QUASI JUDICIAL - cases

G.R. No. 96938 October 15, 1991

GOVERNMENT SERVICE INSURANCE SYSTEM (GSIS), petitioner,

vs.
CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION, HEIRS OF ELIZAR NAMUCO, and HEIRS OF EUSEBIO MANUEL, respondents.

Benigno M. Puno for private respondents.

Fetalino, Llamas-Villanueva and Noro for CSC.

NARVASA, J.:

In May, 1981, the Government Service Insurance System (GSIS) dismissed six (6) employees as being "notoriously
undersirable," they having allegedly been found to be connected with irregularities in the canvass of supplies and
materials. The dismissal was based on Article IX, Presidential Decree No. 807 (Civil Service Law) 1 in relation to LOI 14-A
and/or LOI No. 72. The employees' Motion for Reconsideration was subsequently denied.

Five of these six dismissed employees appealed to the Merit Systems Board. The Board found the dismissals to be illegal
because effected without formal charges having been filed or an opportunity given to the employees to answer, and
ordered the remand of the cases to the GSIS for appropriate disciplinary proceedings.

The GSIS appealed tothe Civil Service Commission. By Resolution dated October 21, 1987, the Commission ruled that
the dismissal of all five was indeed illegal and disposed as follows:

WHEREFORE, it being obvious that respondents' separation from the service is illegal, the GSIS is directed to
reinstate them with payment of back salaries and benefits due them not later than ten (10) days from receipt of a
copy hereof, without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to pursue proper disciplinary action against them. It is also
directed that the services of their replacement be terminated effective upon reinstatement of herein respondents.

xxx xxx xxx

Still unconvinced, the GSIS appealed to the Supreme Court (G.R. Nos. 80321-22). Once more, it was rebuffed. On July 4,
1988 this Court's Second Division promulgated a Resolution which:

a) denied its petition for failing to show any grave abuse of discretion on the part of the Civl Service Commission,
the dismissals of the employees having in truth been made without formal charge and hearin, and

b) declared that reinstatement of said five employees was proper, "without prejudice to the right of the GSIS to
pursue proper disciplinary action against them;"

c) MODIFIED, however, the challenged CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 "by elminating the payment of back
salaries to private respondents (employees) until the outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known,
considering the gravity of the offenses imputed to them ..., 2

d) ordered reinstateement only of three employees, namely: Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, "it appearing tht respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio
Manuel have since passed away." 3

On January 8, 1990, the aforesaid Resolution of July 4, 1988 having become final, the heirs of Namuco and Manuel filed a motion for execution of the Civil Service Commission Resolution
of October 21, 1987, supra. The GSIS opposed the motion. It argued that the CSC Resolution of October 21, 1987 — directing reinstatement of the employees and payment to them of
back salaries and benefits — had been superseded by the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988 — precisely eliminating the payment of back salaries.
The Civil Service Commission granted the motion for execution in an Order dated June 20, 1990. It accordingly directed the GSIS "to pay the compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco
and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation up to the date of their demise." The GSIS filed a motion for reconsideration. It was denied by Order of the CSC
dated November 22, 1990.

Once again the GSIS has come to this Court, this time praying that certiorari issue to nullify the Orders of June 20, 1990 and November 22, 1990. Here it contends that the Civil Service
Commission has no pwer to execute its judgments and final orders or resolutions, and even conceding the contrary, the writ of execution issued on June 20, 1990 is void because it varies
this Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

The Civil Service Commission, like the Commission on Elections and the Commission on Audit, is a consitutional commission invested by the Constitution and relevant laws not only with
authority to administer the civil service, 4
but also with quasi-judicial powers. 5 It has the authority to hear and decide administrative
disciplinary cases instituted directly with it or brought to it on appeal. 6 The Commission shall decide by a majority vote of
all its Members any case or matter brought before it within sixty days from the date of its submission for decision it within
sixty days from the date of its submission for on certiorari by any aggrieved party within thirty days from receipt of a copy
thereof. 7 It has the power, too, sitting en banc, to promulgate its own rules concerning pleadings and practice before it or
before any of its offices, which rules should not however diminish, increase, or modify substantive rights. 8

On October 9, 1989, the Civil Service Commission promulgated Resolution No. 89-779 adopting, approving and putting into effect simplified rules of procedure on administrative
disciplinary and protest cases, pursuant tothe authority granted by the constitutional and statutory provisions above cited, as well as Republic Act No. 6713. 9
Those rules
provide, among other things, 10 that decision in "administrative disciplinary cases" shall be immediately executory unless a
motion for reconsideration is seasonably filed. If the decision of the Commission is brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari, the same shall still be executory unless a restraining order or preliminary injunction is issued by the High
Court." 11 This is similar to a provision in the former Civil Service Rules authorizing the Commissioner, "if public interest so
warrants, ... (to) order his decision executed pending appeal to the Civil Service Board of Appeals." 12 The provisions are
analogous and entirely consistent with the duty or responsibility reposed in the Chairman by PD 807, subject to policies
and resolutions adopted by the Commission, "to enforce decision on administrative discipline involving officials of the
Commission," 13 as well as with Section 37 of the same decree declaring that an appeal to the Commission 14 "shall not
stop the decision from being executory, and in case the penalty is suspension or removal, the respondent shall be
considered as having been under preventive suspension during the pendency of the appeal in the event he wins an
appeal."

In light of all the foregoing consitutional and statutory provisions, it would appear absurd to deny to the Civil Service
Commission the power or authority or order execution of its decisions, resolutions or orders which, it should be stressed, it
has been exercising through the years. It would seem quite obvious that the authority to decide cases is inutile unless
accompanied by the authority to see taht what has been decided is carried out. Hence, the grant to a tribunal or agency of
adjudicatory power, or the authority to hear and adjudge cases, should normally and logically be deemed to include the
grant of authority to enforce or execute the judgments it thus renders, unless the law otherwise provides.

In any event, the Commission's exercise of that power of execution has been sanctioned by this Court in several cases.

In Cucharo v. Subido, 15 for instance, this Court sustained the challenged directive of the Civil Service Commissioner, that
his decision "be executed immediately 'but not beyond ten days from receipt thereof ...". The Court said:

As a major premise, it has been the repeated pronouncement of this Supreme Tribunal that the Civil Service
Commissioner has the discretion toorder the immediate execution in the public interst of his decisionseparating
petitioner-appellant from the service, always sbuject however to the rule that, in the event the Civil Service Board
of Appeals or the proper court determines that his dismissal is illegal, he should be paid the salary corresponding
to the period of his separation from the service unitl his reinstatement.

Petitioner GSIS concedes that the heirs of Namuco and Manuel "are entitled tothe retirement/death and other benefits due
them as government employees" since, at the time of their death, they "can be considered not to have been separated
from the separated from the service." 16

It contend, however, that since Namuco and Manuel had not been "completely exonerated of the administrative charge filed against them — as the filing of the proper disciplinary action
was yet to have been taken had death not claimed them" — no back salaries may be paid to them, although they "may charge the period of (their) suspension against (their) leave credits,
if any, and may commute such leave credits to money
value;" 17
this, on the authority of this Court's decision in Clemente v. Commission on Audit. 18 It is in line with these
considerations, it argues, that the final and executory Resolution of this Court's Second Division of July 4, 1988 should be
construed; 19 and since the Commission's Order of July 20, 1990 maikes a contrary disposition, the latter order obviously
cannot prevail and must be deemed void and ineffectual.
This Court's Resolution of July 4, 1988, as already stated, modified the Civil Service Commission's Resolution of October
21, 1987 — inter alia granting back salaries tothe five dismissed employees, including Namuco and Manuel — and
pertinently reads as follows:

We modify the said Order, however, by eliminating the payment of back salaries to private respondents until the
outcome of the disciplinary proceedings is known, considering the gravity of the offense imputed to them in
connection with the irregularities in the canvass of supplies and materials at the GSIS.

The reinstatement order shall apply only to respondents Domingo Canero, Renato Navarro and Belen Guerrero, it
appearing that respondents Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel have since passed away. ....

On the other hand, as also already stated, the Commission's Order of June 20, 1990 directed the GSIS "to pay the
compulsory heirs of deceased Elizar Namuco and Eusebio Manuel for the period from the date of their illegal separation
up to the date of their demise."

The Commission asserted that in promulgating its disparate ruling, it was acting "in the interest of justice and for other
humanitarian reasons," since the question of whether or not Namuco and Manuel should receive back salaries was
"dependent on the result of the disciplinary proceedings against their co-respondents in the administrative case before the
GSIS," and since at the tiem of their death, "no formal charge ... (had) as yet been made, nor any finding of their personal
culpability ... and ... they are no longer in a position to refute the charge."

The Court agrees that the challenged orders of the Civil Service Commission should be upheld, and not merely upon
compassionate grounds, but simply because there is no fair and feasible alternative in the circumstances. To be sure, if
the deceased employees were still alive, it would at least be arguable, positing the primacy of this Court's final
dispositions, that the issue of payment of their back salaries should properly await the outcome of the disciplinary
proceedings referred to in the Second Division's Resolution of July 4, 1988.

Death, however, has already sealed that outcome, foreclosing the initiation of disciplinary administrative proceedings, or
the continuation of any then pending, against the deceased employees. Whatever may be said of the binding force of the
Resolution of July 4, 1988 so far as, to all intents and pursposes, it makes exoneration in the adminstrative proceedings a
condition precedent to payment of back salaries, it cannot exact an impossible performance or decree a useless exercise.
Even in the case of crimes, the death of the offender exteinguishes criminal liability, not only as to the personal, but also
as to the pecuniary, penalties if it occurs before final judgment.20 In this context, the subsequent disciplinary proceedings,
even if not assailable on grounds of due process, would be an inutile, empty procedure in so far as the deceased
employees are concerned; they could not possibly be bound by any substatiation in said proceedings of the original
charges: irrigularities in the canvass of supplies and materials. The questioned order of the Civil Service Commission
merely recognized the impossibility of complying with the Resolution of July 4, 1988 and the legal futility of attempting
a post-mortem investigation of the character contemplated.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED, without pronouncement as to costs.

G.R. No. 96681 December 2, 1991

HON. ISIDRO CARIÑO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Education, Culture & Sports, DR.
ERLINDA LOLARGA, in her capacity as Superintendent of City Schools of Manila, petitioners,
vs.
THE COMMISSION ON HUMAN RIGHTS, GRACIANO BUDOY, JULIETA BABARAN, ELSA IBABAO, HELEN LUPO,
AMPARO GONZALES, LUZ DEL CASTILLO, ELSA REYES and APOLINARIO ESBER, respondents.

NARVASA, J.:

The issue raised in the special civil action of certiorari and prohibition at bar, instituted by the Solicitor General, may be
formulated as follows: where the relief sought from the Commission on Human Rights by a party in a case consists of the
review and reversal or modification of a decision or order issued by a court of justice or government agency or official
exercising quasi-judicial functions, may the Commission take cognizance of the case and grant that relief? Stated
otherwise, where a particular subject-matter is placed by law within the jurisdiction of a court or other government agency
or official for purposes of trial and adjudgment, may the Commission on Human Rights take cognizance of the same
subject-matter for the same purposes of hearing and adjudication?

The facts narrated in the petition are not denied by the respondents and are hence taken as substantially correct for
purposes of ruling on the legal questions posed in the present action. These facts, 1 together with others involved in
related cases recently resolved by this Court 2 or otherwise undisputed on the record, are hereunder set forth.

1. On September 17, 1990, a Monday and a class day, some 800 public school teachers, among them members of the
Manila Public School Teachers Association (MPSTA) and Alliance of Concerned Teachers (ACT) undertook what they
described as "mass concerted actions" to "dramatize and highlight" their plight resulting from the alleged failure of the
public authorities to act upon grievances that had time and again been brought to the latter's attention. According to them
they had decided to undertake said "mass concerted actions" after the protest rally staged at the DECS premises on
September 14, 1990 without disrupting classes as a last call for the government to negotiate the granting of demands had
elicited no response from the Secretary of Education. The "mass actions" consisted in staying away from their classes,
converging at the Liwasang Bonifacio, gathering in peaceable assemblies, etc. Through their representatives, the
teachers participating in the mass actions were served with an order of the Secretary of Education to return to work in 24
hours or face dismissal, and a memorandum directing the DECS officials concerned to initiate dismissal proceedings
against those who did not comply and to hire their replacements. Those directives notwithstanding, the mass actions
continued into the week, with more teachers joining in the days that followed. 3

Among those who took part in the "concerted mass actions" were the eight (8) private respondents herein, teachers at the Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, who had agreed to
support the non-political demands of the MPSTA. 4

2. For failure to heed the return-to-work order, the CHR complainants (private respondents) were administratively charged on the basis of the principal's report and given five (5) days to
answer the charges. They were also preventively suspended for ninety (90) days "pursuant to Section 41 of P.D. 807" and temporarily replaced (unmarked CHR Exhibits, Annexes F, G,
H). An investigation committee was consequently formed to hear the charges in accordance with P.D. 807. 5

3. In the administrative case docketed as Case No. DECS 90-082 in which CHR complainants Graciano Budoy, Jr., Julieta Babaran, Luz del Castillo, Apolinario Esber were, among others,
named respondents, 6
the latter filed separate answers, opted for a formal investigation, and also moved "for suspension of the
administrative proceedings pending resolution by . . (the Supreme) Court of their application for issuance of an injunctive
writ/temporary restraining order." But when their motion for suspension was denied by Order dated November 8, 1990 of
the Investigating Committee, which later also denied their motion for reconsideration orally made at the hearing of
November 14, 1990, "the respondents led by their counsel staged a walkout signifying their intent to boycott the entire
proceedings." 7 The case eventually resulted in a Decision of Secretary Cariño dated December 17, 1990, rendered after
evaluation of the evidence as well as the answers, affidavits and documents submitted by the respondents, decreeing
dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del
Castillo. 8

4. In the meantime, the "MPSTA filed a petition for certiorari before the Regional Trial Court of Manila against petitioner (Cariño), which was dismissed (unmarked CHR Exhibit, Annex I).
Later, the MPSTA went to the Supreme Court (on certiorari, in an attempt to nullify said dismissal, grounded on the) alleged violation of the striking teachers" right to due process and
peaceable assembly docketed as G.R. No. 95445, supra. The ACT also filed a similar petition before the Supreme Court . . . docketed as G.R. No. 95590." 9
Both petitions in
this Court were filed in behalf of the teacher associations, a few named individuals, and "other teacher-members so
numerous similarly situated" or "other similarly situated public school teachers too numerous to be impleaded."

5. In the meantime, too, the respondent teachers submitted sworn statements dated September 27, 1990 to the
Commission on Human Rights to complain that while they were participating in peaceful mass actions, they suddenly
learned of their replacements as teachers, allegedly without notice and consequently for reasons completely unknown to
them. 10

6. Their complaints — and those of other teachers also "ordered suspended by the . . . (DECS)," all numbering forty-two (42) — were docketed as "Striking Teachers CHR Case No.
90775." In connection therewith the Commission scheduled a "dialogue" on October 11, 1990, and sent a subpoena to Secretary Cariño requiring his attendance therein. 11

On the day of the "dialogue," although it said that it was "not certain whether he (Sec. Cariño) received the subpoena which was served at his office, . . . (the) Commission, with the
Chairman presiding, and Commissioners Hesiquio R. Mallilin and Narciso C. Monteiro, proceeded to hear the case;" it heard the complainants' counsel (a) explain that his clients had been
"denied due process and suspended without formal notice, and unjustly, since they did not join the mass leave," and (b) expatiate on the grievances which were "the cause of the mass
leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes they (CHR complainants) sympathize." 12 The Commission thereafter issued an Order 13reciting these
facts and making the following disposition:

To be properly apprised of the real facts of the case and be accordingly guided in its investigation and resolution
of the matter, considering that these forty two teachers are now suspended and deprived of their wages, which
they need very badly, Secretary Isidro Cariño, of the Department of Education, Culture and Sports, Dr. Erlinda
Lolarga, school superintendent of Manila and the Principal of Ramon Magsaysay High School, Manila, are hereby
 enjoined to appear and enlighten the Commission en banc on October 19, 1990 at 11:00 A.M. and to bring with
them any and all documents relevant to the allegations aforestated herein to assist the Commission in this matter.
Otherwise, the Commission will resolve the complaint on the basis of complainants' evidence.

xxx xxx xxx

7. Through the Office of the Solicitor General, Secretary Cariño sought and was granted leave to file a motion to dismiss
the case. His motion to dismiss was submitted on November 14, 1990 alleging as grounds therefor, "that the complaint
states no cause of action and that the CHR has no jurisdiction over the case." 14

8. Pending determination by the Commission of the motion to dismiss, judgments affecting the "striking teachers" were promulgated in two (2) cases, as aforestated, viz.:

a) The Decision dated December l7, 1990 of Education Secretary Cariño in Case No. DECS 90-082, decreeing dismissal from the service of Apolinario Esber and the
suspension for nine (9) months of Babaran, Budoy and del Castillo; 15 and

b) The joint Resolution of this Court dated August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590 dismissing the petitions "without prejudice to any appeals, if still timely, that the
individual petitioners may take to the Civil Service Commission on the matters complained of," 16 and inter alia "ruling that it was prima facie lawful for petitioner Cariño to
issue return-to-work orders, file administrative charges against recalcitrants, preventively suspend them, and issue decision on those charges." 17

9. In an Order dated December 28, 1990, respondent Commission denied Sec. Cariño's motion to dismiss and required him and Superintendent Lolarga "to submit their counter-affidavits
within ten (10) days . . . (after which) the Commission shall proceed to hear and resolve the case on the merits with or without respondents counter affidavit." 18
It held that the
"striking teachers" "were denied due process of law; . . . they should not have been replaced without a chance to reply to
the administrative charges;" there had been a violation of their civil and political rights which the Commission was
empowered to investigate; and while expressing its "utmost respect to the Supreme Court . . . the facts before . . . (it) are
different from those in the case decided by the Supreme Court" (the reference being unmistakably to this Court's joint
Resolution of August 6, 1991 in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra).

It is to invalidate and set aside this Order of December 28, 1990 that the Solicitor General, in behalf of petitioner Cariño,
has commenced the present action of certiorari and prohibition.

The Commission on Human Rights has made clear its position that it does not feel bound by this Court's joint Resolution
in G.R. Nos. 95445 and 95590, supra. It has also made plain its intention "to hear and resolve the case (i.e., Striking
Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits." It intends, in other words, to try and decide or hear and determine, i.e.,
exercise jurisdiction over the following general issues:

1) whether or not the striking teachers were denied due process, and just cause exists for the imposition of administrative
disciplinary sanctions on them by their superiors; and

2) whether or not the grievances which were "the cause of the mass leave of MPSTA teachers, (and) with which causes
they (CHR complainants) sympathize," justify their mass action or strike.

The Commission evidently intends to itself adjudicate, that is to say, determine with character of finality and definiteness,
the same issues which have been passed upon and decided by the Secretary of Education, Culture & Sports, subject to
appeal to the Civil Service Commission, this Court having in fact, as aforementioned, declared that the teachers affected
may take appeals to the Civil Service Commission on said matters, if still timely.

The threshold question is whether or not the Commission on Human Rights has the power under the Constitution to do
so; whether or not, like a court of justice, 19 or even a quasi-judicial agency, 20 it has jurisdiction or adjudicatory powers
over, or the power to try and decide, or hear and determine, certain specific type of cases, like alleged human rights
violations involving civil or political rights.

The Court declares the Commission on Human Rights to have no such power; and that it was not meant by the
fundamental law to be another court or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions
of the latter.

The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may investigate, i.e., receive
evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights violations involving civil and political rights. But fact
finding is not adjudication, and cannot be likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial
agency or official. The function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making factual conclusions in a
controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to those factual conclusions to the end that the
controversy may be decided or determined authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of
review as may be provided by law. 21 This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have. 22

The proposition is made clear by the constitutional provisions specifying the powers of the Commission on Human Rights.

The Commission was created by the 1987 Constitution as an independent office. 23

Upon its constitution, it succeeded and superseded the
Presidential Committee on Human Rights existing at the time of the effectivity of the Constitution. 24 Its powers and
functions are the following 25

(1) Investigate, on its own or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights;

(2) Adopt its operational guidelines and rules of procedure, and cite for contempt for violations thereof in accordance with the Rules of Court;

(3) Provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within the Philippines, as well as Filipinos residing abroad, and provide for preventive
measures and legal aid services to the underprivileged whose human rights have been violated or need protection;

(4) Exercise visitorial powers over jails, prisons, or detention facilities;

(5) Establish a continuing program of research, education, and information to enhance respect for the primacy of human rights;

(6) Recommend to the Congress effective measures to promote human rights and to provide for compensation to victims of violations of human rights, or their families;

(7) Monitor the Philippine Government's compliance with international treaty obligations on human rights;

(8) Grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth in
any investigation conducted by it or under its authority;

(9) Request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions;

(10) Appoint its officers and employees in accordance with law; and

(11) Perform such other duties and functions as may be provided by law.

As should at once be observed, only the first of the enumerated powers and functions bears any resemblance to adjudication or adjudgment. The Constitution clearly and categorically
grants to the Commission the power to investigate all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights. It can exercise that power on its own initiative or on complaint of any
person. It may exercise that power pursuant to such rules of procedure as it may adopt and, in cases of violations of said rules, cite for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court. In
the course of any investigation conducted by it or under its authority, it may grant immunity from prosecution to any person whose testimony or whose possession of documents or other
evidence is necessary or convenient to determine the truth. It may also request the assistance of any department, bureau, office, or agency in the performance of its functions, in the
conduct of its investigation or in extending such remedy as may be required by its findings. 26

But it cannot try and decide cases (or hear and determine causes) as courts of justice, or even quasi-judicial bodies do. To investigate is not to adjudicate or adjudge. Whether in the
popular or the technical sense, these terms have well understood and quite distinct meanings.

"Investigate," commonly understood, means to examine, explore, inquire or delve or probe into, research on, study. The dictionary definition of "investigate" is "to observe or study closely:
inquire into systematically. "to search or inquire into: . . . to subject to an official probe . . .: to conduct an official inquiry." 27 The purpose of investigation, of course,
is to discover, to find out, to learn, obtain information. Nowhere included or intimated is the notion of settling, deciding or
resolving a controversy involved in the facts inquired into by application of the law to the facts established by the inquiry.

The legal meaning of "investigate" is essentially the same: "(t)o follow up step by step by patient inquiry or observation. To
trace or track; to search into; to examine and inquire into with care and accuracy; to find out by careful inquisition;
examination; the taking of evidence; a legal inquiry;" 28 "to inquire; to make an investigation," "investigation" being in turn
describe as "(a)n administrative function, the exercise of which ordinarily does not require a hearing. 2 Am J2d Adm L
Sec. 257; . . . an inquiry, judicial or otherwise, for the discovery and collection of facts concerning a certain matter or
matters." 29

"Adjudicate," commonly or popularly understood, means to adjudge, arbitrate, judge, decide, determine, resolve, rule on, settle. The dictionary defines the term as "to settle finally (the
rights and duties of the parties to a court case) on the merits of issues raised: . . . to pass judgment on: settle judicially: . . . act as judge." 30
And "adjudge" means "to
decide or rule upon as a judge or with judicial or quasi-judicial powers: . . . to award or grant judicially in a case of
controversy . . . ." 31

In the legal sense, "adjudicate" means: "To settle in the exercise of judicial authority. To determine finally. Synonymous with adjudge in its strictest sense;" and "adjudge" means: "To pass
on judicially, to decide, settle or decree, or to sentence or condemn. . . . Implies a judicial determination of a fact, and the entry of a judgment." 32

Hence it is that the Commission on Human Rights, having merely the power "to investigate," cannot and should not "try and resolve on the merits" (adjudicate) the matters involved in
Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775, as it has announced it means to do; and it cannot do so even if there be a claim that in the administrative disciplinary proceedings against the
teachers in question, initiated and conducted by the DECS, their human rights, or civil or political rights had been transgressed. More particularly, the Commission has no power to "resolve
on the merits" the question of (a) whether or not the mass concerted actions engaged in by the teachers constitute and are prohibited or otherwise restricted by law; (b) whether or not the
act of carrying on and taking part in those actions, and the failure of the teachers to discontinue those actions, and return to their classes despite the order to this effect by the Secretary of
Education, constitute infractions of relevant rules and regulations warranting administrative disciplinary sanctions, or are justified by the grievances complained of by them; and (c) what
where the particular acts done by each individual teacher and what sanctions, if any, may properly be imposed for said acts or omissions.

These are matters undoubtedly and clearly within the original jurisdiction of the Secretary of Education, being within the scope of the disciplinary powers granted to him under the Civil
Service Law, and also, within the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

Indeed, the Secretary of Education has, as above narrated, already taken cognizance of the issues and resolved them, 33
and it appears that appeals have been
seasonably taken by the aggrieved parties to the Civil Service Commission; and even this Court itself has had occasion to
pass upon said issues. 34

Now, it is quite obvious that whether or not the conclusions reached by the Secretary of Education in disciplinary cases are correct and are adequately based on substantial evidence;
whether or not the proceedings themselves are void or defective in not having accorded the respondents due process; and whether or not the Secretary of Education had in truth committed
"human rights violations involving civil and political rights," are matters which may be passed upon and determined through a motion for reconsideration addressed to the Secretary
Education himself, and in the event of an adverse verdict, may be reviewed by the Civil Service Commission and eventually the Supreme Court.

The Commission on Human Rights simply has no place in this scheme of things. It has no business intruding into the jurisdiction and functions of the Education Secretary or the Civil
Service Commission. It has no business going over the same ground traversed by the latter and making its own judgment on the questions involved. This would accord success to what
may well have been the complaining teachers' strategy to abort, frustrate or negate the judgment of the Education Secretary in the administrative cases against them which they anticipated
would be adverse to them.

This cannot be done. It will not be permitted to be done.

In any event, the investigation by the Commission on Human Rights would serve no useful purpose. If its investigation should result in conclusions contrary to those reached by Secretary
Cariño, it would have no power anyway to reverse the Secretary's conclusions. Reversal thereof can only by done by the Civil Service Commission and lastly by this Court. The only thing
the Commission can do, if it concludes that Secretary Cariño was in error, is to refer the matter to the appropriate Government agency or tribunal for assistance; that would be the Civil
Service Commission. 35 It cannot arrogate unto itself the appellate jurisdiction of the Civil Service Commission.

WHEREFORE, the petition is granted; the Order of December 29, 1990 is ANNULLED and SET ASIDE, and the
respondent Commission on Human Rights and the Chairman and Members thereof are prohibited "to hear and resolve
the case (i.e., Striking Teachers HRC Case No. 90-775) on the merits."

SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995

GLORIA G. LASTIMOSA, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu, petitioner,

vs.
HONORABLE OMBUDSMAN CONRADO VASQUEZ, HONORABLE ARTURO C. MOJICA, DEPUTY
OMBUDSMAN FOR THE VISAYAS, and HONORABLE FRANKLIN DRILON, SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, and
UNDERSECRETARY OF JUSTICE RAMON J. LIWAG, respondents.

MENDOZA, J.:

This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government prosecutors
for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his office and the conditions
under which he may do so.

Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the Provincial
Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the Ombudsman, an
administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of duty and maliciously refraining
from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt
was brought against them, both in the Office of the Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under
preventive suspension. This is a petition for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of
the Ombudsman with respect to the two proceedings.

The background of this case is as follows:

On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a criminal complaint
for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of authority and grave misconduct
against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo. 1 The cases were filed with the Office of the
Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036,
respectively.

The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no prima
facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing the matter, however,
the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation and instead directed that Mayor
Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial Court.2

Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo C. Mojica,
referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the "filing of appropriate information with
the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, . . ." 3 The case was eventually assigned to herein petitioner, First
Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.

It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found that only acts of
lasciviousness had been committed.4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar, she filed on July 4,
1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of
Santa Fe. 5

In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more specifically the directive of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6

As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor's Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica ordered on
July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause why they should not be
punished for contempt for "refusing and failing to obey the lawful directives" of the Office of the Ombudsman. 7

For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were given until
August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer. 8 An answer 9 was timely filed by them and hearings were
thereupon conducted.

It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of
the Ombudsman for Visayas by Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative
complaint for violation of Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law) 10 and another one was
a criminal complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal
Code. 11 The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of the
Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.

In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Mojica issued
an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E.
Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, 12 pursuant to Rule III, §9 of the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The
order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting
Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial
Prosecutor of Cebu.

On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders 13 in the two cases,
directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and controverting
evidence.

On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and prohibition to set
aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Department of Justice:

(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related
orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-
93-0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, "for filing of the appropriate
action (for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.

(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing
petitioner and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three
(3) days from receipt why they should not be punished for indirect Contempt of the Office of the
Ombudsman "for refusing and failing . . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.

(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag,
ordering the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the
Ombudsman that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in
recognition of the authority of said Office.

(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs.
Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay.

(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter
dated August 15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994,
placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.

(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.

Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are stated in the
petition.

I.

The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on the Provincial
Prosecutor to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa
claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor's office have concurrent authority to investigate
public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case against Mayor Ilustrisimo,
it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the Ombudsman's office, according to petitioner,
to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part and parcel of
the preliminary investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could
not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in conducting a
preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the Ombudsman to delegate the
filing of the case to her office.

In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case against the
mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public office. For this reason it is
argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under
preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.

Petitioner's contention has no merit. The office of the Ombudsman has the power to "investigate and prosecute
on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or agency,
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient." 14 This power has been held to
include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the
acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official
duty 15 It is enough that the act or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when
committed by a public official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and
prosecute.

In the existence of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:

Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors. — The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of
his office and/or designate of deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government
service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of
certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control. (Emphasis added)

It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman Arturo C.
Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted rape against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrismo.

It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the preliminary investigation
and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in
court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his
determination of the nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the
Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the Ombudsman's Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes
under the "supervision and control" of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor's) decision. 16 Petitioner cannot legally
act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the Ombudsman.

II.

The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an information for
attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the complaint in the case she found that
he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.

§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to "punish for contempt, in
accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein."
There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for
contempt because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of
the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which
the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.

Whether petitioner's refusal to follow the Ombudsman's orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience or resistance
of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for indirect contempt under Rule
71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after appropriate hearing. At this point it is important
only to note the existence of the contempt power of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.

III.

Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be found that she is
guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the Ombudsman's power to place her in
the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
 §21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions. — The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local
government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the
Judiciary.

§22. Preventive Suspension. — The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or
employee under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is
strong, and (a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant removal
from the service; or (c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed
against him.

The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition
of the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period
of suspension herein provided.

A.

Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate, the evidence
against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior notice and hearing is a not
required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As
held in Nera v. Garcia: 17

In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for
the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is
a preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis
added).

It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman's Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public official, the
evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is present:

(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;

(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or

(c) the respondent's continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.

As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier, 18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of
the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in
cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this
case, this Court said in that case:

The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
expressly left such determination of guilt to the "judgment" of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint. . . . 19

In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of petitioner and
Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:

A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records
pertaining thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner]
 clearly leads to the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges
involved offenses of grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant
respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service.
Moreover, considering the unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false
pretexts and alibis to justify their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman
as their official position in their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast
media, the probability is strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases
referred by the Office of the Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor's office will be
disrupted and prejudiced and the records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor's Office during the pendency of these proceedings.

Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the preventive
suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the administrative complaint
against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the Office of the Ombudsman. The
administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their
designation as deputies of the ombudsman in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in determine
whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the purpose of placing them
under preventive suspension.

Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor
Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that case may
not be hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct,
insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the
Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.

B.

Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it should only be
for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error. She is referring to cases
where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension to ninety (90) days. With respect to the
first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v. Sandiganbayan 21 that —

To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13
of Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned
that this Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the
aforementioned laws, as follows:

1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a
maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers,
(as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.

2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
employees whose positions are embraced in the Civil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and
4 of said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from
issuance, except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault,
negligence or petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted
in computing the period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a
presidential appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the
circumstances of the case may warrant.

On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive suspension pursuant to
§24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that "the preventive suspension shall continue until the case
is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay." Their preventive
suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to law.

C.

Nor is there merit in petitioner's claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any action in the
administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a prejudicial question. There is
 simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the same act or omission and may proceed hand
in hand, or one can be heard before the other. Whatever order is followed will not really matter.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive Suspension
is DENIED.

SO ORDERED.

G.R. No. 74457 March 20, 1987

RESTITUTO YNOT, petitioner,

vs.
INTERMEDIATE APPELLATE COURT, THE STATION COMMANDER, INTEGRATED NATIONAL POLICE, BAROTAC
NUEVO, ILOILO and THE REGIONAL DIRECTOR, BUREAU OF ANIMAL INDUSTRY, REGION IV, ILOILO
CITY, respondents.

Ramon A. Gonzales for petitioner.

CRUZ, J.:

The essence of due process is distilled in the immortal cry of Themistocles to Alcibiades "Strike — but hear me first!" It is
this cry that the petitioner in effect repeats here as he challenges the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.

The said executive order reads in full as follows:

WHEREAS, the President has given orders prohibiting the interprovincial movement of carabaos and the
slaughtering of carabaos not complying with the requirements of Executive Order No. 626 particularly with
respect to age;

WHEREAS, it has been observed that despite such orders the violators still manage to circumvent the
prohibition against inter-provincial movement of carabaos by transporting carabeef instead; and

WHEREAS, in order to achieve the purposes and objectives of Executive Order No. 626 and the
prohibition against interprovincial movement of carabaos, it is necessary to strengthen the said Executive
Order and provide for the disposition of the carabaos and carabeef subject of the violation;

NOW, THEREFORE, I, FERDINAND E. MARCOS, President of the Philippines, by virtue of the powers
vested in me by the Constitution, do hereby promulgate the following:

SECTION 1. Executive Order No. 626 is hereby amended such that henceforth, no carabao regardless of
age, sex, physical condition or purpose and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to
another. The carabao or carabeef transported in violation of this Executive Order as amended shall be
subject to confiscation and forfeiture by the government, to be distributed to charitable institutions and
other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may ay see fit, in
the case of carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may
see fit, in the case of carabaos.

SECTION 2. This Executive Order shall take effect immediately.

Done in the City of Manila, this 25th day of October, in the year of Our Lord, nineteen hundred and eighty.

(SGD.) FERDINAND E. MARCOS

President
 Republic of the Philippines

The petitioner had transported six carabaos in a pump boat from Masbate to Iloilo on January 13, 1984, when they were
confiscated by the police station commander of Barotac Nuevo, Iloilo, for violation of the above measure. 1 The petitioner
sued for recovery, and the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City issued a writ of replevin upon his filing of a supersedeas bond
of P12,000.00. After considering the merits of the case, the court sustained the confiscation of the carabaos and, since
they could no longer be produced, ordered the confiscation of the bond. The court also declined to rule on the
constitutionality of the executive order, as raise by the petitioner, for lack of authority and also for its presumed validity. 2

The petitioner appealed the decision to the Intermediate Appellate Court,* 3 which upheld the trial court, ** and he has
now come before us in this petition for review on certiorari.

The thrust of his petition is that the executive order is unconstitutional insofar as it authorizes outright confiscation of the
carabao or carabeef being transported across provincial boundaries. His claim is that the penalty is invalid because it is
imposed without according the owner a right to be heard before a competent and impartial court as guaranteed by due
process. He complains that the measure should not have been presumed, and so sustained, as constitutional. There is
also a challenge to the improper exercise of the legislative power by the former President under Amendment No. 6 of the
1973 Constitution. 4

While also involving the same executive order, the case of Pesigan v. Angeles 5 is not applicable here. The question
raised there was the necessity of the previous publication of the measure in the Official Gazette before it could be
considered enforceable. We imposed the requirement then on the basis of due process of law. In doing so, however, this
Court did not, as contended by the Solicitor General, impliedly affirm the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 626-A.
That is an entirely different matter.

This Court has declared that while lower courts should observe a becoming modesty in examining constitutional
questions, they are nonetheless not prevented from resolving the same whenever warranted, subject only to review by the
highest tribunal. 6 We have jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review, revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal
or certiorari, as the law or rules of court may provide," final judgments and orders of lower courts in, among others, all
cases involving the constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This simply means that the resolution of such cases may be
made in the first instance by these lower courts.

And while it is true that laws are presumed to be constitutional, that presumption is not by any means conclusive and in
fact may be rebutted. Indeed, if there be a clear showing of their invalidity, and of the need to declare them so, then "will
be the time to make the hammer fall, and heavily," 8 to recall Justice Laurel's trenchant warning. Stated otherwise, courts
should not follow the path of least resistance by simply presuming the constitutionality of a law when it is questioned. On
the contrary, they should probe the issue more deeply, to relieve the abscess, paraphrasing another distinguished
jurist, 9 and so heal the wound or excise the affliction.

Judicial power authorizes this; and when the exercise is demanded, there should be no shirking of the task for fear of
retaliation, or loss of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this Court.

The challenged measure is denominated an executive order but it is really presidential decree, promulgating a new rule
instead of merely implementing an existing law. It was issued by President Marcos not for the purpose of taking care that
the laws were faithfully executed but in the exercise of his legislative authority under Amendment No. 6. It was provided
thereunder that whenever in his judgment there existed a grave emergency or a threat or imminence thereof or whenever
the legislature failed or was unable to act adequately on any matter that in his judgment required immediate action, he
could, in order to meet the exigency, issue decrees, orders or letters of instruction that were to have the force and effect of
law. As there is no showing of any exigency to justify the exercise of that extraordinary power then, the petitioner has
reason, indeed, to question the validity of the executive order. Nevertheless, since the determination of the grounds was
supposed to have been made by the President "in his judgment, " a phrase that will lead to protracted discussion not
really necessary at this time, we reserve resolution of this matter until a more appropriate occasion. For the nonce, we
confine ourselves to the more fundamental question of due process.

It is part of the art of constitution-making that the provisions of the charter be cast in precise and unmistakable language
to avoid controversies that might arise on their correct interpretation. That is the Ideal. In the case of the due process
clause, however, this rule was deliberately not followed and the wording was purposely kept ambiguous. In fact, a
proposal to delineate it more clearly was submitted in the Constitutional Convention of 1934, but it was rejected by
Delegate Jose P. Laurel, Chairman of the Committee on the Bill of Rights, who forcefully argued against it. He was
sustained by the body. 10
The due process clause was kept intentionally vague so it would remain also conveniently resilient. This was felt
necessary because due process is not, like some provisions of the fundamental law, an "iron rule" laying down an
implacable and immutable command for all seasons and all persons. Flexibility must be the best virtue of the guaranty.
The very elasticity of the due process clause was meant to make it adapt easily to every situation, enlarging or
constricting its protection as the changing times and circumstances may require.

Aware of this, the courts have also hesitated to adopt their own specific description of due process lest they confine
themselves in a legal straitjacket that will deprive them of the elbow room they may need to vary the meaning of the
clause whenever indicated. Instead, they have preferred to leave the import of the protection open-ended, as it were, to
be "gradually ascertained by the process of inclusion and exclusion in the course of the decision of cases as they
arise." 11 Thus, Justice Felix Frankfurter of the U.S. Supreme Court, for example, would go no farther than to define due
process — and in so doing sums it all up — as nothing more and nothing less than "the embodiment of the sporting Idea
of fair play." 12

When the barons of England extracted from their sovereign liege the reluctant promise that that Crown would thenceforth
not proceed against the life liberty or property of any of its subjects except by the lawful judgment of his peers or the law
of the land, they thereby won for themselves and their progeny that splendid guaranty of fairness that is now the hallmark
of the free society. The solemn vow that King John made at Runnymede in 1215 has since then resounded through the
ages, as a ringing reminder to all rulers, benevolent or base, that every person, when confronted by the stern visage of
the law, is entitled to have his say in a fair and open hearing of his cause.

The closed mind has no place in the open society. It is part of the sporting Idea of fair play to hear "the other side" before
an opinion is formed or a decision is made by those who sit in judgment. Obviously, one side is only one-half of the
question; the other half must also be considered if an impartial verdict is to be reached based on an informed appreciation
of the issues in contention. It is indispensable that the two sides complement each other, as unto the bow the arrow, in
leading to the correct ruling after examination of the problem not from one or the other perspective only but in its totality. A
judgment based on less that this full appraisal, on the pretext that a hearing is unnecessary or useless, is tainted with the
vice of bias or intolerance or ignorance, or worst of all, in repressive regimes, the insolence of power.

The minimum requirements of due process are notice and hearing 13 which, generally speaking, may not be dispensed
with because they are intended as a safeguard against official arbitrariness. It is a gratifying commentary on our judicial
system that the jurisprudence of this country is rich with applications of this guaranty as proof of our fealty to the rule of
law and the ancient rudiments of fair play. We have consistently declared that every person, faced by the awesome power
of the State, is entitled to "the law of the land," which Daniel Webster described almost two hundred years ago in the
famous Dartmouth College Case, 14 as "the law which hears before it condemns, which proceeds upon inquiry and
renders judgment only after trial." It has to be so if the rights of every person are to be secured beyond the reach of
officials who, out of mistaken zeal or plain arrogance, would degrade the due process clause into a worn and empty
catchword.

This is not to say that notice and hearing are imperative in every case for, to be sure, there are a number of admitted
exceptions. The conclusive presumption, for example, bars the admission of contrary evidence as long as such
presumption is based on human experience or there is a rational connection between the fact proved and the fact
ultimately presumed therefrom. 15 There are instances when the need for expeditions action will justify omission of these
requisites, as in the summary abatement of a nuisance per se, like a mad dog on the loose, which may be killed on sight
because of the immediate danger it poses to the safety and lives of the people. Pornographic materials, contaminated
meat and narcotic drugs are inherently pernicious and may be summarily destroyed. The passport of a person sought for
a criminal offense may be cancelled without hearing, to compel his return to the country he has fled. 16 Filthy restaurants
may be summarily padlocked in the interest of the public health and bawdy houses to protect the public morals. 17 In such
instances, previous judicial hearing may be omitted without violation of due process in view of the nature of the property
involved or the urgency of the need to protect the general welfare from a clear and present danger.

The protection of the general welfare is the particular function of the police power which both restraints and is restrained
by due process. The police power is simply defined as the power inherent in the State to regulate liberty and property for
the promotion of the general welfare. 18 By reason of its function, it extends to all the great public needs and is described
as the most pervasive, the least limitable and the most demanding of the three inherent powers of the State, far outpacing
taxation and eminent domain. The individual, as a member of society, is hemmed in by the police power, which affects
him even before he is born and follows him still after he is dead — from the womb to beyond the tomb — in practically
everything he does or owns. Its reach is virtually limitless. It is a ubiquitous and often unwelcome intrusion. Even so, as
long as the activity or the property has some relevance to the public welfare, its regulation under the police power is not
only proper but necessary. And the justification is found in the venerable Latin maxims, Salus populi est suprema
lex and Sic utere tuo ut alienum non laedas, which call for the subordination of individual interests to the benefit of the
greater number.
It is this power that is now invoked by the government to justify Executive Order No. 626-A, amending the basic rule in
Executive Order No. 626, prohibiting the slaughter of carabaos except under certain conditions. The original measure was
issued for the reason, as expressed in one of its Whereases, that "present conditions demand that the carabaos and the
buffaloes be conserved for the benefit of the small farmers who rely on them for energy needs." We affirm at the outset
the need for such a measure. In the face of the worsening energy crisis and the increased dependence of our farms on
these traditional beasts of burden, the government would have been remiss, indeed, if it had not taken steps to protect
and preserve them.

A similar prohibition was challenged in United States v. Toribio, 19 where a law regulating the registration, branding and
slaughter of large cattle was claimed to be a deprivation of property without due process of law. The defendant had been
convicted thereunder for having slaughtered his own carabao without the required permit, and he appealed to the
Supreme Court. The conviction was affirmed. The law was sustained as a valid police measure to prevent the
indiscriminate killing of carabaos, which were then badly needed by farmers. An epidemic had stricken many of these
animals and the reduction of their number had resulted in an acute decline in agricultural output, which in turn had caused
an incipient famine. Furthermore, because of the scarcity of the animals and the consequent increase in their price, cattle-
rustling had spread alarmingly, necessitating more effective measures for the registration and branding of these animals.
The Court held that the questioned statute was a valid exercise of the police power and declared in part as follows:

To justify the State in thus interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it must appear, first, that the
interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a particular class, require such
interference; and second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accomplishment of the
purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. ...

From what has been said, we think it is clear that the enactment of the provisions of the statute under
consideration was required by "the interests of the public generally, as distinguished from those of a
particular class" and that the prohibition of the slaughter of carabaos for human consumption, so long as
these animals are fit for agricultural work or draft purposes was a "reasonably necessary" limitation on
private ownership, to protect the community from the loss of the services of such animals by their
slaughter by improvident owners, tempted either by greed of momentary gain, or by a desire to enjoy the
luxury of animal food, even when by so doing the productive power of the community may be measurably
and dangerously affected.

In the light of the tests mentioned above, we hold with the Toribio Case that the carabao, as the poor man's tractor, so to
speak, has a direct relevance to the public welfare and so is a lawful subject of Executive Order No. 626. The method
chosen in the basic measure is also reasonably necessary for the purpose sought to be achieved and not unduly
oppressive upon individuals, again following the above-cited doctrine. There is no doubt that by banning the slaughter of
these animals except where they are at least seven years old if male and eleven years old if female upon issuance of the
necessary permit, the executive order will be conserving those still fit for farm work or breeding and preventing their
improvident depletion.

But while conceding that the amendatory measure has the same lawful subject as the original executive order, we cannot
say with equal certainty that it complies with the second requirement, viz., that there be a lawful method. We note that to
strengthen the original measure, Executive Order No. 626-A imposes an absolute ban not on the slaughter of the
carabaos but on their movement, providing that "no carabao regardless of age, sex, physical condition or purpose (sic)
and no carabeef shall be transported from one province to another." The object of the prohibition escapes us. The
reasonable connection between the means employed and the purpose sought to be achieved by the questioned measure
is missing

We do not see how the prohibition of the inter-provincial transport of carabaos can prevent their indiscriminate slaughter,
considering that they can be killed anywhere, with no less difficulty in one province than in another. Obviously, retaining
the carabaos in one province will not prevent their slaughter there, any more than moving them to another province will
make it easier to kill them there. As for the carabeef, the prohibition is made to apply to it as otherwise, so says executive
order, it could be easily circumvented by simply killing the animal. Perhaps so. However, if the movement of the live
animals for the purpose of preventing their slaughter cannot be prohibited, it should follow that there is no reason either to
prohibit their transfer as, not to be flippant dead meat.

Even if a reasonable relation between the means and the end were to be assumed, we would still have to reckon with the
sanction that the measure applies for violation of the prohibition. The penalty is outright confiscation of the carabao or
carabeef being transported, to be meted out by the executive authorities, usually the police only. In the Toribio Case, the
statute was sustained because the penalty prescribed was fine and imprisonment, to be imposed by the court after trial
and conviction of the accused. Under the challenged measure, significantly, no such trial is prescribed, and the property
being transported is immediately impounded by the police and declared, by the measure itself, as forfeited to the
government.

In the instant case, the carabaos were arbitrarily confiscated by the police station commander, were returned to the
petitioner only after he had filed a complaint for recovery and given a supersedeas bond of P12,000.00, which was
ordered confiscated upon his failure to produce the carabaos when ordered by the trial court. The executive order defined
the prohibition, convicted the petitioner and immediately imposed punishment, which was carried out forthright. The
measure struck at once and pounced upon the petitioner without giving him a chance to be heard, thus denying him the
centuries-old guaranty of elementary fair play.

It has already been remarked that there are occasions when notice and hearing may be validly dispensed with
notwithstanding the usual requirement for these minimum guarantees of due process. It is also conceded that summary
action may be validly taken in administrative proceedings as procedural due process is not necessarily judicial only. 20 In
the exceptional cases accepted, however. there is a justification for the omission of the right to a previous hearing, to wit,
the immediacy of the problem sought to be corrected and the urgency of the need to correct it.

In the case before us, there was no such pressure of time or action calling for the petitioner's peremptory treatment. The
properties involved were not even inimical per se as to require their instant destruction. There certainly was no reason
why the offense prohibited by the executive order should not have been proved first in a court of justice, with the accused
being accorded all the rights safeguarded to him under the Constitution. Considering that, as we held in Pesigan v.
Angeles, 21 Executive Order No. 626-A is penal in nature, the violation thereof should have been pronounced not by the
police only but by a court of justice, which alone would have had the authority to impose the prescribed penalty, and only
after trial and conviction of the accused.

We also mark, on top of all this, the questionable manner of the disposition of the confiscated property as prescribed in
the questioned executive order. It is there authorized that the seized property shall "be distributed to charitable institutions
and other similar institutions as the Chairman of the National Meat Inspection Commission may see fit, in the case of
carabeef, and to deserving farmers through dispersal as the Director of Animal Industry may see fit, in the case of
carabaos." (Emphasis supplied.) The phrase "may see fit" is an extremely generous and dangerous condition, if condition
it is. It is laden with perilous opportunities for partiality and abuse, and even corruption. One searches in vain for the usual
standard and the reasonable guidelines, or better still, the limitations that the said officers must observe when they make
their distribution. There is none. Their options are apparently boundless. Who shall be the fortunate beneficiaries of their
generosity and by what criteria shall they be chosen? Only the officers named can supply the answer, they and they alone
may choose the grantee as they see fit, and in their own exclusive discretion. Definitely, there is here a "roving
commission," a wide and sweeping authority that is not "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing," in short, a
clearly profligate and therefore invalid delegation of legislative powers.

To sum up then, we find that the challenged measure is an invalid exercise of the police power because the method
employed to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably necessary to the purpose of the law and, worse, is unduly
oppressive. Due process is violated because the owner of the property confiscated is denied the right to be heard in his
defense and is immediately condemned and punished. The conferment on the administrative authorities of the power to
adjudge the guilt of the supposed offender is a clear encroachment on judicial functions and militates against the doctrine
of separation of powers. There is, finally, also an invalid delegation of legislative powers to the officers mentioned therein
who are granted unlimited discretion in the distribution of the properties arbitrarily taken. For these reasons, we hereby
declare Executive Order No. 626-A unconstitutional.

We agree with the respondent court, however, that the police station commander who confiscated the petitioner's
carabaos is not liable in damages for enforcing the executive order in accordance with its mandate. The law was at that
time presumptively valid, and it was his obligation, as a member of the police, to enforce it. It would have been impertinent
of him, being a mere subordinate of the President, to declare the executive order unconstitutional and, on his own
responsibility alone, refuse to execute it. Even the trial court, in fact, and the Court of Appeals itself did not feel they had
the competence, for all their superior authority, to question the order we now annul.

The Court notes that if the petitioner had not seen fit to assert and protect his rights as he saw them, this case would
never have reached us and the taking of his property under the challenged measure would have become
a faitaccompli despite its invalidity. We commend him for his spirit. Without the present challenge, the matter would have
ended in that pump boat in Masbate and another violation of the Constitution, for all its obviousness, would have been
perpetrated, allowed without protest, and soon forgotten in the limbo of relinquished rights.

The strength of democracy lies not in the rights it guarantees but in the courage of the people to invoke them whenever
they are ignored or violated. Rights are but weapons on the wall if, like expensive tapestry, all they do is embellish and
impress. Rights, as weapons, must be a promise of protection. They become truly meaningful, and fulfill the role assigned
to them in the free society, if they are kept bright and sharp with use by those who are not afraid to assert them.

WHEREFORE, Executive Order No. 626-A is hereby declared unconstitutional. Except as affirmed above, the decision of
the Court of Appeals is reversed. The supersedeas bond is cancelled and the amount thereof is ordered restored to the
petitioner. No costs.

SO ORDERED.

DOCTRINE OF PRIMARY JURISDICTION AND EXHAUSTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE REMEDIES

G.R. No. 95694 October 9, 1997VICENTE VILLAFLOR, substituted by his heirs,

petitioner,vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and NASIPIT LUMBER CO., INC.,
respondents.
PANGANIBAN,
J.:
The case is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the CA’s
order affirming the dismissal by the lower court of petitioner’s complaint against Private Respondent Nasipit
Lumber Co., Incorporated.

The synopsis of the case is as follows:

The Petitioner bought a large tract of land containing one hundred forty (140) hectares to four (4) different owners in
1940. The land was part of the public domain, but the petitioners predecessor in interest over which he acquired
the property, have been in open, exclusive and notorious possession of the same for sometime. After acquisition, petitioner
asserts exclusive rights thereof for more than fifty (50) years.
In 1946, petitioner entered into a lease agreement with respondent Nasipit Lumber Co.Inc. However, an “Agreement
for the Relinquishment of Rights” was entered into by both parties in 1950. The respondent
having complied all the requirements agreed upon, assumed ownership and possession of the property
since then. Respondent corporation likewise filed a sales application in 1950 over the property to bolster his claim
which the Bureau of Land otherwise granted on the same year as proof of an “Order of Award” issued.

In 1974 or twenty four (24) years had passed, when petitioner, questioned and made several collateral and extraneous
claims against the respondent. However, the Bureau of Lands dismissed the claim, arguing that petitioner no
longer has any substantial rights to question the validity of acquisition of the respondent and the
subsequent issuance of free patent by the Bureau of Lands.

Unperturbed, petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration at the Ministry of NaturalResources which
likewise dismissed the petition . On July 6, 1978, petitioner filed a
complaint in the trial court for "Declaration of Nullity of Contract (Deed
o f Relinquishment of Rights), Recovery of Possession (of two parcels of land subject of the contract), and Damages" at
about the same time that he appealed the decision of the Minister of Natural Resources to the Office of the President.

On January 28, 1983, petitioner died. Petitioner’s heir substituted in his behalf to pursuethe claim. The trial court in Butuan City who initially take
cognizance of the case ordered the case dismissed, on the grounds that: (1) petitioner admitted the due execution and
genuineness of the contract and was estopped from proving its nullity, (2) the verbal lease agreements were
unenforceable under Article 1403 (2) (e) of the Civil Code, and (3) his causes of action were barred by extinctive
prescription and/or laches. The heirs appealed to the CA which likewise rendered judgment of dismissal by
uphelding thelower court’s ruling.

Not satisfied, petitioner's heirs filed the instant petition for review which the court granted, hence this petition.

Issues:

W h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p e t i t i o n e r s t i l l h a s c a u s e o f a c t i o n t o p u r s u e c l a i m o f ownership
over the property since his rights thereon was already transferred and relinquished to the respondent by virtue of the Deed executed thereon;
andW h e t h e r o r n o t t h e p r i v a t e r e s p o n d e n t c o r p o r a t i o n i s q u a l i f i e d t o a c q u i r e ownership over the land of
public domain.

Ruling:

The petition is bereft of merit. The court ruled that the petitioner no longer has a cause of action to demand declaration of nullity
over the rights conferred to respondents since his claimed thereof was merely based on speculations, surmises and conjectures.
The petitioner’s claim of ownership and rights over the property was negated by proof tha the ceded the same to the respondent
by virtue of an “Agreement on the Relinquishment of Rights” which they have executed. The petitioner insistence that the court
erred in affirming his cause is misplaced. The finding of the court and the agency which acquire primary jurisdiction over the
petition was accorded great weight by the court. As to the prohibition that “xxxx corporation or association may not hold alienable
land o f p u b l i c d o m a i n e x c e p t f o r l e a s e n o t t o e x c e e d o n e t h o u s a n d h e c t a r e s

”, that court declared that

“xxx where the applicant had, before the Constitution took effect, fully complied with all this obligations
under the Public Land Act in order to entitle him to a Sales patent, there would be no legal or equitable
justification for refusing to issue or release the sales patent”.
The requirements for a sales application under the Public Land Act for a corporation to acquire
ownership of public domain, was essentially complied upon by the respondent, hence no disqualification
exist not to extend and validly issued the confirmation of title over the land in question to the
respondentcorporation. All told, the only disqualification that can be imputed to private respondent is theprohibition in the
1973 Constitution against the holding of alienable lands of the public domain by corporations. However, this Court
settled the matter, declaring that said constitutional prohibition had no retroactive effect and could not prevail over a
vested right
t o t h e l a n d . A p p l i c a t i o n f o r p a t e n t f o r a n d i n b e h a l f o f N a s i p i t h a s c l e a r l y n o impediment, for
they have proven satisfactory compliance of the requirements of the law. Petition is DISMISSED

G.R. No. 109093 November 20, 1995

LOPE MACHETE, NICASIO JUMAWID, SANTIAGO JUMAWID, JOHN JUMAWID, PEDRO GAMAYA, RENATO
DELGADO, FERNANDO OMBAHIN, MATIAS ROLEDA, PASIANO BARO, IGNACIO BARO, MAMERTO PLARAS and
JUSTINIANO VILLALON, petitioners,
vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and CELESTINO VILLALON, respondents.

BELLOSILLO, J.:

Are Regional Trial Courts' vested with jurisdiction over cases for collection of back rentals from leasehold tenants?

On 21 July 1989 private respondent Celestino Villalon filed a complaint for collection of back rentals and damages before
the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City against petitioners Lope Machete, Nicasio Jumawid, Santiago Jumawid, John
Jumawid, Pedro Gamaya, Renato Delgado, Fernando Ombahin, Matias Roleda, Pasiano Baro, Ignacio Baro, Mamerto
Plaras and Justiniano Villalon. The complaint alleged that the parties entered into a leasehold agreement with respect to
private respondent's landholdings at Poblacion Norte, Carmen, Bohol, under which petitioners were to pay private
respondent a certain amount or percentage of their harvests. However, despite repeated demands and with no valid
reason, petitioners failed to pay their respective rentals. Private respondent thus prayed that petitioners be ordered to pay
him back rentals and damages.

Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction of the trial court over the subject matter.
They contended that the case arose out of or was connected with agrarian relations, hence, the subject matter of the
complaint fell squarely within the jurisdiction of the Department of Agrarian Reform (DAR) in the exercise of its quasi-
judicial powers under Sec. 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of the Revised Rules of the Department of Agrarian Reform
Adjudication Board (DARAB).
On 22 August 1989 the trial court granted the motion to dismiss,1 and on 28 September 1989 denied the motion for
reconsideration.2

Private respondent sought annulment of both orders before respondent Court of Appeals which on 21 May 1992 rendered
judgment reversing the trial court and directing it to assume jurisdiction over the case 3 on the basis of its finding that —

. . . The CARL (RA 6657) and other pertinent laws on agrarian reform cannot be seen to encompass a
case of simple collection of back rentals by virtue of an agreement, as the one at bar, where there is no
agrarian dispute to speak of (since the allegation of failure to pay the agreed rentals was never
controverted in the motion to dismiss) nor the issue raised on application, implementation, enforcement or
interpretation of these laws.4

On 18 January 1993 the appellate court rejected the motion for

reconsideration.5

Petitioners maintain that the alleged cause of action of private respondent arose from an agrarian relation and that
respondent appellate court failed to consider that the agreement involved is an agricultural leasehold contract, hence, the
dispute is agrarian in nature. The laws governing its execution and the rights and obligations of the parties thereto are
necessarily R.A. 3844,6 R.A. 66577 and other pertinent agrarian laws. Considering that the application, implementation,
enforcement or interpretation of said laws are matters which have been vested in the DAR, this case is outside the
jurisdiction of the trial court.

The petition is impressed with merit. Section 17 of E.O. 2298 vested the DAR with quasi-judicial powers to determine and
adjudicate agrarian reform matters as well as exclusive original jurisdiction over all matters involving implementation of
agrarian reform except those falling under the exclusive original jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture and the
Department of Environment and Natural Resources in accordance with law.

Executive Order 129-A, while in the process of reorganizing and strengthening the DAR, created the DARAB to assume
the powers and functions with respect to the adjudication of agrarian reform cases. 9 Section 1, pars. (a) and (b), Rule II of
the Revised Rules of the DARAB explicitly provides —

Sec. 1. Primary, Original and Appellate Jurisdiction. — The Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board shall
have primary jurisdiction, both original and appellate, to determine and adjudicate all agrarian disputes,
cases, controversies, and matters or incidents involving the implementation of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Program under Republic Act No. 6657, Executive Orders Nos. 229, 228 and 129-A,
Republic Act No. 3844 as amended by Republic Act No. 6389, Presidential Decree No. 27 and other
agrarian laws and their implementing rules and regulations. Specifically, such jurisdiction shall extend
over but not be limited to the following: (a) Cases involving the rights and obligations of persons engaged
in the cultivation and use of agricultural land covered by the Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Program
(CARP) and other agrarian laws, (b) Cases involving the valuation of land, and determination and
payment of just compensation, fixing and collection of lease rentals, disturbance compensation,
amortization payments, and similar disputes concerning the functions of the Land Bank . . .

In Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,10 this Court interpreted the effect of Sec. 17 of E.O. 229 on P.D. 946, which amended
R.A. 3844, the agrarian law then in force —

The above quoted provision (Sec. 17) should be deemed to have repealed11 Sec. 12 (a) and (b) of
Presidential Decree No. 946 which invested the then courts of agrarian relations with original exclusive
jurisdiction over cases and questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by presidential
issuances promulgated in relation to the agrarian reform program.

Formerly, under Presidential Decree No. 946, amending Chapter IX of Republic Act No. 3844, the courts
of agrarian relations had original and exclusive jurisdiction over "cases involving the rights and obligations
of persons in the cultivation and use of agricultural land except those cognizable by the National Labor
Relations Commission" and "questions involving rights granted and obligations imposed by laws,
Presidential Decrees, Orders, Instructions, Rules and Regulations issued and promulgated in relation to
the agrarian reform program," except those matters involving the administrative implementation of the
transfer of land to the tenant-farmer under Presidential Decree No. 27 and amendments thereto which
shall be exclusively cognizable by the Secretary of Agrarian Reform. 12
 In 1980, upon the passage of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, otherwise known as the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, the courts of agrarian relations were integrated into the regional trial courts and the
jurisdiction of the former was vested in the latter courts. 13

However, with the enactment of Executive Order No. 229, which took effect on August 29, 1987, fifteen
(15) days after its release for publication in the Official Gazette, 14 the regional trial courts were divested of
their general jurisdiction to try agrarian reform matters. The said jurisdiction is now vested in the
Department of Agrarian Reform.

On 15 June 1988 R.A. 6657 was passed containing provisions which evince and support the intention of the legislature to
vest in the DAR exclusive jurisdiction over all agrarian reform matters. 15 Section 50 thereof substantially reiterates Sec. 17
of E.O. 229 thus —

Sec. 50. Quasi-Judicial Powers of the DAR. — The DAR is hereby vested with primary jurisdiction to
determine and adjudicate agrarian reform matters and shall have exclusive original jurisdiction over all
matters involving the implementation of agrarian reform, except those falling under the exclusive
jurisdiction of the Department of Agriculture (DA) and the Department of Environment and Natural
Resources
(DENR) . . .

Section 3, par. (d), thereof defines the term "agrarian dispute" as referring to any controversy relating to tenurial
arrangements, whether leasehold, tenancy, stewardship or otherwise, over lands devoted to agriculture, including
disputes concerning farm workers' associations or representation of persons in negotiating, fixing, maintaining,
changing or seeking to arrange terms or conditions of such tenurial arrangements.

However it may be mentioned in passing that the Regional Trial Courts have not been completely divested of jurisdiction
over agrarian reform matters. Section 56 of R.A. 6657 confers "special jurisdiction" on "Special Agrarian Courts," which
are Regional Trial Courts designated by this Court — at least one (1) branch within each province — to act as such.
These Regional Trial Courts designated as Special Agrarian Courts have, according to Sec. 57 of the same law, original
and exclusive jurisdiction over: (a) all petitions for the determination of just compensation to landowners, and (b) the
prosecution of all criminal offenses under the Act.16

Consequently, there exists an agrarian dispute in the case at bench which is exclusively cognizable by the DARAB. The
failure of petitioners to pay back rentals pursuant to the leasehold contract with private respondent is an issue which is
clearly beyond the legal competence of the trial court to resolve. The doctrine of primary jurisdiction does not warrant a
court to arrogate unto itself the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an
administrative body of special competence.17

Thus, respondent appellate court erred in directing the trial court to assume jurisdiction over this case. At any rate, the
present legal battle is "not altogether lost" on the part of private respondent because as this Court was quite emphatic
in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,18 the resolution by the DAR is to the best advantage of the parties since it is in a better
position to resolve agrarian disputes, being the administrative agency presumably possessing the necessary expertise on
the matter. Further, the proceedings therein are summary in nature and the department is not bound by the technical rules
of procedure and evidence, to the end that agrarian reform disputes and other issues will be adjudicated in a just,
expeditious and inexpensive proceeding.19

WHEREFORE, the decision of respondent Court of Appeals as well as its resolution denying reconsideration is
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The orders of the Regional Trial Court of Tagbilaran City dated 22 August and 28
September 1989 are REINSTATED. Consequently, let the records of this case be immediately transmitted to the
appropriate Department of Agrarian Reform Adjudication Board (DARAB) for proper adjudication in accordance with the
ruling in Vda. de Tangub v. Court of Appeals 20 and reiterated in Quismundo v. Court of Appeals,21 as well as pertinent
agrarian laws.

SO ORDERED.

RUPERTO A. AMBIL, JR.,

petitioner, vs.
THE COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS (FIRST DIVISION, FORMERLY SECONDDIVISION) and JOSE T. RAMIREZ,
respondents
.[G.R. No. 143398. October 25, 2000]FACTS:

Petitioner Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. and respondent Jose T. Ramirez were candidates for the position ofGovernor, Eastern
Samar, during the May 11, 1998 elections.

On May 16, 1998, the ProvincialBoard of Canvassers proclaimed Ruperto A. Ambil, Jr. as the duly elected Governor,
EasternSamar.

ISSUE:
Whether Comelec, First Division, in scheduling the promulgation of the resolution in the case (EPCCase No. 98-29) acted
without jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction.

HELD:
We find the petition without merit. The case at bar is an election protest involving the position ofGovernor, Eastern Samar.
It is within the original jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections in division.
Admittedly, petitioner did not ask for a reconsideration of the division’s resolution
or final decision In likemanner, a decision, order or resolution of a division of the Comelec must be reviewed by the
Comelec enbanc via a motion for reconsideration before the final en banc decision may be brought to the Supreme Court
on certiorari. The pre-requisite filing of a motion for reconsideration is mandatory. Under the existing Constitutional
scheme, a party to an election case within the jurisdiction of the Comelec in division can not dispense with the filing of a
motion for reconsideration of a decision, resolution nor final order of the Division of the Commission on Elections because
the case would not reach the Comelec en banc without such motion for reconsideration having been filed and resolved by
the Division. The instant case does not fall under any of the recognized exceptions to the rule in certiorari cases
dispensing with a motion for reconsideration prior to the filing of a petition. In truth, the exceptions do not apply to
election cases where a motion for reconsideration is mandatory by Constitutional fiat to elevate the case to the
Comelec en banc whose final decision is what is reviewable via certiorari beforethe Supreme Court.

Hence, the petition at bar must be dismissed for prematurity. “Failure to exhaust administrative
remedies is fatal to a party's cause of action and a dismissal based on that ground is tantamount to a
dismissal based on lack of cause of action.”

WHEREFORE, the Court hereby DISMISSES the petition for prematurity.

FULGENCIO S. FACTORAN, JR., Secretary, Department of Environment and Natural Resources, VICENTE A. ROBLES
and NESTOR GAPUZAN, petitioners, vs. COURT OF APPEALS (Third Division), Hon. BENIGNO T. DAYAW,as, Judge,
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City, Branch 80, JESUS SY and LILY FRANCISCO UY, respondents. [G.R. No. 93540.
December 13, 1999] Case Digest
FACTS:

On August 9, 1988 two police officers of Marikina Police Station, Sub-Station III, intercepted a six-wheeler truck carrying
4,000 board feet of narra lumber as it was cruising along Marcos Highway. They apprehended the truck driver, private
respondent Jesus Sy, and brought the truck and its cargo to the Personnel Investigation Committee/Special Actions and
Investigation Division (PIC/SAID) of DENR Office in Quezon City. There, petitioner Atty. Vicente Robles of the PIC/SAID
investigated them, and discovered the discrepancies in the documentation of the narra lumber.

What were declared in the documents were narra flitches, while the cargo of the truck consisted of narra lumber. In the
documents, the plate numbers of the truck supposed to carry the cargo bear the numbers BAX-404, PEC-492 or NSN-
267, while the plate of the truck apprehended is NVT-881. Considering that the cargo is lumber, the transport should have
been accompanied by a Certificate of Lumber Origin, scale sheet of said lumber and not by a Certificate of Timber Origin.
The Log Sale Purchase Agreement presented is between DSM Golden Cup International as the Seller and Bonamy
Enterprises as the buyer/consignee and not with Lily Francisco Lumber Hardware.

These are in violation of Bureau of Forestry Development (BFD) Circular No. 10 which requires possession or
transportation of lumber to be supported by the following documents:
1. Certificate of Lumber Origin (CLO) which shall be issued only by the District Forester, or in his absence,
the Assistant District Forester;
2. Sales Invoice;
3. Delivery Receipt; and
4. Tally Sheets.
Such omission is punishable under Sec. 68 of Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 705 otherwise known as the Revised
Forestry Code. Thus, petitioner Atty. Robles issued a temporary seizure order and seizure receipt for the narra lumber
and the six-wheeler truck.

On January 20, 1989, petitioner Fulgencio S. Factoran, then Secretary of Environment and Natural Resources issued an
order for the confiscation of the narra lumber and the six-wheeler truck

Private respondents neither asked for reconsideration of nor appealed the said order to the Office of the President.
Consequently, the narra lumber and six-wheeler truck were forfeited in favor of the government and were later on
advertised to be sold at a public auction on March 20, 1989.

On March 17, 1989, private respondents filed a complaint with prayer for the issuance of the writs of replevin and
preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order for the recovery of the confiscated items, and to enjoin the
panned auction sale of the subject narra lumber, respectively.

On the same day, the trial court issued an order directing the parties to desist from proceeding with the planned auction
sale and setting the hearing for the issuance of the writ of preliminary injunction on March 27, 1989.

On March 20, 1989, private respondents filed and Ex-Parte motion for Release and Return of Goods and Documents
(Replevin) supported by an Affidavit for Issuance of Writ of Replevin and Preliminary Injunction and a Replevin Bond in
the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court granted the writ of replevin on the same day and directed the petitioners "to
deliver the xxx [n]arra lumber, original documents and truck with plate no. NJT 881 to the custody of the plaintiffs and/or
their representatives x x x".

On March 22, 1989, the trial court issued a writ of seizure. However, petitioners refused to comply therewith. Sheriff David
G. Brodett of Branch 80 of the RTC of Quezon City, reported that the petitioners prevented him from removing the subject
properties from the DENR compound and transferring them to the Mobile Unit compound of the Quezon City Police Force.
He then agreed to a constructive possession of the properties. On that same day, petitioners filed a Manifestation stating
their intention to file a counterbond under Rule 60 of the Rules of Court to stay the execution of the writ of seizure and to
post a cash bond in the amount of P180,000.00. The trial court did not oblige the petitioners for they failed to serve a copy
of the Manifestation on the private respondents. Petitioners then made immediately the required service and tendered the
cash counterbond but it was refused, petitioners' Manifestation having already been set for hearing on March 30, 1989.

On March 27, 1989, petitioners made another attempt to post a counterbond but was also denied for the same reason.

On the same day, private respondents filed a motion to declare petitioners in contempt for disobeying the writ of seizure.
The trial court gave petitioners 24 hours to answer the motion. Hearing was scheduled on March 30, 1989.

On March 29, 1989, petitioners filed with the Court of Appeals a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and/or Mandamus to
annul the orders of the trial court dated March 20, 1989 and March 27, 1989.

On March 30, 1989, the Court of Appeals granted petitioners temporary relief in the form of a temporary restraining order
(TRO).

On September 11, 1989, the Court of Appeals converted the TRO into a writ of preliminary injunction upon filing by
petitioners of a bond in the amount of P180,000.00.

On March 30, 1990, the Court of Appeals lifted the writ of preliminary injunction and dismissed the petition. It declared that
the complaint for replevin filed by the private respondents complied with the requirements of an affidavit and bond under
Sec. 1 and 2 of Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, issuance of the writ of replevin was mandatory.

As for the contempt charges against the petitioners, the Court of Appeals believed that the same were sufficiently based
on a written charge by private respondents and the reports submitted by the Sheriff.

On April 25, 1990, petitioners filed a motion for reconsideration of the foregoing decision but it was subsequently denied
by the Court of Appeals in its Resolution dated May 18, 1990.

Hence this petition.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the RTC was correct in the issuance of a writ of replevin and the Court of Appeals in dismissing the
petition and lifting the preliminary injunction.

RULING:

Pursuant to Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 705, all actions and decision of the Director are subject to review, motu propio or upon
appeal of any person aggrieved thereby, by the Department Head whose decision shall be final and executory after the
lapse of 30 days from the receipt by the aggrieved party of said decision unless appealed to the President. The decision
of the Department Head may not be reviewed by the courts except through a special civil action for certiorari or
prohibition.

It was observed by the Court that herein respondents never appealed the confiscation order of the petitioner Secretary to
the Office of the President.

The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies is basic. Courts, for reasons of law, comity and convenience,
should not entertain suits unless the available administrative remedies have first been resorted to and proper authorities
have been given an appropriate opportunity to act and correct their alleged errors, if any, committed in the administrative
forum.

It was pointed out by the Court in Paat vs. Court of Appeals that the enforcement of forestry laws, rules and regulations
and the protection, development and management of forest land fall within the primary and special responsibilities of the
DENR. It held that assumption of the trial court of a replevin suit constitutes an encroachment into the domain of the
administrative agency's prerogative. The doctrine of preliminary jurisdiction does not warrant a court to arrogate unto itself
the authority to resolve a controversy the jurisdiction over which is initially lodged with an administrative body of special
competence.

However, herein petitioners did not a motion to dismiss on the ground of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies. Thus,
it is deemed waived.

Nonetheless, the Court finds the petition impressed with merit.

First. A writ of replevin does not issue as a matter of course upon the applicant's filing of a bond and affidavit, as the Court
of Appeals has wrongly put it. The mere filing of an affidavit, sans allegations therein that satisfy the requirements of
Section 2 Rule 60 of the Revised Rules of Court, cannot justify the issuance of a writ of replevin. Wrongful detention of the
properties sought in an action for replevin must be satisfactory established. If only mechanistic averment thereof is
offered, the writ should not be issued.

In the case at bar, the taking of the subject property was within the administrative authority of the Secretary as provided
by Section 68-A of P.D. No. 705. Thus, it is not wrongful and does not warrant the issuance of a writ of replevin prayed for
by the private respondents.

Second. By virtue of the confiscation order by petitioner Secretary, the subject properties of private respondents were held
in custodia legis and hence, beyond the reach of replevin. Property lawfully taken by virtue of legal process is deemed to
be in custodia legis. So basic is this doctrine that it found inclusion in the 1997 amendments introduced to the Rules of
Civil Procedure.

Third. Petitioner Secretary's authority to confiscate forest products under SEction 68-A of P.D. No. 705 is distinct and
independent of the confiscation of forest products in a criminal action provided for in Section 68 of P.D. No. 705.

Fourth. SEction 80 of P.D. No. 705 which requires the delivery of the seized forest products within six (6) hours from the
time of the seizure to the appropriate official designated by law to conduct preliminary investigations applies only to
criminal prosecutions provided for in Section 68 and not to administrative confiscation provided for in Section 68-A.

Fifth. Nothing in the records supports private respondents' allegation that their right to due process was violated as no
investigation was conducted prior to confiscation of their properties.

Finally. The writ or seizure and the writ of replevin was issued by the trial court in grave abuse of its discretion. Thus,
disobedience thereto cannot constitute indirect contempt of court which presupposes that the court order thereby violated
was valid and legal. Without a lawful order being issued, no contempt of court could be committed.

The instant petition is granted. The decision of the Court of Appeals dated March 30, 1990 and its Resolution dated May
18, 1990 were set aside. Respondent presiding judge of the RTC of Quezon City was permanently enjoined from
enforcing the Orders dated March 20, 1989 and March 22, 1989, or if said orders had already been issued, said
respondent judge was directed to render judgement of forfeiture of replevin bond filed by private respondents. Finally, the
said respondent judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further acting on the Motion for Contempt filed by private
respondents against petitioners.

Leonardo Paat

vs

Court of Appeals, et. Al.

GR No. 111107, 10 January 1997

266 SCRA 167

FACTS
The truck of private respondent Victoria de Guzman was seized by the DENR personnel while on its way to Bulacan
because the driver could not produce the required documents for the forest product found concealed in the truck.
Petitioner Jovito Layugan, CENRO ordered the confiscation of the truck and required the owner to explain. Private
respondents failed to submit required
explanation. The DENR Regional Executive Director Rogelio Baggayan sustained Layugan’s action for confiscation and
ordered the forfeiture of the truck. Private respondents brought the case to the DENR Secretary. Pending appeal, private
respondents filed a replevin case before the RTC against petitioner Layugan and Baggayan. RTC granted the same.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the case contending, inter alia, that private respondents had no cause of action for their
failure to exhaust administrative remedies. The trial court denied their motion. Hence, this petition for review on certiorari.
Petitioners aver that the trial court could not legally entertain the suit for replevin because the truck was under
administrative seizure proceedings.
ISSUE
Whether or not the instant case falls within the exception of the doctrine.
HELD
The Court held in the negative. The Court has consistently held that before a party is allowed to seek the intervention of
the court, it is a pre-condition that he should have availed of all the means of administrative processed afforded him.
Hence, if a remedy within the administrative machinery can still be resorted to by giving the administrative officer
concerned every opportunity to decide
on a matter that comes within his jurisdiction then such remedy should be exhausted first before court’s judicial power
can be sought. The premature invocation of court’ intervention is fatal to one’s cause of action.
The doctrine is a relative one and its flexibility is called upon by the peculiarity and uniqueness of the factual and
circumstantial settings of a case. Hence, it is disregarded (1) when there is violation of due process, (2) when the issue
involved is purely a legal question, (3) when the administrative action is patently illegal amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction, (4) when there is estoppelson the part of the administrative agency concerned, (5) when there is irreparable
injury, (6) when the respondent is a department secretary whose acts as an alter ego of the President bears the implied
and assumed approval of the latter, (7) when to require exhaustion of administrative remedies would be unreasonable, (8)
when it would amount to nullification of a claim, (9) when the subject matter is a private land in land case proceedings,
(10) when the rule does not provide a plain, speedy and adequate remedy, and (11) when there are circumstances
indicating the urgency of judicial intervention. A suit for replevin cannot be sustained against the petitioners for the subject
truck taken and retained by them for administrative forfeiture proceedings in pursuant to Sections 68-A of OD 705, as
amended. Dismissal of the replevin suit for lack of
cause of action in view of the private respondents’ failure to exhaust administrative remedies should have been the proper
course of action by the lower court instead of assuming jurisdiction over the case and consequently issuing the writ
ordering the return of the truck.