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PIL CASES DOCTRINES (STUDY GUIDE)
1. NICARAGUA VS US (1986)
The Court held that the United States violated its customary
international law obligation not to use force against another
State.
“ Under Article 2(4) of the Charter of the United Nations
(UN Charter) and in customary international law,
generally, there is prohibition on the use of force by one
state against another state, except if it involves
individual or collective self-defense (Art.51). “
Under international law, several requirements must be met for
a State to exercise the right of individual or collective self-
defense.
(1) A State must have been the victim of an
armed attack;
o The Court held that an armed attack
included:
(a) action by regular armed forces across an
international border; and
(b) “the sending by or on behalf of a State of
armed bands, groups, irregulars or
mercenaries, which carry out acts of (sic)
armed force against another State of such
gravity as to amount to (inter alia) an actual
armed attack conducted by regular forces, or
its (the State’s) substantial involvement
therein”.
(2) That State must declare itself as a victim of an
armed attack. The assessment on whether an
armed attack had taken place or not, is done by the
State who was subjected to the attack. A third
State cannot exercise a right of collective self-
defense based that third State’s own
assessment;
(3) In the case of collective self-defense, the
victim State must request for assistance. The
Court held that “there is no rule permitting the
exercise of collective self-defense in the absence
of a request by the State which regards itself as the
victim of an armed attack”;
(4) A State that is attacked, does not,
under customary international law, have the same
obligation as under Article 51 of the UN Charter to
report to the Security Council that an armed attack
2. NORTH SEA CONTINENTAL SHEL CASES
(1969) ICJ
FACTS: The parties requested the Court to decide the
principles and rules of international law that are applicable to
the above delimitation because the parties disagreed on the
applicable principles or rules of delimitation. Netherlands and
Denmark relied on the principle of equidistance (the method
of determining the boundaries in such a way that every point
in the boundary is equidistant from the nearest points of the
baselines from which the breath of the territorial sea of each
State is measured).
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Issues: Is Germany under a legal obligation to accept the
equidistance – special circumstances principle, contained in
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention on the Continental Shelf
of 1958, either as a customary international law rule or on
the basis of the Geneva Convention.
Held: No. The use of the equidistance method had not
crystallized into customary law and the method was not
obligatory for the delimitation of the areas in the North Sea
related to the present proceedings.
First, the Geneva Convention is not binding on Germany.
Article 6 of the Geneva Convention stated that unless the
parties had already agreed on a method for delimitation or
unless special circumstances exist, the equidistance method
would apply. Germany had signed, but not ratified, the
Geneva Convention, while Netherlands and Denmark
were parties to the Convention.
The Court held that the existence of a situation of
estoppel would have allowed Article 6 to become binding on
Germany – but held that Germany’s action did not support an
argument for estoppel. The mere fact that Germany may not
have specifically objected to the equidistance principle as
contained in Article 6, is not sufficient to state that the principle
is now binding upon it.
Second, for a customary rule to emerge, the court held that:
the dual requirement for the formation of customary
international law must be met:
(1) State practice (the objective element) and
(2) opinio juris (the subjective element).
In this case, the Court explained the criteria necessary to
establish State practice is – widespread and representative
participation.
While in opinion juris, uniform and consistent practice was
necessary. Opinio juris is the belief that State practice
amounts to a legal obligation.
The concept of opinion juris, the state must therefore feel that
they are conforming to what amounts to legal obligation. THE
FREQUENCY, DURATION OR HABITUALITY OF AN ACT IS
NOT ENOUGH.
The principle had not attained a customary international law
at the time of the entry into force of the Geneva Convention.
As such, the Court held that the use of the equidistance
method is not obligatory for the delimitation of the areas
concerned in the present proceedings.
3. SISON VS BOARD OF ACCOUNATNCY
ISSUE: WON an accountant from the United Kingdom,
granted with certificates to practice, may practice the
profession of certified public accountant in the Philippines.
HELD: Yes. International Law is founded largely upon
mutuality, reciprocity, and the principle of comity of nations.
Comity, in this connection, is neither a matter of absolute
obligation on the one hand, nor of mere courtesy and good
will on the other. As in one case, the court noted that comity
is the recognition which one nation allows within its
territory to the legislative, executive, or judicial acts of
another nation, having due regard both to International duty
and convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens or of
other persons who are under the protection of its laws.

In this case, the UK accountants were not granted with the
opportunity to practice accountancy in the Philippines by
virtue of the principle of reciprocity but by comity.
The record shows that the British Minister accredited to the
Philippine Republic in two notes concerning this question,
addressed to the President of the Philippines in his capacity
as Head of the Department of Foreign Affairs, said:
that qualified Philippine citizen are allowed to
practice the profession of accountancy
including income tax accounting, in the United
Kingdom.
We are bound to take notice of the fact that fact that the
Philippine and the United Kingdom, are bound by a treaty
of friendship and commerce, and each nation is
represented in the other by corresponding diplomatic envoy.
There is no reason whatsoever to doubt the statement and
assurance made by the diplomatic representative of the
British Government in the Philippines, regarding the practice
of the accountancy profession in the United Kingdom and the
fact that Filipino certified public accountant will be admitted to
practice their profession in the United Kingdom should they
choose to do so.
Under such circumstances, and without necessarily
construing that such attitude of the British Government in the
premises, as represented by the British Minister, amounts to
reciprocity, we may at least state that it comes within the realm
of comity, as contemplated in our law.
4. BANK OF AMERICA, NT and SA, petitioner, vs.
AMERICAN REALTY CORPORATION and COURT OF
APPEALS, respondents.
321 SCRA 659 (1999)
WON petitioner’s act of filing a collection suit against the
principal debtors for the recovery of the loan before foreign
courts constituted a waiver of the remedy of foreclosure.
Held: Yes.
In a long line of decisions, this Court adopted the well-
imbedded principle in our jurisdiction that there is no
judicial notice of any foreign law. A foreign law must be
properly pleaded and proved as a fact.
Thus, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded
and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law
is the same as our local or domestic or internal law. This
is what we refer to as the doctrine of processual
presumption.
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English Law
on the matter were properly pleaded and proved, said foreign
law would still not find applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is contrary
to a sound and established public policy of the forum, the
said foreign law, judgment or order shall not be applied.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant case is
the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction proscribing the
splitting up of a single cause of action. Moreover, foreign
law should not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the forum.
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To give justice is the most important function of law; hence, a
law, or judgment or contract that is obviously unjust negates
the fundamental principles of Conflict of Laws.
5. HILTON V. GUYOT, 159 U.S. 113 (1895)
ISSUE:
Do laws have any effect, of their own force, beyond the limits
of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived?
HELD:
No. No law has any effect, of its own force, beyond the limits
of the sovereignty from which its authority is derived. No
sovereign is bound, unless by special compact, to
execute within his dominions a judgment rendered by the
tribunals of another state, and if execution be sought by
suit upon the judgment or otherwise, the tribunal in which
the suit is brought, or from which execution is sought, is,
on principle, at liberty to examine into the merits of such
judgment, and to give effect to it or not, as may be found
just and equitable.
However, the general comity, utility and convenience of
nations have established a usage among most civilized
states, by which the final judgments of foreign courts of
competent jurisdiction are reciprocally carried into execution,
under certain regulations and restrictions, which differ in
different countries. Additionally, judgments rendered in
France, or in any foreign country, by the laws of which our own
judgments are reviewable upon the merits, are not entitled to
full credit and conclusive effect when sued upon in this
country, but are prima facie evidence only of the justice of the
plaintiffs’ claim. Reversed
6. CLIPPERTON ISLAND CASE (FRANCE VS. MEXICO)
Overview: France claimed to have occupied an island, but
Mexico also claimed that Spain discovered it and that it was
the successor.
ISSUE: Who between France and Mexico has sovereignty
over Clipperton Island?
HELD: FRANCE.
Under international law, mere discovery gave a State an
'inchoate title': an option to occupy the territory within a
reasonable time, during which time other States were not
allowed to occupy the territory. Also, to have effective
occupation, there should be:
a) intention and will to act as sovereign and
b) adequate exercise or display of sovereignty
In this case, As ruled by King Victor Emmanuel III of Italy, the
Arbitrator, the discovery by Spain had not been proved , and
that France had not abandoned her claim and so had title to
the Island.
When France proclaimed her sovereignty over Clipperton, the
Island was in a legal situation of terra nullius, and
therefore susceptible to occupation
By the regularity of the act of France, it is clear that it had the
intention to consider the island as his territory.
.

It is beyond doubt that by immemorial usage, having the force
of law, besides animus occupandi, the ACTUAL and not
the normal taking of possession is a necessary condition
of occupation.
Thus, if a territory, by virtue of the fact that it was completely
uninhabited, is, from the first moment when the occupying
State makes its appearance there, at the absolute and
undisputed disposition of that place, from that moment, the
taking of possession must be considered as
accomplished, and the occupation is thereby completed.
In this case, it follows from these premises that Clipperton
Island was legitimately acquired by France on November 17,
1858. There is no reason that France lost her right by derelict,
since she never had the animus of abandoning the island, and
the fact that she has not exercised her authority there in a
positive manner does not imply forfeiture of an acquisition
already definitely perfected.
7. FRONTIER DISPUTE CASE (BURKINA FASO V.
REPUBLIC OF MALI)
ISSUE: Does there exist an obligation to respect pre-existing
international frontiers in the event of a state succession?
Held: Yes. There exists an obligation to respect pre-existing
international frontiers in the event of a state succession,
whether or not the rule is expressed in the form of uti
possidetis. The fact that the principle did not exist when the
states declared such independence in 1960 does not
foreclose its present application.
As regards the applicable law, the Parties had stated in
the preamble to the Special Agreement that the settlement
of the dispute should be "based in particular on the respect for
the principle of the intangibility of frontiers inherited from
colonization". Thus, the Chamber could not disregard the
principle of uti possidetis juris which it declared to be a
firmly established principle of international law where
decolonization is concerned.
Its obvious purpose was to prevent the independence and
stability of new States being endangered by the
challenging of frontiers subsequent to the withdrawal of
the administering power by upgrading former
administrative frontiers to international frontiers. This
principle, therefore, might represent the wisest course to
preserve stability.
THE PRINCIPLE OF UTI POSSIDETIS:
which it declared to be a firmly established principle of
international law where decolonization is concerned. Its
obvious purpose was to prevent the independence and
stability of new States being endangered by the
challenging of frontiers subsequent to the withdrawal of
the administering power by upgrading former
administrative frontiers to international frontiers.
This principle, therefore, might represent the wisest course to
preserve stability.
the Court described the principle as follows: “The general
principle offered the advantage of establishing an absolute
rule that there was not in law in the old Spanish America any
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terra nullius; while there might exist many regions that had
never been occupied by the Spaniards, the regions were
reputed to belonging in law to whichever of the republics
succeeded to the Spanish province to which these territories
attached by virtue of the old Royal ordinances of the Spanish
mother country.”
8. BANCO NACIONAL DE CUBA V. SABBATINO 376 U.S.
398 (1964)
Issue. Does the judiciary have the authority to examine the
validity of a taking of property within its own territory by a
foreign sovereign even if the taking violated international law?
Held. No. The judiciary, in line with the Act of State Doctrine
will not examine the validity of a taking of property within its
own territory by a foreign sovereign government recognized
by this country in the absence of international agreements to
the contrary, even if the taking violates customary
international law.
OTHER IMPORTANT POINT:
Q: WON a non-recognized state may be allowed to file suit in
the courts of the non-recognizing state. US and Cuban had
severance of diplomatic relations although Cuban was
recognized by US.
HELD: Yes.
Under the principles of comity, sovereign states are allowed
to sue in the courts of US.
The US Supreme Court ruled that the absence of recognition
of the government, being a political question, did not preclude
the filing of a suit by a foreign state, under the principle of
separation of powers.
There is a distinction between recognition of a state and
recognition of a government of that state.
The recognition of a state is an acknowledgement that the
state has complied with all the requirements of a state, and it
continues to be a state even though its form of government
has been changed. Thus, even if the government of the state
has not been recognized by another, that government cannot
sue in the recognizing state, but the state or its instrumentality
may be allowed to sue.
The privilege to sue is denied only to:
1. Governments at war with the
other state
2. To those which are not
recognized by the latter.
9. GUARANTY TRUST CO. OF NEW YORK V. U.S
RECOGNITION OF STATEDHOOD
ISSUE:
WON the the statute of limitation starts to run during the
Provisional Government of Russia.
HELD: In conformity to generally accepted principles, the
Soviet Government could not maintain a suit in our courts
before its recognition by the political department of the
government.

For this reason access to the federal and state courts was
denied to the Soviet government before recognition.
It is not true that the judgment in suits maintained here
by the diplomatic representatives of the Provisional
Government valid when rendered, and became invalid upon
the recognition of the Soviet Government.
The one operates only to validate to a limited extent acts
of a de facto government which, by virtue of the recognition,
has become a government de jure. But it does not follow
that recognition renders of no effect transactions here
with a prior recognized government in conformity to the
declared policy of our own government, otherwise
recognition would be an idle ceremony.
The very purpose of the recognition by our
government is that our nationals may be conclusively
advised with what government they may safely carry on
business transactions and who its representatives are.
Thus, the the judgment in suits maintained by the
representative of the Provisional Government would be
conclusive upon all successor governments.
10. ACCORDANCE WITH INTERNATIONAL LAW OF THE
UNILATERAL DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE IN
RESPECT OF KOSOVO (2010)
ISSUE: “Is the unilateral declaration of independence by the
Provisional Institutions of Self Government of Kosovo in
accordance with international law?”
HELD: YES
As to right to self-determination:
 During the second half of the twentieth century, the
international law of self-determination developed in
such a way as to create a right to independence for
the peoples of non-self-governing territories and
peoples subject to alien subjugation, domination
and exploitation.
A number of participants in the present proceedings have
claimed, although in almost every instance only as a
secondary argument, that the population of Kosovo has the
right to create an independent State either as a
manifestation of a right to self-determination or pursuant
to what they described as a right of “remedial secession”
in the face of the situation in Kosovo.
11. WESTERN SAHARA (ICJ ADVISORY OPINION, 1975)
Self-determination: denotes the legal right of
people to decide their own destiny in the
international order.
Self-determination is a core principle of
international law, arising from customary
international law, but also recognized as a general
principle of law, and enshrined in a number
of international treaties such as United Nations
Charter and the International Covenant on Civil and
Political Rights as a right of “all peoples.”
ISSUE: WON there were the legal ties between Western
Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco and the Mauritian entity.
HELD: No.
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Western Sahara at the time of colonization by Spain was not
terra nullius.
[There are] legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan
of Morocco and some of the tribes living in the territory of
Western Sahara. [There are also] legal ties between the
Mauritanian entity … and the territory of Western Sahara.
[However, such] do not establish any tie of territorial
sovereignty between the territory of Western Sahara and the
Kingdom of Morocco or the Mauritanian entity.
Thus the Court, being mindful of the purpose for which
the Advisory Opinion was sought, held in its penultimate
paragraph: “The materials and information presented to the
Court show the existence, at the time of Spanish colonization,
of legal ties of allegiance between the Sultan of Morocco and
some of the tribes living in the territory of Western Sahara.
They equally show the existence of rights, including some
rights relating to the land, which constituted legal ties between
the Mauritanian entity, as understood by the Court, and the
territory of Western Sahara. On the other hand, the Court's
conclusion is that the materials and information presented to
it do not establish any tie of territorial sovereignty between the
territory of Western Sahara and the Kingdom of Morocco or
the Mauritanian entity.
Thus the Court has not found legal ties of such a
nature as might affect the application of resolution 1514
(XV) in the decolonization of Western Sahara and, in
particular, of the principle of self-determination through the
free and genuine expression of the will of the peoples of the
Territory.
12. MINGTAI FIRE & MARINE INSURANCE CO., LTD. V.
UNITED PARCEL SERVICE, MAY 25, 1999
Binding Effect of the Executive’s position in foreign
relations to the courts
ISSUE: WON the executive’s position in foreign relations
binds the court.
HELD: Yes. The Supreme Court has repeatedly held that the
Constitution commits to the Executive Branch alone the
authority to recognize, and to withdraw recognition from,
foreign regimes. Similarly, “governmental action must be
regarded as of controlling importance” in determining the
status of treaties.
The Warsaw convention in this case does not apply to Taiwan
hence the Dc properly upheld the limitation of liability in the
airway bill.
The Convention only applies to shipments between territories
of signatories, otherwise referred to as “High Contracting
Parties.” The parties do not dispute that Taiwan is not a High
Contracting Party, nor that China is a High Contracting Party.