II. Marriages (Arts.

1-54)

A. Classification of Marriages/Relationships. Parties In Interest; NCC; FC; AM 02-11-10

SC

OCA vs. Flores

Facts:

This administrative case originated from an investigation conducted by the Office of the
Court Administrator (OCA) pursuant to two anonymous letters alleging certain
irregularities being committed by Judge Flores.

Both letters accused Judge Flores of rendering favorable judgments in exchange for
monetary consideration; of taking cognizance of, and deciding cases on annulment of
marriage even if said cases were beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the courts he
presided; and, that every time an audit team of the OCA visits Iligan, Lanao del Norte
and Marawi City, Judge Flores would meet them at the airport, act as their driver,
entertain them and even give presents for their return to Manila.

In numerous active/pending cases for declaration of nullity of marriage, the OCA team
noted an apparent disregard of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as amended.

Prosecutor Cabrera also claimed that Judge Flores neglected to resolve incidents in
eight criminal cases, which were then pending in his sala, and that he rendered
favorable decisions in numerous petitions for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage in
exchange for monetary consideration even if the parties reside in areas outside the
territorial jurisdiction of his courts.

Held:

When a law or a rule is basic, a judge owes it to his office to simply apply the law.
"Anything less is gross ignorance of the law.”

In petitions for declaration of nullity of void marriages, the applicable rule is A.M. No. 02-
11-10-SC, as amended. In particular, Section 4 categorically states the venue where a
petition shall be filed, to wit:

SEC. 4. Venue. - The petition shall be filed in the Family Court of the province or
city where the petitioner or the respondent has been residing for at least six
months prior to the date of the filling, or in case of a non-resident respondent,
where he may be found in the Philippines, at the election of the petitioner. x x x.

In this case, the OCA report is replete with findings showing that Judge Flores
deliberately disregarded the foregoing rule. He continued to try and resolve cases
despite glaring circumstances, which should have created doubt as to the veracity of the
residential addresses declared in the petitions. Prosecutor Cabrera even actually
brought these to the attention of Judge Flores but he was merely brushed aside. Worse,
there were even instances when Judge Flores, during clarificatory questioning,
knowingly led a party into curing the defect. Thus, in the Narvasa,93 the petitioner
declared that she resides at c/o Lacson's Residence, Poblacion, Tubod, Lanao del
Norte. During her cross-examination,94 however, she admitted that she actually resides
in Steel Town, Sta. Elena, Iligan City. When Judge Flores propounded clarificatory
questions, the petitioner ended up declaring that she resides in Quibranza Building,
Tubod, Lanao del Norte - "for purposes of her petition,"

Corollary to A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC, as amended, is Re: Report on the Judicial Audit
Conducted in the RTC, Branch 60, Barili, Cebu,96 where the Court sustained the
findings of the Court's audit team and concurred that the use of "c/o" (care of)
addresses in petitions for nullity of marriage raises doubt as to the veracity of their
actual residence.

The undisputed OCA Investigation Report in the present consolidated cases showed an
alarming number of pending and decided cases where the actual residence of the
parties are obviously not within the territorial jurisdiction of the courts presided by Judge
Flores but he nevertheless took cognizance of these cases without even making an
inquiry as to their veracity. Judge Flores' incompetence became even more manifest
when he curtailed the efforts of the public prosecutors in ensuring that the rule on
proper venue will not be circumvented. As observed by the OCA team, Judge Flores
almost always rejects the public prosecutors' recommendation of dismissal in their
investigation report on the alleged reason that the role of the prosecutor is only to
determine if collusion exists between the parties or if the evidence is being
suppressed.97 Competence and diligence are prerequisites to the due performance of
judicial office98 and every judge is required to observe the law.99 There is gross
ignorance of the law when an error committed by the judge was gross or patent,
deliberate or malicious, or when a judge ignores, contradicts or fails to apply settled law
and jurisprudence because of bad faith, fraud, dishonesty or corruption.

Judge Flores was held guilty of Gross Ignorance of the Law and Gross Misconduct, and
is dismissed from service.

OCA vs. J. Necessario et. al.

A.M. No. 07-1691, April 2, 2013

Facts:

This is an administrative case that stemmed from the 6 July 2007 Memorandum of the
Office of the Court Administrator (OCA). The judicial audit team created by the OCA
reported alleged irregularities in the solemnization of marriages in several branches of
the Municipal Trial Court in Cities (MTCC) and Regional Trial Court (RTC) in Cebu City.
Certain package fees were offered to interested parties by "fixers" or "facilitators" for
instant marriages.

THE FACTS

On 3 July 2007, Atty. Rullyn Garcia, Region 7 Judicial Supervisor, proceeded to Cebu
City and headed the audit team created by OCA in investigating Branches 2, 3, 4, and 8
of the MTCC in Cebu City. A female and male lawyer of the audit team went undercover
as a couple looking to get married. They went to the Palace of Justice and were
directed by the guard on duty to go to Branch 4 and look for a certain "Meloy". The male
lawyer feared that he would be recognized by other court personnel, specifically the
Clerk of Court of Branch 4 who was a former law school classmate. The two lawyers
then agreed that only the female lawyer would go inside and inquire about the marriage
application process. Inside Branch 4, a woman named Helen approached and assisted
the female lawyer. When the female lawyer asked if the marriage process could be
rushed, Helen assured the lawyer that the marriage could be solemnized the next day,
but the marriage certificate would only be dated the day the marriage license becomes
available. Helen also guaranteed the regularity of the process for a fee of three
thousand pesos (₱3,000) only.

In its 10 July 2007 Resolution, this Court treated the Memorandum dated 6 July 2007 of
the judicial audit team as a formal administrative complaint and directed Judge Anatalio
S. Necessario, Judge Gil R. Acosta, Judge Rosabella M. Tormis, and Judge Edgemelo
C. Rosales to submit their respective comments. The Court also suspended the judges
pending resolution of the cases against them.

On 24 August 2007, the OCA through Senior Deputy Court Administrator Zenaida N.
Elepaño submitted its Memorandum dated 29 August 2007 and Supplemental Report.
Six hundred forty-three (643) marriage certificates were examined by the judicial audit
team. The team reported that out of the 643 marriage certificates examined, 280
marriages were solemnized under Article 34 of the Family Code. The logbooks of the
MTCC Branches indicate a higher number of solemnized marriages than the number of
marriage certificates in the courts’ custody. There is also an unusual number of
marriage licenses obtained from the local civil registrars of the towns of Barili and
Liloan, Cebu. There were even marriages solemnized at 9 a.m. with marriage licenses
obtained on the same day. The town of Barili, Cebu is more than sixty (60) kilometers
away from Cebu City and entails a travel time of almost two (2) hours. Liloan, Cebu, on
the other hand, is more than ten (10) kilometers away from Cebu City.

Ruling:

To summarize, the liabilities of the judges are the following:

First, Judges Necessario, Tormis and Rosales solemnized marriages even if the
requirements submitted by the couples were incomplete and of questionable character.
Most of these documents showed visible signs of tampering, erasures, corrections or
superimpositions of entries related to the parties’ place of residence. These included
indistinguishable features such as the font, font size, and ink of the computer-printed
entries in the marriage certificate and marriage license. These actions of the respondent
judges constitute gross inefficiency. In Vega v. Asdala, the Court held that inefficiency
implies negligence, incompetence, ignorance, and carelessness.

Second, the judges were also found guilty of neglect of duty regarding the payment of
solemnization fees.

Third, Judges Necessario, Tormis, and Rosales also solemnized marriages where a
contracting party is a foreigner who did not submit a certificate of legal capacity to marry
from his or her embassy. What the foreigners submitted were mere affidavits stating
their capacity to marry. The irregularity in the certificates of legal capacity that are
required under Article 21 of the Family Code displayed the gross neglect of duty of the
judges. They should have been diligent in scrutinizing the documents required for the
marriage license issuance. Any irregularities would have been prevented in the
qualifications of parties to contract marriage.

Fourth, Judges Necessario, Acosta, and Tormis are likewise guilty of gross ignorance of
the law under Article 34 of the Family Code with respect to the marriages they
solemnized where legal impediments existed during cohabitation such as the minority
status of one party.The audit team cites in their Supplemental Report that there were
parties whose ages ranged from eighteen (18) to twenty-two (22) years old who were
married by mere submission of a pro forma joint affidavit of cohabitation. These
affidavits were notarized by the solemnizing judge himself or herself.

Finally, positive testimonies were also given regarding the solemnization of marriages of
some couples where no marriage license was previously issued. The contracting parties
were made to fill up the application for a license on the same day the marriage was
solemnized.

The Court does not accept the arguments of the respondent judges that the
ascertainment of the validity of the marriage license is beyond the scope of the duty of a
solemnizing officer especially when there are glaring pieces of evidence that point to the
contrary. As correctly observed by the OCA, the presumption of regularity accorded to a
marriage license disappears the moment the marriage documents do not appear regular
on its face.

In People v. Jansen, this Court held that:

…the solemnizing officer is not duty-bound to investigate whether or not a marriage
license has been duly and regularly issued by the local civil registrar. All the solemnizing
officer needs to know is that the license has been issued by the competent official, and
it may be presumed from the issuance of the license that said official has fulfilled the
duty to ascertain whether the contracting parties had fulfilled the requirements of law.
However, this Court also said in Sevilla v. Cardenas, that "the presumption of regularity
of official acts may be rebutted by affirmative evidence of irregularity or failure to
perform a duty." The visible superimpositions on the marriage licenses should have
alerted the solemnizing judges to the irregularity of the issuance.

It follows also that although Article 21 of the Family Code requires the submission of the
certificate from the embassy of the foreign party to the local registrar for acquiring a
marriage license, the judges should have been more diligent in reviewing the parties’
documents and qualifications.

As noted by the OCA, the absence of the required certificates coupled with the
presence of mere affidavits should have aroused suspicion as to the regularity of the
marriage license issuance.

The judges’ gross ignorance of the law is also evident when they solemnized marriages
under Article 34 of the Family Code without the required qualifications and with the
existence of legal impediments such as minority of a party. Marriages of exceptional
character such as those made under Article 34 are, doubtless, the exceptions to the rule
on the indispensability of the formal requisite of a marriage license. Under the rules of
statutory construction, exceptions as a general rule should be strictly but reasonably
construed. The affidavits of cohabitation should not be issued and accepted pro forma
particularly in view of the settled rulings of the Court on this matter. The five-year period
of cohabitation should be one of a perfect union valid under the law but rendered
imperfect only by the absence of the marriage contract. The parties should have been
capacitated to marry each other during the entire period and not only at the time of the
marriage.

The absence of a marriage license will clearly render a marriage void ab initio. The
actions of the judges have raised a very alarming issue regarding the validity of the
marriages they solemnized since they did not follow the proper procedure or check the
required documents and qualifications. In Aranes v. Judge Salvador Occiano, the Court
said that a marriage solemnized without a marriage license is void and the subsequent
issuance of the license cannot render valid or add even an iota of validity to the
marriage. It is the marriage license that gives the solemnizing officer the authority to
solemnize a marriage and the act of solemnizing the marriage without a license
constitutes gross ignorance of the law.

OCA vs. Castañeda

A.M. No. RTJ-12-2316, October 9, 2012

Facts:
Prompted by reports that Branch 67 is fast becoming a haven for couples who want
their marriages to be judicially declared null and void or annulled, or those who merely
want to be legally separated, the audit team gave special attention to cases for
declaration of nullity of marriage, annulment of marriage and legal separation, and
found that of the 717 civil cases, 522 or 72.80% involved nullity of marriage, annulment
and legal separation.

Further investigation of these cases revealed various irregularities in the proceedings,

consisting of blatant violations of A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC,5 or the Rule on Declaration of
Absolute Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, as well as
A.M. No. 02-11-11-SC,6 or the Rule on Legal Separation.

First. Judge Castañeda allowed the petitions for nullity of marriage or annulment to
prosper despite the impropriety of venue. The audit showed that most of the parties in
these petitions are not actual residents of the places under the territorial jurisdiction of
Branch 67, i.e., Paniqui, Anao, Moncada and San Miguel, all in Tarlac. A number of the
addresses reflected on the pleadings are incomplete or vague, some are handwritten,
typewritten or super-imposed on blanks, or even left completely blank. Many of the
respondents raised the issue of improper venue, which Judge Castañeda ignored. One
of the respondents, Lea Benaid, the respondent in Civil Case No. 254-P’07 (Dodgie
Benaid v. Lea Borreo-Benaid) claimed, in a letter7 dated October 8, 2008 addressed to
the Chief Justice, that she and her petitioner-husband are not residents of Tarlac but of
Infanta, Quezon, and that she never received any summons nor has she been notified
of a collusion investigation by the public prosecutor. She also averred that she never
met the clinical psychologist, whose report reflected that she was purportedly suffering
from psychological incapacity. Neither was she subjected to any psychological test.

Second. In some cases, there are no proofs of payment of docket fees, while in others,
summons and other initial court processes were issued even before the docket fees
were fully paid.

Third. There are cases where the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) and the Office of
the Public Prosecutor (OPP) were not furnished copies of the petition, which under the
rules must be done within five (5) days from the date of its filing, and proof of such
service must be submitted to the court within the same period, otherwise, the petition
may be outrightly dismissed. However, in those cases where it has been established
that the OSG and OPP were not served copies of the petition, Judge Castañeda did not
order the petitioners to comply.

Fourth. In several cases, the process server or sheriff merely resorted to substituted
service of summons, without strict compliance with the rule8 thereon as well as the
Court's ruling in Manotoc v. Court of Appeals 9 elucidating on the requirements for
effecting a valid substituted service. Nonetheless, Judge Castañeda acted on these
petitions.

Fifth. Judge Castañeda likewise granted motions for depositions and allowed the
advance taking of testimonies even without the respondent or public prosecutor being
furnished copies of the motion. In several cases, she granted the motion on the very
same day, or merely a day after it was filed.
Sixth. After having been served with summons, respondents were usually no longer
notified of subsequent court orders or processes.

Seventh. In other cases, Judge Castañeda permitted the public prosecutor to conduct a
collusion investigation even before the respondent has filed an answer, or the lapse of
the prescribed period of 15 days. She would proceed with the pre-trial even without
proof that respondent had been duly notified, or terminate the pre-trial for failure of
respondent to file an answer and even without the prosecutor's collusion report. Worse,
eight (8) petitions were granted despite the absence of an investigation report from the
public prosecutor.

Eighth. Judge Castañeda allowed the pre-trial to proceed in several cases,

notwithstanding the absence of the petitioner, or the fact that the latter failed to
authorize his/her counsel, through a duly-executed special power of attorney (SPA), to
represent him/her thereat. She also condoned the late filing of pre-trial briefs, as in fact,
there were instances when the petitioner's pre-trial brief was filed on the day of the pre-
trial conference itself.

Ninth. There are cases where the documentary evidence had been allegedly marked
and formally offered, and which Judge Castañeda admitted, but which cannot be found
in the records. In several cases, the petitioner would be allegedly cross-examined by
the public prosecutor, but records are bereft of showing to establish such proceeding.

Tenth. Most of the pyschologists' reports are pro forma and mere photocopies, and the
psychologists did not even testify in court. On the other hand, the respondent's failure to
appear in court for purposes of presenting his/her evidence is considered a waiver
thereof, despite lack of due notice.

Eleventh. At the time of the audit, Judge Castañeda had granted 175 cases involving
nullity or annulment of marriage and legal separation. More particularly, the audit team
observed the extraordinary speed and overzealousness with which Judge Castañeda
acted in granting some 11 cases, which were decided between a period of a mere 16
days to four (4) months from the date of their filing.

Finally, Judge Castañeda issued certificates of finality of decisions notwithstanding the

lack of proof that the parties, counsels, the OSG and the OPP had been duly furnished
with copies of the decisions.

Issue:

Whether or not Judge Castañeda, et. al, are guilty of the antecedent facts.

Ruling:
On Disregarding the Provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC

"A judge should observe the usual and traditional mode of adjudication requiring that he
should hear both sides with patience and understanding to keep the risk of reaching an
unjust decision at a minimum." Thus, ―he must neither sacrifice for expediency’s sake
the fundamental requirements of due process nor forget that he must conscientiously
endeavor each time to seek the truth, to know and aptly apply the law, and to dispose of
the controversy objectively and impartially."

The serious infractions committed by Judge Castañeda were in cases involving petitions
for nullity and annulment of marriage and legal separation, the most disturbing and
scandalous of which was the haste with which she disposed of such cases. For the year
2010 alone, Judge Castañeda granted a total of 410 petitions of this nature. The audits
likewise showed that she acted on these petitions despite the fact that it was not
verified; that the OSG or the OPP were not furnished a copy of the petition within 5 days
from its filing; that the petition did not recite the true residence of the parties, which
should be within the territorial jurisdiction of Branch 67 for at least 6 months prior to the
filing of the petition; or that the docket fees have not been fully paid and jurisdiction over
the person of the respondents have not been acquired.

The Court takes special exception to Civil Case No. 254-P’07 (Dodgie Benaid v. Lea
Benaid), which Judge Castañeda granted notwithstanding the following irregularities: (1)
petitioner-husband Dodgie Benaid appeared to be a resident of Infanta, Quezon,
contrary to the information reflected on the petition that he was a resident of Apulid,
Paniqui, Tarlac; (2) respondent-wife Lea Benaid is not a resident, either, of Goldenland
Subdivision, Mabalacat, Pampanga, but of Infanta, Quezon; and (3) Lea was neither
interviewed nor investigated by the public prosecutor in arriving at the conclusion that
no collusion exists between her and her husband. In fact, records show that Dodgie
Benaid, the Chief of Police of Real, Quezon, was eventually found guilty of misconduct
and dishonesty for falsely claiming in his petition for nullity of marriage that he was a
resident of Apulid, Tarlac and that his wife, Lea, was a resident of Mabalacat,
Pampanga.

The OCA has extensively elucidated on the transgressions committed by Judge

Castañeda, which the Court adopts in its entirety. For her blatant disregard of the
provisions of A.M. Nos. 02-11-10-SC and 02-11-11-SC, Judge Castañeda is thus found
guilty of gross ignorance of the law and procedure. Thus, in Pesayco v. Layague, the
Court held:

No less than the Code of Judicial conduct mandates that a judge shall be faithful to the
laws and maintain professional competence. Indeed, competence is a mark of a good
judge. A judge must be acquainted with legal norms and precepts as well as with
procedural rules. When a judge displays an utter lack of familiarity with the rules, he
erodes the public’s confidence in the competence of our courts. Such is gross ignorance
of the law. One who accepts the exalted position of a judge owes the public and the
court the duty to be proficient in the law. Unfamiliarity with the Rules of Court is a sign of
incompetence. Basic rules of procedure must be at the palm of a judge’s hands.
Moreover, the reprehensible haste with which she granted petitions for nullity and
annulment of marriage and legal separation, despite noncompliance with the
appropriate rules and evident irregularities in the proceedings, displayed her utter lack
of competence and probity, and can only be considered as grave abuse of authority.

OCA vs. Indar

A.M. No. RTJ-10-2232, April 10, 2012

Facts:

This is an administrative complaint for gross misconduct and dishonesty against

respondent Judge Cader P. Indar, Al Haj (Judge Indar), Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC), Branch 14, Cotabato City and Acting Presiding Judge of the RTC,
Branch 15, Shariff Aguak, Maguindanao.

This case originated from reports by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon
City to the Office of the Court Administrator (OCA) that they have received an alarming
number of decisions, resolutions, and orders on annulment of marriage cases allegedly
issued by Judge Indar.

To verify the allegations against Judge Indar, the OCA conducted a judicial audit in
RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15, where the Audit Team found that the list of cases
submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City do not appear in the
records of cases received, pending or disposed by RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15.
Likewise, the annulment decisions did not exist in the records of RTC-Cotabato, Branch
14. The Audit Team further observed that the case numbers in the list submitted by the
Local Civil Registrars are not within the series of case numbers recorded in the docket
books of either RTC-Shariff Aguak or RTC-Cotabato.

Issue:
Whether or not Judge Indar is guilty of gross misconduct and dishonesty.

Ruling:

Yes.

In this case, Judge Indar issued decisions on numerous annulment of marriage cases
which do not exist in the records of RTC-Shariff Aguak, Branch 15 or the Office of the
Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court, Cotabato City. There is nothing to show that
(1) proceedings were had on the questioned cases; (2) docket fees had been paid; (3)
the parties were notified of a scheduled hearing as calendared; (4) hearings had been
conducted; or (5) the cases were submitted for decision. As found by the Audit Team,
the list of case titles submitted by the Local Civil Registrars of Manila and Quezon City
are not found in the list of cases filed, pending or decided in RTC, Branch 15, Shariff
Aguak, nor in the records of the Office of the Clerk of Court of the Regional Trial Court,
Cotabato City. In other words, Judge Indar, who had sworn to faithfully uphold the law,
issued decisions on the questioned annulment of marriage cases, without any showing
that such cases underwent trial and complied with the statutory and jurisprudential
requisites for voiding marriages. Such act undoubtedly constitutes gross misconduct.

The Court condemns Judge Indars reprehensible act of issuing Decisions that voided
marital unions, without conducting any judicial proceedings. Such malfeasance not only
makes a mockery of marriage and its life-changing consequences but likewise grossly
violates the basic norms of truth, justice, and due process. Not only that, Judge Indars
gross misconduct greatly undermines the peoples faith in the judiciary and betrays
public trust and confidence in the courts. Judge Indars utter lack of moral fitness has no
place in the Judiciary. Judge Indar deserves nothing less than dismissal from the
service.

B. Other Classifications

Yu vs. yu
Gr. No. 200072, June 20, 2016

Facts:

This is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
seeking to reverse and set aside the Decision dated September 30, 2011 and
Resolution dated January 5, 2012 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP
No. 111414 which granted the petition for the annulment of the Decision
dated August 20, 2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC), Fourth Judicial
Region, Branch 10, Balayan, Batangas.

Petitioner Philip Yu and respondent Viveca Lim Yu were married on

November 18, 1984. They had four children and maintained their conjugal
home at Room 1603 Horizon Condominium, Meralco Avenue, Pasig, Metro
Manila. In 1993, however, Viveca left the conjugal home with their four
children and filed a Petition for Legal Separation against Philip before the
RTC of Pasig City, Branch 261, for repeated physical violence, grossly
abusive conduct against her and the children, sexual infidelity, and attempt
on her life. She prayed for permanent custody over the children, support,
and the dissolution and distribution of their conjugal partnership valued at
approximately P5,000,000.00.4chanrobleslaw
Philip denied the accusations against him claiming that it was Viveca who
actually attacked him a few times. He narrated that his marriage to Viveca
was arranged according to the Chinese tradition and that it was much later
when he discovered Viveca's excessively jealous, cynical, and insecure
behaviour. He countered that since she abandoned the family home, taking
their four children away, she was not entitled to support. She was, likewise,
unqualified to become the administrator of their conjugal funds, which had
outstanding obligations. Thus, Philip prayed in his Counterclaim for the
declaration of nullity of their marriage due to Viveca's psychological
incapacity, rendering her incapable of complying with her marital
obligations.5chanrobleslaw

On April 24, 2007, however, Philip filed a Motion to Withdraw Counterclaim

for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage revealing that he no longer had the
desire to have his marriage declared void. Despite Viveca's fervent
opposition, the Pasig RTC granted the motion.

On July 1, 2009, the RTC of Pasig City rendered a Decision dismissing the
Petition for Legal Separation based on the declaration of nullity of the
marriage of the parties, on the ground of the psychological incapacity of
petitioner, Viveca Yu, pursuant to the Decision of Branch 10, RTC of Balayan,
Batangas, which attained its finality on October 13, 2008. Since the
marriage of the parties was declared a nullity there is, therefore, no legal
basis to issue a decree of legal separation to the spouses whose marriage
has already been declared of no force and effect.

Claiming to be completely unaware of the proceedings before the RTC of

Balayan, Batangas, nullifying her marriage with Philip on the ground of her
psychological incapacity, Viveca filed a Petition for Annulment of Judgment9
before the CA seeking to annul the Decision dated August 20, 2008 of said
court. According to Viveca, jurisdiction over her person did not properly vest
since she was not duly served with Summons. She alleged that she was
deprived of her right to due process when Philip fraudulently declared that
her address upon which she may be duly summoned was still at their
conjugal home, when he clearly knew that she had long left said address for
the United States of America.

The CA granted Viveca’s petition.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred in granting Viveca’s petition for annulment of judgment.

Ruling:
No. Annulment of judgment is a recourse equitable in character, allowed
only in exceptional cases as where there is no available or other adequate
remedy. Section 2, Rule 47 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure provides
that judgments may be annulled only on grounds of extrinsic fraud and lack
of jurisdiction or denial of due process. The objective of the remedy of
annulment of judgment or final order is to undo or set aside the judgment or
final order, and thereby grant to the petitioner an opportunity to prosecute
his cause or to ventilate his defense. If the ground relied upon is lack of
jurisdiction, the entire proceedings are set aside without prejudice to the
original action being refiled in the proper court. If the judgment or final
order or resolution is set aside on the ground of extrinsic fraud, the CA may
on motion order the trial court to try the case as if a timely motion for new
trial had been granted therein.

Extrinsic fraud exists when there is a fraudulent act committed by the

prevailing party outside of the trial of the case, whereby the defeated party
was prevented from presenting fully his side of the case by fraud or
deception practiced on him by the prevailing party. Fraud is extrinsic where
the unsuccessful party had been prevented from exhibiting fully his case, by
means of fraud or deception, as by keeping him away from court, or by a
false promise of a compromise; or where the defendant never had
knowledge of the suit, being kept in ignorance by the acts of the plaintiff; or
where an attorney fraudulently or without authority assumes to represent a
party and connives at his defeat; these and similar cases which show that
there has never been a real contest in the trial or hearing of the case are
reasons for which a new suit may be sustained to set aside and annul the
former judgment and open the case for a new and fair hearing. Ultimately,
the overriding consideration is that the fraudulent scheme of the prevailing
litigant prevented a party from having his day in court.

In the present case, We find that Viveca was completely prevented from
participating in the Declaration of Nullity case because of the fraudulent
scheme employed by Philip insofar as the service of summons is concerned.

It is interesting to note, moreover, that as pointed out by Viveca, Philip does

not even reside in Batangas, the city of the court wherein he filed his
Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage. In a Certification31 issued by
Ricardo V. Bautista, Barangay Chairman of Poblacion 1, Calatagan,
Batangas, it was categorically stated that "the name Philip Yu is not a
resident of Barangay Poblacion 1, Calatagan, Batangas." Section 4 of A.M.
No. 02-11-10-SC, otherwise known as the Rule on Declaration of Absolute
Nullity of Void Marriages and Annulment of Voidable Marriages, which took
effect on March 15, 2003, provides:
 Section 4. Venue. - The Petition shall be filed in the Family Court
of the province or city where the petitioner or the respondent has
been residing for at least six months prior to the date of filing. Or in
the case of non-resident respondent, where he may be found in the
Philippines, at the election of the petitioner.

It is, therefore, evident that not only did Philip contradict his previous
Motion to Withdraw his Counterclaim for the Declaration of Nullity of
marriage, he even violated a basic mandate of law so as to be able to file
the same action before a different court in a city he was not even a resident
of.

Castillo vs Castillo
Gr. No. 189607, April 18, 2016

Facts:

On 25 May 1972, respondent Lea P. de Leon married Benjamin Bautista. On 6 January 1979,
respondent married herein petitioner Renato Castillo.

On 28 May 2011, Renato filed before the RTC a Petition for Declaration of Nullity of Marriage,
praying that his marriage to Lea be declared void due to her subsisting marriage to Bautista.
Respondent opposed the Petition, and contended that her marriage to Bautista was null and void
as they had not secured and license therefor, and neither of them was a member of the
denomination to which the solemnizing officer belonged.

RTC declared the marriage between petitioner and respondent null and void ab initio on the
ground that it was a bigamous marriage under Art. 41 of the Family Code. The RTC said that the
fact that Lea’s marriage to Bautista was subsisting when she married Renato on January 1979,
makes her marriage to Renato bigamous, thus rendering it void ab initio. The lower court
dismissed Lea’s argument that she need not obtain a judicial decree of nullity and could presume
the nullity of a prior subsisting marriage. The RTC stressed that so long as no judicial declaration
exists, the prior marriage is valid and existing.

Lastly, RTC also said that even if respondent eventually had her first marriage judicially
declared void, the fact remains that the first and second marriages were subsisting before the first
marriage was annulled, since Lea failed to obtain a judicial decree of nullity for her first
marriage to Bautista before contracting her second marriage with Renato.

Issue:

Whether or not judicial declaration is necessary in order to establish the nullity of a marriage.

Ruling:
 No. The Court held that the subsequent marriage of Lea to to Renato is valid in view of
the invalidity if her first marriage to Bautista because of the absence of a marriage license. That
there was no judicial declaration that the first marriage was void ab initio before the second
marriage was contracted is immaterial as this is not a requirement under the Civil Code.
Nonetheless, the subsequent decision of the RTC declaring the nullity of Lea’s first marriage
only serves to strengthen the conclusion that her subsequent marriage to Renato is valid.

Cagayan II vs Rapanan
GR 199886 December 3, 2014

Facts:

On 31 October 1998, a motorcycle with 3 passengers figured in a mishap along the National
Highway in Cagayan. It was driven by Camilo Tangonan who died from the accident, while his
companions respondent Rapanan and another suffered injuries.

On 29 March 2000, Rapanan and Camilo's common law wife, respondent Mary Gine Tangonan,
filed before the RTC of Aparri, Cagayan a complaint for damages against petitioner. They
contended that the mishap was due to petitioner's negligence when it failed to fix and change the
live tension wire that was damaged by the typhoon.

During the trial, Mary Gine testified that she is not married to Camilo but they are living together
and that they have one child. She also prayed that she be awarded moral and exemplary damages,
among others, on the death of Camilo.

Issue:

Whether or not the deceased's common law wife is eligible to institute an action against
petitioner.

Ruling:

No.

The RTC rendered a decision in favor of petitioner and dismissed the complaint for damages of
respondents. The lower court held that respondent Mary Gine has no legal personality to institute
the action since such right is only given to the legal heir of the deceased. Mary Gine is not a legal
heir of Camilo since she is only his common law wife.

People vs Jumawan
GR 187495 April 21, 2014

Facts:
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK, were married and have four children.

On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-Affidavit, alleging that her husband, the
accused-appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998 at their residence in Cagayan de
Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998, the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing
to have sex with him.

As to the charge of rape according to KKK, conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital
problems between her and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact, both frequent and fulfilling. He
treated her well and she, of course, responded with equal degree of enthusiasm. However, in
1997, he started to be brutal in bed. He would immediately remove her panties and, sans any
foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His abridged method of lovemaking was physically
painful for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he would threaten her into submission.

One night, in the spouse’s bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and fixed the matrimonial bed
but she did not lie thereon with the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in a cot near
the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him to ask angrily: “Why are you lying on the cot?”,
and to instantaneously order: “You transfer here to our bed.”

KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she had headache and abdominal pain due to
her forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease him and he got angrier. He rose from
the bed, lifted the cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on the floor. Terrified,
KKK stood up from where she fell, took her pillow and transferred to the bed.

The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not before long, expressed his desire to copulate
with her by tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by warding off his hand and
reiterating that she was not feeling well.

The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual yearning and when KKK tried to resist by
holding on to her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore on the sides. KKK stayed
defiant by refusing to bend her legs.

The accused-appellant then raised KKK’s daster, stretched her legs apart and rested his own legs
on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held her hands and succeeded in penetrating her.
As he was carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest by desperately shouting:
“Don ‘t do that to me because I’m not feeling well.”

Accused raised the defense of denial and alleged that KKK merely fabricated the rape charges as
her revenge because he took over the control and management of their businesses, and to cover
up her extra-marital affairs.

Issue:

Whether or not there can be a marital rape.

Ruling:

Yes.

The Supreme Court held that husbands do not have property rights over their wives’ bodies.
Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of marriage, if not consensual, is rape.

Violation of equal protection clause

The Court ruled that to treat marital rape cases differently from non-marital rape cases in terms
of the elements that constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof, infringes on the equal
protection clause.

The Court found that there is no rational basis for distinguishing between marital rape and non-
marital rape. The various rationales which have been asserted in defense of the exemption are
either based upon archaic notions about the consent and property rights incident to marriage or
are simply unable to withstand even the slightest scrutiny.

The Court declared the marital exemption for rape in the New York statute to be
unconstitutional.

Said exemption states that a husband was endowed with absolute immunity from prosecution for
the rape of his wife. The privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He had the marital
right to rape his wife but he will be liable when he aids or abets another person in raping her.

Moreover, Section 1 of RA 8353 penalizes the crime without regard to the rapist’s legal
relationship with his victim.

Implied consent theory untenable

The Court also ruled against the application of implied consent theory which was raised by the
accused. The accused argued that consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting husband
and wife unless the contrary is proved.

According to the Court, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of sexual violence, exists
within marriage. A man who penetrates her wife without her consent or against her will commits
sexual violence upon her, and the Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDAW and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.

Lucas vs Lucas
GR 190710 June 6, 2011

Facts:
Petitioner, Jesse Lucas filed a Petition to Establish Filiation with a Motion for the Submission of
Parties to DNA Testing before the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Jesse alleged that he is the son of
his mother Elsie who got acquainted with respondent, Jesus S. Lucas in Manila. He also
submitted documents which include (a) petitioner’s certificate of live birth; (b) petitioner’s
baptismal certificate; (c) petitioner’s college diploma, showing that he graduated from Saint
Louis University in Baguio City with a degree in Psychology; (d) his Certificate of Graduation
from the same school; (e) Certificate of Recognition from the University of the Philippines,
College of Music; and (f) clippings of several articles from different newspapers about petitioner,
as a musical prodigy.

Jesus learned of this and he filed a Special Appearance and Comment manifesting that the
petition was adversarial in nature and therefore summons should be served on him. Meanwhile,
Jesse filed a Very Urgent Motion to Try and Hear the Case which the RTC found to be sufficient
in form and hence set the case for hearing. Jesus filed a Motion for Reconsideration arguing that
DNA testing cannot be had on the basis of a mere allegation pointing to him as Jesse’s father.

Acting on Jesus’ Motion for Reconsideration, the RTC dismissed the case and held that Jesse
failed to establish compliance with the four procedural aspects for a paternity action enumerated
in the case of Herrera v. Alba namely, a prima facie case, affirmativedefences, presumption of
legitimacy, and physical resemblance between the putative father and the child.

This prompted Jesse to file a Motion for Reconsideration which the RTC granted. A new hearing
was scheduled where the RTC held that ruling on the grounds relied upon by Jesse for filing the
instant petition is premature considering that a full-blown trial has not yet taken place. Jesus filed
a Motion for Reconsideration which was denied by the RTC. He then filed a petition for
certiorari with the Court of Appeals (CA). The CA ruled in favour of Jesus, it noted that Jesse
failed to show that the four significant aspects of a traditional paternity action had been met and
held that DNA testing should not be allowed when the petitioner has failed to establish a prima
facie case.

Issue:

Whether or not the CA erred when it resolved the issue of lack of jurisdiction over the person of
respondent albeit the same was never raised in the petition for certiorari.

Ruling:

Yes.

Petitioner contends that respondent never raised as issue in his petition for certiorari the courts
lack of jurisdiction over his person. Hence, the CA had no legal basis to discuss the same,
because issues not raised are deemed waived or abandoned. At any rate, respondent had already
voluntarily submitted to the jurisdiction of the trial court by his filing of several motions asking
for affirmative relief, such as the (a) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated September 3,
2007; (b) Ex Parte Motion to Resolve Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated November
6, 2007; and (c) Motion for Reconsideration of the Order dated October 20, 2008 and for
Dismissal of Petition. Petitioner points out that respondent even expressly admitted that he has
waived his right to summons in his Manifestation and Comment on Petitioners Very Urgent
Motion to Try and Hear the Case. Hence, the issue is already moot and academic.

The herein petition to establish illegitimate filiation is an action in rem. By the simple filing of
the petition to establish illegitimate filiation before the RTC, which undoubtedly had jurisdiction
over the subject matter of the petition, the latter thereby acquired jurisdiction over the case. An in
rem proceeding is validated essentially through publication. Publication is notice to the whole
world that the proceeding has for its object to bar indefinitely all who might be minded to make
an objection of any sort to the right sought to be established. Through publication, all interested
parties are deemed notified of the petition.