MCC INDUSTRIAL SALES CORPORATION, petitioner, vs.

SSANGYONG CORPORATION, respondents.

G.R. No. 170633; October 17, 2007
Facts:
Petitioner is engaged in the business of importing and wholesaling stainless steel products. One of its suppliers is the
responded, an international trading company with head office in Seoul, South Korea and regional headquarters in
Makati City, Philippines. The two corporations conducted business through telephone calls and facsimile or telecopy
transmissions. Respondent would send the pro forma invoices containing the details of the steel product order to petitioner;
if the latter conforms thereto, its representative affixes his signature on the faxed copy and sends it back to the respondent,
again by fax.
Respondent filed a civil action for damages due to breach of contract against petitioner before the Regional Trial Court of
Makati City. In its complaint, respondent alleged that defendants breached their contract when they refused to open the
letter of credit in the amount of US$170,000.00 for the remaining 100MT of steel under Pro Forma Invoice Nos. ST2-
POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2.
After respondent rested its case, petitioner filed a Demurrer to Evidence alleging that respondent failed to present the
original copies of the pro forma invoices on which the civil action was based. Petitioner contends that the photocopies of the
pro forma invoices presented by respondent Ssangyong to prove the perfection of their supposed contract of sale are
inadmissible in evidence and do not fall within the ambit of R.A. No. 8792, because the law merely admits as the best
evidence the original fax transmittal. On the other hand, respondent posits that, from a reading of the law and the Rules on
Electronic Evidence, the original facsimile transmittal of the pro forma invoice is admissible in evidence since it is an
electronic document and, therefore, the best evidence under the law and the Rules. Respondent further claims that the
photocopies of these fax transmittals (specifically ST2-POSTS0401-1 and ST2-POSTS0401-2) are admissible under the Rules
on Evidence because the respondent sufficiently explained the non-production of the original fax transmittals.
Issue:
Whether the print-out and/or photocopies of facsimile transmissions are electronic evidence and admissible as such?
Held:
Electronic document shall be regarded as the equivalent of an original document under the Best Evidence Rule, as long as it
is a printout or output readable by sight or other means, showing to reflect the data accurately. Thus, to be admissible in
evidence as an electronic data message or to be considered as the functional equivalent of an original document under the
Best Evidence Rule, the writing must foremost be an “electronic data message” or an “electronic document.
The Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of R.A. No. 8792 defines the “Electronic Data Message” refers to information
generated, sent, received or stored by electronic, optical or similar means, but not limited to, electronic data interchange
(EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy.
The phrase “but not limited to, electronic data interchange (EDI), electronic mail, telegram, telex or telecopy” in the
IRR’s definition of “electronic data message” is copied from the Model Law on Electronic Commerce adopted by the United
Nations Commission on International Trade Law (UNCITRAL), from which majority of the provisions of R.A. No. 8792 were
taken. While Congress deleted this phrase in the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000, the drafters of the IRR reinstated it. The
deletion by Congress of the said phrase is significant and pivotal.
Moreover, when Congress formulated the term “electronic data message,” it intended the same meaning as the term
“electronic record” in the Canada law. This construction of the term “electronic data message,” which excludes telexes or
faxes, except computer-generated faxes, is in harmony with the Electronic Commerce Law’s focus on “paperless”
communications and the “functional equivalent approach” that it espouses. Facsimile transmissions are not, in this sense,
“paperless,” but verily are paper-based.
[I]n an ordinary facsimile transmission, there exists an original paper-based information or data that is scanned, sent
through a phone line, and re-printed at the receiving end. … [I]n a virtual or paperless environment, technically, there is no
original copy to speak of, as all direct printouts of the virtual reality are the same, in all respects, and are considered as
originals. Ineluctably, the law’s definition of “electronic data message,” which, as aforesaid, is interchangeable with
“electronic document,” could not have included facsimile transmissions, which have an original paper-based copy as sent and
a paper-based facsimile copy as received. These two copies are distinct from each other, and have different legal effects.
While Congress anticipated future developments in communications and computer technology when it drafted the law, it
excluded the early forms of technology, like telegraph, telex and telecopy (except computer-generated faxes, which is a
newer development as compared to the ordinary fax machine to fax machine transmission), when it defined the term
“electronic data message.”
[T]he terms “electronic data message” and “electronic document,” as defined under the Electronic Commerce Act of 2000,
do not include a facsimile transmission. Accordingly, a facsimile transmission cannot be considered as electronic evidence.
It is not the functional equivalent of an original under the Best Evidence Rule and is not admissible as electronic evidence.

G.R. No. 188130 July 26, 2010

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES,vs. MARY LOU OMICTIN y SINGCO

Doctrine:
Self-serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party’s
testimony as a witness in court.

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and
their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in court made under
oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination.

Facts:
Separate informations were filed charging Omictin with illegal recruitment in large scale and estafa.

Crim. Case No. Q-04-125442

That on or about the 9th day of March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused, without any authority of law, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously for a fee, enlist, recruit, and promise overseas employment to the
following persons, to wit: PRIMO ARVIN S. GUEVARRA, ANTHONY P. AMBROSIO, ROY FERNANDEZ MAGNO and VERONICA
G. CAPONPON, without first securing the required license from the Department of Labor and Employment, in violation of said
law.

Crim. Case Nos. Q-04-125443-45

That on or about the period comprised from January to March 2004, in Quezon City, Philippines, the said accused did then
and there willfully, unlawfully, and feloniously defraud [Roy Fernandez Magno, Anthony P. Ambrosio, Primo Arvin S.
Guevarra, respectively] by means of false manifestations and fraudulent representation which she made to said
complainant[s] to the effect that she had the power and capacity to recruit and employ the said complainant[s] in U.K.
London as caregiver[s] and induced and succeeded in inducing said [complainants] to give and deliver, as in fact, gave and
delivered to said accused the amount[s] of [PhP 40,000, PhP 16,000, PhP 40,000, respectively] as in fact she did obtain the
amount[s] once in possession, misappropriated, misapplied and converted to her own personal use and benefit, to the
damage and prejudice of said [complainants].

During trial, Omictin gave a different version of the facts.

The RTC found Omictin guilty as charged.

Aggrieved, Omictin appealed16 to the CA, raising in her Brief for the Accused-Appellant,17 the following issues:
(1) Primo Guevarra was not the one who paid the accused, but Elisa Dotenes, 18 who issued a check in favor of
accused-appellant in behalf of Guevarra. Thus, without the supporting testimony of Dotenes who was not presented
by the prosecution, Guevarra’s testimony is unsubstantiated and hearsay;19 and
(2) As to private complainant Ambrosio, there was no receipt presented to show payment to accused-appellant,
rendering his testimony uncorroborated and self-serving.20
Eventually, the CA found appellant Mary Lou Omictin, guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes charged.

Issue:
Whether or not the issues raised by the accused in her brief filed to the CA, if considered, would lead to her acquittal.

Ruling:
No, these contentions are erroneous.

First, the testimony of Ambrosio cannot be considered as self-serving evidence. The phrase "self-serving evidence" is a
concept which has a well-defined judicial meaning. The common objection known as "self-serving" is not correct because
almost all testimonies are self-serving. The proper basis for objection is "hearsay".

Petitioner fails to take into account the distinction between self-serving statements and testimonies made in court. Self-
serving statements are those made by a party out of court advocating his own interest; they do not include a party’s
testimony as a witness in court.

Self-serving statements are inadmissible because the adverse party is not given the opportunity for cross-examination, and
their admission would encourage fabrication of testimony. This cannot be said of a party’s testimony in court made under
oath, with full opportunity on the part of the opposing party for cross-examination. Against the foregoing standards,
Ambrosio’s testimony is not self-serving and is admissible in evidence.

We can hypothetically assume, as a second consideration, that the testimonies of Guevarra and Ambrosio are
unsubstantiated and self-serving. Still, the unsubstantiated and self-serving nature of said testimonies would not carry the
day for Omictin, since she admitted, during trial, the substance of their testimonies. Omictin testified thus before the RTC:
Q So how much did each of the four complainants paid (sic) you for the processing of their visa?
A Arvin [Guevarra] and Roy [Mago], P40,000.00 each.
Q How about this Anthony Ambrosio?
A P16,000.0028

Through her testimony, Omictin admitted and established the fact that she was paid by Guevarra the amount of PhP 40,000
and Ambrosio the amount of PhP 16,000.
In all, we find no compelling reason to disturb the findings and core disposition of the CA, confirmatory of that of the trial
court.

Title: RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA vs. THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH SAGUD

Doctrine: Applicability of Electronic Evidence.

An electronic document should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under
Section 1, Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC do not apply to the present criminal
action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and
administrative proceedings.

Facts:

The evidence for the prosecution shows that complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan were
classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-and-off"
sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in partner
(now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant, Irish broke up with him.

In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of a
naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A). 2 The sender’s
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit
B).3

After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be easy
for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent through
the internet. One of the messages he sent to Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali lang
ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring send sa lahat ng chatter."4

Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora who referred her to the police. Under police
supervision, Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers he used in sending the picture and his text
messages. Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He
came in a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish but the waiting police officers intercepted and
arrested him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While
Rustan was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"

For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their
relation lasted until December of that year. Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess because Irish
asked him to help her identify a prankster who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan got the
sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish, contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back obscene
messages from the prankster, which he forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he said, why the
obscene messages appeared to have originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that it was Irish
herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom he
identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5

Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims
that she received the pictures and hid the memory card (Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was
jealous and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But, while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy
clothing, in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further, the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6
could not be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the
woman in the picture was fully dressed.

RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section 5(h) of R.A. 9262.

Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed the RTC decision.

Issue:

Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in evidence the obscene picture presented in the case.

Ruling: Yes.

Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic document.
Thus, it should be authenticated by means of an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1, Rule 5 of the
Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-01-SC).

Rustan is raising this objection to the admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the first time before this
Court. The objection is too late since he should have objected to the admission of the picture on such ground at
the time it was offered in evidence. He should be deemed to have already waived such ground for objection.
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings, and administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.