WTO and Philippine Agriculture:

Seven Years of Unbridled Trade Liberalization and Misery for Small Farmers

By Francisco G. Pascual and Arze G. Glipo

S
EVEN YEARS under the GATT-WTO, Philippine agriculture has not shown any sign of remark-
able growth promised under a liberalized trading regime. The purported gains in trade and em-
ployment in the GATT era are nowhere to be felt. Agricultural imports have outpaced exports,
transforming the country from the status of an agricultural exporter to a net food importer by the end of
2000. Traditional export crops like coconut, abaca and sugar have been losing markets contrary to expec-
tations of expanded market access under the WTO regime. Indeed, agriculture’s dismal performance over
the years does not bode well for a country where more than 50% of the population depend upon agricul-
ture for subsistence and, to the economy as a whole since agriculture still contributes 20 percent of the
GDP.
What happened along the way? Where have all the pro- move our agriculture forward from the doldrums.
mised jobs, better commodity prices and increased export reve-
nues gone? THE WTO-AOA

A
This paper aims to provide answers to these questions
GRICULTURE IS one of the most contentious
and provide an in-depth look into the state of Philippine ag-
issues in the Uruguay Round of negotiation of the
riculture seven years after the Philippines ratified the GATT-
GATT that began in 1986 and ended only in 1994.
UR. It will show that contrary to the arguments laid down by
The controversy lies in the fact that agriculture, had hitherto
the Philippine government, our membership in the WTO has
been outside of the GATT, which covered only trade in the
only imperiled the country’s food security, destroyed the live-
industrial sector. The inclusion of agriculture in the last round
lihood of small farmers and agricultural workers and exacer-
supposedly aims to establish “a fair and market-oriented trad-
bated long-running social inequities. It shall look into the
ing system” in agriculture by eliminating so-called “trade
internal structure of Philippine agriculture as well as the na-
barriers” and “trade-distorting” support in agriculture. The
ture and operations of the international trading regime un-
rules by which a more “level” playing field in the world’s ag-
der the rules of the WTO to provide a fuller understanding
ricultural trading system can be achieved are outlined in the
on why Philippine agriculture has remained on the losing end.
main provisions of the Agriculture Agreement, i.e. on mar-
It shall endeavor to put forward policy recommendations for
ket access, domestic support and export subsidies. The area
enhancing food security, raising incomes of poor peasants
and ensuring equitable development of agriculture.
This assessment comes at no more than an opportune
time when member countries of WTO have decided to launch
a new round and within this are undertaking the second phase
of the review of the implementation of the agriculture agree-
ment. While some of the statements of the Philippine negoti-
ating panel in the WTO point to an increasing bias for food
security and development concerns, much remains to be de-
sired in reforming government policies that have allowed the
rapid liberalization of trade in agriculture at the expense of
the vast majority of the country’s agricultural producers. This
paper will try to offer a range of policy options that could

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 1

on market access calls for the tariffication of all non-tariff
barriers and the progressive reduction of tariffs over the years.
The provisions on domestic support and export competition
require member states to reduce agriculture subsidies that dis-
tort trade. Implementation of the agreement for developed
countries is until the end of 2000, while that of developing
countries is until 2004. Table 1 shows the specific rules for
each provision.
But beyond rhetorics of leveling the playing field for trade
in agriculture, the AOA, by design is basically a highly iniq-
uitous agreement skewed in favor of the interests of deve-
loped countries. While it offers special and differential (S&D)
treatment to developing countries such as in the form of longer
implementation periods, it provides far better concessions to
developed countries through the green and blue boxes, which
are categories of exemptions under the subsidy reduction rule.
These kinds of subsidy are allowed if they are intended to
meet social or environmental objectives. More often than not,
these boxes are used to replace the lost production support
and export subsidies of developed countries subjected to re-
duction under the WTO regime. The net effect is that agricul-
tural trading systems in developed countries remain highly
subsidized and protected, while those of developing coun-
tries are rapidly pried open and subjected to dumping of cheap
imported goods. Ironically, developing countries with very
minimal public expenditures in agriculture, as they are saddled
already by chronic budget deficits and increasing debt bur-
dens, could not even make use of these exemptions. Given such
gaping loopholes, the AOA only serves to legitimize and
strengthen the trade-distorting practices of developed countries.
Developed countries’ interests are more than favored in
the AOA. Provisions were intently formulated to be of more
use to developed countries than developing countries. For in-
stance, the Due Restraint Clause of Article 13 protects various
subsidies, such as those falling under the green and blue boxes.
While the export and input and investment subsidies allowed
for developing countries under the S&D treatment support
could not be challenged until 2003, the decision to make this
provision valid and binding beyond 2003 is yet to be made by
the WTO member states.
The Special Safeguard provision contained in Article 5
of the Agreement is another tool by which developed coun-
tries could manipulate their way around tariffication of im-
ported commodities. This allows countries the right to impose
additional tariffs to protect local products from sudden im-
port surges or fall in world prices. The safeguard tariffs are
however good for only one year and should not exceed 1/3
of the commodity’s normal tariff rates. Commitment sched-
ules made by member states showed that mostly developed
countries availed of this provision and only 21 developing
countries were eligible to use this option. (Murphy, 2001).

Table 1. WTO - AOA Provisions

PROVISIONS
1. Market Access
1.1. Tariffication of all non-tariff
barriers. Base reference
period is 1986-1988.
1.2. Minimum Access Volumes
(MAVs). Base reference
period is 1986-1988.
2. Domestic Support
3. Export Subsidies
SPECIFIC RULES AND COMMITMENTS
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES DEVELOPING COUNTRIES
Tariffs will be reduced by an average of 36% Tariffs will be reduced by an average of 24%
over a period of six years (1994-2000), with over ten years (1994-2004), with a reduction by
each tariff line reduced by at least 15% at least 10% for each tariff line.
Provision of minimum access opportunities for Tariffs will be reduced by an average of 24%
imported agricultural pro-ducts at 3% of base over ten years (1994-2004), with a reduction by
year domestic consumption starting in 1995 at least 10% for each tariff line.
and increasing to 5% by 2000.Tariffs will be
reduced by an average of 24% over ten years
(1994-2004), with a reduction by at least 10%
for each tariff line.
The Aggregate Measure of Support (AMS) will AMS will be reduced by 13.3% from average of
be reduced by 20% from average of base year base year (1986-1988) over 10 years.
(1986-1988) in equal installments over six (6)
years.
Reduction of export subsidies by 21% in Reduction by 14% in volume and 24% in
volume and 36% in monetary terms over six monetary terms over nine (9) years.
years.

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 2

 Negotiations on the AOA are mandated to take place
under Article 20 a year before the end of the implementation
period for the developed countries, i.e beginning of year 2000.
The objective of such negotiations is to complete the process
of reforms in global agricultural trade until a “ fair and mar-
ket-oriented agricultural trading system is established that will
prevent and correct restrictions and distortions in world agri-
cultural markets.”
IMPLEMENTATION EXPERIENCE
rendered ineffectual as government expenditures on agricul-
ture in deve-loped countries remain high. While AMS spend-
ing in the US and EU was lowered, the Green Box
expenditures inversely increased. The total agricultural sup-
port in OECD countries has reached $360B in 1999 up by
28% from $280 B in 1997. The EU, JAPAN and US account
for 90% of these subsidies. In the US alone, domestic support
to agriculture has risen to US$28B in 2000.
The increasing subsidies reflect the wholesale violation
of the avowed intent if not the letter of the agreement, which

T
aimed to reduce subsidies and reign in the destructive com-
HE IMPLEMENTATION of the scheduled commit
petition between the EU and the US in agricultural trade. As
ments of member countries under AOA has clearly
massive agricultural subsidies remained uncurbed among
exposed the inherent imbalances and anomalies in
developed countries, the practice of export dumping has been
the agreement. Developing countries that rapidly tariffied their
entrenched further wreaking havoc on the livelihoods of small
quantitative import restrictions and reduced tariffs at scales
farmers in developing countries and directly threatening food
more than what have been stipulated in the agreement in the
security of developing nations. AOA has turned many of these
hope of increasing market access for their products have ironi-
countries into net food importers in just a short span of time,
cally found their prime exports stagnating over the past few
undermining their food security and rural development goals.
years. Markets in developed countries especially for agricul-
ture and textiles remained heavily protected. Of the 38% of
global imports accounted for by the EU in 1999, 2/3 of this STRENGTHENING TNC CONTROL
came from trade between EU member states themselves. IN GLOBAL AGRICULTURAL TRADE

T
(Murphy, 2001). Prices of agricultural commodities in the
HE AOA has helped in no uncertain terms the ex-
world market instead of rising are falling, a picture contrast-
pansion of MNC control in global agricultural trade.
ing sharply with projections of increasing foreign exchange
The main beneficiaries of expanded market access
earnings out of enhanced competitiveness of developing coun-
and increased agricultural subsidies in the north are not even
tries’ agricultural exports. The actual results show that deve-
loping countries have been suffering
from decreasing agricultural export Table 2. In-Quota Tariff Rates for Sensitive Agricultural Products: Average by Product
Group, 1995 to 2000, In Percentage
revenues. In fact, even before the
WTO-AOA, the share of developing Product Group Initial Commitments Final
countries’ agricultural exports to to- Rate Applied Tariff Rate Rate
tal world agricultural exports has 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2004
been declining over time from 40%
Beef fresh/chilled 30 30 30 30 20 10 30
in 1961 to 27% in 1990. (Binswanger,
Beef frozen 30 30 30 30 20 10 30
2000).
Pork fresh/chilled/frozen 30 30 30 30 30 30 30
The downtrend in the world
Poultry fresh/chilled/frozen 50 46.47 42.35 42.35 42.35 42.35 40
prices of agricultural commodities
basically stems from overproduction Potatoes fresh/chilled 50 50 45 45 45 45 40
of these commodities, the develop- Onions, shallots, and garlic NI 30 30 30 30 30 NI
ment of substitutes and the massive Maize, other than seed 35 35 35 35 35 35 35
domestic support and export subsi- Rice 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
dies employed by the governments of
Sugar 50 50 50 50 50 50 50
the developed economies. The AOA
Source: Section 1-B, Phil. Schedule LXXV, GATT-UR; EO No. 313, 29 March 1996; EO No.
rules for substantial reduction of sub-
465, Jan. 1998; and TCCP Nov. 1998 & April 1999
sidies have been circumvented and Prepared by DA-AGILE; 30 June 99

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 3

Table 3. Minimum Access Volumes Committed to the WTO 1995 to 2005
Product 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005
Beef fresh/chilled (000 mt) 2,000 4,087 4,261 4,436 4,611 4,785 4,959 5,134 5,308 5,483 2,786
Beef frozen (000 mt) 0 21.1 57.1 71.3 85.6 98.4 108.3 119.1 131.0 144.1 72.0
Pork fresh/chilled/frozen (000 mt) 16.3 33.7 36.1 38.5 41.0 43.4 45.8 48.2 50.6 53.0 27.1
Poultry fresh/chilled/frozen
(000 mt) 7.3 15.2 16.2 16.7 17.7 18.8 19.8 20.9 21.9 23.0 10.4
Potatoes fresh/chilled (mt) 465 965 1,035 1,102 1,171 1,240 1,309 1,378 1,447 1,516 772
Maize, other than seed (000 mt) 65.1 135.0 144.6 154.3 164.0 173.6 183.2 192.8 202.5 212.1 108.5
Rice (000 mt) 29.9 61.5 65.1 97.1 112 119.5 134.4 164.3 194.1 224.0 142.2
Sugar (00 mt) 19.2 39.8 42.7 45.5 48.4 51.2 54.1 56.9 59.8 62.6 32.0
Source: Annex 1, AO1, 1998, MAV Management Committee, DA
Prepared by DA-AGILE; June 99

the family based farmers in Europe or in the US. It is the
transnational agribusiness corporations which control trad-
ing, input supply, processing and marketing in agriculture glo-
bally that benefit immensely from these trade rules.
Under WTO’s globalized trading regime, the TNCs have
been able to expand their operations tremendously. A recent
seeds and genetic resources vital to ensuring sustainable food
production systems in the South. An example of this integra-
tion is the joint venture of Cargill and Monsanto to develop
genetically engineered foods. (Murphy, 2001).
THE PHILIPPINE EXPERIENCE

T
survey by WIR shows that foreign direct investments (FDI)
HE PHILIPPINE government’s formal accession to
flow into developed countries expanded from $481 B in 1998
the GATT-WTO was made possible by the ratifica
to $636B in 1999 and FDIs to developing countries increased
tion of the Philippine Senate of the GATT-UR in
from $179 B in 1998 to $208 B in 1999, a 32% and 16% in-
December 1994. Along with it, the government’s commit-
crease respectively. TNCs have gained more economic clout
ments to the various agreements embodied in the Uruguay
than their governments. Consider some facts: Mitsubishi’s
Round including the Agreement on Agriculture (AOA) were
trade volume is greater than the GNP of Indonesia, Ford’s
made legally binding. To pursue the full completion of its
trade is more than that of South Africa and Royal Dutch
commitments to the AOA, the government has subsequently
Shell’s income is more than Norway’s. (Capdevila, 2001).
amended and revised existing laws and policy measures that
Their dominance in global economy and trade enable were not in congruence with the rules of the WTO.
TNCs to dictate the agenda for negotiations in the WTO
Thus, RA 8178 known as “An Act Replacing Quantita-
through their governments. In fact, they had more clout in
tive Import Restrictions on Agricultural Products, Except Rice,
the UR negotiations than most developing country GATT
with Tariffs, Creating the Agricultural Competitiveness En-
members. To influence their governments, they formed ac-
hancement Fund, and for Other Purposes” was enacted un-
tive lobby groups such as the Intellectual Property Coalition
der the then Ramos administration. It repealed the Magna
whose members were leading American agro-chemical con-
Carta of Small Farmers of 1991, which protected products
glomerates like Dupont, Monsanto and Pfizer.(Rocamora,
of small farmers. It replaced all quantitative restrictions on
1996).
agricultural imports with tariffs that will be substantially re-
A growing trend in global agribusines operation is the duced over ten years. The government’s commitment to the
consolidation of TNCs vertically and horizontally, further WTO-AOA allowed for an initial bound rate of 100% for
expanding and strengthening their control over economies of sensitive products like corn, sugar, onions and garlic. But these
developing countries whose agriculture comprise about 25- have to be reduced to 40%-50% by 2004, considered to be the
35 percent of their GDPs. This phenomenon of increasing final bound rates. In other developing countries, 300% tariff
TNC control of global agriculture dispossesses Third world rates were initially imposed on highly sensitive products.
farmers of their control not only of their lands but also of

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 4

 In addition to substantially lowering tar- Table 4. Growth Rate of Real Gross Value of Agriculture and Specific Crops (%)
iffs over ten years, government also commit- 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000
ted to provide a minimum access for imported Agri 1.4 0.4 2.1 2.6 0.8 3.1 2.9% -8.3 6.3 3.5
agricultural products to be slapped with virtu- Palay 3.8 -5.9 3.2 10.4 0.02 7.05 -0.1 -24.1 37.8 5.1
ally minimal tariff rates ranging from 30% -
Corn 1.2 -0.76 3.7 -6.1 -8.65 0.57 4.4 -11.7 19.9 -1.6
50% right after the ratification of GATT-UR.
Coconut -61 0.2 0.17 0.05 7.4 -7.1 5.3 -13.1 -9.5 14.2
These are called in-quota tariff rates as differ-
entiated from the normal rates which are ap- Source: National Statistics and Census Board, NSO
plied to quantities of import exceeding the
minimum access volume (MAV). See Table 2, In-Quota Tar- ment of postharvest facilities and P64 M for the installation
iff Rates for Sensitive Agricultural Products, 1995-2000. of grain centers. Seven years after, the plan remained a gran-
diose dream. According to DA, only 50% of the budgetary
Much of the imported goods, and hence the tariff rates
requirement of the plan was met.
applied in the years following the GATT ratification fell un-
der the MAV category (in-quota tariff rates). For instance, In 1998, with the executive safety net program tottering
even if the government was able to postpone import liberal- on the brink of collapse, the government came out with a
ization of rice to 2005 under the AOA’s Special Treatment legislative measure that pursued the same goals of building
Clause, rice importation was still allowed within the mini- the global competitiveness of Philippine agriculture. This time,
mum access volume commitment of the government. Other the Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization Act (AFMA)
sensitive crops not previously imported were also placed un- was passed by Congress, which provided for government sup-
der MAV schedules. See Table 3. port in irrigation, post-harvest facilities, credit and financ-
ing, information and marketing assistance, product
Under the AOA, the government is not required to re-
standardization and consumer safety, research and develop-
duce its domestic support to agriculture as its current levels
ment, etc. It also provided for the identification of Strategic
of subsidies fall below the minimum of 10% of the value of
Agricultural and Fisheries Development Zones (SAFDZs),
production. According to data from the Department of Trade
which were no better than the Ramos’ Key Production Areas
and Industry, government market price support for rice and
(KPAs), a locus for high value crop production. The AFMA
corn in 1996 was only 5% and 1% respectively of the total
was allocated a budget that is distinct from the normal opera-
value of production. (Bernardino, 2000).
tional budget of the Department of Agriculture. But despite
Side by side with rapid tariff reforms, the government having a legislated annual budgetary allocation, AFMA was
came out with a much-trumpeted safety net plan called the not able to take off the ground as government could not even
DA Action Plan in 1994, supposedly to minimize dislocation meet the annual budgetary needs of the DA.
of livelihood of farmers and make them competitive in prepa-
ration for entering the global market. The plan, exhibiting THE STARK REALITIES
the optimism of pro-GATT proponents at that time allocated OF TRADE LIBERALIZATION
P27B for the improvement of irrigation facilities, P8B for the

P
construction of farm-to-market roads, P762M for the improve- ARTLY TO ensure favorable public opinion leading
to the ratification of the UR-GATT in 1994, govern
Table 5. Comparative Average Prices of Coconut Products, ment came out with a very optimistic computation
1999-2000 of the benefits that could be derived from the country’s enter-
COCONUT PRODUCTS WORLD PRICES GROWTH ing into the agreement.
(in US $ per kg) RATES (%) • Increase in annual agricultural export earnings by
August 1999 August 2000 at least PhPesos 3.4 B.
Coconut Oil 0.725 0.384 -47.0 • Increase in the annual gross value added of agricul-
Copra Oil Cake or Meal 0.093 0.075 -19.4 ture by PhP 60B.
Desiccated Coconut 1.124 0.928 -17.4 • Creation of an additional 500,000 jobs annually.

Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, DA Hence, in the heat of the debate between the pro and anti
WTO, government armed with these arguments easily branded

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 5

the opposition as anti-development and anti-poor claiming
3,000
further that the latter refused to see the tremendous economic
and social benefits that free trade could offer to the country’s

Million US $
poor. 2,000

By 2000 as the country reeled from one crisis to another,

and the rosy predictions were blurred by grimmer economic 1,000
realities, the free traders could merely offer lame excuses as
to why the promised benefits remained unfulfilled. 0

1994

1995

1996

1997

1998

1999

2000
DECLINING AGRICULTURAL
Year
PRODUCTIVITY Figure 1. Value of Agricultural Exports, 1994-2000

I
N THE period from 1995-2000, the performance of the
agriculture sector, which employs about half of the to policy issues as the more significant factors.
country’s labor force remained lackluster. The total out-
put of agriculture as measured by its real gross-value added FALLING AGRICULTURAL PRICES
has minimally increased. For the past six years, the average

T
growth rate of the agriculture GVA was a mere 1.38% lower HE PRICES of specific agricultural commodities like
than the ave-rage rate of 1.62% in the years 1991-1994. The sugar, coconut oil, rice and corn during the pre and
decline in GVAs mirrors declining output of agriculture and post-GATT-UR periods showed no remarkable
hence its capacity to supply the food needs of the population changes. The relative prices of these products in fact have
as well as its ability to generate employment not to mention been on the decline since the 70’s. This downward trend in
compete in the world market. agricultural prices in the country was attributed partly to in-
sufficient agricultural support and investments, decreasing
The crop subsector, which accounts for 50%-60% of
hectarage devoted to agriculture and stagnant per capita ag-
agriculture’s GVA has performed poorly. Rice production in-
ricultural output (Lim, 1996). The importation of relatively
creased in the early years of the AOA but soon suffered sig-
cheaper agricultural products, notwithstanding the flooding
nificant declines in recent years (through 1997 to 1998),
of local markets with smuggled goods in the recent years fur-
dipping to a negative 24.1% in 1998. The same is true for
ther pushed down domestic prices particularly of rice and
corn production which posted negative growth rates in the
corn.
years 1995, 1998, and 2000. See Table 4. The coconut subsector
likewise has consistently posted declining production growth On the other hand, increasing competition from suppos-
in the years following the GATT ratification. While DA offi- edly healthier and cheaper substitutes in the world market pulled
cials would blame weather disturbances for the over-all de- down the prices of the country’s leading export commodities
cline in crop production for the year 1998, the sluggish such as coconut oil and other coconut-based products. Table 5
performance across sectors over the last six years would point shows an almost 50% decline in the world price of coconut oil
in the year 1999-2000. The sanitary and phyto-sanitary mea-
Table 6. Comparative Average Prices of Food, Grain and sures under the WTO, which actually discriminated exports
Beverages, 1999-2000 from the South, depressed further their prices because they are
COCONUT PRODUCTS WORLD PRICES GROWTH considered “sub-standard,” if not outrightly denied them the
(in US $ per kg) RATES (%) markets because they do not meet the standards.
August 1999 August 2000
The continuing glut in the world market as many coun-
SUGAR 0.141 0.246 74.5 tries from the South produce the same short list of commodi-
WHEAT 0.099 0.101 2.02 ties weighed down on the world prices heavily. The world
prices of corn and coffee, which are top exports from the
CORN 0.073 0.059 -19.2
South took a nosedive in the year 2000. See Table 6.
COFFEE 2.047 1.764 -13.8
The over-all downward trend of commodity prices, in
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics, DA

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 6

real terms, for the past Table 7. Value of Agricultural our “comparative advantage.”
two decades has re- Exports, 1994-2000
Year Exports The impetus for high value crops production is nothing
sulted to deteriorating
(in million US Dollars) new. In fact, export-oriented agricultural production has been
terms-of-trade for most
government’s policy dating back to the 70’s when the banana
developing countries 1994 2,072.02
and pineapple industries in Mindanao under the control and
dependent on commod- 1995 2,499.06 ownership of transnational corporations flourished. This
ity exports and subse-
1996 2,306.64 policy was further strengthened under the IMF-WB sponsored
quently in huge trade
Structural Adjustment Program in the 80’s and 90’s as agri-
losses for these countries. 1997 2,337.51
culture was increasingly deregulated and trade liberalized.
But despite the depressed 1998 2,224.67 High value crop production took center stage in agricultural
prices in the 80’s, the
1999 1,760.14 policy under the Ramos Medium-Term Agricultural Devel-
volume of commodity
opment Program (MTADP) in the 90s. The promise of in-
exports from developing 2000 1,982.73
creased market access under WTO further drove government
countries has in fact
priorities to the development of this sector. As a consequence,
risen by over 40% from 1980 to 1990. The tendency for devel-
areas devoted to these crops have expanded tremendously in
oping countries dependent on agricultural exports for foreign
the recent years. For instance, the hectarage planted to pine-
exchange earnings is to double or triple the volume of their
apple have doubled in less than ten years, from 61, 000 hec-
exports in order to offset the declining value.
tares in 1989 to 102,000 hectares in 1996. Banana plantations
expanded by 40,000 hectares in the last seven years. The area
DECLINING AGRICULTURAL devoted to cutflower production has grown from 1,008 hec-
EXPORT EARNINGS tares in 1990 to 1,427 hectares in 1996. In fact, rice and corn

H
ENCE, OWING to low demand and depressed lands in Mindanao have been reduced by 63.56% and 46.67%,
prices of agricultural commodities in the world respectively, to give way to high value crops. (Aquino, Jr.,
market, Philippine agricultural exports have not 1998).
boomed as promised by the pro-WTO proponents. Contrary
to expectations, the value of agricultural exports has not sig- HEAVY IMPORTATION ERODING FOOD
nificantly risen in the past six years. See Table 7 and Figure 1. SELF-SUFFICIENCY

T
Value of Agricultural Exports 1994-2000. It declined 25% from
HE WTO-AOA period saw record increases in the
1997 - 1999. This partly explains the fact that the share of
volume of imported agricultural products since even
agricultural exports in the economy’s total merchandise ex-
previously banned products were liberalized. The
ports decreased substantially from 20.8% in 1990 to a mere
WTO-AOA provision on Minimum Access Volume (MAV)
4.9% in 1999. Export earnings specifically from food and live
caused heavy surges of imported food products like rice, corn,
animals have been decreasing from 1996 - 1998. The value of
wheat, poultry, livestock and vegetables. The postponement
crude coconut oil exports, which is the 4th top merchandise
export of the country posted a declining trend (at constant
prices) for the past three years, from P14 million export earn-
ings in 1998 it declined to a mere P4.6 million in 1999 and
partially recovered to about P10.5 million in 2000. (Economic
and Social Statistics Office, NSCB 2001). Table 8 also shows
the declining value of specific agricultural commodity exports
in the country in the post- GATT-UR period.
But despite declining competitiveness of the country’s
leading export crops, government continues to blindly pro-
mote export crop production. Government support in agri-
culture is increasingly channeled to the production of
non-traditional exports like asparagus, mangoes, pineapple
and banana, where according to government technocrats lie

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 7

of the liberalization of rice to 2004 did
Table 8. Principal Agricultural Commodity Exports (in Million Dollars)
not deter its heavy importation. In 1998,
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
rice became the top imported agricul-
Coconut Oil 361 299 481 358 474 826 571 673 706 342
tural product with a value of $585 mil-
lion, which comprise 35% of the total Banana 149 173 158 226 215 224 237 216 217 241
value of agricultural imports. The high Sugar 133 115 88 102 61 66 136 83 80 62
volumes of imported rice in the period Pineapple, 120 131 127 124 121 115 131 123 140 137
following the GATT-UR ratification ex- Pineapple
ceeded the committed quantities of products
minimum access by the government, Source: NSO
which is 1% of total consumption (base
weakening the country’s capacity for food self-sufficiency.
year 1986-1988) in 1995 increasing to 4% of consumption in
the year 2005. Actual rice imports were placed at 3.5% of The import boom during these years did not only pose
total consumption in 1995 and rising to a staggering 32% in serious threats to the countyr’s food security, it has in fact
1998! This trend poses serious threats to the country’s self- contributed to the accumulation of large trade deficits in ag-
sufficiency in rice. See Table 9. riculture. In a span of six years following the GATT ratifi-
cation, the balance of trade in agriculture posted deficits
The same is true for other food items. Importation of
reaching to as high as US$ 1 billion in 1999, as compared to
cereals and cereal preparation increased significantly from
a consistent trade surplus in 70’s and 80’s. Ironic as it seems,
$843 M in 1996 to $981M in 1998. There were also heavy
but the country’s gaining a member status in the WTO con-
importation of milk, poultry, beef, onion, garlic, and vegetable
signed it to become a net food importer from one of an agri-
oils. Table 10 shows that imported volumes of key food items
cultural exporter in the 80’s. Table 11 shows the country’s
constitute a significant portion of local production indicat-
balance of trade in agriculture from the 80’s to the 90’s.
ing the country’s growing dependence on imports. This has
dire consequence in terms of dampening local production and
RISING UNEMPLOYMENT

T
Table 9. Rice Importation, 1992-2000 (in million metric tons HE PROMISED millions of jobs to be created in the
Year Production Consumption Importation Ratio: post-GATT-UR period, sad to say, did not material-
Importation to ize either. On the contrary, as a result of the full inte-
Consumption gration of Philippine agriculture into the international mar-
1986 6.05 5.22 0.00598 0.11 ket, livelihoods of millions of poor peasants were seriously
1987 5.59 5.39 - - threatened. Rice and corn farmers who faced stiffer competi-
1988 5.87 5.56 0.18117 3.25 tion from cheap imports have experienced substantial declines
1989 6.19 5.64 0.21993 3.89 in their incomes. Corn farmers in the south have abandoned
1990 6.09 5.93 0.62079 10.46 their farms as farmgate prices of corn continue to plummet
down. The same is true for coconut farmers. Subsistence pro-
1991 6.33 5.52 - -
ducers were displaced as agricultural export production in-
1992 5.970 5.822 - -
tensified and transnational agribusiness corporations
1993 6.132 6.032 0.210 3.48
expanded their operations. Farms devoted to staple crops were
1994 6.850 6.169 - - converted into agribusiness plantations as well as industrial
1995 6.852 6.445 0.247 3.83 and real estate enclaves. Exacerbated by the financial melt-
1996 7.334 6.990 0.918 13.13 down in Asia in 1997, the chronic crisis in Philippine economy
1997 7.325 6.996 0.722 10.32 and agriculture led to massive unemployment particularly in
1998 5.560 6.711 2.171 32.34 the agriculture sector. In 1998 alone, it lost 710,000 jobs. In-
1999 7.662 7.413 0.836 11.27 deed, without significant leaps in output in the past years,
Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics agriculture’s capacity to generate employment has been se-

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 8

verely eroded. Table 10. Production and Importation of Selected Agricultural
Products (in metric tons), 1995 - 1998
LETTING THE MARKET RULE Product Year Production Importation % of Importation

R
to Production
ELIGIOUSLY SUBSCRIBING to the WTO frame
work of “reducing barriers in trade” and elimin- Corn 1995 4,128,520 208,020 5.03
ation of “trade-distorting” subsidies and support
1996 4,151,300 405,440 9.76
in agriculture, the government has taken a very minimal role
in agricultural development in the past years. While such a 1997 4,332,420 307,590 7.09
stance has been adopted under the SAP policy of deregula- 1998 3,823,180 113,120 2.95
tion and privatization in the 80’s up to the nineties, the in-
creasingly lesser and lesser intervention of government in Garlic
agriculture was in no time more pronounced than in the post- 1995 17,227 0 -
GATT-UR era. As a result, market forces and monopolies
1996 18,591 1,651 8.88
have increasingly dominated every aspect of agriculture - from
production, credit and marketing to semi-processing. 1997 20,153 5,423 26.90
Government’s agricultural support in the form of price 1998 19,314 13,855 71.73
support, credit, research and development, and infrastructure
Onion
development has been on the decline. Land Bank, which is
the repository of the Agrarian Reform Fund has allocated 1995 88,427 1 0.001
only 28% of its loan portfolio to agriculture and agrarian pur-
1996 83,322 1,374 1.64
poses. The expansion of irrigated lands has slowed down from
an average of 25,000 hectares per year in the 70’s and 80’s to 1997 85,383 808 0.94
less than 10,000 hectares per year in the recent years (PPI, 1998 87,666 11,408 13.01
2001). Declining government support is evident in the declin-
ing share of agriculture in the national budget from 3.99% in Beef
1997 to 2.29% in 2000. See Table 12. 1995 147,463 26,194 17.76
Apparently, because of government’s policy of deregula- 1996 160,826 32,662 20.30
tion and privatization, the safety net measures it designed
1997 176,636 39,610 22.42
supposedly to cushion the negative impact of GATT on the
more vulnerable sectors are but empty promises and slogans. 1998 182,629 29,783 16.30
The government’s Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
Source: Supply and Utilization Accounts
(AFMA) Program which embodies its goal to modernize Bureau of Agricultue Statistics
agriculture and make it globally competitive rests on a highly
ambitious budget.
affected sectors/ groups to prove that such unfair trade prac-
Actual implementation, however shows that AFMA’s leg- tices exist. Another thing is that legal actions ordinarily en-
islated budget allocation of P128 B to be released over four tail a lot of time and resources on the part of the complainant.
years has not been delivered. Government could not even in- Proving dumping and trade-distorting practices involving trad-
crease the regular budgetary allocation for the Department ing partners from other countries is a much more complex
of Agriculture. case. Without active government support, the possibility of
poor peasants in the country winning against powerful
Weak governance in agriculture is evident even more in
transnational corporations is almost preposterous.
the government’s implementation of the S&D provisions in
the WTO. The legislated measures that have been designed Implementation experience at the global level showed that
to provide protection to local industries adversely affected by only developed countries because of huge resources at the
dumping and import surges such as the Anti-Dumping Act command of corporations and their governments have suc-
(RA No. 8752) and the Safeguard Measures Act (RA No. cessfully utilized these provisions, of course to the detriment
8800) are ineffective. For one, they put all the burden on the of developing countries.

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 9

 THE INHERENT DISADVANTAGE Table 11. Balance of Trade in Agriculture, 1980-2000
OF PHILIPPINE AGRICULTURE (FOB Value in Million $)

IN THE AOA Year Exports Imports Balance of Trade

T
1980 2,166.91 823.44 1,343.47
HE NEGATIVE impact of the implementation of 1981 2,057.03 862.16 1,194.87
the WTO AoA on Philippine agriculture and par-
1982 1,743.72 960.71 783.01
ticularly on poor peasants and farm workers we sub-
mit must be seen in the context of the basic character of agri- 1983 1,559.14 818.60 740.54
culture and its role in the economy. This is the only logical 1984 1,663.59 655.44 1,008.15
starting point of government in dealing with the issue of the 1985 1,285.97 706.83 579.14
AoA and agricultural trade liberalization. We argue that the 1986 1,421.07 656.55 764.52
WTO AoA and the premises upon which it was founded in-
1987 1,520.75 816.67 704.08
herently work against Philippine agriculture on the one hand.
1988 1,713.28 1,106.24 607.04
On the other hand, Philippine agriculture is not in a position
to compete with the highly subsidized industrial agriculture 1989 1,720.96 1,317.21 403.75
of the world economic powers. 1990 1,701.13 1,555.23 145.90

First, small-scale, low-level-technology agricultural pro- 1991 1,844.67 1,259.17 585.50

duction prevails. The agricultural economy is characterized 1992 1,866.49 1,599.70 266.79
by small plot production of traditional food and cash crops 1993 1,918.25 1,626.20 292.05
like rice, corn, coconut and vegetables, with an average farm 1994 2,072.02 2,112.98 (40.96)
size of 1.5 hectares. Manual labor is dominant and the use of
1995 2,499.06 2,648.65 (149.59)
machinery is very limited. In rice, hand tractors and thresh-
ers are commonly used but in corn lands mechanization is 1996 2,306.64 3,095.85 (764.28)
even less. 1997 2,337.51 3,101.79 (764.28)
1998 2,224.67 2,894.56 (669.89)
This type of small-scale agriculture coexists side by side
with export agriculture producing mainly traditional exports 1999 1,760.14 2,878.13 (1,117.99)
like coconut and cane sugar grown in large haciendas and 2000 1,982.73 2,776.93 (794.20)
also banana and pineapple grown in plantations operated by Source: Bureau of Agricultural Statistics
transnational corporations mainly in the island of Mindanao;
with large integrated production in the livestock sector; and sugar at half the cost we do.
with commercial fishing employing modern fishing gears.
This backward state of Philippine agriculture precludes
Nonetheless, the level of technology in general is very fair competition (“level playing field”) in the international
low. Agricultural production relies mainly on sheer peasant market. It is obvious that small peasant producers in the South
brawn and simple farm tools. In irrigated rice lands, peasants can not compete with the large TNCs that dominate agricul-
employ mechanically powered tools like hand tractors and tural production in the North whether in the international
threshers. Mechanized farming typical of capitalist agricul- and the domestic markets.
ture exists only in TNC-operated pineapple and banana plan-
Second, exploitative relations prevail in agriculture. The
tations and which represent only a small fraction of farms in
age-old problem of land concentration and of course the at-
the country.
tendant land rent still prevails. Large farms of over 12 hec-
Given this primitive technological core of agricultural tares comprising 43 % of total farms are owned by only 5 %
production, productivity and efficiency are obviously very low. of the total landowning class. Bigger farms of over 50 hec-
For example, corn production per hectare is 5 times and in tares, representing 21% of total farm area, are owned by a
rice 3 times bigger in the industrial economies than in the smaller 0.5% of the landowning elite. The vast majority of
Phil farms. The sugar industry, absent any radical policy re- small farms averaging 1.5 hectares comprise less than 1/5 of
form will certainly lose to the Australians who produce cane total farm area and are distributed among peasants and small

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 10

independent farmers who represent 67% of total landhold- economy is obvious. The values created within agriculture
ings. are taken out of agriculture and leaves agriculture nothing
for its development. These structural inequities are at the bot-
On top of land concentration and land rent, merchant
tom of the low level of development of agriculture. Fixed to
monopolies dominate the marketing and distribution of agri-
this primitive state, peasants are impoverished and have no
cultural inputs and products. This leads to predatory pricing
fighting chance in a liberalized trading regime.
of agricultural products. In many cases, the landlord and the
trader are one and the same, collecting rent on land, farm
machinery and post harvest facilities while at the same time SUMMARY OF ASSESSMENT

S
earning profits from their merchant operations and usurious
EVEN YEARS into the WTO-AOA, Philippine agri-
money-lending activities. In the rice and corn sector, mer-
culture fared no better. On the contrary, it has
chants who are not necessarily landowners operate in a big
seriously undermined the local economy and the
way - lending money for subsistence of the peasant family or
country’s food sovereignty, destroyed livelihoods of poor peas-
for production, collecting rent on farm machinery and cor-
ants and subsistence producers and retarded agricultural and
nering the produce.
economic development.
Since the “green revolution” the introduction of chemi-
The haste by which the AOA was implemented in the
cal based farming technology has increased the cost of pro-
country without thought and regard as to its impact on the
duction for practically all crops - rice, corn and vegetables.
vulnerable agricultural sectors had only succeeded in prying
This has provided another basis for the accumulation of mer-
open agriculture to cheap imports and subjecting farmers pro-
chant profits and usury. Increased productivity if any did not
ducts to unfair competition from highly subsidized products
mean increased incomes for peasants. Rather it meant in-
of the North. Those who benefitted are mainly the big com-
creased profits for the TNC suppliers and the local merchants.
panies and traders who profited from the lower prices of im-
The result of such a structure of production is impover- ported agricultural products slapped with lower tariff rates
ishment of the peasants. Take for example the case of rice. under MAV such as the big rice traders, integrators in poultry
One study shows that a rice farmer earns only a measly net and livestock and the food and beverage companies.
income of 9% from one hectare of production, while 22%
The promise of market access in developed countries did
goes to land rent and interest on loans, 30% to merchant price
not materialize since the AOA, by design is intended to ex-
mark-up, 20% to post-harvest facilities and transportation and
pand market opportunities only for big players such as the
the rest to other costs of production like chemical inputs, hired
US and EU while maintaining high protection of their agri-
labor and land preparation. Thus, the peasant is squeezed
cultures. By tearing down what they call barriers to trade, the
dry and is left nothing with to improve production. (Lim,
AOA ensured powerful agricultural exporters from the North
1996).
a ready market for their products while depriving developing
The implication of this structure of the agricultural country’s capacity to produce adequate and quality food for
Table 12. Annual Budget of Department of Agriculture, 1994-2000 its population.
(in thousand pesos) It was too late in the game when the Philippine govern-
Year Dep’t of Agriculture National Budget % To National ment realized about the lack of “reciprocity” on the part of
Budget the developed countries. It had already committed the elimi-
1994 8,426,893 322,694,974 2.61% nation of the remaining trade barriers in agriculture by set-
1995 10,712,912 387,397,933 2.77% ting bound tariff rates way below what are stipulated in the
1996 15,769,274 394,855,182 3.99% agreement. Based on its unilateral liberalization program,
government committed to the lowering of tariffs at 3% by the
1997 17,165,131 433,817,543 3.96%
year 2005.
1998 17,180,077 546,743,816 3.14%
As AOA failed to curb subsidies enabling developed coun-
1999 14,722,021 585,097,506 2.52%
tries to sell their products in the world market below the cost
2000 18,320,298 798,313,128 2.29%
of prodution, agricultural production in developing countries
Source: Department of Agriculture has been increasingly undermined. In the Philippines, in-
creased dependence on cheap and heavily subsidized imports

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 11

has seriously eroded the country’s capacity to become food
self-sufficient.
The WTO-AOA worsened existing exploitative relations
in agriculture. Land monopoly intensified as agribusiness
corporations, commercial producers and the landed elite ex-
panded their landholdings and intensified production for ex-
ports. Traders and big agribusiness corporations expanded
their control in credit, marketing and processing. Agricultural
trade liberalization reinforced further the export-oriented
import-dependent model of Philippine agriculture. In effect,
the WTO-AOA under the guise of “free trade,” succeeded in
further cementing the colonial trade relations between the
Philippines and advanced industrial nations.
Finally, the Philippine government’s accession to the
WTO-AOA is but a culmination of a set of structural reforms
began in the 80’s aimed at fully liberalizing and deregulating
the economy. Together with policies imposed by the IMF-
WB’s Structural Adjustment Program, the WTO-AOA suc-
ceeded in opening up the domestic market, putting an effective
cap to agricultural support, and fully re-orienting production
from one aimed at the needs of the domestic population to
the demands of the international market. The Philippine go-
vernment by abandoning its function to actively intervene in
agricultural development in favor of “free trade” and the
operation of market forces has virtually allowed the
impoverisation and exploitation of poor peasants.
THE POST-DOHA SCENARIO
T
HE TRIUMPH of the US and developed countries
to push for the negotiation of a new round in the
fourth WTO Ministerial Meeting in Doha, Qatar
despite the clamor of developing countries against a new
round, signals an increased offensive towards accelerating
trade liberalization and economic globalization. While a new
round was not actually launched in Doha, the process for
opening up negotiations for new agreements such as on trans-
parency in government procurement, investment and compe-
tition policy began, with the US and other industrial powers
securing the commitments of the WTO members for a new
round of negotiations after the fifth ministerial meeting. This
will mean heightening further the existing inequities between
and within nations and wreaking more havoc on the econo-
mies of developing countries as the imbalances inherent in
the existing WTO agreements have never been redressed.
The demand of developing countries to first review the
agreements such as the AOA and TRIPs were not taken up,
Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002
instead DOHA merely “acknowledged the need to review
implementation issues.” A severely watered-down agriculture
declaration calling for the “phase-out” of subsidies came out
of pressures from the European Union. Likewise, there was
no commitment to strike out patenting of life forms under
the TRIPS Agreement, a key demand of developing coun-
tries in Doha.
The manner by which the US forced down their agenda
on the less powerful nations speaks of the undemocratic char-
acter and decision-making processes within the WTO. The
use of carrot-and stick tactics in the negotiations as well as
the manipulation of the Sept. 11 events to drum up support
for US economic and political interests ensure that develop-
ing countries toe the line and abandon their remaining na-
tional interests and agenda as what happened to India,
Pakistan, Malaysia, etc.
This only shows that the US and developed countries will
use all resources at their command (aid, loans,etc.) as well as
intimidation and bullying tactics to pursue their agenda for
trade and market expansion, despite the growing resistance
of developing countries.
IMPLICATIONS ON POLICY
T
HE IMPLICATIONS of the above with regards to
state policy in the current negotiations in the WTO
and specifically with regards to the Agreement on
Agriculture are obvious.
The current negotiations now come within the frame-
work of the new comprehensive round that would expand
rather than diminish the coverage of “free trade.” The gov-
ernment should resist the pressures applied by the world’s
economic powers and give primacy to the national economy.
For a start, Congress should immediately conduct a tho-
rough review of the Philippine commitments to the WTO.
This review should look into the impact of the WTO on agri-
culture (and possibly industry) to lay the basis for policy
changes and legislation to protect sectors adversely affected
by trade liberalization. The review should not be confined to
specific commitments but should include the whole rationale
for getting into the AoA in the first place. Congress should
see to it that in this review the perspective of small peasants,
through their own organizations, are heard and that the agri-
cultural sector be not misrepresented by a handful of
agribusiness corporations and traders.
12
 State policy should take the livelihood of peasants and
farm workers the majority of the labor force as the explicit
starting point. The country is an agricultural country. Al-
though agriculture contributes about 20 percent of the gross
domestic product, it employs over 50 percent of the total la-
bor force. Agriculture in this sense is the major pillar of the
economy. The overwhelming numbers of agricultural labor
force are small peasants that are very vulnerable to the vaga-
ries of the world trading system. Of the small peasants that
constitute 95 percent of the agricultural labor force, 50 per-
cent till the land as tenants or owner cultivators. The other
half work as itinerant labor force moving from one area to
another.
The bias should be for protection of peasant agriculture
in consideration of the livelihood of the peasants. The so-
called “safety nets” in so far as they are meant to mitigate the
bad effects of trade liberalization rather than develop agricul-
ture, can be futile. Small peasants do not stand a chance against
TNCs in a liberalized economy.
Reforms in the external trading regime should be coupled
with internal reforms. The two policy areas are complemen-
tary. An unfavorable external trading regime could roll back
internal reforms assuming that the latter were in the right
direction. But it is the internal reforms that build the founda-
tion for a dynamic agricultural development.
The internal reforms include - land reform, the break up
of merchant monopolies, and a program to overcome the
import dependence of agricultural production. Government
policy as, stated in the land reform program, is the establish-
ment of viable family based farms. This is far from being ac-
complished due to the failure of government’s agrarian reform
program. Certainly, viability is dependent on a whole set of
policy environment only government can provide. It is, there-
fore, a political question.
The viability of agriculture is an absolute necessity for
development not to mention of survival in the competition in
the world market. Irony of it all is that government by liberal-
izing agricultural trade leaves the peasant who is weighed
down by old forms of exploitation like land rent, usury and
merchant predatory pricing at the mercy of heavily subsidized
This paper was presented during the NGO-PO-Legislators Forum on Philippine Agriculture Under WTO-
AoA held at Quezon City on December 12, 2001.
The paper is prepared by Francisco G. Pascual Jr, a member of the Board of Trustees of the Integrated
Rural Development Foundation of the Philippines (IRDF), and, Arze Glipo, Executive Director of
IRDF.
Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002
TNC.
The main thrusts of agricultural development should be
reviewed including the Government’s singular focus on ex-
port crop production. The dual role of agriculture - produc-
tion for export and food production for the domestic market
is one that has been imposed on the country by colonial domi-
nation. This dual role remains to this day. How the economy
is directed to fulfill this dual role is of primary significance to
the country’s food security since these dual roles can come in
conflict with each other, as has been historically the case.
The country’s food security should first of all be based
on food self-sufficiency. Dependence on imports for food and
other needs is certainly very risky from a national point of
view.
Government should take a second look at the so-called
“safety nets.” The concept is certainly flawed because it stems
from the premise that free trade as operationalized by the
WTO is inherently good and what remains to be done is to
ensure “safety nets” for the handful of “losers.” The fact is
that Philippine agriculture (and also industry) is inherently
disadvantaged; that government must support rather than
withdraw from intervention in the agricultural sector.
The Philippines should withdraw from the Cairns group,
which is only being used by the US in its rivalry against the
European Union. It should instead seek alliances with coun-
tries and groups within the WTO that reflect the perspectives
of the developing countries.
Starting from the interests of the majority of its citizens
that are negatively affected by the liberalized trading regime,
the government should work for a suspension of the AoA at
least until internal reforms have been put into place and agri-
culture would be competitive in the world market.
In the final analysis the government should insist on its
sovereign right to protect disadvantaged sectors of the
economy especially peasant agriculture. This principle should
be paramount over the principles of “free trade” which after
all, but especially in the period of implementation of the Uru-
guay Round, has been proven to work against vital sectors of
the economy.
13
 ENDNOTES:

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Sector,” The Impact of the WTO Agreement on Agriculture, IBON, Agriculture: Technicalities and Trade Tricks Explained,” Focus on the
2000. Global South, Bangkok, 1998.
Aquino, Carlos Jr. “Changing the Rules of the Game: The 1999 Lim, Joseph Y. “Issues Concerning the Three Major Agricultural
Review of the GATT-UR Agreement on Agriculture and the Future of Crops and GATT,” in The GATT: Philippine Issues and Perspectives.
Filipino Farmers,” PPI Briefing Paper, Vol. VI No. 4, December 1998. PPI: 1996.
Bernardino-Yabut, Natividad . “An Impact Study of Agricultural Murphy, Sophia. “Food Security and the WTO,” in Food Security
Trade Liberalization in the Philippines,” ISGN, Quezon City, September and the WTO. A CIDSE Position Paper, September 2001.
2000.
National Statistics Office, 1998 and 2001 Philippine Statistical
Binswanger, Hans and Ernst Lutz. “Agricultural Trade Barriers, Yearbook
Trade Negotiations, and the Interests of Developing Countries,” A
PPI. “Common Agri-Fishery Agenda of the Small Farmers and
Paper prepared for UNCTAD X, Bangkok, 12 February 2000.
Fisherfolk for the National Socio-Economic Summit of 2001,”
Bureau of Agricultural Statistics. Foreign Agricultural Trade Annual December 10, 2001.
Report for 1995, 1996, 1997, 1998, 1999, BAS.
Raghavan, Chakravarthi. “M&A Driven, World FDI Flows will
Cainglet, Jayson. “Of Exotic Orchids, Sumptuous Asparagus, Exceed $1 Trillion,” in SUNS 2000. http://www.twnside.org.
Empty Pots and Bare Plates,” A Paper Delivered to the Poorest 7
Republic Act 8435: The Agriculture and Fisheries Modernization
Summit European Parliament, Brussels, December 3-5, 2001.
Act of 1997.
Capdevila, Gustavo. “HR Body to Scrutinize TNC Activities,” in
Rocamora, Joel. “Can the Philippine Compete?,” in The GATT:
South-North Development Monitor. 2001 http://www.twnside.org.
Philippine Issues and Perspectives. PPI: 1996.
Green, Duncan and Shishir Priyadarshi. “Proposal for a
Development Box in the WTO Agreement on Agriculture,” CAFOD:
June 2001.
Habito, Cielito F. “Farms, Food and Foreign Trade: The World
Trade Organization and Philippine Agriculture,” AGILE, Manila,
September 1999.

Development Forum, No. 1 Series 2002 14