Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 & 4)

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS
RULES 3 & 4
Absuelo, Erika
Arancon, Sheba
Damasing, Tanya
Gaid, Mayang
Honor, Angela
Maliawao, Sittie
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
XAVIER UNIVERSITY-ATENEO DE CAGAYAN COLLEGE OF LAW
Table of Contents
Taxpayer’s Suit; Locus Standi

1. Tatad vs Garcia GR# 114222 April 06, 1995
2. Kilosbayan Inc vs Teofisto Guingona, Jr. 232 scra 110
3. Oposa vs Factoran GR# 101083 July 30, 1993
Rule 3, Section 1
1. St. Anne Medical Center v. Parel 176 SCRA 755
2. Ching v. Court of Appeals 181 SCRA 9
3. Barlin vs. Ramirez 7 Phil. Rep., 41
Rule 3, Section 2
1. Ralla v. Ralla 199 SCRA 495
2. Dela Peña v. CA GR# 81827 March 28, 1994
3. U.P. v. Ligot-Telan 227 SCRA 342
4. Galarosa v. Valencia, 227 SCRA 728
5. Tanpingco v. IAC, 207 SCRA 652
6. US vs. Reyes GR# 79253 March 1, 1993
7. Sustiguer v. Tamayo 176 SCRA 579
8. Board of Optometry vs. Colet GR# 122241 July 30, 1996
9. Smith Bell Co. vs. Court of Appeals GR# 110668 February 06, 1997
Rule 3, Section 4
1. Stasa, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 879
2. G-Tractors, Inc., Vs CA, 135 SCRA 192
Cases on Indispensable Parties

1. U.P. v. Ligot-Telan supra
2. Galarosa v. Valencia supra
3. Tay Chun Uy v. CA, 212 SCRA 713
4. National Development Co. vs. Court of Appeals, 211 SCRA 422
5. Barfel Dev. Co. v. CA, 223 SCRA 268
6. Nocom vs. Camerino GR#182984 February 10, 2009
Rule 3, Section 8
1. Quilisadio v. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA 401
2. United Paracale Mining Company vs. CA GR#104721 May 31, 1994
3. Barfel Dev. Co. v. CA supra
Rule 3, Section 10
1. Emata v. IAC, 174 SCRA 464
Rule 3, Section 12
1. Oposa vs Factoran supra
Rule 3, Section 13
1. Emata v. IAC supra
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
ERIKA ABSUELO • SHEBA ARANCON • TANYA DAMASING • MAYANG GAID • ANGELA HONOR • SITTIE MALIAWAO
Rule 3, Section 17
1. Heirs of Mayor Nemencio Galvez vs. CA GR# 119193 March 29, 1996
Rule 4
1. Philippine Banking Corporation v. Tensuan, 230 SCRA 413
2. Gesmundo, et al. v. JRB Realty Corporation, et al., 234 SCRA 153
3. BPI vs. IAC 206 SCRA 408
4. Paderanga vs Buissan 286 SCRA 786
5. Hernandez vs DBP 71 SCRA 85? pero 290,292 naa.
6. Nasser v. Court of Appeals 191 SCRA 783
7. Sweet Lines, Inc. v. Bernardo Teves, et al. 83 SCRA 361
8. Polytrade Corporation v. Blanco, 30 SCRA 187
9. Baritua vs CA GR# 100748 February 03, 1997
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
FRANCISCO TATAD, JOHN OSMENA AND RODOLFO BIAZON v. JESUS GARCIA
G.R. No. 11422
April 6, 1995
FACTS: In 1989, DOTC planned to construct an LRT line along EDSA to be called as EDSA LRT III.
Sec. Olbos invited Levin to send a technical team to discuss the project with DOTC. President Aquino
signed the Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) Law which provides two schemes for the financing,
construction and operation of gov’t projects through private investment: BOT or Build-Transfer (BT).
In accordance with the BOT Law and to set the EDSA LRT III Project, DOTC issued orders creating
the prequalification and the technical committee. After which, the notice were published in the
newspaper of Gen Circulation. Among the bidders, only the EDSA LRT Consortium, organized under
the Hong Kong Laws, met the requirements. Sec. Prado sent letters to President Aquino
recommending the award to the sole complying bidder and requesting for authority to negotiate with
the said firm for contract pursuant to the BOT Law. The same was granted. Now, EDSA LRT Corp
entered an agreement to build, lease and transfer a LRT under BOT Law. In a letter, Exec. Sec Drilon
informed Sec. Prado that the president cannot grant the requested approval for some reasons that
DOTC failed to follow some rules under BOT Law. The DOTC and private respondent renegotiated
the agreement. Being aware that DOTC has full authority to sign the agreement without need of
approval by the president. Again, both entered into a supplemental agreement to the revised
agreement, now the DOTC represented by Sec. Garcia, submitted it to President Ramos and thus the
two agreements were approved. Under the agreement, PR shall undertake and finance the entire
project required for a complete operational LRT system. DOTC shall pay PR rentals on a monthly
basis through a letter of credit. After 25 years and DOTC completed payment of the rentals,
ownership shall be transferred to the latter for a consideration of only U.S. $1.00. On 1994, an act
amending certain sections of BOT Law took effect expressly recognizes BLT scheme and allows
direct negotiation of BLT contract. Petitioner asserted that the two agreements executed before were
unconstitutional and illegal. Respondents claimed that petitioners are not the real parties-in-interest
and have no legal standing to institute the present petition. Petitioners however argue that the action
was filed by them in their capacity as Senators and as taxpayers.
ISSUE: WON the petitioners are the real parties-in-interest or have legal standing in the case?
HELD: Yes. The prevailing doctrines in taxpayer’s suits are to allow taxpayers to question contracts
entered into by the national government or government-owned or control corporations allegedly in
contravention of the law and to disallow the same only when municipal contracts are involved. For as
long as the ruling in Kilosbayan on locus standi is not reversed, we have no choice but to follow it and
uphold the legal standing of petitioners as taxpayers to institute the present action. The agreements
are however valid Although the Court gave way to the petition, the same was still denied. The Court
held that the agreements entered into by DOTC in the exercise of its governmental function being the
primary regulating branch of the government in the promotion of dependable and coordinated
networks of transportation and communications services. It is the Executive department, DOTC, has
the power, authority and technical expertise determine whether or not a specific transportation or
communication project beneficial to people. The discretion to award a contract is vested in the
government agencies entrusted with that function. Government officials are presumed to perform their
functions with regularity and strong evidence is necessary to rebut this presumption. Petitioners have
not presented evidence on the reasonable rentals to be paid by the parties to each other.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
KILOS BAYAN v. GUINGONA
FACTS: PCSO decided to establish an on- line lottery system for the purpose of increasing its revenue base and
diversifying its sources of funds. After learning that the PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery system,
the Berjaya Group Berhad, a multinational company in Malaysia, became interested to offer its services and
resources to PCSO. Berjaya Group Berhad organized with some Filipino investors in March 1993 a Philippine
corporation known as the Philippine Gaming Management Corporation (PGMC). The PCSO formally issued a
Request for Proposal (RFP) for the Lease Contract of an on-line lottery system for the PCSO. The Office of the
President announced that it had given the respondent PGMC the go signal to operate the country's on-line lottery
system and that the corresponding implementing contract would be submitted for final clearance and approval by
the Chief Executive. On 4 November 1993, KILOSBAYAN sent an open letter to Pres Ramos strongly opposing the
setting up to the on-line lottery system on the basis of serious moral and ethical considerations. Petitioner
Kilosbayan, avers that it is a non-stock domestic corporation composed of civic-spirited citizens, pastors, priests,
nuns, and lay leaders who are committed to the cause of truth, justice, and national renewal. The petitioners are
suing in their capacities as members of the Board of Trustees of KILOSBAYAN and as taxpayers and concerned
citizens. At the meeting of the Committee on Games and Amusements of the Senate on 12 November 1993,
KILOSBAYAN reiterated its vigorous opposition to the on-line lottery on account of its immorality and illegality.
Petitioners submit that the PCSO cannot validly enter into a Contract of Lease with the PGMC because it shows that
there is a "collaboration, association, or joint venture between respondents PCSO and PGMC in the holding of the
On-Line Lottery System," and that there are terms and conditions of the Contract "showing that respondent PGMC
is the actual lotto operator and not respondent PCSO. PGMC is a 75% foreign-owned or controlled corporation and
cannot, therefore, be granted a franchise for that purpose because of Section 11, Article XII of the 1987
Constitution. The petitioners pray that a temporary restraining order and a writ of preliminary injunction be issued
commanding the respondents to cease and desist from implementing the challenged Contract of Lease and that a
judgment declaring the Contract of Lease void and without effect and making the injunction permanent. Private
respondent PGMC asserts that it is merely an independent contractor for a piece of work, and it is neither engaged
in "gambling" nor in "public service" relative to the telecommunications network. Finally, it states that the execution
and implementation of the contract does not violate the Constitution and the laws; that the issue on the "morality" of
the lottery franchise granted to the PCSO is political and not judicial or legal, which should be ventilated in another
forum. Both public and private respondents allege that the petitioners do not have the legal standing or real interest
in the subject contract and in obtaining the reliefs sought. They also argue that the contract does not violate the
Foreign Investment Act of 1991; that the Articles of Incorporation of PGMC authorize it to enter into the Contract of
Lease; and that the issues of "wisdom, morality and propriety of acts of the executive department are beyond the
ambit of judicial review”.
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing and real interest in obtaining the reliefs sought.
HELD: Yes. The petitioners have locus standi. A party's standing before the Court is a procedural technicality which
it may, in the exercise of its discretion, set aside in view of the importance of the issues raised and of paramount
public interest. In the landmark Emergency Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this technicality because the
transcendental importance to the public of these cases demands that they be settled promptly and definitely
brushing aside technicalities of procedure. Considering the importance to the public of the case at bar, and in
keeping with the Court's duty, under the 1987 Constitution, to determine whether or not the other branches of
government have kept themselves within the limits of the Constitution and the laws and that they have not abused
the discretion given to them, this Court has brushed aside technicalities of procedure and has taken cognizance of
these petitions. Private and public interests are, both in a substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of
the legal order. Moreover, petitioners have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to
sue has been amply demonstrated. In line with the liberal policy of the Court on locus standi, ordinary taxpayers,
members of Congress, and even association of planters, and non-profit civic organizations were allowed to initiate
and prosecute actions before this Court to question the constitutionality or validity of laws, acts, decisions, rulings, or
orders of various government agencies or instrumentalities. The petitioners and intervenors have a real interest
because each of them has sustained or is in danger of sustaining an immediate injury as a result of the acts or
measures complained of. The instant petition is hereby GRANTED and the challenged Contract of Lease executed
on 17 December 1993 by respondent PCSO and respondent PGMC is hereby DECLARED contrary to law and
invalid. The Temporary Restraining Order issued hereby MADE PERMANENT.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
MINORS OPOSA v. FACTORAN
G.R. No. 101083
July 30, 1993
FACTS: Petitioners, all minors duly represented by their respective parents, filed a petition to cancel
all existing timber license agreements (TLAs) in the country and to cease and desists from receiving,
accepting, processing, renewing or approving new timber license agreements. This case is filed not
only on the appellants’ right as taxpayers, but they are also suing in behalf of succeeding generations
based on the concept of “intergenerational responsibility” in so far as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned. Together with the Philippine Ecological Network (PENI), petitioners
presented scientific evidence that deforestation have resulted in a host of environmental tragedies.
One of these is the reduction of the earth’s capacity to process carbon dioxide, otherwise known as
the “greenhouse effect.”
ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing
HELD: Yes. The petitioners have locus standi on the case as a taxpayers’ (class) suit. The subject
matter of complaint is of common and general interest to all the citizens of the Philippines. The court
found difficulty in ruling that the appellants can, for themselves, and for others file a class suit. The
Court as well found that the petitioner minors can represent their generation as well as generations
yet unborn. They can, for themselves, for others of their generation and for the succeeding
generations, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of the succeeding generations can only
be based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and
healthful ecology is concerned.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
ST. ANNE v. PAREL
G.R. No. 78554
August 25, 1989
FACTS: A complaint was filed on February 1987 by Raquel Hit, et al against St. Anne Medical Center at Cadiz
City for underpayment of the basic minimum wage of P10/day, underpayment of ECOLA having paid only
P170/month, nonpayment of overtime pay in excess of 40 hours while working for 6 days a week,
underpayment of regular holiday, special holiday, rest day premium pay and underpayment of overtime pay
and non-payment of ECOLA during sick leave and maternity leave with pay. On February 1987, DOLE
conducted inspection on Labor Standards Laws and Occupational Safety and Health Standards. After
inspection, violations were found. The management, thru Dr. Fernandez, was instructed to effect restitution
and/or correction within 10 days. However, the management failed to comply with the instruction. A subpoena
duces tecum was issued directing the management to submit to this Office all employment records and
payrolls to determine the extent of violations discovered which again the management failed to comply.
Incidentally, only xerox copies of the payrolls and daily time records for the months of April 1984, November
1985 and December 1986 were submitted prompting this Office to determine the extent of violations based on
available data and complainants' interview. The extent of violations stood at P3, 059, 829. 57 representing
differential pay of 127 employees on their wages, ECOLA 13th month pay, holiday pay and overtime pay for
work rendered in excess of 40 hours a week excluding 6 employees who are holding managerial position
and/or receiving salaries more than the minimum wage fixed by law. Director Parel ordered respondent St.
Anne Medical Center to restitute to its 127 employees through this Office their differential wages, ECOLA,
holiday pay, 13th month pay and overtime pay the amount of P3, 059, 829. 57 within 15 days from receipt of
this order. Respondent is also ordered to effect correction of violations on Occupational Safety and Health
Standards. Respondent is also ordered to effect immediately and comply with the present minimum wage laws
applicable to hospitals. Dr. Fernandez, director of St. Anne Medical Center, sought reconsideration alleging
that Director Parel erred in imposing the money award because there's an absence of notice and hearing, the
award is not supported by evidence and there was an identical complaint already filed by the complaining
employees pending with the NLRC. In denying reconsideration, Director Parel held that the hospital had been
given amole opportunity to effect restitution and rectify the violations. He also ordered the issuance of a writ of
execution. Dr. Fernandez filed a petition for Certiorari and Prohibition to SC. The petition was brought in the
name of St. Anne Medical Center as petitioner although it does not appear that it is a juridical entity. Petitioner
also contended that they were denied due process. They also assailed the jurisdiction of the Regional Director
of DOLE to act on money claims.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the petition for certiorari may be brought by St. Anne Medical Center
(2) Whether the Regional Director of DOLE, Director Parel, has jurisdiction to act on the money claims.
HELD:
(1) The Court granted it. (So technically, not a yes or no.) The petition for certiorari and prohibition was
brought in the name of St. Anne Medical Center as petitioner although it does not appear that it is a
juridical entity. Under the RoC, only natural or juridical persons or entities authorizes by law may be
parties in a civil action. In view of the serious questions involved though, the Court bypasses technical
distinctions in this case and impleads the planter’s association, the real owner of the hospital and
hence, the real party in interest as the petitioner. Under the Rules, “parties may be added by order of
the court on its own initiative at any stage of the action and on such terms as are just.
(2) No. The regional offices of the Department of Labor are charged alone with "mediation and conciliation"
and should the parties fail to agree, they must refer the case to the labor arbiters. The fact alone that at
the time Director Parel entered into the picture, respondents-workers had earlier commenced identical
proceedings in the NLRC, labor arbitrage section, is enough to warrant the grant of petition. The rule in
Civil cases is that the acquisition of jurisdiction by a court of concurrent jurisdiction divests another of its
own jurisdiction. The Court granted the petition and ordered to set aside the decision of Director Parel.
The Court also instructed NLRC to proceed with the case.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
ALFREDO CHING v. CA
FACTS: In May 1960, an original certificate of land title was issued to spouses Nofuente covering the land
located at Rizal. The 5/6 portion of the property was reconvened by said spouses to the Nofeuntes' et al.
and TCT was issued. By virtue of sale to Ching Leng, a TCT was issued and TCT to the Nofuentes' was
cancelled. Ching died in Boston. His son, Alfredo Ching, filed with the RTC a petition for administration in
Ching Leng's estate. After presentation of evidence, Alfredo was appointed as adminisratix. 13 years later,
a case was filed by private respondent Pedro Asedillo at the RTC of Pasay for the reconveyance of the
said property in Rizal and the cancellation of TCT, issued to Ching, in his favor based on possession.
Asedillo alleged that the fact that Ching has been residing abroad xxx, and it is not known xxx still alive or
dead, he or his estate may be end served by summons and other processes only by publication.
Summons by publication on Ching' estate was directed by RTC and published in the newspaper of
general circulation. Defendant failed to file a responsive pleading within the 60-day period. RTC declared
Asedillo to be the true and the owner of the property and ordered Ching’s estate to reconvey the property
in favor of Asedillo. A new TCT was issued and subsequently sold to Villa Esperanza. Aggrieved of the
decision, Alfredo Ching filed a verified petition to set aside as null and void for lack of jurisdiction which
was granted by the court. Asedillo then filed a motion and the court reconsidered and set aside the
decision which declared the decision null and void. Thus, petitioner Alfredo Ching filed an MR which was
denied. He brought the matter via petition for certiorari before the CA but the same was dismissed. During
the pendency of the case, Asedillo also died. Petitioner then brings the matter before the SC. According to
petitioner, an action for reconveyance and cancellation of title is in personam and the court a quo never
acquired jurisdiction over the deceased Ching Leng or his estate by means of service of summons by
publication.
ISSUE: WON the action for cancellation of title is in personam or in rem?
HELD: It is in personam (petitioner’s contention is granted). An action to redeem, or to recover title to or

possession of real property is not an action in rem or an action against the whole world, like a land
registration proceeding or the probate of will; it is an action in personam since it only binds the parties
properly impleaded and duly heard or given an opportunity to be heard. Actions in personam and actions
in rem differ in that the former are directed against specific persons and seek personal judgments, while
the latter are directed against the thing or property or status of a person and seek judgments with respect
thereto as against the whole world. An action to recover a parcel of land is a real action but it is an action
in personam for it binds a particular individual only although it concerns the right to a tangible thing. The
action for reconveyance and cancellation being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. Asedillo's action for
reconveyance and cancellation of title being in personam, the judgment in question is null and void for
lack of jurisdiction over the person of the deceased defendant Ching Leng. He was not, and he could not
have been validly served with summons. He had no more civil personality. It was lost through death. Also,
an estate can sue or be used through an executor or administrator.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
BARLIN v. RAMIREZ
G.R. No. L-2832
November 24, 1906
FACTS: The Roman Catholic Church which was burned in 1869 was reconstructed, from government
funds and from “voluntary” labor of the townspeople, upon orders of the town officials, also based on
general laws and guidelines of the Spanish government between 1870 and 1873. Reconstruction was
completed in 1873, and until 1902 a Roman Catholic priest administered this church. Defendant Ramirez
took possession of the church in 1901 and administered it under orders of his superiors until 1902. A
successor to Ramirez was appointed but he refused to turn over the church, convent and other
properties. This was the point in history when Spain ceded authority to the United States and all
its property together with it. Many Filipino clergy rebelled against the Roman Catholic Church whom they
said refused to recognize and grant the rights of the Filipino priests. This Filipino priests joined together
and formed the United Filipino Church, who, though not recognizing the Roman Catholic Church,
nonetheless continued to hold office and ceremonies in the Roman Catholic tradition, on the condition that
unless the Roman Catholic Church recognized them, they will hold on to their church properties and
refuse to turn them over. The defendant refused in writing to make the delivery stating that the town of
Lagonoy has seen fit to sever connection with the Pope at Rome and his representatives in the
Philippines and join the Filipino Church. Defendant still continued to be in possession of the church.
Plaintiff brought the action against the defendant alleging that the Roman Catholic Church owned the
church building and the other properties. Thus he prayed that the possession of the properties be restored
to the Roman Catholic Church. In his answer, defendant generally denied the allegations of the complaint
and stated that he was in possession and administration of the property described with the authority of the
municipality of Lagonoy and its inhabitants who were the lawful owners of said property. After this answer,
the municipality of Lagonoy asked to intervene and join with defendant. Defendants also alleged that the
Roman Catholic Church has no legal personality in the Philippines. Judgment was held in favor of
plaintiff.
ISSUE: Whether the Roman Catholic Church has legal personality.
HELD: Defendant took possession of the property as servant or agent of the plaintiff. The only right that
defendant had was the right given to him by the plaintiff. He cannot say that the plaintiff is not the owner of
the property and the same cannot be delivered back to plaintiff. The rule that the tenant cannot deny the
landlord’s title is applicable here. Neither does the municipality of Lagonoy own the property. Never was it
shown that the municipality was in the physical possession of the property. The court held that the church
was a property of the Roman Catholic Church. There was a law that states that all church buildings were
made by the Spanish government and representatives in the Philippines using government and private
local funds, but the Spanish government implemented this to the effect that the churches and its income
were dedicated for the propagation of the faith. Hence, its properties were beyond the commerce of man.
Priests held them in the concept of guardians or stewards. The truth is that, from the earliest times down
to the cession of the Philippines to the United States, churches and other consecrated objects were
considered outside of the commerce of man. They were not public property, nor could they be subjects
of private property in the sense that any private person could the owner thereof. They constituted a kind of
property distinctive characteristic of which was that it was devoted to the worship of God. Furthermore, the
municipality cannot show evidence of title, right of ownership or possession. On the contention that the
Roman Catholic Church no longer had legal and juridical personality in the islands, since the latter half of
the third century, and more particularly since the year 313, when Constantine, by the edict of Milan,
inaugurated an era of protection for the church, the latter gradually entered upon the exercise of such
rights as were required for the acquisition, preservation, and transmission of property the same as any
other juridical entity under the laws of the Empire.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
RALLA v. RALLA
G.R. No. 78646
July 23, 1991
FACTS: Rosendo Ralla had two sons, Pablo, whom he loved and Pedro, who was not in good terms with
him. Pablo and his family lived with Rosendo, who took care of all household expenses and administered
part of the family properties and received a monthly salary of P250.00 plus part of the produce of the land.
Paz Escarella died in 1957 and the two brothers partitioned 63 parcels of land she left as her
paraphernalia property. On December 22, 1958, Rosendo executed a will disinheriting Pedro and leaving
everything he owned to Pablo, to whom he said earlier sold a part of his property for P10,000.00.
Rosendo filed for the probate of the will but pendente lite died on October 1, 1960. On November 3, 1966,
the probate judge converted SP 564 into an intestate proceeding. On February 28, 1978, a creditor of the
deceased filed a petition for the probate for Rosendo’s will in SP 1106, which was heard jointly with SP
564. The order of November 3, 1966 was set aside. The last will and testament of Rosendo was allowed
on June 7, 1982 but on October 20, 1982 the disinheritance of Pedro was disapproved. This order was
elevated to the Court of Appeals. The Court of Appeals reversed the trial court and reinstated the
disinheritance clause after finding that the requisites of a valid disinheritance had been complied with in
the will. The court also noted that Pedro had threatened to kill his father, who was afraid of him and had
earlier sued him for slander and grave oral defamation.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent court is correct in annulling the deed of sale executed by Rosendo Ralla
in favor of Pablo.
HELD: The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest, an
interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from mere interest in the question
involved, or a mere incidental interest. As a general rule, one having no right or interest to protect cannot
invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. As the sole heir, Pablo Ralla had the
right to inherit the totality of his father's estate after payment of all its debts. Even if it be assumed that the
deed of sale was indeed invalid, the subject-matter thereof nevertheless devolved upon Pablo as the
universal successor of his father Rosendo. In his wig, Rosendo claimed the 149 parcels as "part of my
property" –– as distinguished from the conjugal estate –– which he had earlier sold to Pablo. Significantly,
Pedro did not deny this description of the property in his Comment to the present petition, confining
himself to assailing the validity of the sale. The Court must note the lackadaisical attitude of the heirs of
Pedro Ralla, who substituted him upon his death. They seem to have lost interest in this litigation,
probably because of the approval of their father's disinheritance by the respondent court. When the
parties were required to submit their respective memoranda after the court gave due course to the
petition, the petitioners did but not the private respondents. Although the period to do so had already
expired, the Court relaxed its rules to give the private respondents another opportunity to comply with the
requirement. When the resolution could not be served upon the private respondents' counsel, the court
directed that it be served on the private respondents themselves. The heirs of Pedro Ralla informed the
Court that they were retaining another counsel and asked that they be furnished a copy of the petition and
given 30 days within which to file their memorandum. This motion was granted. The records show that
they received a copy of the petition but their memorandum was never filed. The Court, noting this
omission, finally resolved to dispense with the memorandum and to decide this case on the basis of the
available records.The decision is that as a validly disinherited heir, and not claiming to be a creditor of his
deceased father, Pedro Ralla had no legal personality to question the deed of sale between Rosendo
Ralla and his son Pablo. Legally speaking, Pedro Ralla was a stranger to the transaction as he did not
stand to benefit from its annulment. His disinheritance had rendered him hors de combat.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
DELA PENA v. CA and TAN
G.R. No. L-81827
March 28, 1994
FACTS: Ciriaco Reducto was occupying a 24-hectare parcel of land for which he filed Homestead with
the Bureau of Lands. A certain Potenciano Nazaret likewise filed an application for the same lot. As a
result, a case arose wherein Nazaret’s application and that of Reducto were “conflicted.” Prior thereto
however, by means of a “Deed of Relinquishment,” Reducto transferred his possessory rights over 8
hectares of the lot to petitioner Dela Pena who thereafter entered his appearance in the administrative
case when the portion transferred to him remained included in the homestead applications of Reducto and
Nazaret. After it was ascertained in a field verification that petitioner had a better right to acquire the
portion claimed, the Director of Lands directed petitioner to apply for the portion himself. However, no
such application was filed. Meanwhile, Reducto transferred his rights over another 1 ½-hectare portion of
the lot to Michael Doble who in turn sold his rights to Ricardo Tan. Upon a survey by the Bureau of Lands,
they found out that Tan’s lot was smaller than what he had brought. Tan then built a fence on his reclined
potion but Dela Pena kept on destroying it. Ricardo Tan then transferred the lot to Herotido Tan. Dela
Pena later filed a complaint for forcible entry against Ricardo Tan and was later on amended to Herotido
in the MTC. MTC ruled in favor of Dela Pena. It concluded that petitioner had prior possession of the
disputed ¾-heactare portion and that he was prevented by entering the same by the fence constructed by
private respondent. This was affirmed by the RTC. Dela Pena instituted another action for reconveyance
with damages with the RTC during the pendency of the forcible entry case. He alleged that private
respondent fraudulently registered that ¾-hectare portion actually cultivated by him when the former
stated in his free patent application that "the land applied for is not claimed or occupied by any other
person. He also denied that a survey was conducted; if at all, it was merely a "table survey." It was
discovered in the survey that the area of petitioner's actual occupation exceeded that which he bought
from Reducto. The court rejected petitioner's denial of the Survey on the ground that he was already
estopped from contesting it when he offered Subdivision Plan CSD-11-001883-D in evidence. Therefore,
since the disputed ¾-hectare portion was not part of the area bought and paid for by petitioner, the latter
was not entitled to reconveyance. RTC rejected such action and counterclaim was granted and Dela Peña
was ordered to pay P6,000 attorney's fees and expenses of litigation, P15,000 for moral damages and the
costs of the proceedings. Petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals reiterating his allegations of
fraud and misrepresentation and, at the same time, contending that the judgment in the forcible entry case
constituted res judicata on the action for reconveyance. This was again denied. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not a favorable judgment in the forcible entry case constituted res judicata for
reconveyance.
HELD: No. The fact that petitioner obtained a favorable judgment in the forcible entry case was not
conclusive and did not ipso facto entitle him to a similar favorable judgment in the reconveyance case for
the reason that while prior physical possession was the sole issue in the forcible entry case, that of lawful
ownership or possession de jure was the issue disputed in the reconveyance case. It is well-settled that
reconveyance is a remedy granted only to the owner of the property alleged to be erroneously titled in
another's name. 15 In the case at bench, petitioner does not claim to be the owner of the disputed portion.
Admittedly, what he has is only a "preferential right" to acquire ownership thereof by virtue of his actual
occupation since January 1947. Persons who have not obtained title to public lands could not question the
titles legally issued by the State. In such cases, the real party in interest is the Republic of the Philippines
to whom the property would revert if it is ever established, after appropriate proceedings, that the free
patent issued to the grantee is indeed vulnerable to annulment on the ground that the grantee failed to
comply with the conditions imposed by the law. Not being an applicant, much less a grantee, petitioner
cannot ask for reconveyance.
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U.P. v. LIGOT-TELAN
G.R. No. 110280
October 12, 1993
FACTS: UP administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee
payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP or popularly known as
“Iskolar ng Bayan” program) to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to
include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. All students are entitled to
apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12 per hour by working for
the University. However, applicants are required to state the amount and source of the annual income
of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University
may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets.
Failure to disclose such information is punishable under Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on
Student Conduct and Discipline of the University. On March 14, 1991, a team conducted a home
investigation against Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law and found out that
Nadal failed to disclose that the family owned a 1977 Corolla car and that his mother worked in the
US. UP charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of dishonesty in violation of
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline. After hearing, the SDT
rendered a decision exculpating Nadal of withholding the information about the car but finding him
guilty of withholding information about the income of his mother. SDT imposed the penalty of
expulsion and required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits. The SDT decision was automatically
elevated to the Executive Committee of UP Diliman for review which affirmed the decision of SDT.
Nadal appealed to the Board of Regents which affirmed the decision of SDT but because of the
Board was willing to grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and
predicament of the mother as an immigrant ‘TNT’ in the US, the penalty was modified from expulsion
to one-year suspension plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal
interest. Nadal filed a motion for reconsideration. On March 28, 1993, a vote was held by secret ballot
on whether Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not which results in 4 votes guilty; 3 votes not guilty; and 3
conditional votes, pending verification with ADMU of Nadal’s statement that he was granted
scholarship by ADMU while in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received
financial assistance, then the conditional votes would be considered guilty and if otherwise, not guilty.
On March 29, 1993, ADMU confirms the scholarship grant but the BOR found Nadal guilty and
imposed the penalty of one year suspension, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character
during the suspension and reimburse the STFAP benefits. Nadal filed with the RTC of Quezon a
petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for a temporary restraining order against
President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia Caoilli.
The RTC granted the petition. The petitioners, President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar
Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia Caoilli, filed a petition for certiorari. Nadal raised an issue
that Dr Caoilli and Dr Abueva are not real parties in interest who should file the petition.
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ISSUES:
(1) Whether Dr Caoilli and Dr Abueva are real parties in interest.
(2) Whether Nadal was denied due process in administrative disciplinary proceedings.
(3) Whether respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the writ of preliminary
injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty imposed on
Nadal.
HELD:
(1) Yes. A real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ‘Interest’ within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.” Undoubtedly, the UP
Board of Regents has an interest to protect its power to impose disciplinary actions against
student who violated its rules and regulations. Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and
Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now stopped
from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. It is not mandatory that each and
every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an
action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where
it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality.
(2) As to due process, Nadal contended that he was deprived due process when he was not given
notice of the March 29 meeting and that the ground upon which Nadal was convicted was not
the same as the original charge referring to the conditional votes on March 28. The court ruled
that it is gross error to equate due process with the sending of notice. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on
the agenda of the Board. And that the charge was exactly the same charge as the original
which was the withholding of information on the income of Nadal’s mother. In administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required and it is sufficient admission
that Nadal withheld information when he admitted that his mother was a “TNT” in the US.
(3) The court also gravely abused its discretion when it based its ruling that the implementation of
disciplinary sanction on Nadal “would work injustice to Nadal”, completely disregarding the
right of UP to academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon erring student of an institution of higher learning.
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GALAROSA v. VALENCIA
G.R. No. 109455
November 11, 1993
FACTS: Petitioner Galarosa is the incumbent President of the Association of Barangay Councils and
the appointed member of the Sangguniang Bayan. Private respondent, incumbent barangay captain
and aspirant of the position of ABC president of the municipality, sought before the RTC the
interpretation of Sec. 494 of R.A. 7160 which reads as follows: Sec. 494 . Ex officio Membership in
Sanggunians. — The duly elected presidents of the Liga [ng mga Barangay] at the municipal, city and
provincial levels, including the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve
as ex-officio members of the sanggunian bayan, sanggunian panglunsod, and sanggunian
panlalawigan, respectively. They shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of
the liga chapters, which in no case shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
He asked the court whether the President of the ABC can continue holding office despite termination
of the terms of office of SB. He posited that Galarosa, an ex-officio member of SB has coterminous
term with the said SB which expired, thus a new election must be conducted for the ABC
representative. In sum, he asked that a TRO be issued enjoining the SB from recognizing Galarosa
as an ex-officio member of SB and from allowing him to participate in its deliberations, holding in
abeyance Galarosa’s salaries and to give an interpretation of the above cited provision. In its
Answer, SB, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor asked for the dismissal of the petition because:
a) Lasay has no legal right to file the petition or petition is based on speculative right;
b) Petition is premature since resolution of the issues may still be the subject of rules and
regulations. The respondent judge granted the writ of preliminary injunction prayed by private
respondent.
Galarosa filed with the court a quo an appearance with motion to annul injunction order so that he will
be recognized as an ex-officio member and be allowed to enjoy the benefits and emoluments. The
same was not resolved by the trial court. The RTC judge ruled in favor of Lasay and declared
Galarosa as without any further right or legal basis to continue in office as ex- officio member of the
SB. Respondent judge did not squarely tackle the issue regarding the locus standi of Lasay but
described him as the incumbent barangay captain, aspirant for the position of ABC president and a
taxpayer claiming interest to complain, protest and seek proper relief. Galarosa appealed the
decision. Lasay, on the other hand, opposed the appeal and said that Galarosa has no right to file the
petition not being a party to the case. He added that although a motion for intervention was filed, the
pleading was not acted upon by the court. The Sol Gen filed its comment and suggested that the
respondent judge should have dismissed the case for private respondent failed to present a
justiciable controversy, that he is not the proper party to assail membership of Galarosa, and that the
latter, who was to be directly affected by the petition was not named a party-respondent [non-joinder
of proper party].
ISSUES:
(1) Whether Lasay has the personality to file the petition for declaratory relief and injunction with
the trial court.
(2) Whether Galarosa is an indispensable party.
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HELD:
(1) The Court ruled that as to the declaratory relief prayed for, Lasay does not have a legal
standing to institute the action for he is a mere aspirant to the presidency of ABC and his right
is a mere expectancy. However, as a taxpayer, Lasay has the sufficient legal standing
because the injunctive prayed is founded on what he believed to be an illegal disbursement of
public funds of his municipal government. He has the locus standi to have the issue resolved
because a decision against Galarosa would mean that he is not entitled to receive his salary
and other benefits as an SB member and any such payment to the latter beyond 30 June 1992
would be illegal. Moreover, the strict rule relative to the determination of real parties in interest
has been sufficiently relaxed to allow the taxpayer to bring an action to restrain the unlawful
disbursement of public funds.
(2) Yes. The form and nature of the action filed by Lasay required the inclusion of Galarosa as an
adverse party. It is his right to his office that is challenged and he is the person who would be
directly affected by any decision therein. No final determination of an action can be had unless
he is joined therein. He is therefore, an indispensable party. Under Section 7, Rule 3 of the
Revised Rules of Court, the joinder of indispensable parties is compulsory; consequently, no
action can proceed unless they are joined. The absence of an indispensable party in a case
render ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complaint including the
judgment. Lasay should have been required to implead Galarosa and should he fail to do so,
the petition should be dismissed. Galarosa in fact sought to intervene in the case by filing on
26 January 1993 an "Appearance with Motion to Annul the Injunction Order." Unfortunately,
after it was noted and LASAY was directed to file his "comment and/or opposition thereto" after
which the incident would be submitted for resolution, the respondent Judge, for reasons known
only to him, never did resolve it. Then with undue and precipitate haste, he rendered the
challenged decision on 24 March 1993. That decision must be set aside for having been
rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an
indispensable party, Galarosa was not effectively impleaded and recognized as a party in the
case and given the opportunity to file a responsive pleading.
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TANPINGCO v. IAC
G.R. No. 76225
March 31, 1992
FACTS: Petitioner is the tenant-lessee in the respondent’s parcel of agricultural riceland under a leasehold contract. In a
letter, the respondent through his representative informed him to desist from working on the subject land, having already
donated the same and that the respondent openly ordered the petitioner to vacate the landholding and is determined to
oust him in violation of the law and that the petitioner is willing to accept payment of disturbance compensation in an
amount computed in accordance with law and in the alternative to remain as tenant-lessee of the subject riceland. The
trial court gave the respondent to file his answer. The respondent filed instead a Motion to Dismiss alleging that the
complaint states no cause of action because the respondent is not the real party-in-interest having already donated the
subject land to the Ministry of Education, Culture, and Sports, Region VIII, as a school site and that the donation not
having in anyway benefited the respondent, no disturbance compensation is due the petitioner since under Section 36 (1)
of the Agrarian Reform Code as amended, disturbance compensation holds true only in cases wherein the lessor-owner
derives financial benefits from the conversion of the agricultural land into non-agricultural purposes. The trial court granted
the respondent's Motion to Dismiss and denied the petitioner's Motion for Reconsideration. The Intermediate Appellate
Court rendered the decision now assailed finding no merit in the instant appeal, the same is hereby dismissed with costs
taxed against the appellant.
ISSUES:
(1) Was it proper for the trial court to grant the Motion to Dismis filed by the defendant inspite of explicit mandate
against such action as contained in Section 17 of P.D. No. 946?
(2) Was respondent Court correct in sustaining the validity of the conversion of the subject tenanted riceland into a
school site?
(3) Was it correct in ruling that a tenant is not entitled to payment of disturbance compensation in case his tenanted
landholding is donated and converted into a school site?
HELD:
(1) The petitioner anchors his contention mainly on Section 17 of Presidential Decree No. 946 which provides: Sec.
17. Pleading, Hearing, Limitation on Postponements. — The defendant shall file answer to the complaint (not a
motion to dismiss), within a non-extendible period of ten (10) days from service of summons . . . The Court
declared that where the law speaks in clear and categorical language, there is no room for interpretation.
However, technicalities may be disregarded in order to resolve the case on its merits. Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court requires that every action must be prosecuted in the name of the real party-in-interest. A corollary
proposition to this rule is that an action must be brought against the real party-in-interest, or against a party which
may be bound by the judgment to be rendered therein. The petitioner should have impleaded the Ministry of
Education, Culture and Sports as the party-defendant for as stated in Roman Catholic Archbishop of Manila
v. Court of Appeals (198 SCRA 300 [1991]), a donation, as a mode of acquiring ownership, results in an effective
transfer of title over the property from the donor to the donee and once a donation is accepted, the donee
becomes the absolute owner of the property donated.
(2) Under Article 428 of the New Civil Code, the owner has the right to dispose of a thing without other limitations
than those established by law. There is nothing to prevent a landowner from donating his naked title to the land.
However, the new owner must respect the rights of the tenant. Section 7 of R.A. No. 3844, as amended (Code of
Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines) gives the agricultural lessee the right to work on the landholding once the
leasehold relationship is established. It also entitles him to security of tenure on his landholding. He can only be
ejected by the court for cause. Also, under Section 10 of the same Act, the law explicitly provides that the
leasehold relation is not extinguished by the alienation or transfer of the legal possession of the landholding. The
only instances when the agricultural leasehold relationship is extinguished are found in Section 8, 28 and 36 of
the Code of Agrarian Reforms of the Philippines. The donation of the land did not terminate the tenancy
relationship. However, the donation itself is valid.
(3) The trial court correctly dismissed the complaint for payment of disturbance compensation because the private
respondent is not the real party-in-interest. It is deemed necessary to pass upon the other errors assigned by the
petitioner for a person who was not impleaded in the complaint could not be bound by the decision rendered
therein, for no man shall be affected by a proceeding to which he is a stranger. The remedy then of the petitioner
is to claim his disturbance compensation from the new owner or whatever agency, local or national, is in a
position to pay for it.
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US v. REYES
G.R. No. 79253
March 1, 1993
FACTS: Respondent Nelia Montoya, an American Citizen, worked as an ID checker at the US Navy
Exchange (NEX) at the US Military Assistance Group (JUSMAG) headquarters in Quezon City.
Petitioner Maxine is an American Citizen employed at the JUSMAG headquarters as the activity
exchange manager. Montoya bought some items from the retail store Bradford managed, where she
had purchasing privileges. After shopping and while she was already at the parking lot, Mrs. Yong
Kennedy, a fellow ID checker approached her and told her that she needed to search her bags upon
Bradford’s instruction. Montoya approached Bradford to protest the search but she was told that it
was to be made on all JUSMAG employees on that day. Mrs. Kennedy then performed the search on
her person, bags and car in front of Bradford and other curious onlookers. Nothing irregular was
found thus she was allowed to leave afterwards. Montoya learned that she was the only person
subjected to such search that day and she was informed by NEX Security Manager Roynon that NEX
JUSMAG employees are not searched outside the store unless there is a strong evidence of a wrong-
doing. Montoya can’t recall any circumstance that would trigger suspicion of a wrong-doing on her
part. She is aware of Bradford’s propensity to suspect Filipinos for theft and/or shoplifting. Montoya
filed a formal protest with Mr. Roynon but no action was taken. She filed a suit against Bradford for
damages due to the oppressive and discriminatory acts committed by petitioner in excess of her
authority as store manager. She claims that she has been exposed to contempt and ridicule causing
her undue embarrassment and indignity. She further claims that the act was not motivated by any
other reason aside from racial discrimination in our own land which is a blow to our national pride and
dignity. She seeks for moral damages of P500,000.00 and exemplary damages of P100,000.00.
Summons and complaint were served on Bradford but instead of filing an answer, she along with
USA government filed a motion to dismiss on grounds that:
1. This is a suit against US which is a foreign sovereign immune from suit without its consent and
2. Bradford is immune from suit for acts done in the performance of her official functions under
Phil-US Military Assistance Agreement of 1947 and Military Bases Agreement of 1947.
They claim that US has rights, power and authority within the bases, necessary for the establishment,
use and operation and defense thereof. It will also use facilities and areas within bases and will have
effective command over the facilities, US personnel, employees, equipment and material. They
further claim that checking of purchases at NEX is a routine procedure observed at base retail outlets
to protect & safeguard merchandise, cash and equipment. Montoya filed a motion for preliminary
attachment claiming that Bradford was about to leave the country and was removing and disposing
her properties with intent to defraud her creditors. Motion granted by RTC. Montoya opposed
Bradford’s motion to dismiss. She claims that:
1. The search was outside NEX JUSMAG store thus it’s improper, unlawful and highly-
discriminatory and beyond Bradford’s authority;
2. Due to excess in authority and since her liability is personal, Bradford can’t rely on
sovereign immunity;
3. Bradford’s act was committed outside the military base thus under the jurisdiction of
Philippine courts;
4. The Court can inquire into the factual circumstances of case to determine whether or not
Bradford acted within or outside her authority.
RTC granted Montoya’s motion for the issuance of a writ of preliminary attachment and later on
issued writ of attachment opposed by Bradford. Montoya allowed to present evidence and Bradford
declared in default for failure to file an answer. RTC ruled in favor of Montoya claiming that search
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was unreasonable, reckless, oppressive and against Montoya’s liberty guaranteed by the
Constitution. She was awarded P300,000.00 for moral damages, P100,000.00 for exemplary
damages and P50,000.00 for actual expenses. Bradford filed a Petition for Restraining Order. SC
granted TRO enjoining RTC from enforcing decision. Montoya claims that Bradford was acting as a
civilian employee thus not performing governmental functions. Even if she were performing
governmental acts, she would still not be covered by the immunity since she was acting outside the
scope of her authority. She claims that criminal acts of a public officer/employee are his private acts
and he alone is liable for such acts. She believes that this case is under Philippine courts’ jurisdiction
because act was done outside the territorial control of the US Military Bases, it does not fall under
offenses where US has been given right to exercise its jurisdiction and Bradford does not possess
diplomatic immunity. She further claims that Philippine courts can inquire into the factual
circumstances and determine whether or not Bradford is immune.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the case is under the RTC’s jurisdiction.
(2) Whether the RTC committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying Bradford’s motion to
dismiss.
HELD:
(1) Yes. Intervention of a third party is discretionary upon the Court. US did not obtain leave of
court (something like asking for Court’s permission) to intervene in the present case.
Technically, it should not be allowed to intervene but since RTC entertained its motion to
dismiss, it is deemed to have allowed US to intervene. By voluntarily appearing, US must be
deemed to have subjected itself to RTC’s jurisdiction.
(2) No. Petitioners failed to specify any grounds for a motion to dismiss enumerated in Sec. 1,
Rule 16, Rules of Court. Thus, it actually lacks cause of action. A cause of action is necessary
so that Court would be able to render a valid judgment in accordance with the prayer in the
complaint. A motion to dismiss which fails to state a cause of action hypothetically admits the
truth of the allegations in the complaint. The RTC should have deferred the resolution instead
of denying it for lack of merit. But this is immaterial at this time since petitioners have already
brought this petition to the SC.
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SUSTIGUER v. TAMAYO
G.R. No. 29341
August 21, 1989
FACTS: A 234-square meter lot was one of the 42 lots acquired by the City Government of Bacolod
from the Development Bank of the Philippines which lots were later converted into a subdivision
known as Bacolod City RFC Subdivision for sale. The sale of the subdivision was governed by
Ordinance No. 149, Series of 1958, enacted by the City Council of Bacolod. Under the ordinance,
there shall be only 1 buyer or awardee for a sublot. The Office of the Mayor awarded the lot in
question to Isabel Aposaga. When Aposaga went to the Secretary of the Mayor to make the down
payment, she was advised to come back later as the Secretary was out of town. Aposaga was not
able to take effect the execution of the sale because she failed to make the required down payment.
Subsequently, the City Government of Bacolod, executed a Contract of Sale on Installment over the
said lot in favor of one Jose Tamayo. Sustiguer and Asopaga filed a complaint for annulment of the
sale on installment and award of said lot against the Government of Bacolod and Tamayo, claiming
that the latter is neither qualified to apply for the award nor to purchase the said lot under the
Ordinance. It was also claimed that after the execution of the sale between Tamayo and the City of
Bacolod, the former maliciously filed a complaint for unlawful detainer against Aposaga and
Sustiguer. The City Government of Bacolod and Tamayo denied that the Secretary of the Mayor was
absent when Aposaga failed to deposit the down payment. Thereafter, Ramon Villamarzo filed a
complaint in intervention, claiming that he has been occupying 2/3 of subject land for 10 years by
virtue of a house built thereon, and has the preferential right to purchase the same land, praying that
the contract executed by the City Mayor of Bacolod City and Tamayo be declared as without having
complied with the requisites of aforesaid Ordinance and that he be given preference to acquire the
lot. Aposaga filed a "Motion to Withdraw Civil Case No. 6528 and Confess Judgment in Civil Case
No. 7512," declaring that she had been paid for all her claim in said case. Sustiguer filed a
manifestation stating that the withdrawal of Aposaga does not change the status and character of the
said cases. Tamayo moved for a preliminary hearing on his affirmative and special defenses and
thereafter to dismiss both the complaint and complaint in intervention invoking Section 5 of Rule 16 of
the Rules of Court. Tamayo filed his memorandum on the issue whether or not Sustiguer has any
cause of action against the defendants as shown by the recital of the complaint. Sustiguer filed an
opposition to the motion to dismiss for lack of cause of action and moved for judgment on the
pleadings pursuant to Section 1 of Rule 19 of the Rules of Court. The lower court dismissed the
complaint of Sustiguer for lack of cause of action. Sustiguer then filed a motion for reconsideration
and new trial claiming that the dismissal of the complaint is contrary to law as there was no
preliminary hearing and that as plaintiff she still has a valid cause of action even after the withdrawal
of Aposaga from the case. After Tamayo filed his opposition to the motion for reconsideration and
new trial, the lower court denied the motion for reconsideration and new trial.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether the lower court committed an error in dismissing the complaint without holding a trial
on the merits on a mere motion of the appellee that the said cause of action although the
allegations therein are sufficient to constitute the causes of action against the appellees.
(2) Whether the lower court committed in making a conclusion that after Asopaga withdrew from
the complaint, there is no more cause of action left in favor of Sustiguer.
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HELD: The Supreme Court affirmed the order of dismissal of appellant's complaint for lack of cause
of action. The dismissal of the complaint for lack of cause of action was basically premised on the
procedural rule set forth under Section 2 of Rule 3 of the Rules of Court that every action must be
prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest and that all persons having an
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs.
Section 2, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court provides, thus: SEC. 2. Parties in interest. — Every action
must be prosecuted and defended in the name of the real party-in-interest. All persons having an
interest in the subject of the action and in obtaining the relief demanded shall be joined as plaintiffs. ...
The real party-in-interest is the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or the
party entitled to the avails of the suit. "Interest" within the meaning of the rule means material interest,
an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree. As a general rule, one having no right or
interest to protect cannot invoke the jurisdiction of the court as a party-plaintiff in an action. From the
allegations of the complaint, it appears that Isabel Aposaga and Edith Sustiguer jointly claimed that
they are qualified and entitled to purchase the lot for the reason that under the Ordinance, they
possess the preferential right to buy the same from the City Government of Bacolod, being the "actual
occupant or occupants" of the disputed lot. In the same complaint, however, it was disclosed by the
plaintiffs that the disputed lot was awarded by the Office of the City Mayor to plaintiff Isabel Aposaga
in accordance with the Ordinance as stated in the official statement and quoted at the same time in
the certificate issued by the Office of the Mayor. When Aposaga withdrew her complaint, the mere
allegation of Sustiguer that she has a preferential right to purchase the disputed lot on the basis of the
fact that she actually occupied the same together with Aposaga does not give rise to a cause of
action independent from that which has been withdrawn. Appellant cannot claim an interest to protect
over the disputed lot as she is not a real party-in-interest who would be benefited or injured by the
judgment in the event trial proceeded in the instant case. The interest appellant had, if any, on the
disputed lot cannot be categorized as material interest within the meaning of Section 2, Rule 3 of the
Rules of Court considering that it is contingent upon the final execution of the contract of sale on
installment in favor of Aposaga upon compliance with the requirements of Ordinance. Under the facts
pleaded in the complaint, it appears with certainty that appellant Edith Sustiguer is not entitled to the
relief prayed for, she not being the real party-in-interest. Hence, the dismissal of the complaint for lack
of cause of action is proper under the circumstances in the instant case. For, it is well-settled that
where the plaintiff is not the real party-in-interest, the ground for the motion to dismiss is lack of cause
of action.
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BOARD OF OPTOMETRY v. COLET
G.R. No. 122241
30 July 1996
Facts: R.A. No. 8050, 1 entitled "An Act Regulating the Practice of Optometry Education, Integrating
Optometrists, and for Other Purposes," otherwise known as the Revised Optometry Law of 1995 was approved
into law by the President on 7 June 1995. On 31 July 1995, the private respondents filed with the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of Manila a petition for declaratory relief and for prohibition and injunction, with a prayer for a
temporary restraining order.
1. There were surreptitious and unauthorized insertion and addition of provisions in the Reconciled bill
which were made without the knowledge and conformity of the Senate panel, thereby derogating the
orderly procedure essential to the legislative process and vitiating legislative consent;
2. R.A. No. 8050 derogates and violates the fundamental right of ever Filipino to reasonable safeguards
against deprivation of life, liberty and property without due process of law in that it authorizes
optometrists to engage in acts of practice within the zone of medical practice through permitted use in
certain kinds of diagnostic pharmaceutical agents thereby exposing and subjecting those who avail of
the services of optometrists to definite hazards which would inflict upon them impairment of vision,
resultant blindness, or possible loss of life;
3. R.A, No. 8050 derogates and violates the principle against undue delegation of legislative power when
it provides for a penalty of imprisonment for a maximum of eight years and a fine not exceeding
P40,000.00 upon any person found violating any rule or regulation promulgated pursuant to said law;
4. R.A. No. 8050 suppresses truthful advertising concerning optical goods and services in violation of the
guaranty of freedom of speech and press; and
5. R.A. No. 8050 employs vague ambiguous terms in defining prohibitions and restrictions, hence, it falls
within the ambit of void-for-vagueness doctrine which safeguards the guaranty of due process of law
They then prayed that after due notice and hearing, an order be issued granting a writ of preliminary injunction
enjoining, restraining, restricting, and forbidding the respondents therein (herein petitioners), their agents,
officers, and employees from performing or undertaking any act in implementation or enforcement of R.A. No.
8050, or any of its provisions, or its Code of Ethics, during the pendency of the case. The body of the petition,
however, gave no details as to the juridical personality and addresses of these alleged associations, save for
Acebedo Optical Co., Inc. It merely listed the names of the alleged presidents as well as their profession and
home addresses.
On 1 August 1995, the trial court, per respondent Judge Angel V. Colet, issued a Temporary Restraining
Order 9 enjoining the respondents from enforcing or implementing R.A. No. 8050 or its Code of Ethics, until
further orders of the court; On 11 August 1995, the petitioners herein, as respondents below, filed an
Opposition 10 to the application for preliminary injunction and alleged that:
1. No proper ground exists to warrant the issuance of a writ as
a. petitioners therein do not possess the requisite right as would entitle them to the relief
demanded;
b. petitioners have unquestionably not shown their Legal existence or capacity to file the case,
much Less their authority to file it in a representative capacity; and
c. petitioners have misled the court into believing that an act is being done in the implementation
of R.A. No. 8050 tending to make the judgment ineffectual;
2. The implementation of R.A. No. 8050 carries no injurious effect; and
3. Petitioners failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionally in favor of R.A. No. 8050.
On 25 August 1995, the trial court issued the challenged order, 12 the dispositive portion of which reads as
follows:
PREMISES CONSIDERED, the Court grants the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for until
further orders of the Court, respondents and their officials, agents and employees, are
restrained, enjoined, and prohibited from undertaking in any form or manner, the enforcement or
implementation of the Revised Optometry Law [R.A. 8050] or any regulation or Code of Ethics
issued thereunder.
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Petitioners have legal rights affected by the Revised Optometry Law, and that in its operation, said Law is likely
to inflict serious and irreparable injury to such legal rights. On 1 September 1995, respondent Judge Colet
issued a Writ of Preliminary Injunction. The petitioners then filed this special civil action for certiorari and
prohibition with a prayer for a writ of preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
1. The locus standi of the private respondents to question the Constitutionality of R.A. No. 8050; and
2. The absence of a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition.
ISSUES:
(1) WON the private respondents have locus standi to question the constitutionality of RA 8050
(2) WON there is a valid cause of action for either declaratory relief or prohibition
HELD: The facts showing the capacity of a party to sue or the legal existence of an organized association of
persons that is made a party must be averred. Second, not even in the sworn statements. 19 of the alleged
presidents representing the "associations," which were offered in evidence in support of the application for a
writ of preliminary injunction, were such "associations" mentioned or named. Finally, in their Comment on the
instant petition, the private respondents chose to remain silent on the issue of the juridical personality of their
"associations." For having failed to show that they are juridical entities, private respondents OPAP, COA,
ACMO, and SMOAP must then be deemed to be devoid of legal personality to bring an action. Not only did the
private respondents fail to allege this in their petition, they likewise failed to allege the existence and prove the
requisites of a class suit, viz., the subject matter of the controversy is one of common or general interest to
many persons, and the parties are so numerous that it is impracticable to bring them all before the court. 23
As a special civil action for declaratory relief, 26 its requisites are: (1) the existence of a justiciable controversy;
(2) the controversy is between persons whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking the relief has a
legal interest in the controversy; and (4) that the issue invoked is ripe for judicial determination. 27 On this
score, we find no difficulty holding that at least the first and fourth requisites are wanting.
Then there is the unbending rule in constitutional law that courts will not assume jurisdiction over a
constitutional question unless the following requisites are first satisfied: (1) there must be an actual case or
controversy involving a conflict or rights susceptible of judicial determination; (2) the constitutional question
must be raised by a proper party; (3) the constitutional question must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and
(4) the resolution of the constitutional question must be necessary to the resolution of the case. 28
An actual case or controversy means as existing case or controversy that is appropriate or ripe for
determination, not conjectural or anticipatory. 29 It cannot be disputed that there is yet no actual case or
controversy involving all or any of the private respondents on one hand, and all or any of the petitioners on the
other, with respect to rights or obligations under R.A. No. 8050
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The challenged order of 25 August 1995 of respondent
Judge Angel V. Colet in Civil Case No. 95-74770 granting the application for the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction, and the writ of preliminary injunction issued on 1 September 1995 are hereby
ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. The respondent Judge is further DIRECTED to DISMISS Civil Case No. 95-
74770.
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SMITH BELL & CO. v. CA and JOSEPH BENGZON
G.R. No. 110668
4 February 1997
FACTS: On July 1982, the plaintiffs, doing business under the style of Tic Hin Chiong, Importer,
bought and imported to the Phils from the firm Chin Gact Co of Taipei, Taiwan 50 metric tons of
Dicalcium Phosphate valued at $13,000. These were contained in 1,250 bags and shipped from the
Port of Kaohsiung, Taiwaan on Board “S.S GOLDEN WEALTH” for the Port of Manila. On July 27,
1982, this shipment was insured by the defendant First Insurance Co. for $19,500 “against all risks” at
port of departure with the note “claim, if any, payable in US currency at Manila and with defendant
Smith Bell and Co. stamped at the lower left side of the policy as “Claim Agent”. Thereafter, the entire
cargo was discharged to the local arrastre contractor, Metroport Services Inc. with a number of the
cargo in apparent bad order condition. On Sept 27, 1982, the plaintiff secured the services of a
cargo surveyor to conduct a survey of the damaged cargo. The surveyor’s showed that of the 1,250
bags of the imported material, 600 were damaged by tearing at the sides of the container bags and
the contents partly empty. Upon weighing, the contents of the damaged bags were found to be
18,546 kg short. Accordingly, on Oct 16, the plaintiff filed with Smith Bell, and Co, Inc. a formal
statement of claim with proof of loss and a demand for settlement of the corresponding value of the
losses, in the sum of $7,347.78. The offer not being acceptable to the plaintiff no settlement of the
claim having been made, the plaintiff then caused the instant case to be filed. RTC ruled in favour of
plaintiff-appellee. It ruled that plaintiff-appellee has fully established the liability of the insurance firm
on the subject insurance contract as teh former presented concrete evidence of teh amount of losses
resulting from the risks insured against which were supported by reliable report and assessment of
professional cargo surveyor. As regards defendant – appellant, the lower court held that since it is
admittedly a claim agent of the foreign insurance firm doing business in teh Phils, justice is better
served if said agent is made liable without prejudice to its right of action against its principal, the
insurance firm.
ISSUE: WON a claim agent of a principal foreign insurance can be held jointly and severally liable
with said principal under the latter’s marine cargo insurance policy, given that the agent is not a party
to the insurance contract
HELD: No, for he is not a real party-in-interest. Being a mere agent and representative, Smith Bell
Co is also not the real party-in-interest in this case. An action brought for a practical purpose, that is,
to obtain actual and positive relief. If the party sued is not the proper party, any decision that may be
rendered against him would be futile, for the decision cannot be enforced or executed The cause of
action of private respondent is based on contract ofinsurance, which was already shown was not
participated in by petitioner. It is not a “person who claimant interest adverse to the plaintiff” nor is
said respondent “necessary to a complete determination or settlement of the questions involved “in
the controversy. Petitioner is improperly impleaded for not being a real-party-interest. It will not
benefit or suffer in case the action prospers.
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G-TRACTORS INC. v. CA
135 SCRA 192
FACTS: Luis Narciso is married to Josefina Narciso. He operates a logging concession. Luis
Narciso entered into contract to hire of heavy equipment with petioner G-Tractors where the latter
leased the former tractors. The contract stipulated payment for rental. However Luis wasn’t able to
pay. Property of Luis was sold to pay for his debt, one of which was conjugal property of land. The
wife’s contentions were as follows: whatever transpired in the civil case against them could be binding
only on the husband Luis and could not affect or bind the plaintiff-wife Josefina who was not a party to
that case that the nature of the Sheriff’s sale clearly stated that only the property of the husband may
be sold to satisfy the money judgment against him that the conjugal property of the plaintiffs-spouses
could not be made liable for the satisfaction of the judgment in the civil case considering that the
subject matter of said case was never used for the benefit of the conjugal partnership of the family
ISSUE: WON the debt of private respondent Luis is a conjugal debt for which the conjugal
partnership property can be held answerable
HELD: Yes. Article 161 of the New Civil Code provides that conjugal partnership shall be liable for
“all teh debts and obligations contracted by the husband for the benefit of the conjugal partnership,
and those contracted by the wife, also fro the same purpose, in the cases where she may legally bind
the partnership. There is no doubt then that his account with the petitioner was brought about in order
to enhance the productivity of said logging business, a commercial enterprise for gain which he had
the right to embark the conjugal partnership. The obligations were contracted in connection with his
legitimate business as a producer and exporter in mahogany logs and certainly benefited the conjugal
partnership. The debts contracted by teh husband for and in the exercise of teh industry or
profession by which he contributes to the support of teh family cannot be deemed to be his exclusive
and private debts
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U.P. BOARD v. LIGOT-TELAN
227 SCRA 342
FACTS: UP administration conceptualized and implemented the socialized scheme of tuition fee
payments through the Socialized Tuition Fee and Assistance Program (STFAP or popularly known as
“Iskolar ng Bayan” program) to expand the coverage of government educational subsidies so as to
include the deserving in the lower rungs of the socio-economic ladder. All students are entitled to
apply for STFAP benefits which include reduction in fees, living and book subsidies and student
assistantships which give undergraduate students the opportunity to earn P12 per hour by working for
the University. However, applicants are required to state the amount and source of the annual income
of the family, their real and personal properties and special circumstances from which the University
may evaluate their financial status and need on the basis of which they are categorized into brackets.
Failure to disclose such information is punishable under Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on
Student Conduct and Discipline of the University. On March 14, 1991, a team conducted a home
investigation against Ramon P. Nadal, a student enrolled in the College of Law and found out that
Nadal failed to disclose that the family owned a 1977 Corolla car and that his mother worked in the
US.
UP charged Nadal before the Student Disciplinary Tribunal (SDT) of dishonesty in violation of Section
2 of the Rules and Regulations on Student Conduct and Discipline. After hearing, the SDT rendered a
decision exculpating Nadal of withholding the information about the car but finding him guilty of
withholding information about the income of his mother. SDT imposed the penalty of expulsion and
required him to reimburse all STFAP benefits. The SDT decision was automatically elevated to the
Executive Committee of UP Diliman for review which affirmed the decision of SDT. Nadal appealed to
the Board of Regents which affirmed the decision of SDT but because of the Board was willing to
grant a degree of compassion to the appellant in view of the alleged status and predicament of the
mother as an immigrant ‘TNT’ in the US, the penalty was modified from expulsion to one-year
suspension plus reimbursement of all benefits received from the STFAP, with legal interest. Nadal
filed a motion for reconsideration. On March 28, 1993, a vote was held by secret ballot on whether
Ramon P. Nadal was guilty or not which results in 4 votes guilty; 3 votes not guilty; and 3 conditional
votes, pending verification with ADMU of Nadal’s statement that he was granted scholarship by
ADMU while in high school. Should Ateneo confirm that Nadal had not received financial assistance,
then the conditional votes would be considered guilty and if otherwise, not guilty. On March 29, 1993,
ADMU confirms the scholarship grant but the BOR found Nadal guilty and imposed the penalty of one
year suspension, non-issuance of any certificate of good moral character during the suspension and
reimburse the STFAP benefits.
Nadal filed with the RTC of Quezon a petition for mandamus with preliminary injunction and prayer for
a temporary restraining order against President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar
Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia Caoilli. The RTC granted the petition. The petitioners,
President Abueva, the BOR, Oscar Alfonso, Cesar Buenaventure, Armand Fabella, and Olivia Caoilli,
filed a petition for certiorari. Nadal raised an issue that Dr Caoilli and Dr Abueva are not real parties in
interest who should file the petition.
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ISSUES:
(1) Whether Dr Caoilli and Dr Abueva are real parties in interest
(2) Whether Nadal was denied due process in administrative disciplinary proceedings.
(3) Whether respondent judge gravely abused her discretion in issuing the writ of ppreliminary
injunction thereby preventing the BOR from implementing the suspension penalty imposed on
Nadal.
HELD:
(1) Yes. A real party in interest is one “who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment or
the party entitled to the avails of the suit. ‘Interest’ within the meaning of the rule means
material interest, an interest in issue and to be affected by the decree, as distinguished from
mere interest in the question involved, or a mere incidental interest.” Undoubtedly, the UP
Board of Regents has an interest to protect its power to impose disciplinary actions against
student who violated its rules and regulations. Having specifically named Drs. Abueva and
Caoili as respondents in the petition for mandamus that he filed below, Nadal is now stopped
from questioning their personality to file the instant petition. It is not mandatory that each and
every member of the BOR be named petitioners. As the Court has time and again held, an
action may be entertained, notwithstanding the failure to include an indispensable party where
it appears that the naming of the party would be but a formality.
(2) As to due process, Nadal contended that he was deprived due process when he was not given
notice of the March 29 meeting and that the ground upon which Nadal was convicted was not
the same as the original charge referring to the conditional votes on March 28. The court ruled
that it is gross error to equate due process with the sending of notice. University rules do not
require the attendance in BOR meetings of individuals whose cases are included as items on
the agenda of the Board. And that the charge was exactly the same charge as the original
which was the withholding of information on the income of Nadal’s mother. In administrative or
quasi-judicial proceedings, only substantial evidence is required and it is sufficient admission
that Nadal withheld information when he admitted that his mother was a “TNT” in the US.
(3) The court also gravely abused its discretion when it based its ruling that the implementation of
disciplinary sanction on Nadal “would work injustice to Nadal”, completely disregarding the
right of UP to academic freedom which provides more than ample justification for the
imposition of a disciplinary sanction upon erring student of an institution of higher learning
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GALAROSA v. VALENCIA
207 SCRA 728
FACTS: Petitioner Galarosa is the incumbent President of the Association of Barangay Councils
(ABC) of Sorsogon and the appointed member of the Sangguniang Bayan (SB). In August 1992,
private respondent, incumbent barangay captain of Gimaloto Sorsogon and aspirant of the position of
ABC president of the municipality, sought before the RTC of Sorsogon the interpretation of Sec 494
of RA 7160 which reads as follows: Sec 494 Ex officio Membership in Sanggunians. – The duly
elected presidents of the Liga ng mga Barangay at the municipal, city and provincial levels, including
the component cities and municipalities of Metropolitan Manila, shall serve as ex-officio members of
the sanggunian bayan, sanggunian panglunsod, and sanggunian panlalawigan, respectively. They
shall serve as such only during their term of office as presidents of the liga chapters, which in no case
shall be beyond the term of office of the sanggunian concerned.
He, therefore asked the court whether the President of the ABC can continue holding office despite
termination of the terms of office of SB on 30 June 1992. He posited that Galarosa, an ex-officio
member of SB of Sorsogon, has coterminous term with the said SB which expired on 30 June 1992,
thus a new election must be conducted for the ABC representative. In sum, he asked that a TRO be
issued enjoining the SB from recognizing Galarosa as an ex-officio member of SB and from allowing
him to participate in its deliberations, holding in abeyance Galarosa’s salaries and to give an
interpretation of the above cited provision. In its answer, SB, represented by the Provincial Prosecutor
asked for the dismissal of the petition because: a) Lasay has no legal right to file the petition or
petition is based on speculative right; b) petition is premature since resolution of the issues may still
be the subject of rules and regulations. The respondent judge granted the writ of preliminary injuction
prayed by private respondent. Galarosa thereafter filed with the court a quo an appearance with
motion to annul injunction order so that he will be recognized as an ex-officio member and be allowed
to enjoy the benefits and emoluments. The same was not resolved by the trial court. The RTC judge
ruled in favour of Lasay and declared Galarosa as without any further right or legal basis to continue
in office as ex-officio member of the SB. Respondent judge did not squarely tackle the issue
regarding the locus standi of Lasay but described him as the incumbent brgy captain of Gimaloto,
aspirant for the position of ABC president and a taxpayer claiming interest to complain, protest and
seek proper relief. Galarosa appealed the decision. Lasay, on the other hand, opposed the appeal
and said that Galarosa has no right to file the petition not being a party to the case. He added that
although the motion for intervention was filed, the pleading was not acted upon by the court. The sol
gen filed its comment and suggested that the respondent judge should have dismissed the case for
private respondent failed to present a justiciable controversy, that he is not the proper party to assail
membership of Galarosa, and that the latter, who was to be directly affected by the petition was not
named a party-respondent (non-joinder of proper party.
ISSUES:
(1) WON Lasay has the personality to file the petition for declaratory relief and injunction with the
trial court.
(2) WON Galarosa is an indispensable party
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HELD:
(1) The court ruled that as to the declaratory relief prayed for, Lasay does not have a legal
standing to institute the action for he is a mere aspirant to the presidency of ABC and his right
is a mere expectancy. However, as a taxpayer, Lasay has the sufficient legal standing
because the injunctive prayed is founded on what he believed to be an illegal disbursement of
public funds of his municipal government. He has the locus standi to have the issue resolved
because a decision against Galarosa would mean that he is not entitled to receive a salary and
other benefits as an SB member and any such payment to the latter beyond 30 June 1992
would be illegal. Morevover, the strict rule relative to the determination of real parties in
interest has been sufficiently relaxed to allow the taxpayer to bring an action to restrain the
unlawful disbursement of public funds.
(2) Yes the form and nature of the action filed by Lasay required the inclusion of Galarosa as an
adverse party. It is his right to his office that is challenged and he is the person who would be
directly affected by any decision therein. No final determination of an action can be had unless
he is joined therein. He is therefore, an indispensable party. The absence of an indispensable
party in a case render ineffectual all the proceedings subsequent to the filing of the complain
including the judgment. Lasay should have been required to implead Galarosa and should he
fail to do so, the petition should be dismissed. Galarosa in fact sought to intervene in the case
by filing on 26 Jan 1993 an “Appearance with Motion to Annul the Injuction Order”.
Unfortunately, after it was noted and Lasay was directed to file his “comment and/or opposition
thereto” after which the incident would be submitted for resolution, the respondent Judge, for
reasons known only to him, never did resolve it. then with undue and precipitate haste, he
rendered the challenged decision on 24 Mar 1993. That decision must be set aside for having
been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of jurisdiction since an
indispensable party, Galarosa was not effectively impleaded and recognized as a party in the
case and given the opportunity to file a responsive pleading.
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TAN CHUN UY v. CA & DBP
212 SCRA 713
FACTS: On 9 May 1978, Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. (SCLC), obtained a loan of P18,514,357.56 from private
respondent Development Bank of the Philippines (DBP). As security for the loan, SCLC mortgaged some of its
properties, among which was a vessel, MV Sta. Clara I . Upon SCLC's failure to pay the loan, the mortgage was
foreclosed. On 18 August 1982, the Clerk of Court and Provincial Sheriff Ex-Officio of Sultan Kudarat, Aurelio M.
Rendon, conducted an auction sale and sold the vessel to DBP for P3,600,000.00. He thereafter issued a certificate
of sale dated 18 August 1982 in favor of DBP. 1 However, DBP did not register with the Philippine Coast Guard the
mortgage; neither the foreclosure nor the auction sale. In December 1983, DBP and Sta. Clara Housing Industries,
Inc. (SCHI), entered into a Lease/Purchase Agreement2 which provided that DBP should lease some of the former
properties of SCLC, including MV Sta. Clara I, to the latter and transfer actual ownership over these properties upon
completion by the lessee of the stipulated lease/purchase payment. On 10 July 1986, petitioner caused the levy and
attachment of the same vessel, MV Sta. Clara I, in order to satisfy a judgment rendered by the Regional Trial Court,
Br. XII, Davao City, in Civil Case No. 15970, "Tay Chun Suy v. Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc." At the time of the levy,
the coastwise license of the vessel was in the name of Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc. On the scheduled date of the
execution sale, Atty. Necitas Kintanar, counsel for SCHI, verbally informed Deputy Sheriff Manases M. Reyes, Jr.,
who was to conduct the sale, that MV Sta. Clara I was no longer owned by SCLC but by DBP pursuant to a prior
extrajudicial foreclosure sale. Despite such information, Sheriff Reyes, Jr., proceeded with the sale and awarded the
vessel to petitioner for P317,000.00. 3 Upon being informed of the execution sale to petitioner, DBP filed a complaint
before the Regional Trial Court, Br. XVII, Davao City, for annulment of the execution sale, recovery of possession,
damages and attorney's fees with prayer for restraining order and preliminary injunction. 5 Petitioner moved to
dismiss the complaint for alleged lack of jurisdiction, cause of action and/or legal personality to sue on the part of
DBP. 6 On 28 October 1986, the court denied the motion to dismiss but granted DBP's prayer for a writ of
preliminary injunction. 7 Petitioner moved for reconsideration of the denial but on 19 November 1986, the motion
was likewise denied. 8 Forthwith, petitioner filed with the Court of Appeals a petition
for certiorari and mandamus with prohibition assailing the Orders of 28 October. The Third Division of this Court
denied the petition for lack of merit. 10 On 4 December 1987, the trial court issued a decision which, among other
matters, declared that DBP was the lawful owner of MV Sta. Clara I and that the public auction sale conducted by
Deputy Sheriff Manases Reyes, Jr., on 16 July 1986 and the resultant certificate of sale were null and void. 11 On 16
December 1987, petitioner sought recourse to the Court of Appeals. On 28 February 1990, the appellate court
dismissed his appeal. 12 On 23 May 1990, the motion to reconsider the dismissal was denied. 13 Hence, this petition
for review on certiorari. Petitioner contends that the Court of Appeals erred (1) in finding that the sheriff's auction
sale of the vessel did not enjoy the presumption of regularity; and (2) in affirming the decision of the trial court
declaring DBP as the true and exclusive owner of MV Sta. Clara I.
ISSUE: As between the buyer of a vessel at a prior extrajudicial foreclosure and the buyer at a subsequent auction
sale, both buyers failing to register their transactions, who has a better right of dominion over the vessel?
HELD: Well-entrenched is the rule that factual findings of the trial court, as well as those of the Court of Appeals,
are entitled to great weight and respect. 15 This rule once more finds application in the case at bar. The records
show that SCHI, lessee of the vessel, is an entity separate from SCLC, and was not a party to the case filed by
petitioner against the latter. 16 Yet, SCHI was furnished, on a Saturday, copy of the auction sale of MV Sta. Clara I .
Sta. Clara Lumber Co., Inc., which was the proper party, does not appear to have been notified. Further, petitioner
contends that he is a bona fide purchaser for value at the auction sale and that he came to know about the
acquisition by DBP only upon its filing of complaint for annulment of the execution sale. 28 The evidence on record
belies such contention. Before the auction sale started, counsel for petitioner was already aware of the cloud on the
title of SCLC to the vessel as shown hereunder — Notwithstanding his knowledge of the prior claim of DBP,
petitioner insisted that the sheriff proceeded with the auction sale. Under the caveat emptor rule, he assumed the
risk of losing the vessel because his right to it cannot be considered superior to that of DBP. WHEREFORE, finding
no reversible error in the decision of the court a quo, the petition for review on certiorari is DISMISSED, with costs
against petitioner.
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BARFEL DEV. CO. V. CA
FACTS: The defendants are sellers, and the plaintiff corp. as buyer, concluded an Agreement to
Buy/Sell 2 parcels of land with 2 houses erected thereon. Said Agreement bears a stipulation that
“The seller will apply the payment of the cash portion of the purchase price to the removal of any and
all liens on the properties.” Plaintiff paid an amt. of P100, 000 as down payment upon signing. During
the time of the Agreement, the defendants repeatedly warranted that except for a mortgage in favor of
BPI and the Deed of Restrictions, the subject properties are “free from any liens and encumbrances.”
Plaintiff found out that defendant made a misrepresentation when it was discovered that the subject
properties have second mortgage with the PISO/Central Bank in the amount of P 2,571, 400.
Informed by the discovery, defendant advised plaintiff that the second mortgage was reduced to only
P54, 000 and gave assurance that he will work out with the PISO for the release of the second
mortgage. The PSB gave notice that it has approved plaintiff’s application for loan and sent separate
letters of the undertaking to the defendants and BPI detailing the arrangements that the PSB will
directly pay the BPI and also pay the defendants the balance of the purchase price. In view of the
assurances of defendants, plaintiffs in a letter sent to defendants its willingness to pay the sum of P2,
000,000, ahead of the PSB loan proceeds upon release of the second mortgage. Defendants
conformed with this arrangements. Undisputed fact is that, the defendants, in gross and bad faith and
in malicious breach of contract, failed and/or refused to comply with their obligation of securing the
release of the second mortgage. Petitioners (as defendants) filed an answer that the Corp. is aware
off all liens including the mortgage in favor of PISO and the parties agreed that if full payment could
not be effective, within 30 days, they will each have the option to terminate the agreement.
Defendants (herein petitioners) filed a motion to admit the same an amendment impleading PISO
bank as additional party defendant and compel it to accept payment of the existing second mortgage
from private respondent Reginas since allegedly no complete relief can be had unless the second
mortgage in favor of said PISO bank is released. Despite petitioners’ opposition, an order was issued
by the trial court admitting the amended complaint and after denial of their motion for reconsideration
petitioners proceeded to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA ruled that PISO is a
proper party under Section 8 of Rule 3 of the RRC. For the defendants to be able to comply with its
obligation there had to be a determination of the amount really due in PISO.
ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.
HELD: PISO is not an indispensable or necessary party without whom no final determination can be
had of an action for specific performance with damages. PISO is not a party to the 3 contracts which
are subject of an action for specific performance and damages between the private respondents and
petitioners. PISO is a second mortgage, whatever the outcome of the litigation between the
petitioners and the private respondents would be. Its second mortgage lien attaches to the property.
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NOCOM v. CAMERINO
FACTS: (G.R. No. 161029) Respondent Oscar Camerino and respondents-intervenors Efren Camerino, Cornelio
Mantile, the deceased Nolasco Del Rosario, represented by Mildred Del Rosario, and Domingo Enriquez were the
tenants who were tilling on the parcels of land planted to rice and corn previously owned by Victoria Homes, Inc.
Without notifying the respondents, Victoria Homes, Inc. sold the said lots to Springsun Management Systems
Corporation. Subsequently, SMSC mortgaged to Banco Filipino (BF) the said lots as collaterals for its loans. As
SMSC failed to pay the loans due, BF extrajudicially foreclosed the mortgage and, later, was adjudged the highest
bidder and SMSC redeemed the lots from BF. Respondents filed a complaint against SMSC and BF for
Prohibition/Certiorari, Reconveyance/Redemption, Damages, Injunction with Preliminary Injunction and Temporary
Restraining Order. RTC found respondents to be tenants who have been tilling on the subject land planted to rice
and corn since 1967 and, thus, authorized them to redeem the subject lots. CA affirmed with modification the RTC
by declaring the respondents to be tenants or agricultural lessees on the disputed lots and, thus, entitled to exercise
their right of redemption, but deleted the award of P200, 000 attorney’s fees for lack of legal basis.
(Present G.R. No. 182984) Petitioner Mariano Nocom gave the respondents several Philtrust Bank Managers
Checks amounting to P500, 000 each, which the latter enchased, representing the price of their inchoate and
contingent rights over the subject lots which they sold to him. With the marital consent of their wives, executed an
Irrevocable Power of Attorney which was notarized. Respondent Oscar Camerino filed a complaint against
petitioner, captioned as Petition to Revoke Power of Attorney. The turnover of the titles to the properties in his favor,
and the payment of attorney’s fees and other legal fees. Respondent, alleged that the contents of the said document
were not explained to him and that he and co-respondents were asked by their counsel, Atty. Arturo S. Santos, to
sign a document with the representation that it was urgently needed in the legal proceedings against SMSC.
Petitioner countered that on September 3, 2003, Atty. Santos informed him of the desire of his clients, herein
respondents, to sell and assign to him their inchoate and contingent rights and interests over the subject lots
because they were in dire need of money and could no longer wait until the termination of the proceedings as SMSC
would probably appeal the CAs Decision to this Court. Respondents Efren Camerino, Cornelio Mantile and Mildred
Del Rosario, in her capacity as legal heir and representative of Nolasco Del Rosario, filed a Motion for Leave of
Court to Admit the Complaint-in-Intervention with the attached Complaint-in-Interventionseeking the nullification of
the Irrevocable Power of Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy. Their Complaint-in-Intervention alleged
that they had a legal interest in the subject matter of the controversy and would either be directly injured or benefited
by the judgment; that they were co-signatories or co-grantors of respondent Oscar Camerino in the Irrevocable
Power of Attorney they executed in favor of the petitioner; that their consent was vitiated by fraud,
misrepresentation, machination, mistake and undue influence perpetrated by their own counsel and the petitioner.
The RTC admitted the Complaint-in-Intervention and also granted the Motion for Summary Judgment because a
meticulous scrutiny of the material facts admitted in the pleadings of the parties reveals that there is really no
genuine issue of fact presented therein. RTC rendered a Summary Judgment annulling the Irrevocable Power of
Attorney for being contrary to law and public policy. CA affirmed the trial courts Joint Order and Summary Judgment.
ISSUE: WON the CA is correct in not voiding the assailed summary judgment for failure of the respondents to
implead an indispensable parties.
HELD: In Domingo v. Scheer, the Court explained that the non-joinder of an indispensable party is not a ground for
the dismissal of an action. Section 7, Rule 3 of the Rules, as amended, requires indispensable parties to be joined
as plaintiffs or defendants. The joinder of indispensable parties is mandatory. Without the presence of indispensable
parties to the suit, the judgment of the court cannot attain real finality. Strangers to a case are not bound by the
judgment rendered by the court. The absence of an indispensable party renders all subsequent actions of the court
null and void. There is lack of authority to act not only of the absent party but also as to those present. The
responsibility of impleading all the indispensable parties rests on the petitioner or plaintiff. However, the non-joinder
of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. Parties may be added by order of the court on
motion of the party or on its own initiative at any stage of the action and/or such times as are just. If the petitioner or
plaintiff refuses to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, the latter may dismiss the complaint
or petition for the petitioner or plaintiffs failure to comply therefor. The remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to
be indispensable. In the present case, the RTC and the CA did not require the respondents to implead Atty. Santos
as party-defendant or respondent in the case.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
QUILISADIO v. CA
FACTS: During the marriage, spouses Catalino Quilisadio and Isabel Dagar acquired the parcel of
land in question. The said spouses died before World War II, survived by their 6 legitimate children.
The disputed land was sold to the respondent Conejos by Fernando, Rustica Quilisadio
(Granddaughter and Grandson of the deceased spouses) and Tasan. After the said sale, respondent
took possession of the whole lot. A complaint for recovery of ownership and possession of registered
land was filed in the Court of First Instance. At the time of filling, the sellers of the said land already
died. And their surviving children took over the said case. The complaint alleged, among others, that
respondent bought some undivided interest, rights and participation of the petitioners’ co-owners in
the land in question for the sum of P800,000; that the alleged sale in respondent was not registered
pursuant to the law and was made without the knowledge of the petitioners who owned ¾ undivided
interest, right and participation. One of the petitioner requested respondent to allow him to
repurchase the interest sold to the latter by reimbursing hi, the price, per the deed of sale plus all
lawful expenses but respondent refused. The petitioners filed a motion to admit an amended
complaint which included respondent corporation as a party defendant on the allegations that the 5
hectares of the disputed land had been leased by respondent to the said corporation. Respondent in
his answers, counter alleged that he bought the land in good faith from the persons he honestly
believed to be the owners thereof. The respondent corporation in its answers set up the following
affirmative defenses; that the petitioners had no cause of action against it because it was merely a
lessee of respondent and it does not claim ownership nor possession of the land. And that
respondent made an implied warranty and executed an affidavit making him liable for the damages
the case at bar will cause. Trial Court found petitioners guilty of laches. Appellate court affirmed lower
court’s decision.
ISSUE: WON the respondent corporation should have been impleaded.
HELD: The respondent corporation is a proper party in the petitioners’ case for complete relief to be
accorded in case of a favorable judgment, it was discretionary for the lower court to include the said
corporation as a proper party and not an indispensable party as the petitioner had made it party.
Proper or necessary parties must be joined in order to adjudicate the whole controversy and avoid
multiplicity of suits.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
UNITED PARACLE MINING COMPANY v. CA
FACTS: Petitioner United Paracale Mining Co. filed a complaint against the Director of Lands and
other 53 other individuals alleging that the company was the owner of the 49 mining claims. These
mining claims were thereby supposed to be private property of the company and segregated from the
mass of the public domain. Petitioner had applied for a patent on the claims, and Bureau of Mines
approved and recognizes the company’s rights over the mining claims. Petitioner filed with the
Bureau of Mines an application for mining lease over the claims with the reservation that “the filling of
the application for mining lease was without prejudice to the rights of the applicant and its
predecessors-in-interest in and all the mineral claims. 37 of the 53 individual defendants filed an
answer denying the material allegations of the complaint. Private respondent Jose Chuatengco filed a
motion to dismiss the complaint, asseverating that complaint did not state a cause of action. The trial
court granted the motion to dismiss; whereupon, petitioner filed an appeal with respondent court. The
appellate court affirmed he decision of the trial court. The Solicitor General filed a comment and
motion, alleging that when the petitioner appealed the trial court’s order of dismissal, only private
respondent Chautengco was named adverse party.
ISSUE: WON joinder is mandatory and if the Director of lands is an indispensable party to the case.
HELD: Section 7, Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: Section 7. Compulsory joinder of
indispensable parties.- Parties in interest without whom no final determination can be had of an action
shall be joined either as plaintiffs or defendants. An action cannot proceed unless the indispensable
parties are joined; that joinder is mandatory and, unless such indispensable parties are impleaded the
case must be dismissed. Clearly, the Director of Lands is an indispensable party to the case, and his
omission is fatal to the cause of herein petitioner. The Petition is DISMISSED.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
BARFEL DEV. CO. v. CA
FACTS: The defendants are sellers, and the plaintiff corp. as buyer, concluded an Agreement to
Buy/Sell 2 parcels of land with 2 houses erected thereon. Said Agreement bears a stipulation that
“The seller will apply the payment of the cash portion of the purchase price to the removal of any and
all liens on the properties.” Plaintiff paid an amt. of P100, 000 as down payment upon signing. During
the time of the Agreement, the defendants repeatedly warranted that except for a mortgage in favor of
BPI and the Deed of Restrictions, the subject properties are “free from any liens and encumbrances.”
Plaintiff found out that defendant made a misrepresentation when it was discovered that the subject
properties have second mortgage with the PISO/Central Bank in the amount of P 2,571, 400.
Informed by the discovery, defendant advised plaintiff that the second mortgage was reduced to only
P54, 000 and gave assurance that he will work out with the PISO for the release of the second
mortgage. The PSB gave notice that it has approved plaintiff’s application for loan and sent separate
letters of the undertaking to the defendants and BPI detailing the arrangements that the PSB will
directly pay the BPI and also pay the defendants the balance of the purchase price. In view of the
assurances of defendants, plaintiffs in a letter sent to defendants its willingness to pay the sum of P2,
000,000, ahead of the PSB loan proceeds upon release of the second mortgage. Defendants
conformed with this arrangements. Undisputed fact is that, the defendants, in gross and bad faith and
in malicious breach of contract, failed and/or refused to comply with their obligation of securing the
release of the second mortgage. Petitioners (as defendants) filed an answer that the Corp. is aware
off all liens including the mortgage in favor of PISO and the parties agreed that if full payment could
not be effective, within 30 days, they will each have the option to terminate the agreement.
Defendants (herein petitioners) filed a motion to admit the same an amendment impleading PISO
bank as additional party defendant and compel it to accept payment of the existing second mortgage
from private respondent Reginas since allegedly no complete relief can be had unless the second
mortgage in favor of said PISO bank is released. Despite petitioners’ opposition, an order was issued
by the trial court admitting the amended complaint and after denial of their motion for reconsideration
petitioners proceeded to the CA on a petition for certiorari and prohibition. CA ruled that PISO is a
proper party under Section 8 of Rule 3 of the RRC. For the defendants to be able to comply with its
obligation there had to be a determination of the amount really due in PISO.
ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.
HELD: PISO is not an indispensable or necessary party without whom no final determination can be
had of an action for specific performance with damages. PISO is not a party to the 3 contracts which
are subject of an action for specific performance and damages between the private respondents and
petitioners. PISO is a second mortgage, whatever the outcome of the litigation between the
petitioners and the private respondents would be. Its second mortgage lien attaches to the property.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
EMATA v. IAC
FACTS: Petitioner purchases a car on installment from Violago with a down payment of P14, 982.
Petitioner likewise executed in favor of the seller a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the
car as a security for the payment of the note. After the execution of said documents, Violago
endorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Filinvest upon payment by the
latter of the unpaid balance of the list cash price of the car. Three years later, Filinvest, assigned to
private respondent Service wide the remaining balance due on and corresponding to the period from
Feb to Aug. Alleging nonpayment of 5 consecutive installments, private respondent initiated a case in
the trial court for a writ of replevin to effect the seizure of the car, or alternatively, for the payment of
the petitioner of the sum of P1, 332.40 with interest of 14% per annum until fully paid, additionally for
atty’s fees and costs. Herein petitioner in answer alleged that the promissory note does express the
true intent of the and agreement of the parties, the same been procured by fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation, that he was made to sign the note and mortgage in blank, that he is paid or even
overpaid, that the note charged more that the prescribed rates in Usury Law and the note is null and
void. Petitioner filed a “Motion to Impead Filinvest Credit Corp” on the theory that “for all legal
purposes the corporation sought to be impleaded is the real party in interest” because it retained
interest over the balance of the petitioner’s account in spite of its assignment to private respondent.
The trial court rendered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff insisted that
Filinvest the real party in interest and it should be impleaded under Rule 3 of the ROC. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.
HELD: Petitioner cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3 which envisages a party who
should be joined as a plaintiff but who does not assent to such joinder. Obviously and necessarily,
such unwilling party must be a real party in interest. In the case at bar, Filinvest's position and the
evidence thereon was that it was not a real party in interest, as it was no longer entitled to the avails
of the suit by reason of the anterior assignment it made in favor of private respondent. Hence, at the
very least, its capacity was in issue and it would be a case of procedural petitio principii for the trial
court to have categorized it as an unwilling co-plaintiff, with the procedural consequences thereof,
although such operative issue was still unresolved. Furthermore, the option lies with the plaintiff on
whether or not to join an additional party in his complaint. The original plaintiff cannot be compelled,
on the mere representations of the defendant, to implead anyone, especially if it does not appear that
such joinder is proper or is necessary for the complete and expeditious adjudication of the case. Nor
can the general rule in Section 11, Rule 3, on the power to order the addition or dropping of a party at
any stage of action, be of solace to the petitioner. This is a power addressed to the sound discretion
of the court to be exercised on such terms as are just, and by this is meant that it must be just to all
the other parties. 15 Obviously, given the facts of this case, the trial court wisely exercised its
discretion in refusing to give in to the unjustified importunings of petitioner.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
OPOSA v. FACTORAN
FACTS: The plaintiffs in this case are all minors duly represented and joined by their parents. The
first complaint was filed as a taxpayer’s class suit at RTC, National capital Judicial Region against
defendant (respondent) Secretary of the Department of Environment and Natural Resources.
Plaintiffs alleged that they are entitled to the full benefit, use and enjoyment of the natural resource
treasure that is the country’s virgin tropical forests. They further asserted that they represent their
generation as well as generations yet unborn and asserted that continued deforestation have caused
a distortion and disturbance of the ecological balance and have resulted in a host of environmental
tragedies. Plaintiff prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the respondent, his agents,
representatives and other persons acting in his behalf to cancel all existing Timber License
Agreement (TLA) in the country and to cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing,
renewing or approving new TLAs. Defendant on the other hand, filed a motion to dismiss on the
ground that the complaint had no cause of action against him and that raises a political question. The
RTC judge sustained the motion to dismiss, further ruling that granting of the relief prayed for would
result in the impairment of contracts which is prohibited by the Constitution. Plaintiff (petitioner) thus
filed the instant special civil action for certiorari and asked the court to rescind and set aside the
dismissal order on the ground that the respondent RTC Judge gravely abused his discretion in
dismissing the action.
ISSUE: Whether or not the plaintiffs have a cause of action and if the case is one of a class suit.
HELD: Respondents aver that the petitioners failed to allege in their complaint a specific legal right
violated by the respondent Secretary for which any relief is provided by law. The Court did not agree
with this. The complaint focuses on one fundamental legal right- the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology which is incorporated in Section 16 Article II of the Constitution. Petitioners instituted Civil
Case No. 90-777 as a class suit. The original defendant and the present respondent did not take
issue with this matter. Nevertheless, the Court ruled that the said civil case is indeed a class suit. The
subject matter of the complaint is of common and general interest not just to several, but to all
citizens of the Philippines. Consequently, since the parties are so numerous, it becomes
impracticable, if not totally impossible, to bring all of them in the court. Hence, all the requisites for the
filing of a valid class suit under Section 12 Rule 3 of the Revised Rules of Court are present.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
EMATA v. IAC
FACTS: Petitioner purchases a car on installment from Violago with a down payment of P14, 982.
Petitioner likewise executed in favor of the seller a promissory note and a chattel mortgage over the
car as a security for the payment of the note. After the execution of said documents, Violago
endorsed the promissory note and assigned the chattel mortgage to Filinvest upon payment by the
latter of the unpaid balance of the list cash price of the car. Three years later, Filinvest, assigned to
private respondent Service wide the remaining balance due on and corresponding to the period from
Feb to Aug. Alleging nonpayment of 5 consecutive installments, private respondent initiated a case in
the trial court for a writ of replevin to effect the seizure of the car, or alternatively, for the payment of
the petitioner of the sum of P1, 332.40 with interest of 14% per annum until fully paid, additionally for
atty’s fees and costs. Herein petitioner in answer alleged that the promissory note does express the
true intent of the and agreement of the parties, the same been procured by fraud, deceit and
misrepresentation, that he was made to sign the note and mortgage in blank, that he is paid or even
overpaid, that the note charged more that the prescribed rates in Usury Law and the note is null and
void. Petitioner filed a “Motion to Impead Filinvest Credit Corp” on the theory that “for all legal
purposes the corporation sought to be impleaded is the real party in interest” because it retained
interest over the balance of the petitioner’s account in spite of its assignment to private respondent.
The trial court rendered against the defendant and in favor of the plaintiff. Plaintiff insisted that
Filinvest the real party in interest and it should be impleaded under Rule 3 of the ROC. The
Intermediate Appellate Court affirmed in toto the decision of the Trial Court.
ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.
HELD: Petitioner cannot rely on the provisions of Section 10, Rule 3 which envisages a party who
should be joined as a plaintiff but who does not assent to such joinder. Obviously and necessarily,
such unwilling party must be a real party in interest. In the case at bar, Filinvest's position and the
evidence thereon was that it was not a real party in interest, as it was no longer entitled to the avails
of the suit by reason of the anterior assignment it made in favor of private respondent. Hence, at the
very least, its capacity was in issue and it would be a case of procedural petitio principii for the trial
court to have categorized it as an unwilling co-plaintiff, with the procedural consequences thereof,
although such operative issue was still unresolved. Furthermore, the option lies with the plaintiff on
whether or not to join an additional party in his complaint. The original plaintiff cannot be compelled,
on the mere representations of the defendant, to implead anyone, especially if it does not appear that
such joinder is proper or is necessary for the complete and expeditious adjudication of the case. Nor
can the general rule in Section 11, Rule 3, on the power to order the addition or dropping of a party at
any stage of action, be of solace to the petitioner. This is a power addressed to the sound discretion
of the court to be exercised on such terms as are just, and by this is meant that it must be just to all
the other parties. 15 Obviously, given the facts of this case, the trial court wisely exercised its
discretion in refusing to give in to the unjustified importuning of petitioner.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
HEIRS OF MAYOR NEMENCIO GALVEZ v. CA
FACTS: The late Dr. Galvez served as Mayor of Municipality of Balagtas. The deceased private respondent,
Mendoza, during her lifetime, was the registered owner and operator of a cockpit. Private respondent Mendoza filed
a written application for the renewal of the cockpits business license and permit. Having failed to secure a renewal
of the cockpits license and permit outrightly, private respondent, made a written demand asking Mayor Galvez to
issue the necessary license and permit applied for. Still, no favorable action came from the said Mayor Galvez. A
petition was filed with the Philippine Gamefowl Commission (PGC) by private respondent against Mayor Galvez
praying, among others, for the issuance of an interlocutory order so that the cockpit may operate temporarily while
awaiting the approval of its renewal papers. Then the PGC approved. The Sangguniang Bayan of Balagtas passed
and unanimously approved a Resolution which ordered the closure and cessation of operations of private
respondent Mendoza’s cockpit until payment of the proper municipal taxes. A Temporary Restraining Order was
issued by the Regional Trial Court. The Trial Court directed the mayor to issue the license provided the
corresponding feed be paid. A Manifestation with Motion was filed apprising the lower court of the fact that Mayor
Galvez had died and that the terms of office of the local public officials concerned had already expired. The
Provincial Fiscals office requested that it be relieved as counsel for the said public officials considering that the
award of damages by the lower court affected the officials in their personal capacities and that, with respect to
Mayor Galvez, the money judgment maybe enforced only against his estate. The lower court issued an Order
granting the relief with instructions to serve copies of the decision to the deceased mayor through his lawyer-son,
Atty. Enrique Galvez. Atty. Galvez filed a Motion for Recall of Decision reiterating his position that he could not be
compelled to receive the lower court’s decision and praying that the said decision be withdrawn and Civil be
dismissed for failure to effect substitution of parties in accordance with Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court. The
lower court denied Atty. Galvez motion for recall of decision on the ground that the decision was already final and
executory. A notice of levy on execution on the real properties of the then deceased Mayor. A public auction was
held wherein the real property covered was sold to the highest bidder in the person of private respondent Andres D.
Manuel. Private respondent Manuel filed a motion to the defendants to surrender the property. The lower court
issued an Order deferring resolution the lower court issued an Order deferring resolution. The CA ordered the heirs
of the late Mayor to surrender the property within 30 days from the receipt.
ISSUE: Whether a money judgment rendered by a Court in a case for Mandamus and Prohibition is valid or not, the
defendant, a Municipal Mayor, (a) having died during trial and before judgment could be rendered, and (b) after the
defendant mayor and all the other respondents ceased to hold office, without the substitution of parties provided for
in Section 18, Rule 3, of the Rules of Court.
HELD: Considering the attendant circumstances in the case at bench, the failure to make the substitution pursuant
to the aforequoted provision is a procedural defect. This petition arose is in the nature of a petition for mandamus
and prohibition which sought to compel the then mayor, Dr. Nemencio Galvez, to issue the municipal license and
permit to resume operations of the Balagtas Sports Arena at Balagtas, Bulacan, and to enjoin the said mayor and
the Sangguniang Bayan of Balagtas, Bulacan, When the said public officials were replaced by OICs as an aftermath
of the 1986 Edsa Revolution, it was incumbent upon private respondent Mendoza, through her counsel, to file for a
substitution of parties within thirty (30) days after the named successors-in-office of Mayor Galvez and the members
of the Sangguniang Bayan of Balagtas, Bulacan, assumed office. Inasmuch as no such substitution was effected,
the mandamus petition cannot prosper in the absence of a supplemental pleading showing that the successors of
Mayor Galvez and the members of the Sangguniang Bayan of Balagtas, Bulacan, had adopted or had continued or
threatened to adopt or continue the action of their predecessors in enforcing the assailed resolution which ordered
the closure of the subject cockpit arena. In fact, there is reason to believe petitioners claim that the appointed OIC
no longer pursued the closure policy of Mayor Galvez so that the corresponding license and permit to operate the
Balagtas Sports Arena were subsequently granted. Thus, the mandamus petition should have been dismissed for
non-compliance with the substitution procedure pursuant to Rule 3, Section 18 of the Rules of Court. Thus, when no
proper substitution of parties was seasonably effected under Rule 3, Section 18 of the ROC, the court a quo acted
an excess of jurisdiction for having rendered the assailed decision against the petitioners in utter violation of their
constitutional right to due process.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
PHILIPPINE BANKING CORPORATION v. TENSUAN
230 SCRA 413
FACTS: PBC filed a complaint with prayer for preliminary attachment against Brinell Metal Works
Corporation and Spouses Jose and Nally Ang for collection of a loan evidenced by 2 promissory
notes. Court granted PBC’s prayer. On Jan 28, 1992, respondents filed motion to dismiss on the
ground that court has lack of jurisdiction over respondents, and for improper venue ((it is declared in
the promissory note: I/WE HEREBY EXPRESSLY SUBMIT TO THE JURISDICTION OF THE
COURTS OF MANILA, ANY LEGAL ACTION WHICH MAY ARISE OUT OF THIS PROMISSORY
NOTE.). Court granted motion to dismiss. PBC moved for reconsideration; stating that in view of the
absence of qualifying/restrictive word in the agreement which would indicate that Manila alone is the
venue agreed upon by the parties. Court denied motion for reconsideration. As provided in Section
2(b) Rule 4 of the Rules of Court. Petition for review on certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether or not court erred in holding that the venue was improperly laid.
HELD: YES. RTC decisions in dismissing complaint and denying motion for reconsideration are
reversed. Section 1(c) RoC- a motion to dismiss an action may be made within the time for pleading
on the ground that venue is improperly laid. Venue relates to the place of trial or geographical location
in which an action or proceeding should be brought and not to the jurisdiction of the court. General
rule: All personal actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants
resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the
plaintiff. By written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred
from one province to another. In Polytrade Corp v Blanco in the absence of qualifying or restrictive
words which would indicate that the Manila and Manila alone is the venue means that the parties
merely consented to be sued in Manila; it is merely permissive. They did not waive the right to pursue
remedy in the courts specifically mention in Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of RoC. In the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words, they should be considered merely as an agreement on additional
forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place. They are not exclusive but, rather permissive. For,
to restrict venue only to that place stipulated in the agreement is a construction purely based on
technicality which, on the contrary, should be liberally construed.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
GESMUNDO, ET AL. v. JRB REALTY CORPORATION, ET AL.
234 SCRA 413
FACTS: On April 7, 1980, JRB Realty Corporation leased a room in Blanco Suites, Pasay City to
Virgilio Gesmundo and it was stated in the lease contract that: venue for all suits, whether for branch
hereof or damages or any cause between the lessor and lessee and persons claiming under each,
being the courts of appropriate jurisdiction in Pasay City. On March 1993, Gesmundo filed complaint
for damages alleging that they received a letter terminating their lease; none of the other tenants
received such similar letter. And that respondent Blanco, told Gesmundo that since JRB did not pay
him his retainer’s fees, he did not want them in any of his apartment units. Gesmundo sent a letter
asking for reconsideration of the termination of their lease. JRB sent a letter to Gesmundo with their
statement of accounts, and reiterating that their lease had been terminated. They were forced to
vacate the premises and leased another apartment. Petitioners prayed for P33,500 as actual
damages and compensatory damages, P1,000,000 as moral damages and P50,000 as attorney’s
fees and costs. Respondents moved to dismiss the case on the ground that venue was improperly
laid in the RTC of Makati. Court dismissed action on the ground of improper venue; and denied their
motion for reconsideration. Petition for review on certiorari was filed with the SC.
ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati
HELD: NO. It is clear that the parties intended to limit to the "courts of appropriate jurisdiction of
Pasay City" the venue of all suits between the lessor and lessee and those between parties claiming
under them. This means a waiver of their right to institute action in the courts provided for in Rule 4,
sec. 2(b). This is different from Polytrade Corp v Blanco. Rule 4 Sec 3 - Venue by agreement. — By
written agreement of the parties, the venue of an action may be changed or transferred from one
province to another. Gesmundo’s wife and Blanco’s (President of the Realty) inclusion in the case is
not necessary. It is also notes that the stipulation applies not only to the parties to the contract but
also to “any persons claiming under each.” Their ultimate cause of action is anchored on their right
under the lease contract; therefore, they cannot avoid the limitation as to the venue in that contract.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
BPI v. IAC
206 SCRA 408
FACTS: Spouses Arthur and Vivienne Canlas opened a joint current account on April 25, 1977 in the
Quezon City Branch of the Commercial Bank and Trust Company of the Philipines (CBTC) with an
initial deposit of P2,250. Arthur already had an existing and separate personal checking account in
the same branch. The teller mistakenly placed the account number of Arthur’s separate checking
account for the initial deposit of the joint account. The spouses subsequently deposited other
amounts in their joint account. When Vivienne issued 2 checks in 1977, one of the checks was
dishonored for insufficient funds and a charge of P20 was deducted from the account in both
instances. The bank tried to contact the spouses but the spouses actually resided in Porac,
Pampanga. The city address and tel no. they gave the bank belonged to Vivienne’s parents. On
December 15, 1977, the spouses files a complaint against CBTC in CFI Pampanga. CBTC filed
motion to dismiss the complaint for improper venue. Motion was denied. During pendency of the
case, BPI and CBTC merged. BPI took over the prosecution and defense of any pending claims,
actions or proceedings by and against CBTC. On May 5, 1981, RTC Pampanga rendered a decision
against BPI sentencing BPI to pay actual,moral and exemplary damages, attorney’s fees and costs.
On appeal, the IAC deleted the actual damages, and reduced the other awards.
Petitioners filed motion for review with SC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid at Pampanga
(2) Whether petitioner was in gross negligence in the handling of respondents’ bank account
(3) Whether respondents are entitled to moral and exemplary damages and attorney’s fees.
HELD:
(1) YES. There was ample proof that the spouses resided in Porac, Pampanga. The city address
of Mrs Canlas’ parents was placed there as suggested by the teller. No waiver of their
provincial residence for determining the venue of an action against the bank may be inferred
from the “misrepresentation” of their true residence.
(2) YES. The mistake committed by the teller constitutes serious negligence. It cannot absolve
BPI from liability for damages to respondents even on the assumption of honest mistake
because of the embarrassment it can cause to its depositors.
(3) YES. Simex International v CA - as a business affected with public interest and because of the
nature of its functions, the bank is under obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary nature of their relationship. It caused
serious anxiety, embarrassment and humiliation to the private respondents for which they are
entitled to recover reasonable moral damages (American Express International, Inc. vs. IAC,
167 SCRA 209). The award of reasonable attorney's fees is proper for the private respondents
were compelled to litigate to protect their interest (Art. 2208, Civil Code). However, the
absence of malice and bad faith renders the award of exemplary damages improper (Globe
Mackay Cable and Radio Corp. vs. Court of Appeals, 176 SCRA 778).
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
PADERANGA v. BUISSAN
286 SCRA 786
FACTS: Jorge Paderanga and respondent Elumba Industries, represented by its General Manager
Jose Elumba, entered into an oral contract for the use of a commercial space within a building in
Ozamiz City. The leasewas for an indefinite period with payment made monthly. Paderanga
subdivided the leased premises into two separated by a wall and took possession of the other half the
acquisition said to have been agreed upon by the local manager of Elumba. Respondent filed an
action for damages and prayed for the fixing of the period of lease atleast 5 years before CFI Dipolog
City. Petitioner moved for the dismissal alleging that since the action is a real action and should have
been filed with CFI of Misamis Occidental because property is situated in Ozamis City. Respondent
Judge Buissan denied motion to dismiss and held that the complaint was an enforcement of the
contract of lease and that question of ownership was not raised.Petitioner pleaded for
reconsideration; was denied.
ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in CFI Dipolog City
HELD:
Venue was improperly laid. While it may be that the instant complaint does not explicitly pray for
recovery of possession, such is the necessary consequence thereof. The instant action therefore
does not operate to efface the fundamental and prime objective of the nature of the case which is to
recover the one-half portion repossessed by the lessor, herein petitioner. Indeed, where the ultimate
purpose of an action involves title to or seeks recovery of possession, partition or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage on, real property, such an action must be deemed a real action and must
perforce be commenced and tried in the province where the property or any part thereof lies. In a
personal action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of personal property, the enforcement of a contract or
the recovery of damages. In a real action, the plaintiff seeks the recovery of real property, or, as
indicated in section 2(a) of Rule 4, a real action is an action affecting title to real property or for the
recovery of possession, or for partition or condemnation of, or foreclosure of a mortgage on, real
property. An action in personam is an action against a person on the basis of his personal liability,
while an action in rem is an action against the thing itself, instead of against the person. Hence, a real
action may at the same time be an action in personam and not necessarily an action in rem.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
HERNANDEZ v. DBP
71 SCRA 292
FACTS: Jose Hernandez was an employee of DBP in its legal department for 21 years until his
retirement due to illness in 1966. In 1964, in recognition of his unqualified service as Assistant
Attorney in the department, DBP awarded him a lot containing an area of 810 sq.m. with a type E
house in Quezon City. On August 1968, he received a statement of account of the purchase price of
the lot payable monthly for 15 years from DBP’s housing project committee. He sent cashier’s check
to the committee in the name of his wife for the full payment of the house and lot awarded to him. A
week after, the committee returned his check informing him that they had cancelled the award of the
house and lot on the ground that he has retired, he only had an option to purchase the lo, etc. He
protested against the cancellation of the award and demanded from DBP the restoration of his right to
the award. DBP refused. On May 1969, he filed a complaint in CFI Batangas seeking the annulment
of the cancellation of the award of the house and lot in his favor and the restoration of his rights
thereto. Respondent filed motion to dismiss on the ground of improper venue contending that the
house and lot is situated in Quezon City; action should have been commenced where the real
property is located. Court sustained motion to dismiss on ground of improper venue.
Hernandez filed petition to review order of CFI in SC.
ISSUE: Whether action was properly filed in CFI Batangas
HELD: YES. Petitioner’s action is a personal action. His action is to declare null and void the
cancellation of the award; which does not involve title and ownership over said property but seeks to
compel respondent to recognize the award as valid and subsisting which cannot be arbitrarily and
unilaterally cancelled. A real action is one brought for the specific recovery of land, tenements, or
hereditaments. A personal action is one brought for the recovery of personal property, for the
enforcement of some contract or recovery of damages for its breach, or for the recovery of damages
for the commission of an injury to the person or property. Section 2, Rule 4 of the Rules of Court,
"actions affecting title to, or for recovery of possession, or for partition, or condemnation of, or
foreclosure of mortgage in real property, shall be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of
the defendants resides or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the
election of the plaintiff".
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
SWEET LINES INC v. TEVES
G.R. No. L-37750
May 19, 1978
FACTS: Atty. Tandog and Rogelio Tiro, contractor by profession bought tickets for voyage on
December 31, 1971 at the Branch office of Sweet Lines Inc, a shipping company transporting
passengers and cargoes, at Cagayan de Oro City. The two were to board M/S Sweet Hope bound for
Tagbilaran via Port of Cebu. Upon learning that the ship was no proceeding to Bohol since many of
the passengers were bound for Surigao, the two as per advice went to the branch office for relocation
to another ship M/S Sweet Town. Since the vessel was at full capacity, they were forced to agree to
hide at the cargo section to avoid inspection of the officers from the Philippine Coastguard. They sued
Sweet Lines Inc for damages and for breach of contract of carriage before CFI of Misamis Oriental
alleging that they were exposed to the scorching heat of the sun and dust coming from the cargo of
corn grits. And that the tickets they bought at CDO for Tagbilaran City were not honored and they
were made to pay for other tickets. Sweetlines filed a motion to dismiss complaint for improper venue
premised on condition no. 14 printed at the back of the tickets that: It is hereby agreed and
understood that any and all actions arising out of the conditions and provisions of this ticket,
irrespective of where it is issued, shall be filed in the competent courts in the City of Cebu. Motion
was denied by the court. Sweet Lines moved for reconsideration but was denied. Sweetlines filed an
original action for prohibition with preinjunction to restrain respondent judge from proceeding further
with the civil case.
ISSUE: Whether condition 14 is a valid stipulation limiting the venue to Cebu.
HELD: NO. Condition No. 14 printed at the back of the passage tickets should be held as void and
unenforceable. Considering the expense and trouble a passenger residing outside of Cebu City would
incur to prosecute a claim in the City of Cebu, he would most probably decide not to file the action at
all. The condition will thus defeat, instead of enhance, the ends of justice. "Contracts of adhesion,"
the validity and/or enforceability of which will have to be determined by the peculiar circumstances
obtaining in each case and the nature of the conditions or terms sought to be enforced. Condition No.
14 was prepared solely at the will of the petitioner, respondents had no say in its preparation. Neither
did the latter have the opportunity to take the conditions into account prior to the purchase of their
tickets. For, unlike the small print provisions of contracts — the common example of contracts of
adherence — which are entered into by the insured in his awareness of said conditions, since the
insured is afforded the op to and co the same, passengers of inter-island do not have the same
chance, since their alleged adhesion is presumed only from the fact that they purpose chased the
tickets.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
POLYTRADE CORPORATION v. BLANCO
G.R. No. L-27033
October 31, 1969
FACTS: Polytrade Corporation has its place of business in Makati, Rizal. Blanco is a resident of
Bulacan. Polytrade corp filed four causes of action against Blanco for the recovery of the purchase
price of the raw hide delivered by the corporation to Blanco in CFI of Bulacan. Blanco moved to
dismiss on the ground of improper venue; claiming that by contract, the suit may be filed only in the
courts of Manila. Court overruled. Blanco did not file an answer, the court rendered judgment in
default ordering him to pay corresponding prices at interest rate of 1% per month until full amount is
paid, attorney's fees amounting to 25% of amount due, and costs.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was properly laid
(2) Whether interest rate is correct
(3) Whether the attorney's fees is exorbitant and unconscionable
HELD:
(1) YES. Venue was properly laid. The stipulation that "the parties agree to sue and be sued in the
courts of Manila" which can be found in the agreements in the third and fourth causes of
action does not preclude the filing of suits in the residence of the plaintiff or defendant. It
means that they consented to be sued in Manila. Qualifying or restrictive terms indicating That
Manila is the sole venue are absent. They did not waive their right to pursue remedy in the
courts specifically mentioned in Section 2(b) of Rule 4 of the RoC.
(2) YES. It is expressly stated in the trust receipts executed by defendant in favor of plaintiff that
"All obligations from the undersigned under this agreement of trust shall bear the interest rate
of one per centum per month from date due until paid.
(3) NO. The attorney's fees are not unconscionable and exorbitant. They are in the nature of
liquidated damages and the stipulation therefore is called a penal clause. So long as such
stipulation is not against the law, morals, public order, it is strictly binding upon defendant. The
governing law is Art 2227 of the Civil Code which provides that "liquidated damages, whether
intended as indemnity or penalty shall be equitably reduced if they are iniquitous or
unconscionable." Considering the circumstances that plaintiff's lawyers are of high standing,
and that this case should not have gone to court had the defendant been faithful to his
obligations, the attorney's fees awarded cannot be called iniquitous or unconscionable.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY
JOSE BARITUA v. COURT OF APPEALS
G.R. No. 100748
February 3, 1997
FACTS: Roy Domingo’s car was rammed along Maharlika highway by a bus owned by Jose Baritua.
Domingo filed a complaint on June 16, 1989, represented by his attorney-in-fact, Crispin Domingo, in
RTC Pangasinan to recover actual and exemplary damages. Roy Domingo was a resident in
Pangasinan before he went to the United States where he now lives. Baritua moved to dismiss the
complaint for improper venue since Domingo was no longer a resident in Pangasinan because he now
lives in the US. Trial court denied motion to dismiss upon finding that Domingo was only temporarily
out of the country and did not lose his legal residence in Pangasinan. Court of Appeals affirmed the
trial court decision. Baritua filed petition for certiorari and prohibition with the SC.
ISSUES:
(1) Whether venue was improperly laid
(2) Whether Domingo remained as an actual resident of the USA
HELD: YES to both. A complaint for damages is a personal action. In cases filed before the Regional
Trial Court, the venue for personal actions is laid down in Section 2 (b) of Rule 4: Personal actions. —
All other actions may be commenced and tried where the defendant or any of the defendants resides
or may be found, or where the plaintiff or any of the plaintiffs resides, at the election of the plaintiff.
The plaintiff or the defendant must be residents of the place where the action has been instituted at
the time the action is commenced. The residence of a person must be his personal, actual or physical
habitation or his actual residence or abode. Actual residence is the place of abode and not
necessarily legal residence or domicile. Actual residence signifies personal residence, i.e., physical
presence and actual stay thereat. This physical presence, nonetheless, must be more than temporary
and must be with continuity and consistency. In the special power of attorney that Domingo executed,
he declared that he was a resident of Los Angeles, California. He was not a mere transient or
occasional resident of the US. When the complaint for damages was filed in Pangasinan, not one of
the parties was a resident thereof. Domingo, a resident of the USA, Baritua with his business address
in Pasay City, and the attorney in fact with his residence in Quezon City. Venue was improperly laid in
Pangasinan.
S.Y. 2015-2016
PORTIA SORORITY

Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 & 4)

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CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS

Taxpayer’s Suit; Locus Standi

Cases on Indispensable Parties

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing

ISSUE: WON the action for cancellation of title is in personam or in rem?

HELD: It is in personam (petitioner’s contention is granted). An action to redeem, or to recover title to or

ISSUE: Whether the Roman Catholic Church has legal personality.

ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.

ISSUE: WON the respondent corporation should have been impleaded.

ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.

ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.

ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in CFI Dipolog City

ISSUE: Whether action was properly filed in CFI Batangas

ISSUE: Whether condition 14 is a valid stipulation limiting the venue to Cebu.

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Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 &amp; 4)

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Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 &amp; 4)

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

CIVIL PROCEDURE CASE DIGESTS

Taxpayer’s Suit; Locus Standi

Cases on Indispensable Parties

ISSUE: Whether or not the petitioners have legal standing

ISSUE: WON the action for cancellation of title is in personam or in rem?

HELD: It is in personam (petitioner’s contention is granted). An action to redeem, or to recover title to or

ISSUE: Whether the Roman Catholic Church has legal personality.

ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.

ISSUE: WON the respondent corporation should have been impleaded.

ISSUE: WON PISO should be impleaded as additional party defendant.

ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.

ISSUE: WON Filinvest is a real party in interest.

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in the RTC of Makati

ISSUE: Whether venue was properly laid in CFI Dipolog City

ISSUE: Whether action was properly filed in CFI Batangas

ISSUE: Whether condition 14 is a valid stipulation limiting the venue to Cebu.

You might also like

Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 & 4)

Civil Procedure Case Digests (Rules 3 & 4)