On the future of relations between the sexes

It is, for several reasons, impossible to foretell the future of sex and family relations, chiefly
because sex and family relations form an integral part of the conditions of social contact and
consequently cannot be analyzed in isolation. The only way to approach the question is to ask
what type of sexual and family relations can be expected if we assume a certain definite set of
social relations to prevail in the future. Second, it is not easy to make predictions even on the
basis of the future state of social relations. Today more than ever before, mankind is facing
several different social alternatives. It depends on human decision, actions and practices which
of these alternatives are actually realized. Thus we cannot answer our question merely by the
extrapolation of current social trends. What, then, can we do? Taking as our point of departure
the given conditions and potential of present society, in its economic, political and social
dimensions, we can describe the optimal and least desirable variants of social development and
predict the probable development of sexual and family relations under the optimal and least
desirable variants. Such a description itself naturally involves some choice. It is on the basis of
our values and our attitude in social conflicts (the two being integrated in practice) that we
choose a future for ourselves. The writer of these lines—a Marxist—has chosen a Communist
future for herself, which implies a definite attitude to the values mankind has developed to date.
Thus, in speaking about the future of sexual and family relations, we will henceforward outline
them in the context of a developing Communist society, this being the value system we have
chosen, since for us it incorporates the optimal realization of the potential of our times. It does
not mean that we exclude a less desirable, or even a repugnant solution, nor that we would
exclude the treatment of such a pessimistic possibility from Marxist theory and analysis. What it
does mean, however, is that the solutions possible in the perspective of communism remain our
yardstick in judging the future of sexual and family relations. Below—partly for reasons of
space—we shall deal mainly with the optimum possibility. The great variability of sexual and
moral rules and customs was already well known during the Renaissance. During the Age of
Enlightenment the rules of sexual morality were cited as a commonplace example of the
changing and incidental character of mores. Beyond variability, we are here primarily interested
in the following questions: first, are there amongst widely variable moral customs certain
inherent values which appear to be constant since a definite period in history, and if so which can
be regarded as [universal human values, that is, as factors in the development of the 'generic
essence' (Marx)? Further, which point beyond themselves in a positive manner? Second, what is
the significance and function of sexual mores generally, and what makes them specific within the
entire complex of moral customs? The answers to these questions have a far-reaching influence
on the concepts we form about the sexual and family relations of the future. Before the evolution
of civilization—of class societies—sexual customs were more variable than after the emergence
of class societies. There is no space here to analyze the reason for this phenomenon. Let us point
out, however, that this apparent richness conceals real poverty: it actually expresses the social
fusion of the tribal world. It is an aspect of the lack of universality and of individuality. In fact
only a single one of the values more or less formulated in primitive societies and adapted under
civilization with bearing on sexual relations is still operative: the incest taboo. With the passage
of time, this norm became instinctive: members of the same family—at least as the social
norm—do not even desire each other. By this norm, mankind socially regulated and codified its
interests as a species. Thus, the first universal (that is, historically permanent) value to apply to
sexual relations was born not merely as a result of natural selection, but by social provision—and
this is true even if man was not clearly aware of what he was doing. This was how the process
which Marx called 'pushing back natural frontiers' (Zurückweichung der Naturschranken) started
in relation to the sex instinct, a process which, as we shall see, has been very limited in this case.

Beginning with the development of civilization—and to repeat: historically this coincides with
the birth of class societies—the variability of moral ethics assumed new forms in the field of
sexual contacts. In this way a certain variability developed between different classes and strata
within the same society. At the same time the institution of marriage based on private property
came into being, together with the social inequality of men and women in sexual and family
relations. The influence of private property in sexual and family relations developed permanent
characteristics—to be found in every existing structure of customs—which, despite their
persistence, do not represent universal human values, for they are rooted in the process of
alienation. Alienation is the discrepancy between human essence and existence, the development
of the material powers of mankind at the cost of the depletion of the human essence of
individuals, and of entire social classes and strata. This is given manifold expression in the trends
of sexual relations—in different forms, at different historical periods. A common permanent
feature—which, by the way, does not only affect family relations—characteristic of every
alienated social structuration, is that, under private ownership, life is oriented towards
possessions. Only what is in our possession can be regarded as really ours. In this way, the desire
for possession becomes a basic drive and motivation, not only in relation to objects, but also to
persons. If a person is my property, he or she cannot belong to anyone else, just like my land, my
flock, my factory, or my house. Accordingly, the relationship between men and women is also
permeated by motives of possession. To avoid any misunderstanding, let me clarify that the drive
for possession dominant in sexual and family relations is not to be confused with the aspiration,
prevalent in every love relationship, that the person I desire, whom I love, should be 'mine'. If for
no other reason, confusion should be avoided because the 'instinct' of possession is independent
of desire and emotion. The man avenges the wife 'guilty' of adultery and her 'seducer' even if he
never loved and desired her, simply because she is 'his'. It is part of one's 'honor' not to be
deprived of anything that has been one's property, regardless of whether one needs it or not,
regardless of the degree of one's need for the object or person. It should be added, of course, that
the attitude of wanting to gain possession is closely interwoven even with the desire that the
loved or desired person be one's own. The motivation of possession becomes overpowering in
this relationship, too, and profoundly influences the desire itself. It is part of male prestige to
possess as many women as possible, and this is further enhanced if the women in question are
'difficult'; on the other hand, the prestige of women depends on the number—and no less, the
social rank—of their suitors and admirers.
Within class society it is generally not human being who confronts human being, but a person
occupying one position in the division of labor with one filling another. People are only equal if
their position in the division of labor (within the social hierarchy) is similar. This is an equality
of unequal, for its basis is not equal human substance or value. Of course, substantial equality is
possible even between people similarly situated on the social scale; or, in other words,
meaningful relations based on equality are possible even under conditions of alienation. But in
the vast majority of cases they are possible under these conditions only between the same sex, in
the first place among male friends. The relationship of people of different sexes is—as we said
before—by definition unequal. Above all, the woman is judged not on the basis of her own place
in the division of labor but according to her father's or husband's position. Only the nineteenth
and twentieth centuries brought some change in this field, though not a significant one. Sexual
relations are thus condemned to be relations between unequal people, and in this way reflect the
alienation of the properties of the species {Substanz der Gattung).

This inequality is evident in every aspect of the relations between the sexes. It is reflected in the
sexual aspect, for the reciprocity of sexual pleasure is an expressly universal aim only in
exceptional periods. It is obvious morally, for what is permissible for the man is forbidden for
the woman. It is to be seen in the intellectual and legal fields as well—in the latter it is most
clearly demonstrated by the different legal positions of men and women within the family. The
subjective aspect of alienation is the silent acceptance of this inequality, rebellions against which
usually break out at times of universal social revolutions or as a consequence thereof, (during the
Renaissance, the Age of Enlightenment, early Romanticism, Utopian Socialism, and later
parallel with the spread of Marxism).

Universal social alienation extends to sexual relations in other ways too : through the mediation
of the alienation of morality. Attitudes centered on property presuppose a particularist
personality, an individual who strives, primarily, to maintain himself under given conditions—
even against others if need be, an individual in whom emotions relating merely to his own person
—such as envy and jealousy, vanity and selfishness—become dominant, the kind of person
unable to look at himself objectively, from a distance, but uncritically identifying himself with
his own emotions and interests. Morality develops along with the genesis of the particularist
personality, and its function is to regulate particularist ambitions, subordinating them to more
universal social requirements and interests. Moral imperatives do not merely remain external—
indeed, they would not be moral if they did so. The individual internalizes them, adopts them as
part of his internal make-up and code, some internalizing more, others less, depending on the
person. Conscience as an 'internal judge' is the form in which the 'external judge'—public moral
judgment and opinion—appears within the personality. Obviously, morals play an exceptionally
important role even in their alienated form in the humanization of mankind, and of the relation
between the sexes. Similarly, it is evident that the antagonism between moral norms and
individual particularist drives does at least as much to conserve particularism as to humanize it.
Here we are only examining sexual relations. The norms of sex morality also only partly
humanize the individual, while on the other hand, they keep alive the opposition between
particularist efforts and moral norms (which may also be particularist). The desire for possession,
jealousy and selfishness are not eliminated, but merely redirected to areas where they do not
conflict —or only very slightly—with social norms. For instance, a man who cannot beat up his
superior can find compensation in beating up his wife. Several varieties of sadism and
masochism, on record as sexual perversions, are basically nothing more than an outlet for a
particularist desire for possession within the permitted framework. (This, of course, applies not
only to sex: let us just think of the sadism of war; against the enemy anything is permitted.) In
regard to morality and the relations between the sexes, there is, however, a special problem
which should be treated separately. When we mentioned how the incest taboo developed even
before the birth of civilization, we also said that this is a manifestation of pushing back natural
barriers. In the relationship between the sexes the driving back of natural barriers however
appears theoretically in a different form than in all other forms of human contact, simply because
it is the only human relationship based on biological (natural) instinct. True, nutrition is also a
biological drive, but one for which human contact is of only subordinate importance. On the
other hand, the natural instinct at work in the relations between mother and baby is by definition
(by nature) one of unequal. In the relations between a mother and her adult children, the natural
barriers become less and less effective. Today grownup children usually 'pick' their mothers on
the basis of social and ethical judgment, or in other words shape their relations with their mother
independently of the kinship bond. And the mother does the same with her adult children. The
sex instinct, on the contrary, is an absolute and uneliminable foundation for contact between the
sexes. It cannot be driven back, only humanized. This is the genesis of the special function of
moral alienation in the regulation of the relationship between the sexes. The fact is that moral
norms either humanize or suppress the sex instinct—there is no third alternative. It is to Freud's
everlasting credit that he recognized the antagonism between moral norms and the sex instinct,
and all the aberrations caused by the suppression of the sex instinct. Since Freud, however,
regarded alienated social relations as the permanent human state, he did not think of the second
alternative : the possibility of humanization. And yet several aspects of this alternative were
already evident in the prehistory of mankind. In the humanization of the contact between the
sexes and, inseparably, in the simple suppression of the sex instinct, Christianity played a
distinctive role, having been for over a thousand years the dominant ideology governing
morality. This is where the double function of alienated morality can be most clearly observed.
Let us look at humanization first. Christianity accepted and proclaimed (though only as a
tendency and an ideology) the equality of women, at least before God. Women are the equals of
men in the congregation and, although excluded from the priesthood, can become saints. The
moral norms are also the same for both men and women: virginity is a virtue and adultery a sin
for both. (That this morality was not valid in practice is a different story.) Without this
ideological equality, modern love, amour passion would not have come into being. However,
Christian ethics display a peculiar paradox in respect to sexual relations. In Antiquity the degree
of humanization in the contact between the sexes reflected the prevailing level of moral
development. The Christian world, however, produced the opposite relation as well: the stronger
the power of morality, the more suppressed was sex, regarded even ideologically as something
'bestial'. Although sex itself was permissible, for it serves reproduction of the race, erotic
enjoyment, taking pleasure in sex, and especially the cult of pleasure were a sin accompanied by
guilt feelings. Bourgeois ethics took over Christian ethics of least partly in this respect (primarily
affecting women), yet on the other hand—in actual opposition to Christianity—adopted the
inequality of the sexes as an ideological principle. Monogamy became openly associated with the
brothel. Consequently, it is by no means fortuitous that the so-called 'sexual revolution' is one of
the chief manifestations of rebellion against bourgeois ethics. 'The sexual revolution' has already
had several waves, but never one so sweeping as that experienced today in the Western European
student movements. Of course, this is not a unified movement, but one in which several
tendencies meet. We can nevertheless distinguish two main trends. One of these turns everything
always practiced in periods of dissolution of moral norms into an ideological principle; it
identifies man with the particularist individual and demands his absolute sexual satisfaction. This
is how sexual perversions and primarily the very sado-masochism of whose clearly particularist
character we have already spoken—become ideals. For us, however, the other trend is the more
interesting. Its adherents regard the sexual revolution as one way to end alienation—and this is,
indeed, what they are looking for. They do not merely declare the right of all human beings to
pleasure (the ideology has been provided by Marcuse's Eros and Civilization), but consciously
believe in the equality of men and women in the relation between the sexes. Moreover they want
to eliminate from this relation one of the principal manifestations of alienation, namely the
motive of possession. Those pursuing this search through the sexual revolution are probing for a
humanized society even if their theory and practice incorporate a great deal of naïveté and even
absurdity. We have already mentioned that forms of humanized relations between the sexes
appear even under conditions of alienation, though only exceptionally. Most important is the
development of individual love and the demand, which has been imperative for some time, that
marriage be based on love. It also includes cultured eroticism, the camaraderie and friendship
(the two not being the same) of the couple. Also under this heading falls self-education to
overcome the instinct of possession—including self-training to combat jealousy—of which life
and literature show many examples. (We are thinking of the Diary of Chernishevsky, whose
battle against jealousy formed an important element in his total revolutionary attitude.) Of
course, all positive elements pointing towards the development of the species can assume
inhuman forms and may in other respects be destructive. This holds even for comradeship and
friendship, for Lady Macbeth's comradely identification with her husband sets no good moral
example. This kind of moral degradation often goes hand in hand with individual love, too. Love
as a passion often virtually sweeps away all the obstacles (including living people) in its way.
Here, however, it is not passion itself which is at fault, but prior judgments and a system of
prejudices rooted in the human psyche which places obstacles in the way of passion (for
instance, reasons of state, as in Racine's Bérénice, or the possessive nature of the passion, as in
his Phaedra). Nor is love independent in other respects from the social and human framework in
which it arises: people generally fall in love with persons who can promote their interests. In a
class society love crosses social boundaries and classes only exceptionally. This is exemplified in
Shaw's play Widower's Houses. Love relations are inseparable from financial relations both in
prostitution and in marriage, where the woman is generally maintained. And, in the twentieth
century, love became a social custom, part of ‘good manners', and in a certain sense 'obligatory'.
The mass media manipulate love just as much as they manipulate sex (cf. the film 'Marty').

Of course, the depth or superficiality of love is only one manifestation of the depth or
shallowness of human essence. The relative prevalence of passionate love coincides historically
with the development of human subjectivity in its positive sense; with the birth of modern
bourgeois individualism (modern love poetry is the finest expression of the change). The more
substantial an individual (emotionally, ethically and culturally), the more substantial the love of
which he is capable. The more depleted, the more alienated, a person, the less meaningful, the
more superficial and incidental his love. Nevertheless, we cannot consider the cult of love (and
within it of sex) in the twentieth century merely a result of manipulation. The fact is that in a
world in which community ties loosen and break, in which the individual is lonely and
defenseless, love (and sex) is the only direct and personal human relationship in which one
individual finds another. Even the poorest love preserves something of the joy of discovering
another person, and reduces or dissolves—though only temporarily—the sense of loneliness and
isolation, building a bridge from soul to soul. Thus, even the most commercial relationship
between the sexes expresses something of human essence and contributes something to its
preservation. Let us now say a few words about the problem of so-called ' sex morality'. We raise
the question again: is the existence of a separate 'sex morality' a lasting value? Our answer is a
definite 'no'. It is no because the existence of all partial or restricted moralities (and this applies
not only to sex morality, but similarly to 'business morals' or 'political morals') is an expression
of moral alienation. A large part of public opinion still holds that whatever is contrary to the
prevalent sexual mores is 'immoral'. Moreover, the term 'immorality' is often used to cover the
violation of the customary rules governing sex. If, on the other hand, we examine the problem
from the point of view of the development of the properties of the species—and here already the
problem of future trends appears—it becomes clear that in the relation between the sexes the
same factors—and only those factors—impair universal values which are detrimental to all other
aspects of morality. Breaking the will of another person, deliberate misleading (lies), regarding
the other person simply as a tool, ruining other people's lives, lack of reciprocity, and inequality,
these are the attitudes and acts in contacts between the sexes which violate the universal generic
values most irreparably. But obviously they do not offend against the special ethics of sex
morality only, for they also violate the properties of the species in every other aspect of human
relations.

Our first assertion in regard to the future then is that the special system of ethics governing 'sex
morality' will disappear, and contact between the sexes will be judged by the same moral criteria
which apply to any other field of human relations.
As we said, we presuppose the kind of future society in which there is no alienation, and in this
connexion foresee the ending of alienation in the relation between the sexes, as in all other
domains yet analyzed. What is our image of these relations? What can we say about them
prospectively? First of all, the social inequality of men and women will cease. Naturally we do
not mean by this the ending of all kinds of inequality; since the inequality of human beings
cannot be eliminated in any other respects either. And by the ending of social inequality we do
not only mean that social position, and the chances of a start in life will be equal, but also that the
differences in traits and characteristics which seem 'natural' because we have grown used to them
over thousands of years, but which are still results of the social division of labor will be reduced
and gradually disappear. Amongst these are the inequality of men and women in sexual
enjoyment and in choosing a partner, in intellectual efforts and accomplishments, and also in
such emotional and moral attributes as the 'natural' hardness and rationality of man and the
'natural' softness and emotionality of women, etc. Since life in general will no longer be centered
on property, possessiveness will disappear from the relations between the sexes. The other
person will no longer be a prestige object, a trophy, or a means to an end. In the relationship of
genuinely free people, the other person is always a goal in himself. Nothing but the termination
of the need on one side can end a relationship, just as nothing but reciprocated need for the other
person can bring it into existence. Clearly this will not eliminate grief. One-sided or unequal
desire and love will always remain a source of pain and sometimes even of tragedy. But the
trauma deriving from the frustrated drive for possession will disappear. When one loses a
partner, personal loss alone will cause the pain, and not hurt vanity or injured 'honor', the feeling
that 'my property has been taken from me'. There will no longer be any catastrophist arising from
a distinct 'sex morality', just as there will be no sin, and no guilt feelings springing from the
supposed transgression of a distinct sex code. Thus, disappointment in love will become a pain
worthy of man. In a non-alienated world where the main drive is no longer for property, persons
will no longer be particularistic. Individual personality, which has been only an exception, will
become socially typical. Moral norms will no longer confront a person steeped in particularism
as something alien. The personality will be able to follow its specific gifts (natural abilities,
talents and emotions) in the direction of valid choices, to humanize its impulses instead of
suppressing them. We have seen that this is of special significance in sexuality, where the natural
barriers cannot be gradually driven back, but either must be suppressed or humanized. The
individual person need no longer suppress his physical desires, if these desires themselves
become humanized. We have already mentioned the criteria of humanness: equality, reciprocity,
free choice and approaching others as ends in themselves. Thus, even a merely sexual attraction
can be entirely human if it fulfills these criteria, just ¡as today even the most 'spiritual' love can
be inhuman if it does not meet them. The line between what is human and inhuman is therefore
not drawn where traditional morality (chiefly Christian) defines the limit, not between the
'merely' physical and the 'spiritual'. If we say that all human beings will be individuals capable of
humanizing their emotions, we certainly do not mean that everyone will love or desire equally
and with equal intensity. Quite the opposite. Everybody humanizes his drives on the basis of the
above criteria, and these drives can be widely different. But fully developed individuals do not
need the rules of 'sexual morality' to direct their drives along a human course. Every person
knows best what relationship or relationships are most suitable for him. We have already
mentioned that, before the development of civilization, extraordinary variability characterized
the relations between the sexes. This variability developed within the framework of clans and
tribes and in this way was not bound to any universality. In the society of the future such
variability will return, but this time individually, in this way it will be characterized by the
greatest universality, with the individual pattern directly embodying the universality of the
human species. To this point, we have only discussed the wealth of types in relations between the
sexes. Now their depth should also be mentioned. As we have seen, the depth, the
meaningfulness of relations between the sexes depends directly on the general depth and
substance of human beings. The richer the emotional, moral and intellectual culture, the more
universal the warmth of emotions, the richer and more profound the emotional and intellectual
relations will become in contact between the sexes. Without a doubt, the perspective we have
outlined implies the disappearance of alienated, monogamous marriage. (By alienated marriage
we mean marriage based on property. Its monogamous version is that which for long officially
sanctioned the cohabitation of a man and woman for life.) The dissolution of monogamous
marriage is something we are already witnessing in this day and age; this is & factum brutum
today. The mere dissolution of monogamy, however, does not at all mean that new and more
worthy relations necessarily develop. To achieve this, a social movement must clearly develop
which leads to the liquidation of all forms of alienation. Until real equality of men and women
has been achieved, the dissolution of monogamy implies, at least transitionally, greater
disadvantages for women. Until a new organic human community has come into being, the
dissolution of monogamy makes loneliness explicit—and in this way more distressing—even if it
does not increase it. We regard the dissolution of alienated monogamous marriage, despite its
painful conflicts, as a process which points ahead to a better future over the longer range. It
reduces the role of ownership and financial relations in cohabitation and in extramarital sexual
relations, while also reducing prostitution (this holds particularly for socialist societies). True, as
long as there is ' spontaneously evolved {naturwüchsig) division of labour' (Marx), property and
monetary considerations cannot be eliminated from the relation between the sexes. But the
motivational force of these factors can, and does, diminish. Nineteenth century Marxists (Engels,
Bebel) foresaw and approved this aspect of the dissolution of alienated monogamy. What Engels
and Bebel did not foresee were the conflicts and contradictions concomitant with such
dissolution, for they regarded socialism as a kind of society made up of close communities, right
from the moment of its inception. We have stressed repeatedly that the people of the future will
choose the pattern and depth of their relations individually, without being bound and their
impulses suppressed by the taboos of sex morality. This certainly does not mean, however, that
the actor himself can ever be the only and chief judge of his deeds. Even the most advanced
person may make false decisions, which are opposed to universal value judgments, or can act on
occasion against his human substance; moreover, there will never be a time when every person is
equally advanced. Consequently there will continue to be a judge and judgment, and this will be
the public opinion of communities built on equal and free human relations. This public opinion,
however, will differ from all types of public judgments to date in not being founded on
particularistic norms hostile to the individual and based merely on custom. It will judge on the
basis of the individual case and situation, and the only relevant criterion will be whether a given
decision offended against the general values at the given level of development of the species, and
whether it might have been possible—and if so at what price—for the individual to refrain from
violating them. Thus the judgment of public opinion will not have the effect of suppressing
individual impulses but of humanizing them.

Fourier, and in his wake Marx, said that the degree of the humanization of a society can be
gauged by the relations between men and women. Here we have sketched a perspective in which
a humanized society makes possible humanized relationships between men and women, the first
such case in the history of mankind. We do not deny, however (in fact we pointed it out at the
beginning), that there is also the possibility of another perspective. In a world ruled by
manipulation, everything that today points in the direction of the development of values can have
an opposite, undesirable, outcome. Thus, the dissolution of monogamy or the 'sexual revolution'
can not only herald a more humane future, but can also be the precursor of a decline of those
values mankind has progressively created. The individual manipulated on the basis of his
particularist motives may sink lower in his relationship with the opposite sex than the ascetic
who suppresses his instincts, or the libertine who, blindly and completely unconcerned for
others, follows the bidding of his passions. The pseudo-scientific and literary dishing-up of sex
life, its 'expert' and at the same time conformist teaching based on the appeal of 'everybody's
doing it' degrades sexuality more than the most tormenting guilt feelings over secret eroticism.
(To avoid any possible misunderstanding, these remarks are not directed against sex instruction!)
In fact, this sort of manipulation erodes individuality, the very quality which is most valuable in
the relation between the sexes, whether in sexuality, eroticism, or love.

When we make our choice in social conflicts, we are at the same time making a choice as to the
future of the relation between the sexes. We choose the free and equal—and certainly
individual—relations of the sexes, relations cleansed of the drive for possession and rich, deep
and meaningful in every aspect of human life.

Agnes Heller, a former assistant to from Hungarian] Professor György Lukács, is now on the
staff of the Sociological Research Group of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. She has
published numerous articles in periodicals both in Hungary and other countries and a collection
of her papers has appeared under the title Value and History, amongst her other works are The
Theory of Rational Selfishness, The Sociology of Morality or the Morality of Sociology and
Social Role and Prejudice.