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Deployment
Originally, the Spaniards had deployed from Alexandrowka, to the W, up to the shore of the Ishora, to the E.
But in January, when the 4ª Division SS - Polizei left its lines, the Spanish sector extended up to the
Leningrad-Moscow railroad. The front, of more than 30 kilometers, demanded that the three Regiments, plus
the Reserve battalion 250º would deploy in forward edge, without practically leaving no Battalion acting as
reserve.
The 263º Regiment (Lieutenant Colonel Crescencio Perez de Bolumburu) occupied the western end of
the Spanish front, due north of the city of Pushkin; with some companies of its I. /263 as reserve. To its
right, the 269º Regiment (Colonel Carlos Rubio Lopez-Guijarro), occupied the center of the sector, due north
of the city of Sluzk. The most Eastern segment of the front of the Blue Division was occupied by the 262º
Regiment (Colonel Manuel Sagrado Marchena), with its three Battalions in the trenches and, as it had
extended its sector, it had received as reinforcement the Reserve battalion 250º and the Company of Skiers
250ª.
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The Spanish artillery had deployed its IIº Group astride the positions of the Regiments 263º and 269º, the
IIIº Group in the line of contact between the 269º and the 262º and the Iº Group directly behind the
positions of this last Regiment. The IVº Group, the heavy one, was located more to rear, having deployed all
its batteries covering with their fires the whole sector of the division. The Artillery regiment 250º,
commanded by Colonel (Oberst) Francisco Bandín Delgado, had its CP in Sluzk. Something more to the
south, in the small population of Pokrovskaia, was the Headquarters of the Division. The bulk of the train
units had settled down in Mestelevo.
Neighboring Units
To the High Command of the German Army Group " North" did not escape the new danger that loomed
over his 18 AOK so several measures it had been taken, among them, it was ordered to return to its primitive
sector in the zone of the Tosna to the 4. SS Division. Exactly on February 08, the first echelons of that
division began to arrive to its previous lines although, significantly, not to the lines that had given to the Blue
Division, but only to that given to the 5 GD. On February 10, when triggering the Soviet attack the Division
SS was in the middle of a delicate situation while taking its new deployment’s line.
The sector of 4 SS - Division was split in three subsectors. The Eastern one, next to ending of the Tosna
River, under Major Dórner, fitted the few men ready for duty of the 2 SS-Police Regiment, reinforced by two
weak Companies added to it (one of the100º Mountain infantry regiment and another one of the 374º
Regiment of Grenadiers). The total strength for duty in forward edge was of around 500 men. In the center,
Major Schümers had in line which was left of the 1º SS-Police Regiment and the division Reconnaissance
group, with other 500 men. The Western sector, which was adjacent to the Spaniards, was under the
command of the Lieutenant Colonel Reifflin, with the remnants of the 3º SS-Police Regiment, which totalized
335 men exactly.
The other neighbor of the Blue Division, on its left flank, was another unit of the Waffen SS, specifically
the 2 SS - Brigade of Infantry. When it had been created, in 1941, did not think about using it as a combat
force, but for antipartisans tasks in the occupied USSR. The Soviet counter-offensive in the winter of 1941-42
had catapulted it to the front, losing one of its two Regiments, shifted to a more threatened sector. In order
to complete it, the Germans subordinated to this brigade several of the Legions of Volunteers who had been
recruited in Europe: the SS - Dutch Legion (equivalent to a Regiment) and the SS - Flemish Legion
(equivalent to a Battalion).
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An incorporation, that took place very shortly before the beginning of the battle, was one antitank
Battery (three pieces of 75 mm) which belonged to the Legion SS Norway, integrated within the 2º SS
Brigade as was told before, that marched in the direction of the Spanish sector on February 04. On the other
hand, a Battery of 155 mm of French origin which was located in the southern edge of Krasny Bor. It was
indeed the “2. Battery of Heeres Küstenartillerie Abteilung 289". Although deployed next to the Spaniards,
this unit depended on the Artillery headquarters of the L Army Corps, "Arko 138". Also under orders of this
Artillery headquarters a German Infantry company was located in the population of Krasny Bor, under orders
of Leutnant Loppel, in charge of the tactical defense of the German batteries deployed nearby.
The total front occupied by the 262º Regiment was of around 17 kilometers and its four battalions
covered sectors that stretched from 3 kilometers in the case of Reserve battalion 250º up to 6 kilometers held
by the Iº/262. In any case, as we saw, the front of the 262º IR had been divided in two subsectors. The
subsector of the Ishora under the Lieutenant Colonel Araujo, had two Battalions, the IIIº/262 (Captain
García Calvo) and the Reserve Battalion 250 (Captain Miranda). The former was the one which linked with
the neighbor 269º Regiment. The Eastern subsector, the one of Krasny Bor proper, started from a deep anti-
tank ditch that in North-South direction cut the Spanish lines and ran something to the east of the Leningrad-
Moscow highway.
The Soviets
By 1943 the Red Army was already a formidable war machine. Before Moscow, in 1941, and the Volga River
banks, in 1942, had known to stop and to humiliate to a Wehrmacht that until then did not know the
meaning of the word defeats. By the dates of the battle of Krasny Bor its moral was as high as the clouds: the
victory in Stalingrado had been completed and their troops advanced by very many sectors. Luckyly, neither
Govorov (Commander of the Front) nor Sviridov (Commander of 55º Army), appear between the great
Soviet generals. Straits of minds, Govorov (of whom their staff officers said that he had shopkeeper
mentality) as much as Sviridov, were incapable to assimilate the instructions sent by the Stavka and therefore
in the end they managed to launch something like a powerful local offensive, in spite of the amplitude of
assets given to them.
From September of 1941 to February of 1943, many of the men who would go to attack the Spaniards
had been 16 months in a fixed front, without taking part in nothing of more importance than a nigh raid. It
was the case of the 72ª Rifle Division, under Colonel Iastrebov, which was sent against the Reserve Battalion
250º - to breach its front and, to a lesser extent, against the III./ IR 262 - to fix it in its positions. Composed
by the Rifle Regiments 14º, 133º and 187º, along with the 9º of Artillery, the unit had been recruited originally
in Leningrad.
The Eastern end was for another quite anodyne unit, the 43ª Rifle Division under Colonel Sinkevich,
composed by the Rifle Regiments 65º, 147º and 708º, along with the 162º of Artillery. It had to beat the I./
IR 262, although also it would operate against the Germans. The Rifle Regiments 147º and 65º would take the
task of fixing the 4 SS Division Polizei in their positions, whereas the 708º (reinforced by a Battalion of the
65º) would be the one which mounted the assault against the Spaniards.
Between both Infantry Divisions was deployed the unit which had to assume the weight of the main
strike, the 63ª Guards Division. But in the sake of the truth we must say that it had reached such status
exactly the previous month. Until that date it had been simply 136ª Rifle Division, but since it did an
outstanding work in the operations due south of the Ladoga Lake it was given that prize, that also implied
changes in the number of its subordinate units. The Division originally did not belong to the 55º Army, but it
was one of the shock units maintained as reserve by the Front of Leningrad. Its three Guards Regiments
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(269º, 270º and 342º), along with the armored force which would stand by its side, had to erase the Spanish
IIº/262 of the Earth’s face.
The other Guards unit which was going to operate, the 45º Division, under General Krasnov, had
reached such status something before, in September of 1942. Even then it had been the 70ª Rifle Division.
The Division did not belong either originally to the 55º Army, but was transferred to it shortly before the
offensive by the 67º Army. In theory, this Division, which counted with the Guards Regiments 129º, 131º
and 134º, plus the 96º of the Guards Artillery, would not take place in the rupture, but to exploit it.
Also would be part of the operation, the Skiers Brigades 34º and 35º, whereas the armored component
would be represented by elements of the 31º Armored Regiment, for the breakthrough and the 222ª Armored
Brigade for the exploitation phase.
The maneuver designed by Sviridov was clear. The famous General Simoniak, supported by heavy tanks,
would attack frontally to make the breach in Krasny Bor. Their flanks would be covered by the Rifle
Divisions 72ª and 43ª. Hardly consolidated that rupture, Krasnov would conduct the battle with his forces to
advance towards the Tosna, while Simoniak continued quickly towards Sablino-Ulianovka and the Divisions
72ª and 43ª extended their attack in flanks.
Infantry’s Assault
At 08: 40 hours, after two hours of hammering, the Soviet artillery ceased to crush the defense's forward edge
and it lengthened his fire: the assault began. The unit which was going to take the weight of the assault, the
63ª Guards Division, was harangued by its Commander, General Simoniak. From the departure point to
Krasny Bor, the men of Simoniak had to advance 3 km. The day was going to be a long one, since it would be
necessary to advance up to Sablino-Ulianovka and that supposed almost 15 kilometers, but the Russian
soldiers trusted that it would begin of the best way.
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At 07: 45 hours, the first echelon of assault of General Simoniak’s Division, left its positions in the
second line, in order to occupy its assault positions. With surprise, the Soviet soldiers accused an intense fire
of the Spanish machine guns on their flank, coming from locations on the foot of the slope of the railroad,
which caused an unexpected number of losses to them. But their moral was not altered and they charged with
confidence. The assault of the tanks and the infantry were simultaneous on all the Companies of the
Battalions Iº/262, IIº/262 and Reserve 250º (called Aunt Bernarda).
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The IIº/262
Against the men of Comandante Payeras' battalion, went to the attack the 63ª Guards Division of general
Simoniak, with a very clear mission: to seize Krasny Bor itself quickly since the effective control of this
locality would allow the Russians to advance towards the south, to Ulianovka, and the East, towards
Nikolskoye.
All the attempts of the Iº/AR 250 to restrain the Soviet infantry before the lines of the IIº/262 were
useless, wave after wave, the three Rifle Regiments of the 63ª Guards Division, continued their assault. The
6ª/262, in center of the deployment of Payeras, underwent serious losses in the artillery attack and its captain,
Iglesia, died soon after beginning the enemy assault. This was the point by where the Soviets secured his first
rupture in the sector of the IIº/262. The very little survivors ended up going towards the positions of the
neighboring unit by the W., the 7ª/262 of Captain Campos.
This Company had had the fortune of not suffering so serious losses in the artillery barrage and was
carrying out an energetic defense. Nevertheless, the breach open in its flank by the destruction of the 6ª/262
sealed the luck of the 7ª/262: Campos was attacked from the N., but also from the E. and the S. Finally also
he and his men had to fall back towards the W. where it was the mass of the 8ª/262 of Captain Arozarena. In
the Eastern end of the dispositive of Payeras still remained alive a very energetic resistance, carried out by the
rest of the 5ª/262 of Captain Palacios.
One hour after of launching the assault of its infantry, the 63ª Guards Division informed to the High
Command that already it had reached Krasny Bor and it was heading towards the southern limit of the town,
although it was a too optimistic official notice. One of the victims of the irruption was Lieutenant Colonel
Ascarza, head of the Spanish artillery in the whole sector of Krasny Bor, who was killed together with almost
all the officers of his Staff.
But, even so, Simoniak had been mistaken when announcing so soon his victory; also in this sector
Colonel Sagrado arranged a counterattack. He ordered to 2º/Explo. 250, of Captain Andújar, that advanced
as quickly as possible towards the Payeras’ CP to help him to seal the breach in his rows. Leaving two of his
Platoons with the Commander, Andújar turned westwards with the rest. He could release a group of Spanish
prisoners just caught, but the enemy pressure blocked further advance; when returning towards the CP of
Payeras he found the commander was seriously wounded. The heroic battalion commander was evacuated
immediately and would be sent to the Spanish Military Hospital of Riga, where he would die a month later as
a result of those wounds.
Captain Andújar, mutilated of the Civil War, was wounded by enemy fire and was laying in the ground. In
order to finish him off, the Soviet attackers attacked him with machete blows. But a group of his men
improvised a counterattack, rescued his captain and evacuated him as best as they could. Together with
Captain Andújar, was necessary to register the loss of Lieutenant Marchesi, due serious wounds, whereas
Lieutenant Durán fell killed in action.
Also the IIº/262 seemed to have ceased to exist. But on its Eastern end, Captain Palacios with a handful
of his men stayed alive, being contiguous to other miraculous survivors, the men of Huidobro. The Soviets
attacked that bend of the Spanish lines with all means: artillery, aviation, etc. But Palacios resisted, around
15:30 hours, Captain Palacios, one of his officers, 14 NCOs and soldiers still unharmed and 21 wounded fell
into the the enemy hands.
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unique sector where the Spanish lines were something more than a tenuous line of infantry, since Captain
Miranda, Commanding Officer of the Battalion, had put in forward edge the 2ª/Res. 250 (Ulzurrun) and the
3ª/Res. 250 (Oroquieta), maintaining the 1ª/Res. 250 (Auba) like maneuvering force and the 4ª/Res. 250
(Anda) in positions to the rear to furnish support with its heavy weapons of infantry.
After the demolishing action of its artillery, the 72ª Soviet Rifle Division, whereas one of its Regiments
fixed the IIIº/262 of Captain García Calvo to its positions, went on to the offensive against the Reserve
Battalion 250º with the mass of its force and with tank support. The attack was repulsed with serious own
losses, but successfully, by the 3ª/Res. 250 of Oroquieta.
However, in the neighboring sector, the Russians broke through the line of the 2ª/Res. 250 of Ulzurrun
in spite of its brave defense (Ulzurrun was wounded from the beginning of the combat). This Company fell
back towards the Ishora, but the Commanding Officer of the Battalion, Miranda, led himself a counterattack
carried out by the 1ª/Res. 250 and the rest of the 2ª/Res. 250. The action was settled with a bloody drain for
the Spaniards. Miranda and Ulzurrun fell during its development, while Auba was wounded. Actually, the
front of the Reserve battalion 250º was broken and only the 3ª/Res. 250 (reinforced by one of the Platoons
of the 1ª/Res. 250) remained in its positions.
Like in both previous cases, the reserves located in the rear of the sector tried to seal the breach. The
1º/Expl. 250 of the Lieutenant Rey launched a counterattack with such aim, but suffering to many losses,
among them the lieutenant himself who was seriously wounded (Lieutenant Gavilán took command, until
Captain Ortega, commander of the unit could reincorporate to his command post) and the death in combat
of the lieutenant García Estepa. Finally the Squadron had to fall back towards the great meander of the
Ishora.
The breakthrough in the front of the Reserve Batalion 250º and the failure of the Spanish counterattack,
allowed the enemy to send its vanguards towards the Ishora. The most favorable points to cross it were in the
great meander where the Factory of Paper was placed and in Stararia-Mysa and Sansonovka, two villages
located one against another on either banks of the river.
The enemy attack was not limited to the sector of the Factory of Paper, where it was trying to take the
IIIº/262 by its rear, but also it was intense more to the south, in Sansonovka, where was located the CP of
the Leader of the Subsector, Araujo, who also sent to the battle his last reserve: the Assault Platoon of the
regiment, which was fitted in the 15ª/262, that was sent against the enemy forces which advanced still further
to the south, towards Podolovo. The sacrifice of this unit reflected in the death in combat of its leader,
Lieutenant Rico, could not stop the offensive either . The rest of the 15ª/262 of Captain Ortíz, on the other
hand, had to engage fully to contain the enemy before the village of Sansonovka.
It seemed that in this sector the Spanish front had been crushed. Nevertheless, with incredible obstinacy,
Oroquieta remained in his positions in the forward edge. This epic defense continued until the night fell. His
sacrifice had not been sterile. On one hand they had restrained the enemy advance much more time of the
imaginable; besides, they had blocked the advance of the enemy whom tried to cross the Ishora.
By comparison, the IIIº/262 escaped relatively undamaged.
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the other hand, the heroic sacrifice of the forward edge caused that the Soviets arrived before those Spanish
positions already worn away.
When no longer they waited for more resistance they met head on with the 8ª/262 and the 3ª/Zapad.
250, which disturbed them totally. The first frontal attack against this Spanish group was registered in the
morning around 10:00 hours. This discontinuous attack allowed that Captain Campos, with the rest of his
7ª/262 and some elements of the 6ª/262 and 5ª/262 reached the positions of Arozarena and Aramburu.
Shortly after, the position was also surrounded indeed by the south and all contact with the rest of the Blue
Division was lost. But as the Bastion had resisted, the enemy was forced, actually, to turn aside from one of
his main axes of advance.
When the night fell (that is to say, around 15:30 hours) a handful of soldiers from Oroquieta arrived at
the position; they informed on the extreme situation in which his unit was. As soon as it grew dark it was
tried to connect with the surrounded 3ª/Res. 250, from the positions of Aramburu but without success.
Finally, around 22:00 hours, the three captains present there, Aramburu, Arozarena and Campos, held a
meeting and decided that the assigned mission could be given as fulfilled, so the moment had arrived for
saving the men trying to reach the own lines. At 00:40 hours of the day 11 and the luck accompanied to this
group of almost 200 Spanish soldiers (rest of the Companies 5ª, 7ª and 8ª of the 262, 3ª/Reser. 250 and
3ª/Zapad. 250). The Spaniards had taken advantage of dark and the fact that the Russians had not
consolidated their positions yet, in order to withdraw towards Sablino; after marching aside Krasny Bor, they
could reach their own lines at 06:30 hours of the day 11.
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Reinlein and Bellod were very effective and organized, so well as they could, given the circumstances, a
new improvised line. However, the Soviet pressure, given its absolute numerical superiority, was exhausting,
but the men of Reinlein and Bellod with their desperated action, denied which the Soviets as much longed
for: the total and effective control on the town of Krasny Bor.
At the Advanced CP
So soon it was confirmed that the Soviet main strike was triggered against Krasny Bor, as already we saw,
General Esteban-Infantes had moved to the Advanced CP established in Raykolovo, to try to direct the battle
from there. Around 12:00 hours (peculiarly, the same hour in that Simoniak informed to Sviridov that he had
taken the effective control of Krasny Bor, according to the Historical record of the Soviet 55º Army) the
situation, as it was seen from the Divisional CP was the following one:
• The Iº/262 and the Company of Skiers 250º had been beaten and overwhelmed.
• The IIº/262 had been crushed and only “the Bastión" had resisted yet;.
• The Reserve battalion 250º had sustained serious losses and had been beaten also. It was known that
Oroquieta resisted.
• The IIIº/262 had suffered enough with the artillery fire, but it had not faced an strong infantry assault as
the three before mentioned Battalions, hence it stayed in his positions, although with its right flank
threatened.
• The Anti-tank battalion 250º had lost practically all their material in the unequal fights against the Soviet
tanks.
• The Companies of the Engineers Battalion 250º had not been able to contain the rupture, although
Aramburu, with his 3ª Company, had stayed firmly next to "the Bastión".
• The squadrons of the Reconnaissance Detachment 250º had been bled in the counterattacks, without
managing to seal the breaches.
• The Group Iº/ AR 250 and the batteries which had been attached to it had lost, practically, all its pieces
and its ammunition was on the verge of running out.
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The Spanish general, practically, did not have reserves. The Iº/263 (Comandante/Maj Blanco Linares), it
had begun to move its two Companies which had in Federovskoye towards the Ishora since 08:00 hours,
while it started up towards the sector the other two Companies of the Battalion. The reserves of the neighbor
269º Regiment, given the lack of motorised vehicles, arrived slowly and in addition we cannot forget that it
was the IIº/269 (Capitán Merry), a unit which just finished its reorganization and was incomplete.
The general ordered to make use of the Battalion of Repatriation which was in the rear ready to return to
Spain. But the Battalion had not weapons. Neither there were means of transport to bring it fast from
Vyarlevo. Fearing that he himself could be a casualty at any time, General Esteban-Infantes ordered Colonel
Carlos Rubio, Commander of the 269º Regiment who had came to Raykolovo, to be ready to assume the
command of the division.
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Blue Division and 4ª SS Division. Throughout the day 10 the final luck of the battle in Krasny Bor was
doubtful, reason why the Army Group North alarmed the 24 ID, deployed along the Wolchow at those
moments, concretely in Chudovo, so that it was prepared to march towards Krasny Bor.
Colonel Sagrado, was informed about the presence of the 390º Regiment in Sablino. From that moment
onwards his greater preoccupation was to contact with Oberst Heckel, in order he could approach, as quickly
as possible, in his support; but the the Spanish impression was that Heckel did not want to advance.
But Heckel sinned of excess of prudence, for desperation of Colonel Sagrado, who left his men in Krasny
Bor in order to try to force the Germans to advance more quickly. The judgments that have been formulated
on both colonels, as much on Sagrado as on Heckel, have been very hard. On the former it was told that he
really left his men. On the latter, that his delay contributed to enlarge the breach between the lines of the Blue
Division and 4ª SS Division. Perhaps seen the subject with perspective, both would be really scapegoats. In
any case, as much Sagrado as Heckel in the end lost the command of their respective Regiments shortly after
finishing the battle and it is necessary to admit that they did not lack reasons for it.
Meanwhile, Esteban-Infantes was trying to save the saveable thing, that is to say, to avoid that his Blue
Division was surrounded. Since 16:30 hours, by order of the Army Corps, the sector of Krasny Bor - from
the Leningrad-Moscow railroad to the Ishora- no longer was his responsability, but of General Reymann.
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Lieutenant Colonel Robles Pazos. Esteban-Infantes ordered to him to settle down some kind of line between
the lshora and the Leningrad-Moscow highway.
As quickly as possible the rest of Iº/263 and the IIº/269 had been summoned. Therefore Major
(Comandante) Blanco Linares, Commanding Officer of the Iº/263, received the order stating that he should
progress from Podolovo, crossing the Ishora to its Eastern margin, in North direction.
The 2ª/263 would do it close to the river, and the 5ª/269 would advance next to the old antitank ditch
which had been built by the Soviets in 1941. In center it would march the 3ª/263 and, marching behind them
and in support, some elements of the 4ª/263 (machine guns).
When the Spaniards reached Staraia Mysa took place violent shocks, but in the end the Soviets were
expelled from the village and the vanguard continued the advance. Nevertheless, when the Spanish vanguard
progressing towards the north, the Red Army counterattacked on its flank and in a heavy combat expelled the
Spaniards from Staraia Mysa.
In the meanwhile, the 2ª/263, the elements of the 3ª/263, the 4ª/263 and the 5ª/269 (this last one
without never obtain a close contact with its companions), had followed its progression towards the North,
although there were lost contact with Major (Comandante) Blanco Linares. Then they received a strong
Soviet counterattacks by its flank, coming from the lines where had been deployed the 7ª/262. The dark, the
lack of the Major Blanco Linares and the hardness of the enemy attack, finished to dislocate to the Spanish
troops.
The counterattack failed, not only Staraia Mysa seemed lost, but the threat extended to the neighboring
village of Sansonovka, where it was fought hard all night, with many losses. Nevertheless, all these losses
ended up obtaining that the Soviets did not cross the lshora towards the West.
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Altura) and the 5ª/262 (Palacios). The German artillery, on the other hand, conscious of the enemy
movement, crushed the men of Krasnov. The Commanders Reinlein and Bellod had taken over the defense
of Krasny Bor. Bellod assured the control in the East sector. His "front" stretched from the location of the
Battery 2ª/Art. 250 and towards the East until Stepanovka.
The fight immediately focused on two key points: the area Stepanovka-Chernisovo and the station of
Popovka: both opened the routes to the East, towards Nikolskoye. The Soviets fought to open the road
which ran from Stepanovka and ended up dislodging the Spanish. Next the Soviet met a battle group which
was improvised on the march, led by the SS Obersturmbannführer Bock, of the artillery of the 4th SS
Division, which unsuccessfully tried to contain the Russians between Stepanovka and Chernisovo, although
ultimately delayed so much the Russian advance that Bock earned for it the Knight Cross. Upon reaching
Chernisovo, the Russians overran the position of the Spanish 9th/Art 250, there was seriously injured
Captain Andrada.
With the same emphasis the Soviets pushed against Popovka, the small village whose station, a narrow
gauge railway, was also vital for them. The Russian finally occupied it after a fierce defense. Krasnov
eventually finding their way and his advanced elements reached Mishkino by the end of the day. But Krasnov
had a narrow corridor which was pressed on his flank by Bellod (in Stepanovka) and Bock (in Porkusi), letting
him only a narrow bottleneck to progress.
Around 18:30 Bellod by then a commander increasingly overwhelmed at last received a pleasant surprise:
the arrival of the vanguard of the 374 German Infantry Regiment-of Oberst Paul Gerd von Below. This
speed surprised when it was compared with the timid progress of Heckel’s 390th Infantry Regiment. But
while the 390th had remained months in the trenches and neither Heckel nor his men were accustomed to a
war of movement, the 374th Regiment was employed in a partisan fight, therefore it had become accustomed
to rapid movements within wooded areas and also it had participated in the very fluid fighting north of
Sinyavino.
Just landed in Sablino, it had marched hastily due north along the railway lines. Without many formalities
Bellod handed over to the Germans the control of the area and marched with his men to Sablino, except for
the survivors of the 2º/ Expl. 250 º, they were so exhausted that they preferred the risk a involvement in new
clashes that the night march. They would leave to Sablino next day.
Reinlein seemed to be determined that the Soviet 63rd Guards Division, which was exhausted, could not
get some rest; the night came and the Soviet division could not dominate effectively even the center of
Krasny Bor. Luckily for Reinlein and his men, the stubborn resistance of Aramburu and Arozarena kept
pretty busy the Soviets in the western sector of Krasny Bor, so, together with Comandante (Maj) La Cruz,
Reinlein was able to organize a sufficient number of defensive cores to deny the enemy control of the area.
Reinlein got a fleeting contact with the divisional Advanced CP at 15:00 hours, from where he was
informed that the 390th Regiment was in march to help them. Reinlein launched himself down the road until
he could reach Oberst Heckel, finding him very unwilling to move, so he returned to Krasny Bor to continue
managing their own "guerrilla warfare." His only joy was to see appear at last at 15:30 hours, the "Luftwaffe",
which sent its squadrons of "Stukas" to crush the enemy's rear.
The enemy came to the southern edge of the population, where it was located the evacuation station. The
wounded Captain Andújar, took over the less serious injured to repel the attack. But the enemy was
advancing with the support of a monstrous KV-1. A simple sapper, Antonio Ponte Anido, seeing that the
giant was going to slaughter their comrades, and the "Molotov cocktails" did nothing against it, like the other
more sophisticated means such as magnetic charges that had been glued to its thick armor , rushed to the
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combat vehicle with two anti-tank mines, which he placed before its chains. The explosion finally stopped the
tank, but also swept away the life of the heroic soldier.
Around 19:30, Bellod and Reinlein had decided to send the Assault Platoon available in the HQ of the
250th Anti-Tank Battalion to liaise with the encircled men. It was not possible. Without the urgent arrival of
the German 390th Regiment, nothing could save those brave. Reinlein finally received the order to abandon
the sector, which was the responsibility of the Germans since 16:30. But as the Germans did not appear, he
refused to leave the area without waiting for the men of Aramburu and Arozarena. Around 20:00 the German
artillery shortened its shots. Finally, at 24:00, Reinlein and La Cruz decided to obey the order of Esteban-
Infantes which stated to leave the area and withdraw towards the positions where the German 390th
Regiment remained static. However, in the southernmost part of Krasny Bor they found face to face with the
German battery located there (the 2nd of the Coastal Group 289 º - HKAA 289) and its leader implored
them to help him to protect these pieces. La Cruz insisted in accomplishing the orders, so he followed the
march, but Reinlein, Captain De Andrés and a handful of Spanish gunners returned to take up their weapons
to protect those barrels.
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