADMISSION TO THE PHILIPPINE BAR,
vs.
VICENTE D. CHING, applicant.
RESOLUTION

KAPUNAN, J.:
Can a legitimate child born under the 1935 Constitution of a Filipino mother and an alien father validly
elect Philippine citizenship fourteen (14) years after he has reached the age of majority? This is the question
sought to be resolved in the present case involving the application for admission to the Philippine Bar of
Vicente D. Ching.
The facts of this case are as follows:
Vicente D. Ching, the legitimate son of the spouses Tat Ching, a Chinese citizen, and Prescila A.
Dulay, a Filipino, was born in Francia West, Tubao, La Union on 11 April 1964. Since his birth, Ching has
resided in the Philippines.
On 17 July 1998, Ching, after having completed a Bachelor of Laws course at the St. Louis University
in Baguio City, filed an application to take the 1998 Bar Examinations. In a Resolution of this Court, dated
1 September 1998, he was allowed to take the Bar Examinations, subject to the condition that he must
submit to the Court proof of his Philippine citizenship.
In compliance with the above resolution, Ching submitted on 18 November 1998, the following
documents:
1. Certification, dated 9 June 1986, issued by the Board of Accountancy of the Professional
Regulations Commission showing that Ching is a certified public accountant;
2. Voter Certification, dated 14 June 1997, issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, Election Officer of the
Commission on Elections (COMELEC) in Tubao La Union showing that Ching is a registered voter of the
said place; and
3. Certification, dated 12 October 1998, also issued by Elizabeth B. Cerezo, showing that Ching was
elected as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan of Tubao, La Union during the 12 May 1992 synchronized
elections.
On 5 April 1999, the results of the 1998 Bar Examinations were released and Ching was one of the
successful Bar examinees. The oath-taking of the successful Bar examinees was scheduled on 5 May 1999.
However, because of the questionable status of Ching’s citizenship, he was not allowed to take his oath.
Pursuant to the resolution of this Court, dated 20 April 1999, he was required to submit further proof of his
citizenship. In the same resolution, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was required to file a comment
on Ching’s petition for admission to the bar and on the documents evidencing his Philippine citizenship.
The OSG filed its comment on 8 July 1999, stating that Ching, being the “legitimate child of a Chinese
father and a Filipino mother born under the 1935 Constitution was a Chinese citizen and continued to be
so, unless upon reaching the age of majority he elected Philippine citizenship” 1 in strict compliance with
the provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 625 entitled “An Act Providing for the Manner in which the Option
to Elect Philippine Citizenship shall be Declared by a Person Whose Mother is a Filipino Citizen.” The OSG
adds that “(w)hat he acquired at best was only an inchoate Philippine citizenship which he could perfect by
election upon reaching the age of majority.” 2 In this regard, the OSG clarifies that “two (2) conditions must
concur in order that the election of Philippine citizenship may be effective, namely: (a) the mother of the
person making the election must be a citizen of the Philippines; and (b) said election must be made upon
reaching the age of majority.” 3 The OSG then explains the meaning of the phrase “upon reaching the age
of majority:”
The clause “upon reaching the age of majority” has been construed to mean a reasonable time after
reaching the age of majority which had been interpreted by the Secretary of Justice to be three (3) years
(VELAYO, supra at p. 51 citing Op., Sec. of Justice No. 70, s. 1940, Feb. 27, 1940). Said period may be
extended under certain circumstances, as when a (sic) person concerned has always considered himself a
Filipino (ibid., citing Op. Nos. 355 and 422, s. 1955; 3, 12, 46, 86 and 97, s. 1953). But in Cuenco, it was
held that an election done after over seven (7) years was not made within a reasonable time.
In conclusion, the OSG points out that Ching has not formally elected Philippine citizenship and, if
ever he does, it would already be beyond the “reasonable time” allowed by present jurisprudence. However,
due to the peculiar circumstances surrounding Ching’s case, the OSG recommends the relaxation of the
standing rule on the construction of the phrase “reasonable period” and the allowance of Ching to elect
Philippine citizenship in accordance with C.A. No. 625 prior to taking his oath as a member of the Philippine
Bar.
On 27 July 1999, Ching filed a Manifestation, attaching therewith his Affidavit of Election of Philippine
Citizenship and his Oath of Allegiance, both dated 15 July 1999. In his Manifestation, Ching states:
1. I have always considered myself as a Filipino;
2. I was registered as a Filipino and consistently declared myself as one in my school records and
other official documents;
3. I am practicing a profession (Certified Public Accountant) reserved for Filipino citizens;
4. I participated in electoral process[es] since the time I was eligible to vote;
5. I had served the people of Tubao, La Union as a member of the Sangguniang Bayan from 1992
to 1995;
6. I elected Philippine citizenship on July 15, 1999 in accordance with Commonwealth Act No. 625;
7. My election was expressed in a statement signed and sworn to by me before a notary public;
8. I accompanied my election of Philippine citizenship with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution
and the Government of the Philippines;
9. I filed my election of Philippine citizenship and my oath of allegiance to (sic) the Civil Registrar of
Tubao La Union, and
10. I paid the amount of TEN PESOS (Ps. 10.00) as filing fees.
Since Ching has already elected Philippine citizenship on 15 July 1999, the question raised is
whether he has elected Philippine citizenship within a “reasonable time.” In the affirmative, whether his
citizenship by election retroacted to the time he took the bar examination.
When Ching was born in 1964, the governing charter was the 1935 Constitution. Under Article IV,
Section 1(3) of the 1935 Constitution, the citizenship of a legitimate child born of a Filipino mother and an
alien father followed the citizenship of the father, unless, upon reaching the age of majority, the child elected
Philippine citizenship. 4 This right to elect Philippine citizenship was recognized in the 1973 Constitution
when it provided that “(t)hose who elect Philippine citizenship pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution
of nineteen hundred and thirty-five” are citizens of the Philippines. 5 Likewise, this recognition by the 1973
Constitution was carried over to the 1987 Constitution which states that “(t)hose born before January 17,
1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon reaching the age of majority” are Philippine
citizens. 6 It should be noted, however, that the 1973 and 1987 Constitutional provisions on the election of
Philippine citizenship should not be understood as having a curative effect on any irregularity in the
acquisition of citizenship for those covered by the 1935 Constitution. 7 If the citizenship of a person was
subject to challenge under the old charter, it remains subject to challenge under the new charter even if the
judicial challenge had not been commenced before the effectivity of the new Constitution. 8
C.A. No. 625 which was enacted pursuant to Section 1(3), Article IV of the 1935 Constitution,
prescribes the procedure that should be followed in order to make a valid election of Philippine citizenship.
Under Section 1 thereof, legitimate children born of Filipino mothers may elect Philippine citizenship by
expressing such intention “in a statement to be signed and sworn to by the party concerned before any
officer authorized to administer oaths, and shall be filed with the nearest civil registry. The said party shall
accompany the aforesaid statement with the oath of allegiance to the Constitution and the Government of
the Philippines.”
However, the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 did not prescribe a time period within which the
election of Philippine citizenship should be made. The 1935 Charter only provides that the election should
be made “upon reaching the age of majority.” The age of majority then commenced upon reaching twenty-
one (21) years. 9 In the opinions of the Secretary of Justice on cases involving the validity of election of
Philippine citizenship, this dilemma was resolved by basing the time period on the decisions of this Court
prior to the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution. In these decisions, the proper period for electing Philippine
citizenship was, in turn, based on the pronouncements of the Department of State of the United States
Government to the effect that the election should be made within a “reasonable time” after attaining the age
of majority. 10 The phrase “reasonable time” has been interpreted to mean that the election should be made
within three (3) years from reaching the age of majority. 11 However, we held in Cuenco vs. Secretary of
Justice, 12 that the three (3) year period is not an inflexible rule. We said:
It is true that this clause has been construed to mean a reasonable period after reaching the age of
majority, and that the Secretary of Justice has ruled that three (3) years is the reasonable time to elect
Philippine citizenship under the constitutional provision adverted to above, which period may be extended
under certain circumstances, as when the person concerned has always considered himself a Filipino. 13
However, we cautioned in Cuenco that the extension of the option to elect Philippine citizenship is
not indefinite:
Regardless of the foregoing, petitioner was born on February 16, 1923. He became of age on
February 16, 1944. His election of citizenship was made on May 15, 1951, when he was over twenty-eight
(28) years of age, or over seven (7) years after he had reached the age of majority. It is clear that said
election has not been made “upon reaching the age of majority.” 14
In the present case, Ching, having been born on 11 April 1964, was already thirty-five (35) years old
when he complied with the requirements of C.A. No. 625 on 15 June 1999, or over fourteen (14) years after
he had reached the age of majority. Based on the interpretation of the phrase “upon reaching the age of
majority,” Ching’s election was clearly beyond, by any reasonable yardstick, the allowable period within
which to exercise the privilege. It should be stated, in this connection, that the special circumstances invoked
by Ching, i.e., his continuous and uninterrupted stay in the Philippines and his being a certified public
accountant, a registered voter and a former elected public official, cannot vest in him Philippine citizenship
as the law specifically lays down the requirements for acquisition of Philippine citizenship by election.
Definitely, the so-called special circumstances cannot constitute what Ching erroneously labels as
informal election of citizenship. Ching cannot find a refuge in the case of In re: Florencio Mallare, 15 the
pertinent portion of which reads:
And even assuming arguendo that Ana Mallare were (sic) legally married to an alien, Esteban’s
exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age, constitutes a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. It has been established that Esteban Mallare was a registered voter as of April 14, 1928, and
that as early as 1925 (when he was about 22 years old), Esteban was already participating in the elections
and campaigning for certain candidate[s]. These acts are sufficient to show his preference for Philippine
citizenship.16
Ching’s reliance on Mallare is misplaced. The facts and circumstances obtaining therein are very
different from those in the present case, thus, negating its applicability. First, Esteban Mallare was born
before the effectivity of the 1935 Constitution and the enactment of C.A. No. 625. Hence, the requirements
and procedures prescribed under the 1935 Constitution and C.A. No. 625 for electing Philippine citizenship
would not be applicable to him. Second, the ruling in Mallare was an obiter since, as correctly pointed out
by the OSG, it was not necessary for Esteban Mallare to elect Philippine citizenship because he was already
a Filipino, he being a natural child of a Filipino mother. In this regard, the Court stated:
Esteban Mallare, natural child of Ana Mallare, a Filipina, is therefore himself a Filipino, and no other
act would be necessary to confer on him all the rights and privileges attached to Philippine citizenship (U.S.
vs. Ong Tianse, 29 Phil. 332; Santos Co vs. Government of the Philippine Islands, 42 Phil. 543, Serra vs.
Republic, L-4223, May 12, 1952, Sy Quimsuan vs. Republic, L-4693, Feb. 16, 1953; Pitallano vs. Republic,
L-5111, June 28, 1954). Neither could any act be taken on the erroneous belief that he is a non-Filipino
divest him of the citizenship privileges to which he is rightfully entitled. 17
The ruling in Mallare was reiterated and further elaborated in Co vs. Electoral Tribunal of the House
of Representatives, 18 where we held:
We have jurisprudence that defines “election” as both a formal and an informal process.
In the case of In re: Florencio Mallare (59 SCRA 45 [1974]), the Court held that the exercise of the
right of suffrage and the participation in election exercises constitute a positive act of election of Philippine
citizenship. In the exact pronouncement of the Court, we held:
Esteban’s exercise of the right of suffrage when he came of age constitutes a positive act of
Philippine citizenship. (p. 52: emphasis supplied)
The private respondent did more than merely exercise his right of suffrage. He has established his
life here in the Philippines.
For those in the peculiar situation of the respondent who cannot be excepted to have elected
Philippine citizenship as they were already citizens, we apply the In Re Mallare rule.
xxx xxx xxx
The filing of sworn statement or formal declaration is a requirement for those who still have to elect
citizenship. For those already Filipinos when the time to elect came up, there are acts of deliberate choice
which cannot be less binding. Entering a profession open only to Filipinos, serving in public office where
citizenship is a qualification, voting during election time, running for public office, and other categorical acts
of similar nature are themselves formal manifestations for these persons.
An election of Philippine citizenship presupposes that the person electing is an alien. Or his status
is doubtful because he is a national of two countries. There is no doubt in this case about Mr. Ong’s being
a Filipino when he turned twenty-one (21).
We repeat that any election of Philippine citizenship on the part of the private respondent would not
only have been superfluous but it would also have resulted in an absurdity. How can a Filipino citizen elect
Philippine citizenship? 19
The Court, like the OSG, is sympathetic with the plight of Ching. However, even if we consider the
special circumstances in the life of Ching like his having lived in the Philippines all his life and his consistent
belief that he is a Filipino, controlling statutes and jurisprudence constrain us to disagree with the
recommendation of the OSG. Consequently, we hold that Ching failed to validly elect Philippine citizenship.
The span of fourteen (14) years that lapsed from the time he reached the age of majority until he finally
expressed his intention to elect Philippine citizenship is clearly way beyond the contemplation of the
requirement of electing “upon reaching the age of majority.” Moreover, Ching has offered no reason why he
delayed his election of Philippine citizenship. The prescribed procedure in electing Philippine citizenship is
certainly not a tedious and painstaking process. All that is required of the elector is to execute an affidavit
of election of Philippine citizenship and, thereafter, file the same with the nearest civil registry. Ching’s
unreasonable and unexplained delay in making his election cannot be simply glossed over.
Philippine citizenship can never be treated like a commodity that can be claimed when needed and
suppressed when convenient. 20 One who is privileged to elect Philippine citizenship has only an inchoate
right to such citizenship. As such, he should avail of the right with fervor, enthusiasm and promptitude.
Sadly, in this case, Ching slept on his opportunity to elect Philippine citizenship and, as a result, this golden
privilege slipped away from his grasp.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the Court Resolves to DENY Vicente D. Ching’s application for
admission to the Philippine Bar. SO ORDERED.

EN BANC

[B.M. No. 1154. June 8, 2004]

IN THE MATTER OF THE DISQUALIFICATION OF BAR EXAMINEE HARON S. MELING IN

THE 2002 BAR EXAMINATIONS AND FOR DISCIPLINARY ACTION AS MEMBER OF THE
PHILIPPINE SHARIA BAR,

ATTY. FROILAN R. MELENDREZ, petitioner,

RESOLUTION

TINGA, J.:

The Court is here confronted with a Petition that seeks twin reliefs, one of which is ripe while the
other has been rendered moot by a supervening event.

The antecedents follow.

On October 14, 2002, Atty. Froilan R. Melendrez (Melendrez) filed with the Office of the Bar
Confidant (OBC) a Petition[1] to disqualify Haron S. Meling (Meling) from taking the 2002 Bar Examinations
and to impose on him the appropriate disciplinary penalty as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar.

In the Petition, Melendrez alleges that Meling did not disclose in his Petition to take the 2002 Bar
Examinations that he has three (3) pending criminal cases before the Municipal Trial Court in Cities
(MTCC), Cotabato City, namely: Criminal Cases Noa. 15685 and 15686, both for Grave Oral Defamation,
and Criminal Case No. 15687 for Less Serious Physical Injuries.

The above-mentioned cases arose from an incident which occurred on May 21, 2001, when Meling
allegedly uttered defamatory words against Melendrez and his wife in front of media practitioners and other
people. Meling also purportedly attacked and hit the face of Melendrez wife causing the injuries to the latter.

Furthermore, Melendrez alleges that Meling has been using the title Attorney in his communications,
as Secretary to the Mayor of Cotabato City, despite the fact that he is not a member of the Bar. Attached to
the Petition is an indorsement letter which shows that Meling used the appellation and appears on its face
to have been received by the Sangguniang Panglungsod of Cotabato City on November 27, 2001.

Pursuant to this Courts Resolution[2] dated December 3, 2002, Meling filed his Answer with the OBC.

In his Answer,[3] Meling explains that he did not disclose the criminal cases filed against him by
Melendrez because retired Judge Corocoy Moson, their former professor, advised him to settle his
misunderstanding with Melendrez. Believing in good faith that the case would be settled because the said
Judge has moral ascendancy over them, he being their former professor in the College of Law, Meling
considered the three cases that actually arose from a single incident and involving the same parties as
closed and terminated. Moreover, Meling denies the charges and adds that the acts complained of do not
involve moral turpitude.
 As regards the use of the title Attorney, Meling admits that some of his communications really
contained the word Attorney as they were, according to him, typed by the office clerk.

In its Report and Recommendation[4] dated December 8, 2003, the OBC disposed of the charge of
non-disclosure against Meling in this wise:

The reasons of Meling in not disclosing the criminal cases filed against him in his petition to take the
Bar Examinations are ludicrous. He should have known that only the court of competent jurisdiction can
dismiss cases, not a retired judge nor a law professor. In fact, the cases filed against Meling are still
pending. Furthermore, granting arguendo that these cases were already dismissed, he is still required to
disclose the same for the Court to ascertain his good moral character. Petitions to take the Bar Examinations
are made under oath, and should not be taken lightly by an applicant.
The merit of the cases against Meling is not material in this case. What matters is his act of
concealing them which constitutes dishonesty.
In Bar Matter 1209, the Court stated, thus:
It has been held that good moral character is what a person really is, as distinguished from good
reputation or from the opinion generally entertained of him, the estimate in which he is held by the public in
the place where he is known. Moral character is not a subjective term but one which corresponds to
objective reality. The standard of personal and professional integrity is not satisfied by such conduct as it
merely enables a person to escape the penalty of criminal law. Good moral character includes at least
common honesty.
The non-disclosure of Meling of the criminal cases filed against him makes him also answerable
under Rule 7.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility which states that a lawyer shall be answerable
for knowingly making a false statement or suppressing a material fact in connection with his application for
admission to the bar.[5]

As regards Melings use of the title Attorney, the OBC had this to say:

Anent the issue of the use of the appellation Attorney in his letters, the explanation of Meling is not
acceptable. Aware that he is not a member of the Bar, there was no valid reason why he signed as attorney
whoever may have typed the letters.
Although there is no showing that Meling is engaged in the practice of law, the fact is, he is signing
his communications as Atty. Haron S. Meling knowing fully well that he is not entitled thereto. As held by
the Court in Bar Matter 1209, the unauthorized use of the appellation attorney may render a person liable
for indirect contempt of court.[6]

Consequently, the OBC recommended that Meling not be allowed to take the Lawyers Oath and sign
the Roll of Attorneys in the event that he passes the Bar Examinations. Further, it recommended that
Melings membership in the Sharia Bar be suspended until further orders from the Court. [7]

We fully concur with the findings and recommendation of the OBC. Meling, however, did not pass
the 2003 Bar Examinations. This renders the Petition, insofar as it seeks to prevent Meling from taking the
Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys, moot and academic.

On the other hand, the prayer in the same Petition for the Court to impose the appropriate sanctions
upon him as a member of the Sharia Bar is ripe for resolution and has to be acted upon.

Practice of law, whether under the regular or the Sharia Court, is not a matter of right but merely a
privilege bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law but who are also known to possess
good moral character.[8] The requirement of good moral character is not only a condition precedent to
admission to the practice of law, its continued possession is also essential for remaining in the practice of
law.[9]

The standard form issued in connection with the application to take the 2002 Bar Examinations
requires the applicant to aver that he or she has not been charged with any act or omission punishable by
law, rule or regulation before a fiscal, judge, officer or administrative body, or indicted for, or accused or
convicted by any court or tribunal of, any offense or crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there any pending
case or charge against him/her. Despite the declaration required by the form, Meling did not reveal that he
has three pending criminal cases. His deliberate silence constitutes concealment, done under oath at that.

The disclosure requirement is imposed by the Court to determine whether there is satisfactory
evidence of good moral character of the applicant.[10] The nature of whatever cases are pending against the
applicant would aid the Court in determining whether he is endowed with the moral fitness demanded of a
lawyer. By concealing the existence of such cases, the applicant then flunks the test of fitness even if the
cases are ultimately proven to be unwarranted or insufficient to impugn or affect the good moral character
of the applicant.

Melings concealment of the fact that there are three (3) pending criminal cases against him speaks
of his lack of the requisite good moral character and results in the forfeiture of the privilege bestowed upon
him as a member of the Sharia Bar.

Moreover, his use of the appellation Attorney, knowing fully well that he is not entitled to its use,
cannot go unchecked. In Alawi v. Alauya,[11] the Court had the occasion to discuss the impropriety of the
use of the title Attorney by members of the Sharia Bar who are not likewise members of the Philippine
Bar. The respondent therein, an executive clerk of court of the 4thJudicial Sharia District in Marawi City,
used the title Attorney in several correspondence in connection with the rescission of a contract entered
into by him in his private capacity. The Court declared that:

persons who pass the Sharia Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence, may
only practice law before Sharia courts. While one who has been admitted to the Sharia Bar, and one who
has been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered counselors, in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an attorney. The title attorney is reserved to
those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.[12]

The judiciary has no place for dishonest officers of the court, such as Meling in this case. The solemn
task of administering justice demands that those who are privileged to be part of service therein, from the
highest official to the lowliest employee, must not only be competent and dedicated, but likewise live and
practice the virtues of honesty and integrity. Anything short of this standard would diminish the public's faith
in the Judiciary and constitutes infidelity to the constitutional tenet that a public office is a public trust.

In Leda v. Tabang, supra, the respondent concealed the fact of his marriage in his application to
take the Bar examinations and made conflicting submissions before the Court. As a result, we found the
respondent grossly unfit and unworthy to continue in the practice of law and suspended him therefrom until
further orders from the Court.

WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED insofar as it seeks the imposition of appropriate sanctions
upon Haron S. Meling as a member of the Philippine Sharia Bar. Accordingly, the membership of Haron S.
Meling in the Philippine Sharia Bar is hereby SUSPENDED until further orders from the Court, the
suspension to take effect immediately. Insofar as the Petitionseeks to prevent Haron S. Meling from taking
the Lawyers Oath and signing the Roll of Attorneys as a member of the Philippine Bar, the same is
DISMISSED for having become moot and academic.
 Copies of this Decision shall be circulated to all the Sharia Courts in the country for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

THIRD DIVISION

[A.M. SDC-97-2-P. February 24, 1997]

SOPHIA ALAWI, complainant, vs. ASHARY M. ALAUYA, Clerk of Court VI, Shari'a District
Court, Marawi City, respondent.

DECISION

NARVASA, C.J.:

Sophia Alawi was (and presumably still is) a sales representative (or coordinator) of E. B. Villarosa
& Partners Co., Ltd. of Davao City, a real estate and housing company. Ashari M. Alauya is the incumbent
executive clerk of court of the 4th Judicial Shari'a District in Marawi City. They were classmates, and used
to be friends.

It appears that through Alawi's agency, a contract was executed for the purchase on installments by
Alauya of one of the housing units belonging to the above mentioned firm (hereafter, simply Villarosa &
Co.); and in connection therewith, a housing loan was also granted to Alauya by the National Home
Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC).

Not long afterwards, or more precisely on December 15, 1995, Alauya addressed a letter to the
President of Villarosa & Co. advising of the termination of his contract with the company. He wrote:

" ** I am formally and officially withdrawing from and notifying you of my intent to terminate the
Contract/Agreement entered into between me and your company, as represented by your Sales
Agent/Coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, of your company's branch office here in Cagayan de Oro City, on the
grounds that my consent was vitiated by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud, dishonesty and abuse of
confidence by the aforesaid sales agent which made said contract void ab initio. Said sales agent acting in
bad faith perpetrated such illegal and unauthorized acts which made said contract an Onerous Contract
prejudicial to my rights and interests."

He then proceeded to expound in considerable detail and quite acerbic language on the "grounds
which could evidence the bad faith, deceit, fraud, misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence
by the unscrupulous sales agent ** ;" and closed with the plea that Villarosa & Co. "agree for the mutual
rescission of our contract, even as I inform you that I categorically state on record that I am terminating the
contract **. I hope I do not have to resort to any legal action before said onerous and manipulated contract
against my interest be annulled. I was actually fooled by your sales agent, hence the need to annul the
controversial contract."

Alauya sent a copy of the letter to the Vice-President of Villarosa & Co. at San Pedro, Gusa, Cagayan
de Oro City. The envelope containing it, and which actually went through the post, bore no stamps. Instead
at the right hand corner above the description of the addressee, the words, "Free Postage PD 26," had been
typed.

On the same date, December 15, 1995, Alauya also wrote to Mr. Fermin T. Arzaga, Vice-President,
Credit & Collection Group of the National Home Mortgage Finance Corporation (NHMFC) at Salcedo
Village, Makati City, repudiating as fraudulent and void his contract with Villarosa & Co.; and asking for
cancellation of his housing loan in connection therewith, which was payable from salary deductions at the
rate of P4,338.00 a month. Among other things, he said:

" ** (T)hrough this written notice, I am terminating, as I hereby annul, cancel, rescind and voided, the
'manipulated contract' entered into between me and the E.B. Villarosa & Partner Co., Ltd., as represented
by its sales agent/coordinator, SOPHIA ALAWI, who maliciously and fraudulently manipulated said contract
and unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without my authority and against my will. Thus, the
contract itself is deemed to be void ab initio in view of the attending circumstances, that my consent was
vitiated by misrepresentation, fraud, deceit, dishonesty, and abuse of confidence; and that there was no
meeting of the minds between me and the swindling sales agent who concealed the real facts from me."

And, as in his letter to Villarosa & Co., he narrated in some detail what he took to be the anomalous
actuations of Sophia Alawi.

Alauya wrote three other letters to Mr. Arzaga of the NHMFC, dated February 21, 1996, April 15,
1996, and May 3, 1996, in all of which, for the same reasons already cited, he insisted on the cancellation
of his housing loan and discontinuance of deductions from his salary on account thereof.a He also wrote on
January 18, 1996 to Ms. Corazon M. Ordoez, Head of the Fiscal Management & Budget Office, and to the
Chief, Finance Division, both of this Court, to stop deductions from his salary in relation to the loan in
question, again asserting the anomalous manner by which he was allegedly duped into entering into the
contracts by "the scheming sales agent."b

The upshot was that in May, 1996, the NHMFC wrote to the Supreme Court requesting it to stop
deductions on Alauya's UHLP loan "effective May 1996," and began negotiating with Villarosa & Co. "for
the buy-back of ** (Alauya's) mortgage, and ** the refund of ** (his) payments."c

On learning of Alauya's letter to Villarosa & Co. of December 15, 1995, Sophia Alawi filed with this
Court a verified complaint dated January 25, 1996 -- to which she appended a copy of the letter, and of the
above mentioned envelope bearing the typewritten words, "Free Postage PD 26."[1] In that complaint, she
accused Alauya of:

1. "Imputation of malicious and libelous charges with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance
and evident bad faith;"

2. "Causing undue injury to, and blemishing her honor and established reputation;"

3. "Unauthorized enjoyment of the privilege of free postage **;" and

4. Usurpation of the title of "attorney," which only regular members of the Philippine Bar may properly
use.

She deplored Alauya's references to her as "unscrupulous, swindler, forger, manipulator, etc."
without "even a bit of evidence to cloth (sic) his allegations with the essence of truth," denouncing his
imputations as irresponsible, "all concoctions, lies, baseless and coupled with manifest ignorance and
evident bad faith," and asserting that all her dealings with Alauya had been regular and completely
transparent. She closed with the plea that Alauya "be dismissed from the service, or be appropriately
disciplined (sic) ** "

The Court resolved to order Alauya to comment on the complaint. Conformably with established
usage that notices of resolutions emanate from the corresponding Office of the Clerk of Court, the notice of
resolution in this case was signed by Atty. Alfredo P. Marasigan, Assistant Division Clerk of Court. [2]
 Alauya first submitted a "Preliminary Comment"[3] in which he questioned the authority of Atty.
Marasigan to require an explanation of him, this power pertaining, according to him, not to "a mere Asst.
Div. Clerk of Court investigating an Executive Clerk of Court." but only to the District Judge, the Court
Administrator or the Chief Justice, and voiced the suspicion that the Resolution was the result of a "strong
link" between Ms. Alawi and Atty. Marasigan's office. He also averred that the complaint had no factual
basis; Alawi was envious of him for being not only "the Executive Clerk of court and ex-officio Provincial
Sheriff and District Registrar," but also "a scion of a Royal Family **."[4]

In a subsequent letter to Atty. Marasigan, but this time in much less aggressive, even obsequious
tones,[5] Alauya requested the former to give him a copy of the complaint in order that he might comment
thereon.[6] He stated that his acts as clerk of court were done in good faith and within the confines of the
law; and that Sophia Alawi as sales agent of Villarosa & Co. had, by falsifying his signature, fraudulently
bound him to a housing loan contract entailing monthly deductions of P4,333.10 from his salary.

And in his comment thereafter submitted under date of June 5, 1996, Alauya contended that it was
he who had suffered "undue injury, mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial
suffering," considering that in six months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[7] He
declared that there was no basis for the complaint; in communicating with Villarosa & Co. he had merely
acted in defense of his rights. He denied any abuse of the franking privilege, saying that he gave P20.00
plus transportation fare to a subordinate whom he entrusted with the mailing of certain letters; that the
words: "Free Postage PD 26," were typewritten on the envelope by some other person, an averment
corroborated by the affidavit of Absamen C. Domocao, Clerk IV (subscribed and sworn to before respondent
himself, and attached to the comment as Annex J);[8] and as far as he knew, his subordinate mailed the
letters with the use of the money he had given for postage, and if those letters were indeed mixed with the
official mail of the court, this had occurred inadvertently and because of an honest mistake. [9]

Alauya justified his use of the title, "attorney," by the assertion that it is "lexically synonymous" with
"Counsellors-at-law," a title to which Shari'a lawyers have a rightful claim, adding that he prefers the title of
"attorney" because "counsellor" is often mistaken for "councilor," "konsehal or the Maranao term "consial,"
connoting a local legislator beholden to the mayor. Withal, he does not consider himself a lawyer.

He pleads for the Court's compassion, alleging that what he did "is expected of any man unduly
prejudiced and injured."[10] He claims he was manipulated into reposing his trust in Alawi, a classmate and
friend.[11] He was induced to sign a blank contract on Alawi's assurance that she would show the completed
document to him later for correction, but she had since avoided him; despite "numerous letters and follow-
ups" he still does not know where the property -- subject of his supposed agreement with Alawi's principal,
Villarosa & Co. -- is situated;[12]He says Alawi somehow got his GSIS policy from his wife, and although she
promised to return it the next day, she did not do so until after several months. He also claims that in
connection with his contract with Villarosa & Co., Alawi forged his signature on such pertinent documents
as those regarding the down payment, clearance, lay-out, receipt of the key of the house, salary deduction,
none of which he ever saw.[13]

Averring in fine that his acts in question were done without malice, Alauya prays for the dismissal of
the complaint for lack of merit, it consisting of "fallacious, malicious and baseless allegations," and
complainant Alawi having come to the Court with unclean hands, her complicity in the fraudulent housing
loan being apparent and demonstrable.

It may be mentioned that in contrast to his two (2) letters to Assistant Clerk of Court Marasigan (dated
April 19, 1996 and April 22, 1996), and his two (2) earlier letters both dated December 15, 1996 -- all of
which he signed as "Atty. Ashary M. Alauya" -- in his Comment of June 5, 1996, he does not use the title
but refers to himself as "DATU ASHARY M. ALAUYA."

The Court referred the case to the Office of the Court Administrator for evaluation, report and
recommendation.[14]
 The first accusation against Alauya is that in his aforesaid letters, he made "malicious and libelous
charges (against Alawi) with no solid grounds through manifest ignorance and evident bad faith," resulting
in "undue injury to (her) and blemishing her honor and established reputation." In those letters, Alauya had
written inter alia that:

1) Alawi obtained his consent to the contracts in question "by gross misrepresentation, deceit, fraud,
dishonesty and abuse of confidence;"

2) Alawi acted in bad faith and perpetrated ** illegal and unauthorized acts ** ** prejudicial to ** (his)
rights and interests;"

3) Alawi was an "unscrupulous (and "swindling") sales agent" who had fooled him by "deceit, fraud,
misrepresentation, dishonesty and abuse of confidence;" and

4) Alawi had maliciously and fraudulently manipulated the contract with Villarosa & Co., and
unlawfully secured and pursued the housing loan without ** (his) authority and against ** (his) will," and
"concealed the real facts **."

Alauya's defense essentially is that in making these statements, he was merely acting in defense of
his rights, and doing only what "is expected of any man unduly prejudiced and injured," who had suffered
"mental anguish, sleepless nights, wounded feelings and untold financial suffering," considering that in six
months, a total of P26,028.60 had been deducted from his salary.[15]

The Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees (RA
6713) inter alia enunciates the State policy of promoting a high standard of ethics and utmost responsibility
in the public service.[16] Section 4 of the Code commands that "(p)ublic officials and employees ** at all times
respect the rights of others, and ** refrain from doing acts contrary to law, good morals, good customs,
public policy, public order, public safety and public interest."[17] More than once has this Court emphasized
that "the conduct and behavior of every official and employee of an agency involved in the administration of
justice, from the presiding judge to the most junior clerk, should be circumscribed with the heavy burden of
responsibility. Their conduct must at all times be characterized by, among others, strict propriety and
decorum so as to earn and keep the respect of the public for the judiciary." [18]

Now, it does not appear to the Court consistent with good morals, good customs or public policy, or
respect for the rights of others, to couch denunciations of acts believed -- however sincerely -- to be
deceitful, fraudulent or malicious, in excessively intemperate. insulting or virulent language. Alauya is
evidently convinced that he has a right of action against Sophia Alawi. The law requires that he exercise
that right with propriety, without malice or vindictiveness, or undue harm to anyone; in a manner consistent
with good morals, good customs, public policy, public order, supra; or otherwise stated, that he "act with
justice, give everyone his due, and observe honesty and good faith."[19] Righteous indignation, or vindication
of right cannot justify resort to vituperative language, or downright name-calling. As a member of the Shari'a
Bar and an officer of a Court, Alawi is subject to a standard of conduct more stringent than for most other
government workers. As a man of the law, he may not use language which is abusive, offensive,
scandalous, menacing, or otherwise improper.[20] As a judicial employee, it is expected that he accord
respect for the person and the rights of others at all times, and that his every act and word should be
characterized by prudence, restraint, courtesy, dignity. His radical deviation from these salutary norms might
perhaps be mitigated, but cannot be excused, by his strongly held conviction that he had been grievously
wronged.

As regards Alauya's use of the title of "Attorney," this Court has already had occasion to declare that
persons who pass the Shari'a Bar are not full-fledged members of the Philippine Bar, hence may only
practice law before Shari'a courts.[21] While one who has been admitted to the Shari'a Bar, and one who has
been admitted to the Philippine Bar, may both be considered "counsellors," in the sense that they give
counsel or advice in a professional capacity, only the latter is an "attorney." The title of "attorney" is reserved
to those who, having obtained the necessary degree in the study of law and successfully taken the Bar
Examinations, have been admitted to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and remain members thereof in
good standing; and it is they only who are authorized to practice law in this jurisdiction.

Alauya says he does not wish to use the title, "counsellor" or "counsellor-at-law," because in his
region, there are pejorative connotations to the term, or it is confusingly similar to that given to local
legislators. The ratiocination, valid or not, is of no moment. His disinclination to use the title of "counsellor"
does not warrant his use of the title of attorney.

Finally, respecting Alauya's alleged unauthorized use of the franking privilege, the record contains
no evidence adequately establishing the accusation.

WHEREFORE, respondent Ashari M. Alauya is hereby REPRIMANDED for the use of excessively
intemperate, insulting or virulent language, i.e., language unbecoming a judicial officer, and for usurping the
title of attorney; and he is warned that any similar or other impropriety or misconduct in the future will be
dealt with more severely.

SO ORDERED

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

EN BANC

A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975

IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court, respondent.

A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975

IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar Examinee, respondent.

A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975

IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY. MANUEL TOMACRUZ,
ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY. GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.

MAKASIAR, J.:

Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang — for disbarment; Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C.
Tomacruz; Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. — for disciplinary
action — for their acts and omissions during the 1971 Bar Examinations.

In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to the Court for re-correction
and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971 Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in
the 1971, 1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and 67.55%, respectively —
invited the attention of the Court to "The starling fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least
one bar candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results were released this
year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner
himself (Hon. Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He further therein
stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the grades in other examination notebooks in other
subjects also underwent alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results. Note that
this was without any formal motion or request from the proper parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If
the examiners concerned reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why they may
not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is made. It would be contrary to due
process postulates. Might not one say that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination? Does this not afford sufficient
reason for the Court en banc to go into these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter
of admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).

Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records of the 1971 Bar
Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects — Political Law and Public International Law, Civil
Law, Mercantile Law, Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with office code No.
954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly initialed and authenticated by the respective
examiner concerned. Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office code No. 954
is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963,
and 1962 bar examinations with a grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a grade of 74.15%, which was considered
as 75% by virtue of a Court of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971 bar
examinations.

Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman requested Bar Confidant
Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the
matter, with which request they complied.

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar Confidant admitted having brought the five
examination notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective examiners for
re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances under which the same was done and his
reasons for doing the same.

Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or
re-checked the notebook involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar Confidant
Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the examinee concerned failed only in his
particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.

Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal investigation, the Court
required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten
(10) days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162,
p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing average in the 1971 bar
examinations, the Court likewise resolved on March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p.
99, rec.). The five examiners concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31,
rec.).

Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while
respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case
No. 1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on August 27, 1973, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his unverified answer on March 16,
1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and
complaince came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
 In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent Bernardo Pardo who re-
evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public
International Law of examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo, Jr., examiner
in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to help in the correction of a number of examination
notebooks in Political Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission (pp. 17-24, Vol.
V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in
Administrative Case No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was also discovered
that another paper in Political Law and Public International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-
checking. This notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another successful candidate
by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation
and/or re-checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the change of the grade from
4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the
name of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father were summoned to testify
in the investigation.

An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon request of the Chairman of
the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra,
alias Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon University, was, on September
8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on
Eufrosino F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this information at the hearing
of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32, rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember
having been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol. VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).

Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations, did not make mention of this
fact which he is required under the rules to do.

The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and was terminated on October
2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November 14, 1973.

Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent residence in Australia,
where he is believed to be gainfully employed. Hence, he was not summoned to testify.

At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who offered as evidence only
his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence the affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same became the basis for
their cross-examination.

In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as their direct testimony in the
investigation conducted by the Court, the respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which
they re-evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.

In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate Justice of the Court of
Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil Law, affirmed:

2. That one evening sometime in December last year, while I was correcting the examination
notebooks, Atty. Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the practice and the policy in bar
examinations that he (Atty. Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all subjects and if he finds
that candidate obtained an extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low one in another, he will
bring back the latter to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of grade;
 3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%;

5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back to me for such re-evaluation and upon
verifying my files I found that the notebook is numbered '95;

6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation of the answers were based on the same
standard used in the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3 and 4 with original grades of 7%
each was reconsidered to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and No. 8 with 8% to 10%
(emphasis supplied).

His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations in his April 11, 1972 affidavit
with following additional statements:

xxx xxx xxx

3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were not reconsidered as it is no longer to make
the reconsideration of these answers because of the same evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and
10 remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;

4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the
identity of its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable Supreme Court nor the identities of the
examiners in other subjects;

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on the following circumstances:

a) Since I started correcting the papers on or about October 16, 1971, relationship between Atty.
Lanuevo and myself had developed to the point that with respect to the correction of the examination
booklets of bar candidates I have always followed him and considered his instructions as reflecting the rules
and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court with respect to the same; that I have no alternative but to take
his words;

b) That considering this relationship and considering his misrepresentation to me as reflecting the
real and policy of the Honorable Supreme Court, I did not bother any more to get the consent and permission
of the Chairman of the Bar Committee. Besides, at that time, I was isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the chairman of the Bar Committee for fear that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;

xxx xxx xxx

e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received by me in return for such recorrection, and
as proof of it, I declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not
the one who made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo, examiner in Political Law and
Public International Law, confirmed in his affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
 On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my residence to obtain from me the last bag of two
hundred notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to 1400) which according to my record was on
February 5, 1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme
Court, with at least two companions. The bar confidant had with him an examinee's notebook bearing code
number 661, and, after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was possible for me to review and re-
examine the said notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained a grade of 57, whereas,
according to the Bar Confidant, the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest
of which was 84, if I recall correctly, in remedial law.

I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-examinee the notebook as I had submitted
the same beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so because the same was still within my
control and authority as long as the particular examinee's name had not been identified or that the code
number decode and the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant told me that the name of the
examinee in the case present bearing code number 661 had not been identified or revealed; and that it
might have been possible that I had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.

Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's representations to me, and as it was humanly
possible that I might have erred in the grading of the said notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read
the answer, and graded it in accordance with the same standards I had used throughout the grading of the
entire notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an increased grade of 66. After again clearing
with the Bar Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he had assured me that the code number
of the examinee in question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I therefore corrected the total
grade in the notebook and the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed the same. I also
corrected the itemized grades (from item No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets, my
personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis
supplied)

In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as "Explanation", respondent Bernardo
P. Pardo adopted and replaced therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:

xxx xxx xxx

3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in political and international law, code numbered
661, I did know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know his name only upon receipt of the
resolution of March 5, 1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not know him personally, and
that I have never met him even up to the present;

4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was authorized to make such review, and had
repeatedly asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to make such revision and was so assured of
my authority as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded or his identity revealed. The Bar
Confidant's assurance was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the regular course of express
prohibition in the rules and guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar Confidant was my official
liaison with the Chairman, as, unless called, I refrained as much as possible from frequent personal contact
with the Chairman lest I be identified as an examiner. ...;

5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about 7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence,
I felt it inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It did not appear to me that his representations
were unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme
Court, a Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions, which was usual, and thus looked like a
regular visit to me of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that he used to see me:
 xxx xxx xxx

7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in the same condition as when I submitted the
same. In agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered 661, my aim was to see if I committed an
error in the correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I considered it entirely humanly possible
to have erred, because I corrected that particular notebook on December 31, 1971, considering especially
the representation of the Bar Confidant that the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual
that the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the position to know and that there was nothing
irregular in that:

8. In political and international law, the original grade obtained by the examinee with notebook code
numbered 661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points, resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still,
the examinee did not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim was not to make the examinee
pass, notwithstanding the representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...

9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar Examiners' Committee consensus was that
where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner in said subject would review
the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the Committee's first meeting, we still did not
know the names of the candidates.

10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It had absolutely no knowledge of the motives
of the Bar Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know the examinee concerned nor had I any
kind of contract with him before or rather the review and even up to the present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
60-63; rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 12, 1972:

1. xxx xxx xxx

2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and collect examination books to my residence
at 951 Luna Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.

3. That towards the end when I had already completed correction of the books in Criminal Law and
was helping in the correction of some of the papers in another subject, the Bar Confidant brought back to
me one (1) paper in Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had missed the passing grade by
only a fraction of a percent and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75% then
he would make the general passing average.

4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%, that is, giving a raise of, if I remember
correctly, 2 or 3 points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the mark and revised also the mark in
the general list.

5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
69, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I accepted the word of the
Bar Confidant in good faith and without the slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question
who up to now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive any personal benefit"
(Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit dated April 14, 1972, that:
 xxx xxx xxx

2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He
produced to me an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had previously graded and submitted to
him. He informed me that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed the said notebook. He
requested me to review the said notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had previously given.
He explained that the examine concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade that I had given him in Remedial Law his general average was short of passing.
Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr. Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact
in his answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however
informed me that whether I would reconsider the grades I had previously given and submitted was entirely
within my discretion.

3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority as Bar Confidant to address such a request
to me and that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and
re-evaluate each and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my re-evaluation of the answers, I
increased the grades in some items, made deductions in other items, and maintained the same grades in
other items. However, I recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new grades that I had given after
re-evaluation, the total grade increased by a few points, but still short of the passing mark of 75% in my
subject.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo reiterated the contents of his
sworn statement, adding the following:

xxx xxx xxx

5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted in increasing the total grade of the
examinee-concerned in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein respondent acted in good faith. It may
well be that he could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman of the Committee of Bar Examiners
the legitimacy of the request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent, however, pleads in attenuation of
such omission, that —

a) Having been appointed an Examiner for the first time, he was not aware, not having been apprised
otherwise, that it was not within the authority of the Bar Confidant of the Supreme Court to request or
suggest that the grade of a particular examination notebook be revised or reconsidered. He had every right
to presume, owing to the highly fiduciary nature of the position of the Bar Confidant, that the request was
legitimate.

xxx xxx xxx

c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answers by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was only
in that particular subject that the said examine failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given to him, but that he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of 75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein respondent downgraded a previous rating of an answer written by the
examinee, from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
 Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his affidavit dated April 17, 1972:

xxx xxx xxx

That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners' Committee after the Bar Examinations
were held, I was informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law;

That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this
particular Bar candidate;.

That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing
a grade of 61%;

That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the answers of this particular Bar candidate
I decided to increase his final grade to 71%;

That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed the changes in the grade sheet (Adm.
Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.; emphasis supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the contents of his sworn
statement of April 17, 1972, and

xxx xxx xxx

2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I hereby state that I re-evaluated the
examination notebook of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute good faith and in direct
compliance with the agreement made during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners Committee that
where a candidate fails in only one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-evaluation of the
answers of the candidate concerned, which I did.

3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I made the aforementioned re-evaluation that
notebook No. 1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
and that I have never met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.;
emphasis supplied).

In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo stated:

xxx xxx xxx

As I was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on
the record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook. This led me to
scrutinize all the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-evalation on the basis of the
memorandum circularized to the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that

... in the correction of the papers, substantial weight should then be given to clarify of language and
soundness of reasoning' (par. 4),

I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-
checking.

It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately after the release of the results of the
examinations, we are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that they be shown their notebooks.
Many of them would copy their answers and have them checked by their professors. Eventually some of
them would file motions or requests for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have some 19 of
such motions or requests which we are reading for submission to the Honorable Court.

Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just the same they have to be denied because
the result of the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.

It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such instances that motivated me to bring those
notebooks back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis
supplied).

In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:

That he submitted the notebooks in question to the examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the
same merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed
in him as bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee concerned; that neither did he act
in a presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone
to the examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does not remember having made the alleged
misrepresentation but that he remembers having brought to the attention of the Committee during the
meeting a matter concerning another examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade
below 50% in Mercantile Law. As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification by way of raising the
grade in said subject, respondent brought the notebook in question to the Examiner concerned who thereby
raised the grade thus enabling the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the examinee concerned
is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or "Ty-de la Cruz".

Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that his act would stir such serious charges as
would tend to undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis supplied).

On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn
statement in addition to, and in amplification of, his answer, stating:

xxx xxx xxx

1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners concerned into believing that the
examinee involved failed only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter being that the notebooks in
question were submitted to the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all good faith that they
so merited on the basis of the Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh. 1-Lanuevo,
particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier,
leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-evaluation was in order,

2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into the notebooks in question:

Sometime during the latter part of January and the early part of February, 1972, on my way back to
the office (Bar Division) after lunch, I though of buying a sweepstake ticket. I have always made it a point
that the moment I think of so buying, I pick a number from any object and the first number that comes into
my sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I buy. At that moment, the first number that I saw was "954"
boldly printed on an electrical contribance (evidently belonging to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P. Faura street towards the Supreme Court building from San Marcelino
street and almost adjacent to the south-eastern corner of the fence of the Araullo High School(photograph
of the number '954', the contrivance on which it is printed and a portion of the post to which it is attached is
identified and marked as Exhibit 4-Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-a-Lanuevo).
 With this number (954) in mind, I proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a ticket that would contain
such number. Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then bought, whose last three digits corresponded to
"954". This number became doubly impressive to me because the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so significant to me that everything I do I try somewhat instinctively to
link or connect it with said number whenever possible. Thus even in assigning code numbers on the Master
List of examinees from 1968 when I first took charge of the examinations as Bar Confidant up to 1971, I
either started with the number "27" (or "227") or end with said number. (1968 Master List is identified and
marked as Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo; 1969 Master
List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list, as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master
List as Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo; and the 1971
Master List as Exh. 8-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).

The significance to me of this number (27) was born out of these incidents in my life, to wit: (a) On
November 27, 1941 while with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
I was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result. As
will be recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on December 8, 1941. While I was still confined at the hospital,
our camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 resulting in many casualties.
From then on, I regarded November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a new life for me having been saved from
the possibility of being among the casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I was able to get out of the army
byway of honorable discharge; and (c) on February 27, 1947, I got married and since then we begot children
the youngest of whom was born on February 27, 1957.

Returning to the office that same afternoon after buying the ticket, I resumed my work which at the
time was on the checking of the notebooks. While thus checking, I came upon the notebooks bearing the
office code number "954". As the number was still fresh in my mind, it aroused my curiosity prompting me
to pry into the contents of the notebooks. Impressed by the clarity of the writing and language and the
apparent soundness of the answers and, thereby, believing in all good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh. 1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on took them back to the respective examiners for possible review
recalling to them the said Confidential Memorandum but leaving absolutely the matter to their discretion
and judgment.

3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could have reference to either of the two cases
which I brought to the attention of the committee during the meeting and which the Committee agreed to
refer back to the respective examines, namely:

(a) That of an examinee who obtained a passing general average but with a grade below 50% (47%)
in Mercantile Law(the notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 110, identified and marked as
Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original
grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and

(b) That of an examinee who obtained a borderline general average of 73.15% with a grade below
60% (57%) in one subject which, at the time, I could not pinpoint having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject was Political and International Law under Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo (The notebooks of this examinee bear the Office Code No. 1622 identified and marked as
Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the notebook in Political and International Law bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661
with the original grade of 57% increased to 66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-Lanuevo). This notebook
in Political and International Law is precisely the same notebook mentioned in the sworn statement of Asst.
Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).

4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or
notebook was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law in the former; and only Political and
International Law in the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made known to the Committee and
pursuant to which the Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks involved to the examiners
concerned;

5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even volunteered to review or re-check some 19,
or so, notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that there was very little time left and that the
increase in grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial, may not alter the outcome since the
subject carries the weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.).

The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the fact that Lanuevo's story is
devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April 12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks"
of respondent Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on the first notebook "as
he "was going over those notebooks, checking the entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings." In his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a Meralco post
provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of respondent Galang "bearing office code number
'954."

Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among others;

1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never
met him before except once when, as required by the latter respondent submitted certain papers necessary
for taking the bar examinations.

xxx xxx xxx

4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after
the official release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing" case, especially in a situation where
the respondent and the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed, met only once in the ordinary
course of official business?

It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to
which respondent is richly entitled?

5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973,
had no knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in
particular in the resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man intimately nor, had the herein
respondent utilized anyone to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.

But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution,
which are evidently purported to show as having redounded to the benefit of herein respondent, these
questions arise: First, was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination papers by the Bar Examination
Committee done only or especially for him and not done generally as regards the paper of the other bar
candidates who are supposed to have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades was done among
those of others, then it must have been done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase the
percentage of passing in that year's examination and, therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's
papers were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far
fetched. Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's actuations resulted in herein Respondent's
benefit an evidence per se of Respondent's having caused actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done
in former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in effect because that would be presuming all the
members of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity, unfit for the bar themselves and the
result of their work that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these inferences are deductible from the
narration of facts in the resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of facts an unworthy of
credence, or consideration.
 xxx xxx xxx

7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973 would make this Respondent Account or
answer for the actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the actuations of the Bar Examiners
implying the existence of some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The evident imputation is
denied and it is contended that the Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties and that they
should be regarded as such in the consideration of this case.

xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).

The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent Lanuevo systematically and
cleverly initiated and prepared the stage leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the respondents-examiners to make the
desired revision without prior authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had been
submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who is simply the custodian thereof for and
in behalf of the Court.

It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of December, 1971, just before
Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the representations that as
BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that
a candidate obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one on another, he will
bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo brought back to respondent-
examiner Pamatian an examination booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee
who owned the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in said subject could be
reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took
respondent Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and policy of the Supreme
Court and in his further belief that he was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the
paper and reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The particular notebook
belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know the identity of
the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet (Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).

Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in seven subjects including Civil
Law. After such revision, examinee Galang still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing
average of 75% for admission to the Bar.

Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of February, 1972, respondent
Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent Manalo and previously corrected
and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and
possibly to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has reviewed the said
notebook and that the examinee concerned had done well in other subjects, but that because of the
comparatively low grade given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general average
of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo likewise made the remark and observation
that he thought that if the notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also particularly called the attention of
respondent Manalo to the fact that in his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum that read as follows:

4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic, knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability
to analyze and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in the correction of papers, substantial
weight should be given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.

Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that the matter of
reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion. Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent
Lanuevo, as Bar Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing that such request
was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an
increase of the examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25% to 74.5%.
Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the changes made by him in the notebook and in the
grading sheet. The said notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier mentioned by
him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).

But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could not make the passing
grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.

Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when respondent Lanuevo went to
deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political
Law and Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought out a notebook in Political
Law bearing Examiner's Code Number 1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said notebook seems to have passed in all other
subjects except in Political Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be re-
evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee will pass the bar examinations. After
satisfying himself from respondent that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that
this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject — respondent
Pablo acceded to the request and thereby told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook.
Respondent Pablo thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-evaluation, the
grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of 10%. Respondent Pablo then made the
corresponding corrections in the grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-
46, rec.).

After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general average was still below the
passing grade, because of his failing marks in four subjects.

Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent Lanuevo brought back to
respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who
was then helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public International Law, as he had already
finished correcting the examination notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent and that if
his grade in Criminal Law would be raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the justification and because he did not
want to be the one causing the failure of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64%
to 75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the mark in the general list and likewise
initialed the same. The examinee's Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954.
This examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25, 60-61, rec.).
 Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by respondent Lanuevo when
the latter approached him for this particular re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that
where a candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one subject, as a matter of policy
of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls,
however, that he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was long before the re-
evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the same was received by him before the examination
period (Vol. V, p. 61, rec.).

However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's general average to a passing
grade because of his failing mark in three more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of
examinee Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the last phase of his quite
ingenious scheme — by securing authorization from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in
Mercantile Law tore-evaluate said notebook.

At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
suggested that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned
would review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the Committee adopted the suggestion
(Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).

At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent Montecillo was informed
by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information
was made during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all closely seated together.
Respondent Montecillo made known his willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day,
respondent Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-
evaluating the answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not however thereafter
officially brought to the Committee for consideration or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 40-41, 70-71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information that the particular examinee
failed only in his subject and passed all the others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation
of the said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that there was only one instance
he remembers, which is substantiated by his personal records, that he had to change the grade of an
examinee after he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-
35, rec.).

A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of respondent-
examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200 notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of
respondent Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the Philippines with two
companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this was around the second week of February, 1972, after
the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on that occasion an
examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No. 661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual
amenities, requested respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said notebook because,
according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades
in other subjects, the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with respondent Lanuevo his
authority to reconsider the grades, respondent Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine
concerned, resulting in an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622 as office
code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs. 1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-
63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30, rec.).

II

Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.

 A

UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE RAMON E. GALANG, alias

ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5) MAJOR SUBJECTS.

Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own initiative the five examiners
concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually
resulted in the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade 74.15%, or a total increase
of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a
resolution of the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination without any grade below
fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that
he had no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps towards the said re-evaluation of
the answers of Galang or of other examinees.

Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that respondent Galang failed
only in their respective subjects and/or was on the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to
justify his actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum(Exhs.
1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos. 1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.)
distributed to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he acted in good faith and
"in his honest belief that the same merited re-evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake
or betray the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice to the examinee
concerned; and that neither did he act in a presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
pp. 35-37, rec.).

But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said confidential memorandum
was intended solely for the examiners to guide them in the initial correction of the examination papers and
never as a basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the examination papers of
the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also
offensive to the norms of delicacy.

We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz, Pardo and Pamatian — whose
declarations on the matter of the misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.

For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-examiners (Adm. Case No.
1164) and clarified by extensive cross-examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the
cases show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of examinee Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent
Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court and the Examiners
implicit in his position as BarConfidant as well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized
his relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who were thus deceived
and induced into re-evaluating the answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the
increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a member of the Philippine Bar.

It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized respondent Lanuevo's well-studied
and well-calculated moves in successively representing separately to each of the five examiners concerned
to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular subject and/or was on the borderline of passing.
To repeat, the before the unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5) major
subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average was only 66.25% — which under no
circumstances or standard could it be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on
the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was referred back to the examiner
concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and individual grades of Galang before and
after the unauthorized re-evaluation are as follows:

BAI

1. Political Law Public

International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points

BAI

Labor Laws and Social

Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.

2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points

or 33 weighted points.

Taxation 74% 74% = no re-

evaluation made.

3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.

or 30 weighted points.

4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or

22 weighted points.

5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =

11 pts. or 44 weighted points.

Legal Ethics and Practical

Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————

General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%

Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang in the five (5)
subjects under the circumstances already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and prejudice of the integrity of the Bar
examinations and to the disadvantage of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang,
with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. But only one notebook
was re-evaluated for each of the latter who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and
Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.

The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely nothing to do in the re-evaluation
or reconsideration of the grades of examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected notebooks are submitted to him by the
Examiners, his only function is to tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare a comparative data showing the
percentage of passing and failing in relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to
the Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing average, whether 75 or 74 or 73,
etc. The Bar Confidant has no business evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner.
He cannot presume to know better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done by the
examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which alone can validly act thereon. A Bar
Confidant who takes such initiative, exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as
well as the image of the Court.

Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang without any intention of
betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in
the fact of the incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation, leaving out the
papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which
he was fully aware (Vol. VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as borderline cases.
This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of absolute good faith in referring back the papers of
Galang to the Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original weighted average of 66.25%
of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees
were more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to Galang, as claimed by respondent
Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the
said more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent Lanuevo to apprise the Court
or the Committee or even the Bar Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-evaluation
and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent with, any pretension of good faith.

His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and International Law of Ernesto
Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of
Galang a semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who were far better situated than
Galang would not give him away. Even the re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of
Ty dela Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee to re-evaluate
when the examinee concerned fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.

The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number given to Galang's notebook,
unveiled for the first time by respondent Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo,
Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this Court as to why he pried into
the papers of Galang deserves scant consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by respondent Lanuevo for the first time only
on August 27, 1973 or a period of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing that it was just an after-thought.

REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN MERCHANTILE LAW TO

RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE
ERNESTO QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-
EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.

Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back the aforesaid notebooks on
Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners
concerned.

The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and
Quitaleg were referred back to the Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51,
rec.) and the latter decided to refer them back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to
the case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-
86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet
of paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee (Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.).
Likewise a record of the dates of every meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol.
VI, p. 28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees and record of the dates of the
meeting of the Committee were not presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave after the release of the Bar results
(Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court in
the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case
No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp. 11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).

Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there was only one notebook in
Mercantile Law which was officially brought to him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record
(Vol. VI, pp. 34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is 1613 (Vol. V, p.35,
rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original
grade of 47% in Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the cover of the
notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was
present when respondent Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing Examiner
code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and
the figures 47 crossed out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo as Exhibit
9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo
did not interpose any objection to their admission in evidence.

In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he remembers a case of an examinee
presented to the Committee, who obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the subject in which the examinee failed
(Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V,
p. 16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an examinee who was on the
borderline of passing but who got a grade below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee
(Vol. V, pp. 16-17, rec.).

Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner Code Number 1613 (belonging
to Galang) which was referred to the Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an examinee with Code Number 1613 was
taken up, respondent Lanuevo handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This particular
notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.

Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was Mercantile Law that was
taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-
61, rec.). Pardo declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the Committee that
involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the
representation made by respondent Lanuevo to him.

As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8, 1972 of the members of
the Committee that where an examinee failed in only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner
in whose subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook (Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh.
2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case
No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).

At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade of 57% was referred back
to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:

Labor Laws 3%

Taxation 69%

Mercantile Law 68%

Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as
follows:

BA

Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27

weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————

Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%

(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, rec.)

Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was referred to Examiner Montecillo to
remove the disqualification grade of 47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:

Political Law 70%

Taxation 72%

His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was removed are as follows:

BA

Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation

Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————

Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%

The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the answers of Ty dela Cruz in
Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which
violation was due to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.

It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile Law to Examiner Montecillo
can hardly be said to be covered by the consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the
time of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his answers of four (4) subjects,
Galang had still failing grades in Taxation and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial
Law was considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so entered in the record. His grade
in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
 Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of having betrayed the trust and
confidence reposed in him as Bar Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.

As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be disbarred or their names stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.

III

Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, respondent.

The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, should likewise be stricken off
the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in
five(5) major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law, Remedial Law, and
Mercantile Law.

The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the legal profession, which
necessarily involves the exercise of discretion, requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2)
concrete facts, whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a decision as to whether
these facts are governed by the rules and principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to
the Bar -- 94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has obtained the required
passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).

In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination Committee, composed of
a member of the Court who acts as Chairman and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in
the eight (8) bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison officer between the
Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the individual members of the Committee, on the other, is
the Bar Confidant who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every act of the
Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the admission of examinees to membership of
the Bar must be in accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be subject to the
final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the
designation indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar examinations are defined and
circumscribed by the Court and must be strictly adhered to.

The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination answers of respondent Galang in
five (5) subjects, as already clearly established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority
from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by the Court in him as Bar Confidant.
Consequently, the re-evaluation that enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and
to be admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not possess any discretion with
respect to the matter of admission of examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-evaluation or whether the Examiner's
appraisal of such answers is correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or a
privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings or incidents that led to the
candidate's admission to the Bar were in accordance with the rules.

Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in connection, among others, with the
character requirement of candidates for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission
as a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory evidence of good moral character,
and that no charges against him involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar applicant was required to produce
before the Supreme Court satisfactory testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both
rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his involvement in any criminal case, pending
or otherwise terminated, to enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral character.
Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the
necessity of laying before or informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending — becomes more compelling. The
forms for application to take the Bar examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965
require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude filed or pending against the
applicant but also of all other criminal cases of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the
application form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in 1962 did not expressly
require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task
to show satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to reveal to the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case so that the Court can consider them in the ascertainment and
determination of his moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records before it, the
Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that
an applicant's involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its dismissal or
applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In
1963 and 1964, when respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time, respectively, the
application form provided by the Court for use of applicants already required the applicant to declare under
oath that "he has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of any offense
involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending case of that nature against him." By 1966, when
Galang took the Bar examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the Court for use of
applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In
paragraph 4 of that form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not been charged with
any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by
any court or tribunal of any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against him" (Adm.
Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the
Court his criminal case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in the City Court
of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar
examinations in 1967, 1969 and 1971.

All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty of fraudulently concealing
and withholding from the Court his pending criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966,
1967, 1969 and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when he declared under
oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By falsely representing to the Court that he had no
criminal case pending in court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar examinations
seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.

That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar examinations of the fact that
he had been charged with, or indicted for, an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to
practice law is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:

[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that the respondent, in withholding from the board
of law examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he applied for admission, information respecting
so serious a matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud upon the court (cases cited).

[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners, or the judge to whom he applied for
admission, been apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the board nor of the judge would
have been forthcoming (State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N — W — 709 — 710).
 The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was required to surrender to the
clerk of court the license issued to him, and his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).

Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:

[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in the discretion of the Appellate Division.'
In the exercise of the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and frankly of matters tending to
show the character of the applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from which he comes. The finding
of indictments against him, one of which was still outstanding at the time of his motion, were facts which
should have been submitted to the court, with such explanations as were available. Silence respecting them
was reprehensible, as tending to deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis supplied).

Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).

Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any criminal case despite his
having been apprised by the Investigation of some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the
very name of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by the victim himself, who
was called to testify thereon), and his continued failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that
criminal case up to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty, probity and good
demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a member of the noble profession of law.

While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution of the Court requiring him
to explain why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early
as August, 1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal case. Yet he did not
offer any explanation for such omission.

Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, was
allowed to take the Bar examinations and the highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have
no other alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the striking out of his name
from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re Felipe del Rosario:

The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be granted every one who demands it, but is a
privilege to be extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion. The standards of the legal
profession are not satisfied by conduct which merely enables one to escape the penalties of the criminal
law. It would be a disgrace to the Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable as an officer of
the court, to clothe him with all the prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold himself as a
duly authorized member of the bar (citing American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].

What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, in this present case
is not without any precedent in this jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on the grounds, among others, of
(a)misrepresentations of, or false pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off the name of Juan T. Publico from
the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-478; (b) lack of good moral character
[In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314]; and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil. 399 and People vs. Castro and
Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime of falsification of public documents.

IV
 RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo (now CFI Judge),
Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G.
Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr., respondents.

All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-evaluation and/or re-correction
of the papers in question upon the misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades of the notebooks without knowing
the identity of the examinee who owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any
consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and
WE so declare that indeed the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in good faith
and without any consideration whatsoever.

Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of admission of members to the
Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and
caution and should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of respondent Bar Confidant
Lanuevo. They could have asked the Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred
the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners should have required respondent
Lanuevo to produce or show them the complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented
by respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular subject and/or was on the
borderline of passing to fully satisfy themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances.
This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations could have been avoided.

Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed and so declared under oath
that the answers of respondent Galang really deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with
respondent Pardo in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in Political Law. With
respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would appear that they increased the grades of Galang in
their respective subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent Lanuevo. Hence, in the
words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to me one paper and you said that this particular examinee
had almost passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot remember the exact average
and if he would get a few points higher, he would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did
not wish to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.; emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that
this particular examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject and that if I can re-
evaluate this examination notebook and increase the mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass
the bar examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said 'Yes, that is the practice
used to be done before to help out examinees who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his
request and said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with me and what i did was
to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I could. While I did not mark correct the answers which
were wrong, what I did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was not complete
I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and what I did was to correct the grading sheet
accordingly and initial the changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).

It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-evaluations made by respondents
Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades
they gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent influenced by the
misrepresentation and deception committed by respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:

Montecillo —

Q And by reason of that information you made the re-evaluation of the paper?

A Yeas, your Honor.

 Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper of your own accord in the absence of such information?

A No, your Honor, because I have submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.; see also
allegations in paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April 17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation No. 2, Answer
dated march 19, 1973, Exh. A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, and 72, rec.).

Pamatian —

3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year, he brought back to me an examination
booklet in Civil Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner of the paper is on the borderline
and if I could reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get passing mark;

4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it was really the practice and policy of the
Supreme Court to do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting cooperation in doing so, I re-
evaluated the paper and reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55,
rec.); and

5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith and under the belief that I am authorized to
do so in view of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo, ..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 33-34, rec.).

Manalo —

(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated
each and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the answer by the criteria laid down by the Court,
and giving the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr. Lanuevo's representation that it was
only in that particular subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent became convinced that the said
examinee deserved a higher grade than that previously given him, but he did not deserve, in herein
respondent's honest appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.; emphasis supplied).

Pardo —

... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred, because I corrected that particular
notebook on December 31,1971, considering especially the representation of the Bar Confidant that the
said examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects, the highest of which was 84% in Remedial
Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).

With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by respondent Lanuevo to induce the
herein examiners to make the re-evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper influence, their conceded integrity,
honesty and competence notwithstanding.

Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the increased grades given after the
said re-evaluations(Galang's memo attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).

At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the respondents-examiners, which
were earlier quoted in full, that their actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any disciplinary action. WE find their
explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless, WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that
their participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed with the highest consideration
of public interest — absolute purity of the proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or
utmost case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.

Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on November 14, 1973, claimed
that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or
support thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal to be pressured into helping
his (examiner's) alleged friend — a participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named
as Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo,
Adm. Case No. 1162).

It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and integrity of the late Justice
Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's
insinuations. Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the investigation which in his
words is "essential to his defense. "His pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation
when Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge against Justice Pamatian and
possibly also against Oscar Landicho before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a leverage for a favorable outcome of
this case on the part of respondent or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn
the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee, who also affirmed that he
deceived them into re-evaluating or revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.

It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations, Oscar
Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the
purpose of seeking his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner Pamatian advised
Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in
passing to Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him (Pamatian) before the release of
the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec). Even though such information was divulged by respondent
Pamatian after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act, hardly expected of a
member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to
the rules of delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar examinations and to
impair public faith in the Supreme Court.

VI

The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal machination of respondent
Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.

There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo immediately after the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations in February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.

1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house
and lot with an area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount of P84,114.00. The deed of sale
was dated March 5, 1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the same date, however, respondent
Lanuevo and his wife executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and lot in favor of BF Homes,
Inc. in the total amount of P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No. 90913: date of instrument
— April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage — P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914:
date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4, Vol. III, rec.].
Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that
P5,000.00 of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining the P12,000.00 came from his sister in
Okinawa in the form of a loan and received by him through a niece before Christmas of 1971 in dollars
($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48; Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]

It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00 savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not
fully reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.

In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under Assets a bank deposit in the amount of
only P2,000.00. In his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets was in the amount of P1,011.00,
which shows therefore that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971 statement under Assets, only
the amount of P989.00 was used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable listed under Assets
in his 1971 statement was not realized because the transaction therein involved did not push through
(Statement of Assets and Liabilities of respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-48, rec.).

Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of respondent from his married sister in Okinawa
is extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of $2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in
his 1971 Statement of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972. Secondly, the alleged note which he
allegedly received from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not even presented by respondent
during the investigation. And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he considered this a loan,
his sister did not seriously consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment was agreed upon by
them. And furthermore, during the investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the Investigator
the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records. Considering
that there is no showing that his sister, who has a family of her own, is among the top earners in Okinawa
or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.

On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to
the GSIS for the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14, 1972 — date of instrument; August 23,
1972 — date of inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90914, was redeemed by respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March 20,1973, Entry No. 30143.
Subsequently, or on March 2, 1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90913 was also
redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4, Vol. III,
rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and
lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in
the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets
and Liabilities).

2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued
at P5,200.00. That he acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and November, 1972 could be
inferred from the fact that no such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets and liabilities of 1971
or in the years previous to 1965. It appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding receivables in
his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed total
assets, excluding the house and lot was P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth P5,200.00.

The proximity in point of time between the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations and the
acquisition of the above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the said acquisitions with the illegal
machination committed by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent Galang's examination papers
or to show that the money used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the above properties came
from respondent Galang in consideration of his passing the Bar.
 During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had informed respondent Lanuevo of
the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and
in fact, after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn statement on the matter, as ordered
by the Court, respondent Lanuevo surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was required to show cause on March 5,
1973 but after he was informed of the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.

It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of the 1971 Bar examinations,
respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining
the case value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially claimed at the investigation
that h e used a part thereof as a down payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.),
which he bought on April 5, 1972.

Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo under Section 3 (a & e) in
relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379 (Anti-Graft Law) for:

(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public officer to perform an act constituting a violation
of rules and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority or an offense in connection with the official
duties of the latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or influenced to commit such violation or
offense.

xxx xxx xxx

(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the Government, or giving any private party any
unwarranted benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his official administrative or judicial
functions through manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence. This provision
shall apply to officers and employees of offices or government corporations charged with the grant of
licenses or permits or other concessions.

Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or removal of a public officer once
it is determined that his property or money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2,
Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep. Act 3019).

It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's aforementioned Statements of Assets

and Liabilities were not presented or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.

There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between respondent Ramon E.
Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.

1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of Rights educational program of
the Philippine Veterans Board from his high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the
MLQ Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948 to 1958, respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo was connected with the Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted
with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to
1958, Respondent Lanuevo successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims Investigator (Service Record, p. 9,
Adm. Case No. 1162). During that period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's educational benefits was approved
on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A,
Vol. IV, rec.).

It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all the time attended to the
availment of the said educational benefits and even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at
MLQ Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang was already 19 years old, and
from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-
80, 86-87, rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the private secretary of
Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated
June 28, 1955 of the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the approval of the
transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first
semester of the school year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent Ramon E. Galang
at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV, rec.).

Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the Office of the Philippine
Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and claimed that he does not even know the location of the
said office. He does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights educational benefits are
required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.).
But respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court of Manila, although he insists
that he never bothered to take a look at the neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and
imposing Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely across the City Court
building.

2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine Veterans Board, he

investigated claims for the several benefits given to veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits;
that he does not remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans investigator, he came
across the application of Ramon E. Galang for educational benefits; and that he does not know the father
of Mr. Ramon E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).

3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the 91st Infantry operating at
Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he
joined the guerrilla movement in Samar.

He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially while working with the
Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).

He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which Galang's father belonged. During
the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications
with other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.

He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in Samar only and does not
remember having attended its meeting here in Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine
Veterans Board. He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII, p.51, rec.).

On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the Philippine Army stationed at Camp
Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija, he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva
Ecija Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their camp was bombed and strafed
by Japanese planes on December 13, 1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27,
1973, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).

German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise
known as the Banal Regiment. He was commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16,
1942 and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and served into the XI-Corps, US
Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army, stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the
38th Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations against the enemies, from 9
May 1945 date of recognition to 31 December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).

It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the corrected notebooks to the Bar
Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the actuations of the bar examiners in
Administrative Case No. 1164 as above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT VICTORIO D. LANUEVO

IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS;
AND IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E. GALANG, alias Roman E.
GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

EN BANC

[B. M. No. 1036. June 10, 2003]

DONNA MARIE S. AGUIRRE, complainant, vs. EDWIN L. RANA, respondent.

DECISION

CARPIO, J.:

The Case

Before one is admitted to the Philippine Bar, he must possess the requisite moral integrity for
membership in the legal profession. Possession of moral integrity is of greater importance than possession
of legal learning. The practice of law is a privilege bestowed only on the morally fit. A bar candidate who is
morally unfit cannot practice law even if he passes the bar examinations.

The Facts

Respondent Edwin L. Rana (respondent) was among those who passed the 2000 Bar Examinations.

On 21 May 2001, one day before the scheduled mass oath-taking of successful bar examinees as
members of the Philippine Bar, complainant Donna Marie Aguirre (complainant) filed against respondent
a Petition for Denial of Admission to the Bar. Complainant charged respondent with unauthorized practice
of law, grave misconduct, violation of law, and grave misrepresentation.

The Court allowed respondent to take his oath as a member of the Bar during the scheduled oath-
taking on 22 May 2001 at the Philippine International Convention Center. However, the Court ruled that
respondent could not sign the Roll of Attorneys pending the resolution of the charge against him. Thus,
respondent took the lawyers oath on the scheduled date but has not signed the Roll of Attorneys up to now.

Complainant charges respondent for unauthorized practice of law and grave

misconduct. Complainant alleges that respondent, while not yet a lawyer, appeared as counsel for a
candidate in the May 2001 elections before the Municipal Board of Election Canvassers (MBEC) of
Mandaon, Masbate. Complainant further alleges that respondent filed with the MBEC a pleading dated 19
May 2001 entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor. In this pleading, respondent represented himself as counsel for and in behalf of Vice
Mayoralty Candidate, George Bunan, and signed the pleading as counsel for George Bunan (Bunan).

On the charge of violation of law, complainant claims that respondent is a municipal government
employee, being a secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan of Mandaon, Masbate. As such, respondent is not
allowed by law to act as counsel for a client in any court or administrative body.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, complainant accuses respondent of

acting as counsel for vice mayoralty candidate George Bunan (Bunan) without the latter engaging
respondents services. Complainant claims that respondent filed the pleading as a ploy to prevent the
proclamation of the winning vice mayoralty candidate.

On 22 May 2001, the Court issued a resolution allowing respondent to take the lawyers oath but
disallowed him from signing the Roll of Attorneys until he is cleared of the charges against him. In the same
resolution, the Court required respondent to comment on the complaint against him.

In his Comment, respondent admits that Bunan sought his specific assistance to represent him
before the MBEC. Respondent claims that he decided to assist and advice Bunan, not as a lawyer but as a
person who knows the law. Respondent admits signing the 19 May 2001 pleading that objected to the
inclusion of certain votes in the canvassing. He explains, however, that he did not sign the pleading as a
lawyer or represented himself as an attorney in the pleading.

On his employment as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent claims that he submitted
his resignation on 11 May 2001 which was allegedly accepted on the same date. He submitted a copy of
the Certification of Receipt of Revocable Resignation dated 28 May 2001 signed by Vice-Mayor Napoleon
Relox. Respondent further claims that the complaint is politically motivated considering that complainant is
the daughter of Silvestre Aguirre, the losing candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate. Respondent prays
that the complaint be dismissed for lack of merit and that he be allowed to sign the Roll of Attorneys.

On 22 June 2001, complainant filed her Reply to respondents Comment and refuted the claim of
respondent that his appearance before the MBEC was only to extend specific assistance to Bunan.
Complainant alleges that on 19 May 2001 Emily Estipona-Hao (Estipona-Hao) filed a petition for
proclamation as the winning candidate for mayor. Respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in this
petition. When respondent appeared as counsel before the MBEC, complainant questioned his appearance
on two grounds: (1) respondent had not taken his oath as a lawyer; and (2) he was an employee of the
government.

Respondent filed a Reply (Re: Reply to Respondents Comment) reiterating his claim that the instant
administrative case is motivated mainly by political vendetta.

On 17 July 2001, the Court referred the case to the Office of the Bar Confidant (OBC) for evaluation,
report and recommendation.

OBCs Report and Recommendation

The OBC found that respondent indeed appeared before the MBEC as counsel for Bunan in the May
2001 elections. The minutes of the MBEC proceedings show that respondent actively participated in the
proceedings. The OBC likewise found that respondent appeared in the MBEC proceedings even before he
took the lawyers oath on 22 May 2001. The OBC believes that respondents misconduct casts a serious
doubt on his moral fitness to be a member of the Bar. The OBC also believes that respondents unauthorized
practice of law is a ground to deny his admission to the practice of law. The OBC therefore recommends
that respondent be denied admission to the Philippine Bar.
 On the other charges, OBC stated that complainant failed to cite a law which respondent allegedly
violated when he appeared as counsel for Bunan while he was a government employee. Respondent
resigned as secretary and his resignation was accepted. Likewise, respondent was authorized by Bunan to
represent him before the MBEC.

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of the OBC that respondent engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law and thus does not deserve admission to the Philippine Bar.

Respondent took his oath as lawyer on 22 May 2001. However, the records show that respondent
appeared as counsel for Bunan prior to 22 May 2001, before respondent took the lawyers oath. In the
pleading entitled Formal Objection to the Inclusion in the Canvassing of Votes in Some Precincts for the
Office of Vice-Mayor dated 19 May 2001, respondent signed as counsel for George Bunan. In the first
paragraph of the same pleading respondent stated that he was the (U)ndersigned Counsel for, and in
behalf of Vice Mayoralty Candidate, GEORGE T. BUNAN. Bunan himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May
2001 that he had authorized Atty. Edwin L. Rana as his counsel to represent him before the MBEC and
similar bodies.

On 14 May 2001, mayoralty candidate Emily Estipona-Hao also retained respondent as her
counsel. On the same date, 14 May 2001, Erly D. Hao informed the MBEC that Atty. Edwin L. Rana has
been authorized by REFORMA LM-PPC as the legal counsel of the party and the candidate of the said
party. Respondent himself wrote the MBEC on 14 May 2001 that he was entering his appearance as
counsel for Mayoralty Candidate Emily Estipona-Hao and for the REFORMA LM-PPC. On 19 May
2001, respondent signed as counsel for Estipona-Hao in the petition filed before the MBEC praying for the
proclamation of Estipona-Hao as the winning candidate for mayor of Mandaon, Masbate.

All these happened even before respondent took the lawyers oath. Clearly, respondent engaged in
the practice of law without being a member of the Philippine Bar.

In Philippine Lawyers Association v. Agrava,[1] the Court elucidated that:

The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases or litigation in court; it embraces the
preparation of pleadings and other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the management of
such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients before judges and courts, and in addition, conveyancing.
In general, all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in matters connected with the law,incorporation
services, assessment and condemnation services contemplating an appearance before a judicial body, the
foreclosure of a mortgage, enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency proceedings,
and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in matters of estate and guardianship have been held to
constitute law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal instruments, where the work done
involves the determination by the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5 Am. Jur. p.
262, 263). (Italics supplied) x x x

In Cayetano v. Monsod,[2] the Court held that practice of law means any activity, in or out of court,
which requires the application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience. To engage in
the practice of law is to perform acts which are usually performed by members of the legal profession.
Generally, to practice law is to render any kind of service which requires the use of legal knowledge or skill.

Verily, respondent was engaged in the practice of law when he appeared in the proceedings before
the MBEC and filed various pleadings, without license to do so. Evidence clearly supports the charge of
unauthorized practice of law. Respondent called himself counsel knowing fully well that he was not a
member of the Bar. Having held himself out as counsel knowing that he had no authority to practice law,
respondent has shown moral unfitness to be a member of the Philippine Bar. [3]
 The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is a privilege. It is limited to persons
of good moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and certified.The exercise of this
privilege presupposes possession of integrity, legal knowledge, educational attainment, and even public
trust[4] since a lawyer is an officer of the court. A bar candidate does not acquire the right to practice law
simply by passing the bar examinations. The practice of law is a privilege that can be withheld even from
one who has passed the bar examinations, if the person seeking admission had practiced law without a
license.[5]

The regulation of the practice of law is unquestionably strict. In Beltran, Jr. v. Abad,[6] a candidate
passed the bar examinations but had not taken his oath and signed the Roll of Attorneys. He was held in
contempt of court for practicing law even before his admission to the Bar. Under Section 3 (e) of Rule 71 of
the Rules of Court, a person who engages in the unauthorized practice of law is liable for indirect contempt
of court.[7]

True, respondent here passed the 2000 Bar Examinations and took the lawyers oath. However, it is
the signing in the Roll of Attorneys that finally makes one a full-fledged lawyer. The fact that respondent
passed the bar examinations is immaterial. Passing the bar is not the only qualification to become an
attorney-at-law.[8] Respondent should know that two essential requisites for becoming a lawyer still had to
be performed, namely: his lawyers oath to be administered by this Court and his signature in the Roll of
Attorneys.[9]

On the charge of violation of law, complainant contends that the law does not allow respondent to
act as counsel for a private client in any court or administrative body since respondent is the secretary of
the Sangguniang Bayan.

Respondent tendered his resignation as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan prior to the acts
complained of as constituting unauthorized practice of law. In his letter dated 11 May 2001 addressed to
Napoleon Relox, vice- mayor and presiding officer of the Sangguniang Bayan, respondent stated that he
was resigning effective upon your acceptance.[10] Vice-Mayor Relox accepted respondents resignation
effective 11 May 2001.[11] Thus, the evidence does not support the charge that respondent acted as counsel
for a client while serving as secretary of the Sangguniang Bayan.

On the charge of grave misconduct and misrepresentation, evidence shows that Bunan indeed
authorized respondent to represent him as his counsel before the MBEC and similar bodies. While there
was no misrepresentation, respondent nonetheless had no authority to practice law.

WHEREFORE, respondent Edwin L. Rana is DENIED admission to the Philippine Bar.

SO ORDERED.

Republic of the Philippines

SUPREME COURT
Manila

SECOND DIVISION

G.R. No. 111474 August 22, 1994

FIVE J TAXI and/or JUAN S. ARMAMENTO, petitioners,

vs.
NATIONAL LABOR RELATIONS COMMISSION, DOMINGO MALDIGAN and GILBERTO
SABSALON, respondents.

Edgardo G. Fernandez for petitioners.

R E SO L U T I O N

REGALADO, J.:

Petitioners Five J Taxi and/or Juan S. Armamento filed this special civil action for certiorari to annul
the decision 1of respondent National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) ordering petitioners to pay
private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon their accumulated deposits and car wash
payments, plus interest thereon at the legal rate from the date of promulgation of judgment to the date of
actual payment, and 10% of the total amount as and for attorney's fees.

We have given due course to this petition for, while to the cynical the de minimis amounts involved
should not impose upon the valuable time of this Court, we find therein a need to clarify some issues the
resolution of which are important to small wage earners such as taxicab drivers. As we have heretofore
repeatedly demonstrated, this Court does not exist only for the rich or the powerful, with their reputed
monumental cases of national impact. It is also the Court of the poor or the underprivileged, with the actual
quotidian problems that beset their individual lives.

Private respondents Domingo Maldigan and Gilberto Sabsalon were hired by the petitioners as taxi
drivers 2 and, as such, they worked for 4 days weekly on a 24-hour shifting schedule. Aside from the daily
"boundary" of P700.00 for air-conditioned taxi or P450.00 for non-air-conditioned taxi, they were also
required to pay P20.00 for car washing, and to further make a P15.00 deposit to answer for any deficiency
in their "boundary," for every actual working day.

In less than 4 months after Maldigan was hired as an extra driver by the petitioners, he already failed
to report for work for unknown reasons. Later, petitioners learned that he was working for "Mine of Gold"
Taxi Company. With respect to Sabsalon, while driving a taxicab of petitioners on September 6, 1983, he
was held up by his armed passenger who took all his money and thereafter stabbed him. He was
hospitalized and after his discharge, he went to his home province to recuperate.

In January, 1987, Sabsalon was re-admitted by petitioners as a taxi driver under the same terms
and conditions as when he was first employed, but his working schedule was made on an "alternative basis,"
that is, he drove only every other day. However, on several occasions, he failed to report for work during
his schedule.

On September 22, 1991, Sabsalon failed to remit his "boundary" of P700.00 for the previous day.
Also, he abandoned his taxicab in Makati without fuel refill worth P300.00. Despite repeated requests of
petitioners for him to report for work, he adamantly refused. Afterwards it was revealed that he was driving
a taxi for "Bulaklak Company."

Sometime in 1989, Maldigan requested petitioners for the reimbursement of his daily cash deposits
for 2 years, but herein petitioners told him that not a single centavo was left of his deposits as these were
not even enough to cover the amount spent for the repairs of the taxi he was driving. This was allegedly the
practice adopted by petitioners to recoup the expenses incurred in the repair of their taxicab units. When
Maldigan insisted on the refund of his deposit, petitioners terminated his services. Sabsalon, on his part,
claimed that his termination from employment was effected when he refused to pay for the washing of his
taxi seat covers.
 On November 27, 1991, private respondents filed a complaint with the Manila Arbitration Office of
the National Labor Relations Commission charging petitioners with illegal dismissal and illegal deductions.
That complaint was dismissed, the labor arbiter holding that it took private respondents two years to file the
same and such unreasonable delay was not consistent with the natural reaction of a person who claimed
to be unjustly treated, hence the filing of the case could be interpreted as a mere afterthought.

Respondent NLRC concurred in said findings, with the observation that private respondents failed
to controvert the evidence showing that Maldigan was employed by "Mine of Gold" Taxi Company from
February 10, 1987 to December 10, 1990; that Sabsalon abandoned his taxicab on September 1, 1990;
and that they voluntarily left their jobs for similar employment with other taxi operators. It, accordingly,
affirmed the ruling of the labor arbiter that private respondents' services were not illegally terminated. It,
however, modified the decision of the labor arbiter by ordering petitioners to pay private respondents the
awards stated at the beginning of this resolution.

Petitioners' motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC, this petition is now before
us imputing grave abuse of discretion on the part of said public respondent.

This Court has repeatedly declared that the factual findings of quasi-judicial agencies like the NLRC,
which have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters, are generally
accorded not only respect but, at times, finality if such findings are supported by substantial
evidence. 3 Where, however, such conclusions are not supported by the evidence, they must be struck
down for being whimsical and capricious and, therefore, arrived at with grave abuse of discretion. 4

Respondent NLRC held that the P15.00 daily deposits made by respondents to defray any shortage
in their "boundary" is covered by the general prohibition in Article 114 of the Labor Code against requiring
employees to make deposits, and that there is no showing that the Secretary of Labor has recognized the
same as a "practice" in the taxi industry. Consequently, the deposits made were illegal and the respondents
must be refunded therefor.

Article 114 of the Labor Code provides as follows:

Art. 114. Deposits for loss or damage. — No employer shall require his worker to make deposits
from which deductions shall be made for the reimbursement of loss of or damage to tools, materials, or
equipment supplied by the employer, except when the employer is engaged in such trades, occupations or
business where the practice of making deposits is a recognized one, or is necessary or desirable as
determined by the Secretary of Labor in appropriate rules and regulations.

It can be deduced therefrom that the said article provides the rule on deposits for loss or damage to
tools, materials or equipments supplied by the employer. Clearly, the same does not apply to or permit
deposits to defray any deficiency which the taxi driver may incur in the remittance of his "boundary." Also,
when private respondents stopped working for petitioners, the alleged purpose for which petitioners required
such unauthorized deposits no longer existed. In other case, any balance due to private respondents after
proper accounting must be returned to them with legal interest.

However, the unrebutted evidence with regard to the claim of Sabsalon is as follows:

YEAR DEPOSITS SHORTAGES VALES

1987 P 1,403.00 P 567.00 P 1,000.00

1988 720.00 760.00 200.00

1989 686.00 130.00 1,500.00

 1990 605.00 570.00

1991 165.00 2,300.00

———— ———— ————

P 3,579.00 P 4,327.00 P 2,700.00

The foregoing accounting shows that from 1987-1991, Sabsalon was able to withdraw his deposits
through vales or he incurred shortages, such that he is even indebted to petitioners in the amount of
P3,448.00. With respect to Maldigan's deposits, nothing was mentioned questioning the same even in the
present petition. We accordingly agree with the recommendation of the Solicitor General that since the
evidence shows that he had not withdrawn the same, he should be reimbursed the amount of his
accumulated cash deposits. 5

On the matter of the car wash payments, the labor arbiter had this to say in his decision: "Anent the
issue of illegal deductions, there is no dispute that as a matter of practice in the taxi industry, after a tour of
duty, it is incumbent upon the driver to restore the unit he has driven to the same clean condition when he
took it out, and as claimed by the respondents (petitioners in the present case), complainant(s) (private
respondents herein) were made to shoulder the expenses for washing, the amount doled out was paid
directly to the person who washed the unit, thus we find nothing illegal in this practice, much more (sic) to
consider the amount paid by the driver as illegal deduction in the context of the law." 6 (Words in
parentheses added.)

Consequently, private respondents are not entitled to the refund of the P20.00 car wash payments
they made. It will be noted that there was nothing to prevent private respondents from cleaning the taxi units
themselves, if they wanted to save their P20.00. Also, as the Solicitor General correctly noted, car washing
after a tour of duty is a practice in the taxi industry, and is, in fact, dictated by fair play.

On the last issue of attorney's fees or service fees for private respondents' authorized representative,
Article 222 of the Labor Code, as amended by Section 3 of Presidential Decree No. 1691, states that non-
lawyers may appear before the NLRC or any labor arbiter only (1) if they represent themselves, or (2) if they
represent their organization or the members thereof. While it may be true that Guillermo H. Pulia was the
authorized representative of private respondents, he was a non-lawyer who did not fall in either of the
foregoing categories. Hence, by clear mandate of the law, he is not entitled to attorney's fees.

Furthermore, the statutory rule that an attorney shall be entitled to have and recover from his client
a reasonable compensation for his services 7 necessarily imports the existence of an attorney-client
relationship as a condition for the recovery of attorney's fees, and such relationship cannot exist unless the
client's representative is a lawyer. 8

WHEREFORE, the questioned judgment of respondent National Labor Relations Commission is

hereby MODIFIED by deleting the awards for reimbursement of car wash expenses and attorney's fees and
directing said public respondent to order and effect the computation and payment by petitioners of the refund
for private respondent Domingo Maldigan's deposits, plus legal interest thereon from the date of finality of
this resolution up to the date of actual payment thereof.

SO ORDERED.