FIRST DIVISION

WILFREDO M. CATU, A.C. No. 5738

Complainant,
Present:

PUNO, C.J., Chairperson,

SANDOVAL-GUTIERREZ,
- v e r s u s - CORONA,
AZCUNA and
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, JJ.

ATTY. VICENTE G. RELLOSA,

Respondent. Promulgated:
February 19, 2008

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RESOLUTION
CORONA, J.:

Complainant Wilfredo M. Catu is a co-owner of a lot[1] and the building erected

thereon located at 959 San Andres Street, Malate, Manila. His mother and brother,
Regina Catu and Antonio Catu, contested the possession of Elizabeth C. Diaz-
Catu[2] and Antonio Pastor[3] of one of the units in the building. The latter ignored
demands for them to vacate the premises. Thus, a complaint was initiated against
them in the Lupong Tagapamayapa of Barangay 723, Zone 79 of the 5th District of
Manila[4] where the parties reside.

Respondent, as punong barangay of Barangay 723, summoned the parties to

conciliation meetings.[5] When the parties failed to arrive at an amicable settlement,
respondent issued a certification for the filing of the appropriate action in court.
Thereafter, Regina and Antonio filed a complaint for ejectment against Elizabeth
and Pastor in the Metropolitan Trial Court of Manila, Branch 11. Respondent entered
his appearance as counsel for the defendants in that case. Because of this,
complainant filed the instant administrative complaint,[6] claiming that respondent
committed an act of impropriety as a lawyer and as a public officer when he stood
as counsel for the defendants despite the fact that he presided over the conciliation
proceedings between the litigants as punong barangay.

In his defense, respondent claimed that one of his duties as punong barangay was to
hear complaints referred to the barangays Lupong Tagapamayapa. As such, he heard
the complaint of Regina and Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. As head of
the Lupon, he performed his task with utmost objectivity, without bias or partiality
towards any of the parties. The parties, however, were not able to amicably settle
their dispute and Regina and Antonio filed the ejectment case. It was then that
Elizabeth sought his legal assistance. He acceded to her request. He handled her case
for free because she was financially distressed and he wanted to prevent the
commission of a patent injustice against her.

The complaint was referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for
investigation, report and recommendation. As there was no factual issue to thresh
out, the IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD) required the parties to submit
their respective position papers. After evaluating the contentions of the parties, the
IBP-CBD found sufficient ground to discipline respondent.[7]

According to the IBP-CBD, respondent admitted that, as punong barangay,

he presided over the conciliation proceedings and heard the complaint of Regina and
Antonio against Elizabeth and Pastor. Subsequently, however, he represented
Elizabeth and Pastor in the ejectment case filed against them by Regina and Antonio.
In the course thereof, he prepared and signed pleadings including the answer with
counterclaim, pre-trial brief, position paper and notice of appeal. By so doing,
respondent violated Rule 6.03 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

Rule 6.03 A lawyer shall not, after leaving government service,

accept engagement or employment in connection with any matter in
which he intervened while in said service.

Furthermore, as an elective official, respondent contravened the prohibition

under Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713:[8]

SEC. 7. Prohibited Acts and Transactions. In addition to acts and

omissions of public officials and employees now prescribed in the
Constitution and existing laws, the following shall constitute prohibited
acts and transactions of any public official ands employee and are hereby
declared to be unlawful:

xxx xxx xxx

(b) Outside employment and other activities related thereto. Public

officials and employees during their incumbency shall not:

xxx xxx xxx

(2) Engage in the private practice of profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such
practice will not conflict or tend to conflict with their official
functions; xxx (emphasis supplied)

According to the IBP-CBD, respondents violation of this prohibition

constituted a breach of Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION, OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND, PROMOTE
RESPECT FOR LAW AND LEGAL PROCESSES. (emphasis
supplied)
 For these infractions, the IBP-CBD recommended the respondents suspension
from the practice of law for one month with a stern warning that the commission of
the same or similar act will be dealt with more severely.[9] This was adopted and
approved by the IBP Board of Governors.[10]

We modify the foregoing findings regarding the transgression of respondent

as well as the recommendation on the imposable penalty.

RULE 6.03 OF THE CODE

OF PROFESSIONAL RESPONSIBILITY
APPLIES ONLY TO FORMER
GOVERNMENT LAWYERS

Respondent cannot be found liable for violation of Rule 6.03 of the Code of
Professional Responsibility. As worded, that Rule applies only to a lawyer who
has left government service and in connection with any matter in which he
intervened while in said service. In PCGG v. Sandiganbayan,[11] we ruled that Rule
6.03 prohibits former government lawyers from accepting engagement or
employment in connection with any matter in which [they] had intervened while in
said service.

Respondent was an incumbent punong barangay at the time he committed the

act complained of. Therefore, he was not covered by that provision.

SECTION 90 OF RA 7160, NOT SECTION

7(B)(2) OF RA 6713, GOVERNS THE
PRACTICE OF PROFESSION OF
ELECTIVE LOCAL GOVERNMENT
OFFICIALS

Section 7(b)(2) of RA 6713 prohibits public officials and employees, during

their incumbency, from engaging in the private practice of their profession unless
authorized by the Constitution or law, provided that such practice will not conflict
or tend to conflict with their official functions. This is the general law which applies
to all public officials and employees.
For elective local government officials, Section 90 of RA 7160[12] governs:
SEC. 90. Practice of Profession. (a) All governors, city and municipal
mayors are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any
occupation other than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives.
(b) Sanggunian members may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours: Provided,
That sanggunian members who are members of the Bar shall not:
(1) Appear as counsel before any court in any civil case wherein a
local government unit or any office, agency, or instrumentality of the
government is the adverse party;
(2) Appear as counsel in any criminal case wherein an officer or
employee of the national or local government is accused of an offense
committed in relation to his office;
(3) Collect any fee for their appearance in administrative
proceedings involving the local government unit of which he is an official;
and
(4) Use property and personnel of the Government except when
the sanggunian member concerned is defending the interest of the
Government.
(c) Doctors of medicine may practice their profession even during official
hours of work only on occasions of emergency: Provided, That the officials
concerned do not derive monetary compensation therefrom.

This is a special provision that applies specifically to the practice of profession

by elective local officials. As a special law with a definite scope (that is, the practice
of profession by elective local officials), it constitutes an exception to Section
7(b)(2) of RA 6713, the general law on engaging in the private practice of profession
by public officials and employees. Lex specialibus derogat generalibus.[13]

Under RA 7160, elective local officials of provinces, cities, municipalities and

barangays are the following: the governor, the vice governor and members of
the sangguniang panlalawigan for provinces; the city mayor, the city vice mayor
and the members of the sangguniang panlungsod for cities; the municipal mayor,
the municipal vice mayor and the members of the sangguniang bayan for
municipalities and the punong barangay, the members of the sangguniang
barangay and the members of the sangguniang kabataan for barangays.

Of these elective local officials, governors, city mayors and municipal mayors
are prohibited from practicing their profession or engaging in any occupation other
than the exercise of their functions as local chief executives. This is because they are
required to render full time service. They should therefore devote all their time and
attention to the performance of their official duties.

On the other hand, members of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang

panlungsod or sangguniang bayan may practice their professions, engage in any
occupation, or teach in schools except during session hours. In other words, they
may practice their professions, engage in any occupation, or teach in schools outside
their session hours. Unlike governors, city mayors and municipal mayors, members
of the sangguniang panlalawigan, sangguniang panlungsod or sangguniang
bayan are required to hold regular sessions only at least once a week.[14] Since the
law itself grants them the authority to practice their professions, engage in any
occupation or teach in schools outside session hours, there is no longer any need for
them to secure prior permission or authorization from any other person or office for
any of these purposes.

While, as already discussed, certain local elective officials (like governors,

mayors, provincial board members and councilors) are expressly subjected to a total
or partial proscription to practice their profession or engage in any occupation, no
such interdiction is made on the punong barangay and the members of
the sangguniang barangay. Expressio unius est exclusio alterius.[15] Since they are
excluded from any prohibition, the presumption is that they are allowed to practice
their profession. And this stands to reason because they are not mandated to serve
full time. In fact, the sangguniang barangay is supposed to hold regular sessions
only twice a month.[16]

Accordingly, as punong barangay, respondent was not forbidden to practice

his profession. However, he should have procured prior permission or authorization
from the head of his Department, as required by civil service regulations.

A LAWYER IN GOVERNMENT
SERVICE WHO IS NOT PROHIBITED
TO PRACTICE LAW MUST SECURE
PRIOR AUTHORITY FROM THE HEAD
OF HIS DEPARTMENT

A civil service officer or employee whose responsibilities do not require his time to
be fully at the disposal of the government can engage in the private practice of law
only with the written permission of the head of the department concerned.[17] Section
12, Rule XVIII of the Revised Civil Service Rules provides:

Sec. 12. No officer or employee shall engage directly in

any private business, vocation, or profession or be connected with any
 commercial, credit, agricultural, or industrial undertaking without a
written permission from the head of the Department: Provided, That
this prohibition will be absolute in the case of those officers and
employees whose duties and responsibilities require that their entire time
be at the disposal of the Government; Provided, further, That if an
employee is granted permission to engage in outside activities, time so
devoted outside of office hours should be fixed by the agency to the end
that it will not impair in any way the efficiency of the officer or employee:
And provided, finally, that no permission is necessary in the case of
investments, made by an officer or employee, which do not involve real
or apparent conflict between his private interests and public duties, or in
any way influence him in the discharge of his duties, and he shall not take
part in the management of the enterprise or become an officer of the board
of directors. (emphasis supplied)

As punong barangay, respondent should have therefore obtained the prior

written permission of the Secretary of Interior and Local Government before he
entered his appearance as counsel for Elizabeth and Pastor. This he failed to do.

The failure of respondent to comply with Section 12, Rule XVIII of the Revised
Civil Service Rules constitutes a violation of his oath as a lawyer: to obey the laws.
Lawyers are servants of the law, vires legis, men of the law. Their paramount duty
to society is to obey the law and promote respect for it. To underscore the primacy
and importance of this duty, it is enshrined as the first canon of the Code of
Professional Responsibility.

In acting as counsel for a party without first securing the required written permission,
respondent not only engaged in the unauthorized practice of law but also violated
civil service rules which is a breach of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility:
Rule 1.01 A lawyer shall not engage in unlawful, dishonest,
immoral or deceitful conduct. (emphasis supplied)
For not living up to his oath as well as for not complying with the exacting ethical
standards of the legal profession, respondent failed to comply with Canon 7 of the
Code of Professional Responsibility:

CANON 7. A LAWYER SHALL AT ALL TIMES UPHOLD THE

INTEGRITY AND THE DIGNITY OF THE LEGAL
PROFESSION AND SUPPORT THE ACTIVITIES OF THE
INTEGRATED BAR. (emphasis supplied)

Indeed, a lawyer who disobeys the law disrespects it. In so doing, he

disregards legal ethics and disgraces the dignity of the legal profession.

Public confidence in the law and in lawyers may be eroded by the

irresponsible and improper conduct of a member of the bar.[18] Every lawyer should
act and comport himself in a manner that promotes public confidence in the integrity
of the legal profession.[19]

A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as an

attorney for violation of the lawyers oath[20] and/or for breach of the ethics of the
legal profession as embodied in the Code of Professional Responsibility.

WHEREFORE, respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa is hereby found GUILTY of

professional misconduct for violating his oath as a lawyer and Canons 1 and 7 and
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility. He is
therefore SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of six months
effective from his receipt of this resolution. He is sternly WARNED that any
repetition of similar acts shall be dealt with more severely.
Respondent is strongly advised to look up and take to heart the meaning of the
word delicadeza.

Let a copy of this resolution be furnished the Office of the Bar Confidant and entered
into the records of respondent Atty. Vicente G. Rellosa. The Office of the Court
Administrator shall furnish copies to all the courts of the land for their information
and guidance.

SO ORDERED.

[AC-5365. April 27, 2005]

Spouses FRANKLIN and LOURDES OLBES, complainants, vs. Atty.

VICTOR V. DECIEMBRE, respondent.

DECISION
PANGANIBAN, J.:

Constituting a serious transgression of the Code of Professional

Responsibility was the malevolent act of respondent, who filled up the blank
checks entrusted to him as security for a loan by writing on those checks
amounts that had not been agreed upon at all, despite his full knowledge that
the loan they were meant to secure had already been paid.

The Case

Before us is a verified Petition for the disbarment of Atty. Victor V.

[1]

Deciembre, filed by Spouses Franklin and Lourdes Olbes with the Office of the
Bar Confidant of this Court. Petitioners charged respondent with willful and
deliberate acts of dishonesty, falsification and conduct unbecoming a member
of the Bar. After he had filed his Comment on the Petition, the Court referred
[2]
the case to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP) for investigation, report
and recommendation.
The IBPs Commission on Bar Discipline (CBD), through Commissioner
Caesar R. Dulay, held several hearings. During those hearings, the last of which
was held on May 12, 2003, the parties were able to present their respective
[3]

witnesses and documentary evidence. After the filing of the parties respective
formal offers of evidence, as well as petitioners Memorandum, the case was
[4]

considered submitted for resolution. Subsequently, the commissioner rendered

his Report and Recommendation dated January 30, 2004, which was later
adopted and approved by the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XV-
2003-177 dated July 30, 2004.

The Facts

In their Petition, Spouses Olbes allege that they were government

employees working at the Central Post Office, Manila; and that Franklin was a
letter carrier receiving a monthly salary of P6,700, and Lourdes, a mail
sorter, P6,000.[5]

Through respondent, Lourdes renewed on July 1, 1999 her application for

a loan from Rodela Loans, Inc., in the amount of P10,000. As security for the
loan, she issued and delivered to respondent five Philippine National Bank
(PNB) blank checks (Nos. 0046241-45), which served as collateral for the
approved loan as well as any other loans that might be obtained in the future. [6]

On August 31, 1999, Lourdes paid respondent the amount of P14,874.37

corresponding to the loan plus surcharges, penalties and interests, for which
the latter issued a receipt, herein quoted as follows:
[7]

August 31, 1999

Received the amount of P14,874.37 as payment of the loan
of P10,000.00 taken earlier by Lourdes Olbes.

(Sgd.) Atty. Victor V. Deciembre

8-31-99
P10,000.00
PNB Check No. 46241 8/15/99 [8]

Notwithstanding the full payment of the loan, respondent filled up four (of
the five) blank PNB Checks (Nos. 0046241, 0046242, 0046243 and 0046244)
for the amount of P50,000 each, with different dates of maturity -- August 15,
1999, August 20, 1999, October 15, 1999 and November 15, 1999,
respectively.[9]

On October 19, 1999, respondent filed before the Provincial Prosecution

Office of Rizal an Affidavit-Complaint against petitioners for estafa and violation
of Batas Pambansa (BP) 22. He alleged therein that on July 15, 1999, around
one-thirty in the afternoon at Cainta, Rizal, they personally approached him and
requested that he immediately exchange with cash their postdated PNB Check
Nos. 0046241 and 0046242 totaling P100,000. [10]

Several months after, or on January 20, 2000, respondent filed against

petitioners another Affidavit-Complaint for estafa and violation of BP 22. He
stated, among others, that on the same day, July 15, 1999, around two oclock
in the afternoon at Quezon City, they again approached him and requested that
he exchange with cash PNB Check Nos. 0046243 and 0046244
totaling P100,000. [11]

Petitioners insisted that on the afternoon of July 15, 1999, they never went
either to Cainta, Rizal, or to Quezon City to transact business with respondent.
Allegedly, they were in their office at the time, as shown by their Daily Time
Records; so it would have been physically impossible for them to transact
business in Cainta, Rizal, and, after an interval of only thirty minutes, in Quezon
City, especially considering the heavy traffic conditions in those places. [12]

Petitioners averred that many of their office mates -- among them, Juanita
Manaois, Honorata Acosta and Eugenia Mendoza -- had suffered the same fate
in their dealings with respondent. [13]

In his Comment, respondent denied petitioners claims, which he called

[14]

baseless and devoid of any truth and merit. Allegedly, petitioners were the ones
who had deceived him by not honoring their commitment regarding their July
15, 1999 transactions. Those transactions, totaling P200,000, had allegedly
been covered by their four PNB checks that were, however, subsequently
dishonored due to ACCOUNT CLOSED. Thus, he filed criminal cases against
them. He claimed that the checks had already been fully filled up when
petitioners signed them in his presence. He further claimed that he had given
them the amounts of money indicated in the checks, because his previous
satisfactory transactions with them convinced him that they had the capacity to
pay.
Moreover, respondent said that the loans were his private and personal
transactions, which were not in any way connected with his profession as a
lawyer. The criminal cases against petitioners were allegedly private actions
intended to vindicate his rights against their deception and violation of their
obligations. He maintained that his right to litigate should not be curtailed by this
administrative action.

Report of the Investigating Commissioner

In his Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Dulay recommended

that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two years for violating
Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility.
The commissioner said that respondents version of the facts was not
credible. Commissioner Dulay rendered the following analysis and evaluation
of the evidence presented:

In his affidavit-complaint x x x executed to support his complaint filed before the

Provincial Prosecution Office of Rizal respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, in the jurisdiction of Cainta, Rizal, both LOURDES E.
OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and requested me to
immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated checks
totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business venture.

Again in his affidavit-complaint executed to support his complaint filed with the
Office of the City Prosecutor of Quezon City respondent stated that:

2. That last July 15, 1999, at around 2PM, in the jurisdiction of Quezon City, M.M.,
both LOURDES E. OLBES and FRANKLIN A. OLBES x x x, personally met and
requested me to immediately exchange with cash, right there and then, their postdated
checks totaling P100,000.00 then, to be immediately used by them in their business
venture.

The above statements executed by respondent under oath are in direct contrast to his
testimony before this Commission on cross-examination during the May 12, 2003
hearing, thus:

ATTY PUNZALAN: (continuing)

Q. Based on these four (4) checks which you claimed the complainant issued to you,
you filed two separate criminal cases against them, one, in Pasig City and the
other in Quezon City, is that correct?
A. Yes, Your Honor, because the checks were deposited at different banks.
Q. These four checks were accordingly issued to you by the complainants on July 15,
1999, is that correct?
A. I will consult my records, You Honor, because its quite a long time. Yes, Your
Honor, the first two checks is in the morning and the next two checks is in the
afternoon (sic).
COMM. DULAY:
Which are the first two checks?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
The first two checks covering check Nos. 46241 and 46242 in the morning. And
Check No. 46243 and 46244 in the afternoon, Your Honor.
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
Q. Could you recall what particular time in the morning that these two checks with
number 0046241 and 0046242 xxx have been issued to you?
A. I could not remember exactly but in the middle part of the morning around 9:30 to
10:00.
Q. This was issued to you in what particular place?
A. Here in my office at Garnet Road, Ortigas Center, Pasig City.
Q. Is that your house?
A. No, its not my house?
Q. What is that, is that your law office?
A. That is my retainer client.
Q. What is the name of that retainer client of yours?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
Your Honor, may I object because what is the materiality of the question?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
That is very material. I am trying to test your credibility because according to you
these checks have been issued in Pasig in the place of your client on a retainer.
Thats why I am asking your client
COMM. DULAY:
The name of the client is not material I think. It is enough that he said it was issued
here in Pasig. What building?
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
AIC Corporate Center, Your Honor.
COMM. DULAY:
What is the materiality of knowing the name of his clients office?
ATTY. PUNZALAN:
 Because, Your Honor, the materiality is to find out whether he is telling the truth.
The place, Your Honor, according to the respondent is his client. Now I am asking
who is that client?
COMM. DULAY:
Your answer.
ATTY. DECIEMBRE:
A. It is AIC Realty Corporation at AIC Building.
Q. And the same date likewise, the complainants in the afternoon issued PNB Check
Nos. 0046243 and 0046244, is that correct?
A. Yes.
Q. So would you want to tell this Honorable office that there were four checks issued in
the place of your client in Pasig City, two in the morning and two in the afternoon?
A. That is correct, sir.

Respondent was clearly not being truthful in his narration of the transaction with the
complainants. As between his version as to when the four checks were given, we find
the story of complainant[s] more credible. Respondent has blatantly distorted the
truth, insofar as the place where the transaction involving the four checks took place.
Such distortion on a very material fact would seriously cast doubt on his version of
the transaction with complainants.

Furthermore respondents statements as to the time when the transactions took place
are also obviously and glaringly inconsistent and contradicts the written statements
made before the public prosecutors. Thus further adding to the lack of credibility of
respondents version of the transaction.

Complainants version that they issued blank checks to respondent as security for the
payment of a loan of P10,000.00 plus interest, and that respondent filled up the checks
in amounts not agreed upon appears to be more credible. Complainants herein are
mere employees of the Central Post Office in Manila who had a previous loan
of P10,000.00 from respondent and which has since been paid x x x. Respondent does
not deny the said transaction. This appears to be the only previous transaction between
the parties. In fact, complainants were even late in paying the loan when it fell due
such that they had to pay interest. That respondent would trust them once more by
giving them another P200,000.00 allegedly to be used for a business and immediately
release the amounts under the circumstances described by respondent does not appear
credible given the background of the previous transaction and personal circumstances
of complainants. That respondent who is a lawyer would not even bother to ask from
complainants a receipt for the money he has given, nor bother to verify and ask them
what businesses they would use the money for contributes further to the lack of
credibility of respondents version. These circumstances really cast doubt as to the
version of respondent with regard to the transaction. The resolution of the public
prosecutors notwithstanding we believe respondent is clearly lacking in honesty in
dealing with the complainants. Complainant Franklin Olbes had to be jailed as a result
of respondents filing of the criminal cases. Parenthetically, we note that respondent
has also filed similar cases against the co-employees of complainants in the Central
Post Office and respondent is facing similar complaints in the IBP for his actions. [15]

The Courts Ruling

We agree with the findings and conclusions of Commissioner Dulay, as

approved and adopted by the IBP Board of Governors. However, the penalty
should be more severe than what the IBP recommended.

Respondents Administrative Liability

Membership in the legal profession is a special privilege burdened with

conditions. It is bestowed upon individuals who are not only learned in the law,
[16]

but also known to possess good moral character. A lawyer is an oath-bound

[17]

servant of society whose conduct is clearly circumscribed by inflexible norms of

law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the advancement of the quest for
truth and justice, for which he [or she] has sworn to be a fearless crusader. [18]

By taking the lawyers oath, an attorney becomes a guardian of truth and the
rule of law, and an indispensable instrument in the fair and impartial
administration of justice. Lawyers should act and comport themselves with
[19]

honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach, in order to promote the

publics faith in the legal profession. [20]

The Code of Professional Responsibility specifically mandates the

following:

Canon 1. A lawyer shall uphold the constitution, obey the laws of the land and
promote respect for law and legal processes.

xxxxxxxxx

Canon 7. A lawyer shall at all times uphold the integrity and dignity of the legal
profession and support the activities of the Integrated Bar.
 xxxxxxxxx

Rule 7.03. A lawyer shall not engage in conduct that adversely reflects on his fitness
to practice law, nor should he, whether in public or private life, behave in a
scandalous manner to the discredit of the legal profession.

A high standard of excellence and ethics is expected and required of

members of the bar. Such conduct of nobility and uprightness should remain
[21]

with them, whether in their public or in their private lives. As officers of the courts
and keepers of the publics faith, they are burdened with the highest degree of
social responsibility and are thus mandated to behave at all times in a manner
consistent with truth and honor. [22]

The oath that lawyers swear to likewise impresses upon them the duty of
exhibiting the highest degree of good faith, fairness and candor in their
relationships with others. The oath is a sacred trust that must be upheld and
kept inviolable at all times. Thus, lawyers may be disciplined for any conduct,
whether in their professional or in their private capacity, if such conduct renders
them unfit to continue to be officers of the court. [23]

In the present case, the IBP commissioner gave credence to the story of
petitioners, who said that they had given five blank personal checks to
respondent at the Central Post Office in Manila as security for the P10,000 loan
they had contracted. Found untrue and unbelievable was respondents
assertion that they had filled up the checks and exchanged these with his cash
at Quezon City and Cainta, Rizal. After a careful review of the records, we find
no reason to deviate from these findings.
Under the circumstances, there is no need to stretch ones imagination to
arrive at an inevitable conclusion. Respondent does not deny the P10,000 loan
obtained from him by petitioners. According to Franklin Olbes testimony on
cross-examination, they asked respondent for the blank checks after the loan
had been paid. On the pretext that he was not able to bring the checks with
him, he was not able to return them. He thus committed abominable
[24]

dishonesty by abusing the confidence reposed in him by petitioners. It was their

high regard for him as a member of the bar that made them trust him with their
blank checks. [25]

It is also glaringly clear that the Code of Professional Responsibility was

seriously transgressed by his malevolent act of filling up the blank checks by
indicating amounts that had not been agreed upon at all and despite
respondents full knowledge that the loan supposed to be secured by the checks
had already been paid. His was a brazen act of falsification of a commercial
document, resorted to for his material gain.
 And he did not stop there. Because the checks were dishonored upon
presentment, respondent had the temerity to initiate unfounded criminal suits
against petitioners, thereby exhibiting his vile intent to have them punished and
deprived of liberty for frustrating the criminal duplicity he had wanted to foist on
them. As a matter of fact, one of the petitioners (Franklin) was detained for three
months because of the Complaints. Respondent is clearly guilty of serious
[26]

dishonesty and professional misconduct. He committed an act indicative of

moral depravity not expected from, and highly unbecoming, a member of the
bar.
Good moral character is an essential qualification for the privilege to enter
into the practice of law. It is equally essential to observe this norm meticulously
during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the privilege. Good
[27]

moral character includes at least common honesty. No moral qualification for

[28]

bar membership is more important than truthfulness and candor. The rigorous
[29]

ethics of the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns

duplicitous behavior. Lawyers must be ministers of truth. Hence, they must not
[30]

mislead the court or allow it to be misled by any artifice. In all their dealings,
they are expected to act in good faith. [31]

Deception and other fraudulent acts are not merely unacceptable practices
that are disgraceful and dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. The
[32]

standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by conduct that merely
enables one to escape the penalties of criminal laws. [33]

Considering the depravity of the offense committed by respondent, we find

the penalty recommended by the IBP of suspension for two years from the
practice of law to be too mild. His propensity for employing deceit and
misrepresentation is reprehensible. His misuse of the filled-up checks that led
to the detention of one petitioner is loathsome.
In Eustaquio v. Rimorin, the forging of a special power of attorney (SPA)
[34]

by the respondent to make it appear that he was authorized to sell anothers

property, as well as his fraudulent and malicious inducement of Alicia Rubis to
sign a Memorandum of Agreement to give a semblance of legality to the SPA,
were sanctioned with suspension from the practice of law for five years. Here,
the conduct of herein respondent is even worse. He used falsified checks as
bases for maliciously indicting petitioners and thereby caused the detention of
one of them.
WHEREFORE, Atty. Victor V. Deciembre is found guilty of gross
misconduct and violation of Rules 1.01 and 7.03 of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. He is hereby indefinitely SUSPENDED from the practice of law
effective immediately. Let copies of this Decision be furnished all courts as well
as the Office of the Bar Confidant, which is directed to append a copy to
respondents personal record. Let another copy be furnished the National Office
of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines.
SO ORDERED.

[A. C. No. 2841. July 3, 2002]

RE: ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 44 OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT,

BRANCH IV, TAGBILARAN CITY, AGAINST ATTY. SAMUEL C.
OCCEA.

DECISION
PER CURIAM:

Membership in the bar is in the category of a mandate to public service of the highest
order. A lawyer is an oath-bound servant of society whose conduct is clearly
circumscribed by inflexible norms of law and ethics, and whose primary duty is the
advancement of the quest for truth and justice, for which he has sworn to be a fearless
crusader.[1] These were the eloquent words of the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro in
exalting the sacred and honorable legal profession. But he laments the pathetic and
deplorable fact that, many a law practitioner, forgetting his sacred mission as a sworn
public servant and his exalted position as an officer of the court, has allowed himself to
become an instigator of controversy and a predator of conflict instead of a mediator for
concord and a conciliator for compromise, a virtuoso of technicality in the conduct of
litigation instead of a true exponent of the primacy of truth and moral justice, a mercenary
purveying the benefits of his enlightened advocacy in direct proportion to a litigants
financial posture instead of a faithful friend of the courts in the dispensation of equal
justice to rich and poor alike.[2] Here, Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as later shown by his
disgraceful and outrageous conduct, is one such lawyer who has become an apostate to
his exalted position as an officer of the court. He thus deserves to be weeded out from
the legal profession to protect its sanctity and nobility.
This administrative case stemmed from the settlement of the estate of testator William
C. Ogan which has since been pending in the Court of First Instance (CFI), now Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 4, Tagbilaran City, docketed as Special Proceedings No. 423.
In 1976, Judge Fernando S. Ruiz took over the case from Judge Paulino S. Marquez who,
in turn, inherited it from Judge Antonio Beldia. Noting that the proceedings have been
pending for thirteen (13) years, Judge Ruiz then inquired into the principal causes of the
delay. He found out, as will be shown later in detail, that Atty. Samuel C. Occea caused
the delay by disobeying lawful court orders and by willfully prolonging the litigation through
his various maneuvers, in gross violation of his oath as a lawyer that he will not willingly
sue any groundless, false, or unlawful suit, or delay any mans cause for money or malice.
Going back to Special Proceedings No. 423, under the terms of the Last Will and
Testament of the late William C. Ogan, his residuary estate was divided among his seven
children. One of them, Necitas Ogan-Occea, was named in the will as executrix of the
estate. As such, she retained her husband, Atty. Samuel C. Occea, as her lawyer.
The estate consists of bank deposits, securities (both here and in the United States
of America), and real estate in Cebu City and in Ohio, U.S.A. The deceased left no debt.
Thus, the settlement of the estate should have been simple and speedy. However, since
the death of the testator on February 1, 1963, the settlement of his estate has not yet
been terminated owing largely to the dilatory tactics of Atty. Occea.
Looking into the causes of the delay, Judge Ruiz learned that the executrix, Necitas
Ogan-Occea, filed a project of partition on August 4, 1967. On September 22, 1967, the
probate court approved the project except certain portions. The executrix then interposed
an appeal. In view of the delay caused by the pendency of the appeal, the other heirs
filed several motions praying that the estates remaining P250,000.00 cash as well as its
shares of stocks in the Philippines and in the United States be distributed among all the
heirs. The executrix, through her husband Atty. Occea, vehemently opposed the motions,
asserting that the P250,000.00 cash had already been earmarked for her husbands
attorneys fee and other expenses, and that the shares of stocks could not be distributed
among the heirs because the stock certificates were not in her possession. The dispute
between the executrix, on the one hand, and the other heirs, on the other, which delayed
the proceedings, centered mainly on the P250,000.00 cash and the shares of stocks.
Records also show that the executrix, through Atty. Occea, interposed numerous
appeals from the orders of the probate court. For their part, the heirs repeatedly prayed
in their motions for the release of the shares of stocks and the remaining cash. But the
executrix and Atty. Occea opposed the same, thus prolonging the proceedings. In CA-
GR No. 48716-R (December, 1974), the Court of Appeals, in remanding the case to the
probate court, had this to say:

It is, however, earnestly hoped, and the parties are urged, to settle their
differences with the view to closing the estate which has been pending since
1963. The executrix, the heirs, and the lawyers, are reminded that the
prolongation of administrative proceedings can only benefit the executor or
administrator or the counsels for the contending parties. It always results in
the diminution of the share of each of the heirs because the estate is
burdened with the expenses of the administration proceedings, the heir must
have to pay attorneys fee and the longer the proceedings the bigger the
attorneys fee. [3]

Obviously, the main causes of the delay in the probate proceedings were Atty.
Occeas claim for attorneys fee in the amount of P250,000.00 and the executrixs refusal,
through her husband, to account for the shares of stocks belonging to the estate which,
according to her, were not in her possession. The other heirs could not accept that
explanation because as executrix, she was charged with the responsibility of collecting
all the assets of the estate.
Thus, on August 8, 1977, Judge Ruiz issued an order directing the executrix to
comment why the securities were not in her possession. She filed her comment, through
her husband, that some Philippine and American securities were not in her possession.
To determine which securities were in her possession, Judge Ruiz on October 22, 1977,
issued an order requiring her to submit within 30 days the latest inventory of all the
securities of the estate. However, she failed to comply with the order. Judge Ruiz then
issued another order on February 6, 1978, directing her to take possession of all
certificates of stocks or their replacements belonging to the estate and to make an up-to-
date inventory thereof with a statement of their nature and their value. Again, she did not
comply with the order.
Determined to block the release of the P250,000.00 to the heirs, the executrix,
through Atty. Occea, appealed the numerous interlocutory orders of the probate court to
the Court of Appeals, hence, adding to the delay. Because of the propensity of the
executrix, through Atty. Occea, to elevate interlocutory orders to the Court of Appeals,
Judge Ruiz issued an order on June 16, 1978 directing her to refrain from instituting any
action or proceeding without first informing the court. The executrix and her husband
disobeyed this order. In fact, he filed six cases with the Court of Appeals and one with
this Court.
On August 15, 1979, Judge Ruiz issued an order authorizing Nancy Ogan-Gibson,
one of the heirs, to go to Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A., to take proper action on the five
parcels of land owned by the estate and to submit a report to the probate court. To provide
money for the purpose, the court ordered the executrix to release to Nancy Ogan-Gibson
the sum of $1,000.00 from the estate fund, the same to be liquidated with supporting
receipts upon her submission of her report on or before September 30, 1979. The
executrix assailed the order before the Court of Appeals in a petition for prohibition
and certiorari, docketed therein as CA-G. R. No. SP-10326. Dismissing the petition on
January 13, 1981 for lack of merit, the Court of Appeals said:

Indeed it is surprising why petitioner as executrix should oppose such an

order of the court which is and would be for the benefit of the estate and the
heirs. All the other heirs completely agreed with what the trial court did. xxx

Thus, rather than accuse respondent judge of grave abuse of discretion in

issuing the questioned orders he should be complimented in finding ways and
means of promptly and expeditiously determining the assets of the estate to
be ultimately distributed among the heirs.

On May 12, 1981, Judge Ruiz cited the executrix for contempt of court for her failure
to obey the orders of October 22, 1977, December 8, 1977, February 6, 1978 and October
16, 1979 and directed her to report to the court which securities were and were not in her
possession and to give the reason therefor.
 On February 11, 1982, the executrix and Atty. Occea were held in contempt of court
and fined P250.00 each for disobeying the court order of August 15, 1979 requiring the
executrix to release $1,000.00 to Nancy Ogan-Gibson. Both were given the chance to
explain their failure to comply with the order, but they did not submit any explanation. On
January 13, 1981, this order was affirmed by the Court of Appeals in CA-G. R. No. SP-
10326. It bears emphasis that this incident delayed the proceedings for four (4) years.
On October 16, 1979, the probate court issued an order requiring the executrix to
distribute immediately among the heirs all the shares of stocks of the estate in the
Batangas-Laguna Transportation Co., the Masonic Hall, Inc. and the Motor Service Co.;
to report her compliance within 10 days from notice; and within the same period, to file a
written report to the court stating (a) what other certificates of stocks belonging to the
estate are in her possession; and (b) which certificates of stocks are not with her, giving
the reasons therefor. Again, the executrix and her husband, Atty. Occea, did not comply
with the said order. The probate court thus ordered her to explain why she should not be
punished for contempt of court. After several postponements at her instance and that of
her husband, the incident was set for hearing on April 20, 1981. But neither of them
appeared, thus delaying the proceedings for about a year and a half. Finding the executrix
unfaithful in the performance of her duties, the probate court, on May 12, 1981, adjudged
her in contempt of court.
Forthwith, Atty. Occea and his wife, filed with the then CFI of Davao City, Civil Case
No. 14456 for damages (P200,000.00 as moral damages and expenses of litigation)
against Judge Ruiz. But, on October 13, 1981, the court dismissed the complaint for lack
of merit.
After the dismissal of Civil Case No. 14456, Atty. Occea filed with the Tanodbayan a
letter-complaint against Judge Ruiz, charging him with knowingly rendering unjust
interlocutory orders, in that without prior notice and hearing, he punished the executrix for
indirect contempt of court and censured her for non-compliance with the probate courts
order of October 16, 1979. For lack of merit, Atty. Occeas complaint was dismissed by
then Tanodbayan Bernardo P. Fernandez in a Resolution dated November 19, 1984.
On November 13, 1979, Atty. Occea filed with this Court Administrative Case No.
2345-CFI against Judge Ruiz for gross inefficiency and dishonesty. In a Resolution dated
October 11, 1982, this Court dismissed the complaint for failure of Atty. Occea to
substantiate his charges during the investigation.
Unhappy with what Judge Ruiz stated in his comment on the said administrative
complaint, Atty. Occea and his wife filed with the CFI of Davao City Civil Case No. 14957
for damages against the former. The couple alleged that they suffered damages upon
reading the judges comment filed with the Supreme Court. On June 11, 1982, the CFI
dismissed the complaint for lack of cause of action, the comment being an absolutely
privileged communication.
By filing the said civil actions, criminal charge, and administrative complaints, found
to be groundless, Atty. Occea further delayed with malice the probate proceedings and
inflicted hardship and pain upon Judge Ruiz.
 More telling is the fact that by deliberately delaying the proceedings, Atty. Occea has
inflicted greater harm to the other heirs, with the executrix herself as his willing partner.
From the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13 petitions were filed
with this Court and the Court of Appeals by Atty. Occea, questioning the interlocutory
orders of the probate court. But most, if not all, were without merit.
Aside from Judge Ruiz, his predecessor, the late Judge Antonio Beldia, in the same
probate proceedings, was also harassed by Atty. Occea with groundless administrative
charges and suits, both criminal and civil. These cases, while pending, were then utilized
by Atty. Occea in securing restraining orders from the Court of Appeals or as grounds for
the judges inhibition.
Pursuant to Section 28, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court providing inter
alia that the CFI may suspend an attorney from the practice of law for cause, Judge Ruiz,
on May 26, 1982, filed with the same probate court Administrative Case No. 44 charging
Atty. Occea with gross misconduct, violation of his oath as a lawyer and willful
disobedience of lawful court orders. Instead of filing an answer, he submitted a motion
praying for the inhibition of Judge Ruiz. This motion was denied. Atty. Occea was then
directed to file his answer within 15 days from notice which was extended to another 15
days upon his motion. Still, he did not file an answer. What he submitted was a motion to
dismiss the complaint for lack of jurisdiction. But it was denied for lack of merit.
Administrative Case No. 44 was set for hearing on December 2 and 3, 1982, morning
and afternoon. Upon Atty. Occeas motion, he was given an extension of 15 days from
November 3, 1982 within which to file his answer. However, he did not comply. Neither
did he appear during the hearing.
Eventually, further hearing of the case was suspended when this Court issued a
temporary restraining order in G. R. No. 62453, Samuel Occea vs. District Judge
Fernando S. Ruiz, CFI-4, Bohol for prohibition. However, on August 15, 1983, this Court
dismissed Atty. Occeas petition for lack of merit. The hearing of the administrative case
was set on January 30 and 31, 1984, but again, he did not appear.
The hearing was reset but once more, Atty. Occea failed to appear. Upon his
telegraphic request, the hearing was reset on December 13 and 14, 1984. On December
7, 1984, he filed his Answer and Motion for Referral to the Solicitor General or the
Integrated Bar of the Philippines. His motion was denied. The hearing was reset on May
8 and 9, 1985. Upon another telegraphic request of Atty. Occea, the hearing was
postponed to August 14 and 15, 1985. Again, he did not appear. Thus, in its order of
August 15, 1985, the probate court considered his failure to appear as a waiver of his
right to present evidence.[4]
On November 14, 1985, based on the evidence presented ex parte, showing that
Atty. Occea has abused, misused and overused the judicial system, [5] Judge Ruiz
rendered a decision suspending[6] him from the practice of law for three (3) years. The
decision[7] unfolded a long list of his administrative offenses, thus:
I
 Willful disobedience of lawful orders of the court;
gross misconduct in office

During the probate proceedings, respondent Occea, on behalf of his wife

executrix, filed with the Court of Appeals six (6) cases; and with the Supreme
Court one (1) case, assailing the order of the probate court directing the said
executrix to provide Nancy Ogan, authorized to determine the assets of the
estate in the U.S., $1,000.00 to be taken from the estate; and the order
ordering the same executrix to report to the probate court the securities
belonging to the estate. Atty. Occeas refusal to obey the said orders and
elevating the same to the higher courts unnecessarily delayed the probate
proceedings.
II

Wittingly or willingly promoted or sued groundless

suits and gave aid or consent to the same; delayed
persons for money or malice

Respondent, together with his wife, filed against the judge of the probate court
two actions for damages which were both dismissed for lack of merit and lack
of cause of action. Respondent also filed with the Tanodbayan a letter-
complaint charging the judge of the probate court with knowingly rendering
unjust interlocutory orders. The complaint was likewise dismissed for lack of
merit. Respondent also filed with this Court an administrative complaint which
was again dismissed for failure of respondent to substantiate the charge.

By filing the above-cited civil actions for damages, administrative complaint

and criminal charge which were found to be groundless and unsubstantiated,
respondent unduly delayed the settlement of the estate proceedings by
harassing Judge Ruiz who had to spend time, effort and money to defend
himself against said frivolous and unmeritorious cases.

In fact, respondents propensity to file groundless administrative charges, as

well as civil and criminal suits, harassed not only Judge Ruiz but also the
previous judges who handled the case. As a measure of self defense, these
judges were compelled to prepare and file pleadings or comments thereby
using time which could have been devoted to expediting the closure of the
estate proceedings.

Finally, since the start of the testate proceedings in 1963, no less than 13
petitions were filed with the Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals
questioning the interlocutory orders of the probate court. Most, if not all of
these petitions, were determined to be groundless and without merit.
III

Disobeying the laws

Respondent violated his lawyers oath of office by flagrantly disobeying the

clear provision of Rule 140, Section 6, Revised Rules of Court, entitled
Charges Against Judges of First Instance, which reads as follows:

Sec. 6. Confidential - Proceedings against judges of first instance shall be

private and confidential.

During the pendency of the administrative complaint (Adm. Matter No. 23345-
CFI, Exh. Z) filed by respondent against Judge Ruiz in the Supreme Court, he
violated the private and confidential nature thereof three (3) times, to wit:

1. On April 1, 1980, respondent filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C. Ogan, et al. vs. Hon.
Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-10604, questioning an interlocutory
order of the probate court (No. 2, Exh. V) to which he attached as Annex AW
a complete copy of his aforesaid administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz
albeit the same is completely immaterial to the issue raised in said petition.

2. In another petition for prohibition and certiorari, entitled Estate of William C.

Ogan, et al. vs. Hon. Fernando S. Ruiz, et al., CA-G.R. No. SP-13162 (No. 4,
Exh. V), impugning an interlocutory order of the probate court, he attached as
Annex C thereof a true and complete copy of the said administrative complaint
although not relevant to the question therein raised; and

3. On March 29, 1982, when respondent filed a letter-criminal complaint with

the Tanodbayan (Exh. Y), he also attached as Annex A thereof a true and
complete copy of said administrative complaint against Judge Ruiz even if
said administrative complaint is not germane to the charge (Page 2, No. 1,
Exh. Y).

By repeatedly violating said provision of the Rules of Court, respondent, as an

officer of the court, put to naught one of the principal purposes thereof which
is to protect the personal and professional reputation of judges from the
baseless charges of disgruntled, vindictive and irresponsible clients, litigants
and counsels (In re Abistado, 57 Phil. 668; Murillo vs. Superable, Adm. Case
No. 341, March 23, 1960; Moran, Rules of Court, 1963 Ed., Vol. VI, page
260). Respondent committed gross misconduct in office and has not
conducted himself as a lawyer according to the best of his knowledge and
discretion.
IV

Did falsehood and consented to the

doing of same in court.

In his complaint for damages against Judge Ruiz (Civil Case No. 14456 (Exh.
W), respondent alleged in paragraph IV-7b thereof (Exh. W-1) that his wife-
executrix Necitas Ogan Occea was held in contempt and censured, without
any hearing, for not obeying the probate courts order of October 16, 1979
(Exh. N).

However, the records of the Ogan estate proceedings (Sp. Proc. No. 423)
would show that in the order of February 26, 1980, the probate court directed
said executrix to explain within 5 days from notice why she should not be cited
for contempt (Exh. O). In the order of April 8, 1980, the contempt charge was
set for hearing on June 23, 1980, at 9:00 oclock in the morning (Exh. P) but
was reset to October 22, 1980 after the lifting of the restraining order of the
Court of Appeals (Exh. Q). This was again reset to April 20, 1981, subsequent
to the denial by the Supreme Court of the respondents petition for review
impugning the Court of Appeals decision. As stated in the order of May 12,
1981, page 2, paragraph 3 (Exh. R), copies of the order setting the hearing of
the contempt charge on said date (April 20, 1981) were received by the
respondent and his wife-executrix on March 24, 1981. On the date of the
hearing, neither the executrix nor respondent appeared. The following day
(April 21, 1981), the court received executrixs motion for postponement of the
hearing, which was denied for lack of merit. Subsequently, the order of May
12, 1981 (Exh. R) was rendered holding the executrix in contempt and
penalized with censure.

In fine, there was hearing with notice but the executrix and her counsel did not
attend.

Meanwhile, respondent once more, committed falsehood when he

subsequently alleged under oath in his letter-complaint to the Tanodbayan,
dated March 29, 1982, against Judge Ruiz (Exh. Y) that without prior notice
and without any hearing, Judge Ruiz adjudged executrix Necitas Ogan
Occea guilty of contempt and censuring her (page 2, paragraph 2, Exh. Y-2;
page 5, paragraph 9b, Exh. Y-3).

Furthermore, in order to avoid complying with the probate court order of

August 15, 1979 (Exh. C), directing said executrix to remit immediately the
sum of $1,000.00 to her co-heir Nancy Ogan-Gibson with which to meet
whatever necessary expenses that she might incur in inquiring into the status
of the 5 parcels of land owned by the estate at Vinton County, Ohio, U.S.A.,
respondent and his wife-executrix committed falsehood when they stated in
their petition filed with the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. No. SP-10326 that the
said order was issued without hearing and thus a violation of procedural due
process. The Court of Appeals, in its decision which has become final (Exh.
E), confirmed this falsehood when it held that the petitioner-executrix was not
deprived of her right to be heard when the respondent judge issued the
two orders in question (Page 6, Exh. E).

In accordance with the provisions of Section 29, Rule 138 [8] and Section 9, Rule
139 of the Revised Rules of Court, Judge Ruiz, on November 26, 1985, transmitted to
[9]

this Court a certified true copy of the order of suspension and a full statement of facts. [10]
On February 11, 1986, this Court, upon Atty. Occeas motion, restrained Judge Ruiz
from enforcing his decision of November 14, 1985. The case then has remained pending
so that on May 30, 1989, this Court issued an Order[11] requiring the parties to move in the
premises, by informing the Court about the status of the decision or order
suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law, Judge Ruiz particularly
indicating if he still pursues the instant case, within ten (10) days from notice.
On June 2, 1989, Judge Ruiz filed a comment that he has been waiting for this Courts
action on his decision suspending Atty. Occea.
On August 25, 1989, Atty. Occea filed an Explanation and Motion praying that the
case be referred to the Integrated Bar of the Philippines for investigation and
recommendation. This Court denied the motion and instead referred the case to Atty.
Emilio Rebueno (now deceased), then Bar Confidant, for evaluation, report and
recommendation. After going over the records, he recommended that the temporary
restraining order enjoining Judge Fernando S. Ruiz from enforcing the decision dated
November 14, 1985 suspending Atty. Samuel C. Occea from the practice of law for a
period of three years be forthwith LIFTED, and that Atty. Samuel C. Occea
be DISBARRED from the practice of law for grave violation of his oath of office as
attorney; likewise, that his name be DROPPED from the roll of attorneys.
We sustain the evaluation, report and recommendation of the Office of the Bar
Confidant, the same being supported by the facts on record.
Indeed, a lawyer may be disbarred or suspended for any misconduct showing any
fault or deficiency in his moral character, honesty, probity or good demeanor. [12] His guilt,
however, cannot be presumed.[13] It must indicate the dubious character of the acts done,
as well as the motivation thereof. Furthermore, a disbarred lawyer must have been given
full opportunity upon reasonable notice to answer the charges against him, produce
witnesses in his own behalf, and to be heard by himself and counsel. [14] All these
requirements have been complied with in the case at hand.
In fact, it was Atty. Occea who did not bother at all to appear in the hearing of the
administrative case against him which was postponed by Judge Ruiz so many times so
that he could be accorded the full measure of due process. The court a quo, therefore,
appropriately proceeded to hear the case ex parte as Atty. Occea deliberately failed to
appear and answer the accusations against him.
Section 27, Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court mandates that a member of the
Bar may be disbarred or suspended by this Court for any (1) deceit, (2) malpractice, (3)
gross misconduct in office, (4) grossly immoral conduct, (5) conviction of a crime involving
moral turpitude, (6) violation of the lawyers oath, (7) willful disobedience of any lawful
order of a superior court, and for (8) willfully appearing as an attorney for a party without
authority to do so. Not only did Atty. Occea commit deceit, malpractice, grossly immoral
conduct and willful disobedience to a superior court. Beyond these transgressions, he
violated the lawyers oath whereby he imposed upon himself the following duties, thus:

I, __________________,of __________________,do
(place of birth)

solemnly swear that I will maintain allegiance to the Republic of the

Philippines; I will support its Constitution and obey the laws as well as the
legal orders of the duly constituted authorities therein; I will do no falsehood,
nor consent to the doing of any in court; I will not wittingly or willing promote or
sue any groundless, false or unlawful suit, or give aid nor consent to the
same; I will delay no man for money or malice, and will conduct myself as a
lawyer according to the best of my knowledge and discretion, with all good
fidelity as well to the court as to my clients; and I impose upon myself these
voluntary obligations without any mental reservation or purpose of evasion. So
help me God.

As shown by the records, Atty. Occea gravely violated his oath of office in his handling
of Special Proceedings No. 423. The facts of the case succinctly show that through his
atrocious maneuvers, he successfully delayed the disposition of the case for the last
thirty-eight (38) years, causing untold hurt and prejudice, not only to the heirs, but also to
Judges Ruiz and Beldia who heard the case. For respondents part and that of his wife,
such prolonged litigation obviously benefited them. As aptly declared by the Court of
Appeals, the delay can only benefit the executor or administrator and the longer the
proceedings, the bigger the attorneys fees. But the more tragic reality is the fact that Atty.
Occea has caused a mockery of the judicial proceedings and inflicted injury to the
administration of justice through his deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral
conduct. Indeed, he abused beyond measure his privilege to practice law.
 This Court has held that a lawyer should not abuse his right of recourse to the courts
for the purpose of arguing a cause that had been repeatedly rebuffed. Neither should he
use his knowledge of law as an instrument to harass a party nor to misuse judicial
processes, as the same constitutes serious transgression of the Code of Professional
Responsibility. For while he owes fidelity to the cause of his client, it should not be at the
expense of truth and the administration of justice.[15]
The practice of law is a sacred and noble profession. It is a special privilege bestowed
only upon those who are competent intellectually, academically and morally. [16] A lawyer
must at all times conduct himself, especially in his dealings with his clients and the public
at large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach. [17] He must faithfully
perform his duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to his clients. A violation of the
high standards of the legal profession subjects the lawyer to administrative sanctions by
this Court which includes suspension and disbarment.
Clearly, Atty. Occeas conduct has made him unfit to remain in the legal profession
even for a single moment.
It is a time-honored rule that good moral character is not only a condition precedent
to admission to the practice of law. Its continued possession is also essential for
remaining in the legal profession.[18] Atty. Occea has definitely fallen below the moral bar
when he engaged in deceitful, dishonest, unlawful and grossly immoral acts. This Court
has repeatedly stressed the importance of integrity and good moral character as part of
a lawyers equipment in the practice of his profession,[19] because it cannot be denied that
the respect of litigants for the profession is inexorably diminished whenever a member of
the Bar betrays their trust and confidence.[20] Thus, for his serious administrative offenses,
punishable under Section 27 of Rule 138, Atty. Occea deserves the ultimate penalty, that
of expulsion from the esteemed brotherhood of lawyers.
WHEREFORE, ATTY. SAMUEL C. OCCEA is DISBARRED from the practice of law.
His name is STRICKEN from the Roll of Attorneys EFFECTIVE IMMEDIATELY.
Let copies of this Decision be furnished the Bar Confidant, the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines and all courts throughout the country.
SO ORDERED.

[BAR MATTER No. 712. March 19, 1997]

RE: PETITION OF AL ARGOSINO TO TAKE THE LAWYER'S OATH

RESOLUTION
PADILLA, J.:
 Petitioner Al Caparros Argosino passed the bar examinations held in 1993.
The Court however deferred his oath-taking due to his previous conviction for
Reckless Imprudence Resulting In Homicide.
The criminal case which resulted in petitioner' s conviction, arose from the
death of a neophyte during fraternity initiation rites sometime in September
1991. Petitioner and seven (7) other accused initially entered pleas of not guilty
to homicide charges. The eight (8) accused later withdrew their initial pleas and
upon re-arraignment all pleaded guilty to reckless imprudence resulting in
homicide.
On the basis of such pleas, the trial court rendered judgment dated 11
February 1993 imposing on each of the accused a sentence of imprisonment
of from two (2) years four (4) months and one (1) day to four (4) years.
On 18 June 1993, the trial court granted herein petitioner's application for
probation.
On 11 April 1994, the trial court issued an order approving a report dated 6
April 1994 submitted by the Probation Officer recommending petitioner's
discharge from probation
On 14 April 1994, petitioner filed before this Court a petition to be allowed
to take the lawyer's oath based on the order of his discharge from probation.
On 13 July 1995, the Court through then Senior Associate Justice Florentino
P. Feliciano issued a resolution requiring petitioner Al C. Argosino to submit to
the Court evidence that he may now be regarded as complying with the
requirement of good moral character imposed upon those seeking admission
to the bar.
In compliance with the above resolution, petitioner submitted no less than
fifteen (15) certifications/letters executed by among others two (2) senators, five
(5) trial court judges, and six (6) members of religious orders. Petitioner likewise
submitted evidence that a scholarship foundation had been established in honor
of Raul Camaligan, the hazing victim, through joint efforts of the latter's family
and the eight (8) accused in the criminal case.
On 26 September 1995, the Court required Atty Gilbert Camaligan, father
of Raul, to comment on petitioner's prayer to be allowed to take the lawyer's
oath.
In his comment dated 4 December 1995, Atty. Camaligan states that:
a. He still believes that the infliction of severe physical injuries which led to the death of
his son was deliberate rather than accidental. The offense therefore was not only homicide
but murder since the accused took advantage of the neophyte's helplessness implying abuse
of confidence, taking advantage of superior strength and treachery.
b. He consented to the accused's plea of guilt to the lesser offense of reckless
imprudence resulting in homicide only out of pity for the mothers of the accused and a
pregnant wife of one of the accused who went to their house on Christmas day 1991 and
Maundy Thursday 1992, literally on their knees, crying and begging for forgiveness and
compassion. They also told him that the father of one of the accused had died of a heart
attack upon learning of his son's involvement in the incident.
c. As a Christian, he has forgiven petitioner and his co-accused for the death of his son.
However, as a loving father who had lost a son whom he had hoped would succeed him in
his law practice, he still feels the pain of an untimely demise and the stigma of the gruesome
manner of his death.
d. He is not in a position to say whether petitioner is now morally fit for admission to the
bar. He therefore submits the matter to the sound discretion of the Court.

The practice of law is a privilege granted only to those who possess the
strict intellectual and moral qualifications required of lawyers who are
instruments in the effective and efficient administration o f justice. It is the sworn
duty of this Court not only to "weed out" lawyers who have become a disgrace
to the noble profession of the law but, also of equal importance, to prevent
"misfits" from taking the lawyer' s oath, thereby further tarnishing the public
image of lawyers which in recent years has undoubtedly become less than
irreproachable.
The resolution of the issue before us required a weighing and re-weighing
of the reasons for allowing or disallowing petitioner's admission to the practice
of law. The senseless beatings inf1icted upon Raul Camaligan constituted
evident absence of that moral fitness required for admission to the bar since
they were totally irresponsible, irrelevant and uncalled for.
In the 13 July 1995 resolution in this case we stated:

"x x x participation in the prolonged and mindless physical behavior, [which] makes
impossible a finding that the participant [herein petitioner] was then possessed of
good moral character." [1]

In the same resolution, however, we stated that the Court is prepared to

consider de novo the question of whether petitioner has purged himself of the
obvious deficiency in moral character referred to above.
Before anything else, the Court understands and shares the sentiment of
Atty. Gilbert Camaligan. The death of one's child is, for a parent, a most
traumatic experience. The suffering becomes even more pronounced and
profound in cases where the death is due to causes other than natural or
accidental but due to the reckless imprudence of third parties. The feeling then
becomes a struggle between grief and anger directed at the cause of death.
Atty. Camaligan's statement before the Court manifesting his having
forgiven the accused is no less than praiseworthy and commendable. It is
exceptional for a parent, given the circumstances in this cases, to find room for
forgiveness.
However, Atty. Camaligan admits that he is still not in a position to state if
petitioner is now morally fit to be a lawyer.
After a very careful evaluation of this case, we resolve to allow petitioner Al
Caparros Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, sign the Roll of Attorneys and
practice the legal profession with the following admonition:
In allowing Mr. Argosino to take the lawyer's oath, the Court recognizes that
Mr. Argosino is not inherently of bad moral fiber. On the contrary, the various
certifications show that he is a devout Catholic with a genuine concern for civic
duties and public service.
The Court is persuaded that Mr. Argosino has exerted all efforts to atone for
the death of Raul Camaligan. We are prepared to give him the benefit of the
doubt, taking judicial notice of the general tendency of youth to be rash,
temerarious and uncalculating.
We stress to Mr. Argosino that the lawyer's oath is NOT a mere ceremony
or formality for practicing law. Every lawyer should at ALL TIMES weigh his
actions according to the sworn promises he makes when taking the lawyer's
oath. If all lawyers conducted themselves strictly according to the lawyer's oath
and the Code of Professional Responsibility, the administration of justice will
undoubtedly be faster, fairer and easier for everyone concerned.
The Court sincerely hopes that Mr. Argosino will continue with the
assistance he has been giving to his community. As a lawyer he will now be in
a better position to render legal and other services to the more unfortunate
members of society.
PREMISES CONSIDERED, petitioner Al Caparros Argosino is hereby
ALLOWED to take the lawyer's oath on a date to be set by the Court, to sign
the Roll of Attorneys and, thereafter, to practice the legal profession.
SO ORDERED.
 [A.C. No. 4838. July 29, 2003]

EMILIO GRANDE, complainant, vs. ATTY. EVANGELINE DE

SILVA, respondent.

DECISION
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:

Complainant Emilio Grande was the private offended party in Criminal

Cases Nos. 96-1346 to 96-1353, filed with the Regional Trial Court of Marikina
City, Branch 273, for Estafa and Violation of Batas Pambansa Bilang 22,
entitled People of the Philippines, Plaintiff versus Sergio Natividad,
Accused. During the proceedings, respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva,
counsel for the accused, tendered to complainant Check No. 0023638 in the
amount of P144,768.00, drawn against her account with the Philippine National
Bank, as settlement of the civil aspect of the case against her
client. Complainant refused to accept the check, but respondent assured him
that the same will be paid upon its presentment to her drawee bank. She
manifested that as a lawyer, she would not issue a check which is not
sufficiently funded. Thus, respondent was prevailed upon by complainant to
accept the check. Consequently, he desisted from participating as a
complaining witness in the criminal case, which led to the dismissal of the same
and the release of the accused, Sergio Natividad.
When complainant deposited the check, the same was returned unpaid by
the drawee bank for the reason: Account Closed. On June 19, 1997,
complainant wrote a letter to respondent demanding that she pay the face value
of the check. However, his demand was ignored by respondent; hence, he
[1]

instituted a criminal complaint against her for Estafa and Violation of Batas
Pambansa Bilang 22 with the Office of the City Prosecutor of Marikina, which
was docketed as I.S. No. 97-1036. On September 22, 1997, the Marikina City
Prosecutor filed the necessary information for violation of Batas Pambansa
Bilang 22 against respondent Atty. Evangeline de Silva. [2]

On November 10, 1997, complainant filed the instant administrative

complaint for disbarment of respondent for deceit and violation of the Lawyers
Oath.[3]

In a Resolution dated February 2, 1998 sent to respondents given address

at Carmelo Compound, Newton Avenue, Mayamot, Antipolo City, she was
required to comment on the complaint within ten (10) days from
notice. However, it was returned unserved with the notation Moved. The
[4] [5]

Assistant National Secretary of the IBP submitted the latest address of

respondent as 274 M.H. Del Pilar Street, Pasig City. [6]

On June 20, 2001, another resolution requiring respondent to comment on

the administrative complaint filed against her was served at the aforesaid
address. This was again returned unserved with the notation: Refused. Thus,
the case was referred to the IBP Commission on Bar Discipline (IBP-CBD) for
investigation, report and recommendation. [7]

In a Report dated December 6, 2001, Investigating Commissioner

Florimond C. Rous found respondent guilty of deceit, gross misconduct and
violation of the Lawyers Oath. Thus, he recommended that respondent be
suspended from the practice of law for two (2) years.
On October 19, 2002, the IBP Board of Governors passed Resolution No.
XV-2002-554 which adopted the recommendation of the Investigating
Commissioner that respondent be suspended from the practice of law for two
(2) years.
We fully agree with the findings and recommendation of the IBP Board of
Governors.
The record shows that respondent prevailed upon complainant to accept
her personal check by way of settlement for the civil liability of her client, Sergio
Natividad, with the assurance that the check will have sufficient funds when
presented for payment. In doing so, she deceived complainant into withdrawing
his complaint against her client in exchange for a check which she drew against
a closed account.
It is clear that the breach of trust committed by respondent in issuing a
bouncing check amounted to deceit and constituted a violation of her oath, for
which she should be accordingly penalized. Such an act constitutes gross
[8]

misconduct and the penalties for such malfeasance is prescribed by Rule 138,
Section 27of the Rules of Court, to wit:

SEC. 27. Disbarment and suspension of attorneys by Supreme Court, grounds

therefore. A member of the bar may be disbarred or suspended from his office as
attorney by the Supreme Court for any deceit, malpractice or other gross misconduct
in such office, grossly immoral conduct or by reason of his conviction of a crime
involving moral turpitude, or for any violation of the oath which he is required to take
before the admission to practice, or for a willful disobedience appearing as attorney
for a party without authority to do so.
 The nature of the office of an attorney requires that a lawyer shall be a
person of good moral character. Since this qualification is a condition precedent
to a license to enter upon the practice of law, the maintenance thereof is equally
essential during the continuance of the practice and the exercise of the
privilege. Gross misconduct which puts the lawyers moral character in serious
doubt may render her unfit to continue in the practice of law. [9]

The loss of moral character of a lawyer for any reason whatsoever shall
warrant her suspension or disbarment, because it is important that members
[10]

of the legal brotherhood must conform to the highest standards of

morality. Any wrongdoing which indicates moral unfitness for the profession,
[11]

whether it be professional or non-professional, justifies disciplinary

action. Thus, a lawyer may be disciplined for evading payment of a debt validly
incurred. Such conduct is unbecoming and does not speak well of a member of
the bar, for a lawyers professional and personal conduct must at all times be
kept beyond reproach and above suspicion. [12]

Moreover, the attitude of respondent in deliberately refusing to accept the

notices served on her betrays a deplorably willful character or disposition which
stains the nobility of the legal profession. Her conduct not only underscores
[13]

her utter lack of respect for authority; it also brings to the fore a darker and more
sinister character flaw in her psyche which renders highly questionable her
moral fitness to continue in the practice of law: a defiance for law and order
which is at the very core of her profession.
Such defiance is anathema to those who seek a career in the administration
of justice because obedience to the dictates of the law and justice is demanded
of every lawyer. How else would respondent even endeavor to serve justice and
uphold the law when she disdains to follow even simple directives? Indeed, the
first and foremost command of the Code of Professional Responsibility could
not be any clearer:

CANON 1. A LAWYER SHALL UPHOLD THE

CONSTITUTION OBEY THE LAWS OF THE LAND AND
PROMOTE RESPECT FOR LEGAL PROCESSES.

Needless to state, respondents persistent refusal to comply with lawful

orders directed at her with not even an explanation for doing so is contumacious
conduct which merits no compassion. The duty of a lawyer is to uphold the
integrity and dignity of the legal profession at all times. She can only do this
by faithfully performing her duties to society, to the bar, to the courts and to her
clients. We can not tolerate any misconduct that tends to besmirch the fair
[14]

name of an honorable profession.

 WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent ATTY. EVANGELINE
DE SILVA is SUSPENDED from the practice of law for a period of Two (2)
Years, effective upon receipt hereof. Let copies of this Decision be entered in
her record as attorney and be furnished the Integrated Bar of the Philippines
and all courts in the country for their information and guidance.
SO ORDERED.