SPL Doctrines

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS| ATTY.
AXEL CRUZ
SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

ATTY. AXEL CRUZ
1. Distinguish Mala in se and Mala Prohibita
U.S v. Go Chico The court ruled out the evidence offered, and held that
(Insurrection EMBLEMS) intentionally doing the act prohibited constituted the
offense. It is quite clear that the facts offered to be shown, if
true, would relieve the defendant from the imputation of a
corrupt intent, and, indeed, from any intent to violate the
statute. The defendants made a mistake of law. Such
mistakes do not excuse the commission of prohibited acts.
The rule on the subject appears to be, that in acts mala in
se, the intent governs but in those mala prohibita, the only
inquiry is, has the law been violated?'
"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element

of the offense. The act alone, irrespective of its motive,
constitutes the crime.
Padilla v. Dizon The respondent judge has shown gross incompetence or
(Judge- Aqcuitted gross ignorance of the law in holding that to convict the
accused because of accused for violation of Central Bank Circular No. 960, the
the absence of intent- prosecution must establish that the accused had the
criminal intent to violate the law. The respondent ought to
smuggling foreign
know that proof of malice or deliberate intent (mens rea) is
currency) not essential in offenses punished by special laws, which are
mala prohibita. In requiring proof of malice, the respondent
has by his gross ignorance allowed the accused to go scot
free. The accused at the time of his apprehension at the
Manila International Airport had in his possession the
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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS| ATTY. AXEL CRUZ
amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and

foreign exchange instruments (380 pieces), without any
specific authority from the Central Bank as required by law.
At the time of his apprehension, he was able to exhibit only
two foreign currency declarations in his possession. These
were old declarations made by him on the occasion of his
previous trips to the Philippines.
Estrada v. Void for Vagueness - “a statute which either forbids or
Sandiganbayan requires the doing of an act in terms so vague that men of
(Plunder case of common intelligence must necessarily guess at its meaning
Estrada) and differ as to its application, violates the first essential of
due process of law.” The doctrine has been formulated in
various ways, but is most commonly stated to the effect that
a statute establishing a criminal offense must define the
offense with sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited by
the statute. It can only be invoked against that specie of
legislation that is utterly vague on its face, i.e., that which
cannot be clarified either by a saving clause or by
construction. The word pattern and combination shall be
used in its general terms.
Over breadth doctrine - “a governmental purpose may not

be achieved by means which sweep unnecessarily broadly
and thereby invade the area of protected freedoms.” A
facial challenge is allowed to be made to a vague statute
and to one which is overbroad because of possible “chilling
effect” upon protected speech. This rationale does not
apply to penal statutes. Criminal statutes have general in
terrorem effect resulting from their very existence, and, if
facial challenge is allowed for this reason alone, the State
may well be prevented from enacting laws against socially
harmful conduct. In the area of criminal law, the law cannot
take chances as in the area of free speech. The over
breadth and vagueness doctrines then have special
application only to free speech cases. They are inapt for
testing the validity of penal statutes.
We agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in

se which requires proof of criminal intent. Thus, he says, in his
Concurring Opinion—x x x Precisely because the
constitutive crimes are mala in se the element of mens rea
must be proven in a prosecution for plunder. It is noteworthy
that the amended information alleges that the crime of
plunder was committed “willfully, unlawfully and criminally.”
It thus alleges guilty knowledge on the part of petitioner.
Go v. SB As early as in 1970, through the erudite Justice J.B.L. Reyes in
(DOTC in CONSPIRACY Luciano v. Estrella, 34 SCRA 769 (1970), the Court had
with PIATCO – NAIA – ascertained the scope of Section 3(g) of RA 3019 as
gross disadvantageous applying to both public officers and private persons: x x x
[T]he act treated thereunder [referring to Section 3(g) of RA
to the Government)
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3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the

commission of that act as defined by law, not the character
or effect thereof, that determines whether or not the
provision has been violated. And this construction would be
in consonance with the announced purpose for which
Republic Act 3019 was enacted, which is the repression of
certain acts of public officers and private persons
constituting graft or corrupt practices act or which may
lead thereto. Like in the present case, the Information in the
said case charged both public officers and private persons
with violation of Section 3(g) of RA 3019.
Teves v. COMELEC Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is
(Elevtion Law – Cockpit done contrary to justice, modesty, or good morals; an act
– Moral turpitude) of baseness, vileness or depravity in the private and social
duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to society in
general.
“International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court

admitted that it cannot always be ascertained whether
moral turpitude does or does not exist by merely classifying
a crime as malum in se or as malum prohibitum. There are
crimes which are mala in se and yet but rarely involve moral
turpitude and there are crimes which involve moral
turpitude and are mala prohibita only. In the final analysis,
whether or not a crime involves moral turpitude is ultimately
a question of fact and frequently depends on all the
circumstances surrounding the violation of the statute.”
2. Relationship between special penal laws and RPC (Art.10)
Sanchez v. People The penalty for Other Acts of Child Abuse is prision mayor in
(Child Abuse law – its minimum period. This penalty is derived from, and
Hitting her 3x in the defined in, the Revised Penal Code. Although R.A. No. 7610
upper part of her leg – is a special law, the rules in the Revised Penal Code for
graduating penalties by degrees or determining the proper
Father, Leasing
period should be applied. Thus, where the special law
fishpond) adopted penalties from the Revised Penal Code, the
Indeterminate Sentence Law will apply just as it would in
felonies.
Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be

considered as child abuse but merely as slight physical
injuries defined and punishable under Article 266 of the
Revised Penal Code. Appellant conveniently forgets that
when the incident happened, VVV was a child entitled to
the protection extended by R.A. No. 7610, as mandated by
the Constitution. As defined in the law, child abuse includes
physical abuse of the child, whether the same is habitual or
not. The act of appellant falls squarely within this definition.
We, therefore, cannot accept appellant’s contention.
People v. Saley Altogether, the evidence against appellant has established
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(Illegal Recruitment + beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is

Estafa – A person can indeed guilty of illegal recruitment on various counts. Being
be convicted at the neither a licensee nor a holder of authority to recruit,
same time in RPC and appellant must suffer under Article 39(c) of the Labor Code
the penalty of imprisonment of not less than four years nor
Special Law)
more than eight years or a fine of not less than P20,000.00
nor more than P100,000.00 or both such imprisonment and
fine, at the discretion of the court. In imposing the penalty,
the provisions of the Revised Penal Code on the application
of the circumstances that could modify the criminal liability
of an accused cannot be considered, these provisions
being inapplicable to special laws.
Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code

does not bar the punishment of the offender for estafa.
Illegal recruitment is a malum prohibitum offense where
criminal intent of the accused is not necessary for
conviction while estafa is malum in se which requires
criminal intent to warrant conviction. Under Article 315,
paragraph 2(a), of the Revised Penal Code, the elements of
the offense (estafa) are that (1) the accused has
defrauded another by abuse of confidence or by means of
deceit and (2) damage or prejudice capable of pecuniary
estimation is caused to the offended party or third person.
Clearly, these elements have sufficiently been shown in the
cases under review.
People v. Simon This is also the rationale for the holding in previous cases that
(DRUGS/MARIJUANA the provisions of the Code on the graduation of penalties
less than 250grams –PC; by degrees could not be given supplementary application
250 to 499grams –PM; to special laws, since the penalties in the latter were not
components of or contemplated in the scale of penalties
500-749grams –RT)
provided by Article 71 of the former. The suppletory effect of
the Revised Penal Code to special laws, as provided in
Article 10 of the former, cannot be invoked where there is a
legal or physical impossibility of, or a prohibition in the
special law against, such supplementary application.
The situation, however, is different where although the

offense is defined in and ostensibly punished under a
special law, the penalty therefor is actually taken from the
Revised Penal Code in its technical nomenclature and,
necessarily, with its duration, correlation and legal effects
under the system of penalties native to said Code. When, as
in this case, the law involved speaks of prision correccional,
in its technical sense under the Code, it would consequently
be both illogical and absurd to posit otherwise. More on this
later. For the nonce, we hold that in the instant case the
imposable penalty under Republic Act No. 6425, as
amended by Republic Act No. 7659, is prision correccional,
to be taken from the medium period thereof pursuant to
Article 64 of the Revised Penal Code, there being no
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attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.
Concurring - It is thus clear that an offense is punished by

the Revised Penal Code if both its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the said Code, and it is deemed
punished by a special law if its definition and the penalty
therefor are found in the special law. That the latter imports
or borrows from the Revised Penal Code its nomenclature of
penalties does not make an offense in the special law
punished by or punishable under the Revised Penal Code.
The reason is quite simple. It is still the special law that
defines the offense and imposes a penalty therefor,
although it adopts the Code’s nomenclature of penalties. In
short, the mere use by a special law of a penalty found in
the Revised Penal Code can by no means make an offense
thereunder an offense “punished or punishable” by the
Revised Penal Code. APPEAL from a judgment of the
Regional Trial Court of Guagua, Pampanga, Br. 51.
Ladonga v. People B.P. Blg. 22 does not expressly proscribe the suppletory
(Wife BP22 – acquitted – application of the provisions of the RPC. Thus, in the
not enough evidence) absence of contrary provision in B.P. Blg. 22, the general
provisions of the RPC which, by their nature, are necessarily
applicable, may be applied suppletorily. Indeed, in the
recent case of Yu vs. People, the Court applied suppletorily
the provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22. The suppletory application of the
principle of conspiracy in this case is analogous to the
application of the provision on principals under Article 17 in
U.S. vs. Ponte. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the act
of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or modality of
participation of each of them becomes secondary, since all
the conspirators are principals.
People v. Bustinera In the 2000 case of People v. Tan where the accused took a
(Carnapping – TAXI) Mitsubishi Gallant and in the later case of People v.
Lobitania which involved the taking of a Yamaha motorized
tricycle, this Court held that the unlawful taking of motor
vehicles is now covered by the anti-carnapping law and
not by the provisions on qualified theft or robbery.
It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping

law penalizes the unlawful taking of motor vehicles, it
excepts from its coverage certain vehicles such as
roadrollers, trolleys, streetsweepers, sprinklers, lawn mowers,
amphibian trucks and cranes if not used on public
highways, vehicles which run only on rails and tracks, and
tractors, trailers and tractor engines of all kinds and used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. By implication, the
theft or robbery of the foregoing vehicles would be covered
by Article 310 of the Revised Penal Code, as amended and
the provisions on robbery, respectively.43
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Go-Tan v. Tan Most recently, in Ladonga v. People, 451 SCRA 673 (2005),
(VAWC – Protection the Court applied suppletorily the principle of conspiracy
Order against parents- under Article 8 of the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a
in-law) contrary provision therein. With more reason, therefore, the
principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of the RPC may be
applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262 because of the express
provision of Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary
to said law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by
their nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily. Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be
applied to R.A. No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in
concert to achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of
one is the act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent
or modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262

expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another, thus: SEC. 5. Acts of Violence
against The crime of violence against women and their
children is committed through any of the following acts:
x x x (h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that alarms or
causes substantial emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts: x x x
3. Principles of the RPC applicable to special penal laws
People v. Velasco In the “Simon” case, the Court has had the occasion to rule
(Shabu queen of tondo) that the abovementioned beneficent provisions can be
applied retroactively to judgments which may have
become final and executory prior to December 31, 1993
and even to those who are already serving their sentence.
This doctrine was reiterated in “People v. Martinez” where
the Court held that the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death and a fine as a conjunctive penalty shall be imposed
only when the shabu involved is 200 grams or more,
otherwise if the quantity involved is less than the foregoing,
the penalty shall range from prision correccional to
reclusion temporal minus the fine.
A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions

apply only to civil cases that have not yet reached the
pretrial stage. Neither from an express proviso nor by
implication can it be understood as having retroactive
application to criminal cases pending or decided by the
Regional Trial Courts prior to its effectivity. Thus, the general
rule enunciated above is the controlling doctrine in the
case at bar.
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4. Prohibition of Death Penalty (R.A. 9346)
People v. Bon In truth, there is no material difference between “imposition” and

“application,” for both terms embody the operation in law of the
death penalty. Since Article 71 denominates “death” as an
element in the graduated scale of penalties, there is no question
that the operation of Article 71 involves the actual application of
the death penalty as a means of determining the extent which a
person’s liberty is to be deprived. Since Rep. Act No. 9346
unequivocally bars the application of the death penalty, as well as
expressly repeals all such statutory provisions requiring the
application of the death penalty, such effect necessarily extends
to its relevance to the graduated scale of penalties under Article
71. We cannot find basis to conclude that Rep. Act No. 9346
intended to retain the operative effects of the death penalty in the
graduation of the other penalties in our penal laws.
Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death

penalty in the Philippines, also effectively classified the crimes listed
therein as “heinous,” within constitutional contemplation. Such
reclassification under Rep. Act No. 7659 was accompanied by
certain legal effects other than the imposition of the death
penalty, such as the increase in imposable fines attached to
certain heinous crimes. The categorization of certain crimes as
“heinous,” constituting as it does official recognition that some
crimes are more odious than others, has also influenced this Court
in adjudging the proper pecuniary indemnities awarded to the
victims of these crimes. Hence, a general inclination persists in
levying a greater amount of damages on accused found guilty of
heinous crimes. It should be understood that the debarring of the
death penalty through Rep. Act No. 9346 did not correspondingly
declassify those crimes previously catalogued as “heinous.” The
amendatory effects of Rep. Act No. 9346 extend only to the
application of the death penalty but not to the definition or
classification of crimes. True, the penalties for heinous crimes have
been downgraded under the aegis of the new law. Still, what
remains extant is the recognition by law that such crimes, by their
abhorrent nature, constitute a special category by themselves.
Accordingly, Rep. Act No. 9346 does not serve as basis for the
reduction of civil indemnity and other damages that adhere to
heinous crimes.
As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the

application is immediate. Henceforth, “death,” as utilized in Article
71 of the Revised Penal Code, shall no longer form part of the
equation in the graduation of penalties. For example, in the case
of appellant, the determination of his penalty for attempted rape
shall be reckoned not from two degrees lower than death, but two
degrees lower than reclusion perpetua. Hence, the maximum term
of his penalty shall no longer be reclusion temporal, as ruled by the
Court of Appeals, but instead, prision mayor.
Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be

extended to this new ruling, favorable as it is to persons previously
convicted of crimes which, if consummated or participated in as a
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principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We

see no choice but to extend the retroactive benefit. Article 22 of
the Revised Penal Code states that “[p]enal laws shall have a
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the person guilty of a
felony, who is not a habitual criminal x x x x although at the time of
the publication of such laws a final sentence has been
pronounced and the convict is serving the same.” Given that we
have ruled that Rep. Act No. 9346 downgraded the penalties for
such crimes, the benefit of Article 22 has to apply, except as to
those persons defined as “habitual criminal[s].” Indeed, Rep. Act
No. 9346 expressly recognized that its enactment would have
retroactive beneficial effects, referring as it did to “persons x x x
whose sentences were reduced to reclusion perpetua by reason
of this Act.”
5. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (R.A. 9344; R.A. 10630)
Ortega v. People GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED

(RAPE – 5 inches & 2 Section 64 of the law categorically provides that cases of
Ballpens) children 15 years old and below, at the time of the
commission of the crime, shall immediately be dismissed
and the child shall be referred to the appropriate local
social welfare and development officer (LSWDO). What is
controlling, therefore, with respect to the exemption from
criminal liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time
of the promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the
time of the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of
R.A. No. 9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been
raised from 9 to 15 years old. Given this precise statutory
declaration, it is imperative that this Court accord
retroactive application to the aforequoted provisions of R.A.
No. 9344 pursuant to the well-entrenched principle in
criminal law—favorabilia sunt amplianda adiosa
restrigenda. Penal laws which are favorable to the accused
are given retroactive effect. This principle is embodied in
Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code, which provides: Art.
22. Retroactive effect of penal laws.—Penal laws shall have
a retroactive effect insofar as they favor the persons guilty
of a felony, who is not a habitual criminal, as this term is
defined in Rule 5 of Article 62 of this Code, although at the
time of the publication of such laws, a final sentence has
been pronounced and the convict is serving the same.
The RTC erred in not separately awarding moral damages,

distinct from the civil indemnity awarded to the rape victim.
AAA is entitled to moral damages in the amount of
P50,000.00 for each count of rape, pursuant to Article 2219
of the Civil Code, without the necessity of additional
pleading or proof other than the fact of rape. Moral
damages are granted in recognition of the victim’s injury
necessarily resulting from the odious crime of rape.
People v. Arpon GUILTY – JJWA DENIED
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(Statutory Rape – UNCLE

– LEYTE) The circumstance of minority  the time of the commission
of the offense.
In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic

document, or the testimony of the victim’s mother or
relatives concerning the victim’s age, the complainant’s
testimony will suffice provided that it is expressly and clearly
admitted by the accused. It is the prosecution that has the
burden of proving the age of the offended party. The failure
of the accused to object to the testimonial evidence
regarding age shall not be taken against him.
For the second and third counts of rape that were

committed in the year 1999, the accused-appellant was
already 17 years old. We likewise find that in the said
instances, the accused-appellant acted with discernment.
In Madali v. People, 595 SCRA 274 (2009), the Court had the
occasion to reiterate that “[d]iscernment is that mental
capacity of a minor to fully appreciate the consequences
of his unlawful act. Such capacity may be known and
should be determined by taking into consideration all the
facts and circumstances afforded by the records in each
case.”
Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the

accused-appellant the circumstance of his minority, the
latter would have been entitled to a suspension of sentence
for the second and third counts of rape under Section 38 of
Republic Act No. 9344 be that as it may, the suspension of
sentence may no longer be applied in the instant case
given that the accused-appellant is now about 29 years of
age and Section 40 of Republic Act No. 9344 puts a limit to
the application of a suspended sentence, namely, when
the child reaches a maximum age of 21.
The civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have

been committed. Based on prevailing jurisprudence, we
affirm the award of P75,000.00 to the rape victim as civil
indemnity for each count.
Madali v. People GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED
(Join the RUGBY CLUB - Bernardo – Guilty – Probation
Homicide)
As to the criminal liability, Raymond is exempt. As correctly
ruled by the Court of Appeals, Raymund, who was only 14
years of age at the time he committed the crime, should be
exempt from criminal liability and should be released to the
custody of his parents or guardian pursuant to Sections 6
and 20 of Republic Act No. 9344, to wit: SEC. 6. Minimum
Age of Criminal Responsibility.—A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of the offense
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shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child

shall be subjected to an intervention program pursuant to
Section 20 of this Act. x x x x The exemption from criminal
liability herein established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in accordance with
existing laws. Although the crime was committed on 13 April
1999 and Republic Act No. 9344 took effect only on 20 May
2006, the said law should be given retroactive effect in favor
of Raymond who was not shown to be a habitual criminal.
This is based on Article 22 of the Revised Penal Code
Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully

appreciate the consequences of his unlawful act. Such
capacity may be known and should be determined by
taking into consideration all the facts and circumstances
afforded by the records in each case. Rodel (16years of
age), together with his cohorts, warned Jovencio not to
reveal their hideous act to anyone; otherwise, they would
kill him. Rodel knew, therefore, that killing AAA was a
condemnable act and should be kept in secrecy. He fully
appreciated the consequences of his unlawful act.
Llave v. People GUILTY – JJWA - DENIED
(Honor student – Seller Intelligence is the power necessary to determine the
of Quail eggs – llave morality of human acts to distinguish a licit from an illicit act.
nagtago sa bahay ng On the other hand, discernment is the mental capacity to
understand the difference between right and wrong.
lola/aunt niya) *1month
after convicted na In the present case, the petitioner, with methodical fashion,
promulgate yung R.A dragged the resisting victim behind the pile of hollow blocks
9344 near the vacant house to insure that passersby would not
be able to discover his dastardly acts. When he was
discovered by Teofisto Bucud who shouted at him, the
petitioner hastily fled from the scene to escape arrest. Upon
the prodding of his father and her mother, he hid in his
grandmother’s house to avoid being arrested by policemen
and remained thereat until barangay tanods arrived and
took him into custody.
The petitioner also testified that he had been an

outstanding grade school student and even received
awards. While in Grade I, he was the best in his class in his
academic subjects. He represented his class in a quiz bee
contest.86 At his the age of 12, he finished a computer
course. Hence, he acted with discernment.
WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is

hereby MODIFIED in that the accused-appellant is
sentenced to an indeterminate penalty of two (2) years and
four (4) months of prision correccional medium as the
minimum to eight (8) years and one (1) day of prision mayor
medium as the maximum. + indemnities + damages
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Sierra v. People GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED

(Brother Raped his sister
and sister’s friend) That the petitioner committed the rape before R.A. No. 9344
took effect and that he is no longer a minor (he was
already 20 years old when he took the stand) will not bar
him from enjoying the benefit of total exemption that
Section 6 of R.A. No. 9344 grants. As we explained in
discussing Sections 64 and 68 of R.A. No. 9344 in the recent
case of Ortega v. People, 562 SCRA 450 (2008), Section 64
of the law categorically provides that cases of children 15
years old and below, at the time of the commission of the
crime, shall immediately be dismissed and the child shall be
referred to the appropriate local social welfare and
development officers (LSWDO). What is controlling,
therefore, with respect to the exemption from criminal
liability of the CICL, is not the CICL’s age at the time of the
promulgation of judgment but the CICL’s age at the time of
the commission of the offense. In short, by virtue of R.A. No.
9344, the age of criminal irresponsibility has been raised
from 9 to 15 years old. The retroactive application of R.A.
No. 9344 is also justified under Article 22 of the RPC, as
amended, which provides that penal laws are to be given
retroactive effect insofar as they favor the accused who is
not found to be a habitual criminal. Nothing in the records
of this case indicates that the petitioner is a habitual
criminal.
People v. Jacinto GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED
In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of

Appeals correctly considered Republic Act No. 9344
(Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of 2006) despite the
commission of the crime three (3) years before it was
enacted on 28 April 2006. We recognize its retroactive
application following the rationale elucidated in People v.
Sarcia, 599 SCRA 20 (2009): [Sec. 68 of Republic Act No.
9344] allows the retroactive application of the Act to those
who have been convicted and are serving sentence at the
time of the effectivity of this said Act, and who were below
the age of 18 years at the time of the commission of the
offense. With more reason, the Act should apply to this case
wherein the conviction by the lower court is still under
review.
Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence

of a child in conflict with the law notwithstanding that
he/she has reached the age of majority at the time the
judgment of conviction is pronounced. Be that as it may, to
give meaning to the legislative intent of the Act, the
promotion of the welfare of a child in conflict with the law
should extend even to one who has exceeded the age limit
of twenty-one (21) years, so long as he/she committed the
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crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be

entitled to the right to restoration, rehabilitation and
reintegration in accordance with the Act in order that
he/she is given the chance to live a normal life and
become a productive member of the community. The age
of the child in conflict with the law at the time of the
promulgation of the judgment of conviction is not material.
What matters is that the offender committed the offense
when he/she was still of tender age.
Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or

any other training facility in accordance with Sec. 51 of
Republic Act No. 9344.
6. Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A 4103)
Judge Guadiz ISL SHOULD HAVE APPLIED
The provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is very

explicit in its applicability even as to offenses punished by
special laws not by the Revised Penal Code. Presidential
Decree No. 583 is such special penal statute.
The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods

of the indeterminate sentence is to prevent the unnecessary
and excessive deprivation of liberty and economic
usefulness of the accused, since he may be exempted from
serving the entire sentence, depending upon his behavior
and his physical, mental and moral record.
The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in

all criminal offenses, whether punished by the Revised Penal
Code or by special laws, with definite minimum and
maximum terms, as the Court deems proper within the legal
range of the penalty specified by the law must, therefore,
be deemed mandatory. Compliance with this requirement
should have appeared to respondent judge particularly
clear and easy in the case in question, where the penalty is
given in the same term as those prescribed for offenses
punished under the Revised Penal Code, that of prision
mayor, which, like all the other penalties prescribed in said
Code, except the indivisible penalties, have minimum and
maximum periods for easy determination of the
indeterminate sentence to be imposed, in terms of specific
number of years, months and days both in its minimum and
maximum periods.
Batistis v. People ISL APPLIED
The straight penalty the CA imposed was contrary to the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, whose Section 1 requires that
the penalty of imprisonment should be an indeterminate
sentence. According to Spouses Bacar v. Judge de
12| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 (1997) the imposition of an

indeterminate sentence with maximum and minimum
periods in criminal cases not excepted from the coverage
of the Indeterminate Sentence Law pursuant to its Section 2
is mandatory, viz.: The need for specifying the minimum and
maximum periods of the indeterminate sentence is to
prevent the unnecessary and excessive deprivation of
liberty and to enhance the economic usefulness of the
accused, since he may be exempted from serving the
entire sentence, depending upon his behavior and his
physical, mental, and moral record. The requirement of
imposing an indeterminate sentence in all criminal offenses
whether punishable by the Revised Penal Code or by
special laws, with definite minimum and maximum terms, as
the Court deems proper within the legal range of the
penalty specified by the law must, therefore, be deemed
mandatory.
7. Probation Law (P.D 968; P.D. 1257)
Llamado v. CA PROBATION DENIED

(BP 22 – Pascual As if to provide emphasis, a new proviso was appended to
kasama niya tumakas – the first paragraph of Section 4 that expressly prohibits the
naghanap ng bagong grant of an application for probation “if the defendant has
perfected an appeal from the judgment of conviction.” It is
lawyer.)
worthy of note too that Section 4 in its present form has
dropped the phrase which said that the filing of an
PD 968 – Habang wala application for probation means “the automatic withdrawal
pang final decision = of a pending appeal.” The deletion is quite logical since an
can still apply for application for probation can no longer be filed once an
probation appeal is perfected; there can, therefore, be no pending
appeal that would have to be withdrawn.
PD 1257 – as long as
before the start of your The period for perfecting an appeal from a judgment
sentence, even after rendered by the Regional Trial Court, under Section 39 of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 19 of the Interim Rules
judgment – can still
and Guidelines for the Implementation of B.P. Blg. 129 and
apply for probation under the 1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure, as amended,
or more specifically Section 5 of Rule 122 of the Revised
PD 1990 – No probation Rules of Court, is fifteen (15) days from the promulgation or
= perfected appeal notice of the judgment appealed from. It is also clear from
Section 3 (a) of Rule 122 that such appeal is taken or
Perfected = filing or perfected by simply filing a notice of appeal with the
notice of appeal Regional Trial Court which rendered the judgment
appealed from and by serving a copy thereof upon the
People of the Philippines. As noted earlier, petitioner
Llamado had manifested orally and in open court his
intention to appeal at the time of promulgation of the
judgment of conviction, a manifestation at least equivalent
to a written notice of appeal and treated as such by the
Regional Trial Court.
13| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Francisco v. CA PROBATION DENIED

(General Manager of Probation is a mere privilege, not a right. Its benefits cannot
ASPAC – 4 counts of extend to those not expressly included. The grant of
oral defamation) probation rests solely upon the discretion of the court which
is to be exercised primarily for the benefit of organized
society, and only incidentally for the benefit of the accused.
*Penalties – separate
and not the totality At the outset, the penalties imposed by the MeTC were
already probationable. Hence, there was no need to
MTC convicted – 1year appeal if only to reduce the penalties to within the
and 8 months = probationable period. Multiple prison terms imposed against
probational na raw an accused found guilty of several offenses in one decision
are not, and should not be, added up. And, the sum of the
RTC mitigating multiple prison terms imposed against an applicant should
circumstance – 8 not be determinative of his eligibility for, nay his
disqualification from, probation. The multiple prison terms
months nalang
are distinct from each other, and if none of the terms
exceeds the limit set out in the Probation Law, i.e., not more
than six (6) years, then he is entitled to probation, unless he
is otherwise specifically disqualified. The number of offenses
is immaterial as long as all the penalties imposed, taken
separately, are within the probationable period. For, Sec. 9,
par. (a), P.D. 968, as amended, uses the word maximum,
not total, when it says that “[t]he benefits of this Decree
shall not be extended to those x x x x sentenced to serve a
maximum term of imprisonment of more than six years.”
Evidently, the law does not intend to sum up the penalties
imposed but to take each penalty separately and distinctly
with the others.
The law considers appeal and probation mutually exclusive

remedies.
Colinares v. People PROBATION GRANTED
(Frustrated homicide – The Probation Law, said the Court in Francisco, requires that
Bato sa ulo – not fatal  an accused must not have appealed his conviction before
attempted homicide; he can avail himself of probation. This requirement “outlaws
the element of speculation on the part of the accused—to
PROBATION GRANTED =
wager on the result of his appeal—that when his conviction
WRONG JUDGEMENT) is finally affirmed on appeal, the moment of truth well-nigh
at hand, and the service of his sentence inevitable, he now
applies for probation as an ‘escape hatch’ thus rendering
nugatory the appellate court’s affirmance of his
conviction.”
In a real sense, the Court’s finding that Arnel was guilty, not
of frustrated homicide, but only of attempted homicide, is
an original conviction that for the first time imposes on him a
probationable penalty. Had the RTC done him right from the
start, it would have found him guilty of the correct offense
and imposed on him the right penalty of two years and four
months maximum. This would have afforded Arnel the right
14| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

to apply for probation.
8. Fencing (P.D. 1612)
Tan v. People NOT GUILTY

(Stolen Boat Parts) Short of evidence establishing beyond reasonable doubt
the existence of the essential elements of fencing, there can
*No proof that theft was be no conviction for such offense. “It is an ancient principle
of our penal system that no one shall be found guilty of
committed, hence
crime except upon proof beyond reasonable doubt.
element #1 is missing.
Complainant Rosita Lim testified that she lost certain items
*Confession without and Manuelito Mendez confessed that he stole those items
evidence of corpus and sold them to the accused. However, Rosita Lim never
delecti is insufficient. reported the theft or even loss to the police. She admitted
that after Manuelito Mendez, her former employee,
*No showing at all that confessed to the unlawful taking of the items, she forgave
the accused know or him, and did not prosecute him. Theft is a public crime. It
should have known that can be prosecuted de oficio, or even without a private
complainant, but it cannot be without a victim. As
the very stolen articles
complainant Rosita Lim reported no loss, we cannot hold for
were the one sold to certain that there was committed a crime of theft. Thus, the
him. first element of the crime of fencing is absent, that is, a
crime of robbery or theft has been committed.
Dimat v. People GUILTY
(Carnapped Car – The elements of “fencing” are 1) a robbery or theft has
Nissan Safari) been committed; 2) the accused, who took no part in the
robbery or theft, “buys, receives, possesses, keeps,
acquires, conceals, sells or disposes, or buys and sells, or in
Montequilla (Owner) 
any manner deals in any article or object taken” during that
Tolentino  Dimat  robbery or theft; (3) the accused knows or should have
Delgado known that the thing derived from that crime; and (4) he
intends by the deal he makes to gain for himself or for
another.
1. Theft or robbery  When inspected the engine

have the same chasis number and engine number
as montequilla’s lost car.
2. Dimat bought the car from tolentino
3. Dimat knew that the Nissan Safari he bought was not
properly documented. He said that Tolentino
showed him its old certificate of registration and
official receipt. But this certainly could not be true
because, the vehicle having been carnapped,
Tolentino had no documents to show. That Tolentino
was unable to make good on his promise to
produce new documents undoubtedly confirmed to
Dimat that the Nissan Safari came from an illicit
source.
9. Prescription (Act. No. 3326)
15| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Citibank v. Tanco- WITHIN PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD- 7 years lapsed from the

Gabaldon commission of the crime/ 3 years lapsed from discovery.
(Naloko sila – Act No. 3326 is the law applicable to offenses under special
laws which do not provide their own prescriptive periods.
inducement –
Section 1 of Act No. 3326 provides: Violations penalized by
subscription special acts shall, unless otherwise provided in such acts,
agreement) prescribe in accordance with the following rules: (a) after a
year for offenses punished only by a fine or by imprisonment
for not more than one month, or both; (b) after four years
for those punished by imprisonment for more than one
month, but less than two years; (c) after eight years for
those punished by imprisonment for two years or more, but
less than six years; and (d) after twelve years for any other
offense punished by imprisonment for six years or more,
except the crime of treason, which shall prescribe after
twenty years. Violations penalized by municipal ordinances
shall prescribe after two months.
The Court ruled that Section 2 provides two rules for

determining when the prescriptive period shall begin to run:
first, from the day of the commission of the violation of the
law, if such commission is known; and second, from its
discovery, if not then known, and the institution of judicial
proceedings for its investigation and punishment.
People v. Pangilinan WITHIN PRESCRIPTIVE PERIOD – The period was interrupted by
(Violation of BP 22 – 9 Judicial Proceedings.
checks amounting
9million – bounced) Since BP Blg. 22 is a special law that imposes a penalty of
imprisonment of not less than thirty (30) days but not more
than one year or by a fine for its violation, it therefor
prescribes in four (4) years in accordance with the
aforecited law. The running of the prescriptive period,
however, should be tolled upon the institution of
proceedings against the guilty person.
There is no more distinction between cases under the RPC

and those covered by special laws with respect to the
interruption of the period of prescription. The ruling in
Zaldivia v. Reyes, Jr., 211 SCRA 277 (1992), is not controlling
in special laws. In Llenes v. Dicdican, 260 SCRA 207 (1996),
Ingco, et al. v. Sandiganbayan, 272 SCRA 563 (1997),
Brillante v. CA, 440 SCRA 541 (2004), and Sanrio Company
Limited v. Lim, 546 SCRA 303 (2008), cases involving special
laws, this Court held that the institution of proceedings for
preliminary investigation against the accused interrupts the
period of prescription. In Securities and Exchange
Commission v. Interport Resources Corporation, et al., 567
SCRA 354 (2008), the Court even ruled that investigations
conducted by the Securities and Exchange Commission for
16| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

violations of the Revised Securities Act and the Securities

Regulations Code effectively interrupts the prescription
period because it is equivalent to the preliminary
investigation conducted by the DOJ in criminal cases.
10. CHILD ABUSE (R.A 7610; R.A 7658; R.A 9231)

Malto v. People GUILTY
(Student [17 years old] – The elements of paragraph (a) are: 1. the accused
Teacher relationship [28 engages in, promotes, facilitates or induces child
years old] – Student prostitution; 2. the act is done through, but not limited to,
the following means: a. acting as a procurer of a child
from Assumption
prostitute; b. inducing a person to be a client of a child
College) prostitute by means of written or oral advertisements or
other similar means; c. taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as a prostitute; d. threatening
or using violence towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute or, e. giving monetary consideration, goods or
other pecuniary benefit to a child with intent to engage
such child in prostitution; 3. the child is exploited or intended
to be exploited in prostitution and, 4. the child, whether
male or female, is below 18 years of age.
On the other hand, the elements of paragraph (b) are: 1.

the accused commits the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct; 2. the act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse
and, 3. the child, whether male or female, is below 18 years
of age.
Petitioner was charged and convicted for violation of

Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610, not rape. The offense for
which he was convicted is punished by a special law while
rape is a felony under the Revised Penal Code. They have
different elements. The two are separate and distinct crimes.
Thus, petitioner can be held liable for violation of Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610 despite a finding that he did not
commit rape.
The sweetheart theory applies in acts of lasciviousness and

rape, felonies committed against or without the consent of
the victim. It operates on the theory that the sexual act was
consensual. It requires proof that the accused and the
victim were lovers and that she consented to the sexual
relations. For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person.
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
17| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610. The

mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is proscribed.
People v. Matias GUILTY of RAPE under R.A 7610
(ATE, PABILI NG GULAY – The Court explained: Under Section 5 (b), Article III of RA
“A” – 13 years old) 7610 in relation to RA 8353, if the victim of sexual abuse is
below 12 years of age, the offender should not be
prosecuted for sexual abuse but for statutory rape under
Article 266-A(1)(d) of the Revised Penal Code and
penalized with reclusion perpetua. On the other hand, if the
victim is 12 years or older, the offender should be charged
with either sexual abuse under Section 5(b) of RA 7610 or
rape under Article 266-A (except paragraph 1[d]) of the
Revised Penal Code. However, the offender cannot be
accused of both crimes for the same act because his right
against double jeopardy will be prejudiced. A person
cannot be subjected twice to criminal liability for a single
criminal act. Likewise, rape cannot be complexed with a
violation of Section 5(b) of RA 7610. Under Section 48 of the
Revised Penal Code (on complex crimes), a felony under
the Revised Penal Code (such as rape) cannot be
complexed with an offense penalized by a special law.
Flordeliz v. People GUILTY
(Incestuous father – Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
AAA 14 years old & BBB conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but
11 years old – “I LOVE also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It covers
not only a situation where a child is abused for profit, but
YOU DAD; You’re the
also where one—through coercion, intimidation or
BEST FATHER”) influence—engages in sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct with a child.
We are aware that the Information specifically charged

petitioner with Acts of Lasciviousness under the RPC, without
stating therein that it was in relation to R.A. No. 7610.
However, the failure to designate the offense by statute or
to mention the specific provision penalizing the act, or an
erroneous specification of the law violated, does not vitiate
the information if the facts alleged therein clearly recite the
facts constituting the crime charged. The character of the
crime is not determined by the caption or preamble of the
information nor by the specification of the provision of law
alleged to have been violated, but by the recital of the
ultimate facts and circumstances in the complaint or
information.
People v. Dahilig GUILTY
(HELPERS – SUMISIGAW The case of People v. Abay, 580 SCRA 235 (2009), however,
TAPOS SI ROXANNE is enlightening and instructional on this issue. It was stated in
HINDI MAGISING - that case that if the victim is 12 years or older, the offender
should be charged with either sexual abuse under Section
YAYA 16 years old <3
18| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

BOY) 5(b) of R.A. No. 7610 or rape under Article 266-A (except
paragraph 1[d]) of the Revised Penal Code. However, the
offender cannot be accused of both crimes for the same
act because his right against double jeopardy will be
prejudiced. A person cannot be subjected twice to criminal
liability for a single criminal act.
The sweetheart defense proffered by the accused likewise

deserves scant consideration. For the said theory to prosper,
the existence of the supposed relationship must be proven
by convincing substantial evidence. Failure to adduce such
evidence renders his claim to be self-serving and of no
probative value. For the satisfaction of the Court, there
should be a corroboration by their common friends or, if
none, a substantiation by tokens of such a relationship such
as love letters, gifts, pictures and the like.
Accordingly, the accused can indeed be charged with

either Rape or Child Abuse and be convicted therefor.
Considering, however, that the information correctly
charged the accused with rape in violation of Article 266-A
par. 1 in relation to Article 266-B, 1st par. of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, and that he
was convicted therefor, the CA should have merely
affirmed the conviction.
Garingarao v. People GUILTY
(MANIAC NURSE – ”A” The Court has already ruled that it is inconsequential that
16 years old) sexual abuse under RA 7610 occurred only once. Section
3(b) of RA 7610 provides that the abuse may be habitual or
not. Hence, the fact that the offense occurred only once is
enough to hold Garingarao liable for acts of lasciviousness
under RA 7610.
People v. Olayon ACQUITTED
(A 14 years old – SEX sa In People v. Larin, 297 SCRA 309 (1998), the information
bahay ni Espiritu – alleged that the therein accused took advantage of his
sumakay sa tricycle) authority, influence, and moral ascendancy as
trainor/swimming instructor of the minor victim which the
Court found constituted “psychological coercion.” In
convicting the therein accused for lascivious acts, the Court
held: It must be noted that [Republic Act No. 7610] covers
not only a situation in which a child is abused for profit, but
also one in which a child, through coercion or intimidation,
engages in any lascivious conduct. (Emphasis and italics
supplied) And even in Malto v. People, 533 SCRA 643 (2007),
wherein the accused was convicted for violation of Section
5(b) of R.A. No. 7610, the information alleged, and the
prosecution proved, that the therein accused who was the
minor’s professor obtained the minor’s consent by taking
advantage of his relationship and moral ascendancy to
exert influence on her. In the case at bar, even if
respondent were charged under Section 5(b), instead of
19| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Section 10(a), respondent would just the same have been

acquitted as there was no allegation that an element of the
offense—coercion or influence or intimidation—attended its
commission.
SEC 10 – CHILD ABUSE

SEC 5 – SEXUAL ABUSE
Caballo v. People GUILTY
(DANCER – A “17 years It must be pointed out that RA 7610 was meant to advance
old” – Promise to Marry & the state policy of affording “special protection to children
Withdrawal Method) from all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions prejudicial to their
development” and in such regard, “provide sanctions for
their commission.” It also furthers the “best interests of
children” and as such, its provisions are guided by this
standard.
Jurisprudence settles that consent is immaterial in cases

involving a violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as
such, the argument that AAA and Caballo were
sweethearts remains irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely
instructive on this point: For purposes of sexual intercourse
and lascivious conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610,
the sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person. The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
“[t]hose who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse.” Unlike rape, therefore,
consent is immaterial in cases involving violation of Section
5, Article III of RA 7610. The mere act of having sexual
intercourse or committing lascivious conduct with a child
who is exploited in prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse
constitutes the offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that
is proscribed. A child cannot give consent to a contract
under our civil laws. This is on the rationale that she can
easily be the victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions.
To note, the term “influence” means the “improper use of

power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free will
and substitutes another’s objective.” Meanwhile, “coercion”
is the “improper use of x x x power to compel another to
submit to the wishes of one who wields it.”
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that Caballo’s
actuations may be classified as “coercion” and “influence”
within the purview of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610:
1. Minority
2. Seniority
20| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

3. Overt Acts of coercion and influence  promise to

marry and withdrawal method
4. 1st encounter - AAA refused Caballo’s incipient
advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However,
AAA eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that
she was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of
clear thought and choice.
5. TRAFFICKING (R.A 9208; R.A 10364)

People v. Lalli GUILTY
(Lolita – Malaysia – Given the broad definition of recruitment and placement,
Prostitute – Arinoy even the mere act of referring someone for placement
(recruitment head) ; abroad can be considered recruitment. Such act of referral,
in connivance with someone without the requisite authority
Nestor(financier) and
or POEA license, constitutes illegal recruitment. In its simplest
Lali (traveller)) terms, illegal recruitment is committed by persons who,
without authority from the government, give the impression
that they have the power to send workers abroad for
employment purposes.
In this case, the trial court, as affirmed by the appellate

court, found Lalli, Aringoy and Relampagos to have
conspired and confederated with one another to recruit and
place Lolita for work in Malaysia, without a POEA license.
The three elements of syndicated illegal recruitment are
present in this case, in particular: (1) the accused have no
valid license or authority required by law to enable them to
lawfully engage in the recruitment and placement of
workers; (2) the accused engaged in this activity of
recruitment and placement by actually recruiting,
deploying and transporting Lolita to Malaysia; and (3) illegal
recruitment was committed by three persons (Aringoy, Lalli
and Relampagos), conspiring and confederating with one
another.
6. VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN AND CHILDREN (R.A 9262)

People v. Genosa Woman is GUILTY of Parricide with mitigating circumstances
– BWS was not proven
NOT SELF DEFENSE – Absence of unlawful aggression from

the victim.
CYCLE OF VIOLENCE (At least 2x) - Tension Building Phase,

Accute Battering then Tranquil Loving Phase.
The final phase of the cycle of violence begins when the

acute battering incident ends. During this tranquil period,
the couple experience profound relief. On the one hand,
the batterer may show a tender and nurturing behavior
towards his partner. He knows that he has been viciously
cruel and tries to make up for it, begging for her forgiveness
21| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

and promising never to beat her again. On the other hand,

the battered woman also tries to convince herself that the
battery will never happen again; that her partner will
change for the better; and that this “good, gentle and
caring man” is the real person whom she loves. A battered
woman usually believes that she is the sole anchor of the
emotional stability of the batterer. Sensing his isolation and
despair, she feels responsible for his well-being. The truth,
though, is that the chances of his reforming, or seeking or
receiving professional help, are very slim, especially if she
remains with him. Generally, only after she leaves him does
he seek professional help as a way of getting her back. Yet,
it is in this phase of remorseful reconciliation that she is most
thoroughly tormented psychologically. The illusion of
absolute inter dependency is well-entrenched in a battered
woman’s psyche. In this phase, she and her batterer are
indeed emotionally dependent on each other—she for his
nurturant behavior, he for her forgiveness. Underneath this
miserable cycle of ‘‘tension, violence and forgiveness,”
each partner may believe that it is better to die than to be
separated. Neither one may really feel independent,
capable of functioning without the other.  FAILED TO
PROVE na may last phase and nagdalawang cycle.
Ang v. CA GUILTY
(Nude- edited face of the Section 3(e) provides that a “dating relationship” includes a
victim – Dating as a noun situation where the parties are romantically involved over
and not as a verb) time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. Thus: (e) “Dating relationship” refers to a
situation wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are romantically involved
over time and on a continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a business or social
context is not a dating relationship.
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that “violence against

women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman x x x with whom the person
has or had a sexual or dating relationship.” Clearly, the law
itself distinguishes a sexual relationship from a dating
relationship. Indeed, Section 3(e) above defines “dating
relationship” while Section 3(f) defines “sexual relations.” The
latter “refers to a single sexual act which may or may not
result in the bearing of a common child.” The dating
relationship that the law contemplates can, therefore, exist
even without a sexual intercourse taking place between
those involved.
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes “any act or series of acts”

that constitutes violence against women. This means that a
22| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

single act of harassment, which translates into violence,

would be enough. The object of the law is to protect
women and children. Punishing only violence that is
repeatedly committed would license isolated ones.
7. DANGEROUS DRUGS (R.A 9165;R.A 10640)

People v. Cabugatan GUILTY
(MARANAW Selling In the prosecution of offenses involving this provision of the
Sunglasses – Billiard – statute, it is necessary that the following elements be
Baguio – Illegal Sale & established: (1) the identity of the buyer and seller, object,
and consideration; and (2) the delivery of the thing sold
Possession)
and the payment therefore. What is material to the
prosecution for illegal sale of dangerous drugs is the proof
that the transaction or sale actually took place, coupled
with the presentation in court of evidence of corpus delicti.
For the claim of frame-up to prosper, the defense must

present clear and convincing evidence to overcome the
presumption that the arresting policemen performed their
duties in a regular and proper manner.
Article 63(2) of the Revised Penal Code shall not be used in

the determination of the penalty to be imposed on the
accused. Since Section 98 of the said law contains the word
“shall,” the non-applicability of the Revised Penal Code
provisions is mandatory, subject only to the exception in
case the offender is a minor.
People v. Partoza ACQUITTED
(Trycyle Driver of Makati In illegal possession of dangerous drugs, the elements are:
– Prior to the Buy Busy (1) the accused is in possession of an item or object which is
may commotion pa) identified to be a prohibited drug; (2) such possession is not
authorized by law; and (3) the accused freely and
consciously possessed the said drug. Similarly, in this case,
the evidence of the corpus delicti must be established
beyond doubt.
Failure to observed statutory safeguards are not fatal as

long as there is justifiable ground.
a. Marking the seized item
b. Inventory
c. Photograph
d. Representative of the media or Nation Prosecution
Service
Failure to establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.

While PO3 Tougan admitted to have in his possession the
shabu from the time appellant was apprehended at the
crime scene to the police station, records are bereft of
proof on how the seized items were handled from the time
they left the hands of PO3 Tougan. PO3 Tougan mentioned
a certain Inspector Manahan as the one who signed the
23| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

request for laboratory examination. He did not however

relate to whom the custody of the drugs was turned over.
Furthermore, the evidence of the prosecution did not reveal
the identity of the person who had the custody and
safekeeping of the drugs after its examination and pending
presentation in court. The failure of the prosecution to
establish the chain of custody is fatal to its cause.
People v. Padua GUILTY
(Taguig City – Pinasok The procedure for the custody and disposition of
sa bahay – Provincial confiscated, seized and/or surrendered dangerous drugs,
Truck Driver) among others, is provided under paragraph 1, Section 21,
Article II of Republic Act No. 9165, as follows:
(1) The apprehending team having initial custody and
control of the drugs shall, immediately after seizure and
confiscation, physically inventory and photograph the same
in the presence of the accused or the person/s from whom
such items were confiscated and/or seized, or his/her
representative or counsel, a representative from the media
and the Department of Justice (DOJ), and any elected
public official who shall be required to sign the copies of the
inventory and be given a copy thereof. Section 21(a),
Article II of the Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Republic Act No. 9165, which implements said provision,
stipulates: “(a) The apprehending officer/team having initial
custody and control of the drugs shall, immediately after
seizure and confiscation, physically inventory and
photograph the same in the presence of the accused or
the person/s from whom such items were confiscated
and/or seized, or his/her representative or counsel, a
representative from the media and the Department of
Justice (DOJ), and any elected public official who shall be
required to sign the copies of the inventory and be given a
copy thereof: x x x Provided, further, that non-compliance
with these requirements under justifiable grounds, as long as
the integrity and the evidentiary value of the seized items
are properly preserved by the apprehending officer/team,
shall not render void and invalid such seizures of and
custody over said items.” Under the same proviso, non-
compliance with the stipulated procedure, under justifiable
grounds, shall not render void and invalid such seizures of
and custody over said items, for as long as the integrity and
evidentiary value of the seized items are properly preserved
by the apprehending officers.
The matter of presentation of witnesses by the prosecution is

not for the court to decide. The prosecution has the
discretion as to how to present its case and it has the right
to choose whom it wishes to present as witnesses.
It is well-settled that the testimony of an informant in

drugpushing cases is not essential for conviction and may
24| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

be dispensed if the poseur-buyer testified on the same.

Informants are almost always never presented in court
because of the need to preserve their invaluable service to
the police.
Not all people who came into contact with the seized drugs
are required to testify in court. There is nothing in Republic
Act No. 9165 or in any rule implementing the same that
imposes such requirement. As long as the chain of custody
of the seized drug was clearly established not to have been
broken and that the prosecution did not fail to identify
properly the drugs seized, it is not indispensable that each
and every person who came into possession of the drugs
should take the witness stand.
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of an

entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of which
has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a trait of good
police work. However the police carry out its entrapment
operations, for as long as the rights of the accused have not
been violated in the process, the courts will not pass on the
wisdom thereof. The police officers may decide that time is
of the essence and dispense with the need for prior
surveillance.
People v. Habana ACQUITTED
(Chowking information)
Failure to comply with the procedures in the custody of the
seized drugs compromised the identity and integrity of the
items seized by which corpus delicti of each of the crime is
charged.
In all prosecutions for the violation of The Dangerous Drugs

Act, the existence of the prohibited drug has to be proved.
The chain of custody rule requires that testimony be
presented about every link in the chain, from the moment
the item was seized up to the time it is offered in evidence.
To this end, the prosecution must ensure that the substance
presented in court is the same substance seized from the
accused.
The prosecution failed to show how the seized items

changed hands, from when the police officers seized them
from Habana to the time they were presented in court as
evidence. PO1 Paras said that he turned over the sachets of
shabu to the investigator on duty. But the prosecution did
not adduce evidence on what the investigator on duty did
with the seized articles, how these got to the laboratory
technician, and how they were kept before being
adduced in evidence at the trial.
While this Court recognizes substantial adherence to the
25| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

requirements of R.A. 9165 and its implementing rules and

regulations, not perfect adherence, is what is demanded of
police officers attending to drugs cases, still, such officers
must present justifiable reason for their imperfect conduct
and show that the integrity and evidentiary value of the
seized items had been preserved. Here, however, they
failed to meet these conditions. The police officers offered
no explanation for their failure to observe the chain of
custody rule.
People v. Santiago ACQUITTED
Esguerra testified that he seized a heat-sealed sachet of

white substance from Roselle and marked the sachet with
“RPS” right in her presence. He claimed that he then
immediately submitted the specimen to the police crime
laboratory for examination. But the request for laboratory
exam reveals that it was not Esguerra who delivered the
specimen to the crime laboratory. It appears that Esguerra
gave it to a certain SPO3 Puno who in turn forwarded it to a
certain PO2 Santos. No testimony covers the movement of
the specimen among these other persons. Consequently,
the prosecution was unable to establish the chain of
custody of the seized item and its preservation from possible
tampering.
What is more, the prosecution failed to account for the

whereabouts of the seized specimen after the crime
laboratory conducted its tests. This omission is fatal since the
chain of custody should be established from the time the
seized drugs were confiscated and eventually marked until
the same is presented during trial.
If the prosecution had presented the forensic chemist to

attest to the fact that the sachet was handed to him for
examination in the same condition and etc. The court
would have been assured of the integrity of the specimen
presented before it.
People v. Watamama ACQUITTED
In all prosecutions for the violation of the Comprehensive
Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, the existence of the
prohibited drug has to be proved. The chain of custody rule
requires that testimony be presented about every link in the
chain, from the moment the item was seized up to the time
it is offered in evidence. To this end, the prosecution must
ensure that the substance presented in court is the same
substance seized from the accused.
Instructive is the case of People v. Kamad, 610 SCRA 295

(2010), where the Court enumerated the different links that
the prosecution must endeavor to establish with respect to
the chain of custody in a buy-bust operation:
26| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

1. The seizure and marking of the illegal drug

recovered from the accused by the apprehending
officer;
2. The turn over of the illegal drug seized by the
apprehending officer to the investigating officer;
3. The turn over by the investigating officer of the illegal
drug to the forensic chemist for laboratory
examination;
4. The turn over and submission of the marked illegal
drug seized by the forensic chemist to the court.
8. FIREARMS AND AMMUNITIONS (P.D 1866; R.A 8294; R.A 9516; R.A 10591)
People v. Ladjaalam GUILTY – Direct Assault & Multiple Attempted Homicide with
(WARPAN – M14 – VOID aggravating circumstance of weapon.
SEARCH WARRANT)
Duly proven from the foregoing were the two elements of
the crime of illegal possession of firearms. Undoubtedly, the
established fact that appellant had fired an M-14 rifle upon
the approaching police officers clearly showed the
existence of the firearm or weapon and his possession
thereof. Sufficing to satisfy the second element was the
prosecution’s Certification stating that he had not filed any
application for license to possess a firearm, and that he had
not been given authority to carry any outside his residence.
Further, it should be pointed out that his possession and use
of an M-14 rifle were obviously unauthorized because this
weapon could not be licensed in favor of, or carried by, a
private individual.
We cannot accept either of these interpretations because

they ignore the plain language of the statute. A simple
reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is used
in the commission of any crime, there can be no separate
offense of simple illegal possession of firearms. Hence, if the
“other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal possession of
firearms becomes merely an aggravating circumstance,
not a separate offense. Since direct assault with multiple
attempted homicide was committed in this case, appellant
can no longer be held liable for illegal possession of
firearms.
Sison v. People GUILTY – Qualified Rape with the use of weapon.
(RAPIST DRIVER – Night However, as to petitioner’s conviction for illegal possession
Shift – Police station 7 P.of firearms, such judgment must be set aside. We find that
Tuazon – Promise to he can no longer be held liable for such offense since
another crime was committed, i.e., rape.
buy luxury clothes)
“Feeling natin prostitute In People v. Ladjaalam, 340 SCRA 617 (2000), we laid down
talaga si ate girl” the correct interpretation of the law and ruled: “x x x A
simple reading thereof shows that if an unlicensed firearm is
used in the commission of any crime, there can be no
separate offense of simple illegal possession of firearms.
27| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Hence, if the “other crime” is murder or homicide, illegal

possession of firearms becomes merely an aggravating
circumstance, not a separate offense. Since direct assault
with multiple attempted homicide was committed in this
case, appellant can no longer be held liable for illegal
possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws are construed
liberally in favor of the accused. In this case, the plain
meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most favorable to
herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation is justified,
for the language of the new law demonstrates the
legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. Moreover, since the crime committed
was direct assault and not homicide or murder, illegal
possession of firearms cannot be deemed an aggravating
circumstance. x x x x x x x The law is clear: the accused
can be convicted of simple illegal possession of firearms,
provided that “no other crime was committed by the
person arrested.” If the intention of the law in the second
paragraph were to refer only to homicide and murder, it
should have expressly said so, as it did in the third
paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.”
Evangelista v. Sistosa The Office of the Solicitor General which did not interpose
(Robbery & Illegal any objection to this petition is correct in pointing out that
Possession of firearms) should petitioner’s case be reviewed in light of recent
jurisprudence, he may be found guilty only of the crime of
robbery. In other words, he would be exonerated of the
offense of illegal possession of firearm. The reason for this is
our pronouncement in People vs. Walpan Ladjaalam that
the accused can be convicted of simple illegal possession
of firearms, provided that no other crime was committed by
the person arrested. Conversely stated, if another crime was
committed by the accused, he cannot be convicted of
simple illegal possession of firearms.
It bears reiterating that this Court’s interpretation of laws are

as much a part of the law of the land as the letters of the
laws themselves. Meaning, our interpretation of Republic
Act No. 8294 forms part of the said law. In view of the well-
entrenched rule that criminal laws shall be given retroactive
effect if favorable to the accused, petitioner Danilo
Evangelista is deemed to have committed only the crime of
robbery for which he has already served more than the
maximum period of the penalty imposed upon him.
Agote v. Lorenzo In People vs. Walpan M. Ladjaalam, this Court, interpreting
the subject proviso in Section 1 of Rep. Act No. 8294,
applied the basic principles in criminal law, and
categorically held: x x x A simple reading thereof shows that
if an unlicensed firearm is used in the commission of any
28| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

crime, there can be no separate offense of simple illegal

possession of firearms. Hence, if the ‘other crime’ is murder
or homicide, illegal possession of firearms becomes merely
an aggravating circumstance, not a separate offense.
Since direct assault with multiple attempted homicide was
committed in this case, appellant can no longer be held
liable for illegal possession of firearms. Moreover, penal laws
are construed liberally in favor of the accused. In this case,
the plain meaning of RA 8294’s simple language is most
favorable to herein appellant. Verily, no other interpretation
is justified, for the language of the new law demonstrates
the legislative intent to favor the accused. Accordingly,
appellant cannot be convicted of two separate offenses of
illegal possession of firearms and direct assault with
attempted homicide. x x x xxx xxx x x x The law is
clear: the accused can be convicted of simple illegal
possession of firearms, provided that ‘no other crime was
committed by the person arrested.’ If the intention of the
law in the second paragraph were to refer only to homicide
and murder, it should have expressly said so, as it did in the
third paragraph. Verily, where the law does not distinguish,
neither should we.
The Court cannot but set aside petitioner’s conviction in

Criminal Case No. 96-149820 for illegal possession of firearm
since another crime was committed at the same time, i.e.,
violation of COMELEC Resolution No. 2826 or the Gun Ban.
Admittedly, this ruling is not without misgivings considering
that it would mean petitioner’s acquittal of the more serious
offense of illegal possession of firearms which carries a much
heavier penalty than violation of the COMELEC gun-ban
resolution. However, as we have rationalized in Ladjaalam: x
x x Indeed, the accused may evade conviction for illegal
possession of firearms by using such weapons in committing
an even lighter offense, like alarm and scandal or slight
physical injuries, both of which are punishable by arresto
menor. This consequence, however, necessarily arises from
the language of RA 8294, whose wisdom is not subject to
the Court’s review. Any perception that the result reached
here appears unwise should be addressed to Congress.
Indeed, the Court has no discretion to give statutes a new
meaning detached from the manifest intendment and
language of the legislature. Our task is constitutionally
confined only to applying the law and jurisprudence to the
proven facts, and we have done so in this case.
As written, Sec. 1, Rep. Act No. 8294 restrains the Court from
convicting petitioner of the separate crime of illegal
possession of firearm despite the fact that, as in Almeida,
the unlicensed firearm was not actually “used.” For sure,
there is, in this case, closer relation between possession of
29| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

unlicensed firearm and violation of the COMELEC gun-ban

than the illegal possession of unlicensed firearm to the crime
of illegal possession of prohibited drugs in Almeida.
9. ANTI-CARNAPPING ACT (R.A 6539; R.A7659)

People v. Bustinera Already discussed.
Taxi nanakaw.
People v. Lagat GUILTY – QUALIFIED CARNAPPING- CIRCUMSTANTIAL
(Tricycle Driver – EVIDENCE PROVEN IN COURT
HOMICIDE – DEAD –
Tricycle ginagamit for “Carnapping” taking, with intent to gain, of a motor vehicle
belonging to another without the latter’s consent, or by
palay)
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things.
“Motor vehicle” is any vehicle propelled by any power

other than muscular power using the public highways, but
excepting road rollers, trolley cars, street-sweepers,
sprinklers, lawn mowers, bulldozers, graders, fork-lifts,
amphibian trucks, and cranes if not used on public
highways, vehicles, which run only on rails or tracks, and
tractors, trailers and traction engines of all kinds used
exclusively for agricultural purposes. Trailers having any
number of wheels, when propelled or intended to be
propelled by attachment to a motor vehicle, shall be
classified as separate motor vehicle with no power rating.
The elements of carnapping as defined and penalized

under the Anti-Carnapping Act of 1972 are the following: 1.
That there is an actual taking of the vehicle; 2. That the
vehicle belongs to a person other than the offender
himself; 3. That the taking is without the consent of the
owner thereof; or that the taking was committed by means
of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by using
force upon things; and 4. That the offender intends to gain
from the taking of the vehicle.
Unlawful taking, or apoderamiento, is the taking of the

motor vehicle without the consent of the owner, or by
means of violence against or intimidation of persons, or by
using force upon things; it is deemed complete from the
moment the offender gains possession of the thing, even if
he has no opportunity to dispose of the same.
Intent to gain or animus lucrandi is an internal act,

presumed from the unlawful taking of the motor vehicle.
Actual gain is irrelevant as the important consideration is the
intent to gain. The term “gain” is not merely limited to
pecuniary benefit but also includes the benefit which in any
other sense may be derived or expected from the act which
is performed. Thus, the mere use of the thing, which was
30| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

taken without the owner’s consent, constitutes gain.

People v. Nocum GUILTY – SPECIAL COMPLEX CRIME OF CARNAPPING WITH
(FX GANG) HOMICIDE
The crime of carnapping with homicide is punishable under

Section 14 of the said law, as amended by Section 20 of RA
7659. To prove the special complex crime of carnapping
with homicide, there must be proof not only of the essential
elements of carnapping, but also that it was the original
criminal design of the culprit and the killing was perpetrated
“in the course of the commission of the carnapping or on
the occasion thereof.”
Thus, the prosecution in this case has proven that: (1) Mallari
took the Toyota FX taxi; (2) his original criminal design was
carnapping; (3) he killed the driver, Medel; and (4) the
killing was perpetrated “in the course of the commission of
the carnapping or on the occasion thereof.
Dimat v. People Already discussed.
-Anti-fencing
31| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

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SPECIAL PENAL LAWS| ATTY.

SPECIAL PENAL LAWS

1. Distinguish Mala in se and Mala Prohibita

"As the law stands, knowledge or intention forms no element

1| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

amount of US$355,349.57 in assorted foreign currencies and

Over breadth doctrine - “a governmental purpose may not

We agree with Justice Mendoza that plunder is a malum in

2| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

3019] partakes the nature of malum prohibitum; it is the

“International Rice Research Institute v. NLRC, the Court

2. Relationship between special penal laws and RPC (Art.10)

Appellant contends that, after proof, the act should not be

3| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

(Illegal Recruitment + beyond any discernible shadow of doubt that appellant is

Conviction for these various offenses under the Labor Code

The situation, however, is different where although the

4| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

attendant mitigating or aggravating circumstance.

Concurring - It is thus clear that an offense is punished by

It is to be noted, however, that while the anti-carnapping

5| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262

3. Principles of the RPC applicable to special penal laws

A perusal of R.A. 7691 will show that its retroactive provisions

6| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

4. Prohibition of Death Penalty (R.A. 9346)

People v. Bon In truth, there is no material difference between “imposition” and

Rep. Act No. 7659, in the course of reintroducing the death

As to sentences not yet handed down, or affirmed with finality, the

Then there is the matter of whether retroactive effect should be

7| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

principal, would have warranted the solitary penalty of death. We

5. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act (R.A. 9344; R.A. 10630)

Ortega v. People GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED

The RTC erred in not separately awarding moral damages,

8| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

(Statutory Rape – UNCLE

In the absence of a certificate of live birth, authentic

For the second and third counts of rape that were

Had the trial court correctly appreciated in favor of the

The civil indemnity is mandatory when rape is found to have

9| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

shall be exempt from criminal liability. However, the child

Discernment is that mental capacity of a minor to fully

The petitioner also testified that he had been an

WHEREFORE, the decision subject of the instant appeal is

10| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Sierra v. People GUILTY – JJWA APPLIED

In the determination of the imposable penalty, the Court of

Republic Act No. 9344 warrants the suspension of sentence

11| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

crime when he/she was still a child. The offender shall be

Thus, appellant may be confined in an agricultural camp or

6. Indeterminate Sentence Law (R.A 4103)

Judge Guadiz ISL SHOULD HAVE APPLIED

The provision of the Indeterminate Sentence Law is very

The need for specifying the minimum and maximum periods

The requirement of imposing an indeterminate sentence in

12| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A

Guzman, Jr., 271 SCRA 328 (1997) the imposition of an

7. Probation Law (P.D 968; P.D. 1257)

Llamado v. CA PROBATION DENIED

13| R.E. BELLO 2018, 2A