FULL Permanent Savings vs. Velarde

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 439 17/01/2018, 11)01 PM
*
G.R. No. 140608. September 23, 2004.
PERMANENT SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, petitioner,

vs. MARIANO VELARDE, respondent.
Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised

in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of
Court, as „the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts‰; Exceptions.
·Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds it
necessary to reiterate the well-settled rule that only questions of
law may be raised in a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the
_______________
* SECOND DIVISION.
2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde
Rules of Court, as „the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.‰ It is

not our function to review, examine and evaluate or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented. There are, however,
exceptions to the rule, e.g., when the factual inferences of the
appellate court are manifestly mistaken; the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain
relevant and undisputed facts that, if properly considered, would
http://central.com.ph/sfsreader/session/0000016104a2a1a6d9728dfa003600fb002c009e/p/AQB152/?username=Guest Page 1 of 17
justify a different legal conclusion.

Same; Evidence; Meaning of admission of the genuineness and
due execution of a document.·RespondentÊs allegations amount to
an implied admission of the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document means that the party whose signature it
bears admits that he voluntarily signed the document or it was
signed by another for him and with his authority; that at the time it
was signed it was in words and figures exactly as set out in the
pleading of the party relying upon it; that the document was
delivered; and that any formalities required by law, such as a seal,
an acknowledgment, or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are waived
by him. Also, it effectively eliminated any defense relating to the
authenticity and due execution of the document, e.g., that the
document was spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its
face as the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon were forgeries; or that the signatures were
unauthorized.
Same; Same; Same; In the present case, there is no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan
documents because of respondentÊs implied admission thereof.
·While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court requires that
private documents be proved of their due execution and
authenticity before they can be received in evidence, i.e.,
presentation and examination of witnesses to testify on this fact; in
the present case, there is no need for proof of execution and
authenticity with respect to the loan documents because of
respondentÊs implied admission thereof.
Same; Same; Prescription; The prescriptive period is interrupted
when there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors.·
PetitionerÊs action for collection of a sum of money was based on a
written contract and prescribes after ten years from the time its
right of action arose. The prescriptive period is interrupted when
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 3
there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors. The

interruption of the prescriptive period by written extrajudicial
demand means that the said period would commence anew from the
receipt of the demand.
Same; Pleadings and Practice; Demurrer to Evidence; If a
demurrer to evidence is granted but on appeal the order of dismissal
is reversed, the movant shall be deemed to have waived the right to
present evidence; Movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiffÊs
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if the trial
court disagrees with them.·If a demurrer to evidence is granted but
on appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall be
deemed to have waived the right to present evidence. The movant
who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff Ês evidence retains the right
to present their own evidence, if the trial court disagrees with them;
if the trial court agrees with them, but on appeal, the appellate
court disagrees with both of them and reverses the dismissal order,
the defendants lose the right to present their own evidence. The
appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and render
judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a demurrer aims to
discourage prolonged litigations. Thus, respondent may no longer
offer proof to establish that he has no liability under the loan
documents sued upon by petitioner.
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

Court of Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

The Office of the Chief Legal Counsel for petitioner.
Raval and Loking Lawyers for respondent.
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
In a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional

Trial Court of Manila (Branch 37), docketed as Civil Case
No. 94-71639, petitioner Permanent Savings and Loan
Bank sought to recover from respondent Mariano Velarde,
the sum of P1,000,000.00 plus accrued interests and
penalties, based on a loan obtained by respondent from
petitioner bank, evi-

denced by the following:1

(1) promissory note dated
September 28, 1983; 2
(2) loan release sheet dated
September 28, 1983; and3 (3) loan disclosure statement
dated September 28, 1983. Petitioner bank, represented by
its Deputy Liquidator after it was placed under liquidation,
sent a letter of demand to respondent4 on July 27, 1988,
demanding full payment
5
of the loan. Despite receipt of
said demand letter, respondent failed to settle his account.6
Another letter of demand was sent on February 22, 1994,
and this time, respondentÊs counsel replied, stating that the
obligation „is not actually existing but covered by
contemporaneous7
or subsequent agreement between the
parties . . .‰
In his Answer, respondent disclaims any liability on the
instrument, thus:
2. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the

alleged loan of P1-Million, and the purported documents evidencing
the same, only the signature appearing at the back of the
promissory note, Annex „A‰ seems to be that of herein defendant.
However, as to any liability arising therefrom, the receipt of the
said amount of P1-Million shows that the amount was received by
another person, not the herein defendant. Hence, no liability
attaches and as further stated in the special and affirmative
defenses that, assuming the promissory note exists, it does not bind
much less is there the intention by the parties to bind the herein
defendant. In other words, the documents relative to the loan do not
8
express the true intention of the parties.
RespondentÊs Answer also contained a denial under oath,

which reads:
_______________
1 Records, p. 4, Annex „A‰.

2 Id., p. 5, Annex „B‰.
3 Id., p. 6, Annex „C‰.
4 Id., p. 7, Annex „D‰.
5 Id., p. 8, Annex „D-1‰.
6 Id., p. 9, Annex „E‰.

7 Id., p. 10, Annex „F‰.
8 Id., p. 23.

I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this case,

that I caused the preparation of the complaint and that all the
allegations thereat are true and correct; that the promissory note
sued upon, assuming that it exists and bears the genuine signature
of herein defendant, the same does not bind him and that it did not
truly express the real intention of the parties as stated in the
9
defenses; . . .
During pre-trial, the issues were defined as follows:
1. Whether or not the defendant has an outstanding

loan obligation granted by the plaintiff;
2. Whether or not the defendant is obligated to pay
the loan including interests and attorneyÊs fees;
3. Whether or not the defendant has really executed
the Promissory Note considering the doubt as to the
genuineness of the signature and as well as the
non-receipt of the said amount;
4. Whether or not the obligation has prescribed on
account of the lapse of time from date of execution
and demand for enforcement; and
5. Whether or not the defendant is 10
entitled to his
counter-claim and other damages.
On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole

witness, Antonio Marquez, the Assistant Department
Manager of the Philippine Deposit Insurance Corporation
(PDIC) and the designated Deputy Liquidator for petitioner
11
bank, who identified the Promissory Note 12 dated
September 28, 1983, the Loan Release Sheet dated
September 28, 1983,13
and the Disclosure Statement of Loan
Credit Transaction.
_______________
9 Id., p. 27.
10 Id., p. 61.
11 Id., p. 4, Exhibit „A‰.
12 Id., p. 5, Exhibit „B‰.
13 Id., p. 6, Exhibit „C‰.

After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of

presenting evidence, filed with leave of court his demurrer
to evidence, alleging the grounds that:
(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY

PREPONDERANCE OF EVIDENCE.
(b) THE CAUSE OF ACTION, CONCLUDING
ARGUENTI THAT IT EXISTS, IS 14BARRED BY
PRESCRIPTION AND/OR LACHES.
The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996,

found merit in respondentÊs demurrer to evidence and
dismissed the complaint including respondentÊs
15
counterclaims, without pronouncement as to costs.
On appeal, the Court of Appeals agreed with the trial
court and16
affirmed the dismissal of17 the complaint in its
Decision dated October 27, 1999. The appellate court
found that petitioner failed to present any evidence to
prove the existence of respondentÊs alleged loan obligations,
considering that respondent denied petitionerÊs allegations
in its complaint. It also found that petitioner
18
bankÊs cause
of action is already barred by prescription.
Hence, the present petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules Court, with the following
assignment of errors:
4.1
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONER FAILED TO ESTABLISH THE GENUINENESS,
DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUBJECT

LOAN DOCUMENTS.
_______________
14 Id., p. 87.
15 Id., p. 106.
16 Penned by Justice Roberto A. Barrios, concurred in by Justices
Godardo A. Jacinto and Mercedes Gozo-Dadole.
17 CA Rollo, pp. 103-104.
18 Id., pp. 102-103.

4.2
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

PETITIONERÊS CAUSE OF ACTION IS ALREADY BARRED BY
19
PRESCRIPTION AND OR LACHES.
Before going into the merits of the petition, the Court finds
it necessary to reiterate the well-settled rule that only
questions of law may be raised in a petition for review on
certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of20 Court, as „the
Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.‰ It is not our
function to review, examine and evaluate 21
or weigh the
probative value of the evidence presented.
There are, however, exceptions to the rule, e.g., when the
factual inferences of the appellate court are manifestly
mistaken; the judgment is based on a misapprehension of
facts; or the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and
undisputed facts that, if properly
22
considered, would justify
a different legal conclusion. This case falls under said
exceptions.
The pertinent rule on actionable documents is found in
Rule 8, Section 7 of the Rules of Court which provides that
when the cause of action is anchored on a document, the
genuineness or due execution of the instrument shall be
deemed impliedly admitted unless the defendant, under
oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he

claims to be the facts.
It was the trial courtÊs opinion that:
The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan,

but absent the testimony of a competent witness to the transac-
_______________
19 Rollo, p. 32.
20 New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. vs. Philippine National
Bank, G.R. No. 148753, July 30, 2004, 435 SCRA 565, 579-580.
21 Philippine Lawin Bus Co. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 130972, January
23, 2002, 374 SCRA 332, 337.
22 Supra, New Sampaguita Builders Construction, Inc. case, note 20.

tion and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of

liability by the defendant does not suffice to meet the requisite
preponderance of evidence in civil cases. The documents, standing
alone, unsupported by independent evidence of their existence, have
no legal basis to stand on. They are not competent evidence. Such
failure leaves this Court without ample basis to sustain the
plaintiff Ês cause of action and other reliefs prayed for. The loan
document being challenged. (sic) Plaintiff did not exert additional
effort to strengthen its case by the required preponderance of
23
evidence. On this score, the suit must be dismissed.
The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courtÊs

finding and affirmed the dismissal of the complaint, viz.:
. . . The bank should have presented at least a single witness

qualified to testify on the existence and execution of the documents
it relied upon to prove the disputed loan obligations of Velarde. . . .
This falls short of the requirement that (B)efore any private writing
may be received in evidence, its due execution and authenticity must
be proved either: (a) By anyone who saw the writing executed; (b) By
evidence of the genuineness of the handwriting of the maker; or (c)
By a subscribing witness. (Rule 132, Sec. 21, Rules of Court) . . .
It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove

the loan and its supporting papers as Velarde has already admitted
these. Velarde had in fact denied these in his responsive pleading.
And consistent with his denial, he objected to the presentation of
Marquez as a witness to identify the Exhibits of the Bank, and
objected to their admission when these were offered as evidence.
Though these were grudgingly admitted anyway, still admissibility
24
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence . . . .
A reading of respondentÊs Answer, however, shows that

respondent did not specifically deny that he signed the loan
documents. What he merely stated in his Answer was that
the signature appearing at the back of the promissory note
seems to be his. Respondent also denied any liability on the
promissory note as he allegedly did not receive the amount
_______________
23 Records, pp. 105-106.

24 CA Rollo, pp. 102-103.

stated therein, and the loan 25documents do not express the

true intention of the parties. Respondent reiterated these
allegations in his „denial under oath,‰ stating that „the
promissory note sued upon, assuming that it exists and
bears the genuine signature of herein defendant, the same
does not bind him and that it did not truly express the 26
real
intention of the parties as stated in the defenses . . .‰
RespondentÊs denials do not constitute an effective
specific denial as contemplated
27
by law. In the early case of
Songco vs. Sellner, the Court expounded on how to deny
the genuineness and due execution of an actionable
document, viz.:
. . . This means that the defendant must declare under oath that he
did not sign the document or that it is otherwise false or fabricated.
Neither does the statement of the answer to the effect that the
instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any

issue as to its genuineness or due execution. On the contrary such a
plea is an admission both of the genuineness and due execution
thereof, since it seeks to avoid the instrument upon a ground not
affecting either.
In fact, respondentÊs allegations amount to an implied

admission of the due execution and genuineness of the
promissory note. The admission of the genuineness and due
execution of a document means that the party whose
signature it bears admits that he voluntarily signed the
document or it was signed by another for him and with his
authority; that at the time it was signed it was in words
and figures exactly as set out in the pleading of the party
relying upon it; that the document was delivered; and that
any formalities required by law, such as a seal, an
acknowledgment,28
or revenue stamp, which it lacks, are
waived by him. Also, it effectively elimi-
_______________
25 Records, p. 23.
26 Id., p. 27.
27 37 Phil. 254, 256 (1917).
28 Filipinas Textile Mills vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 119800,
November 12, 2003, 415 SCRA 635.
10

nated any defense relating to the authenticity and due

execution of the document, e.g., that the document was
spurious, counterfeit, or of different import on its face as
the one executed by the parties; or that the signatures
appearing thereon 29were forgeries; or that the signatures
were unauthorized.
Clearly, both the trial court and the Court of Appeals
erred in concluding that respondent specifically denied
petitionerÊs allegations regarding the loan documents, as
respondentÊs Answer shows that he failed to specifically
deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the

promissory note and its concomitant documents. Therefore,
respondent is deemed to have admitted the loan documents
and acknowledged his obligation with petitioner; and with
respondentÊs implied admission, it was not necessary for
petitioner to present further evidence to establish the due
execution and authenticity of the loan documents sued
upon.
While Section 22, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court
requires that private documents be proved of their due
execution and authenticity before they can be received in
evidence, i.e., presentation and examination of witnesses to
testify on this fact; in the present case, there is no need for
proof of execution and authenticity with respect to the loan
documents30
because of respondentÊs implied admission
thereof.
Respondent claims that he did not receive the net
proceeds in the amount of P988,333.00 as stated 31in the
Loan Release Sheet dated September 23, 1983. The
document,32 however, bears 33 respondentÊs signature as
borrower. Res ipsa loquitur. The document speaks for
itself. Respondent has already
_______________
29 Velasquez vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 124049, June 30, 1999, 309
SCRA 539, 547.
30 Chua vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 88383, February 19, 1992, 206
SCRA 339, 346.
31 Records, p. 23.
32 Id., p. 5, Exhibit „B-1‰.
33 Associated Bank vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 123793, June 29,
1998, 291 SCRA 511, 527.
11
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 11

impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of

the loan documents. No further proof is necessary to show
that he undertook the obligation with petitioner. „A person
34
cannot accept and reject the same instrument.‰
The Court also finds that petitionerÊs claim is not barred
by prescription.
PetitionerÊs action for collection of a sum of money was
based on a written contract and prescribes 35
after ten years
from the time its right of action arose. The prescriptive
period is interrupted when there
36
is a written extrajudicial
demand by the creditors. The interruption of the
prescriptive period by written extrajudicial demand means
that the said period
37
would commence anew from the receipt
of the demand.
Thus, 38
in the case of The Overseas Bank of Manila vs.
Geraldez, the Court categorically stated that the correct
meaning of interruption as distinguished from mere
suspension or tolling of the prescriptive period is that said
period would commence anew from the receipt of the
demand. In said case, the respondents Valenton and Juan,
on February 16, 1966, obtained a credit accommodation
from the Overseas Bank of Manila in the amount of
P150,000.00. Written extrajudicial demands dated
February 9, March 1 and 27, 1968, November 13 and
December 8, 1975 and February 7 and August 27, 1976
were made upon the respondents but they refused to pay.
When the bank filed a case for the recovery of said amount,
the trial court dismissed the same on the ground of
prescription as the bankÊs cause of action accrued on
February 16, 1966 (the date of the managerÊs check for
P150,000.00 issued by the plaintiff bank to the Republic
Bank) and the
_______________
34 Id., at page 528.

35 Article 1144, Civil Code.
36 Article 1155, Civil Code.
37 Ledesma vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 106646, June 30, 1993, 224
SCRA 175, 177-178.
38 G.R. No. L-46541, December 28, 1979, 94 SCRA 937.
12
complaint was filed only on October 22, 1976. Reversing

the ruling of the trial court, the Court ruled:
An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years

from the time the right of action accrues (Art. 1144[1], Civil Code).
„The prescription of actions is interrupted when they are filed
before the court, when there is a written extrajudicial demand by
the creditors, and when there is any written acknowledgment of the
debt by the debtor‰ (Art. 1155, Ibid., applied in Gonzalo Puyat &
Sons, Inc. vs. City of Manila, 117 Phil. 985, 993; Philippine National
Bank vs. Fernandez, L-20086, July 10, 1967, 20 SCRA 645, 648;
Harden vs. Harden, L-22174, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 706, 711).
A written extrajudicial demand wipes out the period that has
already elapsed and starts anew the prescriptive period. Giorgi
says: „La interrupcion difiere de la suspension porque borra el
tiempo transcurrido anteriormente y obliga a la prescripcion a
comenzar de nuevo‰ (9 Teoria de las Obligaciones, 2nd Ed., p. 222).
„La interrupcion . . . quita toda eficacia al tiempo pasado y abre
camino a un computo totalmente nuevo, que parte del ultimo
momento del acto interruptivo, precisamente, como si en aquel
momento y no antes hubiese nacido el credito‰ (8 Giorgi, ibid., pp.
390-2).
...
That same view as to the meaning of interruption was adopted in
Florendo vs. Organo, 90 Phil. 483, 488, where it ruled that the
interruption of the ten-year prescriptive period through a judicial
demand means that „the full period of prescription commenced to
run anew upon the cessation of the suspension‰. „When prescription
is interrupted by a judicial demand, the full time for the
prescription must be reckoned from the cessation of the
interruption‰ (Spring vs. Barr, 120 So. 256 cited in 54 C.J.S. 293,
note 27). That rule was followed in Nator and Talon vs. CIR, 114
Phil. 661, Sagucio vs. Bulos, 115 Phil. 786 and Fulton Insurance Co.
vs. Manila Railroad Company, L-24263, November 18, 1967, 21
SCRA 974, 981.
...
Interruption of the prescriptive period as meaning renewal of the
original term seems to be the basis of the ruling in Ramos vs.
Condez, L-22072, August 30, 1967, 20 SCRA 1146, 1151. In that
case the cause of action accrued on June 25, 1952. There was a
written acknowledgment by the vendors on November 10, 1956 of

the validity of the deed of sale.
13
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 13

...
In National Marketing Corporation vs. Marquez, L-25553,
January 31, 1969, 26 SCRA 722, it appears that Gabino Marquez
executed on June 24, 1950 a promissory note wherein he bound
himself to pay to the Namarco P12,000 in installments within the
one-year period starting on June 24, 1951 and ending on June 25,
1952. After making partial payments on July 7, 1951 and February
23, 1952, Marquez defaulted.
His total obligation, including interest, as of October 31, 1964,
amounted to P19,990.91. Written demands for the payment of the
obligation were made upon Marquez and his surety on March 22,
1956, February 16, 1963, June 10, September 18 and October 13,
1964. Marquez did not make any further payment.
The Namarco sued Marquez and his surety on December 16,
1964. They contended that the action had prescribed because the
ten-year period for suing on the note expired on June 25, 1962. That
contention was not sustained. It was held that the prescriptive
period was interrupted by the written demands, copies of which
were furnished the surety.
RespondentÊs obligation under the promissory note became

due and demandable on October 13, 1983. On July 27,
1988, petitionerÊs counsel made a written demand for
petitioner to settle his obligation. From the time
respondentÊs obligation became due and demandable on
October 13, 1983, up to the time the demand was made,
only 4 years, 9 months and 14 days had elapsed. The
prescriptive period then commenced anew when 39
respondent received the demand letter on August 5, 1988.
Thus, when petitioner
40
sent another demand letter on
February 22, 1994, the action still had not yet prescribed
as only 5 years, 6 months and 17 days had lapsed. While
the records do not show when respondent received the
second demand letter, nevertheless, it is still apparent that
petitioner had the right to institute the complaint on

September
_______________
39 Records, p. 8, Exhibit „D-1‰.

40 Id., p. 9, Exhibit „E‰.
14

14, 1994, as it was filed before the lapse of the ten-year

prescriptive period.
Lastly, if a demurrer to evidence is granted but on
appeal the order of dismissal is reversed, the movant shall 41
be deemed to have waived the right to present evidence.
The movant who presents a demurrer to the plaintiff Ês
evidence retains the right to present their own evidence, if
the trial court disagrees with them; if the trial court agrees
with them, but on appeal, the appellate court disagrees
with both of them and reverses the dismissal order, the
defendants lose the right to present their own evidence.
The appellate court shall, in addition, resolve the case and
render judgment on the merits, inasmuch as a 42demurrer
aims to discourage prolonged litigations. Thus,
respondent may no longer offer proof to establish that he
has no liability under the loan documents sued upon by
petitioner.
The promissory note signed and admitted by respondent
provides for the loan amount of P1,000,000.00, to mature
on October 13, 1983, with interest at the rate of 25% per
annum. The note also provides for a penalty charge of 24%
per annum of the amount due and unpaid, and 25%
attorneyÊs fees. Hence, respondent should be held liable for
these sums.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The
Decisions of the Regional Trial Court of Manila (Branch 37)
dated January 26, 1996, and the Court of Appeals dated
October 27, 1999 are SET ASIDE. Respondent is ordered to
pay One Million Pesos (P1,000,000.00) plus 25% interest
and 24% penalty charge per annum beginning October 13,

1983 until fully paid, and 25% of the amount due as
attorneyÊs fees.
Costs against respondent.
_______________
41 FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking

Corporation, G.R. No. 141910, August 6, 2002, 386 SCRA 312, 322-323.
42 Radiowealth Finance Company vs. Del Rosario, G.R. No. 138739,
July 6, 2000, 335 SCRA 288, 297.
15
VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 15

Department of Agrarian Reform vs. Cuenca
SO ORDERED.
Puno (Chairman), Callejo, Sr. and Tinga, JJ., concur.
Chico-Nazario, J., On Leave.
Petition granted, assailed decisions of the Regional Trial
Court and of the Court of Appeals set aside. Respondent
ordered to pay P1,000,000.00 plus 25% interest and 24%
penalty charge per annum, and 25% of the amount due as
attorneyÊs fees.
Note.·Jurisdiction of the Court in a petition for review

on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court is limited
to reviewing only errors of law. (Baricuatro, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, 325 SCRA 137 [2000])
··o0o··
© Copyright 2018 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

FULL Permanent Savings vs. Velarde

Uploaded by

Document Information

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

FULL Permanent Savings vs. Velarde

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 439 17/01/2018, 11)01 PM

PERMANENT SAVINGS AND LOAN BANK, petitioner,

Civil Procedure; Certiorari; Only questions of law may be raised

2 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde

Rules of Court, as „the Supreme Court is not a trier of facts.‰ It is

justify a different legal conclusion.

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 3

Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde

there is a written extrajudicial demand by the creditors. The

PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

In a complaint for sum of money filed before the Regional

4 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

denced by the following:1

2. The allegations in par. 2, Complaint, on the existence of the

RespondentÊs Answer also contained a denial under oath,

1 Records, p. 4, Annex „A‰.

6 Id., p. 9, Annex „E‰.

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 5

I, MARIANO Z. VELARDE, of age, am the defendant in this case,

During pre-trial, the issues were defined as follows:

1. Whether or not the defendant has an outstanding

On September 6, 1995, petitioner bank presented its sole

6 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

After petitioner bank rested its case, respondent, instead of

(a) PLAINTIFF FAILED TO PROVE ITS CASE BY

The trial court, in its Decision dated January 26, 1996,

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

DUE EXECUTION AND AUTHENTICITY OF THE SUBJECT

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 7

THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN HOLDING THAT

oath, specifically denies them, and sets forth what he

The mere presentation of supposed documents regarding the loan,

8 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

tion and the documentary evidence, coupled with the denial of

The Court of Appeals concurred with the trial courtÊs

. . . The bank should have presented at least a single witness

It is not true, as the Bank claims, that there is no need to prove

A reading of respondentÊs Answer, however, shows that

23 Records, pp. 105-106.

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 9

stated therein, and the loan 25documents do not express the

instrument was procured by fraudulent representation raise any

In fact, respondentÊs allegations amount to an implied

10 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

nated any defense relating to the authenticity and due

deny under oath the genuineness and due execution of the

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 11

impliedly admitted the genuineness and due execution of

34 Id., at page 528.

12 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Permanent Savings and Loan Bank vs. Velarde

complaint was filed only on October 22, 1976. Reversing

An action upon a written contract must be brought within ten years

written acknowledgment by the vendors on November 10, 1956 of

VOL. 439, SEPTEMBER 23, 2004 13

RespondentÊs obligation under the promissory note became

petitioner had the right to institute the complaint on

39 Records, p. 8, Exhibit „D-1‰.

14 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

14, 1994, as it was filed before the lapse of the ten-year

and 24% penalty charge per annum beginning October 13,

41 FGU Insurance Corporation vs. G.P. Sarmiento Trucking