Using fictitious name and concealing true name (Art.

178)

Legamia vs IAC

Facts:
Corazon Legamia was accused of using an alias in violation of Commonwealth
Act No. 142, as amended
>she used an alias “CORAZON L. REYES”

Corazon Legamia lived with Emilio N. Reyes for 19 years from November 8,
1955 to September 26, 1974, when Emilio died. During their live-in arrangement
they produced a boy who was named Michael Raphael Gabriel L. Reyes. He was
born on October 18, 1971.

From the time Corazon and Emilio lived together until the latter's death, Corazon
was known as Corazon L. Reyes; she then and there wilfully and unlawfully use
the substitute or alias name CORAZON L. REYES, which is different from
Corazon Legamia y Rivera with which she was christened or by which she has
been known since childhood; and Emilio introduced her to friends as Mrs. Reyes.

Emilio was Branch Claim Manager Naga Branch, of the Agricultural Credit
Administration when he died. On October 29, 1974, or shortly after Emilio's
death, Corazon filed a letter in behalf of Michael with the Agricultural Credit
Administration for death benefits. The letter was signed "Corazon L. Reyes." The
voucher evidencing payment of Michael's claim in the amount of P2,648.76 was
also signed "Corazon L. Reyes."

For using the name Reyes although she was not married to Emilio, Felicisima
Reyes who was married to Emilio filed a complaint which led to Corazon's
prosecution. Parenthetically, the amount paid to Michael is "equivalent to 2/5 of
that which is due to each illegitimate child in accordance with the provisions of
the Civil Code" per advice given by Atty. Diomedes A. Bragado of the Agricultural
Credit Administration to Felicisima.

Rtc Ruling:
Indeterminate prison term of only (1) year, as minimum, to two (2) years, as
maximum; to pay a fine a fine of P5,000.00, with subsidiary imprisonment; and to
pay the costs

CA: Affirmed

Issue: Did the petitioner violate the law in the light of the facts above stated

SC Ruling: Decision Set Aside, Acquitted.

It is not uncommon in Philippine society for a woman to represent herself as the
wife and use the name of the man she is living with despite the fact that the man
is married to another woman. The practice, to be sure, is not encouraged but
neither is it unduly frowned upon. A number of women can be identified who are
living with men prominent in political, business and social circles. The woman
publicly holds herself out as the man's wife and uses his family name blithely
ignoring the fact that he is not her husband. And yet none of the women has
been charged of violating the C.A. No. 142 because ours is not a bigoted but a
tolerant and understanding society. It is in the light of our cultural environment
that the law must be construed.

In the case at bar, Corazon had been living with Emilio for almost 20 years. He
introduced her to the public as his wife and she assumed that role and his name
without any sinister purpose or personal material gain in mind. She applied for
benefits upon his death not for herself but for Michael who as a boy of tender
years was under her guardianship. Surely, the lawmakers could not have meant
to criminalize what Corazon had done especially because some of them probably
had their own Corazons.

False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn affirmation (Art. 183)

DIAZ vs. PEOPLE, 191 SCRA 86

Summary: Petitioner Reolandi Diaz was charged with the crime of Falsification
of Official Document before the Court of first Instance of Pampanga. He was
found guilty as charged. On appeal, the court modified its decision increasing the
penalty of the accused. Hence this petition.

Facts:

Reolandi Diaz was a Senior Clerk at Jose Abad Santos High School in San
Fernando Pampanga. He sought appointment as School Administrative Assistant
1, and as one of the requirements to said appointment, he filled up Civil Service
Form 212 and swore to the truth and veracity of the date
and information therein that his highest educational attainment was Fourth
Year A.B. (Liberal Arts) allegedly pursued at the Cosmopolitan and Harvardian
Colleges.

On that basis, he was appointed to the position. But contrary to the claim of
petitioner, he was never enrolled at the Cosmopolitan Colleges certified by its
Registrar, neither was he a student at the Harvardian Colleges, certified by the
school’s president. The name of the petitioner was not also included in all
the enrollment lists of college students submitted to the then Bureau of Private
Schools.

Issues:
Whether the accused is guilty of falsification.
Held:
No. The court held that the crime committed was not falsification but Perjury,
which is the willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation
administered by authority of law on a material matter.

Following the doctrine laid down, however, in the case of People v. Rufo B. Cruz,
No. L-15132, May 25,1960,108 Phil. 255 and the earlier case of United States v.
Tupasi Molina, 29 Phil. 119, the crime committed under the foregoing facts, is
perjury. This offense, as defined in Article 183 of the Revised Penal Code is the
willful and corrupt assertion of a falsehood under oath or affirmation administered
by authority of law on a material matter. The said article provides —

Art. 183. False testimony in other cases and perjury in solemn

affirmation. The penalty of arresto mayorin its maximum period
to prision correccional in its minimum period shall be imposed upon
any person who, knowingly making untruthful statements and not
being included in the provisions of the next preceding articles, shall
testify under oath or make an affidavit upon any material matter
before a competent person authorized to administer an oath in
cases in which the law so requires.

Any person who, in case of a solemn affirmation made in lieu of an

oath, shall commit any of the falsehoods mentioned in this and the
three preceding articles of this section shall suffer respective
penalties provided therein.

In that case of People v. Cruz, supra, the accused Rufo B. Cruz failed up an
application form (Civil Service Form No. 2) for the patrolman examination. He
stated therein that he had never been accused, indicted or tried for violation of
any law, ordinance or regulation before any court, when in truth and in fact, as
the accused well knew, he had been prosecuted and tried before the Justice of
the Peace of Cainta, Rizal, for different crimes. The application was signed and
sworn to by him before the municipal mayor of Cainta, Rizal.

This Court in that case held:

This article is similar to Section 3 of Act No. 1697 of the Philippine

Commission, which was formerly the law punishing perjury. Under
said section 3 of that Act, this Court, in the case of United States v.
Tupasi Molina (29 Phil. 119), held that a person, who stated under
oath in his application to take police examination that he had never
been convicted of any crime, when as a matter of fact he has
previous convictions, committed perjury. The facts in that case are
almost exactly analogous to those in the present, and we find no
reason, either in law or in the arguments of the Solicitor General to
modify or reverse the conclusion of this Court therein. More so,
 because all the elements of the offense of perjury defined in Art.
183 of the Revised Penal Code concur in the present case.

The elements of the crime of perjury are —

(a) That the accused made a statement under oath or executed an affidavit upon
a material matter.

(b) That the statement or affidavit was made before a competent officer,
authorized to receive and administer oath.

(c) That in that statement or affidavit, the accused made a and deliberate
assertion of a falsehood.

(d) That the sworn statement or affidavit containing the falsity is required by law
or made for a legal purpose.

All the foregoing elements are present in the case at bar.

Perjury under Art. 183 of the Revised Penal Code carries a lesser penalty. The
penalty for this crime is arresto mayor in its maximum period to prision
correccional in its minimum period. Since there is no mitigating and aggravating
circumstance the penalty should be imposed in its medium period. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, the penalty should be from four (4) months
of arresto mayor

Machinations in public auctions (Art. 185)

OUANO vs. CA, 188 SCRA 799

Facts:
The appellate proceedings at bar treat of a parcel of land registered under
Rehabilitation Finance Corporation now known as the Development Bank of the
Philippines (DBP). Said property was offered for bidding for the second time
because the first bidding was nullified due to Ouano’s protest.

It appears that prior to the second bidding, Ouano and Echavez orally agreed
that only Echavez would make a bid, and that if it was accepted, they would
divide the property in proportion to their adjoining properties. To ensure success
of their enterprise, they also agreed to induce the only other party known to be
interested in the property-a group headed by a Mrs. Bonsucan to desist from
presenting a bid. They broached the matter to Mrs. Bonsucan's group. The latter
agreed to withdraw, as it did in fact withdraw from the sale; and Ouano's wife
paid it P2,000 as reimbursement for its expenses.

Issue:
Whether Ouano committed machinations in public auction punishable under the
RPC.

Held:
These acts constitute a crime, as the Trial Court has stressed. Ouano and
Echavez had promised to share in the property in question as a consideration for
Ouano's refraining from taking part in the public auction, and they had attempted
to cause and in fact succeeded in causing another bidder to stay away from the
auction. in order to cause reduction of the price of the property auctioned In so
doing, they committed the felony of machinations in public auctions defined and
penalized in Article 185 of the Revised Penal Code, supra.

That both Ouano and Echavez did these acts is a matter of record, as is the fact
that thereby only one bid that of Echavez was entered for the 'land in
consequence of which Echavez eventually acquired it. The agreement therefore
being criminal in character, the parties not only have no action against each other
but are both liable to prosecution and the things and price of their agreement
subject to disposal according to the provisions of the criminal code. This, in
accordance with the so-called pari delicto principle set out in the Civil Code.

CRIMES RELATIVE TO OPIUM AND OTHER PROHIBITED DRUGS

(REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9165 OR THE DANGEROUS DRUGS ACT OF 2002)

People v. Lagata (404 SCRA 671)

Facts:
Edelma Lagata was accused of having in her possession and control of shabu.
Upon arraignment, she pleaded not guilty. Accused-Appellant does not deny the
fact that at the time of her arrest she was in possession of the package which
turned out to contain shabu. But she denied knowledge of the contents of the
package handed to her by the unidentified man. Trial Court rendered accused
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the offense of violation of RA 6425 as
amended by RA 7659.

Issue:
Whether appellant is guilty of the crime charged against her?

Decision:
For one to be convicted of illegal possession of prohibited or regulated drugs, the
following elements must concur:
(1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is identified to be a
prohibited drug;
(2) such possession is not authorized by law; and
(3) the accused freely and consciously possessed the said drug.

The prosecution failed to prove that she had knowledge of the contents of the
package. Thus, it cannot be said that she was caught in flagrante delicto, since
she was not consciously committing a crime when the NBI agents accosted her.
We have held that possession of illegal drugs must be with knowledge of the
accused or that animus possidendi existed together with the possession or
control of said articles.

Knowledge refers to a mental state of awareness of a fact. Animus possidendi,

as a state of mind, may be determined on a case-tocase basis by taking into
consideration the prior or contemporaneous acts of the accused, as well as the
surrounding circumstances. Its existence may and usually must be inferred from
the attendant events in each particular case.

Under the facts and circumstances obtaining in this case, we find that appellants
explanation of how she came into possession of the package without knowing
that it contained shabu is credible and sufficient to rebut the prima facie
presumption of animus possidendi.