G.R. No. 127255 August 14, 1997
Rogelio Sarmiento,
JOKER P. ARROYO, EDCEL C.
LAGMAN, JOHN HENRY R. OSMEÑA,
WIGBERTO E. TAÑADA, AND
RONALDO B. ZAMORA, petitioner,
vs.
JOSE DE VENECIA, RAUL DAZA,
RODOLFO ALBANO, THE EXECUTIVE
SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF
FINANCE, AND THE COMMISSIONER
OF INTERNAL REVENUE, respondents.
MENDOZA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari and/or
prohibition challenging the validity of
Republic Act No. 8240, which amends
certain provisions of the National Internal
Revenue Code by imposing so-called
"sin taxes" (actually specific taxes) on
the manufacture and sale of beer and
cigarettes.
Petitioners are members of the House of
Representatives. They brought this suit
against respondents Jose de Venecia,
Speaker of the House of
Representatives, Deputy Speaker Raul
Daza, Majority Leader Rodolfo Albano,
the Executive Secretary, the Secretary of
Finance, and the Commissioner of
Internal Revenue, charging violation of
the rules of the House which petitioners
claim are "constitutionally mandated" so
that their violation is tantamount to a
violation of the Constitution.
The law originated in the House of
Representatives as H. No. 7198. This bill
was approved on third reading on
September 12, 1996 and transmitted on
September 16, 1996 to the Senate which
approved it with certain amendments on
third reading on November 17, 1996. A
bicameral conference committee was
formed to reconcile the disagreeing
provisions of the House and Senate
versions of the bill.
The bicameral conference committee
submitted its report to the House at 8
a.m. on November 21, 1996. At 11:48
a.m., after a recess, Rep. Exequiel
Javier, chairman of the Committee on
Ways and Means, proceeded to deliver
his sponsorship speech, after which he
was interpellate. Rep. Rogelio Sarmiento
was first to interpellate. He was
interrupted when Rep. Arroyo moved to
adjourn for lack of quorum. Rep. Antonio
Cuenco objected to the motion and
asked for a head count. After a roll call,
the Chair (Deputy Speaker Raul Daza)
declared the presence of a
quorum.1 Rep. Arroyo appealed the
ruling of the Chair, but his motion was
defeated when put to a vote. The
interpellation of the sponsor thereafter
proceeded.
Petitioner Rep. Joker Arroyo registered
to interpellate. He was fourth in the
order, following Rep.
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman and Rep. Enrique
Garcia. In the course of his interpellation,
Rep. Arroyo announced that he was
going to raise a question on the quorum,
although until the end of his interpellation
he never did. What happened thereafter
is shown in the following transcript of the
session on November 21, 1996 of the
House of Representatives, as published
by Congress in the newspaper issues of
December 5 and 6, 1996:
MR. ALBANO. MR. Speaker, I
move that we now approved and
ratify the conference committee
report.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). Any objection to the
motion?
MR. ARROYO. What is that, Mr.
Speaker?
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). There being none,
approved.
(Gavel)
MR. ARROYO. No, no, no, wait a
minute, Mr. Speaker, I stood up. I
want to know what is the
question that the Chair asked the
distinguished sponsor.
 THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). The session is suspended
for one minute.
(It was 3:01 p.m.)
(3:40 p.m., the session was
resumed)
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). The session is resumed.
MR. ALBANO. Mr. Speaker, I
move to adjourn until four
o'clock, Wednesday, next week.
THE DEPUTY SPEAKER (Mr.
Daza). The session is adjourned
until four o'clock, Wednesday,
next week.
(It was 3:40 p.m.)
On the same day, the bill was signed by
the Speaker of the House of
Representatives and the President of the
Senate and certified by the respective
secretaries of both Houses of Congress
as having been finally passed by the
House of Representatives and by the
Senate on November 21, 1996. The
enrolled bill was signed into law by
President Fidel V. Ramos on November
22, 1996.
Petitioners claim that there are actually
four different version of the transcript of
this portion of Rep. Arroyo's
interpellation: (1) the transcript of audio-
sound recording of the proceedings in
the session hall immediately after the
session adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996, which petitioner
Rep. Edcel C. Lagman obtained from he
operators of the sound system; (2) the
transcript of the proceedings from 3:00
p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21, 1996,
as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 21,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman; (3)
the transcript of the proceedings from
3:00 p.m. to 3:40 p.m. of November 21,
1996 as certified by the Chief of the
Transcription Division on November 28,
1996, also obtained by Rep. Lagman;
and (4) the published version
abovequoted. According to petitioners,
the four versions differ on three points, to
wit: (1) in the audio-sound recording the
word "approved," which appears on line
13 in the three other versions, cannot be
heard; (2) in the transcript certified on
November 21, 1996 the world "no" on
line 17 appears only once, while in the
other versions it is repeated three times;
and (3) the published version does not
contain the sentence "(Y)ou better
prepare for a quorum because I will raise
the question of the quorum," which
appears in the other versions.
Petitioners' allegations are vehemently
denied by respondents. However, there
is no need to discuss this point as
petitioners have announced that, in order
to expedite the resolution of this petition,
they admit, without conceding, the
correctness of the transcripts relied upon
by the respondents. Petitioners agree
that for purposes of this proceeding the
word "approved" appears in the
transcripts.
Only the proceedings of the House of
Representatives on the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 are in
question. Petitioners' principal argument
is that R.A. No. 8240 is null and void
because it was passed in violation of the
rules of the House; that these rules
embody the "constitutional mandate" in
Art. VI, §16(3) that "each House may
determine the rules of its proceedings"
and that, consequently, violation of the
House rules is a violation of the
Constitution itself. They contend that the
certification of Speaker De Venecia that
the law was properly passed is false and
spurious.
More specifically, petitioners charge that
(1) in violation of Rule VIII, §35 and Rule
XVII, §103 of the rules of the
House, 2 the Chair, in submitting the
conference committee report to the
House, did not call for the
years or nays,but simply asked for its
approval by motion in order to prevent
petitioner Arroyo from questioning the
presence of a quorum; (2) in violation of
Rule XIX, §112, 3 the Chair deliberately
ignored Rep. Arroyo's question, "What is
that . . . Mr. Speaker?" and did not
repeat Rep. Albano's motion to approve
or ratify; (3) in violation of Rule XVI,
§97,4 the Chair refused to recognize Rep.
Arroyo and instead proceeded to act on
Rep. Albano's motion and afterward
declared the report approved; and (4) in
violation of Rule XX, §§121-122, Rule
XXI, §123, and Rule XVIII, §109, 5the
Chair suspended the session without first
ruling on Rep. Arroyo's question which, it
is alleged, is a point of order or a
privileged motion. It is argued that Rep.
Arroyo's query should have been
resolved upon the resumption of the
session on November 28, 1996, because
the parliamentary situation at the time of
the adjournment remained upon the
resumption of the session.
Petitioners also charge that the session
was hastily adjourned at 3:40 p.m. on
November 21, 1996 and the bill certified
by Speaker Jose De Venecia to prevent
petitioner Rep. Arroyo from formally
challenging the existence of a quorum
and asking for a reconsideration.
Petitioners urge the Court not to feel
bound by the certification of the Speaker
of the House that the law had been
properly passed, considering the Court's
power under Art. VIII, §1 to pass on
claims of grave abuse of discretion by
the other departments of the
government, and they ask for a
reexamination of Tolentino v. Secretary
of Finance, 6which affirmed the
conclusiveness of an enrolled bill, in view
of the changed membership of the Court.
The Solicitor General filed a comment in
behalf of all respondents. In addition,
respondent De Venecia filed a
supplemental comment. Respondents'
defense is anchored on the principle of
separation of powers and the enrolled bill
doctrine. They argue that the Court is not
the proper forum for the enforcement of
the rules of the House and that there is
no justification for reconsidering the
enrolled bill doctrine. Although the
Constitution provides in Art. VI, §16(3)
for the adoption by each House of its
rules of proceedings, enforcement of the
rules cannot be sought in the courts
except insofar as they implement
constitutional requirements such as that
relating to three readings on separate
days before a bill may be passed. At all
events, respondents contend that, in
passing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, the rules of the House, as well as
parliamentary precedents for approval of
conference committee reports on mere
motion, were faithfully observed.
In his supplemental comment,
respondent De Venecia denies that his
certification of H. No. 7198 is false and
spurious and contends that under the
journal entry rule, the judicial inquiry
sought by the petitioners is barred.
Indeed, Journal No. 39 of the House of
Representatives, covering the sessions
of November 20 and 21, 1996, shows
that "On Motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Body approved
the Conference Committee Report on
House Bill No. 7198." 7 This Journal was
approved on December 2, 1996 over the
lone objection of petitioner Rep.
Lagman. 8
After considering the arguments of the
parties, the Court finds no ground for
holding that Congress committed a grave
abuse of discretion in enacting R.A. No.
8240. This case is therefore dismissed.
First. It is clear from the foregoing facts
that what is alleged to have been
violated in the enactment of R.A. No.
8240 are merely internal rules of
procedure of the House rather than
constitutional requirements for the
enactment of a law, i.e., Art. VI, §§26-27.
Petitioners do not claim that there was
no quorum but only that, by some
maneuver allegedly in violation of the
rules of the House, Rep. Arroyo was
effectively prevented from questioning
the presence of a quorum.
Petitioners contend that the House rules
were adopted pursuant to the
constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its
proceedings" 9 and that for this reason
they are judicially enforceable. To begin
with, this contention stands the principle
on its head. In the decided cases, 10 the
constitutional provision that "each House
may determine the rules of its
proceedings" was invoked by parties,
although not successfully, precisely to
support claims of autonomy of the
legislative branch to conduct its business
free from interference by courts. Here
petitioners cite the provision for the
opposite purpose of invoking judicial
review.
But the cases, both here and abroad, in
varying forms of expression, all deny to
the courts the power to inquire into
allegations that, in enacting a law, a
House of Congress failed to comply with
its own rules, in the absence of showing
that there was a violation of a
constitutional provision or the rights of
private individuals. In Osmeña
v.Pendatun, 11 it was held: "At any rate,
courts have declared that 'the rules
adopted by deliberative bodies are
subject to revocation, modification or
waiver at the pleasure of the body
adopting them.' And it has been said that
'Parliamentary rules are merely
procedural, and with their observance,
the courts have no concern. They may
be waived or disregarded by the
legislative body.' Consequently, 'mere
failure to conform to parliamentary usage
will not invalidate the action (taken by a
deliberative body) when the requisite
number of members have agreed to a
particular measure.'"
In United States v. Ballin, Joseph &
Co., 12 the rules was stated thus: "The
Constitution empowers each house to
determine its rules of proceedings. It
may not by its rules ignore constitutional
restraints or violate fundamental rights,
and there should be a reasonable
relation between the mode or method of
proceeding established by the rule and
the result which is sought to be attained.
But within these limitations all matters of
method are open to the determination of
the House, and it is no impeachment of
the rule to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate, or even
more just. It is no objection to the validity
of a rule that a different one has been
prescribed and in force for a length of
time. The power to make rules is not one
which once exercised is exhausted. It is
a continuous power, always subject to be
exercised by the House, and within the
limitations suggested, absolute and
beyond the challenge of any other body
or tribunal."
In Crawford v. Gilchrist, 13 it was held:
"The provision that each House shall
determine the rules of its proceedings
does not restrict the power given to a
mere formulation of standing rules, or to
the proceedings of the body in ordinary
legislative matters; but in the absence of
constitutional restraints, and when
exercised by a majority of a
constitutional quorum, such authority
extends to a determination of the
propriety and effect of any action as it is
taken by the body as it proceeds in the
exercise of any power, in the transaction
of any business, or in the performance of
any duty conferred upon it by the
Constitution."
In State ex rel. City Loan & Savings
Co. v. Moore, 14 the Supreme Court of
Ohio stated: "The provision for
reconsideration is no part of the
Constitution and is therefore entirely
within the control of the General
Assembly. Having made the rule, it
should be regarded, but a failure to
regard it is not the subject-matter of
judicial inquiry. It has been decided by
the courts of last resort of many states,
and also by the United States Supreme
Court, that a legislative act will not be
declared invalid for noncompliance with
rules."
In State v. Savings Bank, 15 the Supreme
Court of Errors of Connecticut declared
itself as follows: "The Constitution
declares that each house shall determine
the rules of its own proceedings and
shall have all powers necessary for a
branch of the Legislature of a free and
independent state. Rules of proceedings
are the servants of the House and
subject to its authority. This authority
may be abused, but when the House has
acted in a matter clearly within its power,
it would be an unwarranted invasion of
the independence of the legislative
department for the court to set aside
such action as void because it may think
that the House has misconstrued or
departed from its own rules of
procedure."
In McDonald v. State, 16 the Wisconsin
Supreme Court held: "When it appears
that an act was so passed, no inquiry will
be permitted to ascertain whether the
two houses have or have not complied
strictly with their own rules in their
procedure upon the bill, intermediate its
introduction and final passage. The
presumption is conclusive that they have
done so. We think no court has ever
declared an act of the legislature void for
non-compliance with the rules of
procedure made by itself , or the
respective branches thereof, and which it
or they may change or suspend at will. If
there are any such adjudications, we
decline to follow them."
Schweizer v. Territory 17 is illustrative of
the rule in these cases. The 1893
Statutes of Oklahoma provided for three
readings on separate days before a bill
may be passed by each house of the
legislature, with the proviso that in case
of an emergency the house concerned
may, by two-thirds vote, suspend the
operation of the rule. Plaintiff was
convicted in the district court of violation
of a law punishing gambling. He
appealed contending that the gambling
statute was not properly passed by the
legislature because the suspension of
the rule on three readings had not been
approved by the requisite two-thirds
vote. Dismissing this contention, the
State Supreme Court of Oklahoma held:
We have no constitutional
provision requiring that the
legislature should read a bill in
any particular manner. It may,
then, read or deliberate upon a
bill as it sees fit. either in
accordance with its own rules, or
in violation thereof, or without
making any rules. The provision
of section 17 referred to is merely
a statutory provision for the
direction of the legislature in its
action upon proposed measures.
It receives its entire force from
legislative sanction, and it exists
only at legislative pleasure. The
failure of the legislature to
properly weigh and consider an
act, its passage through the
legislature in a hasty manner,
might be reasons for the
governor withholding his
signature thereto; but this alone,
even though it is shown to be a
violation of a rule which the
legislature had made to govern
its own proceedings, could be no
reason for the court's refusing its
enforcement after it was actually
passed by a majority of each
branch of the legislature, and
duly signed by the governor. The
courts cannot declare an act of
the legislature void on account of
noncompliance with rules of
procedure made by itself to
govern its
deliberations. McDonald v. State,
80 Wis. 407, 50 N.W. 185; In re
Ryan, 80 Wis. 414, 50 N.W. 187;
State v. Brown, 33 S.C. 151, 11
S.E. 641; Railway Co. v. Gill, 54
Ark. 101, 15 S.W. 18.
We conclude this survey with the useful
summary of the rulings by former Chief
Justice Fernando, commenting on the
power of each House of Congress to
determine its rules of proceedings. He
wrote:
Rules are hardly permanent in
character. The prevailing view is
that they are subject to
revocation, modification or waiver
at the pleasure of the body
adopting them as they are
primarily procedural. Courts
ordinary have no concern with
their observance. They may be
waived or disregarded by the
legislative body. Consequently,
mere failure to conform to them
does not have the effect of
nullifying the act taken if the
requisite number of members
have agreed to a particular
measure. The above principle is
subject, however, to this
qualification. Where the
construction to be given to a rule
affects person other than
members of the legislative body
the question presented is
necessarily judicial in character.
Even its validity is open to
question in a case where private
rights are involved. 18
In this case no rights of private
individuals are involved but only those of
a member who, instead of seeking
redress in the House, chose to transfer
the dispute to this Court. We have no
more power to look into the internal
proceedings of a House than members
of that House have to look over our
shoulders, as long as no violation of
constitutional provisions is shown.
Petitioners must realize that each of the
three departments of our government
has its separate sphere which the others
may not invade without upsetting the
delicate balance on which our
constitutional order rests. Due regard for
the working of our system of
government, more than mere comity,
compels reluctance on our part to enter
upon an inquiry into an alleged violation
of the rules of the House. We must
accordingly decline the invitation to
exercise our power.
Second. Petitioners, quoting former
Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion's
sponsorship in the Constitutional
Commission, contend that under Art.
VIII, §1, "nothing involving abuse of
discretion [by the other branches of the
government] amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction is beyond judicial
review." 19 Implicit in this statement of the
former Chief Justice, however, is an
acknowledgment that the jurisdiction of
this Court is subject to the case and
controversy requirement of Art. VIII. §5
and, therefore, to the requirement of a
justiciable controversy before courts can
adjudicate constitutional questions such
as those which arise in the field of
foreign relations. For while Art. VIII, §1
has broadened the scope of judicial
inquiry into areas normally left to the
political departments to decide, such as
those relating to national security, 20 it
has not altogether done away with
political questions such as those which
arise in the field of foreign relations. As
we have already held, under Art. VIII, §1,
this Court's function
is merely [to] check whether or
not the governmental branch or
agency has gone beyond the
constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction, not that it erred or
has a different view. In the
absence of a showing . . . [of]
grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction,
there is no occasion for the Court
to exercise its corrective power. .
. . It has no power to look into
what it thinks is apparent error. 21
If, then, the established rule is that courts
cannot declare an act of the legislature
void on account merely of
noncompliance with rules of procedure
made by itself, it follows that such a case
does not present a situation in which a
branch of the government has "gone
beyond the constitutional limits of its
jurisdiction" so as to call for the exercise
of our Art. VIII. §1 power.
Third. Petitioners claim that the passage
of the law in the House was "railroaded."
They claim that Rep. Arroyo was still
making a query to the Chair when the
latter declared Rep. Albano's motion
approved.
What happened is that, after Rep.
Arroyo's interpellation of the sponsor of
the committee report, Majority Leader
Rodolfo Albano moved for the approval
and ratification of the conference
committee report. The Chair called out
for objections to the motion. Then the
Chair declared: "There being none,
approved." At the same time the Chair
was saying this, however, Rep. Arroyo
was asking, "What is that . . . Mr.
Speaker?" The Chair and Rep. Arroyo
were talking simultaneously. Thus,
although Rep. Arroyo subsequently
objected to the Majority Leader's motion,
the approval of the conference
committee report had by then already
been declared by the Chair, symbolized
by its banging of the gavel.
Petitioners argue that, in accordance
with the rules of the House, Rep.
Albano's motion for the approval of the
conference committee report should
have been stated by the Chair and later
the individual votes of the members
should have been taken. They say that
the method used in this case is a
legislator's nightmare because it
suggests unanimity when the fact was
that one or some legislators opposed the
report.
No rule of the House of Representative
has been cited which specifically
requires that in case such as this
involving approval of a conference
committee report, the Chair must restate
the motion and conduct a viva voce or
nominal voting. On the other hand, as
the Solicitor General has pointed out, the
manner in which the conference
committee report on H. No. 7198 was
approval was by no means a unique one.
It has basis in legislative practice. It was
the way the conference committee report
on the bills which became the Local
Government Code of 1991 and the
conference committee report on the bills
amending the Tariff and Customs Code
were approved.
In 1957, the practice was questioned as
being contrary to the rules of the House.
The point was answered by Majority
Leader Arturo M. Tolentino and his
answer became the ruling of the Chair
Mr. Tolentino said:
Mr. TOLENTINO. The fact that
nobody objects means a
unanimous action of the House.
Insofar as the matter of
procedure is concerned, this has
been a precedent since I came
here seven years ago, and it has
been the procedure in this House
that if somebody objects, then a
debate follows and after the
debate, then the voting comes in.
xxx xxx xxx
Mr. Speaker, a point of order was
raised by the gentleman from
Leyte, and I wonder what his
attitude is nor on his point of
order. I should just like to state
that I believe that we have had a
substantial compliance with the
Rules. The Rule invoked is not
one that refers to statutory or
constitutional requirement, and a
substantial compliance, to my
mind, is sufficient. When the
Chair announces the vote by
saying "Is there any objection?"
and nobody objects, then the
Chair announces "The bill is
approved on second reading." If
there was any doubt as to the
vote, any motion to divide would
have been proper. So, if that
motion is not presented, we
assume that the House approves
the measure. So I believe there
is substantial compliance here,
and if anybody wants a division
of the House he can always ask
for it, and the Chair can
announce how many are in favor
and how many are against. 22
Indeed, it is no impeachment of the
method to say that some other way
would be better, more accurate and even
more just. 23 The advantages or
disadvantages, the wisdom or folly of a
method do not present any matter for
judicial consideration. 24 In the words of
the U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals, "this
Court cannot provide a second opinion
on what is the best procedure.
Notwithstanding the deference and
esteem that is properly tendered to
individual congressional actors, our
deference and esteem for the institution
as a whole and for the constitutional
command that the institution be allowed
to manage its own affairs precludes us
from even attempting a diagnosis of the
problem." 25
Nor does the Constitution require that
the yeas and the nays of
the Members be taken every time a
House has to vote, except only in the
following instances; upon the last and
third readings of a bill, 26 at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present, 27 and
in repassing a bill over the veto of the
President. 28 Indeed, considering the fact
that in the approval of the original bill the
votes of the members
byyeas and nays had already been
taken, it would have been sheer tedium
to repeat the process.
Petitioners claim that they were
prevented from seeking reconsideration
allegedly as a result of the precipitate
suspension and subsequent
adjournment of the session. 29 It would
appear, however, that the session was
suspended to allow the parties to settle
the problem, because when it resumed
at 3:40 p.m. on that day Rep. Arroyo did
not say anything anymore. While it is
true that the Majority Leader moved for
adjournment until 4 p.m. of Wednesday
of the following week, Rep. Arroyo could
at least have objected if there was
anything he wanted to say. The fact,
however, is that he did not. The Journal
of November 21, 1996 of the House
shows.
ADJOURNMENT OF SESSION
On motion of Mr. Albano, there
being no objection, the Chair
declared the session adjourned
until four o'clock in the afternoon
of Wednesday, November 27,
1996.
It was 3:40 p.m. Thursday,
November 21, 1996. (emphasis
added)
This Journal was approved on December
3, 1996. Again, no one objected to its
approval except Rep. Lagman.
It is thus apparent that petitioners'
predicament was largely of their own
making. Instead of submitting the proper
motions for the House to act upon,
petitioners insisted on the pendency of
Rep. Arroyo's question as an obstacle to
the passage of the bill. But Rep. Arroyo's
question was not, in form or substance, a
point of order or a question of privilege
entitled to precedence.30 And even if Rep.
Arroyo's question were so, Rep. Albano's
motion to adjourn would have
precedence and would have put an end
to any further consideration of the
question. 31
Given this fact, it is difficult to see how it
can plausibly be contended that in
signing the bill which became R.A. No.
8240, respondent Speaker of the House
be acted with grave abuse of his
discretion. Indeed, the phrase "grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction" has a settled
meaning in the jurisprudence of
procedure. It means such capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment by a
tribunal exercising judicial or quasi
judicial power as to amount to lack of
power. As Chief Justice Concepcion
himself said in explaining this provision,
the power granted to the courts by Art.
VIII. §1 extends to cases where "a
branch of the government or any of its
officials has acted without jurisdiction or
in excess of jurisdiction, or so
capriciously as to constitute an abuse of
discretion amounting to excess of
jurisdiction." 32
Here, the matter complained of concerns
a matter of internal procedure of the
House with which the Court should not
he concerned. To repeat, the claim is not
that there was no quorum but only that
Rep. Arroyo was effectively prevented
from questioning the presence of a
quorum. Rep. Arroyo's earlier motion to
adjourn for lack of quorum had already
been defeated, as the roll call
established the existence of a quorum.
The question of quorum cannot be raised
repeatedly — especially when the
quorum is obviously present — for the
purpose of delaying the business of the
House. 33 Rep. Arroyo waived his
objection by his continued interpellation
of the sponsor for in so doing he in effect
acknowledged the presence of a
quorum. 34
At any rate it is noteworthy that of the
111 members of the House earlier found
to be present on November 21, 1996,
only the five, i.e., petitioners in this case,
are questioning the manner by which the
conference committee report on H. No.
7198 was approved on that day. No one,
except Rep. Arroyo, appears to have
objected to the manner by which the
report was approved. Rep. John Henry
Osmeña did not participate in the
bicameral conference committee
proceedings. 35 Rep. Lagman and Rep.
Zamora objected to the report 36 but not
to the manner it was approved; while it is
said that, if voting had been conducted.
Rep. Tañada would have voted in favor
of the conference committee report.37
Fourth. Under the enrolled bill doctrine,
the signing of H. No. 7198 by the
Speaker of the House and the President
of the Senate and the certification by the
secretaries of both Houses of Congress
that it was passed on November 21,
1996 are conclusive of its due
enactment. Much energy and learning is
devoted in the separate opinion of
Justice Puno, joined by Justice Davide,
to disputing this doctrine. To be sure,
there is no claim either here or in the
decision in the EVAT cases [Tolentino v.
Secretary of Finance] that the enrolled
bill embodies a conclusive presumption.
In one case 38 we "went behind" an
enrolled bill and consulted the Journal to
determine whether certain provisions of
a statute had been approved by the
Senate.
But, where as here there is no evidence
to the contrary, this Court will respect the
certification of the presiding officers of
both Houses that a bill has been duly
passed. Under this rule, this Court has
refused to determine claims that the
three-fourths vote needed to pass a
proposed amendment to the Constitution
had not been obtained, because "a duly
authenticated bill or resolution imports
absolute verify and is binding on the
courts." 39 This Court quoted
from Wigmore on Evidence the following
excerpt which embodies good, if old-
fashioned, democratic theory:
The truth is that many have been
carried away with the righteous
desire to check at any cost the
misdoings of Legislatures. They
have set such store by the
Judiciary for this purpose that
they have almost made them a
second and higher Legislature.
But they aim in the wrong
direction. Instead of trusting a
faithful Judiciary to check an
inefficient Legislature, they
should turn to improve the
Legislature. The sensible solution
is not to patch and mend casual
errors by asking the Judiciary to
violate legal principle and to do
impossibilities with the
Constitution; but to represent
ourselves with competent,
careful, and honest legislators,
the work of whose hands on the
statute-roll may come to reflect
credit upon the name of popular
government. 40
This Court has refused to even look into
allegations that the enrolled bill sent to
the President contained provisions which
had been "surreptitiously" inserted in the
conference committee:
[W]here allegations that the
constitutional procedures for the
passage of bills have not been
observed have no more basis
than another allegation that the
Conference Committee
"surreptitiously" inserted
provisions into a bill which it had
prepared, we should decline the
invitation to go behind the
enrolled copy of the bill. To
disregard the "enrolled bill" rule
in such cases would be to
disregard the respect due the
other two departments of our
government. 41
It has refused to look into charges that
an amendment was made upon the last
reading of a bill in violation of Art. VI.
§26(2) of the Constitution that "upon the
last reading of a bill, no amendment shall
be allowed." 42
In other cases, 43 this Court has denied
claims that the tenor of a bill was
otherwise than as certified by the
presiding officers of both Houses of
Congress.
The enrolled bill doctrine, as a rule of
evidence, is well established. It is cited
with approval by text writers here and
abroad. 44 The enrolled bill rule rests on
the following considerations:
. . . As the President has no
authority to approve a bill not
passed by Congress, an enrolled
Act in the custody of the
Secretary of State, and having
the official attestations of the
Speaker of the House of
Representatives, of the President
 of the Senate, and of the
President of the United States,
carries, on its face, a solemn
assurance by the legislative and
executive departments of the
government, charged,
respectively, with the duty of
enacting and executing the laws,
that it was passed by Congress.
The respect due to coequal and
independent departments
requires the judicial department
to act upon that assurance, and
to accept, as having passed
Congress, all bills authenticated
in the manner stated; leaving the
court to determine, when the
question properly arises, whether
the Act, so authenticated, is in
conformity with the
Constitution. 45
To overrule the doctrine now, as the
dissent urges, is to repudiate the
massive teaching of our cases and
overthrow an established rule of
evidence.
Indeed, petitioners have advanced no
argument to warrant a departure from
the rule, except to say that, with a
change in the membership of the Court,
the three new members may be
assumed to have an open mind on the
question of the enrolled bill rule Actually,
not three but four (Cruz, Feliciano, Bidin,
and Quiason, JJ.) have departed from
the Court since our decision in the EVAT
cases and their places have since been
taken by four new members (Francisco,
Hermosisima, Panganiban, and
Torres, JJ.) Petitioners are thus simply
banking on the change in the
membership of the Court.
Moreover, as already noted, the due
enactment of the law in question is
confirmed by the Journal of the House of
November 21, 1996 which shows that
the conference committee report on H.
No. 7198, which became R.A. No. 8740,
was approved on that day. The keeping
of the Journal is required by the
Constitution, Art. VI, §16(4) provides:
Each House shall keep a Journal
of its proceedings, and from time
to time publish the same,
excepting such parts as may, in
its judgment, affect national
security; and
the yeas and nays on any
question shall, at the request of
one-fifth of the Members present,
be entered in the Journal.
Each House shall also keep a
Record of its proceedings.
The Journal is regarded as conclusive
with respect to matters that are required
by the Constitution to be recorded
therein. 46 With respect to other matters,
in the absence of evidence to the
contrary, the Journals have also been
accorded conclusive effect. Thus,
in United States v. Pons, 47 this Court
spoke of the imperatives of public policy
for regarding the Journals as "public
memorials of the most permanent
character," thus: "They should be public,
because all are required to conform to
them; they should be permanent, that
rights acquired today upon the faith of
what has been declared to be law shall
not be destroyed tomorrow, or at some
remote period of time, by facts resting
only in the memory of individuals." As
already noted, the bill which became
R.A. No. 8240 is shown in the Journal.
Hence its due enactment has been duly
proven.
It would be an unwarranted invasion of
the prerogative of a coequal department
for this Court either to set aside a
legislative action as void because the
Court thinks the House has disregarded
its own rules of procedure, or to allow
those defeated in the political arena to
seek a rematch in the judicial forum
when petitioners can find their remedy in
that department itself. The Court has not
been invested with a roving commission
to inquire into complaints, real or
imagined, of legislative skullduggery. It
would be acting in excess of its power
and would itself be guilty of grave abuse
of its discretion were it to do so. The
suggestion made in a case 48 may
instead appropriately be made here:
petitioners can seek the enactment of a
new law or the repeal or amendment of
R.A. No. 8240. In the absence of
anything to the contrary, the Court must
assume that Congress or any House
thereof acted in the good faith belief that
its conduct was permitted by its rules,
and deference rather than disrespect is
due the judgment of that body. 49

WHEREFORE, the petition

for certiorari and prohibition is
DISMISSED.

SO ORDERED.