REMEDIAL LAW REVIEW II

EVIDENCE CASE DIGESTS (JUDGE DEBALUCOS)

1. SAN LUIS VS ROJAS (3/3/2008) à ADMISSIBILITY VS WEIGHT

Principle:
The admissibility of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence
while the weight of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[
Facts:
Private respondent is an American Corporation not engage in business in the Philippines sued petitioner for sum of money only for incidental
transaction. Private respondent move to take deposition of its witnesses because all are in the United States and difficult to come to the Philippines to
take the witness stand. Petitioner opposed the motion on the ground that the court will fail to see the demeanor of the witness because such statements
are only based on depositions. RTC granted the motion of the private petitioner.
Ruling:
It has been repeatedly held that deposition discovery rules are to be accorded a broad and liberal treatment[31] and should not be unduly restricted if
the matters inquired into are otherwise relevant and not privileged, and the inquiry is made in good faith and within the bounds of law. Otherwise, the
advantage of a liberal discovery procedure in ascertaining the truth and expediting the disposal of litigation would be defeated.[32] In fact, we find
nothing in the rules on deposition that limits their use in case of oral contract as alleged by petitioner.
In any event, the admissibility of the deposition does not preclude the determination of its probative value at the appropriate time. The admissibility
of evidence should not be equated with weight of evidence. The admissibility of evidence depends on its relevance and competence while the weight
of evidence pertains to evidence already admitted and its tendency to convince and persuade.[33]
Petitioner argues that to allow such deposition-taking will prevent the RTC from observing the witnesses' demeanor and credibility; and that
petitioner's right to cross-examine the witnesses would be curtailed if not denied as he is limited to cross-interrogatories and re-cross interrogatories
based on written interrogatories.

RULE 130

2. US VS CARALIPIO (48 PHIL 421)

Facts:
Accused was convicted by the justice of peace of theft for stilling carabao. Both the private complainant and the accused avers that the young carabao
is an offspring of their carabaos. Jusitce of the peace made an experiment, ordering the caraballa of the parties allege to be the mother be brought to
the court. The caraballa of the accused was placed in one side and private complainant caraballa to the other side. The young carabao was released
and it went the directly to the caraballa of the private complainant just like a lost child longing for his mother. It was found out that the accused were
guilty of the crime of theft.
Ruling:
We have not the slightest doubt that the young carabao in dispute in this case is and was the property of Feliciano de la Pasion. This being so, it is
equally undoubted that it was feloniously taken from his possession by the accused in this case. It is a point worthy of note that the accused Cipriano
Fernando admitted upon cross-examination that he had branded and obtained certificates of property for two young carabaos of substancially the
same age as the one in dispute, one in the month of November, 1908, and the other in the month of February, 1909, both carabaos of the same
caraballa which he claimed was the mother of the young carabao in question. As the young carabao in dispute is alleged also to be calf of the same
caraballa of the accused and of substantially the same age as the two young carabaos referred to, it presents the unusual spectacle of seeing a
caraballa the mother of three carabaos in less than two years. There is nothing whatever in the case which indicates that the testimony of the
complaint and his witnesses is false. On the other hand, every circumstance which has been presented in this case indicates that that testimony is true.
It is to be wondered why the accused, being a resident of one municipality, in which the accused, being a resident of one municipality, in which he
had caused to be branded two young carabaos during the prior year and from which he had received certificates of property of the same, should take
the carabao in question to another municipality for the same purpose. We are of the opinion that the conclusions of the learned trial court are fully
sustained by the proofs.

3. MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES VS SAN YONG (10/17/2007)

FACTS:
Petitioner MCC Industrial Sales (MCC), a domestic corporation with office at Binondo, Manila, is engaged in the business of importing and
wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the Ssangyong Corporation (Ssangyong), an international trading company with head
office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls
and facsimile or telecopy transmissions. Ssangyong would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to MCC; if the
latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to Ssangyong, again by fax.
Following the failure of MCC to open a letters of credit to facilitate the payment of imported stainless steel products, Ssangyong through counsel
wrote a letter to MCC, on September 11, 2000, canceling the sales contract under ST2-POSTS0401-1 /ST2-POSTS0401-2, and demanding payment
of US$97,317.37 representing losses, warehousing expenses, interests and charges.
Ssangyong then filed, on November 16, 2001, a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against defendants MCC, Sanyo Seiki and Gregory
Chan before the Regional Trial Court of Makati City. In its complaint, Ssangyong alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused
to open the L/C in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-
POSTS0401-2.
After Ssangyong rested its case, defendants filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that Ssangyong failed to present the original copies of the pro
forma invoices on which the civil action was based. In an Order dated April 24, 2003, the court denied the demurrer, ruling that the documentary
evidence presented had already been admitted in the December 16, 2002 Orde and their admissibility finds support in Republic Act (R.A.) No. 8792,
otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000. According to the aforesaid Order, considering that both testimonial and documentary
evidence tended to substantiate the material allegations in the complaint, Ssangyong's evidence sufficed for purposes of a prima facie case.
ISSUE:Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible in evidence as such?
DECISION:
R.A. No. 8792, otherwise known as the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, considers an electronic data message or an electronic document as the
functional equivalent of a written document for evidentiary purposes. The Rules on Electronic Evidence regards an electronic document as
admissible in evidence if it complies with the rules on admissibility prescribed by the Rules of Court and related laws, and is authenticated in the
manner prescribed by the said Rules. An electronic document is also the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, if it is a
printout or output readable by sight or other means, shown to reflect the data accurately.
Thus, to be admissible in evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document."
In an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent through a phone line, and re-
printed at the receiving end. Be it noted that in enacting the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, Congress intended virtual or paperless writings to be
the functional equivalent and to have the same legal function as paper-based documents. Further, in a virtual or paperless environment, technically,
there is no original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as originals.
Ineluctably, the law's definition of "electronic data message," which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with "electronic document," could not have
included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies
are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects. While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer
technology when it drafted the law, it excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes,
which is a newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term "electronic data
message."We, therefore, conclude that the terms "electronic data message" and "electronic document," as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act
of 2000, do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence. It is not the
functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.
Since a facsimile transmission is not an "electronic data message" or an "electronic document," and cannot be considered as electronic evidence by
the Court, with greater reason is a photocopy of such a fax transmission not electronic evidence. In the present case, therefore, Pro Forma Invoice
Nos. ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2 (Exhibits "E" and "F"), which are mere photocopies of the original fax transmittals, are not
electronic evidence, contrary to the position of both the trial and the appellate courts.

4. PP VS TANDOY (192 SCRA 28)

Facts:
Mario Tandoy was convicted of the crime of violation of Art. II, Sec. 4 of Rep. Act No. 6425 known as the Dangerous Drugs Act of 1972.
On May 27, 1986, at about 3:30 p.m. Lt. Salido, Jr. of the Makati Police Station dispatched Pfc. Herino de la Cruz, and Detectives Pablo R. Singayan,
Nicanor Candolesas, Luisito de la Cruz, Estanislao Dalumpines, Antonio Manalastas and Virgilio Padua to conduct a buy-bust operation at Solchuaga
St., Barangay Singkamas, Makati.
The target area was a store along the said street, and Singayan was to pose as the buyer. He stood alone near the store waiting for any pusher to
approach. The other members of the team strategically positioned themselves. Soon, three men approached Singayan. One of them was the accused-
appellant, who said without preamble: "Pare, gusto mo bang umiskor?" Singayan said yes. The exchange was made then and there — two rolls/pieces
of marijuana for one P10.00 and two P5.00 bills marked ANU (meaning Anti-Narcotics Unit).
The team then moved in and arrested Tandoy. Manalastas and Candolesas made a body search of the accused-appellant and took from him the
marked money, as well as eight more rolls/foils of marijuana and crushed leaves.
The arresting officers brought Tandoy to the Office of the Anti-Narcotics Unit, Makati Police Station, for investigation by Detective Marvin Pajilan.
The accused-appellant chose to remain silent after having been informed of his constitutional rights.

These events were narrated under oath by De la Cruz, Singayan and Pajilan. 1 Microscopic, chemical and chromotographic examination was
performed on the confiscated marijuana by Raquel P. Angeles, forensic chemist of the National Bureau of Investigation, who later testified that the
findings were positive. The marijuana was offered as an exhibit. 2 (The facts of the case did not indicate that exhbit 2 is a “xerox copy”).

Issue: Whether or not the Court a quo erred in admitting in evidence against the accused Exh. "E-2-A" which is merely a xerox copy of the P10.00
bill allegedly used as buy-bust money.
Held:
No.
Under the second assigned error, the accused-appellant invokes the best evidence rule and questions the admission by the trial court of the xerox copy
only of the marked P10.00 bill.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment, correctly refuted that contention thus:
This assigned error centers on the trial court's admission of the P10.00 bill marked money (Exh. E-2-A) which, according to the appellant, is
excluded under the best evidence rule for being a mere xerox copy. Apparently, appellant erroneously thinks that said marked money is an ordinary
document falling under Sec. 2, Rule 130 of the Revised Rules of Court which excludes the introduction of secondary evidence except in the five (5)
instances mentioned therein:
The best evidence rule applies only when the contents of the document are the subject of inquiry. Where the issue is only as to whether or not
such document was actually executed, or exists, or in the circumstances relevant to or surrounding its execution, the best evidence rule does
not apply and testimonial evidence is admissible. (Cf. Moran, op. cit., pp. 76-77; 4 Martin, op. cit., p. 78.)
Since the aforesaid marked money was presented by the prosecution solely for the purpose of establishing its existence and not its contents, other
substitutionary evidence, like a xerox copy thereof, is therefore admissible without the need of accounting for the original.
Moreover, the presentation at the trial of the "buy-bust money" was not indispensable to the conviction of the accused-appellant because the sale of
the marijuana had been adequately proved by the testimony of the police officers. So long as the marijuana actually sold by the accused-appellant had
been submitted as an exhibit, the failure to produce the marked money itself would not constitute a fatal omission.

5. RAMOS VS CA (203 SCRA 657)

Facts:
On January 27, 1976, petitioner Fermina Ramos was designated Acting Branch Manager of the FSB in Tagum, Davao due to the transfer of the then
branch manager, Mr. Johnny Cuan to another branch. She was appointed branch manager effective February 16, 1976 which position she held until
the middle of June of the same year. During the term of her predecessor Mr. Cuan, as branch manager of Tagum, the latter was authorized by the
bank's Assistant Vice President Gerry Ramirez of the FSB, Cebu City to allow the drawing against uncleared check deposits (DAUD) to certain
clients of the bank. Apparently, this practice was in violation of the bank's operation manual (O.M.S. No. 2:07).
It appears that the accused, in violation of the bank's policy and without authority from either Ramirez or De Leon, not only continued to grant
DAUD accommodations to old depositors who had enjoyed such privilege under her predecessors, but also extended the same privilege to new
clients of the bank. Among those new clients were Lourdes Orpiano, her co-accused in Crim. Case No. 3349, and the spouses Lourdes and Francisco
Gonzales, her co-accused in Crim. Cases Nos. 3350 and 3351.
In June 1976, the deluge of bouncing checks deposited in the FSB Tagum branch and withdrawn without prior clearance, pursuant the DAUD
accommodations granted by the accused became unmanageable. Even the checks issued by the FSB Tagum branch were longer being honored by its
depository banks. In her letter of May 30, 1976 to Mercedes Gotianum, FSB Executive Vice-President, the accused disclosed that "we no longer
could withdraw against uncleared deposits. Out-of-town checks are to be credited to our account upon clearing only." (Exh. 8-A)
An audit of the Tagum branch was ordered by the FSB central office. It resulted in the filing of twenty-three (23) criminal complaints for estafa
against the depositors and Fermina Ramos. Ten (10) of them were assigned to Branch VIII and thirteen (13) were assigned Branch IX, the sala of
Judge Felix Moya.
As the other accused remained at large, petitioner was tried separately. Thereafter, Judge Felix L. Moya convicted her estafa through reckless
negligence in three (3) of the thirteen (13) cases assigned to his sala and acquitted her in all the rest. These three (3) cases are the subject matter of
this petition. The other cases assigned to Branch VIII of the same Regional Trial Court were also dismissed.
Issue: whether or not the trial judge erred in admitting the testimony of the bank auditor Elrey Ramos based on the worksheets he prepared in the
process of his investigation regarding the unauthorized DAUD extended by the petitioner to her accused.
Held:
No.
There is no error on the part of the trial judge in admitting the testimony of the bank auditor Elrey Ramos based on the worksheets he prepared in the
process of his investigation regarding the unauthorized DAUD extended by the petitioner to her accused. These worksheets, as correctly pointed out
by Solicitor General, are organized data culled from the pertinent bank documents which are not intended to supplant the probative value of said
documents. But together with the other evidence presented such as the account ledgers of petitioner's co-accused, a number of inter-office
correspondence between the petitioner and her superiors as well as the xerox copies of the uncleared checks deposited to the FSB and the checks
issued by the latter corresponding to the withdrawals against said uncleared checks, they present indubitable proof that DAUD was allowed by
petitioner even after that practice was prohibited. Besides, these documents and the testimony of another prosecution witness Francisco Juele, Jr., an
employee of the FSB, Tagum Branch, corroborate with each other. From material dates, the amounts involved, the check numbers the names of the
different depository banks, to the signatures of the parties involved, especially that of the signature of the herein petitioner as the approving officer,
the authencity these documents is apparent.
In Commissioner of Internal Revenue v. Fireman's Fund Ins., Co., G. R. No. L-30644, March 9, 1987, 148 SCRA 315, 323 it was held that the court
is not precluded from admitting documents other than the best evidence to prove a party's allegations.
Moreover, the entries in the account ledgers of the depositors which are on file on the bank may be regarded as originals under paragraph c, Section
4, Rule 30 of the Rules of Court, the pertinent provisions of which reads:
Section 4(c). When an entry is repeated in the regular course of business, one being copied from another at or near the
time of the transaction, all the entries are likewise equally regarded as originals.
The above-cited provision alone is sufficient to reject petitioner's contention that the documents admitted by the trial court which were among the
bases of her conviction do not constitute the best evidence.

6. LECHUGAS VS CA (143 SCRA 55)

Facts:
This petition for review invokes the parol evidence rule as it imputes grave abuse of discretion on the part of the appellate court for admitting and
giving credence to the testimony of the vendor regarding the sale of the disputed lot. The testimony is contrary to the contents of the deed of sale
executed by the vendor in favor of the petitioner.
Victoria Lechugas (petitioner) bought a land from a certain Leoncia Lasangue. After the purchase of the land, the Deed of Absolute Sale executed by
Leoncia Lasangue in her favor specified a certain land Lot No. 5456 stated in the contract. When the defendants (respondents) occupied Lot No.
5456, petitioner filed a complaint for forcible entry with damages (ejectment case) against the defendants but it was dismissed. Petitioner appealed
the case to the CFI (now RTC) of Iloilo.

While the appeal for the ejectment case was pending, petitioner filed another case in the RTC for the recovery of possession against the same
defendants involving the same Lot No. 5456. During the trial, the defendants presented their star witness in the person of Leoncia Lasangue herself.

Leoncia Lasangue testified during the trial. That according to her, the lot that she sold to the petitioner was not Lot No. 5456 but another lot, Lot
5522. Lasangue did not know how to read and write, so the document of sale was prepared by the petitioner, thereafter, the former was made to sign
it. Based on her testimony, the lot indicated in the Deed of Sale which she sold to petitioner was erroneous. It was clear that she did not intend to sell
a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the defendants (respondents). This was objected by the petitioner under the
Parole Evidence Rule.

Issue: Whether or not the petitioner’s contention that the respondent Court had no legal justification when it subjected the true intent and agreement
to parol evidence over the objection of petitioner and that to impugn a written agreement, the evidence must be conclusive.
Held:
The contention is without merit.The appellate court acted correctly in upholding the trial court's action in admitting the testimony of Leoncia
Lasangue.
As explained by a leading commentator on our Rules of Court, the parol evidence rule does not apply, and may not properly be invoked by either
party to the litigation against the other, where at least one of the parties to the suit is not party or a privy of a party to the written instrument in
question and does not base a claim on the instrument or assert a right originating in the instrument or the relation established thereby.
In Horn v. Hansen (57 N.W. 315), the court ruled:
...and the rule therefore applies, that as between parties to a written agreement, or their privies, parol evidence cannot be
received to contradict or vary its terms. Strangers to a contract are, of course, not bound by it, and the rule excluding
extrinsic evidence in the construction of writings is inapplicable in such cases; and it is relaxed where either one of the
parties between whom the question arises is a stranger to the written agreement, and does not claim under or through one
who is party to it. In such case the rule is binding upon neither. ...
The petitioner's reliance on the parol evidence rule is misplaced. The rule is not applicable where the controversy is between one of the parties to the
document and third persons. The deed of sale was executed by Leoncia Lasangue in favor of Victoria Lechugas. The dispute over what was actually
sold is between petitioner and the private respondents. In the case at bar, through the testimony of Leoncia Lasangue, it was shown that what she
really intended to sell and to be the subject of Exhibit A was Lot No. 5522 but not being able to read and write and fully relying on the good faith of
her first cousin, the petitioner, she just placed her thumbmark on a piece of paper which petitioner told her was the document evidencing the sale of
land. The deed of sale described the disputed lot instead.
This fact was clearly shown in Lasangue's testimony and there can be no other conclusion but that Lasangue did not intend to sell as she could not
have sold, a piece of land already sold by her father to the predecessor-in-interest of the respondents.
The fact that vendor Lasangue did not bring an action for the reformation of Exhibit "A" is of no moment. The undisputed fact is that the respondents
have timely questioned the validity of the instrument and have proven that, indeed Exhibit "A" does not reflect the true intention of the vendor.
There is likewise no merit in the contention of the petitioner that the respondents changed their theory on appeal.
Respondents, from the very start, had questioned and denied Leoncia Lasangue's capacity to sell the disputed lot to petitioner. It was their contention
that the lot was sold by Leoncia's father Emeterio Lasangue to their father, Hugo Loza wayback in 1941 while the alleged sale by Leoncia to the
petitioner took place only in 1950. In essence, therefore, the respondents were already attacking the validity of Exhibit "A". Moreover, although the
prior sale of the lot to their father may have been emphasized in their defenses in the civil cases filed against them by the petitioner in the lower
court, nevertheless in their affirmative defense, the respondents already raised doubt on the true intention of Leoncia Lasangue in signing Exhibit "A"
when they alleged that..." Leoncia Lasangue, publicly, and in writing repudiated said allegation and pretension of the plaintiff, to the effect that the
parcel of land now in litigation in the present case "WAS NOT INCLUDED in the sale she executed in favor of the plaintiff ... .
Consequently, petitioner cannot impute grave abuse on the part of the appellate court and state that it allowed a change of theory by the respondents
for the first time on appeal for in reality, there was no such change.

7. FINANCIAL BUILDING CORP V ROADLINK INTERNATIONAL CORPORATION (10/4/2010) à NOT FOUND

 8. PP VS DIANOS (297 SCRA 191)
Doctrine:

(a) Mere relationship by a witness to the victim, however, does not necessarily impair credibility. Unless the Court is convinced that
the witnesses are clearly impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony.

(b) In order to admit such hearsay statements as part of res gestae, there must be a confluence of the following essential conditions:
(1) that the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements are made before the declarant had the
time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and (3) that the statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate
attending circumstances.

(c) There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of factors have been
considered, including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction
and the making of the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the
utterance is given, (4) the presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto,
and (5) the nature and the circumstances of the statement itself.

(d) A paraffin test has never been considered to be foolproof. On the contrary, it has been held to be highly unreliable.

Facts: Involved in the incident were all residents of Cypress Point Village, Irisan, in Baguio City. The relationship among them was due to a
transaction apparently involving Teresita Ortiz (Teresita) and Josie Ortiz Santos (Josie), and accused Romeo Dianos, over a piece of land occupied by
the latter.

On 31 December 1990, at about five o'clock in the morning, Nancy Ortiz Dasudas (Nancy) saw the accused throw a hand grenade near the house
of her parents. Josie, who was standing near the site of the explosion was hit with a shrapnel on the left leg. Later that day, at around 9:30 in the
evening, the accused, donned in military camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, was seen traversing the Cypress Point Road.
Following closely behind was his passenger jeepney with three unidentified men on board.

That same evening, Teresita, together with her husband, Virgilio Ortiz (Virgilio), her daughter, Corazon Ortiz Ihanda (Corazon), her brother,
Ricardo Pablo (Ricardo), and her son, Zaldy Ortiz (Zaldy), were on the terrace of their new house. The three men, Virgilio, Ricardo and Zaldy,
momentarily left the terrace, Virgilio to relieve himself by the side of the house, Zaldy to repair home and Ricardo to go to the house of Nancy Ortiz
Dasudas (Nancy) across the street. Ricardo met the accused near the waiting shed. Without any warning, the latter suddenly struck Ricardo on the
face with the butt of an armalite causing him to fall to the ground. The accused then fired at Ricardo, hitting him on the chest and left arm. The
accused then directed his armalite at Virgilio. The latter was hit on the buttocks. The accused thereupon fired indiscriminately at the house of Zaldy.
Zaldy received a bullet injury in his right thigh, while his daughter, Lizette Ortiz (Lizette), was hit in her abdomen and wrist. The accused moved
towards the direction of the new house and fired at the terrace. Teresita took a bullet wound on the neck from the volley of shots.

In the aftermath, two were found dead, namely, Teresita and Ricardo, while three others, Virgilio, Zaldy and Lizette, sustained injuries. A report on
the bodies of Teresita and Ricardo readily disclosed that their death were due to the gunshot wounds they had sustained. While the accused, right
after the shooting, boarded his jeep and sped towards Baguio City.

Upon receiving a report on the incident, Pat. Ruben Forte (Pat. Forte), Pfc. Marianito Cosape (Pfc. Cosape) and Pat. Robert Credo (Pat. Credo)
were immediately dispatched to the crime scene. Cosape was able to gather several pieces of spent cartridges from the waiting shed and surrounding
areas. At the police station, P/Sgt. Gaydowen promptly met Dianos a burst of gunfire when the accused's jeepney was seen near the sub-station
coming in from Baguio City. Somehow, the accused was able to escape.

The accused disclaimed any knowledge of, or participation in, the grenade throwing and shooting incidents. He recounted that while he was
getting his passenger jeepney out from the carport, an unidentified man poked a gun at his back and instructed him to proceed to Cypress Point Road
to fetch a companion. When they were near the waiting shed area, he saw the unidentified man's companion, a "military man," clad in military
camouflage uniform and armed with an M-16 armalite rifle, altercating with Ricardo. The accused proceeded to Sub-station 1 to report the incident
but he was met with a burst of gunfire. Sustaining an injury in his thigh, he then drove to Sub-station 2 to seek police assistance. Sgt. Giovanni
Gallardo and Pat. Edward Ayochok took him to the Hospital. On the way, the accused had the chance to narrate to the two police officers the
shooting incident in Irisan.

The RTC rendered its decision finding the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes of Murder, Frustrated and Attempted
Murder, with which he was charged.
Hence this appeal.

Issues:

(a) The court a quo erred in giving full faith and credit to the testimony of the prosecution witnesses.
(b) That Dianos' "utterances" made in the presence of, and later testified to, the police officers on their way to the hospital constitutive of the
res gestae.

(c) It was error for the court not to consider the parrafin examination result.

Ruling:

1. It is doctrinally entrenched, that the issue on the credibility of witnesses is a question mainly addressed to the trial court for it to gauge and to
pass upon. Not only are its determination and findings accorded with great respect, but also even often treated with finality. Accused-appellant
belabors the fact that all, but one, of the prosecution witnesses are related to the victims. He asserts that such relationship taints their credibility.
Mere relationship by a witness to the victim, however, does not necessarily impair credibility. Unless the Court is convinced that the
witnesses are clearly impelled by ulterior motives, it will not discard their testimony. No such strong ill-motive has been shown here to
make the Court conclude that the prosecution witness would thereby wish to have the wrong man callously sent to jail.

2. Evidently, accused-appellant is under a misconception. Res gestae rules relate to the admissibility of evidence and not to its weight or
sufficiency. By res gestae, exclamations and statements made by either the participants, victims, or spectators to a crime, immediately before,
during or immediately after the commission of the crime, when the circumstances are such that the statements constitute nothing but
spontaneous reaction or utterance inspired by the excitement of the occasion there being no opportunity for the declarant to deliberate and to
fabricate a false statement become admissible in evidence against the otherwise hearsay rule of inadmissibility. In order to admit such
 hearsay statements as part of res gestae, there must be a confluence of the following essential conditions: (1) that the principal act, the
res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements are made before the declarant had the time to contrive or devise a falsehood; and
(3) that the statement must concern the occurrence in question and its immediate attending circumstances.

There is, of course, no hard and fast rule by which spontaneity may be determined although a number of factors have been considered,
including, but not always confined to, (1) the time that has lapsed between the occurrence of the act or transaction and the making of
the statement, (2) the place where the statement is made, (3) the condition of the declarant when the utterance is given, (4) the
presence or absence of intervening events between the occurrence and the statement relative thereto, and (5) the nature and the
circumstances of the statement itself. The Court, in People vs. Manhuyod,[14] has explained the import of the first four factors; thus:

"x x x (C)ases are not uniform as to the interval of time that should separate the occurrence of the startling event and the making of the
declaration. What is important is that the declarations were voluntarily and spontaneously made 'so nearly contemporaneous as to be in the
presence of the transaction which they illustrate or explain, and were made under such circumstances as necessarily to exclude the ideas of
design or deliberation.'

"As to the second factor, it may be stressed that 'a statement made, or an act done, at a place some distance from the place where the principal
transaction occurred will not ordinarily possess such spontaneity as would render it admissible.'

"Anent the third factor, '[a] statement will ordinarily be deemed spontaneous if, at the time when it was made, the conditions of the declarant
was such as to raise an inference that the effect of the occurrence on his mind still continued, as where he had just received a serious injury, was
suffering severe pain, or was under intense excitement. Conversely, a lack of spontaneity may be inferred from the cool demeanor of declarant,
his consciousness of the absence of all danger, his delay in making a statement until witnesses can be procured, or from the fact that he made a
different statement prior to the one which is offered in evidence.'

"With regard to the fourth factor, what is to be considered is whether there intervened between the event or transaction and the making of the
statement relative thereto, any circumstance calculated to divert the mind of the declarant which would thus restore his mental balance and
afford opportunity for deliberation."

The startling occurrence of consequence to this case is not when accused-appellant was fired upon at police substation 1 but the shooting at the
Cypress Point Village. If at all, what might be so considered as part of the res gestae would be the statements of appellant when he was shot at
near the police station, but this incident is not at all the subject matter of the case against him. Clearly, the fourth element, that there is no
intervening event between the startling occurrence concerned and the making of the statement relative, is not here extant.

3. Accused-appellant capitalizes on the negative results of the paraffin test conducted on him. A paraffin test has never been considered to
be foolproof. On the contrary, it has been held to be highly unreliable. In People vs. Teehankee, Jr., this Court has held:"Appellant cannot
also capitalize on the paraffin test showing he was negative of nitrates. Scientific experts concur in the view that the paraffin test has 'x x x
proved extremely unreliable in use. In numerous rulings, we have also recognized several factors which may bring about the absence of
gunpowder nitrates on the hands of a gunman, viz: when the assailant washes his hands after firing the gun, wears gloves at the time of the
shooting, or if the direction of a strong wind is against the gunman at the time of the firing."

WHEREFORE, the assailed decision is AFFIRMED. SO ORDERED.

9. PP VS REYNALDO (291 SCRA 701) à SOUND OF VOICE

Doctrine: Thus, identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified has been held sufficient, and it is an acceptable means of
identification where it is established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of years.

Facts: This is an appeal from the Decision dated October 29, 1991 of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo finding accused Endriquito Reynaldo alias
Quito guilty of the crime of Rape. At his arraignment, appellant pleaded not guilty to the crime charged. During trial Anacyl Barrera, 16 years old at
that time narrated the incident that about 10:30 that evening, while her brothers and her sister were already asleep, she was awakened because a knife
was pointed at her. They were then sleeping at the sala of the house. Aside from the knife pointed at her, she felt her breast being mashed and she was
told that if she makes any noise or if she told anybody they would all be killed including her aunt. She recognized the person to be the accused,
Endriquito Reynaldo, as she was familiar with his voice and his two hands which were hairy. he dragged her to their room and ordered her to take off
her clothes where the incident happened.
Dr. Gatusang testified in court that the fact that the vagina of the victim bore no lacerations or hematomas did not discount the possibility of the
rape having occurred. The whitish discharge found on the victims vaginal canal may either be semen or the victimss natural discharge. The fact that
the victim complained of pain and her vaginal canal offered resistance when a finger was inserted into it could mean that there was partial or full
[7]
penetration of the labia minora. Dr. Gatusang further testified that the absence of sperm in the victims vaginal canal may be due to the victims
[8]
having cleaned herself after the incident or the possibility that ejaculation happened outside the vaginal canal.
Appellant denied having committed the crime and interposed the defense of alibi. He alleged that at the time of the incident, he was with a
certain Rogelio Norada at the latters house in Barangay Kirayan, and slept there for the night, leaving only the following morning to peddle fish in
[9]
Barangay Tikdalan. He arrived at his house at two oclock in the afternoon, where he was later arrested by policemen bearing a warrant.

Issue: THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT THE IDENTITY OF THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT AS THE
PERPETRATOR OF THE CRIME CHARGED HAS BEEN ESTABLISHED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.

Ruling: The Court agrees with the Solicitor General that the alleged contradictions in the testimony of the complainant pointed to by appellant are
[17]
more imaginary than real and do not detract from the credibility and trustworthiness of the complainants positive identification of appellant as the
perpetrator of the crime.
It is not necessary that the witnesss knowledge of the fact to which he testifies should have been obtained in any particular manner, and he may
[20]
testify to what he hears, feels, tastes, smells, or sees.
Thus, identification by the sound of the voice of the person identified has been held sufficient, and it is an acceptable means of identification
[21]
where it is established that the witness and the accused had known each other personally and closely for a number of years. Here, the complainant
[22]
testified that she had known appellant for seven years prior to the incident because he lived only a house away from theirs. Appellant himself
[23]
admitted having known the complainant by name in the three to four years that he had stayed in Barangay Bambanan. As observed by the trial
court, the complainant and appellant were familiar with each other since they lived together in the same barangay [and] x x x the house of the
[24]
complainant is barely ten armslength away from the house where the accused lived. Indeed, people in rural communities generally know each
[25]
other both by face and by name, and may be expected to know each others distinct and particular features and characteristics.
We find no reason to disturb such conclusion. Indeed, it is highly inconceivable that a young barrio lass like the complainant, who is
inexperienced with the ways of the world, would fabricate a charge of defloration, undergo a medical examination of her private parts, subject herself
to public trial and tarnish her familys honor and reputation unless she was motivated by a potent desire to seek justice for the wrong committed
[28]
against her. Furthermore, as pointed out by the Solicitor General, the spontaneity of the complainants reactions subsequent to the crime she had
unflinchingly named and pointed out appellant, then roaming in the vicinity of her house, as the offender, when her aunt asked her why she was
 [29]
crying at around noon of the day following the incident as well as the failure of appellant to impute upon her an improper motive to accuse him of
[30]
the crime bolster her credibility.
In the light of the victims positive identification of appellant as the perpetrator of the crime, appellants defense of alibi must fail. We note
besides that the defense failed to prove physical impossibilty of appellant being at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission. Defense
witness Rogelio Norada testified that Barangay Kirayan Norte where appellant claimed he was at the night of May 28, 1987, was a mere ten
[31]
kilometers away from Barangay Bambanan, and access between the two barangays was easy with transport such as jeepneys, trucks, triycles and
even trisicads.
[34]
The absence of spermatozoa in the victims vagina does not necessarily negate the commission of rape. Neither is the existence of lacerations
[35]
on the victims sexual organ indispensable. What is essential is that there be penetration of the sexual organ no matter how slight.

10. PP VS HAYAG (11/17/1980)

FACTS:
Issue is the trustworthiness of the interpreter's verbalization of deaf-mute's sign language. - In this alleged rape of Esperanza, 32, a farm girl and a
deaf-mute, the case has been simplified by the admission of the accused, Hayag, 50, a married man with eight children, who finished grade six, that
he had sexual intercourse with Esperanza nine times between 1970 and December 4, 1972 in the town of Carmen, Davao del Norte.
ISSUE:
Whether Virginia Ranga 26, a public school teacher, a college graduate and the victim's sister, correctly and credibly interpreted and verbalized the
sign language of Esperanza as meaning that Hayag raped Esperanza or whether credence should be given to Hayag's story that the sexual intercourse
on that occasion, as on other occasions, was voluntary.
RULING:
Our conclusion is that the prosecution failed to establish the guilt of the accused beyond reasonable doubt. The culpability of Hayag cannot be made
to rest on the uncorroborated story of Esperanza, as conjectured by her sister and mother. That story in itself is not clear, convincing, positive and free
from suspicion. It is not impeccable and does not ring true throughout (People vs. Ariarte 60, Phil. 326).
From Esperanza's version, as articulated by her sister, it is at once evident that Esperanza did not offer much resistance to the alleged sexual assault
made by Hayag. She did not suffer any physical injuries. Her dress was not torn. She did not attempt to free herself from the clutches of Hayag.
It is difficult to rape a healthy adult woman without the help of confederates or without terrifying her with a deadly weapon. If she makes a vigorous
resistance, the likelihood is that the lascivious desire of her assailant would be foiled.
Moreover, the case for the prosecution was irreparably impaired by the inconsistencies committed by the complainant's mother, Mrs. Ranga. She first
swore that according to her interpretation of Esperanza's sign language five rapes were admitted on different dates.
Then, she rectified her first affidavit and swore in a second affidavit and during the preliminary examination that only one rape was committed. On
the witness stand, she declared that the rape was committed on December 4, 1972 but on cross-examination she declared that her daughter was
abused on October 26, 1972. Contrary to the prosecution's theory, Mrs. Ranga testified that Hayag did not do anything to Esperanza on December 4,
1972 (56 and 65 tsn August 6, 1972).
WHEREFORE, the trial court's judgment of conviction is reversed and set aside. On the ground of reasonable doubt or the insufficiency of the
prosecution's evidence, defendant Daniel Hayag is acquitted of the charge of rape. Costs de oficio.

11. ALVAREZ VS RAMIREZ (473 SCRA 72)

FACTS:

Susan Ramirez, herein respondent, is the complaining witness in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN for arson pending before the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 72, Malabon City. The accused is Maximo Alvarez, herein petitioner. He is the husband of Esperanza G. Alvarez, sister of respondent.

On June 21, 1999, the private prosecutor called Esperanza Alvarez to the witness stand as the first witness against petitioner, her husband. Petitioner
and his counsel raised no objection.
[5]
On June 30, 1999, petitioner, through counsel, filed a motion to disqualify Esperanza from testifying against him pursuant to Rule 130 of the
Revised Rules of Court on marital disqualification.

ISSUE:
The issue for our resolution is whether Esperanza Alvarez can testify against her husband in Criminal Case for Arson.
RULING:

It should be stressed that as shown by the records, prior to the commission of the offense, the relationship between petitioner and his wife was already
strained. In fact, they were separated de facto almost six months before the incident. Indeed, the evidence and facts presented reveal that the
preservation of the marriage between petitioner and Esperanza is no longer an interest the State aims to protect.

At this point, it bears emphasis that the State, being interested in laying the truth before the courts so that the guilty may be punished and the innocent
exonerated, must have the right to offer the direct testimony of Esperanza, even against the objection of the accused, because (as stated by this Court
[14]
in Francisco ), it was the latter himself who gave rise to its necessity.

WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED. The trial court, RTC, Branch 72, Malabon City, is ordered to allow Esperanza
Alvarez to testify against petitioner, her husband, in Criminal Case No. 19933-MN.

12. US VS TIN TONG (25 PHIL 39) C/O SITOY

13. SAMSON VS CA (4/22/2003) à DEAD MAN STATUTE C/O SITOY
14. GUNYE VS CA (144 SCRA 222) à DEAD MAN STATUTE C/O JIGO

15. PP VS GALVEZ (3/30/2007) à GOOD SAMARITAN RULE C/O JIGO

 16. PP VS MEJIA (275 SCRA 127)
DOCTRINE:
The offer to reimburse expenses incurred for hospitalization and medical bills is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to
the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

FACTS:
In the evening of 10 March 1994, along the expressway at Barangay Ventinilla, Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan, several persons on board a passenger
jeepney driven by Teofilo Landingin attacked the latter and a passenger, Virgilio Catugas, thereby inflicting upon them multiple stab wounds.
Landingin was pulled out from his seat and dumped on the shoulder of the road. One of the attackers took the wheel of the jeepney and drove away.
Catugas was thrown out to the middle of the road when the jeepney started to move away. Landingin died as a consequence of the injuries he
sustained. Catugas survived.

Held to account for the above acts were Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, Joseph Fabito, Romulo Calimquim, one alias Dennis, Alex
Mamaril, one alias Mondragon, and another unidentified person. Mejia and Benito were taken into police custody a few hours after the incident;
Paraan, the following day; and Fabito, five days after. Calimquim was found dead three days after the incident in question, while the others have
remained at large. Three separate criminal complaints for murder,frustrated murder,and violation of R.A. No. 6539 (Anti Carnapping Act of 1992, as
amended)were filed against them with the Municipal Trial Court of Sta. Barbara, Pangasinan.

The first two were assigned to Branch 44 of the RTC of Dagupan City presided by Judge Crispin C. Laron (hereafter, LARON court) and thereafter
consolidated and jointly tried. The third was assigned to Branch 43 of the said court presided by Judge Silverio Q. Castillo (hereafter, CASTILLO
court). At their arraignments, Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito entered a plea of innocence in each case.

In his testimony, Catugas insisted that it was accused Edwin Benito who stabbed Landingin and that accused Mejia, Paraan, and Fabito were the ones
who stabbed him. He further declared that it was the parents of the accused who offered to pay him, but he refused because such an offer could not be
accepted by [his] conscience.

The defense witness denounced as untrue the testimony on rebuttal of Catugas that the parents of accused were the ones who offered to pay him
money. She declared that they visited Catugas to ask him whether it was true that their children committed the crime. On their first visit, Catugas told
them that he could not yet answer that question; but when they returned, Catugas told them that they had to pay the aggregate sum of P80,000, or
P20,000 per family of the accused.

The trial court gave full credit to the version of the prosecution and relied heavily on the identification of the accused by Catugas, the absence of
ulterior motive on the part of the latter, and the offer of the parents of the accused to compromise the cases.

The LARON court convicted accused Mejia, Benito, Paraan, and Fabito of the crime of murder and of frustrated murder, with treachery as the
qualifying circumstance and nighttime and band as aggravating circumstances.

In the Castillo Court, Prosecution witness Virgilio Catugas added that after Landingin was stabbed, he was thrown out of the jeepney to the shoulder
of the road and that one of the culprits took the wheel of the jeepney, started off its engine, and drove off. He further declared that while he was
confined at the hospital, the policemen of Sta. Barbara investigated him, showed him pictures of the suspects, supplied the suspects names,and took
his statement. After he was discharged therefrom, he was able to talk with the father of accused Benito. He told the father of his hospitalization
expenses and asked P80,000, as a settlement of the case, to be paid by the parents of the accused on an agreed date; but before that date came, he had
already testified against the accused

The CASTILLO court gave full faith to the testimony of Virgilio Catugas. It debunked the version of the defense on account of some inculpating
evidence. The court then convicted accused Gregorio Mejia, Edwin Benito, Pedro Paraan, and Joseph Fabito guilty of the violation of the Anti-
Carnapping Act of 1972, as amended.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the offer of compromise was an implied admission of guilt.

RULING:
No. Catugas was not entirely free from any ulterior motive in implicating the appellants. He admitted that he demanded P80,000 from the parents of
the appellants, but before they could give the money on the agreed date, he testified against the appellants in the LARON court.

In the LARON court, efforts were made by the prosecution to cushion the impact of Catugas demand for payment of P80,000 in consideration of his
exculpatory testimony. It wanted to prove that the parents of the appellants were in fact the ones who proposed. But the testimony of Conrado Benito,
which the prosecution failed to satisfactorily rebut, is that the parents went to see him to verify whether their children had indeed committed the
crimes; but Catugas replied that since the appellants were the ones apprehended, he would just pinpoint them so that he could recover what he had
spent. He then demanded P80,000, which he equally apportioned among the parents of the four appellants.

The LARON court gave credence to the version of the prosecution and even took the incident as offer of compromise, which may be considered an
implied admission of guilt. Said court misapplied Section 27 of Rule 130 of the Rules of Court. There is no evidence whatsoever that any of the
appellants authorized his parents to approach Catugas or knew the matter of payment of P80,000. Moreover, if one were to believe the
explanation of Catugas that the amount of P80,000 represented the expenses he incurred for his hospitalization and medical bills, then the
offer to reimburse it is not admissible in evidence as proof of criminal liability pursuant to the last paragraph of Section 27 of Rule 130.

On the whole then we entertain, unavoidably, serious doubt on the participation of the appellants in the commission of the crimes charged.

17. ESTRADA VS DESIERTO (350 SCRA 127) (ANGARA DIARY)

DOCTRINE:
Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and the
intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment.

Whether or not petitioner resigned has to be determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of
prior, contemporaneous and posterior facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

FACTS:
Estrada was inaugurated as president of the Republic of the Philippines on June 30, 1998 with Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo as his Vice President. In
October 2000, Ilocos Sur governor Luis “Chavit” Singson, a close friend of the President, alleged that he had personally given Estrada money as
payoff from jueteng hidden in a bank account known as “Jose Velarde” – a grassroots-based numbers game. Singson’s allegation also caused
controversy across the nation, which culminated in the House of Representatives’ filing of an impeachment case against Estrada on November 13,
2000. House Speaker Manny Villar fast-tracked the impeachment complaint. The impeachment suit was brought to the Senate and an impeachment
court was formed, with Chief Justice Hilario Davide, Jr. as presiding officer. Estrada, pleaded “not guilty”.

The exposé immediately ignited reactions of rage. On January 18, a crowd continued to grow at EDSA, bolstered by students from private schools
and left-wing organizations. Activists from the group Bayan and Akbayan as well as lawyers of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines and other bar
associations joined in the thousands of protesters. On January 19, The Philippine National Police and the Armed Forces of the Philippines also
withdrew their support for Estrada and joined the crowd at EDSA Shrine. At 2:00pm, Estrada appeared on television for the first time since the
beginning of the protests and maintains that he will not resign. He said that he wanted the impeachment trial to continue, stressing that only a guilty
verdict will remove him from office. At 6:15pm, Estrada again appeared on television, calling for a snap presidential election to be held concurrently
with congressional and local elections on May 14, 2001. He added that he will not run in this election.

On January 20, the Supreme Court declared that the seat of presidency was vacant, saying that Estrada “constructively resigned his post”. Noon of
the same day, Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath of office in the presence of the crowd at EDSA, becoming the 14th president of the
Philippines. At 2:00 pm, Estrada released a letter saying he had “strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her proclamation
as president”, but saying he would give up his office to avoid being an obstacle to healing the nation. Estrada and his family later left Malacañang
Palace.

A heap of cases then succeeded Estrada’s leaving the palace, which he countered by filing a petition for prohibition with a prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. It sought to enjoin the respondent Ombudsman from “conducting any further proceedings in cases filed against him not until
his term as president ends. He also prayed for judgment “confirming petitioner to be the lawful and incumbent President of the Republic of the
Philippines temporarily unable to discharge the duties of his office, and declaring respondent to have taken her oath as and to be holding the Office of
the President, only in an acting capacity pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution.”

ISSUE:
Whether or not Estrada resigned as President.

RULING:
Yes. Resignation is not a high level legal abstraction. It is a factual question and its elements are beyond quibble: there must be an intent to resign and
the intent must be coupled by acts of relinquishment. The validity of a resignation is not governed by any formal requirement as to form. It can be
oral. It can be written. It can be express. It can be implied. As long as the resignation is clear, it must be given legal effect.

In the cases at bar, the facts shows that petitioner did not write any formal letter of resignation before he evacuated Malacanang Palace in the
Afternoon of January 20, 2001 after the oath-taking of respondent Arroyo. Consequently, whether or not petitioner resigned has to be
determined from his acts and omissions before, during and after January 20, 2001 or by the totality of prior, contemporaneous and posterior
facts and circumstantial evidence bearing a material relevance on the issue.

Using this totality test, we hold that petitioner resigned as President.

To appreciate the public pressure that led to the resignation of the petitioner, it is important to follow the succession of events after the expos of
Governor Singson. The Senate Blue Ribbon Committee investigated. The more detailed revelations of petitioners alleged misgovernance in the Blue
Ribbon investigation spiked the hate against him. The Articles of Impeachment filed in the House of Representatives which initially was given a near
cipher chance of succeeding snowballed. In express speed, it gained the signatures of 115 representatives or more than 1/3 of the House of
Representatives. Soon, petitioners powerful political allies began deserting him. Respondent Arroyo quit as Secretary of Social Welfare. Senate
President Drilon and Former Speaker Villar defected with 47 representatives in tow. Then, his respected senior economic advisers resigned together
with his Secretary of Trade and Industry.

As the political isolation of the petitioner worsened, the peoples call for his resignation intensified. The call reached a new crescendo when the eleven
(11) members of the impeachment tribunal refused to open the second envelope. It sent the people to paroxysms of outrage. Before the night of
January 16 was over, the EDSA Shrine was swarming with people crying for redress of their grievance. Their number grew exponentially. Rallies and
demonstration quickly spread to the countryside like a brush fire.

As events approached January 20, we can have an authoritative window on the state of mind of the petitioner. The window is provided in the Final
Days of Joseph Ejercito Estrada, the diary of Executive Secretary Angara serialized in the Philippine Daily Inquirer. The Angara Diary reveals that in
morning of January 19, petitioners loyal advisers were worried about the swelling of the crowd at EDSA, hence, they decided to create an ad hoc
committee to handle it. Their worry would worsen. At 1:20 p.m., petitioner pulled Secretary Angara into his small office at the presidential residence
and exclaimed: Ed, seryoso na ito. Kumalas na si Angelo (Reyes) (Ed, this is serious. Angelo has defected.) An hour later or at 2:30, p.m., the
petitioner decided to call for a snap presidential election and stressed he would not be a candidate. The proposal for a snap election for president in
May where he would not be a candidate is an indicium that petitioner had intended to give up the presidency even at that time. At 3:00 p.m., General
Reyes joined the sea of EDSA demonstrators demanding the resignation of the petitioner and dramatically announced the AFPs withdrawal of
support from the petitioner and their pledge of support to respondent Arroyo. The seismic shift of support left petitioner weak as a president.
According to Secretary Angara, he asked Senator Pimentel to advise petitioner to consider the option of dignified exit or resignation.] Petitioner did
nor disagree but listened intently. The sky was falling fast on the petitioner. At 9:30 p.m., Senator Pimentel repeated to the petitioner the urgency of
making a graceful and dignified exit. He gave the proposal a sweetener by saying that petitioner would allowed to go abroad with enough funds to
support him and his family. Significantly, the petitioner expressed no objection to the suggestion for a graceful and dignified exit but said he would
never leave the country. At 10:00 p.m., petitioner revealed to Secretary Angara, Ed, Angie (Reyes) guaranteed that I would have five days to a week
in the palace. This is proof that petitioner had reconciled himself to the reality that he had to resign. His mind was already concerned with the five-
day grace period he could stay in the palace. It was a matter of time.

The pressure continued piling up. By 11:00 p.m., former President Ramos called up Secretary Angara and requested, Ed, magtulungan tayo para
magkaroon tayo ng (lets cooperate to ensure a) peaceful and orderly transfer of power. There was no defiance to the request. Secretary Angara readily
agreed. Again, we note that at this stage, the problem was already about a peaceful and orderly transfer of power. The resignation of the petitioner
was implied.
The first negotiation for a peaceful and orderly transfer of power immediately started at 12:20 a.m. of January 20, that fateful Saturday. The
negotiation was limited to three (3) points: (1) the transition period of five days after the petitioners resignation; (2) the guarantee of the safety of the
petitioner and his family, and (3) the agreement to open the second envelope to vindicate the name of the petitioner. Again, we note that the
resignation of petitioner was not a disputed point. The petitioner cannot feign ignorance of this fact. According to Secretary Angara, at 2:30 a.m., he
briefed the petitioner on the three points and the following entry in the Angara Diary shows the reaction of the petitioner, viz:

xxx

I explain what happened during the first round of negotiations. The President immediately stresses that he just wants the five-day period promised by
Reyes, as well as to open the second envelope to clear his name.

If the envelope is opened, on Monday, he says, he will leave by Monday.

The President says. Pagod na pagod na ako. Ayoko na masyado nang masakit. Pagod na ako sa red tape, bureaucracy, intriga. (I am very
tired. I dont want any more of this its too painful. Im tired of the red tape, the bureaucracy, the intrigue.)

I just want to clear my name, then I will go.

Again, this is high grade evidence that the petitioner has resigned. The intent to resign is clear when he said x x x Ayoko na masyado nang
masakit. Ayoko na are words of resignation.

The second round of negotiation cements the reading that the petitioner has resigned. It will be noted that during this second round of negotiation, the
resignation of the petitioner was again treated as a given fact. The only unsettled points at that time were the measures to be undertaken by the parties
during and after the transition period.

According to Secretary Angara, the draft agreement which was premised on the resignation of the petitioner was further refined. It was then signed
by their side and he was ready to fax it to General Reyes and Senator Pimentel to await the signature of the United Opposition. However, the signing
by the party of the respondent Arroyo was aborted by her oath-taking. Before petitioner left Malacanang, he made a last statement.

The statement reads: ‘At twelve o’clock noon today, Vice President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo took her oath as President of the Republic of the
Philippines. While along with many other legal minds of our country, I have strong and serious doubts about the legality and constitutionality of her
proclamation as president, I do not wish to be a factor that will prevent the restoration of unity and order in our civil society.

It is for this reason that I now leave Malacañang Palace, the seat of the presidency of this country, for the sake of peace and in order to begin the
healing process of our nation. I leave the Palace of our people with gratitude for the opportunities given to me for service to our people. I will not
shrik from any future challenges that may come ahead in the same service of our country.

I call on all my supporters and followers to join me in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity.

May the Almighty bless our country and our beloved people.

MABUHAY!’”

By making such statement, petitioner impliedly affirms the following: (1) he acknowledged the oath-taking of the respondent as President of the
Republic albeit with the reservation about its legality; (2) he emphasized he was leaving the Palace, the seat of the presidency, for the sake of peace
and in order to begin the healing process of our nation. He did not say he was leaving the Palace due to any kind of inability and that he was going to
re-assume the presidency as soon as the disability disappears; (3) he expressed his gratitude to the people for the opportunity to serve them. Without
doubt, he was referring to the past opportunity given him to serve the people as President; (4) he assured that he will not shirk from any future
challenge that may come ahead in the same service of our country. Petitioner’s reference is to a future challenge after occupying the office of the
president which he has given up; and (5) he called on his supporters to join him in the promotion of a constructive national spirit of reconciliation and
solidarity. Certainly, the national spirit of reconciliation and solidarity could not be attained if he did not give up the presidency.

Petitioner however argues that he only took a temporary leave of absence. This is evidenced by a letter which reads as follows:

“Sir

By virtue of the provisions of Section II, Article VII of the Constitution, I am hereby transmitting this declaration that I am unable to exercise the
powers and duties of my office. By operation of law and the Constitution, the Vice President shall be the Acting President.

(Sgd.) Joseph Ejercito Estrada”

The Court was surprised that the petitioner did not use this letter during the week long crisis. It would be very easy for him to say before he left
Malacanang that he was temporarily unable to govern, thus, he is leaving Malacanang. Under any circumstance, however, the mysterious letter
cannot negate the resignation of the petitioner. If it was prepared before the press release of the petitioner clearly showing his resignation from the
presidency, then the resignation must prevail as a later act. If, however, it was prepared after the press release, still, it commands scant legal
significance.

18. PP VS PARAGSA (84 SCRA 105) à SILENCE OF RAPE VICTIM

Facts:

Paragsa was charged with the rape of Mirasol Magallanes. The information alleged that victim was alone in her house when Paragsa intimidated her
and forced her to lie in bed and there they had intercourse. The deed was interrupted when her aunt Lita, knocked on the door of victim’s house.
Incidentally, Aunt Lita testified that she had seen the accused exiting the house when she came knocking. The victim did not reveal what happened
to her until 6 days after the incident.

Accused interposed the “Sweetheart defense”. Defense claims in effect that there was no force or intimidation involved and that what Aunt Lita saw
was not the aftermath of a rape, but was rather consensual sexual intercourse. Accused also presented witnesses claiming that they were indeed
sweethearts.

Issue:

The main issue boils down to the question of who is more credible, the defense or the prosecution? Thus, whether or not the evidence justifies a
conviction.

Ruling:

NO. A careful scrutiny of the record reveals that the prosecution's evidence is weak, unsatisfactory and inconclusive to justify a conviction. The
Supreme court noted the absence of intimidation considering that the act took place in the daytime, in her house where she is surrounded by her
neighbors. The victim could also have revealed the same the very moment she was confronted by her aunt Lita who asked her what the accused did
to her upon entering the house immediately after the intercourse took place and not 3 days after.

Furthermore, the prosecution was silent in the matter of the allegation that the victim and accused were sweethearts. They did not bother to rebut the
testimony of the appellant and his witnesses to the effect that the accused and Mirasol were actually sweethearts; and that they had had two previous
sexual communications previously. As to this silence, the Supreme Court explained:

The rule allowing silence of a person to be taken as an implied admission of the truth … is applicable in criminal cases provided: 1) that he heard and
understood the statement; 2) that he was at liberty to interpose a denial; 3) that the statement was in respect to some matter affecting his rights or in
which he was then interested, and calling, naturally, for an answer; 4) that the facts were within his knowledge; and 5) that the fact admitted or the
inference to be drawn from his silence would be material to the issue. These requisites of admission by silence all obtain in the present case. Hence,
the silence of Mirasol on the facts asserted by the accused and his witnesses may be safely construed as an admission of the truth of such assertion.

19. PP VS JOB (GR 116084-85, 3/9/2000)

Facts:

The appellants were convicted of kidnapping for ransom of one Charlene Sy. The court, in convicting the accused, relied heavily on the extrajudicial
confession made by the co-accused Gallego and Job. Both confessions were taken separately, on different times and pointing out on the same
material points such as the vehicle used by the group, how the kidnapping was committed, the amount of ransom which would have been demanded
from the victim's parents, the location of the group's safehouse, and the names of the other members of the group.

On appeal appellant claims that the extrajudicial confession executed by accused Gallego and Job cannot be used to establish his culpability, but only
of the confessants themselves.

Issue:

Whether or not the extrajudicial confession of Gallego and Job may be taken against the appellant.

Ruling:

As a general rule, an extrajudicial confession by an accused may be given in evidence only against him, but not against his co-accused. This rule,
however, admits of exceptions. Where several extrajudicial confessions had been made by several persons charged with the same offense, without the
possibility of collusion among them, the fact that the statements are in all material respects identical is confirmatory of the confessions of the co-
defendants and is admissible against other persons implicated therein.[33] Such confessions are commonly known as interlocking confessions.[34]

The extrajudicial confessions of accused Gallego and Job are in the nature of interlocking confessions. They were made independently of each other.
They contain similar material details which only persons involved in their criminal plot could have known.

20. PP VS RAQUEL (265 SCRA 245) à DYING DECLARATION

FACTS:
At midnight of July 4, 1986, tragedy visited the peaceful lives of spouses Juliet and Agapito Gambalan, Jr. Thinking of a neighbor in need,
Agapito attended to the person knocking at the backdoor of their kitchen. Much to his surprise, heavily armed men emerged at the door, declared
a hold-up and fired their guns at him.

Juliet went out of their room after hearing gunshots and saw her husband’s lifeless while a man took her husband’s gun and left hurriedly. She
shouted for help at their window and saw a man fall beside their water pump while two (2) other men ran away but she did not seen their faces.
The police came and found one of the perpetrators of the crime wounded and lying at about 8 meters from the victim’s house. He was identified
as Amado Ponce.

Amado Ponce revealed to P/Sgt. Andal S. Pangato that appellants Sabas and Valeriano Raquel were the perpetrators of the crime.
Upon arraignment thereafter, all the accused pleaded not guilty. While trial was in progress, however, and before he could give his testimony,
accused Amado Ponce escaped from jail. Upon the other hand, appellants relied on alibi as their defense and presented witnesses to support their
alibi.

The trial court rendered judgment finding all of the accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of robbery with homicide and
sentenced them accordingly.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the trial court erred in convicting the appellants of the crime charged, despite absence of evidence positively implicating them as
the perpetrators of the crime?

RULING:
A careful review and objective appraisal of the evidence convinces us that the prosecution failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt the real
identities of the perpetrators of, much less the participation of herein appellants in, the crime charged.
 The lone eyewitness, Juliet Gambalan, was not able to identify the assailants of her husband as base from his testimonies.
A thorough review of the records of this case readily revealed that the identification of herein appellants as the culprits was based chiefly on the
extrajudicial statement of accused Amado Ponce pointing to them as his co-perpetrators of the crime. As earlier stated, the said accused escaped
from jail before he could testify in court and he has been at large since then.
The extrajudicial statements of an accused implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter, unless these are repeated in open
court. If the accused never had the opportunity to cross-examine his co-accused on the latter’s extrajudicial statements, it is elementary that the
same are hearsay as against said accused. That is exactly the situation, and the disadvantaged plight of appellants, in the case at bar.
The res inter alios rule ordains that the rights of a party cannot be prejudiced by an act, declaration, or omission of another. An extrajudicial
confession is binding only upon the confessant and is not admissible against his co-accused. The reason for the rule is that, on a principle of
good faith and mutual convenience, a man’s own acts are binding upon him, and are evidence against him. So are his conduct and declarations.
Yet it would not only be rightly inconvenient, but also manifestly unjust, that a man should be bound by the acts of mere unauthorized
strangers; and if a party ought not to be bound by the acts of strangers, neither ought their acts or conduct be used as evidence against him.
This extrajudicial statement, ironically relied upon as prosecution evidence, was made in violation of the constitutional rights of accused Amado
Ponce. Extrajudicial statements made during custodial investigation without the assistance of counsel are inadmissible and cannot be considered
in the adjudication of the case. While the right to counsel may be waived, such waiver must be made with the assistance of counsel. These
rights, both constitutional and statutory in source and foundation, were never observed.
WHEREFORE, on reasonable doubt, the appealed judgment is REVERSED and accused-appellants Sabas Raquel and Valeriano Raquel are
hereby ACQUITTED of the offense charged, with costs de oficio.

21. PP VS PRECIADO (319 SCRA 1) à NOT FOUND

22. PP VS SAGARIO (14 SCRA 648)

FACTS:
Antipas Sagario, Julian Fuentes, Resurreccion Espiga, Quirico Fuente, Matildo Castro, Marcelino Castro, Tomas Castro, Alejandro Tabiao, Pacifico
Danghil, Vicente Bon, Andres Grado and Luis Gui-e, were charged with the crime of double murder.
They proceeded to municipal building of Molave boarding a car and a jeep, two policemen were on guard duty that same evening and doing the
rounds, by shifts namely: Pat. Paulino Ursais, was replaced by Pat. Jose Gomez. The latter took over Ursais duty.
Gomez recognized the person on the wheel of the jeep as Antipas Sagario. Instantly, he was surrounded by these men and Luis Gui-e whom Gomez
knew well, pointed his carbine at him and cautioned him not to move. Then one, who spoke Waray-waray and armed with a Tommy gun, commanded
him to kneel down and after which he was kicked by the same person. When he was down, this same person said that he was a tough policeman and
he was going to test him. Then, suddenly a gun exploded and Gomez was hit. He lost consciousness momentarily and when he regained it, he heard
another explosion. He crept towards the office of the Chief of Police and hid under a table. Fearing that he might be seen there, he passed through a
window and crawled to the house of a co-policeman Nazario Acapulco, from where he was taken to the house of one Cababaran at Pilar Street.
Chief Turado headed towards the police station, but while passing by the house of Cababaran on Pilar Street, he was told by the occupants thereof
that policeman Gomez was there, wounded and his condition very critical. Turado saw Gomez, and asked him whether he was conscious and when
he received an affirmative answer, Turado inquired as to what happened to him. Sensing, however, the serious condition of the victim, Turado
desisted from further questioning him and called for a doctor who immediately administered blood plasma to Gomez, after which the questioning was
resumed. In the local dialect, Gomez was questioned and narrated to his chief the circumstances of the raid. Present during the questioning were Dr.
Arcadio a nurse Mrs. Vergara Cababaran, Nazario Acapulco and his wife, Sgt. Minoza and Bongabong. The questions and answers given were
reduced to writing by Turado. After the same were accomplished, it was thumbmarked by Gomez who could not sign the same because of his weak
condition. The document was properly attested to by two witnesses, Dr. Arcadio and the chief of police himself. Then, its contents were read to
Gomez word for word, in order to ascertain from him, if the same were true, to which Gomez so affirmed.
On the 7th of September 1956, Gomez died and and the two Sgarios were apprehended and detained outrightly. Accused interposed delay and alibi as
defense.

ISSUE:
WON the declaration of Gomez is a dying declaration

RULING:
YES.
There are four requisites which must concur in order that a dying declaration may be admissible, to wit: (a) it must concern the crime and
surrounding circumstances of the defendant's death (b) at the time it was made, the declarant was under a consciousness of an impending death; (c)
the declarant was competent as a witness; and (d) the declaration is offered in a criminal case for homicide, murder or parricide in which the
declarant was the victim. (III Moran's Comments on the Rules of Court, p. 311, 1952 ed.)

(a) ​The first requisite is present in the ante-mortem statements of deceased Gomez. Certainly, the narration made by Gomez at Cababaran's
house, before the Chief of Police and at the hospital before the Governor, concerned the cause and surrounding circumstances of the declarant's death.
The two government officials heard from the declarant's own lips his description of the circumstances which brought about his injuries and
subsequent tragic death. There were recitals of facts in the declarations of policeman Gomez which he could have given as a witness in court, if
living, and the same included ones coincident with the commission of the crime. (b) The declarant at the time he gave the dying declarations was
conscious of his impending death. Pat. Gomez knew at the time he was being questioned, that chances of his recovery were nil and this fact was
corroborated by the statements of the doctor who attended him to the effect that the victim would not recover from his wounds. One of the questions
posed to Gomez by Chief Turado: "... Do you think you will die?" The victim answered: "Yes sir." Moreover, it must have been obvious to Gomez
that death was fast approaching, because the bullet perforated his internal organs which he must have surely felt. The nature of the wounds justified
the apprehension of a mortal danger to his life. The declarant expressed his serious state of health to Governor Ebarle in the hospital. Governor
Ebarle even asked Gomez whether he would be willing to issue an ante-mortem statement and he readily consented to the request. All of which
clearly evinces a finding that Gomez was under the expectation of a rapidly approaching death or that he had abandoned all hopes to live (People vs.
Chan Lin Wat, 50 Phil. 182, 190). (c) That Pat. Gomez, at the time he gave the dying declarations, was competent as a witness, is too obvious to
warrant further discussion. (d) The dying declarations of Gomez were offered as evidence in a criminal case for, murder in which the declarant was
one of the victims.
The dying declarations of Pat. Gomez pointed unmistakably to accused Antipas Sagario and Luis Gui-e, as among those who participated in the raid.
The records do not show that Gomez rendered involuntary declaration. It may be, as the defense contended, that the dying declarations did not
conform entirely to the other evidence introduced by the prosecution, for instance, the version of Selada, a detention prisoner, which contained
insignificant variations from Gomez' description of how he was shot. But this discrepancy cannot diminish the evidentiary value of the dying
declarations, for it has not changed at all the declarant's positive statement that Sagario and Gui-e were particeps criminis. Moreover, those who took
the dying declarations explained that he did not write all the statements of Gomez, for fear that he might expire, but noted down only the material and
pertinent statements of the deceased, considering his critical condition. "One does not hold the dying to the observance of all the niceties of speech to
which conformity is exacted from one on the stand."

23. PP VS MAROLLANO (7/24/1997)

PRINCIPLE:
alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is an ante-mortem declaration received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of res gestae.
FACTS:

​Marollano et. Al was charged with murder.

​
Prosecution’s version:
In the evening of May 13, 1989, prosecution witness Cesar Mapa was in front of the dancing pavilion at Sta. Fe, Pilar, Sorsogon, together with the
late Domingo Guadamor (victim in this case) erstwhile husband of Sta. Fes lady barangay captain Belleza Favia de Guadamor who was at the time
inside the dancing pavilion watching the on-going dance. Mapa and the victim were then drinking a bottle of beer each near the gate of the dancehall
when Guadamor (the victim) left Mapa and went momentarily to the side of the road to answer the call of nature, about 2 to 3 meters away from
Mapa. While Guadamor was urinating, the latter suddenly shouted: Manoy Cesar, I was stabbed. I was stabbed by Jun Marollano. As Mapa went near
the victim, Mapa saw three (3) persons- two of whom he recognized to be the herein accused Jun Marollano and Consorcio Molleno even as he did
not recognize the other companion of the accused. The herein two accused were standing side by side with the late Domingo Guadamor (who was
already holding his wounded right waist with his right hand) and the two accused, Jun Marollano and Consorcio Molleno, were there with their
bladed weapons as they fled from the scene of the incident to follow their companion who was also already running away.

​
Defense version:
Accused Dionisio Marollano alias Jun recalled that on the date and time in question he was actually having a drinking session of Beer Grande with
Rogelio Mape (whose wife is a cousin of herein private complainant, Belleza Favia vda. de Guadamor) who earlier (at about 7:30 that evening)
invited him to watch the dance at the pavilion of Sta. Fe, Pilar, Sorsogon and David Tolosa, his own uncle by affinity (who joined them also after the
latter bought cigarettes). And that It was just after accused Marollano and companions consumed half of their third bottle of Beer Grande when they
heard someone shouting and announcing that Domingo Guadamor was stabbed; so, Marollano, Mape and Tolosa stood up and went to the succor of
the victim, together with Romulo Molleno and Jose Favia.

Accused Jun Marollano and Rogelio Mape came upon the victim, Domingo Guadamor, who was already seated in the sala of his residence and
holding his wounded right waist. Marollano then helped in carrying the chair whereon the victim was seated and, together with Rogelio Mape,
Romulo Molleno and another one (whose name was not revealed) brought the victim to the side of the street to await the vehicle that thereafter
brought the wounded Guadamor to the hospital. Thereafter, accused Jun Marollano and companions Rogelio Mape and Romulo Molleno went home.

Accused were convicted and assailed the credibility of witneeses Mapa and Belleza.
ISSUES:
Alibi and Denial vs. Dying Declaration and Positive Identification

RULING:
A declaration is deemed as part of the res gestae and thus admissible in evidence as an exception to the hearsay rule when the following requisites
concur: (1) the principal act, the res gestae, is a startling occurrence; (2) the statements were made before the declarant had time to contrive or devise;
and (3) the statements must concern the occurrence in question and its immediately attending circumstances.[52] The victim was stabbed from
behind while relieving himself. That he was stabbed while he was in such a vulnerable position was undoubtedly a startling occurrence. His
utterances identifying appellant as his assailant were made (1) immediately thereafter, (2) while being transported to the hospital and (3) at the
hospital. Under these circumstances, it appears to be improbable for the victim to have concocted such a story. His declaration definitely relates to the
occurrence in question. We hold, therefore, that the utterances of the victim are admissible as part of the res gestae.

Alibi and Denial vs. Dying Declaration

and Positive Identification
Appellant sets up alibi and denial as his defense. He denied having stabbed the victim, asserting that at the time of the incident, he was in a drinking
spree with David Tolosa and Rogelio Mape. In jurisprudence, alibi is one of the weakest defenses that can be resorted to by an accused, not only
because it is inherently weak and unreliable but also because of its susceptibility to fabrication without much opportunity to check or rebut it. For this
defense to prosper, appellant must prove not only that he was somewhere else when the crime was committed, but also that he could not have been
physically present at the crime scene or even its immediate vicinity at the time of its commission.[53]

Appellant testified that he and his group were drinking at Romulo Mollenos store, which was located by the gate of the dance pavilion;[54] and
Romulo Molleno confirmed that his store was about six (6) meters from the gate of the dance pavilion.[55] Mapa testified that the victim and he were
drinking beer about five (5) meters away from the gate.[56] The close proximity of the victim and appellant bars the assertion that it was physically
impossible for him to have been at the scene of the crime. Thus, the alibi cannot stand. We agree with the trial courts rejection of appellants alibi of
having been more than fifty (50) meters away from the roadside during the commission of the crime.
Appellant also claimed that after he heard that the victim was stabbed, he stood up and went to the victims succor. He, Mape, Romulo Molleno, and
Jose Favia chanced upon the victim at his house, seated on a chair with his hand on his stomach. They allegedly helped the victim by placing the
chair at the roadside while waiting for the vehicle, which was to take the victim to the hospital. After the victim was loaded into the vehicle, appellant
left.[57]
The trial court correctly rejected this assertion. Although both Romulo Molleno and Mape confirmed that appellant was at Romulos store, they did
not corroborate appellants claim that they helped the victim at all. Neither was there any mention of any action on their part tending to corroborate
said claim. If appellants claim was true, then these two persons would have confirmed it. Instead, counsel for the defense failed to elicit this vital
information from the witnesses. Therefore, appellants claim that he even helped the victim was merely an uncorroborated self-serving allegation.
Furthermore, alibi is unavailing as a defense where there is an ante-mortem declaration received in evidence either as a dying declaration or as part of
res gestae.[58] Even his allegation that Belleza and Jose Favia implicated him for his refusal to identify the culprits hardly deserves belief by this
court. This does not qualify as an ill motive which will render suspect any testimony unfavorable to him. The normal tendency of the family and
relatives of the victim is to bring to justice the malefactor, not an innocent bystander.[59] By rejecting his alibi and the alleged ill motive, appellants
denial is reduced to an unsupported allegation that bears little persuasive effect, definitely insufficient to prevail over the prosecutions evidence on
positive identification.

24. PP VS BERNAL (274 SCRA 197) à DECLARATION AGAINST INTEREST

PRINCIPLE :
A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it
relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary
to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

FACTS :
Accused-appellant Theodore Bernal, together with two other persons whose identities and whereabouts are still unknown, were charged with the
crime of kidnapping of one Openda Jr.
Trial Court convicted accused-appellant Bernal. In convicting the accused, the court considered the testimony of Enriquez. He testified that
sometime in January 1991, Openda, Jr. confided to him that he and Bernals wife Naty were having an affair. One time, Naty even gave Openda, Jr.
money which they used to pay for a motel room. He advised Naty not to do it again because she (was) a married woman. Undoubtedly, his wifes
infidelity was ample reason for Bernal to contemplate revenge.
ISSUE :
Whether or not Enriquez ' testimony is admissible in evidence

RULING :
Yes. Openda, Jr.'s revelation to Enriquez regarding his illicit relationship with Bernal's wife is admissible in evidence, pursuant to Section 38, Rule
130 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, viz.:
Sec. 38. Declaration against interest. -- The declaration made by a person deceased, or unable to testify, against the interest of the declarant, if the fact
asserted in the declaration was at the time it was made so far contrary to declarants own interest, that a reasonable man in his position would not have
made the declaration unless he believed it to be true, may be received in evidence against himself or his successors-in-interest and against third
persons.

With the deletion of the phrase pecuniary or moral interest from the present provision, it is safe to assume that declaration against interest has been
expanded to include all kinds of interest, that is, pecuniary, proprietary, moral or even penal.

A statement may be admissible when it complies with the following requisites, to wit: (1) that the declarant is dead or unable to testify; (2) that it
relates to a fact against the interest of the declarant; (3) that at the time he made said declaration the declarant was aware that the same was contrary
to his aforesaid interest; and (4) that the declarant had no motive to falsify and believed such declaration to be true.

Openda, Jr., having been missing since his abduction, cannot be called upon to testify. His confession to Enriquez, definitely a declaration against his
own interest, since his affair with Naty Bernal was a crime, is admissible in evidence because no sane person will be presumed to tell a falsehood to
his own detriment.

25. PP VS BERAME (7/30/1976) à RES GESTAE

PRINCIPLE :
Whether specific statements are admissible as part of the res gestae is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of
which is ordinarily conclusive upon appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion.

FACTS :
Evidence both direct and circumstantial resulted in the conviction for the crime of murder of Domiciano Berame, now appellant, for the killing of the
deceased Quirico Maningo. One of the evidence considered by the court is the testimony of one of the suspects Anastacio Montinola. He admitted
that he was one of the killers of Quirico Maningo, and his companions were a certain Doming and one Erning. He made the admission anew at the
Southern Islands Hospital when he was further questioned, nine hours when the incident occurred. Trial court considered such testimony as part of
the res gestae.

ISSUE :
Whether or not a testimony made nine hours after the incident occurred be considered as part of res gestae.

RULING :
Yes, a statement made by one of the original co-accused, Anastacio Montinola, on his being captured after the gunplay where he was wounded, it
turned out, mortally. He admitted his participation in the killing of Maningo and pointed to appellant as one of his companions. While not amounting
to a dying declaration, the lower court considered it as part of the res gestae, and rightly so. That was assigned as error by appellant's counsel in view
of the nine hours that had elapsed from the time of the killing before its utterance. That is not enough to take it out of the operation of the principle.
The teaching of a host of cases from United States v. David, 23 a 1903 decision, is to the effect that it should be given credence. As was stressed by
the then Chief Justice Concepcion in People v. Ner All that is required for the admissibility of a given statement as part of the res gestae, is that it be
made under the influence of a startling event witnessed by the person who made the declaration before he had time to think and make up a story, or to
concoct or contrive a falsehood, or to fabricate an account, and without any undue influence in obtaining it, aside from referring to the event in
question or its immediate attending circumstances". As far back as 1942, in People v. Nartea the marked trend of decisions, according to Justice
Ozaeta, is to extend, rather than narrow, the scope of the doctrine admitting declarations as part of the res gestae.Whether specific statements are
admissible as part of the res gestae is a matter within the sound discretion of the trial court, the determination of which is ordinarily conclusive upon
appeal, in the absence of a clear abuse of discretion. Here, again, there cannot possibly be any abuse of discretion. That much is clear.

26. PP VS LABREGAS (394 SCRA 70) C/O RAMON

27. PAL VS RAMOS (SEC. 43) (207 SCRA 461) C/O RAMON

28. PP VS DIOPITA (436 SCRA 794)

Principle :
An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or
reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any
peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of
accused-appellant is unavailingThe
Facts:
Dominga Pikit-pikit was on her way home from work when suddenly a man appeared from behind, looped his arm around her neck and
warned her not to shout or else she would die. The man dragged her through the banana plantation towards the cornfields. Dominga got a good look
at the man, who turned out to be Rafael Diopita, as he sat on her thighs and proceeded to divest her of her belongings. Thereafter, Diopita announced
his desire to have carnal knowledge of Dominga. After having his way with her, Diopita threatened Dominga not to tell anyone about the incident or
else he would shoot her. Dominga was able to report the incident to the police and gave the description of the suspect and his possible whereabouts. A
colored white/yellow, size 10 slipper was found in the scene of the crime. In a police line-up, Dominga readily pointed to Diopita which was further
bolstered by the fact that when the police had him try the slipper, it easily fitted him. In his defense, Diopita posed the alibi that he was at an
informal Bible session of the Jehovah’s Witnesses at the time of the crime. The trial court convicted Diopita stating that alibi is a weak form of
defense. Among Diopita’s arguments is that it was impossible for him to have committed the crime charged since he is a person of good moral
character, holding as he does the position of “Ministerial Servant” in the congregation of Jehovah’s Witnesses, and that he is a godly man, a
righteous person, a responsible family man and a good Christian who preaches the word of God.

Issue: ​Whether the testimonial evidence regarding his conduct and character is adminissible in evidence.
Held : NO.
The conviction was affirmed by the Supreme Court , ratiocinating that the fact that Diopita is endowed with such "sterling" qualities hardly
justifies the conclusion that he is innocent of the crime charged. Similarly, his having attained the position of "Ministerial Servant" in his faith is no
guarantee against any sexual perversion and plunderous proclivity on his part. Indeed, religiosity is not always an emblem of good conduct, and it is
not the unreligious alone who succumbs to the impulse to rob and rape. An accused is not entitled to an acquittal simply because of his previous good
moral character and exemplary conduct. The affirmance or reversal of his conviction must be resolved on the basic issue of whether the prosecution
had discharged its duty of proving his guilt beyond any peradventure of doubt. Since the evidence of the crime in the instant case is more than
sufficient to convict, the evidence of good moral character of accused-appellant is unavailing.

RULE 131

29. MANDARIN VILLA VS CA (257 SCRA 538)

Facts:
In the evening of 19 Oct 1989, private respondent de Jesus hosted a dinner for his friends at the petitioner’s restaurant, the Mandarin Villa
Seafoods Village in Mandaluyong City. After dinner, the waiter handed to de Jesus the bill amounting to P2,658.50. De Jesus offered his BANKARD
credit card to the waiter for payment. Minutes later, the waiter returned and audibly informed that said credit card had expired. De Jesus demonstrated
that the card had yet to expire on Sept 1990, as embossed on its face. De Jesus approached the cashier who again dishonored such card. De Jesus
offered his BPI express credit card instead and this was accepted, honored and verified. The trial court and CA held petitioner to be negligent.
Issues:
Whether Mandarin may deny the credit card offered as payment when it posted a logo that Bankard are accepted as a mode of payment.

Held: ​
No.
The record shows that petitioner posted a logo inside Mandarin Villa Seafood Village stating that "Bankard is accepted here. This
representation is conclusive upon the petitioner which it cannot deny or disprove as against the private respondent, the party relying
thereon. Petitioner, therefore, cannot disclaim its obligation to accept private respondent's BANKARD credit card without violating the equitable
[
principle of estoppel.

30. BAKASNOT VS SB (11/5/1987) C/O MARCELO

31. PP VS MINGOA (92 PHIL 856) C/O MARCELO

32. AFRICAN VS CALTEX (16 SCRA 446) à PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE

FACTS:
In March 1948, in Rizal Avenue, Manila, a tank truck was hosing gasoline into the underground storage of Caltex. Apparently, a fire broke out from
the gasoline station and the fire spread and burned several houses including the house of Spouses Bernabe and Soledad Africa. Allegedly, someone (a
passerby) threw a cigarette while gasoline was being transferred which caused the fire. But there was no evidence presented to prove this theory and
no other explanation can be had as to the real reason for the fire. Apparently also, Caltex and the branch owner (Mateo Boquiren) failed to install a
concrete firewall to contain fire if in case one happens.
ISSUE:
Whether or not Caltex and Boquiren are liable to pay for damages.
HELD:
Yes. This is pursuant to the application on the principle of res ipsa loquitur (“the transaction speaks for itself”) which states: “where the thing which
caused injury, without fault of the injured person, is under the exclusive control of the defendant and the injury is such as in the ordinary course of
things does not occur if he having such control use proper care, it affords reasonable evidence, in the absence of the explanation, that the injury arose
from defendant’s want of care.” The gasoline station, with all its appliances, equipment and employees, was under the control of Caltex and
Boquiren. A fire occurred therein and spread to and burned the neighboring houses. The persons who knew or could have known how the fire started
were Boquiren, Caltex and their employees, but they gave no explanation thereof whatsoever. It is a fair and reasonable inference that the incident
happened because of want of care.
These facts, descriptive of the location and objective circumstances surrounding the operation of the gasoline station in question, strengthen the
presumption of negligence under the doctrine of res ipsa loquitur, since on their face they called for more stringent measures of caution than
those which would satisfy the standard of due diligence under ordinary circumstances.
Note that ordinarily, he who charges negligence shall prove it. However, res ipsa loquitur is the exception because the burden of proof is shifted to the
party charged of negligence as the latter is the one who had exclusive control of the thing that caused the injury complained of.

RULE 129

33. DEL SOCORRO CS VAN WILSEN (744 SCRA 516)

True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact,
they must be alleged and proved.
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of processual presumption shall govern. Under
this doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the foreign law is the same as our local or
domestic or internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as regards the obligation to support has not been properly pleaded and proved in
the instant case, it is presumed to be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the obligation of parents to support their children and penalizing
the non-compliance therewith.
 RULE 132

34. CHAVEZ VS CA (24 SCRA 633)

PRINCIPLE: Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is
illegally restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and
therefore invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction
may be challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less
effective may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a
recourse to the writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final.
FACTS: The petitioner was charged for qualified theft one (1) Thunderbird car, Motor No. H9YH-143003, with Plate No. H-16648 Pasay City '62
together with its accessories worth P22,200.00. An information was filed against the accused together with other accused,that they conspired, with
intent to gain and abuse of confidence without theconsent of owner Dy Lim, took the vehicle.All the accused plead not guilty. During the trial, the
fiscal grecia (prosecution) asked roger Chavez to be thefirst witness. Counsel of the accused opposed. Fiscal Grecia contends that the accused
(Chavez) will only be an ordinary witness not an state witness. Counsel of accused answer that it will only incriminate his client. But the jugde ruled
in favor of the fiscal. Petitioner was convicted.

ISSUE: Whether or not constitutional right of Chavez against self -incrimination had been violated to warrant writ of Habeas Corpus?

HELD: The High Court said in the positive. Petitioner was forced to testify to incriminate himself, in full breach of his constitutional right to remain
silent. It cannot be said now that he has waived his right. He did not volunteer to take the stand and in his own defense; he did not offer himself as a
witness; Juxtaposed with the circumstances of the case heretofore adverted to, make waiver a shaky defense. It cannot stand. If, by his own
admission, defendant proved his guilt, still, his original claim remains valid. For the privilege, we say again, is a rampart that gives protection – even
to the guilty.

Habeas corpus is a high prerogative writ. It is traditionally considered as an exceptional remedy to release a person whose liberty is illegally
restrained such as when the accused’s constitutional rights are disregarded. Such defect results in the absence or loss of jurisdiction and therefore
invalidates the trial and the consequent conviction of the accused whose fundamental right was violated. That void judgment of conviction may be
challenged by collateral attack, which precisely is the function of habeas corpus. This writ may issue even if another remedy which is less effective
may be availed of by the defendant. Thus, failure by the accused to perfect his appeal before the Court of Appeals does not preclude a recourse to the
writ. The writ may be granted upon a judgment already final. For, as explained in Johnson vs. Zerbst, the writ of habeas corpus as an extraordinary
remedy must be liberally given effect so as to protect well a person whose liberty is at stake. The propriety of the writ was given the nod in that case,
involving a violation of another constitutional right, in this wise:

A court’s jurisdiction at the beginning of trial may be lost “in the course of the proceedings” due to failure to complete the court — as the Sixth
Amendment requires — by providing Counsel for an accused who is unable to obtain Counsel, who has not intelligently waived this constitutional
guaranty, and whose life or liberty is at stake. If this requirement of the Sixth Amendment is not complied with, the court no longer has jurisdiction to
proceed. The judgment of conviction pronounced by a court without jurisdiction is void, and one imprisoned thereunder may obtain release of habeas
corpus.

Under our own Rules of Court, to grant the remedy to the accused Roger Chavez whose case presents a clear picture of disregard of a constitutional
right is absolutely proper. Section 1 of Rule 102 extends the writ, unless otherwise expressly provided by law, “to all cases of illegal confinement or
detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto.

35. BELTRAN VS SAMSON (53 PHIL 170)

PRINCIPLE: Writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical act, because it
requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a means to determine
whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
FACTS: The petitioner complains that the respondent judge ordered him to appear before the provincial fiscal to take dictation in his own
handwriting from the latter. The order for the purpose to compare the petitioner's handwriting and determining whether or not it is he who wrote
certain documents supposed to be falsified.
ISSUE: Is the order of the fiscal valid?
RULING: No.
The rule is that one cannot be compelled to take down dictation in his writing unless he voluntarily agreed so. The Supreme Court cited cases like
Bradford vs. People (43 Pacific Reporter, 1013) and Sprouse vs. Com. (81 Va., 374,378), where the judge asked the defendant to write his name
during the hearing, and the latter did so voluntarily. These cases cannot be applied in the one at the case at bar for the reason that the defendant in this
case did not voluntarily do so.
Furthermore, in the case before us, writing is something more than moving the body, or the hands, or the fingers; writing is not a purely mechanical
act, because it requires the application of intelligence and attention; and in the case at bar writing means that the petitioner herein is to furnish a
means to determine whether or not he is the falsifier, as the petition of the respondent fiscal clearly states.
It cannot be contended in the present case that if permission to obtain a specimen of the petitioner's handwriting is not granted, the crime would go
unpunished. Considering the circumstance that the petitioner is a municipal treasurer, according to Exhibit A, it should not be a difficult matter for
the fiscal to obtained genuine specimens of his handwriting. But even supposing it is impossible to obtain specimen or specimens without resorting to
the means complained herein, that is no reason for trampling upon a personal right guaranteed by the constitution. It might be true that in some cases
criminals may succeed in evading the hand of justice, but such cases are accidental and do not constitute the raison d' etre of the privilege. This
constitutional privilege exists for the protection of innocent persons.

36. TABUENA VS SB (268 SCRA 338)

PRINCIPLE: JUDICIAL ETHICS; JUDGES; EXAMINATION OF WITNESSES MUST BE LIMITED TO CLARIFICATORY QUESTIONS. — The
Court has acknowledged the right of a trial judge to question witnesses with a view to satisfying his mind upon any material point which presents
itself during the trial of a case over which he presides. But not only should his examination be limited to asking "clarificatory" questions, the right
should be sparingly and judiciously used; for the rule is that the court should stay out of it as much as possible neither interfering nor intervening in
the conduct of the trial. "A trial judge should not participate in the examination of witnesses as to create the impression that he is allied with the
prosecution."

FACTS: Tabuena and Peralta were previously the General Manager and Acting Finance Services Manager of MIAA, respectively. They were
charged of Malversation before the Sandiganbayan for the alleged misappropriated amount of P55Million.

Tabuena was requested by then President Marcos through verbal instruction and memorandum to pay the Philippine National Construction
Corporation the sum of P55Million in cash as partial payment of MIAA’s account with the said Company. In obedience to the request, he caused the
release of P55Million of MIAA funds by means of 3 withdrawals through the issuance of manager’s check for the amounts payable to Tabuena.
 There were no vouchers prepared and no receipts issued when the money was received by the Office of the President. Prosecution allege that the
money was misappropriated and converted the proceeds to the personal use and benefit of the accused. In their defense, Tabuena claimed to have
acted in good faith and that he was merely complying with the Marcos Memorandum which ordered him to forward immediately to the Office of the
President P55Million as partial payment of MIAA’s obligation to PNCC.

The Sandiganbayan rejected their claim of good faith which ultimately led to their conviction. Sandiganbayan actively took part in the questioning of
a defense witness and of the accused themselves. At the taking of the testimony of Francis Monera, then Senior Assistant Vice President and
Corporate Comptroller of PNCC, Atty. Andres asked sixteen (16) questions on direct examination. Prosecutor Viernes only asked six (6)

37. PP VS CAPARAS (1/8/1952)

PRINCIPLE: REMEDIAL LAW; EVIDENCE; TESTIMONY OF WITNESSES; PROBATIVE VALUE LESSENED WHEN ELICITED BY MEANS OF
LEADING QUESTIONS. –The probative value of a witness’ testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading questions which are so
put that the witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or assertion of an examining counsel put with such vocal inflection as to be a
question.

FACTS:

​This pertains to two separate motions for reconsideration of the Supreme Court decision dated February 20, 1981 convicting herein
appellants, one filed by their counsel of record in behalf of both of them, seeking the re-examination of the decision insofar as it rejects the plea of
self-defense of appellant Diamsay; the other, filed by a new counsel of Caparas only in his behalf, seeking the review of the testimonies of the two
principal witnesses, Laureano and Lydia Posadas, upon which said appellant was convicted, on the ground of conspiracy between him and Diamsay.

Caparas points out some facts and circumstances which are alleged to impair the credibility of the aforesaid witnesses and thereby leaves
the fact of conspiracy unproven beyond reasonable doubt as it should be.

Thus, Caparas points out that Laureano's testimony was extracted through leading questions, and he quotes:
"Q Do you know the purpose of Carlos Gregorio in coming to your house?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q What was his purpose?
"A Regarding the landholding I was farming and his help I requested.
"Q Did you go to any place with Carlos Gregorio after that?
"A Yes, sir.
"Q Where?
"A To his house.
"Q You are referring to the house of Carlos Gregorio?
"A Yes, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q When you arrived at the house of Carlos Gregorio, who were with you?
"A Carlos Gregorio, Sir.
"Q Who were the persons, if any, that you have seen at the house of Carlos Gregorio?
"A Eufemio Caparas and Diamsay, sir.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q Now, when you arrived in that house, what happened?
"A We talked regarding the landholding, sir.
"Q You said, 'we', to whom are you referring?
"A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
"Q What did you talk about that landholding?
"A Regarding the landholding which he said would be given to me. He said there is already one.
"Q And what did you answer when this was said to you by Eufemio Caparas?
"A I said, 'if there is, I give thanks', but he said that the land he was giving me had some trouble.
"Q And what did you say?
"A I said 'that seems hard', but he said, 'that is easy'.
"Q What else transpired?
"A I asked him what he meant by easy and he said 'it is easy under this condition', and I asked him what condition, and he said 'you kill him'.
"Q During all that time, who were present inside that house?
"A Tisio Diamsay.
"Q Who else?
"A Eufemio Caparas, sir.
"Q Anybody else?
"A Carling Gregorio, sir.
"Q And you?
"A I was present.
xxx xxx xxx
"Q Now, in the vernacular, in Tagalog Language that you have been testifying, you said, 'Patayin n'yo', means plural, do you know to whom
this word 'n'yo' referred to?
"A He was ordering me, Carling, and Tisio Diamsay, sir.
"Q Ordering to what?
"A To kill.
"Q To kill Simeon Paez?
"A Yes, sir.

ISSUE: Whether or not the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracy was elicited by means of leading questions.
RULING: YES. We are constrained to agree that the testimony of Laureano on the supposed conspiracywas elicited by means of leading questions,
the probative value of which, according to accepted legal authorities, is thus diminished or lessened.

"The probative value of a witness' testimony is very much lessened where it is obtained by leading questions which are so put that the
witness merely assents to or dissents from a statement or assertion of an examining counsel put with such vocal inflection as to be a question."

We cannot but entertain doubts as to the veracity of the testimonies of the witnesses which alone provided the basis for the finding of
conspiracy against Caparas. These doubts now disturb the mind of the Court as to his culpability, and must accordingly be resolved in favor of
appellant Caparas it being preferable to acquit a guilty person rather than convict an innocent one.

38. PP VS DEL ROSARIO (GR 142295 , 5/31/2001) à AUTHENTICATION à NOT FOUND

39. CERCADO -SIGA VS CERCADO ,JR. (GR 185374, 3/11/2015)

FACTS:

In their Complaint against respondents Vicente Cercado, Jr., Manuela C. Arabit, Lolita Basco, Maria C. Aralar, Violeta C. Binadas and the Registrar
of Deeds of Binangonan, Rizal, petitioners Simplicia Cercado-Siga (Simplicia) and Ligaya Cercado-Belison (Ligaya) claimed that they are the
legitimate children of the late Vicente and Benita Castillo (Benita), who were married last 9 October 1929 in Pililla, Rizal. Petitioners alleged that
during the lifetime of their parents, their father acquired by gratuitous title a parcel of land. Petitioners claimed that upon the death of their father
Vicente and by virtue of intestate succession, ownership over the subject land pertained to them as heirs; that upon the death of Benita, her
share was acquired by petitioners by operation of law. Sometime in September 1998, petitioners read from a newspaper a notice that the estate of
Vicente and a certain Leonora Ditablan has been extrajudicially settled by their heirs, respondents herein. Upon verification, petitioners were
furnished a copy of the Extrajudicial Settlement of the Estate (Deed) executed and signed by respondents. Petitioners insist that Vicente and
Leonora were not married or if they were so married, then said marriage was null and void by reason of the subsisting marriage of their
parents, Vicente and Benita. Petitioners prayed for the declaration of the Deed as null and void; for the Office of the Register of Deeds of Rizal to
5
correct the entry on the marital status of Vicente; and for the payment of damages and attorney’s fees.

To prove the marriage between Vicente and Benita, petitioners presented the following documents: 1) Contrato Matrimonial or the marriage
6
contract; 2) Certification dated 19 November 2000 issued by Iglesia Filipina Independiente of its acceptance of original marriage
7
contract; 3) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Simplicia issued by the Office of the Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla,
8 9
Rizal; 4) Certificate of Baptism of Simplicia; 5) Certification of non-production of record of birth of Ligaya issued by the Office of the
10
Municipal Civil Registrar of Pililla, Rizal; and 6) Joint Affidavit of two disinterested persons attesting that Ligaya is the child of Vicente
11
and Benita.

In their Answer, respondents alleged that they are the legitimate heirs of Vicente and Leonora, who were married on 27 June 1977 as evidenced by a
marriage certificate registered with the Local Civil Registrar of Binangonan, Rizal. They averred that petitioners are not the real-parties-interest to
institute the case because they failed to present their birth certificates to prove their filiation to Vicente; that the marriage between Vicente and Benita
12
was not valid; that the document showing that Vicente was married to Benita is not a certified true copy; and that they are now estopped by laches.

On 30 January 2007, the RTC rendered judgment in favor of petitioners wherein the trial court held that petitioners are the legitimate children of the
late Vicente Cercado, Sr. and Benita Castillote/Castillo who were married on October 9, 1929, as evidenced by a Contrato Matrimonial.

RULING:

It has been settled that church registries of births, marriages, and deaths made subsequent to the promulgation of General Orders No.
23
68 and the passage of Act No. 190 are no longer public writings, nor are they kept by duly authorized public officials. They are private
24
writings and their authenticity must therefore be proved as are all other private writings in accordance with the rules of evidence.
25
Under Section 20, Rule 132, Rules of Court, before a private document is admitted in evidence, it must be authenticated either by the person
who executed it, the person before whom its execution was acknowledged, any person who was present and saw it executed, or who after its
execution, saw it and recognized the signatures, or the person to whom the parties to the instruments had previously confessed execution thereof.
Petitioners failed to present any one of such witnesses. In fact, only Simplicia testified that her mother gave her the marriage contract. Unfortunately,
she was not present during its execution nor could she identify Benita’s handwriting because Simplicia admitted that she is illiterate.

Petitioners insist on the admissibility of the marriage contract on the ground that it is a duplicate original, hence, the original need not be produced.
The High Court did not agree. It was ruled in Vallarta v. Court of Appeals27 that “ a signed carbon copy or duplicate of a document executed at the
same time as the original is known as a duplicate original and maybe introduced in evidence without accounting for the non- production of the
original. But, an unsigned and uncertified document purporting to be a carbon copy is not competent evidence. It is because there is no public
officer acknowledging the accuracy of the copy.”28

While petitioners concede that the marriage contract is a private document, they now argue that it is an ancient document which need not be
authenticated. Petitioners’ argument still has no merit. Section 21, Rule 132 defines an ancient document as one that: 1) is more than 30 years old;
2) is produced from custody in which it would naturally be found if genuine; and 3) is unblemished by any alteration or by any circumstance of
suspicion. The marriage contract was executed on 9 October 1929, hence it is clearly more than 30-years old. On its face, there appears to be no
evidence of alteration.

The marriage contract however does not meet the second requirement.

Ancient documents are considered from proper custody if they come from a place from which they might reasonably be expected to be found. Custody
is proper if it is proved to have had a legitimate origin or if the circumstances of the particular case are such as to render such an origin probable. If
29
a document is found where it would not properly and naturally be, its absence from the proper place must be satisfactorily accounted for.

It is acknowledged that there is difficulty of obtaining old records, the rules on evidence cannot be ignored, specifically the rule on authentication
with respect to private documents which is precisely in place to prevent the inclusion of spurious documents in the body of evidence that will
determine the resolutions of an issue.

40. HEIRS OF GORGONIO MEDINA VS NATIVIDAD (4/27/2008)

FACTS: (IN RELATION TO THE FOREIGN DOCUMENT)
The Complaint in this case was instituted by Philip M. Natividad in the name of Bonifacio Natividad upon the strength of a Special Power of
Attorney executed by the latter in Washington, U.S.A. While the document appears to have been acknowledged before Phyllis Perry, a Notary Public
for the jurisdiction of the State of Washington, U.S.A., it was not presented before a Philippine Consular Officer for the requisite authentication.
The Revised Rules on Evidence require that a document acknowledged before a notary public being a public document, such record if kept in a
foreign country, should be accompanied with a certificate that such officer has the custody thereof made by a secretary of the embassy or legation,
consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by an officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in
which the record is kept, authenticated by the seal of his office. In the absence of the requisite certification and authentication of the public document,
the same cannot be proved and, therefore, inadmissible as evidence.
Bonifacio Natividad’s Special Power of Attorney not having been duly certified and authenticated, it cannot be duly proved. It is, therefore, deemed
as not having been executed for purposes of instituting an action on his behalf. Without any valid authority to institute the action on behalf of his
father, Philip Natividad is deemed to have instituted it on his own. Philip Natividad not being a party to the Deed of Absolute Sale between Gorgonio
Medina and Bonifacio Natividad, he is undoubtedly not the real party in interest because he does not have any material interest in the contract which
is the source of Bonifacio Natividads cause of action. He does not stand to be benefited or injured by a judgment in the suit and neither is he entitled
to the avails of the suit.
ISSUE: Is the Special Power of Attorney supposedly authorizing Philip Natividad to file the instant case in behalf of his father admissible in
evidence?
RULING:
No. It is not admissible in evidence.
33
In Lopez v. Court of Appeals, we have ruled that a special power of attorney executed in a foreign country is, generally, not admissible in evidence
as a public document in our courts. In said case, we said:.
34
Section 25, Rule 132 of the Rules of Court provides –
 Sec. 25. Proof of public or official record. – An official record or an entry therein, when admissible for any purpose, may be evidenced by
an official publication thereof or by a copy attested by the officer having the legal custody of the record, or by his deputy, and
accompanied, if the record is not kept in the Philippines, with a certificate that such officer has the custody. If the office in which the record
is kept is in a foreign country, the certificate may be made by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or
consular agent or by any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and
authenticated by the seal of his office.
From the foregoing provision, when the special power of attorney is executed and acknowledged before a notary public or other
competent official in a foreign country, it cannot be admitted in evidence unless it is certified as such in accordance with the
foregoing provision of the rules by a secretary of embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by
any officer in the foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept of said public
document and authenticated by the seal of his office. A city judge-notary who notarized the document, as in this case, cannot issue such
certification.
In the case under consideration, the supposed special power of attorney involved was executed and acknowledged before Phyllis Perry, a Notary
Public of the State of Washington, USA. This being the case, a certification or authentication, as required by Section 25 (now Section 24), Rules
of Court, by a secretary of the embassy or legation, consul general, consul, vice consul, or consular agent or by any other officer in the
foreign service of the Philippines stationed in the foreign country in which the record is kept, and authenticated by the seal of his office, is
REQUIRED. A notary public in a foreign country is not one of those who can issue the required certificate.
The records are bereft of evidence showing that there was compliance with Section 25 (now Section 24). Non-compliance therewith will render the
special power of attorney not admissible in evidence. Not being duly established in evidence, the special power of attorney cannot be used by
Philip Natividad to represent his father, Bonifacio Natividad, in this legal action against the petitioners. It is thus clear that this case was not filed by
the real party-in-interest (Bonifacio) or by one duly authorized by said party. Not being a real party-in-interest and sans the authority to pursue the
case, Philip Natividad could not have validly commenced this case. The special power of attorney executed before a notary public in a foreign
country without the requirements mentioned in Section 25 (now Section 24) of the Rules of Court cannot be admitted in evidence before Philippine
courts.

41. RAMOS VS DIZON (GR 137247 8/7/2996)

PRINCIPLE: in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 404], we relaxed the foregoing rule and allowed evidence
not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following requirements are present, viz: first, the same
must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the same must have been incorporated in the records of the case.

FACTS:

​
Petitioner Ramos allegedly bought a parcel under Deed of Sale under Pacto de Retro of land to Elpidio Domingo , the latter being given an
SPA by respondent Dizon. For failure to redeem the land, petitioner filed an action in court for the consolidation of the ownership.

​
Respondent Dizon now assailed the SPA executed to Elpidio, he asserted that the latter exceeds to the authority given by him. He alleges
that the SPA was executed for the purpose of enabling Elpidio to secure a loan of P150,000.00 by using Domingos share in the land covered by TCT
No. 172510 as security.

​
Petitioner during the trial present Elpidio as second witness who testified that he sold to her (petitioner), with a right to repurchase, one-half
of a parcel of land located in Limay, Tondo, Manila, which was owned by respondent Domingo. According to her, Elpidio was then authorized by a
SPA executed by respondent Domingo to enter into said transaction with her. It was agreed upon that the owner (referring to respondent Domingo)
had five months within which he could buy back the property from her.Respondent Domingo, however, failed to exercise his right forcing her to
institute the Petition for consolidation of ownership before the court a quo.

​
Elpidio was subjected to cross-examination by respondent and testified that Elpidio secured a loan from petitioner in the initial amount
of P150,000.00 evidenced by a promissory note dated 17 April 1988 and marked as Exhibit 1 for respondent Domingo. In order to secure this loan,
petitioner and Elpidio agreed to execute a real estate mortgage over the land embraced by TCT No. 172510. The real estate mortgage was marked as
Exhibit. And that respondent Domingo had previously filed a case for specific performance and/or rescission against Elpidio.

​
When respondent Domingos counsel manifested before the trial court he was no longer presenting testimonial evidence; instead, he
requested that the documents be marked in evidence.

Respondent Domingos counsel was given ten days to submit his formal offer of evidence in writing and petitioner was given the same
period of time to file her comment or opposition thereto after which the case would be submitted for resolution.
HOWEVER, prior to the submission of respondent Domingos formal offer of evidence, THE TRIAL COURT rendered a Decision
holding that the contract between petitioner and Elpidio was actually one of equitable mortgage and not a pacto de retro sale.
HENCE, THIS PETITION.

ISSUE:
WON TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN ITS DECISION WHEN IT WAS DONE BEFORE THE OFFER OF RESPONDENT’S
EVIDENCE.

RULING:

NO.

The applicable provision of the Rules of Court on this matter is Sec. 34, Rule 132. It reads:

SEC. 34. Offer of evidence. The court shall consider no evidence which has not been formally offered. The purpose for which the
evidence is offered must be specified.

The case of Vda. De Oate, which was relied upon by the Court of Appeals, reiterated our previous rulings in People v. Napat-
[25] [26]
a and People v. Mate relative to the admission and consideration of exhibits which were not formally offered during the trial. We declared
[27]
in Vda. De Oate that

From the foregoing provision, it is clear that for evidence to be considered, the same must be formally offered. Corollarily, the
mere fact that a particular document to identified and marked as an exhibit does not mean that is has already been offered as part
of the evidence of a party. In Interpacific Transit, Inc. v. Aviles [186 SCRA 385], we had the occasion to make a distinction
between identification of documentary evidence and its formal offer as an exhibit. We said that the first is done in the course of
the trial and is accompanied by the marking of the evidence as an exhibit while the second is done only when the party rests its
case and not before. A party, therefore, may opt to formally offer his evidence if he believes that it will advance his cause or not
to do so at all. In the event he chooses to do the latter, the trial court is not authorized by the Rules to consider the same.
 However, in People v. Napat-a [179 SCRA 403] citing People v. Mate [103 SCRA 404], we relaxed the foregoing rule and
allowed evidence not formally offered to be admitted and considered by the trial court provided the following
requirements are present, viz: first, the same must have been duly identified by testimony duly recorded and, second, the
same must have been incorporated in the records of the case. (Underscoring supplied.)

In this case, we find and so rule that these requirements have been satisfied. The exhibits in question were presented and marked during the pre-trial
of the case thus, they have been incorporated into the records. Further, Elpidio himself explained the contents of these exhibits when he was
interrogated by respondents counsel DURING cross-examination.

Therefore, notwithstanding the fact that respondents exhibits were not formally offered prior to the rendition of the Decision in Civil Case No. 93-
66439 by the court a quo, the trial court judge committed no error when he admitted and considered them in the resolution of the case. After all, the
pre-trial forms part of the proceedings and matters dealt with therein may not be brushed aside in the process of decision making. Otherwise, the real

essence of compulsory pre-trial would be inconsequential and worthless. ​

42. PP VS FRONDA (3/15/200)

[21]
DOCTRINE: Flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime." To be caught flagrante delicto, therefore, necessarily implies
positive identification by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, which is "that which proves the fact in dispute
[22]
without the aid of any inference or presumption" in contrast to circumstantial evidence which is "the proof of facts from which, taken collectively,
[23]
the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence." Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a
weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances
[24]
from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when the evidence is circumstantial than when it is
[25]
direct; for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the accused.
Under the Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a conviction
beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be upheld only if the
circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused, to the exclusion of all
others, as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and consistent with the hypothesis that the accused is
guilty.
FATCS: Accused Michael Fronda (hereafter FRONDA); Antonino Flora, Jr.; and Lauro Millamina, Jr., were charged and convicted for violation of
Dangerous Drugs for selling one kilo of marijuana to to policemen who posed as buyers. All the accused vigorously denied having anything to do
[3]
with the brick of marijuana recovered on the night, which they allegedly saw for the first time only during the trial. FRONDA claimed that he did
[4]
not even know what a marijuana was. Millamina denied that he was engaged in selling marijuana, and that any one of them handed the marijuana
to PO2 Bedey. The trial court convicted them and did not find credible accused claim that they were mere students, since their classcards, enrollment
or registration papers, or even their teachers and classmates were not presented.

ISSUE: WON the accused is guilty beyond reasonable doubt?

RULING: In the instant case, as correctly pointed out by both FRONDA and the OSG, the trial courts finding that FRONDA and the other accused
were "literally caught flagrante delicto, delivering or dealing in a brick of marijuana to Police Officer Bedey" is not supported by the
[21]
evidence adduced by the prosecution. Flagrante delicto means "[i]n the very act of committing the crime." To be caught flagrante delicto,
therefore, necessarily implies positive identification by the eyewitness or eyewitnesses. Such is a "direct evidence" of culpability, which is "that
[22]
which proves the fact in dispute without the aid of any inference or presumption" in contrast to circumstantial evidence which is "the proof of
facts from which, taken collectively, the existence of the particular fact in dispute may be inferred as a necessary or probable consequence."
[23]
Circumstantial evidence, however, is not a weaker form of evidence vis--vis direct evidence, for our rules make no distinction between direct
[24]
evidence of fact and evidence of circumstances from which the existence of a fact may be inferred. No greater degree of certainty is required when
the evidence is circumstantial than when it is direct; for in either case, the trier of fact must be convinced beyond reasonable doubt of the guilt of the
[25]
accused.
In this case, as pointed out by the parties, neither PO2 Bedey, who transacted with and obtained the brick of marijuana from "somebody" in the room
at 341 A. Bonifacio St., Baguio City, nor PO3 Corpuz, who rushed to the scene upon hearing Bedey shout "Positive," could identify the person or
persons Bedey was talking to and dealing with prior to and at the time the brick of marijuana was obtained. Thus, the trial court had to resort to
inference that since Bedey obtained the brick of marijuana from "somebody" from the same room occupied by FRONDA and the other accused who,
when their names were called, "volunteered" as occupants of the room, then one or some of them must be responsible for selling and delivering to
Bedey the marijuana.
Due to the darkness and lack of illumination inside and outside the door where the transaction took place, Bedey could not identify the person he was
dealing with. He was not even sure how many person or persons he was talking to that night in question. Significantly, he admitted that there were
several persons who came out of the room other than the accused. Like PO3 Corpuz, he did not even bother to enter the room to check whether there
were persons other than the accused. When Bedey was given the final chance to identify who among the three accused talked to him and handed him
[26]
the marijuana, he could not do so. PO3 Corpuz, who was in another room when Bedey obtained the marijuana, neither witnessed the transaction
leading to the delivery of marijuana.
In view of the admissions by the police officers who conducted the "operation" that they could not identify the person or persons who transacted with
Bedey and delivered the brick of marijuana, and that they did not bother to enter the room where the marijuana was obtained, there is no moral
certainty that FRONDA and the other accused were responsible for the delivery of marijuana to Bedey.
Indeed, far from having been caught flagrante delicto, the evidence against FRONDA and his co-accused is, at most, only circumstantial in nature.
Where the evidence is purely circumstantial, there should be an even greater need than usual to apply with vigor the rule that the prosecution cannot
[28]
depend on the weakness of the defense and that any conviction must rest on nothing less than a moral certainty of guilt of the accused. Under the
Rules of Court, circumstantial evidence would be sufficient for conviction if the following concur: (a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proved; and (c) the combination of all the circumstances is such as to produce a
conviction beyond reasonable doubt. Or, as jurisprudentially formulated, a judgment of conviction based on circumstantial evidence can be
upheld only if the circumstances proven constitute an unbroken chain which leads to one fair and reasonable conclusion pointing to the
accused, to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person; i.e., the circumstances proven must be consistent with each other and consistent
[29]
with the hypothesis that the accused is guilty.

43. COSCOLLUELA v. SANDIGANBAYAN (G.R. No. 191411, July 15, 2013)

Facts:
On July 9, 2009, Coscolluela filed a Motion to Quash,12 arguing, among others, that his constitutional right to speedy disposition of cases was
violated as the criminal charges against him were resolved only after almost eight (8) years since the complaint was instituted.

Issue:

The sole issue raised for the Court’s resolution is whether the SB gravely abused its discretion in finding that petitioners’ right to speedy disposition
of cases was not violated.

Ruling:

Court holds that petitioners’ right to a speedy disposition of their criminal case had been violated.

It is observed that the preliminary investigation proceedings took a protracted amount of time to complete.

In this relation, the Court does not lend credence to the SB’s position that the conduct of preliminary investigation was terminated as early as March
27, 2003, or the time when Cañares prepared the Resolution recommending the filing of the Information. This is belied by Section 4, Rule II of the
Administrative Order No. 07 dated April 10, 1990, otherwise known as the “Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,” which provides:

SEC. 4. Procedure – The preliminary investigation of cases falling under the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan and Regional Trial Courts shall be
conducted in the manner prescribed in Section 3, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court, subject to the following provisions: x x x x No information may be
filed and no complaint may be dismissed without the written authority or approval of the Ombudsman in cases falling within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan, or of the proper Deputy Ombudsman in all other cases.

The above-cited provision readily reveals that there is no complete resolution of a case under preliminary investigation until the Ombudsman
approves the investigating officer’s recommendation to either file an Information with the SB or to dismiss the complaint. Therefore, in the case at
bar, the preliminary investigation proceedings against the petitioners were not terminated upon Cañares’ preparation of the March 27, 2003
Resolution and Information but rather, only at the time Casimiro finally approved the same for filing with the SB. In this regard, the proceedings
were terminated only on May 21, 2009, or almost eight (8) years after the filing of the complaint.

Thus, in view of the unjustified length of time miring the Office of the Ombudsman’s resolution of the case as well as the concomitant prejudice that
the delay in this case has caused, it is undeniable that petitioners’ constitutional right to due process and speedy disposition of cases had been
violated. As the institutional vanguard against corruption and bureaucracy, the Office of the Ombudsman should create a system of accountability in
order to ensure that cases before it are resolved with reasonable dispatch and to equally expose those who are responsible for its delays, as it ought to
determine in this case.

44. PP VS VALLEJO (DNA EVIDNCE)

DOCTRINE:
In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how the samples were
collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the samples, whether the
proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who conducted the tests.

Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but also
inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court.

FACTS:
On July 10, 1999 at about 1pm, the victim’s mother, Ma. Nida Diolola, sent her 9-year old daughter Daisy Diolola to their neighbors house
in Pilapil, Ligtong I, Rosario, Cavite, so that Aimee Vallejo, the sister of accused-appellant, could help Daisy with her lessons. Aimees house, where
accused-appellant was also staying, is about four to five meters away from Daisys house. Ma. Nida saw her daughter go to the house of her tutor. She
was wearing pink short pants and a white sleeveless shirt. An hour later, Daisy came back with accused-appellant. They were looking for a book
which accused-appellant could copy to make a drawing or a poster that Daisy would submit to her teacher. After finding the book, Daisy and
accused-appellant went back to the latters house. When Ma. Nida woke up at about 5:30 oclock after an afternoon nap, she noticed that Daisy was not
yet home. She started looking for her daughter and proceeded to the house of Aimee, Daisys tutor. Aimees mother told Ma. Nida that Daisy was not
there and that Aimee was not able to help Daisy with her lessons because Aimee was not feeling well as she had her menstrual period. Ma. Nida
looked for Daisy in her brothers and sisters houses, but she was not there, either. At about 7:00 oclock that evening, Ma. Nida went back to her
neighbors house, and there saw accused-appellant, who told her that Daisy had gone to her classmates house to borrow a book. But, when Ma. Nida
went there, she was told that Daisy had not been there. Ma. Nida went to the dike and was told that they saw Daisy playing at about 3:30 oclock in
the afternoon. Jessiemin Mataverde also told Ma. Nida that Daisy was playing in front of her house that afternoon and even watched television in her
house, but that Daisy later left with accused-appellant.

The next morning, Daisy’s body was found tied to a tree near a river bank. Apparently, she was raped and thereafter strangled to death. In
the afternoon of July 11, the police went to Vallejo’s house to question the latter as he was one of the last persons with the victim. But prior to that,
some neighbors have already told the police that Vallejo was acting strangely during the afternoon of July 10. The police requested for the clothes
that Vallejo wore the day Daisy disappeared. Vallejo complied and the clothes were submitted for processing. The person who processed the clothing
was Pet Byron Buan, a Forensic Biologist of the NBI. At the instance of the local fiscal, he also took buccal swabs (mouth/cheek swabs) from Vallejo
and a vaginal swab from Daisy’s body for DNA testing. Dr. Buan found that there were bloodstains in Vallejo’s clothing a Blood Type A, similar to
that of the victim, while Vallejo’s Blood Type is O. Buan also found that the vaginal swab from Daisy contained Vallejo’s DNA profile. Meanwhile,
Vallejo already executed a sworn statement admitting the crime. But when trial came, Vallejo insisted that the sworn statement was coerced; that he
was threatened by the cops; that the DNA samples should be inadmissible because the body and the clothing of Daisy were already soaked in smirchy
waters, hence contaminated. Vallejo was convicted and was sentenced to death by the trial court.
ISSUE/S:
1) Whether or not the circumstantial evidence presented was sufficient to prove the accused’s guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
2) Whether or not the DNA samples obtained from Vallejo’s clothes and those of the victim are admissible as evidence

RULING:
1) Yes. An accused can be convicted even if no eyewitness is available, provided sufficient circumstantial evidence is presented by the
prosecution to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused committed the crime. In rape with homicide, the evidence against an accused is more
often than not circumstantial. This is because the nature of the crime, where only the victim and the rapist would have been present at the time of its
commission, makes the prosecution of the offense particularly difficult since the victim could no longer testify against the perpetrator. Resort to
circumstantial evidence is inevitable and to demand direct evidence proving the modality of the offense and the identity of the perpetrator is
unreasonable.

Under Rule 133, section 4 of the Revised Rules on Evidence, circumstantial evidence is sufficient to sustain a conviction if:
(a) there is more than one circumstance;
(b) the facts from which the inferences are derived are proven; and
(c) the combination of all circumstances is such as to produce conviction beyond reasonable doubt.

In the case at bar, the following circumstantial evidence establish beyond reasonable doubt the guilt of accused-appellant:
1. The victim went to Aimee Vallejos house, where accused-appellant was residing, at 1:00 oclock in the afternoon of July 10, 1999, for
tutoring.

2. At around 2:00 oclock in the afternoon, accused-appellant and Daisy went together to the latters house to get a book from which the
former could copy Daisys school project. After getting the book, they proceeded to accused-appellants residence.

3. From accused-appellants house, Daisy then went to the house of Jessiemin Mataverde where she watched television. Accused-appellant
thereafter arrived and whispered something to Daisy, and the latter went with him towards the compuerta.

4. At about 4:30 oclock in the afternoon, the spouses Iluminado and Charito Yepes saw accused-appellant coming out of the compuerta,
with his clothes, basketball shorts, and t-shirt wet, although his face and hair were not. According to these witnesses, he looked pale,
uneasy, and troubled (balisa). He kept looking around and did not even greet them as was his custom to do so.

5. The fishing boat which accused-appellant used as a bomber (a boat for catching fish with dynamite) was docked by the seashore.

6. A little before 5:00 oclock in the afternoon, Jessiemin Mataverde also saw accused-appellant buying a Marlboro cigarette from a store.
Jessiemen also noticed that accused-appellants clothes were wet but not his face nor his hair.
7. By 5:30 oclock in the afternoon, as Ma. Nida Diolola looked for her daughter, she was told by accused-appellant that Daisy had gone to
her classmate Rosarios house. The information proved to be false.

8. Daisys body was found tied to an aroma tree at the part of the river near the compuerta.

9. During the initial investigation, accused-appellant had scratches on his feet similar to those caused by the thorns of an aroma tree.

10. The clothes which accused-appellant wore the day before were bloodstained. The
bloodstains on accused-appellants clothes and on Daisys clothes were found positive of human blood type A.

11. Accused-appellant has blood type O.

12. The vaginal swabs from Daisys body contained her DNA profile as well as that of accused-appellant.

2) Yes. DNA is an organic substance found in a person’s cells which contains his or her genetic code. Except for identical twins, each
person’s DNA profile is distinct and unique.

When a crime is committed, material is collected from the scene of the crime or from the victim’s body for the suspects DNA. This is the
evidence sample. The evidence sample is then matched with the reference sample taken from the suspect and the victim.

The purpose of DNA testing is to ascertain whether an association exists between the evidence sample and the reference sample.
The samples collected are subjected to various chemical processes to establish their profile. The test may yield three possible results:

1) The samples are different and therefore must have originated from different sources (exclusion). This conclusion is absolute and requires
no further analysis or discussion;

2) It is not possible to be sure, based on the results of the test, whether the samples have similar DNA types (inconclusive). This might
occur for a variety of reasons including degradation, contamination, or failure of some aspect of the protocol. Various parts of the analysis
might then be repeated with the same or a different sample, to obtain a more conclusive result; or

3) The samples are similar, and could have originated from the same source (inclusion).In such a case, the samples are found to be similar,
the analyst proceeds to determine the statistical significance of the Similarity.

In assessing the probative value of DNA evidence, therefore, courts should consider, among others things, the following data: how
the samples were collected, how they were handled, the possibility of contamination of the samples, the procedure followed in analyzing the
samples, whether the proper standards and procedures were followed in conducting the tests, and the qualification of the analyst who
conducted the tests.

In the case at bar, the bloodstains taken from the clothing of the victim and of accused-appellant, the smears taken from the victim as well
as the strands of hair and nails taken from her tested negative for the presence of human DNA,] because, as Ms. Viloria-Magsipoc explained:
xxxx
We found that these specimens were soaked in smirchy water before they were submitted to the laboratory. The state of the specimens prior
to the DNA analysis could have hampered the preservation of any DNA that could have been there before. So when serological methods were done
on these specimens, Mr. Byron could have taken such portion or stains that were only amenable for serological method and were not enough for DNA
analysis already. So negative results were found on the clothings that were submitted which were specimens no. 1 to 5 in my report, Sir. xxxx
 Thus, it is the inadequacy of the specimens submitted for examination, and not the possibility that the samples had been contaminated,
which accounted for the negative results of their examination. But the vaginal swabs taken from the victim yielded positive for the presence of human
DNA. Upon analysis by the experts, they showed the DNA profile of accused-appellant.

In conclusion, we hold that the totality of the evidence points to no other conclusion than that accused-appellant is guilty of the crime
charged. Evidence is weighed not counted. When facts or circumstances which are proved are not only consistent with the guilt of the accused but
also inconsistent with his innocence, such evidence, in its weight and probative force, may surpass direct evidence in its effect upon the court. This is
how it is in this case.

45. LUCAS VS LUCAS

Facts:
Jesse U. Lucas (Jesse), filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) against Jesus Lucas (Jesus), his putative father.
Jesus filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that Jesse failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action
enumerated in the case of Herrera v. Alba.
(In Herrera case, the SC ruled that there are four significant procedural aspects in a traditional paternity case which parties have to face, i.e., a prima
facie case, affirmative defenses, presumption of legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child).
(In effect, Jesus is arguing that since there is no prima facie case, DNA testing should not be given due course).
The motion of Jesus was granted and affirmed by the CA on appeal, hence the case.

Issue:
Whether or not a prima facie showing is necessary before a court can issue a DNA testing order.

Ruling:
Generally, yes!
Section 4 of the Rule on DNA evidence states:
The appropriate court may, at any time, either motu proprio or on application of any person who has a legal interest in the matter in litigation, order a
DNA testing. Such order shall issue after due hearing and notice to the parties upon a showing of the following:

a. A biological sample exists that is relevant to the case;

b. The biological sample: (i) was not previously subjected to the type of DNA testing now requested; or (ii) was previously
subjected to DNA testing, but the results may require confirmation for good reasons;

c. The DNA testing uses a scientifically valid technique;

d. The DNA testing has the scientific potential to produce new information that is relevant to the proper resolution of the case; and
e. The existence of other factors, if any, which the court may consider as potentially affecting the accuracy of integrity of the DNA
testing.
This Rule shall not preclude a DNA testing, without need of a prior court order, at the behest of any party, including law enforcement agencies,
before a suit or proceeding is commenced.
This does not mean, however, that a DNA testing order will be issued as a matter of right if, during the hearing, the said conditions are established.
(The reason is that) a Court order for blood testing equivalent to “search” under the Constitution. Thus, although a paternity action is civil, not
criminal, the constitutional prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures is still applicable, and a proper showing of sufficient justification
under the particular factual circumstances of the case must be made before a court may order a compulsory blood test, ( note: this is under American
jurisdiction).
The same condition precedent should be applied in our jurisdiction to protect the putative father from mere harassment suits. Thus, during the hearing
on the motion for DNA testing, the petitioner must present prima facie evidence or establish a reasonable possibility of paternity.
However, Notwithstanding these, it should be stressed that the issuance of a DNA testing order remains discretionary upon the court. The court may,
for example, consider whether there is absolute necessity for the DNA testing. If there is already preponderance of evidence to establish paternity and
the DNA test result would only be corroborative, the court may, in its discretion, disallow a DNA testing. (so despite all the lengthy reasoning, at the
end SC said it’s up to the court, dimada).

ELECTRONIC EVIDENCE

46. MCC INDUSTRIAL VS SSANGYONG CORP (REFER TO PREVIOUS DIGEST) à FAX

47. NPC VS CODILLA (GR 170491 4/4/2007) à PHOTOCOPY

FACTS:

NAPOCOR filed before the RTC a complaint for damages against BANGPAI for the alleged damages caused on NAPOCOR's power barges.
WALLEM, on the other hand, was impleaded by NAPOCOR as additional defendant for being allegedly the ship agent of BANGPAI.

NAPOCOR, after adducing evidence during the trial of the case, filed a formal offer of evidence before the said court consisting of Exhibits "A" to
"V" together with the sub-marked portions thereof. Consequently, BANGPAI and WALLEM filed their respective objections to NAPOCOR's formal
offer of evidence for being mere Xerox or photocopies.

The RTC denied the admission and excluded from the records NAPOCOR’s exhibits and its sub-markings.

NAPOCOR filed a Petition for Certiorari seeking to set aside the Order of the RTC. Accordingly, the photocopies offered are equivalent to the
original of the document on the basis of the Electronic Evidence.

The CA denied the Petition of NAPOCOR. Hence, this Petition for Review on Certiorari.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Xerox or photocopies offered by NAPOCOR are admissible as evidence for being equivalent to the “original of the document” on
the basis of the Electronic Evidence.

RULING:

The Court ruled that Xerox or photocopies offered by NAPOCOR are inadmissible as evidence. Accordingly, it does not constitute the electronic
evidence defined in Section 1 of Rule 2 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence as follows:

"(h) "Electronic document" refers to information or the representation of information, data, figures, symbols or other models of written expression,
described or however represented, by which a right is established or an obligation extinguished, or by which a fact may be proved and affirmed,
which is received, recorded, transmitted, stored, processed, retrieved or produced electronically. It includes digitally signed documents and any
printout, readable by sight or other means which accurately reflects the electronic data message or electronic document. For the purpose of these
Rules, the term "electronic document" may be used interchangeably with "electronic data message".

The information in those Xerox or photocopies was not received, recorded, retrieved or produced electronically. Moreover, such electronic evidence
must be authenticated (Sections 1 and 2, Rule 5, Rules on Electronic Evidence), which NAPOCOR failed to do. Finally, the required Affidavit to
prove the admissibility and evidentiary weight of the alleged electronic evidence (Sec. 1, Rule 9) was not executed, much less presented in evidence.

Hence, the Xerox or photocopies offered should, therefore, be stricken off the record. (The Court denied the Petition of NAPOCOR and affirmed the
decision of the CA)

SPECIAL PROCEEDINGS

48. YAPTINCHAI VS DEL ROSARIO (304 SCRA 18) C/O MARCELO

49. SPOUSES MARCOS VS BANGI (GR 185748 10/15/2014)

Principle: On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has
been completely or partly performed. Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law,
equity will in proper cases, where the parol partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the
exercise of ownership by the parties of the respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of
the parties thereunder

Facts:

The evidence presented by the parties indubitably show that, after the death of Alipio, his heirs – Eusebio, Espedita and Jose Bangi – had

orally partitioned his estate, including the subject property, which was assigned to Eusebio.

On June 26, 1998, the heirs of Isidro Bangi (Isidro) and Genoveva Diccion (Genoveva) (respondents), filed with the RTC a complaint, for
annulment of documents, cancellation of transfer certificates of titles, restoration of original certificate of title and recovery of ownership
plus damages against spouses Dominador Marcos (Dominador) and Gloria Marcos (Gloria) (petitioners). In their complaint, the
respondents averred that on November 5, 1943, their parents, Isidro and Genoveva, bought the one-third portion of a 2,138-square meter
parcel of land situated in San Manuel, Pangasinan and covered by Original Certificate of Title (OCT) No. 22361 (subject property) from
Eusebio Bangi (Eusebio), as evidenced by a Deed of Absolute Sale executed by the latter. OCT No. 22361 was registered in the name of
Alipio Bangi (Alipio), Eusebio’s father. After the sale, the respondents claimed that Isidro and Genoveva took possession of the subject
property until they passed away. The respondents then took possession of the same.
Further, the respondents alleged that sometime in 1998, they learned that the title to the subject property, including the portion sold to Isidro
and Genoveva, was transferred to herein petitioner Dominador, Primo Alap (Primo), Ceasaria’s husband, Jose, and Emilio through a Deed
of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, supposedly executed by Alipio with the consent of his wife Ramona Diccion (Ramona). The
respondents claimed that the said deed of absolute sale is a forgery since Alipio died in 1918 while Ramona passed away on June 13, 1957.
Consequently, by virtue of the alleged Deed of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995, OCT No. 22361 was cancelled and Transfer
Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 47829 was issued to Dominador, Primo, Jose and Emilio. On November 21, 1995, Primo, Jose and Emilio
executed another deed of absolute sale over the same property in favor of herein petitioners. TCT No. T-47829 was then cancelled and TCT
No. T-48446 was issued in the names of herein petitioners. The respondents claimed that the Deed of Absolute Sale dated November 21,
1995 was likewise a forgery since Primo could not have signed the same on the said date since he died on January 29, 1972.
Thus, the respondents sought the nullification of the Deeds of Absolute Sale dated August 10, 1995 and November 21, 1995 and,
accordingly, the cancellation of TCT Nos. T-47829 and T-48446. The respondents likewise sought the restoration of OCT No. 22361.

Issue : Whether oral partition of the property subject of succession is valid.

Held:

Partition is the separation, division and assignment of a thing held in common among those to whom it may belong. Every act which is
17
intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition. Partition may be inferred from
circumstances sufficiently strong to support the presumption. Thus, after a long possession in severalty, a deed of partition may be
presumed.

On general principle, independent and in spite of the statute of frauds, courts of equity have enforced oral partition when it has been
completely or partly performed.

Regardless of whether a parol partition or agreement to partition is valid and enforceable at law, equity will in proper cases, where the parol
partition has actually been consummated by the taking of possession in severalty and the exercise of ownership by the parties of the
respective portions set off to each, recognize and enforce such parol partition and the rights of the parties thereunder. Thus, it has been held
or stated in a number of cases involving an oral partition under which the parties went into possession, exercised acts of ownership, or
 otherwise partly performed the partition agreement, that equity will confirm such partition and in a proper case decree title in accordance
with the possession in severalty.

A parol partition may also be sustained on the ground that the parties thereto have acquiesced in and ratified the partition by
taking possession in severalty, exercising acts of ownership with respect thereto, or otherwise recognizing the existence of the
partition.

50. PORTUGAL VS PORTUGAL (GR 155555 8/16/2005)

FACTS:

On November 25, 1942, Jose Q. Portugal (Portugal) married Paz Lazo. On May 22, 1948, Portugal married petitioner Isabel de la Puerta. On
September 13, 1949, petitioner Isabel gave birth to a boy whom she named Jose Douglas Portugal Jr., her herein co-petitioner. On April 11, 1950, Paz
gave birth to a girl, Aleli, later baptized as Leonila Perpetua Aleli Portugal, herein respondent.
On May 16, 1968, Portugal and his four (4) siblings executed a Deed of Extra-Judicial Partition and Waiver of Rights over the estate of their
father, Mariano Portugal, who died intestate on November 2, 1964. In the deed, Portugals siblings waived their rights, interests, and participation
over a 155 sq. m. parcel of land located in Caloocan in his favour.
On January 2, 1970, the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City issued Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. 34292 covering the Caloocan parcel
of land in the name of Jose Q. Portugal, married to Paz C. Lazo.
On February 18, 1984, Paz died. On April 21, 1985, Portugal died intestate. On February 15, 1988, respondent executed an Affidavit of
Adjudication by Sole Heir of Estate of Deceased Person adjudicating to herself the Caloocan parcel of land. TCT No. 34292/T-172 in Portugals name
was subsequently cancelled and in its stead TCT No. 159813 was issued by the Registry of Deeds for Caloocan City on March 9, 1988 in the name of
respondent, Leonila Portugal-Beltran, married to Merardo M. Beltran, Jr.
Later getting wind of the death in 1985 of Portugal and still later of the 1988 transfer by respondent of the title to the Caloocan property in her
name, petitioners filed before the RTC of Caloocan City on July 23, 1996 a complaint against respondent for annulment of the Affidavit of
Adjudication executed by her and the transfer certificate of title issued in her name.
In their complaint, petitioners alleged that respondent is not related whatsoever to the deceased Portugal, hence, not entitled to inherit the
Caloocan parcel of land and that she perjured herself when she made false representations in her Affidavit of Adjudication.

ISSUE:
Whether petitioners have to institute a special proceeding to determine their status as heirs before they can pursue the case for annulment of
respondents Affidavit of Adjudication and of the TCT issued in her name.
RULING:
In the case at bar, respondent, believing rightly or wrongly that she was the sole heir to Portugals estate, executed on February 15, 1988 the
questioned Affidavit of Adjudication under the second sentence of Rule 74, Section 1 of the Revised Rules of Court. Said rule is an exception to the
general rule that when a person dies leaving a property, it should be judicially administered and the competent court should appoint a qualified
administrator, in the order established in Sec. 6, Rule 78 in case the deceased left no will, or in case he did, he failed to name an executor therein.
Petitioners claim, however, to be the exclusive heirs of Portugal. A probate or intestate court, no doubt, has jurisdiction to declare who are the
heirs of a deceased.
It appearing, however, that in the present case the only property of the intestate estate of Portugal is the Caloocan parcel of land, to still subject
it, under the circumstances of the case, to a special proceeding which could be long, hence, not expeditious, just to establish the status of petitioners
as heirs is not only impractical; it is burdensome to the estate with the costs and expenses of an administration proceeding. And it is superfluous in
light of the fact that the parties to the civil case subject of the present case, could and had already in fact presented evidence before the trial court
which assumed jurisdiction over the case upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
In fine, under the circumstances of the present case, there being no compelling reason to still subject Portugals estate to administration
proceedings since a determination of petitioners status as heirs could be achieved in the civil case filed by petitioners, the trial court should proceed
to evaluate the evidence presented by the parties during the trial and render a decision thereon upon the issues it defined during pre-trial.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED.

51. RODRIGUEZ VS BORJA (17 SCRA 418)

PRINCIPLE: PROBATE PROCEEDINGS; EFFECT OF WILL DEPOSITED IN COURT; CASE AT BAR. –The jurisdiction of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan became vested upon the delivery thereto of the will of the late Father Rodriguez on March 4, 1963, even if no petition for its
allowance was filed until later, because upon the will being deposited the court could, motu proprio, have taken steps to fix the time and place for
proving the will, and issued the corresponding notices conformably to what is prescribed by Section 3 Rule 76, of the revised Rules of Court.

The use of the disjunctive in the words ‘when a will is delivered to or a petition for the allowance of a will is filed’ plainly indicates that the court
may act upon the mere deposit therein of a decedent’s testament, even if no petition for its allowance is yet filed. Where the petition for probate is
made after the deposit of the will, the petition is deemed to relate back to the time when the will was delivered.

FACTS: Fr. Rodriguez was born in Paranaque, Rizal. He was a parish priest of the Catholic Church in Bulacan from 1930 to 1963. He died on
February 12, 1963 in the City of Manila, buried in Bulacan and left real properties on Rizal, Cavite, Quezon City and Bulacan.

On March 4, 1963, Pangilinan and Jacalan delivered to the Clerk of Court of Bulacan a purported last will and testament of Fr. Rodriguez. Maria
Rodriguez (MARIA) and Angela Rodriguez (ANGELA) filed a petition for leave of court to allow them to examine the alleged will. Before the
court could act of the petition, the same was withdrawn.

At 8 AM on March 12, 1963, petitioners filed before the CFI of Rizal a petition for the settlement of the intestate estate of Fr. Rodriguez At 11AM
on the same day, Pangilinan and Jacalan filed a petition for probate of the will of Fr. Rodriguez before the CFI of Bulacan.
 Petitioners contend that since the intestate proceedings in the CFI of Rizal was filed ahead of the petition for probate filed in CFI Bulacan, the latter
Court has no jurisdiction to entertain the petition.

ISSUE: who has jurisdiction over the case?

RULING: CFI of Bulacan has jurisdiction over the case.

52. RODELAS VS ARANZA (1982) C/O RAMON

53. RUPERTA PALAGANAS VS PALAGANAS (1/26/2011)

Principle: In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin
obviously have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated
and allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be established

FACTS: Ruperta, a Filipino who became naturalized US citizen, died single and childless. In the last will and testament she executed in California,
she designated her brother, Sergio, as the executor of her will for she had left her properties in the Philippines and in the US.

Ernesto, another brother of Ruperta, filed with the RTC, a petition for the probate of Ruperta’s will and for his appointment as special administrator
of her estate. However, Manuel and Benjamin, nephews of Ruperta, opposed the petition on the ground that Ruperta’s will should not be probated in
the Philippines but in the US where she executed it. Manuel and Benjamin added that, assuming Ruperta’s will could be probated in the Philippines,
it is valid nonetheless for having been executed under duress and without the testator’s full understanding of the consequences of such act. Ernesto,
they claimed, is not also qualified to act as administrator of the estate.

Meantime, since Ruperta’s foreign based siblings, Gloria and and Sergio, were on separate occasions in the Philippines for a short visit, Ernesto filed
a motion with RTC for leave to take their deposition, which it granted. The RTC directed the parties to submit their memorandum on the issue of
whether or not Ruperta’s will may be probated in the Philippines.

The RTC admitted the probate of the will. The appellate court affirmed the decision of the RTC.

ISSUE: Whether or not a will executed by a foreigner abroad may be probated in the Philippines although it has been previously probated and
allowed in the country where it was executed?

RULING: Yes.

Our laws do not prohibit the probate of wills executed by foreigners abroad although the same have not as yet been probated and allowed in the
countries of their execution. A foreign will can be given legal effects in our jurisdiction. Article 816 of the Civil Code states that the will of an
alien who is abroad produces effect in the Philippines if made in accordance with the formalities prescribed by the law of the place where he resides,

or according to the formalities observed in his country.

In this connection, Section 1, Rule 73 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that if the decedent is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the RTC
of the province where he has an estate may take cognizance of the settlement of such estate. Sections 1 and 2 of Rule 76 further state that the
executor, devisee, or legatee named in the will, or any other person interested in the estate, may, at any time after the death of the testator, petition the
court having jurisdiction to have the will allowed, whether the same be in his possession or not, or is lost or destroyed.

Our rules require merely that the petition for the allowance of a will must show, so far as known to the petitioner: (a) the jurisdictional facts; (b) the
names, ages, and residences of the heirs, legatees, and devisees of the testator or decedent; (c) the probable value and character of the property of the
estate; (d) the name of the person for whom letters are prayed; and (e) if the will has not been delivered to the court, the name of the person having
custody of it. Jurisdictional facts refer to the fact of death of the decedent, his residence at the time of his death in the province where the probate
court is sitting, or if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the estate he left in such province. The rules do not require proof that the foreign will has
already been allowed and probated in the country of its execution.

In insisting that Rupertas will should have been first probated and allowed by the court of California, petitioners Manuel and Benjamin obviously
have in mind the procedure for the reprobate of will before admitting it here. But, reprobate or re-authentication of a will already probated and
allowed in a foreign country is different from that probate where the will is presented for the first time before a competent court. Reprobate is
specifically governed by Rule 77 of the Rules of Court. Contrary to petitioners stance, since this latter rule applies only to reprobate of a will, it
cannot be made to apply to the present case. In reprobate, the local court acknowledges as binding the findings of the foreign probate court provided
its jurisdiction over the matter can be established.

54. AREVALO VS BUSTAMANTE C/O SITOY

55. SAN LUIS VS SAN LUIS (GR 133743 2/6/2007)

Principle :
As generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides
should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of
abode.

Facts :
The instant case involves the settlement of the estate of Felicisimo T. San Luis (Felicisimo), who was the former governor of the Province of Laguna.
During his lifetime, Felicisimo contracted three marriages. His first marriage was with Virginia Sulit on March 17, 1942 out of which were born six
children, namely: Rodolfo, Mila, Edgar, Linda, Emilita and Manuel. On August 11, 1963, Virginia predeceased Felicisimo.

Five years later, on May 1, 1968, Felicisimo married Merry Lee Corwin, with whom he had a son, Tobias. However, on October 15, 1971, Merry
Lee, an American citizen, filed a Complaint for Divorce before the Family Court of the First Circuit, State of Hawaii, United States of America
(U.S.A.), which issued a Decree Granting Absolute Divorce and Awarding Child Custody on December 14, 1973.

On June 20, 1974, Felicisimo married respondent Felicidad San Luis, at Wilshire Boulevard, Los Angeles, California, U.S.A. He had no children
with respondent but lived with her for 18 years from the time of their marriage up to his death on December 18, 1992.

On December 17, 1993, she filed a petition for letters of administration before the RTC Makati City. Respondent alleged that she is the widow of
Felicisimo; that, at the time of his death, the decedent was residing at 100 San Juanico Street, New Alabang Village, Alabang, Metro Manila; that the
decedents surviving heirs are respondent as legal spouse, his six children by his first marriage, and son by his second marriage; that the decedent left
real properties, both conjugal and exclusive, valued at P30,304,178.00 more or less; that the decedent does not have any unpaid debts. Respondent
prayed that the conjugal partnership assets be liquidated and that letters of administration be issued to her.

Herein petitioner moved to dismiss the petition on the grounds of improper venue and failure to state a cause of action. He claimed that the petition
for letters of administration should have been filed in the Province of Laguna because this was Felicisimos place of residence prior to his death. He
further claimed that respondent has no legal personality to file the petition because she was only a mistress of Felicisimo since the latter, at the time
of his death, was still legally married to Merry Lee.

Issue :
Whether or not venue was properly laid.

Ruling :
Under Section 1, Rule 73 of the Rules of Court, the petition for letters of administration of the estate of Felicisimo should be filed in the Regional
Trial Court of the province in which he resides at the time of his death. In the case of Garcia Fule v. Court of Appeals, we laid down the doctrinal rule
for determining the residence as contradistinguished from domicile of the decedent for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate:

The term resides connotes ex vi termini actual residence as distinguished from legal residence or domicile. This term resides, like the terms residing
and residence, is elastic and should be interpreted in the light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. In the application
of venue statutes and rules Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court is of such nature residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word domicile still it is construed as meaning residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a
distinction between the terms residence and domicile but as generally used in statutes fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same
meaning as the term inhabitant. In other words, resides should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical
habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the
term means merely residence, that is, personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as an inhabitant
in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an intention to make it ones domicile. No particular length of time of
residence is required though; however, the residence must be more than temporary.(Emphasis supplied)

In the instant case, while petitioners established that Felicisimo was domiciled in Sta. Cruz, Laguna, respondent proved that he also maintained a
residence in Alabang, Muntinlupa from 1982 up to the time of his death. Respondent submitted in evidence the Deed of Absolute Sale dated January
5, 1983 showing that the deceased purchased the aforesaid property. She also presented billing statements from the Philippine Heart Center and
Chinese General Hospital for the period August to December 1992 indicating the address of Felicisimo at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang,
Muntinlupa. Respondent also presented proof of membership of the deceased in the Ayala Alabang Village Associationand Ayala Country Club,
Inc.,letter-envelopes from 1988 to 1990 sent by the deceaseds children to him at his Alabang address, and the deceaseds calling cards stating that his
home/city address is at 100 San Juanico, Ayala Alabang Village, Muntinlupa while his office/provincial address is in Provincial Capitol, Sta. Cruz,
Laguna.

From the foregoing, we find that Felicisimo was a resident of Alabang, Muntinlupa for purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of his estate.
Consequently, the subject petition for letters of administration was validly filed in the Regional Trial Court which has territorial jurisdiction over
Alabang, Muntinlupa.

56. VASQUEZ VS MALVAR

Principle: Medina case regarding the prohibition against the practice by probate courts of appointing clerk of court or other court personnel as
administrators of estates of deceased persons and enjoining the probate courts to desist from such practice.

Facts: On September 5, 1973, respondent Judge appointed his clerk of court, Atty. Demetrio L. Hilbero, as special administrator, "for the purpose of
receiving and administering the harvests from the ricefields and coconut plantations of the estate until the hearing of this petition on September 17,
1973.” On September 12, 1973, Paul Pelaez, through Counsel Atty. David, suggested the appointment of the Philippine National Bank as special
administrator. But during the hearing of September 17, 1973, the court moves for the appointment of Atty. Hilbero as regular administrator.

Then, in the hearing of October 22, 1973, as the records show, the question of administration was again brought up by Atty. Jose Blanco, counsel for
oppositors Jose Blanco, et al., in effect objecting to the appointment of Atty. Hilbero as regular administrator. Resolving the question of
administration brought up by Atty. Blanco, respondent Judge issued an order to terminate the administration by Atty. Hilbero as early as possible and
proceed to the appointment of a regular administrator after due hearing.

Surprisingly, however, on the very same day — October 22, 1973 — respondent Judge issued another order, this time EXTENDING, NOT
TERMINATING, as earlier pointed out, the appointment of his clerk of court as special administrator with full powers until the appointment of a
regular administrator

Held: On top of all these facts not to mention OUR ruling in the Medina case on September 29, 1973, against the practice by probate courts of
appointing clerk of court or other court personnel as administrators of estates of deceased persons and enjoining the probate courts to desist from
such practice, and despite a Joint Motion for the Appointment of a Regular Administrator, dated January 18, 1974 and another Motion for
Appointment of Regular (Joint) Administrators, dated October 15, 1974, respondent allowed his clerk of court to act as special administrator up to
December 19, 1974.

57. MEDINA VS CA (9/28/1973)

FACTS:
In this review by certiorari of the appellate court's resolution dismissing the petition filed by petitioners challenging the lower court's orders
appointing private respondent Beda Gonzales as special administrator of the intestate estate of the decedent Agustin Medina, the Court excludes the
said special administrator from interfering in the possession and enjoyment of the harvests of the property known as "Bitukang Manok" by petitioner
Rosalia M. del Carmen to whom the said property had been sold, and full payment therefor received, by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor
with the approval of the lower court, which overruled Gonzales' opposition thereto as an assignee of some heirs of the estate, and as one personally
interested in the purchase of the property for himself.
The Court's action is based on the established doctrine that a person with an adverse conflicting interest is unsuitable for the trust reposed in an
administrator of an estate. Respondent Gonzales, whose appeal of the lower court's order of approval of the sale to the Court of Appeals is pending,
cannot be at the same time an appellant in his personal capacity opposing the sale of the property and an appellee representing the estate
and upholding the same sale as made by the estate through Gonzales' predecessor as special administrator with the due approval and confirmation of
the lower court. Since the estate proceedings have been pending for over 13 years now without the lower court once having appointed
a regular administrator, said court is directed to name a suitable person as regular administrator charged with the task of accomplishing the
administration of the estate with the utmost reasonable dispatch.
HELD:
The established doctrine that an administrator is deemed unsuitable and should be removed where his personal interests conflict with his official
duties, by virtue of the equally established principle that an administrator is a quasi trustee, disqualified from acquiring properties of the
11
estate, and who should be indifferent between the estate and claimants of the property except to preserve it for due administration, and who
12
should be removed when his interest conflicts with such right and duly.
13
As restated by the Court in Lim vs. Dias-Millares, "(I)n this jurisdiction, one is considered to be unsuitable for appointment as administrator
when he has adverse interest of some kind of hostility to those immediately interested in the estate.".
The Court noted from the questioned order of February 11, 1971 that respondent Gonzales was designated special administrator in replacement of the
lower court's clerk of court, Atty. Pastor de Castro, Jr., who had been appointed as such in the earlier order of March 6, 1970. The Court does not look
with favor on such practice of clerks of court or other court employees being appointed as administrators of estates of decedents pending settlement
before the probate court.
On this consideration (the replacement of the clerk of court) and on the further consideration of the specific and limited powers of special
administrators and that their appointment merely temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is duly appointed (since Rule 80, section 1
provides for the appointment of a special administrator as a caretaker only "when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
15
by any cause") the Court has resolved to allow the appointment of respondent Gonzales as special administrator to stand, insofar as taking
care of the other properties of the estate are concerned, to the exclusion of the Bitukang Manok property already sold by the estate to
petitioner Rosalia del Carmen. (The said property shall pertain to said petitioner's possession and enjoyment as the vendee thereof and in the event
that the appellate courts find cause to set aside the lower court's confirmation of the sale in her favor in the pending appeal of Gonzales in his
personal capacity, then shall be the time for the estate and/or the heirs to reclaim possession of the property upon return to her of the purchase price
paid by her).
The Court has finally noted that while the estate involved is not large and there seem to be no complicated questions that have impeded its prompt
settlement, and notwithstanding the lower court's avowed desire to terminate the proceedings once and for all, the said estate proceedings have been
pending now for over thirteen years without the lower court once having appointed a regular administrator in accordance with the Rules of Court to
take charge of the settlement thereof and the distribution and partition of the net estate to the heirs entitled thereto.
As time and again stated by the Court, while the provisions of the Rules of Court may be deemed directory in nature, "the speedy settlement of the
estates of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those entitled to residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
16
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law" and "courts of first instance should exert themselves to close up estate within
twelve months from the time they are presented, and they may refuse to allow any compensation to executors and administrators who do not actively
1
labor to that end, and they may even adopt harsher measures."

58. SAN DIEGO VS NOMBRE (GR-L 19265 5/29/1964)

FACTS:The controlling issue in this case is the legality of the contract of lease entered into by the former administrator Nombre, and Pedro Escanlar
on May 1, 1960.

Respondents contend that this contract, not having been authorized or approved by the Court, is null and void and cannot be an obstacle to the
execution of another of lease by the new administrator, Campillanos.
ISSUE:

Whether or not a judicial administrator can validly lease property of the estate without prior judicial authority and approval.

RULING:

YES. We believe that the Court of Appeals was correct in sustaining the validity of the contract of lease in favor of Escanlar, notwithstanding the lack
of prior authority and approval. The law and prevailing jurisprudence on the matter militates in favor of this view. While it may be admitted that the
duties of a judicial administrator and an agent (petitioner alleges that both act in representative capacity), are in some respects, identical, the
provisions on agency (Art. 1878, C.C.), should not apply to a judicial administrator. A judicial administrator is appointed by the Court. He is not only
the representative of said Court, but also the heirs and creditors of the estate (Chua Tan v. Del Rosario, 57 Phil. 411). A judicial administrator before
entering into his duties, is required to file a bond. These circumstances are not true in case of agency. The agent is only answerable to his principal.
The protection which the law gives the principal, in limiting the powers and rights of an agent, stems from the fact that control by the principal can
only be thru agreements, whereas the acts of a judicial administrator are subject to specific provisions of law and orders of the appointing court. The
observation of former Chief Justice Moran [Moran says: "Under this provision, the executor or administrator has the power of administering the
estate of the deceased for purposes of liquidation and distribution. He may, therefore, exercise all acts of administration without special authority of
the Court. For instance, he may lease the property without securing previously any permission from the court. And where the lease has formally been
entered into, the court cannot, in the same proceeding, annul the same, to the prejudice of the lessee, over whose person it had no jurisdiction. The
proper remedy would be a separate action by the administrator or the heirs to annul the lease.xxx], as quoted in the decision of the Court of Appeals,
is indeed sound, and We are not prone to alter the same, at the moment.

RULE 86

59. PNB VS INDEPENDENT PLANTERS ASSOCIATION (122 SCRA 113) C/O RAMON

60. IMPERIAL ISURANCE VS DAVIL (137 SCRA 317) C/O SITOY

 61. GOTAMCO VS CHAN SENG (46 PHIL 542)
Principle: A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is the
conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found by the court or
admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only is a judgment which is
pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .
In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like
rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.
FACTS: Antonio Tanpoco died and left a will dividing his estate among four sons, one-half of which he bequeathed to Tan Kim Hong, the claimant,
whom he described in his will as his legitimate son, and the other half he left in equal shares to his three adopted sons, Tan Kimco.
Two Chinese named Tan Kim Lay and Te Sue, one of Tarlac and the other of Manila, were appointed and qualified as commissioners. At the time all
of the heirs, including Tan Kim Hong, were minors and had lived in China since the death of Antonio Tanpoco, as also had the widow of the
deceased.
The executed filed a motion asking for the appointment of an attorney of his own choice as curador ad litem for the minor heirs which, among other
things, recites as follows:
2. That the heirs who are interested in the estate of the above entitled action are all minors, to wit: Tan Kimco, age 20; Tan Kim Hong, age
12; Tan Kimbio, age 11; and Tan Kim Choo, age 4; and that all the above heirs are now in China, and the day of their return to the Islands
is unknown to the administrator of the estate.
The court ignored request of the executor, upon its own motion, appointed Mr. Felipe Canillas, who treated his appointed as a formality and did not
make any investigation of the facts.
During all of this time the minor heirs were still in China. They arrived in Manila and employed counsel to represent and protect their interest, and it
was then that Chan Seng learned for the first time of the allowance of the claim in favor of Tan Kim Hong. Upon her motion, Judge Harvey ordered
an investigation of the administration of Go Siu San as executor, which was made by Mr. Felipe Canillas, who still held the position of curador ad
litem of all the minor heirs.
The report concluded with a recommendation for the removal of the executor for gross misconduct and fraud, and the annulment of the claim of Tan
Kim Hong.
After the report was filed, a hearing was had and testimony was taken, and Judge Harvey removed Go Siu San as executor.
After such proceedings, nothing was further done when the present administrator applied to the court for authority, among other things, to pay the
claim in question, to which the appellee appeared and objected. The court denied the application of the present guardian to the claimant to require the
administrator to pay the claim in question upon the ground that it was void and fictitious, from which Tan Kim Hong appeals, contending that the
lower court erred in hearing and sustaining the objections to the allowance of the claim, and in denying the motion of the administrator for authority
to pay the claim.
ISSUE: Can the claim be validly allowed?
RULING: No.
The appellant cites and relies upon section 773, 774 and 775 of the Code of Civil Procedure as follows:
SEC. 773. An appeal from allowance or disallowance of claim. — Any executor or administrator may appeal to the Court of First Instance
from the allowance of any claim against the estate by the committee appointed for the purpose of allowing claims against the estate of
deceased persons, or from the disallowance, in whole or in part, of any offset presented by the executor or administrator to such claim; any
creditor may appeal to the Court of First Instance from the disallowance of the whole or any part of his claim by such committee, or the
allowance of the whole or a part of any claim in offset to his claim against the estate by such committee.
SEC. 774. If administrator does not appeal, heir or creditor may. — If the executor or administrator does not appeal from the allowance of
any claim against the estate by the committee, or the disallowance in whole or in part by it of any offset in behalf of the estate against such
claim, any heir or creditor may appeal to the Court of First Instance from such allowance or disallowance, and prosecute the appeal in the
name of the executor or administrator, upon filing in court a bond to the administrator or executor, to be approved by the court, conditioned
that he will prosecute the appeal to effect, and indemnify the administrator of executor against all costs and expenses, by reason of the
appeal, and will likewise pay to the claimant such costs as may be ultimately awarded to him by reason of such appeal. The bond shall be
available for such claimant as well as for the executor or administrator.
SEC. 775. Perfecting appeal. — The appeal provided in the two preceding section shall be perfected by filing with the clerk of the Court of
First Instance that has jurisdiction of the estate, within twenty-five days after the committee's reports is filed therein, a statement that the
person so appealing is dissatisfied with the action of the committee in respect to the item or items complained of, and appeals therefrom to
the court.
He points out that the report of the committee allowing the claim was made and filed on June 29, 1921, and contends that it became automatically
final on July 14, 1921; that the opponent should have made her opposition within the time specified in the Code, and that her failure to take the
statutory appeal is a bar to all defenses, citing and relying upon the case of De los Santos vs. Reyes (37 Phil. 104).
The authorities cited by the appellant upon the question of res judicata are good law, but are not in point. Here, there was no claim presented to
the commissioners. Hence, there was nothing for them to adjudicate. Neither the claimant nor anyone on his behalf made or presented a claim.
Hence, it must follow that the commissioners did not have any authority to allow or reject the claim, and that they were without jurisdiction to act in
the premises. Neither is the evidence in the record sufficient to sustain the claim. Outside of the fact that the above entries were made in the books of
the deceased by the his bookkeeper, there is nothing in the record upon which to base the claim, and it does not even appear that such entries were
authorized by the deceased.
Giving full force and effect to the provisions of the Code of Civil Procedure above quoted, all of the prerequisites and essential elements of a
judgment are wanting.
Ruling Case Law, volume 15, page 569, says:
A judgment is the law's last word in a judicial controversy. It may therefore be defined as the final consideration and determination of a
court of competent jurisdiction upon the matters submitted to it in an action or proceeding. A more precise definition is that a judgment is
the conclusion of the law upon the matters contained in the record, or the application of the law to the pleadings and to the facts, as found
by the court or admitted by the parties, or deemed to exist upon their default in a course of judicial proceedings. It should be noted that only
is a judgment which is pronounced between the parties to an action upon the matters submitted to the court for decision. . . .
In the instant case there was not claim made, filed or presented by anyone. Legally speaking, the allowance of the claim would be like
rendering a judgment without the filing of a complaint, or even the making or presentment of a claim.
Upon the facts shown, to legalize the allowance of the claim with all of the formalities and requisites of a final judgment, would be a travesty
upon justice. It appears from the record before us that the commissioners did not have any jurisdiction to allow the claim; that as to the claim in
question their proceedings were null and void ab initio, and hence they were not res judicata, and in addition to that, it clearly appears that the
allowance of the claim was a fraud upon the appellee.

62. DE BAUTISTA VS DE GUZMAN (11/25/1983)

Facts:
Rosendo de Guzman is an operator of a jeepney driven by Eugenio Medrano y Torres . Said driver drove and managed said jeepney at that time along
Taft Avenue, Pasay City, in a negligent and reckless manner and, as a result, the jeepney turned turtle and, consequently, passenger Numeriano
Bautista sustained physical injuries which caused his death. Eugenio Medrano, the driver, was accused and convicted of homicide through reckless
imprudence by the trial court in a decision promulgated on May 27, 1952 and sentenced to a penalty of imprisonment of four (4) months and one (1)
day of arresto mayor and to indemnify the heirs of Numeriano Bautista, plaintiffs-appellees herein, in the sum of P3,000.00. A writ of execution was
issued against said driver, Eugenio Medrano for the said sum of P3,000.00 but the same was returned to the Court unsatisfied.
On May 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman, the operator died.
Because of their failure to collect the said sum of P3,000.00 from the driver, Eugenio Medrano, plaintiffs-appellees filed a complaint against
defendants-appellants( heirs nani sila and defendants) alleging that they demanded from Rosendo de Guzman and from the defendants-appellants the
payment of the sums of P3,000.00 as subsidiary liability; P10,000.00 as actual exemplary and moral damages and Pl,000.00 as attorney's fees for the
suit by reason of the death of Numeriano Bautista as related above. Defendants-appellants through counsel filed a motion to dismiss predicated on
two grounds, namely, that the lower court had no jurisdiction over the subject matter of the litigation and that the complaint stated no cause of action.
In support of said motion, they maintained that the suit was for a money claim against the supposed debtor who was already dead and as such it
should be filed in testate or intestate proceedings or, in the absence of such proceedings, after the lapse of thirty (30) days, the creditors should initiate
such proceedings, that the heirs could not be held liable therefor since there was no allegation that they assumed the alleged obligation. The case was
dismissed.
Then on December 14, 1954, plaintiffs-appellees filed with the same trial court Civil Case No. 3530 (subject of this appeal) against the same
defendants in the former case, the complaint containing analogous allegations as those embodied in the first complaint but in this second complaint
they further allege that on June 12, 1952, Rosendo de Guzman died intestate and that intestate proceedings were filed in the same court and docketed
therein as Special Proceedings No. 1303-P, wherein on April 20, 1953, a project of partition was presented in and approved by said Court with the
five heirs receiving their shares valued at P2,294.05 each, and on May 14, 1953, said intestate proceedings were closed.

ISSUE: ​ Whether the court erred in not declaring that the claim is already barred for failure to file it in the intestate proceedings.
Held: ​Yes.
We sympathize with the plight of the plaintiffs-appellees but they have lost their right to recover because of negligence and a failure to
observe mandatory provisions of the law and the Rules. They overlooked the fact that they were no longer suing Rosendo de Guzman who died
shortly after the accident but his heirs.
Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
All claims for money against the decedent arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be due, not due, or
contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of the decedents, and judgment for money against
the decedent, must be filed within the time in the notice; otherwise they are barred forever; except that they may be set forth as
counterclaims in any action that the executor or administrator may bring against the claimants ... Claims not yet due, or
contingent, may be approved at their present value.
The above-quoted rule is mandatory. The contingent claims must first have been established and allowed in the probate court before the creditors can
file an action directly, against the distributees. Such is not the situation, however, in the case at bar. The complaint herein was filed after the intestate
proceedings had terminated and the estate finally distributed to the heirs. If we are to allow the complaint to prosper and the trial court to take
cognizance of the same, then the rules providing for the claims against the estate in a testate or intestate proceedings within a specific period would
be rendered nugatory as a subsequent action for money against the distributees may be filed independently of such proceedings. This precisely is
what the rule seeks to prevent so as to avoid further delays in the settlement of the estate of the deceased and in the distribution of his property to the
heirs, legatees or devisees.
Furthermore, even assuming that the plaintiffs-appellees had no knowledge of the intestate proceedings which is not established, the law presumes
that they had such knowledge because the settlement of estate is a proceeding in remark and therefore the failure to file their claims before such
proceedings barred them from subsequently filing the same claims outside said proceedings.

63.SHEKER VS SHEKER (GR 157912 11/13/2007)

PRINCIPLE:
• A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent
since the claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim,
not being an initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

• the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the
payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.[

FACTS:

The RTC admitted to probate the holographic will of Alice O. Sheker and thereafter issued an order for all the creditors to file their respective claims
against the estate. In compliance therewith, petitioner filed 2002 a contingent claim for agent's commission due him amounting to approximately
P206,250.00 in the event of the sale of certain parcels of land belonging to the estate, and the amount of P275,000.00, as reimbursement for expenses
incurred and/or to be incurred by petitioner in the course of negotiating the sale of said realties.

The executrix of the Estate of Alice O. Sheker (respondent) moved for the dismissal of said money claim against the estate on the grounds that (1) the
requisite docket fee, as prescribed in Section 7(a), Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, had not been paid; (2) petitioner failed to attach a certification
against non-forum shopping; and (3) petitioner failed to attach a written explanation why the money claim was not filed and served personally.

RTC dismissedthe contingency claim

ISSUE:
did the RTC err in dismissing petitioner's contingent money claim against respondent estate for failure of petitioner to attach to his motion a
certification against non-forum shopping and filing fees?

RULING:
Yes
The certification of non-forum shopping is required only for complaints and other initiatory pleadings. The RTC erred in ruling that a contingent
money claim against the estate of a decedent is an initiatory pleading. In the present case, the whole probate proceeding was initiated upon the filing
of the petition for allowance of the decedent's will. Under Sections 1 and 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court, after granting letters of testamentary or of
administration, all persons having money claims against the decedent are mandated to file or notify the court and the estate administrator of their
respective money claims; otherwise, they would be barred, subject to certain exceptions.[5]
Such being the case, a money claim against an estate is more akin to a motion for creditors' claims to be recognized and taken into consideration in
the proper disposition of the properties of the estate. In Arquiza v. Court of Appeals,[6] the Court explained thus:

x x x The office of a motion is not to initiate new litigation, but to bring a material but incidental matter arising in the progress of the case in which
the motion is filed. A motion is not an independent right or remedy, but is confined to incidental matters in the progress of a cause. It relates to some
question that is collateral to the main object of the action and is connected with and dependent upon the principal remedy.[7] (Emphasis supplied)

A money claim is only an incidental matter in the main action for the settlement of the decedent's estate; more so if the claim is contingent since the
claimant cannot even institute a separate action for a mere contingent claim. Hence, herein petitioner's contingent money claim, not being an
initiatory pleading, does not require a certification against non-forum shopping.

Issues on filing fees

the Court ruled in Pascual v. Court of Appeals,[8] that the trial court has jurisdiction to act on a money claim (attorney's fees) against an estate for
services rendered by a lawyer to the administratrix to assist her in fulfilling her duties to the estate even without payment of separate docket fees
because the filing fees shall constitute a lien on the judgment pursuant to Section 2, Rule 141 of the Rules of Court, or the trial court may order the
payment of such filing fees within a reasonable time.[9] After all, the trial court had already assumed jurisdiction over the action for settlement of the
estate. Clearly, therefore, non-payment of filing fees for a money claim against the estate is not one of the grounds for dismissing a money claim
against the estate.

RULE 87

64. PAHAMOTANG VS PNB (GR 156403 3/31/2005) C/O GIME

65. MARINDUQUE MINING VS CA (567 SCRA 483)

PRINCIPLE: The reason for multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate and distinct
issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a particular
incident of the case is brought to the appellate court for resolution with the rest of the proceedings remaining within the jurisdiction of the trial
court.

FACTS: NAPOCOR filed a complaint for expropriation against petitioners for the construction a Transmission Line on the latter’s proprerty (7875
sq.m.).

Marinduque Mining alleged that the expropriation should cover not only 7875 square meter but the entire parcel of land. It claimed that the
expropriation would render the remaining portion of their property valueless and unfit for whatever purpose.

Trial court fixed the market value at P115 per sq.meter. It also directed the commissioners to submit a report and determine the fair market value of
the “dangling area” affected by the installation of NAPOCOR’s transmission lines.

NAPOCOR filed an MR. In its Supplemental Decision, the trial court fixed its fair market value at P65 per s.m. and declared that the petitioners
entitled to consequential damages.

The MR filed by NAPOCOR was denied for being moot and academic. It filed a Notice of Appeal of the Supplemental Decision.

Petitioners argued that NAPOCOR’s appeal should be dismissed because it failed to file a record on appeal and consequently, it failed to comply
with the material date rule.

ISSUE: Was there a need for NAPOCOR to file a record on appeal?

RULING: No. No record on appeal shall be required except in special proceedings and other cases of multiple or separate appeals where the law or
the Rules of Court so require. The reason for multiple appeals in the same case is to enable the rest of the case to proceed in the event that a separate
and distinct issue is resolved by the trial court and held to be final. In such a case, the filing of a record on appeal becomes indispensable since only a
particular incident of the case is brought to the appellate

HABEAS CORPUS

66. SUMBONG VS CA (252 SCRA 663) C/O MARCELO

67. GO VS DIMAGIBA 6/21/2005)

DOCTRINE:
The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty.

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-conviction
remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant: (1) there has
been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence; or (3) the
imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.
FACTS:
Respondent Dimagiba issued to Susan Go thirteen (13) checks which, when presented to the drawee bank for encashment or payment on the due
dates, were dishonored for the reason account closed. Dimagiba was subsequently prosecuted for 13 counts of violation of BP 22 under separate
Complaints filed with the MTCC in Baguio City. He was found guilty by the MTCC.

The appeal of Dimagiba was raffled to Branch 4 of the RTC in Baguio City.On May 23, 2000, the RTC denied the appeal and sustained his
conviction.There being no further appeal to the CA, the RTC issued on February 1, 2001, a Certificate of Finality of the Decision. Thus, on February
14, 2001, the MTCC issued an Order directing the arrest of Dimagiba for the service of his sentence as a result of his conviction. The trial court also
issued a Writ of Execution to enforce his civil liability.

On February 27, 2001, Dimagiba filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCC Order. He prayed for the recall of the Order of Arrest and the
modification of the final Decision, arguing that the penalty of fine only, instead of imprisonment also, should have been imposed on him.The
arguments raised in that Motion were reiterated in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution filed on February 28, 2001. The MTCC
denied the Motion for Reconsideration and directed the issuance of a Warrant of Arrest against Dimagiba. On September 28, 2001, he was arrested
and imprisoned for the service of his sentence.

On October 9, 2001, he filed with the RTC of Baguio City a Petition for a writ of habeas corpus. Right after hearing the case on October 10, 2001, the
RTC issued an Order directing the immediate release of Dimagiba from confinement and requiring him to pay a fine of P100,000 in lieu of
imprisonment.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for writ of habeas corpus was validly granted.

RULING:
No. The writ of habeas corpus applies to all cases of illegal confinement or detention in which individuals are deprived of liberty. It was
devised as a speedy and effectual remedy to relieve persons from unlawful restraint; or, more specifically, to obtain immediate relief for those
who may have been illegally confined or imprisoned without sufficient cause and thus deliver them from unlawful custody. It is therefore a
writ of inquiry intended to test the circumstances under which a person is detained.

The writ may not be availed of when the person in custody is under a judicial process or by virtue of a valid judgment. However, as a post-
conviction remedy, it may be allowed when, as a consequence of a judicial proceeding, any of the following exceptional circumstances is attendant:
(1) there has been a deprivation of a constitutional right resulting in the restraint of a person; (2) the court had no jurisdiction to impose the sentence;
or (3) the imposed penalty has been excessive, thus voiding the sentence as to such excess.

In the present case, the Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was anchored on the ruling in Vaca and on SC-AC No. 12-2000, which allegedly
prescribed the imposition of a fine, not imprisonment, for convictions under BP 22. Respondent sought the retroactive effect of those rulings, thereby
effectively challenging the penalty imposed on him for being excessive. From his allegations, the Petition appeared sufficient in form to support the
issuance of the writ.

However, it appears that respondent has previously sought the modification of his sentence in a Motion for Reconsideration of the MTCCs Execution
Order and in a Motion for the Partial Quashal of the Writ of Execution.Both were denied by the MTCC on the ground that it had no power or
authority to amend a judgment issued by the RTC.

In his Petition for habeas corpus, respondent raised the same arguments that he had invoked in the said Motions. We believe that his resort to this
extraordinary remedy was a procedural infirmity. The remedy should have been an appeal of the MTCC Order denying his Motions, in which
he should have prayed that the execution of the judgment be stayed. But he effectively misused the action he had chosen, obviously with the
intent of finding a favorable court. His Petition for a writ of habeas corpus was clearly an attempt to reopen a case that had already become final and
executory. Such an action deplorably amounted to forum shopping. Respondent should have resorted to the proper, available remedy instead of
instituting a different action in another forum.

68. THORNTON VS THORNTON (8/16/2004)

Principle :
The provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with the Court of
Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue.

Facts :
Petitioner, an American, and respondent, a Filipino, were married on August 28, 1998 in the Catholic Evangelical Church at United Nations Avenue,
Manila. A year later, respondent gave birth to a baby girl whom they named Sequeira Jennifer Delle Francisco Thornton.
However, after three years, respondent grew restless and bored as a plain housewife. She wanted to return to her old job as a guest relations officer in
a nightclub, with the freedom to go out with her friends. In fact, whenever petitioner was out of the country, respondent was also often out with her
friends, leaving her daughter in the care of the househelp.

Petitioner admonished respondent about her irresponsibility but she continued her carefree ways. On December 7, 2001, respondent left the family
home with her daughter Sequiera without notifying her husband. She told the servants that she was bringing Sequiera to Purok Marikit, Sta. Clara,
Lamitan, Basilan Province.

Petitioner filed a petition for habeas corpus in the designated Family Court in Makati City but this was dismissed, presumably because of the
allegation that the child was in Basilan. Petitioner then went to Basilan to ascertain the whereabouts of respondent and their daughter. However, he
did not find them there and the barangay office of Sta. Clara, Lamitan, Basilan, issued a certification[3] that respondent was no longer residing there.

Petitioner gave up his search when he got hold of respondents cellular phone bills showing calls from different places such as Cavite, Nueva Ecija,
Metro Manila and other provinces. Petitioner then filed another petition for habeas corpus, this time in the Court of Appeals which could issue a writ
of habeas corpus enforceable in the entire country.

However, the petition was denied by the Court of Appeals on the ground that it did not have jurisdiction over the case. It ruled that since RA 8369
(The Family Courts Act of 1997) gave family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over petitions for habeas corpus, it impliedly repealed RA 7902
(An Act Expanding the Jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals) and Batas Pambansa 129 (The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980)

Issue :
Whether or not the Court of Appeals has jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas corpus in cases involving custody of minors in the light of the provision
in RA 8369 giving family courts exclusive original jurisdiction over such petitions.
Ruling :
The Court of Appeals should take cognizance of the case since there is nothing in RA 8369 that revoked its jurisdiction to issue writs of habeas
corpus involving the custody of minors.

If family courts exercise exclusive jurisdiction of habeas corpus cases involving minors, it will result in an iniquitous situation, leaving individuals
like petitioner without legal recourse in obtaining custody of their children. Individuals who do not know the whereabouts of minors they are looking
for would be helpless since they cannot seek redress from family courts whose writs are enforceable only in their respective territorial jurisdictions.
Thus, if a minor is being transferred from one place to another, which seems to be the case here, the petitioner in a habeas corpus case will be left
without legal remedy. This lack of recourse could not have been the intention of the lawmakers when they passed the Family Courts Act of 1997.

The provisions of RA 8369 reveal no manifest intent to revoke the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court to issue writs of habeas
corpus relating to the custody of minors. Further, it cannot be said that the provisions of RA 8369, RA 7092 and BP 129 are absolutely incompatible
since RA 8369 does not prohibit the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court from issuing writs of habeas corpus in cases involving the custody of
minors. Thus, the provisions of RA 8369 must be read in harmony with RA 7029 and BP 129 ― that family courts have concurrent jurisdiction with
the Court of Appeals and the Supreme Court in petitions for habeas corpus where the custody of minors is at issue

69. RODRIGUEZ VS BUENAFLOR (344 SCRA 319)

Principle: Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of
habeas corpus. His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be
allowed after the party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation
Board of the Bureau of Immigration.

Facts: On May 7, 1999 at about 11 p.m., the National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) in coordination with the Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) and the Bureau of Immigration (BI) conducted simultaneous raids at the Royal Flame Club, Space World and Narcissus Club which are all
located in Ermita, Manila as a result of which 20 female Chinese nationals were caught in the act of entertaining customers and guests.

No Alien Employment Permits or Alien Employment Registration Certificates having been presented by these nationals, they were turned over to the
BI for custody and verification of their alien status. They were thereupon confined at the BI Detention Center at Camp Bagong Diwa, Taguig, Metro
Manila on May 8, 1999.

On May 17, 1999, Chinese National Ma Jing, one of the 20 apprehended Chinese, filed a petition for habeas corpus at the Pasig Regional Trial Court
(RTC) which was raffleto Branch 151 thereof.

A Charge Sheet was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Section 37 [a] (7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.

After conducting a hearing on the petition for habeas corpus, Judge Bonifacio, by Order of May 27, 1999, granted the petition.

On May 28, 1999, complainant-respondent filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the said order but respondent judge denied the same in an Order
dated June 15, 1999, and required complainant and his co-respondents to show cause why they should not be cited in contempt. On the same date, a
Summary Deportation Order was issued in the BID Case against Ma Jing.

Held: Section 4, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court provides:

SEC. 4. When writ not allowed or discharge authorized. If it appears that the person to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an officer
under process issued by a court or judge; or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that court or judge had jurisdiction to issue the
process, render the judgment, or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the person shall
not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to authorize the
discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful judgment.

Once a person detained is duly charged in court, he may no longer question his detention through a petition for issuance of a writ of habeas corpus.
His remedy would be to quash the information and/or the warrant of arrest duly issued. The writ of habeas corpus should not be allowed after the
party sought to be released had been charged before any court. The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau
of Immigration.

The records disclose that the Return of the Writ stated that a Charge Sheet was filed on May 13, 1999 against Ma Jing for violation of Section 37 [a]
(7) of the Philippine Immigration Act of 1940.Despite this, respondent judge issued an Order dated May 27, 1999 directing Ma Jings immediate
release. It was grievous error for respondent judge, in the face of these factual circumstances disclosed by the records, to give due course to the
petition for habeas corpus despite the pendency of a deportation case against Ma Jing. Where the BID had not yet completed its hearing and
investigation proceedings with respect to an alien and there is no showing that it is unduly delaying its decision, habeas corpus proceedings are
premature and should be dismissed.

70. JACKSON VS MACALINO (416 SCRA 390)

Doctrine:

• the writ of habeas corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty,
or by which the rightful custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of the writ
of habeas corpus is to relieve a person from unlawful restraint.

• The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration
• Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into
is the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention
is at its inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no
longer illegal at the time of the filing of the application.
Facts: An information was filed against an American citizen, Raymond Jackson for violation of Article 176 of the Revised Penal Code.
Summary deportation proceedings were initiated at the Commission of Immigration and Deportation (CID) against the petitioner. However, he
could not be deported because he filed a petition to lift the summary order of deportation with the CID which had not yet been resolved. The
CID then issued an order for his arrest for being an undesirable alien, based on the hold departure order in one of the criminal cases. Jackson
filed a petition for habeas corpus against the Commissioner of the CID. The court directed its issuance as well as a return of the writ by the
respondents. In their return, the respondents alleged inter alia that the detention was on the basis of the summary deportation order issued and
the hold departure order of the Makati RTC.
Issue: WON the Commissioner of the CID can issue warrants of arrest and if so, WON such warrants can only be issued to enforce a final order of
deportation.
Ruling: Section 1, Rule 102 of the Rules of Court, as amended, provides that except as otherwise expressly provided by law, the writ of habeas
corpus shall extend to all cases of illegal confinement or detention by which any person is deprived of his liberty, or by which the rightful
custody of any person is withheld from the person entitled thereto. The ultimate purpose of the writ of habeas corpus is to relieve a person
[26]
from unlawful restraint. It is essentially a writ of inquiry and is granted to test the right under which he is detained. Section 4, Rule 102 of the
said Rules provides when the writ of habeas corpus is not allowed or discharged authorized:
Sec. 4. When writ not allowed or discharged authorized. If it appears that the person alleged to be restrained of his liberty is in the custody of an
officer under process issued by a court or judge or by virtue of a judgment or order of a court of record, and that the court or judge had jurisdiction to
issue the process, render the judgment; or make the order, the writ shall not be allowed; or if the jurisdiction appears after the writ is allowed, the
person shall not be discharged by reason of any informality or defect in the process, judgment, or order. Nor shall anything in this rule be held to
authorize the discharge of a person charged with or convicted of an offense in the Philippines, or of a person suffering imprisonment under lawful
judgment.
[27]
The term court includes quasi-judicial bodies like the Deportation Board of the Bureau of Immigration.
Even if the arrest of a person is illegal, supervening events may bar his release or discharge from custody. What is to be inquired into is
the legality of his detention as of, at the earliest, the filing of the application for a writ of habeas corpus, for even if the detention is at its
inception illegal, it may, by reason of same supervening events such as the instances mentioned in Section 4, Rule 102, be no longer illegal at
the time of the filing of the application. Any such supervening events are the issuance of a judicial process preventing the discharge of the detained
[28]
person.

​
As a general rule, the burden of proving illegal restraint by the respondents rests on the petitioner who attaches such restraints. Whether
the return sets forth process where on its face shows good ground for the detention of the petitioner, it is incumbent on him to allege and provenew
matter that tends to invalidate the apparent effects of such process. If it appears that the detained person is in custody under a warrant of commitment
in pursuance of law, the return shall be considered prima facie evidence of the cause of restraint. In this case, based on the return of the writ by the
respondents, Jackson was arrested and detained based on the order of the BOC which had become final and executory. His passports were also
cancelled by the US consul on the ground that they were tampered with. Based on previous jurisprudence, such constitute sufficient grounds for the
arrest and deportation of aliens from the Philippines. Hence,the petition was dismissed

71. HOGAN VS ENRILE (139 SCRA 349) C/O FAITH

72. VILLAVICENCIO VS LUKBAN C/O AIRENE
RULE 108

73. SILVERIO VS REPUBLIC

FACTS:
Petitioner Rommel Jacinto Dantes Silverio filed a petition for the change of his first name and sex in his birth certificate in the Regional Trial Court
of Manila, Branch 8.
Petitioner alleged that he is a male transsexual, that is, "anatomically male but feels, thinks and acts as a female" and that he had always identified
1
himself with girls since childhood. Feeling trapped in a man’s body, he consulted several doctors in the United States. He underwent psychological
examination, hormone treatment and breast augmentation. His attempts to transform himself to a "woman" culminated on January 27, 2001 when he
2
underwent sex reassignment surgery in Bangkok, Thailand. He was thereafter examined by Dr. Marcelino Reysio-Cruz, Jr., a plastic and
reconstruction surgeon in the Philippines, who issued a medical certificate attesting that he (petitioner) had in fact undergone the procedure.
From then on, petitioner lived as a female and was in fact engaged to be married. He then sought to have his name in his birth certificate changed
from "Rommel Jacinto" to "Mely," and his sex from "male" to "female."

ISSUE:Whether or not petitioner is entitled to the relief asked.

RULING:
NO.
A Person’s First Name Cannot Be Changed On the Ground of Sex Reassignment.
Petitioner believes that after having acquired the physical features of a female, he became entitled to the civil registry changes sought. We disagree.

A change of name is a privilege, not a right. Petitions for change of name are controlled by statutes. In this connection, Article 376 of the Civil Code
provides:

ART. 376. No person can change his name or surname without judicial authority.
This Civil Code provision was amended by RA 9048 (Clerical Error Law). In particular, Section 1 of RA 9048 provides:
SECTION 1. Authority to Correct Clerical or Typographical Error and Change of First Name or Nickname. – No entry in a civil register
shall be changed or corrected without a judicial order, except for clerical or typographical errors and change of first name or nickname
which can be corrected or changed by the concerned city or municipal civil registrar or consul general in accordance with the
provisions of this Act and its implementing rules and regulations.

The remedy and the proceedings regulating change of first name are primarily administrative in nature, not judicial.
RA 9048 likewise provides the grounds for which change of first name may be allow
SECTION 4. Grounds for Change of First Name or Nickname. – The petition for change of first name or nickname may be allowed in any
of the following cases:
(1) The petitioner finds the first name or nickname to be ridiculous, tainted with dishonor or extremely difficult to write or pronounce;
(2) The new first name or nickname has been habitually and continuously used by the petitioner and he has been publicly known by that
first name or nickname in the community; or
(3) The change will avoid confusion.
RA 9048 does not sanction a change of first name on the ground of sex reassignment. Rather than avoiding confusion, changing petitioner’s
first name for his declared purpose may only create grave complications in the civil registry and the public interest.
19
Before a person can legally change his given name, he must present proper or reasonable cause or any compelling reason justifying such change. In
20
addition, he must show that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. In this case, he failed to show, or even allege, any
prejudice that he might suffer as a result of using his true and official name.

VENUE AND JURISDICTION:

The instant case was an improper remedy because the proper remedy was administrative, that is, that provided under RA 9048 (should have been
filed before local civil registrar). It was also filed in the wrong venue as the proper venue was in the Office of the Civil Registrar of Manila where his
birth certificate is kept. More importantly, it had no merit since the use of his true and official name does not prejudice him at all.

No Law Allows The Change of Entry In The Birth Certificate As To Sex On the Ground of Sex Reassignment
Section 2(c) of RA 9048 defines what a "clerical or typographical error" is:
SECTION 2. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act, the following terms shall mean:
xxx xxx xxx
(3) "Clerical or typographical error" refers to a mistake committed in the performance of clerical work in writing, copying, transcribing or
typing an entry in the civil register that is harmless and innocuous, such as misspelled name or misspelled place of birth or the like, which
is visible to the eyes or obvious to the understanding, and can be corrected or changed only by reference to other existing record or records:
Provided, however, That no correction must involve the change of nationality, age, status or sex of the petitioner. (emphasis supplied)
Under RA 9048, a correction in the civil registry involving the change of sex is not a mere clerical or typographical error. It is a substantial change
for which the applicable procedure is Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The entries envisaged in Article 412 of the Civil Code and correctable under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court are those provided in Articles 407 and
408 of the Civil Code:
ART. 407. Acts, events and judicial decrees concerning the civil status of persons shall be recorded in the civil register.
ART. 408. The following shall be entered in the civil register:

(1) Births; (2) marriages; (3) deaths; (4) legal separations; (5) annulments of marriage; (6) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (7) legitimations; (8) adoptions; (9) acknowledgments of natural children; (10) naturalization; (11) loss, or (12) recovery of
citizenship; (13) civil interdiction; (14) judicial determination of filiation; (15) voluntary emancipation of a minor; and (16) changes of
name.

ART 407: These acts, events and judicial decrees produce legal consequences that touch upon the legal capacity, status and nationality of a person.
Their effects are expressly sanctioned by the laws. In contrast, sex reassignment is not among those acts or events mentioned in Article 407. Neither
is it recognized nor even mentioned by any law, expressly or impliedly.
ART. 413. All other matters pertaining to the registration of civil status shall be governed by special laws.
But there is no such special law in the Philippines governing sex reassignment and its effects. This is fatal to petitioner’s cause.
Section 5 of Act 3753 (the Civil Register Law): a birth certificate is a historical record of the facts as they existed at the time of birth. Thus, the sex
of a person is determined at birth, visually done by the birth attendant (the physician or midwife) by examining the genitals of the infant. Considering
that there is no law legally recognizing sex reassignment, the determination of a person’s sex made at the time of his or her birth, if not attended by
error, is immutable.
Neither May Entries in the Birth Certificate As to First Name or Sex Be Changed on the Ground of Equity
The changes sought by petitioner will have serious and wide-ranging legal and public policy consequences. First, even the trial court itself found that
the petition was but petitioner’s first step towards his eventual marriage to his male fiancé.
However, marriage, one of the most sacred social institutions, is a special contract of permanent union between a man and a woman. One of its
essential requisites is the legal capacity of the contracting parties who must be a male and a female. To grant the changes sought by petitioner will
substantially reconfigure and greatly alter the laws on marriage and family relations. It will allow the union of a man with another man who has
undergone sex reassignment (a male-to-female post-operative transsexual). Second, there are various laws which apply particularly to women such as
39 40
the provisions of the Labor Code on employment of women, certain felonies under the Revised Penal Code and the presumption of survivorship
41
in case of calamities under Rule 131 of the Rules of Court, among others. These laws underscore the public policy in relation to women which
could be substantially affected if petitioner’s petition were to be granted.
It is true that Article 9 of the Civil Code mandates that "[n]o judge or court shall decline to render judgment by reason of the silence, obscurity or
insufficiency of the law." However, it is not a license for courts to engage in judicial legislation. The duty of the courts is to apply or interpret the law,
not to make or amend it.
In our system of government, it is for the legislature, should it choose to do so, to determine what guidelines should govern the recognition of the
effects of sex reassignment. The need for legislative guidelines becomes particularly important in this case where the claims asserted are statute-
based. WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED.

74. REPUBLIC VS CAGANDAHAN

FACTS:

On December 11, 2003, respondent Jennifer Cagandahan filed a Petition for Correction of Entries in Birth Certificate before the RTC, Branch 33 of
Siniloan, Laguna. In her petition, she alleged that she was born on January 13, 1981 and was registered as a female in the Certificate of Live Birth but
while growing up, she developed secondary male characteristics and was diagnosed to have Congenital Adrenal Hyperplasia (CAH) which is a
condition where persons thus afflicted possess both male and female characteristics. She further alleged that she was diagnosed to have clitoral
hyperthropy in her early years and at age six, underwent an ultrasound where it was discovered that she has small ovaries. At age thirteen, tests
revealed that her ovarian structures had minimized, she has stopped growing and she has no breast or menstrual development. She then alleged that
for all interests and appearances as well as in mind and emotion, she has become a male person. Thus, she prayed that her birth certificate be
corrected such that her gender be changed from female to male and her first name be changed from Jennifer to Jeff.

The petition was published in a newspaper of general circulation for three (3) consecutive weeks and was posted in conspicuous places by the sheriff
of the court. The Solicitor General entered his appearance and authorized the Assistant Provincial Prosecutor to appear in his behalf.

To prove her claim, respondent testified and presented the testimony of Dr. Michael Sionzon of the Department of Psychiatry, University of
the Philippines-Philippine General Hospital. Dr. Sionzon issued a medical certificate stating that respondents condition is known as CAH. He
explained that genetically respondent is female but because her body secretes male hormones, her female organs did not develop normally and she
has two sex organs female and male. He testified that this condition is very rare, that respondents uterus is not fully developed because of lack of
female hormones, and that she has no monthly period. He further testified that respondents condition is permanent and recommended the change of
gender because respondent has made up her mind, adjusted to her chosen role as male, and the gender change would be advantageous to her.

RTC granted Cagandahan’s petition. The same is also affirmed by the Court of Appeals. Hence this petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the trial court erred in ordering the correction of entries in the birth certificate of respondent to change her sex or gender,
from female to male, on the ground of her medical condition known as CAH, and her name from Jennifer to Jeff, under Rules 103 and 108
of the Rules of Court.

RULING:

No. In deciding this case, we consider the compassionate calls for recognition of the various degrees of intersex as variations which should not be
subject to outright denial. It has been suggested that there is some middle ground between the sexes, a no-mans land for those individuals who are
neither truly male nor truly female. The current state of Philippine statutes apparently compels that a person be classified either as a male or as a
female, but this Court is not controlled by mere appearances when nature itself fundamentally negates such rigid classification.

In the instant case, if we determine respondent to be a female, then there is no basis for a change in the birth certificate entry for gender. But if we
determine, based on medical testimony and scientific development showing the respondent to be other than female, then a change in the subjects birth
certificate entry is in order.

Ultimately, we are of the view that where the person is biologically or naturally intersex the determining factor in his gender classification would be
what the individual, like respondent, having reached the age of majority, with good reason thinks of his/her sex. Respondent here thinks of himself as
a male and considering that his body produces high levels of male hormones (androgen) there is preponderant biological support for considering him
as being male. Sexual development in cases of intersex persons makes the gender classification at birth inconclusive. It is at maturity that the gender
of such persons, like respondent, is fixed.

Respondent here has simply let nature take its course and has not taken unnatural steps to arrest or interfere with what he was born with. And
accordingly, he has already ordered his life to that of a male. Respondent could have undergone treatment and taken steps, like taking lifelong
medication, to force his body into the categorical mold of a female but he did not. He chose not to do so. Nature has instead taken its due course in
respondents development to reveal more fully his male characteristics.

In the absence of a law on the matter, the Court will not dictate on respondent concerning a matter so innately private as ones sexuality and lifestyle
preferences, much less on whether or not to undergo medical treatment to reverse the male tendency due to CAH. The Court will not consider
respondent as having erred in not choosing to undergo treatment in order to become or remain as a female. Neither will the Court force respondent to
undergo treatment and to take medication in order to fit the mold of a female, as society commonly currently knows this gender of the human
species. Respondent is the one who has to live with his intersex anatomy. To him belongs the human right to the pursuit of happiness and of
health. Thus, to him should belong the primordial choice of what courses of action to take along the path of his sexual development and
maturation. In the absence of evidence that respondent is an incompetent and in the absence of evidence to show that classifying respondent as a male
will harm other members of society who are equally entitled to protection under the law, the Court affirms as valid and justified the respondents
position and his personal judgment of being a male.

In so ruling we do no more than give respect to (1) the diversity of nature; and (2) how an individual deals with what nature has handed out. In other
words, we respect respondents congenital condition and his mature decision to be a male. Life is already difficult for the ordinary person. We cannot
but respect how respondent deals with his unordinary state and thus help make his life easier, considering the unique circumstances in this case.

As for respondents change of name under Rule 103, this Court has held that a change of name is not a matter of right but of judicial discretion, to be
exercised in the light of the reasons adduced and the consequences that will follow. The trial courts grant of respondents change of name from
Jennifer to Jeff implies a change of a feminine name to a masculine name. Considering the consequence that respondents change of name merely
recognizes his preferred gender, we find merit in respondents change of name. Such a change will conform with the change of the entry in his birth
certificate from female to male.

75. REPUBLC VS COSETENG-MAGPAYO (2/2/2011)

DOCTRINE:
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change
of name would prejudice public interest.

Changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate are substantial and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after
appropriate adversary proceedings.

FACTS:
Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as
respondent’s certificate of live birth shows, contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.

Claiming that his parents were never legally married, respondent filed on July 22, 2008 at the RTC of Quezon City a Petition to change his name to
Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the NSO stating that his mother
Anna Dominique does not appear in [its] National Indices of Marriage. He also submitted his academic records from elementary up to college
showing that he carried the surname Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his surname. In the 1998, 2001 and
2004 Elections, he ran and was elected as Councilor of Quezon City’s 3rd District using the name JULIAN M.L. COSETENG.

On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,respondent amended his petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency
requirement under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.

The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6,
2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008. And a copy of the notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG). No
opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte.

The trial court granted respondent’s petition. The Republic filed a motion for reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court, hence, it, thru the
OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on pure question of law.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition involves the change of respondent’s civil status from legitimate to illegitimate and therefore, should be made through an
appropriate adversarial proceedings.

RULING:
Yes. A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including (a) when the name
is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c)
when the change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of
alien parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and
(f) when the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change
of name would prejudice public interest. Respondents reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to, recognized
grounds, however.

The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the Philippines. In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely
sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled
to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to
that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.

Labayo-Rowe v. Republic categorically holds that changes which may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary proceedings . . .

Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:

SECTION 1. Who may file petition. Any person interested in any act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto, with the [RTC] of the
province where the corresponding civil registry is located.

xxxx

SEC. 3. Parties. When cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be made parties to the proceeding.

SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be
made parties to the proceeding.

As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as the
above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were
made parties thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote in support of his claim that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary
proceeding.

Republic v. Belmonte, illuminates, however:

The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the civil
registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise would
render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the change of one’s name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only upon
meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of these two statutory remedies, respondent cannot be said to have sufficiently
complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all affected parties
as respondents in the case.

Republic v. Labrador mandates that a petition for a substantial correction or change of entries in the civil registry should have as
respondents the civil registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that would be affected thereby. It cannot be
gainsaid that change of status of a child in relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil registry.

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the same, and
cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be published once a week for
three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person having or claiming any interest under the entry whose cancellation or correction is sought may,
within fifteen (15) days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first
notice is that given to the persons named in the petition and the second (which is through publication) is that given to other persons who are not
named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under
the above-quoted Section 4 is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for two periods (for the two types of
potential oppositors) within which to file an opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).

xxxx

The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep of the decision would
cover even parties who should have been impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left out. x x x x.] (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

xxxx
IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil register involves substantial and controversial alterations
including those on citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict compliance with the requirements of
Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.

76. REPUBLIC VS LANSANG-UY (GR 198010, 2013)

Facts:

Respondent has been known since childhood as “Anita Sy Lugsanay” a Filipino – fact that also appears in all of her records and dealings. However,
her certificate of live birth (CLB) indicates her as one “Anita Sy”, a Chinese. She filed a petition for correction of entries with the Office of the Local
Civil Registrar of Gingoog City. However it was not acted upon because her NSO still bears the name “Anita Sy”.

Thus, she filed a Petition for Correction of Entry in her CLB, impleaded, as respondent is the Local Civil Registrar. The RTC granted the petition and
it was also affirmed by the CA.

The Republic, however, through the Solicitor General appealed the case contending that the respondent failed to implead her parents as indispensable
parties.

Issue: WON the petition is dismissible for failure to implead indispensable parties.

Ruling: Yes.

First:
In this case, respondent sought the correction of entries in her birth certificate, particularly those pertaining to her first name, surname and
citizenship.

The changes are obviously not mere clerical as they touch on respondent’s filiation and citizenship. In changing her surname from "Sy" (which is the
surname of her father) to "Lugsanay" (which is the surname of her mother), she, in effect, changes her status from legitimate to illegitimate; and in
changing her citizenship from Chinese to Filipino, the same affects her rights and obligations in this country. Clearly, the changes are substantial.

(Thus, it cannot be filed as mere affidavit in the LCR of Gignoog City, but must be under appropriate adversarial proceeding. Since the case is
adversarial, she must also implead interested person as provided in Sec. 4 and 5, Rule 108).

Second:

A reading of Sections 4 and 5, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court shows that the Rules mandate two sets of notices to different potential oppositors: one
given to the persons named in the petition and another given to other persons who are not named in the petition but nonetheless may be considered
interested or affected parties.
Thus, respondent should have impleaded and notified not only the Local Civil Registrar but also her parents and siblings as the persons who have
interest and are affected by the changes or corrections respondent wanted to make.

77. IN RE: PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAME AND/OR CORRECTION/CANCELLATION OF ENTRY IN CIVIL REGISTRY
OF JULIAN LIN CARULASAN WANG (GR 159966)
FACTS:

Julian was born in Cebu City to parents Anna Lisa Wang and Sing-Foe Wang who were then not yet married to each other. When his parents
subsequently got married, they executed a deed of legitimation of their son so that the child’s name was changed from Julian Lin Carulasan to Julian
Lin Carulasan Wang.

The parents of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang plan to stay in Singapore for a long time because they will let him study there together with his sister
named Wang Mei Jasmine who was born in Singapore. Since in Singapore middle names or the maiden surname of the mother are not carried in a
persons name, they anticipate that Julian Lin Carulasan Wang will be discriminated against because of his current registered name which carries a
middle name. Julian and his sister might also be asking whether they are brother and sister since they have different surnames. Carulasan sounds
funny in Singapores Mandarin language since they do not have the letter R but if there is, they pronounce it as L. It is for these reasons that the name
of Julian Lin Carulasan Wang is requested to be changed to Julian Lin Wang.

After trial, the RTC denied the petition because the reason given did not fall within the grounds recognized by law. The RTC ruled that since the State
has an interest in the name of a person it cannot just be changed to suit the convenience of the bearer of the name.

ISSUE:

Whether or not it is proper to drop the child's middle name.

RULING:

No. The State has an interest in the names borne by individuals and entities for purposes of identification, and that a change of name is a privilege
and not a right, so that before a person can be authorized to change his name given him either in his certificate of birth or civil registry, he must show
proper or reasonable cause, or any compelling reason which may justify such change. Otherwise, the request should be denied.

The touchstone for the grant of a change of name is that there be proper and reasonable cause for which the change is sought.To justify a request for
change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefore but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true
and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are: (a) when the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or
extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal consequence, as in legitimation; (c) when the change will avoid
confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a
sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname
causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.

Middle names serve to identify the maternal lineage or filiation of a person as well as further distinguish him from others who may have the same
given name and surname as he has. Our laws on the use of surnames state that legitimate and legitimated children shall principally use the surname of
the father.The Family Code gives legitimate children the right to bear the surnames of the father and the mother, while illegitimate children shall use
the surname of their mother, unless their father recognizes their filiation, in which case they may bear the fathers surname.

Applying these laws, an illegitimate child whose filiation is not recognized by the father bears only a given name and his mothers surname, and does
not have a middle name. The name of the unrecognized illegitimate child therefore identifies him as such. It is only when the illegitimate child is
legitimated by the subsequent marriage of his parents or acknowledged by the father in a public document or private handwritten instrument that he
bears both his mothers surname as his middle name and his fathers surname as his surname, reflecting his status as a legitimated child or an
acknowledged illegitimate child.
Accordingly, the registration in the civil registry of the birth of such individuals requires that the middle name be indicated in the certificate. The
registered name of a legitimate, legitimated and recognized illegitimate child thus contains a given or proper name, a middle name, and a surname.

In the case at bar, the only reason advanced by petitioner for the dropping his middle name is convenience. However, how such change of name
would make his integration into Singaporean society easier and convenient is not clearly established. That the continued use of his middle name
would cause confusion and difficulty does not constitute proper and reasonable cause to drop it from his registered complete name.

In addition, petitioner is only a minor. Considering the nebulous foundation on which his petition for change of name is based, it is best that the
matter of change of his name be left to his judgment and discretion when he reaches the age of majority. As he is of tender age, he may not yet
understand and appreciate the value of the change of his name and granting of the same at this point may just prejudice him in his rights under our
laws.
RULE 103

78. REP VS MERCEDERA (12/8/2010) C/O GIME

79. GRANDE VS ANTONIO (GR 2062248 , 2014)

FACTS:
Petitioner Grace Grande (Grande) and respondent Patricio Antonio (Antonio) for a period of time lived together as husband and wife, although
Antonio was at that time already married to someone else. Out of this illicit relationship, two sons were born. The children were not expressly
recognized by respondent as his own in the Record of Births of the children in the Civil Registry. The parties’ relationship, however, eventually
turned sour, and Grande left for the United States with her two children in May 2007. This prompted respondent Antonio to file a Petition for Judicial
Approval of Recognition with Prayer to take Parental Authority, Parental Physical Custody, Correction/Change of Surname of Minors and for the
Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction before the Regional Trial Court, Branch 8 of Aparri, Cagayan (RTC), appending a notarized Deed of
Voluntary Recognition of Paternity of the children.
ISSUE:
Whether or not a father can compel the use of his surname by his illegitimate children upon his recognition of their filiation.
RULING:
Parental authority over minor children is lodged by Art. 176 on the mother; hence, respondent’s prayer has no legal mooring. Since parental authority
is given to the mother, then custody over the minor children also goes to the mother, unless she is shown to be unfit.
Now comes the matter of the change of surname of the illegitimate children. Is there a legal basis for the court a quo to order the change of the
surname to that of respondent?
Clearly, there is none. Otherwise, the order or ruling will contravene the explicit and unequivocal provision of Art. 176 of the Family Code, as
amended by RA 9255.
Art. 176 gives illegitimate children the right to decide if they want to use the surname of their father or not. It is not the father (herein respondent) or
the mother (herein petitioner) who is granted by law the right to dictate the surname of their illegitimate children.

80.REP VS CA (5/21/1992)
PRINCIPLE:

It has been held that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien
nationality which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name

FACTS:

The facts are undisputed. Private respondent Maximo Wong is the legitimate son of Maximo Alcala, Sr. and Segundina Y. Alcala. When he was but
two and a half years old and then known as Maximo Alcala, Jr., and his sister Margaret Alcala, was then nine years old, they were, with the consent
3 4
of their natural parents and by order of the court in Special Case No. 593 issued on September 9, 1967, adopted by spouses Hoong Wong and
Concepcion Ty Wong, both naturalized Filipinos. Hoong Wong, now deceased, was an insurance agent while Concepcion Ty Wong was a high school
teacher. They decided to adopt the children as they remained childless after fifteen years of marriage. The couples showered their adopted children
with parental love and reared them as their own children.
Upon reaching the age of twenty-two, herein private respondent, by then married and a junior Engineering student at Notre Dame University,
Cotabato City, filed a petition to change his name to Maximo Alcala, Jr. It was averred that his use of the surname Wong embarrassed and isolated
him from his relatives and friends, as the same suggests a Chinese ancestry when in truth and in fact he is a Muslim Filipino residing in a Muslim
community, and he wants to erase any implication whatsoever of alien nationality; that he is being ridiculed for carrying a Chinese surname, thus
hampering his business and social life; and that his adoptive mother does not oppose his desire to revert to his former surname.
ISSUE:

whether or not the reasons given by private respondent in his petition for change of name are valid, sufficient and proper to warrant the granting of
said petition.

RULING:

YES

It bears stressing at this point that to justify a request for change of name, petitioner must show not only some proper or compelling reason therefor
24
but also that he will be prejudiced by the use of his true and official name. Among the grounds for change of name which have been held valid are:
(a) When the name is ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) When the change results as a legal consequence, as in
25
legitimation; (c) When the change will avoid confusion; (d) Having continuously used and been known since childhood by a Filipino name,
26
unaware of her alien parentage; (e) A sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith and without
27
prejudicing anybody; and (f) When the surname causes embarrassment and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest.

From the testimony of petitioner-appellee and of his adopter mother Concepcion Ty-Wong, We discern that said appellee was prompted to file the
petition for change of name because of the embarrassment and ridicule his family name "Wong" brings in his dealings with his relatives and friends,
he being a Muslim Filipino and living in a Muslim community. Another cause is his desire to improve his social and business life. It has been held
that in the absence of prejudice to the state or any individual, a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of a former alien nationality
which only hamper(s) social and business life, is a proper and reasonable cause for change of name (Uy vs. Republic, L-22712, Nov. 25, 1965, Que
Liong Sian vs. Republic, L-23167, Aug. 17, 1967, 20

SCRA 1074). Justice dictates that a person should be allowed to improve his social standing as long as in doing so, he does not cause prejudice or
injury to the interest of the State or other persons (Calderon vs. Republic, supra). Nothing whatsoever is shown in the record of this case that such
prejudice or injury to the interest of the state or of other persons would result in the change of petitioner's name.

While it is true that the statutory fiat under Article 365 of the Civil Code is to the effect that an adopted child shall bear the surname of the adopter, it
must nevertheless be borne in mind that the change of the surname of the adopted child is more an incident rather than the object of adoption
30
proceedings. The act of adoption fixes a status, viz., that of parent and child. More technically, it is an act by which relations of paternity and
affiliation are recognized as legally existing between persons not so related by nature. It has been defined as the taking into one's family of the child
of another as son or daughter and heir and conferring on it a title to the rights and privileges of such. The purpose of an adoption proceeding is to
effect this new status of relationship between the child and its adoptive parents, the change of name which frequently accompanies adoption being
31
more an incident than the object of the proceeding. The welfare of the child is the primary consideration in the determination of an application for
adoption. On this point, there is unanimous agreement.

HABEAS CORPUS
 81. FR. REYES VS CA (606 SCRA 580)
Principle :
The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2)
right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

Facts :
Petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege on November 30, 2007. After finding of probable cause, petitioner with 36
others were charged with Rebellion. In line therewith,DILG requested respondent DOJ Secretary Raul Gonzales to issued Hold Departure Order
(HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of Immigration to include in the Hold Departure List of the Bureau of Immigration and
Deportation (BID) the name of petitioner and 49 others relative to the aforementioned case in the interest of national security and public safety.
Subsequently, the RTC issued an Order dismissing the charge for Rebellion against petitioner and 17 others for lack of probable cause. Counsel for
petitioner wrote the DOJ Secretary requesting the lifting of HDO No. 45 in view of the dismissal of Criminal (Rebellion ) cases against petitioner.

Since the DOJ did not act upon his request for the lifting of HDO No. 45, petitioner filed a petition for the issuance of writ of amparo claiming that
every time petitioner would leave and return to the country, the immigration officers at the NAIA detain and interrogate him for several minutes
because of the existing HDO and because of the said HDO, it violated his right to travel.

Issue :
Whether or not the right to travel is covered by the Rule on the Writ of Amparo.
Ruling :
No. The rights that fall within the protective mantle of the Writ of Amparo under Section 1 of the Rules thereon are the following: (1) right to life; (2)
right to liberty; and (3) right to security.

In Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al., the Court explained the concept of right to life in this wise:
While the right to life under Article III, Section 1 guarantees essentially the right to be alive- upon which the enjoyment of all other rights is
preconditioned - the right to security of person is a guarantee of the secure quality of this life, viz: "The life to which each person has a right is not a
life lived in fear that his person and property may be unreasonably violated by a powerful ruler. Rather, it is a life lived with the assurance that the
government he established and consented to, will protect the security of his person and property. The ideal of security in life and property… pervades
the whole history of man. It touches every aspect of man’s existence." In a broad sense, the right to security of person "emanates in a person’s legal
and uninterrupted enjoyment of his life, his limbs, his body, his health, and his reputation. It includes the right to exist, and the right to enjoyment of
life while existing, and it is invaded not only by a deprivation of life but also of those things which are necessary to the enjoyment of life according to
the nature, temperament, and lawful desires of the individual."

The right to liberty, on the other hand, was defined in the City of Manila, et al. v. Hon. Laguio, Jr., in this manner:

Liberty as guaranteed by the Constitution was defined by Justice Malcolm to include "the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint
or servitude. The term cannot be dwarfed into mere freedom from physical restraint of the person of the citizen, but is deemed to embrace the right of
man to enjoy the facilities with which he has been endowed by his Creator, subject only to such restraint as are necessary for the common welfare." x
xx

Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al. thoroughly expounded on the import of the right to security, thus:
A closer look at the right to security of person would yield various permutations of the exercise of this right.

In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, "freedom from fear" is the right and any threat to the rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable
wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to
well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the variation of the prolificacy of their
imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus. Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the "right to
security" is actually the "freedom from threat." Viewed in this light, the "threatened with violation" Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the
Amparo Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.

Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or security. Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution
guarantees that, as a general rule, one’s body cannot be searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of
extralegal killings and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute dismemberment, physical
disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law,
physical injuries constitute a crime against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.

Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the government. In the context of the writ of amparo, this right is
built into the guarantees of the right to life and liberty under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as
freedom from threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security of person in this third
sense is a corollary of the policy that the State "guarantees full respect for human rights" under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the
government is the chief guarantor of order and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat. Protection includes conducting effective
investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats
thereof) and/or their families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.

The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v. Sandiganbayan, "xxx a person’s right to
travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused
should be permitted to leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound discretion."

Here, the restriction on petitioner’s right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the criminal case filed against him was not unlawful.
Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it amounted to a serious violation of his
right to life, liberty and security, for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.

In Canlas et al. v. Napico Homeowners Association I – XIII, Inc. et al.,23 this Court ruled that:

This new remedy of writ of amparo which is made available by this Court is intended for the protection of the highest possible rights of any person,
which is his or her right to life, liberty and security. The Court will not spare any time or effort on its part in order to give priority to petitions of this
nature. However, the Court will also not waste its precious time and effort on matters not covered by the writ.
 82. CANLAS VS NAPICO HOMEOWNER’SASSOCIATION (558 SCRA 208)
Facts:

The petitoners seek the issuance of a Writ of Amparo. They claim that they were deprived of their liberty, freedom and/or rights to shelter enshrined
and embodied in our Constitution. Their dwellings/houses have either been demolished as of the time of filing of the petition, or is about to be
demolished pursuant to a court judgment. They claimed that fraudulent and spurious land titles were issued by certain Land Officials. These Land
Officials should be summoned to answer their participation in the issuances of these fraudulent and spurious titles, now, in the hands of the Private
Respondents

Issue : Whether or not the writ of amparo applies in this case.

Held : The petition is dismissed.

The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation
by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity. The writ shall cover extralegal killings and
enforced disappearances or threats thereof. The threatened demolition of a dwelling by virtue of a final judgment of the court is not included among
the enumeration of rights as stated in the above-quoted Section 1 for which the remedy of a writ of amparo is made available.

83. DE LIMA VS GATDULA (GR 204528, 2/19/2001) C/O MARCELO

84. RAZON VS TAGITIS (606 SCRA 598) C/O PAGAPONG

85. SECRETARY OF NATIONAL DEFENSE VS MORALES (568 SCRA 681)

Doctrine:
• Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. [95]

• The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and security has been violated or is
threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals or entities.

•
Facts: Brothers Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo were abducted by military men belonging to the CAFGU on the suspicion that they were members
and supporters of the NPA. After 18 months of detention and torture, the brothers escaped on August 13, 2007.

Ten days after their escape, they filed a Petition for Prohibition, Injunction, and Temporary Restraining Order to stop the military officers and agents
from depriving them of their right to liberty and other basic rights. While the said case was pending, the Rule on the Writ of Amparo took effect on
October 24, 2007. The Manalos subsequently filed a manifestation and omnibus motion to treat their existing petition as amparo petition.

On December 26, 2007, the Court of Appeals granted the privilege of the writ of amparo. The CA ordered the Secretary of National Defense and the
Chief of Staff of the AFP to furnish the Manalos and the court with all official and unofficial investigation reports as to the Manalos’ custody, confirm
the present places of official assignment of two military officials involved, and produce all medical reports and records of the Manalo brothers while
under military custody. The Secretary of National Defense and the Chief of Staff of the AFP appealed to the SC seeking to reverse and set aside the
decision promulgated by the CA.

Issue: whether or not THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY AND GRIEVOUSLY ERRED IN REQUIRING RESPONDENTS (HEREIN
PETITIONERS) TO: (A) FURNISH TO THE MANALO BROTHER(S) AND TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL OFFICIAL AND
UNOFFICIAL REPORTS OF THE INVESTIGATION UNDERTAKEN IN CONNECTION WITH THEIR CASE, EXCEPT THOSE ALREADY IN
FILE WITH THE COURT; (B) CONFIRM IN WRITING THE PRESENT PLACES OF OFFICIAL ASSIGNMENT OF M/SGT. HILARIO aka
ROLLIE CASTILLO AND DONALD CAIGAS; AND (C) CAUSE TO BE PRODUCED TO THE COURT OF APPEALS ALL MEDICAL
REPORTS, RECORDS AND CHARTS, AND REPORTS OF ANY TREATMENT GIVEN OR RECOMMENDED AND MEDICINES
PRESCRIBED, IF ANY, TO THE MANALO BROTHERS, TO INCLUDE A LIST OF MEDICAL PERSONNEL (MILITARY AND CIVILIAN)
WHO ATTENDED TO THEM FROM FEBRUARY 14, 2006 UNTIL AUGUST 12, 2007.
Ruling: The case at bar is the first decision on the application of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo (Amparo Rule).
Brief history (included in the discussion of Judge D)

The adoption of the Amparo Rule surfaced as a recurring proposition in the recommendations that resulted from a two-day National Consultative
Summit on Extrajudicial Killings and Enforced Disappearances sponsored by the Court on July 16-17, 2007. The Summit was envisioned to provide
[71]
a broad and fact-based perspective on the issue of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances, hence representatives from all sides of the
[72]
political and social spectrum, as well as all the stakeholders in the justice system participated in mapping out ways to resolve the crisis.

[73]
On October 24, 2007, the Court promulgated the Amparo Rule in light of the prevalence of extralegal killing and enforced disappearances. It was
an exercise for the first time of the Courts expanded power to promulgate rules to protect our peoples constitutional rights, which made its maiden
[74]
appearance in the 1987 Constitution in response to the Filipino experience of the martial law regime. As the Amparo Rule was intended to address
the intractable problem of extralegal killings and enforced disappearances, its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to
[75]
threats thereof. Extralegal killings are killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal safeguards or judicial proceedings. On the
other hand, enforced disappearances are attended by the following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government
official or organized groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of the State to
disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the
protection of law.

The writ of amparo then spread throughout the Western Hemisphere, gradually evolving into various forms, in response to the particular needs of
[83]
each country. It became, in the words of a justice of the Mexican Federal Supreme Court, one piece of Mexicos self-attributed task of conveying to
[84]
the worlds legal heritage that institution which, as a shield of human dignity, her own painful history conceived. What began as a protection
against acts or omissions of public authorities in violation of constitutional rights later evolved for several purposes: (1) amparo libertad for the
protection of personal freedom, equivalent to the habeas corpus writ; (2) amparo contra leyes for the judicial review of the constitutionality of
statutes; (3) amparo casacion for the judicial review of the constitutionality and legality of a judicial decision; (4) amparo administrativo for the
judicial review of administrative actions; and (5) amparo agrario for the protection of peasants rights derived from the agrarian reform process.

In the Philippines, while the 1987 Constitution does not explicitly provide for the writ of amparo, several of the above amparo protections are
guaranteed by our charter. The second paragraph of Article VIII, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution, the Grave Abuse Clause, provides for the
judicial power to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any
branch or instrumentality of the Government. The Clause accords a similar general protection to human rights extended by the amparo contra
leyes, amparo casacion, and amparo administrativo. Amparo libertad is comparable to the remedy of habeas corpus found in several provisions of
[88]
the 1987 Constitution. The Clause is an offspring of the U.S. common law tradition of judicial review, which finds its roots in the 1803 case
 [89]
of Marbury v. Madison.

In the case at bar

In delving into the veracity of the evidence, we need to mine and refine the ore of petitioners cause of action, to determine whether the
evidence presented is metal-strong to satisfy the degree of proof required.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides for the following causes of action, viz:

Section 1. Petition. The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty and
security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private
individual or entity.

The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof. (emphasis supplied)

Sections 17 and 18, on the other hand, provide for the degree of proof required, viz:
Sec. 17. Burden of Proof and Standard of Diligence Required. The parties shall establish their claims by substantial evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

Sec. 18. Judgment. If the allegations in the petition are proven by substantial evidence, the court shall grant the privilege of
the writ and such reliefs as may be proper and appropriate; otherwise, the privilege shall be denied. (emphases supplied)
[95]
Substantial evidence has been defined as such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.

After careful perusal of the evidence presented, we affirm the findings of the Court of Appeals that respondents were abducted from their houses in
Sito Muzon, Brgy. Buhol na Mangga, San Ildefonso, Bulacan on February 14, 2006 and were continuously detained until they escaped on August 13,
2007. The abduction, detention, torture, and escape of the respondents were narrated by respondent Raymond Manalo in a clear and convincing
manner. His account is dotted with countless candid details of respondents harrowing experience and tenacious will to escape, captured through his
different senses and etched in his memory.
We reject the claim of petitioners that respondent Raymond Manalos statements were not corroborated by other independent and credible pieces of
[102]
evidence. Raymonds affidavit and testimony were corroborated by the affidavit of respondent Reynaldo Manalo. The testimony and medical
[103]
reports prepared by forensic specialist Dr. Molino, and the pictures of the scars left by the physical injuries inflicted on respondents, also
corroborate respondents accounts of the torture they endured while in detention.

With the secret nature of an enforced disappearance and the torture perpetrated on the victim during detention, it logically holds that much of the
information and evidence of the ordeal will come from the victims themselves, and the veracity of their account will depend on their credibility and
candidness in their written and/or oral statements. Their statements can be corroborated by other evidence such as physical evidence left by the
torture they suffered or landmarks they can identify in the places where they were detained. Where powerful military officers are implicated, the
hesitation of witnesses to surface and testify against them comes as no surprise.

We now come to the right of the respondents to the privilege of the writ of amparo. There is no quarrel that the enforced disappearance of
both respondents Raymond and Reynaldo Manalo has now passed as they have escaped from captivity and surfaced. But while respondents admit
[109]
that they are no longer in detention and are physically free, they assert that they are not free in every sense of the word as their movements
continue to be restricted for fear that people they have named in their Judicial Affidavits and testified against (in the case of Raymond) are still at
large and have not been held accountable in any way. These people are directly connected to the Armed Forces of the Philippines and are, thus, in a
[110]
position to threaten respondents rights to life, liberty and security. (emphasis supplied) Respondents claim that they are under threat of being
[111]
once again abducted, kept captive or even killed, which constitute a direct violation of their right to security of person.
The SC discusses each of the constitutional rights in this case and in upholding the CA decision, the Supreme Court ruled that there is a continuing
violation of the Manalos right to security. xxx The Writ of Amparo is the most potent remedy available to any person whose right to life, liberty, and
security has been violated or is threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission by public officials or employees and by private individuals
or entities. xxx Understandably, since their escape, the Manalos have been under concealment and protection by private citizens because of the threat
to their life, liberty, and security. The circumstances of respondents’ abduction, detention, torture and escape reasonably support a conclusion that
there is an apparent threat that they will again be abducted, tortured, and this time, even executed. These constitute threats to their liberty, security,
and life, actionable through a petition for a writ of amparo,” the Court explained.

Further, the production order under the Rule on the Writ of Amparo should not be confused with a search warrant for law enforcement under Art. III,
sec. 2 of the 1987 Constitution. This Constitutional provision is a protection of the people from the unreasonable intrusion of the government, not a
protection of the government from the demand of the people such as respondents. It said that the production order should be likened to the production
of documents or things under sec. 1, Rule 27 of the Rules of Civil Procedure which states that “upon motion of any party showing good cause
therefor, the court in which an action is pending may (a) order any party to produce and permit the inspection and copying or photographing, by or on
behalf of the moving party, of any designated documents, papers, books of accounts, letters, photographs, objects or tangible things, not privileged,
which constitute or contain evidence material to any matter involved in the action and which are in his possession, custody or control.”

Wherefore, the petition is DISMISSED

86. LOZADA VS ARROYO (670 SCRA 545) C/O RAZA

87.
RODRIGUEZ VS ARROYO (GR 191805 11/15/2011)
DOCTRINE:

The writ of amparo is an extraordinary and independent remedy that provides rapid judicial relief, as it partakes of a summary proceeding that
requires only substantial evidence to make the appropriate interim and permanent reliefs available to the petitioner. It is not an action to determine
criminal guilt requiring proof beyond reasonable doubt, or liability for damages requiring preponderance of evidence, or administrative responsibility
requiring substantial evidence that will require full and exhaustive proceedings. Rather, it serves both preventive and curative roles in addressing the
problem of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. It is preventive in that it breaks the expectation of impunity in the commission of these
offenses, and it is curative in that it facilitates the subsequent punishment of perpetrators by inevitably leading to subsequent investigation and action.

Meanwhile, the writ of habeas data provides a judicial remedy to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in
instances where such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends. As an independent and summary
remedy to protect the right to privacy especially the right to informational privacy the proceedings for the issuance of the writ of habeas data does
not entail any finding of criminal, civil or administrative culpability. If the allegations in the petition are proven through substantial evidence, then the
Court may (a) grant access to the database or information; (b) enjoin the act complained of; or (c) in case the database or information contains
erroneous data or information, order its deletion, destruction or rectification.
The provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they
can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once
granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party.

FACTS:

Petitioner Noriel Rodriguez is a member of Alyansa Dagiti Mannalon Iti Cagayan (Kagimungan), a peasant organization affiliated with Kilusang
Magbubukid ng Pilipinas (KMP). He claims that the military tagged KMP as an enemy of the State under the Oplan Bantay Laya, making its
members targets of extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances. Rodriguez was abducted by military men and was tortured repeatedly when he
refused toconfess to his membership in the NPA. When released, he filed a Petition for the Writ of Amparo and Petition for the Writ of Habeas Data
with Prayers for Protection Orders, Inspection of Place, and Production of Documents and Personal Properties. The petition was filed against former
Pres. Arroyo, et al. The writs were granted but the CA dropped Pres. Arroyo as party-respondent, as she may not be sued in any case during her
tenure of office or actual incumbency.

ISSUE/S:

1) Whether or not the interim reliefs prayed for by Rodriguez may be granted after the writs of amparo and habeas data have already been
issued in his favor.

2) Whether or not former President Arroyo should be dropped as a respondent on the basis of the presidential immunity from suit.

3) Whether or not the doctrine of command responsibility can be used in amparo and habeas data cases.
4) Whether or not the rights to life, liberty and property of Rodriguez were violated or threatened by respondents.

RULING:

1) No. In the petition in G.R. No. 191805, Rodriguez prays for the issuance of a temporary protection order. It must be underscored that this
interim relief is only available before final judgment.

We held in Yano v. Sanchez that [t]hese provisional reliefs are intended to assist the court before it arrives at a judicious determination of
the amparo petition. Being interim reliefs, they can only be granted before a final adjudication of the case is made. In any case, it must be
underscored that the privilege of the writ of amparo, once granted, necessarily entails the protection of the aggrieved party. Thus, since we
grant petitioner the privilege of the writ of amparo, there is no need to issue a temporary protection order independently of the former. The
order restricting respondents from going near Rodriguez is subsumed under the privilege of the writ.

2) No. It bears stressing that since there is no determination of administrative, civil or criminal liability in amparo and habeas
data proceedings, courts can only go as far as ascertaining responsibility or accountability for the enforced disappearance or extrajudicial
killing. As we held in Razon v. Tagitis:

It does not determine guilt nor pinpoint criminal culpability for the disappearance; rather, it determines responsibility,
or at least accountability, for the enforced disappearance for purposes of imposing the appropriate remedies to address the
disappearance. Responsibility refers to the extent the actors have been established by substantial evidence to have participated in
whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, as a measure of the remedies this Court shall craft, among
them, the directive to file the appropriate criminal and civil cases against the responsible parties in the proper
courts. Accountability, on the other hand, refers to the measure of remedies that should be addressed to those who
exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of their complicity to the level of
responsibility defined above; or who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the
burden of disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. In all these cases, the issuance of the Writ of Amparo is justified by our primary goal
of addressing the disappearance, so that the life of the victim is preserved and his liberty and security are restored.(Emphasis
supplied.)

In Estrada v. Desierto, we clarified the doctrine that a non-sitting President does not enjoy immunity from suit, even for acts
committed during the latters tenure. We emphasize our ruling therein that courts should look with disfavor upon the presidential
privilege of immunity, especially when it impedes the search for truth or impairs the vindication of a right.

The term means the time during which the officer may claim to hold the office as of right, and fixes the interval after which the
several incumbents shall succeed one another. The tenure represents the term during which the incumbent actually holds office.
The tenure may be shorter than the term for reasons within or beyond the power of the incumbent. From the deliberations, the
intent of the framers is clear that the immunity of the president from suit is concurrent only with his tenure and not his term.
(Emphasis supplied)

Applying the foregoing rationale to the case at bar, it is clear that former President Arroyo cannot use the presidential immunity
from suit to shield herself from judicial scrutiny that would assess whether, within the context of amparo proceedings, she was
responsible or accountable for the abduction of Rodriguez.

3) Yes. As we explained in Rubrico v. Arroyo,command responsibility pertains to the responsibility of commanders for crimes
committed by subordinate members of the armed forces or other persons subject to their control in international wars or domestic
conflict. Although originally used for ascertaining criminal complicity, the command responsibility doctrine has also found
application in civil cases for human rights abuses. In the United States, for example, command responsibility was used in Ford v.
Garcia and Romagoza v. Garcia civil actions filed under the Alien Tort Claims Act and the Torture Victim Protection Act. This
development in the use of command responsibility in civil proceedings shows that the application of this doctrine has been
liberally extended even to cases not criminal in nature. Thus, it is our view that command responsibility may likewise find
application in proceedings seeking the privilege of the writ of amparo.
 This Separate Opinion was reiterated in the recently decided case of Boac v. Cadapan, likewise penned by Justice Carpio-
Morales, wherein this Court ruled:
Rubrico categorically denies the application of command responsibility in amparo cases to determine criminal
liability. The Court maintains its adherence to this pronouncement as far as amparo cases are concerned.

Rubrico, however, recognizes a preliminary yet limited application of command responsibility in amparo cases to
instances of determining the responsible or accountable individuals or entities that are duty-bound to abate any transgression on
the life, liberty or security of the aggrieved party.

If command responsibility were to be invoked and applied to these proceedings, it should, at most, be
only to determine the author who, at the first instance, is accountable for, and has the duty to address, the
disappearance and harassments complained of, so as to enable the Court to devise remedial measures that
may be appropriate under the premises to protect rights covered by the writ of amparo. As intimated earlier,
however, the determination should not be pursued to fix criminal liability on respondents preparatory to
criminal prosecution, or as a prelude to administrative disciplinary proceedings under existing administrative
issuances, if there be any.

In other words, command responsibility may be loosely applied in amparo cases in order to identify those accountable
individuals that have the power to effectively implement whatever processes an amparo court would issue. In such application,
the amparo court does not impute criminal responsibility but merely pinpoint the superiors it considers to be in the best position
to protect the rights of the aggrieved party.

Such identification of the responsible and accountable superiors may well be a preliminary determination of criminal liability
which, of course, is still subject to further investigation by the appropriate government agency. (Emphasis supplied.)

As earlier pointed out, amparo proceedings determine (a) responsibility, or the extent the actors have been established by substantial
evidence to have participated in whatever way, by action or omission, in an enforced disappearance, and (b) accountability, or the measure
of remedies that should be addressed to those (i) who exhibited involvement in the enforced disappearance without bringing the level of
their complicity to the level of responsibility defined above; or (ii) who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance
and who carry the burden of disclosure; or (iii) those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the
investigation of the enforced disappearance. Thus, although there is no determination of criminal, civil or administrative liabilities, the
doctrine of command responsibility may nevertheless be applied to ascertain responsibility and accountability within these foregoing
definitions.

Having established the applicability of the doctrine of command responsibility in amparo proceedings, it must now be resolved whether the
president, as commander-in-chief of the military, can be held responsible or accountable for extrajudicial killings and enforced
disappearances. We rule in the affirmative.

To hold someone liable under the doctrine of command responsibility, the following elements must obtain:

a. the existence of a superior-subordinate relationship between the accused as superior and the perpetrator of the crime as his
subordinate;

b. the superior knew or had reason to know that the crime was about to be or had been committed; and

c. the superior failed to take the necessary and reasonable measures to prevent the criminal acts or punish the perpetrators
thereof.

The president, being the commander-in-chief of all armed forces, necessarily possesses control over the military that qualifies him as
a superior within the purview of the command responsibility doctrine.

On the issue of knowledge, it must be pointed out that although international tribunals apply a strict standard of knowledge, i.e., actual
knowledge, such may nonetheless be established through circumstantial evidence. In the Philippines, a more liberal view is adopted and
superiors may be charged with constructive knowledge. This view is buttressed by the enactment of Executive Order No. 226, otherwise
known as the Institutionalization of the Doctrine of Command Responsibility in all Government Offices, particularly at all Levels of
Command in the Philippine National Police and other Law Enforcement Agencies (E.O. 226). Under E.O. 226, a government official may
be held liable for neglect of duty under the doctrine of command responsibility if he has knowledge that a crime or offense shall be
committed, is being committed, or has been committed by his subordinates, or by others within his area of responsibility and, despite such
knowledge, he did not take preventive or corrective action either before, during, or immediately after its commission. Knowledge of the
commission of irregularities, crimes or offenses is presumed when (a) the acts are widespread within the government officials area of
jurisdiction; (b) the acts have been repeatedly or regularly committed within his area of responsibility; or (c) members of his immediate
staff or office personnel are involved.

Meanwhile, as to the issue of failure to prevent or punish, it is important to note that as the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the
president has the power to effectively command, control and discipline the military.

4) Yes. The doctrine of totality of evidence in amparo cases was first laid down in this Court’s ruling in Razon, to wit:
The fair and proper rule, to our mind, is to consider all the pieces of evidence adduced in their totality, and to consider
any evidence otherwise inadmissible under our usual rules to be admissible if it is consistent with the admissible evidence
adduced. In other words, we reduce our rules to the most basic test of reason i.e., to the relevance of the evidence to the issue at
hand and its consistency with all other pieces of adduced evidence. Thus, even hearsay evidence can be admitted if it satisfies
this basic minimum test.(Emphasis supplied.)

In the case at bar, we find no reason to depart from the factual findings of the Court of Appeals, the same being supported by
substantial evidence. A careful examination of the records of this case reveals that the totality of the evidence adduced by
Rodriguez indubitably prove the responsibility and accountability of some respondents in G.R. No. 191805 for violating his right
to life, liberty and security.

After a careful examination of the records of these cases, we are convinced that the Court of Appeals correctly found sufficient evidence
th th
proving that the soldiers of the 17 Infantry Battalion, 5 Infantry Division of the military abducted Rodriguez on 6 September 2009, and
detained and tortured him until 17 September 2009.

Rodriguezs Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 4 December 2009 was a meticulous and straightforward account of his horrific ordeal with the
military, detailing the manner in which he was captured and maltreated on account of his suspected membership in the NPA.His narration
of his suffering included an exhaustive description of his physical surroundings, personal circumstances and perceived observations. He
st
likewise positively identified respondents 1 Lt. Matutina and Lt. Col. Mina to be present during his abduction, detention and torture, and
respondents Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan as the CHR representatives who appeared during his release.
 More particularly, the fact of Rodriguezs abduction was corroborated by Carlos in his Sinumpaang Salaysay dated 16 September 2009,
wherein he recounted in detail the circumstances surrounding the victims capture.

As regards the allegation of torture, the respective Certifications of Dr. Ramil and Dr. Pamugas validate the physical maltreatment
th th
Rodriguez suffered in the hands of the soldiers of the 17 Infantry Battalion, 5 Infantry Division.

Furthermore, the appellate court also properly ruled that aside from the abduction, detention and torture of Rodriguez, respondents,
st
specifically 1 Lt. Matutina, had violated and threatened the formers right to security when they made a visual recording of his house, as
well as the photos of his relatives, to wit:

In the videos taken by the soldiers one of whom was respondent Matutina in the house of petitioner on September 18,
2009, the soldiers even went as far as taking videos of the photos of petitioners relatives hung on the wall of the house, as well as
videos of the innermost part of the house. This Court notes that 1Lt. Matutina, by taking the said videos, did not merely intend
to make proofs of the safe arrival of petitioner and his family in their home. 1Lt. Matutina also desired to instill fear in the
minds of petitioner and his family by showing them that the sanctity of their home, from then on, will not be free from the
watchful eyes of the military, permanently captured through the medium of a seemingly innocuous cellhpone video camera. The
Court cannot and will not condone such act, as it intrudes into the very core of petitioner’s right to security guaranteed by the
fundamental law. (Emphasis supplied.)

The Rule on the Writ of Amparo explicitly states that the violation of or threat to the right to life, liberty and security may be
caused by either an act or an omission of a public official. Moreover, in the context of amparo proceedings, responsibility may
refer to the participation of the respondents, by action or omission, in enforced disappearance. Accountability, on the other hand,
may attach to respondents who are imputed with knowledge relating to the enforced disappearance and who carry the burden of
disclosure; or those who carry, but have failed to discharge, the burden of extraordinary diligence in the investigation of the
enforced disappearance.

In the instant case, this Court rules that respondents in G.R. No. 191805 are responsible or accountable for the violation of
Rodriguezs right to life, liberty and security on account of their abject failure to conduct a fair and effective official investigation
of his ordeal in the hands of the military. Respondents Gen. Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Col. De
Vera and Lt. Col. Mina only conducted a perfunctory investigation, exerting no efforts to take Ramirez’s account of the events
into consideration. Rather, these respondents solely relied on the reports and narration of the military.
xxxx

From all the foregoing, we rule that Rodriguez was successful in proving through substantial evidence that respondents Gen.
st
Ibrado, PDG. Verzosa, Lt. Gen. Bangit, Maj. Gen. Ochoa, Brig. Gen. De Vera, 1 Lt. Matutina, and Lt. Col. Mina were
responsible and accountable for the violation of Rodriguezs rights to life, liberty and security on the basis of (a) his abduction,
detention and torture from 6 September to 17 September 2009, and (b) the lack of any fair and effective official investigation as
to his allegations. Thus, the privilege of the writs of amparo and habeas data must be granted in his favor. As a result, there is no
longer any need to issue a temporary protection order, as the privilege of these writs already has the effect of enjoining
respondents in G.R. No. 191805 from violating his rights to life, liberty and security.

It is also clear from the above discussion that despite (a) maintaining former President Arroyo in the list of respondents in G.R. No.
191805, and (b) allowing the application of the command responsibility doctrine to amparo and habeas data proceedings, Rodriguez failed
to prove through substantial evidence that former President Arroyo was responsible or accountable for the violation of his rights to life,
liberty and property. He likewise failed to prove through substantial evidence the accountability or responsibility of respondents Maj. Gen.
Ochoa, Cruz, Pasicolan and Callagan.

HABEAS DATA

88. VIVARES VS STC (GR 202666 11/15/2011)

Doctrine:

❖ The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by
an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or
11
storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and
summary remedy designed to protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a
forum to enforce one’s right to the truth and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding
oneself, particularly in instances in which such information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

❖ To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in
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something.” It does not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or
entity must be gathering, collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such
undertaking carries the element of regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any
other reason or even for no reason at all, is immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity

Facts:

In January 2012, Angela Tan, a high school student at St. Theresa’s College (STC), uploaded on Facebook several pictures of her and her classmates
(Nenita Daluz and Julienne Suzara) wearing only their undergarments.

Thereafter, some of their classmates reported said photos to their teacher, Mylene Escudero. Escudero, through her students, viewed and downloaded
said pictures. She showed the said pictures to STC’s Discipline-in-Charge for appropriate action.

Later, STC found Tan et al to have violated the student’s handbook and banned them from “marching” in their graduation ceremonies scheduled in
March 2012.

The issue went to court but despite a TRO (temporary restraining order) granted by the Cebu RTC enjoining the school from barring the students in
the graduation ceremonies, STC still barred said students.

Subsequently, Rhonda Vivares, mother of Nenita, and the other mothers filed a petition for the issuance of the writ of habeas data against the school.
They argued, among others, that:
 1. The privacy setting of their children’s Facebook accounts was set at “Friends Only.” They, thus, have a reasonable expectation of privacy
which must be respected.

2. The photos accessed belong to the girls and, thus, cannot be used and reproduced without their consent. Escudero, however, violated
their rights by saving digital copies of the photos and by subsequently showing them to STC’s officials. Thus, the Facebook accounts of the
children were intruded upon;

3. The intrusion into the Facebook accounts, as well as the copying of information, data, and digital images happened at STC’s Computer
Laboratory;

They prayed that STC be ordered to surrender and deposit with the court all soft and printed copies of the subject data and have such data be declared
illegally obtained in violation of the children’s right to privacy

Issue:

Whether or not a writ of habeas data should be issued given the factual milieu. Crucial in resolving the controversy, however, is the pivotal point of
whether or not there was indeed an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in the life, liberty, or security of the minors involved in this
case.

Ruling:

There is no merit in the petition.

The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or threatened by an unlawful
act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of data or
11
information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. It is an independent and summary remedy designed to
protect the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of information of an individual, and to provide a forum to enforce one’s right to the truth
and to informational privacy. It seeks to protect a person’s right to control information regarding oneself, particularly in instances in which such
information is being collected through unlawful means in order to achieve unlawful ends.

In developing the writ of habeas data, the Court aimed to protect an individual’s right to informational privacy, among others. A comparative law
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scholar has, in fact, defined habeas data as “a procedure designed to safeguard individual freedom from abuse in the information age.” The writ,
however, will not issue on the basis merely of an alleged unauthorized access to information about a person. Availment of the writ requires the
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existence of a nexus between the right to privacy on the one hand, and the right to life, liberty or security on the other. Thus, the existence of a
person’s right to informational privacy and a showing, at least by substantial evidence, of an actual or threatened violation of the right to privacy in
15
life, liberty or security of the victim are indispensable before the privilege of the writ may be extended.

Without an actionable entitlement in the first place to the right to informational privacy, a habeas data petition will not prosper. Viewed from
the perspective of the case at bar, this requisite begs this question: given the nature of an online social network (OSN)––(1) that it facilitates and
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promotes real-time interaction among millions, if not billions, of users, sans the spatial barriers, bridging the gap created by physical space; and (2)
that any information uploaded in OSNs leaves an indelible trace in the provider’s databases, which are outside the control of the end-users––is there
a right to informational privacy in OSN activities of its users?

Meaning of “engaged” in the gathering,

collecting or storing of data or information

Respondents’ contention that the habeas data writ may not issue against STC, it not being an entity engaged in the gathering, collecting or storing of
data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party, while valid to a point, is, nonetheless, erroneous.

To be sure, nothing in the Rule would suggest that the habeas data protection shall be available only against abuses of a person or entity engaged in
the business of gathering, storing, and collecting of data. As provided under Section 1 of the Rule:chanRoblesvirtualLawlibrary

Section 1. Habeas Data. – The writ of habeas data is a remedy available to any person whose right to privacy in life, liberty or security is violated or
threatened by an unlawful act or omission of a public official or employee, or of a private individual or entity engaged in the gathering, collecting
or storing of data or information regarding the person, family, home and correspondence of the aggrieved party. (emphasis Ours)

The provision, when taken in its proper context, as a whole, irresistibly conveys the idea that habeas data is a protection against unlawful acts or
omissions of public officials and of private individuals or entities engaged in gathering, collecting, or storing data about the aggrieved party and his
or her correspondences, or about his or her family. Such individual or entity need not be in the business of collecting or storing data.
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To “engage” in something is different from undertaking a business endeavour. To “engage” means “to do or take part in something.” It does
not necessarily mean that the activity must be done in pursuit of a business. What matters is that the person or entity must be gathering,
collecting or storing said data or information about the aggrieved party or his or her family. Whether such undertaking carries the element of
regularity, as when one pursues a business, and is in the nature of a personal endeavour, for any other reason or even for no reason at all, is
immaterial and such will not prevent the writ from getting to said person or entity.

To agree with respondents’ above argument, would mean unduly limiting the reach of the writ to a very small group, i.e., private persons and entities
whose business is data gathering and storage, and in the process decreasing the effectiveness of the writ as an instrument designed to protect a right
which is easily violated in view of rapid advancements in the information and communications technology––a right which a great majority of the
users of technology themselves are not capable of protecting.

Having resolved the procedural aspect of the case, We now proceed to the core of the controversy.

89. MERALCO VS GOPEZ-LIM (10/5/2010)

FACTS: Cherry Lim (respondent) is an administrative clerk at MERALCO. An anonymous letter was posted at the door of the Office of the
Administration bldg. of MERALCO. The letter reads:

Cherry Lim:
MATAPOS MONG LAMUNIN LAHAT NG BIYAYA NG MERALCO, NGAYON NAMAN AY GUSTO MONG PALAMON ANG BUONG
KUMPANYA SA MGA BUWAYA NG GOBYERNO. KAPAL NG MUKHA MO, LUMAYAS KA RITO, WALANG UTANG NA LOOB . . . .

Copies of the letter were also inserted in the lockers of MERALCO linesmen. Respondent reported the matter to the PNP. Because of the threats to
her security, MERALCO Human Resource transferred her to Alabang. Lim contends that the transfer amounted to due process and violates the
provisions on job security of their CBA.

Respondent filed a petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data against the petitioners before the RTC. According to respondent, petitioners'
unlawful act and omission consisting of their continued failure and refusal to provide her with details or information about the alleged report which
MERALCO purportedly received concerning threats to her safety and security amount to a violation of her right to privacy in life, liberty and
security, correctible by habeas data.

ISSUE: WON petition for the issuance of a writ of habeas data proper.

RULING: No. Respondent's plea that she be spared from complying with MERALCO's Memorandum directing her reassignment to the Alabang
Sector, under the guise of a quest for information or data allegedly in possession of petitioners, does not fall within the province of a writ of habeas
data.

The habeas data rule, in general, is designed to protect by means of judicial complaint the image, privacy, honor, information, and freedom of
information of an individual. It is meant to provide a forum to enforce one's right to the truth and to informational privacy, thus safeguarding the

constitutional guarantees of a person's right to life, liberty and security against abuse in this age of information technology.

In another vein, there is no showing from the facts presented that petitioners committed any unjustifiable or unlawful violation of respondent's right
to privacy visa- vis the right to life, liberty or security. To argue that petitioners' refusal to disclose the contents of reports allegedly received on the
threats to respondent's safety amounts to a violation of her right to privacy is at best speculative. Respondent in fact trivializes these threats and
accusations from unknown individuals in her earlier-quoted portion of her July 10, 2008 letter as "highly suspicious, doubtful or are just mere jokes if
they existed at all." And she even suspects that her transfer to another place of work "betray[s] the real intent of management" and could be a
"punitive move." Her posture unwittingly concedes that the issue is labor-related.

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QUANTUM LEAP (USJ-R SCHOOL OF LAW BATCH 2017) TEAM QL