PEOPLE VS RODIL

FACTS:

Accused Floro Rodil was found guilty for the death of Lt. Guillermo Masana of the Philippine Constabulary. The accused,
armed with a double-bladed dagger, with evident premeditation and treachery, and with intent to kill, did, attack and
stab PC Lt. Guillermo Masana while the latter was in the performance of his official duties, which directly caused his
death.

ISSUE: Whether or not the crime of murder can be complexed with assault upon agent of authority.

HELD: Yes. The Solicitor General claims the crime committed was murder because "it was established by the
prosecution that during the stabbing incident, appellant suddenly and without giving the victim a chance to defend
himself, stabbed the latter several times with a dagger, inflicting. The suddenness of the attack does not by itself suffice
to support a finding of treachery , the record failed to show that the accused made any preparation to kill his victim so
as to insure the commission of the crime. Clearly, therefore, the impelling motive for the attack by appellant on his
victim was the latter's performance of official duty, which the former resented. This kind of evidence does not clearly
show the presence of treachery in the commission of the crime.

The aggravating circumstance of disregard of rank should be appreciated because it is obvious that the victim. Identified
himself as a PC officer to the accused who is merely a member of the Anti-Smuggling Unit and therefore inferior both in
rank and social status to the victim. If the accused herein were charged with the complex crime of murder with assault
against an agent of a person in authority, and not merely murder, then the aggravating circumstance of disregard of
rank or contempt of or insult to public authority cannot be appreciated as aggravating because either circumstance is
inherent in the charge of assault against a person in authority or an agent of a person in authority.

Pangan v. Gatbalite Digest

Facts:

1. On September 16, 1987, the petitioner was convicted of the offense charged and was sentenced to serve a penalty of
two months and one day of arresto mayor. On appeal, the Regional Trial Court, on October 24, 1988, affirmed in toto
the decision of the MTC. Petitioner never got to serve his sentence and hid for about nine years.

2. Then, on January 20, 2000, the petitioner was apprehended and detained at the Mabalacat Detention Cell. Four days
thereafter, he filed a Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at the RTC of Angeles City, impleading respondent (Acting
Chief of Police of Mabalacat, Pampanga). Petitioner contended that his arrest was illegal and unjustified on the grounds
that, a) the straight penalty of two months and one day of arresto mayor prescribes in five years under No. 3,Article 93
[of the] Revised Penal Code, and (b) having been able to continuously evade service of sentence for almost nine years,
his criminalliability has long been totally extinguished under No. 6, Article 89 of the Revised Penal Code.

3. The petition for a writ of habeas corpus was denied since there was no evasion of the service of the sentence. Evasion
presupposes escape during the service of the sentence consisting in deprivation of liberty.

Issue: Whether or not the penalty already prescribed

HELD: NO.

The period of prescription of penalties – the succeeding Article 93 provides – "shall commence to run from the date
when the culprit should evade the service of his sentence". Article 157 of the RPC discussed how evasion of service of
sentence was perfected. It is provided therein that,

"The penalty of prision correccional in its medium and maximum periods shall be imposed upon any convict who shall
evade service of his sentence by escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment. To consider
properly the meaning of evasion service of sentence, its elements must be present these are: (1) the offender is a
convict by final judgment; (2) he "is serving his sentence which consists in deprivation of liberty"; and (3) he evades
service of sentence by escaping during the term of his sentence. For, by the express terms of the statute, a convict
evades "service of his sentence" by "escaping during the term of his imprisonment by reason of final judgment."

That escape should take place while serving sentence, is emphasized by the second sentence of Article 157. It provides
for a higher penalty if such "evasion or escape shall have taken place by means of unlawful entry, by breaking doors,
windows, gates, walls, roofs, or floors, or by using picklocks, false keys, disguise, deceit, violence or intimidation, or
through connivance with other convicts or employees of the penal institution, . . ." Indeed, evasion of sentence is but
another expression of the term "jail breaking."

As pointed out by the Solicitor General, "escape" in legal parlance and for purposes of Articles 93 and 157 of the RPC
means the unlawful departure of prisoner from the limits of his custody. Clearly, one who has not been committed to
prison cannot be said to have escaped therefrom.

In this case, the petitioner was never brought to prison. As the record would show, even before the execution of the
judgment for his conviction, he was already in hiding. He now begs for the compassion of the Court because he has
ceased to live a life of peace and tranquility after he failed to appear in court for the execution of his sentence. But it
was petitioner who chose to become a fugitive. The Court accords compassion only to those who are deserving.
Petitioner's guilt was proven beyond reasonable doubt but he refused to answer for the wrong he committed. He is
therefore not to be rewarded therefor.

But in the case at bar, the appellant is accused of murder only. Consequently, either aggravating circumstance should be
considered in the imposition of the penalty. Appellant guilty of HOMICIDE AGGRAVATED BY CONTEMPT FOR OR INSULT
TO A PUBLIC AUTHORITY OR DISREGARD OF THE RESPECT DUE THE OFFENDED PARTY ON ACCOUNT OF HIS RANK.

PEOPLE v. ROLANDO GONZALES Y LAYSON

G.R. No. 105689

Appellant Rolando L. Gonzales was charged before the Regional Trial Court of Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Branch 172
with violation of Section 4, Article II of Republic Act No. 6425 otherwise known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972 as
amended, in an information which reads:

"That on or about the 26th day of November, 1991 in Valenzuela, Metro Manila, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, without authority of law did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously sell and deliver to PO3 RENATO FLORANO y PEREZ, who posed as buyer, dried marijuana leaves, knowing the
same to be a prohibited drugs (sic).

Contrary to law." (Rollo, p. 3)

Upon arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the charge and trial on the merits thereafter ensued.

The facts of the case as summarized by the Solicitor General are as follows:

"On November 26, 1991, at about 3:20 pm, an information was received at the Dona Ata Police Sub-Station, Valenzuela,
Metro Manila that marijuana was being sold publicly at P. Deato Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila.

"A 'buy-bust' team was then formed by SPO 4 Jacinto Cruz, composed of prosecution witness PO3 Renato Florano, SPO 1
Enrique Dabu and Pat. Arnel Rosete. PO2 Florano was to act as the poseur-buyer.

The buy-bust team then proceeded to P. Deato St. Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila and arrived thereat at about 3:30
pm. There they saw appellant Rolando Gonzales conversing with two other persons.
PO3 Florano approached appellant and told the latter that he (Florano) wanted to buy marijuana, at the same time
handing to appellant one ten-peso bill.

After receiving the money from PO3 Florano, appellant went inside a house located in a compound and returned three
minutes later with the marijuana. PO3 Florano then introduced himself as a police officer, called his other companions
and arrested appellant and the two persons earlier seen talking with appellant. The money previously given to the
appellant was recovered from his right pocket.

The marijuana confiscated from appellant was submitted to the National Bureau of Investigation for examination and
found to be positive for marijuana." (Rollo, pp. 119-120)

At the trial, the prosecution presented three (3) witnesses, namely PO3 Renato Florano, PO3 Frederico Patag and NBI
Forensic Chemist Julieta Flores. PO3 Florano testified on the events of the buy-bust operation which culminated in the
arrest of appellant while Flores testified on the results of the chemical examination she conducted on the contents of
the plastic bag handed by appellant to Florano which she found positive for marijuana. Patag merely testified on the
investigation he conducted on appellant after the latter's arrest.

The defense on the other hand, presented accused-appellant as its sole witness, who presented a totally different
version of the circumstances surrounding his arrest.

Appellant's version of the events that led to his arrest purports to show that at about 3:30 p.m. on November 26, 1991,
while he was alone outside the front yard of their house at P. Deato Street, Marulas, Valenzuela, Metro Manila, police
officers led by PO3 Florano picked him up and made him board an owner-type jeepney owned by PO1 Dabu. Aboard the
jeepney were two persons allegedly earlier apprehended by the group of Florano.

Appellant claims that on the way to the police sub-station, said police officers forced him to admit that he sold
marijuana to the two (2) other persons aboard the owner-type jeepney, which he allegedly refused to do. The police
officers, however, persisted on their demand and because of his continued refusal to admit, brought him to the police
station where he was charged with the violation of Section 4, Article II of RA No. 6425.

After trial, judgment was rendered convicting the accused of the crime charged, the dispositive portion of which reads:

"WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the court finds the accused guilty of violation of Section 4, Art. II of R.A. 6425
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of LIFE IMPRISONMENT and a fine of P 20,000.00 without subsidiary
imprisonment in case of insolvency and to pay the costs. The marijuana subject of this case is ordered confiscated in
favor of the government.

"SO ORDERED." (Rollo, p. 12)

Appellant appeals from the aforementioned decision of the court a quo and assigns the following errors:

I "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN NOT RULING THAT THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION'S PRINCIPAL WITNESS PO3 RENATO
FLORANO WAS SO INCONSISTENT WITH HUMAN EXPERIENCE THAT IT CANNOT SUPPORT A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION.

II "THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE TO ESTABLISH HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT." (Rollo, p. 30)

Appellant assails the credibility of the testimony of PO3 Florano considering that it was the only basis for his conviction.
Appellant contends that it is highly unbelievable that he would readily sell marijuana to PO3 Florano who is known to
him to be a police officer. The ease with which Florano allegedly bought marijuana from him, renders the former's
testimony suspect. The foregoing circumstances, appellant claims, are so inconsistent with human experience and the
natural order of things and therefore cannot be made the basis for a judgment of conviction.

Appellant likewise assails the validity of the buy-bust operation given that it was allegedly conducted solely at the
instance of PO3 Florano who acted as the poseur-buyer and the arresting officer at the same time. It is further claimed
that there was no evidence presented showing the regularity of such operation. Appellant points to the fact that no
documentation was ever presented showing that the operation was authorized by a superior officer.

It is evident, therefore, that the resolution of this case hinges on the issue of credibility. Once again, we reiterate the
well-entrenched rule that the findings of the trial court regarding the issue of credibility of witnesses and their
testimonies are entitled to great respect and are accorded the highest consideration by appellate courts (People v.
Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279 [1992]). The matter of assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who, unlike appellate magistrates, can weigh such testimony in the light of
the declarant's demeanor, conduct and attitude at the trial and is thereby placed in a more competent position to
discriminate between the true and false representations (People v. Babac, 204 SCRA 968 [1991]).

In the case at bar, the trial court, after evaluating the evidence before it, found the testimony of PO3 Florano credible
and convincing, as follows:

"The prosecution has only one witness here, PO3 Renato Florano whose testimony in Court tally in details with his
statement (Exs. G, G-1, G-2) although in the said statement of Florano, it is said that the accused handed to him the
marijuana leaves. His testimony is credible and positive and it satisfies the Court beyond reasonable doubt to convict the
accused."

We find no compelling reason to overturn the findings of the trial court. After a careful reading of the records, the Court
finds the testimony of PO3 Florano regarding the buy-bust operation, which resulted in the apprehension, prosecution
and subsequent conviction of appellant to be direct, clear and forthright. Being totally untainted by contradictions in any
of the material points, it deserves credence. Appellant's contention that Florano's testimony on the buy-bust operation
is uncorroborated is of no moment.

Well-settled is the rule that the testimony of a lone prosecution witness, as long as it is credible and positive, can prove
the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt (People v. Abelita, 210 SCRA 497 [1992]).

Appellant therefore cannot discredit the testimony of PO3 Florano. Aside from the clear and convincing evidence
presented by the prosecution, nothing in the records tend to show that the police officers were actuated by improper
motives in apprehending accused-appellant. Police officers are presumed to have regularly performed their duties in the
absence of evidence showing the contrary.

Appellant's claim that it was impossible for him to have sold marijuana to PO3 Florano knowing him to be a police officer
is patently without merit. Aside from its lack of corroboration, appellant's contention is a matter which can be so easily
contrived, for all that appellant has to do is to affirmatively declare knowledge of the identity of the peace
officer/poseur-buyer and seek refuge in this self-serving contention. On the other hand, PO3 Florano's testimony is to
the effect that appellant is a stranger to him (Florano)

Even assuming arguendo that said knowledge and/or recognition of Florano by appellant is true, what matters in drug-
related cases is not the existing familiarity between the seller and the buyer, but their agreement and the acts
constituting the sale and delivery of the prohibited drugs (People v. Jaymalin, 214 SCRA 685 [1991]). Drug pushers,
especially small quantity or retail pushers, sell their prohibited wares to anyone who can pay for the same, be they
strangers or not (People vs. Madriaga, 211 SCRA 711 [1992]).

The fact that appellant returned with the plastic bag of marijuana after receiving a certain amount from the police
officer who acted as poseur-buyer shows his willingness to enter into a transaction of selling and delivering the
prohibited drug. This willingness in turn, shows that he opted to take the risk of being brought into the folds of the law.

Equally untenable is appellant's assertion regarding the irregularity of the buy-bust operation for allegedly having been
conducted solely at the instance of PO3 Florano. There is no fixed procedure for conducting buy-bust operations (People
v. Cruda, 211 SCRA 125 [1992]). Contrary to the submission of the appellant, we cannot see how the procedure adopted
by the police officers in this case can nullify the end results of said buy-bust operation or defeat the application of the
presumption of regularity in the performance of their official duties as earlier stated. The records show no irregularity in
the conduct of the buy-bust operation which may exculpate the accused. If a police operation has to be conducted
immediately, as in this case, time is of the essence. Consequently, not every contingency could be anticipated and
provided for. What is important is the fact that the rights of the accused-appellant, from the moment of his
apprehension to filing of the information against him were shown to have been fully protected.

WHEREFORE, the appealed judgment is hereby AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.

LEONILA BATULANON VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES

G.R. NO. 139857 September 15, 2006

FACTS: Polomok Credit Cooperative Incorporated (PCCI) employed Leonila Batulanon as its Cashier/Manager from May
1980 up to December 22, 1982. She was in charge of receiving deposits from and releasing loans to the member of the
cooperative.

During an audit conducted in December 1982, certain irregularities concerning the release of loans were discovered. It
was found that Batulanon falsified four commercial documents, all checks/cash vouchers representing granted loans to
different persons namely: Omadlao, Oracion, Arroyo and Dennis Batulanon, making it appear that said names were
granted a loan and received the amount of the checks/cash vouchers when in truth and in fact the said persons never
received a grant, never received the checks, and never signed the check vouchers issued in their names. In furtherance,
Batulanon released to herself the checks and received the loans and thereafter misappropriated and converted it to her
own use and benefit.

Thereafter, four Informations for Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents were filed against Batulanon.
The prosecution presented Medallo, Gopio, Jr. and Jayoma as witnesses. Medallo, the posting clerk whose job was to
assist Batulanon in the preparation of cash vouchers testified that Batulanon forged the signatures of Omadlao, Oracion
and Arroyo. Gopio, Jr. stated that Oracion is Batulanon’ sister-in-law and Dennis Batulanon is her son who was only 3
years old in 1982. He averred that membership in the cooperative is not open to minors.

On April 15, 1993, the trial court rendered a Decision convicting Batulanon of Estafa through Falsification of Commercial
Documents. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the trial court, hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the crime committed by Batulanon was Falsification of Private Documents.

HELD: Yes. Although the offense charged in the Information is Estafa through Falsification of Commercial Documents,
Batulanon could be convicted of Falsification of Private Documents under the well-settled rule that it is the allegation in
the information that determines the nature of the offense and not the technical name given in the preamble of the
information.

As there is no complex crime of Estafa through Falsification of Private Documents, it is important to ascertain whether
the offender is to be charged with Falsification of a Private Document or with Estafa. If the falsification of a private
document is committed as a means to commit estafa, the proper crime to be charged is falsification. If the Estafa can be
committed without the necessity of falsifying a document, the proper crime is Estafa. We find that the Court of Appeals
correctly held Batulanon guilty beyond reasonable doubt of Falsification of Private Documents in the cases of Omadlao,
Oracion and Arroyo.

In the case of Dennis Batulanon, records show that Batulanon did not falsify the signature of Dennis. What she did was
to sign: “by: Ibatulanon” to indicate that she received the proceeds of the loan in behalf of Dennis. Said act does not fall
under any of the modes of Falsification under Article 171 because there is nothing untruthful about the fact that she
used the name of Dennis and that as representative of the latter, obtained the proceeds of the loan from PCCI. The
essence of falsification is the act of making untruthful or false statements, which is not attendant in this case. As to
whether, such representation involves fraud which caused damage to PCCI is a different matter which will make her
liable for estafa, but not for falsification. Hence, it was an error for the courts below to hold that Batulanon is also guilty
of Falsification of Private Document with respect to the case involving the cash voucher of Dennis Batulanon.