§ 61.

Termination of tenancy by injury to or destruction of premises

The destruction of a building or improvements on leased property by fire does not terminate the lease;
however, this rule does not prohibit the parties from contracting with respect to such contingencies. 1
Statutory provisions change the common-law rule with respect to leases made for a term of not more
than seven years. Therefore, pursuant to statute, if the improvements on property rented for a term of not
more than seven years become untenantable by reason of fire or unavoidable accident, the tenancy
terminates, and all liability for rent ceases on payment proportionately to the day of the fire or
unavoidable accident.2

The statute, in cases in which it is applicable, does not prohibit the parties from contracting with respect
to such contingencies.3 Thus, where such provisions are made in the lease, the rights of the parties with
respect to the termination of the lease are determined by those provisions. However, if a lease does not
provide for such contingencies, then the statute controls in cases to which it is applicable.4

Illustration:

The phrase “condemnation by public authorities” in a lease did not include condemnation by eminent
domain as voiding the lease, where the context in which the phrase appeared indicated that the
condemnation contemplated by the parties would be that resulting from structural defects or damage;
thus, the lessee was allowed to share in the eminent domain condemnation award, for the loss of the
leasehold interest.5

Casualty provisions may provide for the termination of the lease where the premises are substantially
destroyed or rendered untenantable. The destruction in such a case must be of a character to render the
premises permanently untenantable or that restoration would be practically the equivalent of a new
building, or so extensive that the demised building has as a practical matter lost its character as a
building.6 Under such provisions, where the building may be restored by ordinary repairs made to the
building with no considerable interruption of the tenant’s use while the repairs are being made, the
tenancy is not terminated.7

Illustration:

Nonstructural damage to a large, single-story building situated on low ground, caused by unprecedented
rainfall accompanying a hurricane, did not constitute such “substantial destruction” of the leased
premises as would justify cancellation of the lease under a casualty clause, defining “substantial
destruction” as damage to such extent as to render 50% or more of the floor space unusable for the
tenant’s business, where although flooding rendered all of the leased floor space temporarily unusable,
the building valued at more than $100,000 was made completely tenantable within one month at a cost
of only $5,000.8
 § 62. Termination of tenancy by surrender or abandonment of premises

A lease may be terminated by a surrender of the leasehold estate, that is, by a yielding up of the estate to
the landlord so that the leasehold interest becomes extinct. 1 A lease may be terminated by an express
surrender in writing,2 or by act or by operation of law, whereby the parties form the common intent for
the surrender to take place and then engage in acts that are tantamount to a stipulation to effectuate the
assignment.3 A surrender by operation of law may be accomplished where the landlord accepts a verbal
surrender and actually accepts or puts another tenant in possession, or the landlord itself takes
possession.4 The fact that a landlord relets the premises for the account of the tenant after a default in the
payment of rent and notice to the landlord does not constitute an acceptance of the premises so as to
amount to a “surrender” by operation of law or to take a claimed oral surrender out of the statute of
frauds.5

Observation:

Determinations of whether a surrender of a leasehold interest has occurred are made on a case-by-case
basis and are generally a matter for the trier-of-fact.6

In order to constitute a valid surrender of rented premises by a tenant during the term, there must be the
assent of both parties to the rescinding of the contract of renting. 7 The assent may be express or implied
from acts which reasonably indicate that the parties have agreed that the tenant must abandon the
premises and that the landlord must assume possession. 8 Note, reentry by a landlord when a tenant has
abandoned the premises does not relieve the tenant of liability under the lease.9

Illustration:

Evidence was insufficient to support a finding that either the landlord or the landlord’s assignee accepted
or recognized a claimed oral surrender of a five-year lease substituting the tenant’s former partner in his
place, where the parties signed a document which was not a release but merely an amendment adding
the former partner as a tenant, or to establish that the landlord assumed possession, thereby creating
surrender by operation of law.10

Where a first lease for a given term is followed by a second lease for the same term or part of the same
term between the same parties, for the same property, and the terms, covenants, and conditions of the
second lease are so inconsistent with the first lease that the two cannot exist together, the first lease is
rendered null and void by the second lease. However, where the first lease is not so inconsistent and
incompatible with the second lease entered into between the same parties for the same term or part of the
same term for the same property that the two cannot operate together, the first lease is not rendered null
and void, but still exists and there is only a modification of the first lease.11

§ 63. Forfeiture of lease

A tenancy for years may end by forfeiture before the expiration of the term. 1 However, forfeitures for
breaches of covenants in leases are not favored. 2 Courts will provide relief from the forfeiture of a lease
where the omission and subsequent forfeiture are the result of mistake or accident, and the injury arising
from it is capable of compensation. 3 Thus, courts of equity will grant relief from the forfeiture where
such a condition is provided to secure the payment of money, as in the case of a right of re-entry for the
nonpayment of rent at the time designated in the lease.4

Illustration:

Notwithstanding a lack of controversy over the duty of tenants to pay all rent and taxes due after suit
was filed, a judge was justified in including sums due and owing therefor in the total figure he decreed
payable by the tenants in order to prevent forfeiture of the lease.5

The courts will refuse to interfere, however, where the transaction resulting in forfeiture is willful or
compensation is impracticable.6 Thus, where the tenant’s “willful” acts create a situation where the
determination of compensation became impracticable, the granting of equitable relief from forfeiture is
precluded.7

Illustrations:

A tenant which continually did not comply with the terms of the lease and which destroyed and
manipulated the records necessary to determine the rental due violated the fundamental principles of fair
dealing and thus was not entitled to equitable relief from forfeiture of the lease.8

In addition, the tenants’ former breaches of a rent payment covenant were not waived and could properly
be given consideration by the trial judge when deciding whether equitable relief preventing forfeiture of
the lease on the ground of subsequent default in payment of rent and taxes would be appropriate.9

§ 64. Forfeiture of lease by breach of covenant or condition by lessee

A tenancy cannot usually be terminated for breach of a covenant by the lessee unless there is an express
provision for forfeiture or right of re-entry. A lease may, under its provisions, be terminable by the lessor
where its provisions as to the use to be made of the premises by the lessee are breached. 1 Where the
lease so provides, the breach of a provision against the assigning or subletting by the lessee will
authorize a forfeiture of the lease by the lessor.2

Observation:

The proportionate injury caused by the breach of a condition of the lease is one factor in the
consideration of whether to grant equitable relief against a forfeiture.3

§ 65. Forfeiture of lease by breach of covenant or condition by lessee—Nonpayment of rent, taxes, and
assessments

A mere breach of a covenant to pay rent does not necessarily forfeit the estate. 1 Rather, the terms of the
lease determine whether a lease is forfeited by a breach of the covenant to pay rent. 2 Equitable relief
against forfeiture will be afforded where a default in payment of rent is due to fraud, mistake, surprise,
or accident, but courts are divided on the question of whether they should intercede where a breach is
due to gross negligence or is willful and persistent, and none will grant relief against forfeiture where the
tenant has violated the fundamental principles of fair dealing. 3 The lease itself may provide for forfeiture
where the rent is in arrears for a specified time.4

Illustration:

A loan association, in computing the monthly sum payable to it by the tenant under the terms of a lease,
performed as the agent for both the landlords and the tenant so that a mistake in computation by it
resulted in mutual mistake of fact, preventing the landlords from claiming default under the lease
because of a deficiency in the rent payment.5

In order to entitle the landlord to enforce a forfeiture for nonpayment of rent, a demand for payment may
be required. Where the lessor’s conduct in a long course of dealing with the lessee is sufficient to have
led the lessee to believe that prompt payment of rent would not be insisted on, and that it would not be
the lessor’s intention to enforce a forfeiture because of the alleged breach of such condition of the lease,
the lessor will not be permitted, without notice of an intention to do so, to enforce a forfeiture for breach
of the prompt payment condition.6

Observation:

A lease requiring the landlords to give notice of default in instances of violations of covenants other than
that for payment of rent does not entitle the tenants to notice by the landlords on each date the rent is due
or absolve a tenant of default in the absence of notice.7
On the other hand, a payment or tender of all the rent due may not always prevent a forfeiture of a lease
for nonpayment of the rent.8

Illustration:

A lease of premises for an open-air movie theater was properly forfeited for nonpayment of rent
notwithstanding there was a tender of all that was due and owing and an offer by the father of the
stockholder of the corporate tenant and the officer of the corporate tenant to pay all that was due to the
landlords, where the tenant was insolvent to such a degree that it would be unjust to the landlords to
enjoin the forfeiture.9

Generally, the lessee’s failure to pay taxes or assessments on the leased property is a ground for
forfeiture under a provision in the lease to that effect. 10 However, failure to make tax payments may not
always constitute a default such as to give rise to forfeiture of the lease.11

Illustration:

The failure to make payments did not constitute a default under the lease where, although the landlords
had the right under the lease to demand a tenant’s payment of additional monthly sums for taxes and
insurance, under the circumstances the tenant was justified in refusing to make additional payments after
the landlords withdrew the surplus from an insurance escrow account and the tenant instituted a
declaratory judgment action with respect to the surplus in the escrow account.12

§ 66. Forfeiture of lease by breach of covenant or condition by lessee—Enforcement of forfeiture

While it is usually optional with the landlord or one standing in the landlord’s place to avail itself of the
right to forfeit a lease for breach by the tenant of a lease covenant, where a lease provides that in the
event of the violation of any of the covenants, terms, or conditions of the lease the landlord may, at its
option, cancel and annul the lease or relet the premises as the agent of the tenant, actions by the landlord
amount to an election to cancel and annul the lease where such actions when considered together are
inconsistent with anything except the termination of the tenancy by the landlord.1

Illustration:

A landlord’s actions amounted to an election to cancel and annul the lease where the landlord reentered
and took possession of the demised premises, and prior to the sale of the assets of the tenant on the
leased premises: (1) made improvements for a new tenant without the consent or permission of the
receiver who received a new lease for a longer period than the original lease had to run; and (2) filed a
claim in receivership proceedings for the rent owing at the time and made no claim for possible future
rent.2

§ 67. Waiver of forfeiture for breach of covenant or condition by lessee

Because it is optional with the landlord or one standing in his or her place to avail itself of the right to
forfeit a lease for a breach by the tenant of a covenant or condition,1 the landlord may elect to waive the
forfeiture.2 A waiver by the landlord of its right to forfeit a lease for the breach of a condition by the
tenant may be express or it may be implied from the landlord’s acts. 3 Any act of the landlord, done with
knowledge of a cause of forfeiture by the tenant, affirming the existence of the lease and recognizing the
tenant as his or her tenant, or otherwise inconsistent with the intention to declare a forfeiture, constitutes
a waiver of the forfeiture.4

Illustration:

A corporate lessor’s acquiescence in the breach of a tenant’s covenant not to use the leased premises for
purposes other than those of a rendering factory by continuing to supply steam, as agreed in the lease,
for the making of cattle and poultry feed by the tenant on the premises, without objection for three years,
with knowledge of the tenant’s use of the premises for that purpose, operated as a waiver of the breach.5

The acceptance of rent accruing after the breach of a covenant in the lease implies a waiver of the right
to declare a forfeiture.6 The underlying rationale for this rule is that the acceptance of rent accruing after
a breach is an affirmation of the tenancy and a recognition of its continuance; in effect, the lessor elects
to continue the relationship of landlord and tenant. Nevertheless, the acceptance of rent by the lessor
after a breach of the lease by the lessee does not establish a waiver as a matter of law. 7 Note, the
acceptance of rent after a breach of a covenant in a lease does not constitute a waiver of the forfeiture
where the rent accepted accrued prior to the time of the forfeiture.8

Illustration:

Landlords’ cashing of checks for overdue rent when the tenants were spending many thousands of
dollars in valuable improvements did not constitute waiver of prior breaches of the lease by failure to
pay rent, in view of two suits the landlords had been forced to institute to collect back taxes and the
landlords’ abortive suit for repossession.9

§ 68. Notice to terminate tenancy

At common law, no notice to quit is necessary to terminate a tenancy for years at the expiration of the
term fixed in the lease.1 A provision for the termination of the lease by notice may be inserted in the
lease, and in such case notice must be given in accordance with the provision of the lease. 2 Note, a
notice intended to terminate or determine a tenancy should not be confused with the notice which
entitles the landlord to repossess itself of the premises by a statutory remedy.3

Illustration:

A provision of a lease for warehouse space, requiring the lessee to provide notice to any superior
mortgagee or superior lessor prior to canceling or terminating the lease because of any act or omission
by the lessor, did not preclude the lessee from terminating the lease after the lessor actually evicted the
lessee by allowing a neighboring lessee to occupy the lessee’s premises, since no superior mortgagee or
superior lessor existed to whom the lessee could give notice; the provision was intended to address the
rights of the superior mortgagee or superior lessor, if any existed.4

Pursuant to the Real Property Article, no written agreement between a landlord and tenant will provide
for a longer notice period to be furnished by the tenant to the landlord in order to terminate the tenancy
than that required of the landlord to the tenant in order to terminate the tenancy.5

In addition, under statute, a tenant who is a victim of domestic violence or a victim of sexual assault, to
terminate a residential lease under specified circumstances, is required to provide written notice of an
intent to vacate the premises to the landlord.6

§ 69. Notice to terminate tenancy—Periodic tenancies

In the case of tenancies for a first period of time with an indefinite succession of periodic renewals, such
as a tenancy from year to year or month to month, notice to quit is required for termination. 1 The right to
determine such tenancies by notice is reciprocal and can be given by either the landlord or the tenant.2

A notice to quit is usually good if on the whole it is intelligible and sufficiently certain that the tenant
cannot reasonably misunderstand it.3 Furthermore, delivery of the notice on the rented premises to a
husband, wife, or agent of the tenant is a sufficient service.4

In the absence of any language in the lease providing for a different method of counting days between
notice and termination of a month-to-month tenancy, the rule is not to include or exclude both the day on
which the notice was served and the day on which termination was to occur, but to exclude the one and
include the other.5

Illustration:
Tenants gave timely notice of their intent to terminate a residential lease by delivering to the landlord on
April 1st a notice that they intended to terminate their month-to-month tenancy as of April 30th,
although the lease provision required “thirty (30) days’ written notice of termination prior to the Rent
Due Date”; the first day of each month was a Rent Due Date until the time either party gave notice of
termination, and until the tenants delivered their timely notice of termination, May 1st was a Rent Due
Date under the terms of the subject lease, and consequently, the notice delivered on April 1st was
delivered: (1) 30 days prior to termination; and (2) 30 days prior to the next Rent Due Date.6

§ 70. Use and enjoyment of premises

In determining what is demised by a lease, the intention of the parties must be ascertained as shown by
the whole instrument in the light of existing circumstances and the general rules of construction. 1 As a
general rule, a lease of a building conveys an interest in the land on which the building is situated, 2 and,
unless limited by its terms, such lease includes the external walls of the building. 3 In the absence of any
language indicating an intention to the contrary of the lessor, a lease passes to the lessee everything that
is properly appurtenant to the land demised or is essential or reasonably necessary to the full beneficial
use and enjoyment of the property.4 The question as to the meaning of the description of premises in a
lease is for the court.5

Illustration:

A lease which permitted the tenants to erect suitable and neat signs at both entrances and on the building
itself but which did not mention what would constitute the north wall after demolition of another portion
of the building had been accomplished gave rise to a presumption that the landlord had reserved part of
the outside walls of the building for its own use, and the trial court’s conclusion that the landlord had
reserved the right to use most of the wall for advertising purposes and that the tenants had the right to
erect a locative sign on the wall over the entrance door in addition to a smaller sign on one side of the
entrance and another smaller sign on a pole at the entrance to the parking lot was fair and reasonable
under the circumstances.6

The word “premises” as used in a lease has a varied meaning depending on the context and object to
which it is applied. After considering the language of the instrument itself, consideration is to be given
to the nature of the building and the surrounding property as well as the general purposes of the parties,
in order to determine what constitutes the premises. 7 Where a lease, demising certain premises, states
that a plat, giving a specific and exact description of the property, will be furnished by the lessors and
made a part of the lease, the plat when properly attached to the lease controls its provisions even where
the effect is to eliminate part of the property from the demise, and in such case the rule that doubtful
language in a lease is construed against the party drafting it is inapplicable.8

A description of premises in a lease of a building by the street number includes only so much of the lot
upon which the building is situated as is necessary to the complete enjoyment of the building for the
purpose for which it was leased. The question of whether land in the rear of a building that is described
by street number is necessary to its complete enjoyment so as to be included within the demise is a
question of fact for the trier-of-facts, who, in determining the question, may consider whether the land is
situated in a thickly settled community, whether the land is enclosed by a fence, whether the business
conducted on the premises is such as requires the use of the land for storage, shipment, or other
purposes, whether it abuts on a street, and whether there are adjoining landowners or tenants who have a
special use for the land.9

§ 71. Possession of premises

In the absence of express agreement, the lessor is not required to give the lessee possession of the
property, nor is it the lessor’s duty, when the demised premises are wrongfully held by a third person, to
take the necessary steps to put the lessee into possession. 1 Where the lessor does not covenant or agree to
put the lessee into possession, a covenant to protect the lessee against a paramount title or against a
person claiming under the lessor will be implied. However, a covenant to protect the lessee against a
trespasser wrongfully in possession, such as a lessee holding over after the term, will not be implied, so
that, as to such wrongdoer, the lessee is responsible for the assertion and establishment of the title and
right of possession granted by the lease.2 Accordingly, where possession is withheld from the lessee by a
wrongdoer, the lessee may bring an action against the wrongdoer, but may not maintain an action for
damages against the lessor, and if such action is brought against the lessor, he or she may introduce
evidence to show that he or she has not, by act, withheld possession from the lessee.3

Observation:

A tenant properly on the premises of a property has a right of possession as against a landlord. It follows
that a landlord, or a person who has succeeded to the position of a landlord, would have no right of
immediate possession as against a tenant legally in possession of the property.4

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

When a lease expires or is terminated, but the tenant does not vacate the leased premises, the landlord
may bring an action for damages against the tenant known as a “tenant holding over” action. West’s
Ann.Md.Code, Real Property, § 8–402. Lockett v. Blue Ocean Bristol, LLC, 446 Md. 397, 132 A.3d 257
(2016).
 § 72. Covenants for quiet enjoyment

In the absence of a provision to the contrary, the law implies a covenant in the lease for quiet enjoyment
and undisturbed possession of the leased premises, and the lessor is as fully bound as though there were
an express covenant to that effect in the lease. 1 It is expressly provided by statute that in any lease,
unless the lease provides otherwise, there is an implied covenant by the lessor that the lessee will quietly
enjoy the land.2 This statutorily implied covenant of quiet enjoyment is applicable to residential as well
as to commercial leases.3

Observation:

The scope or magnitude of the interference necessary to constitute a breach of the covenant of quiet
enjoyment in a lease must be such as goes to the essence of what the landlord is to provide. If it is
proven that the landlord’s conduct strikes at the essence of what the landlord is to provide, a breach of
the covenant of quiet enjoyment will be established and the tenant may recover damages incurred by the
breach, that is, the difference in value between what the tenant in fact received and what he or she would
have received, absent the breach.4

An implied covenant for quiet enjoyment relates to the sufficiency of the lessor’s title to enable the
lessor to make a valid and unencumbered lease, and secures the lessee against disturbance of the
possession and enjoyment of the premises by the lessor or someone rightfully claiming under the lessor
or from paramount title. However, it is not a warranty against the acts of strangers or wrongdoers.5

A breach of the implied covenant of quiet enjoyment may be based upon interference with a permissible
use of the tenancy by someone whose conduct is attributable to the landlord.6

§ 73. Disturbance of tenant’s possession

In general, an invasion of the tenant’s right of possession of the leased premises by the landlord
constitutes a trespass.1 Where the landlord goes on the leased premises by proper consent of the tenant,
the landlord nevertheless becomes a trespasser if he or she proceeds in a manner unnecessarily injuring,
damaging, and depriving the tenant of the peaceful possession of the premises.2

§ 74. Disturbance of tenant’s possession—Remedies; damages

A wrongful interference by the landlord with the tenant’s right of possession gives the tenant a right of
action for damages against the landlord, which may be maintained by the tenant even after the expiration
of the lease.1 Where a tenant brings an action for the disturbance of possession resulting from the
negligent manner in which the landlord makes repairs to the premises, the measure of damages is the
loss sustained by the tenant in consequence of the landlord’s negligence, to be determined not by the
value of the residue of the term of the lease, but by the loss sustained by the tenant by the breaking up of
the tenant’s business.2

§ 75. Disturbance of tenant’s possession—Equitable relief

Equity jurisdiction may protect a tenant’s interest by enjoining others from interfering with the tenant’s
enjoyment of the premises when an action at law would not afford an adequate remedy or the tenant
would otherwise be required to resort to actions in ejectment and tort to obtain redress for the wrongs
committed. The tenant, remaining in possession of the premises after the breach of a covenant by the
landlord or interference with the tenant’s right of possession, may seek an injunction restraining
threatened continuous trespasses or other interference by the landlord, 1 or may seek the aid of equity in
removing a matter which constitutes an interference with the right to possession.2

Illustration:

A complaint describing by street and number the building leased to the plaintiffs for the manufacture and
sale of electrical appliances, and alleging that the owner without the plaintiff’s consent had leased the
exterior wall of their building to a third person who caused an advertising sign to be painted thereon,
stated sufficient facts to warrant the granting of a mandatory injunction requiring removal of the sign
and the restoration of the wall to its previous condition.3

The expiration of the term of the lease pending the action for equitable relief precludes such relief, in
which case the tenant is relegated to an action at law for damages. 4 However, in a proper case the action
for equitable relief may be retained by the court for the purpose of assessing damages although no
equitable relief is warranted.5

§ 76. Use of premises

Where the lease is silent on the subject, by implication the lessee has the right to occupy and use the
premises for any lawful purpose which is not injurious to the rights of the lessor. 1 However, where the
premises are expressly leased for a particular purpose, the tenant may use the leased premises only for
such purpose, and their use for any other purpose is prohibited. 2 Where property is leased for residential
purposes, the lease impliedly obligates the lessee not to change the use of the premises from such
purpose.3

Observation:

An implied warranty of merchantability is inapplicable to leases because title does not pass.4

Restrictive covenants or conditions in a lease governing the purposes for which the property may be
used should be construed to carry into effect the intention of the parties. If their meaning is not clear, the
circumstances surrounding the execution of the lease should be considered in arriving at the intention of
the parties, and the apparent meaning and object of the provisions of the lease should be gathered from
all possible sources.5

Illustration:

A severability provision of a lease operated to put the risk on the tenant that the demised property might
not lawfully be used for office and commercial purposes, where the landlord had not made
misrepresentations to or defrauded the tenant concerning the use of the property.6

Where a lease provides for the use of the premises for a purpose for which a license from the public
authorities, which will not be given to the lessee unless the lessor consents to its issuance, is required
before the premises may be so used, the obligation of the lessor to give its consent will be implied as a
necessary incident to the lease as fully as though there were a positive stipulation to that effect in the
lease.7

§ 77. Cultivation of land under farm lease

A lease of farmland imposes affirmative duties on the lessee, the compliance with which is termed “good
husbandry,” which is unlike an ordinary lease that normally would require only that the lessee refrain
from acts of affirmative waste. In addition, the tenant has no right to use the land in such manner as to
injure the freehold.1 The lease may contain specific provisions as to the use of the land for farming and
as to the manner of cultivation of the land, and a covenant in the lease runs with the land. 2 In the absence
of a contractual or statutory provision to the contrary, as between the landlord and the tenant, the annual
crop raised on the leased property constitutes no part of the freehold, and when matured or severed from
the soil during the term of the lease, it becomes the personal property of the lessee, which the lessee may
dispose of as the lessee sees fit.3

In the absence of an express stipulation to that effect, a lessee under a farm lease has no right to remove
from the occupied premises any manure made in whole or in part from the produce of the land.4
Where land is leased for a fixed term and the lease is silent as to who is entitled to the growing crops on
the land at the end of the term, in the absence of a custom to the contrary, the outgoing lessee is not
entitled to remove the crops which the lessee knows will mature after the end of the term. 5 A lease which
implies an obligation on the part of the lessee to sow a crop in the last year of the term does not, in the
absence of an express provision, entitle the lessee to harvest and remove the crops after the termination
of the lease, although the lessor may be estopped by its conduct to claim the crop planted by the lessee.6

A lessee for an uncertain term usually has the right to take away, within a reasonable time after the
expiration of the tenancy, such annual products of the soil as are raised by the lessee’s labor. 7 In the
absence of an agreement or a custom to the contrary, however, the lessee is not entitled to remove the
crops where the estate is of such a nature that it may be terminated by the lessee’s act, and the lessee
does so act, such as where the lessee voluntarily surrenders the land to the lessor, 8 or through some
default forfeits the lease and the lessor re-enters the premises.9

In the absence of an agreement to the contrary, a tenant is entitled to products which are classified as
“fructus industriales” but not to products classified as “fructus naturales.”10

Illustration:

Sod which had been on a dairy farm but which had been cut and sold was not a growing crop, but was
“fructus naturales” and thus was part of the realty to which the tenant was not entitled, where there was
no agreement between the parties as to the sod and no history of such use.11

§ 78. Remedies for objectionable use by lessee

A lessee may be held liable for damages to the premises resulting from a use prohibited by the lease or
from a breach of its duty not to occupy the property so as to bring injury to the lessor.1

In the absence of an adequate remedy at law, a lessor may maintain an action to enjoin a lessee from
converting the premises to uses which are inconsistent with the terms of the lease, 2 even though there is
no express covenant against such change of use; 3 such proceedings are not governed by the principles
applicable to actions for specific performance. The option on the part of a lessor to cancel a lease for a
breach of its terms by the lessee may be found not to be such an adequate remedy at law as would
preclude the lessor from maintaining an action to enjoin the lessee from selling goods not authorized by
the lease.4

Practice Tip:

The burden rests on the party relying on a restrictive covenant in a lease relating to the use to which the
premises may be put to bring him- or herself within its terms. 5 Furthermore, in an action to enjoin the
improper use of the premises, the allegations of the complaint must be proved by evidence which is clear
and certain.6

§ 79. Liability to lessee for injuries to premises

A third person causing an injury to the use or possession of the leased premises, 1 or to growing crops,2 is
liable to the lessee in possession at the time of the injury. A lessee in possession of the land may
maintain an action of trespass against the wrongdoer for an injury to his or her possession.3

The lessor is not liable to the lessee for injuries resulting from the acts of third persons, such as injuries
resulting from the removal of an adjoining party wall under an agreement with the lessor, 4 or from
excavations on an adjoining lot, even though the injury necessitates the removal of the lessee before the
expiration of the term, where the lessee is, by the terms of the lease, required to make all repairs.5

A lessor is liable in damages to the lessee for injuries to the premises that prevent the lessee’s use or
occupation or diminish the value thereof for the purposes of the lease, where such injuries arise from the
culpable negligence or deliberate act of the lessor. Moreover, where the gist of an action by the assignee
of the lessee against the lessor is for injury to the right of possession by acts of the lessor, the lease is
admissible in evidence to establish and define the assignee’s right to the possession of the premises.6

§ 80. Surrender of possession

On the expiration of a lease, it is the duty of the lessee to surrender possession of the premises. 1 The
lessee may not justify its refusal to do so on the ground that enjoyment of the granted rights under the
lease made the lessee a tenant in common by estoppel with the lessor. 2 A lessor may maintain an action
for damages directly caused by the lessee’s failure to surrender the premises on the termination of the
tenancy.3

Observation:

The acceptance of a surrender of a lease is a matter of intention. A landlord’s reletting of the premises
beyond the original term of the lease is not acceptance of a surrender as a matter of law where there is
evidence from which the trier-of-fact could find that the landlord did not intend that result.4

The general right of a lessee to remove fixtures and articles of personal property at the termination of the
tenancy may be controlled by express contract; however, covenants restricting or claiming to restrict
such right are strictly construed and may not be extended by implication. 5 The act of a lessor in
wrongfully preventing the outgoing lessee from removing personal property may constitute a conversion
for which the lessor is liable.6

§ 81. Eviction

”Eviction” means anything of a serious and permanent character done by the landlord or those acting
under the landlord’s authority with the intention and effect of depriving the tenant of the use, occupation,
and enjoyment of the premises.1 A partial eviction is something done by the lessor with the intention of
depriving the lessee of a portion of the premises and means more than a mere trespass.2

Illustration:

The lessor’s excavation of land at the rear of the demised building did not amount to a partial eviction
where the lease demised the premises at a specified street number “consisting of a one-story building
and including all equipment therein contained” and the lessees failed to show that the land to the rear of
the building was necessary to complete enjoyment of the building; under the language of the lease, the
premises demised consisted of a building and only as much of the lot as was necessary to complete
enjoyment of the building.3

In order to constitute a constructive eviction, the act complained of must have been done by the lessor or
by its procurement with the intent and effect of depriving the tenant of the use and enjoyment of the
leased premises.4 Acts or omissions that might constitute constructive eviction include, for example,
failures to furnish heat, elevator service, and necessary electricity; failure to furnish sanitary restroom
facilities; and frequent flooding of the premises because of the landlord’s fault. 5 The failure of the lessor
to perform an implied covenant of the lease to give his or her consent to the use of the premises for a
specific purpose in order that the lessee may obtain a license for such use from a public authority
constitutes a constructive eviction.6 However, the receipt of a notice from a city zoning enforcement
officer to discontinue a use of the leased premises in violation of a city ordinance, the sending of which
was induced by the tenant’s improper use, is not a constructive eviction.7

In order for a tenant to successfully assert a constructive eviction claim, the tenant must have abandoned
the premises as a result of the act relied on within a reasonable time.8

Damages are recoverable for a wrongful eviction.9

Illustration:

Evidence was sufficient to support a compensatory damage award to a lessee for the loss of use of
property, loss of income opportunity, and moving expenses in a lessee’s wrongful eviction and
conversion action against a lessor for lockout from his office; the lessee was prevented from using his
office, business materials, and computer equipment for 12 to 14 days while he was working on a
consulting contract, the lessee did not meet the completion date on the contract as a result of being
locked out, and the lessee experienced difficulty in communicating with his clients after the lessor
disconnected his telephone line.10

Caution:

As a general rule, lease obligations are terminated upon re-entry or eviction for breach of a covenant in a
lease; however, a tenant may continue to be liable to the landlord based upon a provision in the lease
which imposes liability for rent, damages, or deficiency arising in the case of reletting.11

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Cases:

Good cause to terminate a project-based federally subsidized lease at the end of a lease term or
successive term based on a claimed lease violation should be subjected to Maryland’s breach of lease
standard for eviction. West’s Ann.Md.Code, Real Property, § 8–402.1. Grady Management, Inc. v. Epps,
218 Md. App. 712, 98 A.3d 457 (2014).

§ 82. Eviction—Retaliatory actions

The Real Property Article provides that, for any reason listed in the statute, a landlord of any residential
property may not: (1) bring or threaten to bring an action for possession against a tenant; (2) arbitrarily
increase the rent or decrease the services to which a tenant has been entitled; or (3) terminate a periodic
tenancy.1

A landlord may not take any of the actions listed above for any of the following reasons:2
0 • because the tenant or the tenant’s agent has provided written or actual notice of a good faith
complaint about an alleged violation of the lease, violation of law, or condition on the leased
premises that is a substantial threat to the health or safety of occupants to either the landlord or to
any public agency against the landlord
1 • because the tenant or the tenant’s agent has filed a lawsuit against the landlord, or testified or
participated in a lawsuit involving the landlord
2 • because the tenant has participated in any tenants’ organization
A landlord’s violation of any of the above is a “retaliatory action.”3 A tenant may raise a retaliatory
action of a landlord: (1) in defense to an action for possession; or (2) as an affirmative claim for
damages resulting from a retaliatory action of a landlord occurring during a tenancy. 4 An action by a
landlord may not be deemed to be retaliatory for these purposes; however, if the alleged retaliatory
action occurs more than six months after a tenant’s action that is protected under this statute.5

If in any proceeding the court finds in favor of the tenant because the landlord engaged in a retaliatory
action, the court may enter judgment against the landlord for damages not to exceed the equivalent of
three months’ rent, reasonable attorney’s fees, and court costs. 6 On the other hand, if in any proceeding
the court finds that a tenant’s assertion of a retaliatory action was in bad faith or without substantial
justification, the court may enter judgment against the tenant for damages not to exceed the equivalent
of three months’ rent, reasonable attorney’s fees, and court costs.7

The relief provided under the retaliatory actions statute is conditioned upon the tenant being current on
the rent due and owing to the landlord at the time of the alleged retaliatory action, unless the tenant
withholds rent in accordance with the lease, the statute requiring the landlord to repair or eliminate
serious conditions and defects of residential dwelling units, or a comparable local ordinance. 8 In
addition, if the alleged retaliatory action is a landlord’s termination of a periodic tenancy: (1) in the case
of tenancies measured by a period of one month or more, the court having not entered against the tenant
more than three judgments of possession for rent due and unpaid in the 12-month period immediately
prior to the initiation of the action by the tenant or by the landlord; or (2) in the case of tenancies
requiring the weekly payment of rent, the court having not entered against the tenant more than five
judgments of possession for rent due and unpaid in the 12-month period immediately prior to the
initiation of the action by the tenant or by the landlord, or, if the tenant has lived on the premises six
months or less, the court having not entered against the tenant three judgments of possession for rent due
and unpaid.9

As long as a landlord’s termination of a tenancy is not the result of a retaliatory action, nothing in this
statute may be interpreted to alter the landlord’s or the tenant’s rights to terminate or not renew a
tenancy.10

If any county has enacted or enacts an ordinance comparable in subject matter to this statute, this statute
will supersede the provisions of the ordinance to the extent that the ordinance provides less protection to
a tenant.11

Notwithstanding the above provisions, a landlord of real property subject to the lead poisoning
provisions of the Environment Article may not evict or take any other retaliatory action against a tenant
primarily as a result of the tenant providing information to the landlord about lead poisoning.12

CUMULATIVE SUPPLEMENT

Statutes:
§ 8-208.1(d) of the Real Property Article, as repealed and reenacted, with amendments in 2014, effective
October 1, 2014, now provides relief under the retaliatory actions statute is conditioned on the tenant
being current on the rent due and owing to the landlord at the time of the alleged retaliatory action,
unless the tenant withholds rent in accordance with the lease, the statute requiring the landlord to repair
or eliminate serious conditions and defects of residential dwelling units, or a comparable local
ordinance.