Professional Documents
Culture Documents
Founding Editors
Jacob L. Mey Herman Parret Jef Verschueren
University of Southern Belgian National Science Belgian National Science
Denmark Foundation, Universities of Foundation,
Louvain and Antwerp University of Antwerp
Editorial Board
Robyn Carston Sachiko Ide Deborah Schiffrin
University College London Japan Women’s University Georgetown University
Thorstein Fretheim Kuniyoshi Kataoka Paul Osamu Takahara
University of Trondheim Aichi University Kobe City University of
Miriam A. Locher Foreign Studies
John C. Heritage
University of California at Los Universität Basel Sandra A. Thompson
Angeles Sophia S.A. Marmaridou University of California at
University of Athens Santa Barbara
Susan C. Herring
Indiana University Srikant Sarangi Teun A. van Dijk
Cardiff University Universitat Pompeu Fabra,
Masako K. Hiraga
Barcelona
St. Paul’s (Rikkyo) University Marina Sbisà
University of Trieste Yunxia Zhu
The University of Queensland
Volume 196
New Adventures in Language and Interaction
Edited by Jürgen Streeck
New Adventures in Language
and Interaction
Edited by
Jürgen Streeck
The University of Texas at Austin
Jürgen Streeck
The University of Texas at Austin
This book has developed from an idea by Carlo Prevignano and Paul Thibault to
have a diverse group of well-known researchers who are engaged in the empirical
study of language and interaction discuss the start of the art of the field. All of the
contributors are either influenced by or develop their own line of inquiry in criti-
cal dialogue with conversation analysis and/or interactional sociolinguistics, as
conceived by John Gumperz. This book thus complements the prior discussions
with Emanuel Schegloff (Prevignano & Thibault 2003) and John Gumperz
(Eerdmans, Prevignano & Thibault 2003) that these scholars have published. The
resulting volume gives an impression of how diverse the field has become.
While all of the contributors see their work as grounded in what we may now
call the interactionist canon – G.H. Mead, the late Wittgenstein, perhaps Vygostky
and Bakhtin, Bateson, maybe Garfinkel, but above all Goffman (see, for example,
the contributions by Trognon and Batt, Streeck, and Shotter) – they have branched
out from this shared ground in a number of different directions:
– by subjecting these dominant paradigms in language and interaction research
– conversation analysis (CA) and interactional sociolinguistics (IS) – to a crit-
ical review and formulating their own distinct theoretical edifice, vision, or
methodology in contradistinction to them, sometimes by giving these a
name that sets them off from those methodologies, e.g.€ interlocutory logic
(Trognon and Batt) or action-implicative discourse analysis (Tracy and Craig);
Kerbrat-Orecchioni pleads for an eclectic methodology, while Shotter articu-
lates a philosophy of dialogical dynamics as it has emerged from his research
as well as from the interplay of utterances by Vygostky and Wittgenstein that
has unfolded in his work; or
– by taking these methodologies, notably conversation analysis, and integrating
them with separate, differently focused but philosophically compatible meth-
odologies, such as systemic-functional linguistics as proposed by M.A.K.
Halliday (Muntigl and Ventola); or
Jürgen Streeck
Peter Muntigl and Eija Ventona take a very different turn than, for example,
Cowley and Trognon and Batt: instead of reducing or questioning the relevance of
grammar in the achievement of intersubjectivity in interaction, they exemplify its
relevance – the relevance of grammatical choices – for the development of social-
interactional processes and interpersonal life. Their approach, which draws on
Halliday’s systemic-functional linguistics is compatible with recent work by conver-
sation analysts and interactional linguists on positionally sensitive grammar, in-
volving a type of analysis of grammatical structures and devices that pays attention
to the positions within emergent turns, sequences, and activities where these struc-
tures and devices can be deployed. Both systemic-functional linguistics and con-
versation analysis, they point out, “insist on examining speakers’ meaning-making
resources”, specifically the constructional alternatives that are available to them at
a given point in an interaction and which include such choices as that between ac-
tive and passive voice or action-, achievement-, and relational verbs. Aligning with
the “behaviorist” view of the relationship between linguistic resources and socio-
cognitive behavior espoused by Ryle (1949) and Wittgenstein (1953; see Coulter
1989), they show that grammatical resources are not simply resources for making
clauses, but that choosing one type of clause over another means enacting a differ-
ent action, construing an experience in different ways, and offering different types
of relationship.€This conception is developed through the analysis of a brief excerpt
from a couple’s therapy in which the therapist successively alters the grammatical
frame in terms of which the husband’s habits are construed.
Angel Lin’s chapter reconciles the perspective of Gumperz’ interactional socio-
linguistics with the methods and procedures of conversation analysis. She rejects
Gumperz’ criticism that conversation analysis treats social groups and categories as
static and refers to Sacks’ account, in one of his lectures (cf.€Sacks 1992:€288), of how
groups are locally constituted through specific linguistic practices. Lin argues for
the integration of micro- and macro-perspectives and draws on Giddens’ structura-
tion theory for a concept of structuration practices and a framework that recognizes
the constraining influence of social macro-structures and institutions and can guide
an investigation of how these structures and institutions emerge from situated so-
cial action, interaction, and work. Lin is particularly interested in what happens in
the “borderlands” of inter-group and inter-positional interaction in the context of
an increasingly globalized world. Her focus is on the structuring activities that take
place during inter-cultural communication in non-egalitarian encounters. Follow-
ing Davies and Harré (1990), she describes how in such encounters participants
position one another according to conflicting, but consistent storylines and assign
each other parts in these stories. While high-status participants may seek to use
their power to secure the enforcement of their storyline, participants in less power-
ful positions use tactics (de Certeau 1984) to counteract non-egalitarian interactional
New adventures in language and interaction
structures. Lin’s contribution illustrates the need for language and interaction re-
search that focuses on settings and engagements in which horizontal relations of
affiliation and engagement and vertical relations of power and control over linguis-
tic and communicative norms are negotiated and contested.
Karen Tracy and Robert Craig position their approach to the study of lan-
guage and interaction – which they call action-implicative discourse analysis
(AIDA) – in contradistinction to interactional sociolinguists and conversation
analysis. They argue that all approaches always reflect and have to reckon with the
traditions, concerns, and thematic regimes of their respective home disciplines: in
the case of their own approach, communication studies; linguistics and anthropol-
ogy in the case of interactional sociolinguistics; and sociology in the case of CA.
According to Tracy and Craig, CA takes on different flavors and is less firmly
bounded when it is transported into other fields. For communication scholars,
Tracy and Craig suggest, the practical dimension of research has always been a
main concern, reaching back to the beginnings of the rhetorical tradition in an-
cient Greece and Rome. Communication studies and, a fortiori, action-implicative
discourse analysis, are fundamentally interested in cultivating communication, that
is, in providing, on the basis of research on actual cases, guidance for improved
practice. The authors illustrate this perspective with an analysis of a school-board
meeting. Approaching the setting with an ethnographically grounded version of
discourse analysis (cf.€Schiffrin 1994), they aim to reconstruct the “situated ideals”
of different categories of participants, in order to explicate their normative stand-
ards, which can then guide the cultivation of communicative practice.
Srikant Sarangi is similarly motivated by the task of professional communica-
tion analysts to guide professionals, for example in health-care, in reflections of
their own communicative practice. Health-care professionals, he argues, are likely
“to apply such insights about interaction selectively, in the same way they deal with
theories and models of scientific and technical knowledge”. In contrast to other
contributions, Sarangi does not begin with a generic, bottom-up analysis of inter-
action sequences and their various embeddings within specific macro-contexts
and fields of social practice. Rather, he comes to his research with an understand-
ing of current policy-induced changes in the professional roles of health-care pro-
viders and the impact that these changes have on their interactional statuses and
roles as knowledge providers. To give an example, software-based expert systems
play an increasing role in health-care, but while they potentially lower the status of
physicians as human experts, they are also apt to empower nurses, which are ena-
bled to perform minor surgery and dispense advice independently of physicians.
Drawing upon Levinson’s study of “activity types and language” (Levinson
1979/1992), Sarangi conducts activity analysis, complemented by theme-oriented
discourse-analysis, and illustrates his approach here with analytic observations of
Jürgen Streeck
while reckoning with the historical constitution of the resources, contexts, and
practices that we study.
Frederick Erickson addresses the issue, first forcefully raised by Ochs (1979),
that transcription methods incorporate theories of the (linguistic, interactional)
realities that are meant to be represented by them, and he criticizes the conversa-
tion-analytic system devised by Gail Jefferson, which arranges turns at talk as in a
playscript, for its inherent neglect of the hearer and its logocentrism. Interaction,
Erickson points out, predates language. The transcripts that inform our research
and theorizing should accordingly show the embeddedness of talk in interaction,
which includes not only sequential phenomena (i.e. phenomena ordered by suc-
cession), but also the phenomena of mutuality that are embodied in participants’
concurrent spatial orientations to one another. Visible behaviors of co-participants
may shape both what they say and how they say it while they are saying it. These,
too, are absent from Jeffersonian transcripts (although they are recorded in detail
in such variations as the system of gaze notation developed by Goodwin 1981).
Erickson proposes and illustrates a transcription system that is derived from musi-
cal scores. It organizes the vocal and visible behaviors of all participants relative to
a common time-line and displays units of time in analogy to measure in music
notation. Importantly, musical notation can also record, as Erickson demonstrates
in an analysis of a “collective complaint sequence” during a family mealtime con-
versation, the timing of instrumental acts such as those of food distribution. It
thus allows the display and analysis of the temporal articulation of different strata
of activities and interactions. Erickson concludes that “the time is ripe for a re-
newed effort toward the study of space, time, and visual phenomena in social in-
teraction. The prospect seems promising for nonverbal and temporal aspects to
receive more attention in relation to speech than in the recent past.”
John Shotter’s final, visionary chapter, Dialogical dynamics: Inside the moment
of speaking, replaces, as Cowley’s does, the Cartesian view of understanding as a
congruence of representations with a view of intersubjectivity grounded in bodily
resonance. “All communication begins in, and continues with, our living, sponta-
neous, expressive-responsive (gestural), bodily activities that occur in the meetings
between ourselves and the others and othernesses around us.” Our intellectual
lives, Shotter writes, are based in “’inner’, dialogically-structured movements, in a
dialogical dynamics giving rise to unfolding movements which shift this way and
that in a distinctive fashion, movements whose ‘shape’ can be ‘felt’ or ‘sensed’ but
not pictured, or known at all in a propositional form”. Thought is not separate from
feeling; it orchestrates heterogeneous influences and provides us with senses of how
to go on in a situation. Shotter, who avows to be influenced by “specific utterances
or expressions” in the writings of Wittgenstein, Vygotsky, Bakhtin, Garfinkel, and
Merleau-Ponty, envisions a therapeutic form of analysis that will allow us to
Jürgen Streeck
improve our practices from within our practices. Words and ways of talking are
psychological tools that enable us “to relate ourselves to our circumstances in a dif-
ferent way”. Therapy can engage us in Bakhtinian modes of thinking in the voices of
others and teach us new ways across the totality of our shared language games.
All of the contributors address themselves, implicitly or explicitly, to some of
the questions that Prevignano and Thibault initially posed to them and that related
to the authors’ conceptions of interaction and interaction analysis, the relative use-
fulness of analytic procedures, the categories of analysis, and the obstacles and
future that the analysis of interaction and language currently faces. The answer is
a multivocal Baktinian polylogue in which the authors act like ventriloquists and
the voices of the founders of our fields resonate in concert with the submerged
voices of Prevignano and Thibault. Cries of excitement continue to be heard on
our adventurous journeys into the microcosm of human encounters.
References
After exhibiting the historical and epistemic context of the discovery of the
interaction order, the authors develop a global theory of the cognitive-affective-
social organization of talk-in-interaction: «Interlocutory Logic». On the basis
of insights provided by the pragmatics of natural languages and the theory and
methods of contemporary logic, this theory deals with elementary illocutionary
acts and higher-order units (turns, exchanges) of conversation with the help of
methods of natural deduction and dialogical logic. The authors present a model
constructed within the empirical domain of functional dialogues during «hand-
overs» between work-shifts in a factory to demonstrate the descriptive and
explicative values of «Interlocutory Logic».
Introduction
What are the main success and failures of studying interaction in this last do-
main? And what tasks are needed? Answering these two questions in a first para-
graph where we will see that «accounting for interaction, and especially for verbal
interaction (...) still constitutes an essential challenge for cognitive psychology
(Caron 1997:€234)» (Trognon et al. 2008:€624) will bring us to propose a unified
framework, namely Interlocutory Logic. We shall present this theory in a second
paragraph: its goals, its formal organization, and a model which will illustrate its
semantics. The corresponding domain, a real one, of this model will be a func-
tional dialogue during a shift changeover situation.
In the human and social sciences, the first substantial work on interaction as a
concept began in the 1930’s, with Bakhtin (1929) in linguistics, and Mead (1934),
Vygotski (1934), and even «young» Piaget (1928, 1932) in psychology. At that time,
the theses set forth by these authors were purely speculative. But they proved ex-
tremely prolific forty years later in the 1970’s, when «this subject became a more or
less autonomous field of research [research that] has now reached maturity» (Ker-
brat-Orecchioni 1997:€1). This is when a full-fledged scientific program began to
emerge, one which, according to a synthesis of the field proposed by Kerbrat-Orec-
chioni (1989, 1990, 1997, 1998), could be called the «interactionist paradigm».
It should be noted that technological innovations had reached a level that per-
mitted the empirical study of interaction. Indeed, at the same time as this field of
research was developing, was offering increasingly sophisticated techniques for
recording sound and images (tape recorders and video cameras) and reproducing
observed events (digitization, and more generally artificial intelligence). With in-
teraction having become a fully accessible entity for observation and modelling on
the computer (Geniffey and Trognon 1986), research had a new scientific object at
its disposal. In fact, conversational analysis was to grow out of this very setting, as
Sacks noted in his famous Lectures (Sacks 1984:€26).
In the thirty years that followed, the research proliferated at the intersection
between sociology, psychology, linguistics, the philosophy of language, and artifi-
cial intelligence, each of these disciplines founding in interactional analysis mate-
rial to fuel its research and renewing its issues.
Interlocutory logic
All data, whatever their nature, whatever channel they tap, for they are multimo-
dal (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1990), exhibit this first characteristic. An interpretation,
for example, is no more ineffable than a behaviour and can be grasped in the same
way. Both Gumperz (1982, 2002) and Garfinkel (1967, 1996), each in his own
way, offered us definitive proof of this, and in doing so, provided the groundwork
for the emergence of an original method of investigation and knowledge acquisi-
tion in the human and social sciences. This method (Levinson 1983; Heritage
1990) espouses the processes and devices by means of which people give inter-
subjective meaning to the everyday activities they accomplish in the here and
now, devices and processes which support the ever-changing, immanent, contex-
tual anchoring of social relations (Trognon 1994). The method thus helps us dis-
cover the repertoires which – along with different types of indexicals (Levinson
2002; Thibaut 2002) like the contextualization cues discovered by Gumperz (1982,
2002) – «index» interpersonal relationships in social relations. With such meth-
ods, the human and social sciences are in a position to go beyond the traditional
survey-based dichotomy between externality (e.g., sociology surveys) and im-
mersion (e.g., ethnology surveys conducted in the field, participation surveys).
The second feature, which follows from the first, involves the mixing of theo-
retical and epistemological references – interaction studies are multidisciplinary
(Boutet 1989; Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1989; Thibaut 2002) – and this is where re-
searchers who venture into this area run the risk of stigmatization in their com-
munity of origin. Investigators like Garfinkel, the first to call himself an eth-
nomethodologist before ethnomethodology was instituted, have been subjected to
numerous attacks and insults.
The third orientation, which in some sense overarches the other two, is the
desire to edify a natural science rather than a formal discipline (Goffman 1981;
especially Sacks 1984) and thus to adopt an empirical rather than hypothetico-
deductive approach (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1989).
fact, it is the relationship that explains reciprocal expectations and not vice versa:
permissible perturbations are ones that cannot be exceeded without breaking the
relational couple or destroying the self-organized system it engendered. (Jacques
1988:€52–53, our translation).
Downward, the interaction order is the womb of the self and of the mind (Stern
2004; Trevarthen 1993, 2001, 2004).
backbone of this structure is sequentiality, and this is why it has been placed at
the crux of conversational analysis: «CA is concerned with the study of the se-
quential organization of interaction and of the reasoning that is inherently em-
bedded within it» (Heritage 1990:€27). For example, as Schegloff (1991) wrote,
conversational sequentiality [t1,€ t2,...,€ ti,€ tj,...,€ tn] quasi-automatically creates a
special type of repair mechanism, which he called third position repair.
Third position repair may be thought of as the last systematically provided oppor-
tunity to catch (among other problems) divergent understandings that embody
breakdowns of intersubjectivity, that is, trouble in socially shared cognition of the
talk and conduct in the interaction (Schegloff 1991:€158).
Schegloff does not give a detailed analysis of the third position repair mechanism.
For our part, we have proposed an interlocutory analysis of it (Trognon and Brassac
1993; Trognon and Saint Dizier 1999; Trognon 2002), founded on Interlocutory
Logic (cf.€ supra), which shows quite clearly how the interlocution produces the
shared world or intersubjectivity evoked by Schegloff. The resulting model, named
“The Conversational Mechanism of Mutual Understanding” (CM2U), bridges the
gap between the speaker meaning and the meaning intersubjectively taken to be
the speaker meaning (Clark 1996; Trognon 2002).
So, as Schegloff (1991) wrote it, repairs, especially third position repairs, sup-
port the intersubjectivity of the participants in the interaction, i.e., «the mainte-
nance of a world (including the developing course of the interaction itself) mutu-
ally understood by the participants as some same world» (Schegloff 1991:€ 151).
The «discovery» of third position repair thus brings empirical content to the pro-
cedural solution that Garfinkel, by inventing ethnomethodology, suggested for
academic sociology’s unsolvable problem, that of the acquisition, confirmation,
and revision of «common» sense (Bernicot et al. 1997; Trognon 2002)€ in such a
way that even if interaction were not the source of intersubjectivity, the latter being
somehow innate (as believed by Trevarthen (1993, 2001, 2004; for example) or
even embodied (as the discovery of mirror neurons would lead one to believe;
cf.€di Pellegrino et al. 1992), it would still constitute a medium, a receptacle, a con-
tainer necessary for the psychological survival of the human individual.
In short:
The kinds of language components from which it is fashioned – sounds, words,
and sentences – have the character they do and are formed the way they are in part
because they are designed to inhabit an environment in which the apparatus of
repair is available and in which, accordingly, flexible arrangements can be permit-
ted (Schegloff 1991:€155).
But after the interactionist breakaway had extended the pragmatic reorientation
(Bernicot et al. 2002), it became clear that:
Knowledge and understanding (in both the cognitive and linguistic senses) do not
result from formal operations on mental representations of an objectively exist-
ing world [but] arise from the individual’s committed participation in mutually
oriented patterns of behaviour that are embedded in a socially shared background
of concerns, actions, and beliefs (Winograd et al. 1989:€78).
«The cognitive subject is not a monad: he interacts in an ongoing way with his
environment, and in particular, with other subjects» (Caron 1997:€233, our trans-
lation). «What this interaction brings into play, above all, is language» (ibidem).
So, «accounting for this interaction, and notably verbal interaction, which is un-
doubtedly its most elaborate form, poses an essential challenge to the cognitive
psychology [...] upon which it must be based»(ibidem). But psychology could ben-
efit a great deal from the study of interaction and talk-in-interaction as “structured
environments of action and cognition”, as it may lead to less speculative, more
parsimonious and descriptively more adequate modes of cognition (Good 1990).
If psychology is starting to acknowledge, especially in developmental psychology,
that cognitions (or at least their expressions) are overdetermined by «the logic» of the
interaction order. For example, «the young child’s non-conserving responses could
reflect, not so much the inability to understand the effects of the transformation (i.e.,
failure to grasp conservation) than the inability to understand the experimenter’s in-
tentions. The confusion is not so much conservational as it is conversational» (Light
et al. 1989:€103; our translation; see also Siegal 1991). If, more generally, we are willing
to agree in establishing cognitive psychology that «a reasoning experiment is more
like a conversational exchange where the subject, the listener, infers certain conclu-
sions from what the experimenter, the speaker, says» (Van der Henst 2002:€291, our
translation; the italics are the author’s) and that «taking the conversational context
into account allows us to distinguish that which pertains to reasoning per se from that
which pertains to an interpretation» (ibid, 301; our translation), it is still too often
proposed in the petitio principii mode. Indeed, studying the production of cognitions
during «talk-in-interaction» on the one hand, and studying its appropriation by in-
teractants in situ on the other – even if they could end up providing empirical answers
Interlocutory logic
to the questions raised nearly a century ago by Mead (1934), Vygotski (1934) and
even Piaget (1928) are no longer a top priority in cognitive psychology.
It seems to us that the absence of a conceptual framework capable of describ-
ing the occurrence and the outcome of cognitions during talk-in-interaction does
not facilitate an aggiornimento in psychology. Interlocutory logic was designed to
provide some elements of such a framework.
Any theory that attempts to satisfy the requirements mentioned above must have
at least two properties. Firstly, it must be able to formally describe interlocutory
events. Secondly and more generally, it must be able to build a «grammar» of the
types of dialogue in which we engage and their felicity conditions. The phenome-
nal properties that must be rendered are:
– Illocutionarity: an interlocution is made up of acts of discourse.
– Successiveness: an interlocution is a concatenation.
– Dialogicity: the contributions to an interlocution come from several sources.
– Recursiveness: the hierarchical elements are organized into different text levels.
These empirical properties determine the organized set of logical methods that
enable one to apply a calculus to interlocutory events, and thus to treat interlocu-
tion as a rationally accessible phenomenon.
The first principle (illocutionarity) defines the alphabet of interlocutory logic.
It encompasses the acts of discourse and the «relaters» of natural language, which
include not only connectives, but also marks used to structure the conversation,
interjections, adverbs, etc. The other principles define the empirical forms that
articulate these components: for example, the principle that they succeed each
other linearly and hierarchically.
The logic methods chosen are not necessarily independent of each other. For
example, if interlocutory logic adopts natural deduction as one of its logic meth-
ods, it is because natural deduction enables one to operationalize the principle of
successiveness. But recourse to dialogical logics à la Barth and Krabbe enables one
to operationalize the principle of successiveness and the principle of dialogicity at
the same time, since this type of logic shows how to go from one to the other. Now
if interlocutory logicians are so enthusiastic about Hintikka’s theories, it is
because referring to these theories allows one to simultaneously operationalize the
Alain Trognon and Martine Batt
Table 1.╇
Two aims can be assigned to interlocutory logic. One is quite modest: describe the
sociocognitive organization of interlocutions by devising a system of formal pro-
cedures that adheres as closely as possible to the «phenomenology» of interlocu-
tion. Many studies published since 1995 illustrate this first approach (Trognon
1999; Trognon and Kostuski 1999). The other aim is much more ambitious: it con-
sists in using the above system to make hypotheses about the subjective processes
that take place at the cognitive level and lead logically to the products of a conver-
sation as they are expressed formally at the end of the descriptive phase of the
analysis. Accordingly, interlocutory logic proposes an analysis of the cognitive
production of a conversation, i.e., the study of the conversational emergence of
both declarative and procedural knowledge. Some examples of situations where
the emergence of knowledge has already been analyzed in this framework include
learning to move the cursor in a word-processing tutorial (Trognon and Saint-
Dizier 1999), learning to handle a pneumatic drill in an apprenticeship setting
(Sannino et al. 2003), volume conservation tasks (Marro et al. 1999), school
Interlocutory logic
learning of division (Trognon, Saint-Dizier et al. 1999; Trognon 2007) and propor-
tionality (Schwarz et al. 2008; Trognon, Batt et al. 2006), hypothetico-deductive
reasoning applied to an empirical problem (Trognon and Batt 2003, 2005) and a
logical problem (Batt et al. 2009; Laux et al. 2008; Trognon and Batt 2004; Trog-
non, Batt et al. 2007), and making diagnoses (Brixhe et al. 2000). Interlocutory
logic has also been used to formalize the co-resolution of the Tower of Hanoi
problem by children (Trognon et al. 2008).
Past studies have already shown, then, that interlocutory logic, as a theoretical
and technical system that abides by and reconstructs the phenomenal properties
of interlocution, is a useful method of analysis for describing interlocutory events
and uncovering their underlying processes, notably by way of a computational
analysis that is as natural as possible (Trognon 1999, 2003; Trognon et al. 2008).
The system of coordinate logics that constitutes interlocutory logic is suited to
natural language. It is true that they form a limited class of logics because of the
constraints they must satisfy, but they are nevertheless of general relevance to any
discourse expressed in natural language. More fundamentally, because of the in-
tertraductibility of model-theoretical, dialectical and derivational methods of
modern logic (see for example Barth et al. 1982:€306, Theorem 29), proved along
1980’s years, interlocutory logic is able to find out strategies by which intersubjec-
tivity passes into intrasubjectivity and vice versa. According to a psycholinguistics
point of view, by virtue of Theorem 29, what an individual can cognate, a dyad
(and moreover a small group) can cognate it, and often better (Trognon, Batt et al.
2007; Laughlin et al. 2006). Reciprocally, what a dyad (and moreover a small
group) can cognate, an individual can cognate it. It is why a talk-in-interaction
context generally favours acquisition. Moreover interlocutory logic might explain
why individuals take off cognitive benefits from talk in interaction, as we have
showed it in Laux et al. (2008) and Trognon, Batt et al. (2007) for individuals who
resolved the Wason’s task, in Trognon et al. (2008) for children who resolved the
Tour of Hanoï’s problem, and in Schwarz et al. (2008) and Trognon, Batt et al.
(2006) for the acquisition of proportionality.
Type Token
F(p) C
1 2 3 4 5 6
The rows in the table are filled in gradually as the elementary components of the
participants’ contributions to the dialogue are made. The middle column of the
table (column 3) is filled in first with the component’s position in the sequence.
This step is essential since it breaks the sequence down into its final elements,
which it ranks by order of occurrence. It is also a preliminary task, in that sequen-
tiality is what lays the empirical grounds for all interlocutory events, as conversa-
tional analysis specialists have so clearly demonstrated (Trognon 2002). The or-
dered elements are then assigned their illocutionary interpretations in columns 4
and 5 (type, for example, if it is an assertion; token, for example, if that assertion
defends a point of view), and their cognitive interpretations in column 6, which is
itself split into as many columns as there are participants in the conversation. The
illocutionary interpretations correspond to the forces of the speech acts accom-
plished during a given contribution. We are indeed referring to speech act theory
here, for no matter what has been said about speech acts, no one has yet been able
to replace them as the minimal units of linguistic communication which best ac-
count for the fact that communication via language is fundamentally a sociocogni-
tive event. The illocutionary force is the pragmatic function accomplished when an
utterance is produced; it corresponds to what uttering the speech act amounts to
doing during a conversation. Five major types of actions can be accomplished by
uttering a speech act: assertive, commissive, directive, declarative, and expressive.
The actions are qualified by a number of properties: the goal (and its direction of
adjustment), powerfulness, mode of accomplishment, propositional content con-
ditions, preparatory conditions, and sincerity conditions. The cognitive interpreta-
tions of the tokens located in the middle column are the propositional contents of
the speech acts accomplished by the interacting partners as the conversation un-
folds. Propositional content is the representation with respect to which an illocu-
tionary force is applied in the world. Corresponding to the cognitive-representa-
tional function of a speech act, it is a proposition that represents the state of affairs
targeted by the utterance, with the force being a sort of operator of that state of af-
fairs. Here again, the illocutionary and cognitive interpretations are assigned in
order of occurrence, but – and this is a very important point – via a process that is
Interlocutory logic
In Interlocutory Logic, this process is described with the CM2U model. It consists of
at least two speakers (S1 and S2), the first and second speakers, respectively) and three
speech turns (T1, T2, and T3) successively distributed in the following manner:
T1: S1
T2: S2
T3: S1
The mechanism is composed of the two relationships organized in the diagram below.
(T1, T2) forms an interpretation relationship.€Its second element enacts S2’s
interpretation of the action performed by S1 in T1. S2 thus makes this interpreta-
tion mutually obvious (Sperber and Wilson, 1986). Explaining why (T1, T2) con-
stitutes an interpretation relationship is equivalent to explaining why T2 «inher-
ently embodies and displays its producer’s interpretation of the prior actions in the
sequence». T2 can be defined in this manner because T2 is an action that creates a
state of affairs available to each interactant, and because that state of affairs appears
«after» T1 and thus, according to the rules of communication (cooperation or rel-
evance) in response to T1. In general semantics, T2 can be defined as an action
reformulation
T1 T2 T3
interpretation
evaluation
Figure 1.╇
Alain Trognon and Martine Batt
Levels a b
a1 1
b1 2 BaBb(i)
a2 3 BbBaBb(i)
b2 4 BaBbBaBb(i)
... ... ...
Interlocutory logic
given in the dialogue and, on the other hand, of events which are deduced from
these premises. The rules intervening in this inference are rules of a dialogue game.
For example, the dialogue sequent {1A}ˇ 2B rests on a rule belonging to the game
theory of the question-response dialogue. This example shows that interlocutory
logic seems to generalize the sequent notion to all the illocutory acts used in an
interlocution.
The dialogue recorded here took place during a shift changeover in a production
shop of a paper company (Grusenmeyer et al. 1995, 1996; Trognon et al. 1997).
Shift changeovers result in specific kinds of talk-exchanges. What is peculiar to
them is that the common activity is time shared; the operators contribute succes-
sively in carrying out the collective intentionality. Therefore, as the succession of
operators is governed by an abstract rule, it is very difficult for each operator to es-
timate in real time his own contribution to the collective intentionality. The opera-
tor leaving the work station (outgoing operator) cannot directly evaluate all the ef-
fects of his actions, since it is the operator taking over (incoming operator) who is
affected by them. If the outgoing and incoming operators alternate (the second suc-
ceeds the first, the first the second, and so on, as in the present dialogue), the outgo-
ing one can only receive feedback regarding this evaluation during his next shift,
when he asks his predecessor and/or the latter inform him. The information «trans-
mitted» by the outgoing operator is therefore useful to his incoming colleague. On
the one hand, it allows the latter to construct a global representation of the process.
He is then likely to receive feedback on his own prior actions, thereby enabling him
to evaluate the effectiveness of these actions. On the other hand, he can get to know
the reasons for the action he has to undertake. This information is «transmitted»
during shift changeover when the outgoing operator meets the incoming one. Use-
ful in «normal running», this information becomes necessary and even crucial in
problematic or unusual situations, such as a malfunction or an incident.
The operator who was leaving work (the outgoing worker) will be called A, and
the operator who was taking over for A at that same workstation (the incoming
worker) will be called B. These two workers operate a machine that produces sheets
of paper. A sheet of paper arrives on the partially damp machine. It is trimmed on
both sides by two edgers located at the front and back of the damp part of the ma-
chine. The edgers produce two very fine sprays of water that mark off the edges of
the sheet (hereafter called «pistols»). It sometimes happens that projected paper
pulp accumulates in the edgers and causes tearing. The problem under debate here
is how to assess (and explain) the present working of the machine.
Interlocutory logic
2.4.1.1.2 Objection!
The reaction, B1, seems to raise an objection. B points out that one of the pistols, the
back one, «still lifts the sheet a little». B thus implies (Grice 1979; Sperber et al.
op.€cit.) or implicitly signifies that the pistols still are not working correctly, and thus
that what A asserted is false, since one of the necessary conditions of this state
(working well) is still not met in the utterance context of A1 and B1, at time tn.
Clearly, if a pistol lifts, it can cause paper pulp to accumulate, and that can cause a
malfunction. This knowledge is shared by A and B. In B1, B assumes (sarcastically?),
«if you noticed», that A also realized that the back pistol was still lifting. So B seems
to be contradicting A. This contradiction is put up for discussion in the subsequent
conversation. Using the same formalization (presented above), let Lpb be the prop-
ositional content expressed explicitly by B in B1 and, in the same manner, let Lpb€⊃
¬Wpb symbolize the propositional content implicated in B1. A can only think that,
for B, at least one pistol still is not working right at time tn, and from there, deduce
that for B, it is false to say, for all pistols, that «the pistols seem to be working well»
at time tn. B1 thus conveys the following propositions, translated into the language
of first-order predicate calculus: (Lpb ⊃ ¬Wpb) ⊃ (∀p)¬Wp. Italics denote what is
implicated or implied. At this point in the conversation, we do not know how A will
interpret B1. Let us examine the possible inferences for A. Note, however, that the
expression «the pistols aren’t working well», which will be understood as a contra-
diction of A1, will be taken to communicate information shared by all speakers and
readers of this dialogical sequence: «¬(Wpf€∧€Wpb) or the equivalent expression
(¬Wpf€∨€¬Wpb)». On a linear representation of time, this gives Figure 2.
By saying «the back one still lifts the sheet a little», B gives the value true (1) at
instant tn of the utterance to the proposition «the back pistol lifts» (Lpb); by utter-
ing the adverb «still», he seems to also indicate the truth of this proposition at
some instant set in the past. Without any other precise indication about what mo-
ment in the past B is referring to, the proposition «the back pistol lifts» takes on the
value true (1) at all times prior to utterance time tn. Let us draw up the truth table
of this proposition (Lpb) using a Prior matrix (following Gardies, 1975). Let us
also put in the value false (0) that B claims to assign to the proposition «the pistols
are working well» (Wp) at times tn and t’.
t’ tn
φ’ ¬φ
Wpb Wpb
¬Wp ¬Wp
¬Wpf ∨ ¬ Wpb ¬Wpf ∨ ¬ Wpb
Figure 2.╇
Lpb 1 1
Wp 0 0
Lpb 1
Wp 1
This diagram shows that A1 generates an exchange where the interlocutors re-
spond explicitly as well as implicitly. B1 consists of the implicit negation of A1. The
explicit constituent of B1, the back pistol lifts (Lpb), is an utterance that gets vali-
dated by the dialogue in A2a. By contrast, its implicit constituent is already being
debated in A2b. For A, B1 implies an assertion that does not have a truth condition
in utterance context tn. For A, the implication relation suggested in B1 is false, i.e.,
for A, ¬(Lpb€⊃€¬Wp) is true. For A, the back pistol lifts, granted, but the pistols are
not working improperly when B1 is uttered: Lpb is true, and, a minima, ¬Wpb is
false (¬¬Wpb).
B A
Wp A1
A communicates an assertion to B: initial thesis
Lpb B1
B hears A’s assertion, B makes an assertion
himself, and tacitly defies A about Wp; he seems
to not accept Wp (doubt, disbelief, disagree-
ment?). B1 is thus considered to be the source of
the debate. B thereby becomes A’s opponent. B’s
opposition of A1 has to do with the consequent of
an implicated implication relation, which is
written: Lpb ⊃ ¬Wp. So, Lpb⊃ ¬Wp expresses an
attack of A1 via B1: B1 = aA1
( ?)Wpb
A’s response is a direct (structural) defense:
apparently, for the purposes of this debate, A was
inclined to accept Lpb, but was also ready to
defend Wp. A’s response is a challenging
declarative sentence (Barth and Krabbe, op. cit.):
A2 = dA1
Wp A2
B doesn’t question A’s moderate acceptance of Lpb ∧ Wp A2
Lpb ¬(Lpb ⊃ ¬Wp) A2
¬Wpb B2
B doesn’t withdraw his tacit challenge but rather
accepts its criticism. For B, at the very least, it is
Wpb that is not true, which is what B says he be-
lieves:
B2 = caA2
¬Wpb? A3a
A’s counter-attack of the argument ¬Wpb: A3a =
caB2. By means of this question, A invites B to re-
spond to a sentence of the form: “How do you de-
fend ¬Wpb?”. The interrogative sentence uttered
by A functions as a counter-attack of B2.
Wpd A3b
For B, a verbal attack of the sentence Wp is no A does not withdraw his assertion; he seems to in-
longer possible because B used up the only ar- tend to unconditionally defend Wpb. The conflict
gument he had: Lpb. A’s strategy is a structural is over: A won the debate initiated by the criticism
counter-attack of B1. B is unable to falsify the (B1). He used dialogical rules that are authorized
conditional relation Lpb ⊃ Wpb. B1 thus consti- and strategically recommended for winning, i.e.,
tutes what Barth and Krabbe call an attack or systematically defend Wp against B’s criticism.
critical remark of the first kind. If he wishes to A3b = dA1
pursue the discussion, B can do so, but he has
lost this particular declared conflict of opinion.
Interlocutory logic
Table 5.╇ Joint reasoning process to explain the solution to the pulp-projection
problem (first part)
B A
(note the use of the past perfect tense in B3a), there is projected pulp.€This line of
reasoning, as B tells it to his interlocutor, can be described as:
B2: I had some
B3a: And I had decreased it a little,
B3b: because I felt it was moving the sheet away a little and
B3c: that made it uh... squirt out
In B’s discourse, then, we find, firstly, the temporal modalities that define (i) the
time period of his work shift, period i (A’s period being period j), (ii) the utterance
time, tn, and (iii) the times that preceded it, t’’ and t’. Secondly, we find the tempo-
ral modalities that reconstruct the order of the search for a solution to the problem
(diagnosis, hypothesis, action) expressed via different verb conjugations. To these
temporal modalities, one can add a modality assigned to the predicate «lift». In-
deed, B says he decreased the opening of the back pistol «a little». B’s action, which
involved preventing the back pistol from lifting, was thus incomplete. So when he
claims that the back pistol still lifts, A can understand that the back pistol still lifts
a little even after the lifting has been decreased a little. To account for this modality,
we thus assign the value 0.5 to the proposition Lpb. At utterance time tn, B seems
to interpret the modality «a little» in such a way that he attributes the semantic
value true to the predicate «lift» (i.e., the back pistol lifts) and in the universe situ-
ated in the past, at time t’, the value false (by decreasing it a little more, the pistol
doesn’t lift). Put into a Prior matrix, B’s discourse is represented on Figure 6.
the cause of the malfunction is the set€«front pistol and back pistol», irrespective of
the fact that the back pistol lifts. He does not seem to be «aware» of this proposi-
tion, and it is the conversation that will make him understand the logical deduction
that follows from what he does. The hypothesis that the front pistol is responsible
for the problem should arise in his thoughts, but it is A who formulates it in A4-
A5: «(...) I reopened it, it’s the front one (...)» and if there is accumulated pulp, then
it is the responsible one. At time t, which came before tn and after t’, A changed the
settings of the front pistol (Lpf) and for him, there is no pulp.€This can be formal-
ized using the anteriority predicate «U»: Ut’¬Lpf tLpf tnWp, which gives Figure 7.
B can only agree with A, and in B5, he will finally be held accountable for the
proposition to which he committed. It all appears as if he were becoming aware of
his knowledge. The two men agree: «because they’re set right». This give Figure 8.
Being prompted by a collective or joint intentionality, namely the desire to
make the paper machine function properly, the workers are satisfied. It is A who
expresses this in A6: «It’s just as good, huh?»
t'' t' t tn
¬Wp Wp Wp
Lpb Lpb
¬Lpf Lpf Lpf
Figure 7.╇
discourse that threatens to make B lose face (Goffmann 1959), it is A who, through
his silence, neutralizes this potential threat. After B3, A could point out to B that
his utterance consisted quite simply in reinforcing the opposite thesis to the one he
was claiming to defend: through his argumentation, B in fact «fuels» A’s point of
view. A does not so this; he does not cross over into that territory, but sets forth an
intermediate thesis that finally convinces B. This move by A constitutes a sociocog-
nitive process, insofar as it is both formally «correct» and socially protective of the
interlocutor.
pistols are set right; it is B who states this. This all seems to suggest that B assumed that
A4 was true, and that he incorporated it into his own thinking before saying «they’re
set right». The cognitive moves in this conversation are represented in Table€6.
More schematically, three moves show up in the interlocution: (i) two separate
points of view are asserted in succession, (ii) the interlocutors each carry out their
own lines of thinking irrespective of the other, and (iii) the interlocutors each car-
ry out their lines of thinking by integrating certain propositions of their partner,
in what one might call a subliminal manner or by formulating, in the conversa-
tional space, the conclusions they came to draw in the process.
It is the (iii) process which opens the possibility for the interlocutors to con-
verge on Wp.6 We have named it a «learning in interaction» (Trognon et al. 2003,
2006; Schwarz et al. 2008). A Learning in interaction is a process by which
Table 6.╇ Joint reasoning process to explain the solution to the pulp-projection problem
(second part)
In natural deduction theory, one is not concerned with the origin of the hypotheses
that trigger a sub-reasoning process, for «(...) we can, at any stage of a derivation,
introduce the auxiliary hypothesis of our choice, provided, of course, we begin a
new sub-derivation». Our contribution to this theory therefore consists in adding
to a converser’s auxiliary hypotheses certain propositions of his/her partner.
Conclusion
It has been fifteen years that Jean Caron, a French psycholinguist, feared that the
success of the interactionist paradigm might lead to a regression in linguistics. He
Interlocutory logic
wrote: “In the name of the «linguistics of talk», we could lose sight of language. (...)
The skeleton in a living body cannot be seen; and of course, the flesh is so much
more interesting! But if we take the skeleton away, only a shapeless, limp mass re-
mains. Won’t taking away language, its structures and its constraints, have us prac-
ticing a spineless linguistics?” (Caron, 1989a: 138, our translation). Twenty years
later, we can reassure him. The «interaction order» did not invade the «institution
order» nor the «language order». Granted, the language institution is partly im-
mersed in the interaction order (see Figure 9), so the formal structures of language
are available to interactions, which select the ones that suit the ever-changing state
of the interaction.
This explains why a sentence is sometimes recognized on the basis of syntax
and sometimes on the basis of semantics, depending on the requirements of the
situation (Caron, 1989b). But it is only partially that the formal structures of lan-
guage depend upon the interaction order, regardless of Thibaut’s statement that
«the notion of a ‘language system’ does not refer to some reified entity ‘out there’
which exists independently of the social meaning-making practices of a given so-
cial group and which has an independent causal status» (2002:€136). Besides, nei-
ther Garfinkel and the conversational analysts on one side, nor Gumperz and in-
teractionist sociolinguists on the other, ever claimed to have discovered new social
categories: it is their embodiment in social relations that interests these authors.
Moreover, Gumperz’s definition of communicative practices, in line with Saus-
sure’s, assumes that language is a system (Gumperz in Prevignano and Thibaut,
2002:€149).
Social Institution
The transition
from “the x x Speaking Mass
intersubjective x x
to the x x
intrasubjective”
Interaction (the
“Interaction Order”
= communicative
practices (Gumperz))
Persons in interaction
Lewis wrote in 1972: “I distinguish two topics: first, the description of possible
languages or grammars as abstract semantic systems whereby symbols are associ-
ated with aspects of the world; and second, the description of the psychological
and sociological facts whereby a particular one of these abstract semantic systems
is the one used by a person or population. Only confusion comes of mixing these
two topics” (Lewis, 1972:€170). In the end, then, after thirty years of existence, the
interactionist paradigm will have recognized this distinction, on inventing an in-
termediate area between the two terms of the dichotomy. And it is what Bakhtin
want in 1929 (Gardin, 1989; Thibaut, 2002).
But there are many unresolved difficulties. The main ones are epistemologi-
cal. Firstly, what sort of object is the “interaction”, and in particular “interlocu-
tion”? Here, more than a taxonomy, we need a sort of generative theory of inter-
locution, even rough, capable of generating dialogue types from ordinary
conversation, in much the same way as a generative grammar produces sentence
types from a core sentence (Trognon and Bromberg, 2007; Trognon et al. in
press.). With such a theory, one could work under a thesis now acknowledged
both in conversational analysis (see Heritage, 1990) and in the cognitive psy-
cholinguistics of dialogue (see Clark, 1996), in fact, shared by all researchers in
the domain, which stipulates that ordinary conversation is the matrix of all oth-
er forms of conversation. Secondly, how to combine formal and observational
researches on “interaction” (Searle: 1992 vs Duncan, Fiske et al.: 1985). Con-
cerning this second sort of researches what becomes of statistical proofs when it
comes to demonstrating structures? For instance, non-preferential actions are
not always correlated with the discourse pauses, delays, and repetitions assumed
to indicate – both to the interactants and to the analyst – that those actions are
not the preferred ones. Does this mean that it is invalid to establish a corre-
spondence€between them? The answer is no, if we agree with Schegloff (1993)
that the informal quantification used in conversational analysis and statistical
quantification are two fundamentally different enterprises, that the latter cannot
be substituted for the analysis of isolated cases and groups of sequences, and
that, in sum, statistical quantification is not an educated form of informal quan-
tification. Conversely, it is not because we recognize the merits of informal
quantification that statistical tools should be avoided. But what is true is that the
ambivalence (exhibited by Sacks, 1987, for example) and sometimes even casu-
alness of certain researchers with respect to statistical quantification (Duncan,
Fiske et al.: 1985) does not help in conducting a discussion that deserves, fol-
lowing Gumperz’s (2002) example, an unbiased, dispassionate approach.
Finally, there is still much ground to cover to explore the «interaction order».
Interlocutory logic
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Beyond symbols
Interaction and the enslavement principle
Stephen J. Cowley
University of Hertfordshire, UK and University of KwaZulu-Natal, South Africa
Humans often contextualize without using cues. While Gumperz showed that
analysis is not sufficient to explain interaction, his view of what lay beyond
symbols was based in cognitive internalism. Opposing this, prosody can be
shown to contribute directly to conversational sense-making. Humans use self-
organizing dynamics in ways that resemble what happens in gas-lasers. Voices
attract each other and, at times, set off laser like synergies. Using these effects,
we modulate our actions in situation-transcending events that give sense to the
dynamics. Conversation is distributed cognition during which prosodic sense-
making links the world with brains and bodies. Far from being based in word-
forms, interaction and language are dynamical first and symbolic afterwards.
1. Beyond symbols
The linguistic turn of the 20th century produced, among other things, the compu-
tational theory of mind and social constructionism. Breaking with post-Saussuri-
an assumptions, this paper presents another perspective. Rejecting models where
language systems are separated from their use, weight is given to conversing. By
linking the work of Gumperz (1982), Maturana (1978), Hutchins (1995), Love
(2004; 2007) and others, 20th century tradition is shown to exaggerate the impor-
tance of linguistic forms. This appears, above all, in the curious opposition of ex-
ternalism to mentalism. Instead of acknowledging that conversations are founda-
tional to minded behaviour, theorists retreated into two camps. On the one hand,
externalists tended to identify what can be known with symbolic patterns or dis-
course; on the other, cognitive internalists reified symbols by appeal to informa-
tion processing. Historically, of course, Saussure’s (1916) vision of synchronic lin-
guistics can be used to legitimize both sets of views. By opposing system (langue)
to use (parole), he gave us a picture of a cognitive world where context reduces to
no more than the perceived external setting. Having separated people from the
Stephen J. Cowley
world, agency is ascribed to language. Bizarrely, brains and/or bodies are regarded
as producing and processing social activity (including language). Theorists who
appeal to programmed brains thus make the same error as those who reduce peo-
ple to rule-followers. On both sides, language and interaction are separated from
the full-bodied activity which shapes the experience of human subjects.
One great merit of Gumperz’s opus (e.g. 1982; 2003) was that he showed that
making sense of language depends on events that lie beyond symbols. While
adopting the cognitive internalism of the mid-twentieth century, he saw the “se-
mantic importance of context” (2003: 9). Accordingly, his work took on a practical
relevance that is all too rare in the language sciences. This arose in focusing or
miscommunication which, in his terms, exploited contextualization cues. While
these constructs are discussed below, the move establishes two de facto principles:
– Recognition of interindividual communication
– The importance of vocal patterns beyond symbols
Gumperz’s models are less convincing than his practices. Thus, Levinson notes
lack of theoretical cleanliness (2003: 32), Prevignano doubts that interpretations
often coincide (2003:17) and Thibault (2003a) stresses that indexicality is all per-
vasive. Rather than contrast the ‘symbolic’ with the ‘indexical’, the paper offers an
alternative to contextual semantics. Denying that interaction is an ‘analytical
prime’ (Gumperz, 2003: 106), conversing or first-order language is traced to how
people control dynamics. Invoking Haken’s (1993) enslavement principle, parallels
and contrasts are drawn between gas lasers and conversation. In stressing real-
time contextualizing, humans are shown to orient to patterns in a pico-scale: we
not only use phonological regularities but also voice dynamics that operate in time
domains around the threshold of consciousness (200–300msec). While drawing
on something like the enslavement principle, we monitor the sound of speaking to
set up counter-effects. For this reason interaction analysis needs to be supplement-
ed by other modes of investigation. Language and interaction can be rethought as
distributed cognition (Hutchins, 1995; Clark, 1997; Wheeler, 2004; Cowley &
Spurrett, 2003; Cowley, 2007d, 2009b). Using circular causation, we hear social
norms that enable us to think as we engage in interaction.
The spell of von Neumann machines led to a 50 year fixation with symbols and rep-
resentations. At the end of the 20th century, indeed, many assumed that both lan-
guage and interaction depend on inferencing that links text with context. It was
widely touted that, whatever else we do, symbolic forms lie at the heart of human
Beyond symbols
1. Attacking the ghost in the machine Ryle (1949) pointed out the error of confusing brains
with minds. To invoke a central processing mechanism is metaphorical because brains are dis-
tributed self-organizing systems that integrate events with different evolutionary and develop-
mental histories (Deacon, 1997). Computationally, central processing is too rigid for simulating
adaptive behaviour (Clark, 1997). In addition, many deny ‘psychological reality’ to language and
belief (e.g. Matthews, 1979; Linell, 1979; Harris, 1981; Dennett, 1987).
Stephen J. Cowley
1.B y’know when we’re starting # haha the 1.B sai quando iniziamo noi # haha il dieci
tenth of October ottobre
2.P of next year 2.P di un altr’anno
3.B of no of this year but 3.B di no di quest’anno ma
4.P. yeah but that’ll be 4.P si` ma passa tutto=
5.B [mm well] 5.B [be’ mm]
6.P almost next year 6.P l’anno praticamente
7.B [well yeah] 7.B. [be` si`]
8.B oh he’s got no time he says 8.B ah non c’e` tempo dice
9.P [in Oct]ober 9.P [a ot]tobre
10.B the beginning of October before the 10.B i prima di ottobre prima dei primi
beginning
2. The analyst claims to draw on shared knowledge to reconstruct the presuppositions that, in
context, give rise to a determinate illocutionary act.
Beyond symbols
that she has heard Patrizia make a faux pas (in 2). In 4–6, Patrizia tries to rec-
tify this and, in 9, makes up for her error. How can this be explained? For a
context semanticist, the gaffe, recognition, and making-up can only depend on
social or mental programs. In what follows, distributed cognition is used to
sketch an alternative.
4. Interaction is dynamical
3. Recognising that lay views are essential to language, it is often erroneously thought that
theory must be based on these views. With Dennett (1987), this is like arguing that since behav-
iour can be described from an intentional stance, it must be explained intentionally. In fact, he
argues the contrary: accounts from physical and design stances are necessary even if, ultimately,
they must specify how we come to believe in the abstracta posited from the intentional stance.
Beyond symbols
Physicists are impressed when systems show design that gives rise to ‘higher-level’
organization. Such events depend, not on push-pull causality, but on how systems
self-organize. When circular causation (Haken, 1993) applies, coupling imple-
ments the ‘enslavement principle’. This occurs, for example, in gas lasers. In simple
cases, these consist in a sealed tube containing a light emitting gas. To precipitate a
laser effect, an electric current of a certain voltage is passed through the tube. The
light remains disorganized until, at a certain threshold, gas molecules self-organize
as a laser-beam. Strikingly, this appears instantaneous. Indeed, while possible to
calculate the threshold at which circular causation arises, the underlying micro-
processes rely on neither the chemistry of the gas nor the electric charge. Thanks
to the current, high-level interaction between molecules prompts competition and,
remarkably, this leads to self-organization. The enslavement principle ensures that,
even in principle, outcomes are unpredictable. This is typical of self-organizing
systems which depend on principles more complex than rhythmic entrainment.
Next, therefore, I use the model in thinking about the real-time coupling of human
voices. While finding similar patterns of attraction, it is stressed that people moni-
tor the results to co-ordinate in ways that give talk much of its singularity.
A transcript can show how interpersonal relationships play out in time. It hints at
how, in the pico-scale, brains jointly control coupled microdynamics. In the talk
described, Brunella is seeking empathy from Patrizia. This is done because, as
close friends, she is likely to understand the difficulties with getting builders. Such
empathy, however, does not depend on social routine. In these circumstances, in
fact, she “inadvertently indicates that she is not paying close attention to what she
is hearing” (Cowley, 1993: 146). This is a social gaffe: it is unacceptable to misin-
terpret ‘the 10th of October’ (il dieci ottobre). Since Brunella show signs (sic) of
hearing her misconduct, her friend tries to cover up. Seconds later (in 9), Patrizia
reiterates Brunella’s ‘in October’ (a ottobre). By doing so appropriately, Patrizia
‘makes good’. For convenience, key utterances are printed in italics.
Beyond symbols
1.B y’know when we’re starting # haha the 1.B sai quando iniziamo noi # haha il dieci
tenth of October ottobre
2.P of next year 2.P di un altr’anno
3.B of no of this year but 3.B di no di quest’anno ma
4.P. yeah but that’ll be 4.P si` ma passa tutto=
5.B [mm well] 5.B [be’ mm]
6.P almost next year 6.P l’anno praticamente
7.B [well yeah] 7.B. [be` si`]
8.B oh he’s got no time he says 8.B ah non c’e` tempo dice
9.P [in Oct]ober 9.P [a ot]tobre
10.B the beginning of October before the 10.B i primi di ottobre prima dei primi
beginning
Before turning to acoustic evidence, the transcript can be used to justify this as-
cription. It needs to be demonstrated, first, that saying di un altr’anno (of next
year) is a faux pas. Second, it needs to be shown that social equilibrium is restored
by Patrizia’s a ottobre (in October). This matters because, often, saying ‘of next year’
would be a sensible response to ‘ha ha the tenth of October’. Accordingly, I con-
sider why, in these circumstances, it inappropriately ‘goes beyond the situation’. It
is a social gaffe which, as things turn out, is put right by a blatant interruption (9)
that restores social equilibrium.
Spoken on a fall-rise tone di un altr’anno (of next year) looks unexceptional. It
might be said, for example, at the end of the year or, indeed, where normal to wait
five months for builders.4 This talk, however, occurs in May and Patrizia knows the
local builders. She thus fails to show adequate understanding or, indeed, to give
her friend support. The problem, then, is not one of inference. Rather, saying ‘in
October next year’ is not licensed by Brunella’s (unmarked) tone. Just as one would
expect in Italian and other languages (including English) Brunella’s fall-rise an-
ticipates an empathetic echo. However, rather than repeating what her friend has
said, she offers:
4. Any such interpretation would be false. First for biographical reasons (Patrizia has heard
talk about building in the village – a major topic of conversation – all her life.) Second, even if
she forgets it is May, her wording shows that she sees the new year as far away (she says not
‘dell’anno prossimo’ but ‘di un altr’anno’). Third, if the mistake were based on such ‘reasons’, her
gaffe would not be social.
Stephen J. Cowley
Di un’ altr’ a n n o
—
—
— ✓
Patrizia speaks as if five months would be a short wait; she replies as if Brunella’s
tone suggested a longer delay. While transcription shows no outward sign of hurt
(‘no di quest’anno ma’), she hears the faux pas. In terms of the next utterance proof
of CA, Brunella’s ‘no of this year but’ displays that she expected something different
(especially, the final ‘but’). Then, Patrizia responds by offering a lame explanation
of her error. Waiting from May to October is, she implies, ‘like’ waiting 17 months
(in 4 and 6). This cover up is meant as a socially acceptable way of justifying sloppy
response. As such, it shows that Patrizia is monitoring the events. With ‘yes, but
practically the whole year passes’, however, she gets into more trouble. She implies
not only that the wait must feel long but, by so doing, shows that she knows it is
about a year away. By neither covering up her ignorance nor making a joke, she
shows that she ‘got the wrong end of the stick’.5 It is this, indeed, which is lame. In
treating the wait as if it were more than 3 times as long, she violates social norms.
She breaks the rule that, with friends, you ‘listen’. Thus, in 2, Patrizia is guilty of
lack of due attention.6 While such analysis clarifies what happens, it gives no in-
sight into how effects are achieved. Another mode of investigation is needed if we
are to understand how, in a few hundred milliseconds, a gaffe becomes salient,
prompts a lame utterance, and changes the flow of the talk. First, however, I sketch
how the disruption is overcome and equilibrium restored.
When Brunella is 4 syllables into her story, Patrizia interrupts with ‘a ottobre?’
How can use of known information be “verbally and prosodically right” (Cowley,
1993: 147)? Why does Patrizia use a fall-rise to repeat the fact and thus make up
for her previous gaffe?
First, in the lived present, three seconds is not long enough for reasoning based on
the words that are actually spoken. The parties depend on intricate voice dynamics
5. Since it is May the period is actually 17 months. Neither party notices this (and, in 1993,
nor did I- in spite of having listened to the tape tens of times).
6. During conversations, people who do listen (in a normative sense) break the social rules.
Patrizia establishes that, in this sense, she is not guilty (She only misinterpreted what was said).
Beyond symbols
that are much too rapid to rely on presuppositions. Not only are these beyond sym-
bols but, as argued elsewhere (Cowley, 2006), the vocalizations act directly. While
humans can be compared to turn-taking, inference-using symbol processors, we
are also self-conscious affective beings. We orient to each other as we integrate
bodily dynamics with manifest beliefs. Social life happens as we draw on affec-
tively charged ‘words’: we use pico-scale sound patterns:
– Persons use real-time sounding as they engage in co-action.
– Each picks up on subtleties in the other’s utterance-activity.
– Co-action is not simply entrained; persons are sensitive to affect and motives
as well as pico-scale events.
To capture the function of real-time dynamics, acoustic events can be repeatedly
frozen (see Cowley, 1993, 1994, 1998; in press). Pico-scale investigation shows the
delicacy with which, together, we link action and perception. Sound patterns shape
what, given repeated listening, an observer hears ‘in’ the words actually spoken. As
dynamic resources, vocalizations can regulate co-temporal activity. Events consist,
in part, of utterance-activity like that of 8–9 where Patrizia and Brunella couple their
talk. Not only is this a laser-like effect but its audible result makes up for the gaffe.
The women talk within a narrow pitch-range, mesh their timing, and echo the pitch
cadence of concurrent syllables (tempo and a ottobre). Prosodic closeness enables
the women to use pitch-matching which, while often noted (e.g. Brazil et al., 1980;
Gumperz, 1982), has many crucial functions (Cowley, 1998). Below, this is illustrated
with measures of fundamental frequency (on voiced segments) shown iconically.
(Fundamental frequency is in Hz and bold segments represent overlap).7
The observations show parallels between one person’s perceiving and the other’s
acting. As if based on circular causation, the voice dynamics show:
7. All measures were made on a Kay DSP Sona-graph 5500. In relation to fundamental fre-
quency, attention was given to vowels (and some voiced consonants) and, especially local pitch
peaks, troughs and moments of onset and offset. Given the settings of the machine, measures are
likely to be accurate within a range of approximately 4.5 Hz. For details, see Cowley (1993; 1998).
Stephen J. Cowley
270 302 —
—
✓ 320 205
— —
215 â•… —
╅╇╛╛╛
— 280 220 — —
160
✓
These utterances show contrast in both pitch-range and other musical features.
This arises as, launching into her story Brunella emanates tension while using fal-
setto to make demands of empathetic display. With respect to 9, Patrizia shows a
pitch range (+10 Hz) far from Brunella’s expansion (+80 Hz). Equally, the ‘hollow
ring’ depends on looser timing and lack of overlap. In contrast with events three
seconds later, Patrizia is unresponsive to her friend’s voice. The events, however,
are neither neutral speech nor, indeed, ‘noise’. Far from being rule-governed or
prosodically determined, the gaffe is – in one sense – a reasonable response. In this
8. In parallel to Wittgenstein’s (1958) remarks on colour, the phrase makes no use of inner samples.
Beyond symbols
9. In 1993, I failed to notice that, in compensating for the gaffe, Brunella adjusts to make
things easier for Patrizia. While in line with circular causation presented, this challenges my
earlier Wittgenstein-inspired emphasis on reacting-responding bodies.
10. It takes about 200msec. to speak a stressed syllable. The argument parallels Kirsh and
Maglio’s (1994) demonstration that Tetris playing is better served by epistemic action than
(inner) mental life.
Stephen J. Cowley
As confirmed by both the example and experience, moreover, this can influence
what is said. Especially if talk is spontaneous, vocal coupling prompts feelings and
‘ideas’. Such mechanisms are most powerful, of course, where people know each
other well and are unconcerned with specific tasks or ideas. While talk is accom-
plished by co-ordinating bodies it is also experienced by living human subjects.
Much can be meant without being internally processed. Acts, thoughts and feel-
ings can be correctly ascribed by making judgements about circumstances. In il-
lustration, consider an example from Hutchins:
One evening a marine commander on board the Palau, Major Rock, telephoned
the Charthouse. Quartermaster Smith answered the phone. Major Rock asked
Smith what phase the moon would be that night. Smith asked Chief Richards who
was sitting nearby. Richards immediately replied, “Gibbous waning”. Smith re-
layed the answer to Rock. Rock apparently did not understand the answer and he
and Smith talked past each other for several conversational turns. Finally, Smith
put his hand over the mouthpiece and said, “Chief, he says it’s got to be one of,
‘new’, ‘first’, ‘full’, and ‘last’.” Chief Richards said, “It’s last.” Smith told Rock and
Rock hung up…. After Smith hung up the phone, Chief Richards said: “Rock is a
great big guy with a brain about this big (making a circle with the tip of his index
finger touching the first joint of his thumb). He must never have taken an amphib
Stephen J. Cowley
mission onto a beach at night. He might get by with a crescent moon, but on a
gibbous moon he’ll be dead. (Hutchins, 1995; 230–231).
Events depend neither on what Richards (or Smith) meant by ‘gibbous waning’ nor
how Rock inwardly understood ‘it’s last’. Rather, they show Rock’s poor use of the
words actually spoken. Given limited vocabulary and naval experience he fails to in-
tegrate what he needs to know with hearing ‘gibbous waning’. As shown by the gaffe
described, human interaction often features such failings. Yet, as Richards remarks,
familiarity with the moon can, at times, make the difference between killing and being
killed. As we co-act we use publicly available routines to link with past experience
while anticipating what may happen. Though interaction is situated, we use experi-
ence in projecting possible outcomes. While analysis highlights the words that are
actually spoken, much depends on pico-scale events. Thus Patrizia and Brunella inte-
grate these with verbal patterns to show exquisite sensitivity to each other’s feelings. As
they do so, they shape each other’s thinking and the flow of events. In historical time,
we have developed a meshwork of constructs, artifacts and modes of action (Love,
2004). People hear linguistic forms in the flow of talk. In utterance-activity, of course,
we also draw on ‘words’.11 Patrizia and Brunella connect what they hear, see, say and
feel with current expectations. Like the naval officers, the women monitor available
information by attending to more than is actually said. By hearing her gaffe, Patrizia
uses the sound of her speaking as a prompt to make good. In (9), she synergises af-
fectively mediated dynamics with Brunella’s story telling. Just as for the officers, events
originating in one brain influence the other person. We move beyond the current situ-
ation. While this may be reducible to information (in Shannon’s probabilistic sense),
we also draw on text-based inferences, affect and past experience. On a distributed
view, much ‘thinking’ is co-action elicited by barely noted sound patterns.
11. In Love’s (2004) terms, conversing is first-order language that can be heard in terms of
second-order cultural constructs (including ‘words’).
12. In an influential definition this is: “speakers’ and listeners’ use of verbal and nonverbal signs
to relate what is said at any one time and in any one place to knowledge acquired through past
experience, in order to retrieve the presuppositions they must rely on to maintain conversa-
tional involvement and assess what is intended” (Gumperz, 1992: 231).
Beyond symbols
perspective, vocal synergies prompt lay judgements. Brain-side events are insepa-
rable from affect and, connecting people in time, set off social events. While some
expression has an internal basis, many ‘intentional’ properties are extrinsically de-
rived. In hearing “gibbous waning” anything that Richards and Smith ‘mean’ mat-
ters less than Rock’s failure to grasp the expression. In similar vein, instead of ago-
nizing over the ‘meaning’ of the dynamics of 2 and 9, what matters is how the talk
is integrated. There is a disjunction between human sense-making and what inter-
action analysis sdescribe. This is because, while analysis demands a shared meta-
language, human experience is body-based. As a result, we use dynamics in mak-
ing judgements and ascriptions of meaning. Indeed, once we consider how
pico-scale events self-organize, we can rethink how Brunella and Patrizia syner-
gise affect, social practice and their relationship. Contextualization uses utterance-
activity that orients to both this now and what, on average, is likely to bring future
benefit (see, Cowley, 2004). Conversing is flexible behaviour that occurs alongside
explicit intentions and inferences. During utterance-activity, moreover, contextu-
alizing can often make direct use of what is felt, done, and thought.
Given trust in phonetic intuitions and nose for social meaning, Gumperz re-
jected text-context duality. He avoided reading transcriptions as evidence of
program-like units and, therefore, over-inflating symbols. Using an ear trained to
structural analysis, he identified interactional constituents by means of careful lis-
tening. In line with classic cognitive science, he assumed that these functioned
‘between the ears’. As a cognitive internalist, he treated the cues as ‘real’ and as-
similated them to sui generis models of language. Emphasizing the primacy of in-
teraction, he separated languages from the speech of determinate communities. By
extension, sense-making is activity and, for Gumperz, it is mistaken to think that
“meaning resides in language” (2003:121). While rejecting his view of cues, the
distributed view uses this insight by tracing meaning-making to prosodic syner-
gies. Talk is co-constructed as feelings, presuppositions and inferences spread.
Pico-scale events also permit complex ascriptions. Given this post hoc quality, we
can use voice dynamics to predict and, indeed, shape events. Expanding on work
like that of Malinowski (1927), Abercrombie (1967) and Bolinger (1986), Gumperz
shows that language-in-time cannot be reduced to folk constructs. As complex
social behaviour, utterance-activity is based in human biomechanics.13
Since contextualizing integrates activity between persons, there is no a priori
limit on its functions. Above all, while synergetics shape interindividual aspects of
13. Malinowski (1927) saw that primitive language must be grounded in action. Abercrombie
(1967) recognised that what is now called ‘prosody’ must inevitably deal with what he called
‘voice dynamics’: Bolinger (1986) saw that the forms and cues of prosodic analysis are no more
that cultivated versions of ‘wild’ ways of using the voice.
Stephen J. Cowley
talk, interaction also uses symbolic and probabilistic processes. The distributed
view thus rejects appeal to a priori language ‘systems’. Rather, meaning-making is
traced to human capacities for co-ordination. Continuous, embodied utterance-
activity prompts us to re-member experience as circular causation sets off judge-
ments. Given the slow pace of experience, we can (partly) transcend our own bio-
mechanics. While mistaken to trace interaction to the units of lay analysis – words,
utterances and intentions– talking demands belief in such fictions. In develop-
mental time, contextualizing must prompt a baby to believe in rules and units
(see, Cowley et al. 2004; Spurrett & Cowley, 2004). In learning to converse, sym-
bols must be grounded into brains, normative activity and first-person experience.
As children come to hear words, they take a language stance (Cowley, 2007a; in
press): they begin to hear vocalizations as verbal patterns. Saussure’s error, there-
fore, lay in reifying a mere ‘point of view’. By emphasizing forms, he reduced lan-
guage to models of system and use. For many linguists, therefore, people are agents
who link texts to contexts (and vice versa). By contrast, on a distributed view,
people are inseparable from language: human agency arises as bodies act together
in a cultural world.
grounds language (Cowley et al. 2004; Cowley, 2007a). Indeed, without per-
ceiving and monitoring affect, there can be no attention sharing and, as a con-
sequence, babies would lack the perceptual skills used to hear utterances in a
verbal aspect. In adults, reciprocal monitoring allows talk to proceed without
need for either Thibault’s (2000) downward causation or Gumperz’s (2003)
contextual semantics. Internal and external motive systems co-develop as we
orient to a shared cognitive world. Without thinking, Patrizia commits and
makes up for a social gaffe while, without words, Brunella accepts an unspo-
ken apology.
In rejecting the primacy of social formations, weight falls on human reso-
nance. It is only by emphasizing the causal loops of affective expression that we
can move beyond post-Saussurian symbols. In tracing pico-scale coupling, real-
time events are shown to be constituted by dynamic information that sets off
effects. During interaction, the epistemic functions of affective activity are suf-
ficient to prompt (explicit) ‘thoughts’. In lay terms, attitudes spark ‘what to say
next’ and, for an analyst, suggest construals of events. More technically, we rely
on full-bodied events that animate what we do together. Rather than view inter-
action in terms of formal units, we turn to how, using a pico-scale, bodies use a
world of social norms to display manifest beliefs. Experience with bodily
prompts and probes gives us neuro-behavioural resources based in affect, ex-
pectations in human relationships. While we can describe contextualization
‘cues’ (and conventional gestures), social events are also directly embodied. Giv-
en shared history, affective patterns often render redundant any appeal to cues
and conventions.
Presenting lay analysis as invoking abstracta runs against post-Saussurian
emphasis on linguistic (or semiotic) autonomy. Instead of ascribing independent
reality to language, interaction is traced to real-time dynamics. Far from being
based in word-forms, language bottoms out in pico-scale co-ordination. While
material processes (Thibault, 2003b) are synergetic, active subjects manage
events in larger scales. Monitoring word-forms and ‘talking without thinking’
shape relationships. What the friends show is important but limited. First, some-
thing like the enslavement principle allows verbal functions to be integrated with
affect. Second, an analyst can use third person ascriptions based on how the
sound of voices is integrated with wordings. However, such processes are mar-
ginal in erudite talk. Patrizia and Brunella show only that talk can proceed with-
out inner thoughts, presuppositions, and inferences. In close relationships,
movements and vocalizations often ‘direct’ activity. Drawing on a shared past,
events are assessed and managed under dual control. In humans too, much de-
pends on bodily resonance. As social vertebrates (Cowley, 1997), we often con-
textualize without cues.
Stephen J. Cowley
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The case for an eclectic approach
to discourse-in-interaction
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
Université Lumière Lyon€2
1. Introduction
1. See Le discours en interaction (2005), where the different principles exposed here are devel-
oped and illustrated.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
would also be suitable terms here as they refer to the study of different types of
interactions (reciprocal action systems) performed by mainly linguistic means.2
The boundaries of this field are fuzzy, for discourses can display different de-
grees of interactivity: an informal conversation is clearly more interactive than a
lecture, a television debate more interactive than the news, etc. (certain types of
oral discourse are therefore barely interactive, whereas certain types of written
discourse such as Internet Relay Chats are, to some extent, interactive).
This kind of investigation requires natural data, which are highly complex. In
order to account for this complexity in a satisfactory way, it seems preferable to put
together one’s own comprehensive toolbox. Mine includes, besides classical lin-
guistic tools, borrowings from different trends in “discourse analysis” (especially
the so-called Birmingham and Geneva schools), pragmatics (Ducrot, Grice, speech
act theory), and, of course, interactional linguistics (conversation analysis – hence-
forth CA – and also Gumperz, Goffman, Brown and Levinson’s linguistic polite-
ness theory, etc.). In other words, this kind of approach is founded on methodo-
logical eclecticism (that is the controlled use of tools coming from different
paradigms). As this term sometimes carries a pejorative connotation, it is worth
noting that it has been employed in a positive way by authors as different as Aston
(1988:€13); Wetherel (1998:€388); Vicher and Sankoff (1989), who speak of “meth-
odological hybridization”; Eggins and Slade (1997:€273); House (2000:€146), who
advocates “an eclectic model comprehensive and powerful enough to handle di-
verse cases of misunderstandings”; Gumperz (see Eerdmans, Prevignano and
Thibault 2003:€32, 50, 71); or Heritage (1995:€397):
Many CA insights and observations are profoundly compatible with the view-
points developed in connection with, for example, Gricean implicature or polite-
ness theory.
The purpose of this article is to present the case for an eclectic approach towards
discourse-in-interaction. I will begin by reviewing some general principles on
which such an approach is based.
2. Principles
Looking at my materials, these long collections of talk, and trying to get an abstract
rule that would generate, not the particular things that are said, but let’s say the
sequences […]. (Sacks 1992, Vol.€I: 49; emphasis added)
2. “Interaction” refers first and foremost to a process (that is a series of actions and reactions)
and secondly, by metonymy, to the very event in which this process occurs.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
The way of working outlined here by Sacks is not unfamiliar to linguists: the con-
stant toing and froing between the observation of materials and the search for
underlying abstract rules. However, what is new compared to the usual practices
of linguists (especially considering the time when Sacks delivers his first lectures)
is the nature of these materials and the relationship to data that he recommends.
Any generalization should be the result of scrupulous and detailed analysis of “ac-
tual episodes of interactions of one sort or another”. The data must be plentiful
(“long collections of talk”) and for the most part, naturally occurring.3
3. Sacks does use made-up examples from time to time, however; and for some phenomena,
it can be interesting to take advantage of literary examples.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
We need some rules of sequencing, and then some objects that will be handled by
the rules of sequencing. (Sacks 1992, Vol. I: 95).
We will now look at these objects which are handled by the rules of sequencing, that
is “the embarrassing question of units” (Goffman 1981:€22) – they are in fact very
diverse in nature, including strictly linguistic units (phonemes, words, different types
of grammatical units) but also pragmatic, discursive and conversational units.
On a “superficial” level, conversations and other types of verbal interactions
present themselves as a succession of “turns” made up of “turn-constructional
units”. We will not go back over these units here as they have been deeply investi-
gated in conversation analysis, but rather prefer to make some comments about
two types of units which, in our opinion, are of a totally different nature and be-
long to another level of analysis, namely adjacency pairs and speech acts.
The adjacency pair (henceforth AP) is widely accepted as being the prototypical
smallest unit of sequential organization, yet it poses many theoretical and descrip-
tive problems. First, the minimal units are not always “in pairs”, nor “adjacent”, as
we can see considering the most common examples dealt with in the literature:
greetings only come in pairs in two-party conversations;4 questions often initiate a
ternary sequence as the answer should generally be followed by an acknowledg-
ment; and invitations frequently open an extended sequence. Moreover, these
types of sequences often contain more complex configurations (insertion sequenc-
es, embedded and side-sequences, interlocking organizations, etc.), and this great-
ly limits the adjacency property, despite the “preference for contiguity” principle
(Sacks 1987). All these structural particularities lead us to the conclusion that ad-
jacency pairs are only one specific type of inclusive units, generally labelled “se-
quences” in CA where the meaning of this term is never made fully explicit.
Another problem with APs is knowing what they are made up of. Sacks talks
about “utterances”, but “turn” is also often employed in the literature. However, it
should be made clear that pair parts are not turns, primarily because their bound-
aries do not always coincide: pair parts are simply “housed” inside turns (“you
have a turn and in it a first pair part”, Sacks 1987:€56). Above all, turns are units
which “pertain to the surface structure of conversation” (Roulet 1992:€92), where-
as pair parts are units of a pragmatic nature: they correspond to “actions” that
4. Incidentally, the importance given to this notion of “pair” is an index of the primacy given
to a dyadic conception of talk-in-interaction (Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2004a).
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
“epiphenomena” such as turns serve to convey (Selting 2000:€511). APs are made
up of speech acts, or more precisely of segments revolving around a “head act”
which may be accompanied by one or more “subordinate acts”. These monological
units which form minimal dialogical units are called moves in discourse analysis
(or by Goffman) and the dialogical units they form are labelled exchanges or inter-
changes (the term is ambiguous, but its technical definition is relatively clear: any
set of moves depending on one and the same initiative move). These kinds of or-
ganization have been well described for example by Sinclair and Coulthard or the
Geneva school, whose objective is to show how a conversation is built by combin-
ing units of different hierarchical “ranks”.5
They raise a certain number of issues (where one exchange begins and another
one ends, the occurrence of “Janus elements” which are oriented both towards the
previous and the next move, etc.), but the important thing is to recognize that
moves and exchanges pertain to another level of analysis than the turn.6 Take this
example of an interaction in a bakery as a brief illustration of the sequential or-
ganization of these pragmatic units:
1 B madame bonjour/
2 Cl bonjour (.) je voudrais une baguette s’il vous plaît
3 B bien cuite [ou
4 Cl [bien cuite oui
5 B (tendant la baguette) alors voilà (.) et avec ça/
6 Cl ça sera tout merci […]
1 B good morning madam/
2 C good morning (.) I’d like a baguette please
3 B well-done [or
4 C [yes well-done
5 B (giving the baguette) here you are then (.) anything else/
6 C that’s all thanks […]
The excerpt is made up of six turns, five exchanges and ten moves. The first exchange
stretches over T1 and T2: it is an exchange of greetings (“good morning/good morn-
ing”) which is primarily built on lexical material. However, T1 also works as a ques-
tion, due to the rising intonation which means “What would you like?” (two speech
acts are amalgamated here in one segment because of its multimodality). This
initiative move opens up a second exchange which is interwoven with the first:
question-answer exchange, with the answer coming in T2, after the reactive greet-
ing. As for T2: on the one hand, the assertion “I’d like a baguette please” assumes a
request value, by virtue of the illocutionary derivation rule “any assertion of some
need, addressed to someone who can satisfy this need, must be interpreted conven-
tionally as an indirect request to satisfy this need” –€it should be noted that some
contextual elements should be incorporated into the formulation of pragmatic rules:
in the commercial context, the assertion is addressed to somebody who not only can
but must satisfy the customer’s need (unless the requested product is not available),
the indirect speech act is all the more obvious here. On the other hand, this “request-
ing answer” is not clear enough for the baker (problem of applying the Gricean
“maxim of quantity”), who therefore asks the customer for more detail by introduc-
ing in T3 an embedded question-answer type exchange. Once B has obtained the
necessary detail, she can go ahead and fulfill the request, as evidenced in T5 where
the reactive move is made up of a head act which is, in fact, a non-verbal action (ac-
companied by an utterance to be considered as a subordinate act: “here you are
then”).
The end of T5 initiates a new question-answer type exchange (the answer is
delivered in T6).
Hence, this sequence consists of the following exchanges:
(1) E1 (T1€-€T2’s first segment): greetings;
(2) E2 (T1€-€T2’s second segment): question-answer; amalgamation of E1 and
E2’s initiative moves, the reactive moves being distinct and delivered suc-
cessively in the same turn;
(3) E3 (T3€-€T4): question (request for details) followed by answer; E3 is em-
bedded in E4;
(4) E4 (T2’s second segment and T4€-€T5’s first segment): request-request ful-
filled; the request is grafted onto the answer and delivered in two parts
(“I’d like a baguette please” and “well-done”);
(5) E5 (T5’s second segment€-€T6): question-answer (the answer is accompa-
nied by a subordinate act of thanks).
Such a banal example as this shows the limits of the notion of “adjacency pair”: the
boundaries of exchanges coincide only exceptionally with the boundaries of turns,
insofar as one same turn can be made up of several moves which are either successive,
or amalgamated by virtue of indirect speech acts, and sometimes, of multimodality.
The trickiest problem with the notion of the adjacency pair is this: if two adjacent
turns can sometimes be considered as forming an AP, but at other times not, which
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
criteria should be used to decide whether or not one is dealing with an AP? It is based
on the feeling that both items have a “conditional relevance” relationship (“given the
first, the second is expectable”, Schegloff 1972:€363). But what is this feeling based on?
To answer this question we have to turn to the notion of the speech act.
Despite what is often said following a famous controversy,7 it is not obvious
that CA and speech act theory are incompatible. On the contrary even, CA con-
stantly refers to an implicit theory of speech acts with its persistent use of notions
like “question”, “request”, “greeting”, “offer”, “complaint”, etc., to which we can add
more interactive kinds of pragmatic units such as “challenging”, “repairing”, etc.
These units are usually referred to as “actions” in CA, but as they are very specific
actions realized by verbal8 means, it would seem that the expression “speech acts”
is more appropriate –€ the use of this term does not imply the adoption of all
Austin’s, Searle’s or Venderveken’s theoretical postulates: today the notion of speech
act has come into the public domain; it is part of the basic vocabulary for those
dealing with discourse, in interaction or not.
However we label this class of object, the questions, requests or greetings are
defined by the “job” they do (something very similar to Searle’s illocutionary force)
which dictates their sequential properties (if a question is generally followed by an
answer, surely it is because its purpose, by definition, is to obtain some sort of in-
formation, supposed to be unknown to the person asking the question). “Sequenc-
es” are not interpretable on the sole basis of their sequentiality (the fact that an
utterance immediately follows a question is neither necessary nor sufficient to say
that it is the answer to the question);9 and the application of conditional relevance
and sequential implicativeness principles rests above all on the content of the utter-
ances, which creates some specific expectations about the nature of what follows.
Without going back over the criticism of speech act theory, I would say that in
my opinion, it does not fundamentally challenge this theory. We could also show
that Schegloff ’s relevant analysis of “For whom” or “Do you know who’s going to
that meeting?” (1984 and 1988) does not in any way contradict standard speech
acts theory.10 But there is no doubt that work carried out in the framework of CA
has helped to make this theory more operative by examining how speech acts re-
ally function in an interactive context, the role of the utterance’s position in the
sequence for determining its pragmatic value, how this value can be negotiated by
the participants, and also the possible transformations a speech act can undergo
throughout the exchange; for example, how a greeting question such as “how
are you?” can progressively become a real question (Kerbrat-Orecchioni
2001:€118–120), or how an offer can be turned into an order, as in the “stubborn
old man and the herring” sequence examined by Sacks (1992, Vol. II: 327–331).
Sacks’ analysis brilliantly shows the successive transformations that the speech act
undergoes (somewhat like the music of Steve Reich, where the theme changes so
surreptitiously that the listener suddenly finds himself in the middle of a new mo-
tif with no idea as to when exactly the change took place); it shows also that this
metamorphosis is already potentially contained in the offer’s very first utterance.
This kind of analysis has greatly refined the description of speech acts, but it is
founded upon Austin and Searle’s theory.11
11. In other terms, I don’t think that “a gap between the theory [of SA] and the reality of dis-
course” exists (Streeck 1980:€133).
12. See for example the different articles in the book edited by Atkinson and Heritage,
1984: Part II.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
result of a kind of hybridization between Goffman and Searle’s work (as it looks at
speech acts from the point of view of the effects they can have on participants’
faces) was drawn up by Brown and Levinson (1978 and 1987), and several modi-
fications of it have been suggested.13
Whichever version of this model we choose to adopt can render the descrip-
tion of discourse-in-interaction considerable service. In particular, it helps to
make the problem of preference organization clearer, as Lerner notes (1996:€304):
It has been widely observed […] that matters of face, on the one hand, and preference
organization in conversational interaction, on the other, are intimately connected.
13. Personally I have suggested introducing the notion of Face Flattering Act (FFA) into the
model, alongside the notion of “Face Threatening Act” (FTA) –€ in a similar way others talk
about “face enhancing acts” or “face boosting acts” –, as politeness consists not only of softening
up threatening acts (negative politeness) but also of producing valorizing acts (positive polite-
ness). See Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992 and 2005€: chap.€3.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
negative reaction. It is a double bind situation, therefore, and the only exit is via
compromise, delay or avoidance strategies: the complexity of this exchange with
regard to the face-work system can explain why responses to compliments can
often be seen as excessively fussy and affected.14
On the contrary, if after most assertions agreement is preferred to disagree-
ment (that is the least expensive reaction rather than the most expensive one), it is
because agreement is more satisfactory for face: whatever the initiative act, the
preferred reaction (that is the most expected and frequent one) is not the least
expensive one but the one which best satisfies mutual face preservation.
14. Regarding the different possible reactions to a compliment, see Pomerantz 1978 for English
and Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1994: chap.€5 for French€; and on how to apply the “double bind” notion
to description of interactions, Kerbrat-Orecchioni 1992:€279–289 and 1994:€273–275.
15. This question is at the centre of the debate between Schegloff and Wetherell in Discourse &
Society, 8(2), 1997 and 9(3), 1998.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
All linguists admit that the location of an item in the syntagmatic chain deter-
mines in part its meaning. However the relative importance accorded to the con-
ventional meaning (pre-existing) and to the location (occasional) varies according
to authors and theories. As for the role of sequential placement of an utterance for
determining its value, all depends on the type of utterance we are dealing with: if
it is true that we identify an “answer” because it comes after a question (and also
because of its semantic content),18 then we must accept that questions present
specific formal characteristics. Consider as well the often mentioned example of
greetings: Sacks (1992, Vol. I: 94) states that “we need to distinguish between a
‘greeting item’ and a ‘greeting place’”, and quite rightly adds that “if some other
item occurs in a greeting place it’s not a greeting”. More questionable is his asser-
tion that “if a greeting item occurs elsewhere it’s not a greeting”: a “Good morn-
ing!” occurring in the middle of a conversation will be a greeting as well (a “mis-
placed” greeting), which proves the robustness of the intrinsic meaning of most
linguistic items.
The effects of these misplacements can be very diverse: polemical (an example
of which we will see shortly), playful, or even pathological (as we find in the “ab-
surd” dialogues in Ionesco’s or Tardieu’s plays), or metaphorical as in the example
18. Cf. Levinson (1983:€193): “Answerhood is a complex property composed of sequential loca-
tion and topical coherence across two utterances amongst other things; significantly there is no
proposed illocutionary force of answering.”
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
Context shapes utterances and utterances shape context in turn: this conception,
which reconciles determinism and constructionism, is widely accepted today. Dis-
course is both an activity which is conditioned by the context and which transforms
this very context: pre-existing to interaction, context is continuously renewed
19. The notions of “sequence”, “sequencing” and “sequentiality” are used in a number of theo-
retical frameworks. For an overview of the different approaches towards these notions from
both formal and functional perspectives, see Fetzer and Meierkord (eds.) 2002.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
throughout. The renewable nature of context is partly due to the fact that the term
refers not only to the “external” or “situational” context (this “frame” surrounding
the interaction, itself comprised of different components which can be classed in
several ways)20 but also to the “sequential” or “intra-interactional” context21
(Schegloff 1992b), which continuously reframes conversational activities (for ex-
ample, the introduction of a question creates “a new arena for subsequent action”,
Duranti and Goodwin 1992:€29). In addition, context should be considered as a set
of cognitive representations (shared at least partially by the different participants)
which are constantly enriched and modified – even if it is obvious that all is not
“renewable” in the context and that many components remain constant through-
out the interaction.
It is also widely agreed that context strongly determines the production and
interpretation mechanisms which work in an “indexical” or “setting-related” way.
Opinions diverge, however, regarding to what extent the analyst can and should
use information which is not actually contained in the interaction’s text.22 Gump-
erz (in Eerdmans, Prevignano and Thibault 2002:€22) claims that the analyst “al-
ways needs a prior analysis of context”, and should therefore collect as much “eth-
nographic” information as possible on the setting being studied. However, most
conversation analysts consider that we should do without “external” interpretative
resources, which may be “misleading” (Heritage 1984:€282): considering that con-
text is an infinite set, all the elements are not interactionally relevant and those
which are will be revealed as such by the participants. At any moment of the inter-
actional process, they can bring to light some specific aspect of context and make
it significant; so the relevant contextual facts are “internalized” to some extent in
the form of “indicators” which allow the analyst to do without external informa-
tion. In this light, context is entirely considered as
something endogenously generated within the talk of the participants and, in-
deed, as something created in and through that talk. (Heritage 1984:€283)
Let us note first of all that even when analysis wants to be purely “internal”, the
analyst always draws on some external information. Take the example of a small
shop: from what point is the mention of context legitimate? As soon as the shop-
keeper “exhibits” his status as shopkeeper, by saying something like “Yes madam?”
or “May I help you?” Yet the question cannot be correctly interpreted without
20. See among others Hymes’ (1972) SPEAKING model or Brown and Fraser’s (1979) model.
21. In textual linguistics, the internal surroundings of a given segment are sometimes called cotext.
22. On “controversy in CA about the proper attitude toward contextual knowledge”, see
Bilmes 1996:€184. Note that this debate reminds us somewhat of the raging textual linguistics
debate in the 70’s.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
knowing that it is occurring in a small shop... Is it necessary to wait until the cus-
tomer says something like “I’d like a loaf of bread” to discover that the scene is
taking place in a bakery (which is an interpretation made possible by a lexical and
“encyclopedic” knowledge that cannot be considered as purely internal)? Such an
attitude of refusing external information can seem rather artificial – all the more
so as the constitution of a corpus, at least when dealing with a “collection” (interac-
tions in small shops, telephone calls, work meetings, etc.), entirely depends on
external criteria... Let us note too that the distinction between endogenous and
exogenous context is entirely dependent on the way the corpus is made up
(for example, for the analyst who only has an audio recording the characteristics
of the setting constitute external information, whereas in a video recording they
form entirely part of the semiotic material which makes up the interaction), and
the way it is delimitated (if we widen the corpus, what is “external” may become
“internal”). The analyst’s first gesture is to isolate a more or less long segment of
talk-in-interaction, but for the members this segment only takes on meaning with
regard to its environment, immediate or not. This initial gesture therefore consti-
tutes a “bias” for the analyst who cannot therefore claim to take on the members’
point of view, especially if he chooses to look no further than the boundaries set by
the sequence on which the analysis is focussed.
Whether in a bakery, or in another setting, participants know where they are
well before “showing” it. And this is the main objection we can make against this
descriptive attitude: it contradicts the principle by which description should be
made as far as possible from “the members’ point of view”; for when they enter a
shop or a classroom, or when they take part in a television show, the members al-
ready have an idea regarding what kind of event they are involved in, and this
mental picture will be called up constantly throughout the interaction.
If taking context into account can be “misleading”, refusal to do so can be even
worse. In a classroom, Heritage reminds us, we can have a non-didactic interac-
tion and the opposite. But it is not because the teacher and pupils (or the doctor
and patient) can from time to time in the classroom (or in the doctors’ office) pro-
duce an exchange which is apparently a conversation between peers that it will
really be one. For example, in the co-constructed narrative taking place in a school
analyzed by Mondada (1998:€252–3), the first ten turns give no explicit indication
as to the status of the teacher; this does not mean, however, that it is a true “peer
interaction”: the “members” are well aware of their respective status (which can be
here considered as “omnirelevant”, cf.€Sacks 1992:€594–596), and this knowledge
cannot help but influence their interpretation of conversational events. Moreover,
when these markers occur, they have to be interpreted, which can only be achieved
on the basis of prior conventionalization. I can understand that a speaker is “doing
being teacher” or “doing being doctor” thanks to the kind of questions he asks; but
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
23. See Garfinkel for “breaching” experiments, and Goffman for “breaking frame” and “fraud-
ulent identity”. We can also think of the fascinating “phoney” character, defined as someone
whose “doings” are not in harmony with his “being”.
24. The notion of “conversational negotiation” appears best suited to deal with the reciprocal
action between what exists before and what emerges during the interaction; on this notion see
for example Roulet 1992 and Kerbrat-Orecchioni 2005: Chap.€2.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
excerpt from a television debate which took place in 2003 between Nicolas Sarkozy
(who was Interior Minister at the time) and Jean-Marie Le Pen (President of the
National Front party)25, and which will give me the chance to go back over the case
of greetings.
Sarkozy has already been on the show for a while and has been confronted
with several members of the political arena. Le Pen makes his entrance, gives a
general greeting, and makes himself comfortable as invited to do so by the host of
the show Olivier Mazerolle (OM):
1 OM: monsieur Sarkozy alors euh Jean-Marie Le Pen président du Front
National est avec nous euh vous allez débattre ensemble bonsoir mon-
sieur Le Pen
2 LP: bonsoir/
3 OM: voilà (.) prenez place (.) monsieur Le Pen […]
1 OM: so Mr Sarkozy euh Jean-Marie Le Pen the president of the National
Front party is here with us euh and you are going to talk together good
evening Mr Le Pen
2 LP: good evening/
3 OM: right then (.) take a seat (.) Mr Le Pen […]
No sooner is he sitting down than he launches into a diatribe against the political-
media world for treating him as an “outcast”. Sarkozy lets him get on with his act
for more than a minute. At the very moment when Le Pen after this general pre-
amble turns towards Sarkozy, getting ready to attack, here is what happens:
4 LP: […] ASP26 monsieu:r/ le ministre de l’Intérieu:r/ vous me donnez
l’impression::/
[ASP]
5 NS: [bonsoir/] monsieur Le Pen
6 LP: bonsoir/ bonsoir monsieu::r eh j’ai dit bonsoir en arrivant/ ASP mais
euh vous étiez inclus collectiv- dans mon bonsoir collectif\
4 LP: […] ASP Mr Minister/ you seem to me::/
[ASP]
5 NS: [good evening/] Mr Le Pen
6 LP: good evening/ good evening si::r eh I did say good evening when I arrived/
ASP but uh you were included collectiv- in my collective greeting\
25. This is the program 100 minutes pour convaincre [100 minutes to convince], France 2,
20th Nov. 2003.
26. ASP signals an audible inspiration.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
I will describe the greeting good evening Mr Le Pen, which appears identically
twice (turns 1OM and 5NS), but with considerably different values due to the dif-
ference in sequential placement in the following way:
As soon as we speak of a “greeting” it is necessary to turn to speech acts theory,
since a greeting is a specific speech act, where the speaker “courteously indicates
that he has recognized the listener”: such is the illocutionary value of so-called
“greeting” utterances, according to Searle (1972:€107)27 who adds that this type of
utterance is subject to the preliminary condition that “speaker and listener have just
met”. This implies that the greeting should normally come at the very beginning of
the interaction: this is in fact the case for the first occurrence of the greeting. This
occurrence is also perfectly orthodox as far as sequencing is concerned: one greet-
ing calls for another one in return (the exchange is “symmetrical”). Let us note,
however, in the reactive move (or if preferred, in the second part of the adjacency
pair), the absence of all term of address and the fact that it is collective (Le Pen ut-
ters this greeting as he walks towards his seat looking at no one in particular).
The greeting delivered by Sarkozy (in 5) is more unusual: on the one hand it
brutally interrupts Le Pen’s speech, on the other hand it arises when Sarkozy and
Le Pen have been engaged in conversation for a while, it can therefore be consid-
ered as “misplaced” – but in part only for as Le Pen had until this point not been
addressing Sarkozy exclusively, we can accept that “Mr Interior Minister” marks
the beginning of a new interaction, embedded in the previous one (a “dilogue”
finds itself embedded in a “polylogue”).
The question is whether in a case like this a new exchange of greetings is nec-
essary. Nothing is less sure: our ritual system is uncertain here, and the greeting is
far from expected (in any case for Le Pen, whose norms apparently diverge from
Sarkozy’s on this point, the greeting is totally unexpected). Nevertheless, due to its
very specific placement, Sarkozy’s “good evening”, without ceasing to be a greeting,
also serves as an indirect act of reproach. This value is the result of implicit reason-
ing like this: in engaging in an exchange with me you should have greeted me first,
but you did not, so you lack good manners. It is also reinforced by intonation
(markedly more rising than in turn 1OM), and also by the expression of triumph
used by Sarkozy to welcome Le Pen’s reactive “good evening” (nodding his head up
and down with a little smile), which is a sort of retroactive clue as to the indirect
meaning of the reproach.
Sarkozy’s utterance therefore receives a double illocutionary force: the force of
a greeting conventionally attached to the “good evening”, and the force of a re-
proach which emerges in this particular context. It calls for a double reaction,
27. In fact, the “essential condition” of the greeting is rather that “the speaker indicates to the
addressee that he has recognized him and/or intends to engage in a verbal exchange with him”.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
which indeed comes: obliged to return the greeting (which he repeats not without
some annoyance), Le Pen also feels that he must justify his behavior (“I did say
good evening when I arrived but you were included in my collective greeting”: his
reaction to the reproach). Other interactional values (“perlocutionary” for speech
acts theory) come along on top of these two illocutionary values, for example: The
unexpected irruption of the greeting will upset the exchange and unsettle the op-
ponent, as we can see in 7LP –€cut off in mid sentence, Le Pen is clearly thrown
off balance, for at the end of his turn he is victim of a failure followed by a repair
(“you were included in my collectiv- in my collective greeting”), which is not like
him. In addition, this greeting will invalidate what has come before: since a greet-
ing should normally appear at the very beginning of the exchange, what came be-
fore will to some extent become null and void; in this way Sarkozy suggests that
the general preamble should not have taken place, and that Le Pen should have
addressed him personally right from the beginning (Sarkozy’s reproach also con-
cerns this point).
In order to describe what happens at this moment of the interaction we can
also call on face-work theory: A greeting is in principle an act of “courtesy” (see
Searle’s definition above), in that it constitutes a “face flattering€act” (FFA), which
is obviously the case with the host’s “good evening Mr Le Pen” (the politeness of
the greeting is reinforced here by the term of address). But the FFA is seriously
harmed by the way in which the greeting is used by Sarkozy afterwards, as a “face
threatening act” (FTA) interfering with the greeting, namely the reproach aggra-
vated by the interruption: Le Pen is severely reprimanded by Sarkozy and is obliged
to justify his behavior like a naughty child (he is clearly placed in a low position by
the reproach which is addressed to him). In such an example the threatening com-
ponent is stronger than the flattering component and even cancels it out (here we
have a sample of this “courteous delegitimization” which has been identified as one
of Sarkozy’s favorite debating strategies).
Finally we could call on Goffman for his work on “presentation of self ” and
correlative construction of self-image and of that of others throughout the interac-
tion: in this way Sarkozy, killing two birds with one stone, uses the greeting to
show that he is a polite debater (even if this politeness is rather suspect here), and
to label his opponent as having an unmannerly ethos. We can call upon Goffman
again for the notions he has introduced in order to describe the “participation
framework” –€in this example the setting is complex as we are dealing with a media
interaction, the exchange taking place on the TV set is in fact a show intended for
another party: the audience, who for the most part, we can imagine are overjoyed
at the trick Sarkozy has played on Le Pen, who has the reputation of being a very
skilled debater.
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
Obviously when necessary other tools can be called upon depending on the
needs of the description. But this short example allows us to get some idea as to
what an eclectic, and correlatively syncretic approach can mean, as it draws on de-
scriptive resources taken from diverse fields of analysis and puts them together.
This eclecticism is justified by the fact that discourse, and more especially dis-
course-in-interaction, functions on different levels which are both distinct and
articulated (management of turns-at-talk, semantic-pragmatic coherence of the
dialogue, global as well as local organization, face-work and ritualistic constraints),
one same item working simultaneously on several levels, for example:
– In “Can you close the door please?”, please acts as both a marker of illocution-
ary derivation (confirming the question’s indirect request value which is al-
ready suggested by the conventionalization of the structure and by the extral-
inguistic context), and as a softener of the face threatening act that the request
constitutes.
– In “I’d just like a baguette”, the adverb just firstly serves to prospectively organ-
ize the interaction by projecting that the transaction will merely consist of one
purchase and that the shop assistant will have no need to ask “anything else?”
afterwards. “Just” also has a ritualistic purpose: it is a kind of apology (the
customer is sorry for issuing such a banal request); this adverb tends to appear
systematically, in this context of small shops, when the request is for a product
whose value is inferior to an agreed norm, defined according to either the av-
erage of the other transactions carried out in this setting or more locally to the
prior transaction.
4. Concluding remarks
CA has established the golden rule of absolute respect of data, which should be
observed “carefully, closely, seriously, open-mindedly” (Schegloff 1999:€581). For
us, “open-mindedly” means that we can make use of all available analytical re-
sources, as long as they are compatible and adapted to both the object and the
objective of the description. Thus, I have tried to show that in order to account
effectively for what happens in interactions, it is often desirable –€and indeed in
some cases even essential€– to include theoretical propositions from different par-
adigms (for example, we cannot do without the notion of speech act to describe
the sequential organization of a conversation, or the notion of face-work to de-
scribe preference organization).
In their introduction to (On) Searle on conversation (1992:€ 5), Parret and
Verschueren evoke “the classical debate concerning the complementarity or the
exclusivity of different orientations within pragmatics”. Personally, I am inclined to
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
favor complementarity, which makes description much richer and more exciting,
albeit less “pure” –€if any approach can ever be totally pure: no model is made up
of exclusively endogenous notions, for concepts spread out, migrate and cross
school and even disciplinary boundaries (as the notion of “interaction” itself il-
lustrates). This commitment in favor of complementarity (that is “eclectism”) is
not without risks, as regards the global coherence of the description. The problem
of how to connect the different layers of analysis, and how to put together a kind of
“integrated model” which would take into account the different constraints that
condition the construction of conversations (“technical” constraints such as turn-
taking, linguistic constraints, ritualistic and cognitive constraints too...) also arises.
This point can perhaps be considered premature.28 To conclude, I would rather
come back to the question of interpretation, which is central to discourse analysis.
As we consider like Gumperz (in Eerdmans, Prevignano and Thibault 2002:€150)
that the analysis of discourse-in-interaction’s main objective is to try to understand
“how speakers understand each other”, we must accept the leitmotiv of conversa-
tion analysis whereby the analysis should “take on the members’ point of view”. But
what exactly should we understand by that? Not that the analyst’s job is the same as
that of the participants: the conditions in which these two categories of interpreters
find themselves are different in all respects. With regard to the “members”, the ana-
lyst is both at a disadvantage (he generally does not have all the relevant contextual
information at hand)29 and at an advantage as he has time (to review the recording
at leisure, and continue to discover new relevant details), and a full set of theoretical
tools and descriptive categories, which are never “natural” ones.30 They are catego-
ries which have been constructed in the context of a specific theory – TCUs, adja-
cency pairs, preliminaries, repairs, etc. are certainly not “membership categories”;
and even apparently “commonsense” categories such as “turn” or “interruption”
must be redefined and refined in order to become operative.
Clearly this does not mean either that the analyst leaves full responsibility of
interpretative work to the members: even if the conversation sometimes carries
“metaconversational” elements, it goes without saying that the presence in the cor-
pus of a term like “request” or “interruption” is not in any way a necessary condi-
tion (nor even in some cases a sufficient one) for identifying a request or an inter-
ruption. To adopt the members’ point of view can only mean that the analyst’s
28. See, however, Roulet et al.’s “modular” model (Roulet, Fillietaz and Grobet 2001) which
proposes an integrated representation of the different constitutive dimensions of all kinds of
discourse, be it monological or dialogical.€
29. Unless he himself also took part in the interaction, which in turn creates other problems.
30. See Segerdahl 2003:€95€; and Schmale 2008 on folk conceptions of conversation (the study
shows how far they are from scientists’ conceptions).
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
31. For an example of this confidence in the “transparency of understanding”, see LeBaron and
Koschman 2003 (where they talk above all about gestures which accompany verbal material
–€gestures which are more or less iconic, therefore effectively more or less “transparent”, but the
authors do not even discuss this very fundamental point). This text also illustrates the fact that
what appears today to be a sort of denial of the semiotic process goes hand in hand with the dread
of “mentalism” and the obsession of “objective” analysis (like in the good old days of distribu-
tionalism and behaviorism).
32. The linear nature of interpretative work does not rule out the possibility of “retro-interpretation”.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
the analyst’s task will be. For example, when dealing with a TV talk show he has to
take into account not only the different participants in the studio but also the audi-
ence, which is made up of “members” whose understanding is not made “available”
during the communicative event, and which is most heterogeneous. How these
different participants interpret the interaction depends on their point of view (in
every sense of the word) on the interactional scene, as well as on their background
information, which cannot be completely reconstructed by the analyst.
To finish, let us remember that the process of collective discourse construction
is first made possible by the linguistic and more generally communicative compe-
tence of the participants, that means their knowledge of all kinds of conventions
which are pre-existent to discourse (these rules that “generate the sequences”, to
come back to Sacks quoted at the beginning of this article) and which are continu-
ously activated and negotiated throughout – but no negotiation would be possible
without a prior set of rules (which can themselves be subject to negotiation). If the
progression of the exchange develops in such a tentative way, by incessant failures
and repairs, this relentless search for the correct word, the appropriate expression
and the right construction proves very clearly the existence of a system of rules
that have been internalized by the participants in the interaction, and to which
they do their best to conform. The analysis constantly refers (consciously or not,
explicitly or not) to these rules – grammatical rules, pragmatic rules such as those
which regulate speech acts, or lexical rules such as those on which activities of
“categorization” are founded: for example, a speaker can categorize his emotional
state via the term “angry” and its conventional meaning; if he says later that he is
“furious”, we will be led to conclude that he “recategorizes” his state, even in the
absence of any marker such as “I am even furious”, because we know that in Eng-
lish, the terms “angry” and “furious” are not synonymous. In other words: dis-
course analysts constantly make use of their linguistic knowledge; study of “lan-
guage system” and study of “language uses and practices” are to be seen as
definitely complementary.
We cannot seriously claim that language reinvents itself in each moment of
discourse. What is problematic, however, is knowing to what extent the linguistic
system is affected by interaction and more particularly with regard to turn-taking
constraints (given that language use is far from being limited to interactive con-
texts). This question is today under debate within CA (see for example Ochs,
Schegloff and Thompson 1996). Schegloff is cautious about this point (saying in
Prevignano and Thibault eds. 2003, 168: “it seems to me too early to offer ‘answers’
to these questions”), whereas others go so far as to claim that “language is interac-
tionally structured”, and that “linguistic resources […] are shaped by interactional
principles” (Mondada 2000:€24). This point needs to be clarified, therefore, just as
the question as to what we should understand by “emergent” grammar (Hopper
Catherine Kerbrat-Orecchioni
1988, Streeck 1996) –€we can wonder if this term really means anything different
than the traditional idea that the language system is nothing but a sedimentation
of language use,33 as Saussure or Benveniste already said:
C’est dans le discours […] que la langue se forme et se configure. On pourrait dire,
calquant une formule classique: nihil est in lingua quod non prius fuerit in oratione.
(Benveniste 1966:€131)34
These sedimentation phenomena can only be dealt with from a diachronic point
of view. In one particular instance of discourse-in-interaction, what we can ob-
serve is the collective and tentative construction of malleable utterances according
to a set of flexible rules:
Conversation is like playing tennis with a ball made of Krazy Putty that keeps
coming back over the net in a different shape. (David Lodge, Small World, Penguin
Books, 1985:€25)
References
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Aston (ed.), 25–43. Bologna: CLUEB.
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versation analysis. Cambridge: CUP.
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33. Concerning the question as to whether grammar precedes discourse or whether “grammar
is secondary to discourse” (as Hopper asserts, 1988:€121), it reminds us of the sophistic question
about which came first, the chicken or the egg; and regarding the drastic opposition he makes
between two conceptions of grammar, “a priori” vs. “emergent” (supposedly belonging respec-
tively to a “structuralist” vs. “hermeneutic” ideology), this is made possible by caricaturing the
first conception as being “a deterministic view of grammar as a static, prioristic, complete sys-
tem” (ibid.: 132), which no one has ever advocated.
34. “It is in discourse […] that the language is formed and configured. […]. One could say, to
borrow a classical formula: nothing exists in language that was not before in discourse”.
The case for an eclectic approach to discourse-in-interaction
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Duranti, Alessandro and Goodwin, Charles (eds.). 1992. Rethinking Context. Cambridge: CUP.
Eerdmans, Susan L., Previgano, Carlo L. and Thibault, Paul J. (eds.). 2002. Language and Interac-
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Fetzer, Anita and Meierkord, Christiane (eds.). 2002. Rethinking Sequentiality. Amsterdam/
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Goffman, Erving. 1981: Forms of Talk. Oxford: Blackwell.
Goodwin, Charles. 1981. Conversational organization: Interaction between Speakers and Hearers.
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Gumperz, John. 2002. “Response essay”. In Eerdmans et al. (eds.) 2002, 105–126.
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Heritage, John. 1995. “Conversation Analysis. Methodological aspects”. In Aspects of Oral Com-
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in Context: Connecting Observation and Understanding, Deborah Tannen (ed.), 117–134.
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House, Juliane. 2000. “Understanding misunderstanding: A pragmatic-discourse approach to
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35–71. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Wilson.
Kerbrat-Orecchioni, Catherine. 1990–1992–1994. Les interactions verbales (3 vol.). Paris: A.€Colin.
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Grammar
A neglected resource in interaction analysis?
Our aim in this paper is to explore the variety of ways in which grammar can
be used as a resource for interaction. We propose that a grammatical analysis
of social interaction needs to take two perspectives into account. The first
involves showing how the meaning of a grammatical unit depends on its
context of use (Schegloff 1996). The second involves identifying speakers’
specific choices of grammatical categories (e.g., verbs, nouns, etc.) and showing
how these categories combine to create specific inference-rich meanings
(Halliday 1978, 1994). Drawing from couples therapy data, we show that by
adopting grammatical categories into our analysis, a unique perspective on the
moment-to-moment unfolding of therapy can be provided.
1. Introduction
resource used in social interaction1 (see Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson 1996). One
major line of research in this regard focuses on grammatical projectability in turn
taking. In this work, grammar is seen as an interactional resource that allows speak-
ers to project (i.e., infer) actions in progress and possible turn completions (Good-
win 1986; Sacks, Schegloff and Jefferson’s 1974; Schegloff 1996). Moreover, since
different languages may use different clause formats, a speaker’s ability to project
turn completions may depend on the language being spoken (see Thompson and
Couper-Kuhlen (2005) for a comparison of English and Japanese).
To those linguists who adopt a functional approach to language – who have an
interest in language in use – this endorsement of grammar from conversation ana-
lysts is certainly welcome. But for all the renewed interest in words and the gram-
matical formats of turns and turn constructional units, conversation analysts still
seem to be somewhat wary about the extent to which grammar, and linguistic
categories/concepts in particular, may play a role in explaining social interaction.
There are, presumably, many reasons for why grammar has an equivocal status.
One reason involves the conversation analytic tenet that any analysis of social in-
teraction must be sensitive to participants’ orientations to meanings. This means
that if categories are imported into an analysis, the analyst must demonstrate that
conversational participants are in some way orienting to these categories. As a re-
sult, linguistic categories such as Agent, Subject, Modality, Theme can only form
part of an analysis if these categories can be shown to be interactionally relevant to
the conversational participants and to the trajectory of the interaction.2 A second
reason stems from Schegloff ’s (1984) observation that there is no one-to-one rela-
tionship between grammatical structure and social action. For example, a turn
containing a wh-interrogative (“why don’t you come and see me sometimes”) does
1. It should be noted that in systemic linguistics, words (i.e., lexis) and grammar are consid-
ered to be part of the same phenomenon, with lexis being the most delicate realization of the
grammar (see Hasan 1987).
2. An even stronger constraint on analyst categories comes from the conversation analytic
view on social context and sociological variables. Schegloff takes a very strong position on this
issue, arguing that all interpretations of the data must be endogenously grounded in the details
of talk-in-interation; for, as Schegloff (1997:€165) very forcefully argues in his abstract, “…this is
a useful constraint on analysis in disciplining work to the indigenous preoccupations of the
everyday world being grasped, and serving as a buffer against the potential for academic and
theoretical imperialism which imposes intellectual’s preoccupations on a world without respect
to their indigenous resonance.” To put it briefly, Schegloff is arguing against “critical discursive”
research that assumes certain sociological variables such as gender or class to be relevant to the
text, without first having looked at the text. Schegloff ’s position is to examine the details of the
text first, and then see if any meaningful links can be made to such sociological variables. From
this we can assume that any links postulated between grammar and social interaction will be put
to the same test.
Grammar
3. The complete question was: “From your perspective, could you clarify the bi-directional
relationship between the levels of grammar, or linguistic forms, and turns in conversation and
their organization? In other words, how do you see constraints emanating from the level of
grammar operating in relation to turn-taking in conversation and the construction of turns,
and, secondly, how does turn-taking impinge on grammar and its specific contribution?”
(Prevignano and Thibault 2003:€167)
Peter Muntigl and Eija Ventola
In the remainder of this paper, we attempt to explore the concept of social in-
teraction from an SFL perspective, by showing how speakers draw on grammatical
resources in situations of meaning making. In particular, we focus on three differ-
ent modes of the grammar that are commonly referred to as interpersonal, idea-
tional and textual (see Halliday 1994). We aim also to make links with studies in
conversation analysis (hereafter CA) and CA-related approaches that have an in-
terest in the meaning making potential of grammar. Our goal, therefore, is not
simply to illustrate that the grammar is functionally-oriented, but also to show
that, in Schegloff ’s (1996) sense, that the grammar is “positionally sensitive” to the
interactional context in which it occurs.
specific hour/minute/second did you forget?) or “how long did your forgetting
take?”4 Through various forms of grammatical tests we can tease out the behav-
iour of verbs and determine whether they construe states (know, believe), activi-
ties (run, walk), accomplishments (paint a picture, make a table) or achievements
(win a race, realize).5,
Functional linguists would also call attention to the kind of situation or event
that the clause and/or verb is bringing into existence (e.g., Dik 1997; Halliday 1994;
van Valin and Lapolla 1997). But, as someone more interested in discourse (and
less in clause grammar) may ask, how would knowing that a verb construes a state
or activity tell us anything about a social interaction? Wouldn’t this just merely be
a linguist’s concern in sorting out verb typologies? We would argue that it cer-
tainly can be a participant’s concern. Consider example (1), taken from a couples
therapy session. The transcript notation used for all examples is shown in Table€1.
4. Coulter was principally arguing against cognitive science views of the ‘mental’, in which
remembering and forgetting are viewed as processes that involve storage, retrieval, etc. Coulter’s
point is that our grammar reveals that we do not understand these terms as being activities.
5. This typology of verb-types is taken from Vendler (1967). Ryle (1949) proposed similar
categories such as ‘act-verb’, ‘achievement-verb’ and ‘success-verb’.
Grammar
(1) 1 Ther: a::nd ((directs gaze at S)) what was the occasion of your,
2 [(0.5) ]
3 Ther: [((shifts gaze towards M)) ]
4 Ther: split. (in February)
→ 5 Mark: domestic violence.
6 Mark: ((gazes at T, slightly raises eyebrows when saying “domestic”))
The therapist asks Mark what caused (i.e., occasioned) Mark and Stacey’s (Mark’s
spouse) separation, to which Mark replies “domestic violence.” Now, although
Mark does not supply an actual ‘verb’, we may infer an activity-type event realized
in the nominalized form of “violence” in which a certain kind of (violent) action
has taken place. Furthermore, there is the implication that there are two ‘partici-
pants’ involved in the action: this would be someone doing the action and someone
(or something) to whom the action is done. From the classifier “domestic”, we may
also infer that the violence is done to someone, and in this particular case it is more
specifically an act of spousal violence. But, the way it stands, we do not know from
Mark’s response who was violent to whom. This information is left unspecified.
In order to show that it is not just us analysts but more importantly it is the
therapist who is also orienting to these implied meanings, let us examine from
example (2) what immediately follows.
(2) 7 Ther: o:kay. ((makes ‘body’ nod, nodding head and leg))
8 (1.8) ((maintains gaze with M))
9 Ther: on uh,
10 (1.0)
→ 11 Ther: on yer part?
What the therapist does in line 11 is prompt Mark to expand on his response
(see Muntigl and Hadic Zabala 2008 on therapist prompts), and the Therapist does
so by designing his prompt so as to grammatically latch onto Mark’s noun phrase:
“domestic violence … on yer part?” The prompt targets the ‘who to whom’ infor-
mation and one could well imagine that this sort of information may be important
for a therapist in sorting out the degree of violence in the relationship.€What this
brief example shows is that speakers are attuned to how experience gets construed
and they will, therefore, pay close attention to the grammar of these construals.
The therapist worked to unpack the unspecified yet inferable information deriving
from the nominalized term “domestic violence”.6 Other relevant information
6. Now, of course, conversation analysts are aware that terms and categories are inference-rich
(see Sacks 1992). In CA terms, the production of membership categories such as ‘boyfriend’ or
‘girlfriend’ will immediately make relevant specific meanings. In a similar vein, Potter (1996)
argues that certain terms carry with them certain category entitlements that can map onto certain
Peter Muntigl and Eija Ventola
associated with the expression “domestic violence” was also elicited by the thera-
pist later on in the sequence. This included ‘what form the violence took’ (pushing
Stacey through the door backwards), ‘how the violence came about’ (initiated by
drinking) and ‘the result of the violent episode’ (physical injury).
To sum up, although we whole-heartedly agree with the general claim made
within CA that sequence and turn-taking organization provides the architecture
for negotiating meaning and intersubjectivity (Heritage 1984a; Schegloff 2007), we
would also add that the grammar, and what we will be later referring to as interper-
sonal, ideational and textual grammar, can influence how a sequence of social ac-
tions gets played out. For the remainder of this paper, we show how Hallidayan
functional linguistics offers some powerful conceptual tools with which one can
identify ‘grammars in use’.
social roles or epistemic rights. Potter (1996:€ 133) provides an example of the differences in
categorizing a ‘newspaper reporter’ as ‘journalist’ or ‘hack’. Whereas the former category can
evoke meanings of ‘objectivity’ and ‘truth’, the latter may instead call to mind contrastive mean-
ings such as ‘subjectivity’ and ‘corruption’. Returning to the therapy example, the term ‘domestic
violence’ is also a category that generates certain kinds of inferences. Our point is that some of
these inferences are bound up with the grammar of violence, as in ‘X does Y to Z’ where ‘does Y’
is a violent act, X is the doer and Y is the one to whom the violent act is done. Further, violent
acts can be construed as having causes and results. A nominalization, however, leaves a range of
meanings unspecified and in this way opens the door to their future specification and negotia-
tion in the unfolding interaction.
Grammar
Ideationally, the speaker is construing experience in terms of how she views her
husband’s behaviour. This construal is realized in three parts. He is given the par-
ticipant role of ‘behaver’, likes to lecture realizes a ‘behavioural process’ and on any:
any subject that… realizes the ‘aboutness’ of the husband’s behaviour. Interperson-
ally, the clause is a highly evaluative statement about the husband. Evaluation is
accomplished by linking the husband’s behaviour with meanings such as desire
and strong inclination. Through these links the husband’s behaviour may gain the
interpretation of being overly persistent and extreme or not quite ‘normal’. Textu-
ally, the clause places the husband in thematic position, with the new information
realizing the scope of the husband’s lecturing. In other words, the clause is ‘about’
the husband and the new information involves the husband’s ‘extreme’ or overly
persistent behaviour.
Although, as we mentioned before, all three metafunctions are always ‘in op-
eration’ for any given discourse, the interpersonal dimension does seem to play a
prominent role in social interaction. This is because the interpersonal mode pro-
vides such resources as epistemic modal expressions, social actions and the or-
ganization of actions in sequence. This is very much in keeping with the CA con-
cept of sequence organization as “…the vehicle for getting some activity
accomplished” (Schegloff 2007:€2). The interpersonal mode can thus be seen as a
frame in which the other metafunctions are realized; our ways of construing expe-
rience (ideational) and organizing our message (textual) is framed by our unfold-
ing collaborative actions.
The above illustration served to briefly sketch out the relationship between the
different language functions and the various clause units that helped to realize those
functions. Function, therefore, is closely tied up with the clause and the clause’s
units. Changing the content of a clause (i.e., modifying a clause’s grammatical struc-
ture by inserting a different verbal group or prepositional phrase) will certainly
have an impact on its function. Related to the notion that language is functional is
the claim that language always occurs in some relevant social context or ‘context of
use’. For, according to Halliday (1978:€ 28), “we do not experience language in
isolation – if we did we would not experience it as language – but always in relation
Peter Muntigl and Eija Ventola
to a scenario, some background of persons and actions and events from which the
things which are said derive their meaning.” The term ‘social context’ refers to
something very different from aspects of the material environment in which people
interact. Instead, social context is an abstract concept that corresponds to “first,
what is actually taking place; secondly, who is taking part; and thirdly, what part the
language is playing” (Halliday 1978:€31). The first aspect of social context, what is
actually taking place, is termed ‘field’ and refers to the subject matter and social ac-
tivity that people are co-producing. For example, W’s clause above may be said to be
realizing the social activity of complaining about her husband (see all of example
(3) to convince yourself of this). The second aspect, who is taking part, refers to the
social roles of all participants, which include status differences and the degree of
social distance and affect found between participants. The third and final aspect,
what part the language is playing, refers to the ‘mode’ of the interaction. Relevant
aspects of mode include the medium (does the interaction involve writing or speak-
ing?) and channel (are both visual and aural channels open to all participants?). It is
important to emphasize that social context is a dynamic concept; that is, social roles,
social activity, and mode of interaction are not static and nor do they in some way
come before language. Rather, social context and language unfold together. Just as
certain language selections can construct and alter the social activity or the social
roles of the speakers, so do the already co-constructed social activities and social
roles influence how language will be used. The aim in any analysis of text is to begin
at both ends and not assume that the social context is somehow ‘given’ and will ex-
ercise its influence over the unfolding of the whole text.
In order to take stock of how people collaboratively make meaning, or inter-
act, we need to take how speakers use linguistic resources into account; that is, we
need to be able to describe how speakers are using grammatical resources with
respect to ideational, interpersonal and textual meanings. In the next sections, we
explicate the role these resources have in the meaning-making process.
7. This does not mean that meanings are only realized in major clauses. Minor clauses such as
exclamations, calls, greetings and alarms also realize metafunctional meanings (Halliday
1994:€95). These minor clauses, however, tend to be mono-functional and not tri-functional.
Grammar
→ 23 as tuh whether or not what we’re seeing here is this particular
pattern
→ 24 .hh umm which is leading tuh the kinda communication
→ 25 that (both) you’re talking about.hh
→ 26 your experience Wendy Sue.hh is of uh living with a man
→ 27 who has a lecturing style
28 Wen: yes
→ 29 Ther: who talks to you cons-
30 excuse me if I I’m relating back in her ways.hh ahh
→ 31 who who lectures you constantly.hh
→ 32 who goes on about things bove and beyond the point
→ 33 of being [resolved ] when they’re already resolved
34 Wen: [yes ]
35 Wen: yes
.
.
.
36 Ther: [(what perhaps would you create tuh) ]
37 Wen: [I would agree I I would agree with that ]
38 Fred: [that’s uh ( ) ]
39 Wen: I jus I just want tuh give up an and just say yes
40 Ther: okay I wanna I wanna talk about that
41 I wanna talk in the little bit of the time that we have left about um
42 about that particular pattern.hh
43 um m: maybe since you’re speaking about I’ll ask you um.hh
44 what are y- impact or effect.hh does this lecturing style that you
45 experience from Fred
46 what does- what impact does that have on you.hh as a person
47 Wen: .hh oh well I it makes me feel like uh a child?.hh
48 to a certain degree.hh it makes me feel
49 like I’m (1.0) I I’m ignorant
50 that I can’t grasp it quickly.hh umm
One key component of Ex. (3) involves a therapist (re)formulation of a client’s turn
(lines 18–33). The term formulation is taken from Heritage and Watson (1979:€141)
and refers to “the provision of candidate readings for the sense established in pre-
ceding stretches of talk”. These candidate readings generally do the work of provid-
ing the gist or an upshot of what a previous speaker had said (for examinations of
formulations in therapy see Antaki 2008; Antaki et al. 2005; Buttny 1996; Davis
1986; Hak and de Boer 1996; Muntigl 2004a, 2007). We feel that formulations are
Grammar
With this metafunction, an SFL analysis begins to part company with CA. In an
ideational analysis, specific attention is given to what is called the transitivity struc-
ture of each of the clauses that comprise a turn and the conjunctive meanings that
link clauses together (Halliday 1994, 2005[1967, 1968]). This essentially means
identifying the conjunctive, verbal, nominal, adverbial and prepositional elements
of each clause. For analyzing social interaction, however, the point of doing this
kind of analysis is not simply to identify how often a certain verb, noun, preposi-
tion, etc. occurs. Instead, these grammatical structures are analyzed for their func-
tions and for their ‘positional sensitivity’ or ‘function within the exchange’.
Within ideational grammar, formulations are interpreted in a way that bears simi-
larity to CA. They are rhetorical/conjunctive relations that function to summarize
and/or clarify what a speaker had formulated in a previous turn (Muntigl 2004a, 2007).
If we turn now to the specifics of the therapist’s formulation, two linguistic resources
play an especially important function in summarizing Wendy’s meanings. The first
corresponds to relational verbs (e.g., ‘to be’, ‘exemplify’, ‘represent’, ‘equals’) in which
two entities are placed in an identifying relationship (‘x’ = ‘y’). The second is T’s use of
grammatical metaphor (Halliday 1987, 1994, 1998), in which the client’s construal of
experience becomes grammatically more abstract (e.g., turning a Process into a Par-
ticipant; that is, a verb becoming a noun or adjective).
One significant difference between the speakers’ use of ideational resources
involves process (i.e., verb) type. Whereas Wendy construes experience in terms of
action or behavioural verbs (e.g., to lecture, go on and on, pressed his point), the
therapist construes experience in terms of relational verbs (e.g., “is”). The rela-
tional verb allows him to equate two ‘thing’-like phenomena. For example, the
therapist equates his experience with “a pattern” (line 19), everyone’s experience
with “this particular pattern” (line 23) and Wendy’s experience with a number of
Fred’s behaviours (lines 26–33). From the ‘x’ side of the relational clause equation,
the therapist moves from ‘my experience’ to ‘our experience’ to ‘Wendy’s experi-
ence’. On the ‘y’ side, Wendy’s prior formulation moves from ‘a pattern’ to ‘this
particular pattern’ to ‘the features of the pattern’. The summarizing component of
the Therapist’s formulation consists of his narrowing down what Wendy had
Grammar
‘X’ = ‘Y’
Another important aspect of the formulation includes how the client’s talk be-
comes modified. In particular, the therapist does not simply repeat what Wendy
had said; instead, he reworks her wordings by placing some wordings in a new
grammatical context. For example, “he likes to lecture?...” in line 07 (repeated in
line 09) is transformed into “…a man who has a lecturing style.” Grammatically,
Wendy’s construal of Fred as doing lecturing is changed into ‘lecturing’ as being an
attribute of Fred. This type of transformation is commonly referred to as gram-
matical metaphor (Halliday 1994; 1998). Note, however, that the therapist does
unpack lecturing style later on in his turn, reinstating lecturing to its original dy-
namic interpretation of “lectures you constantly” and “goes on about things.” But,
as will be discussed shortly, ‘lecturing style’ in its metaphorical attributive form
retains a high level of interactional relevance and has significant implications for
the ensuing conversation.
To sum up, the therapist’s use of ideational grammar serves a number of inter-
active functions. First, the relational verb structures provide a recurring frame for
much of the summarizing work performed by the therapist. Second, transitivity
resources such as grammatical metaphor are used to modify Wendy’s original de-
scription of Fred (i.e., lecturing → lecturing style). Third, the unique clausal con-
structions help to organize the therapist’s noticing and subsequent formulation as
a newsworthy event. This last function, however, forms part of the textual
metafunction and will be discussed in more detail below.
position’ of the clause and the new information in speech tends to realized via in-
tonation (see Halliday 1994:€296). Thematic progressions can be examined for any
given conversational sequence if we identify the themes within speaker turns. The
topical themes (i.e., the ideational component of the theme) contained within
Wendy’s script formulation and the therapist’s formulation are shown in Table€2
(lines 1–33).
By examining the topical themes of Wendy’s clauses, it immediately becomes
apparent that her husband is most often realized in theme position. In the major-
ity of cases, Wendy’s husband serves as the point of departure for her assessments.
For Wendy, thematic development does not consist of a change in her ‘point of
departure’, but of consistently maintaining the same point of departure throughout
her turn. In this way, she is able to build up a gradually increasing negative assess-
ment of her husband.
The topical themes of the Therapist’s formulation mark a different kind of pro-
gression. No longer is Fred the point of departure of the message. Instead, ‘seeing/
experiencing’ or ‘the therapist’s perspective’ is commonly made the theme. In oth-
er words, through these new themes the therapist is able to re-direct the trajectory
of the talk such that what the clients and the therapist ‘see’ or ‘experience’ is placed
under negotiation. Relational clauses, especially thematic equatives (or pseudo-cleft
sentences) of the form “what I’m starting tuh see here is…”, are often used by
speakers for thematic purposes (Halliday 1994:€42).
We now turn to the aspect of new information or, more specifically, the way in
which the therapist orients to the general issue of what is newsworthy. First of all,
we should point out that much of Wendy’s script orients to the ‘typicality’ or ‘non-
news’ character of Fred’s behaviour; that is, Fred has ‘always’ lectured and, from
Wendy’s perspective, this is not ‘front page headline’ material. But, what is deemed
unremarkable for the speaker may, by contrast, be highly newsworthy for the ad-
dressee. First, and perhaps most obvious, is the therapist’s mention of a pattern. In
this way, the therapist announces that he has identified something therapeutically
relevant; that is, his noticing constitutes a new way of looking at Fred’s lecturing,
not merely as ‘typical’ behaviour but something that is deserving of more attention
within a therapeutic context. Further, the therapist’s noticing of a pattern also
Grammar
projects future talk that specifies the news, in the similar way that pre-announce-
ment sequences do (Terasaki 2004). The pattern, therefore, will need to be ‘un-
packed’ and elaborated upon. Newsworthiness is also realized in the verbal group
“starting to see”; that is, by explicitly stating that he is “starting to…”, the therapist
implies that he has just, at that moment, come to see/notice/realize something that
was not available to him before. The newsworthiness, therefore, comes from his
sudden ability to make an important, therapeutically relevant, inference.
nominal group (i.e., participant) of a clause (“what are y- impact or effect.hh does
this lecturing style that you experience from Fred what does what impact does that
have on you.hh as a person”). As a result “this lecturing style” (also realized by
“that” on line 46) becomes reconstrued as an Agent that impacts on/affects Wendy.
Reformulating “lecture” into “a lecturing style”, therefore, creates certain interac-
tional possibilities for both the therapist and Wendy. For this therapist nominal-
izing “lecture” allowed him to construe lecturing as an agentive participant that
influences Wendy’s life. This unfolding activity of reformulating problems for the
purpose of exploring their causal influences has been well documented in Muntigl
(2004a, 2004b). Furthermore, this specific therapist activity relates to what is
known in narrative therapy as externalizing the problem in order to unpack nega-
tive identity conclusions (for overviews of narrative therapy see White and Epston
1990; White 2001). If we view this process grammatically, it transforms Wendy’s
formulation of ‘Fred lectures’ into simply ‘lecturing’, leaving the doer of the lectur-
ing unspecified – note that the therapist does not say “Fred’s lecturing style”, which
would merely have been a nominalized version of what Wendy had said before. So,
by ‘de-thematizing’ Fred, the therapist is able to uncouple the strong association
that Wendy makes between Fred and his lecturing behaviour. The behaviour
(i.e., the lecturing) rather than the person is placed into the foreground.
The practices of nominalizing, construing experience through ‘causal’
grammatical structures and using relational verbs to connect up different ‘par-
ticipants’ also plays a significant part in linking different domains of the cli-
ents’ experience (see also Peräkylä 2004). These practices also helped to pro-
duce a substantially expanded ‘grammar of lecturing’. In order to show how
domains of experience and grammatical realization of lecturing are mutually
constitutive of each other, let us first consider the way in which Wendy’s initial
script formulation was entirely focussed on Fred. It should be noted, however,
that although Wendy clearly was the target of Fred’s lecturing, this was never
expressed explicitly as such. This can be seen from if we take a sample of
Wendy’s clauses:
a. he likes to lecture? (1.2) on any: any subject
b. he likes to lecture and and go on and on and on and on about it
Notice that there is no ‘complement’ to the verb ‘lecture’; that is, Wendy does not say
“he likes to lecture me…”. Fred’s lecturing, therefore, is formulated as a general ac-
tivity, done to various people (including Wendy) in various situations. So, although
we can infer that Wendy construes Fred as a lecturer, the link to herself as the
repeated target of the lecturing is often not made explicit (with the exception of the
‘I thought X, but Y happened’ trope she provides towards the end of her script).
Grammar
One of the things that the therapist does in the subsequent turn is tighten up
this link between Wendy’s experience and Fred’s behaviour. Consider the follow-
ing formulations made by the therapist:
a. your experience Wendy Sue.hh is of uh living with a man who has a lecturing
style
b. who who lectures you constantly
In clause ‘a’, an identifying relationship is made between Wendy’s experience and
the lecturing, and in clause ‘b’, the complement of lecturing is specified (“lectures
you…”). By placing the focus on Wendy’s experience and by specifying Wendy as
the target of Fred’s lecturing, the therapist personalizes Wendy’s domain of experi-
ence. This means altering descriptions of Fred as a general lecturer, to one who
lectures Wendy specifically.
As a last step, the therapist provides causal connections between ‘the lecturing’
and Wendy’s personal domains of experience on which the lecturing was having a
negative impact; in this way, the meaning and relevance of the lecturing becomes
expanded in that it now also speaks to her feelings of self-worth or self-esteem
(e.g., “it makes me feel like uh a child”; “it makes me feel like I’m ignorant”).
6. Conclusions
One of the guiding principles that both SFL and CA share in common is the insist-
ence that any analysis of social interaction include an examination of speakers’
meaning making resources used to (co-)construct the interaction. In this article,
we have attempted to draw attention to some grammatical resources involved in
meaning making and to show how links can be made between speakers’ gram-
matical selections and the kinds of interactional business these selections can ac-
complish. By taking stock of grammatical selections that are drawn on by a thera-
pist and a client, we were able to develop a ‘grammatical profile’ of the therapeutic
activity and to ascertain the therapist’s professional stock of interactional knowledge
(see Peräkylä and Vehviläinen 2003). This did not simply mean identifying differ-
ent nouns or verbs or counting grammatical structures to see how frequently they
occur. Instead, it meant locating grammatical structures within sequences and ac-
counting for their positional sensitivity. It meant identifying what interactional
business the grammatical selections perform and what kinds of meanings, actions
and activities they projected in the unfolding conversation.
In the course of this paper, we tried to foreground different aspects of the
grammar (interpersonal, ideational and textual) in our analysis. This was done in
Peter Muntigl and Eija Ventola
We might say that we tried to go even further than Halliday by pushing a gram-
matical analysis in the direction of a sequential analysis. Proceeding along the
lines of Schegloff (1996), we were also interested in discovering the grammar’s
positional sensitivity within specific sequential contexts and, more specifically,
what kinds of interactional work the grammar is capable of doing. But in order to
do this, we still need to maintain our focus on the functional grammatical units
that speakers deploy. The challenge for interaction analysts, as we see it, is to oper-
ate at both ends (i.e., grammar & interaction) and to make the appropriate links,
where relevant.
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Researching intercultural communication
Discourse tactics in non-egalitarian contexts
Angel Lin
Faculty of Education, The University of Hong Kong
an exhibition). However, stretching the notion to that far end will not be too useful
for the practical linguistic anthropologist interested in everyday human interac-
tion. I shall therefore focus my analysis on the range of activities that involve some
form of bi- or multi-party, face-to-face meaning-making, which is embedded in
some shared forms of life or ways of living engaged in by the interactants. And
“face-to-face” is to be understood broadly, i.e., can be mediated via some form of
technology, e.g., phone talk, net talk, e-mail talk, etc.
Interaction analysis thus has as its aim the uncovering of the kinds and nature
of the meaning-making, interpretive processes involved and the semiotic resourc-
es drawn upon to enable the achievement of some mutual sense of inter-subjectiv-
ity (i.e., the perception on both/all parties that they achieve the sharing of certain
perspectives with each other/one another). How is this sense of inter-subjectivity
achieved? What is happening when this is not achieved (e.g., in cases of perceived
communication barriers or breakdowns)? What is it that can bring about the over-
coming of the communicative barriers or breakdowns?
Under an interactional conception of language, language should not be seen as
a reified object of study by linguists and language as a bounded concept is an ideo-
logical, theoretical and social construct – born of the activities of armchair lin-
guists and/or political, national unifying/segregating agendas. The analytical focus
should be on how languages as (continuously changing) systems of semiotic re-
sources (among other semiotic systems of resources) are recruited and utilized for,
and at the same time also transformed, during interaction.
While the above brief summary will be familiar to those working in the inter-
pretive traditions of discourse analysis, scholars working in the broader field of
communication and/or intercultural communication might, however, need a brief
introduction to discourse-based approaches. In the next section, key sociological
traditions forming the theoretical backdrop of current discourse-based approach-
es to intercultural communication research will be discussed and John Gumperz’s
contribution to highlighting the interactional nature of everyday communication
and language use will be outlined. Then I shall introduce the central thesis of this
chapter: that discourse-based approaches to intercultural communication provide
helpful frameworks for understanding how power is fluid and mediated through
discourse and meaning-making, and how different social actors located in differ-
ential, hierarchical social positions, and coming from different cultural back-
grounds, can negotiate through discourse for more advantageous positions for
themselves. This thesis will then be delineated through drawing on positioning
theory, (Davies and Harré, 1990; Harré and Langenhove, 1999), a discourse-based
social identity theory, to analyse two examples of intercultural/inter-group com-
munication.
Researching intercultural communication
form of social totality, but social practices ordered across space and time. Human
social activities, like some self-reproducing items in nature, are recursive. That is
to say, they are not brought into being by social actors but continually recreated
by them via the very means whereby they express themselves as actors. In and
through their activities agents reproduce the conditions that make these activities
possible. (Giddens, 1984, p.€2).
compares this approach with the grammarian’s approach: while grammarians ana-
lyse grammatical and ungrammatical sentences and compare them to yield gram-
matical insights, an interactional analyst should analyse both successful commu-
nication events and instances of communication barriers and breakdowns. The
long-term objective is to uncover the methods and procedures that people
(e.g., coming from very different backgrounds or with very different member-
ships) can possibly use to co-construct common methods/procedures of sense-
making, of achieving some perceived (provisional) sense of inter-subjectivity. This
is a theoretical project with important implications for a number of disciplines and
for practical challenges facing us now in an increasingly globalized world of in-
commensurable discourses (with both processes of homogenization and fragmen-
tation taking place). Communication after 911 takes on different meanings – is
communication or sharing some form of consensus possible only among “mem-
bers”? How do “non-members” (e.g., coming from radically different positions,
backgrounds, be it linguistic, racial/ethnic, religious, social, gender, sexuality, gen-
erational) become recognizable to one another as “fellow members” (of shared
humanity) – i.e., recognizable to one another as sharing some common methods
and procedures of meaning-making and co-inhabiting some shared forms of life
(including methods and procedures for resolving conflicts of interests and cul-
tures), no matter how provisional it is?
In this section I shall draw on the analytical resources of positioning theory (Davies
and Harré, 1990; Harré and Langenhove, 1999) to analyse discursive tactics in two
examples presented. In typical colonial encounters, the colonizer discursively po-
sitioned the colonized as a cultural, ethnic and linguistic ‘other’, establishing bi-
nary separation of the colonizer and the colonized and asserting the naturalness
and primacy of the former (Ashcroft, Griffiths and Tiffin, 1998). In both our daily
conversations as well as public discourses such discursive construction of self and
other and of different subject positions for self and other routinely occurs. Posi-
tioning theory (Davies and Harré, 1990) proposes that such subject positions are
linked to our discursively constructed storylines which are constantly being nego-
tiated by different parties:
One speaker can position others by adopting a story line which incorporates a
particular interpretation of cultural stereotypes to which they are ‘invited’ to con-
form, indeed are required to conform if they are to continue to converse with the
first speaker in such a way as to contribute to that person’s story line. Of course,
they may not wish to do so for all sorts of reasons. Sometimes they may not con-
tribute because they do not understand what the story line is meant to be, or
they may pursue their own story line, quite blind to the story line implicit in the
first speaker’s utterance, or as an attempt to resist. Or they may conform because
they do not define themselves as having choice, but feel angry or oppressed or af-
fronted or some combination of these. (Davies and Harré, 1990, p.€7)
makes available ‘a subject position which the other speaker in the normal course
of events would take up.’ (Davies and Harré, 1990, p.€5). Below we shall quote Dav-
ies and Harré (1990) to delineate the key concepts of positioning theory for ana-
lyzing discursive tactics through analyzing the kinds of subject positions and sto-
rylines being both enabled and contested in discourse by different parties:
We shall argue that the constitutive force of each discursive practice lies in its
provision of subject positions. A subject position incorporates both a conceptual
repertoire and a location for persons within the structure of rights for those that
use that repertoire. Once having taken up a particular position as one’s own, a
person inevitably sees the world from the vantage point of that position and in
terms of the particular images, metaphors, story lines and concepts which are
made relevant within the particular discursive practice in which they are posi-
tioned. (Davies and Harré, 1990, p.€3)
In the following case study of Carman Lee (pseudo-name), a Hong Kong busi-
ness executive and her US client on the phone, we seem to be witnessing such ten-
sions in the negotiation of a less or more egalitarian context. Then in Case Two, we
shall look at the discourse tactics of ‘Long Hair’, a grass-root, leftist, democracy fight-
er in Hong Kong, and how he negotiates a more egalitarian discourse context when
interacting with powerful middle class politicians and party leaders in public.
Carman Lee works in a medium-size gift and premium company in Hong Kong.
Her company manufactures and trades gifts and premiums, plastic products, both
generic and tailor-made. They have a factory with 200 workers in China where the
manufacturing takes place, and a marketing and sales office in Hong Kong where
designing of products and negotiations with clients take place. Their clients come
from the Middle East, Europe and their biggest clients are from the US. However,
these US clients seldom come to Hong Kong and they communicate with them
mainly through email. The clients she comes into face-to-face contact with are
mostly from the Middle East (e.g., Dubai), and these are diasporic ethnic Indian
and Pakistani business executives who are very hardworking and very willing to
travel. Some clients are from Europe (e.g., Italy), and when they come she will
speak a few words such as Italian and they will be very happy to hear them; they
will also learn a few phrases in Chinese, such as “Ni hau ma?” (How are you?).
English to her is easier to learn than Mandarin Chinese although she is ethnic
Chinese, because to her Mandarin Chinese comes in a more formal style than
Cantonese, which is her mother tongue (e.g., “go haak hou yiu-kauh” in Canton-
ese; in Mandarin Chinese, one should say: “go haak yiu-kauh hou yimh-gaak” – a
more formal, elaborate style needs to be used).
Her job responsibility lies mainly in sales and marketing; solving the problems
of clients, e.g., helping them to do promotion; e.g., a big pharmaceutical company
wants to use their company logo to design a stationery holder plus a clock; her job
focuses on communication with them; e.g., explain the design, negotiate the price,
and the schedule, etc.
Now with e-mail in very common use, she mostly uses e-mail to communicate
with overseas clients. Thus, more written English than spoken English is used, es-
pecially when they are in the same time zone. On socializing with clients: she
mainly needs to socialize with long-term clients who have become personal
friends; when they come she will take them to lunch; these clients are frequent
visitors to Hong Kong and have visited HK for over 10 years; so, they are very
familiar with the places in Hong Kong; and in dinners with them they will talk
about things such as different education systems in different places.
Researching intercultural communication
The following are excerpts from the interview exchanges conducted in June
2004 between the author and Carman on intercultural communication experi-
ences (the interview was conducted in both Cantonese and English and both par-
ties code-switch naturally in the interview; the following is an English translation
of the exchanges):
Carman: Yes, we have a Hong Kong accent. I care about it a little bit; I feel that it’s
not nice to hear; I’ll learn by imitation; e.g., paying attention to the
English on TV; sometimes when I hear some Hong Kong people speak-
ing English on TV with a distinctive Hong Kong accent I would feel a
bit uncomfortable;… Anson Chan’s (the former high official in Hong
Kong, an ethnic Chinese educated in the University of Hong Kong)
English is okay; and Uncle Tung’s (the former Chief Executive of Hong
Kong) English is not bad either. But I don’t have any problems com-
municating with my clients.
Lin: If you have children, which accents of English do you want them to learn?
Carman: Well, I don’t care much about that; as long as they can communicate, it’s
okay. Because, even within the same country, people have different accents
and you cannot say which ones are the best or more superior. My former
colleague in the bank, when she spoke English we can tell she’s a Hong
Kong person but she is someone who’s speaking rather good English. ….
I think I can handle them (English-speaking foreigners) in my job do-
mains; so I can speak English in certain domains only, e.g., some jargon
related to their culture, which I’m not familiar with; sometimes we
guess each other’s meanings but we can communicate alright. ….
Lin: Have you ever come across any communication difficulties with your
clients?
Carman: In particular I have an Italian client, and he’s very happy when I speak
Italian to him, but my Italian is limited (to several sentences) and English
is not his mother tongue and sometimes he’d say, sorry, my poor Eng-
lish; but we can understand each other alright; speaking is more diffi-
cult, because of loss of meaning or misunderstanding; so before each
meeting his secretary will e-mail the agenda to me first and then after
the meeting he or his secretary will give us the minutes, or we’ll e-mail
him to confirm what has been discussed, to do this, just “for sure”.
I have an Engineering colleague who writes very well in English, and
he’s very good in using simplified English to express technical details
and people can understand his writing clearly.
One incident of difficulty in communication: one time in a very noisy
environment, a long-distance call from a US client, and the topic is
Angel Lin
linguistic or cultural inferior. For instance, she will handle them quite confidently;
e.g., by asking them to spell their names when the pronunciation is not clear. In
doing this, she indicates to the other party that the burden of intercultural com-
munication rests with both parties, and not only on her side and she successfully
uses her discourse tactics to negotiate a more egalitarian intercultural communi-
cation context through projecting a different storyline with more egalitarian sub-
ject positions linked to a moral order under which both parties share equal re-
sponsibilities for making the communication work rather than expecting one
party to lopsidedly accommodate the linguistic demands of the other party. In the
next section we shall use positioning theory and storyline analysis to analyse dis-
course tactics used by people of the marginalized.
In this exchange, we can see that Long Hair is very skillful in using quick, witty,
discursive tactics to position his interlocutor, his debating opponent, James Tien,
as a rich family’s son not knowing much about the living conditions and suffering
of grassroot people. James Tien, being well-known in Hong Kong society as com-
ing from a rich family, is often addressed to as ‘Tien-siu’ in public media (literally:
Young Master Tien). In the Chinese language, ‘personal name + siu’ is an address
term reserved for young masters, usually used by servants to address their young
masters (‘siu’ being a word to attach to the name of the young master; ‘siu’ means
‘young master’). In public media in Hong Kong, sons of wealthy families are often
referred to as X-siu (X is the name of the person). Long hair (Leung), by using this
membership category term (Jayyusi, 1984; Hester and Eglin, 1997) right from the
beginning of the exchange, is positioning Tien as someone coming from the rich
upper classes, and as someone who does not share the lifeworld of the majority of
people in Hong Kong.
Researching intercultural communication
Then Leung pulled out a newspaper clipping to show that one of Tien’s em-
ployees was treated unfairly (with wages unpaid to him). By showing concrete
evidence and by cornering Tien about his ignorance of the plight of his own em-
ployee, and then juxtaposing/equating Tien’s ignorance with his lack of concern
(Turn 9), Leung is launching a powerful accusation against Tien in Turns 3–9. Be-
ing caught unexpectedly by Leung on this incident, Tien (apparently without any
assistant beside him to brief him on this incident) acts in a role that Leung seems
to have both expected and positioned him to act in the storyline projected in Le-
ung’s discourse: That Tien-siu (Young Master Tien) is uncaring and unkind even
to his own employee (or servants who have served him – his company – for so
long; see Turns 3 and 9).
Having cornered Tien with this concrete incident showing Tien’s lack of con-
cern and care for his own employees, Leung immediately recited a Chinese ancient
poem (‘as a present’ to Tien) which talks about the plight of poor people under a
cruel government in the Sung Dynasty. The poem was taken from the famous
Chinese classical novel, Water Margins, which depicted the story of a group of
disenfranchised people who were forced to rebel against an oppressive, uncaring,
corrupt government which let the rich and the powerful bully poor, powerless,
ordinary people in the Sung Dynasty of China. It must be pointed out here that
while Leung is from the grassroots, he is widely-read in the Chinese classics and
can recite Chinese classical poetry and essays at ease. Compared with Leung, Tien
is shown to be not only an uncaring rich son (due to family wealth), but also some-
one who is unfamiliar with Chinese classics. Leung’s fluent recitation of this an-
cient Chinese poem in one of the most famous Chinese classical novels, has again,
given Leung an upper hand. By reciting this poem from Water Margins, Leung is
also evoking the collective memory of the storyline of Water Margins: how decent,
honest people were forced to become anti-government rebels to fight for justice.
After travelling on the time line from the present (Tien’s apparent unfair and
unkind treatment of his employee) to the ancient (reciting the poem from Water
Margins to evoke the storyline of an unfair and unjust ruling elite), Leung again
takes Tien back to the present by interrogating him about his knowledge of the
living conditions of the grassroot people in Hong Kong (Turns 14–20): asking Tien
how much it costs to have a common meal in Hong Kong). Again, Tien’s knowl-
edge is shown to be inadequate, and Tien is further positioned as a typical member
of the rich not knowing the plight of the poor.
Leung’s discursive tactics are systematic, almost like well-planned, and he has
cleverly drawn on popular cultural and discursive resources: news reports, ancient
Chinese classical stories, Chinese poem depicting the plight of poor people, and
everyday streetwise knowledge (of the living conditions) of grassroot people.
Angel Lin
When reciting the poem, Leung fans a traditional Chinese paper fan, which
serves as a hook to anchor the audience’s imagination (those watching this debate
in front of the television) in Leung’s storytelling – his projecting of a storyline not
too dissimilar to that of Water Margins.
Tien is thus put on the defensive, but given his lack of Chinese cultural and
discursive resources (Tien was Western and English-educated, not familiar with
Chinese classics), his rebuttal seems so ineffective in front of Leung’s consecutive
attacks, the last of which being the accusation of Tien as only knowing and caring
about the reduction of red wine tax (Turn 22). Again, the middle class symbol of
red wine (in Hong Kong, red wine consumption is associated with a middle and
upper class life style) is invoked by Leung to position Tien as a bona fide middle
class person, neither cognizant of, nor caring about, the life conditions of the
grassroot people in Hong Kong.
Long Hair has always been well-known for his eloquent, outspoken, defiant
discourse style and this is precisely why some young people and many working
class people like him. They like his upfront, straightforward, no-nonsense dis-
course style and his consistent voicing out of the economic difficulties of the grass-
roots and his direct attacks on the non-democratic political structure of Hong
Kong. When a well-known rich guy, James Tien, who was also Chair of the Lib-
eral Party representing business interests, was in the debating show, Long Hair
deployed his discursive tactics skillfully to position Tien in a negative light: as
someone who does not know about, and cannot, and will not care about grassroot
people in Hong Kong.
Has Leung been unfair to Tien in cornering him with his superior Chinese
cultural and Hong Kong streetwise knowledge and linguistic resources? Has he
been not interacting in a rational way? Recent critiques of Habermas’s ideal com-
municative situation, where interactants interact in a constraint-free, egalitarian
context, have pointed out how unrealistic it is when the interactions are between
people located in different power relationships (e.g., Crossley and Roberts, 2004).
Gardiner (2004) has even pointed out that subscribing to such rationality norms
will bring more damage to the already marginalized in such a context. In the above
analysis, I attempt to show how Leung (relatively powerless in terms of wealth and
in the existing governing structure of Hong Kong) skillfully deploys his other
kinds of cultural and linguistic capital (e.g., his familiarity of Chinese classical
stories and street knowledge of Hong Kong) to position an otherwise much more
powerful person (Tien) in a negative light. Tien is shown to be of a lesser statue
given the moral order projected by Leung’s storyline. Such a (re)presentation of
the world (and the moral order and accompanying rights and obligations sets
linked to it) gives Long Hair the moral high ground.
Researching intercultural communication
Coda
Having looked at the two examples above, it seems to us that intercultural or inter-
group communication is more likely to be (at least provisionally) successful if both
parties are willing to make the effort to overcome communication barriers, to mu-
tually respect each other’s language and culture (e.g., Carman and her European
and Middle-East clients), and to mutually share the burden of intercultural com-
munication. In their conversation both parties co-produce a storyline which offers
relatively more egalitarian subject positions for both parties. However, in non-
egalitarian contexts (which are in fact not static and are open to negotiation and
re-negotiation through discourse), intercultural communication does not always
resemble the well-intentioned, civil, good-mannered interactive styles of interact-
ants in other intercultural communication contexts, and ‘weaker’ parties might
draw on discourse strategies or tactics; e.g., returning an arrogant question with a
question, turning the tables, and counter-projecting a different storyline with a
more empowered subject position for self (as in Carman’s example when interact-
ing with an arrogant U.S. client) to subvert the power relations and to negotiate for,
and reconstitute the context into a more egalitarian context for interaction. Such
discourse tactics often do not subscribe to rationality, appropriateness or polite-
ness norms as these discourse tactics (or strategies, in Gumperz’s terms) are ‘weap-
ons of the poor’ (de Certeau, 1984). The use of positioning theory and storyline
analysis seems to be a promising direction to help intercultural communication
researchers understand how different social and cultural groups located in differ-
ent positions in the larger social structures, nevertheless, attempt to project a dif-
ferent social and moral order under which they can mitigate their structural dis-
advantage and create a discursive context where more egalitarian subject positions
are discursively made possible, if only momentarily, thus, attempting to change the
context and larger social forms, norms and structures through in situ social ac-
tions and discourse tactics (see earlier discussion of structuration theory). This
paper represents a preliminary attempt to analyse two examples of such inter-
group communication in non-egalitarian contexts and it is hoped that further re-
search in this area will help us understand the different discursive resources (and
constraints) leading to both the challenge and the degree of (im)possibility of
achieving intersubjectivity in inter-group/intercultural communication in adver-
sarial situations.
Angel Lin
Acknowledgement
The author is indebted to the anonymous reviewers for their useful comments and
suggestions for revision on an earlier draft of this paper.
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Studying interaction in order to cultivate
communicative practices
Action-implicative discourse analysis
Introduction
Interview Comments:
(1) John Gumperz, Interactional Sociolinguistics
As to “regularities” of communicative practice, I believe that these should
ultimately be derived from or related to in-depth analyses of situated en-
counters in a variety of settings (Prevignano and Thibault 2003a: 151).
(2) Emanuel Schegloff, Conversation Analysis
If one is committed to understanding actual actions (by which I mean
ones which actually occurred in real time), it is virtually impossible to
detach them from their context for isolated analysis with a straight face
(Cmejrkova and Prevignano 2003:€39).
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
We begin this chapter by echoing words that Schegloff and Gumperz uttered in
interviews in which each was questioned about his approach to studying interac-
tion. Conversation analysis (CA) and interactional sociolinguistics (IS) differ from
each other in many significant ways, as does action-implicative discourse analysis
(AIDA), our own approach. As a starting point, however, all three approaches hold
this in common: to understand social action, interaction, or communicative prac-
tices – whatever this stuff is to be called – requires looking at it in the context in
which it occurred.
Our chapter is divided into two sections. In the first section we overview
AIDA, providing an example to show how we analyze interaction. For the example
we draw upon some recent work studying community-level school board meet-
ings. The second section of the chapter gives focal attention to the similarities and
differences of AIDA with two alternative approaches, CA and IS. We argue that to
understand the distinctive character of these three approaches requires recogniz-
ing each approach’s orientation to the context of a particular academic discipline.
These disciplinary contexts have shaped what each approach takes for granted or
treats as contested about language and social life. That CA originated in sociology,
IS in linguistics, and AIDA in communication is crucial to understanding why
each approach poses the questions about interaction that it does.
AIDA is best described as the coming together of two traditions: practical theory,
an approach developed in the field of communication, and discourse analysis as it
is practiced in the multidisciplinary community. Consider each tradition.
Craig (1989, 1996, 1999, 2008b; Craig and Tracy 1995) has argued that com-
munication studies should be conceived as a practical discipline rather than an
empirical science. Rather than assuming that the ultimate goal of inquiry should
be to produce descriptions and theoretical explanations of empirical phenomena,
as is the case when a discipline is conceived as a science, a practical discipline takes
its ultimate goal to be the cultivation of practice. This difference in goals has impli-
cations for the role of theory, because the cultivation of practice requires attention
to normative as well as empirical questions. Whereas explanatory scientific theory
lends itself to the cultivation of an instrumental (means-ends) orientation to prac-
tice, practical normative theory is “centrally concerned with what ought to be; it
seeks to articulate normative ideals by which to guide the conduct and criticism of
practice” (Craig and Tracy 1995:€249). How exactly to integrate the technical-pro-
ductive (techne) side of communication with its moral-political (praxis) aspects is
a major challenge for communication studies conceived as a practical discipline.
Practical theory seeks to reconstruct communicative practices and provides
methodological guidance for doing so (Craig and Tracy 1995). To reconstruct a
practice means to conceptualize an idealized, normative model that is grounded in
close observation as well as critical reflection. Researchers can reconstruct commu-
nicative practices at three levels. First and most crucial is the problem level: identi-
fying the problems that occur for different categories of participants in particular
social practices. Second, reconstruction can describe the specific conversational
techniques and strategies that are employed to manage focal problems (the technical
level). Finally, reconstruction can formulate the abstract ideals and principles that
account for the selection of techniques for addressing particular kinds of problems
(the philosophical level). Of note, the philosophical level must be grounded in situ-
ated ideals, the beliefs about good conduct that can be inferred from patterns of
praise and blame made by participants in actual situations of practice.
AIDA adopts the goals of practical theory and pursues them through the
method of discourse analysis. Discourse is a term that gets used in quite different
ways (e.g., Cameron 2001; van Dijk 1997a, 1997b). Our usage is similar to that
found in linguistics (e.g., Schiffrin 1994), where “discourse” is paired with the term,
“analysis” and treated as an umbrella term to refer to a variety of approaches to the
study of talk or text. At its simplest, discourse analysis involves careful study of
recorded and transcribed talk or text, where excerpts are used to make scholarly
arguments. A second and different meaning of the term “discourse” is informed by
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
the work of Michél Foucault (1972) – what Gee (1999) refers to as big-D discourse
in contrast with little-d discourse. Big-D discourse, often mentioned in the plural
(discourses), refers to complex social practices such as education or business. Some
forms of discourse analysis, for example critical discourse approaches (Fairclough
2001), are interested in both big-D and little-d discourse, but many discourse ana-
lysts are not. For this reason it is important to keep the two meanings distinct.
As an approach that analyzes interaction, AIDA has been influenced by CA,
anthropologically-influenced speech act traditions, discursive psychology, and
critical discourse analysis (CDA). From CA, AIDA takes the commitment to study
everyday interaction and the practice of repeatedly listening to exchanges that re-
searchers have transcribed while attending to many particulars, including intona-
tion, abrupt word or phrase cut-offs, and repetition and vocalized sounds
(uh, um, eh). Moreover, although not accepting the CA principle that an interpre-
tation should only use what is visibly displayed in a next turn at talk (Schegloff
1992, 1998), AIDA does share the CA view that how an interactional partner re-
sponds is an important resource for anchoring proposals about participant mean-
ing. From anthropologically-influenced speech act traditions (Blum-Kulka, House
and Kasper 1989; Brown and Levinson 1987; Gumperz 1982b), AIDA assumes the
importance of seeing assessments about conversational actions as culturally-in-
flected judgments. Discursive psychology contributes to AIDA through its notion
of dilemma (Billig et al. 1988) and in its development of a rhetorical stance toward
discourse. Finally, critical discourse approaches argue that small-d discourse
should be connected with big-D discourses (Fairclough and Wodak 1997). As
AIDA is committed to cultivating the communicative practices that are studied,
CDA offers one model of how that linkage might be made. But, let us consider
what AIDA studies of interaction look like in their own terms.
the social world to enable analysis. Since institutional practices involve multiple
categories of people who are positioned differently within the practice, the problems
of a practice will differ with a participant’s position. Getting a handle on the interac-
tional problems from the points of view of the main categories of participants is one
aim of AIDA, although often this aim is pursued across multiple studies.
Having identified an important communication practice, a next question be-
comes how to study it. AIDA is a type of discourse analysis that is also ethno-
graphic. To reconstruct a communication practice well demands that a researcher
have extensive knowledge about the routine actions and variation in the practice.
This requires the analyst to do sustained observation of the practice. It also re-
quires analysts to develop an understanding of both how participants talk with
each other in the practice (the focal discourse) and how they talk about their prac-
tice (meta-discourse). What exactly will be the necessary ethnographic compo-
nents will depend on the practice being studied.
In the analysis of school board meetings, soon to be illustrated, the focal dis-
course data were 200 hours of one community’s school board meetings recorded
from a local cable broadcast and collected over a several-year time span. In addi-
tion to the focal discourse, only a small proportion of which was transcribed, were
the following kinds of data: notes taken from viewing the televised meetings; sev-
eral observations of the meetings on site; agenda, minutes, and other documents
related to particular policy discussions; local newspaper articles and editorials
about Board activities; and interviews with a variety of participants. Moreover,
since all of these materials came from one community, the final activity involved
observing meetings in other communities. Thus, a first step in AIDA is to develop
extended knowledge of a focal practice. This can be accomplished by taping
(or getting access to tapes of) a good number of hours of the central discourse
activity, and by building up a portrait of the scene, the people, and the practice
drawing on whatever additional materials are relevant and accessible.
A next step for AIDA is to identify the segments of a focal practice for tran-
scription and analysis. At the selection and transcription stage, AIDA differs from
CA in two ways. First, AIDA would never begin with discourse moments that
before analysis, as Harvey Sacks would advocate, seem to be “utterly uninteresting
data” (1992:€293). While there is no dispute that such analyses can be valuable, for
AIDA, not all moments of interaction are equally promising places to start. In
AIDA, selecting stretches of discourse to be transcribed is a theoretically shaped
activity. Since one goal is to understand the problems of a practice, moments in
which participants seem to be experiencing discomfort, tension, or conflict are
especially promising targets to focus on. Since another goal is to understand the
situated ideals of a practice, instances where participants express evaluation of
other people’s actions are a second type of talk likely to be selected. Finally,
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
segments of interaction that seem at odds with how an institution describes its
aims and practices are also potentially of interest.
Second, AIDA studies typically work with relatively long segments of interac-
tion and give limited attention to timing and prosody. The reason for this choice
flows from the AIDA commitment to develop ideas that contribute to participants’
reflection about a practice. For this reason, AIDA gives primary attention to the
aspects of communication about which people are most able to reflect: choices
about wording, speech acts, arguments, and speech or story organizations.
In its normative orientation and its interest in both big-D and little-d discourse,
AIDA resembles CDA. The normative principle that guides AIDA differs, however,
from that of CDA. Whereas CDA is centrally committed to a negative critique that
exposes invisible practices of power and domination rooted in macrosocial inequi-
ties, AIDA is centrally committed to addressing normative problems that arise with-
in particular, situated social practices. AIDA, unlike CDA, aims toward a positive
reconstruction that conceptualizes how particular communicative practices should
be conducted. From an AIDA point of view, power and status differences are an una-
voidable, and often desirable, aspect of institutional life. Practices cannot be judged
without attending closely to their particular contexts. AIDA draws upon the Aristo-
telian idea of phronesis – good judgment, prudence, practical wisdom, sound and
thoughtful deliberation, reasonableness – as a basis for the critique of practices. Ph-
ronesis is “not a simple process of applying principles or rules to cases that leaves the
principles or rules unchanged; in prudential practice, there is a negotiation between
the case and the principle that allows both to gain in clarity” (Jasinski, 2001:€463).
Within AIDA, the central starting point for development of normative propos-
als is to identify the practice’s situated ideal(s). Situated ideals are participants’ be-
liefs about good conduct that can be reconstructed from discursive moments in
which they praise and criticize. Situated ideals capture the complex prioritizing of
competing concerns and values that not only will, but also arguably should, be
operative in actual practices. Situated ideals may be reconstructed from analysis of
participant interviews (Tracy 1997) or from study of interactive moments in con-
junction with institutional documents or other segments of interaction (e.g., Agne
2007). In the school board meeting project, the school district was developing its
policy position toward students and staff who were gay (Tracy and Ashcraft 2001).
In this deliberative body, the group’s espoused principle of communicative conduct
was to avoid arguing over words. Yet, in reflective moments and in its actual prac-
tices, participants treated word arguments positively, framing them as serving
valuable functions. Arguments over document language were used to manage a
dilemma. To make a decision, the group sought to advance the value to which the
majority of the group was committed – in this case, advocating acceptance of gays.
At the same time, the group majority wanted to maintain good relations with group
Action-implicative discourse analysis
members committed to a contrary value. Because the school board wanted to avoid
being dismissive and sought to show that it was treating all views seriously, it need-
ed to spend a significant amount of time talking about the wording options rather
than moving ahead merely because they had the needed number of votes. Arguing
over words was how the group attended to these competing commitments.
To illustrate how AIDA analyzes interaction, we focus on one exchange that oc-
curred at a school board meeting. As background, it is important to note that, in
the United States, local governance committees, commonly referred to as school
boards, are influential in shaping educational policy. These boards, usually ranging
between 5 and 11 members, are elected by their local communities and make a
host of decisions about policies, resource allocation, and to a certain degree, cur-
riculum. Of all the decisions that school boards make, none is quite as important
as the task of selecting the person to fill the role of superintendent. It is the district
superintendent who interprets and implements the board’s policies and directs the
day-to-day operation of the school district. This person is enormously influential.
A school board meeting typically involves the elected officials, the superin-
tendent and selected school staff, and varying numbers of citizens from the com-
munity. Meetings are public, often broadcast over community-sponsored radio or
television stations, and include times for citizen commentary and for discussion
among the board members about issues on which they will soon be voting. Among
some boards there is little disagreement and almost all votes are unanimous
(Newman and Brown 1992). At other times, though, boards become sites for the
playing out of serious disagreements that exist in the community. The exchange
that is analyzed below comes from a board meeting in which there was a history of
votes routinely splitting into majority and minority positions.
The exchange occurred among one of the board members who took the mi-
nority position and was usually outvoted (Shoemaker), two of the board officers
who were part of the majority coalition, (Hult and Shonkwiler) and a consultant
(Ceruli) who had been hired to assist with the district’s search for the next
superintendent. On the meeting’s agenda, the item of discussion was described as
“Approval and Acceptance of the Superintendent Search Committee.”1
Meeting Excerpt: Minority Member Shoemaker’s No Vote
1. This analysis is a shortened version of one that appears in more detail, with more spe-
cifics of the school board meetings and other segments of meeting interaction in Tracy and
Standerfer (2003).
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
For analytic purposes, we will divide the exchange into two sections: lines 1–28
and 29–54. If we were to interpret Shoemaker’s actions through the focal decision
– approval of the search process – we would likely “see” evidence of hidden agen-
das and the irrationality of much of the talk that goes on in decision-making
groups. However, if we assume that people and their talk are reasonable, attending
to legitimate problems, then what becomes visible?
In lines 1–28, Shoemaker questions the meaning of voting to approve the su-
perintendent search procedures. Although the most straightforward function of
questions is to seek information, questions frequently challenge and criticize
(Tracy 1997). In lines 2–4, where Shoemaker questions whether committee mem-
bers’ names are to be included in the vote, it seems possible that she is merely
seeking information. However, when she twice repeats the upshot of Hult’s answer
(“so we’re voting on the names,” lines 8 and 12) and then explicitly states why she
regards it as unreasonable not to specify the committee make-up, it becomes clear
that the “question” is a challenge. Hult’s response (line 21), in fact, acknowledges
Shoemaker’s criticism and offers a solution. Yet the choice she offers Shoemaker–
“name by name or lump group” – frames Shoemaker as unreasonable. In light of
the shared view that school board meetings were already too long, a proposal to
turn the approval process into a yes-no vote on 11 citizens, as well as all the other
pieces of the process, implicated Shoemaker negatively. Stated differently, Hult’s
comment humors and therein seeks to silence a difficult member. This humoring
is underscored by Shonkwiler’s proposal (lines 24–25) when he states, “Move that
we appoint the listed members to the task force that was approved by the Board at
the last meeting.” In essence, the President’s and Vice President’s comments frame
Shoemaker as haggling over something that has already been decided, and there-
fore implicitly wasting time and being unreasonable.
Shoemaker’s response, “lump sum is fine” (line 22), is interesting because it is
at odds with an implication established through her prior questioning – that there
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
competence. Furthermore, her pursuit of this issue strongly implies that she was
not part of that decision; either the decision occurred behind her back (because
the majority favored it and there was no need to get her input), or it was made
despite concerns she may have raised. Shoemaker’s comments, thus, construct a
version of recent events that make visible for citizens in the community (i.e., voters
in the upcoming election) that the board majority led by the president acted in a
high-handed and/or questionable manner.
Shoemaker went on to vote against the search committee composition, a posi-
tion that was decisively outvoted by other board members. But, although in this
immediate decision, Shoemaker lost – her arguments did not lead the group to
change direction – a negative assessment of her talk is not warranted. When we
look at this deliberation process in a larger frame, her talk on this occasion
functioned to shape longer-term outcomes. In the subsequent election a key issue
became the reasonableness of the incumbents’ conduct in board meetings, both
with each other and in dealing with members of the public (Craig and Tracy 2005;
Tracy 1999; Tracy and Muller 2001). Were members of the board majority acting
democratically with each other and the larger public? Were they exercising good
judgment in the decisions with which they were entrusted? This interactive seg-
ment, as well as others like it, helped create a community impression that the board
leaders were acting “undemocratically.” In the election that followed, the president
and the two other majority coalition members running for election were voted out
of office, and Shoemaker became president.
Arriving at a reconstruction of the problems, conversational techniques, and
situated ideals of a practice, such as school board meetings, requires observing and
reflecting on multiple instances and kinds of interaction from the viewpoints of
various categories of participants. A developed reconstruction needs to attend to
the larger interactional scene. Based on this single analysis, we would highlight the
following. First, using AIDA makes visible a problem. When elected officials in
community groups know their opinions are in the minority, they face a difficulty.
As elected officials, brought to power though a process of voting, they are expected
to show respect for democratic decision-making. They are also expected to exert
influence and shape policies and decisions in a direction consistent with the views
they advocate. How to do this is a major challenge when members know they will
be outvoted. Shoemaker’s moves, analyzed above, point to some of the conversa-
tional techniques that persons in this position can and do use. In essence,
Shoemaker’s way of posing questions and reformulating others’ answers func-
tioned to challenge the good judgment and fairness of the board majority while
displaying her own commitment to democratic process (i.e., her willingness to be
outvoted). Simply put, when elected officials cannot affect the immediate decision,
their talk can be employed to shape the larger decision-making context.
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
Disciplinary discourses2
3. On the history and disciplinary identity of sociology, see also: Collins (1985), Lepenies
(1986), Levine (1995), Mazlish (1989), and Ross (1991).
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
4. The essay, addressing linguists, included 5 features that distinguish a communicative kind
of discourse analysis. The first, which applies to discourse analysis but not to the study of inter-
action, was a preference for discourse that is interactive (i.e., talk) rather than written texts.
Action-implicative discourse analysis
scene, that Gumperz and students’ focus on interaction, and moreover, a func-
tional approach to it, was radical.
In communication, taking a functional approach is mainstream. For communica-
tion scholars, function and its close relative, strategy, are taken-for-granted key con-
cepts to use in studying social life (Craig and Tracy 1983). In contrast to that of CA,
Gumperz’s influence in the field of communication has been relatively limited. An un-
sympathetic reading of his work could frame him as asserting no more than a discipli-
nary commonplace in communication. That communicative functions are important is
an unquestioned assumption in the discourse community of communication studies.
Although IS and Gumperz’s work are not synonymous, for many purposes
they can be treated as alternative forms of reference. This is not the case with CA
and Schegloff ’s work. CA is a broad enterprise. Many scholars internationally and
across disciplines currently would define themselves as doing CA or being strongly
influenced by “it.” Yet, as CA has been taken up in locations outside the US and in
disciplines outside sociology, it has to some degree been refashioned. In each case,
CA has merged with other impulses that are specific to the academic tradition
(US, European) and the particular discipline.
“CA” in communication (e.g.€Beach 1996; Glenn, LeBaron and Mandelbaum
2003), linguistics (Ochs, Schegloff and Thompson 1996), or feminist psychology
(Kitzinger and Frith 1999; Speer 2002) – to identify only three of the most obvious
alternatives – each has a distinctly different flavor from the kind of CA that
Schegloff does. Moreover, in contrast to what is stated in the discussion about CA
with Schegloff that occurred in the Prevignano and Thibault (2003b) volume, in
many intellectual corners (e.g., Hutchby and Wooffitt 1999), Harvey Sacks is treat-
ed as the originator of CA. This way of framing CA is especially visible in work that
builds on Sacks’ analyses of membership terms (Fitzgerald and Housely 2002;
Hester and Eglin 1997). Sometimes this work is treated as a kind of CA; at other
times it is treated as something entirely different and labeled “membership catego-
rization analysis,” an approach to be contrasted with CA.
What is to be treated as inside or outside of CA is by no means obvious. When,
for instance, does a study become CA-influenced rather than a piece of CA schol-
arship proper? Is any study that goes beyond claims that can be grounded in the
recipient’s uptake not a CA study? Is all the work done by visible conversation
analysts actually CA? For instance, would the quantitative coding study of ques-
tions in US presidential press conferences conducted by CA scholars Clayman and
Heritage (2002), be considered CA? How much ethnographic work can a CA
scholar do and how can it be used in interpretation of an interactional scene before
the work’s CA status is called into question? Are studies that pursue issues such as
gender inequality through a close look at conversations that have been transcribed
using the Jeffersonian transcription system CA research?
Action-implicative discourse analysis
AIDA shares with IS a concern with problematic interaction. But, the kinds of
problems to which AIDA and IS give attention are different. Operating within a
linguistic tradition, Gumperz has built an analytic frame on the opposition be-
tween central and peripheral linguistic information (Levinson 2003). Lexical and
syntactic kinds of information are treated as focal, whereas prosody, the use of
discourse particles, and several other features are seen as background language
information. Gumperz ‘s research has highlighted the problems that occur within
language processes (e.g., vocal intonation patterns) that are largely out of aware-
ness. IS, as is true of culture-attentive discourse approaches generally, can help
people recognize that moments of interactional trouble arise from reasonable but
culturally-specific meaning-cueing practices. In contrast, AIDA is primarily inter-
ested in institutional problems that arise among nationally and ethnically similar
persons. Rather than cultivating better understanding of subtle out-of-awareness
practices, AIDA seeks to make visible discourse strategies that can be named, re-
flected upon, and adopted by participants to make their practice work better.
Karen Tracy and Robert T. Craig
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Healthcare interaction as an expert
communicative system
An activity analysis perspective
Srikant Sarangi
Health Communication Research Centre, Cardiff University
debate. Over the years, bureaucracy as a rule-governed expert system has given
way to knowledge-based expertise with the attendant growth in professionalism,
although professional power and expertise are routinely monitored through state
institutions (Johnson 1972, 1993; Larson 1977; Freidson 1994). Freidson (1994:€137)
believes that ‘bureaucratic organisation is assumed to be antithetical to the free-
dom of activity traditionally imputed to the professional’. However, in many do-
mains, e.g., education, healthcare, social welfare, the professional groups are close-
ly embedded and governed within an institutional/organisational frame, thus
risking their independence and credibility. Policy-level changes at the institutional
and organisational level can potentially transform the everyday practices of pro-
fessionals, including their interactional trajectories with clients. In the healthcare
setting, for instance, new regulatory practices such as clinical governance, evi-
dence-based practice, patient-centredness, shared decision-making will no doubt
have epistemological and ontological ramifications regarding the status of expert
knowledge and power, with potential communicative consequences at the interac-
tional level for a given professional-client encounter.
Shils (1968) draws a distinction between experts and intellectuals: while the
latter are preoccupied with general knowledge, experts deal with specialised
knowledge. However, Merton (1957:€209) captures this difference differently: ‘in-
tellectuals devote themselves to cultivating and formulating knowledge’ whereas
experts are more interested in transmitting and applying that knowledge. Moving
away from such narrow dichotomies, Stehr (1994) characterises professional ex-
perts as both ‘knowledge-bearing’ and ‘knowledge-disseminating’ agents. He ar-
gues that in the process of disseminating knowledge, professionals as experts affect
the very knowledge base they mediate. In stressing that their function is not a pas-
sive one, Stehr (1994:€186) writes:
The knowledge these occupations employ is not, under most circumstances, di-
rectly of their creation. That is, these occupations serve as mediator between the
knowledge producers and the knowledge users, between those who create a ca-
pacity for action and those whose job it is to take action.
1. In the healthcare context, expert systems may include technologies such as X-ray proce-
dure, laboratory-based tests, software-assisted risk assessments as well as patients’ case records,
official forms and certificates.
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
and discount the complex nature of knowledge that professionals socialise into
and have access to in their everyday communicative practices.
‘The client comes to the professional because he has met a problem which he can-
not himself handle’ (Hughes 1958:€141). As Agar (1985) suggests, institutional dis-
course, which inevitably involves professional experts, is constituted in three key
stages: diagnosis of the client, directives targeted at the client’s problems, and re-
ports in the form of case notes which encompass both diagnoses and the direc-
tives. This underscores the fact that professionals are privy to scientific knowledge
as well as organisational knowledge that clients do not have direct access to. Ac-
cording to Rueschemeyer (1986:€166), experts
define the situation for the untutored, they suggest priorities, they shape people’s
outlook on their life and world, and they establish standards of judgement in the
different areas of expertise – in matters of health and illness, order and justice, the
design and deployment of technology, the organisation of production.
This then allows for a lay-expert distinction, which is a long standing one. Schutz
(1964) contrasts expert knowledge and lay knowledge as follows:
The expert’s knowledge is restricted to a limited field but therein it is clear and
distinct. His opinions are based on warranted assertions: his judgements are
not mere guesswork or loose suppositions. The man on the street has a working
knowledge of many fields which are not necessarily coherent with one another.
His knowledge of recipes indicating how to bring forth in typical situations typical
results by typical means. (Schutz 1964:€122).
same holds for healthcare concerning children. As Strong and Davis (1978:€63) point
out, parents have expert and detailed knowledge about their children, so doctor’s
scientific and generalised expertise is bound to be contingent on parents’ expertise:
‘The dependency of doctors’ expertise on parents’ expertise exists where the medical
problem can only be resolved by recourse to knowledge that only the parents pos-
sess’. The same is true of elderly patients or patients with limited mental abilities
where carers take on the ‘expert’ role of managing their illness and lifeworld.
With regard to the medical profession, Freidson (1970) suggests that professional
expertise is constituted in a combination of scientific/technical knowledge and
clinical/experiential knowledge. As I see it, both these knowledge systems are in-
teractive, cumulative and systematic and do give rise to an array of expert interac-
tion systems in functional specific ways. Another inevitable component of this
‘expertise mix’, as I have pointed out earlier, is the institutional/organisational
ethos in which professional activities are carried out. Much of the expert knowl-
edge (scientific, clinical and organisational) are discernible in the interactional
level in terms of systematic history taking, diagnostic reasoning, use of evidence,
offer of causal explanations etc. More than mere rule-following, the contingent
character of interaction assumes significance. As Freidson (1970:€90) points out:
People [in the medical profession] are constantly responding to the organised
pressures of the situations they are in at any particular time, that what they are is
not completely but more their present than their past, and what they do is more
an outcome of the pressures of the situation they are in than of what they have
earlier internalised.
Let us take a cursory look at the debate concerning the primacy of interaction
within the social and human sciences (for a recent overview see Atkinson and
Housley 2003). Interactionsim, in a broad sense, is a perspective which allows situ-
ated human agency to mediate social structure. The nature of this mediation, how-
ever, is not necessarily shared among various perspectives. A starting point, for
our purposes, is Blumer’s (1969) model of symbolic interaction, which was prima-
rily a reaction against a deterministic view of the social world which relied heavily
on causal explanations. According to Blumer (1969:€11–12):
The position of symbolic interactionsim is that the ‘worlds’ that exist for human
beings and for their groups are composed of ‘objects’ and that these objects are the
product of symbolic interaction… The nature of an object – of any and every ob-
ject – consists of the meaning that it has for the person for whom it is an object.
Wilson (1971:€ 60) characterises this trend of interactionism as a shift from the
normative paradigm in which ‘interaction is viewed as rule-governed in the sense
that an observed pattern of action is rendered intelligible and is explained by refer-
ring to rules in the forms of dispositions and expectations to which actors are
subject’. As Voysey (1975:€24) puts it:
The major problem with this [normative paradigm], however, is that if rules are
to account for observed or imputed similarities in action in different situations, or
over time, there must be an assumption of ‘substantial cognitive consensus’. Ac-
tors must agree not only that a situation is one in which a particular rule should be
followed, but on what counts as evidence that it is being followed.
This raises particular questions about the positioning of the analyst in looking for
patterns of similarities and differences across a given interactional trajectory. For
Wilson (1971:€67), within the ‘interpretive paradigm’, unlike the normative one,
‘interaction is an essentially interpretative process in which meanings evolve and
change over the course of the interaction’. This echoes the Weberian position:
What distinguishes an interpretive explanation is that it involves explaining be-
haviour by reference to the agent’s conceptions of what he is doing, as opposed to
explaining it by causal laws. Interpretive explanation takes into account the fact
that an agent’s knowledge of his actions differs in important ways from that which
an observer can have of those actions. (Levison 1974:€101)
incidentally, a little obeisance to the fact that there are people out there moving
about. Thus interaction practices have been used to illuminate other things, but
themselves are treated as though they did not need to be defined or were not
worth defining. Yet the nicest use for these events is the explication of their own
generic character.
Following from this conviction, Goffman (1983) formulates his notion of the ‘in-
teraction order’:
My concern over the years has been to promote acceptance of this face-to-face
domain as an analytically viable one – a domain which may be titled, for want of
any happy name, as the interaction order. (Goffman 1983:€2)
In making a strong case for the study of ‘the neglected situation’, Goffman offers a
distinction between interaction order to mean interactional practices and the tradi-
tionally conceptualised ‘elements of social organisation’ in the sense of social struc-
tures – or what Wilson (1971) refers to as the ‘normative paradigm’. He goes on to
capture the linkage between these two domains as ‘loose coupling’ (Goffman 1983).
In this sense, the ‘interaction order’ for Goffman goes beyond face-to-face encoun-
ters, and by extension, talk-in-interaction within the conversation analytic tradi-
tion. This is clearly reflected in what Goffman treats as data in his writings and what
knowledge of context he invokes to aid the interpretive procedure.
One striking observation is that Goffman issues a challenge to linguistics to
explicate systematically the role of language in interaction. As he puts it with rela-
tion to his notion of footing: ‘linguistics provides us with the cues and markers
through which such footings become manifest, helping us to find our way to a
structural basis for analyzing them’ (Goffman 1981:€157). As Tannen (1993) points
out, Gumperz’s (1982) theory of conversational inference is one such response. In
addition to contextualisation cues functioning as a signalling mechanism for ne-
gotiation and shifts in frames and footings, other pragmatic notions such as pre-
supposition, implicature, coherence, indexicality are intricately embedded in
Goffman’s (1974) frame analysis. I shall return to these analytic resources in my
proposal for activity analysis in Section€4.
2. Interestingly, this lack of attention to the patient’s contributions is used as a rationale for
Byrne and Long to focus their analysis only on the doctor’s consulting style, broadly based on
the interaction category system developed by Bales (1970). The complexity of the communica-
tion process, however, has been acknowledged by many researchers from within this tradition
(see, for example, Davis [1982] who draws upon key insights from Goffman).
Srikant Sarangi
only at actual performance features and without knowing the content, whether two
speakers are actively communicating’. While this is true, and Goffman’s notions of
alignment, frame and footing would attest such a position, there is an imperative
for the analyst to engage with the content of the interaction order. This is particu-
larly so in the professional/institutional context, where interactional patterns can-
not be disentangled from the treatment of content or theme (Sarangi 2007).
The key concepts for activity analysis derive from Goffman – the concepts of
frame, footing, face work and alignment. It is worth noting that although Goffman’s
notion of interaction order and the attendant methodology of ‘frame analysis’
(Goffman 1974) have had a lasting impact on many forms of interaction analysis
undertaken within sociolinguistics and discourse studies, Goffman hardly en-
gaged himself with analysing recorded social encounters in a systematic way. What
is not always clear is how one goes about defining and working with notions such
as frame and footing. There has been a tendency to define such concepts in a con-
tingent manner to suit the analyst’s current purposes. Like the term discourse,
frame has been used at different layers of meaning. For instance, Tannen and
Wallat (1993) use frame to draw distinctions between ‘consultation frame’, ‘exami-
nation frame’ and ‘reporting frame’ in the context of medical examination/inter-
view. Also, they go on to suggest that there are tensions in the way such frames are
manifest, although one could regard this as part of hybrid competencies of both
the medical professional and the client.
Another key notion to activity analysis is alignment. The notion of alignment
is based on a view of interaction as jointly produced. In a seminal paper, Stokes and
Hewitt (1976) suggest that the notion of ‘aligning actions’ encompasses two mean-
ings: (i) how individual conduct accords with that of co-participants in the creation
of social acts; and (ii) how problematic situations involve discrepancies ‘between
what is actually taking place in a given situation and what is thought to be typical,
normatively expected, probable, desirable or, in other respects, more in accord with
what is culturally normal’ (1976:€843). Alignment, from an activity analytic per-
spective, involves both well-synchronised turn-taking and a display of shared un-
derstanding of what is talked about and what participant roles are expected at a
particular point in time. As interaction analysts, therefore, we need a reasonable
understanding of the topics of counselling and therapy in order to be able to inter-
pret in a meaningful way the interactional trajectories of a given encounter.
Activity analysis therefore has to be grounded in what I would call ‘thick par-
ticipation’ (Sarangi 2007) in the professional/institutional events, and ‘thick de-
scription’ has to draw upon structural, interactional and thematic mapping of
whole encounters (Roberts and Sarangi 2002, Sarangi [in press]). It is worth point-
ing out that structural and interactional maps have been particularly useful in
educational settings (Green and Wallat 1981, Mehan 1979) and in narrative
Srikant Sarangi
analysis (Labov and Waletsky 1967, Gee 1997). Interactional mapping can be real-
ised both in terms of distribution and volume of turn taking and such maps can
tell us something about the interaction system and the positioning of the partici-
pants within it. This is not to suggest that the more one talks, i.e., holds the floor,
the more powerful s/he is. Interactional asymmetry should not be confused with
knowledge asymmetry. Equal access/right to turn taking does not necessarily
equate with symmetrical knowledge relations.
To summarise, the following analytic features are constitutive of activity analysis:
– Mapping of entire encounters at structural, interactional and thematic levels
– Communicative flexibility in terms of activity types and discourse/interaction
types
– Integration of discoursal and rhetorical devices
– Goffman’s notions of frame, footing and face-work
– Gumperz’s notions of contextualisation cues and conversational inference
– Alignment: sequential and normative
– Social and discourse role-relations
– Thick participation and thick description
Within a framework of activity analysis, interactions are seen as a narrative un-
folding of events and characters, organised temporally and spatially. In addition to
the sequential order, rhetorical moves are also central to how events and charac-
ters are portrayed and managed in interaction (see, for instance, Goodwin’s [1994]
general proposals about nature of salience, backgrounding and foregrounding of
information; see also use of devices such contrast, reported speech, question, rep-
etition, metaphor). In this sense, activity analysis as an enterprise in interpretive
understanding can be situated between sequential description (as is the case with
conversation analysis) and extra-situational explanation (as is the case with critical
discourse analysis).
In this section I adopt the activity-analytic perspective for the purposes of analysing
interactional patterns in counselling encounters, especially genetic counselling
which can be characterised as a hybrid activity type (Sarangi 2000). The choice is
between taking the route of corpus-based analysis of genetic counselling to demon-
strate variations in interaction types (both patterns of differences and similarities)
or focusing on a single case in order to understand the staged dynamism character-
istic of the overall interactional trajectory. Here I choose the latter option and focus
on a single genetic counselling session involving familial breast cancer. My focal
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
theme is risk and uncertainty and the analytic themes will centre around the notions
of frame, alignment and the rhetorical devices of escalation and de-escalation.
Management of risk and uncertainty is typical of genetic counselling, espe-
cially involving predictive testing. The professional expertise of the counsellor is
evident in giving clear explanations about genes, patterns of inheritance, popula-
tion risk etc. It also constitutes a space for discouraging unwarranted decisions,
whether about testing or acting on positive test results. The genetic counselling
protocol in South Wales, from where the following case of breast cancer is taken,
includes at least two or more sessions before a gene test is offered to the client.
The extended extracts below constitute the very first session to ascertain the
at-risk status of the client (AF), who is in her early twenties.3 The genetic counsel-
lor (G2) opens the session as follows:
the purpose of this session is is really to discuss breast cancer – how it can run in
families and (.) just wonder what your own sort of worries and concerns were eh
eh in the matter.
3. The names of participants have been anonymised. The case study is taken from The Well-
come Trust funded project on Communicative Frames in Counselling for Predictive Genetic
Testing (2000–2004).
Srikant Sarangi
03 G2: but if they become altered in some way or or damaged then (.) they
stop working and that protection is lost so if someone if a woman
inherited one of these altered copies of the gene
04 AF: yeah
05 G2: she has a higher risk of developing breast cancer and also it’s like
higher risk of developing ovarian cancer as well (1.5) and that’s (.5)
those are the sort of (.) women that (.) those families are the ones
where you you see a lot of women [affected] (1.5)
06 AF: [yes]
07 G2: (.5) now- these families aren’t that common but what we do find
quite often is that because breast cancer in itself is so common we
find families where there are several people affected just by chance
08 AF: mhm
09 G2: so what we need to do is to try and decide whether and when we’re
looking at someone’s family tree try and decide whether [it’s chance]
10 AF: [it’s chance]
11 G2: or whether we think there might be a gene involved basically
12 AF: mhm
Here G2 dominates the interactional space, much of which has been taken up by
explanations about normal vs. altered genes, which will become the frame of refer-
ence for the rest of the encounter. Unlike psychotherapeutic encounters where the
therapist, through use of minimal backchannelling cues, allows the client to ex-
press his/her concerns (Ferrara 1994), genetic counselling often involves a fair
amount of explanation talk, given that not everybody who comes to clinic will be
familiar with the complexities of how genes work. Through consistent use of min-
imal cues, AF remains interactionally aligned to the explanation routine. The con-
cept of risk is introduced within a framework of uncertainty – in a mixture of hy-
pothetical language (‘if ’), and by using the generic third person referents (‘a
woman’, ‘someone’, ‘those’/’these’ families) – which may be seen as an instance of
typification strategy to manage uncertainty of routine explanation (McIntosh
1978). AF is allocated to an already existent category of at-risk condition, rather
than singling out her personal circumstances and addressing them specifically
(see McIntosh’s distinction between patient’s condition and patient’s circumstanc-
es). There is a significant pause of 1.5 seconds in turn 05, which, as part of delivery
of routine explanation, can be taken as a signal for continuation of G2’s turn (see
Boden’s [1994] discussion of long pauses in committee meetings). The contribu-
tions made by AF are minimal, but taken together they indicate her awareness of
basic genetic knowledge (also evident from her opening remarks, not shown here).
In turns 07 and 09, G2 prepares the ground for diagnostic work, as he draws a
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
distinction between chance mutation and patterns of inheritance, as the latter will
have a significant bearing on whether AF will develop breast and ovarian cancer at
a younger age.
Extract 2 (continues from extract above)
01 G2: so one of the ways we do that is by drawing a family tree like the one
that we’ve drawn for you
02 AF: mhm
03 G2: the one that (nurse) drew for your own family and we’ve to see if we
find any patterns of of breast cancer in in (.) in the family
04 AF: mhm mhm
05 G2: so if we look at your family tree ((both shift their gaze to family tree
diagram on paper)) the circles are women squares are men and the
ones that are coloured in have had breast cancer (.5) so you’re down
here and that’s your mother had breast cancer [at]
06 AF: [yeah]
07 G2: the age of forty two
08 AF: yeah
09 G2: and she’s how is she now?
10 AF: she’s fine
11 G2: she’s fine [yeah okay] alright so she is (.) now sixty-five
12 AF: [yeah she’s fine]
13 G2: and her mother had breast cancer first at the age of forty-three
14 AF: erm
15 G2: and then again at the age of sixty-eight?
16 AF: erm (.5)
17 G2 and also he:::r sister-
18 AF: yeah
19 G2: had breast cancer at the age of sixty and she’s now seventy-eight
20 AF: yeah
21 G2: and you think there might be someone else as well [on that side of
the family]
22 AF: [yes yeah there
is ] (.) there is yeah
23 G2: right also on your father’s side of the family there’s some more dis-
tant relatives [who] who have breast cancer as well but that’s quite
24 AF: mhm
25 G2 [they’ve got-]
26 AF: [my father’s] aunt and cousin
27 G2: =yeah so they’re- they’re quite distantly related already to you
Srikant Sarangi
28 AF: mhm
29 G2: so I think this side of the family is definitely the more important side
(1.0)
What we see here is a retrospective history taking routine, which is typical of ge-
netic counselling. It is striking that G2 presents the genetic facts concerning AF’s
family members in the format of A/B-events4 (Labov and Fanshel 1977), which
only requires AF to confirm G2’s statements. Such a history taking routine is mark-
edly different from those undertaken in many other tertiary consultation settings.
The latter are characterised by embedded and chained questions (A-events) asked
by the doctor to which patients provide information (B-events). In this instance,
G2’s knowledge about AF’s family history is derived from the family pedigree chart
alluded to in turn 05 (note that family pedigree is routinely charted by specialist
nurses prior to the first clinic session). Starting with turn 05, G2 focuses on the
maternal side and foregrounds the age of onset in each instance. It is thus a display
of expert genetic knowledge, which requires attributing discriminatory significance
to patterns of inheritance across AF’s maternal and paternal lines. Affected family
members’ age at onset is crucial information for determining if another close rela-
tive will develop breast cancer at a younger age. The particularities of familial in-
heritance patterns thus come to the fore, as part of G2’s expertise. As we see in turns
21ff, G2 stresses that it is the mother’s side which has direct consequences for AF’s
current and future genetic status. The two family lines are portrayed in terms of
proximal vs distant relations as far as genetic inheritance is concerned. The discus-
sion here anticipates which of the family members will need to be contacted for the
diagnostic/predictive work to be conducted smoothly, and how AF’s decision to
test might have implications for these family members vis-à-vis others.
Extract 3 (continues from extract above)
01 G2: I mean looking at that it does look like there might be something
being passed down the fam- through the family (.5) the other
thing that we do is we can do a calculation where we compare the
ages of the women who have had breast cancer to to those who
haven’t had breast cancer (1.0) and so we can actually from that
we can work out what we think the chances are (.) that there
might be a gene running in the family
02 AF: erm
4. According to Labov and Fanshel (1977), ‘A’ events refer to information which is known to
the speaker, ‘B’ events refer to information which is known to the addressee and ‘A/B’ events
refer to information known to both parties. Following this, if the speaker makes a statement
about a ‘B’ event, this will be heard by the addressee as a request for confirmation.
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
03 G2: and what we think your own risk of having breast cancer in your
lifetime
04 AF: yeah
05 G2 see if it’s increased somewhat
06 AF: yeah
07 G2: now I did this for your (.) for your family and we do it using a com-
puter (.5) but it’s essentially just a sort of complicated calculation
08 AF: yes
09 G2: and your own risk is higher than that of the general population =
10 AF: =I thought it would be ((tense laugh)) I’m not surprised
11 G2: thought yeah yeah and it’s it’s your risk is about thirty percent basi-
cally I [think] so you’re ^^^^^^a thirty [percent]
12 AF: [so that’s] high high is it? Or::::
13 G2: it’s (.5) it is
14 AF: yeah
15 G2 significantly high I mean anything that we’re- I mean w-
16 AF: erm
17 G2: has to be taken with a pinch of salt because it is
18 AF: yeah::::ah
19 G2: just based on a on a sort of mathematical calculations so it’s not a
(.5) a
20 AF: yeah:::ah
21 G2: figure [that is set] in stone or anything [like that] that-
22 AF: [no:: no::] [erm]
23 G2: so it would mean that sort of three times out of ten you would have
a chance of (.) breast cancer (.) but then again seven times out of ten
you won’t [develop] breast cancer
24 AF: [yes:::] (.5)
25 G2: so you- (.5) so your chance is about three times as high as the gen-
eral population
26 AF: oh that’s nice ((laughing)) [hhhh hhhhh hhhhh] hah hah
27 G2: [^^^ ^ na:::::::::] (.5)
28 G2: but it (.) it sounds like that’s not a lot (.5) not a big (.5) of a [of a yeah
yeah]
29 AF: [oh it’s
no shock no no]
30 G2: (you thought that it’d go up higher) (.5) you would be (1.0) we would
think about seriously think about looking for a gene in your family
[(^^ ^^)]
31 AF: mhm
Srikant Sarangi
32 G2: to see if we could find an alteration because you your your risk is
sufficiently high enough for us to think about that
33 AF: right
34 G2: but (.5) doing that test has a lot of implications in it in itself (1.0)
The above episode begins with a return to the results frame, which is strategically
initiated in order to make progress with diagnosis. In turn 07, the computerised
risk figure is ascertained, similar to how medical test results are routinely given,
although a gene test result is yet to be obtained for establishing AF’s at-risk status.
G2 uses mitigation (‘just a sort of ’), which is subjected to further de-escalation in
turn 21 (see below). The risk figure is worked up in a staged manner: beginning
with a general statement such as ‘your own risk is higher’ (turn 09). This is met
with a lack of surprise from AF in turn 10 (notice the absence of a news marker),
almost as if she has been anticipating such an outcome. An interactional misalign-
ment becomes evident. G2 then reformulates the risk in percentage terms. AF
immediately asks if she falls into the category of high risk – the frame of reference
being one’s risk is either high or low in relation to one’s own individual circum-
stances (see Adelswärd and Sachs [1998], Edwards et al [2002], Sarangi 2002 on
how people find it difficult to make sense of individual risk in terms of absolute
numbers). When AF asks whether her risk is high, she seems to allude to the no-
tion of ‘high’ as it applies to her as an individual, and not ‘high’ in a comparative
sense such that her risk is higher vis-à-vis the general population. G2 responds by
labelling AF’s at-risk status as ‘significantly high’ (turn 15), but this is immediately
downgraded when G2 draws attention to the abstract basis of the ‘mathematical
calculation’ and underscores the fact that the 30 percent figure is not ‘set in stone’
(turns 17, 19 and 21). G2 then recasts the 30 percent figure in a different language:
‘three times out of ten you would have a chance of breast cancer’ (turn 23). And
within the same turn he de-escalates this risk assessment without actually altering
the risk figure (‘but then again, seven times out of ten, you won’t develop breast
cancer’). The frame again shifts to AF’s risk vis-à-vis the general population. Meta-
phorically speaking, the dynamics of escalation/de-escalation is achieved by treat-
ing AF as a dice, thrown into the air and then allowing it to land on a chance ter-
ritory. An interactional pattern emerges as far as escalation and de-escalation of
risk is concerned: rather than further escalate a given risk figure in the next avail-
able turn, G2 consistently chooses to de-escalate this risk assessment before addi-
tional escalation is done in a staged manner.5
AF’s response to the high risk figure (turn 26) is another instance of interac-
tional misalignment, which comes across as indifferent, or even sarcastic, tinged
5. For a similar analysis of escalation and de-escalation devices in the legal context, see
Goodwin (1994).
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
with nervous laughter, perhaps as a device to release anxiety. Seen from G2’s view-
point, this marks a dispreferred response, and he has to interactionally adjust to
this situation. We note, in turn 28, G2 formulating AF’s perspective (this seems to
be a variation of what Maynard [1991] regards as perspective display series) before
shifting the frame to diagnosis which will involve ‘looking for a gene in your fam-
ily’ (turn 30). AF has to meet the eligibility criteria for genetic tests, and here G2
has to draw on his expert awareness of local service provision at an organisational
level (Wood et al 2003). The risk figure of 30 percent is regarded by G2 as optimal,
even though AF does not seem to think of this as a high enough risk.
About 12 turns are omitted, where AF latches on to G2’s remark in turn 34 to
talk about a television documentary she had watched recently. This concerned the
story of two sisters, with susceptibility for breast cancer. The test results showed
one of them as positive, who then opted for mastectomy to remove all the tissues
from her breast. AF concludes with the remark: ‘the risk was virtually taken away
for her’. This interjection is significant because, as we will note in the extract below
(see turn 36 in particular), AF may already be considering drastic intervention
measures if her test results were to be positive. For her, mastectomy can be a means
of weeding out potential risk once for all.
Extract 4
01 G2: [yeah] [yeah] yeah (.5) yeah I mean the thing about doing the the
gene test is that if if it shows that you do have an alteration of a gene
02 AF: mhm
03 G2: then your your risk will actually be a lot higher than thirty percent
– it’ll be more like eighty percent
04 AF: ho God ((nervous laughter))
05 G2: so it’s actually-
06 AF: ((sighs))
07 G2: yeah so (.5) so I mean that’s [it’s-]
08 AF: [so it’s] virtually definite then
09 G2: well [still (.) there’s still twenty percent chance that it isn’t] so- but it’s
10 AF: [mmhm]
11 G2 a lot higher [^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^^]
12 AF: [(I mean) ^^^^ ^^^ ^] ^^^ ^^ ^ ^
13 G2: whereas if- if we showed that you didn’t have an alteration in the gene
then your chance of (.) you your chance (would go down again)
14 AF: mhm
15 G2: to the general population so-
16 AF: mhm so if I did have an alteration in the gene what (would happen)
then?(.5)
Srikant Sarangi
03 G2: it would be your mother or- ideally your mother in fact (yeah)
04 AF: mhm
05 G2: because she is the closely most closely related
06 AF: erm
07 G2: to you (.5) and the way- it works is that (1.0) each of us has - you
you’d have how your mother’s got two copies of this gene (.) and if
we assume (.) that she (.5) that one of her one of the copies has
08 AF: mhm
09 G2: altered for her to have had the condition or the disease
10 AF: yeah
11 G2: and she could have either passed on the normal copy of the gene to
you or the altered copy of the gene to you so there’s a fifty-fifty chance
(.5) and if she’s passed on the normal copy for you (.) of the gene to
you then you haven’t got it- your risk is the same as the general
12 AF: erm
13 G2: population - if she’s passed on the (.) the altered copy then your risk
is [much higher]
14 AF: [higher]
15 G2: yeah so that’s - that would be the situation
16 AF: right
17: G2: and the same would also apply to your sister (1.0)
18 AF: my sister doesn’t seem to (^^^^^ ^^^^^^^ ^^) ((laughter)) I [don’t
think]
19 G2: [right
well] I mean different people have different reactions to the whole
thing and some people are not interested at all and that’s fine be-
cause at the end of the day what we’re testing for is something that
we we can’t do that much about (you see)
20 AF: mhm mhm (.5)
21 G2: so it’s it’s not you know that’s why that’s why we spend so (.5) long
going
22 AF: mhm
23 G2: through the implications of it (1.0) how wo- how do you think your
mother would feel about giving a a blood sample
24 AF: oh she’d hate it but she’d do it [she] hates needles [she’d] absolutely
hate it
25 G2: [right] [right] okay (.5)
26 G2: ‘cause there are- I mean the other implication is that there’s also a
higher risk of ovarian cancer as well in these women
27 AF: mhm
Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
6. Conclusion
Appendix
Transcription Conventions
(.): micropause;
(…): pause exceeding one second;
((gap)): indicates an interval of longer length between speaker turns and an ap-
proximation of length in seconds;
underlining: indicates increase emphasis as in stress;
-: indicates cut-off of prior word or sound;
[text in square brackets]: overlapping speech;
((text in double round brackets)): description or anonymised information;
(text in round brackets): transcriber’s guess;
=: a continuous utterance and is used when a speaker’s lengthy utterance is broken
up arbitrarily for purposes of presentation.
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Healthcare interaction as an expert communicative system
1. ‘Problems’ in conversation
Conversations can become problematic for a number of reasons and everyday dif-
ficulties are well documented in otherwise ‘normal’ speakers’ interactions. Misun-
derstandings can occur between interlocutors, leading to the need for clarification
and correction, or these can sometimes lead to conflict, where one person may be
offended by a misinterpretation of another’s comments, and even terminate the
interaction. Speakers can also experience ‘slips of the tongue’ (Cutler 1982) where
individual words or phrases are produced incorrectly, leading to the need for self-
correction and repair. Both the leading proponents of the two key approaches to
interaction analysis that we will be considering in this chapter – Conversation
Interacting with difficulty
and Olness (2000) support this view. Traditionally, language therapy often relied
on word-finding activities involving picture naming tasks, or grammatical activi-
ties such as sentence construction tasks. Carlomagno and colleagues suggest that
therapy focus on both formal aspects of the lexicogrammar, as well as its use in
interactions. For instance, they highlight the necessity of taking context into ac-
count when using co-reference. They discuss the effects that working within a con-
versational framework can have on specific aspects of the lexicogrammar, for ex-
ample, Wertz and colleagues (1981), Springer and colleagues (1991).
Another approach has been based on Conversation Analysis (CA) and has
been used by a number of researchers to address the patterns of interaction occur-
ring in aphasic conversations (Beeke et al. 2007a). Much of the work in applying CA
to aphasia has been influenced by the pioneering work of the linguist, Charles
Goodwin (1981), whose analysis of interactions involving a speaker with severe
expressive aphasia (his father) and others illustrated the co-construction of mean-
ing (Goodwin 1995), and the emergence of communicative competence through
the joint work of the partners, rather than seeing (in)competence as an attribute of
an individual (Goodwin 2003a). Two main areas preoccupy the research using con-
versation analysis to study aphasia, firstly investigating how communication effec-
tiveness might be facilitated through self and other repair (Ferguson 1994, 1998;
Lesser 2003; Lindsay and Wilkinson 1999), and secondly the design and evaluation
of conversational therapy programs (Boles 1998; Booth and Swabey 1999; Whit-
worth et al. 1997; Wilkinson et al. 1998). Parallel with these developments, a number
of aphasia researchers have been exploring the applications of more eclectic frame-
works such as found in the interactional sociolinguistics of Gumperz (1982), and
within these broader frameworks have considered issues of power in interactions
involving a person with aphasia (Simmons-Mackie and Damico 1999).
Systemic functional linguistic principles (SFL) (Halliday and Matthiessen
2004) have also been used to describe aphasic interactions in terms of speech func-
tions (Ferguson 1992b), and generic structure potential (Ferguson and Elliot
2001), with Armstrong (1991; 1993) discussing the implications of breakdowns in
cohesion for interactions. Such applications will be explained in more detail below,
but it has been the link between lexicogrammar and context, central to the work of
Michael Halliday in systemic functional theory, that has attracted the authors to
description of disordered conversations using this framework. As Eggins & Slade
(1997/2004) note:
“Structural-functional approaches ask just what is conversational structure, and
attempt to relate the description of conversational structure to that of other units,
levels, and structures of language.” (p.43).
Elizabeth Armstrong and Alison Ferguson
It is this relating between levels of language, looking for how one is realized by
another, through which SFL offers a different perspective from other forms of in-
teractional analysis. The following section will explore this further.
occurring and what is being discussed), ‘tenor’ (referring to the relative status of the
interlocutors) and ‘mode’ (referring to the channel of communication e.g., written,
spoken) that relate to the three social functions of language: i) to understand and
represent our environment and experience of that environment ii) “to represent
our experience to each other’; and iii) to organise our enactments and representa-
tions as meaningful text” (Martin and Rose 2003:€6). These latter three purposes are
known as the experiential, interpersonal, and textual metafunctions of language. At
an even higher level, one can characterize genres, which are said to “represent a
system of staged goal-oriented social processes through which social subjects in a
given culture live their lives” (Martin 2002:€56–57) in terms of particular patterns
and structures of language required for particular social purposes.
The importance of this higher level of abstraction of context is that discourses
can be seen as having relatively predictable structures, and generalizations about
behaviours can be made beyond the single instantiation of any one event. Sys-
tematicity is central to such a framework, so that a finite set of options is available
to speakers in particular situations, and a level of probability is possible to gauge
in terms of how a particular situation will unfold at various linguistic levels.
When working with data obtained from individuals with communication dis-
orders, such abstraction can be very useful. Firstly, it provides some notion of
‘norm’ for particular genres, about which judgements can be made re pathology/
no pathology. Conversely, it can allow the analyst to isolate particular contextual
variables that may be affecting the behaviours observed. For example, in the anal-
ysis of field, tenor and mode, variables of field can be isolated (topic, nature of in-
teraction), tenor (social distance between conversational participants, familiarity)
and mode (e.g., face to face discourse, telephone interaction, SMS messaging).
This framework has proved useful in a series of studies on individuals who have
neurogenic communication disorders (Armstrong et al. 2005/2007; Armstrong
and Mortensen 2006; Ferguson 2007; Ferguson and Armstrong 2004; Togher 2000;
Togher and Hand 1998; Togher et al. 1997). Findings such as the fact that familiar-
ity has a significant impact on interactions for these individuals (Ferguson 1994;
Togher et al. 1997), and that written vs. spoken modes invoke different use of
grammatical resources (Mortensen 2003) are examples of the ways SFL can inform
clinical practice. While the effects of familiarity may be fairly obvious i.e., speakers
interact differently when levels of shared knowledge and comfort within the inter-
action vary, it is the ways in which language varies that is of interest. Such phe-
nomena as differences in modality manifest themselves in specific ways in interac-
tions involving individuals with brain damage. For example, in investigating
individuals with traumatic brain injury, Togher and Hand (1998) found that these
individuals were less able to use modality for politeness purposes in service en-
counters with unfamiliar persons than their non-brain-damaged counterparts.
Interacting with difficulty
Such phenomena may account at least partially for the perceived bluntness of this
group and their perceived lack of social skills.
The importance of context and an understanding of how meaning is ‘con-
structed’ in an interaction between someone with a communication disorder and
their conversational partner can be viewed as central. SFL’s multistratal and multi-
functional dimensions enable the analyst to examine speakers’ utterances from
multiple perspectives and in so doing, add a depth to analysis not always available
in unidimensional analyses. For example, when exploring aspects such as gram-
matical structure, the role of certain structures in creating meaning is examined.
The use of modality has been examined for its role in the aphasic speaker’s ability
to negotiate conversations and in politeness (Ferguson 1992b). Many grammatical
analyses used in aphasia research tend to quantify features such as the amount of
clausal embedding, or use of tense endings, without looking at the effects of these
on overall discourse meaning. Similarly, ‘repair’ has been addressed without
directly exploring the role of lexicogrammar in the behaviour (Lindsay and
Wilkinson 1999; Perkins 1995). Ferguson’s study of repair (1992a; 1993), however,
incorporated the role of cohesion between turns in the analysis of guessing tech-
niques used by conversational partners (see below).
While aphasia is a heterogeneous disorder, the symptom common to all types and
degrees of severity of aphasia is anomia or word-finding difficulty. Armstrong’s
research considers the availability of lexicogrammatical resources for cohesion for
people with aphasia and demonstrates the difficulties aphasic speakers have pro-
viding clear reference (often using pronouns and demonstratives without explicit
antecedent referents) and producing the variety of lexical sense relations that as-
sists in creating a coherent text. These difficulties in providing explicit cohesive
ties linking ideas within the text place an increased load on the communication
partner as the partner attempts to build a coherent view of the meanings being
conveyed, but to-date most research in aphasia has considered anomia as a prob-
lem of the individual with aphasia rather than recognizing its impact on the inter-
action as a whole.
When communication partners converse with anyone who is having word-
finding difficulty, they frequently will supply the word or prompt the speaker to be
able to find the word. This ‘supplying words’ is a particular feature of conversations
involving a person with aphasia. Naturally, world-knowledge and shared knowl-
edge are major contributors to assist with the guesses made by the partner, but
another important resource is the co-text that immediately precedes the word
Elizabeth Armstrong and Alison Ferguson
supplied to those sought based primarily on the systemic linguistic work on cohe-
sion (Halliday and Hasan 1976) – namely, lexical association of superordinate,
cohyponym, and repetition, as well as other collocational relationships. There were
57/63 guesses involved at these moments of trouble for which it was possible to
identify immediately preceding co-textual resources. Of the 57 guesses, 31 (54%)
were accepted by the partner (i.e., either explicitly accepted, or no further repair)
and 26 (46%) were rejected by the partner. Lexical associates proved to be more
strongly represented in the immediately preceding co-text for rejected guesses
(54% of resources were lexical associates) than for accepted guesses (23% of re-
sources were lexical associates). The converse was found for general collocation,
which was more strongly associated with accepted guesses (26% of resources) than
rejected guesses (4% of resources). This research suggests that the frequency with
which words co-occur in the language provides an important potential resource
for people in interactions involving repair of word-finding, and illustrates the use-
fulness of analysing the interaction as a unit rather than separating the contribu-
tions of the aphasic speaker from those of the communication partner.
6. Interpersonal resources
It is often remarked that people with aphasia have marked preservation of social
and interpersonal interaction skills, despite even severe to profound levels of apha-
sic impairment. While most of the research into aphasic communication has tend-
ed to focus on the difficulties in communication, both conversation analysis and
systemic functional linguistic perspectives have turned the focus of research to the
remaining strengths in communication, and so have illuminated some of the means
by which people with aphasia do manage to communicate despite their difficulties.
For example, how might people with aphasia manage the linguistic resources for
modality that allow speakers to modulate and shade meanings and manage the
politeness work required for interpersonal interaction? Ferguson considered the
linguistic resources available to speakers with moderate-severe aphasia for polite-
ness (Ferguson 1992b), and found that the aphasic speakers (in a series of short
role plays) made use of all available resources (including such devices as shifts in
verb tense, negation, comment adjuncts, use of interrogative forms for giving com-
mands). The extent of modulation remained weak e.g.€using forms such as ‘can’
rather than the more modulated ‘could’, but modulation was clearly an available
resource for interaction, even in the presence of significant aphasic difficulty.
Partners of people with aphasia accommodate for the communicative diffi-
culty in diverse ways, and Ferguson’s conversation analysis research suggested that
communication partners may simply make more use of personal interactive styles
Elizabeth Armstrong and Alison Ferguson
for conversational repair, since they were observed to adopt similar patterns of
repair with both partners with and without aphasia (Ferguson 1994). However, at
least for some people, the presence of communication difficulty appears to lead to
‘over-accommodation’ for the difficulty (Giles et al. 1992; Giles and Smith 1979).
The following Example 2, provides an illustration of both the preserved story-
telling skills of a person with aphasia (in a continuation of the conversation from
the same dyad as described in Example 1) as he tells his story of the fish that got
away, as well as providing an example of overt ‘other-repair’ which would be con-
sidered marked in an interaction between father and son-in-law if aphasic diffi-
culty was absent.
Example 2. Other-repair of trouble in aphasic interaction
A You could see him. It was just on dusk.
LF And you had him on your line?
A Yeah, he was there, break the, you could see him, um, out about, ah seven
metres. X..
LF How far?
A ..About..
LF ..Seven what, metres, feet?1
A I don’t now, I was going to say metres, but X
LF Don’t worry about how far. But he was close enough to see.
A I’ll say.
LF Was he in the waves?
A Yes. And there was three, lifesavers there, XX come on get him! Bring him
in! They seen him too! I said, uh-oh, he’s gone. What!.. Couldn’t believe it.
In Example 2, the son-in-law attempts to clarify the distance being talked about,
firstly through an attempt to clarify the specific term used (‘metres’, ‘feet’), then
appears to let that correction go in order to re-establish the flow of the story, but
then seeks to make the clarification through establishing other information (‘close
enough to see’, ‘in the waves’). Arguably, the closeness of the fish to the beach
makes little difference to the point of the story (that the fish got away), and such
other-repair may have covert ‘therapeutic’ purposes that are rarely seen in non-
aphasic interaction, i.e., an attempt by the partner to provide practice and achieve-
ment of word-finding for the person with aphasia.
1. The metric system of measurement was introduced in Australia during the 1970s, and so
the 60 year old man would be more familiar with imperial measures, while the son-in-law would
be more familiar with metric. However, many people in Australia continue to use ‘inch’ and ‘feet’
measures as general descriptors in casual conversation while using the metric system in accurate
measurement situations.
Interacting with difficulty
Indeed, for much of the early history of aphasia research, brain and language rela-
tionships were the major focus of those seeking an understanding of localization
of function. With the advent of technology allowing accurate imaging of lesion
sites and dynamic brain function in the second half of the twentieth century
(Hillis 2002), work using aphasic data explicitly drew away from localization as a
goal, and focused upon theoretical modelling of components and processes within
the linguistic system. Seidenberg articulates the concern of many working in the
field when he points out that using brain-damaged performance to make infer-
ences about normal function is analogous to trying to find the best way to the
airport by looking at the back roads after there has been a blockage on the freeway
route (Seidenberg 1988). Even within information processing perspectives involv-
ing the design of neural networks that incorporate the real-time processing con-
straints known to operate in human neurophysiology, the search has been to un-
derstand how language may be learned and how it functions within undamaged
systems (Harley 1996; Plaut 1996), rather than relying heavily on inferences from
biologically damaged systems.
As discussed by Schegloff (Cmerjrkova and Prevignano 2003), this focus on
abstract theoretical modelling within cognitive science sees language as an inter-
action of separable components, with any contextual variables either ignored, or
treated as another factor that again can be separated. For those working with apha-
sia, this modular perspective has been both useful and limiting. The cognitive neu-
ropsychological approach to aphasia has been useful in allowing for close defini-
tion of aphasic deficits and clear articulation of therapy targets (Byng 1993).
However, as Lesser (2003) notes, such modelling may provide insights into serial
(conscious, controlled) linguistic processing but not parallel (automatic, contextu-
alized) linguistic processing. Hence, the problems encountered in the generaliza-
tion of therapy gains to real-world contexts are to be expected, when the contex-
tual demands of language use are not incorporated within both assessment and
therapy for aphasia.
Researchers in the field of aphasia have at times suggested, as Lesser (2003)
does, that pathological language use may offer a ‘window’ into psycholinguistic
processing. However, Heeschen and Schegloff (1999) argue against looking at
agrammatic errors as ‘windows into the brain’ with regard to linguistic processing,
arguing instead that such manifestations represent contextual adaptation. How-
ever, we raise the question as to whether other models of language use may have
the potential to offer insights into real-time, real-world linguistic processing. At
this stage we are intrigued by the way that the systemic functional linguistic mod-
el suggests a view of semantic networks based on a probabilistic model of associa-
tion (Hasan et al. 2005/2007) and query the extent to which such a probabilistic
model is compatible with emerging neural network theories investigating semantic
Elizabeth Armstrong and Alison Ferguson
access and storage impairments (Gott and Plaut 2002). We ask whether such mod-
els may provide a way through to future understandings of the semantic retrieval
problems that rest at the heart of aphasia.
There is also the question as to whether research into the social interaction of
people with aphasia can illuminate our understanding of brain and language rela-
tionships. Lesser argues that the methodology of Conversation Analysis does not
allow such insights, given its particular focus on what she describes as “surface
data” (Lesser 2003:€152), and its atheoretical approach. A separate but related ques-
tion is whether or not the study of aphasic interactions might inform an under-
standing of normal social interaction (i.e., of the social machinery, rather than the
individual cognitive processing). Lesser suggests that the inclusion of speakers
with pathology will necessarily result in abnormal interactional patterns. In re-
sponse, we argue, in line with Goodwin (Goodwin 2003b: 17) and Perkins (2003)
that the presence of communicative difficulty exposes the workings of conversa-
tional collaboration. Conversational collaboration is always present in every inter-
action, but typically is as invisible as the technique of a team of professional jug-
glers – dropping the ball alerts us to the interactive processes involved.
speakers (to allow for research development of therapy methods). Ramsberger and
Menn (2003) describe a naturalistic story-retell task involving the aphasic speaker
telling another person about an episode of the television show I Love Lucy, and
this represents a more naturalistic sampling method than similar story-retell tasks
involving picture description, for example the ‘Cookie Theft’ picture from the
Boston Diagnostic Aphasia Examination (Goodglass et al. 2000), or the drawn
cartoon stories, such as the ‘Cat Story’ (Ulatowska et al. 1981), and more recently
using a well-known Finnish cartoon (Korpijaakko-Huuhka 2004). Ferguson has
used an interactive task in which the person with aphasia watches a mock car-ac-
cident enacted using model cars, and then provides an eye-witness account to an-
other person (Ferguson 1993, 2002), while Togher has developed a more interac-
tive task in which the target speaker and partner are left alone to work out what
might be the use of an unusual object and their conversation audio-recorded for
later analysis (Kilov et al. 2009; Power et al. 2004). Researchers working solely
within the conversation analysis paradigm have consistently used real-world con-
versation sampling, although still often in a clinical setting, for example, in the
work of Klippi and Laakso (Klippi 1996; Laakso 2003; Laakso and Klippi 1999). As
Schegloff (2003) points out, any targeted assessment creates a ‘frame’ which draws
our focus towards events within that frame and tends to reduce our focus on what
is happening outside that specific context. Certainly, elicitations such as just de-
scribed allow the interaction analysis a wider view than that obtainable through
formal testing frames, but any elicited observational opportunities need also to be
supplemented with natural observations of the speaker in their everyday interac-
tions to enhance the validity of the assessment process.
The use of interaction analyses allow us to move from a notion of ‘error’
(as resulting from some problem resting in the individual, which we as outside
observers identify) to the notion of ‘trouble’ (as arising in the interaction rather
than in either individual, and as identified by the interactants themselves). This is
a fundamental paradigm shift for the focus of therapy for communication diffi-
culty, as it challenges notions of effective and successful communication, and how
we might characterise linguistic competence. For example, Anward (2003) sug-
gests that the act of repairing provides an opportunity for the person with aphasia
to display social competence. This shift has profound implications for the decision
as to whether or not to provide therapy (i.e., who is deciding whether there is a
problem that requires therapy?), who should be involved in the therapy (i.e., one
or both or more communication partners?), where should therapy be undertaken
(i.e., in clinics or in natural settings?), what should be the goals of therapy (i.e., are
goals defined with reference to the individuals or for the interaction?), and how
are outcomes of therapy to be measured (i.e., how will clinicians know when ther-
apy should finish?).
Elizabeth Armstrong and Alison Ferguson
The work on interaction analysis that has been applied to-date in the field of com-
munication disability in general, and in the study of aphasia particularly, has had a
strong clinical focus. Contemporary studies relate to how useful interaction analy-
sis will be to the mission of speech pathologists, i.e., to maximize communication
for people with communication disability. Thus, a range of approaches which might
be considered as falling within the umbrella of ‘interaction analysis’ have shaped
the research into the nature of communication disability and its consequences for
people’s everyday lives, as well as underpinning the development of clinical tools
for assessment and therapy, and in widening the scope of therapeutic practice.
Looking to the future, at a more theoretical level, it is questionable whether
contemporary studies integrate understandings at a broader social-cultural level
with interaction analyses, and there are limits to which contemporary studies at-
tempt to integrate understandings of brain-language relationships. It may be that
such theoretical boundaries are beyond the scope of approaches within interaction
analysis, but as speech-language pathologists, we find that the nature of our work
demands that we are ‘boundary-riders’ along these ‘borders’ of interaction analy-
sis. We are working with people faced with social stigma and socio-cultural no-
tions of disability in a world where language is highly valued, and in which the loss
of language results in disempowerment - yet our approach to the analysis of these
aspects of communication disability is, at best, guided by general understandings
only, and our interventions are often disconnected with our interaction analyses.
We are also working with people whose language difficulties arose from brain im-
pairment, and so we know a lot about which parts of the brain have been affected
for them, and we necessarily draw on the neurophysiological and psychological
understandings of brain function in order to understand and conceptualize the
‘how’ of their language processing, e.g.€why they might be slower to formulate re-
sponses, why perseveration may occur. These everyday demands prompt us to
view the future directions of interaction analysis as resting with the ability of dif-
ferent perspectives to model and explain linguistic processing in the context of
both the instance of interaction and the wider culture in which communication is
playing a part.
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Ecologies of gesture
Jürgen Streeck
The University of Texas at Austin
1. Context
which have in common the formal feature of raising or retraction and which, as a
family, convey a stance of detachment or indifference towards a proposition or a
reported event. Hand gestures can frame the current or next verbal act by the
speaker or specify the kind of uptake that he or she seeks for the utterance cur-
rently underway. Heath, in his contribution to The Contextualization of Language
showed that hand-gestures, in their moment-by-moment coordination with
speech, form part of “the famework to which subsequent action will be addressed
in the turn by turn organization of talk” (Heath 1992). Streeck and Hartge showed
that certain conventional hand gestures, when they are made in the forefield or at
the beginning of turns at talk, “preview” the action that the speaker is planning to
take in that turn (Streeck & Hartge 1992).
While this is a mode of gesturing which closely corresponds to Bateson’s notion of
contextual frames – bits of behavior are marked (framed) as being of a certain mode
or type–, Bateson also proposed an ecological and systemic understanding of contexts
of interaction, for example when he suggested that no unit of behavior ever stands
apart from the context by which it is specified, but rather is “part of the ecological
subsystem called context”; it is not “the product or effect of what remains of the con-
text once the piece which we want to explain has been cut out from it” (Bateson 1972:€338),
but rather participates in establishing or sustaining the multimodal framework of be-
havioral interrelationships from which it accrues its locally specific meaning. Differ-
ent modes of gesticulation (e.g.€depicting, pointing, displaying an illocution) differen-
tially direct and focus the attention of the participants and in this fashion also
contribute to the structuring of the interaction. This will be clarified below.
While Bateson only made reference to G.H.Mead’s analysis of interaction in
an opaque remark in his contribution to The Natural History of an Interview – “our
concept of communication becomes interactional”, he notes, “and our intellectual
debt is to G.H. Mead” (Bateson 1971:€20) – Mead’s conception of human symbols
and mind as originating in a generic conversation of gestures (Mead 1909, 1934) is
an important foundation for the empirical study of gesture. In Mead’s account of
the interactional phylogenesis of human cognitive and symbolic functions ges-
tures play the most significant part. Mead regarded gestures as early parts of acts,
an idea which he took from Darwin (Darwin 1955 1872). But in contrast to Dar-
win, who thought about gestures as affect expression, Mead suggested that they
facilitate the mutual anticipation of social acts: a gesture is a foreshadowing, not an
expression. Gestures enable individuals to navigate the rapids of potentially harm-
ful moment-by-moment interaction by allowing them to adapt to what is coming
before the fact (cf.€Streeck 2009b).
We must be aware that the foreshadowing of imminent actions is not the only
purpose for which gestures are made and that Mead’s account would not cover and
explain all conversational gestures. Nevertheless, Mead’s model of the conversation
Ecologies of gesture
of gestures gives us a starting point for analyzing gestures – namely in terms of how
they contextualize the next moment (see McDermott & Roth 1978) – that is not
very different from a conversation-analytic approach (e.g.€Goodwin 1986; Good-
win & Goodwin 1986; Heath 1986; Schegloff 1984). The analogy between Mead’s
account of interaction and conversation analysis and his implicit influence on CA
are rarely acknowledged. Evidently, Mead was a thinker of the first half of the 20th
century, not a micro-analyst with a microphone and video-camera. But what Mead
and Schegloff have in common is an understanding of interaction as sequentially,
turn-by-turn-, incrementally designed social action. Conversation analysts thus
have analyzed gestures by reference to where in the turn at talk and action-se-
quence gestures are being and what “jobs” they do and what projections they make
in these positions. Schegloff (1984), observing the frequent pre-positioning of hand
gestures relative to their “lexical affiliates”, analyzed them for how they bring an
element of talk into play and thus mark the opening up of this element’s “projec-
tion space”. While the foreshadowing of a “lexical affiliate” is a function typically
enacted by descriptive (referential) gestures, other modes of “forward-gesturing”
(Streeck 2009b) can be productively analyzed as components of action formation.
Schegloff (2007) has described conversational organization as a set of specific or-
ganizations each of which addresses a fundamental problem that conversational-
ists need to cope with at each and every point in their interaction. Among these is
the “action-formation problem”:
how are the resources of the language, the body, the environment of the inter-
action, and position in the interaction fashioned into … particular actions, …
recognizable by recipients …, – actions like requesting, granting, complaining?
(Schegloff 2007: xiv)
One can distinguish several relevant positions at which gestures are made during the
unit-by-unit unfolding of turns and sequences of action. For example, a first relevant
position is prior to turn beginning, near the possible completion of someone else’s
turn.1 Intending next speakers can rely on body motion, including gestures, to attract
attention to themselves and signal their intent to take the next turn (Kendon 1970).
Once the attention of others is attracted, the gesture can also display what kind of
talk the turn will be used for: a story (Streeck & Hartge 1992), a question, a confes-
sion (Streeck 2009b), etc. Other common displays in the forefield or at the beginning
of turns show aspects of the beginning turn’s design (e.g.€that it will be a multi-unit
turn). Or the gesture displays the speaker’s stance in relation to what is about to be
said (as in the example of shrugs). A common type of turn-final gestures are acts of
1. Concrete examples and analysis of the phenomena that are glossed over here are found in
Streeck 2007, 2009 a,b, and Streeck & Hartge, 1992.
Jürgen Streeck
“handing over” which model talk as a transaction involving physical objects (see
Müller 2003; Cienki & Müller 2009). “Giving” or “offering” hands can gradually turn
into receptacles ready for something to be placed in them. In other words, they can
serve to solicit response (Streeck 2007). Generally, gestures of the hand are well-
adapted to dealing with turn-taking matters because they can be performed and
understood concurrently with speech, free from the pitfalls of overlapping talk.
One ecology to which gestures of the hand contribute and owe their intelligibility,
then, is the production (or “formation”) of sequences and turns of (conversational)
social action. Hand gestures can be part of the design of these turns and actions
and, by virtue of their positioning within them, provide recipients with a “forward-
understanding”, i.e. an anticipation, of what will come next. But this is only one
relevant dimension in terms of which gestures of the hands are made and under-
stood. Another was pointed out by Goffman, in a rarely cited statement:
While the substratum of a gesture derives from the maker’s body, the form of the ges-
ture can be intimately determined by the microecological orbit in which the speaker
finds himself. To describe the gesture, let alone uncover its meaning, we might then
have to introduce the human and material setting in which the gesture is made. … The
individual gestures with the immediate environment, not only with his body, and so
we must introduce this environment in some systematic way (Goffman 1964:€164).
Symbolic acts of the hands, in other words, are also made within real, physical settings,
and they can couple with specific aspects of the scene (Goodwin 2007) and illuminate
it. I have found a heuristic of six ecologically different modes of gesturing useful:
1. gestures physically linked to the (tangible) environment at hand;
2. gestures elaborating the (visible) world in sight;
3. gestures that depict actual, imaginary, and abstract worlds;
4. gestures that construe ideational content (gestural concepts);
5. gestures that embody and construe communicative acts by the gesturer
(e.g.€concurrent acts of speech); and
6. gestures by which transactions are managed, including those that regulate the
behavior of co-interactants.
Other gesture ecologies could presumably be identified, but in the meantime this
heuristic enables us to take note of the fact that hand gestures not only embody
meaning and mediate communication in heterogeneous ways, but also bring the
communicating body in contact with the world in a variety of distinct modes.
Ecologies of gesture
What is at issue in part is how visual and tactile (or haptic) features of gestures
intersect. Consider gesture practices of the first variety. These involve direct tactile
contact – or at least near-contact – between the gesturing hand and the immediate
physical setting, the world at hand. Gestures of this kind, which involve immediate
physical contact, are abundant in many work settings, including those where peo-
ple cooperate by means of inscriptions on paper. One can think of two car-me-
chanics exploring with their fingers a dent in a fender to determine how to remove
it: exploratory motions become gestures, which can display information, such as
the texture of the surface. People can virtually share tactile experience by gestural-
izing the motions through which this experience is gathered. Car-mechanics (and
practitioners of many other professions) also disassemble and mock-disassemble
complex objects (e.g.€car-parts) and make the connectedness and separability of
subparts visible by motions of their hands. Or think of a group architects leaning
over a blueprint, one of them emphasizing by a motion of the hand the curvature
of a (planned) wall. All of these practices engage the interactants’ hands in their
actual, material involvement with the material world. In each case, the world at
hand is elaborated and made intelligible with the help of gestures.
A concrete example of this first variety comes from the interaction between a
car-mechanic and his apprentice. The apprentice explains the function of a bolt in
the trunk of a car to his boss. He points to tracks on the two sides of the trunk and
moves his hands back and forth, thus showing how the bolt moves while holding
the trunk-cover in place as it is being opened or closed. Notice how truncated the
apprentice’s verbal explanation is; without the gesture, it would be incomprehensi-
ble. (Black dots in the transcripts indicate the moments captured in the drawings.)
(1) 1 Mechanic What this bolt here for, need to go inside?
Figure 1
2 Apprentice Oh no, there’s- an ( - - - - • - - - - - - - )
3 Mechanic Something to hang from this?
4 Apprentice For the cover right here.
5 Mechanic Okay. ( - - ) You just inspect everything.
Jürgen Streeck
Figure 2.1
1 Mechanic (summons Cedric with an ‘index up’ gesture)
(5.5)
Figure 2.2
Ecologies of gesture
Figure 2.3
3 the fro:nt •
Figure 2.4
4 Cedric ( )
[
5 Mechanic • this side
6 Cedric Okay
7 Mechanic you need to switch with that tire
8 Cedric Okay.
Gestures of the hands that focus attention on an object in the tangible or visible
environment often also provide an aspect under which an object is to be per-
ceived.2 Differences in hand-shape, for example, can indicate whether an object is
to be seen as an individual, as an examplar, as a set or collection, and so on. Add-
ons to pointing gestures can indicate that there is something beyond the horizon,
and tracing motions can select and emphasize boundaries in the landscape.
Through gestures of both the first and the second ecological variety then, the local
setting of the interaction – the place that is currently inhabited by the interactants
– is structured and its meaning for the ongoing activity clarified. These gestures, in
turn, derive their visible significance from their coupling with the context that is
available to the senses.
Figure 3.1
9 how the • power-cabels come across because
(-----)
Ecologies of gesture
Figure 3.2
11 the house is to actually do it in three terrace • levels.=
12 C = Mh hm.
13 MJ Because the side almost has this three (. ) ter-
Figure 3.3
14 It has two very disti:nct ( - • - )
15 terrace levels and then
16 we’ll probably try’n pull one out of the very to:p.
(----)
17 Absolutely fanta:stic.
(11 lines deleted))
29 And on this bottom one ( - - )
Figure 3.4
Jürgen Streeck
Figure 3.5
31 And it’s this very tiny, • intimate-
32 C Hmm.
[
33 MJ piece, with the with the water runoff coming down and
34 dripping.
The drawings show that, in contrast to the previous interactions, the gesturer here
focuses his gaze on his own hands. The architect’s gaze upon his hands is in fact
quite sustained, owing to the centrality of his hand motions to the complex spatial
representation that he is building. An intermittent glance by the gesturer to the
gesturing hands, however, is generally characteristic of hand-gestures made in the
depictive mode (Streeck 1993). The focus of attention of the entire interacting en-
semble is upon the gestures, which represent some world beyond the setting of the
interaction, rather than highlighting and elaborating features of the current scene.
This is what, quite simply, is meant by ecology here: a gesture’s relations to the
participants’ attentional field, that is, the field which they perceive, construe, or
imagine. Depictive gestures structure the participants’ imagination, pointing and
other visually indexical gestures the setting that they can see, and tactile and haptic
gestures the setting that they can touch, handle, and, more often than not, see as
well. In other words, the three types of gestures evoke figures on different kinds of
ground and they focus cognitive attention in different ways: they either augment
and organize what is available to the interactants’ senses or they give structure to
their imagination.
Depiction is not the only purpose for which pictorial gestures are made. Only
depictions, by definition, show what something looks like, and it may be for this
reason that speakers who provide depictions with their hands, look at them at
some point. The gaze to the hand is a display of the gesture’s depictiveness.
Equally pictorial (if not always in a narrowly visual sense) is the conceptual
mode of gesticulation, that is, performances of embodied schemata that structure
content and represent something�as something (Goodman 1968). To emphasize its
Ecologies of gesture
nature as a distinctly manual mode of cognitive grasping, I label this mode of ges-
turing ceiving, from Latin cap, “take”, “take hold of ” (as in con-ceive and con-cept).
Gestures in both the depictive and conceptual modes are “iconic” or “imagistic”
(Beattie 2004). But whereas depictive gestures are made deliberately and, at least
briefly, looked at by the gesturer, conceptual gestures are more like spontaneous
bodily insights, creative manual figurations of content that is in need of a form.
This is most visible when the speaker makes a concrete gesture to construe idea-
tional content for which s/he is simultaneously searching a lexical representation.
Gestures produced in this mode are not attended (i.e. looked at) by their makers.
Depiction and conceptualization by gesture, in other words, are two related modes
which are distinguished by the different frameworks of visual attention within
which they operate: depictive gestures are made in or near the center of visual at-
tention, conceptual gestures emerge from the periphery of the attentional field:
they are spontaneous “body thoughts” (Strathern 1996).
In example 4, the mechanic enacts the concept cranking. He is presently taking
issue with a customer’s account of engine trouble that she experienced; he points out
that her car did, in fact, “crank”. (In other words, both battery and starter were work-
ing.) As he utters the word, he performs an eye-brow flash, a facial display of recog-
nition, while rotating the index-finger of his right hand, which is elevated to his ear.
The enactment is a multi-modal performance of “hearing cranking” (i.e. achieving
a knowing recognition of a sound as being by the turning of the starter).
(4) 1 Mechanic When she came to start the car, the car flooded her.
Figure 4
2 She crank•in’. ( - - ) She misdescribed to me.
This is not a pantomimic depiction of someone’s behavior in the talked-about situ-
ation; it is not a depiction at all, but rather a synthetic embodiment of a concept: the
mechanic enacts it frequently along with the word crank, independently of whether
this word is used in descriptive, abstract, or proscriptive contexts. In other words,
the gesture is a concrete cept (manual concept) that corresponds to a verbal concept,
not to a physical entity or event, as depictive gestures do. Many gestures made in the
mode of ceiving depict what we traditionally call the vehicle of a metaphor (Cienki
Jürgen Streeck
& Müller 2009). The speaker’s body supplies a sensorimotor schema that structures
some phenomenon or abstract domain and thereby renders it intelligible.
The remaining modes of gesturing do not relate to the world around the inter-
action or the world that is being talked about, nor do they construe the content of
the conversation in other ways. Rather, they relate to the interaction itself. They
have been called “pragmatic” (Kendon 2004) or “interactive” (Bavelas et al. 1992)
gestures. I distinguish between gestures that relate to the communicative actions
of the speaker/gesturer and those that relate to the current, anticipated, or desired
actions of the addressee. In one mode the gesturer displays (aspects of) what he or
she is doing in the (current or imminent) utterance, in the other s/he directs others
what to do. It is quite possible that this distinction is not tenable or needs to be
refined, so that, for example, gestures that formulate communicative relationships
or engagements can be accomodated. But the ecological difference between these
modes of gesturing and the ones discussed above should be clear enough.
An example of the first of the two types, gestures that display communicative
acts, is the following, from the same interaction as Example 4.
Here, the mechanic concludes his explanation of the customer’s engine trou-
ble, hinted at in Example 4, with a “handing over” or “palm-up/open hand” ges-
ture (cf.€Müller, 2003).
(5) 1 Hussein all the car smoke,
2 wasting gas,
Figure 5
3 no po•wer.
4 Jürgen Oh.
The gesture marks the consequence of the antecedent conditions that the speaker
lists in this sentence, and at the same time marks the end of the utterance and thus
the transfer of the turn to the interlocutor, who produces an understanding token,
oh. Pragmatic gestures appear to be both the most frequent variety of conversa-
tional gestures and the type that is most often conventionalized, and among prag-
matic gestures the open-handed “handing over” is a particularly common unit.
The pragmatic mode of gesturing is not perceptually different from ceiving,
i.e. gestural conceptualization. What differs is what is being conceptualized, and
Ecologies of gesture
thus, how the gesture is processed3: pragmatic gestures do not frame what is being
talked about, but aspects of the process of talking.
Gestures of the other subvariety refer to actions of the addressee, for example
by soliciting a response or by proscribing a responsive action that the other could
take. An example is the following gesture with which its maker seeks to stop the
interlocutor from proceeding further with her talk: that forthcoming talk is figu-
ratively held at bay. Bev is talking about a movie which she recommends Rani go
and see; Rani seeks to keep her from revealing too much about the plot.
(6) 1 Bev It’s really good.
Figure 6
2 Rani Don’t • tell me.
This gesture is understood as relating to the interlocutor’s actions; this is its pri-
mary coupling.
Hand gestures thus mediate processes of sense-making in a number of quite
different fashions, and a multitude of heterogeneous practices are available, appar-
ently in any culture, to deal with gesture’s diverse tasks.
The diversity of ways in which motions and configurations of the hands participate
in communicative processes and their different couplings with components of the
communicative situation gives us pause to reconsider the way in which the body is
conceptualized in research on language and social interaction. Until recently, most
research and model-building concerning “nonverbal communication” was predi-
cated upon an expressive understanding of the human body: various body parts or
regions (the forehead, the face, the hands) or the body in its structured configura-
tion (posture) were treated as expressive of the communicator’s “internal” disposi-
tion, of mental imagery or intent. The body was thus attributed an ancillary role
(as maker of sign-bodies) in activities governed by semiotic relations, or subsumed
under abstract categories such as agent or subject. The body was treated as if it had
nothing of its own to contribute to sense-making. Even though gestures are con-
ceived as “material carriers of thinking-for-speaking” (McNeill & Duncan 2000),
the mindfulness of the human body – the fact that it knows the world on its own
terms – was rarely taken into account. But especially when we study gestures in the
context of activities that involve manual action, as in a car-repair shop, the fact
that they themselves are bodily acts becomes important: gestures can no longer be
reduced to expressive forms that are only incidentally made by the hands, but their
manual nature and their frequent origin in, and indexical ties to, practical actions
of the hands (as well as the tools and objects involved in them) are central to how
these gestures mean.
The empirical study of multimodal interaction meets up here with developing
lines of research and theorizing in fields of study such as cognitive science
(Wilson 2002), cognitive linguistics (Johnson 1987), and “communities of prac-
tice” or praxeology (Hanks 1996). In these fields, attempts have been made to re-
conceptualize the body as a cognitive entity and make sense of it in terms of how
it inhabits and acts in worlds (Streeck, Goodwin and LeBaron, to appear). Much
of the recent work on bodily components of human communication continues to
be based, if not explicitly then in terms of research methods, on a dualist concep-
tion of body and mind. Gestures are seen as the external dimension or “sign vehi-
cles” of mental content or process. In my own work, I take a rather different tack,
working from an understanding of the human body as the primordial organ and
site of human cognition, as proposed by phenomenological philosophers
(Heidegger 1962 (1926); Merleau-Ponty 1962; Polanyi 1958). These have argued
that we must understand human understanding by finding it, in the first place, in
concrete, practical, physical activity in the world. This congrues with recent work
in anthropology (Hastrup 1995; Ingold 2000; Keller & Keller 1996; Strathern
1996), philosophy and linguistics (Varela, Thompson, & Rosch 1991), educational
psychology (Lave 1988), and sociology (Connerton 1989; Harper 1987; Mauss
1973 (1935)), which works from the fact that the human mind – and the symbols
that it relies upon – are embodied. In cognitive science, there is a growing accept-
ance of the idea that certain higher-level cognitive abilities are rooted in lower-
level sensorymotor skills (Wilson 2002). Recent findings indicate that the con-
cepts underlying language are stored in the brain in terms of action-perception
loops (Barsalou 1999; Glenberg 2002). Brain structures that control movement
are also involved in perception, especially perception of other humans (Wilson &
Knoblich 2005). More broadly, the raison d’être of brains is motor control, which
makes thinking an internalized form of movement (Llinàs 2001). Lakoff & John-
son have fittingly entitled their second book Philosophy in the Flesh (1999). In
their work, however, the body appears almost exclusively as a natural, universal
Ecologies of gesture
entity: there is no recognition of the fact that bodily experience is itself culturally
constrained.
Gesture is symbolic body action evolved from the body’s practical engagement
with the world. It exemplifies that traditional separations between internal and
external, or ideational and material resources, and between cognition and com-
munication, embodied communication and practical work, between language use
and practical action, are obsolete. In the most characteristic situations of human
communication – symbolic, multimodal communication lodged in practical co-
operation – they are one. Gestures and languages, then, are not only means for
interacting and communicating – let alone for sharing information–, but for in-
habiting worlds together and managing interaction in the process. They have
evolved from and facilitate distributed cognition (Hutchins 2006).
However, there are limitations even to advanced, non-dualist conceptions of
the body which squarely situate the mindful body in the world. For this world, as
it is commonly construed, is a thing-world, not an interpersonal or intercorporeal
one. This might be the legacy of Heidegger with his emphasis on equipment and
manipulation, or related to the current interest in professional communication
and contexts of material work (Lave 1988). But human bodies do not only acquire
worldly skills in their engagement with objects or matter, but also through their
unmediated contact with other human bodies, and this contact – especially during
childhood – is also subject to cultural regulation and thus difference. For example,
de León, studying the socialization of young children in Maya-speaking Tzotzil
communities in Southern Mexico (de León 2000), has demonstrated that these
children experience social interaction far more frequently and intensely than chil-
dren in the industrialized countries of the Northern hemisphere through the me-
dium of direct physical (tactile) contact. Distinct patterns of intercorporeality dur-
ing childhood have implications for the kinds of participatory competence that the
child acquires. We need a much richer understanding of the body in its culturally
specific modes of participation, resonance, and agency, not so much to solve meth-
odological problems – these, I believe, have large been resolved – but to close the
gaps between the various concurrent, non-dualist conceptions of humanity that
are currently emerging at such a rapid pace.
4. Historical dimensions
An ecological approach to interaction which seeks to come to terms with the mul-
timodal nature of human action and interaction – including the fact that human
action more often than not involves tools and is situated in artefactual,
i.e. human-made, environments – comes up against the issue of the historical
Jürgen Streeck
Levinson has reflected on the origin and history of the parts of the human interac-
tion engine (Levinson, 2006) and argued that
interaction appears to have detailed universal properties. … The … cultural sys-
tems that have been studied reflect very similar, in some cases eerily similar, sub-
systems (Levinson 2006:€46).
Still, these properties are cultural, not biological, properties, notwithstanding the
fact that they are predicated on a human biology that makes the production of
culture – adaptive, local culture – possible.
This challenge, too, is a theoretical one: we usually do not need to reckon with
the historicity of the phenomena when we seek to describe the organization of
social interaction and the deployment of linguistic and gestural components in
interaction. It appears to me that the real challenges – or the more interesting chal-
lenges – at this point are not ones of research methodology – of identification,
Ecologies of gesture
5. Dynamical systems
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The neglected listener
Issues of theory and practice in transcription
from video in interaction analysis
Frederick Erickson €
University of California, Los Angeles
1. Introduction
It seems to me that the two most pressing issues for future work in the study of
language in interaction (or of interaction in relation to language use) concern
(1) empirical work and theory development that connect studies of larger scale
and longer term social processes with local scenes of face to face interaction – the
“structuration” or “macro-micro” issue in relation to oral discourse, and (2) the
tendency over the last generation to emphasize the study of talk’s local conduct
over other aspects of what happens locally during the course of face to face inter-
action. To discuss the first issue requires much more room than is available here,
and I have tried to do that in a book recently published (Erickson, 2004). Accord-
ingly I won’t even try to address that issue here, but will simply mention it by title.
The second issue is the focus of the comments that follow. I should make it clear to
Frederick Erickson
the reader at the outset that I think my own work has contributed somewhat to the
very problem I discuss below. That is, in part, because the study of talk is so intel-
lectually important and empirically intriguing that there is a strong temptation to
give it central focus – and also because many scenes of interaction are primarily
constituted by the talk that is taking place in them (many, admittedly, but not all
– and there’s the rub.). What I say here I do not want to be interpreted as implying
that I think the past half century’s efforts in the study of naturally occurring talk
have not made significant progress from where we were in the late 1950’s. Rather,
I see that work as providing shoulders on which scholars can now stand to look
toward a slightly more distant edge of the horizon.
Over the past fifty years audiovisual recordings (formerly sound cinema film and
more recently videotape) have been increasingly used as a primary information
source in studies of language use in social interaction. As Ochs has noted in a clas-
sic paper (1979), all transcription approaches presuppose theoretical commit-
ments. This is because any transcription is inherently incomplete – the multidi-
mensional complexity of speech and nonverbal behavior involved in social
interaction is such that it cannot be fully represented in any single transcript.
Rather, transcription is necessarily selective, emphasizing some aspects of speech
or nonverbal behavior over others. This selectivity is especially apparent in “play-
script” transcription of speech. Using a succession of lines on a full page as a way
of organizing a transcript can show many details of the real-time conduct of talk,
lexically and (with special diacritical markings added) such transcription can even
show a good deal about speech prosody. But it tends to privilege in its representa-
tion the speaking activity of speakers over the listening activity of listeners that is
occurring simultaneously with the speaking. Thus the on-line influence of listen-
ers upon the on-line production of talk by speakers tends to be obscured.
In other words, “incipit verbum,” whatever its status may be as a theological
proposition appearing at the outset of the Gospel According to John (Jn 1.1: “In the
beginning was the Word...”) is not an appropriate programmatic foundation for
the study of social interaction. Such interaction is a pre-human phenomenon and
thus its organization and conduct is, at least in part, phylogenetically prior to the
evolution of the human capacity for speech. Experientially for its participants, so-
cial interaction begins with space and time, and with vision in addition to hearing,
usually before any words are uttered. Social interaction in circumstances of co-
presence among participants happens in particular places, in real time, and as the
participants are able to monitor one another’s actions visually as well as auditorially.
The neglected listener
(Indeed one of my teachers, Edward T. Hall (1966) showed not only how within
the course of social interaction we judge interpersonal distance visually in a vari-
ety of ways, but how the whole sensorium is involved as we sense distance audito-
rially, kinaesthetically, tactilely, olfactorily, and even thermally, as we monitor in-
tuitively the body heat of those engaged with us in interaction face to face.)
As we speak during the course of social interaction we are not doing so on the
telephone, nor are we talking to one another through a keyhole; we have available
visual information on the listening activity of listeners on-line, while we speak. I
emphasize while here (see Condon and Ogston 1967) because the information
speakers have about listening reactions of audience members comes to us instant-
ly through vision – it is available in present moments as we speak, and everything
that interactional participants are doing together, verbally and nonverbally, con-
tains potentially significant information for the interpretation of what is going on
in the interaction, whether those are the interpretations of analysts or of the par-
ticipants themselves. These are key insights taken from the then cutting edge field
of cybernetics that informed the pioneering approach to the analysis of social in-
teraction developed a half century ago by Bateson, Fromm-Reichman, McQuown,
Birdwhistell, and others in the interdisciplinary group that produced the unpub-
lished monograph “The Natural History of an Interview” (see also Ruesch and
Bateson 1951). This approach has been called “Context Analysis” by Kendon, who
observes “One comes to recognize that what a person may be saying, for example
while he is saying it, may be shaped by information he is taking in from his recipi-
ent; and by the same token, how the recipient is behaving, where he is placing his
headnods, his smiles and frowns, and how he is patterning his visual attention,
may also be shaped by, even as it is shaping the activity of the speaker.” (Kendon,
1990:€29). As I have said elsewhere along similar lines, to be engaged in social in-
teraction is like climbing a tree that climbs you back in the same time. (Erickson,
1986:€296).
In his classic essay “The neglected situation” Goffman called face to face inter-
action an “ecological huddle” (Goffman 1964:€135). Such an ecology is only pos-
sible to maintain when the participants in interaction not only occupy the same
spatial and temporal setting but construct it through their conjoint action. As
McDermott has said (1976:€36), “people in interaction constitute environments for
each other.” The conduct of interaction must be organized socially; that is, the ac-
tivities of the various participants must relate in ways that take account of one
another. This is a local ecology of sustained mutual attention and influence.
Frederick Erickson
It is fair to say that over the last forty years the analysis of social interaction has
focused primarily on speech. Tremendous strides have been taken in the study of
oral discourse within immediate social interaction – I think in particular here of
the study of indexicality in talk that has developed within linguistic anthropology
(c.f. Silverstein, 1976, 1992 and Hanks 1996:€176–183, 230–236) and of the work of
conversation analysis (see the review by Goodwin and Heritage 1990 and the re-
cent volume edited by Prevignano and Thibault 2003). But everything is a tradeoff.
Progress in the study of naturally occurring speech carries with it a tendency to-
ward “logocentrism,” an overemphasis on speech by which the larger “whole” of
The neglected listener
and there are also now available various computer programs for the analysis of
motion and speech.
In such transcription the time line is presented horizontally on the printed
page and the behavior of separate individuals is overlaid vertically across the time-
line, as in the schematic representation below, which shows various verbal and
nonverbal actions of individuals A, B, and C – these could be turns at speech, sin-
gle word utterances as an exclamation or as a listening reaction, head nods, hand
and arm gestures (on this, see especially Kendon 1997), shifts in postural position,
glancing toward and then away from a computer screen or a tire pressure gauge,
reaching for a book on a desk or a plate of food on a dinner table, putting a forkful
of food in one’s mouth:
0 5 10 15 20 25 30 35 40 45
A: xxxx yy xxx zzzzz zzzz yyy xxxx bbb
B: zzzzz xxxx aa xxxxx zz xxxxxxx
C: xx y xxxx zzzzz c
Figure 1.╇ “Horizontal” transcription of verbal and nonverbal behavior on a time line.
In the case of quasi-musical notation (see Erickson 2003, 2004, 2008) the time-
line is not indicated by an ordinal scale displayed horizontally on the page, as in
the example above, but as on a musical page. In such pages the horizontal ar-
rangement of “bar lines” presents each “measure” as approximately equal in du-
ration. A closer representation of actual timing values is provided by the musical
notes within each two beat “measure” – half notes, quarter notes, eighth notes,
sixteenth notes, and thirty-second notes. (When the simultaneous actions of a
set of individuals are displayed on the musical page what results is a diagram
that appears like an orchestra score, and overall such a score resembles the ordi-
nally scaled time line version in the schematic diagram shown above.) An illus-
tration follows.
The quasi-musical notation in the example above shows eight successive two-
beat measures (10–17) from a larger transcript published and discussed in greater
elaboration in Erickson (1992 and 2004). Those discussions emphasized the con-
tent of talk, which is the beginning of a collective complaint sequence in which the
family discusses how much things cost nowadays. The transcript represents the
talk and eating behavior that occurred during a family dinner table conversation.
Seated at the table are the father (Fa), the mother (Mo), a guest (G), the oldest
brother who is in junior high school (B-1), the next oldest brother (B-2), the next
oldest brother (B-3), the sister who is in 3rd grade, and the youngest brother (B-4).
The transcript has a horizontal strip on which verbal and nonverbal activity of
each participant can be shown.
Frederick Erickson
Food had been served by the mother on each person’s plate (fried chicken,
potatoes, and a cooked vegetable). A stainless steel salad bowl sat near the middle
of the table and family members could, if and when they wished, reach for the
bowl, bring it to a position in front of their plate, and help themselves to a serving
of salad – lettuce and tomato from the family garden. A large metal fork and spoon
were placed in the bowl to enable food transfer to one’s plate. In order to get food
from one’s plate into one’s mouth it was necessary to spear a bit of food on one’s
plate with a small fork and then raise it to one’s lips. Because the plates were ce-
ramic and the salad bowl was metal, when the metal utensils hit the surface of the
plate or bowl they made small clicking sounds, which were audible on the video
recording. Thus the onset of food transport motions could be seen and heard to
begin with a click, followed by movement of the utensils toward either one’s plate
(in the case of salad service transfer) or to one’s lips (in the case of transferring one
bit of food to one’s mouth). These sounds and motions of food transfer are indi-
cated in the transcript. “FP” with an eighth note shows the point at which one of
the participants put their fork to their plate, making a click. “FM” indicates the
point at which the fork reached the mouth of the eater. A horizontal line below the
speech line indicates a forkful of food being held motionless in mid-air by an eater
(or moving only very slowly forward), and a jagged line indicates accelerated for-
ward motion of the fork toward the eater’s mouth. (Thus in measure 10 the oldest
brother’s fork is shown as motionless in mid-air, with motion toward his mouth
beginning at the onset of measure 11 and the fork reaching his mouth on the be-
ginning of the second beat of measure 11. Notice also at the beginning of measure
10 the father’s fork hit his plate at the beginning of the first beat. He did not pick
up food at that point, and his fork hit his plate again at the beginning of the second
beat of measure 11. The reader is encouraged to look for other FP-FM occurrences
throughout the eight measures shown above.)
The transcript also shows how the eating behavior of various family members
is temporally coordinated with the speaking behavior that was occurring. Usually
syllables that appear at the beginning of each of the two beats in a measure are
pronounced with volume stress. Thus in measures 10–11 as the oldest brother says
“seventy five dollars goes in a day” he did it with the following stress pattern: “sev-
enty dollars goes in a day.” This clause is initiated with the syllable “se” and is
completed with the word “day” and those syllables both appear at the beginning of
the first beat in each successive measure. In other words, the three volume-stressed
syllables in the clause appear at a regular time interval in relation to one another
– marking an underlying cadence. (The reader should now look across other meas-
ures to see the cadence patterns that are apparent in the verbal transcription that
uses quasi-musical notation.)
Frederick Erickson
mother having “put on hold” in mid-course her transport of salad from the salad
bowl to her plate while her oldest son was addressing her with a question. And
then, as her son completed his utterance and she had quickly brought the salad to
her plate on the next cadential beat, she replied to her son’s question with an iron-
ic rejoinder, “well, we won’t talk about that.”
The transcript’s depiction of the mother’s temporal accommodation of her
salad transport to the timing of her son’s uttering his question to her is analogous
to what that son (B-1) did in measures 10 and 11. Notice that as he said the utter-
ance “seventy-five dollars goes in a day” he held his forkful of food in mid-air until
he had completed the utterance with the final syllable “day,” which also completed
the grammatical unit. It was on the next “beat” of measure 11, and exactly on that
cadential beat, that the son then put the forkful of food to his mouth.
This kind of temporal articulation and accommodation of two different kinds,
or strata, of orderings of interaction at the dinner table – the enacted social order of
eating together and the enacted social order of conversing together – cannot be
shown in playscript transcription nearly so clearly as it can by some sort of “horizon-
tal” multimodal transcription that displays selected aspects of both speaking behav-
ior and eating behavior. The quasi-musical transcript shown and discussed above is
one way to transcribe to show the inter-digitation of talking and eating. (N.B. A
video clip of this example of a dinner table conversation can be viewed on the inter-
net by accessing the homepage of my faculty website at the University of California,
Los Angeles. That address is <www.gseis.ucla.edu/faculty/members/ferickson>)
The previously discussed multimodal transcript did not emphasize spatial or
postural relationships between the various interactional participants and between
individuals and particular objects in their own personal surrounds as individuals
make use of those objects in their interaction. These can be shown concretely by
line drawings (see especially Scheflen 1973 for examples ) or more abstractly by
flow charts of various kinds. Sometimes the spatial displays are tied to a time line
and sometimes it becomes necessary to represent spatial relationships and tempo-
ral relationships separately in diagrams. Hybrid approaches are also possible. It is
now quite simple to import photographs from digital video into playscript tran-
scription of speech (as is especially characteristic in the recent work of Goodwin)
and the effect of this is to “interrupt” to some extent the logocentric implications
of the playscript transcription.
Formerly it was very expensive to print analytic charts in which information
about interactional behavior was displayed “horizontally” on a time line, or in
musical typescript. With the advent of digital typesetting, however, those costs
have decreased substantially. In addition, digital video recording and analysis soft-
ware also makes it logistically easier and less expensive than it used to be to collect
and analyze audiovisual records of social interaction.
Frederick Erickson
6. Conclusion
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Dialogical dynamics
Inside the moment of speaking
John Shotter
University of New Hampshire
As I see it, all communication begins in, and continues with, our living,
spontaneous, expressive-responsive (gestural), bodily activities that occur in the
meetings between ourselves and the others and othenesses around us. Indeed,
as living, embodied beings, we cannot not be responsive in some fashion to
the expressions of others (spoken, written, or otherwise), and to other kinds
of events, occurring in our immediate surroundings. In this article I outline
methods for exploring the unfolding dynamics of our utterances in their speaking
and how they can give rise to a ‘shaped’ and ‘vectored’ sense of our moment-by-
moment changing placement within the situation of our talk – engendering in us
both unique anticipations as to what-next might happen along with, so to speak,
‘action-guiding advisories’ as to what-next we might do.
“On the one hand it is clear that every sentence in our language ‘is in order as
it is’. That is to say, we are not striving after an ideal, as if our ordinary vague
sentences had not yet got a quite unexceptionable sense, and a perfect language
awaited construction by us. – On the other hand it seems clear that where there
is sense there must be perfect order. So there must be perfect order even in the
vaguest sentence” (Wittgenstein 1953, no.98).
Much attention in linguistics has been paid to patterns of already spoken words, to
the spatial shapes or forms of already completed acts of speaking.1 Instead, in this
article, I want to focus attention on people’s words in their speaking, on what hap-
pens in the course of a person’s utterance, and on the dynamic ways in which
1. “If I had to say what is the main mistake made by philosophers of the present generation...
I would say that it is that when language is looked at, what is looked at is a form of words and
not the use made of the form of words” (Wittgenstein, 1966, p.2).
John Shotter
people make use of words in the course of their other actions, as well as on the
subtle details of how, as their use of words unfolds in responsive relation to those
to whom they are addressed, people adjust their expressions accordingly.
This, however, is an approach I came to only slowly. When I first began to
study language (Shotter 1968), I was strongly influenced by Chomsky (1957, 1965).
Central to his whole approach then was idealization: “Linguistic theory,” he said,
“is concerned primarily with an ideal speaker-listener...” (p.3). For, as he then saw
it, due to “memory limitations, distractions, shifts of attention and interest, and
errors (random or characteristic) in applying his knowledge of the language in
actual performance” (p.3), our utterances, actual acts of speaking were too disor-
derly to study. Indeed: “A record of natural speech will show numerous false starts,
deviations from rules, changes of plan in mid-course, and so on. The problem for
the linguist, as well as for the child learning the language, is to determine from the
data of performance the underlying system of rules that has been mastered by the
speaker-hearer and that he puts to use in actual performance” (p.4). In other
words, his central concern in his theory is with discovering the “mental reality”
underlying actual behavior. Now, with reference to Wittgenstein’s (1953) remark
above, my interest has switched completely to a focus on the deviations that
Chomsky, rightly, sees as standing in the way of conducting a “natural scientific”
investigation into the workings of language.2
In the dialogical approach to interaction and interaction analysis I now take, I
have been centrally influenced, not by their theories – as they all especially eschew
idealizations – but by certain specific utterances or expressions in the writings of
Wittgenstein, Vygotsky, Bakhtin, and Voloshinov, as well as drawing influences
from expressions in Merleau-Ponty’s and Garfinkel’s writings. As I see it, all com-
munication begins in, and continues with, our living, spontaneous, expressive-re-
sponsive (gestural), bodily activities that occur in the meetings between ourselves
and the others and othenesses around us. Indeed, as living, embodied beings, we
cannot not be responsive in some fashion to the expressions of others, as well as to
other kinds of events, occurring in our immediate surroundings – hence my
2. “The more narrowly we examine actual language, the sharper becomes the conflict between
it and our requirement. (For the crystalline purity of logic was, of course, not a result of investiga-
tion: it was a requirement.) The conflict becomes intolerable; the requirement is now in danger
of becoming empty. – We have got on to slippery ice where there is no friction and so in a certain
sense the conditions are ideal, but also, just because of that, we are unable to walk. We want to
walk: so we need friction. Back to the rough ground!” (Wittgenstein, 1953, no.107). In other
words, what Chomsky (1965) thinks of as “degraded” examples of language use – which makes
the learning of the ideal principles of syntax difficult for a child – exemplify for Wittgenstein the
rich details (many of) which contribute to the unique sense we make of a person’s expressions.
For him, idealizations strip out essentials, not what is inessential.
Dialogical dynamics
Thus, as I see it, from a dialogical point of view, our intellectual lives are not
primarily based in picture-like mental representations, i.e., inner structures of
only a formal (static patterned) kind, but in ‘inner’ dialogically-structured move-
ments, in a dialogical dynamics giving rise to unfolding movements which shift
this way and that in a distinctive fashion, movements whose ‘shape’ can be ‘felt’ or
‘sensed’ but not pictured, or known at all in a propositional form. These sensed or
shaped ‘inner movements’ are, I take it, the “linguistic intuition[s] of the native
speaker” against which such linguists as Chomsky (1965:€19)3 test their theories of
syntactic structure, or other such general and abstract features of our use of lan-
guage – what he now calls their “I-language” (Chomsky: 2000).4
But here, in talking of such sensed or felt ‘inner movements,’ i.e., of thought as
not in any way separate from feeling, I am taking an approach toward these issues
very different in kind to Chomsky’s: mine is a practical-descriptive kind of ap-
proach rather than a theoretical-explanatory one, as I will explain in a moment.
For, in line with Vygotsky’s comments quoted above, from a dialogical point of
view, our inner intellectual lives can be seen as consisting in an ‘orchestrated’ in-
tertwining of many different kinds of influence: conscious and unconscious ones,
cognitive and affective, deliberate and spontaneous, biologically given and cultur-
ally developed ones, and in fact, as we shall see, many others of a much more oc-
casional or momentary kind that are at work in the immediate practical surround-
ings of a particular utterance.
As William James (1980) noted in his famous “The Stream of Thought” chap-
ter, we have failed in the past, in discussing the nature of such dynamic forms, to
register “the transitive parts” of the stream and succumbed to an “undue empha-
sizing of [its] substantive parts [i.e., its resting-places]” (p.237). In so doing, we
have tended to confuse “the thoughts themselves... and the things of which they
are aware... [But, while] the things are discrete and discontinuous... their comings
and goings and contrasts no more break the flow of thought that thinks them than
they break the time and space in which they lie” (p.233). To break the strangle-
hold of this compulsion upon us, James entreats us thus: “Now what I contend for,
3. “... there is no way to avoid the traditional assumption that the speaker-hearer’s linguistic
intuition is the ultimate standard that determines the accuracy of any proposed grammar, lin-
guistic theory, or operational test, it must be emphasized, once again, that this tacit knowledge
may very well not be immediately available to the user of the language” (Chomsky, 1965, p.21).
4. “... where I is to suggest ‘internalized’ (in the mind/brain) and ‘intensional’ (in that the
procedure is a function of enumerating structural descriptions, considered in intension with a
particular description)” (Chomsky, 2000, p.70). But he adds later, that he also uses “...’I” to sug-
gest ‘internal’, ‘individual’, since this is a strictly internalist, individualist approach to language”
(Chomsky, 2000, p.118) – while I would class my inquiries as ‘internalist’ also, it is in his ‘indi-
vidualist’ orientation that he and I most obviously diverge.
Dialogical dynamics
and accumulate examples to show, is that ‘tendencies’ are not only descriptions
from without, but that they are among the objects of the stream, which is thus
aware of them from within, and must be described as in very large measure large
measure constituted of feelings of tendency, often so vague that we are unable to
name them at all5 “(p. 246). And, in being aware of them from within, i.e., of the
transitory parts of the inner stream of thought occurring within us, we find that as
they unfold they provided us with both a ‘shaped’ and a ‘vectored’ sense of our
moment-by-moment changing placement in our current surroundings. In short,
we find such responsive feelings as engendering in us both unique anticipations as
to what-next might happen along with, so to speak, ‘action-guiding advisories’ as
to what-next we might do – in Wittgenstein’s (1953) terms, they can provide us
with an immediate sense of how to “go on” in our current, practical circumstances.
Elsewhere (Shotter 2005), I have explored such transitory understandings and ac-
tion guiding anticipations extensively.
But what I must do here, is to note that from a dialogical point of view, it is
(mostly) out in the larger flow of inter-activity taking place between people when-
ever they meet, the flow within which they as individuals are ‘participant parts’,
that the momentary dynamic stabilities of interest to us occur – not within the
‘stream of thought’ hidden inside people’s heads. I say ‘mostly’, as the back and
forth flow of movement in such inter-activity, its ‘rhythm’, is of such a kind that, if
we are being spontaneously responsive to the embodied expressions of others,
then we are, so to speak, ‘resonating in tune with them’. And to the extent that we
are jointly participating in this common rhythm with our whole being, both our
‘inner’ feelings and our ‘outer’ expressions share in, or partake of, it too.
In such a short article as this, I cannot explore at any length the extensive array
of complex issues arising out of our participation in dialogically-structured reali-
ties (but see Shotter 1996, 2003). But I do want to emphasize here one of its most
important consequences: it is only in such meetings – and not in the heads of in-
dividuals – that we can find the starting points for our analyses. For it is in such
meetings that we can find the beginnings of our language games. As Wittgenstein
(1980) puts it: “The origin and the primitive form of the language game is,” he says
(p.31), a reaction; only from this can more complicated forms develop.€Language
– I want to say – is a refinement, ‘in the beginning was the deed’ (quoting Goethe)’.”
“The primitive reaction may have been a glance or a gesture, but it may also have
been a word” (1953:€218). “But what is the word ‘primitive’ meant to say here?” he
asks, “Presumably that this sort of behavior is pre-linguistic: that a language-game
5. “The truth is that large tracts of human speech are nothing but signs of direction in thought,
of which direction we nevertheless have an acute discriminatory sense, though no definite sen-
sorial image plays any part in it whatsoever” (p.244).
John Shotter
is based on it, that it is the prototype of a way of thinking and not the result of
thought” (1981: no.541). In other words – and this is a point of especial importance
to practitioners – it is in the once-off, fleeting reactions occurring at the beginning
of our meetings with others, that we can find the beginnings of the uniquely new
ways of thinking required if we are to come to a grasp of the particular, concrete,
never-before-encountered person or circumstances now confronting us. These
moments, then, are moments of common reference, shared foundational moments
that can function as shared starting points for the further exploration of the unique
person or circumstance before us.
6. “Can only logical analysis explain what we mean by the propositions of ordinary language?
Moore is inclined to think so. Are people therefore ignorant of what they mean when they say
‘Today the sky is clearer than yesterday’? Do we have to wait for logical analysis here? What a
hellish idea!” (Wittgenstein in Waismann, 1979, pp.€129–130).
Dialogical dynamics
Crucial to this process, is the realization that there are, as Wittgenstein (1953)
puts it, “countless different kinds of use of what we call ‘symbols’, ‘words’ ‘sentences’”
(no.23), and that, besides people’s talk about states of affairs, in which something
is pictured or portrayed, we need also to understand (among its many other uses)
the expressive use of our embodied talk. Indeed, unless we can understand how
others as 1st-persons, as ‘I’s’, manifest or exhibit crucial aspects of their ‘inner’ lives
to us, e.g., their surety and confidence, their uncertainty or humility, their pom-
posity and arrogance, their respect or contempt for us, their anxiety and sadness,
and so on, in the present moment of their acting, we cannot understand how, so to
speak, to ‘relate’ to them.
Tom Andersen (1996), a world-renowned Norwegian family therapist, in
characterizing his therapeutic attitude to his client’s utterances, their words, com-
ments as follows: “The listener who sees as much as he or she hears will notice that
various spoken words ‘touch’ the speaker differently. The speaker is touched by the
words as they reach his or her own ears. Some words touch the speaker in such a way
that the listener can see him or her being moved... one example may clarify this.
A woman had felt sad for a long while related that she could never ask for help,
even when she was sick. Help had to be given by others, not asked for by her. “Be-
cause,” she explained, “independence was a big word in my family. We were supposed
to be independent.” [JS: The voice of her father and mother at work in her – see the
final sentence in this quote below.] A shift in her face and a drop in the voice when
she uttered the word ‘independent’ indicated the meaningfulness of the word. When
she was asked: “If you looked into that word ‘independence’, what might you see?” she
first said that she did not like the word very much. Asked what she saw that she did
not like, she put her hands to her face and said, weeping: “it is so hard for me to talk
about loneliness... yes, it means staying alone.” As she told how hard it had been to
stay alone in order to fulfill all expectations of her being independent, she cried and
her body sank in resignation. She talked for a long while without interruption and
started to wonder if she would be able to fulfill those expectations. Being more and
more eagerly involved in her own discussion, her voice raised, and her neck and
shoulders raised, and she talked more and more angrily as the idea of being-in-the-
world as independent was forcefully challenged.
Asked what her mother would see in the word, she replied that she would see
strength; her father would also see strength, but of another kind. Her sister and
grandmother would also see what she did” (p.212).
In another case, Andersen (1996) brings to light further influences of (other’s)
words on us: “One woman who had been hospitalized at a mental hospital for a year
finally came to family therapy. Besides herself and her family and the family therapist,
the doctor-in-chief at the hospital and her nurse contact at the ward were present.
When she was asked if she had been given any diagnosis, she said: “a manic-depressive
John Shotter
psychosis.” When she was asked if that diagnosis made any difference, she said it
changed her life. She could no longer laugh and be happy nor be sad and cry, because
she could see on the faces of those around her that they thought she might go manic or
she might become depressed. She therefore had a new inner voice speaking to her all the
time: “Don’t be happy and don’t be sad! Don’t laugh and don’t cry!” (pp.123–124).
As Vygotsky (1962) noted above, words are “the means by which we direct our
mental operations, control their course, and channel them toward the solution of
the problem confronting us” (p.58). But clearly, as both Andersen’s two cases cited
above suggest, and as Wittgenstein suggests throughout his later work, not all the
words we learn from others orient us appropriately, many can also disorient or
mislead us. Thus, as Wittgenstein (1953) puts it, with respect to the kind of ‘prob-
lems’ – or better, difficulties of orientation – we often face (but are often uncon-
scious of) in our own human affairs: “A simile that has been absorbed into the
forms of our language produces a false appearance, and this disquiets us. ‘But this
isn’t how it is!’ we say. ‘Yet this is how it has to be!’” (no.112), i.e., this is how it has
‘to be’ if we are to be intelligible to, and accepted by, those around us as competent
members of our social group.€“‘But this is how it is – ’ I say to myself over and over
again. I feel as though, if only I could fix my gaze absolutely sharply on this fact,
get it in focus, I must grasp the essence of the matter” (no.113). To cure ourselves
of such bewilderments, we require “a battle against the bewitchment of our intel-
ligence by means of language” (no.109). But in this struggle, “there is not a philo-
sophical method [JS - a methodology], though there are indeed methods, like dif-
ferent therapies” (no.133).
7. But Mead (1934) also says, regarding gestures: “They became the tools through which the
other forms responded” (p.44, my emphasis).
8. See Vygotsky’s (1962) account of one of the “basic laws governing human development”
quoted at the beginning of this article.
John Shotter
our position of involvement in things, there are always other possibilities available
to us, other possible ways of ‘going on’.9
This suggests to us a third method that is sometimes important: (3) By the
careful use of selected images, similes, analogies, metaphors, or ‘pictures’, he also
suggests new ways of talking, new idioms, that not only orient us toward sensing
otherwise unnoticed distinctions and relations for the first time, but which also
suggest new connections and relations with the rest of our proceedings. This is
closely connected with a fourth: (4) By the use of various kinds of objects of com-
parison, e.g., other possible ways of talking, other “language games” both actual
and invented, etc., he tries “to throw light on the facts of our language by way of
not only similarities, but also dissimilarities” (1953: no.130). For, by noticing how
what occurs differs in a distinctive way from what we otherwise would expect,
such comparisons can work, he notes, to establish “an order in our knowledge of
the use of language: an order with a particular end in view; one of many possible
orders; not the order” (1953: no.132) – where again, the goal is to achieve a kind of
understanding that is useful in the ‘going on’ of a practice, the overcoming of a
‘disorientation’, of ‘not knowing one’s way about’.10
Such images, similes, and metaphors, etc., cannot represent any already fixed or-
ders in our use of language, for, by their very nature, in being open to determination
only in the context of their occurrence, they do not belong to any such orders. But what
such invented concepts can do for us – in artificially creating a fixed order where none
before existed – is to make aspects of our situated use of language publicly discussable
and accountable. They provide a practical resource: a way of talking that works to draw
our attention, in different ways in different contexts, to what otherwise we would not
know how to attend. Other ways of talking, other relational stances or style (i.e., orien-
tations), will function to bring out other connections. One can imagine many different
aims. Though what is at stake in them all, is not so much the grasp by isolated indi-
viduals, of an inner ‘mental picture’ of a state of affairs, but a grasp of the actual, practi-
cal connections between aspects of our own communicative activities - influences that
are present and at work in ‘shaping’ what we say in a particular circumstance.
9. Again, taking a practical stance toward the problems we face in human affairs, Wittgenstein
(1953) suggests that “a philosophical problem has the form: ‘I don’t know my way about’”
(no.123). In practice, to understand something simply means being able to continue appropri-
ately out in the practice, in the judgment of others, irrespective of what might be happening in
one’s head as an individual.
10. But note, the order produced is not the order, but merely an order. It is the imposing of a
single order of connectedness onto ongoing, complex, multi-dimensional, still developing, hu-
man phenomena, in the service of achieving a final explanation, that renders their living, dy-
namic nature rationally-invisible.
Dialogical dynamics
answers: “Don’t you know? For nothing is hidden.” (no.435). For, in his view, words
do not in themselves have a hidden meaning underlying them. Words in their
speaking are just different ‘means’ or ‘devices’ that we can use in our making of
meanings, with different words (like different tools) making available a range of
different possible uses. Or better: We can use our words in their speaking in fur-
ther specifying, in refining or making a difference to, the meanings already present
in any circumstance in which people are in each other’s living presence. Where the
words we use draw their power – their ability to change the whole character of the
living flow of language entwined activity between us – very little from the words
themselves. They merely function to make a crucial difference at a crucial mo-
ment, a moment that arises due to what we count as the history of its flow so far.
As professional academics, we have all been trained into a certain style of ‘rational’
thought, modeled on thinking in the physical sciences, a style aimed at discover-
ing a supposed ideal ‘reality’ hidden behind appearances. When confronted with a
perplexing (or astonishing) circumstance, we take it that our task is to analyze it
(i.e., dissect it) into a unique set of separate elements, to find a pattern among the
elements, and then to try to invent a theoretical schematism, functioning in terms
of rules, laws, or principles, to account for the pattern so observed. In the arts, we
express this method by seeking ‘the content’ supposed to be hidden in the ‘forms’
before us, by offering ‘interpretations’ supposed to ‘represent’ this content. In
short, we formulate the circumstance in question as a ‘problem’ requiring a ‘solu-
tion’ or ‘explanation’ that those sitting in classrooms or seminar rooms can ‘see’,
can ‘picture’. To the extent that this style of thought is based in mental representa-
tions of our own creation, it leads us into adopting a certain relationship to the
phenomena before us: instead of looking into them more closely, we at first to turn
ourselves away from them while we cudgel our brains in the attempt to construct
an appropriate theoretical schematism into which to fit them, and only then to
turn back toward them again, but now with an action in mind suggested to us by
our theoretical representation of their nature. It achieves a very limited, selective
account of nature – one in fact to do with becoming “masters and possessors of
nature” (Descartes 1968:€78).
Clearly, this Cartesian method of inquiry is a violent method that ignores all
the already existing relations in virtue of which living things grow, develop, flower,
die, but still reproduce others of their kind, thus to continue the unbroken stream
of life on our planet. In it, living wholes are torn asunder (“We murder to dissect”
– Wordsworth), and all the spontaneously responsive living activities occurring
Dialogical dynamics
between us are excluded from our considerations. It is a style of thinking that ig-
nores the fact that people’s meanings and understandings are in their responsive
expressions and focuses only on hidden events supposedly occurring in their
heads somewhere.
Instead of thinking in terms of mastery and possession, in terms of a wholly
controlling agency, what is it to think merely in terms of being a participant, a be-
ing that is as much controlled by one’s surroundings as controlling of them?
According to Bakhtin (1993), those who know how to think in this way,
“know how not to detach their performed act from its product, but rather how
to relate both of them to the unitary and unique context of life and seek to de-
termine them in that context as an indivisible unity” (footnote p.19). In other
words, we do not think about an event or circumstance from afar, but think
with it, as if feeling over its contours, in a comprehensive, responsive explora-
tion of its living, expressive, surface(s). Thus, following Bakhtin, while resonat-
ing also with Wittgenstein, we can outline a distinction between what we might
call ‘withness-‘ and ‘aboutness-thinking’ as follows: Withness (dialogic)-think-
ing is a form of reflective interaction that involves coming into living contact
with an other’s living being, with their utterances, with their bodily expres-
sions, their words, their ‘works’. It is a meeting of outsides, of surfaces, of ‘skins’
or of two kinds of ‘flesh’ (Merleau-Ponty 1968), such that they come into ‘touch’
with each other. They both touch and are touched, and in the relations between
their outgoing touching and resultant incoming, responsive touches of the oth-
er, the sense of a ‘touching’ or ‘moving’ difference emerges. In the interplay of
living movements intertwining with each other, new possibilities of relation
are engendered, new interconnections are made, new ‘shapes’ of experience
can emerge.
A reflective encounter of this kind is thus not simply a ‘seeing’ of objects, for
what is sensed is invisible; nor is it an interpretation (a representation), for it arises
directly and immediately in one’s living encounter with an other’s expressions; nei-
ther is it merely a feeling, for carries with it as it unfolds a bodily sense of the possi-
bilities for responsive action in relation to one’s momentary placement, position, or
orientation in the present interaction. In short, we are spontaneously ‘moved’ to-
ward specific possibilities for action in such thinking. While in aboutness (monologic)-
thinking, “(in its extreme pure form) another person remains wholly and merely an
object of consciousness, and not another consciousness... Monologue is finalized
and deaf to the other’s response, does not expect it and does not acknowledge in it
any decisive force” (Bakhtin 1984:€293). It works simply in terms of ‘pictures’, thus,
even when we ‘get the picture’, we still have to decide, intellectually, on a right course
of action. Interpretation is necessary. But in thinking ‘with’ an other’s voice, with
their utterances, in mind, we can begin to see another very different way in which
John Shotter
what we call ‘theory’ can be an influence in, literally, ‘instructing’ us in our practical
actions out in the world of our everyday, practical affairs.
Instead of turning away from the events before us to bury ourselves in thought,
in an attempt to fit them into an appropriate theoretical scheme in order to re-
spond to them later in its terms, we can turn ourselves responsively toward them,
to find in our reactions to them the beginnings of new language games. This opens
up to possibility of our responding to them in their terms.
But more than this, we can begin an intensive (i.e., detailed) and extensive,
exploratory interaction with them, approaching them this way and that way,
‘moved’ to act in this way and that, in accord with the beneficial “reminders”11 is-
sued to us by others as a result of their explorations. In other words, seeing, think-
ing, and acting with another’s words in mind can itself be a thoughtful, feelingful,
way of seeing, thinking, or acting; while thinking with another’s words in mind can
also be a feelingful, seeingful, way of thinking – a way of seeing and thinking that
brings one into a close and personal, living contact with one’s surroundings, with
their subtle but mattering details. In this, of course, there is no end to the ways in
which we can find the words of others helpful to us in our practices.
This, then, is a style of seeingful and feelingful thought that can be of help to
us in our practical daily affairs, and in further explorations of our own human lives
together – in ordinary interpersonal communication, psychotherapy, intercultural
communication, management, administration, government, etc., and, in fact, in
science, in understanding how ‘aboutness (monological)-thinking’ actually works.
Thus, in psychotherapy, therapists may, at a moment of indecision of next to ‘go on’
in their practice with a client, might find Tom Andersen’s (1996) words reminding
them of something to attend to: “The speaker is touched by the words as they reach
his or her own ears. Some words touch the speaker in such a way that the listener can
see him or her being moved...” And as a result, regain their lost orientation. In
other words, as Wittgenstein (1953, no.98) remarked above, it is only because our
ordinary everyday talk is ‘in order as it is’ that psychotherapists such as Tom An-
dersen can work as they do.12
11. “The work of the philosopher consists in assembling reminders for a particular purpose”
(Wittgenstein, 1953, no.127).
12. Tom Andersen tragically died on May 15, 2007 from injuries when he fell on the rocky
Norwegian coast while walking his dog Chico. The first draft of this article was written before
his death. He was a much beloved friend whom I miss enormously.
Dialogical dynamics
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Wittgenstein, L. 1980 Culture and Value. Introduction by Georg Hendrik Von Wright, translated
by Peter. Winch. Oxford: Blackwell.
Author index
A Giddens╇ 127-128 O
Andersen╇ 263, 268 Goffman╇ 11, 173-174, 179, 245 Ochs╇ 244
Auroux╇ 17 Gumperz╇ 1, 12, 16, 48, 63-64, 84,
131, 145 P
B Prevignano╇ 1, 8, 48
Bakhtin╇ 262 H
Bateson╇ 16, 223-224 Halliday╇ 103 S
Blumer╇ 172 Harré╇ 132-133 Sacks╇ 73, 102, 130-131
Heidegger╇ 236-237 Schegloff╇ 1, 11, 14-15, 16-17, 18,
C 100-101, 145
Carlson╇ 25 J
Chomsky╇ 258, 260 James╇ 258 T
Cowley╇ 51, 60 Thibault╇ 1, 8, 48
L
D Lerner╇ 99 V
Davies╇ 132-133 Levinson╇ 72, 238 Vygotski╇ 258, 259, 264
E M W
Edwards╇ 111-112 McIntosh╇ 176 Weigand ╇ 15
Mead╇ 225 Wittgenstein╇ 258, 262, 264, 265
G Merleau-Ponty236
Garfinkel╇ 12
Subject index
203 Tanskanen, Sanna-Kaisa, Marja-Liisa Helasvuo, Marjut Johansson and Mia Raitaniemi
(eds.): Discourses in Interaction. ca. 300 pp. Expected December 2010
202 Hasegawa, Yoko: Soliloquy in Japanese and English. ix, 223 + index. Expected November 2010
201 Zufferey, Sandrine: Lexical Pragmatics and Theory of Mind. The acquisition of connectives. 2010.
ix, 192 pp.
200 Mullan, Kerry: Expressing Opinions in French and Australian English Discourse. A semantic and
interactional analysis. xvii, 279 pp. + index. Expected October 2010
199 Hoffmann, Christian R. (ed.): Narrative Revisited. Telling a story in the age of new media.
vii, 265 pp. + index. Expected October 2010
198 Limberg, Holger: The Interactional Organization of Academic Talk. Office hour consultations. 2010.
xiv, 397 pp.
197 Dedaić, Mirjana N. and Mirjana Mišković-Luković (eds.): South Slavic Discourse Particles. 2010.
ix, 166 pp.
196 Streeck, Jürgen (ed.): New Adventures in Language and Interaction. 2010. vi, 275 pp.
195 Pahta, Päivi, Minna Nevala, Arja Nurmi and Minna Palander-Collin (eds.): Social Roles and
Language Practices in Late Modern English. 2010. viii, 241 pp.
194 Kühnlein, Peter, Anton Benz and Candace L. Sidner (eds.): Constraints in Discourse 2. 2010.
v, 180 pp.
193 Suomela-Salmi, Eija and Fred Dervin (eds.): Cross-Linguistic and Cross-Cultural Perspectives on
Academic Discourse. 2009. vi, 299 pp.
192 Filipi, Anna: Toddler and Parent Interaction. The organisation of gaze, pointing and vocalisation. 2009.
xiii, 268 pp.
191 Ogiermann, Eva: On Apologising in Negative and Positive Politeness Cultures. 2009. x, 296 pp.
190 Finch, Jason, Martin Gill, Anthony Johnson, Iris Lindahl-Raittila, Inna Lindgren,
Tuija Virtanen and Brita Wårvik (eds.): Humane Readings. Essays on literary mediation and
communication in honour of Roger D. Sell. 2009. xi, 160 pp.
189 Peikola, Matti, Janne Skaffari and Sanna-Kaisa Tanskanen (eds.): Instructional Writing in
English. Studies in honour of Risto Hiltunen. 2009. xiii, 240 pp.
188 Giltrow, Janet and Dieter Stein (eds.): Genres in the Internet. Issues in the theory of genre. 2009.
ix, 294 pp.
187 Jucker, Andreas H. (ed.): Early Modern English News Discourse. Newspapers, pamphlets and scientific
news discourse. 2009. vii, 227 pp.
186 Callies, Marcus: Information Highlighting in Advanced Learner English. The syntax–pragmatics
interface in second language acquisition. 2009. xviii, 293 pp.
185 Mazzon, Gabriella: Interactive Dialogue Sequences in Middle English Drama. 2009. ix, 228 pp.
184 Stenström, Anna-Brita and Annette Myre Jørgensen (eds.): Youngspeak in a Multilingual
Perspective. 2009. vi, 206 pp.
183 Nurmi, Arja, Minna Nevala and Minna Palander-Collin (eds.): The Language of Daily Life in
England (1400–1800). 2009. vii, 312 pp.
182 Norrick, Neal R. and Delia Chiaro (eds.): Humor in Interaction. 2009. xvii, 238 pp.
181 Maschler, Yael: Metalanguage in Interaction. Hebrew discourse markers. 2009. xvi, 258 pp.
180 Jones, Kimberly and Tsuyoshi Ono (eds.): Style Shifting in Japanese. 2008. vii, 335 pp.
179 Simões Lucas Freitas, Elsa: Taboo in Advertising. 2008. xix, 214 pp.
178 Schneider, Klaus P. and Anne Barron (eds.): Variational Pragmatics. A focus on regional varieties in
pluricentric languages. 2008. vii, 371 pp.
177 Rue, Yong-Ju and Grace Zhang: Request Strategies. A comparative study in Mandarin Chinese and
Korean. 2008. xv, 320 pp.
176 Jucker, Andreas H. and Irma Taavitsainen (eds.): Speech Acts in the History of English. 2008.
viii, 318 pp.
175 Gómez González, María de los Ængeles, J. Lachlan Mackenzie and Elsa M. González
Ælvarez (eds.): Languages and Cultures in Contrast and Comparison. 2008. xxii, 364 pp.
174 Heyd, Theresa: Email Hoaxes. Form, function, genre ecology. 2008. vii, 239 pp.
173 Zanotto, Mara Sophia, Lynne Cameron and Marilda C. Cavalcanti (eds.): Confronting
Metaphor in Use. An applied linguistic approach. 2008. vii, 315 pp.
172 Benz, Anton and Peter Kühnlein (eds.): Constraints in Discourse. 2008. vii, 292 pp.
171 Félix-Brasdefer, J. César: Politeness in Mexico and the United States. A contrastive study of the
realization and perception of refusals. 2008. xiv, 195 pp.
170 Oakley, Todd and Anders Hougaard (eds.): Mental Spaces in Discourse and Interaction. 2008.
vi, 262 pp.
169 Connor, Ulla, Ed Nagelhout and William Rozycki (eds.): Contrastive Rhetoric. Reaching to
intercultural rhetoric. 2008. viii, 324 pp.
168 Proost, Kristel: Conceptual Structure in Lexical Items. The lexicalisation of communication concepts in
English, German and Dutch. 2007. xii, 304 pp.
167 Bousfield, Derek: Impoliteness in Interaction. 2008. xiii, 281 pp.
166 Nakane, Ikuko: Silence in Intercultural Communication. Perceptions and performance. 2007. xii, 240 pp.
165 Bublitz, Wolfram and Axel Hübler (eds.): Metapragmatics in Use. 2007. viii, 301 pp.
164 Englebretson, Robert (ed.): Stancetaking in Discourse. Subjectivity, evaluation, interaction. 2007.
viii, 323 pp.
163 Lytra, Vally: Play Frames and Social Identities. Contact encounters in a Greek primary school. 2007.
xii, 300 pp.
162 Fetzer, Anita (ed.): Context and Appropriateness. Micro meets macro. 2007. vi, 265 pp.
161 Celle, Agnès and Ruth Huart (eds.): Connectives as Discourse Landmarks. 2007. viii, 212 pp.
160 Fetzer, Anita and Gerda Eva Lauerbach (eds.): Political Discourse in the Media. Cross-cultural
perspectives. 2007. viii, 379 pp.
159 Maynard, Senko K.: Linguistic Creativity in Japanese Discourse. Exploring the multiplicity of self,
perspective, and voice. 2007. xvi, 356 pp.
158 Walker, Terry: Thou and You in Early Modern English Dialogues. Trials, Depositions, and Drama
Comedy. 2007. xx, 339 pp.
157 Crawford Camiciottoli, Belinda: The Language of Business Studies Lectures. A corpus-assisted
analysis. 2007. xvi, 236 pp.
156 Vega Moreno, Rosa E.: Creativity and Convention. The pragmatics of everyday figurative speech. 2007.
xii, 249 pp.
155 Hedberg, Nancy and Ron Zacharski (eds.): The Grammar–Pragmatics Interface. Essays in honor of
Jeanette K. Gundel. 2007. viii, 345 pp.
154 Hübler, Axel: The Nonverbal Shift in Early Modern English Conversation. 2007. x, 281 pp.
153 Arnovick, Leslie K.: Written Reliquaries. The resonance of orality in medieval English texts. 2006.
xii, 292 pp.
152 Warren, Martin: Features of Naturalness in Conversation. 2006. x, 272 pp.
151 Suzuki, Satoko (ed.): Emotive Communication in Japanese. 2006. x, 234 pp.
150 Busse, Beatrix: Vocative Constructions in the Language of Shakespeare. 2006. xviii, 525 pp.
149 Locher, Miriam A.: Advice Online. Advice-giving in an American Internet health column. 2006.
xvi, 277 pp.
148 Fløttum, Kjersti, Trine Dahl and Torodd Kinn: Academic Voices. Across languages and disciplines.
2006. x, 309 pp.
147 Hinrichs, Lars: Codeswitching on the Web. English and Jamaican Creole in e-mail communication.
2006. x, 302 pp.
146 Tanskanen, Sanna-Kaisa: Collaborating towards Coherence. Lexical cohesion in English discourse.
2006. ix, 192 pp.
145 Kurhila, Salla: Second Language Interaction. 2006. vii, 257 pp.
144 Bührig, Kristin and Jan D. ten Thije (eds.): Beyond Misunderstanding. Linguistic analyses of
intercultural communication. 2006. vi, 339 pp.
143 Baker, Carolyn, Michael Emmison and Alan Firth (eds.): Calling for Help. Language and social
interaction in telephone helplines. 2005. xviii, 352 pp.
142 Sidnell, Jack: Talk and Practical Epistemology. The social life of knowledge in a Caribbean community.
2005. xvi, 255 pp.
141 Zhu, Yunxia: Written Communication across Cultures. A sociocognitive perspective on business genres.
2005. xviii, 216 pp.
140 Butler, Christopher S., María de los Ængeles Gómez González and Susana M. Doval-Suárez
(eds.): The Dynamics of Language Use. Functional and contrastive perspectives. 2005. xvi, 413 pp.
139 Lakoff, Robin T. and Sachiko Ide (eds.): Broadening the Horizon of Linguistic Politeness. 2005.
xii, 342 pp.
138 Müller, Simone: Discourse Markers in Native and Non-native English Discourse. 2005. xviii, 290 pp.
137 Morita, Emi: Negotiation of Contingent Talk. The Japanese interactional particles ne and sa. 2005.
xvi, 240 pp.
136 Sassen, Claudia: Linguistic Dimensions of Crisis Talk. Formalising structures in a controlled language.
2005. ix, 230 pp.
135 Archer, Dawn: Questions and Answers in the English Courtroom (1640–1760). A sociopragmatic
analysis. 2005. xiv, 374 pp.
134 Skaffari, Janne, Matti Peikola, Ruth Carroll, Risto Hiltunen and Brita Wårvik (eds.):
Opening Windows on Texts and Discourses of the Past. 2005. x, 418 pp.
133 Marnette, Sophie: Speech and Thought Presentation in French. Concepts and strategies. 2005.
xiv, 379 pp.
132 Onodera, Noriko O.: Japanese Discourse Markers. Synchronic and diachronic discourse analysis. 2004.
xiv, 253 pp.
131 Janoschka, Anja: Web Advertising. New forms of communication on the Internet. 2004. xiv, 230 pp.
130 Halmari, Helena and Tuija Virtanen (eds.): Persuasion Across Genres. A linguistic approach. 2005.
x, 257 pp.
129 Taboada, María Teresa: Building Coherence and Cohesion. Task-oriented dialogue in English and
Spanish. 2004. xvii, 264 pp.
128 Cordella, Marisa: The Dynamic Consultation. A discourse analytical study of doctor–patient
communication. 2004. xvi, 254 pp.
127 Brisard, Frank, Michael Meeuwis and Bart Vandenabeele (eds.): Seduction, Community,
Speech. A Festschrift for Herman Parret. 2004. vi, 202 pp.
126 Wu, Yi’an: Spatial Demonstratives in English and Chinese. Text and Cognition. 2004. xviii, 236 pp.
125 Lerner, Gene H. (ed.): Conversation Analysis. Studies from the first generation. 2004. x, 302 pp.
124 Vine, Bernadette: Getting Things Done at Work. The discourse of power in workplace interaction. 2004.
x, 278 pp.
123 Márquez Reiter, Rosina and María Elena Placencia (eds.): Current Trends in the Pragmatics of
Spanish. 2004. xvi, 383 pp.
122 González, Montserrat: Pragmatic Markers in Oral Narrative. The case of English and Catalan. 2004.
xvi, 410 pp.
121 Fetzer, Anita: Recontextualizing Context. Grammaticality meets appropriateness. 2004. x, 272 pp.
120 Aijmer, Karin and Anna-Brita Stenström (eds.): Discourse Patterns in Spoken and Written Corpora.
2004. viii, 279 pp.
119 Hiltunen, Risto and Janne Skaffari (eds.): Discourse Perspectives on English. Medieval to modern.
2003. viii, 243 pp.
118 Cheng, Winnie: Intercultural Conversation. 2003. xii, 279 pp.
117 Wu, Ruey-Jiuan Regina: Stance in Talk. A conversation analysis of Mandarin final particles. 2004.
xvi, 260 pp.
116 Grant, Colin B. (ed.): Rethinking Communicative Interaction. New interdisciplinary horizons. 2003.
viii, 330 pp.
115 Kärkkäinen, Elise: Epistemic Stance in English Conversation. A description of its interactional
functions, with a focus on I think. 2003. xii, 213 pp.
114 Kühnlein, Peter, Hannes Rieser and Henk Zeevat (eds.): Perspectives on Dialogue in the New
Millennium. 2003. xii, 400 pp.
113 Panther, Klaus-Uwe and Linda L. Thornburg (eds.): Metonymy and Pragmatic Inferencing. 2003.
xii, 285 pp.
112 Lenz, Friedrich (ed.): Deictic Conceptualisation of Space, Time and Person. 2003. xiv, 279 pp.
111 Ensink, Titus and Christoph Sauer (eds.): Framing and Perspectivising in Discourse. 2003. viii, 227 pp.
110 Androutsopoulos, Jannis K. and Alexandra Georgakopoulou (eds.): Discourse Constructions of
Youth Identities. 2003. viii, 343 pp.
109 Mayes, Patricia: Language, Social Structure, and Culture. A genre analysis of cooking classes in Japan and
America. 2003. xiv, 228 pp.
108 Barron, Anne: Acquisition in Interlanguage Pragmatics. Learning how to do things with words in a study
abroad context. 2003. xviii, 403 pp.
107 Taavitsainen, Irma and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.): Diachronic Perspectives on Address Term Systems.
2003. viii, 446 pp.
106 Busse, Ulrich: Linguistic Variation in the Shakespeare Corpus. Morpho-syntactic variability of second person
pronouns. 2002. xiv, 344 pp.
105 Blackwell, Sarah E.: Implicatures in Discourse. The case of Spanish NP anaphora. 2003. xvi, 303 pp.
104 Beeching, Kate: Gender, Politeness and Pragmatic Particles in French. 2002. x, 251 pp.
103 Fetzer, Anita and Christiane Meierkord (eds.): Rethinking Sequentiality. Linguistics meets
conversational interaction. 2002. vi, 300 pp.
102 Leafgren, John: Degrees of Explicitness. Information structure and the packaging of Bulgarian subjects and
objects. 2002. xii, 252 pp.
101 Luke, K.K. and Theodossia-Soula Pavlidou (eds.): Telephone Calls. Unity and diversity in conversational
structure across languages and cultures. 2002. x, 295 pp.
100 Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M. and Ken Turner (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 2. 2003.
viii, 496 pp.
99 Jaszczolt, Katarzyna M. and Ken Turner (eds.): Meaning Through Language Contrast. Volume 1. 2003.
xii, 388 pp.
98 Duszak, Anna (ed.): Us and Others. Social identities across languages, discourses and cultures. 2002.
viii, 522 pp.
97 Maynard, Senko K.: Linguistic Emotivity. Centrality of place, the topic-comment dynamic, and an ideology
of pathos in Japanese discourse. 2002. xiv, 481 pp.
96 Haverkate, Henk: The Syntax, Semantics and Pragmatics of Spanish Mood. 2002. vi, 241 pp.
95 Fitzmaurice, Susan M.: The Familiar Letter in Early Modern English. A pragmatic approach. 2002.
viii, 263 pp.
94 McIlvenny, Paul (ed.): Talking Gender and Sexuality. 2002. x, 332 pp.
93 Baron, Bettina and Helga Kotthoff (eds.): Gender in Interaction. Perspectives on femininity and
masculinity in ethnography and discourse. 2002. xxiv, 357 pp.
92 Gardner, Rod: When Listeners Talk. Response tokens and listener stance. 2001. xxii, 281 pp.
91 Gross, Joan: Speaking in Other Voices. An ethnography of Walloon puppet theaters. 2001. xxviii, 341 pp.
90 Kenesei, István and Robert M. Harnish (eds.): Perspectives on Semantics, Pragmatics, and Discourse. A
Festschrift for Ferenc Kiefer. 2001. xxii, 352 pp.
89 Itakura, Hiroko: Conversational Dominance and Gender. A study of Japanese speakers in first and second
language contexts. 2001. xviii, 231 pp.
88 Bayraktaroğlu, Arın and Maria Sifianou (eds.): Linguistic Politeness Across Boundaries. The case of
Greek and Turkish. 2001. xiv, 439 pp.
87 Mushin, Ilana: Evidentiality and Epistemological Stance. Narrative Retelling. 2001. xviii, 244 pp.
86 Ifantidou, Elly: Evidentials and Relevance. 2001. xii, 225 pp.
85 Collins, Daniel E.: Reanimated Voices. Speech reporting in a historical-pragmatic perspective. 2001.
xx, 384 pp.
84 Andersen, Gisle: Pragmatic Markers and Sociolinguistic Variation. A relevance-theoretic approach to the
language of adolescents. 2001. ix, 352 pp.
83 Márquez Reiter, Rosina: Linguistic Politeness in Britain and Uruguay. A contrastive study of requests and
apologies. 2000. xviii, 225 pp.
82 Khalil, Esam N.: Grounding in English and Arabic News Discourse. 2000. x, 274 pp.
81 Di Luzio, Aldo, Susanne Günthner and Franca Orletti (eds.): Culture in Communication. Analyses of
intercultural situations. 2001. xvi, 341 pp.
80 Ungerer, Friedrich (ed.): English Media Texts – Past and Present. Language and textual structure. 2000.
xiv, 286 pp.
79 Andersen, Gisle and Thorstein Fretheim (eds.): Pragmatic Markers and Propositional Attitude. 2000.
viii, 273 pp.
78 Sell, Roger D.: Literature as Communication. The foundations of mediating criticism. 2000. xiv, 348 pp.
77 Vanderveken, Daniel and Susumu Kubo (eds.): Essays in Speech Act Theory. 2002. vi, 328 pp.
76 Matsui, Tomoko: Bridging and Relevance. 2000. xii, 251 pp.
75 Pilkington, Adrian: Poetic Effects. A relevance theory perspective. 2000. xiv, 214 pp.
74 Trosborg, Anna (ed.): Analysing Professional Genres. 2000. xvi, 256 pp.
73 Hester, Stephen K. and David Francis (eds.): Local Educational Order. Ethnomethodological studies of
knowledge in action. 2000. viii, 326 pp.
72 Marmaridou, Sophia: Pragmatic Meaning and Cognition. 2000. xii, 322 pp.
71 Gómez González, María de los Ængeles: The Theme–Topic Interface. Evidence from English. 2001.
xxiv, 438 pp.
70 Sorjonen, Marja-Leena: Responding in Conversation. A study of response particles in Finnish. 2001.
x, 330 pp.
69 Noh, Eun-Ju: Metarepresentation. A relevance-theory approach. 2000. xii, 242 pp.
68 Arnovick, Leslie K.: Diachronic Pragmatics. Seven case studies in English illocutionary development. 2000.
xii, 196 pp.
67 Taavitsainen, Irma, Gunnel Melchers and Päivi Pahta (eds.): Writing in Nonstandard English.
2000. viii, 404 pp.
66 Jucker, Andreas H., Gerd Fritz and Franz Lebsanft (eds.): Historical Dialogue Analysis. 1999.
viii, 478 pp.
65 Cooren, François: The Organizing Property of Communication. 2000. xvi, 272 pp.
64 Svennevig, Jan: Getting Acquainted in Conversation. A study of initial interactions. 2000. x, 384 pp.
63 Bublitz, Wolfram, Uta Lenk and Eija Ventola (eds.): Coherence in Spoken and Written Discourse. How
to create it and how to describe it. Selected papers from the International Workshop on Coherence, Augsburg,
24-27 April 1997. 1999. xiv, 300 pp.
62 Tzanne, Angeliki: Talking at Cross-Purposes. The dynamics of miscommunication. 2000. xiv, 263 pp.
61 Mills, Margaret H. (ed.): Slavic Gender Linguistics. 1999. xviii, 251 pp.
60 Jacobs, Geert: Preformulating the News. An analysis of the metapragmatics of press releases. 1999.
xviii, 428 pp.
59 Kamio, Akio and Ken-ichi Takami (eds.): Function and Structure. In honor of Susumu Kuno. 1999.
x, 398 pp.
58 Rouchota, Villy and Andreas H. Jucker (eds.): Current Issues in Relevance Theory. 1998. xii, 368 pp.
57 Jucker, Andreas H. and Yael Ziv (eds.): Discourse Markers. Descriptions and theory. 1998. x, 363 pp.
56 Tanaka, Hiroko: Turn-Taking in Japanese Conversation. A Study in Grammar and Interaction. 2000.
xiv, 242 pp.
55 Allwood, Jens and Peter Gärdenfors (eds.): Cognitive Semantics. Meaning and cognition. 1999.
x, 201 pp.
54 Hyland, Ken: Hedging in Scientific Research Articles. 1998. x, 308 pp.
53 Mosegaard Hansen, Maj-Britt: The Function of Discourse Particles. A study with special reference to
spoken standard French. 1998. xii, 418 pp.
52 Gillis, Steven and Annick De Houwer (eds.): The Acquisition of Dutch. With a Preface by Catherine E.
Snow. 1998. xvi, 444 pp.
51 Boulima, Jamila: Negotiated Interaction in Target Language Classroom Discourse. 1999. xiv, 338 pp.
50 Grenoble, Lenore A.: Deixis and Information Packaging in Russian Discourse. 1998. xviii, 338 pp.
49 Kurzon, Dennis: Discourse of Silence. 1998. vi, 162 pp.
48 Kamio, Akio: Territory of Information. 1997. xiv, 227 pp.
47 Chesterman, Andrew: Contrastive Functional Analysis. 1998. viii, 230 pp.
46 Georgakopoulou, Alexandra: Narrative Performances. A study of Modern Greek storytelling. 1997.
xvii, 282 pp.
45 Paltridge, Brian: Genre, Frames and Writing in Research Settings. 1997. x, 192 pp.
44 Bargiela-Chiappini, Francesca and Sandra J. Harris: Managing Language. The discourse of corporate
meetings. 1997. ix, 295 pp.
43 Janssen, Theo and Wim van der Wurff (eds.): Reported Speech. Forms and functions of the verb. 1996.
x, 312 pp.
42 Kotthoff, Helga and Ruth Wodak (eds.): Communicating Gender in Context. 1997. xxvi, 424 pp.
41 Ventola, Eija and Anna Mauranen (eds.): Academic Writing. Intercultural and textual issues. 1996.
xiv, 258 pp.
40 Diamond, Julie: Status and Power in Verbal Interaction. A study of discourse in a close-knit social network.
1996. viii, 184 pp.
39 Herring, Susan C. (ed.): Computer-Mediated Communication. Linguistic, social, and cross-cultural
perspectives. 1996. viii, 326 pp.
38 Fretheim, Thorstein and Jeanette K. Gundel (eds.): Reference and Referent Accessibility. 1996. xii, 312 pp.
37 Carston, Robyn and Seiji Uchida (eds.): Relevance Theory. Applications and implications. 1998. x, 300 pp.
36 Chilton, Paul, Mikhail V. Ilyin and Jacob L. Mey (eds.): Political Discourse in Transition in Europe
1989–1991. 1998. xi, 272 pp.
35 Jucker, Andreas H. (ed.): Historical Pragmatics. Pragmatic developments in the history of English. 1995.
xvi, 624 pp.
34 Barbe, Katharina: Irony in Context. 1995. x, 208 pp.
33 Goossens, Louis, Paul Pauwels, Brygida Rudzka-Ostyn, Anne-Marie Simon-Vandenbergen
and Johan Vanparys: By Word of Mouth. Metaphor, metonymy and linguistic action in a cognitive
perspective. 1995. xii, 254 pp.
32 Shibatani, Masayoshi and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.): Essays in Semantics and Pragmatics. In honor of
Charles J. Fillmore. 1996. x, 322 pp.
31 Wildgen, Wolfgang: Process, Image, and Meaning. A realistic model of the meaning of sentences and
narrative texts. 1994. xii, 281 pp.
30 Wortham, Stanton E.F.: Acting Out Participant Examples in the Classroom. 1994. xiv, 178 pp.
29 Barsky, Robert F.: Constructing a Productive Other. Discourse theory and the Convention refugee hearing.
1994. x, 272 pp.
28 Van de Walle, Lieve: Pragmatics and Classical Sanskrit. A pilot study in linguistic politeness. 1993.
xii, 454 pp.
27 Suter, Hans-Jürg: The Wedding Report. A prototypical approach to the study of traditional text types. 1993.
xii, 314 pp.
26 Stygall, Gail: Trial Language. Differential discourse processing and discursive formation. 1994. xii, 226 pp.
25 Couper-Kuhlen, Elizabeth: English Speech Rhythm. Form and function in everyday verbal interaction.
1993. x, 346 pp.
24 Maynard, Senko K.: Discourse Modality. Subjectivity, Emotion and Voice in the Japanese Language. 1993.
x, 315 pp.
23 Fortescue, Michael, Peter Harder and Lars Kristoffersen (eds.): Layered Structure and Reference
in a Functional Perspective. Papers from the Functional Grammar Conference, Copenhagen, 1990. 1992.
xiii, 444 pp.
22 Auer, Peter and Aldo Di Luzio (eds.): The Contextualization of Language. 1992. xvi, 402 pp.
21 Searle, John R., Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren: (On) Searle on Conversation. Compiled and
introduced by Herman Parret and Jef Verschueren. 1992. vi, 154 pp.
20 Nuyts, Jan: Aspects of a Cognitive-Pragmatic Theory of Language. On cognition, functionalism, and grammar.
1991. xii, 399 pp.
19 Baker, Carolyn and Allan Luke (eds.): Towards a Critical Sociology of Reading Pedagogy. Papers of the XII
World Congress on Reading. 1991. xxi, 287 pp.
18 Johnstone, Barbara: Repetition in Arabic Discourse. Paradigms, syntagms and the ecology of language. 1991.
viii, 130 pp.
17 Piéraut-Le Bonniec, Gilberte and Marlene Dolitsky (eds.): Language Bases ... Discourse Bases. Some
aspects of contemporary French-language psycholinguistics research. 1991. vi, 342 pp.
16 Mann, William C. and Sandra A. Thompson (eds.): Discourse Description. Diverse linguistic analyses of a
fund-raising text. 1992. xiii, 409 pp.
15 Komter, Martha L.: Conflict and Cooperation in Job Interviews. A study of talks, tasks and ideas. 1991.
viii, 252 pp.
14 Schwartz, Ursula V.: Young Children's Dyadic Pretend Play. A communication analysis of plot structure and
plot generative strategies. 1991. vi, 151 pp.
13 Nuyts, Jan, A. Machtelt Bolkestein and Co Vet (eds.): Layers and Levels of Representation in Language
Theory. A functional view. 1990. xii, 348 pp.
12 Abraham, Werner (ed.): Discourse Particles. Descriptive and theoretical investigations on the logical,
syntactic and pragmatic properties of discourse particles in German. 1991. viii, 338 pp.
11 Luong, Hy V.: Discursive Practices and Linguistic Meanings. The Vietnamese system of person reference. 1990.
x, 213 pp.
10 Murray, Denise E.: Conversation for Action. The computer terminal as medium of communication. 1991.
xii, 176 pp.
9 Luke, K.K.: Utterance Particles in Cantonese Conversation. 1990. xvi, 329 pp.
8 Young, Lynne: Language as Behaviour, Language as Code. A study of academic English. 1991. ix, 304 pp.
7 Lindenfeld, Jacqueline: Speech and Sociability at French Urban Marketplaces. 1990. viii, 173 pp.
6:3 Blommaert, Jan and Jef Verschueren (eds.): The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural
Communication. Selected papers from the International Pragmatics Conference, Antwerp, August 1987. Volume
3: The Pragmatics of International and Intercultural Communication. 1991. viii, 249 pp.
6:2 Verschueren, Jef (ed.): Levels of Linguistic Adaptation. Selected papers from the International Pragmatics
Conference, Antwerp, August 1987. Volume 2: Levels of Linguistic Adaptation. 1991. viii, 339 pp.
6:1 Verschueren, Jef (ed.): Pragmatics at Issue. Selected papers of the International Pragmatics Conference,
Antwerp, August 17–22, 1987. Volume 1: Pragmatics at Issue. 1991. viii, 314 pp.
5 Thelin, Nils B. (ed.): Verbal Aspect in Discourse. 1990. xvi, 490 pp.
4 Raffler-Engel, Walburga von (ed.): Doctor–Patient Interaction. 1989. xxxviii, 294 pp.
3 Oleksy, Wieslaw (ed.): Contrastive Pragmatics. 1988. xiv, 282 pp.
2 Barton, Ellen: Nonsentential Constituents. A theory of grammatical structure and pragmatic interpretation.
1990. xviii, 247 pp.
1 Walter, Bettyruth: The Jury Summation as Speech Genre. An ethnographic study of what it means to those
who use it. 1988. xvii, 264 pp.