CD: Marcos v Manglapus

Facts: This petition for mandamus and prohibition asks the Courts to order the respondents to
issue travel documents to Mr. Marcos and the immediate members of his family and to enjoin
the implementation of the President's decision to bar their return to the Philippines.

The case for petitioners is founded on the assertion that the right of the Marcoses to return to
the Philippines is guaranteed under the following provisions of the Bill of Rights, to wit:

Section 1. No person shall be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due

process of law, nor shall any person be denied the equal protection of the laws.

xxx xxx xxx

Section 6. The liberty of abode and of changing the same within the limits
prescribed by law shall not be impaired except upon lawful order of the court.
Neither shall the right to travel be impaired except in the interest of national
security, public safety, or public health, as may be provided by law.

The petitioners contend that the President is without power to impair the liberty of abode of the
Marcoses because only a court may do so "within the limits prescribed by law." Nor may the
President impair their right to travel because no law has authorized her to do so. They advance
the view that before the right to travel may be impaired by any authority or agency of the
government, there must be legislation to that effect.

The petitioners further assert that under international law, the right of Mr. Marcos and his family
to return to the Philippines is guaranteed.

The Universal Declaration of Human Rights provides:

Article 13. (1) Everyone has the right to freedom of movement and residence
within the borders of each state.

(2) Everyone has the right to leave any country, including his own, and to return
to his country.

Likewise, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, which had been ratified by the
Philippines, provides:

Article 12

1) Everyone lawfully within the territory of a State shall, within that territory, have
the right to liberty of movement and freedom to choose his residence.

2) Everyone shall be free to leave any country, including his own.

 3) The above-mentioned rights shall not be subject to any restrictions except
those which are provided by law, are necessary to protect national security,
public order (order public), public health or morals or the rights and freedoms of
others, and are consistent with the other rights recognized in the present
Covenant.

4) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of the right to enter his own country.

On the other hand, the respondents' principal argument is that the issue in this case involves a
political question which is non-justiciable.

Issue: Whether or not, the issue of the return of Marcoses to the country is a political
question and whether or not the courts may review this controversy.

Held: Under the Constitution, judicial power includes the duty to determine whether or not there
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government." [Art. VIII, Sec. 1] Given this wording, we
cannot agree with the Solicitor General that the issue constitutes a political question which is
beyond the jurisdiction of the Court to decide.

The present Constitution limits resort to the political question doctrine and broadens the scope
of judicial inquiry into areas which the Court, under previous constitutions, would have normally
left to the political departments to decide.

There is nothing in the case before us that precludes our determination thereof on the political
question doctrine. The deliberations of the Constitutional Commission cited by petitioners show
that the framers intended to widen the scope of judicial review but they did not intend courts of
justice to settle all actual controversies before them. When political questions are involved, the
Constitution limits the determination to whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the official whose action is
being questioned. If grave abuse is not established, the Court will not substitute its judgment for
that of the official concerned and decide a matter which by its nature or by law is for the latter
alone to decide. In this light, it would appear clear that the second paragraph of Article VIII,
Section 1 of the Constitution, defining "judicial power," which specifically empowers the courts to
determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion on the part of any branch
or instrumentality of the government, incorporates in the fundamental law the ruling in Lansang
v. Garcia [G.R. No. L-33964, December 11, 1971, 42 SCRA 4481 that:]

Article VII of the [1935] Constitution vests in the Executive the power to suspend
the privilege of the writ of habeas corpus under specified conditions. Pursuant to
the principle of separation of powers underlying our system of government, the
Executive is supreme within his own sphere. However, the separation of powers,
under the Constitution, is not absolute. What is more, it goes hand in hand with
the system of checks and balances, under which the Executive is supreme, as
regards the suspension of the privilege, but only if and when he acts within the
sphere alloted to him by the Basic Law, and the authority to determine whether or
not he has so acted is vested in the Judicial Department, which, in this respect,
is, in turn, constitutionally supreme. In the exercise of such authority, the function
of the Court is merely to check — not to supplant the Executive, or to ascertain
merely whether he has gone beyond the constitutional limits of his jurisdiction,
 not to exercise the power vested in him or to determine the wisdom of his act [At
479-480.]

Accordingly, the question for the Court to determine is whether or not there exist factual bases
for the President to conclude that it was in the national interest to bar the return of the Marcoses
to the Philippines. If such postulates do exist, it cannot be said that she has acted, or acts,
arbitrarily or that she has gravely abused her discretion in deciding to bar their return.

We find that from the pleadings filed by the parties, from their oral arguments, and the facts
revealed during the briefing in chambers by the Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines and the National Security Adviser, wherein petitioners and respondents were
represented, there exist factual bases for the President's decision..

The Court cannot close its eyes to present realities and pretend that the country is not besieged
from within by a well-organized communist insurgency, a separatist movement in Mindanao,
rightist conspiracies to grab power, urban terrorism, the murder with impunity of military men,
police officers and civilian officials, to mention only a few. The documented history of the efforts
of the Marcose's and their followers to destabilize the country, as earlier narrated in
this ponencia bolsters the conclusion that the return of the Marcoses at this time would only
exacerbate and intensify the violence directed against the State and instigate more chaos.

As divergent and discordant forces, the enemies of the State may be contained. The military
establishment has given assurances that it could handle the threats posed by particular groups.
But it is the catalytic effect of the return of the Marcoses that may prove to be the proverbial final
straw that would break the camel's back. With these before her, the President cannot be said to
have acted arbitrarily and capriciously and whimsically in determining that the return of the
Marcoses poses a serious threat to the national interest and welfare and in prohibiting their
return.