[G.R. Nos. 136300-02. September 24, 2002.
] told him that she urgently needed to relieve herself
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee, v.
EMMANUEL AARON, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
CORONA, J.:
Before us on appeal is the Decision 1 of the Regional
Trial Court of Balanga, Bataan, Branch 3, in Criminal
Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and 6732 convicting herein
appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, of one count of rape and
sentencing him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to pay the victim P50,000 as civil
indemnity.chanrob1es virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
The appellant, Emmanuel Aaron y Dizon, was charged
with three counts of rape defined and penalized under
Articles 266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, 2
respectively, in three separate criminal complaints filed
and signed by the private complainant, Jona G. Grajo,
and subscribed and sworn to on January 17, 1998
before 3rd Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Oscar M.
Lasam. Save for their docket numbers, the said criminal
complaints are identically worded thus:chanrob1es
virtual 1aw library
That on or about 16 January 1998 at Brgy. San Jose,
Balanga, Bataan, Philippines and within the jurisdiction
of this Honorable Court, the said accused, armed with a
knife and by means of force and intimidation, did then
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously succeed in
having sexual intercourse with the offended party JONA
G. GRAJO, against the will and consent of the latter, to
her damage and prejudice.
Contrary to law.
Upon arraignment on January 30, 1998, the accused,
Emmanuel Aaron, assisted by counsel of his choice,
entered the plea of "not guilty" to each of the three
complaints in Criminal Cases Nos. 6730, 6731 and
6732. Thereafter, joint trial on the merits ensued.
The evidence of the prosecution shows that, on January
16, 1998, at around 7:00 o’clock in the morning, the
private complainant, Jona Grajo, was asleep in bed
("papag") inside her room on the second floor of the
apartment unit which she shared with her sister and her
brother-in-law, herein appellant Emmanuel Aaron. Jona
was wearing only a panty and was covered with a
blanket. Sensing that someone was inside her room,
Jona opened her eyes and was surprised to find
Emmanuel sitting beside her in bed totally naked.
Emmanuel immediately went on top of Jona and poked a
knife on her neck. Jona’s attempt to cry for help proved
futile as Emmanuel quickly covered her mouth with his
left hand. 3 together with his sister-in-law, herein private
Emmanuel removed her panty and succeeded in having
carnal intercourse with Jona who could only manage to
cry. Subsequently, Emmanuel withdrew his penis and
ordered Jona to lie down on the floor. He inserted his
penis into her vagina for the second time with the knife
still poked on Jona’s neck. Thereafter, Emmanuel stood
up and commanded Jona to lie down near the
headboard of the "papag" bed where he inserted his
penis into her vagina for the third time, still armed with a
knife, and continued making pumping motions
("umiindayog"). 4 upstairs where the cabinet was located opposite the
After the incident, Jona pleaded to be released but
Emmanuel initially refused. He budged only after Jona
("Ihing-ihi na ako, puputok na ang pantog ko.") but not
before warning her not to tell anyone about the incident.
Jona quickly put on her panty and hurried down the
street in front of the apartment with only a blanket
covering herself. Her cries drew the attention of a
neighbor, Lilibeth Isidro, who tried to persuade Jona to
go back inside the apartment, to no avail, for fear of
Emmanuel. Upon the prodding of another neighbor, a
certain Agnes, Jona revealed that she was raped by her
brother-in-law, 5 the appellant herein.
Jona proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady
upon the latter’s arrival from the market and she related
the misfortune that had befallen her. At that instance,
Emmanuel approached and warned her to be careful
with her words. Then he left for the house of Bong
Talastas. 6
After Emmanuel left, Jona went back to their house and
dressed up. Thereafter, she went to the police station in
Balanga, Bataan to report the incident. 7 Police Officers
Rommel Morales and Edgardo Flores proceeded to the
residence of the private complainant who appeared very
tense but the neighbors informed them that Emmanuel
had left. The police officers then proceeded to the house
of Bong Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan, where
the victim told them Emmanuel could have possibly
gone. On arrival there, they found Emmanuel conversing
with Bong Talastas and they immediately arrested the
appellant herein upon ascertaining his identity. 8
After bringing Emmanuel to the police station, Police
Officers Morales and Flores accompanied Jona to the
provincial hospital in Bataan for physical examination.
Thereupon, the attending physician at the Bataan
Provincial Hospital, Dra. Emelita Firmacion, M.D., found
"multiple healed laceration(s) at 1, 3, 5, 6, 9 o’clock
position(s), incomplete type" in Jona Grajo’s private part.
At the trial, Dra. Firmacion identified her signature 9
appearing on the lower right portion of the medical
certificate 10 and affirmed the medical findings
contained therein. The multiple hymenal lacerations
sustained by Jona which were respectively indicated in
the medical certificate as 1 o’clock, 3 o’clock, 5 o’clock, 6
o’clock and 9 o’clock could have been caused by sexual
intercourse, masturbation, strenuous exercises or
penetration of any hard object. The appearance of a
lacerated hymen could indicate the approximate time
when the laceration was sustained. In the case of Jona
Grajo, her hymenal lacerations were completely healed,
indicating that the same were sustained at least one
month before she was examined on January 16, 1998.
However, it was possible that she had sexual intercourse
immediately before the said examination. 11
The defense denied any liability for the three counts of
rape charged. Appellant Emmanuel Aaron testified that
he and his wife were residing in an apartment unit
complainant, Jona Grajo. 12 Jona occupied a room on
the second floor while the couple stayed at the ground
floor. 13
On the date of the incident, Emmanuel admitted that he
and Jona were the only persons inside the apartment.
He had just arrived from work as a night-shift waiter at
Base One restaurant in Balanga, Bataan. He had earlier
met Bong Talastas at 7:00 o’clock in the morning as
Bong was preparing to leave his house while his wife
had gone to the market. Emmanuel changed his clothes
room occupied by Jona. Emmanuel noticed that the door
of Jona’s room was partly open so he peeped through
the narrow opening and saw her wearing only a panty.
He was about to close the door when Jona woke up and
began shouting. 14
Emmanuel did not know why Jona kept on shouting. She
even followed as Emmanuel descended the stairs and
she proceeded to the nearby store of their landlady.
Emmanuel went her to the store to caution Jona about
her words ("Ayusin mo ang sinasabi mo") because she
was telling their landlady that he raped her. However,
Jona ignored him so he left and decided to see Bong
Talastas in San Jose, Balanga, Bataan to inquire from
the latter why Jona was accusing him of having raped
her. Emmanuel denied that he was armed with a knife
during the incident, much less threatened Jona with it.
15
On October 14, 1998, the trial court rendered a decision,
16 the dispositive portion of which read:chanrob1es
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WHEREFORE, the guilt of the accused for the single act
of rape having been proved beyond reasonable doubt,
the accused is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalty provided
by law. The accused is further required to indemnify the
complainant the sum of P50,000.00 and to pay the
costs.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied with the decision of the trial court,
Emmanuel Aaron interposed the instant appeal. In his
Brief, 17 appellant raised a single assignment of
error:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THE GUILT
OF THE ACCUSED BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT
Appellant argues that the account of the private
complainant, Jona Grajo, of the alleged incidents of rape
appears incredible and contrary to common human
experience. Based on her testimony, the appellant
suddenly placed himself on top of her with his right hand
poking a knife on her neck and with his left hand
covering her mouth. Subsequently, the appellant
removed her panty and succeeded in inserting his penis
into her private part even without previously opening his
zipper or removing his pants. Likewise, the private
complainant did not offer any resistance although she
could have done so. After the alleged acts of rape, the
victim did not even complain to her sister who, by then,
had already arrived from the market. The
uncharacteristic behavior of the private complainant
could only be explained by the fact that she admittedly
had several sexual experiences in the past with her
boyfriend and live-in partner Bong Talastas. The
appellant theorizes that private complainant wanted to
get back at him for the embarrassment of being seen by
him in her panty after her boyfriend, Bong Talastas, left
the apartment. Appellant downplays the testimony of
PO1 Rommel Morales as not worthy of credence for lack
of corroborative evidence. 18
On the other hand, the prosecution showed that the
appellant was already naked even before the private
complainant was awakened by his presence; that the
private complainant could not effectively offer any
resistance as the appellant was armed with a knife which
he used to intimidate her; and that the private
complainant’s being a non-virgin did not discount rape
on January 16, 1998. 19
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code
provides:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Article 266-A. Rape; When And How Committed. —
Rape is committed —
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following
circumstances:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machinations or grave abuse
of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12) years of
age or is demented, even though none of the
circumstances mentioned above are present.
2) By any person who, under any of the circumstances
mentioned in paragraph 1 hereof, shall commit an act of
sexual assault by inserting his penis into another
person’s mouth or anal orifice or any instrument or
object, into the genital or anal orifice of another person.
Article 266-B of the same Code provides:chanrob1es
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Article 266-B. Penalties. — Rape under paragraph 1 of
the next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a deadly
weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty shall be
reclusion perpetua to death.
x x x
It should be stressed that in the review of rape cases,
this Court is almost invariably guided by three principles:
(1) an accusation of rape can be made with facility; it is
difficult to prove but more difficult for the person
accused, though innocent, to disprove; (2) in view of the
intrinsic nature of the crime of rape where only two
persons are usually involved, the testimony of the
complainant is scrutinized with extreme caution and (3)
the evidence of the prosecution stands or falls on its own
merits and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the defense. 20 In other words, the
credibility of the private complainant is determinative of
the outcome of these cases for rape. Her consistency on
material points, or lack of it, that can sustain or negate
conviction, becomes the single most important matter in
inquiry. 21
After a thorough review, we find that the testimony of
private complainant, Jona Grajo, sufficiently established
all the elements of rape committed under Article 266-A,
paragraph (1) (a) of the Revised Penal Code, namely: a)
that the offender, who must be a man, had carnal
knowledge of a woman and (b) that such act is
accomplished by using force or intimidation. 22 The gist
of private complainant’s testimony clearly shows that the
appellant, Emmanuel Aaron, forced himself on her at
around 7:00 o’clock in the morning on January 16, 1998.
The sexual assault started on the "papag" bed inside her
room on the second floor of their apartment unit. After
going on top of the private complainant, the appellant
succeeded in inserting his penis into her vagina after
which he made pumping motions while poking a knife on
her neck. He then succeeded in inserting his penis into
her vagina two more times on the same occasion after
transferring locations inside the room, with the knife
continuously poked on her neck.
We also find no reason to disturb the assessment of the
trial court of private complainant’s credibility. Her
testimony during the trial was completely credible as it
was given in an honest and straightforward manner. As
noted above, she gave a lucid and consistent account of
the commission of the crime and did not waver in
pinpointing her brother-in-law, herein appellant, as the
perpetrator thereof. Likewise, her actuation after the
incident vividly portrayed a confused and traumatized
woman typical of victims of rape. Thus, after she broke
free of the appellant on the pretense that she urgently
needed to relieve herself, the private complainant quickly
put on her panty and rushed to the street with only a
blanket to cover her naked body. Her neighbors took
note of her obviously troubled condition and admonished
her to go back inside the apartment but she refused,
claiming that she had been raped. She sought refuge at
the nearby store of their landlady to whom she confided
that she was raped by her brother-in-law. Private
complainant hurried back to their apartment to get
dressed only upon making sure that the appellant had
already left the place. Without losing time, she
proceeded directly to the police station and lodged a
complaint for rape against the Appellant.
Prosecution witness PO1 Rommel Morales of Balanga,
Bataan, who was the police officer on duty at the time
Jona Grajo came to the police station, recounted during
the trial that the private complainant was crying and
trembling on arrival at the Balanga, Bataan police station
on January 16, 1998. Private complainant took time to
answer the queries of the police officer since she was
crying uncontrollably. When she finally got hold of
herself, the private complainant reported that she had
been raped by the appellant who was subsequently
arrested by the police. The actuations of the private
complainant immediately after the incident may be
considered as part of the res gestae that substantially
strengthens her claim of sexual assault by the appellant.
23
On the other hand, all the appellant can offer in his
defense is bare denial. He claims that he had just
changed his clothes on the second floor of their
apartment where his cabinet was located when he
chanced upon the private complainant naked inside her
room as the door was then slightly ajar. He did not do
anything further as the private complainant was
awakened and she already started shouting. In view of
the positive and convincing testimony of the private
complainant, however, the defense of denial must fail. It
is well-settled that denial is an intrinsically weak defense
which must be buttressed by strong evidence of non-
culpability to merit credibility. 24
The appellant argues that it was impossible for him to
have inserted his penis into the private part of the
complainant without first opening his zipper or removing
his pants. This argument of the appellant is misleading
for the reason that, per the testimony of the private
complainant, the appellant was already naked when his
presence roused her from her sleep:chanrob1es virtual
1aw library
PROS. LASAM:chanrob1es virtual 1aw library
Q: While you were in your room on that time and date,
do you remember of any incident that happened?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: What was that incident?
A: While I was inside my room, I sensed that there was a
person inside my room and when I opened my eyes, I
saw that he is my brother-in-law.
Q: And that brother-in-law of yours is the person whom
you pointed a while ago. Is that correct?
A: Yes, sir.
Q: How does he look when you saw him inside your
room?
A: He was naked sitting beside me.25cralaw:red
That the private complainant did not offer sustained
resistance despite having been ordered twice by the
appellant to change location inside the room can easily
be explained by the fact that the appellant was
threatening to stab her if she resisted. The private
complainant was obviously overwhelmed by intense fear
when she woke up with a knife pointed at her neck. The
continuing intimidation of private complainant cowed her
into helpless submission to appellant’s lechery. She
could only express her disgust over the sexual attack of
her brother-in-law silently in tears. In this connection, it
has been ruled that physical resistance need not be
established in rape when intimidation is used on the
victim and the latter submits herself, against her will, to
the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and
personal safety. 26
The failure of the private complainant to confide the
sexual assault to her sister who, appellant claimed, had
arrived from the market before she (private complainant)
went to report the matter to the police is quite
understandable and far from being uncharacteristic of a
rape victim, as what appellant would like to make it
appear. The workings of the human mind which is under
a great deal of emotional and psychological stress are
unpredictable and different people will react differently to
a given situation. 27 Besides, the private complainant
did not want to drag her sister into the controversy and
hurt her in the process. During the trial, the private
complainant revealed that she kept from her sister the
previous sexual advances of the appellant in order not to
destroy their good relationship. Private complainant
explained that she did not leave the apartment despite
the said harassments of the appellant inasmuch as she
had no other place to go. However, she confided her
ordeal to their landlady, a certain Elsa Navarro. At any
rate, what is important is that the private complainant
reported the rape immediately to the police.
Admittedly, private complainant was having an affair with
a certain Bong Talastas 28 and that she was not
innocent to the ways of the world. However, such fact
alone does not negate the commission of rape by the
appellant against her. Dra. Firmacion testified that
although the lacerations found in the private part of Jona
Grajo were completely healed, such fact did not discount
the possibility that she was sexually molested
immediately before she was examined on January 16,
1998. We emphasize that moral character is immaterial
in the prosecution and conviction of the offender in the
crime of rape. The Court has ruled time and again that
even a prostitute can be a victim of rape 29 as the
essence is the victim’s lack of consent to the sexual act.
Significantly, the appellant failed to advance any credible
motive that could have impelled the private complainant
to testify falsely against him. 30 In a desperate attempt
to avoid any responsibility for his crime, however, the
appellant theorizes that the private complainant merely
wanted to exact revenge from him for the
embarrassment she experienced when he chanced upon
her clad merely in a panty inside her room. This alleged
motive on the part of the private complainant is too
shallow to merit even scant consideration from this
Court. If appellant were to be believed, would not private
complainant have instead opted to keep quiet about the
incident to spare herself from further embarrassment?
Common experience dictates that no woman, especially
one of tender age, will concoct a rape complaint, allow a
gynecological examination and permit herself to be
subjected to public trial if she is not motivated solely by
the desire to have the culprit apprehended and
punished. 31 Indeed, coming out in the open with the
accusation of sexual assault on her by her brother-in-law
inevitably entailed risking her relationship with her
boyfriend, Bong Talastas, and with her sister. However,
the rape simply proved too much for her to bear.
We agree with the trial court that the appellant should be
convicted of only one count of rape. It may appear from
the facts that the appellant thrice succeeded in inserting
his penis into the private part of Jona Grajo. However,
the three penetrations occurred during one continuing
act of rape in which the appellant was obviously
motivated by a single criminal intent. There is no
indication in the records, as the trial court correctly
observed, from which it can be inferred that the appellant
decided to commit those separate and distinct acts of
sexual assault other than his lustful desire to change
positions inside the room where the crime was
committed.
Considering that the crime of rape was committed by the
appellant with the use of a deadly weapon, the
imposable penalty under Article 266-B is reclusion
perpetua to death. In the absence of any mitigating nor
aggravating circumstance, the trial court correctly
imposed the penalty of reclusion perpetua on the
appellant. She is also entitled to a civil indemnity of fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000). And due to the emotional
distress suffered by the private complainant who was
only nineteen years old at the time of the rape, she is
also entitled to an award of moral damages in the
amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000). 32
WHEREFORE, the judgment of the court a quo
convicting the appellant Emmanuel Aaron of one count
of rape and sentencing him to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua and to pay the private complainant
the amount of fifty thousand pesos (P50,000) as civil
indemnity is hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION
that said appellant shall pay an additional fifty thousand
pesos (P50,000) by way of moral damages.chanrob1es
virtua1 1aw 1ibrary
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 190632, February 26, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff–
Appellee, v. MANOLITO LUCENA Y VELASQUEZ,
ALIAS “MACHETE,” Accused–Appellant.
DECISION
PEREZ, J.:
The subject of this appeal is the Decision 1 dated 24
August 2009 of the Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–
H.C. No. 03371 affirming the Decision2 dated 30 April
2008 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Parañaque
City, Branch 260, in Criminal Cases Nos. 03–0763 to
03–0765, finding herein appellant Manolito Lucena y
Velasquez alias “Machete” guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of three counts of rape, thereby sentencing him to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each count
and ordering him to pay AAA3 the amount of P50,000.00
as moral damages and P50,000.00 as civil indemnity
also for each count.
Three (3) similarly worded Informations,4 all dated 24
June 2003 allege:
That on or about the 28th day of April 2003, in the City of
Parañaque, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above–named [appellant],
a Barangay Tanod Volunteer, who took advantage of his
position to facilitate the commission of the crime, by
means of force, threat or intimidation and with the
use of a gun did then and there willfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge of the complainant
AAA, a minor, 17 years of age, against her will and
consent. (Emphasis and italics supplied).
The appellant, assisted by counsel de oficio, pleaded
NOT GUILTY to all the charges against him.5Thereafter,
the cases were jointly tried.
The prosecution presented AAA, the victim herself; and
Dr. Merle Tan (Dr. Tan) of the Child Protection Unit,
University of the Philippines – Philippine General
Hospital (UP–PGH), who examined the victim.
The testimonies of the above–named prosecution
witnesses established that on 28 April 2003, at around
11:30 p.m., while AAA, who was then 17 years old,
having been born on 10 July 1986, was walking and
chatting with her friends along one of the streets of San
Dionisio, Parañaque City, two (2) barangay tanods, one
of whom is the appellant, approached and informed
them that they were being arrested for violating a city
ordinance imposing curfew against minors. AAA’s
companions, however, managed to escape, thus, she
alone was apprehended.6 AAA was then ordered by
the barangay tanods to board the tricycle. Afraid that she
might spend the night in jail, AAA pleaded with them and
protested that she did not commit any offense as she
was just chatting with her friends. AAA’s plea, however,
remained unheeded.7
AAA was then brought by the two (2) barangay
tanods within the vicinity of the San
Dionisio BarangayHall. Afterwards, one of them alighted
from the tricycle and went inside the barangay hall. The
appellant, on the other hand, stayed in the tricycle to
guard AAA. After a while, the barangay tanod, the one
who went inside the barangay hall, returned. But, the
appellant told the former that he will just be the one to
bring AAA back to her house.8
But, instead of escorting AAA back to her house, the
appellant brought her to Kabuboy Bridge in San Dionisio,
Parañaque City. While on their way, the appellant
threatened AAA that he would kill her once she resists or
jumps off the tricycle. Upon arrival, the appellant ordered
AAA to alight from the tricycle. AAA asked the appellant
what he would do with her but the former did not
respond. The appellant then took out the backseat of the
tricycle and positioned it in a grassy area. He
subsequently pointed a gun at AAA and commanded her
to lie down and to take off her clothes. The appellant
later put the gun down on the ground and inserted his
penis into AAA’s vagina despite the latter’s plea not to
rape her. Satisfied, the appellant stopped. But, after a
short while, or after about five (5) minutes, the appellant,
once again, inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina.
Thereafter, he stopped. On the third time, the appellant
inserted again his penis into AAA’s vagina. Fulfilling his
bestial desire, the appellant stopped and finally ordered
AAA to dress up. The appellant even threatened AAA
that he would kill her should she tell anyone about what
happened between them.9
The appellant, thereafter, directed AAA to board the
tricycle. He then brought AAA in front of a school in
Parañaque City. But, before allowing AAA to get off, the
appellant repeated his threat to kill her should she tell
anyone about the incident.10
The following day, AAA took the courage to seek the
assistance of their barangay kagawad, who simply
advised her to just proceed to the barangay hall to lodge
her complaint against the appellant. AAA and her mother
subsequently went to PGH, where she was subjected to
physical examination by Dr. Tan,11which resulted in
the following findings:
Tanner Stage 3, healing laceration[s] 3 and 5
o’clock area with petechiae, fresh laceration at 9
HYMEN
o’clock area with eccymosi at 8–10 o’clock area,
Type of Hymen: Crescentic
xxx
Perianal Skin: fresh laceration[s]
at 12 and 1 o’clock area. No
ANAL EXAMINATION
evident injury at the time of
examination.
xxx
IMPRESSIONS
Disclosure of sexual abuse.
Genital findings show clear Evidence Of Blunt
Force Or Penetrating Trauma.12 (Emphasis
supplied).
AAA also went to the Coastal Road Police Headquarters,
where she executed her sworn statement accusing the
appellant of rape. AAA was able to identify the appellant
as her assailant because the former was wearing a
jacket emblazoned with “Barangay Police,” as well as
a Barangay Identification Card, at the time of the
incident.13
The appellant and Rodel Corpuz (Corpuz) took the
witness stand for the defense.
In the course of Corpuz’s direct examination, however,
the parties made the following stipulations: (1) that the
[herein appellant] was the assigned barangay radio
operator on that date, [28 April 2003], and he stayed at
the barangay hall from 12:00 midnight to 5:00 a.m.; (2)
that the witness was there up to 12:00 midnight, but at
about past 12:00, he left and returned after two (2)
hours, at 2:00 o’clock a.m.; and (3) that when he woke
up at 5:00 o’clock in the morning, the [appellant] was still
there. With these stipulations, Corpuz’s testimony was
dispensed with.14
The appellant, for his part, could only muster the
defenses of denial and alibi. He, thus, offered a different
version of the story.
On 28 April 2003, the appellant claimed that he was on
duty as a radio operator at the barangay hall. His task as
such was to receive complaints from the residents of
the barangay, as well as to receive calls from
fellow barangay officials who are in need of assistance.
On the same day, he received a call from his companion,
who is also a barangay tanod. He cannot, however,
recall any unusual incident that transpired on that day.15
The appellant admitted that he knew AAA as the one
who lodged a complaint against him but he denied that
he knew her personally. He also vehemently denied the
following: (1) that he raped AAA; (2) that he was one of
those barangay tanods who apprehended AAA for
violating the curfew ordinance of their barangay; and (3)
that he was the one driving the tricycle in going to
the barangay hall. Instead, the appellant claimed that
after 12:00 midnight of 28 April 2003, he went home
already. In fact, he was shocked when he was arrested
on 25 September 2003 as he did not commit any
crime.16
In its Decision dated 30 April 2008, the trial court, giving
credence to the categorical, straightforward and positive
testimony of AAA, coupled with the medical findings of
sexual abuse, convicted the appellant of three (3) counts
of rape as defined and penalized under paragraph 1(a)
of Article 266–A, in relation to Article 266–B, of the
Revised Penal Code of the Philippines, as amended.
The trial court, thus, decreed:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds the [herein
appellant] MANOLITO
LUCENA y VELASQUEZ alias MACHETE,
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of three (3) counts
of Rape (under Art. 266–a par. 1(a) in relation to Art.
266–B of the RPC as amended by RA 8353)and is
hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of Rape. In addition, the
[appellant] is ordered to pay [AAA] the amount of
P50,000.00 as moral damages and P50,000.00 as
civil indemnity for each count.17 (Emphasis and italics
theirs).
The appellant appealed18 the trial court’s Decision to the
Court of Appeals with the following assignment of errors:
I.
THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE [HEREIN APPELLANT] OF RAPE
DESPITE THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE
THE ELEMENT OF FORCE AND INTIMIDATION.
II.
GRANTING, ARGUENDO, THAT THE [APPELLANT]
COMMITTED THE CRIME CHARGED, THE TRIAL
COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN CONVICTING HIM OF
THREE (3) COUNTS OF RAPE.19
After a thorough study of the records, the Court of
Appeals rendered its now assailed Decision dated 24
August 2009 sustaining appellant’s conviction for three
(3) counts of rape, as well as the damages awarded to
AAA. In doing so, the Court of Appeals explained that
the facts revealed that the appellant succeeded thrice in
inserting his penis into AAA’s vagina. The said three (3)
penetrations happened one after another at an interval
of five (5) minutes, wherein the appellant would take a
rest after satiating his lust and after regaining his
strength would again rape AAA. Undoubtedly, the
appellant decided to commit those separate and distinct
acts of sexual assault on AAA. Thus, his conviction for
three (3) counts of rape is irrefutable.20
Hence, this appeal.21
Both parties in their manifestations22 before this Court
adopted their respective appeal briefs23 filed with the
Court of Appeals in lieu of Supplemental Briefs.
In his Brief, the appellant contends that the prosecution
failed to prove that force or intimidation attended the
commission of rape. Records revealed that AAA did not
even attempt to resist his alleged sexual advances over
her person. Instead, AAA opted to remain passive
throughout her ordeal despite the fact that during the
three (3) episodes of their sexual intercourse he was
unarmed and she, thus, had all the opportunity to
escape, which she never did. These reactions of AAA
were contrary to human experience, thus, cast serious
doubts on the veracity of her testimony and on her
credibility as a witness.
The appellant similarly argues that the result of AAA’s
medical examination is quite disturbing as it appears that
her anal orifice was also penetrated by a hard object
though nothing was said to this effect in her testimony.
The appellant likewise avers that he cannot be convicted
of three counts of rape. The intervening period of five (5)
minutes between each penetration does not necessarily
prove that he decided to commit three separate acts of
rape. He maintains that what is of prime importance is
that he was motivated by a single criminal intent.
With the foregoing, the appellant believes that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt; hence, his
acquittal is inevitable.
This Court holds otherwise. The conviction of the
appellant, thus, stands but the damages awarded in
favor AAA must be modified.
Primarily, in reviewing rape cases, this Court is guided
with three settled principles: (1) an accusation of rape
can be made with facility and while the accusation is
difficult to prove, it is even more difficult for the person
accused, although innocent, to disprove; (2) considering
the intrinsic nature of the crime, only two persons being
usually involved, the testimony of the complainant
should be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the
evidence for the prosecution must stand or fall on its
own merit, and cannot be allowed to draw strength from
the weakness of the evidence for the defense.24
Rape is a serious transgression with grave
consequences both for the accused and the
complainant. Following the above principles, this Court is
duty–bound to conduct a thorough and exhaustive
evaluation of a judgment of conviction for rape.25
After a careful scrutiny of the entire records, however,
this Court finds no justifiable reason to reverse the
rulings of the lower courts.
All the Informations in this case charged the appellant
with rape under paragraph 1(a), Article 266–A, in relation
to paragraph 2, Article 266–B, of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. These provisions specifically state:
ART. 266–A. Rape; When and How Committed. – Rape
is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
authority; and d) When the offended party is under
twelve (12) years of age or is demented, even though
none of the circumstances mentioned above be present.
xxxx
ART. 266–B. Penalties. – Rape under paragraph 1 of the
next preceding article shall be punished by reclusion
perpetua.
Whenever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon or by two or more persons, the penalty
shall be reclusion perpetua to death. (Emphasis
supplied).
Certainly, carnal knowledge of a woman under any of the
following instances constitutes rape: (1) when force or
intimidation is used; (2) when the woman is deprived
of reason or is otherwise unconscious; and (3) when she
is under twelve (12) years of age.26
The force and violence required in rape cases is relative
and need not be overpowering or irresistible when
applied. For rape to exist, it is not necessary that the
force or intimidation be so great or be of such character
as could not be resisted – it is only necessary that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate
the purpose which the accused had in
mind.27 Further, it should be viewed from the perception
and judgment of the victim at the time of the commission
of the crime. What is vital is that the force or
intimidation be of such degree as to cow the
unprotected and vulnerable victim into submission.
Force is sufficient if it produces fear in the victim,
such as when the latter is threatened with death. 28
In the case at bench, as can be gleaned from the
transcript of stenographic notes and as observed by the
trial court, which the Court of Appeals sustained, AAA’s
categorical, straightforward and positive testimony
revealed that the appellant was armed with a gun and
the same was pointed at her while she was ordered to lie
down and to take off her clothes, to which she acceded
because of fear for her life and personal safety. The
appellant then put the gun down on the ground and
successfully inserted his penis into AAA’s vagina, not
only once but thrice. This happened despite AAA’s plea
not to rape her. And, after satisfying his lust, the
appellant threatened AAA that he would kill her should
she tell anyone about the incident. This same threat of
killing AAA was first made by the appellant while the
former was still inside the tricycle on their way
to Kabuboy Bridge.29 It cannot be denied, therefore, that
force and intimidation were employed by the appellant
upon AAA in order to achieve his depraved desires.
While it is true that the appellant had already put the gun
down on the ground the moment he inserted his penis
into AAA’s vagina and was actually unarmed on those
three (3) episodes of sexual intercourse, the same does
not necessarily take away the fear of being killed that
had already been instilled in the mind of AAA. Emphasis
must be given to the fact that the gun was still within
appellant’s reach, therefore, he could still make good of
his threat on AAA at anytime the latter would show any
resistance to his evil desires. AAA’s lack of physical
resistance, therefore, is understandable and would not in
any way discredit her testimony.
It must be borne in mind that when a rape victim
becomes paralyzed with fear, she cannot be expected to
think and act coherently. Further, as has been
consistently held by this Court, physical resistance is
not an essential element of rape and need not be
established when intimidation is exercised upon the
victim, and, the latter submits herself, against her will, to
the rapist’s embrace because of fear for her life and
personal safety. The victim’s failure to shout or offer
tenacious resistance did not make voluntary her
submission to the criminal acts of her aggressor. It bears
stressing that not every rape victim can be expected to
act with reason or in conformity with the usual
expectations of everyone. The workings of a human
mind placed under emotional stress are
unpredictable; people react differently. Some may
shout, some may faint, while others may be shocked into
insensibility.30
In his attempt to ruin AAA’s credibility in order to
exculpate himself from all the charges, the appellant
puts stress on the portion of the result of AAA’s medical
examination disclosing that even her anal orifice was
also penetrated by a hard object, which she never
mentioned in her testimony.
To the mind of this Court, such argument is flimsy and
totally misplaced. It would not even work to appellant’s
advantage and would not in any way cast doubt on the
veracity of AAA’s testimony. As this Court has previously
stated, a medical examination and a medical certificate,
albeit corroborative of the commission of rape, are not
indispensable to a successful prosecution for
rape.31 Moreover, even though AAA made no mention of
any anal penetration, such omission would not change
the fact that she was, indeed, raped by the appellant. As
succinctly found by both lower courts, AAA categorically,
straightforwardly, clearly and positively narrated her
harrowing experience in the hands of the appellant. She
recounted in detail how the appellant took advantage of
her by bringing her to Kabuboy Bridge, where nobody
was present; commanding her to lie down and undress
herself at a point of a gun; and successfully inserting his
penis into her vagina, not only once but thrice. AAA
stated that after the first penetration the appellant
stopped. After about five minutes, however, the
appellant, once again, inserted his penis into her vagina.
Thereafter, the appellant stopped. For the third and last
time, the appellant again inserted his penis into her
vagina. This narration was consistent with the rest of the
medical findings showing fresh hymenal lacerations on
AAA’s vagina, which according to Dr. Tan is a clear
evidence of “blunt force or penetrating trauma” – a
disclosure of sexual abuse.
For his ultimate defense, the appellant puts forward
denial and alibi. Notably, these defenses are totally
inconsistent with his line of argument that the rape was
committed without force or intimidation thereby implying
that the sexual intercourse between him and AAA was
consensual.
Time and again, this Court has viewed denial
and alibi as inherently weak defenses, unless supported
by clear and convincing evidence, the same cannot
prevail over the positive declarations of the victim who,
in a simple and straightforward manner, convincingly
identified the appellant as the defiler of her
chastity.32 Simply put, the positive assertions of AAA that
he raped her are entitled to greater weight. While denial
and alibi are legitimate defenses in rape cases, bare
assertions to this effect cannot overcome the categorical
testimony of the victim,33 as in this case.
Also, appellant’s alibi that on the night the rape incident
happened, he was at the barangay hall doing his job as
radio operator and at 12:00 midnight he already went
home, failed to sufficiently establish that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime when
it was committed. Moreover, the corroborating testimony
of defense witness Corpuz that the appellant left at
about past 12:00 midnight, almost the same time the
rape incident happened, and then returned after two (2)
hours, even bolster the possibility of the appellant’s
presence at the scene of the crime.
This Court also notes that the appellant failed to show
any ill–motive on the part of AAA to testify falsely against
him. This bolsters the veracity of AAA’s accusation since
no woman would concoct a tale that would tarnish her
reputation, bring humiliation and disgrace to herself and
her family, and submit herself to the rigors, shame, and
stigma attendant to the prosecution of rape, unless she
is motivated by her quest to seek justice for the crime
committed against her.34
In light of the foregoing, it is beyond any cavil of doubt
that the appellant’s guilt for the crime of rape has been
proven beyond reasonable doubt.
As to the number of rapes committed. The appellant,
citing People v. Aaron (Aaron Case),35 insists that he
cannot be convicted of three (3) counts of rape despite
the three (3) penetrations because he was motivated by
a single criminal intent. This Court finds this contention
fallacious.
In the Aaron Case, the accused inserted his penis into
the victim’s vagina; he then withdrew it and ordered the
latter to lie down on the floor and, for the second time,
he inserted again his penis into the victim’s vagina; the
accused, thereafter, stood up and commanded the victim
to lie near the headboard of the makeshift bed and, for
the third time, he inserted again his penis into the
victim’s vagina and continued making pumping motions.
From these sets of facts, this Court convicted the
accused therein for only one count of rape despite the
three successful penetrations because there is no
indication in the records from which it can be inferred
that the accused decided to commit those separate and
distinct acts of sexual assault other than his lustful
desire to change positions inside the room where
the crime was committed. This Court, thus, viewed that
the three penetrations occurred during one continuing
act of rape in which the accused was obviously
motivated by a single criminal intent.
The circumstances in the present case, however, are far
different from the Aaron Case. Here, we quote with
approval the observations of the Court of Appeals, which
affirmed that of the trial court, to wit:
We agree with the trial court that the [herein appellant]
should be convicted of three (3) counts of rape. It
appears from the facts that the [appellant] thrice
succeeded in inserting his penis into the private part of
[AAA]. The three (3) penetrations occurred one after the
other at an interval of five (5) minutes wherein
the [appellant] would rest after satiating his lust
upon his victim and, after he has regained his
strength, he would again rape [AAA]. Hence, it can be
clearly inferred from the foregoing that when
the [appellant] decided to commit those separate
and distinct acts of sexual assault upon [AAA], he
was not motivated by a single impulse[,] but rather
by several criminal intent. Hence, his conviction for
three (3) counts of rape is indubitable.36 (Emphasis
supplied).
This Court sustains the findings of both lower courts that,
indeed, the three insertions into AAA were in satiation of
successive but distinct criminal carnality. Therefore, the
appellant’s conviction for three counts of rape is proper.
As to penalty. The second paragraph of Art. 266–B of the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, provides that
“[w]henever the rape is committed with the use of a
deadly weapon x x x the penalty shall be reclusion
perpetua to death.” As it was properly alleged and
proved that the appellant used a gun in order to
consummate his evil desires, thus, both lower courts
correctly imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count of rape.
As to damages. Civil indemnity, which is mandatory in a
finding of rape is distinct from and should not be
denominated as moral damages which are based on
different jural foundations and assessed by the court in
the exercise of sound discretion.37 The award of moral
damages, on the other hand, is automatically granted in
rape cases without need of further proof other than the
commission of the crime because it is assumed that a
rape victim has actually suffered moral injuries entitling
her to such award.38 Hence, this Court upholds the
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and P50,000.00 moral
damages, for each count of rape, that were awarded by
both lower courts in favor of AAA.
In addition, this Court deems it proper to award
exemplary damages in favor of AAA. The award of
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the
Civil Code if there is an aggravating circumstance,
whether ordinary or qualifying.39 In this case, since the
qualifying circumstance of the use of a deadly weapon
was present in the commission of the crime, exemplary
damages in the amount of P30,000.00, for each count of
rape, is awarded in favor of AAA. Moreover, in line with
recent jurisprudence, the interest at the rate of 6% per
annum shall be imposed on all damages awarded from
the date of the finality of this judgment until fully paid.40
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA–G.R. CR–H.C. No. 03371 dated
24 August 2009 finding herein appellant guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of three counts of rape is
hereby AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that: (1)
the exemplary damages in the amount of P30,000.00,
for each count of rape, is awarded in favor of AAA; and
(2) the appellant is ordered to pay AAA the interest on all
damages at the legal rate of 6% per annum from the
date of finality of this judgment.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 196315, October 22, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y
SILVANO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
This is an Appeal1 from the Decision2 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No. 32275 dated August 11,
2010 affirming the conviction of accused-appellant
Leonardo Cataytay y Silvano for the crime of rape.
Accused-appellant Cataytay was charged of said crime
in an Information dated September 9,
2003:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 07th day of September 2003, in the
City of Mandaluyong, Philippines, a place within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with lewd designs[,] and by means of force and
intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA],3 19 years of
age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a
retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at
the time of the commission of the offense, against her
will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.4
Accused-appellant Cataytay entered a plea of not guilty
at his arraignment on October 3, 2003. Trial thereafter
ensued.
BBB (AAA’s mother) testified that she knew accused-
appellant Cataytay as her neighbor in their compound in
Mandaluyong City. Accused-appellant was a shoe
repairman who had a shop six houses away from BBB’s
house.5chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On September 7, 2003, at around 6:30 p.m., BBB left
AAA in their house to look for BBB’s youngest daughter.
Thirty minutes later, when she reached the bridge near
Block 37, her neighbor, Lito, told her that there was a
problem, and brought her to the barangay outpost. AAA
and the accused-appellant were already at the outpost.
Lito told the persons at the outpost that she was the
mother of the victim. When BBB saw AAA, the latter told
her, “Mommy, ni-rape po ako.” BBB asked her who
raped her. AAA responded by pointing to accused-
appellant. During the interviews made by
the barangay officials, AAA narrated how she was raped
by accused-appellant, which ended when a certain
“Mimi” knocked at the door. When accused-appellant
answered the knock, Mimi told the former that she will
shout if he does not leave the house. AAA went out of
the house and sought help from their neighbors. One of
their neighbors, Amelita Morante, called
the barangay officials at the
outpost.6chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
BBB identified a Psychological Evaluation Report from
the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) dated May 25, 1999, which was conducted in
connection with another rape case. The report stated
that AAA had the mental capacity of an eight-year-old
child.7 BBB also identified AAA’s birth certificate which
showed that she was biologically 19 years old at the time
of the incident.8chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On cross-examination, BBB confirmed that AAA was the
victim in a rape case in 1999 against a certain Norberto
Lerit. BBB admitted that she did not personally witness
the alleged rape committed by the accused-
appellant.9chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
When AAA appeared as the second witness for the
prosecution, the prosecution manifested that by merely
looking at her, it was apparent that she was mentally
retardate.10 AAA, who was crying while being asked
questions, testified that she was raped by accused-
appellant by inserting his penis into her, despite her
protestations. After the deed, she was given money by
accused-appellant. She knew the accused-appellant
before the incident as a shoe
repairman.11chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
DSWD Social Worker Arlene Gampal testified that she
referred AAA to the National Center for Mental Health
(NCMH) for psychological examination. She also
conducted a Social Case Study upon AAA in relation to
the incident of sexual abuse at the hands of the
accused.12 NCMH Psychologist Susan Sabado was
presented as a prosecution witness, but her testimony
was dispensed with when the defense agreed to a
stipulation regarding her expertise and that the tests
conducted on AAA affirmed that the latter had a mental
capacity of a seven-year-old
child.13chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Police Chief Inspector (PC/Insp.) Bonnie Chua, the
medico-legal officer who examined AAA on September
8, 2003 was likewise presented as a prosecution
witness. The defense agreed to a stipulation that the
findings of the examination were consistent with recent
sexual intercourse.14chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
For the defense, accused-appellant testified that on
September 7, 2003, at around 7:00 p.m., he was in his
house together with his brother, feeding his four-year-old
daughter. He then went out and proceeded to
a videoke bar, which was around 20 meters from his
house.15 He stayed at the videoke bar for less than 15
minutes, as barangay officers suddenly arrived and
arrested him. Upon asking why he was being arrested,
the officers told him that he was the suspect in the rape
of AAA. He was brought to the Barangay Hall, where he
denied the accusations against him. He estimated that
the house of BBB was more or less 50 meters away
from his house,16 and that it would take more or less a
one minute walk from the videoke bar to the house of
AAA.17 Accused-appellant admitted that by merely
looking at AAA, he could tell that she has a mental
disability.18chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused-appellant’s brother, Jose Fresco Cataytay
(Jose), testified that at 6:30 p.m. of September 7, 2003,
accused-appellant was inside their house feeding his
daughter. At around 7:00 p.m., accused-appellant told
Jose that he will go to the videoke bar, which was
around 30 meters away from their house. Accused-
appellant stayed in the videoke bar for 5 to 10 minutes,
then went back to their house and watched television.
Accused-appellant was arrested that night within the
vicinity of their house by the barangay tanods. He
estimated that AAA’s house is 20 to 30 meters away
from the videoke bar, and that it would take less than five
minutes to reach the house of AAA from
the videoke bar.19chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Alicia Panaguitol (Alicia), a neighbor of AAA and
accused-appellant, testified that she lives two meters
away from AAA’s house and 60 meters away from that of
accused-appellant. She was inside her house at around
7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003, during which time she
heard AAA shouting that she was raped. She asked
AAA who raped her. AAA replied “Pilay,” apparently
referring to their neighbor who was called Jun Pilay.
Alicia saw Jun Pilay run from AAA’s house towards a
dark area.20chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
On February 5, 2009, the RTC rendered its Judgment
finding accused-appellant guilty as charged, and
disposing of the case as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, accused
LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby found
GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt for the crime of rape
against one [AAA] defined and penalized under Article
266-A, paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code in
relation to Article 266-B paragraph 10 of the same Code.
As a consequence thereof, accused LEONARDO
CATAYTAY y SILVANO is hereby sentenced to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of from TWENTY YEARS (20)
and ONE (1) DAY to FORTY (40) YEARS of reclusion
perpetua.
Further, accused LEONARDO CATAYTAY y SILVANO is
hereby ordered to indemnify the victim [AAA], the
amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS
(P75,000.00) as and by way of moral damages and
SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND PESOS (P75,000.00) by
way of exemplary damages.
Finally, the period of detention of accused LEONARDO
CATAYTAY y SILVANO at the Mandaluyong City Jail is
hereby fully credited to his
account.21ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
The case was elevated to the Court of Appeals, where it
was docketed as CA-G.R. CR No. 32275. On August
11, 2010, the Court of Appeals rendered the assailed
Decision, the dispositive portion of which
reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the instant
appeal is DENIED. The decision appealed from is
AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATIONS that an additional
award of P75,000.00 as civil indemnity is granted to the
victim and the award of exemplary damages of
P75,000.00 is reduced to P30,000.00. The penalty of
imprisonment to be served is simply reclusion
perpetua.22ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
Hence, this appeal, where accused-appellant Cataytay
adopted his Appellant’s Brief with the Court of Appeals,
which contained the following assignment of
errors:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
I
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE PROSECUTION’S FAILURE TO PROVE HIS
GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.
II
THE COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN
CONVICTING THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE
THE FACT THAT HE WAS ILLEGALLY
ARRESTED.23ChanRoblesVirtualawlibrary
In his appellant’s brief, accused-appellant claims that
BBB’s testimony concerning the details of the
commission of the rape as narrated by AAA is hearsay
and therefore has no probative value. Accused-
appellant also points out that the Psychological
Evaluation Report dated May 25, 1999 and
Psychological Report dated June 29, 2009 illustrate that
AAA can be easily influenced.
At the outset, we agree with accused-appellant that the
details concerning the manner of the commission of the
rape, which was merely narrated by AAA at
the barangay outpost, is hearsay and cannot be
considered by this Court. A witness can testify only on
the facts that she knows of his own personal knowledge,
or more precisely, those which are derived from her own
perception.24 A witness may not testify on what she
merely learned, read or heard from others because such
testimony is considered hearsay and may not be
received as proof of the truth of what she has learned,
read or heard.25cralawredchanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Notwithstanding the inadmissibility of the details of the
rape which BBB merely heard from AAA’s narration, we
nevertheless find no reason to disturb the findings of fact
of the trial court. Despite lacking certain details
concerning the manner in which AAA was allegedly
raped, the trial court, taking into consideration the mental
incapacity of AAA and qualifying her to be a child
witness,26 found her testimony to be credible and
convincing:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Q- Uulitin ko sa iyo ‘yung unang tinanong ko sa’yo physical impossibility of the presence of the accused at
ha, bakit ka nandito sa office ni Judge, para the locus criminis or its immediate vicinity at the time of
ano? the incident.30 In the case at bar, accused-appellant and
A- Para magsumbong. his brother, second defense witness Jose, claim that the
Q- Sinong isusumbong mo? former was taking care of his daughter in his house at
A- Leonardo Cataytay. around 7:00 p.m. of September 7, 2003. He then went
INTERPRETER: out and proceeded to a videoke bar, which was merely
Witness at this moment is now crying. 20 meters away from his house. Accused-appellant and
Q- Nandito ba si Leonardo Cataytay, [AAA], his brother admitted that their house was merely 50
nandito ba siya ngayon sa office ni Judge? meters away, or around a one-minute walk, from the
Tingin ka sa office ni Judge kung nandito house of AAA, where the alleged incident occurred.
ngayon si Leonardo, sabi mo isusumbong mo Accused-appellant was therefore clearly in the
siya kay Judge, diba? immediate vicinity of the locus criminis at the time of the
COURT: commission of the crime, and thus accused-appellant’s
Ituro mo nga kung nandiyan siya, sige. defense of alibi must fail.
INTERPRETER:
Witness pointed to the male person seated in Other than alibi and denial, accused-appellant presented
the first row of the gallery, wearing white t-shirt, the testimony of Alicia, a neighbor of AAA and accused-
who when asked to identify himself, answered appellant, to prove that another person raped AAA.
to the name of LEONARDO CATAYTAY Y However, the record is clear that AAA positively identified
SILVANO. accused-appellant as the culprit both at
PROS. LAZARO: the barangay outpost minutes after the incident, and in
Q- [AAA], itinuro mo si Leonardo, sabi mo kanina open court. It is furthermore axiomatic that when it
isusumbong mo siya, bakit mo siya comes to evaluating the credibility of the testimonies of
isusumbong, anong ginawa niya sa’yo? the witnesses, great respect is accorded to the findings
A- Ni-rape po ako. of the trial judge who is in a better position to observe
Q- Ilang beses ka niya ni-rape? the demeanor, facial expression, and manner of
A- Isa lang po. testifying of witnesses, and to decide who among them
Q- Papaano ka niya ni-rape? is telling the truth.31 The trial court, which was able to
A- Pinasok niya ‘yung ari niya sa akin. carefully observe the testimony of Alicia, was not
Q- Anong sinabi mo sa kanya ‘nung ni-rape ka adequately convinced by her allegations.
niya, anong sinabi mo kay Leonardo?
A- Ayaw ko na po. To recall, the Information charged accused-appellant of
Q- Anong sinabi naman ni Leonardo habang nire- committing the following act: “by means of force and
rape ka niya? intimidation, did, then and there willfully, unlawfully, and
A- Wag daw po ako maingay. feloniously have carnal knowledge [of AAA], 19 years of
Q- Kasi pag maingay ka, ano daw ang gagawin age but with a mental age of a 5 year old, hence, a
sa’yo? retardate, or demented, which is known to accused at
A- Uulitin daw niya po. the time of the commission of the offense, against her
Q- Anong sinabi ni Leonardo sa’yo pagkatapos ka will and consent and to her damage and prejudice.” 32
niyang ni-rape, [AAA]? May sinabi sa’yo The Information, as worded, can conceivably
pagkatapos ka niya ni-rape? Meron o wala? comprehend rape under either paragraph 1(b) or 1(d) of
A- Wala po. Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code, which
Q- May binigay sya sa’yo? provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A- Opo.
Q- Anong binigay niya? Punasan mo ang luha mo. Article 266-A. Rape; When and How
A- Pera po. Committed. — Rape is committed —
Q- Alam mo kung magkano?
A- Hindi po.27 1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following
AAA’s mental condition may have prevented her from circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
delving into the specifics of the assault in her testimony
almost three years later, unlike the way she narrated the a) Through force, threat or intimidation;chanrobleslaw
same when she was asked at the barangay outpost
merely minutes after the incident. However, as we have b) When the offended party is deprived of reason or
ruled in a litany of cases, when a woman, more so if she is otherwise unconscious;chanrobleslaw
is a minor, says she has been raped, she says, in effect,
all that is necessary to prove that rape was committed. c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave abuse of
Youth and, as is more applicable in the case at bar, authority;chanrobleslaw
immaturity are generally badges of truth.28 Furthermore,
the report of PC/Insp. Chua that the findings of the d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
physical examination were consistent with recent sexual years of age or is demented, even though none of
intercourse, provide additional corroboration to the the circumstances mentioned above be
testimonies of AAA and BBB. It should be noted that this present. (Emphasis supplied)
report was stipulated upon by the prosecution and the
defense. In People v. Caoile,33 we differentiated the terms
“deprived of reason” and “demented,” as
We have pronounced time and again that both denial follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
and alibi are inherently weak defenses which cannot
prevail over the positive and credible testimony of the The term demented refers to a person who has
prosecution witness that the accused committed the dementia, which is a condition of deteriorated mentality,
crime. Thus, as between a categorical testimony which characterized by marked decline from the individual's
has a ring of truth on one hand, and a mere denial and former intellectual level and often by emotional apathy,
alibi on the other, the former is generally held to madness, or insanity. On the other hand, the phrase
prevail.29 For the defense of alibi to prosper, it must be deprived of reason under paragraph 1 (b) has been
sufficiently convincing as to preclude any doubt on the interpreted to include those suffering from mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation. Thus, AAA, who
was clinically diagnosed to be a mental retardate, can be
properly classified as a person who is “deprived of
reason,” and not one who is “demented.”
In the case at bar, AAA was clinically diagnosed to have
mental retardation with the mental capacity of a seven-
year old child.34 The prosecution and the defense
agreed to stipulate on the conclusion of the psychologist
that the “mental age of the victim whose chronological
age at the time of the commission of the offense is
nineteen (19) years old x x x is that of a seven (7) year
old child.”35 Accused-appellant is therefore criminally
liable for rape under paragraph 1(b) of Article 266-A of
the Revised Penal Code. The appropriate penalty is
provided for by Article 266-B, which relevantly
provides:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The death penalty shall also be imposed if the crime of
rape is committed with any of the following
aggravating/qualifying circumstances:cralawlawlibrary
x x x x
10. When the offender knew of the mental disability,
emotional disorder and/or physical handicap of the
offended party at the time of the commission of the
crime.
Since the accused-appellant’s knowledge of AAA’s
mental retardation was alleged in the Information and
admitted by the former during the trial, the above special
qualifying circumstance is applicable, and the penalty of
death should have been imposed. With the passage,
however, of Republic Act No. 934636prohibiting the
imposition of the death penalty, the penalty of reclusion
perpetua shall instead be imposed.
The RTC sentenced accused-appellant to suffer the
penalty of imprisonment of twenty years and one day to
forty years of reclusion perpetua. The Court of Appeals
correctly modified the penalty to be simply reclusion
perpetua. Since reclusion perpetua is an indivisible
penalty, the Indeterminate Sentence Law cannot be
applied.37chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
As regards accused-appellant’s civil liability, the RTC
ordered him to pay AAA in the amount of P75,000.00 as
moral damages and P75,000.00 as exemplary
damages. The Court of Appeals modified the trial court’s
decision by granting the additional award of P75,000.00
as civil indemnity and reducing the award of exemplary
damages to P30,000.00. In accordance, however,
to People v. Lumaho,38 where the penalty for the crime
committed is death which cannot be imposed because of
Republic Act No. 9346, we increase the amounts of
indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows:
P100,000.00 as civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral
damages; and P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. In
addition, we impose 6% interest per annum from finality
of judgment until fully paid.39chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, the present appeal is DENIED. The
Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR No.
32275 dated August 11, 2010 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION increasing the amounts of indemnity
and damages to be imposed as follows: P100,000.00 as
civil indemnity; P100,000.00 as moral damages; and
P100,000.00 as exemplary damages. All amounts are
furthermore subject to interest at the rate of 6% per
annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
MARITAL RAPE
G.R. No. 187495 April 21, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
EDGAR JUMAWAN, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Among the duties assumed by the husband are his
duties to love, cherish and protect his wife, to give her a
home, to provide her with the comforts and the
necessities of life within his means, to treat her kindly
and not cruelly or inhumanely. He is bound to honor her
x x x; it is his duty not only to maintain and support her,
but also to protect her from oppression and wrong."1
REYES, J.:
Husbands do not have property rights over their wives'
bodies. Sexual intercourse, albeit within the realm of
marriage, if not consensual, is rape. This is the clear
State policy expressly legislated in Section 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended by Republic
Act (R.A.) No. 8353 or the Anti-Rape Law of 1997.
The Case
This is an automatic review2 of the Decision3 dated July
9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-HC
No. 00353, which affirmed the Judgment4 dated April 1,
2002 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Cagayan de
Oro City, Branch 19, in Criminal Case Nos. 99-668 and
99-669 convicting him to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua for each count.
The Facts
Accused-appellant and his wife, KKK,5 were married on
October 18, 1975. They Ii ved together since then and
raised their four (4) children6 as they put up several
businesses over the years.
On February 19, 1999, KKK executed a Complaint-
Affidavit,7 alleging that her husband, the accused-
appellant, raped her at 3 :00 a.m. of December 3, 1998
at their residence in Phase 2, Villa Ernesto, Gusa,
Cagayan de Oro City, and that on December 12, 1998,
the accused-appellant boxed her shoulder for refusing to
have sex with him.
On June 11, 1999, the Office of the City Prosecutor of
Cagayan de Oro City issued a Joint Resolution, 8 finding
probable cause for grave threats, less serious physical
injuries and rape and recommending that the appropriate
criminal information be filed against the accused-
appellant.
On July 16, 1999, two Informations for rape were filed
before the RTC respectively docketed as Criminal Case
No. 99-6689 and Criminal Case No. 99-669.10 The
Information in Criminal Case No. 99-668 charged the
accused-appellant as follows:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of
October 9, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force
upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter[']s will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997.
Meanwhile the Information in Criminal Case No. 99-669
reads:
That on or about 10:30 in the evening more or less, of
October 10, 1998, at Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable
Court, the above-named accused by means of force
upon person did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously have carnal knowledge with the private
complainant, her [sic] wife, against the latter's will.
Contrary to and in Violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997.
The accused-appellant was arrested upon a warrant
issued on July 21, 1999.11 On August 18, 1999, the
accused-appellant filed a Motion for
Reinvestigation,12 which was denied by the trial court in
an Order13 dated August 19, 1999. On even date, the
accused-appellant was arraigned and he entered a plea
of not guilty to both charges.14
On January 10, 2000, the prosecution filed a Motion to
Admit Amended Information15 averring that the name of
the private complainant was omitted in the original
informations for rape. The motion also stated that KKK,
thru a Supplemental Affidavit dated November 15,
1999,16 attested that the true dates of commission of the
crime are October 16, 1998 and October 1 7, 1998
thereby modifying the dates stated in her previous
complaint-affidavit. The motion was granted on January
18, 2000.17 Accordingly, the criminal informations were
amended as follows:
Criminal Case No. 99-668:
That on or about October 16, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997.18
Criminal Case No. 99-669:
That on or about October 17, 1998 at Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused by means
of force upon person did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously have carnal knowledge with
the private complainant, his wife, [KKK], against the
latter's will.
Contrary to and in violation of R.A. 8353, the Anti-Rape
Law of 1997.19
The accused-appellant was thereafter re-arraigned. He
maintained his not guilty plea to both indictments and a
joint trial of the two cases forthwith ensued.
Version of the prosecution
The prosecution's theory was anchored on the
testimonies of KKK, and her daughters MMM and 000,
which, together with pertinent physical evidence,
depicted the following events:
KKK met the accused-appellant at the farm of her
parents where his father was one of the laborers. They
got married after a year of courtship.20 When their first
child, MMM, was born, KKK and the accused-appellant
put up a sari-sari store. 21 Later on, they engaged in
several other businesses -trucking, rice mill and
hardware. KKK managed the businesses except for the
rice mill, which, ideally, was under the accused-
appellant's supervision with the help of a trusted
employee. In reality, however, he merely assisted in the
rice mill business by occasionally driving one of the
trucks to haul goods.22
Accused-appellant's keenness to make the businesses
flourish was not as fervent as KKK's dedication. Even
the daughters observed the disproportionate labors of
their parents.23 He would drive the trucks sometimes but
KKK was the one who actively managed the
businesses.24
She wanted to provide a comfortable life for their
children; he, on the other hand, did not acquiesce with
that objective.25
In 1994, KKK and the accused-appellant bought a lot
and built a house in Villa Ernesto, Gusa, Cagayan de
Oro City.26 Three of the children transferred residence
therein while KKK, the accused-appellant and one of
their sons stayed in Dangcagan, Bukidnon. She shuttled
between the two places regularly and sometimes he
accompanied her.27 In 1998, KKK stayed in Gusa,
Cagayan De Oro City most of the days of the week. 28 On
Wednesdays, she went to Dangcagan, Bukidnon to
procure supplies for the family store and then returned to
Cagayan de Oro City on the same day.29
Conjugal intimacy did not really cause marital problems
between KKK and the accused-appellant. It was, in fact,
both frequent and fulfilling. He treated her well and she,
of course, responded with equal degree of
enthusiasm.30However, in 1997, he started to be brutal in
bed. He would immediately remove her panties and,
sans any foreplay, insert her penis in her vagina. His
abridged method of lovemaking was physically painful
for her so she would resist his sexual ambush but he
would threaten her into submission.31
In 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant started
quarrelling usually upon his complaint that she failed to
attend to him. She was preoccupied with financial
problems in their businesses and a bank loan. He
wanted KKK to stay at home because "a woman must
stay in the house and only good in bed (sic) x x x." She
disobeyed his wishes and focused on her goal of
providing a good future for the children.32
Four days before the subject rape incidents or on
October 12, 1998, KKK and the accused-appellant slept
together in Cebu City where the graduation rites of their
eldest daughter were held. By October 14, 1998, the
three of them were already back in Cagayan de Oro
City.33
On October 16, 1998, the accused-appellant, his wife
KKK and their children went about their nightly routine.
The family store in their residence was closed at about
9:00 p.m. before supper was taken. Afterwards, KKK and
the children went to the girls' bedroom at the mezzanine
of the house to pray the rosary while the accused-
appellant watched television in the living room. 34 OOO
and MMM then prepared their beds. Soon after, the
accused-appellant fetched KKK and bid her to come with
him to their conjugal bedroom in the third floor of the
house. KKK complied.35
Once in the bedroom, KKK changed into a daster and
fixed the matrimonial bed but she did not lie thereon with
the accused-appellant and instead, rested separately in
a cot near the bed. Her reclusive behavior prompted him
to ask angrily: "[W]hy are you lying on the c{o]t[?]", and
to instantaneously order: "You transfer here [to] our
bed."36
KKK insisted to stay on the cot and explained that she
had headache and abdominal pain due to her
forthcoming menstruation. Her reasons did not appease
him and he got angrier. He rose from the bed, lifted the
cot and threw it against the wall causing KKK to fall on
the floor. Terrified, KKK stood up from where she fell,
took her pillow and transferred to the bed.37
The accused-appellant then lay beside KKK and not
before long, expressed his desire to copulate with her by
tapping his fingers on her lap. She politely declined by
warding off his hand and reiterating that she was not
feeling well.38
The accused-appellant again asserted his sexual
yearning and when KKK tried to resist by holding on to
her panties, he pulled them down so forcefully they tore
on the sides.39 KKK stayed defiant by refusing to bend
her legs.40
The accused-appellant then raised KKK's
daster,41 stretched her legs apart and rested his own
legs on them. She tried to wrestle him away but he held
her hands and succeeded in penetrating her. As he was
carrying out his carnal desires, KKK continued to protest
by desperately shouting: "[D]on 't do that to me because
I'm not feeling well."42
With a concrete wall on one side and a mere wooden
partition on the other enclosing the spouses'
bedroom,43KKK's pleas were audible in the children's
bedroom where MMM lay awake.
Upon hearing her mother crying and hysterically
shouting: "Eddie, don't do that to me, have pity on
me,"44 MMM woke up 000 who prodded her to go to their
parents' room.45 MMM hurriedly climbed upstairs,
vigorously knocked on the door of her parents' bedroom
and inquired: "Pa, why is it that Mama is crying?" 46 The
accused-appellant then quickly put on his briefs and
shirt, partly opened the door and said: "[D]on 't interfere
because this is a family trouble," before closing it
again.47 Since she heard her mother continue to cry,
MMM ignored his father's admonition, knocked at the
bedroom door again, and then kicked it.48 A furious
accused-appellant opened the door wider and rebuked
MMM once more: "Don't interfere us. Go downstairs
because this is family trouble!" Upon seeing KKK
crouching and crying on top of the bed, MMM boldly
entered the room, approached her mother and asked:
"Ma, why are you crying?" before asking her father: "Pa,
what happened to Mama why is it that her underwear is
torn[?]"49
When MMM received no definite answers to her
questions, she helped her mother get up in order to bring
her to the girls' bedroom. KKK then picked up her tom
underwear and covered herself with a her arm, reached for the doorknob inside and
blanket.50 However, their breakout from the room was
not easy. To prevent KKK from leaving, the accused-
appellant blocked the doorway by extending his arm
towards the knob. He commanded KKK to "[S]tay here,
you sleep in our room," when the trembling KKK
pleaded: "Eddie, allow me to go out." He then held
KKK's hands but she pulled them back. Determined to
get away, MMM leaned against door and embraced her
mother tightly as they pushed their way out.51
In their bedroom, the girls gave their mother some water
and queried her as to what happened. 52 KKK relayed:
"[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced me to
have sex with him when I'm not feeling well." The girls
then locked the door and let her rest."53
The accused-appellant's aggression recurred the
following night. After closing the family store on October
17, 1998, KKK and the children took their supper. The
accused-appellant did not join them since, according to
him, he already ate dinner elsewhere. After resting for a
short while, KKK and the children proceeded to the girls'
bedroom and prayed the rosary. KKK decided to spend
the night in the room's small bed and the girls were
already fixing the beddings when the accused-appellant
entered.
"Why are you sleeping in the room of our children", he
asked KKK, who responded that she preferred to sleep
with the children.54 He then scoffed: "Its alright if you will
not go with me, anyway, there are women that could be
paid [P] 1,000.00." She dismissed his comment by
turning her head away after retorting: "So be it." After
that, he left the room.55
He returned 15 minutes later56 and when KKK still
refused to go with him, he became infuriated. He lifted
her from the bed and attempted to carry her out of the
room as he exclaimed: "Why will you sleep here[?] Lets
go to our bedroom." When she defied him, he grabbed
her short pants causing them to tear apart. 57 At this
point, MMM interfered, "Pa, don't do that to Mama
because we are in front of you."58
The presence of his children apparently did not pacify
the accused-appellant who yelled, "[E]ven in front of you,
I can have sex of your mother [sic J because I'm the
head of the family." He then ordered his daughters to
leave the room. Frightened, the girls obliged and went to
the staircase where they subsequently heard the pleas
of their helpless mother resonate with the creaking
bed.59
The episodes in the bedroom were no less disturbing.
The accused-appellant forcibly pulled KKK's short pants
and panties. He paid no heed as she begged, "[D]on 't
do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do
[sic]. I cannot withstand sex."60
After removing his own short pants and briefs, he flexed
her legs, held her hands, mounted her and forced
himself inside her. Once gratified, the accused-appellant
put on his short pants and briefs, stood up, and went out
of the room laughing as he conceitedly uttered: "[I]t s
nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a] flirt or
fond of sex." He then retreated to the masters'
bedroom.61
Sensing that the commotion in their bedroom has
ceased, MMM and OOO scurried upstairs but found the
door locked. MMM pulled out a jalousie window, inserted
disengaged its lock. Upon entering the room, MMM and
OOO found their mother crouched on the bed with her
hair disheveled. The girls asked: "Ma, what happened to
you, why are you crying?" KKK replied: "[Y}our father is
a beast and animal, he again forced me to have sex with
him even if I don't feel well. "62
Version of the defense
The defense spun a different tale. The accused-
appellant's father owned a land adjacent to that of KKK's
father. He came to know KKK because she brought food
for her father's laborers. When they got married on
October 18, 1975, he was a high school graduate while
she was an elementary graduate.
Their humble educational background did not deter them
from pursuing a comfortable life. Through their joint hard
work and efforts, the couple gradually acquired personal
properties and established their own businesses that
included a rice mill managed by the accused-appellant.
He also drove their trucks that hauled coffee, copra, or
com.63
The accused-appellant denied raping his wife on
October 16 and 17, 1998. He claimed that on those
dates he was in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, peeling com. On
October 7, his truck met an accident somewhere in
Angeles Ranch, Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon. He
left the truck by the roadside because he had to attend
MMM's graduation in Cebu on October 12 with KKK.
When they returned to Bukidnon on October 14, he
asked KKK and MMM to proceed to Cagayan de Oro
City and just leave him behind so he can take care of the
truck and buy some com.64
Ryle Equia (Equia), the spouses' driver from January
1996 until June 1999 corroborated the above claims.
According to him, on October 16, 1998, the accused-
appellant was within the vicinity of the rice mill's loading
area in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, cleaning a pick-up truck.
On October 17, 1998, he and the accused-appellant
were in Dangcagan, Bukidnon, loading sacks of com into
the truck. They finished loading at 3 :00 p.m. The
accused-appellant then instructed Equia to proceed to
Maluko, Manolo Fortich, Bukidnon while the former
attended a fiesta in New Cebu, Kianggat, Dangcagan,
Bukidnon. At around 4:00 p.m., Equia, together with a
helper and a mechanic, left for Maluko in order to tow
the stalled truck left there by the accused-appellant in
October 7 and thereafter, bring it to Cagayan de Oro City
together with the separate truck loaded with com.
They arrived in Maluko at 7:00 p.m. and it took them
three hours to turn the truck around and hoist it to the
towing bar of the other truck. At around 10:00 p.m., the
accused-appellant arrived in Maluko. The four of them
then proceeded to Cagayan de Oro City where they
arrived at 3 :00 a.m. of October 18, 1998. The accused-
appellant went to Gusa while the other three men
brought the damaged truck to Cugman.65
The accused-appellant asserted that KKK merely
fabricated the rape charges as her revenge because he
took over the control and management of their
businesses as well as the possession of their pick-up
truck in January 1999. The accused-appellant was
provoked to do so when she failed to account for their
bank deposits and business earnings. The entries in
their bank account showed the balance of
₱3,190,539.83 on October 31, 1996 but after only a
month or on November 30, 1996, the amount dwindled
to a measly ₱9,894.88.66 Her failure to immediately
report to the police also belies her rape allegations.67
KKK wanted to cover-up her extra-marital affairs, which
the accused-appellant gradually detected from her odd
behavior. While in Cebu on October 12, 1998 for MMM's
graduation rites, the accused-appellant and KKK had
sexual intercourse. He was surprised when his wife
asked him to get a napkin to wipe her after having sex.
He tagged her request as "high-tech," because they did
not do the same when they had sex in the past. KKK had
also become increasingly indifferent to him. When he
arrives home, it was an employee, not her, who opened
the door and welcomed him. She prettied herself and
would no longer ask for his permission whenever she
went out.68
Bebs,69 KKK's cousin and a cashier in their Bukidnon
store, gave the accused-appellant several love letters
purportedly addressed to Bebs but were actually
intended for KKK.70
KKK had more than ten paramours some of whom the
accused-appellant came to know as: Arsenio, Jong-
Jong, Joy or Joey, somebody from the military or the
Philippine National Police, another one is a government
employee, a certain Fernandez and three other
priests.71 Several persons told him about the paramours
of his wife but he never confronted her or them about it
because he trusted her.72
What further confirmed his suspicions was the statement
made by OOO on November 2, 1998. At that time, OOO
was listening loudly to a cassette player. Since he
wanted to watch a television program, he asked OOO to
tum down the volume of the cassette player. She got
annoyed, unplugged the player, spinned around and hit
the accused-appellant's head with the socket. His head
bled. An altercation between the accused-appellant and
KKK thereafter followed because the latter took OOO's
side. During the argument, OOO blurted out that KKK
was better off without the accused-appellant because
she had somebody young, handsome, and a
businessman unlike the accused-appellant who smelled
bad, and was old, and ugly.73
KKK also wanted their property divided between them
with three-fourths thereof going to her and one-fourth to
the accused-appellant. However, the separation did not
push through because the accused-appellant's parents
intervened.74 Thereafter, KKK pursued legal separation
from the accused-appellant by initiating Barangay Case
No. 00588-99 before the Office of Lupong
Tagapamayapa of Gusa, Cagayan de Oro City and
thereafter obtaining a Certificate to File Action dated
February 18, 1999.75
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment76 dated April 1, 2002, the RTC sustained
the version proffered by the prosecution by giving
greater weight and credence to the spontaneous and
straightforward testimonies of the prosecution's
witnesses. The trial court also upheld as sincere and
genuine the two daughters' testimonies, as it is not
natural in our culture for daughters to testify against their
own father for a crime such as rape if the same was not
truly committed.
The trial court rejected the version of the defense and
found unbelievable the accused-appellant's accusations
of extra-marital affairs and money squandering against
KKK. The trial court shelved the accused-appellant's alibi
for being premised on inconsistent testimonies and the
contradicting declarations of the other defense witness,
Equia, as to the accused-appellant's actual whereabouts
on October 16, 1998. Accordingly, the RTC ruling
disposed as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby finds accused Edgar
Jumawan "GUILTY" beyond reasonable doubt of the two
(2) separate charges of rape and hereby sentences him
to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua for each, to
pay complainant [P]50,000.00 in each case as moral
damages, indemnify complainant the sum of
(P]75,000.00 in each case, [P]50,000.00 as exemplary
damages and to pay the costs.
SO ORDERED.77
Ruling of the CA
In its Decision78 dated July 9, 2008, the CA affirmed in
toto the RTC ruling. The CA held that Section 14, Rule
110 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure, sanctioned the
amendment of the original informations. Further, the
accused-appellant was not prejudiced by the
amendment because he was re-arraigned with respect
to the amended informations.
The CA found that the prosecution, through the
straightforward testimony of the victim herself and the
corroborative declarations of MMM and OOO, was able
to establish, beyond reasonable doubt, all the elements
of rape under R.A. No. 8353. The accused-appellant had
carnal knowledge of KKK by using force and
intimidation.
The CA also ruled that KKK's failure to submit herself to
medical examination did not negate the commission of
the crime because a medical certificate is not necessary
to prove rape.
The CA rejected the accused-appellant's argument that
since he and KKK are husband and wife with mutual
obligations of and right to sexual intercourse, there must
be convincing physical evidence or manifestations of the
alleged force and intimidation used upon KKK such as
bruises. The CA explained that physical showing of
external injures is not indispensable to prosecute and
convict a person for rape; what is necessary is that the
victim was forced to have sexual intercourse with the
accused.
In addition, the CA noted that the fact that KKK and the
accused-appellant are spouses only reinforces the
truthfulness of KKK's accusations because no wife in her
right mind would accuse her husband of having raped
her if it were not true.
The delay in the filing of the rape complaint was
sufficiently explained by KKK when she stated that she
only found out that a wife may charge his husband with
rape when the fiscal investigating her separate complaint
for grave threats and physical injuries told her about it.
Finally, the CA dismissed the accused-appellant's alibi
for lack of convincing evidence that it was physically
impossible for him to be at his residence in Cagayan de
Oro City at the time of the commission of the crimes,
considering that Dangcagan, Bukidnon, the place where
he allegedly was, is only about four or five hours away.
Accordingly, the decretal portion of the decision read:
WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing, the appealed
Judgment is hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.79
Hence, the present review. In the Court
Resolution80 dated July 6, 2009, the Court notified the
parties that, if they so desire, they may file their
respective supplemental briefs. In a Manifestation and
Motion81 dated September 4, 2009, the appellee, through
the Office of the Solicitor General, expressed that it
intends to adopt its Brief before the CA. On April 16,
2012, the accused-appellant, through counsel, filed his
Supplemental Brief, arguing that he was not in Cagayan
de Oro City when the alleged rape incidents took place,
and the presence of force, threat or intimidation is
negated by: (a) KKK's voluntary act of going with him to
the conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998; (b) KKK's
failure to put up resistance or seek help from police
authorities; and ( c) the absence of a medical certificate
and of blood traces in KKK's panties.82
Our Ruling
I. Rape and marriage: the historical connection
The evolution of rape laws is actually traced to two
ancient English practices of 'bride capture' whereby a
man conquered a woman through rape and 'stealing an
heiress' whereby a man abducted a woman and married
her.83
The rape laws then were intended not to redress the
violation of the woman's chastity but rather to punish the
act of obtaining the heiress' property by forcible
marriage84 or to protect a man's valuable interest in his
wife's chastity or her daughter's virginity.85
If a man raped an unmarried virgin, he was guilty of
stealing her father's property and if a man raped his wife,
he was merely using his property.86
Women were subjugated in laws and society as objects
or goods and such treatment was justified under three
ideologies.
Under the chattel theory prevalent during the 6th
century, a woman was the property of her father until she
marries to become the property of her husband. 87 If a
man abducted an unmarried woman, he had to pay the
owner, and later buy her from the owner; buying and
marrying a wife were synonymous.88
From the 11th century to the 16th century, a woman lost
her identity upon marriage and the law denied her
political power and status under the feudal doctrine of
coverture.89
A husband had the right to chastise his wife and beat her
if she misbehaved, allowing him to bring order within the
family.90
This was supplanted by the marital unity theory, which
espoused a similar concept. Upon marrying, the woman
becomes one with her husband. She had no right to
make a contract, sue another, own personal property or
write a will.91
II. The marital exemption rule
In the 17th century, Sir Matthew Hale (Hale), a Chief
Justice in England, conceived the irrevocable implied
consent theory that would later on emerge as the marital
exemption rule in rape. He stated that:
[T]he husband cannot be guilty of a rape committed by
himself upon his lawful wife, for by their mutual
matrimonial consent and contract the wife hath given up
herself in this kind unto her husband, which she cannot
retract.92
The rule was observed in common law countries such as
the United States of America (USA) and England. It
gives legal immunity to a man who forcibly sexually
assaults his wife, an act which would be rape if
committed against a woman not his wife. 93 In those
jurisdictions, rape is traditionally defined as "the forcible
penetration of the body of a woman who is not the wife
of the perpetrator."94
The first case in the USA that applied the marital
exemption rule was Commonwealth v.
Fogerty95 promulgated in 1857. The Supreme Judicial
Court of Massachusetts pronounced that it would always
be a defense in rape to show marriage to the victim.
Several other courts adhered to a similar rationale with
all of them citing Hale's theory as basis.96
The rule was formally codified in the Penal Code of New
York in 1909. A husband was endowed with absolute
immunity from prosecution for the rape of his wife. 97 The
privilege was personal and pertained to him alone. He
had the marital right to rape his wife but he will be liable
when he aids or abets another person in raping her.98
In the 1970s, the rule was challenged by women's
movements in the USA demanding for its abolition for
being violative of married women's right to be equally
protected under rape laws.99
In 1978, the rule was qualified by the Legislature in New
York by proscribing the application of the rule in cases
where the husband and wife are living apart pursuant to
a court order "which by its terms or in its effects requires
such living apart," or a decree, judgment or written
agreement of separation.100
In 1983, the marital exemption rule was abandoned in
New York when the Court of Appeals of New York
declared the same unconstitutional in People v.
Liberta101 for lack of rational basis in distinguishing
between marital rape and non-marital rape. The
decision, which also renounced Hale's irrevocable
implied consent theory, ratiocinated as follows:
We find that there is no rational basis for distinguishing
between marital rape and nonmarital rape. The various
rationales which have been asserted in defense of the
exemption are either based upon archaic notions about
the consent and property rights incident to marriage or
are simply unable to withstand even the slightest
scrutiny. We therefore declare the marital exemption for
rape in the New York statute to be unconstitutional.
Lord Hale's notion of an irrevocable implied consent by a
married woman to sexual intercourse has been cited
most frequently in support of the marital exemption. x x x
Any argument based on a supposed consent, however,
is untenable. Rape is not simply a sexual act to which
one party does not consent. Rather, it is a degrading,
violent act which violates the bodily integrity of the victim
and frequently causes severe, long-lasting physical and
psychic harm x x x. To ever imply consent to such an act
is irrational and absurd. Other than in the context of rape
statutes, marriage has never been viewed as giving a
husband the right to coerced intercourse on demand x x
x. Certainly, then, a marriage license should not be
viewed as a license for a husband to forcibly rape his
wife with impunity. A married woman has the same right
to control her own body as does an unmarried woman x
x x. If a husband feels "aggrieved" by his wife's refusal to
engage in sexual intercourse, he should seek relief in
the courts governing domestic relations, not in "violent or
forceful self-help x x x."
The other traditional justifications for the marital
exemption were the common-law doctrines that a
woman was the property of her husband and that the
legal existence of the woman was "incorporated and
consolidated into that of the husband x x x." Both these
doctrines, of course, have long been rejected in this
State. Indeed, "[nowhere] in the common-law world - [or]
in any modem society - is a woman regarded as chattel
or demeaned by denial of a separate legal identity and
the dignity associated with recognition as a whole
human being x x x."102 (Citations omitted)
By 1993, marital rape was a crime in all 50 states, with
17 of them, as well as the District of Columbia, outlawing
the act without exemptions. Meanwhile, the 33 other
states granted some exemptions to a husband from
prosecution such as when the wife is mentally or
physically impaired, unconscious, asleep, or legally
unable to consent.103
III. Marital Rape in the Philippines
Interestingly, no documented case on marital rape has
ever reached this Court until now. It appears, however,
that the old provisions of rape under Article 335 of the
RPC adhered to Hale's irrevocable implied consent
theory, albeit in a limited form. According to Chief Justice
Ramon C. Aquino,104 a husband may not be guilty of
rape under Article 335 of Act No. 3815 but, in case there
is legal separation, the husband should be held guilty of
rape if he forces his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse.105
In 1981, the Philippines joined 180 countries in ratifying
the United Nations Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Discrimination Against Women (UN-
CEDAW).106 Hailed as the first international women's bill
of rights, the CEDAW is the first major instrument that
contains a ban on all forms of discrimination against
women. The Philippines assumed the role of promoting
gender equality and women's empowerment as a vital
element in addressing global concerns.107 The country
also committed, among others, to condemn
discrimination against women in all its forms, and agreed
to pursue, by all appropriate means and without delay, a
policy of eliminating discrimination against women and,
to this end, undertook:
(a) To embody the principle of the equality of
men and women in their national constitutions
or other appropriate legislation if not yet
incorporated therein and to ensure, through law
and other appropriate means, the practical
realization of this principle;
(b) To adopt appropriate legislative and other
measures, including sanctions where
appropriate, prohibiting all discrimination
against women;
xxxx
(f) To take all appropriate measures, including
legislation, to modify or abolish existing laws,
regulations, customs and practices which
constitute discrimination against women;
 (g) To repeal all national penal provisions which
constitute discrimination against women.108
In compliance with the foregoing international
commitments, the Philippines enshrined the principle of
gender equality in the 1987 Constitution specifically in
Sections 11 and 14 of Article II thereof, thus:
Sec. 11. The State values the dignity of every human
person and guarantees full respect for human rights.
xxxx
Sec. 14. The State recognizes the role of women in
nation-building, and shall ensure the fundamental
equality before the law of women and men. The
Philippines also acceded to adopt and implement the
generally accepted principles of international law such
as the CEDA W and its allied issuances, viz:
Article II, Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as
an instrument of national policy, and adopts the
generally accepted principles of international law as part
of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all
nations. (Emphasis ours)
The Legislature then pursued the enactment of laws to
propagate gender equality. In 1997, R.A. No. 8353
eradicated the stereotype concept of rape in Article 335
of the RPC.109 The law reclassified rape as a crime
against person and removed it from the ambit of crimes
against chastity. More particular to the present case, and
perhaps the law's most progressive proviso is the 2nd
paragraph of Section 2 thereof recognizing the reality of
marital rape and criminalizing its perpetration, viz:
Article 266-C. Effect of Pardon. - The subsequent valid
marriage between the offended party shall extinguish the
criminal action or the penalty imposed.
In case it is the legal husband who is the offender, the
subsequent forgiveness by the wife as the offended
party shall extinguish the criminal action or the penalty:
Provided, That the crime shall not be extinguished or the
penalty shall not be abated if the marriage is void ab
initio.
Read together with Section 1 of the law, which
unqualifiedly uses the term "man" in defining rape, it is
unmistakable that R.A. No. 8353 penalizes the crime
without regard to the rapist's legal relationship with his
victim, thus:
Article 266-A. Rape: When And How Committed. - Rape
is committed:
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat, or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be
present.
The explicit intent to outlaw marital rape is deducible
from the records of the deliberations of the 10th
Congress on the law's progenitor's, House Bill No. 6265
and Senate Bill No. 650. In spite of qualms on tagging
the crime as 'marital rape' due to conservative Filipino
impressions on marriage, the consensus of our
lawmakers was clearly to include and penalize marital
rape under the general definition of 'rape,' viz:
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, one
more point
of clarification in the House version on Anti-Rape Bill,
House Bill No. 6265, we never agreed to marital rape.
But under Article 266-C, it says here: "In case it is the
legal husband who is the offender... " Does this
presuppose that there is now marital rape? x x x.
MR. LARA: x x x [I]n this jurisdiction, well, I only have a
limited, very limited 17 years of private practice in the
legal profession, Madam Speaker, and I believe that I
can put at stake my license as a lawyer in this
jurisdiction there is no law that prohibits a husband from
being sued by the wife for rape. Even jurisprudence, we
don't have any jurisprudence that prohibits a wife from
suing a husband. That is why even if we don't provide in
this bill expanding the definition of crime that is now
being presented for approval, Madam Speaker, even if
we don't provide here for marital rape, even if we don't
provide for sexual rape, there is the right of the wife to
go against the husband. The wife can sue the husband
for marital rape and she cannot be prevented from doing
so because in this jurisdiction there is no law that
prohibits her from doing so. This is why we had to put
second paragraph of 266-C because it is the belief of
many of us. x x x, that if it is true that in this jurisdiction
there is marital rape even if we don't provide it here, then
we must provide for something that will unify and keep
the cohesion of the family together that is why we have
the second paragraph.
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, under
the House version specifically House Bill No. 6265 our
provision on a husband forcing the wife is not marital
rape, it is marital sexual assault.
MR. LARA: That is correct, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: But here it is marital rape because
there is no crime of sexual assault. So, Your Honor,
direct to the point, under Article 266-C, is it our
understanding that in the second paragraph, quote: "In
case it is the legal husband who is the offender, this
refers to marital rape filed against the husband? Is that
correct?
MR. LARA: No, Madam Speaker, not entirely, no. The
answer is no.
MR. DAMASING: So if the husband is guilty of sexual
assault, what do you call- it?
MR. LARA: Sexual assault, Madam Speaker.
MR. DAMASING: There is no crime of sexual assault,
Your Honor, we have already stated that. Because under
1 and 2 it is all denominated as rape, there is no crime of
sexual assault. That is why I am sorry that our House
version which provided for sexual assault was not
carried by the Senate version because all sexual crimes
under this bicameral conference committee report are all
now denominated as rape whether the penalty is from
reclusion perpetua to death or whether the penalty is
only prision mayor. So there is marital rape, Your Honor,
is that correct?
xxxx
MR. DAMASING: Madam Speaker, Your Honor, I am in
favor of this. I am in favor of punishing the husband who
forces the wife even to 30 years imprisonment. But
please do not call it marital rape, call it marital sexual
assault because of the sanctity of marriage. x x
x.110 (Emphasis ours)
HON. APOSTOL: In our version, we did not mention
marital rape but marital rape is not excluded.
HON. ROCO: Yeah. No. But I think there is also no
specific mention.
HON. APOSTOL: No. No. No. Silent lang 'yung marital
rape.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: xx x [I]f we can retain the effect of pardon,
then this marital rape can be implicitly contained in the
second paragraph. x x x So marital rape actually was in
the House version x x x. But it was not another definition
of rape. You will notice, it only says, that because you
are the lawful husband does not mean that you cannot
commit rape. Theoretically, I mean, you can beat up your
wife until she's blue. And if the wife complains she was
raped, I guess that, I mean, you just cannot raise the
defense x x x[:] I am the husband. But where in the
marriage contract does it say that I can beat you up?
That's all it means. That is why if we stop referring to it
as marital rape, acceptance is easy. Because parang
ang marital rape, married na nga kami. I cannot have
sex. No, what it is saying is you're [the] husband but you
cannot beat me up. x x x. That's why to me it's not
alarming. It was just a way of saying you're [the]
husband, you cannot say when I am charged with rape x
x x.
PRESIDING OFFICER SHAHAN!: All right, so how do
you propose it if we put it in[?]
HON. ROCO: x x x [A]ll we are saying [is] that if you are
the lawful husband does not mean you can have carnal
knowledge by force[,] threat or intimidation or by
depriving your wife reason, a grave abuse of authority, I
don't know how that cannot apply. Di ba yung, or putting
an instrument into the, yun ang sinasabi ko lang, it is not
meant to have another classification of rape. It is all the
same definition x x x.
xxxx
HON.ROCO: What is 266-F? x x x. Now if we can retain
266-F x x x, we can say that this rule is implicit already in
the first proviso. It implies na there is an instance when a
husband can be charged [with] rape x x x.
HON. ROXAS: Otherwise, silent na.
HON. ROCO: Otherwise, we are silent na. So parang i-
delete natin ito. But it is understood that this rule of
evidence is now transport[ed], put into 266-F, the effect
of pardon.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: We will retain this
effect of pardon. We will remove marital rape.
HON. ROCO: No, yun ang, oo we will remove this one
on page 3 but we will retain the one on page 8, the effect
of pardon. x x x [I]t is inferred but we leave it because
after all it is just a rule of evidence. But I think we should
understand that a husband cannot beat at his wife to
have sex. Di ha? I think that should be made clear. x x x.
xxxx
HON. ROCO: x x x [W]e are not defining a crime of
marital rape. All we are saying is that if you're [the] legal
husband, Jesus Christ, don't beat up to have sex. I
almost want, you are my wife, why do you have to beat
me up.
So, ganoon. So, if we both justify it that way in the
Report as inferred in proviso, I mean, we can face up, I
hope, to the women and they would understand that it is
half achieved.
HON. ZAMORA: I think, Raul, as long as we understand
that we are not defining or creating a new crime but
instead, we are just defining a rule of evidence. x x x.
HON. ROCO: Then, in which case we may just want to
clarify as a rule of evidence the fact that he is husband is
not, does not negate.111
CHAIRMAN LARA: x x x We all agree on the substance
of the point in discussion. The only disagreement now is
where to place it. Let us clear this matter. There are two
suggestions now on marital rape. One is that it is rape if
it is done with force or intimidation or any of the
circumstances that would define rape x x x immaterial.
The fact that the husband and wife are separated does
not come into the picture. So even if they are living
under one roof x x x for as long as the attendant
circumstances of the traditional rape is present, then that
is rape.112
PRESIDING OFFICER ANGARA-CASTILLO: Mr.
Chairman, x x x [t]his provision on marital rape, it does
not actually change the meaning of rape. It merely
erases the doubt in anybody's mind, whether or not rape
can indeed be committed by the husband against the
wife. So the bill really says, you having been married to
one another is not a legal impediment. So I don't really
think there is any need to change the concept of rape as
defined presently under the revised penal code. This
do[es] not actually add anything to the definition of rape.
It merely says, it is merely clarificatory. That if indeed the
wife has evidence to show that she was really brow
beaten, or whatever or forced or intimidated into having
sexual intercourse against her will, then the crime of
rape has been committed against her by the husband,
notwithstanding the fact that they have been legally
married. It does not change anything at all, Mr.
Chairman.
PRESIDING OFFICER APOSTOL: Yes, I think, there is
no change on this x x x.113
The paradigm shift on marital rape in the Philippine
jurisdiction is further affirmed by R.A. No. 9262,114 which
regards rape within marriage as a form of sexual
violence that may be committed by a man against his
wife within or outside the family abode, viz:
Violence against women and their children refers to any
act or a series of acts committed by any person against
a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against a
woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in. physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that
include bodily or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is
sexual in nature, committed against a woman
or her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause
the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
Statistical figures confirm the above characterization.
Emotional and other forms of non-personal violence are
the most common type of spousal violence accounting
for 23% incidence among ever-married women. One in
seven ever-married women experienced physical
violence by their husbands while eight percent (8%)
experienced sexual violence.115
IV. Refutation of the accused-appellant's arguments
The crux of the accused-appellant's plea for acquittal
mirrors the irrevocable implied consent theory. In his
appeal brief before the CA, he posits that the two
incidents of sexual intercourse, which gave rise to the
criminal charges for rape, were theoretically consensual,
obligatory even, because he and the victim, KKK, were a
legally married and cohabiting couple. He argues that
consent to copulation is presumed between cohabiting
husband and wife unless the contrary is proved.
The accused-appellant further claims that this case
should be viewed and treated differently from ordinary
rape cases and that the standards for determining the
presence of consent or lack thereof must be adjusted on
the ground that sexual community is a mutual right and
obligation between husband and wife.116
The contentions failed to muster legal and rational merit.
The ancient customs and ideologies from which the
irrevocable implied consent theory evolved have already
been superseded by modem global principles on the
equality of rights between men and women and respect
for human dignity established in various international
conventions, such as the CEDAW. The Philippines, as
State Party to the CEDAW, recognized that a change in
the traditional role of men as well as the role of women
in society and in the family is needed to achieve full
equality between them. Accordingly, the country vowed
to take all appropriate measures to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices, customs
and all other practices which are based on the idea of
the inferiority or the superiority of either of the sexes or
on stereotyped roles for men and women.117 One of such
measures is R.A. No 8353 insofar as it eradicated the
archaic notion that marital rape cannot exist because a
husband has absolute proprietary rights over his wife's
body and thus her consent to every act of sexual
intimacy with him is always obligatory or at least,
presumed.
Another important international instrument on gender
equality is the UN Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women, which was Promulgated118 by
the UN General Assembly subsequent to the CEDA W.
The Declaration, in enumerating the forms of gender-
based violence that constitute acts of discrimination
against women, identified 'marital rape' as a species of
sexual violence, viz:
Article 1
For the purposes of this Declaration, the term "violence
against women" means any act of gender-based
violence that results in, or is likely to result in, physical,
sexual or psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion or arbitrary
deprivation of liberty, whether occurring in public or in
private life.
Article 2
Violence against women shall be understood to
encompass, but not be limited to, the following:
(a) Physical, sexual and psychological violence
occurring in the family, including battering, sexual abuse
of female children in the household, dowry-related
violence, marital rape, female genital mutilation and
other traditional practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence and violence related to
exploitation;119 (Emphasis ours)
Clearly, it is now acknowledged that rape, as a form of
sexual violence, exists within marriage. A man who
penetrates her wife without her consent or against her
will commits sexual violence upon her, and the
Philippines, as a State Party to the CEDA W and its
accompanying Declaration, defines and penalizes the
act as rape under R.A. No. 8353.
A woman is no longer the chattel-antiquated practices
labeled her to be. A husband who has sexual intercourse
with his wife is not merely using a property, he is fulfilling
a marital consortium with a fellow human being with
dignity equal120 to that he accords himself. He cannot be
permitted to violate this dignity by coercing her to
engage in a sexual act without her full and free consent.
Surely, the Philippines cannot renege on its international
commitments and accommodate conservative yet
irrational notions on marital activities121 that have lost
their relevance in a progressive society.
It is true that the Family Code,122 obligates the spouses
to love one another but this rule sanctions affection and
sexual intimacy, as expressions of love, that are both
spontaneous and mutual123 and not the kind which is
unilaterally exacted by force or coercion.
Further, the delicate and reverent nature of sexual
intimacy between a husband and wife excludes cruelty
and coercion. Sexual intimacy brings spouses
wholeness and oneness. It is a gift and a participation in
the mystery of creation. It is a deep sense of spiritual
communion. It is a function which enlivens the hope of
procreation and ensures the continuation of family
relations. It is an expressive interest in each other's
feelings at a time it is needed by the other and it can go
a long way in deepening marital relationship.124 When it
is egoistically utilized to despoil marital union in order to
advance a felonious urge for coitus by force, violence or
intimidation, the Court will step in to protect its lofty
purpose, vindicate justice and protect our laws and State
policies. Besides, a husband who feels aggrieved by his
indifferent or uninterested wife's absolute refusal to
engage in sexual intimacy may legally seek the court's
intervention to declare her psychologically incapacitated
to fulfill an essential marital obligation.125 But he cannot
and should not demand sexual intimacy from her
coercively or violently.
Moreover, to treat marital rape cases differently from
non-marital rape cases in terms of the elements that
constitute the crime and in the rules for their proof,
infringes on the equal protection clause. The
Constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws126 ordains that similar subjects should not be
treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and
unjustly discriminate against others; no person or class
of persons shall be denied the same protection of laws,
which is enjoyed, by other persons or other classes in
like circumstances.127
As above discussed, the definition of rape in Section 1 of
R.A. No. 8353 pertains to: (a) rape, as traditionally
known; (b) sexual assault; and (c) marital rape or that
where the victim is the perpetrator's own spouse. The
single definition for all three forms of the crime shows
that the law does not distinguish between rape
committed in wedlock and those committed without a
marriage. Hence, the law affords protection to women
raped by their husband and those raped by any other
man alike.
The posture advanced by the accused-appellant
arbitrarily discriminates against married rape victims
over unmarried rape victims because it withholds from
married women raped by their husbands the penal
redress equally granted by law to all rape victims.
Further, the Court adheres to and hereby adopts the
rationale in Liberta in rejecting the argument akin to
those raised by herein accused-appellant. A marriage
license should not be viewed as a license for a husband
to forcibly rape his wife with impunity. A married woman
has the same right to control her own body, as does an
unmarried woman.128 She can give or withhold her
consent to a sexual intercourse with her husband and he
cannot unlawfully wrestle such consent from her in case
she refuses.
Lastly, the human rights of women include their right to
have control over and decide freely and responsibly on
matters related to their sexuality, including sexual and
reproductive health, free of coercion, discrimination and
violence.129 Women do not divest themselves of such
right by contracting marriage for the simple reason that
human rights are inalienable.130
In fine, since the law does not separately categorize
marital rape and non-marital rape nor provide for
different definition or elements for either, the Court,
tasked to interpret and apply what the law dictates,
cannot trudge the forbidden sphere of judicial legislation
and unlawfully divert from what the law sets forth.
Neither can the Court frame distinct or stricter
evidentiary rules for marital rape cases as it would
inequitably burden its victims and unreasonably and
irrationally classify them differently from the victims of
non-marital rape.
Indeed, there exists no legal or rational reason for the
Court to apply the law and the evidentiary rules on rape
any differently if the aggressor is the woman's own legal
husband. The elements and quantum of proof that
support a moral certainty of guilt in rape cases should
apply uniformly regardless of the legal relationship
between the accused and his accuser.
Thus, the Court meticulously reviewed the present case
in accordance with the established legal principles and
evidentiary policies in the prosecution and resolution of
rape cases and found that no reversible error can be
imputed to the conviction meted the accused-appellant.
The evidence for the prosecution was
based on credible witnesses who gave
equally credible testimonies
In rape cases, the conviction of the accused rests
heavily on the credibility of the victim. Hence, the strict
mandate that all courts must examine thoroughly the
testimony of the offended party. While the accused in a
rape case may be convicted solely on the testimony of
the complaining witness, courts are, nonetheless, duty-
bound to establish that their reliance on the victim's
testimony is justified. Courts must ensure that the
testimony is credible, convincing, and otherwise
consistent with human nature. If the testimony of the
complainant meets the test of credibility, the accused
may be convicted on the basis thereof.131
It is settled that the evaluation by the trial court of the
credibility of witnesses and their testimonies are entitled
to the highest respect. This is in view of its inimitable
opportunity to directly observe the witnesses and their
deportment, conduct and attitude, especially during
cross-examination. Thus, unless it is shown that its
evaluation was tainted with arbitrariness or certain facts
of substance and value have been plainly overlooked,
misunderstood, or misapplied, the same will not be
disturbed on appeal.132
After approximating the perspective of the trial court thru
a meticulous scrutiny of the entire records of the trial
proceedings and the transcript of each witnesses'
testimony, the Court found no justification to disturb its
findings.
Rather, the Court observed that KKK and her testimony
were both credible and spontaneous. Hailed to the
witness stand on six separate occasions, KKK never
wavered neither did her statements vacillate between
uncertainty and certitude. She remained consistent,
categorical, straightforward, and candid during the
rigorous cross-examination and on rebuttal examination,
she was able to convincingly explain and debunk the
allegations of the defense.
She vividly recounted how the accused-appellant forced
her to have sex with him despite her refusal on October
16, 1998. He initially ordered her to sleep beside him in
their conjugal bed by violently throwing the cot where
she was resting. In order not to aggravate his temper,
KKK obeyed. On the bed, he insinuated for them to have
sex. When she rejected his advances due to abdominal
pain and headache, his request for intimacy transformed
into a stubborn demand. Unyielding, KKK held her
panties but the accused-appellant forcibly pulled them
down. The tug caused the small clothing to tear apart.
She reiterated that she was not feeling well and begged
him to stop. But no amount of resistance or begging
subdued him. He flexed her two legs apart, gripped her
hands, mounted her, rested his own legs on hers and
inserted his penis into her vagina. She continued
pleading but he never desisted.133
Her accurate recollection of the second rape incident on
October 1 7, 1998 is likewise unmistakable. After the
appalling episode in the conjugal bedroom the previous
night, KKK decided to sleep in the children's bedroom.
While her daughters were fixing the beddings, the
accused-appellant barged into the room and berated her
for refusing to go with him to their conjugal bedroom.
When KKK insisted to stay in the children's bedroom, the
accused-appellant got angry and pulled her up. MMM's
attempt to pacify the accused-appellant further enraged
him. He reminded them that as the head of the family he
could do whatever he wants with his wife. To
demonstrate his role as patriarch, he ordered the
children to go out of the room and thereafter proceeded
to force KKK into sexual intercourse. He forcibly pulled
down her short pants and panties as KKK begged "Dont
do that to me, my body is still aching and also my
abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted me to do. I
cannot withstand sex."134 But her pleas fell on deaf ears.
The accused-appellant removed his shorts and briefs,
spread KKK's legs apart, held her hands, mounted her
and inserted his penis into her vagina. After gratifying
himself, he got dressed, left the room as he chuckled:
"Its nice, that is what you deserve because you are [a]
flirt or fond of sex."135
Entrenched is the rule that in the prosecution of rape
cases, the essential element that must be proved is the
absence of the victim's consent to the sexual
congress.136
Under the law, consent is absent when: (a) it was
wrestled from the victim by force, threat or intimidation,
fraudulent machinations or grave abuse of authority; or
(b) the victim is incapable of giving free and voluntary
consent because he/she is deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious or that the offended party is
under 12 years of age or is demented.
Contrary to the accused-appellant's asseverations,
KKK's consent was wrestled from her through force and
intimidation both of which were established beyond
moral certainty by the prosecution through the pertinent
testimony of KKK, viz:
On the October 16, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO:
Q So, while you were already lying on the bed together
with your husband, do you remember what happened?
A He lie down beside me and asked me to have sex with
him.
Q How did he manifest that he wanted to have sex with
you?
A He put his hand on my lap and asked me to have sex
with him but I warded off his hand.
Q Can you demonstrate to this Court how did he use his
hand?
A Yes. "witness demonstrating on how the accused used
his finger by touching or knocking her lap which means
that he wanted to have sex."
Q So, what did you do after that?
A I warded off his hand and refused because I was not
feeling well. (at this juncture the witness is sobbing)
Q So, what did your husband do when you refused him
to have sex with you?
A He insisted and he pulled my pantie forcibly, that is
why my pantie [sic] was tom.
Q Why, what did you do when he started to pull your
pantie [sic]?
A I resisted and tried to hold my pantie [sic] but I failed,
because he is so strong.
xx xx
Q So, when your pantie [sic] was tom by your husband,
what else did he do?
A He flexed my two legs and rested his two legs on my
legs.
Q So after that what else did he do?
A He succeeded in having sex with me because he held
my two hands no matter how I wrestled but I failed
because he is stronger than me.
COURT: Make it of record that the witness is sobbing
while she is giving her testimony.
ATTY. LARGO: (To the witness cont'ng.)
Q So, what did you do when your husband already
stretched your two legs and rode on you and held your
two hands?
A I told him, "don't do that because I'm not feeling well
and my whole body is aching."
Q How did you say that to your husband?
A I told him, "don't do that to me because I'm not feeling
well."
Q Did you say that in the manner you are saying now?
xxxx Q So, after your children went out of the room, what
transpired?
A I shouted when I uttered that words.
A He successfully having sex with me because he pulled
xxxx my short pant and pantie forcible.

Q Was your husband able to consummate his desire? Q So, what did you say when he forcibly pulled your
short and pantie?
xxxx
A I told him, "don't do that to me, my body is still aching
137
and also my abdomen and I cannot do what you wanted
A Yes, sir, because I cannot do anything. me to do. I cannot withstand sex."

(Cross-Examination) Q So, what happened to your short when he forcibly

ATTY. AMARGA;
Q Every time you have sex with your husband it was
your husband normally remove your panty?
A Yes, Sir.
Q It was not unusual for your husband then to remove
your panty because according to you he normally do that
if he have sex with you?
A Yes, Sir.
Q And finally according to you your husband have sex
with you?
pulled it down?
A It was tom.
Q And after your short and pantie was pulled down by
your husband, what did he do?
A He also removed his short and brief and flexed my two
legs and mounted on me and succeeded in having sex
with me.139
The accused-appellant forced his wife when he
knowingly overpowered her by gripping her hands,
flexing her legs and then resting his own legs thereon in
order to facilitate the consummation of his much-desired
non-consensual sexual intercourse.

A Yes, Sir because he forcibly used me in spite of
holding my panty because I don't want to have sex with
him at that time.
Q You did not spread your legs at that time when he
removed your panty?
Records also show that the accused-appellant employed
sufficient intimidation upon KKK. His actuations prior to
the actual moment of the felonious coitus revealed that
he imposed his distorted sense of moral authority on his
wife. He furiously demanded for her to lay with him on
the bed and thereafter coerced her to indulge his sexual
craving.

A Yes, Sir. The fury the accused-appellant exhibited when KKK

Q Meaning, your position of your legs was normal during
that time?
A I tried to resist by not flexing my legs.
xxxx
Q At that time when your husband allegedly removed
your panty he also remove your nightgown?
A No, Sir.
Q And he did pull out your duster [sic] towards your
face?
A He raised my duster [sic] up.
Q In other words your face was covered when he raised
your duster [sic]?
A No, only on the breast level.138
On the October 17, 1998 rape incident:
(Direct Examination)
ATTY. LARGO
refused to sleep with him on their bed, when she insisted
to sleep in the children's bedroom and the fact that he
exercises dominance over her as husband all cowed
KKK into submission.
The fact that KKK voluntarily went with the accused-
appellant to their conjugal bedroom on October 16, 1998
cannot be stretched to mean that she consented to the
forced sexual intercourse that ensued. The accused-
appellant was KKK's husband and hence it was
customary for her to sleep in the conjugal bedroom. No
consent can be deduced from such act of KKK because
at that juncture there were no indications that sexual
intercourse was about to take place. The issue of
consent was still irrelevant since the act for which the
same is legally required did not exist yet or at least
unclear to the person from whom the consent was
desired. The significant point when consent must be
given is at that time when it is clear to the victim that her
aggressor is soliciting sexual congress. In this case, that
point is when the accused-appellant tapped his fingers
on her lap, a gesture KKK comprehended to be an
invitation for a sexual intercourse, which she refused.
Resistance, medical certificate and blood traces.
We cannot give credence to the accused-appellant's
argument that KKK should have hit him to convey that
she was resisting his sexual onslaught. Resistance is not
an element of rape and the law does not impose upon
the victim the burden to prove resistance140 much more
requires her to raise a specific kind thereof.
At any rate, KKK put up persistent, audible and
intelligible resistance for the accused-appellant to
recognize that she seriously did not assent to a sexual
congress. She held on to her panties to prevent him from
undressing her, she refused to bend her legs and she
repeatedly shouted and begged for him to stop.
Moreover, as an element of rape, force or intimidation
need not be irresistible; it may be just enough to bring
about the desired result. What is necessary is that the
force or intimidation be sufficient to consummate the
purpose that the accused had in mind 141 or is of such a
degree as to impel the defenseless and hapless victim to
bow into submission.142
Contrary to the accused-appellant's allusions, the
absence of blood traces in KKK's panties or the lack of a
medical certificate do not negate rape. It is not the
presence or absence of blood on the victim's underwear
that determines the fact of rape143 inasmuch as a
medical certificate is dispensable evidence that is not
necessary to prove rape.144These details do not pertain
to the elements that produce the gravamen of the
offense that is -sexual intercourse with a woman against
her will or without her consent.145
The accused-appellant harps on the acquittal ruling in
People v. Godoy,146 the evidentiary circumstances of
which are, however, disparate from those in the present
case. In Godoy, the testimony of the complainant was
inherently weak, inconsistent, and was controverted by
the prosecution's medico-legal expert witness who
stated that force was not applied based on the position
of her hymenal laceration. This led the Court to conclude
that the absence of any sign of physical violence on the
victim's body is an indication of consent. 147 Here,
however, KKK's testimony is, as discussed earlier,
credible, spontaneous and forthright.
The corroborative testimonies of
MMM and OOO are worthy of credence.
The accused-appellant's assertion that MMM and OOO's
testimonies lacked probative value as they did not
witness the actual rape is bereft of merit. It must be
stressed that rape is essentially committed in relative
isolation, thus, it is usually only the victim who can testify
with regard to the fact of the forced sexual
intercourse.148 Hence, the probative value of MMM and
OOO's testimonies rest not on whether they actually
witnessed the rape but on whether their declarations
were in harmony with KKK's narration of the
circumstances, preceding, subsequent to and concurrent
with, the rape incidents.
MMM and OOO's testimonies substantiated significant
points in KKK's narration. MMM heard KKK shouting and
crying: "Eddie, don’t do that to me, have pity on
me"149 on the night of October 16, 1998 shortly after KKK
and the accused-appellant went to their conjugal
bedroom. When MMM went upstairs to check on her
mother, the accused-appellant admonished her for
meddling. Frustrated to aid her mother who persistently
cried, MMM kicked the door so hard the accused-
appellant was prompted to open it and rebuke MMM
once more. OOO heard all these commotion from the
room downstairs.
MMM then saw her mother crouched on the bed, crying,
with her hair disheveled while her tom panty lay on the
floor. After a brief struggle with the accused-appellant,
MMM and KKK were finally able to escape and retreat to
the children's bedroom where KKK narrated to her
daughters: "[Y]our father is an animal, a beast; he forced
me to have sex with him when I'm not feeling well. "
KKK gave a similar narration to MMM and OOO the
following night after the accused-appellant barged inside
the children's bedroom. The couple had an argument
and when MMM tried to interfere, the accused-appellant
ordered her and OOO to get out after bragging that he
can have sex with his wife even in front of the children
because he is the head of the family. The girls then
stayed by the staircase where they afterwards heard
their mother helplessly crying and shouting for the
accused-appellant to stop.
Indeed, the testimonies of KKK, MMM and OOO
coherently depicted that the accused-appellant, through
the use of force and intimidation, had non-consensual
and forced carnal knowledge of his wife, KKK on the
nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
KKK's helpless screams and pleas from inside the
bedroom coupled with her verbal and physical resistance
were clear manifestations of coercion. Her appearance
when MMM saw her on the bed after the accused
appellant opened the door on October 16, 1998, her
conduct towards the accused-appellant on her way out
of the room, and her categorical outcry to her children
after the two bedroom episodes - all generate the
conclusion that the sexual acts that occurred were
against her will.
Failure to immediately report to the
police authorities, if satisfactorily
explained, is not fatal to the
credibility of a witness.
The testimonies of KKK and her daughters cannot be
discredited merely because they failed to report the rape
incidents to the police authorities or that KKK belatedly
filed the rape charges. Delay or vacillation by the victims
in reporting sexual assaults does not necessarily impair
their credibility if such delay is satisfactorily explained.150
At that time, KKK and her daughters were not aware that
a husband forcing his wife to submit to sexual
intercourse is considered rape. In fact, KKK only found
out that she could sue his husband for rape when
Prosecutor Benjamin Tabique, Jr. (Prosecutor Tabique)
told her about it when she filed the separate charges for
grave threats and physical injuries against the accused-
appellant.151
It must be noted that the incidents occurred a year into
the effectivity of R.A. No. 8353 abolishing marital
exemption in rape cases hence it is understandable that
it was not yet known to a layman as opposed to legal
professionals like Prosecutor Tabique. In addition, fear of
reprisal thru social humiliation which is the common
factor that deter rape victims from reporting the crime to
the authorities is more cumbersome in marital rape
cases. This is in view of the popular yet outdated belief
that it is the wife's absolute obligation to submit to her
husband's carnal desires. A husband raping his own wife
is often dismissed as a peculiar occurrence or trivialized
as simple domestic trouble.
Unfamiliarity with or lack of knowledge of the law
criminalizing marital rape, the stigma and public scrutiny
that could have befallen KKK and her family had the
intervention of police authorities or even the neighbors
been sought, are acceptable explanations for the failure
or delay in reporting the subject rape incidents.
The victim -S testimony on the
witness stand rendered
unnecessary the presentation of her
complaint-affidavit as evidence.
The failure of the prosecution to present KKK's
complaint-affidavit for rape is not fatal in view of the
credible, candid and positive testimony of KKK on the
witness stand. Testimonial evidence carries more weight
than the affidavit since it underwent the rudiments of a
direct, cross, re-direct and re-cross examinations.
Affidavits or statements taken ex parte are generally
considered incomplete and inaccurate. Thus, by nature,
they are inferior to testimony given in court.152
Ill motive imputed to the victim
The ill motive, which the accused-appellant imputed to
KKK, does not inspire belief as it is riddled with
loopholes generated by incongruent and flimsy
evidence. The prosecution was able to establish that the
₱3 Million deposit in the spouses' bank account was the
proceeds of their loan from the Bank of Philippine
Islands (BPI). Exhibit J, which is a BPI ML instruction
sheet dated October 31, 1996 in the amount of
₱3,149,840.63 is the same amount the accused-
appellant claimed to have entrusted to her wife. Although
the accused-appellant denied being aware of such loan,
he admitted that approximately ₱3 Million was spent for
the construction of their house. These pieces of
evidence effectively belie the accused appellant's
allegation that KKK could not account for the money
deposited in the bank.153
Anent, KKK's alleged extra-marital affairs, the accused-
appellant failed to explain how Bebs could be his wife
KKK when the letter-sender greeted Bebs a "happy
birthday" on October 28 while KKK's birthday is June 23.
The accused-appellant also did not present Bebs
herself, being a more competent witness to the
existence of the alleged love letters for KKK. He likewise
failed, despite promise to do so, to present the original
copies of such love letters neither did he substantiate
KKK's supposed extra-marital affairs by presenting
witnesses who could corroborate his claims. Further, the
Court finds it unbelievable that an able man would not
have the temerity to confront his wife who has fooled
around with 10 men - some of whom he has even met.
The accused-appellant's erratic statements on the
witness stand are inconsistent with the theory of extra-
marital romance making it reasonable to infer that he
merely made up those malicious stories as a desperate
ploy to extricate himself out of this legal quandary.
At best, the basis of the alleged illicit affairs of KKK were
the accused-appellant's unfounded suspicions that hold
no evidentiary weight in law and thus incompetent to
destroy KKK's credibility and that of her testimony. In
sum, the defense failed to present sufficiently convincing
evidence that KKK is a mere vindictive wife who is
harassing the accused-appellant with fabricated rape
charges.
Alibi
It must be stressed that in raising the irrevocable implied
consent theory as defense, the accused-appellant has
essentially admitted the facts of sexual intercourse
embodied in the two criminal informations for rape. This
admission is inconsistent with the defense of alibi and
any discussion thereon will thus be irrelevant.
At any rate, the courts a quo correctly rejected his alibi.
Alibi is one of the weakest defenses not only because it
is inherently frail and unreliable, but also because it is
easy to fabricate and difficult to check or rebut. It cannot
prevail over the positive identification of the accused by
eyewitnesses who had no improper motive to testify
falsely.154
For the defense of alibi to prosper, the accused must
prove not only that he was at some other place at the
time of the commission of the crime, but also that it was
physically impossible for him to be at the locus delicti or
within its immediate vicinity. Physical impossibility refers
not only to the geographical distance between the place
where the accused was and the place where the crime
was committed when the crime transpired, but more
importantly, the facility of access between the two
places.155
Even granting in arguendo that the accused-appellant
had indeed attended a fiesta in Dangcagan, Bukidnon or
was hauling com with Equia on the dates of commission
of the crime, the same will not easily exonerate him. The
accused-appellant failed to adduce clear and convincing
evidence that it was physically impossible for him to be
at his residence in Cagayan de Oro City at the time of
the commission of the crime. Dangcagan, Bukidnon can
be traversed by about four or five hours from Cagayan
de Oro City, and even less by private vehicle which was
available to the accused appellant at any time.156 Thus, it
was not physically impossible for him to be at the situs
criminis at the dates and times when the two rape
incidents were committed.
Between the accused-appellant's alibi and denial, and
the positive identification and credible testimony of the
victim, and her two daughters, the Court must give
weight to the latter, especially in the absence of ill motive
on their part to falsely testify against the accused-
appellant.
Conclusion
All told, the presumption of innocence endowed an
accused-appellant was sufficiently overcome by KKK's
clear, straightforward, credible, and truthful declaration
that on two separate occasions, he succeeded in having
sexual intercourse with her, without her consent and
against her will. Evidence of overwhelming force and
intimidation to consummate rape is extant from KKK's
narration as believably corroborated by the testimonies
of MMM and OOO and the physical evidence of KKK's
tom panties and short pants. Based thereon, the reason
and conscience of the Court is morally certain that the
accused-appellant is guilty of raping his wife on the
nights of October 16 and 17, 1998.
Penalties
The Court affirms the penalty of reclusion perpetua, for
each count of rape, meted upon the accused-appellant
for being in accord with Article 266-A in relation to 266-B
of the RPC. Further, he shall not be eligible for parole
pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346, which states that
"persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua, or whose sentences will be reduced to
reclusion perpetua, by reason of this Act, shall not be
eligible for parole under Act No. 4180, otherwise known
as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as amended."157
The Court sustains the moral damages awarded in the
amount of ₱50,000.00. Moral damages are granted to
rape victims without need of proof other than the fact of
rape under the assumption that the victim suffered moral
injuries from the experience she underwent.158
The award of civil indemnity is proper; it is mandatory
upon the finding that rape took
place.1âwphi1 Considering that the crime committed is
simple rape, there being no qualifying circumstances
attendant in its commission, the appropriate amount is
₱50,000.00159 and not ₱75,000.00 as awarded by the
RTC.
To serve as an example for public good and in order to
deter a similar form of domestic violence, an award of
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages is imperative.160
The damages awarded shall earn legal interest at the
rate of six percent (6%) per annum to be reckoned from
the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.161
A Final Note
Rape is a crime that evokes global condemnation
because it is an abhorrence to a woman's value and
dignity as a human being. It respects no time, place,
age, physical condition or social status. It can happen
anywhere and it can happen to anyone. Even, as shown
in the present case, to a wife, inside her time-honored
fortress, the family home, committed against her by her
husband who vowed to be her refuge from cruelty. The
herein pronouncement is an affirmation to wives that our
rape laws provide the atonement they seek from their
sexually coercive husbands.
Husbands are once again reminded that marriage is not
a license to forcibly rape their wives. A husband does not
own his wife's body by reason of marriage. By marrying,
she does not divest herself of the human right to an
exclusive autonomy over her own body and thus, she
can lawfully opt to give or withhold her consent to marital
coitus. A husband aggrieved by his wife's unremitting
refusal to engage in sexual intercourse cannot resort to
felonious force or coercion to make her yield. He can
seek succor before the Family Courts that can determine
whether her refusal constitutes psychological incapacity
justifying an annulment of the marriage.
Sexual intimacy is an integral part of marriage because it
is the spiritual and biological communion that achieves
the marital purpose of procreation. It entails mutual love
and self-giving and as such it contemplates only mutual
sexual cooperation and never sexual coercion or
imposition.
The Court is aware that despite the noble intentions of
the herein pronouncement, menacing personalities may
use this as a tool to harass innocent husbands. In this
regard, let it be stressed that safeguards in the criminal
justice system are in place to spot and scrutinize
fabricated or false marital rape complaints and any
person who institutes untrue and malicious charges will
be made answerable under the pertinent provisions of
the RPC and/or other laws.
WHEREFORE, all the foregoing considered, the
Decision dated July 9, 2008 of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00353 is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATIONS. Accused-appellant Edgar Jumawan is
found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of two (2)
counts of RAPE and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of
reclusion perpetua for each count, without eligibility for
parole. He is further ordered to pay the victim, KKK, the
amounts of PS0,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00
as moral damages, and ₱30,000.00 as exemplary
damages, for each count of rape. The award of damages
shall earn legal interest at the rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the finality of this judgment until fully
paid.
SO ORDERED.
STATUTORY RAPE
G.R. No. 203086 June 11, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Appellee,
vs.
JOSE DALAN y PALDINGAN, Appellant.
DECISION
BRION, J.:
We review the appeal, filed by appellant Jose Dalan,
assailing the Decision1 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 04279.
The CA affirmed the Judgment 2 of the Regional Trial
Court (RTC), Branch 64, Abatan, Buguias, Benguet,
which found the appellant guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of two counts of statutory rape.
In its Judgment dated December 3, 2009, the RTC
convicted the appellant of two counts of statutory rape. It
ruled that the prosecution was able to prove that the
appellant inserted his penis in AAA' s vagina on two
occasions, namely, in December 2006 and on March 3,
2007. It added that AAA' s testimony was corroborated
by the medical findings of Dr. Sabrina Florendo. The
RTC further explained that AAA's mental retardation
cannot disqualify her as a witness, since she capably
narrated the details of the sexual abuses committed
against her by the appellant in 2006 and 2007.
Accordingly, the RTC sentenced the appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify the
victim the amounts of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity and
₱50,000.00 as moral damages, both for each count of
statutory rape.
On appeal, the CA affirmed the RTC decision. The CA
ruled that AAA positively identified the appellant asthe
person who raped her on two occasions. According to
the CA, AAA was consistent in her recollection of the
details of the crime. It alsoadded that AAA’s moderate
mental retardation was sufficiently established by the
prosecution’s evidence. Finally, the RTC found the
appellant’s uncorroborated denial and alibi to be
unmeritorious.
Our Ruling
We deny the appeal, but modify the designation of the
crime committed and the awarded indemnities.
For the charge of rape to prosper,the prosecution must
prove that (1) the offender had carnal knowledge of a
woman, and (2) he accomplished such act through force
or intimidation, or when she was deprived of reason or
otherwise unconscious, or when she was under 12 years
of age or was demented.3 Carnal knowledge of a woman
who is a mental retardate is rape under Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(b) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended.
Proof of force or intimidation is not necessary, as a
mental retardate is not capable of giving consent to a
sexual act. What need to be proven are the facts of
sexual congress between the accused and the victim,
and the mental retardation of the latter.4
In the present case, the prosecution established the
elements of rape under Article 266-A of the Revised
Penal Code, as amended. First, AAA positively identified
the appellant as the person who inserted his penis in her
vaginain December 2006 and in March 2007; she never
wavered in this identification. Significantly, AAA’s claim of
sexual intercourse had been corroborated by the
medical findings and testimony of Dr. Florendo who
testified that the markedattenuated hymen at 6 o’clock
position was most probably caused by an erect penis,
while the absent hymen at the 4, 5 and 7 o’clock
positions could be caused by repeated sexual
experience.
Second, the prosecution satisfactorily established the
mental condition of the victim. Dr. Ekid conducted a
battery of tests to determine the mental age, social
maturity and emotional condition of AAA. During trial, Dr.
Ekid explained each test, and how she arrived at her
conclusions. Accordingly, she found AAA to be suffering
from moderate retardation, with a mental age of a
person four (4) years and seven (7) months old.
As the lower courts did, we are unpersuaded by the
appellant’s alibi that he was at a farm in Ca-ew,
Bulalacao, during the two rapes. Aside from being
uncorroborated, we point out thatCa-ew was just five (5)
minutes away from the scene of the rape. In short, the
appellant miserably failed to show that it was physically
impossible for him to be at the places where AAA had
been sexually abused.
The Crime Committed
Article 266-A paragraph 1 of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, provides:
Article 266-A. Rape, When and How Committed. – Rape
is committed –
1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a
woman under any of the following circumstances:
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
b) When the offended party is deprived of
reasonor is otherwise unconscious;
c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave
abuse of authority; and
d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be
present; x x x
In the present case, the Information alleged that the
victim was "xxx a minor, being seventeen (17) years of
age,or below eighteen (18) years old at the time of the
commission of the crime, but mentally retarded with a
mental age that equates to a child of four (4) years and
seven (7) months," and this circumstance had been
proven during trial. The RTC, however, equated AAA’s
mental retardation with dementia. It is settled that carnal
knowledge of a woman who is a mental retardate is rape
as she is in the same class as a woman deprived of
reason or otherwise unconscious.5 Our ruling in People
v. Monticalvo6 on this point is instructive:
The term "deprived of reason" has been construed to
encompass those suffering from mental abnormality,
deficiency or retardation. The term "demented," on the
other hand, means having dementia, which Webster
defines as mental deterioration; also madness, insanity.
Dementiahas also been defined in Black’sLaw Dictionary
as a "form of mental disorder in which cognitive and
intellectual functions of the mind are prominently
affected; x x x total recovery not possible since cerebral
disease is involved."Thus, a mental retardate can be
classified as a person "deprived of reason," not one who
is "demented" and carnal knowledge of a mental
retardate is considered rape under subparagraph (b), not
subparagraph (d) of Article 266-A(1)of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended. [Emphasis in the original]
Aside from erroneously equating AAA’s mental
retardation with dementia, the RTC further justified its
conviction of the appellant of statutory rape on account
of the victim’s mental age. The gravamen of the offense
of statutory rape, as provided for in Article 266-A,
paragraph 1(d) of the Revised Penal Code, as amended,
is the carnal knowledge of a woman below 12 years old.
To convict an accused of the crime of statutory rape, the
prosecution must prove: first, the age of the complainant;
second, the identity of the accused; and last but not the
least, the carnal knowledge between the accused and
the complainant.7
In the present case, it is not disputed that AAA was
already 17 years old when she was raped.1âwphi1 In
People v. Butiong,8 we held that carnal knowledge of a
female mental retardate with the mental age below 12
years of ageis considered as rape of a woman deprived
of reason, thus:
It should no longer be debatable that rape of a mental
retardate falls under paragraph 1(b), of Article 266-A, x x
x, because the provision refers to a rape of a female
"deprived of reason," a phrase that refers to mental
abnormality, deficiency or retardation.
We are not unaware that there have been cases9 where
the Court stated that sexual intercourse with a mental
retardate constitutes statutory rape. Nonetheless, the
Court in these cases affirmed the accused’s conviction
for simple rape despite a finding that the victim was a
mental retardate with a mental age of a person less than
12 years old.
Based on these discussions, we hold that the term
statutory rape should only be confined to situations
where the victim of rape is a person less than 12 years
of age. If the victim of rape is a person with mental
abnormality, deficiency, or retardation,the crime
committed is simple rape under Article 266-A, paragraph
(1)(b) asshe is considered "deprived of reason"
notwithstanding that her mental age isequivalent to that
of a person under 12. In short, carnal knowledge with a
mental retardate whose mental age is that of a person
below 12 years, while akinto statutory rape under Article
266-A, paragraph 1(d), should still be designated as
simple rape under paragraph 1(b). At any rate, proof of
force, threat or intimidation is dispensed with in both
statutory rape and rape with a person who is deprived of
reason.
With respect to the awarded indemnities, we further
direct the appellant to pay the victim ₱30,000.00 as
exemplary damages to set a public example and to
protect hapless individuals from sexual molestation. We
also impose a 6% interest on all the monetary awards for battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
damages to be reckoned from the date of finality of this arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is
decision until fully paid.10 not limited to, the following acts:

WHEREFORE, in light of all the foregoing, the CA A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts
decision dated January 31, 2012 in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. that include bodily or physical harm;
04279 is AFFIRMED with the following
MODIFICATIONS: B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act
which is sexual in nature, committed
(a) the appellant is found guilty of simple rape against a woman or her child. It
under Article 266-A(1)(b) of the Revised Penal includes, but is not limited to:
Code, as amended;
a) rape, sexual harassment,
(b) he is further ordered to pay AAA ₱30,000.00 acts of lasciviousness,
as exemplary damages; and treating a woman or her child
as a sex object, making
(c) he is ordered to pay interest, at the rate of demeaning and sexually
6% per annum on the award of civil indemnity, suggestive remarks,
moral damages, and exemplary damages from physically attacking the
finality of judgment until fully paid. sexual parts of the victim's
body, forcing her/him to
watch obscene publications
SO ORDERED. and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her
R.A. 9262 child to do indecent acts
and/or make films thereof,
Republic Act No. 9262 March 08, 2004 forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the
conjugal home or sleep
AN ACT DEFINING VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN together in the same room
AND THEIR CHILDREN, PROVIDING FOR with the abuser;
PROTECTIVE MEASURES FOR VICTIMS,
PRESCRIBING PENALTIES THEREFORE, AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES b) acts causing or attempting
to cause the victim to engage
in any sexual activity by
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of force, threat of force, physical
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress or other harm or threat of
assembled: physical or other harm or
coercion;
SECTION 1. Short Title.- This Act shall be known as the
"Anti-Violence Against Women and Their Children Act of c) Prostituting the woman or
2004". child.

SECTION 2. Declaration of Policy.- It is hereby declared C. "Psychological violence" refers to

that the State values the dignity of women and children acts or omissions causing or likely to
and guarantees full respect for human rights. The State cause mental or emotional suffering of
also recognizes the need to protect the family and its the victim such as but not limited to
members particularly women and children, from violence intimidation, harassment, stalking,
and threats to their personal safety and security. damage to property, public ridicule or
humiliation, repeated verbal abuse
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address and mental infidelity. It includes
violence committed against women and children in causing or allowing the victim to
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed witness the physical, sexual or
under the Constitution and the Provisions of the psychological abuse of a member of
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the convention the family to which the victim belongs,
on the Elimination of all forms of discrimination Against or to witness pornography in any form
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other or to witness abusive injury to pets or
international human rights instruments of which the to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of
Philippines is a party. the right to custody and/or visitation of
common children.
SECTION 3. Definition of Terms.- As used in this Act,
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts
that make or attempt to make a
(a) "Violence against women and their children"
woman financially dependent which
refers to any act or a series of acts committed
includes, but is not limited to the
by any person against a woman who is his wife,
following:
former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common 1. withdrawal of financial
child, or against her child whether legitimate or support or preventing the
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, victim from engaging in any
which result in or is likely to result in physical, legitimate profession,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or occupation, business or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, activity, except in cases
 wherein the other
spouse/partner objects on
valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article
73 of the Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of
deprivation of financial
resources and the right to the
use and enjoyment of the
conjugal, community or
property owned in common;
3. destroying household
property;
4. controlling the victims' own
money or properties or solely
controlling the conjugal
money or properties.
(b) "Battery" refers to an act of inflicting
physical harm upon the woman or her child
resulting to the physical and psychological or
emotional distress.
(c) "Battered Woman Syndrome" refers to a
scientifically defined pattern of psychological
and behavioral symptoms found in women
living in battering relationships as a result of
cumulative abuse.
(d) "Stalking" refers to an intentional act
committed by a person who, knowingly and
without lawful justification follows the woman or
her child or places the woman or her child
under surveillance directly or indirectly or a
combination thereof.
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation
wherein the parties live as husband and wife
without the benefit of marriage or are
romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the
relationship. A casual acquaintance or ordinary
socialization between two individuals in a
business or social context is not a dating
relationship.
(f) "Sexual relations" refers to a single sexual
act which may or may not result in the bearing
of a common child.
(g) "Safe place or shelter" refers to any home or
institution maintained or managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) or by any other agency or voluntary
organization accredited by the DSWD for the
purposes of this Act or any other suitable place
the resident of which is willing temporarily to
receive the victim.
(h) "Children" refers to those below eighteen
(18) years of age or older but are incapable of
taking care of themselves as defined under
Republic Act No. 7610. As used in this Act, it
includes the biological children of the victim and
other children under her care.
SECTION 4. Construction.- This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of victims
of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
(a) Causing physical harm to the woman or her
child;
(b) Threatening to cause the woman or her
child physical harm;
(c) Attempting to cause the woman or her child
physical harm;
(d) Placing the woman or her child in fear of
imminent physical harm;
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the
woman or her child to engage in conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to desist
from or desist from conduct which the woman
or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's
or her child's freedom of movement or conduct
by force or threat of force, physical or other
harm or threat of physical or other harm, or
intimidation directed against the woman or
child. This shall include, but not limited to, the
following acts committed with the purpose or
effect of controlling or restricting the woman's or
her child's movement or conduct:
(1) Threatening to deprive or actually
depriving the woman or her child of
custody to her/his family;
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive
the woman or her children of financial
support legally due her or her family,
or deliberately providing the woman's
children insufficient financial support;
(3) Depriving or threatening to deprive
the woman or her child of a legal right;
(4) Preventing the woman in engaging
in any legitimate profession,
occupation, business or activity or
controlling the victim's own mon4ey or
properties, or solely controlling the
conjugal or common money, or
properties;
(f) Inflicting or threatening to inflict physical
harm on oneself for the purpose of controlling
her actions or decisions;
(g) Causing or attempting to cause the woman
or her child to engage in any sexual activity
which does not constitute rape, by force or
threat of force, physical harm, or through
intimidation directed against the woman or her
child or her/his immediate family;
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through
another, that alarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:
 (1) Stalking or following the woman or
her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering
outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the
dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and
personal belongings or inflicting harm
to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of
harassment or violence;
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public
ridicule or humiliation to the woman or her child,
including, but not limited to, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, and denial of financial
support or custody of minor children of access
to the woman's child/children.
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against
women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall
be punished according to the following rules:
(a) Acts falling under Section 5(a) constituting
attempted, frustrated or consummated parricide
or murder or homicide shall be punished in
accordance with the provisions of the Revised
Penal Code.
If these acts resulted in mutilation, it shall be
punishable in accordance with the Revised
Penal Code; those constituting serious physical
injuries shall have the penalty of prison mayor;
those constituting less serious physical injuries
shall be punished by prision correccional; and
those constituting slight physical injuries shall
be punished by arresto mayor.
Acts falling under Section 5(b) shall be
punished by imprisonment of two degrees lower
than the prescribed penalty for the
consummated crime as specified in the
preceding paragraph but shall in no case be
lower than arresto mayor.
(b) Acts falling under Section 5(c) and 5(d) shall
be punished by arresto mayor;
(c) Acts falling under Section 5(e) shall be
punished by prision correccional;
(d) Acts falling under Section 5(f) shall be
punished by arresto mayor;
(e) Acts falling under Section 5(g) shall be
punished by prision mayor;
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section
5(i) shall be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or
child is pregnant or committed in the presence
of her child, the penalty to be applied shall be
the maximum period of penalty prescribed in
the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator
shall (a) pay a fine in the amount of not less
than One hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00) but not more than three hundred
thousand pesos (300,000.00); (b) undergo
mandatory psychological counseling or
psychiatric treatment and shall report
compliance to the court.
SECTION 7. Venue.- The Regional Trial Court
designated as a Family Court shall have original and
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against
women and their children under this law. In the absence
of such court in the place where the offense was
committed, the case shall be filed in the Regional Trial
Court where the crime or any of its elements was
committed at the option of the compliant.
SECTION 8. Protection Orders.- A protection order is an
order issued under this act for the purpose of preventing
further acts of violence against a woman or her child
specified in Section 5 of this Act and granting other
necessary relief. The relief granted under a protection
order serve the purpose of safeguarding the victim from
further harm, minimizing any disruption in the victim's
daily life, and facilitating the opportunity and ability of the
victim to independently regain control over her life. The
provisions of the protection order shall be enforced by
law enforcement agencies. The protection orders that
may be issued under this Act are the barangay
protection order (BPO), temporary protection order
(TPO) and permanent protection order (PPO). The
protection orders that may be issued under this Act shall
include any, some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from
threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned
in Section 5 of this Act;
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from
harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner,
directly or indirectly;
(c) Removal and exclusion of the respondent
from the residence of the petitioner, regardless
of ownership of the residence, either
temporarily for the purpose of protecting the
petitioner, or permanently where no property
rights are violated, and if respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the
court shall direct a law enforcement agent to
accompany the respondent has gathered his
things and escort respondent from the
residence;
(d) Directing the respondent to stay away from
petitioner and designated family or household
member at a distance specified by the court,
and to stay away from the residence, school,
place of employment, or any specified place
frequented by the petitioner and any designated
family or household member;
(e) Directing lawful possession and use by
petitioner of an automobile and other essential
personal effects, regardless of ownership, and
directing the appropriate law enforcement
officer to accompany the petitioner to the
 residence of the parties to ensure that the
petitioner is safely restored to the possession of
the automobile and other essential personal
effects, or to supervise the petitioner's or
respondent's removal of personal belongings;
(f) Granting a temporary or permanent custody
of a child/children to the petitioner;
(g) Directing the respondent to provide support
to the woman and/or her child if entitled to legal
support. Notwithstanding other laws to the
contrary, the court shall order an appropriate
percentage of the income or salary of the
respondent to be withheld regularly by the
respondent's employer for the same to be
automatically remitted directly to the woman.
Failure to remit and/or withhold or any delay in
the remittance of support to the woman and/or
her child without justifiable cause shall render
the respondent or his employer liable for
indirect contempt of court;
(h) Prohibition of the respondent from any use
or possession of any firearm or deadly weapon
and order him to surrender the same to the
court for appropriate disposition by the court,
including revocation of license and
disqualification to apply for any license to use
or possess a firearm. If the offender is a law
enforcement agent, the court shall order the
offender to surrender his firearm and shall
direct the appropriate authority to investigate on
the offender and take appropriate action on
matter;
(i) Restitution for actual damages caused by the
violence inflicted, including, but not limited to,
property damage, medical expenses, childcare
expenses and loss of income;
(j) Directing the DSWD or any appropriate
agency to provide petitioner may need; and
(k) Provision of such other forms of relief as the
court deems necessary to protect and provide
for the safety of the petitioner and any
designated family or household member,
provided petitioner and any designated family
or household member consents to such relief.
Any of the reliefs provided under this section
shall be granted even in the absence of a
decree of legal separation or annulment or
declaration of absolute nullity of marriage.
The issuance of a BPO or the pendency of an
application for BPO shall not preclude a
petitioner from applying for, or the court from
granting a TPO or PPO.
SECTION 9. Who may file Petition for Protection Orders.
– A petition for protection order may be filed by any of
the following:
(a) the offended party;
(b) parents or guardians of the offended party;
(c) ascendants, descendants or collateral
relatives within the fourth civil degree of
consanguinity or affinity;
(d) officers or social workers of the DSWD or
social workers of local government units
(LGUs);
(e) police officers, preferably those in charge of
women and children's desks;
(f) Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad;
(g) lawyer, counselor, therapist or healthcare
provider of the petitioner;
(h) At least two (2) concerned responsible
citizens of the city or municipality where the
violence against women and their children
occurred and who has personal knowledge of
the offense committed.
SECTION 10. Where to Apply for a Protection Order. –
Applications for BPOs shall follow the rules on venue
under Section 409 of the Local Government Code of
1991 and its implementing rules and regulations. An
application for a TPO or PPO may be filed in the regional
trial court, metropolitan trial court, municipal trial court,
municipal circuit trial court with territorial jurisdiction over
the place of residence of the petitioner: Provided,
however, That if a family court exists in the place of
residence of the petitioner, the application shall be filed
with that court.
SECTION 11. How to Apply for a Protection Order. – The
application for a protection order must be in writing,
signed and verified under oath by the applicant. It may
be filed as an independent action or as incidental relief in
any civil or criminal case the subject matter or issues
thereof partakes of a violence as described in this Act. A
standard protection order application form, written in
English with translation to the major local languages,
shall be made available to facilitate applications for
protections order, and shall contain, among other, the
following information:
(a) names and addresses of petitioner and
respondent;
(b) description of relationships between
petitioner and respondent;
(c) a statement of the circumstances of the
abuse;
(d) description of the reliefs requested by
petitioner as specified in Section 8 herein;
(e) request for counsel and reasons for such;
(f) request for waiver of application fees until
hearing; and
(g) an attestation that there is no pending
application for a protection order in another
court.
If the applicants is not the victim, the application must be
accompanied by an affidavit of the applicant attesting to
(a) the circumstances of the abuse suffered by the victim
and (b) the circumstances of consent given by the victim
for the filling of the application. When disclosure of the
address of the victim will pose danger to her life, it shall
be so stated in the application. In such a case, the
applicant shall attest that the victim is residing in the
municipality or city over which court has territorial
jurisdiction, and shall provide a mailing address for
purpose of service processing.
An application for protection order filed with a court shall
be considered an application for both a TPO and PPO.
Barangay officials and court personnel shall assist
applicants in the preparation of the application. Law
enforcement agents shall also extend assistance in the
application for protection orders in cases brought to their
attention.
SECTION 12. Enforceability of Protection Orders. – All
TPOs and PPOs issued under this Act shall be
enforceable anywhere in the Philippines and a violation
thereof shall be punishable with a fine ranging from Five
Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00) to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00) and/or imprisonment of six (6) months.
SECTION 13. Legal Representation of Petitioners for
Protection Order. – If the woman or her child requests in
the applications for a protection order for the
appointment of counsel because of lack of economic
means to hire a counsel de parte, the court shall
immediately direct the Public Attorney's Office (PAO) to
represent the petitioner in the hearing on the application.
If the PAO determines that the applicant can afford to
hire the services of a counsel de parte, it shall facilitate
the legal representation of the petitioner by a counsel de
parte. The lack of access to family or conjugal resources
by the applicant, such as when the same are controlled
by the perpetrator, shall qualify the petitioner to legal
representation by the PAO.
However, a private counsel offering free legal service is
not barred from representing the petitioner.
SECTION 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who
May Issue and How. - Barangay Protection Orders
(BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist
from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act. A Punong Barangay who receives applications for a
BPO shall issue the protection order to the applicant on
the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis
of the application. If the Punong Barangay is unavailable
to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall
be acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If
the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad the order
must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay
Kagawad that the Punong Barangay was unavailable at
the time for the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be
effective for fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the
issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the
same on the respondent, or direct any barangay official
to effect is personal service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer
advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
SECTION 15. Temporary Protection Orders.
– Temporary Protection Orders (TPOs) refers to the
protection order issued by the court on the date of filing
of the application after ex parte determination that such
order should be issued. A court may grant in a TPO any,
some or all of the reliefs mentioned in this Act and shall
be effective for thirty (30) days. The court shall schedule
a hearing on the issuance of a PPO prior to or on the
date of the expiration of the TPO. The court shall order
the immediate personal service of the TPO on the
respondent by the court sheriff who may obtain the
assistance of law enforcement agents for the service.
The TPO shall include notice of the date of the hearing
on the merits of the issuance of a PPO.
SECTION 16. Permanent Protection Orders. –
Permanent Protection Order (PPO) refers to protection
order issued by the court after notice and hearing.
Respondents non-appearance despite proper notice, or
his lack of a lawyer, or the non-availability of his lawyer
shall not be a ground for rescheduling or postponing the
hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO. If the
respondents appears without counsel on the date of the
hearing on the PPO, the court shall appoint a lawyer for
the respondent and immediately proceed with the
hearing. In case the respondent fails to appear despite
proper notice, the court shall allow ex parte presentation
of the evidence by the applicant and render judgment on
the basis of the evidence presented. The court shall
allow the introduction of any history of abusive conduct
of a respondent even if the same was not directed
against the applicant or the person for whom the
applicant is made.
The court shall, to the extent possible, conduct the
hearing on the merits of the issuance of a PPO in one
(1) day. Where the court is unable to conduct the hearing
within one (1) day and the TPO issued is due to expire,
the court shall continuously extend or renew the TPO for
a period of thirty (30) days at each particular time until
final judgment is issued. The extended or renewed TPO
may be modified by the court as may be necessary or
applicable to address the needs of the applicant.
The court may grant any, some or all of the reliefs
specified in Section 8 hereof in a PPO. A PPO shall be
effective until revoked by a court upon application of the
person in whose favor the order was issued. The court
shall ensure immediate personal service of the PPO on
respondent.
The court shall not deny the issuance of protection order
on the basis of the lapse of time between the act of
violence and the filing of the application.
Regardless of the conviction or acquittal of the
respondent, the Court must determine whether or not the
PPO shall become final. Even in a dismissal, a PPO
shall be granted as long as there is no clear showing
that the act from which the order might arise did not
exist.
SECTION 17. Notice of Sanction in Protection Orders. –
The following statement must be printed in bold-faced
type or in capital letters on the protection order issued by
the Punong Barangay or court:
"VIOLATION OF THIS ORDER IS PUNISHABLE BY
LAW."
SECTION 18. Mandatory Period For Acting on
Applications For Protection Orders – Failure to act on an
application for a protection order within the reglementary
period specified in the previous section without justifiable
cause shall render the official or judge administratively
liable.
SECTION 19. Legal Separation Cases. – In cases of
legal separation, where violence as specified in this Act
is alleged, Article 58 of the Family Code shall not apply.
The court shall proceed on the main case and other
incidents of the case as soon as possible. The hearing
on any application for a protection order filed by the
petitioner must be conducted within the mandatory
period specified in this Act.
SECTION 20. Priority of Application for a Protection
Order. – Ex parte and adversarial hearings to determine
the basis of applications for a protection order under this
Act shall have priority over all other proceedings.
Barangay officials and the courts shall schedule and
conduct hearings on applications for a protection order
under this Act above all other business and, if necessary,
suspend other proceedings in order to hear applications
for a protection order.
SECTION 21. Violation of Protection Orders. – A
complaint for a violation of a BPO issued under this Act
must be filed directly with any municipal trial court,
metropolitan trial court, or municipal circuit trial court that
has territorial jurisdiction over the barangay that issued
the BPO. Violation of a BPO shall be punishable by
imprisonment of thirty (30) days without prejudice to any
other criminal or civil action that the offended party may
file for any of the acts committed.
A judgement of violation of a BPO ma be appealed
according to the Rules of Court. During trial and upon
judgment, the trial court may motu proprio issue a
protection order as it deems necessary without need of
an application.
Violation of any provision of a TPO or PPO issued under
this Act shall constitute contempt of court punishable
under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court, without prejudice to
any other criminal or civil action that the offended party
may file for any of the acts committed.
SECTION 22. Applicability of Protection Orders to
Criminal Cases. – The foregoing provisions on protection
orders shall be applicable in impliedly instituted with the
criminal actions involving violence against women and
their children.
SECTION 23. Bond to Keep the Peace. – The Court
may order any person against whom a protection order
is issued to give a bond to keep the peace, to present
two sufficient sureties who shall undertake that such
person will not commit the violence sought to be
prevented.
Should the respondent fail to give the bond as required,
he shall be detained for a period which shall in no case
exceed six (6) months, if he shall have been prosecuted
for acts punishable under Section 5(a) to 5(f) and not
exceeding thirty (30) days, if for acts punishable under
Section 5(g) to 5(I).
The protection orders referred to in this section are the
TPOs and the PPOs issued only by the courts.
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under
Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in
ten (10) years.
SECTION 25. Public Crime. – Violence against women
and their children shall be considered a public offense
which may be prosecuted upon the filing of a complaint
by any citizen having personal knowledge of the
circumstances involving the commission of the crime.
SECTION 26. Battered Woman Syndrome as a Defense.
– Victim-survivors who are found by the courts to be
suffering from battered woman syndrome do not incur
any criminal and civil liability notwithstanding the
absence of any of the elements for justifying
circumstances of self-defense under the Revised Penal
Code.
In the determination of the state of mind of the woman
who was suffering from battered woman syndrome at the
time of the commission of the crime, the courts shall be
assisted by expert psychiatrists/ psychologists.
SECTION 27. Prohibited Defense. – Being under the
influence of alcohol, any illicit drug, or any other mind-
altering substance shall not be a defense under this Act.
SECTION 28. Custody of children. – The woman victim
of violence shall be entitled to the custody and support of
her child/children. Children below seven (7) years old
older but with mental or physical disabilities shall
automatically be given to the mother, with right to
support, unless the court finds compelling reasons to
order otherwise.
A victim who is suffering from battered woman syndrome
shall not be disqualified from having custody of her
children. In no case shall custody of minor children be
given to the perpetrator of a woman who is suffering
from Battered woman syndrome.
SECTION 29. Duties of Prosecutors/Court Personnel. –
Prosecutors and court personnel should observe the
following duties when dealing with victims under this Act:
a) communicate with the victim in a language
understood by the woman or her child; and
b) inform the victim of her/his rights including
legal remedies available and procedure, and
privileges for indigent litigants.
SECTION 30. Duties of Barangay Officials and Law
Enforcers. – Barangay officials and law enforcers shall
have the following duties:
(a) respond immediately to a call for help or
request for assistance or protection of the
victim by entering the necessary whether or not
a protection order has been issued and ensure
the safety of the victim/s;
(b) confiscate any deadly weapon in the
possession of the perpetrator or within plain
view;
(c) transport or escort the victim/s to a safe
place of their choice or to a clinic or hospital;
(d) assist the victim in removing personal
belongs from the house;
(e) assist the barangay officials and other
government officers and employees who
respond to a call for help;
(f) ensure the enforcement of the Protection
Orders issued by the Punong Barangy or the
courts;
 (g) arrest the suspected perpetrator wiithout a
warrant when any of the acts of violence
defined by this Act is occurring, or when he/she
has personal knowledge that any act of abuse
has just been committed, and there is imminent
danger to the life or limb of the victim as
defined in this Act; and
(h) immediately report the call for assessment
or assistance of the DSWD, social Welfare
Department of LGUs or accredited non-
government organizations (NGOs).
Any barangay official or law enforcer who fails to report
the incident shall be liable for a fine not exceeding Ten
Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) or whenever applicable
criminal, civil or administrative liability.
SECTION 31. Healthcare Provider Response to Abuse –
Any healthcare provider, including, but not limited to, an
attending physician, nurse, clinician, barangay health
worker, therapist or counselor who suspects abuse or
has been informed by the victim of violence shall:
(a) properly document any of the victim's
physical, emotional or psychological injuries;
(b) properly record any of victim's suspicions,
observations and circumstances of the
examination or visit;
(c) automatically provide the victim free of
charge a medical certificate concerning the
examination or visit;
(d) safeguard the records and make them
available to the victim upon request at actual
cost; and
(e) provide the victim immediate and adequate
notice of rights and remedies provided under
this Act, and services available to them.
SECTION 32. Duties of Other Government Agencies
and LGUs – Other government agencies and LGUs shall
establish programs such as, but not limited to, education
and information campaign and seminars or symposia on
the nature, causes, incidence and consequences of such
violence particularly towards educating the public on its
social impacts.
It shall be the duty of the concerned government
agencies and LGU's to ensure the sustained education
and training of their officers and personnel on the
prevention of violence against women and their children
under the Act.
SECTION 33. Prohibited Acts. – A Punong Barangay,
Barangay Kagawad or the court hearing an application
for a protection order shall not order, direct, force or in
any way unduly influence he applicant for a protection
order to compromise or abandon any of the reliefs
sought in the application for protection under this Act.
Section 7 of the Family Courts Act of 1997 and Sections
410, 411, 412 and 413 of the Local Government Code of
1991 shall not apply in proceedings where relief is
sought under this Act.
Failure to comply with this Section shall render the
official or judge administratively liable.
SECTION 34. Persons Intervening Exempt from Liability.
– In every case of violence against women and their
children as herein defined, any person, private individual
or police authority or barangay official who, acting in
accordance with law, responds or intervenes without
using violence or restraint greater than necessary to
ensure the safety of the victim, shall not be liable for any
criminal, civil or administrative liability resulting
therefrom.
SECTION 35. Rights of Victims. – In addition to their
rights under existing laws, victims of violence against
women and their children shall have the following rights:
(a) to be treated with respect and dignity;
(b) to avail of legal assistance form the PAO of
the Department of Justice (DOJ) or any public
legal assistance office;
(c) To be entitled to support services form the
DSWD and LGUs'
(d) To be entitled to all legal remedies and
support as provided for under the Family Code;
and
(e) To be informed of their rights and the
services available to them including their right
to apply for a protection order.
SECTION 36. Damages. – Any victim of violence under
this Act shall be entitled to actual, compensatory, moral
and exemplary damages.
SECTION 37. Hold Departure Order. – The court shall
expedite the process of issuance of a hold departure
order in cases prosecuted under this Act.
SECTION 38. Exemption from Payment of Docket Fee
and Other Expenses. – If the victim is an indigent or
there is an immediate necessity due to imminent danger
or threat of danger to act on an application for a
protection order, the court shall accept the application
without payment of the filing fee and other fees and of
transcript of stenographic notes.
SECTION 39. Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against
Women and Their Children (IAC-VAWC). In pursuance
of the abovementioned policy, there is hereby
established an Inter-Agency Council on Violence Against
Women and their children, hereinafter known as the
Council, which shall be composed of the following
agencies:
(a) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
(b) National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW);
(c) Civil Service Commission (CSC);
(d) Commission on Human rights (CHR)
(e) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(f) Department of Justice (DOJ);
 (g) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);
(i) Department of Health (DOH);
(j) Department of Education (DepEd);
(k) Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE); and
(l) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI).
These agencies are tasked to formulate programs and
projects to eliminate VAW based on their mandates as
well as develop capability programs for their employees
to become more sensitive to the needs of their clients.
The Council will also serve as the monitoring body as
regards to VAW initiatives.
The Council members may designate their duly
authorized representative who shall have a rank not
lower than an assistant secretary or its equivalent.
These representatives shall attend Council meetings in
their behalf, and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations.
SECTION 40. Mandatory Programs and Services for
Victims. – The DSWD, and LGU's shall provide the
victims temporary shelters, provide counseling, psycho-
social services and /or, recovery, rehabilitation programs
and livelihood assistance.
The DOH shall provide medical assistance to victims.
SECTION 41. Counseling and Treatment of Offenders.
– The DSWD shall provide rehabilitative counseling and
treatment to perpetrators towards learning constructive
ways of coping with anger and emotional outbursts and
reforming their ways. When necessary, the offender shall
be ordered by the Court to submit to psychiatric
treatment or confinement.
SECTION 42. Training of Persons Involved in
Responding to Violence Against Women and their
Children Cases. – All agencies involved in responding to
violence against women and their children cases shall
be required to undergo education and training to
acquaint them with:
a. the nature, extend and causes of violence
against women and their children;
b. the legal rights of, and remedies available to,
victims of violence against women and their
children;
c. the services and facilities available to victims
or survivors;
d. the legal duties imposed on police officers to
make arrest and to offer protection and
assistance; and
e. techniques for handling incidents of violence
against women and their children that minimize
the likelihood of injury to the officer and
promote the safety of the victim or survivor.
The PNP, in coordination with LGU's shall establish an
education and training program for police officers and
barangay officials to enable them to properly handle
cases of violence against women and their children.
SECTION 43. Entitled to Leave. – Victims under this Act
shall be entitled to take a paid leave of absence up to
ten (10) days in addition to other paid leaves under the
Labor Code and Civil Service Rules and Regulations,
extendible when the necessity arises as specified in the
protection order.
Any employer who shall prejudice the right of the person
under this section shall be penalized in accordance with
the provisions of the Labor Code and Civil Service Rules
and Regulations. Likewise, an employer who shall
prejudice any person for assisting a co-employee who is
a victim under this Act shall likewise be liable for
discrimination.
SECTION 44. Confidentiality. – All records pertaining to
cases of violence against women and their children
including those in the barangay shall be confidential and
all public officers and employees and public or private
clinics to hospitals shall respect the right to privacy of the
victim. Whoever publishes or causes to be published, in
any format, the name, address, telephone number,
school, business address, employer, or other identifying
information of a victim or an immediate family member,
without the latter's consent, shall be liable to the
contempt power of the court.
Any person who violates this provision shall suffer the
penalty of one (1) year imprisonment and a fine of not
more than Five Hundred Thousand pesos
(P500,000.00).
SECTION 45. Funding – The amount necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act (GAA).
The Gender and Development (GAD) Budget of the
mandated agencies and LGU's shall be used to
implement services for victim of violence against women
and their children.
SECTION 46. Implementing Rules and Regulations. –
Within six (6) months from the approval of this Act, the
DOJ, the NCRFW, the DSWD, the DILG, the DOH, and
the PNP, and three (3) representatives from NGOs to be
identified by the NCRFW, shall promulgate the
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) of this Act.
SECTION 47. Suppletory Application – For purposes of
this Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable
laws, shall have suppletory application.
SECTION 48. Separability Clause. – If any section or
provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or invalid,
the other sections or provisions shall not be affected.
SECTION 49. Repealing Clause – All laws, Presidential
decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
SECTION 50. Effectivity – This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days from the date of its complete publication
in at least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding
Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod City,
and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in
behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN, JOSEPH
EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed
GARCIA, Respondents.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the
Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or 93 percent
of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the
teachings of Jesus Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for
husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as
Christ loved the church and gave himself up for
her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the pervasiveness
of violence against Filipino women. The National
Commission on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW)
reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence
comprised more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and
violence and more than 90% of these reported cases
were committed by the women's intimate partners such
as their husbands and live-in partners."3
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited
advocacy by women's groups, Congress enacted
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining
Violence Against Women and Their Children, Providing
for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing
Penalties Therefor, and for Other Purposes." It took
effect on March 27, 2004.4
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and
criminalizes acts of violence against women and their
children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate
partners, i.e, husband; former husband; or any person
who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom the woman has a common child. 5 The law
provides for protection orders from the barangay and the
courts to prevent the commission of further acts of
VAWC; and outlines the duties and responsibilities of
barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court
personnel, social workers, health care providers, and
other local government officials in responding to
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
A husband is now before the Court assailing the
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being violative of the
equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue
delegation of judicial power to barangay officials.
The Factual Antecedents
On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private
respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf of her minor
children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797)
before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for
the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO)
against her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner),
pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic
violence as a result of marital infidelity on the part of
petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her
children and of financial support.7
Private respondent's claims
Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she
was 34 years old and the former was eleven years her
senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J.
Garcia, 17 years old, who is the natural child of petitioner
but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3
years old.8
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and
faithful wife, whose life revolved around her husband. On
the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese
descent, is dominant, controlling, and demands absolute
obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from
her friends. When she took up law, and even when she
was already working part time at a law office, petitioner
trivialized her ambitions and prevailed upon her to just
stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that his
attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one
point threatening that he would have any man eyeing her
killed.9
Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an
affair with a bank manager of Robinson's Bank, Bacolod
City, who is the godmother of one of their sons.
Petitioner admitted to the affair when private respondent
confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to the
household help about his sexual relations with said bank
manager. Petitioner told private respondent, though, that
he was just using the woman because of their accounts
with the bank.10
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left
private respondent physically and emotionally wounded.
In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private
respondent on both arms and shook her with such force
that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that
caused some bleeding. Petitioner sometimes turned his
ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text
messages he sent to his paramour and whom he blamed
for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
slapped her many times. When private respondent
decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged her mother to
stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat
her up. Even the small boys are aware of private
respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that
when he grows up, he would beat up his father because
of his cruelty to private respondent.11
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private
respondent to the brink of despair. On December 17,
2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting
her wrist. She was found by her son bleeding on the
floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking
her to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized
for about seven (7) days in which time petitioner never
bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her.
Since then, private respondent has been undergoing
therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12
When private respondent informed the management of
Robinson's Bank that she intends to file charges against
the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for
jeopardizing the manager's job. He then packed his
things and told private respondent that he was leaving
her for good. He even told private respondent's mother,
who lives with them in the family home, that private
respondent should just accept his extramarital affair
since he is not cohabiting with his paramour and has not
sired a child with her.13
Private respondent is determined to separate from
petitioner but she is afraid that he would take her
children from her and deprive her of financial support.
Petitioner had previously warned her that if she goes on
a legal battle with him, she would not get a single
centavo.14
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly
the construction of deep wells. He is the President of
three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros
Rotadrill Corporation, and J-Bros Trading Corporation –
of which he and private respondent are both
stockholders. In contrast to the absolute control of
petitioner over said corporations, private respondent
merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one
corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill Corporation.
Household expenses amounting to not less than
₱200,000.00 a month are paid for by private respondent
through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid
by the same corporation together with the bills for
utilities.15
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary
of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill Corporation, and
enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in
hundreds of thousands of pesos from the
corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him
about the affair, petitioner forbade her to hold office at
JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of
access to full information about said businesses. Until
the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given
private respondent an accounting of the businesses the
value of which she had helped raise to millions of
pesos.17
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent
danger of violence against the private respondent and
her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a
TPO18 on March 24, 2006 effective for thirty (30) days,
which is quoted hereunder:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:
a) Ordered to remove all his personal
belongings from the conjugal dwelling or family
home within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Restraining Order and if he refuses,
ordering that he be removed by police officers
from the conjugal dwelling; this order is
enforceable notwithstanding that the house is
under the name of 236 Realty Holdings Inc.
(Republic Act No. 9262 states "regardless of
ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner
(private respondent herein) to enter the
conjugal dwelling without any danger from the
Respondent.
After the Respondent leaves or is removed
from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime the
Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal
dwelling to remove things, the Petitioner shall
be assisted by police officers when re-entering
the family home.
The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner
police assistance on Sunday, 26 March 2006
because of the danger that the Respondent will
attempt to take her children from her when he
arrives from Manila and finds out about this
suit.
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her
children, mother and all her household help and
driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and
shall not enter the gate of the subdivision where
the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or
otherwise communicate with the Petitioner,
directly or indirectly, or through other persons,
or contact directly or indirectly her children,
mother and household help, nor send gifts,
cards, flowers, letters and the like. Visitation
rights to the children may be subject of a
modified TPO in the future.
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .
9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK and
ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms
and Explosives Unit and the Provincial Director
of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's
firearm licenses. He should also be ordered to
surrender any unlicensed firearms in his
possession or control.
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner
and the children, including rental of a house for
them, and educational and medical expenses.
f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
g) To render an accounting of all advances,
benefits, bonuses and other cash he received
from all the corporations from 1 January 2006
up to 31 March 2006, which himself and as
President of the corporations and his
Comptroller, must submit to the Court not later
than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of
all these funds shall be reported to the court by
the Comptroller, copy furnished to the
Petitioner, every 15 days of the month, under
pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
h) To ensure compliance especially with the
order granting support pendente lite, and
considering the financial resources of the
Respondent and his threat that if the Petitioner
sues she will not get a single centavo, the
Respondent is ordered to put up a BOND TO
KEEP THE PEACE in the amount of FIVE
MILLION PESOS, in two sufficient sureties.
On April 24, 2006, upon motion19 of private
respondent, the trial court issued an amended
TPO,20 effective for thirty (30) days, which
included the following additional provisions:
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein)
are given the continued use of the Nissan
Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using
in Negros Occidental.
j) The petitioners are given the continued use
and occupation of the house in Parañaque, the
continued use of the Starex van in Metro
Manila, whenever they go to Manila.
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a
bond to keep the peace, in two sufficient
sureties.
 l) To give monthly support to the petitioner
provisionally fixed in the sum of One Hundred
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per
month plus rental expenses of Fifty Thousand
Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the
matter of support could be finally resolved.
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an
Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for Renewal of
the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO
on the grounds that it did not (1) comply with the three-
day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. He
further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing
one vehicle used by private respondent and returning
the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading
Corporation, and (2) cancelling or reducing the amount
of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable
level at ₱100,000.00.
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for
the modification of the TPO to allow him visitation rights
to his children.
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended
yet again, but subject only to the following modifications
prayed for by private respondent:
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the
clothes and other personal belongings of
Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus
Ramos, co-counsel for Petitioner, within 24
hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection
Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
Indirect Contempt of Court;
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list
of furniture and equipment in the conjugal
house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision,
Bacolod City within 24 hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of
the Bacolod City Police Headquarters to
remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling
within eight (8) hours from receipt of the
Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and
that he cannot return until 48 hours after the
petitioners have left, so that the petitioner
Rosalie and her representatives can remove
things from the conjugal home and make an
inventory of the household furniture, equipment
and other things in the conjugal home, which
shall be submitted to the Court.
d) Deliver full financial support of
Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental
and Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three
petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
his counsel, otherwise be declared in indirect
contempt of Court;
e) That respondent surrender his two firearms
and all unlicensed firearms to the Clerk of Court
within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary
Protection Order by his counsel;
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner
educational expenses of the children upon
presentation of proof of payment of such
expenses.23
Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of
financial support; failed to faithfully comply with the TPO;
and committed new acts of harassment against her and
their children, private respondent filed another
application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She
alleged inter
alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against
himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which the latter was
purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of
recovering the Nissan Patrol and Starex Van used by
private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin
was served upon private respondent by a group of six or
seven policemen with long firearms that scared the two
small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven
to school, two men allegedly attempted to kidnap him,
which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his
refusal to go back to school. On another occasion,
petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by
the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported
to the police, and Jo-Ann subsequently filed a criminal
complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610,
also known as the "Special Protection of Children
Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination
Act."
Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated
the filing by the housemaids working at the conjugal
home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention
against private respondent. This came about after
private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said
home to get her and her children's belongings. Finding
some of her things inside a housemaid's (Sheryl Jamola)
bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case
for qualified theft against Jamola.27
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO, 28 effective
for thirty (30) days, which reads as follows:
Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is
hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or
committing, personally or through another, acts
of violence against the offended party;
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying,
telephoning, contacting or otherwise
communicating in any form with the offended
party, either directly or indirectly;
3) Required to stay away, personally or through
his friends, relatives, employees or agents,
from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and
her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's three brothers,
her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita
Caranzo, driver Romeo Hontiveros,
laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security
guard Darwin Gayona and the petitioner's other
household helpers from a distance of 1,000
meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
subdivision where the Petitioners are
temporarily residing, as well as from the
schools of the three children; Furthermore, that
respondent shall not contact the schools of the
children directly or indirectly in any manner
including, ostensibly to pay for their tuition or
other fees directly, otherwise he will have
access to the children through the schools and
the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
 4) Directed to surrender all his firearms
including .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther
PPK to the Court;
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of
Php200,000.00 a month and Php50,000.00 for
rental for the period from August 6 to
September 6, 2006; and support in arrears from
March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of
Php1,312,000.00;
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for
2006-2007 the amount of Php75,000.00 and
Php25,000.00;
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a
Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 and a
Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should
the respondent fail to deliver said vehicles,
respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner
another vehicle which is the one taken by J
Bros Tading;
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate,
sell, lease or otherwise dispose of the conjugal
assets, or those real properties in the name of
Jesus Chua Garcia only and those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and respondent have an
interest in, especially the conjugal home
located in No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville
Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties
which are conjugal assets or those in which the
conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an
interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I-1," and
"I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos.
T-186325 and T-168814;
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of
Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be
served a copy of this TEMPORARY
PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to
allow the transfer, sale, encumbrance or
disposition of these above-cited properties to
any person, entity or corporation without the
personal presence of petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the
presence of the Register of Deeds, due to the
fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will
be forged in order to effect the encumbrance or
sale of these properties to defraud her or the
conjugal partnership of gains.
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court
extended the aforequoted TPO for another ten (10)
days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within
which to show cause why the TPO should not be
renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a
copy of private respondent's motion to modify/renew the
TPO, the trial court directed in its Order 31 dated October
6, 2006 that petitioner be furnished a copy of said
motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier,
October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO
dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent portion is quoted
hereunder:
xxxx
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet
be finally terminated, the Temporary Protection Order
issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and
extended for thirty (30) days and continuously extended
and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration,
until further orders, and subject to such modifications as
may be ordered by the court.
After having received a copy of the foregoing Order,
petitioner no longer submitted the required comment to
private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO
arguing that it would only be an "exercise in futility."33
Proceedings before the CA
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner
filed before the Court of Appeals (CA) a petition 34 for
prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer
for injunction and temporary restraining order,
challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for
being violative of the due process and the equal
protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the modified
TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted
product of an invalid law."
On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day
Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO) against the
enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other
orders pursuant thereto.
Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the
appellate court dismissed36 the petition for failure of
petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his
pleadings before the trial court in the civil case, which is
clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly,
the challenge to the validity
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to
annul the protection orders issued by the trial court
constituted a collateral attack on said law.
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision
having been denied in the Resolution 37 dated August 14,
2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues
I.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING
THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE ISSUE
OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE
EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, THE PETITION
CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE
VALIDITY OF THE LAW.
II.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS
ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A. 9262
IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE
MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE
CONSTITUTION.
IV.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING
THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE POLICY OF
THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC
SOCIAL INSTITUTION.
V.
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN
NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN
UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO THE
BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38
The Ruling of the Court
Before delving into the arguments propounded by
petitioner against the constitutionality of R.A. 9262, we
shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the
appellate court of the petition for prohibition (CA-G.R.
CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity so that if not raised
in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the
trial, and if not raised in the trial court, it will not be
considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity
of deciding it.40
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod City, petitioner
argues that the Family Court has limited authority and
jurisdiction that is "inadequate to tackle the complex
issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider
the constitutionality of a statute.
At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are
special courts, of the same level as Regional Trial
Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the
"Family Courts Act of 1997," family courts have exclusive
original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic
violence against women and children.42 In accordance
with said law, the Supreme Court designated from
among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least
one Family Court in each of several key cities
identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned
law, Section 7 of R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional
Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC
defined under the latter law, viz:
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated
as a Family Court shall have original and exclusive
jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and
their children under this law. In the absence of such
court in the place where the offense was committed, the
case shall be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
crime or any of its elements was committed at the option
of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of
Bacolod City remains possessed of authority as a court
of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of
cases whether civil, criminal, special proceedings, land
registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to
resolve the constitutionality of a statute,45 "this authority
being embraced in the general definition of the judicial
power to determine what are the valid and binding laws
by the criterion of their conformity to the fundamental
law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review
or the power to declare the constitutionality or validity of
a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or
regulation not only in this Court, but in all RTCs. 47 We
said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly
the Constitution contemplates that the inferior courts
should have jurisdiction in cases involving
constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of
appellate review of final judgments of inferior courts in
cases where such constitutionality happens to be in
issue." Section 5, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution
reads in part as follows:
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or the Rules of Court may provide,
final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of
any treaty, international or executive agreement, law,
presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction,
ordinance, or regulation is in question.
xxxx
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of
constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could have been raised at
the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition
for protection order before the RTC of Bacolod City,
which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to
the review of this Court.
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on
Violence Against Women and Their Children, lays down
a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file
an opposition to the petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent
may file an opposition to the petition which he himself
shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of
witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
permanent protection order should not be issued.
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any
counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party complaint, but
any cause of action which could be the subject thereof
may be litigated in a separate civil action. (Emphasis
supplied)
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by
petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross-claim and
third-party complaint are to be excluded from the
opposition, the issue of constitutionality cannot likewise
be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim
for money or other relief which a defending party may
have against an opposing party.50 A cross-claim, on the
other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party
arising out of the transaction or occurrence that is the
subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a
claim that a defending party may, with leave of court, file
against a person not a party to the action for
contribution, indemnity, subrogation or any other relief, in
respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by
Justice Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the
unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action
that could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim
or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is not prohibited
from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar
maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius.
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the
resolution of the case a quo because the right of private
respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the
very statute the validity of which is being attacked 53 by
petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct injury
as a result of its enforcement. The alleged
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all intents and
purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a
protection order.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are
summary in nature should not have deterred petitioner
from raising the same in his Opposition. The question
relative to the constitutionality of a statute is one of law
which does not need to be supported by evidence.54 Be
that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
nonetheless allows the conduct of a hearing to
determine legal issues, among others, viz:
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court
determines the need for further hearing, it may issue an
order containing the following:
(a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
(b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents
that have been marked and will be presented;
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to
present their direct testimonies in the form of
affidavits; and
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by
both parties which shall be done in one day, to
the extent possible, within the 30-day period of
the effectivity of the temporary protection order
issued. (Emphasis supplied)
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant
to the conduct of a hearing when necessary, Section 26
(b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary
protection order issued is due to expire, the trial court
may extend or renew the said order for a period of thirty
(30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It
may likewise modify the extended or renewed temporary
protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs
of the parties. With the private respondent given ample
protection, petitioner could proceed to litigate the
constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of
the very purpose for the adoption of the rules on
summary procedure.
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly
dismissed the petition for prohibition with prayer for
injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R.
CEB - SP. No. 01698). Petitioner may have proceeded
upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However,
Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC expressly
disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus
or prohibition against any interlocutory order issued by
the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the
appellate court in this case against the enforcement of
the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant
thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the
case from taking its normal course in an expeditious and
summary manner.
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or
certiorari before judgment is prohibited. Moreover, if the
appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection
shall not stay its enforcement,55 with more reason that a
TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be
unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself entitle a
litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris,
Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of the United States declared,
thus:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either
in their entirety or with respect to their separate and
distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of
course, even if such statutes are unconstitutional. No
citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts.
The imminence of such a prosecution even though
alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not
alone ground for relief in equity which exerts its
extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to
the plaintiff who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status
quo until the trial court hears fully the merits of the case.
It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are
granted ex parte so as to protect women and their
children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction
against such orders will defeat the very purpose of the
law against VAWC.
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not
shirk from our obligation to determine novel issues, or
issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications.
We have, time and again, discharged our solemn duty
as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with more
reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her
Comment59 to the instant Petition that we should put the
challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest.
And so we shall.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to
prevent and criminalize spousal and child abuse, which
could very well be committed by either the husband or
the wife, gender alone is not enough basis to deprive the
husband/father of the remedies under the law.60
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill
No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, reveals that while
the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better
known as Senator Loi Estrada), had originally proposed
what she called a "synthesized measure" 62 – an
amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-
Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti-Abuse of Women
in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to
"all family members, leaving no one in isolation" but at
the same time giving special attention to women as the
"usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it
was eventually agreed that men be denied protection
under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of
the deliberations:
Wednesday, December 10, 2003
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record,
Mr. President. Some women's groups have expressed
concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we
are to include domestic violence apart from against
women as well as other members of the household,
including children or the husband, they fear that this
would weaken the efforts to address domestic violence
of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really
are the wives, the spouses or the female partners in a
relationship. We would like to place that on record. How
does the good Senator respond to this kind of
observation?
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group
of women who call themselves "WIIR" Women in
Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men
in this domestic violence. But plenty of men are also
being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed
here members of the family, prescribing penalties
therefor and providing protective measures for victims.
This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law
wives, and those related with the family.65
xxx
Wednesday, January 14, 2004
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the
discussion whether to limit this to women and not to
families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The
understanding that I have is that we would be having a
broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator
Pangilinan during the interpellation period.
I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in
support of the measure. Do not get me wrong. However,
I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights
especially in the domestic environment.
As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless,
voiceless women who have not had the opportunity to
file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners
after years, if not decade, of battery and abuse. If we
broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming
they can at all be abused by the women or their
spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
situation for women, Mr. President.
I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier
conversations, concurs with this position. I am sure that
the men in this Chamber who love their women in their
lives so dearly will agree with this representation.
Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether
we like it or not, no matter how empowered the women
are, we are not given equal opportunities especially in
the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man
would always feel that he is stronger, more superior to
the Filipino woman.
xxxx
The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor
say?
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this,
the committee came up with this bill because the family
members have been included in this proposed measure
since the other members of the family other than women
are also possible victims of violence. While women are
most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally
why the measure focuses on women, the fact remains
that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be
victimized and that children are almost always the
helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there may
not be enough protection extended to other family
members particularly children who are excluded.
Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or
less, addresses the special needs of abused children.
The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one
are not available in said law.
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about
granting the same protection to men, fearing that they
may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against
women. However, we should also recognize that there
are established procedures and standards in our courts
which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot
just arbitrarily and whimsically entertain baseless
complaints.
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize
family relations and to protect the family as the basic
social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power
relations between men and women in our society, I
believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights
and dignity of both husband and wife and their
immediate family members, particularly children.
While I prefer to focus mainly on women, I was
compelled to include other family members as a critical
input arrived at after a series of consultations/meetings
with various NGOs, experts, sports groups and other
affected sectors, Mr. President.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of
the other senators.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies
on the Floor.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto
III is recognized.
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed
amendment of Senator Legarda would be removing the
"men and children" in this particular bill and focus
specifically on women alone. That will be the net effect
of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi"
Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now whether she is
inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator
Legarda.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not
because if she is going to accept this, I will propose an
amendment to the amendment rather than object to the
amendment, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr.
President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
xxxx
Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the
amendment.
The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the
amendment?
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the
rationale used by the distinguished proponent of the
amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung
may maaabuso, mas malamang iyong babae kaysa sa
lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang
magulpi iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we
remove the children from this particular measure.
So, if I may propose an amendment –
The President Pro Tempore. To the amendment.
Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are
very much abused. As a matter of fact, it is not limited to
minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old
children. I have seen 14, 15-year-old children being
abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And it
breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of
children, this particular measure will update that. It will
enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and
not only women.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we
remove the aspect of the men in the bill but not the
children.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the
Minority Leader.
The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be
women AND CHILDREN.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
[Silence] There being none, the amendment, as
amended, is approved.66
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the
wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real
motivations and wisdom of the members of Congress in
limiting the protection against violence and abuse under
R.A. 9262 to women and children only. No proper
challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this
proceeding. Congress has made its choice and it is not
our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The choice
may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the
remedy against it is to seek its amendment or repeal by
the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it
is the legislative that determines the necessity,
adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law. 68 We only
step in when there is a violation of the Constitution.
However, none was sufficiently shown in this case.
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal
protection of the laws.
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as
to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-
repeated disquisition in the early case of Victoriano v.
Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive:
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a
guaranty of equality in the application of the laws upon
all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement,
in order to avoid the constitutional prohibition against
inequality, that every man, woman and child should be
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of
statutes does not mean indiscriminate operation on
persons merely as such, but on persons according to the
circumstances surrounding them. It guarantees equality,
not identity of rights. The Constitution does not require
that things which are different in fact be treated in law as
though they were the same. The equal protection clause
does not forbid discrimination as to things that are
different. It does not prohibit legislation which is limited
either in the object to which it is directed or by the
territory within which it is to operate.
The equal protection of the laws clause of the
Constitution allows classification. Classification in law, as
in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the
grouping of things in speculation or practice because
they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law
is not invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea
of classification is that of inequality, so that it goes
without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no
manner determines the matter of constitutionality. All that
is required of a valid classification is that it be
reasonable, which means that the classification should
be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of
the law; that it must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and that it must apply equally to each member of
the class. This Court has held that the standard is
satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not
palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick,
we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a valid classification
as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not
violate the equal protection clause by favoring women
over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
The unequal power relationship between women and
men; the fact that women are more likely than men to be
victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and
prejudice against women all make for real differences
justifying the classification under the law. As Justice
McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of
differences ... is the essence of true equality."70
A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the
National Machinery for Gender Equality and Women's
Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is
deemed to be closely linked with the unequal power
relationship between women and men otherwise known
as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and
traditions dictate people to think men are the leaders,
pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in
society while women are nurturers, men's companions
and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society.
This perception leads to men gaining more power over
women. With power comes the need to control to retain
that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of
controlling women to retain power.71
The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as
a human rights issue, passed its Resolution 48/104 on
the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against
Women on December 20, 1993 stating that "violence
against women is a manifestation of historically unequal
power relations between men and women, which have
led to domination over and discrimination against women
by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of
women, and that violence against women is one of the
crucial social mechanisms by which women are forced
into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical
and social context of gender-based violence and
developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his
remarks delivered during the Joint Launching of R.A.
9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004,
the pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of
violence against women. The patriarch of a family was
accorded the right to use force on members of the family
under his control. I quote the early studies:
Traditions subordinating women have a long history
rooted in patriarchy – the institutional rule of men.
Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally
inferior both physically and intellectually. In ancient
Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or
wife, were under the authority of men. In law, they were
treated as property.
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the
husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she endangered
his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and
other religions oriented towards the patriarchal family
strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control
over women. Even the eminent Blackstone has been
quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife
were one and that one was the husband. However, in
the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English
common law began to limit the right of husbands to
chastise their wives. Thus, common law developed the
rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their
wives with a rod or stick no thicker than their thumb.
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of
these rights to chastise wives or inflict corporeal
punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the
family was given more importance than preventing
violence to women.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United
States followed that of the English common law. In 1871,
the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first
appellate court to strike down the common law right of a
husband to beat his wife:
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's
wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke her, spit in her
face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like
indignities, is not now acknowledged by our law... In
person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the
law that the husband can invoke for himself.
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement
became more organized. The temperance leagues
initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They
considered the evils of alcoholism as the root cause of
wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed
saloons, bars and their husbands' other watering holes.
Soon, however, their crusade was joined by suffragette
movements, expanding the liberation movement's
agenda. They fought for women's right to vote, to own
property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement
was on the roll.
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of
the domestic violence to the public gaze. They
succeeded in transforming the issue into an important
public concern. No less than the United States Supreme
Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey,
noted:
In an average 12-month period in this country,
approximately two million women are the victims of
severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey,
women reported that nearly one of every eight husbands
had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as
"marked underestimates," because the nature of these
incidents discourages women from reporting them, and
because surveys typically exclude the very poor, those
who do not speak English well, and women who are
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey
is conducted. According to the AMA, "researchers on
family violence agree that the true incidence of partner
violence is probably double the above estimates; or four
million severely assaulted women per year."
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-
third of all women will be physically assaulted by a
partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an
average day in the United States, nearly 11,000 women
are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families
where wife beating takes place, moreover, child abuse is
often present as well.
Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture.
Physical violence is only the most visible form of abuse.
Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and
economic isolation of women, is also common.
Many victims of domestic violence remain with their
abusers, perhaps because they perceive no superior
alternative...Many abused women who find temporary
refuge in shelters return to their husbands, in large part
because they have no other source of income...
Returning to one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent
Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States
are killed by their spouses...Thirty percent of female
homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the
Violence Against Women Act.
 In the International front, the women's struggle for
equality was no less successful. The United States
Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights 194 148 185 147 204 167 268
affirmed the equality of all human beings. In 1979, the
UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention
on the Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General Assembly 580 536 382 358 445 485 745
also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of
Violence Against Women. World conferences on the role
and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico
City, Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself 3,553 2,335 1,892 1,505 1,307 1,498 2,018
established a Commission on the Status of Women.

The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and

full – steps of all these women's movements. No less 37 38 46 18 54 83
than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution
mandates the State to recognize the role of women in
nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality 218 924 1,269 2,387 3,599 5,285 9,974
before the law of women and men. Our Senate has
ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on the
Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all,
Congress, on March 8, 2004, enacted Rep. Act No. 319 223 199 182 220 208 374
9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women
and Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures
for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for other 19 29 30 19 19 25
Purposes." (Citations omitted)

B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely" 121 102 93 109 109 99 158

victims of violence. 11 16 24 34 152 190

At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723,

official statistics on violence against women and children
show that – 34 23 28 18 25 22

x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases

at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of total cases
reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003,
there were 2,381 reported cases out of 4,354 cases
which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number 6,271 of
women in especially difficult circumstances served by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically
abused/maltreated cases out of the total of 5,608 cases.
xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total
number of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003.
Female violence comprised more than 90% of all forms
of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these
reported cases were committed by the women's intimate
partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women
presented comparative statistics on violence against
women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August
of 2011 with violations under R.A. 9262 ranking first
among the different VAW categories since its
implementation in 2004,74 thus:
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence
Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009
997 927 659 837 811 770
50 59 59 83 703 183
5,374 4,881 5,729 6,905 9,485 15,104
*2011 report covers only from January to August
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and
Children Protection Center (WCPC)
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be
obtained on domestic abuse and violence against men in
the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively
low and, perhaps, because many men will not even
attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom,
32% of women who had ever experienced domestic
violence did so four or five (or more) times, compared
with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever
experienced domestic violence; and women constituted
89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more
incidents of domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada
show that spousal violence by a woman against a man is
less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18
percent versus 44 percent). Men, who experience
violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in
fear of violence at the hands of their spouses, and much
less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many
cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse
are in self-defense or the result of many years of
physical or emotional abuse.76

While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence

us and abuse perpetrated against men in the Philippines,
38 46 26 22 28 27
the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance
requiring drivers of animal-drawn vehicles to pick up,
gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or
discharged by their vehicle-drawing animals in any
public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of
equal protection of laws as its application is limited to
owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not
to those animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass
through the same streets.
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for
the reason that, while there may be non-vehicle-drawing
animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their
number must be negligible and their appearance therein
merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as
not to constitute a menace to the health of the
community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not
violative of the right to equal protection, for every
classification of persons or things for regulation by law
produces inequality in some degree, but the law is not
thereby rendered invalid.78
C. Gender bias and prejudices
From the initial report to the police through prosecution,
trial, and sentencing, crimes against women are often
treated differently and less seriously than other crimes.
This was argued by then United States Senator Joseph
R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the
civil rights remedy as a valid exercise of the U.S.
Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal
Protection Clauses. He stressed that the widespread
gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic
prejudices against victims of rape or domestic violence,
subjecting them to "double victimization" – first at the
hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her
Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat
it as a private matter and advise the parties to settle the
conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the
case to the prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the
complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn. This
lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the
police and prosecution reinforces the escalating,
recurring and often serious nature of domestic
violence."80
Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices
and biases against our women.
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined
RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct Unbecoming
of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language
in reference to the complainant in a petition for TPO and
PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a
"mistress" in an "illegitimate relationship." Judge Amila
even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being
motivated by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with
the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed Judge
Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the
discrimination brought about by biases and prejudices
against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW
Committee on the Elimination of Discrimination against
Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through
specific measures focused on women does not
discriminate against men.82Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory
and that it is an "anti-male," "husband-bashing," and
"hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State
Party to the CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take
all appropriate measures "to modify the social and
cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a
view to achieving the elimination of prejudices and
customary and all other practices which are based on
the idea of the inferiority or the superiority of either of the
sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and
women."84 Justice Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he
paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will
require the development of a distinct mindset on the part
of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the
law.
The distinction between men and women is germane to
the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to address violence
committed against women and children, spelled out in its
Declaration of Policy, as follows:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared that
the State values the dignity of women and children and
guarantees full respect for human rights. The State also
recognizes the need to protect the family and its
members particularly women and children, from violence
and threats to their personal safety and security.
Towards this end, the State shall exert efforts to address
violence committed against women and children in
keeping with the fundamental freedoms guaranteed
under the Constitution and the provisions of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, Convention on the Rights of the Child and other
international human rights instruments of which the
Philippines is a party.
In 1979, the U.N. General Assembly adopted the
CEDAW, which the Philippines ratified on August 5,
1981. Subsequently, the Optional Protocol to the
CEDAW was also ratified by the Philippines on October
6, 2003.86 This Convention mandates that State parties
shall accord to women equality with men before the
law87 and shall take all appropriate measures to
eliminate discrimination against women in all matters
relating to marriage and family relations on the basis of
equality of men and women.88 The Philippines likewise
ratified the Convention on the Rights of the Child and its
two protocols.89 It is, thus, bound by said Conventions
and their respective protocols.
III. The classification is not limited to existing
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to
the existing conditions when it was promulgated, but to
future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and
security of women and their children are threatened by
violence and abuse.
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who
suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 thereof defines
VAWC as:
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person
against a woman who is his wife, former wife, or against
a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or
dating relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which
result in or is likely to result in physical, sexual,
psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse
including threats of such acts, battery, assault, coercion,
harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes,
but is not limited to, the following acts:
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily
or physical harm;
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in
nature, committed against a woman or her child. It
includes, but is not limited to:
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of
lasciviousness, treating a woman or
her child as a sex object, making
demeaning and sexually suggestive
remarks, physically attacking the
sexual parts of the victim's body,
forcing her/him to watch obscene
publications and indecent shows or
forcing the woman or her child to do
indecent acts and/or make films
thereof, forcing the wife and
mistress/lover to live in the conjugal
home or sleep together in the same
room with the abuser;
b) acts causing or attempting to cause
the victim to engage in any sexual
activity by force, threat of force,
physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm or coercion;
c) Prostituting the woman or child.
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and marital
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of
the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt
to make a woman financially dependent which includes,
but is not limited to the following:
1. withdrawal of financial support or
preventing the victim from engaging in
any legitimate profession, occupation,
business or activity, except in cases
wherein the other spouse/partner
objects on valid, serious and moral
grounds as defined in Article 73 of the
Family Code;
2. deprivation or threat of deprivation
of financial resources and the right to
the use and enjoyment of the conjugal,
community or property owned in
common;
3. destroying household property;
4. controlling the victims' own money
or properties or solely controlling the
conjugal money or properties.
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the
aforequoted provision are attributable to research that
has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery.
The acts described here are also found in the U.N.
Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against
Women.90 Hence, the argument advanced by petitioner
that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes the
difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs
is tenuous.
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague
and ambiguous that will confuse petitioner in his
defense. The acts enumerated above are easily
understood and provide adequate contrast between the
innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary
intelligence can understand what conduct is prohibited,
and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its
application.91 Yet, petitioner insists92that phrases like
"depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
child of a legal right," "solely controlling the conjugal or
common money or properties," "marital infidelity," and
"causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that
they make every quarrel a case of spousal abuse.
However, we have stressed that the "vagueness"
doctrine merely requires a reasonable degree of
certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute
precision or mathematical exactitude, as petitioner
seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and
bounds of the statute are clearly delineated. An act will
not be held invalid merely because it might have been
more explicit in its wordings or detailed in its
provisions.93
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A.
9262 singles out the husband or father as the culprit. As
defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed
"against a woman with whom the person has or had a
sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the
gender-neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual
or dating relationship with the woman encompasses
even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law
provides that the offender be related or connected to the
victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or
dating relationship, it does not preclude the application
of the principle of conspiracy under the Revised Penal
Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses
Tan,94 the parents-in-law of Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the
victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case
filed by the latter upon the allegation that they and their
son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of design and
purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient
financial support; harassing and pressuring her to be
ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing
her verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
due process clause of the Constitution.
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically
in the issuance of POs, of all protections afforded by the
due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the
basis of unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no
opportunity to respond, the husband is stripped of family,
property, guns, money, children, job, future employment
and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an
inkling of what happened."95
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further
acts of violence against women and their children, their
family or household members, and to grant other
necessary reliefs. Its purpose is to safeguard the
offended parties from further harm, minimize any
disruption in their daily life and facilitate the opportunity
and ability to regain control of their life.96
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to
ensure that the victim or offended party is afforded all
the remedies necessary to curtail access by a
perpetrator to the victim. This serves to safeguard the
victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim
and any designated family or household member safety
in the family residence, and to prevent the perpetrator
from committing acts that jeopardize the employment
and support of the victim. It also enables the court to
award temporary custody of minor children to protect the
children from violence, to prevent their abduction by the
perpetrator and to ensure their financial support."97
The rules require that petitions for protection order be in
writing, signed and verified by the petitioner98 thereby
undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every
allegation therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases
of VAWC if further violence is to be prevented,"99 the
court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle
but before notice and hearing when the life, limb or
property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is
reasonable ground to believe that the order is necessary
to protect the victim from the immediate and imminent
danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is
about to recur.100
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no
rational basis to issue an ex parte order. The victim is
required not only to verify the allegations in the petition,
but also to attach her witnesses' affidavits to the
petition.101
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be
challenged as violative of the right to due process. Just
like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued
without notice and hearing because the time in which the
hearing will take could be enough to enable the
defendant to abscond or dispose of his property, 102 in the
same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her
tormentor, and possibly even death, if notice and hearing
were required before such acts could be prevented. It is
a constitutional commonplace that the ordinary
requirements of procedural due process must yield to
the necessities of protecting vital public
interests,103among which is protection of women and
children from violence and threats to their personal
safety and security.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex
parte, the court shall likewise order that notice be
immediately given to the respondent directing him to file
an opposition within five (5) days from service.
Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the
petition and TPO be served immediately on the
respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
effective for thirty (30) days from service on the
respondent.104
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will
nonetheless order the immediate issuance and service
of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an
opposition to the petition within five (5) days from
service. The date of the preliminary conference and
hearing on the merits shall likewise be indicated on the
notice.105
The opposition to the petition which the respondent
himself shall verify, must be accompanied by the
affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a
temporary or permanent protection order should not be
issued.106
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of
a petition for protection order should be apprised of the
charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to
present his side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being
"stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job,
future employment and reputation, all in a matter of
seconds, without an inkling of what happened" is a mere
product of an overactive imagination. The essence of
due process is to be found in the reasonable opportunity
to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only
mean verbal arguments in court; one may be heard also
through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either
through oral arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there
is no denial of procedural due process.107
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006
an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte Motion for
Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days
earlier on April 24, 2006. Likewise, on May 23, 2006,
petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO
to allow him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial
court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, gave him
five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO
should not be renewed or extended. Yet, he chose not to
file the required comment arguing that it would just be an
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the
renewal of the questioned TPO was only for a limited
period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent
the continued renewal of said order if he can show
sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so,
petitioner may not now be heard to complain that he was
denied due process of law.
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of
the respondent in the VAWC case from the residence of
the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is
virtually a "blank check" issued to the wife to claim any
property as her conjugal home.108
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by
any stretch of the imagination suggest that this is so. It
states:
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The
protection order shall include any, some or all of the
following reliefs:
xxxx
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the
residence of the offended party, regardless of ownership
of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of
protecting the offended party, or permanently where no
property rights are violated. If the respondent must
remove personal effects from the residence, the court
shall direct a law enforcement agent to accompany the
respondent to the residence, remain there until the
respondent has gathered his things and escort him from
the residence;
xxxx
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded
from private respondent's residence, regardless of
ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting
the latter. Such removal and exclusion may be
permanent only where no property rights are violated.
How then can the private respondent just claim any
property and appropriate it for herself, as petitioner
seems to suggest?
The non-referral of a VAWC case
to a mediator is justified.
Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill
arguments, instead of encouraging mediation and
counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed
policy of the State to "protect and strengthen the family
as a basic autonomous social institution."109
Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court
shall not refer the case or any issue thereof to a
mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-
explained by the Commentary on Section 311 of the
Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as
follows:110
This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring
parties to mediation in a proceeding for an order for
protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in
equivalent bargaining positions voluntarily reach
consensual agreement about the issue at hand.
Violence, however, is not a subject for compromise. A
process which involves parties mediating the issue of
violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In
addition, mediation of issues in a proceeding for an order
of protection is problematic because the petitioner is
frequently unable to participate equally with the person
against whom the protection order has been sought.
(Emphasis supplied)
There is no undue delegation of
judicial power to barangay officials.
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the
exercise of judicial power which, under the Constitution,
is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower
courts as may be established by law" and, thus, protests
the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as
follows:
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May
Issue and How. – Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs)
refer to the protection order issued by the Punong
Barangay ordering the perpetrator to desist from
committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this
Act.1âwphi1 A Punong Barangay who receives
applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to
the applicant on the date of filing after ex parte
determination of the basis of the application. If the
Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application
for a BPO, the application shall be acted upon by any
available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a
Barangay Kagawad, the order must be accompanied by
an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the
Punong Barangay was unavailable at the time of the
issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for fifteen
(15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte
BPO, the Punong Barangay or Barangay Kagawad shall
personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent,
or direct any barangay official to effect its personal
service.
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer
advocate in any proceeding before the Punong
Barangay.
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice
to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine
whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on
the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer
the laws. It is the power of carrying the laws into
practical operation and enforcing their due
observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the
BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, in his
unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad,
merely orders the perpetrator to desist from (a) causing
physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2)
threatening to cause the woman or her child physical
harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus,
purely executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty
under the Local Government Code to "enforce all laws
and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the
barangay."114
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is
required by law to inquire into the existence of certain
facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine
what his official conduct shall be and the fact that these
acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
exercise of judicial powers."115
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains
through a preliminary inquiry or proceeding "whether
there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense
has been committed and the accused is probably guilty
thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of
violence against the woman and her children exists or is
about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a
BPO. The preliminary investigation conducted by the
prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a judicial,
function. The same holds true with the issuance of a
BPO.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner
that since barangay officials and other law enforcement
agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of
violence and abuse, it would be very unlikely that they
would remain objective and impartial, and that the
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated,
assistance by barangay officials and other law
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to
enforce the law and to maintain peace and order.
Conclusion
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are
voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a clear conflict with
the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative
one, must be demonstrated in such a manner as to
leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words,
the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable
doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no concrete
evidence and convincing arguments were presented by
petitioner to warrant a declaration of the
unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of
Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of
the co-equal executive department. As we said in
Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that
the legislature is ever conscious of the borders and
edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full
knowledge of the facts and for the purpose of promoting
what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the
history of the women's movement against domestic
violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles
was the fight against the violence of law itself. If we keep
that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the
struggle of women for equality but will be its
fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality of R.A.
9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on
certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 168852 September 30, 2008
SHARICA MARI L. GO-TAN, Petitioner,
vs.
SPOUSES PERFECTO C. TAN and JUANITA L.
TAN, Respondents.*
DECISION
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review
on Certiorari under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court
assailing the Resolution1 dated March 7, 2005 of the
Regional Trial Court (RTC), Branch 94, Quezon City in
Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 and the RTC
Resolution2 dated July 11, 2005 which denied petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration.
The factual background of the case:
On April 18, 1999, Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan (petitioner)
and Steven L. Tan (Steven) were married. 3 Out of this
union, two female children were born, Kyra Danielle4 and
Kristen Denise.5 On January 12, 2005, barely six years
into the marriage, petitioner filed a Petition with Prayer
for the Issuance of a Temporary Protective Order
(TPO)6 against Steven and her parents-in-law, Spouses
Perfecto C. Tan and Juanita L. Tan (respondents) before
the RTC. She alleged that Steven, in conspiracy with
respondents, were causing verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her in violation of Section 5,
paragraphs (e)(2)(3)(4), (h)(5), and (i)7 of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 9262,8 otherwise known as the "Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act of 2004."
On January 25, 2005, the RTC issued an
Order/Notice9 granting petitioner's prayer for a TPO.
On February 7, 2005, respondents filed a Motion to
Dismiss with Opposition to the Issuance of Permanent
Protection Order Ad Cautelam and Comment on the
Petition,10 contending that the RTC lacked jurisdiction
over their persons since, as parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not covered by R.A. No. 9262.
On February 28, 2005, petitioner filed a Comment on
Opposition11 to respondents' Motion to Dismiss arguing
that respondents were covered by R.A. No. 9262 under
a liberal interpretation thereof aimed at promoting the
protection and safety of victims of violence.
On March 7, 2005, the RTC issued a committed by any person against a woman who is his
Resolution12 dismissing the case as to respondents on
the ground that, being the parents-in-law of the
petitioner, they were not included/covered as
respondents under R.A. No. 9262 under the well-known
rule of law "expressio unius est exclusio alterius."13
On March 16, 2005, petitioner filed her Verified Motion
for Reconsideration14 contending that the doctrine of
necessary implication should be applied in the broader
interests of substantial justice and due process.
On April 8, 2005, respondents filed their Comment on
the Verified Motion for Reconsideration15arguing that
petitioner's liberal construction unduly broadened the
provisions of R.A. No. 9262 since the relationship
between the offender and the alleged victim was an
essential condition for the application of R.A. No. 9262.
On July 11, 2005, the RTC issued a Resolution16 denying
petitioner's
Verified Motion for Reconsideration. The RTC reasoned
that to include respondents under the coverage of R.A.
No. 9262 would be a strained interpretation of the
provisions of the law.
Hence, the present petition on a pure question of law, to
wit:
WHETHER OR NOT RESPONDENTS-SPOUSES
PERFECTO & JUANITA, PARENTS-IN-LAW OF
SHARICA, MAY BE INCLUDED IN THE PETITION FOR
THE ISSUANCE OF A PROTECTIVE ORDER, IN
ACCORDANCE WITH REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9262,
OTHERWISE KNOWN AS THE "ANTI-VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN AND THEIR CHILDREN ACT OF
2004".17
Petitioner contends that R.A. No. 9262 must be
understood in the light of the provisions of Section 47 of
R.A. No. 9262 which explicitly provides for the
suppletory application of the Revised Penal Code (RPC)
and, accordingly, the provision on "conspiracy" under
Article 8 of the RPC can be suppletorily applied to R.A.
No. 9262; that Steven and respondents had community
of design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her
insufficient financial support; harassing and pressuring
her to be ejected from the family home; and in
repeatedly abusing her verbally, emotionally, mentally
and physically; that respondents should be included as
indispensable or necessary parties for complete
resolution of the case.
On the other hand, respondents submit that they are not
covered by R.A. No. 9262 since Section 3 thereof
explicitly provides that the offender should be related to
the victim only by marriage, a former marriage, or a
dating or sexual relationship; that allegations on the
conspiracy of respondents require a factual
determination which cannot be done by this Court in a
petition for review; that respondents cannot be
characterized as indispensable or necessary parties,
since their presence in the case is not only unnecessary
but altogether illegal, considering the non-inclusion of in-
laws as offenders under Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262.
The Court rules in favor of the petitioner.
Section 3 of R.A. No. 9262 defines ''[v]iolence against
women and their children'' as "any act or a series of acts
wife, former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with
whom he has a common child, or against her child
whether legitimate or illegitimate, within or without the
family abode, which result in or is likely to result in
physical, sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts, battery,
assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of
liberty."
While the said provision provides that the offender be
related or connected to the victim by marriage, former
marriage, or a sexual or dating relationship, it does not
preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy
under the RPC.
Indeed, Section 47 of R.A. No. 9262 expressly provides
for the suppletory application of the RPC, thus:
SEC. 47. Suppletory Application. - For purposes of this
Act, the Revised Penal Code and other applicable laws,
shall have suppletory application. (Emphasis supplied)
Parenthetically, Article 10 of the RPC provides:
ART. 10. Offenses not subject to the provisions of this
Code. – Offenses which are or in the future may be
punishable under special laws are not subject to the
provisions of this Code. This Code shall be
supplementary to such laws, unless the latter should
specially provide the contrary.(Emphasis supplied)
Hence, legal principles developed from the Penal Code
may be applied in a supplementary capacity to crimes
punished under special laws, such as R.A. No. 9262, in
which the special law is silent on a particular matter.
Thus, in People v. Moreno,18 the Court applied
suppletorily the provision on subsidiary penalty under
Article 39 of the RPC to cases of violations of Act No.
3992, otherwise known as the "Revised Motor Vehicle
Law," noting that the special law did not contain any
provision that the defendant could be sentenced with
subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency.
In People v. Li Wai Cheung,19 the Court applied
suppletorily the rules on the service of sentences
provided in Article 70 of the RPC in favor of the accused
who was found guilty of multiple violations of R.A. No.
6425, otherwise known as the "Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972," considering the lack of similar rules under the
special law.
In People v. Chowdury,20 the Court applied suppletorily
Articles 17, 18 and 19 of the RPC to define the words
"principal," "accomplices" and "accessories" under R.A.
No. 8042, otherwise known as the "Migrant Workers and
Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995," because said words
were not defined therein, although the special law
referred to the same terms in enumerating the persons
liable for the crime of illegal recruitment.
21
In Yu v. People, the Court applied suppletorily the
provisions on subsidiary imprisonment under Article 39
of the RPC to Batas Pambansa (B.P.) Blg. 22, otherwise
known as the "Bouncing Checks Law," noting the
absence of an express provision on subsidiary
imprisonment in said special law.
Most recently, in Ladonga v. People,22 the Court applied
suppletorily the principle of conspiracy under Article 8 of
the RPC to B.P. Blg. 22 in the absence of a contrary
provision therein.
With more reason, therefore, the principle of conspiracy
under Article 8 of the RPC may be applied suppletorily to
R.A. No. 9262 because of the express provision of
Section 47 that the RPC shall be supplementary to said
law. Thus, general provisions of the RPC, which by their
nature, are necessarily applicable, may be applied
suppletorily.
Thus, the principle of conspiracy may be applied to R.A.
No. 9262. For once conspiracy or action in concert to
achieve a criminal design is shown, the act of one is the
act of all the conspirators, and the precise extent or
modality of participation of each of them becomes
secondary, since all the conspirators are principals.23
It must be further noted that Section 5 of R.A. No. 9262
expressly recognizes that the acts of violence against
women and their children may be committed by an
offender through another, thus:
SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children. - The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxx
(h) Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or
reckless conduct, personally or through
another, thatalarms or causes substantial
emotional or psychological distress to the
woman or her child. This shall include, but not
be limited to, the following acts:
(1) Stalking or following the woman or
her child in public or private places;
(2) Peering in the window or lingering
outside the residence of the woman or
her child;
(3) Entering or remaining in the
dwelling or on the property of the
woman or her child against her/his will;
(4) Destroying the property and
personal belongings or inflicting harm
to animals or pets of the woman or her
child; and
(5) Engaging in any form of
harassment or violence; x x x.
(Emphasis supplied)
In addition, the protection order that may be issued for
the purpose of preventing further acts of violence against
the woman or her child may include
individuals other than the offending husband, thus:
SEC. 8. Protection Orders. – x x x The protection orders
that may be issued under this Act shall include any,
some or all of the following reliefs:
(a) Prohibition of the respondent from
threatening to commit or committing, personally
or through another, any of the acts mentioned
in Section 5 of this Act; 1avvphi1.net
(b) Prohibition of the respondent from
harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or
otherwise communicating with the petitioner,
directly or indirectly; x x x (Emphasis supplied)
Finally, Section 4 of R.A. No. 9262 calls for a liberal
construction of the law, thus:
SEC. 4. Construction. - This Act shall be liberally
construed to promote the protection and safety of
victims of violence against women and their children.
(Emphasis supplied)
It bears mention that the intent of the statute is the
law24 and that this intent must be effectuated by the
courts. In the present case, the express language of
R.A. No. 9262 reflects the intent of the legislature for
liberal construction as will best ensure the attainment of
the object of the law according to its true intent, meaning
and spirit - the protection and safety of victims of
violence against women and children.
Thus, contrary to the RTC's pronouncement, the
maxim "expressio unios est exclusio alterius" finds no
application here. It must be remembered that this maxim
is only an "ancillary rule of statutory construction." It is
not of universal application. Neither is it conclusive. It
should be applied only as a means of discovering
legislative intent which is not otherwise manifest and
should not be permitted to defeat the plainly indicated
purpose of the legislature.25
The Court notes that petitioner unnecessarily argues at
great length on the attendance of circumstances
evidencing the conspiracy or connivance of Steven and
respondents to cause verbal, psychological and
economic abuses upon her. However, conspiracy is an
evidentiary matter which should be threshed out in a full-
blown trial on the merits and cannot be determined in the
present petition since this Court is not a trier of facts. 26 It
is thus premature for petitioner to argue evidentiary
matters since this controversy is centered only on the
determination of whether respondents may be included
in a petition under R.A. No. 9262. The presence or
absence of conspiracy can be best passed upon after a
trial on the merits.
Considering the Court's ruling that the principle of
conspiracy may be applied suppletorily to R.A. No. 9262,
the Court will no longer delve on whether respondents
may be considered indispensable or necessary parties.
To do so would be an exercise in superfluity.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. The
assailed Resolutions dated March 7, 2005 and July 11,
2005 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 94, Quezon
City in Civil Case No. Q-05-54536 are
hereby PARTLY REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as
the dismissal of the petition against respondents is
concerned.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 182835 April 20, 2010
RUSTAN ANG y PASCUA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS and IRISH
SAGUD, Respondents.
DECISION
ABAD, J.:
This case concerns a claim of commission of the crime
of violence against women when a former boyfriend sent
to the girl the picture of a naked woman, not her, but with
her face on it.
The Indictment
The public prosecutor charged petitioner-accused
Rustan Ang (Rustan) before the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) of Baler, Aurora, of violation of the Anti-Violence
Against Women and Their Children Act or Republic Act
(R.A.) 9262 in an information that reads:
That on or about June 5, 2005, in the Municipality of
Maria Aurora, Province of Aurora, Philippines and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said accused
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously, in a purposeful and
reckless conduct, sent through the Short Messaging
Service (SMS) using his mobile phone, a pornographic
picture to one Irish Sagud, who was his former girlfriend,
whereby the face of the latter was attached to a
completely naked body of another woman making it to
appear that it was said Irish Sagud who is depicted in
the said obscene and pornographic picture thereby
causing substantial emotional anguish, psychological
distress and humiliation to the said Irish Sagud.1
The Facts and the Case
The evidence for the prosecution shows that
complainant Irish Sagud (Irish) and accused Rustan
were classmates at Wesleyan University in Aurora
Province. Rustan courted Irish and they became "on-
and-off" sweethearts towards the end of 2004. When
Irish learned afterwards that Rustan had taken a live-in
partner (now his wife), whom he had gotten pregnant,
Irish broke up with him.
Before Rustan got married, however, he got in touch with
Irish and tried to convince her to elope with him, saying
that he did not love the woman he was about to marry.
Irish rejected the proposal and told Rustan to take on his
responsibility to the other woman and their child. Irish
changed her cellphone number but Rustan somehow
managed to get hold of it and sent her text messages.
Rustan used two cellphone numbers for sending his
messages, namely, 0920-4769301 and 0921-8084768.
Irish replied to his text messages but it was to ask him to
leave her alone.
In the early morning of June 5, 2005, Irish received
through multimedia message service (MMS) a picture of
a naked woman with spread legs and with Irish’s face
superimposed on the figure (Exhibit A).2 The sender’s
cellphone number, stated in the message, was 0921-
8084768, one of the numbers that Rustan used. Irish
surmised that he copied the picture of her face from a
shot he took when they were in Baguio in 2003 (Exhibit
B).3
After she got the obscene picture, Irish got other text
messages from Rustan. He boasted that it would be
easy for him to create similarly scandalous pictures of
her. And he threatened to spread the picture he sent
through the internet. One of the messages he sent to
Irish, written in text messaging shorthand, read: "Madali
lang ikalat yun, my chatrum ang tarlac rayt pwede ring
send sa lahat ng chatter."4
Irish sought the help of the vice mayor of Maria Aurora
who referred her to the police. Under police supervision,
Irish contacted Rustan through the cellphone numbers
he used in sending the picture and his text messages.
Irish asked Rustan to meet her at the Lorentess Resort
in Brgy. Ramada, Maria Aurora, and he did. He came in
a motorcycle. After parking it, he walked towards Irish
but the waiting police officers intercepted and arrested
him. They searched him and seized his Sony Ericsson
P900 cellphone and several SIM cards. While Rustan
was being questioned at the police station, he shouted at
Irish: "Malandi ka kasi!"
Joseph Gonzales, an instructor at the Aurora State
College of Technology, testified as an expert in
information technology and computer graphics. He said
that it was very much possible for one to lift the face of a
woman from a picture and superimpose it on the body of
another woman in another picture. Pictures can be
manipulated and enhanced by computer to make it
appear that the face and the body belonged to just one
person.
Gonzales testified that the picture in question (Exhibit A)
had two distinct irregularities: the face was not
proportionate to the body and the face had a lighter
color. In his opinion, the picture was fake and the face on
it had been copied from the picture of Irish in Exhibit B.
Finally, Gonzales explained how this could be done,
transferring a picture from a computer to a cellphone like
the Sony Ericsson P900 seized from Rustan.
For his part, Rustan admitted having courted Irish. He
began visiting her in Tarlac in October 2003 and their
relation lasted until December of that year. He claimed
that after their relation ended, Irish wanted reconciliation.
They met in December 2004 but, after he told her that
his girlfriend at that time (later his wife) was already
pregnant, Irish walked out on him.
Sometime later, Rustan got a text message from Irish,
asking him to meet her at Lorentess Resort as she
needed his help in selling her cellphone. When he
arrived at the place, two police officers approached him,
seized his cellphone and the contents of his pockets,
and brought him to the police station.
Rustan further claims that he also went to Lorentess
because Irish asked him to help her identify a prankster
who was sending her malicious text messages. Rustan
got the sender’s number and, pretending to be Irish,
contacted the person. Rustan claims that he got back
obscene messages from the prankster, which he
forwarded to Irish from his cellphone. This explained, he
said, why the obscene messages appeared to have
originated from his cellphone number. Rustan claims that
it was Irish herself who sent the obscene picture (Exhibit
A) to him. He presented six pictures of a woman whom
he identified as Irish (Exhibits 2 to 7).5
Michelle Ang (Michelle), Rustan’s wife, testified that she
was sure Irish sent the six pictures. Michelle claims that
she received the pictures and hid the memory card
(Exhibit 8) that contained them because she was jealous
and angry. She did not want to see anything of Irish. But,
while the woman in the pictures posed in sexy clothing,
in none did she appear naked as in Exhibit A. Further,
the face of the woman in Exhibits 2, 4, 5 and 6 could not
be seen. Irish denied that she was the woman in those
four pictures. As for Exhibits 3 and 7, the woman in the
picture was fully dressed.
After trial, the RTC found Irish’s testimony completely
credible, given in an honest and spontaneous manner.
The RTC observed that she wept while recounting her
experience, prompting the court to comment: "Her tears
were tangible expression of pain and anguish for the
acts of violence she suffered in the hands of her former
sweetheart. The crying of the victim during her testimony
is evidence of the credibility of her charges with the
verity borne out of human nature and
experience."6 Thus, in its Decision dated August 1, 2001,
the RTC found Rustan guilty of the violation of Section
5(h) of R.A. 9262.
On Rustan’s appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA),7 the
latter rendered a decision dated January 31,
2008,8 affirming the RTC decision. The CA denied
Rustan’s motion for reconsideration in a resolution dated
April 25, 2008. Thus, Rustan filed the present for review
on certiorari.
The Issues Presented
The principal issue in this case is whether or not
accused Rustan sent Irish by cellphone message the
picture with her face pasted on the body of a nude
woman, inflicting anguish, psychological distress, and
humiliation on her in violation of Section 5(h) of R.A.
9262.
The subordinate issues are:
1. Whether or not a "dating relationship" existed
between Rustan and Irish as this term is
defined in R.A. 9262;
2. Whether or not a single act of harassment,
like the sending of the nude picture in this case,
already constitutes a violation of Section 5(h) of
R.A. 9262;
3. Whether or not the evidence used to convict
Rustan was obtained from him in violation of his
constitutional rights; and
4. Whether or not the RTC properly admitted in
evidence the obscene picture presented in the
case.
The Court’s Rulings
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 provides that violence against
women includes an act or acts of a person against a
woman with whom he has or had a sexual or dating
relationship. Thus:
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act,
(a) "Violence against women and their children"
refers to any act or a series of acts committed
by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the
person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or with whom he has a common
child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode,
which result in or is likely to result in physical,
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or
economic abuse including threats of such acts,
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty.
xxxx
Section 5 identifies the act or acts that
constitute violence against women and these
include any form of harassment that causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress
to a woman. Thus:
 SEC. 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and
Their Children. – The crime of violence against
women and their children is committed through
any of the following acts:
xxxx
h. Engaging in purposeful, knowing, or reckless
conduct, personally or through another, that
alarms or causes substantial emotional or
psychological distress to the woman or her
child. This shall include, but not be limited to,
the following acts:
xxxx
5. Engaging in any form of harassment or
violence;
The above provisions, taken together, indicate that the
elements of the crime of violence against women
through harassment are:
1. The offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship with the offended woman;
2. The offender, by himself or through another,
commits an act or series of acts of harassment
against the woman; and
3. The harassment alarms or causes
substantial emotional or psychological distress
to her.
One. The parties to this case agree that the prosecution
needed to prove that accused Rustan had a "dating
relationship" with Irish. Section 3(e) provides that a
"dating relationship" includes a situation where the
parties are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship.
Thus:
(e) "Dating relationship" refers to a situation wherein the
parties live as husband and wife without the benefit of
marriage or are romantically involved over time and on a
continuing basis during the course of the relationship. A
casual acquaintance or ordinary socialization between
two individuals in a business or social context is not a
dating relationship. (Underscoring supplied.)
Here, Rustan claims that, being "romantically involved,"
implies that the offender and the offended woman have
or had sexual relations. According to him, "romance"
implies a sexual act. He cites Webster’s Comprehensive
Dictionary Encyclopedia Edition which provides a
colloquial or informal meaning to the word "romance"
used as a verb, i.e., "to make love; to make love to" as in
"He romanced her."
But it seems clear that the law did not use in its
provisions the colloquial verb "romance" that implies a
sexual act. It did not say that the offender must have
"romanced" the offended woman. Rather, it used the
noun "romance" to describe a couple’s relationship, i.e.,
"a love affair."9
R.A. 9262 provides in Section 3 that "violence against
women x x x refers to any act or a series of acts
committed by any person against a woman x x x with
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating
relationship." Clearly, the law itself distinguishes a sexual
relationship from a dating relationship. Indeed, Section
3(e) above defines "dating relationship" while Section
3(f) defines "sexual relations." The latter "refers to a
single sexual act which may or may not result in the
bearing of a common child." The dating relationship that
the law contemplates can, therefore, exist even without a
sexual intercourse taking place between those involved.
Rustan also claims that since the relationship between
Irish and him was of the "on-and-off" variety (away-bati),
their romance cannot be regarded as having developed
"over time and on a continuing basis." But the two of
them were romantically involved, as Rustan himself
admits, from October to December of 2003. That would
be time enough for nurturing a relationship of mutual
trust and love.
An "away-bati" or a fight-and-kiss thing between two
lovers is a common occurrence. Their taking place does
not mean that the romantic relation between the two
should be deemed broken up during periods of
misunderstanding. Explaining what "away-bati" meant,
Irish explained that at times, when she could not reply to
Rustan’s messages, he would get angry at her. That was
all. Indeed, she characterized their three-month romantic
relation as continuous.10
Two. Rustan argues that the one act of sending an
offensive picture should not be considered a form of
harassment. He claims that such would unduly ruin him
personally and set a very dangerous precedent. But
Section 3(a) of R.A. 9262 punishes "any act or series of
acts" that constitutes violence against women. This
means that a single act of harassment, which translates
into violence, would be enough. The object of the law is
to protect women and children. Punishing only violence
that is repeatedly committed would license isolated
ones.
Rustan alleges that today’s women, like Irish, are so
used to obscene communications that her getting one
could not possibly have produced alarm in her or caused
her substantial emotional or psychological distress. He
claims having previously exchanged obscene pictures
with Irish such that she was already desensitized by
them.
But, firstly, the RTC which saw and heard Rustan and
his wife give their testimonies was not impressed with
their claim that it was Irish who sent the obscene
pictures of herself (Exhibits 2-7). It is doubtful if the
woman in the picture was Irish since her face did not
clearly show on them.
Michelle, Rustan’s wife, claimed that she deleted several
other pictures that Irish sent, except Exhibits 2 to 7. But
her testimony did not make sense. She said that she did
not know that Exhibits 2 to 7 had remained saved after
she deleted the pictures. Later, however, she said that
she did not have time to delete them. 11 And, if she
thought that she had deleted all the pictures from the
memory card, then she had no reason at all to keep and
hide such memory card. There would have been nothing
to hide. Finally, if she knew that some pictures remained
in the card, there was no reason for her to keep it for
several years, given that as she said she was too
jealous to want to see anything connected to Irish. Thus,
the RTC was correct in not giving credence to her
testimony.1avvphi1
Secondly, the Court cannot measure the trauma that
Irish experienced based on Rustan’s low regard for the
alleged moral sensibilities of today’s youth. What is
obscene and injurious to an offended woman can of
course only be determined based on the circumstances
of each case. Here, the naked woman on the picture, her
legs spread open and bearing Irish’s head and face, was
clearly an obscene picture and, to Irish a revolting and
offensive one. Surely, any woman like Irish, who is not in
the pornography trade, would be scandalized and pained
if she sees herself in such a picture. What makes it
further terrifying is that, as Irish testified, Rustan sent the
picture with a threat to post it in the internet for all to see.
That must have given her a nightmare.
Three. Rustan argues that, since he was arrested and
certain items were seized from him without any warrant,
the evidence presented against him should be deemed
inadmissible. But the fact is that the prosecution did not
present in evidence either the cellphone or the SIM
cards that the police officers seized from him at the time
of his arrest. The prosecution did not need such items to
prove its case. Exhibit C for the prosecution was but a
photograph depicting the Sony Ericsson P900 cellphone
that was used, which cellphone Rustan admitted owning
during the pre-trial conference.
Actually, though, the bulk of the evidence against him
consisted in Irish’s testimony that she received the
obscene picture and malicious text messages that the
sender’s cellphone numbers belonged to Rustan with
whom she had been previously in communication.
Indeed, to prove that the cellphone numbers belonged to
Rustan, Irish and the police used such numbers to
summon him to come to Lorentess Resort and he
did.12 Consequently, the prosecution did not have to
present the confiscated cellphone and SIM cards to
prove that Rustan sent those messages.
Moreover, Rustan admitted having sent the malicious
text messages to Irish.13 His defense was that he himself
received those messages from an unidentified person
who was harassing Irish and he merely forwarded the
same to her, using his cellphone. But Rustan never
presented the cellphone number of the unidentified
person who sent the messages to him to authenticate
the same. The RTC did not give credence to such
version and neither will this Court. Besides, it was most
unlikely for Irish to pin the things on Rustan if he had
merely tried to help her identify the sender.
Four. Rustan claims that the obscene picture sent to
Irish through a text message constitutes an electronic
document. Thus, it should be authenticated by means of
an electronic signature, as provided under Section 1,
Rule 5 of the Rules on Electronic Evidence (A.M. 01-7-
01-SC).
But, firstly, Rustan is raising this objection to the
admissibility of the obscene picture, Exhibit A, for the
first time before this Court. The objection is too late since
he should have objected to the admission of the picture
on such ground at the time it was offered in evidence.
He should be deemed to have already waived such
ground for objection.14
Besides, the rules he cites do not apply to the present
criminal action. The Rules on Electronic Evidence
applies only to civil actions, quasi-judicial proceedings,
and administrative proceedings.15
In conclusion, this Court finds that the prosecution has
proved each and every element of the crime charged
beyond reasonable doubt.
WHEREFORE, the Court DENIES the petition and
AFFIRMS the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR 30567 dated January 31, 2008 and its
resolution dated April 25, 2008.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 193707 December 10, 2014
NORMA A. DEL SOCORRO, for and in behalf of her
minor child RODERIGO NORJO VAN
WILSEM, Petitioner,
vs.
ERNST JOHAN BRINKMAN VAN
WILSEM, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on certiorari
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court seeking to reverse
and set aside the Orders 1 dated February 19, 2010 and
September 1, 2010, respectively, of the Regional Trial
Court of Cebu City (RTC-Cebu), which dismissed the
criminal case entitled People of the Philippines v. Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem, docketed as Criminal
Case No. CBU-85503, for violation of Republic Act (R.A.)
No. 9262, otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against
Women and Their Children Act of 2004.
The following facts are culled from the records:
Petitioner Norma A. Del Socorro and respondent Ernst
Johan Brinkman Van Wilsem contracted marriage in
Holland on September 25, 1990.2 On January 19, 1994,
they were blessed with a son named Roderigo Norjo Van
Wilsem, who at the time of the filing of the instant
petition was sixteen (16) years of age.3
Unfortunately, their marriage bond ended on July 19,
1995 by virtue of a Divorce Decree issued by the
appropriate Court of Holland.4 At that time, their son was
only eighteen (18) months old.5 Thereafter, petitioner
and her son came home to the Philippines.6
According to petitioner, respondent made a promise to
provide monthly support to their son in the amount of
Two Hundred Fifty (250) Guildene (which is equivalent to
Php17,500.00 more or less).7 However, since the arrival
of petitioner and her son in the Philippines, respondent
never gave support to the son, Roderigo.8
Not long thereafter, respondent cameto the Philippines
and remarried in Pinamungahan, Cebu, and since then,
have been residing thereat.9 Respondent and his new
wife established a business known as Paree Catering,
located at Barangay Tajao, Municipality of
Pinamungahan, Cebu City.10 To date, all the parties,
including their son, Roderigo, are presently living in
Cebu City.11
On August 28, 2009, petitioner, through her counsel,
sent a letter demanding for support from respondent.
However, respondent refused to receive the letter.12
Because of the foregoing circumstances, petitioner filed
a complaint affidavit with the Provincial Prosecutor of
Cebu City against respondent for violation of Section 5,
paragraph E(2) of R.A. No. 9262 for the latter’s unjust
refusal to support his minor child with
petitioner.13 Respondent submitted his counter-affidavit
thereto, to which petitioner also submitted her reply-
affidavit.14 Thereafter, the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu
City issued a Resolution recommending the filing of an
information for the crime charged against herein
respondent.
The information, which was filed with the RTC-Cebu and
raffled to Branch 20 thereof, states that:
That sometime in the year 1995 and up to the present,
more or less, in the Municipality of Minglanilla, Province
of Cebu, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and deliberately deprive,
refuse and still continue to deprive his son RODERIGO
NORJO VAN WILSEM, a fourteen (14) year old minor, of
financial support legally due him, resulting in economic
abuse to the victim. CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Upon motion and after notice and hearing, the RTC-
Cebu issued a Hold Departure Order against
respondent.16Consequently, respondent was arrested
and, subsequently, posted bail.17 Petitioner also filed a
Motion/Application of Permanent Protection Order to
which respondent filed his Opposition.18 Pending the
resolution thereof, respondent was
arraigned.19 Subsequently, without the RTC-Cebu having
resolved the application of the protection order,
respondent filed a Motion to Dismiss on the ground of:
(1) lack of jurisdiction over the offense charged; and (2)
prescription of the crime charged.20
On February 19, 2010, the RTC-Cebu issued the herein
assailed Order,21 dismissing the instant criminal case
against respondent on the ground that the facts charged
in the information do not constitute an offense with
respect to the respondent who is an alien, the dispositive
part of which states:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds that the facts charged in
the information do not constitute an offense with respect
to the accused, he being an alien, and accordingly,
orders this case DISMISSED.
The bail bond posted by accused Ernst Johan Brinkman
Van Wilsem for his provisional liberty is hereby cancelled
(sic) and ordered released.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, February 19, 2010.22
Thereafter, petitioner filed her Motion for
Reconsideration thereto reiterating respondent’s
obligation to support their child under Article 195 23 of the
Family Code, thus, failure to do so makes him liable
under R.A. No. 9262 which "equally applies to all
persons in the Philippines who are obliged to support
their minor children regardless of the obligor’s
nationality."24
On September 1, 2010, the lower court issued an
Order25 denying petitioner’s Motion for Reconsideration
and reiterating its previous ruling. Thus:
x x x The arguments therein presented are basically a
rehash of those advanced earlier in the memorandum of
the prosecution. Thus, the court hereby reiterates its
ruling that since the accused is a foreign national he is
not subject to our national law (The Family Code) in
regard to a parent’s duty and obligation to givesupport to
his child. Consequently, he cannot be charged of
violating R.A. 9262 for his alleged failure to support his
child. Unless it is conclusively established that R.A. 9262
applies to a foreigner who fails to give support tohis
child, notwithstanding that he is not bound by our
domestic law which mandates a parent to give such
support, it is the considered opinion of the court that no
prima faciecase exists against the accused herein,
hence, the case should be dismissed.
WHEREFORE, the motion for reconsideration is hereby
DENIED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
Cebu City, Philippines, September 1, 2010.26
Hence, the present Petition for Review on Certiorari
raising the following issues:
1. Whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under
Philippine law; and
2. Whether or not a foreign national can be held
criminally liable under R.A. No. 9262 for his
unjustified failure to support his minor child.27
At the outset, let it be emphasized that We are taking
cognizance of the instant petition despite the fact that
the same was directly lodged with the Supreme Court,
consistent with the ruling in Republic v. Sunvar Realty
Development Corporation,28 which lays down the
instances when a ruling of the trial court may be brought
on appeal directly to the Supreme Court without violating
the doctrine of hierarchy of courts, to wit:
x x x Nevertheless, the Rules do not prohibit any of the
parties from filing a Rule 45 Petition with this Court, in
case only questions of law are raised or involved. This
latter situation was one that petitioners found themselves
in when they filed the instant Petition to raise only
questions of law. In Republic v. Malabanan, the Court
clarified the three modes of appeal from decisions of the
RTC, to wit: (1) by ordinary appeal or appeal by writ of
error under Rule 41, whereby judgment was rendered in
a civil or criminal action by the RTC in the exercise of its
original jurisdiction; (2) by a petition for review under
Rule 42, whereby judgment was rendered by the RTC in
the exercise of its appellate jurisdiction; and (3) by a
petition for review on certiorari before the Supreme
Court under Rule 45. "The first mode of appeal is taken
to the [Court of Appeals] on questions of fact or mixed
questions of fact and law. The second mode of appeal is
brought to the CA on questions of fact, of law, or mixed
questions of fact and law. The third mode of appealis
elevated to the Supreme Court only on questions of law."
(Emphasis supplied)
There is a question of law when the issue does not call
for an examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented or of the truth or falsehood of the facts being
admitted, and the doubt concerns the correct application
of law and jurisprudence on the matter. The resolution of
the issue must rest solely on what the law provides on
the given set of circumstances.29
Indeed, the issues submitted to us for resolution involve
questions of law – the response thereto concerns the
correct application of law and jurisprudence on a given
set of facts, i.e.,whether or not a foreign national has an
obligation to support his minor child under Philippine law;
and whether or not he can be held criminally liable under
R.A. No. 9262 for his unjustified failure to do so.
It cannot be negated, moreover, that the instant petition
highlights a novel question of law concerning the liability
of a foreign national who allegedly commits acts and
omissions punishable under special criminal laws,
specifically in relation to family rights and duties. The
inimitability of the factual milieu of the present case,
therefore, deserves a definitive ruling by this Court,
which will eventually serve as a guidepost for future
cases. Furthermore, dismissing the instant petition and
remanding the same to the CA would only waste the
time, effort and resources of the courts. Thus, in the
present case, considerations of efficiency and economy
in the administration of justice should prevail over the
observance of the hierarchy of courts.
Now, on the matter of the substantive issues, We find
the petition meritorious. Nonetheless, we do not fully
agree with petitioner’s contentions.
To determine whether or not a person is criminally liable
under R.A. No. 9262, it is imperative that the legal
obligation to support exists.
Petitioner invokes Article 19530 of the Family Code,
which provides the parent’s obligation to support his
child. Petitioner contends that notwithstanding the
existence of a divorce decree issued in relation to Article
26 of the Family Code, 31 respondent is not excused from
complying with his obligation to support his minor child
with petitioner.
On the other hand, respondent contends that there is no
sufficient and clear basis presented by petitioner that
she, as well as her minor son, are entitled to financial
support.32 Respondent also added that by reason of the
Divorce Decree, he is not obligated topetitioner for any
financial support.33
On this point, we agree with respondent that petitioner
cannot rely on Article 19534 of the New Civil Code in
demanding support from respondent, who is a foreign
citizen, since Article 1535 of the New Civil Code stresses
the principle of nationality. In other words, insofar as
Philippine laws are concerned, specifically the provisions
of the Family Code on support, the same only applies to
Filipino citizens. By analogy, the same principle applies
to foreigners such that they are governed by their
national law with respect to family rights and duties.36
The obligation to give support to a child is a matter that
falls under family rights and duties. Since the respondent
is a citizen of Holland or the Netherlands, we agree with
the RTC-Cebu that he is subject to the laws of his
country, not to Philippinelaw, as to whether he is obliged
to give support to his child, as well as the consequences
of his failure to do so.37
In the case of Vivo v. Cloribel,38 the Court held that –
Furthermore, being still aliens, they are not in position to
invoke the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines,
for that Code cleaves to the principle that family rights
and duties are governed by their personal law, i.e.,the
laws of the nation to which they belong even when
staying in a foreign country (cf. Civil Code, Article 15).39
It cannot be gainsaid, therefore, that the respondent is
not obliged to support petitioner’s son under Article195
of the Family Code as a consequence of the Divorce
Covenant obtained in Holland. This does not, however,
mean that respondent is not obliged to support
petitioner’s son altogether.
In international law, the party who wants to have a
foreign law applied to a dispute or case has the burden
of proving the foreign law.40 In the present case,
respondent hastily concludes that being a national of the
Netherlands, he is governed by such laws on the matter
of provision of and capacity to support. 41 While
respondent pleaded the laws of the Netherlands in
advancing his position that he is not obliged to support
his son, he never proved the same.
It is incumbent upon respondent to plead and prove that
the national law of the Netherlands does not impose
upon the parents the obligation to support their child
(either before, during or after the issuance of a divorce
decree), because Llorente v. Court of Appeals,42 has
already enunciated that:
True, foreign laws do not prove themselves in our
jurisdiction and our courts are not authorized to
takejudicial notice of them. Like any other fact, they must
be alleged and proved.43
In view of respondent’s failure to prove the national law
of the Netherlands in his favor, the doctrine of
processual presumption shall govern. Under this
doctrine, if the foreign law involved is not properly
pleaded and proved, our courts will presume that the
foreign law is the same as our local or domestic or
internal law.44 Thus, since the law of the Netherlands as
regards the obligation to support has not been properly
pleaded and proved in the instant case, it is presumed to
be the same with Philippine law, which enforces the
obligation of parents to support their children and
penalizing the non-compliance therewith.
Moreover, while in Pilapil v. Ibay-Somera, 45 the Court
held that a divorce obtained in a foreign land as well as
its legal effects may be recognized in the Philippines in
view of the nationality principle on the matter of status of
persons, the Divorce Covenant presented by respondent
does not completely show that he is notliable to give
support to his son after the divorce decree was issued.
Emphasis is placed on petitioner’s allegation that under
the second page of the aforesaid covenant, respondent’s
obligation to support his child is specifically
stated,46 which was not disputed by respondent.
We likewise agree with petitioner that notwithstanding
that the national law of respondent states that parents
have no obligation to support their children or that such
obligation is not punishable by law, said law would still
not find applicability,in light of the ruling in Bank of
America, NT and SA v. American Realty Corporation,47 to
wit:
In the instant case, assuming arguendo that the English
Law on the matter were properly pleaded and proved in
accordance with Section 24, Rule 132 of the Rules of
Court and the jurisprudence laid down in Yao Kee, et al.
vs. Sy-Gonzales, said foreign law would still not find
applicability.
Thus, when the foreign law, judgment or contract is
contrary to a sound and established public policy of the
forum, the said foreign law, judgment or order shall not
be applied.
Additionally, prohibitive laws concerning persons, their
acts or property, and those which have for their object
public order, public policy and good customs shall not be
rendered ineffective by laws or judgments promulgated,
or by determinations or conventions agreed upon in a
foreign country.
The public policy sought to be protected in the instant
case is the principle imbedded in our jurisdiction
proscribing the splitting up of a single cause of action.
Section 4, Rule 2 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure is
pertinent
— children of financial support legally due her or her family,
If two or more suits are instituted on the basis of the
same cause of action, the filing of one or a judgment
upon the merits in any one is available as a ground for
the dismissal of the others. Moreover, foreign law should
not be applied when its application would work
undeniable injustice to the citizens or residents of the
forum. To give justice is the most important function of
law; hence, a law, or judgment or contract that is
obviously unjust negates the fundamental principles of
Conflict of Laws.48
Applying the foregoing, even if the laws of the
Netherlands neither enforce a parent’s obligation to
support his child nor penalize the noncompliance
therewith, such obligation is still duly enforceable in the
Philippines because it would be of great injustice to the
child to be denied of financial support when the latter is
entitled thereto.
We emphasize, however, that as to petitioner herself,
respondent is no longer liable to support his former wife,
in consonance with the ruling in San Luis v. San
Luis,49 to wit:
As to the effect of the divorce on the Filipino wife, the
Court ruled that she should no longerbe considered
marriedto the alien spouse. Further, she should not be
required to perform her marital duties and obligations. It
held:
To maintain, as private respondent does, that, under our
laws, petitioner has to be considered still married to
private respondent and still subject to a wife's obligations
under Article 109, et. seq. of the Civil Code cannot be
just. Petitioner should not be obliged to live together
with, observe respect and fidelity, and render support to
private respondent. The latter should not continue to be
one of her heirs with possible rights to conjugal property.
She should not be discriminated against in her own
country if the ends of justice are to be served. (Emphasis
added)50
Based on the foregoing legal precepts, we find that
respondent may be made liable under Section 5(e) and
(i) of R.A. No. 9262 for unjustly refusing or failing to give
support topetitioner’s son, to wit:
SECTION 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxxx
(e) Attempting to compel or compelling the woman or her
child to engage in conduct which the woman or her child
has the right to desist from or desist from conduct which
the woman or her child has the right to engage in, or
attempting to restrict or restricting the woman's or her
child's freedom of movement or conduct by force or
threat of force, physical or other harm or threat of
physical or other harm, or intimidation directed against
the woman or child. This shall include, butnot limited to,
the following acts committed with the purpose or effect of
controlling or restricting the woman's or her child's
movement or conduct:
xxxx
(2) Depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her
or deliberately providing the woman's children
insufficient financial support; x x x x
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule
or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor childrenof
access to the woman's child/children.51
Under the aforesaid special law, the deprivation or denial
of financial support to the child is considered anact of
violence against women and children.
In addition, considering that respondent is currently living
in the Philippines, we find strength in petitioner’s claim
that the Territoriality Principle in criminal law, in relation
to Article 14 of the New Civil Code, applies to the instant
case, which provides that: "[p]enal laws and those of
public security and safety shall be obligatory upon all
who live and sojourn in Philippine territory, subject to the
principle of public international law and to treaty
stipulations." On this score, it is indisputable that the
alleged continuing acts of respondent in refusing to
support his child with petitioner is committed here in the
Philippines as all of the parties herein are residents of
the Province of Cebu City. As such, our courts have
territorial jurisdiction over the offense charged against
respondent. It is likewise irrefutable that jurisdiction over
the respondent was acquired upon his arrest.
Finally, we do not agree with respondent’s argument that
granting, but not admitting, that there is a legal basis for
charging violation of R.A. No. 9262 in the instant case,
the criminal liability has been extinguished on the ground
of prescription of crime52 under Section 24 of R.A. No.
9262, which provides that:
SECTION 24. Prescriptive Period. – Acts falling under
Sections 5(a) to 5(f) shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
Acts falling under Sections 5(g) to 5(I) shall prescribe in
ten (10) years.
The act of denying support to a child under Section 5(e)
(2) and (i) of R.A. No. 9262 is a continuing
offense,53 which started in 1995 but is still ongoing at
present. Accordingly, the crime charged in the instant
case has clearly not prescribed.
Given, however, that the issue on whether respondent
has provided support to petitioner’s child calls for an
examination of the probative value of the evidence
presented, and the truth and falsehood of facts being
admitted, we hereby remand the determination of this
issue to the RTC-Cebu which has jurisdiction over the
case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Orders
dated February 19, 2010 and September 1, 2010,
respectively, of the Regional Trial Court of the City of
Cebu are hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The
case is REMANDED to the same court to conduct further
proceedings based on the merits of the case.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 199522 June 22, 2015
RICKY DINAMLING, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Before the Court is a Petition for Review on certiorari,
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, assailing the
Decision1dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution2 dated
November 25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R.
CR No. 32912, which affirmed with modification the
conviction of petitioner for violation of Section 5(i), in
relation to Section 6(f) of Republic Act (RA) No. 9262,
otherwise known as the Anti-Violence Against Women
and their Children Act of 2004 .
The facts of the case follow.
On the night of March 14, 2007,petitioner Ricky
Dinamling and a friend came from a drinking session
and went to the boarding house of AAA. 3 At that time,
Dinamling and the woman AAA were in an ongoing five-
year relationship and they had two common children
(then aged four and two years old). Dinamling and his
friend arrived as AAA was putting the two children to
bed. Suddenly, Dinamling started to evict AAA and the
children, ordering AAA to pack her things in a trash bag
and a carton box for ducklings. His reason for the
eviction was that she was allegedly using the place as a
"whore house" wherein she "brought (her) partners."
AAA initially did not want to leave as she could not carry
the children and their things, but she left when Dinamling
threw a baby's feeding bottle outside the house, causing
it to break. She then went to the house of BBB and
requested the latter to fetch her children. When BBB and
another friend went for the children, Dinamling already
had left with the older child and only the baby was left.
The baby was brought by the friends back to AAA. In the
past, there were similar incidents that happened
between Dinamling and AAA. Dinamling would hit AAA's
head, pull her hair and kick her. When AAA went to the
police, she was merely told that it was a family problem
that could be talked over. Dinamling was, at that time, a
policeman himself.4
Six days later, or on March 20, 2007, at around 9:00
p.m., another incident occurred. AAA was at the house of
CCC when Dinamling arrived. He shouted and counted
down for AAA to come out. When she came out,
Dinamling punched her at the left ear, which
subsequently bled. When AAA asked him why he kept
on following her when she already had left him,
Dinamling shouted her family name and told her she was
"good-for-nothing." AAA left for the barangay captain's
house, but Dinamling caught up with her and kicked her
until she fell to the ground. On the road, Dinamling
pulled down AAA's pants and panty and shouted at her
while people looked on. Dinamling then threw the pants
and panty back at AAA and shouted her family name.
Dinamling, then intoxicated, left on a motorcycle.5 AAA
stayed at her friend's home until she felt some back pain
in the next morning. She found out she was bleeding
and about to miscarry so she was immediately brought
to the hospital. There, she was told that she was 19
weeks pregnant and had an incomplete abortion. She
was hospitalized for four days. Dinamling visited her but
showed no remorse over his acts.6
As a result of the above incidents, petitioner Ricky
Dinamling was charged in two (2) criminal Informations
in the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for violation of Section
5(i), in relation to Section 6(f) 7 of RA No. 9262. The two
Informations against him read:
Criminal Case No. 1701:
That on or about the evening of March 14, 2007, at XXX,
Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological
violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two
common children, resulting to mental and emotional
anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by repeated
verbal and emotional abuse consisting of several bad
and insulting utterances directed against the victim and a
feeding bottle being thrown against the latter in anger.
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended
by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
victim being pregnant at the time.
Criminal Case No. 1702:
That on or about the evening of March 20, 2007 at XXX,
Ifugao, the above-named accused did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously inflict psychological
violence upon AAA, a woman with whom he has two
common children, resulting to mental and emotional
anguish and public ridicule or humiliation by boxing the
victim on the head, kicking her at the back and removing
her pant(sic) and panty (sic).
CONTRARY TO LAW, with the offense being attended
by the special qualifying aggravating circumstance of the
victim being pregnant at the time.
Upon arraignment, Dinamling pleaded Not Guilty to both
charges. Thereafter, the cases were tried jointly.8
For the prosecution, AAA, her mother DDD and Dr. Mae
Codamon Diaz testified. For the accused, only petitioner
testified for and in his own defense. His defense was
denial and alibi, claiming that he was on duty at the
town's police station at the time that the offenses were
committed.9
After trial, the RTC rendered its decision on August 4,
2009 finding Dinamling guilty of both charges. For
Criminal Case No. 1701, the court sentenced him to
suffer imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years of prision mayor.10 For Criminal
Case No. 1702, the court ordered him to suffer
imprisonment of from ten (10) years and one (1) day to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor in its maximum
period.
On appeal to the Court of Appeals, the decision in
Criminal Case No. 1701 was affirmed and the one in
Criminal Case No. 1702 was affirmed with the
modification on the penalty, by applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law, such that Dinamling was
sentenced to imprisonment of nine (9) years, four (4)
months and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum,
to twelve (12) years of prision mayor, as maximum.
Hence, the present petition.
The petition assails the findings of the Court of Appeals
for allegedly disregarding his defenses of denial and alibi
as well as in discounting the supposedly exculpatory
nature of a part of a prosecution witness' testimony.
Allegedly, the witness, Dr. Diaz, testified that she was
unsure if the abortion was a result of the mauling that
AAA suffered or could have been caused by an infection
or other factors.11
This Court resolves to deny the petition for lack of merit,
but will modify some of the penalties imposed by the
appellate court.
The petition raises issues that call for an examination of
the factual findings of the trial court and the appellate
court. As a general rule, under Rule 45, no questions of
fact but only questions of law may be raised in a petition
for review brought before this Court. 12 Time and again,
the Court has consistently declared that questions of
facts are beyond the pale of a petition for
review.13 Factual findings of the trial court, particularly
when affirmed by the appellate courts, are generally
binding on this Court.14
But there are recognized exceptions to the rule that
questions of fact may not be entertained by this Court in
a petition for review, to wit:
(1) When the factual findings of the Court of
Appeals and the trial court are contradictory;
(2) When the conclusion is a finding grounded
entirely on speculation, surmises or
conjectures; (3) When the inference made by
the Court of Appeals from its findings of fact is
manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible;
(4) When there is grave abuse of discretion in
the appreciation of facts;
(5) When the appellate court, in making its
findings, went beyond the issues of the case,
and such findings are contrary to the
admissions of both appellant and appellee;
(6) When the judgment of the Court of Appeals
is premised on a misapprehension of facts;
(7) When the Court of Appeals failed to notice
certain relevant facts which, if properly
considered, would justify a different conclusion;
(8) When the findings of fact are themselves
conflicting;
(9) When the findings of fact are conclusions
without citation of the specific evidence on
which they are based; and
(10) When the findings of fact of the Court of
Appeals are premised on the absence of
evidence but such findings are contradicted by
the evidence on record,15
None of the above-mentioned exceptions, however, are
cited by the petitioner as a ground to grant his petition.
But even assuming arguendo, and in the interest of
substantial justice, that any of the exceptions above
were indeed invoked, as the petition alleges that the
appellate court failed to give weight to petitioner's
defenses of denial and alibi as well as to his stance that
the testimony of Dr. Diaz exculpates him from the crime,
this Court, upon a close examination of the case
records, still found no error in the appellate court's
finding of guilt in petitioner.
On its face, there is no reason to doubt the veracity and
truthfulness of the victim AAA's evidence. In particular,
AAA's testimony narrating the specific incidents which
gave rise to the charges was clear, categorical and
straightforward and, therefore, worthy of credence.
Herein below are excerpts of her testimony:
Q. Specifically inviting your attention to that incident in
the evening of March 14, 2007, could you please tell the
court what transpired?
A. In the evening of March 14, 2007, somewhere around
seven or eight o'clock in the evening, I was letting my
kids sleep (w)hen (Dinamling) came with a friend. They
had a drinking spree and x x x he started to evict us from
that boarding house because according to him, I (was)
using that boarding house as a whore house (by)
bringing in partners, et cetera to that boarding house.
That (was) why he was letting us out of it. And he even
told me that if I (had) no travelling bag, I (could) use the
basura (garbage) bag outside and I (could) use the
carton where he placed the ducklings to pack our things
and leave the place. That night, I (did) not know how to
carry them out and I was waiting for him to stop talking
and leave but he never left us up to the time he threw
the feeding bottle of my baby outside that caused it to
break and that was also the time I decided to go to the
house of BBB because it is the place where my landlady
(was) staying.
xxxx
Q. You mentioned of a feeding bottle.
A. He threw it outside, Sir.
Q. How did you feel as regards these actuations of the
accused that evening?
A. That is worst. He was inflicting pain (on) me but that
time it was directed (at an) innocent individual and that is
very painful.
Q. Personally, did you feel distressed or stressed or
fearful at the time the accused was acting that way?
A. When he started acting that way, I fear(ed) he would
again inflict those pain (on) us.
Q. So when you went to the house of BBB, what
happened next?
A. x x x He (BBB) went to fetch the kids and came home
with one of the kids but to my dismay, even the milk of
my baby was not there any more; that night because it
was around 11:00 o'clock, we had to use the feeding
bottle of BBB's son together with the milk because when
they went to fetch the kids, the milk was gone.
Q. Was the incident on March 14, 2007 the first time or it
happened (sic) previously?
A. It happened previously. Those were the time(s) that (I
was) prompted to go back home and to my relatives for
protection but he (came, followed) us where we (went).
Q. In those previous incidents before March 14, 2007,
what did he do, if any?
A. There are times he did that in public. He usually starts
hitting my head, pulls my hair kicks me and there was a
time I went to the police station but they said that (it) is
some kind of family problem that we could talk xxx over
and so it was left that way. I thought leaving him would
be the best thing to do but he kept on following us.16
xxxx
Q. I am inviting your attention to that incident of March
20, 2007. Will you please tell the court what happened
that late afternoon or early evening?
A. I was at the house of CCC waiting for a friend
because of what happened on March 14, 2007 when we
left the boarding house.
xxxx
Q. What transpired thereat, when you were at that
place?
A. After sometime, around 9 o'clock, (Dinamling) came
and shouted words that (on) final count, (I) should be out
of that place.
Q. And what else happened?
A. After shouting, he boxed me at the left ear.
Q. What transpired next?
A. (T)hen I felt there was blood in my ear. I followed him
outside and I inquired (as to) why he (kept on) following
us when we (already) left the boarding house and then
he started shouting at me, shouting my family name, x x
x x that I (was) good for nothing and that I (could) sue
him (in) court and he (would) pay me. So I said "I
thought when we already left, you were at peace with
yourself already." When I was going down, going to the
barangay captain's house, he followed me. When I tried
to go back, he kicked me. He pulled my pants down and
pulled even my panty and he said x x x he (did) that to
me because I was worthless.
Q. (At) what particular spot did the accused pull down
your pants and your panty?
A. Front of CCC.
Q. What was that spot, road or backyard?
A. Road.
Q. Could you describe the place? Were there houses
nearby, that road, that spot where he pulled down your
pants and panty?
A. There is a small store and people were looking at us.
There are houses above and then one of them told me
he saw but he is afraid to come out.
Q. Was it already dark (at) that time?
A. Dark but then there was a street light near the
residence.
Q. Was it still early evening?
A. Yes, sir.
Q. About what time?
A. Around 9 o'clock.
Q. After pulling down your pants and your panty along
that road, what else happened?
A. He threw my pants and panty back tome and he left
shouting at me, my family name. It is very hurting
because my family (had) nothing to do with this.
xxxx
Q. And what happened the following day?
A. I stayed at my friend's house then at 5:00 o'clock
early morning of March 21, there was pain at my back.
That night when he kicked me, there was pain at my
back. I said I (would) just go tomorrow for medication but
I did not reach the day because I was bleeding. When I
went to the bathroom, there (was) blood so I said I think I
am going to abort. There (was) blood already so I
decided to go to bath before I (went) to the hospital but
when I went to take a bath, I already had profuse
bleeding so they (had) to carry me with the use of a
blanket to the hospital.17
AAA also stated that the baby that she claims was
aborted would have been her third child with Dinamling.
She also testified about always being afraid of
Dinamling, even fearing the sound of his motorcycle as
that signalled that she or her children would be abused.
She previously filed with the police a complaint for
physical injuries but nothing came of it. Later, she
learned from Dinamling that he had been discharged as
a policeman.18
The trial court specifically ascribed credibility on the said
testimony of AAA which the Court of Appeals has
affirmed. Under such circumstances, this Court has little
option but to accord said findings with great respect, if
not finality. The findings off act of the trial court, as
regards the credibility of a witness, when affirmed by the
Court of Appeals and supported by the evidence on
record are accorded finality.19
In addition to AAA's testimony, her mother DDD also
testified that her daughter was "like a corpse" because of
Dinamling's maltreatment. DDD narrated the history of
maltreatment of her daughter, including the times that
she saw her with "bluish spots" and when AAA had a
miscarriage from all the boxing and kicking that she had
received from Dinamling.20 She knew that Dinamling was
a married man when he had his relationship with
AAA21 and she knew for a fact that Dinamling did not live
with AAA and the children because he always went
home to his own wife.22
The above testimonies suffice to establish the elements
of the crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262
and as alleged in the two Informations filed against
petitioner. The provision of the law states:
Section 5. Acts of Violence Against Women and Their
Children.- The crime of violence against women and
their children is committed through any of the following
acts:
xxxx
(i) Causing mental or emotional anguish, public ridicule
or humiliation to the woman or her child, including, but
not limited to, repeated verbal and emotional abuse, and
denial of financial support or custody of minor children or
access to the woman's child/children.
From the aforequoted Section 5(i), in relation to other
sections of RA No. 9262, the elements of the crime are
derived as follows:
(1) The offended party is a woman and/or her
child or children;23
(2) The woman is either the wife or former wife
of the offender, or is a woman with whom the
offender has or had a sexual or dating
relationship, or is a woman with whom such
offender has a common child. As for the
woman's child or children, they may be
legitimate or illegitimate, or living within or
without the family abode;24
(3) The offender causes on the woman and/or
child mental or emotional anguish; and
(4) The anguish is caused through acts of
public ridicule or humiliation, repeated verbal
and emotional abuse, denial of financial support
or custody of minor children or access to the
children or similar such acts or omissions.25
As for the first case, Criminal Case No. 1701, filed
against petitioner Dinamling, the elements have been
proven and duly established. It is undisputed that AAA,
as the victim, is a woman who was then in a five-year
ongoing relationship with petitioner Dinamling. At that
time, AAA and Dinamling had two common children. AAA
was often in fear of petitioner due to the latter's physical
and verbal abuse. In the evening of March 14, 2007, an
incident occurred in which she and her children were
actually evicted by Dinamling from a boarding house.
Dinamling, in the presence of his own friend and the
children, accused AAA of using the boarding house as a
"whore-house" and alleged that AAA brought sexual
partners in that place. Dinamling further humiliated AAA
by telling her to pack her clothes in a trash bag and in a
carton box used to pack ducklings. He then threw a baby
bottle outside and broke it. This forced AAA to hastily
leave even without her children. Dinamling also left and
took with him the elder child and left the baby behind.
AAA had to ask for her friends to fetch the children but
the latter found only the baby. According to AAA and her
mother DDD, that incident was not an isolated one, as
similar incidents had happened previously.
As for the second case, Criminal Case No. 1702, the
crime's elements were likewise proven. In addition to the
first two elements of the victim being a woman and in a
relationship with the offender, the prosecution was able
to prove another incident of mental or emotional anguish
through public ridicule or humiliation when it showed
Dinamling acting in the following manner: a) by calling
and counting down on AAA for the latter to come out of
the house where she was staying;
b) by punching AAA at the left ear upon seeing
her;
c) by shouting AAA's family name and calling
her "good-for-nothing;"
d) by saying that AAA could sue him but he
would just pay her;
e) by kicking AAA to the ground and then
pulling off her pants and underwear (panty) and
calling her worthless;
f) by throwing the pants and panty back at AAA
while shouting AAA's family name as he left.
All such acts were committed while in full view and
hearing of the public, highlighting the public ridicule and
humiliation done on AAA and causing her mental and
emotional pain. AAA's suffering is so much that even the
sound of petitioner's motorcycle would put fear in her.
All the above, as established during trial, lead to no other
conclusion than the commission of the crime as
prescribed in the law.
It matters not that no other eyewitness corroborated
AAA's testimony of the actual incidents. The testimony of
the complainant as a lone witness to the actual
perpetration of the act, as long as it is credible, suffices
to establish the guilt of the accused because evidence is
weighed and not counted.26 If, in criminal cases of
rape27 or homicide,28 the positive, categorical and
credible testimony of a lone witness is deemed enough
to support a conviction, then, in the case at bar, involving
a case of violation of Section 5(i) of RA No. 9262, this
Court shall treat in the same manner the testimony of a
single but credible witness for the prosecution.
Especially if the testimony bears the earmarks of truth
and sincerity and was delivered spontaneously, naturally
and in a straightforward manner, corroborative testimony
is not needed to support a conviction.29
It bears emphasis that Section 5(i) penalizes some forms
of psychological violence that are inflicted on victims
who are women and children. Other forms of
psychological violence, as well as physical, sexual and
economic violence, are addressed and penalized in
other sub-parts of Section 5.
The law defines psychological violence as follows:
Section 3(a)
xxxx
C. "Psychological violence" refers to acts or omissions
causing or likely to cause mental or emotional suffering
of the victim such as but not limited to intimidation,
harassment, stalking, damage to property, public ridicule
or humiliation, repeated verbal abuse and mental
infidelity. It includes causing or allowing the victim to
witness the physical, sexual or psychological abuse of a
member of the family to which the victim belongs, or to
witness pornography in any form or to witness abusive
injury to pets or to unlawful or unwanted deprivation of
the right to custody and/or visitation of common children.
Psychological violence is an element of violation of
Section 5(i) just like the mental or emotional anguish
caused on the victim. Psychological violence is the
means employed by the perpetrator, while mental or
emotional anguish is the effect caused to or the damage
sustained by the offended party. To establish
psychological violence as an element of the crime, it is
necessary to show proof of commission of any of the
acts enumerated in Section 5(i) or similar such acts. And
to establish mental or emotional anguish, it is necessary
to present the testimony of the victim as such
experiences are personal to this party.30 All of this was
complied with in the case at bar. In the face of the strong
and credible testimony of AAA, petitioner Dinamling
relies on a defense of denial and alibi. On the nights of
March 14 and 20, 2007, he claimed that he was on duty
at XXX Police Station.31 He denied seeing AAA on those
dates.32 However, on cross examination, he admitted
that it takes only two to three minutes to go from the
police station to AAA's boarding house.33
Denial and alibi, as defenses of an accused in a criminal
case, have been consistently held as inherently
weak34 and which, unless supported by clear and
convincing evidence, cannot prevail over the positive
declarations of the victim.35 In general, a plea of denial
and alibi is not given much weight relative to the
affirmative testimony of the offended party.36 The only
exception to this rule is where there is no effective
identification, or where the identification of the accused
has been fatally tainted by irregularity and attendant
inconsistencies.37
In the case at bar, nothing in Dinamling's defense
overcomes the clear, straightforward, unequivocal and
positive declarations of AAA. For one, the positive
identification of Dinamling as the perpetrator is not an
issue. It is not disputed that he and AAA knew each
other very well as, in fact, they were at that time carrying
on a five-year relationship which had borne two common
children.
Then, as for alibi, such a defense would prosper only if
the accused was able to prove that not only was heat
some other place when the crime was committed, but
also that he could not have been physically present at
the place of the crime, or in its immediate vicinity, during
its commission.38 Using such standards, Dinamling's alibi
holds no water. Not only was his alleged location at the
time of commission, that is, the XXX Police Station
where he was on duty, in the same municipality as the
crimes' place of commission, Dinamling himself also
admited that this police station is just "two to three
minutes" away from AAA's boarding house. Where the
accused admits that he was in the same municipality as
the place where the offense occurred, it cannot be said
that it was physically impossible for him to have
committed the crime, and his defense of alibi cannot
prosper.39
Therefore, the trial and appellate courts correctly found
petitioner Dinamling guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
such conviction must be upheld. To reiterate, the denial
of the accused is a negative assertion that is weaker
than the affirmative testimony of the victim.40 It almost
has no probative value and may be further discarded in
the absence of any evidence of ill motives on the part of
the witness to impute so grave a wrong against the
accused.41As for alibi, it is not given weight if the
accused failed to demonstrate that he was so far away
and could not have been physically present at the scene
of the crime and its immediate vicinity when the crime
was committed.42
But petitioner Dinamling also harps on the allegedly
exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, the substance of
which allegedly frees him from responsibility for the
incomplete abortion of AAA's unborn child.
By way of background, a witness, who is an officer of the
Ifugao Provincial Hospital, brought a copy of a medical
certificate issued by a Dr. Johan Baguilat stating that:
a) AAA was hospitalized at the said hospital
from March 21 to March 24, 2007;
b) AAA had an incomplete abortion secondary
to the mauling, and;
c) AAA had anemia, contusion, hematoma and
abrasion of the left elbow.43
The witness testified that she herself typed the medical
certificate and had it signed by Dr. Baguilat. 44 Dr.
Baguilat, however, was unable to testify, due to the
alleged distance of the court from his current place of
work.45 Instead of Dr. Baguilat, it was Dr. Mae Codamon-
Diaz, an obstetrician-gynecologist of the Ifugao
Provincial Hospital, who testified that the medical
certificate indicated that AAA was pregnant, but that her
incomplete abortion might or might not have been
caused by her "mauling."46 Dr. Diaz added that the
anemia was caused by profuse bleeding, while the
contusion and hematoma were caused by a fall, trauma,
blow or impact to the patient's body. 47 When cross-
examined, Dr. Diaz stated that other possible causes of
abortion include infection of the reproductive organ or
urinary tract infection and intake of strong medicines,
while another cause of anemia is malnutrition.48
Petitioner Dinamling's position is that such testimony of
Dr. Diaz, which expresses an uncertainty as to whether
the mauling of AAA caused her abortion, exculpates him
from the crime.
The Court disagrees. Petitioner barks up the wrong tree
because the fact of AAA's physical injuries from the
mauling, including her abortion, do not constitute an
element of the crime with which he is charged. Such
injuries are likewise not alleged in the two informations
against him. Therefore, the testimony of Dr. Diaz or any
physician as to the fact or existence of such physical
injuries is not indispensable to petitioner's conviction or
acquittal. Simply put, AAA's physical condition is not an
element of the crime that petitioner was charged with,
hence, proof of the same is, strictly speaking,
unnecessary.
In fact, neither the physical injuries suffered by the victim
nor the actual physical violence done by the perpetrator
are necessary to prove the essential elements of the
crime as defined in Section 5(i) of RA 9262. The only
exception is, as in the case at bar, when the physical
violence done by the accused is alleged to have caused
the mental and emotional suffering; in which case, such
acts of physical violence must be proven. In this
instance, the physical violence was a means of causing
mental or emotional suffering. As such, whether or not it
led to actual bodily injury, the physical violence
translates to psychological violence since its main effect
was on the victim's mental or emotional well-being. In
the case at bar, petitioner Dinamling's acts of publicly
punching, kicking and stripping AAA of her pants and
underwear, although obvious acts of physical violence,
are also instances of psychological violence since it was
alleged and proven that they resulted in AAA's public
ridicule and humiliation and mental or emotional distress.
The clear, unrebutted testimony of the victim AAA, as to
the physical violence done on her as well as to the
mental and emotional suffering she experienced as a
result thereof, suffices to prove such facts.
The victim's resulting actual bodily injuries are
immaterial unless such injuries are also alleged to have
led to her mental or emotional anguish. There was no
such allegation in the information in the case at bar.
Thus, proof of physical injuries is not needed for
conviction. Likewise, proof of the absence thereof or lack
of proof of such injuries would not lead to an acquittal.
Physical violence or physical injuries, in isolation, are not
elements of this particular crime.
As earlier discussed, the focus of this particular criminal
act is the causation of non-physical suffering, that is,
mental or emotional distress, or even anxiety and social
shame or dishonor on the offended party, and not of
direct bodily harm or property damage which are
covered by the other subsections of the law's provision.
The use of physical violence, whether or not it causes
physical or property harm to the victim, falls under
Section 5(i) only if it is alleged and proven to have
caused mental or emotional anguish. Likewise, the
physical injuries suffered are similarly covered only if
they lead to such psychological harm. Otherwise,
physical violence or injuries, with no allegation of mental
or emotional harm, are punishable under the other
provisions of the law.
As to the alleged miscarriage or incomplete abortion, the
allegedly exculpatory testimony of Dr. Diaz, or even the
complete disregard of any evidence surrounding such
fact does not lead to petitioner Dinamling's acquittal.
Like the physical injuries that was discussed above, the
fact of AAA's miscarriage or incomplete abortion is not
essential to proving the elements of the crime, unless it
is alleged to have caused mental or emotional suffering.
It is not among the crime's elements. In fact, it is not
abortion but the mere fact of pregnancy of the victim at
the time of commission which is an aggravating
circumstance, not an element, of the offense. Section 6
of RA 9262 reads:
SECTION 6. Penalties.- The crime of violence against
women and their children, under Section 5 hereof shall
be punished according to the following rules:
xxxx
(f) Acts falling under Section 5(h) and Section 5(i) shall
be punished by prision mayor.
If the acts are committed while the woman or child is
pregnant or committed in the presence of her child, the
penalty to be applied shall be the maximum period of
penalty prescribed in the section.
In addition to imprisonment, the perpetrator shall (a) pay
a fine in the amount of not less than One hundred
thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) but not more than three
hundred thousand pesos (₱300,000.00); (b) undergo
mandatory psychological counseling or psychiatric
treatment and shall report compliance to the court.49
For this crime, pregnancy or the presence of the
woman's child are aggravating circumstances which
increase the imposable penalty, thus, they must be
alleged and proven with competent evidence for the
penalty to be properly imposed.50
It is true that the fact of AAA's incomplete abortion or
miscarriage does not establish any of the crime's
elements, as indeed the information itself did not allege
the same. However, from the fact of miscarriage one
may logically derive the fact of AAA's pregnancy, which
is an aggravating circumstance for the crime and which
is alleged as such in the information. The pregnancy is
proven by AAA's unrebutted testimony as well as by the
medical certificate that she presented in the course of
such testimony to show that she was indeed hospitalized
and suffered an "incomplete abortion secondary to the
mauling."
Although petitioner Dinamling, up to this stage of the
case, denies having caused the incomplete abortion or
miscarriage, he does not deny the fact of pregnancy
itself. He did not present contradictory evidence during
trial to controvert the prosecution's assertions and proof
of pregnancy. The pregnancy was never put in issue
during trial and on appeal. Neither is the same in
question in this petition. Therefore, it may be safely
concluded that the fact of AAA's pregnancy has been
established and it may be taken account of and
considered as a circumstance that aggravates
Dinamling's criminal liability.
Therefore, given such finding, this Court will now
accordingly modify the penalties imposed by the trial
court and appellate court.51
As for Criminal Case No. 1701, no mitigating and only
one (1) aggravating circumstance attends the
crime.1âwphi1Although it was stated during trial that the
offense was committed in the presence of AAA's
children, such fact was not alleged in the information and
therefore will not be taken into
consideration.52 Nighttime, though alleged, is not
considered aggravating because it neither facilitated the
commission of the offense nor was it shown to have
been purposely sought by the offender.53 The fact of
AAA's pregnancy during the crime's commission,
however, has been alleged and established. This single
circumstance aggravates the accused's liability and
automatically raises his penalty to the maximum period
of the penalty prescribed, per Section 6 of RA 9262 and
also Article 64(3) of the Revised Penal Code. Hence,
petitioner Dinamling should be sentenced to a maximum
penalty that is derived from prision mayor in its
maximum period, which is imprisonment of ten (10)
years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. Applying the
Indeterminate Sentence Law,54 the minimum penalty
should come from the penalty one degree lower than
prision mayor which is prision correccional, whose range
is from six (6) months and one (1) day to six (6)
years.55 Therefore, this Court modifies the trial court's
Order dated September 17, 2009,56 which was affirmed
by the Court of Appeals, and imposes on petitioner
Dinamling an indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of
two (2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of prision
correccional as minimum to eleven (11) years of prision
mayor as maximum. The trial court's order for petitioner
to pay a fine of one hundred thousand pesos
(₱100,000.00) and to undergo psychological counseling,
as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, is upheld.
As for Criminal Case No. 1702, there is likewise no
mitigating and only one (1) aggravating circumstance.
Again, the single circumstance of pregnancy aggravates
the accused's liability and automatically raises his
penalty to the maximum period of the penalty prescribed,
per Section 6 of RA No. 9262 and Article 64(3) of the
Revised Penal Code. Therefore, the penalty imposed by
the Court of Appeals are to be modified. The maximum
penalty should be derived from prision mayor in its
maximum period, which, again, is imprisonment of ten
(10) years and one (1) day to twelve (12) years. And
again, applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the
minimum should be derived from the penalty next lower
in degree, which is prision correccional. Therefore, the
new penalty to be imposed shall be imprisonment of six
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum to twelve
(12) years of prision mayor as maximum. The rest of the
penalties, like the imposition on the petitioner of a fine of
one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and the
order for him to undergo psychological counseling, as
upheld by the appellate court, are hereby affirmed.
Both Criminal Case Nos. 1701 and 1702 involve the
same offense as defined in RA 9262 and are punishable
by the same range of penalties as prescribed in the said
law. However, due to the greater ignominy of the acts
done by the accused in Criminal Case No. 1702, the
minimum and maximum lengths of the sentence
imposed should therefore be greater than in Criminal
Case No. 1701.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the petition is
DENIED for failure of petitioner to show any reversible
error in the assailed CA decision. The assailed Decision
dated August 11, 2011 and Resolution dated November
25, 2011 of the Court of Appeals, in CA-G.R. CR No.
32912, are hereby AFFIRMED and MODIFIED only as to
the penalties imposed, to wit:
1) in Criminal Case No. 1701, petitioner Ricky
Dinamling is ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of two
(2) years, four (4) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional as minimum to eleven (11)
years of prision mayor as maximum. He is,
likewise, ORDERED to PAY a fine of one
hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00) and to
undergo psychological counseling;
2) in Criminal Case No. 1702, petitioner Ricky
Dinamling is hereby ORDERED to serve an
indeterminate sentence of imprisonment of six (
6) years of prision correccional as minimum to
twelve (12) years of prision mayor as
maximum. He is also ORDERED to PAY a fine
of one hundred thousand pesos (₱100,000.00)
and to undergo psychological counseling.
SO ORDERED.
R.A. 7610
Republic Act No. 7610 June 17, 1992
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR STRONGER DETERRENCE
AND SPECIAL PROTECTION AGAINST CHILD
ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND DISCRIMINATION, AND
FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
ARTICLE
Title, Policy, Principles and Definitions of Terms
Section 1. Title. – This Act shall be known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
Section 2. Declaration of State Policy and
Principles. – It is hereby declared to be the policy of the
State to provide special protection to children from all
firms of abuse, neglect, cruelty exploitation and
discrimination and other conditions, prejudicial their
development; provide sanctions for their commission
and carry out a program for prevention and deterrence of
and crisis intervention in situations of child abuse,
exploitation and discrimination. The State shall intervene
on behalf of the child when the parent, guardian, teacher
or person having care or custody of the child fails or is
unable to protect the child against abuse, exploitation
and discrimination or when such acts against the child
are committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher or
person having care and custody of the
same.1awphi1@alf
It shall be the policy of the State to protect and
rehabilitate children gravely threatened or endangered
by circumstances which affect or will affect their survival
and normal development and over which they have no
control.
The best interests of children shall be the paramount
consideration in all actions concerning them, whether
undertaken by public or private social welfare
institutions, courts of law, administrative authorities, and
legislative bodies, consistent with the principle of First
Call for Children as enunciated in the United Nations
Convention of the Rights of the Child. Every effort shall
be exerted to promote the welfare of children and
enhance their opportunities for a useful and happy life.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. –
(a) "Children" refers to person below eighteen
(18) years of age or those over but are unable
to fully take care of themselves or protect
themselves from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition;
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment,
whether habitual or not, of the child which
includes any of the following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse,
neglect, cruelty, sexual abuse and
emotional maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which
debases, degrades or demeans the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as
a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his
basic needs for survival, such as food
and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting
in serious impairment of his growth
and development or in his permanent
incapacity or death.
I (c) "Circumstances which gravely threaten or
endanger the survival and normal development
of children" include, but are not limited to, the
following;
(1) Being in a community where there
is armed conflict or being affected by
armed conflict-related activities;
(2) Working under conditions
hazardous to life, safety and normal
which unduly interfere with their
normal development;
(3) Living in or fending for themselves
in the streets of urban or rural areas
without the care of parents or a
 guardian or basic services needed for
a good quality of life;
(4) Being a member of a indigenous
cultural community and/or living under
conditions of extreme poverty or in an
area which is underdeveloped and/or
lacks or has inadequate access to
basic services needed for a good
quality of life;
(5) Being a victim of a man-made or
natural disaster or calamity; or
(6) Circumstances analogous to those
abovestated which endanger the life,
safety or normal development of
children.
(d) "Comprehensive program against child
abuse, exploitation and discrimination" refers to
the coordinated program of services and
facilities to protected children against:
(1) Child Prostitution and other sexual
abuse;
(2) Child trafficking;
(3) Obscene publications and indecent
shows;
(4) Other acts of abuses; and
(5) Circumstances which threaten or
endanger the survival and normal
development of children.1awphi1Ÿ
ARTICLE II
Program on Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination
Section 4. Formulation of the Program. – There shall
be a comprehensive program to be formulated, by the
Department of Justice and the Department of Social
Welfare and Development in coordination with other
government agencies and private sector concerned,
within one (1) year from the effectivity of this Act, to
protect children against child prostitution and other
sexual abuse; child trafficking, obscene publications and
indecent shows; other acts of abuse; and circumstances
which endanger child survival and normal development.
ARTICLE III
Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse. – Children, whether male or female, who for
money, profit, or any other consideration or due to the
coercion or influence of any adult, syndicate or group,
indulge in sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are
deemed to be children exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
(a) Those who engage in or promote, facilitate
or induce child prostitution which include, but
are not limited to, the following:
(1) Acting as a procurer of a child
prostitute;
(2) Inducing a person to be a client of
a child prostitute by means of written
or oral advertisements or other similar
means;
(3) Taking advantage of influence or
relationship to procure a child as
prostitute;
(4) Threatening or using violence
towards a child to engage him as a
prostitute; or
(5) Giving monetary consideration
goods or other pecuniary benefit to a
child with intent to engage such child
in prostitution.
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual
intercourse of lascivious conduct with a child
exploited in prostitution or subject to other
sexual abuse; Provided, That when the victims
is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article
335, paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of
Act No. 3815, as amended, the Revised Penal
Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as the
case may be: Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under
twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period; and
(c) Those who derive profit or advantage
therefrom, whether as manager or owner of the
establishment where the prostitution takes
place, or of the sauna, disco, bar, resort, place
of entertainment or establishment serving as a
cover or which engages in prostitution in
addition to the activity for which the license has
been issued to said establishment.
Section 6. Attempt To Commit Child Prostitution. –
There is an attempt to commit child prostitution under
Section 5, paragraph (a) hereof when any person who,
not being a relative of a child, is found alone with the
said child inside the room or cubicle of a house, an inn,
hotel, motel, pension house, apartelle or other similar
establishments, vessel, vehicle or any other hidden or
secluded area under circumstances which would lead a
reasonable person to believe that the child is about to be
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse.
There is also an attempt to commit child prostitution,
under paragraph (b) of Section 5 hereof when any
person is receiving services from a child in a sauna
parlor or bath, massage clinic, health club and other
similar establishments. A penalty lower by two (2)
degrees than that prescribed for the consummated
felony under Section 5 hereof shall be imposed upon the
principals of the attempt to commit the crime of child
prostitution under this Act, or, in the proper case, under
the Revised Penal Code.
ARTICLE IV
Child Trafficking
Section 7. Child Trafficking. – Any person who shall
engage in trading and dealing with children including, but
not limited to, the act of buying and selling of a child for
money, or for any other consideration, or barter, shall
suffer the penalty of reclusion temporal to reclusion
perpetua. The penalty shall be imposed in its maximum
period when the victim is under twelve (12) years of age.
Section 8. Attempt to Commit Child Trafficking. –
There is an attempt to commit child trafficking under
Section 7 of this Act:1awphi1@alf
(a) When a child travels alone to a foreign
country without valid reason therefor and
without clearance issued by the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or written
permit or justification from the child's parents or
legal guardian;
(c) When a person, agency, establishment or
child-caring institution recruits women or
couples to bear children for the purpose of child
trafficking; or
(d) When a doctor, hospital or clinic official or
employee, nurse, midwife, local civil registrar or
any other person simulates birth for the
purpose of child trafficking; or
(e) When a person engages in the act of finding
children among low-income families, hospitals,
clinics, nurseries, day-care centers, or other
child-during institutions who can be offered for
the purpose of child trafficking.
A penalty lower two (2) degrees than that prescribed for
the consummated felony under Section 7 hereof shall be
imposed upon the principals of the attempt to commit
child trafficking under this Act.
ARTICLE V private place of accommodation, whether for
Obscene Publications and Indecent Shows
Section 9. Obscene Publications and Indecent
Shows. – Any person who shall hire, employ, use,
persuade, induce or coerce a child to perform in
obscene exhibitions and indecent shows, whether live or
in video, or model in obscene publications or
pornographic materials or to sell or distribute the said
materials shall suffer the penalty of prision mayor in its
medium period.
If the child used as a performer, subject or
seller/distributor is below twelve (12) years of age, the
penalty shall be imposed in its maximum period.
Any ascendant, guardian, or person entrusted in any
capacity with the care of a child who shall cause and/or
allow such child to be employed or to participate in an
obscene play, scene, act, movie or show or in any other
acts covered by this section shall suffer the penalty of
prision mayor in its medium period.
ARTICLE VI
Other Acts of Abuse
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts
of child abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be
responsible for other conditions prejudicial to
the child's development including those
covered by Article 59 of Presidential Decree
No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its minimum
period.
(b) Any person who shall keep or have in his
company a minor, twelve (12) years or under or
who in ten (10) years or more his junior in any
public or private place, hotel, motel, beer joint,
discotheque, cabaret, pension house, sauna or
massage parlor, beach and/or other tourist
resort or similar places shall suffer the penalty
of prision mayor in its maximum period and a
fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000): Provided, That this provision shall
not apply to any person who is related within
the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity or
any bond recognized by law, local custom and
tradition or acts in the performance of a social,
moral or legal duty.
(c) Any person who shall induce, deliver or offer
a minor to any one prohibited by this Act to
keep or have in his company a minor as
provided in the preceding paragraph shall suffer
the penalty of prision mayor in its medium
period and a fine of not less than Forty
thousand pesos (P40,000); Provided, however,
That should the perpetrator be an ascendant,
stepparent or guardian of the minor, the penalty
to be imposed shall be prision mayor in its
maximum period, a fine of not less than Fifty
thousand pesos (P50,000), and the loss of
parental authority over the minor.
(d) Any person, owner, manager or one
entrusted with the operation of any public or
occupancy, food, drink or otherwise, including
residential places, who allows any person to
take along with him to such place or places any
minor herein described shall be imposed a
penalty of prision mayor in its medium period
and a fine of not less than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000), and the loss of the license to
operate such a place or establishment.
(e) Any person who shall use, coerce, force or
intimidate a street child or any other child to;
(1) Beg or use begging as a means of
living;
(2) Act as conduit or middlemen in
drug trafficking or pushing; or
(3) Conduct any illegal activities, shall
suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua.
For purposes of this Act, the penalty for the commission
of acts punishable under Articles 248, 249, 262,
paragraph 2, and 263, paragraph 1 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of
murder, homicide, other intentional mutilation, and
serious physical injuries, respectively, shall be reclusion
perpetua when the victim is under twelve (12) years of
age. The penalty for the commission of acts punishable
under Article 337, 339, 340 and 341 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for the crimes of
qualified seduction, acts of lasciviousness with the
consent of the offended party, corruption of minors, and
white slave trade, respectively, shall be one (1) degree
higher than that imposed by law when the victim is under
twelve (12) years age.
The victim of the acts committed under this section shall
be entrusted to the care of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development.
ARTICLE VII
Sanctions for Establishments or Enterprises
Section 11. Sanctions of Establishments or
Enterprises which Promote, Facilitate, or Conduct
Activities Constituting Child Prostitution and Other
Sexual Abuse, Child Trafficking, Obscene
Publications and Indecent Shows, and Other Acts of
Abuse. – All establishments and enterprises which
promote or facilitate child prostitution and other sexual
abuse, child trafficking, obscene publications and
indecent shows, and other acts of abuse shall be
immediately closed and their authority or license to
operate cancelled, without prejudice to the owner or
manager thereof being prosecuted under this Act and/or
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, or special laws. A
sign with the words "off limits" shall be conspicuously
displayed outside the establishments or enterprises by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development for
such period which shall not be less than one (1) year, as
the Department may determine. The unauthorized
removal of such sign shall be punishable by prision
correccional.
An establishment shall be deemed to promote or
facilitate child prostitution and other sexual abuse, child
trafficking, obscene publications and indecent shows,
and other acts of abuse if the acts constituting the same
occur in the premises of said establishment under this
Act or in violation of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended. An enterprise such as a sauna, travel agency,
or recruitment agency which: promotes the
aforementioned acts as part of a tour for foreign tourists;
exhibits children in a lewd or indecent show; provides
child masseurs for adults of the same or opposite sex
and said services include any lascivious conduct with the
customers; or solicits children or activities constituting
the aforementioned acts shall be deemed to have
committed the acts penalized herein.
ARTICLE VIII
Working Children
Section 12. Employment of Children. – Children below
fifteen (15) years of age may be employed except:
(1) When a child works directly under the sole
responsibility of his parents or legal guardian
and where only members of the employer's
family are employed: Provided, however, That
his employment neither endangers his life,
safety and health and morals, nor impairs his
normal development: Provided, further, That the
parent or legal guardian shall provide the said
minor child with the prescribed primary and/or
secondary education; or
(2) When a child's employment or participation
in public & entertainment or information through
cinema, theater, radio or television is essential:
Provided, The employment contract concluded
by the child's parent or guardian, with the
express agreement of the child concerned, if
possible, and the approval of the Department of
Labor and Employment: Provided, That the
following requirements in all instances are
strictly complied with:
(a) The employer shall ensure the protection,
health, safety and morals of the child;
(b) the employer shall institute measures to
prevent the child's exploitation or discrimination
taking into account the system and level of
remuneration, and the duration and
arrangement of working time; and;
(c) The employer shall formulate and
implement, subject to the approval and
supervision of competent authorities, a
continuing program for training and skill
acquisition of the child.
In the above exceptional cases where any such child
may be employed, the employer shall first secure, before
engaging such child, a work permit from the Department
of Labor and Employment which shall ensure
observance of the above requirement.
The Department of Labor Employment shall promulgate
rules and regulations necessary for the effective
implementation of this Section.
Section 13. Non-formal Education for Working
Children. – The Department of Education, Culture and
Sports shall promulgate a course design under its non-
formal education program aimed at promoting the
intellectual, moral and vocational efficiency of working
children who have not undergone or finished elementary
or secondary education. Such course design shall
integrate the learning process deemed most effective
under given circumstances.
Section 14. Prohibition on the Employment of
Children in Certain Advertisements. – No person shall
employ child models in all commercials or
advertisements promoting alcoholic beverages,
intoxicating drinks, tobacco and its byproducts and
violence.
Section 15. Duty of Employer. – Every employer shall
comply with the duties provided for in Articles 108 and
109 of Presidential Decree No. 603.
Section 16. Penalties. – Any person who shall violate
any provision of this Article shall suffer the penalty of a
fine of not less than One thousand pesos (P1,000) but
not more than Ten thousand pesos (P10,000) or
imprisonment of not less than three (3) months but not
more than three (3) years, or both at the discretion of the
court; Provided, That, in case of repeated violations of
the provisions of this Article, the offender's license to
operate shall be revoked.
ARTICLE IX
Children of Indigenous Cultural Communities
Section 17. Survival, Protection and Development. –
In addition to the rights guaranteed to children under this
Act and other existing laws, children of indigenous
cultural communities shall be entitled to protection,
survival and development consistent with the customs
and traditions of their respective communities.
Section 18. System of and Access to Education. –
The Department of Education, Culture and Sports shall
develop and institute an alternative system of education
for children of indigenous cultural communities which
culture-specific and relevant to the needs of and the
existing situation in their communities. The Department
of Education, Culture and Sports shall also accredit and
support non-formal but functional indigenous educational
programs conducted by non-government organizations
in said communities.
Section 19. Health and Nutrition. – The delivery of
basic social services in health and nutrition to children of
indigenous cultural communities shall be given priority
by all government agencies concerned. Hospitals and
other health institution shall ensure that children of
indigenous cultural communities are given equal
attention. In the provision of health and nutrition services
to children of indigenous cultural communities,
indigenous health practices shall be respected and
recognized.
Section 20. Discrimination. – Children of indigenous
cultural communities shall not be subjected to any and
all forms of discrimination.
Any person who discriminate against children of
indigenous cultural communities shall suffer a penalty of
arresto mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Five thousand pesos (P5,000) more than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000).
(e) Public infrastructure such as schools,
hospitals and rural health units shall not be
utilized for military purposes such as command
posts, barracks, detachments, and supply
depots; and
(f) All appropriate steps shall be taken to
facilitate the reunion of families temporarily
separated due to armed conflict.
Section 23. Evacuation of Children During Armed
Conflict. – Children shall be given priority during
evacuation as a result of armed conflict. Existing
community organizations shall be tapped to look after
the safety and well-being of children during evacuation
operations. Measures shall be taken to ensure that
children evacuated are accompanied by persons
responsible for their safety and well-being.
Section 24. Family Life and Temporary Shelter. –
Whenever possible, members of the same family shall
be housed in the same premises and given separate
accommodation from other evacuees and provided with
facilities to lead a normal family life. In places of
temporary shelter, expectant and nursing mothers and
children shall be given additional food in proportion to
their physiological needs. Whenever feasible, children
shall be given opportunities for physical exercise, sports
and outdoor games.

Section 21. Participation. – Indigenous cultural
communities, through their duly-designated or appointed
representatives shall be involved in planning, decision-
making implementation, and evaluation of all
government programs affecting children of indigenous
cultural communities. Indigenous institution shall also be
recognized and respected.
ARTICLE
Children in Situations of Armed Conflict
Section 22. Children as Zones of Peace. – Children
are hereby declared as Zones of Peace. It shall be the
responsibility of the State and all other sectors
concerned to resolve armed conflicts in order to promote
the goal of children as zones of peace. To attain this
objective, the following policies shall be observed.
(a) Children shall not be the object of attack
and shall be entitled to special respect. They
shall be protected from any form of threat,
assault, torture or other cruel, inhumane or
degrading treatment;
(b) Children shall not be recruited to become
members of the Armed Forces of the
Philippines of its civilian units or other armed
groups, nor be allowed to take part in the
fighting, or used as guides, couriers, or spies;
(c) Delivery of basic social services such as
education, primary health and emergency relief
services shall be kept unhampered;
(d) The safety and protection of those who
provide services including those involved in
fact-finding missions from both government and
non-government institutions shall be ensured.
They shall not be subjected to undue
harassment in the performance of their work;
Section 25. Rights of Children Arrested for Reasons
Related to Armed Conflict. – Any child who has been
arrested for reasons related to armed conflict, either as
combatant, courier, guide or spy is entitled to the
following rights;
(a) Separate detention from adults except
where families are accommodated as family
X units;
(b) Immediate free legal assistance;
(c) Immediate notice of such arrest to the
parents or guardians of the child; and
(d) Release of the child on recognizance within
twenty-four (24) hours to the custody of the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
or any responsible member of the community
as determined by the court.
If after hearing the evidence in the proper proceedings
the court should find that the aforesaid child committed
the acts charged against him, the court shall determine
the imposable penalty, including any civil liability
chargeable against him. However, instead of
pronouncing judgment of conviction, the court shall
suspend all further proceedings and shall commit such
child to the custody or care of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development or to any training institution
operated by the Government, or duly-licensed agencies
or any other responsible person, until he has had
reached eighteen (18) years of age or, for a shorter
period as the court may deem proper, after considering
the reports and recommendations of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or the agency or
responsible individual under whose care he has been
committed.
The aforesaid child shall subject to visitation and
supervision by a representative of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development or any duly-licensed
agency or such other officer as the court may designate
subject to such conditions as it may prescribe.
The aforesaid child whose sentence is suspended can
appeal from the order of the court in the same manner
as appeals in criminal cases.
Section 26. Monitoring and Reporting of Children in
Situations of Armed Conflict. – The chairman of the
barangay affected by the armed conflict shall submit the
names of children residing in said barangay to the
municipal social welfare and development officer within
twenty-four (24) hours from the occurrence of the armed
conflict.
ARTICLE XI
Remedial Procedures
Section 27. Who May File a Complaint. – Complaints
on cases of unlawful acts committed against the children
as enumerated herein may be filed by the following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the
third degree of consanguinity;1awphi1@ITC
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a
licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development;
(f) Barangay chairman; or
(g) At least three (3) concerned responsible
citizens where the violation occurred.
Section 28. Protective Custody of the Child. – The
offended party shall be immediately placed under the
protective custody of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development pursuant to Executive Order No. 56,
series of 1986. In the regular performance of this
function, the officer of the Department of Social Welfare
and Development shall be free from any administrative,
civil or criminal liability. Custody proceedings shall be in
accordance with the provisions of Presidential Decree
No. 603.
Section 29. Confidentiality. – At the instance of the
offended party, his name may be withheld from the
public until the court acquires jurisdiction over the case.
It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher, and reporter
or columnist in case of printed materials, announcer or
producer in case of television and radio broadcasting,
producer and director of the film in case of the movie
industry, to cause undue and sensationalized publicity of
any case of violation of this Act which results in the
moral degradation and suffering of the offended
party.Lawphi1@alf
Section 30. Special Court Proceedings. – Cases
involving violations of this Act shall be heard in the
chambers of the judge of the Regional Trial Court duly
designated as Juvenile and Domestic Court.
Any provision of existing law to the contrary
notwithstanding and with the exception of habeas
corpus, election cases, and cases involving detention
prisoners and persons covered by Republic Act No.
4908, all courts shall give preference to the hearing or
disposition of cases involving violations of this Act.
ARTICLE XII
Common Penal Provisions
Section 31. Common Penal Provisions. –
(a) The penalty provided under this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender
has been previously convicted under this Act;
(b) When the offender is a corporation,
partnership or association, the officer or
employee thereof who is responsible for the
violation of this Act shall suffer the penalty
imposed in its maximum period;
(c) The penalty provided herein shall be
imposed in its maximum period when the
perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian,
stepparent or collateral relative within the
second degree of consanguinity or affinity, or a
manager or owner of an establishment which
has no license to operate or its license has
expired or has been revoked;
(d) When the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
deported immediately after service of sentence
and forever barred from entry to the country;
(e) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum period if the offender is
a public officer or employee: Provided,
however, That if the penalty imposed is
reclusion perpetua or reclusion temporal, then
the penalty of perpetual or temporary absolute
disqualification shall also be imposed:
Provided, finally, That if the penalty imposed is
prision correccional or arresto mayor, the
penalty of suspension shall also be imposed;
and
(f) A fine to be determined by the court shall be
imposed and administered as a cash fund by
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and disbursed for the
rehabilitation of each child victim, or any
immediate member of his family if the latter is
the perpetrator of the offense.
ARTICLE XIII
Final Provisions
Section 32. Rules and Regulations. – Unless
otherwise provided in this Act, the Department of Justice,
in coordination with the Department of Social Welfare
and Development, shall promulgate rules and
regulations of the effective implementation of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect upon their
publication in two (2) national newspapers of general
circulation.
Section 33. Appropriations. – The amount necessary
to carry out the provisions of this Act is hereby
authorized to be appropriated in the General
Appropriations Act of the year following its enactment
into law and thereafter.
Section 34. Separability Clause. – If any provision of
this Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the
remaining provisions not affected thereby shall continue
in full force and effect.
Section 35. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees, or
rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Acts are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 36. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take
effect upon completion of its publication in at least two
(2) national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved: June 17, 1992.lawphi1Ÿ
G.R. No. 198732 June 10, 2013
CHRISTIAN CABALLO, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Before the Court is a petition for review on
certiorari1 assailing the January 28, 2011 Decision2 and
September 26, 2011 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. CR No. 27399-MIN which affirmed with
modification the April 1, 2003 Decision of the Regional
Trial Court of Surigao City, Branch 30 (RTC), finding
petitioner Christian Caballo (Caballo) guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 10(a), Article VI of
Republic Act No. 76104(RA 7610), otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act," in relation to
Section 2 of the Rules and Regulations on the Reporting
and Investigation of Child Abuse Cases (Rules on Child
Abuse Cases).
The Facts
On March 16, 1999, an Information5 was filed charging
Caballo of violation of Section 10(a), Article VI of RA
7610 which was later amended on May 28, 1999, to
include statements pertaining to the delivery of private
complainant AAA’s6 baby. The Amended
Information7 reads:
That undersigned Second Assistant City Prosecutor
hereby accuses Christian Caballo of the crime of
Violation of Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
committed as follows:
That in or about the last week of March 1998, and on
different dates subsequent thereto, until June 1998, in
the City of Surigao, Philippines, and within the
jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, a 23 year old man, in utter disregard of the
prohibition of the provisions of Republic Act No. 7610
and taking advantage of the innocence and lack of
worldly experience of AAA who was only 17 years old at
that time, having been born on November 3, 1980, did
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
commit sexual abuse upon said AAA, by persuading and
inducing the latter to have sexual intercourse with him,
which ultimately resulted to her untimely pregnancy and
delivery of a baby on March 8, 1999, a condition
prejudicial to her development, to the damage and
prejudice of AAA in such amount as may be allowed by
law.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Surigao City, Philippines, May 28, 1999.
Upon arraignment, Caballo pleaded not guilty to the
aforesaid charges.8
Based on the records, the undisputed facts are as
follows:
AAA, then 17 years old, met Caballo, then 23 years old,
in her uncle’s place in Surigao City. Her uncle was a
choreographer and Caballo was one of his dancers.
During that time, AAA was a sophomore college student
at the University of San Carlos and resided at a boarding
house in Cebu City. On January 17, 1998, Caballo went
to Cebu City to attend the Sinulog Festival and there,
visited AAA. After spending time together, they
eventually became sweethearts.9 Sometime during the
third week of March 1998, AAA went home to Surigao
City and stayed with her uncle. In the last week of March
of the same year, Caballo persuaded AAA to have
sexual intercourse with him. This was followed by
several more of the same in April 1998, in the first and
second weeks of May 1998, on August 31, 1998 and in
November 1998, all of which happened in Surigao City,
except the one in August which occurred in Cebu.10 In
June 1998, AAA becamepregnant and later gave birth on
March 8, 1999.11
During the trial, the prosecution asserted that Caballo
was only able to induce AAA to lose her virginity due to
promises of marriage and his assurance that he would
not get her pregnant due to the use of the "withdrawal
method." Moreover, it claimed that Caballo was shocked
upon hearing the news of AAA’s pregnancy and
consequently, advised her to have an abortion. She
heeded Caballo’s advice; however, her efforts were
unsuccessful. Further, the prosecution averred that when
AAA’s mother confronted Caballo to find out what his
plans were for AAA, he assured her that he would marry
her daughter.12
Opposed to the foregoing, Caballo claimed that during
their first sexual intercourse, AAA was no longer a virgin
as he found it easy to penetrate her and that there was
no bleeding. He also maintained that AAA had (3) three
boyfriends prior to him. Further, he posited that he and
AAA were sweethearts who lived-in together, for one (1)
week in a certain Litang Hotel and another week in the
residence of AAA’s uncle. Eventually, they broke up due
to the intervention of AAA’s parents. At a certain time,
AAA’s mother even told Caballo that he was not
deserving of AAA because he was poor. Lastly, he
alleged that he repeatedly proposed marriage to AAA but
was always rejected because she was still studying.13
The RTC’s Ruling
In a Decision dated April 1, 2003, the RTC found Caballo
guilty beyond reasonable doubt of violation of Section
10(a), Article VI of RA 7610, in relation to Section 2 of
the Rules on Child Abuse Cases. Accordingly, it
sentenced Caballo to suffer imprisonment for an
indeterminate period ranging from prision correccional,
in its maximum period of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day, as minimum, to prision mayor in its
minimum period of six (6) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day, as maximum. It also ordered Caballo to pay
AAA moral damages in the amount of ₱50,000.00.14
Aggrieved, Caballo elevated the case to the CA.
The CA’s Ruling
In a Decision dated January 28, 2011,15 the CA
dismissed the appeal and affirmed with modification the
RTC’s ruling, finding Caballo guilty of violating Section
5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
It ruled that while the Amended Information denominated
the crime charged as violation of Section 10(a), Article VI
of RA 7610, the statements in its body actually support a
charge of violation of Section 5(b), Article III of RA
7610.16
On the merits of the case, it found that the evidence
adduced by the prosecution clearly showed that Caballo
persuaded, induced and enticed AAA, then a minor, to
have carnal knowledge with him. Towards this end,
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love and even
went on to promise marriage to her. He also assured
AAA that she would not get pregnant because he would
be using the "withdrawal method." Thus, it was upon
these repeated coaxing and assuring words that AAA
succumbed to Caballo’s evil desires which deflowered
and got her pregnant. On this score, it observed that
consent is immaterial in child abuse cases involving
sexual intercourse and lascivious conduct and therefore,
the sweetheart defense remains unacceptable.17 It also
found basis to sustain the award of moral damages.18
Caballo filed a motion for reconsideration which was,
however, denied on September 26, 2011.19
Hence, the instant petition.
The Issue
The core of the present controversy revolves around the
interpretation of the phrase "due to the coercion or
influence of any adult" which would thereby classify the
victim as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse" as found in Section 5, Article III of RA
7610. Consequently, the interpretation which the Court
accords herein would determine whether or not the CA
erred in finding Caballo guilty of violating paragraph (b)
of the same proviso.
In his petition, Caballo essentially argues that his
promise to marry or his use of the "withdrawal method"
should not be considered as "persuasion" or
"inducement" sufficient to convict him for the
aforementioned offense, asserting that these should be
coupled with some form of coercion or intimidation to
constitute child abuse. He further alleges that he and
AAA were sweethearts which thus, made the sexual
intercourse consensual.
In its Comment,20 respondent advances the argument
that there was "sexual abuse" within the purview of RA
7610 as well as the Rules on Child Abuse Cases since it
was only upon Caballo’s repeated assurances and
persuasion that AAA gave in to his worldly desires.
Likewise, it points out that the sweetheart theory, as
relied on by Caballo, deserves scant consideration in
view of the Court’s ruling in Malto v. People (Malto).21
The Court’s Ruling
The petition has no merit.
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610 pertinently reads:
SEC. 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. -
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
The penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period to
reclusion perpetua shall be imposed upon the following:
xxxx
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when the
victim is under twelve (12) years of age, the perpetrators
shall be prosecuted under Article 335, paragraph 3 for
rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as amended, the
Revised Penal Code, for rape or lascivious conduct, as
the case may be; Provided, That the penalty for
lascivious conduct when the victim is under twelve (12)
years of age shall be reclusion temporal in its medium
period x x x x (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
As determined in the case of Olivarez v. CA
(Olivarez),22 the elements of the foregoing offense are
the following:
(a) The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
(b) The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
(c) The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.
In this case, the existence of the first and third elements
remains undisputed. Records disclose that Caballo had
succeeded in repeatedly having sexual intercourse with
AAA who, during all those instances, was still a minor.
Thus, the only bone of contention lies in the presence of
the second element. On this note, the defense submits
that AAA could not be considered as a "child exploited in
prostitution and other sexual abuse" since the incidents
to do not point to any form of "coercion" or "influence" on
Caballo’s part.
The argument is untenable.
To put things in proper perspective, it must be pointed
out that RA 7610 was meant to advance the state policy
of affording "special protection to children from all forms
of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and discrimination
and other conditions prejudicial to their development"
and in such regard, "provide sanctions for their
commission."23 It also furthers the "best interests of
children" and as such, its provisions are guided by this
standard.24
Driven by the foregoing considerations, Congress
crafted Article III of the same law in order to penalize
child prostitution and other forms of sexual abuse.
Section 5 thereof provides a definition of who is
considered a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse." As illumined in Olivarez,25 citing People v.
Larin26 and Amployo v. People,27 the final version of the
aforesaid provision was a product of various
deliberations to expand its original coverage to cases
where the minor may have been coerced or intimidated
into sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, not
necessarily for money or profit, viz:
The second element, i.e., that the act is performed with a
child exploited in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse, is likewise present. As succinctly explained in
People v. Larin:
A child is deemed exploited in prostitution or subjected to
other sexual abuse, when the child indulges in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct (a) for money, profit, or
any other consideration; or (b) under the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group...
It must be noted that the law covers not only a situation
in which a child is abused for profit, but also one in which
a child, through coercion or intimidation, engages in
lascivious conduct.
We reiterated this ruling in Amployo v. People:
... As we observed in People v. Larin, Section 5 of Rep.
Act No. 7610 does not merely cover a situation of a child
being abused for profit, but also one in which a child
engages in any lascivious conduct through coercion or
intimidation...
Thus, a child is deemed subjected to other sexual abuse
when the child indulges in lascivious conduct under the
coercion or influence of any adult. In this case, Cristina
was sexually abused because she was coerced or
intimidated by petitioner to indulge in a lascivious
conduct. Furthermore, it is inconsequential that the
sexual abuse occurred only once. As expressly provided
in Section 3(b) of R.A. 7610, the abuse may be habitual
or not. It must be observed that Article III of R.A. 7610 is
captioned as "Child Prostitution and Other Sexual
Abuse" because Congress really intended to cover a
situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into lascivious conduct, not necessarily for
money or profit. The law covers not only child
prostitution but also other forms of sexual abuse. This is
clear from the deliberations of the Senate:
Senator Angara. I refer to line 9, ‘who for money or
profit.’ I would like to amend this, Mr. President, to cover
a situation where the minor may have been coerced or
intimidated into this lascivious conduct, not necessarily
for money or profit, so that we can cover those situations
and not leave loophole in this section.
The proposal I have is something like this: WHO FOR
MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY OTHER CONSIDERATION
OR DUE TO THE COERCION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY
ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE, et cetera.
The President Pro Tempore. I see. That would mean
also changing the subtitle of Section 4. Will it no longer
be child prostitution?
Senator Angara. No, no. Not necessarily, Mr. President,
because we are still talking of the child who is being
misused for sexual purposes either for money or for
consideration. What I am trying to cover is the other
consideration. Because, here, it is limited only to the
child being abused or misused for sexual purposes, only
for money or profit.
I am contending, Mr. President, that there may be
situations where the child may not have been used for
profit or ...
The President Pro Tempore. So, it is no longer
prostitution. Because the essence of prostitution is profit.
Senator Angara. Well, the Gentleman is right. Maybe the
heading ought to be expanded. But, still, the President
will agree that that is a form or manner of child abuse.
The President Pro Tempore. What does the Sponsor
say? Will the Gentleman kindly restate the amendment?
ANGARA AMENDMENT
Senator Angara. The new section will read something
like this, Mr. President: MINORS, WHETHER MALE OR
FEMALE, WHO FOR MONEY, PROFIT, OR ANY
OTHER CONSIDERATION OR INFLUENCE OF ANY
ADULT, SYNDICATE OR GROUP INDULGE IN SEXUAL
INTERCOURSE, et cetera.
Senator Lina. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
[Silence] Hearing none, the amendment is approved.
How about the title, ‘Child Prostitution,’ shall we change
that too?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President, to cover the
expanded scope.
The President Pro Tempore. Is that not what we would
call probable ‘child abuse’?
Senator Angara. Yes, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Subject to rewording. Is
there any objection? [Silence] Hearing none, the
amendment is approved. (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied)
As it is presently worded, Section 5, Article III of RA 7610
provides that when a child indulges in sexual intercourse
or any lascivious conduct due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, the child is deemed to be a "child
exploited in prostitution and other sexual abuse." In this
manner, the law is able to act as an effective deterrent to
quell all forms of abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation and
discrimination against children, prejudicial as they are to
their development.
In this relation, case law further clarifies that sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct under the coercion or
influence of any adult exists when there is some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party’s free will.28 Corollary
thereto, Section 2(g) of the Rules on Child Abuse Cases
conveys that sexual abuse involves the element of
influence which manifests in a variety of forms. It is
defined as:
The employment, use, persuasion, inducement,
enticement or coercion of a child to engage in or assist
another person to engage in, sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct or the molestation, prostitution, or
incest with children.
To note, the term "influence" means the "improper use of
power or trust in any way that deprives a person of free
will and substitutes another’s objective."29 Meanwhile,
"coercion" is the "improper use of x x x power to compel
another to submit to the wishes of one who wields it."30
In view of the foregoing, the Court observes that
Caballo’s actuations may be classified as "coercion" and
"influence" within the purview of Section 5, Article III of
RA 7610:
First, the most crucial element is AAA’s minority. It is
undisputed that AAA was only 17 years old at the time of
the commission of the crime and is hence, considered a
child under the law.31 In this respect, AAA was not
capable of fully understanding or knowing the import of
her actions and in consequence, remained vulnerable to
the cajolery and deception of adults, as in this case.
Based on this premise, jurisprudence settles that
consent is immaterial in cases involving a violation of
Section 5, Article III of RA 7610; as such, the argument
that AAA and Caballo were sweethearts remains
irrelevant. The Malto ruling is largely instructive on this
point:
For purposes of sexual intercourse and lascivious
conduct in child abuse cases under RA 7610, the
sweetheart defense is unacceptable. A child exploited in
prostitution or subjected to other sexual abuse cannot
validly give consent to sexual intercourse with another
person.
The language of the law is clear: it seeks to punish
"those who commit the act of sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution or
subjected to other sexual abuse."
Unlike rape, therefore, consent is immaterial in cases
involving violation of Section 5, Article III of RA 7610.
The mere act of having sexual intercourse or committing
lascivious conduct with a child who is exploited in
prostitution or subjected to sexual abuse constitutes the
offense. It is a malum prohibitum, an evil that is
proscribed.
A child cannot give consent to a contract under our civil
laws. This is on the rationale that she can easily be the
victim of fraud as she is not capable of fully
understanding or knowing the nature or import of her
actions. The State, as parens patriae, is under the
obligation to minimize the risk of harm to those who,
because of their minority, are as yet unable to take care
of themselves fully. Those of tender years deserve its
protection.
The harm which results from a child’s bad decision in a
sexual encounter may be infinitely more damaging to her
than a bad business deal. Thus, the law should protect
her from the harmful consequences of her attempts at
adult sexual behavior. For this reason, a child should not
be deemed to have validly consented to adult sexual
activity and to surrender herself in the act of ultimate
physical intimacy under a law which seeks to afford her
special protection against abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. (Otherwise, sexual predators like
petitioner will be justified, or even unwittingly tempted by
the law, to view her as fair game and vulnerable prey.) In
other words, a child is presumed by law to be incapable
of giving rational consent to any lascivious act or sexual
intercourse. x x x x32 (Emphasis and underscoring
supplied; citations omitted)
Second, coupled with AAA’s minority is Caballo’s
seniority. Records indicate that Caballo was 23 years old
at the time of the commission of the offense and
therefore, 6 years older than AAA, more or less. The age
disparity between an adult and a minor placed Caballo in
a stronger position over AAA so as to enable him to force
his will upon the latter.
Third, Caballo's actions effectively constitute overt acts
of coercion and influence.1âwphi1 Records reveal that
Caballo repeatedly assured AAA of his love for her, and
even, promised to marry her. In addition, he also
guaranteed that she would not get pregnant since he
would be using the "withdrawal method" for safety.
Irrefragably, these were meant to influence AAA to set
aside her reservations and eventually give into having
sex with him, with which he succeeded.
Fourth, at least, with respect to the parties' first sexual
encounter, it is observed that the brash and unexpected
manner in which Caballo pursued AAA to her room and
pressed on her to have sex with him, effectively placed
her in, to a certain extent, a position of duress .. An
important factor is that AAA refused Caballo's incipient
advances and in fact, asked him to leave. However, AAA
eventually yielded. Thus, it stands to reason that she
was put in a situation deprived of the benefit of clear
thought and choice. In any case, the Court observes that
any other choice would, nonetheless, remain tarnished
due to AAA's minority as above-discussed.
Hence, considering that Caballo's acts constitute
"coercion" and "influence" within the context of the law,
and that AAA indulged in sexual intercourse and/or
lascivious conduct with Caballo due to the same, she is
deemed as a "child exploited in prostitution and other
sexual abuse"; as such, the second element of the
subject offense exists.
In fine, finding all elements to be present, the Court
hereby sustains Caballo's conviction for violation of
Section 5(b), Article III of RA 7610.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The January 28,
2011 Decision and September 26, 2011 Resolution of
the Court of Appeals in CAG.R. CR No. 27399-MIN are
hereby AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED .
G.R. No. 202838 September 17, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
JULITO GERANDOY, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
"Childhood should be carefree, playing in the sun: not
living a nightmare in the darkness of the soul."
-Dave Pelzer, A Child Called "It"
PEREZ, J.:
This is an appeal filed by herein accused Julito
Gerandoy (Gerandoy) from the Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals, modifying the decision or conviction rendered
by the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City and finding
the accused guilty of two counts of Acts of
Lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b) of Republic Act
No. 7610 or "Special Protection of Children Against
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act."
The Facts
Before the Regional Trial Court of Surigao City,
Gerandoy was charged with two counts of the crime of
rape under Article 266-A, paragraph 1 in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code.
Criminal Case No. 6624
That on or about the 16th day or December, 2001 in the
City or Surigao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above named-accused, by
means of foreel,I threats, violence, and intimidation and
with the use of deadly weapon and then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have sexual
intercourse with AAA,2 a 13 year old girl, I his] own
daughter without the consent and against the will of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice of in such sum as
may be allowed by law.
Contrary to law Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, with the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, the victim being
the daughter of the accused and aggravating
circumstance of use of deadly weapon.3
Criminal Case No. 6625
That on or about the 7th day of December, 2001 in the
City or Surigao, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, by
means of force[,] threats, violence, and intimidation and
then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously have
sexual intercourse with AAA, a 13 year old girl, !his] own
daughter without the consent and against the will of the
latter, to her damage and prejudice of in such sum as
may be allowed by law.
Contrary to law Article 266-A paragraph 1 in relation to
Article 266-B of the Revised Penal Code, with the
qualifying circumstance of relationship, the victim being
the daughter of the accused.4
When arraigned on 17 February 2004, he pleaded not
guilty to the offenses charged.5
Version of the Prosecution
The victim, AAA, then 13-years-old at the time of the
commission of rape, narrated that her father, accused
Gerandoy, raped her on two (2) occasions on 7 and 16
December 2001 . She recalled that the first rape was
committed on or about 12:00 a.m. of 7 December 2001
at their house. She narrated that while she was sleeping
with her brothers and sisters in one of the two rooms
inside their house, she was awakened when Gerandoy
entered the room and hugged her. The accused then
forced her to lie down despite her resistance. She tried
to stand up but the accused held her waist. He then
kissed her cheeks and tore her dress with a knife. She
kept on resisting the assault of the accused but the latter
told her that he would kill them all if she would not
consent to his advances. AAA told him that she was her
daughter and his acts were sinful. The accused stabbed
and boxed her stomach. She lost her consciousness.
After she became conscious, she was already
undressed and noticed that her vagina was bleeding
while the accused was lying beside her. She cried and
went away to the farm and reported the incident to the
elder sister6 of her mother, CCC (Aunt CCC).7
The second incident of rape happened on 16 December
2001 at around 11 :00 p.m. AAA recalled that she was
sleeping in a room she shared with her brothers and
sisters when awakened by Gerandoy. Gerandoy then
touched her face and told her that he will rape her again.
She pleaded him to stop but her father continued to
touch her body. AAA resisted but her father held her
arms and forced her to lie down. She kept on resisting
but Gerandoy held a knife at her waist and warned that
he could easily stab her. He slapped her and warned
further that he would kill all members of their family
including himself if she would keep on resisting.
Gerandoy told her not to resist anymore as her two older
sisters have already been molested by him. She was
then undressed and Gerandoy mounted her. He touched
and sucked her nipple and kissed her lips. After that,
AAA went again to her aunt and told her what
happened.8 During trial, AAA clarified that she reported
the first incident or rape to her aunt one month after it
happened. She reported the second incident three
months after. She explained that the delay was due to
her fear that her father would make real his warning and
continuing threats that he would kill them all. When
asked why she rep01icd the incidents to her aunt instead
of her mother, she answered that she did tel 1 her
mother about what happened but the she was told to
keep quiet about them because it was embarrassing.
She reported the incident to the police on 2003 and was
medically examined9 on 3 September 2003.
The prosecution likewise presented Dr. Josephine Del
Carmen (Dr. Del Carmen), the medico-legal expert who
examined AAA on 3 September 2003. In lieu of her
testimony in open court, the prosecution and defense
stipulated on the genuineness and due execution as well
as the authenticity of her findings.
Aside from the testimony of AAA and stipulation of facts
relating to the medical examination on the victim, the
prosecution likewise offered as evidence the Certificate
of Live Birth of the victim to prove that she was a minor
when the two incidents of rape were committed and the
medical certificate10 issued by Dr. Del Carmen.
Version of the Defense
On 30 September 2004, AAA executed an Affidavit of
Desistance11 that she was no longer pursuing her case
against her father. However, the court issued an order on
30 August 2005 ordering the continuance of the case to
determine the voluntariness of the execution of the
affidavit.12
Aside from the affidavit, the defense presented its first
witness BBB, the mother of the victim and wife of the
accused. She denied that her daughter AAA was raped
on 7 December 2001 as the victim was not in their house
when the alleged incident happened. BBB, controverting
the earlier statement of AAA, said that she was in their
house on 7 December 2001 and was feeding her infant
child during that time.13
Likewise, she denied that AAA was raped on 16
December 200 I. BBB testified that AAA left their house
at around 8:00 p.m. to attend a Christmas party with her
friends. AAA did not return and stayed in her Aunt CCC's
house. BBB further said that it was unlikely that the
accused would be able to rape AAA as he was in the
farm on that date and time and arrived home at 7:00
a.m. the day after. Upon learning that AAA did not return
home, the accused scolded and beat her with a broom.
As a result, AAA went away and since then stayed in her
aunt's house. She also identified the affidavit of
desistance of AAA. She said that her daughter told her
that the charges of rape against Gerandoy were not
true.14
On her cross-examination, BBB denied that she was
working as a house helper when the alleged incidents of
rape happened. She gave conflicting answers on how
many children she has and the year when AAA was
born.15
On 26 September 2007, AAA was again called to the
witness stand to testify on the voluntariness of the
affidavit of desistance she executed on 30 September
2004.16
On her cross-examination, she testified that pity for her
father prompted her desistance. She expressed her
apprehension that nobody would take care of her other
siblings if the case against her father would push
through. She confirmed that her Aunt CCC convinced
her to file a rape case against her father. When asked by
the court to confirm her reason why she was desisting,
she again answered that she pitied her father.17
Finally, the defense presented the accused as its last
witness. In his direct examination, he denied the charges
of rape filed against him as he was not present in their
house at the time the alleged incidents happened. He
testified that from 15 December 2011, he was in the farm
harvesting coconuts for copra and only arrived at their
house in the evening of 19 December 2001. He learned
that his daughter AAA was not there. He was told by
BBB that AAA did not return home since 15 December
2001 afler attending a party with her boyfriend. He later
confronted AAA about this but AAA answered back. Mad
about AAA's response, he beat his daughter with a
broom. After that, she ran away to her Aunt CCC's
house. He mentioned that CCC and her husband held
grudges against him as he did not allow them to join in
the harvesting of coconuts.18
In his cross-examination, only few questions were asked
by the prosecution. Gerandoy confirmed that he was in
the farm from 15-19 December 2001 and did not go
home to sleep in their house. He also stated that he
became angry with AAA about what her daughter did on
15 December 2001.19
Upon resting their case, the defense offered the affidavit
or desistance of AAA as documentary evidence.
The Ruling of the Trial Court
The trial court on 13 February 2009 found Gerandoy
guilty beyond reasonable doubt for each count of rape
and imposed upon him the penalty of reclusion perpetua
with all the accessory penalties and civil
indemnities.20 The dispositive portion reads:
WHEREFORE, for Criminal Cases Nos. 6624 and 6625,
the Court hereby finds the accused JULITO
GERANDOY, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as
principal for the two counts of rape committed
respectively on December 7, 2001 and December 16,
2001, as may be defined and penalized under Article
266-A and 266-B of the Revised Penal Code in relation
to Republic Act No. 9346.
This Court hereby sentences accused. JULITO
GERANDOY FOR EACH COlJNT OF RAPE to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA together with all the
accessory penalties provided for by law; to indemnify the
victim AAA the amount of SEVENTY FIVE THOUSAND
(₱75,000.00) PESOS; another sum of SEVENTY FIVE
THOUSAND (₱75,000.00) PESOS as moral damages;
and to pay the costs.
In the service or his sentence accused shall be credited
with the full period or his preventive imprisonment
pursuant to Article 29 or the Revised Penal Code as
amended by Republic Act No. 6127.
Let commitment order [BE ISSUED] for the transfer of
the accused from the City Jail BJMP, Silop, Surigao City
to the Bureau of Corrections, Muntinlupa, pursuant to
Circular 4-92 of the Supreme Court of the Philippines
dated April 20, 1992 regarding the transfer of National
Prisoners to the Bureau of Corrections in Muntinlupa
City.21
In its ruling, the trial court found credible the first
testimony given by AAA being spontaneous and worthy
of credibility. It did not give weight to the affidavit of
desistance as it was based on pity. Similarly, the court
set aside the argument of the accused that it was
impossible for the victim to be sexually abused inside a
small room. Jurisprudential rulings have been consistent
that rape need not be committed in isolated places.
The Ruling of the Court of Appeals
On 29 November 2011, the appellate court modified the
ruling of the trial court. The dispositive portion reads:
IN LIGHT OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the Court hereby
MODIFIES the assailed Decision dated February 13,
2009 of the Regional Trial Comi, Branch 29, Surigao City
in Criminal Case Nols]. 6624 and 6625. The Accused-
Appellant Julito Gerandoy is found GUILTY of two
counts of Acts of Lasciviousness in relation with Section
5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610 or Child Prostitution and
Other Sexual Abuse and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua. He is likewise ordered
to pay a fine of P 15,000.00 and to indemnify AAA
₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral
damages, and ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages for
each count, plus legal interest on all damages awarded
at the rate of six percent (6%) from the date of finality of
this decision until fully paid.22
It ruled that the two counts of rape have not been
sufficiently established by the prosecution with moral
certainty but nevertheless still found the accused liable
for acts of lasciviousness in relation with Section 5 (b) of
Republic Act No. 7610. It found credible the testimony of
AAA that the accused hugged, kissed her lips and
nipples, caressed her body and touched her breasts.
The appellate court dismissed the argument that it is
highly unlikely that the victim would be sexually abused
in a small room surrounded by her own siblings.
Our Ruling
After a careful review of the evidence, we affirm with
modification the ruling of the Court of Appeals.
Primarily, accused relies on arguments initially raised in
his Supplemental Brief filed before the Court of Appeals.
The accused reiterates denial of the commission of the
crime, relying on the affidavit of dcsistance. The accused
assigns as error that the appellate court did not give
credit to the affidavit since it truthfully narrated his non-
liability, and pointed to revenge as the reason for the A: At my [check].
filing of the charges. Further, it emphasizes the
inconsistencies made by AAA during her testimony thus Q: Only at your [check]?
eroding her credibility. Finally, in his last effort to discredit
the victim, the accused asserts that the filing of the case
after the lapse of two years from the commission of the A: Yes, sir.
alleged crime indicates ill-motive on the part of the
victim. Q: After he kissed you in your [check], what happened
next?
We find no merit in the appeal.
A: He forced me to lie down, sir.
Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code as amended by
Republic Act No. 8353 describes how rape is committed: Q: Then he was able to let you lie down?

1) By a man who shall have carnal knowledge of a A: Yes, sir.

woman under any of the following circumstances:
Q: After that what happened next?
a) Through force, threat or intimidation;
A: He tried to undress me but I resisted.
b) When the offended party is deprived of'
reason or is otherwise unconscious; Q: What happened next after that?

c) By means of fraudulent machination or grave A: He tore my dress.

abuse of authority;

Q: What did he use in tearing your dress?

d) When the offended party is under twelve (12)
years of age or is demented, even though none
of the circumstances mentioned above be A: Knife, sir.
present. (Emphasis ours).
Q: After tearing your dress what happened next?
Rape is qualified if the victim is under eighteen (18)
years of age and the offender is a parent, ascendant, A: He told me that if Twill not consent he will kill us all.
stepparent, guardian, relative by consanguinity or affinity
within the third civil degree, or the common-law spouse
Q: In your understanding what was your consent – what
of the parent of the victim.23
was to be your consent about?

Upon review, we find the positive and credible testimony

A: That I cannot permit him to touch me.
of AAA sufficient to convict the accused of the crime of
rape.
xxxx
The pertinent portion of her testimony is quoted as
follows: Q: Then what happened next after that?

Q: After that when he hugged you what happened next? A: I kept on resisting, sir.

A: He forced me to lie down. Q: And after you have been resisting, what happened
next?
Q: Then did you lie down?
A: Then he told me again if I will not consent.
A: I resisted, sir.
Q: What was your reply?
Q: When you resisted what happened next?
A: I told him that "I will not consent because you arc my
father and I am your daughter and it is against the law of
A: I tried to stand up but he held me.
God.

Q: Then what did he do next after he held you?

A: He was still holding me.
Q: In what part of your body was held by him'?
A: My waist, sir.
Q: Then after he held your waist what did he do next'?
A: He kissed me.
Q: What part of your body was kissed by him?
Q: Then what did he do when you said those
statements?
A: I kept on crying and told him that I will not consent.
Q: After that -after you were crying what happened next?
A: I kept on crying and the knife was kept on pointing at
my waist and kept on telling me to give in and if I will not
give in he will kill me.
Q: What happened next?
A: He stabbed because I keep on resisting.
Q: Were you wounded when he stabbed you?
A: Yes, sir, only a small wound.
Q: After stabbing you and inflicted you with a small
wound, what happened next?
A: I kept on crying and he kept on telling me that I will
give in to him and I kept on pleading to him that I am his
daughter and then he boxed my stomach.
Q: After boxing you, what happened next?
A: I lost my consciousness.
Q: And after you regain your consciousness what
happened?
A: I was already undressed, I have no underwear. I have
no more short pants.
Q: But did you notice in yourself after you regain your
consciousness?
A: When I regained my consciousness he was at my
side and I noticed that there were blood on my vagina,
sir.24(Emphasis ours).
It is evident from the testimony of AAA that all the
clements of rape were established. The prosecution was
able to prove that on 7 December 2001, the accused
Gerandoy entered the room where AAA was sleeping
with her siblings and through the use of force, threat,
intimidation and deadly weapon, succeeded in having
carnal knowledge with the victim against her will.
The appellate court lowered the crime from rape to acts
or lasciviousness upon finding that the testimony of the
victim was incomplete to constitute all the elements of
rape. It concluded that:
AAA's testimony that her vagina was bloodied when she
woke up. absent even of a testimony that she felt pain in
the said area due to lacerations of her genitals, can be
construed and interpreted to mean various other things,
some of which arc inconsistent with rape. A bloodied
vagina could not only mean forceful penetration but it
could also be a result of a menstrual discharge, among
others. Thus the stark absence in the testimony of AAA
that she felt pain in her genitalia or even d octor or
medical practitioner, who examined AAA immediately
after the incident, that there were fresh lacerations in her
vagina, which was caused by insertion of the penis in the
vagina or even a conclusion that a blunt object entered
the same, is constitutive of an obvious failure to
positively establish that the crime of rape was committed
on December 7, 2001.25
We do not agree.
Despite the absence in AAA's testimony that there was
actual carnal knowledge considering that she Jost
consciousness before that, circumstances indicate that
the bloodied vagina was a result of insertion or the
accused's penis to the vagina of the victim.
Direct evidence is not the only means of proving rape
beyond reasonable doubt.26 Even without direct
evidence, the accused may be convicted on the basis of
circumstantial evidence, provided the proven
circumstances constitute an unbroken chain leading to
one fair reasonable conclusion pointing to the accused,
to the exclusion of all others, as the guilty person.27
To prove conviction based on circumstantial evidence,
there was more than one circumstance; the facts from
which the inferences were derived were proved; and the
combination of all the circumstances was such as to
produce a conviction beyond reasonable doubt. What
was essential was that the unbroken chain of the
established circumstances led to no other logical
conclusion except the appellant's guilt.28
In People v. Lupac,29 the Court convicted the accused of
the crime or rape even in the absence of direct
testimonial evidence from the victim that the accused
had an actual carnal knowledge of her. It rejected the
argument of the accused that the victim, being then
asleep and unconscious, could not reliably attest to his
supposed deed. The Court found the accused guilty or
raping the victim while the latter was sleeping and
unconscious based on the following circumstances:
x x x (a) when AAA went to take her afternoon nap, the
only person inside the house with her was Lupac; (h)
about an hour into her sleep, she woke up to find herself
already stripped naked as to expose her private parts;
(c) she immediately felt her body aching and her vaginal
region hurting upon her regaining consciousness; (d) all
doors and windows were locked from within the house,
with only her and the brief.-clad Lupac inside the house;
(e) he exhibited a remorserul demeanor in unilaterally
seeking her forgiveness (Pasensiya ka na AAA), even
spontaneously explaining that he did not really intend to
do "that" to her, showing his realization or the gravity or
the crime he had just committed against her; (/) her
spontaneous, unhesitating and immediate denunciation
or the rape to Tita Terry and her mother (hindot being the
term she used); and (g) the medico-legal findings about
her congested vestibule within the lahiu minora, deep
fresh bleeding laceration at 9 o'clock position in the
hymen, and abraded and U-shaped posterior fourchette
proved the recency or infliction of her vaginal injuries.30
Similarly, we find the accused guilty of the crime of rape
based on the following unbroken circumstances. First,
the accused entered the room where AAA was sleeping
and forced her to lie down. Second, AAA resisted but the
accused continued to kiss her. Third, the accused
succeeded in undressing her by tearing her clothes with
a knife despite her resistance. Fourth, he pointed his
knife in her waist and threatened to kill her. Fifih, due to
AAA' s continued resistance, he stabbed and boxed her
stomach causing AAA to lose consciousness. Sixth,
upon regaining her consciousness, AAA was already
undressed and her vagina was already bleeding while
the accused was lying at her side.
Clearly, conviction is proper. Combining in an unbroken
chain the proven circumstances, there can be no other
logical conclusion than that AAA was raped by appellant.
On the other hand, we agree with the appellate court
that there was only an act of lasciviousness on 16
December 2001.
On that day, a similar fate befell AAA at around 11 :00
p.m. when the accused sexually abused the victim. We
find credible AAA 's testimony that the accused entered
the small room where the victim was sleeping and
pawed her body. The accused threatened to kill all the
members of their family in case of resistance and even
told the victim not to resist as he had already molested
her other siblings. Thereafter, the accused undressed
AAA a nd forced her to lie down. He then mounted
himself on top of AAA, touched and sucked her nipple
and kissed her on her lips.31
Lascivious conduct is defined as intentional touching,
either directly or through clothing, of the genitalia, anus,
groin, breast, inner thigh, or buttocks, or the introduction
of any object into the genitalia, anus or mouth, of any
person, whether of the same or opposite sex, with the
intent to abuse, humiliate, harass, degrade, or arouse or
gratify the sexual desire of any person, bestiality,
masturbation, lascivious exhibition of the genitals or
pubic area of a person.32
33
The elements of sexual abuse are the following:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct;
2. The said act is performed with a child
exploited in prostitution or subjected to other
sexual abuse; and
3. The child, whether male or female, is below
18 years of age.34
It is deemed that a child is sexually abused under
Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, when he or she is
subjected to other lascivious conduct under the coercion
or influence of any adult. There must be some form of
compulsion equivalent to intimidation which subdues the
free exercise of the offended party's free will.35
In Roallos v. People,36 the Court found Roallos guilty of
acts of lasciviousness in relation to Sec. 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610, when he placed his right hand on the
victim's right shoulder, slid his hand towards the victim's
both breasts and mashed them and kissed the victim's
right cheek.
Likewise in Garingarao v. People, the Court found
Garingarao guilty of acts of lasciviousness when he,
under the pretext of examining the victim as a hospital's
nurse, lifted the latter's bra and touched her lell breast.
He further pressed the stethoscope to her stomach,
touched her two nipples and slid his finger inside the
victim's private part.
In this case, the prosecution established that Gerandoy
again entered the room where AAA was sleeping and
performed lascivious acts against her. Despite AAA 's
objection, Gerandoy touched parts of her body. He
continued his sexual advances by undressing AAA and
forced her to lie down. He kissed AAA's lips, mounted
himself on top of her and touched and sucked AAA's
nipple.
The accused also tried to raise doubt on the victim's
credibility due to the presence of other people inside the
small room when the lascivious acts were committed. He
advances his theory that there is no way that the victim's
siblings, who were sleeping on the same room, would
fail to notice that the accused entered the room, boxed,
threatened and stabbed the victim and be successful in
raping and performing lascivious acts against her.
We arc unconvinced.
As repeatedly held by this Court, "Lust is no respecter of
time and place."37 Neither the crampness of the room,
nor the presence of other people therein, nor the high
risk of being caught, has been held sufficient and
effective obstacle to deter the commission of rape.38 In
the case of People v. Alarcon, 39 the accused argued that
rape could not have committed when the victim's siblings
were by her side was dismissed by the court. Isolation is
not a determinative factor to rule on whether a rape was
committed or not and there is no rule that a woman can
only be raped in seclusion.40 It ca be committed,
discreetly or indiscreetly, even in a room full of family
members sleeping side by side. It has been ruled that
rape is not rendered impossible simply because the
siblings of the victim who were with her in that small
room were not awakened during its commission.41
Also, if rape can be committed inside a small room with
occupants sleeping side by side, it is likewise not
impossible for the accused to commit acts of
lasciviousness or other sexual abuses against the victim
in a similar setting even if her siblings were sleeping with
her.
The accused also attributes error on the part of the Court
of Appeals when it failed to consider the affidavit of
desistance as evidence of his non-liability. He finds fault
in the appellate court's failure to consider the contents of
the affidavit of desistance his theory being that the
affidavit was executed not only out of pity but for other
reasons mentioned in the affidavit.
An affidavit of desistancc is generally looked upon with
disfavor by Courts. In so many cases, retractions arc
generally unreliable and considered as an
afterthought.42 As held in People v. Junio:43
x x x The unreliable character of this document is shown
by the fact that it is quite incredible that after going
through the process or having the [appellant] arrested by
the police, positively identifying him as the person who
raped her, enduring the humiliation or a physical
examination of her private parts, and then repeating her
accusations in open court by recounting her anguish,
[the rape victim] would suddenly turn around and declare
that [a]fter a careful deliberation over the case, (she)
find(s) that the same does not merit or warrant criminal
prosecution.44
Upon this principle, we find that the courts below
correctly favored AAA's testimony in open court over the
affidavit of desistance. The statement that it was
executed out of pity for her father is only an additional
reason why the desistancc would not suffice to acquit
accused. It cannot affect the conclusion that he raped
and sexually abused his daughter.
We also dismiss the argument that the delay in filing the
complaint indicates the innocence of the accused.
Likewise without merit is the accused's contention that
the victim was only persuaded by her aunt to file a case
as an act of revenge.
At the outset, we recognize that the filing of complaint for
rape and sexual abuse against one's own parent is a
difficult act. Indeed, it is not really the publicity of trial
that traumatizes. The nightmare that was the act is for
life.
Delay of two years on the part of AAA in filing a case
docs not necessarily result to a doubt in her credibility. It
must be emphasized that victims of rape and sexual
abuse, especially minors, react differently to the same
set of circumstances. The workings of a human mind
placed under emotional stress arc unpredictable; people
react differently. Some may have a passive or reactive
response or settle into inscnsibility.45
Further, the delay on the part of the victim in relating her
ordeal from her own father was understandable. He is
her parent and her confusion and fear are logical under
the circumstances. It was established during trial that
aside from the use of a knife to enfeeble her resistance,
the accused likewise threatened to kill her and all the
members of their family including himself if she would
keep fighting off the horror. To make the matters worse,
her own mother even expressed sympathy for the
husband over the child. Her mother's expression that it
was embarrassing to relate her sad plight aggravated
the fear already sowed inside the minor victim. The
delay in filing a case, clearly, was expalined.46
Penalties and Civil Indemnities
Criminal Case No. 6624
The penalty prescribed under Section 5(b) of Republic
Act No. 7610 is reclusion temporal in its medium period
to reclusion perpetua. However, the penalty provided
under this Act shall be imposed in its maximum period
when the perpetrator is an ascendant, parent guardian,
stepparent or collateral relative within the second degree
of consanguinity or affinity, or a manager or owner of an
establishment which has no license to operate or its
license has expired or has been rcvoked.47
We likewise impose the payment of the following
amounts or ₱20,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as
moral damages, ₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages and
₱15,000.00 as fine with six percent (6%) interest from
finality of judgment until fully paid.48
Criminal Case No. 6625
The penalty prescribed for qualified rape is death. Under
Article 266-B, death penalty shall also be imposed if the
crime of rape is committed by a parent against his child
under eighteen (18) years of age. However, in view of
Republic Act No. 9346, the penalty of reclusion perpetua
without the eligibility of parole49 shall be imposed in lieu
of the imposition of death penalty.50
Following the new jurisprudential ruling of People v.
Gambao51 on damages, we increase the amounts of
indemnity and damages to be imposed as follows:
₱100,000.00 as civil indemnity; ₱100,000.00 as moral
damages; and ₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages.52 In
addition, we impose six percent ( 6%) interest from
finality of judgment until fully paid.53
WHEREFORE, the appeal is DENIED. The 29
November 2011 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00709 modifying the judgment of
conviction dated 13 February 2009 of the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 29 of Surigao City is hereby AFFIRMED
with the following MODIFICATIONS:
I. In Criminal Case No. 6624:
(a) Finding the accused-appellant guilty of acts
of lasciviousness in relation to Section 5(b),
Article III of Republic Act No. 7610;
(b) Sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua; and
(c) Ordering the accused-appellant to pay AAA
the following amounts of ₱20,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱15,000.00 as moral damages,
₱15,000.00 as exemplary damages and
₱15,000.00 as fine with six percent (6%)
interest from finality ofjudgment until fully paid.
II. In Criminal Case No. 6625:
(a) Finding the accused-appellant guilty of
qualified rape in violation of Art. 266-A
paragraph l in relation to Article 266-B of the
Revised Penal Code;
(b) Sentencing the accused-appellant to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua without the
eligibility of parole; and
(c) Ordering the accused-appellant to pay AAA
the following amounts of ₱100,000.00 as civil
indemnity, ₱100,000.00 as moral damages,
₱100,000.00 as exemplary damages with six
percent (6%) interest from finality of judgment
until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
[G.R. No. 188897 : June 06, 2011]
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, APPELLEE, VS.
IRENO BONAAGUA Y BERCE, APPELLANT.
DECISION
PERALTA, J.:
Ireno Bonaagua (Ireno) seeks the reversal of the
Decision [1] of the Court of Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03133 convicting him with three (3) counts of
Statutory Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the
Revised Penal Code (RPC), as amended, in relation to
Republic Act No. 7610 (R.A. No. 7610) and Acts of
Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The factual and procedural antecedents are as follows:
In four (4) separate Informations, Ireno was charged by
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Las Piñas City with
four (4) counts of Rape under Paragraph 2, Article 266-A
of the RPC, as amended, in relation to R.A. No. 7610,
for inserting his tongue and his finger into the genital of
his minor daughter, AAA. [2]
The accusatory portion of the Information in Criminal
Case No. 03-0254 against Ireno reads:
That on or about the month of December 1998 in the
City of Las Piñas and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with abuse
of influence and moral ascendancy, by means of force,
threat and intimidation, did then and there willfully,
unlawfully and feloniously insert his tongue and finger
into the genital of his daughter, [AAA], a minor then eight
(8) years of age, against her will and consent.
CONTRARY TO LAW and with the special
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority of the
private offended party, [AAA], being then only eight (8)
years of age and relationship of the said private offended
party with the accused, Ireno Bonaagua y Berce, the
latter being the biological father of the former. [3]
The Information in Criminal Case No. 03-0255 [4] has the
same accusatory allegations while the Informations in
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0256 [5] and Criminal Case Nos.
03-0257 [6] are similarly worded, except for the date of
the commission of the crime and the age of AAA, which
are December 2000 and ten (10) years old, respectively.
The cases were later consolidated [7] and upon his
arraignment, Ireno pleaded not guilty to the four (4)
counts of rape with which he was charged.
Consequently, trial on the merits ensued.
At the trial, the prosecution presented the testimonies of
the victim, AAA; the victim's mother; and Dr. Melissa De
Leon. The defense, on the other hand, presented the
lone testimony of the accused as evidence.
Evidence for the Prosecution
The prosecution established that in 1998, AAA and her
mother left their house in Candelaria, Quezon to spend
the Christmas with accused-appellant in Las Piñas
City. They stayed in the house of a certain Lola Jean, the
godmother in the wedding of her parents, at Sta. Cecilia
Subdivision, Las Piñas City.
AAA was inside a room lying in bed one afternoon while
her younger brothers were playing outside the house
and her mother was not home. Accused-appellant
entered the room. He approached her, rolled her shirt
upward, and removed her shorts and panty. She tried to
resist by putting her clothes back on, but her father's
strength prevailed. Thereafter, accused-appellant
touched and caressed her breasts. He licked her vagina
then inserted his finger into it.
In the evening of the same day, the accused-appellant
raped AAA again in the same manner and under the
same circumstances. AAA did not tell her mother that
she was raped because accused-appellant threatened to
kill her mother by placing the latter's body in a drum and
have it cemented if she would report the incidents. She
returned to Quezon with her mother before the end of
the Christmas season.
In December 1999, AAA was raped by accused-
appellant for the third time when he went to Candelaria,
Quezon. In December 2000, AAA and her mother spent
the Yuletide season with accused-appellant in
Pulanglupa, Las Piñas City. In a single day, AAA was
raped for the fourth and fifth time. While spending the
afternoon inside her father's room at the car-wash
station, he removed her shorts and panty then
proceeded to touch and insert his finger into her vagina.
Accused-appellant repeated the same sexual assault
shortly thereafter. AAA again did not report these
incidents for fear that her mother would be killed and
cemented inside a drum.
On January 26, 2001, AAA complained of severe
abdominal pain which prompted her mother to take her
to Gregg Hospital in Sariaya, Quezon. AAA was
transferred to the Quezon Memorial Hospital in Lucena
City where Dr. Melissa De Leon performed on her a
physical examination. The results revealed that there
was a healed superficial laceration at the 9 o'clock
position on the hymen of AAA. This medical finding
forced AAA to reveal to her mother all the incidents of
rape committed by accused-appellant.
After being discharged from the hospital, AAA's mother
took her to the Police Headquarters of Sariaya, Quezon
to file a complaint for rape against accused-appellant.
AAA's mother also took her to the office of the National
Bureau of Investigation in Legaspi City where she
executed a sworn statement against accused-
appellant. [8]
Evidence for the Defense
Accused-appellant denied committing the charges of
rape hurled against him. He claimed to be working in Las
Piñas City while AAA, her mother and siblings where
(sic) in Sariaya, Quezon at the time the alleged rapes
occurred. While he admitted that there were times when
AAA and her mother would visit him in Las Piñas City,
he nonetheless averred that they would leave on the
same day they arrived after he gives them money.
Accused-appellant asserted further that the charges of
rape against him were fabricated by AAA's mother, who
suspected him of having an affair with another woman in
Las Piñas City. [9]
On August 6, 2007, the Regional Trial Court (RTC), after
finding the evidence for the prosecution overwhelming
against the accused's defense of denial and alibi,
rendered a Decision [10] convicting Ireno with four (4)
counts of Rape, the dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being proof
beyond reasonable doubt that accused IRENO
BONAAGUA, has committed four (4) counts of RAPE
under par. 2 of Article 266-A of the Revised Penal Code,
as amended, in relation to R.A. 7610, as charged, the
Court hereby pronounced him GUILTY and sentences
him to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA for
each case and to pay private complainant [AAA], the
amount of Php50,000 for each case, or a total of
Php200,000, by way of civil indemnity plus Php50,000
for each case or a total of Php200,000 as moral
damages.
Costs against the accused.
SO ORDERED. [11]
Aggrieved, Ireno appealed the Decision before the CA,
which appeal was later docketed as CA-G.R. CR-H.C.
No. 03133.
On March 31, 2009, the CA rendered a
Decision [12] affirming the decision of the RTC with
modifications on the imposable penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, and finding Ireno
guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of
R.A. No. 7610, instead of Rape, in Criminal Case Nos.
03-0255, the decretal portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, the Decision of the Regional Trial Court
of Las Piñas City, Branch 254, finding Ireno Bonaagua
y Berce guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of
rape is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby sentenced to suffer
the indeterminate penalty of 12 years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to 20 years of reclusion
temporal, as maximum, for each rape in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257 and is ordered to
pay AAA the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary
damages in each case, apart from the civil indemnity
and moral damages that have already been awarded by
the trial court;
2. Ireno Bonaagua y Berce is hereby held guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of acts of lasciviousness
in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, with relationship as an
aggravating circumstance. He is, accordingly, sentenced
to suffer the indeterminate penalty of 12 years and 1 day
to 17 years and 4 months of reclusion temporal in its
minimum and medium periods and ordered to pay AAA
the amount of PhP15,000 as moral damages and a fine
of PhP15,000.00.
SO ORDERED. [13]

In fine, the CA found Ireno's defense of denial and alibi
inherently weak against the positive identification of AAA
that he was the culprit of the horrid deed. Thus, aside
from modifying the imposable penalty in Criminal Case
Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256 and 03-0257, the CA affirmed
the decision of the RTC finding Ireno guilty of the crime
of Rape Through Sexual Assault.
In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, however, after a diligent
review of the evidence adduced by the prosecution, the
CA only found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
The CA opined that since the prosecution failed to
establish the act of insertion by Ireno of his finger into
the vagina of AAA, Ireno could only be found guilty of
Acts of Lasciviousness, a crime which is necessarily
included in the Information filed against him in Criminal
Case No. 03-0255.
Ireno now comes before this Court for relief.
In a Resolution [14] dated December 16, 2009, the Court
informed the parties that they may file their respective
supplemental briefs if they so desire. In their respective
Manifestations, [15] the parties waived the filing of their
supplemental briefs and, instead, adopted their
respective briefs filed before the CA.
Hence, Ireno raises the lone error:
I witness stand to substantiate the same medical
The COURT A QUO GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING
THE ACCUSED-APPELLANT GUILTY OF THE CRIME
OF RAPE DESPITE THE PROSECUTION'S FAILURE
TO PROVE HIS GUILT BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT. [16]
Simply put, Ireno maintains that the testimony of AAA
was replete with inconsistencies and was extremely
unbelievable. Ireno insists that the allegation that he
inserted his tongue and finger into the genital of AAA
was manifestly incredible as the deed is physiologically
impossible. Moreover, the medical findings are grossly
inconclusive to prove that AAA was raped, since it only
established that there was only one healed superficial
laceration.
This Court, however, finds the arguments raised by Ireno
untenable. To determine the innocence or guilt of the
accused in rape cases, the courts are guided by three
well-entrenched principles: (1) an accusation of rape can
be made with facility and while the accusation is difficult
to prove, it is even more difficult for the accused, though
innocent, to disprove; (2) considering that in the nature
of things, only two persons are usually involved in the
crime of rape, the testimony of the complainant should
be scrutinized with great caution; and (3) the evidence
for the prosecution must stand or fall on its own merits
and cannot be allowed to draw strength from the
weakness of the evidence for the defense. [17]
After perusing the testimony of the victim, AAA, the
prosecution has indubitably established that Ireno was
the one who sexually assaulted her. AAA categorically
narrated that Ireno sexually abused her on several
occasions and even threatened AAA that he would kill
her mother if she would report the incidents.
Time and again, this Court has consistently held that in
rape cases, the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
is best addressed to the sound discretion of the trial
judge whose conclusion thereon deserves much weight
and respect because the judge had the direct
opportunity to observe them on the stand and ascertain
if they were telling the truth or not. Generally, appellate
courts will not interfere with the trial court's assessment
in this regard, absent any indication or showing that the
trial court has overlooked some material facts of
substance or value, or gravely abused its discretion. [18]
It is well entrenched in this jurisdiction that when the
offended parties are young and immature girls, as in this
case, courts are inclined to lend credence to their
version of what transpired, considering not only their
relative vulnerability, but also the shame and
embarrassment to which they would be exposed if the
matter about which they testified were not true. [19] A
young girl would not usually concoct a tale of defloration;
publicly admit having been ravished and her honor
tainted; allow the examination of her private parts; and
undergo all the trouble and inconvenience, not to
mention the trauma and scandal of a public trial, had she
not in fact been raped and been truly moved to protect
and preserve her honor, and motivated by the desire to
obtain justice for the wicked acts committed against
her. [20] Moreover, the Court has repeatedly held that the
lone testimony of the victim in a rape case, if credible, is
enough to sustain a conviction. [21]
Moreover, contrary to Ireno's contention, the medical
findings of Dr. Melissa De Leon did not refute AAA's
testimony of defilement, but instead bolstered her claim.
The RTC correctly concluded:
It is true that Dr. Melissa De Leon, when called to the
certification, did not rule out the possibility that the
laceration might have been inflicted through some other
causes and that there could have been only one
instance of finger insertion into the vagina of private
complainant. However, it is equally true that Dr. De Leon
also did not rule out the possibility that finger insertion
might have been the cause of the laceration (pp. 7-12,
TSN, January 31, 2006). Dr. De Leon also clarified that
only one laceration may be inflicted although a finger is
inserted into the vagina on separate instances (pp. 19-
26, supra). According to Dr. De Leon, this instance
depends on the force exerted into the vagina and on
whether or not the hymen is membranous or firm and
thick. A membranous hymen is easily lacerated and so
when a force is exerted into it on several occasions,
several lacerations may occur. A thick and firm hymen is
not easily lacerated and so a force exerted into it on
several occasions may cause only one laceration.
Private complainant has thick and firm hymen and this
may explain why there is only (sic) laceration on her
hymen although she claimed her father inserted into her
vagina his finger several times (pp. 19-29, supra).
This non-categorical stance of Dr. De Leon is
nonetheless understandable because Dr. De Leon has
no personal knowledge of what actually happened to
private complainant that she (complainant) suffered
hymenal laceration. However, there is one thing very
certain though in the testimony of Dr. De Leon - that she
medically examined [AAA], herein private complainant,
because of the information that [AAA] was sexually
abused by her [AAA's] own father (pp. 5-6, supra). And
indeed, as already discussed lengthily above, there is no
reason to doubt the veracity of AAA's allegation. [22]
The same conclusion was also arrived at by the CA, to
wit:
While the medico-legal findings showed a single healed
superficial laceration on the hymen of AAA, Dr. De Leon
clarified that it is not impossible for a hymen to sustain
only one laceration despite the fact that a finger had
been inserted into the vagina on several accounts. This
situation may arise depending on the force extended into
the vagina and on whether or not the hymen of the victim
is membranous or firm and thick. A membranous hymen
is easily lacerated; thus, when a force is exerted into it
on several occasions, several lacerations may occur. On
the other hand, a thick and firm hymen is not easily
lacerated; a force exerted into it on several occasions
may cause only one laceration. According to Dr. De
Leon, AAA has thick and firm hymen and this may
explain why it has only one laceration despite her claim
that accused-appellant inserted his finger inside her
vagina several times. [23]
Even Ireno's contention that the charges against him
were merely fabricated by his wife because she
suspects that he is having an affair with another woman
deserves scant consideration. Aside from the fact that
the said allegation was not proved, it must be
emphasized that no member of a rape victim's family
would dare encourage the victim to publicly expose the
dishonor to the family unless the crime was in fact
committed, especially in this case where the victim and
the offender are relatives. [24] It is unnatural for a mother
to use her daughter as an engine of malice, especially if
it will subject her child to embarrassment and lifelong
stigma. [25]
Also, Ireno cannot likewise rely on the Affidavit of
Desistance stating that AAA and her mother are no
longer interested in pursuing the case filed against him.
Rape is no longer a crime against chastity for it is now
classified as a crime against persons. [26]Consequently,
rape is no longer considered a private crime or that
whichcannotbeprosecuted,exceptupona complaint filed
by the aggrieved party. Hence, pardon by the offended
party of the offender in the crime of rape will not
extinguish the offender's criminal liability. Moreover, an
Affidavit of Desistance ? even when construed as a
pardon in the erstwhile "private crime" of rape ? is not a
ground for the dismissal of the criminal cases, since the
actions have already been instituted. To justify the
dismissal of the complaints, the pardon should have
been made prior to the institution of the criminal
actions. [27] As correctly concluded by the CA, the said
affidavit was executed in connection with another
accusation of rape which Ireno committed against AAA in
Candelaria, Quezon and not the four cases of rape
subject of this appeal. In addition, AAA's mother testified
that she executed the said affidavit to regain custody of
her children who were brought to Bicol by Ireno's
siblings. [28]
It has been repeatedly held by this Court that it looks
with disfavor on affidavits of desistance. As cited
in People v. Alcazar, [29] the rationale for this was
extensively discussed in People v. Junio: [30]
x x x We have said in so many cases that retractions are
generally unreliable and are looked upon with
considerable disfavor by the courts. The unreliable
character of this document is shown by the fact that it is
quite incredible that after going through the process of
having the [appellant] arrested by the police, positively
identifying him as the person who raped her, enduring
the humiliation of a physical examination of her private
parts, and then repeating her accusations in open court
by recounting her anguish, [the rape victim] would
suddenly turn around and declare that [a]fter a careful
deliberation over the case, (she) find(s) that the same
does not merit or warrant criminal prosecution.
Thus, we have declared that at most the retraction is an
afterthought which should not be given probative value.
It would be a dangerous rule to reject the testimony
taken before the court of justice simply because the
witness who gave it later on changed his mind for one
reason or another. Such a rule [would] make a solemn
trial a mockery and place the investigation at the mercy
of unscrupulous witnesses. Because affidavits of
retraction can easily be secured from poor and ignorant
witnesses, usually for monetary consideration, the Court
has invariably regarded such affidavits as exceedingly
unreliable. [31]
Amidst the overwhelming evidence against him, Ireno
offered nothing but his bare denial of the accusations
against him and that he was someplace else when the
dastardly acts were committed. No jurisprudence in
criminal law is more settled than that alibi is the weakest
of all defenses, for it is easy to contrive and difficult to
disprove, and for which reason it is generally
rejected. [32] It has been consistently held that denial and
alibi are the most common defenses in rape cases.
Denial could not prevail over complainant's direct,
positive and categorical assertion. As between a positive
and categorical testimony which has the ring of truth, on
one hand, and a bare denial, on the other, the former is
generally held to prevail. [33] All said, as found by the CA,
the prosecution has convincingly proved and more than
sufficiently established that: (1) Ireno committed the
accusations of Rape Through Sexual Assault against
AAA in Criminal Cases Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-
0257; (2) that AAA was a minor when Ireno committed
the sexual assault against her; [34] and (3) that Ireno was
the biological father of AAA. [35]
Verily, in criminal cases, an examination of the entire
records of a case may be explored for the purpose of
arriving at a correct conclusion, as an appeal in criminal
cases throws the whole case open for review, it being
the duty of the court to correct such error as may be
found in the judgment appealed from. [36]Since the CA
found Ireno guilty of Acts of Lasciviousness under
Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610 in Criminal Case No. 03-
0255 instead of rape, the Court should thus determine
whether the evidence presented by the prosecution was
sufficient to establish that the intentional touching of the
victim by Ireno constitutes lascivious conduct and
whether the CA imposed the appropriate penalties.
As aptly found by the CA:
A diligent review of the evidence adduced by the
prosecution, however, shows that accused-appellant
cannot be held guilty as charged for the crime of rape in
Criminal Case No. 03-0255. The prosecution failed to
establish insertion by accused-appellant of his finger into
the vagina of AAA, who testified on direct examination
that accused-appellant "touched my private part and
licked it but he did not insert his finger inside my
vagina." In fact, even the trial court asked AAA if
accused-appellant inserted his finger inside her vagina.
She answered in the negative and averred that he licked
her vagina and touched her breasts. In reply to the
prosecution's query if accused-appellant did anything
else aside from licking her organ, she said he also
touched it. During cross-examination, AAA testified that
accused-appellant "merely touched her vagina but did
not insert his finger." [37]
Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610, defines and
penalizes acts of lasciviousness committed against a
child as follows:
Section 5. Child Prostitution and Other Sexual Abuse. --
Children, whether male or female, who for money, profit,
or any other consideration or due to the coercion or
influence of any adult, syndicate or group, indulge in
sexual intercourse or lascivious conduct, are deemed to
be children exploited in prostitution and other sexual
abuse.
x x x x
(b) Those who commit the act of sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child exploited in prostitution
or subject to other sexual abuse; Provided, That when
the victims is under twelve (12) years of age, the
perpetrators shall be prosecuted under Article 335,
paragraph 3, for rape and Article 336 of Act No. 3815, as
amended, the Revised Penal Code, for rape or
lascivious conduct, as the case may be: Provided, That
the penalty for lascivious conduct when the victim is
under twelve (12) years of age shall be reclusion
temporal in its medium period. [38]
Paragraph (b) punishes sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct not only with a child exploited in prostitution, but
also with a child subjected to other sexual abuses. It
covers not only a situation where a child is abused for
profit, but also where one ? through coercion,
intimidation or influence ? engages in sexual intercourse
or lascivious conduct with a child. [39]
However, pursuant to the foregoing provision, before an
accused can be convicted of child abuse through
lascivious conduct committed against a minor below 12
years of age, the requisites for acts of lasciviousness
under Article 336 of the RPC must be met in addition to
the requisites for sexual abuse under Section 5 of R.A.
No. 7610. [40]
Acts of Lasciviousness, as defined in Article 336 of the
RPC, has the following elements:
(1) That the offender commits any act of lasciviousness
or lewdness;
(2) That it is done under any of the following
circumstances:
a. By using force or intimidation; or
b. When the offended party is deprived of reason
or otherwise unconscious; or
c. When the offended party is under 12 years of
age; and
(3) That the offended party is another person of either
sex. [41]
In addition, the following elements of sexual abuse under
Section 5, Article III of R.A. No. 7610 must be
established:
1. The accused commits the act of sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct.
2. The said act is performed with a child exploited
in prostitution or subjected to other sexual
abuse.
3. The child, whether male or female, is below 18
years of age. [42]
Corollarilly, Section 2 (h) of the rules and
regulations [43] of R.A. No. 7610 defines "Lascivious
conduct" as:
[T]he intentional touching, either directly or through
clothing, of the genitalia, anus, groin, breast, inner thigh,
or buttocks, or the introduction of any object into the
genitalia, anus or mouth, of any person, whether of the
same or opposite sex, with an intent to abuse, humiliate,
harass, degrade, or arouse or gratify the sexual desire of
any person, bestiality, masturbation, lascivious exhibition
of the genitals or pubic area of a person. [44]
Undeniably, all the afore-stated elements are present in
Criminal Case No. 03-0255. Ireno committed lascivious
acts against AAA by touching her breasts and licking her
vagina and the lascivious or lewd acts were committed
against AAA, who was 8 years old at the time as
established by her birth certificate. [45]Thus, the CA
correctly found Ireno guilty of the crime of Acts of
Lasciviousness under Section 5 (b) of R.A. No. 7610.
It must be emphasized, however, that like in the crime of
rape whereby the slightest penetration of the male organ
or even its slightest contact with the outer lip or the labia
majora of the vagina already consummates the crime, in
like manner, if the tongue, in an act of cunnilingus,
touches the outer lip of the vagina, the act should also
be considered as already consummating the crime of
rape through sexual assault, not the crime of acts of
lasciviousness. Notwithstanding, in the present case,
such logical interpretation could not be applied. It must
be pointed out that the victim testified that Ireno only
touched her private part and licked it, but did not insert
his finger in her vagina. This testimony of the victim,
however, is open to various interpretation, since it cannot
be identified what specific part of the vagina was defiled
by Ireno. Thus, in conformity with the principle that the
guilt of an accused must be proven beyond reasonable
doubt, the statement cannot be the basis for convicting
Ireno with the crime of rape through sexual assault.
Penalties and Award of Damages
Having found Ireno guilty beyond reasonable doubt of
Rape Through Sexual Assault in Criminal Case Nos. 03-
0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257 and Acts of Lasciviousness
in Criminal Case No. 03-0255, We shall proceed to
determine the appropriate penalties imposable for each
offense.
Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257
Under Article 266-B of the RPC, the penalty for rape by
sexual assault is reclusion temporal "if the rape is
committed by any of the 10 aggravating/qualifying
circumstances mentioned in this article." [46] In Criminal
Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-0257, the
aggravating/qualifying circumstance of minority and
relationship are present, considering that the rape was
committed by a parent against his minor child. Reclusion
temporal ranges from twelve (12) years and one (1) day
to twenty (20) years.
Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum
term of the indeterminate penalty shall be that which
could be properly imposed under the RPC. Other than
the aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship which have been taken into account to raise
the penalty to reclusion temporal, [47] no other
aggravating circumstance was alleged and proven.
Hence, the penalty shall be imposed in its medium
period, [48] or fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and
one (1) day to seventeen (17) years and four (4) months.
On the other hand, the minimum term of the
indeterminate sentence should be within the range of the
penalty next lower in degree than that prescribed by the
Code which is prision mayor or six (6) years and one (1)
day to twelve (12) years. [49] Thus, Ireno should be meted
the indeterminate penalty of ten (10) years of prision
mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17) years and four
(4) months of reclusion temporal,as maximum.
It must be clarified, however, that the reasoning
expounded by the Court in the recent case of People v.
Armando Chingh y Parcia, [50] for imposing upon the
accused the higher penalty provided in Section 5 (b),
Article III of R.A. No. 7610, has no application in the
case at bar. In the said case, the Court, acknowledging
the fact that to impose the lesser penalty would be unfair
to the child victim, meted upon the accused the higher
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium period as
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
instead of the lesser penalty of prision mayor prescribed
by Article 266-B for rape by sexual assault under
paragraph 2, Article 266-A of the RPC. The Court
elucidated:
In this case, the offended party was ten years old at the
time of the commission of the offense. Pursuant to the
above-quoted provision of law, Armando was aptly
prosecuted under Art. 266-A, par. 2 of the Revised Penal
Code, as amended by R.A. No. 8353, for Rape Through
Sexual Assault. However, instead of applying the penalty
prescribed therein, which is prision mayor, considering
that VVV was below 12 years of age, and considering
further that Armando's act of inserting his finger in VVV's
private part undeniably amounted to lascivious conduct,
the appropriate imposable penalty should be that
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period.
The Court is not unmindful to the fact that the accused
who commits acts of lasciviousness under Art. 366 in
relation to Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
suffers the more severe penalty of reclusion temporal in
its medium period than the one who commits Rape
Through Sexual Assault, which is merely punishable
by prision mayor. This is undeniably unfair to the child
victim. To be sure, it was not the intention of the framers
of R.A. No. 8353 to have disallowed the applicability of
R.A. No. 7610 to sexual abuses committed to children.
Despite the passage of RA No. 8353, R.A. No. 7610 is
still good law, which must be applied when the victims
are children or those "persons below eighteen (18) years
of age or those over but are unable to fully take care of
themselves or protect themselves from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition."
In the present case, the factual milieu was different since
the offender, Ireno, is the father of the minor victim.
Hence, the offenses were committed with the
aggravating/qualifying circumstances of minority and
relationship, attendant circumstances which were not
present in the Chingh case, which in turn, warrants the
imposition of the higher penalty of reclusion
temporal prescribed by Article 266-B of the RPC.
Considering that the RPC already prescribes such
penalty, the rationale of unfairness to the child victim
that Chingh wanted to correct is absent. Hence, there is
no more need to apply the penalty prescribed by R.A.
No. 7610.
As to civil liabilities, the damages awarded in the form of
civil indemnity in the amount of P50,000.00 and moral
damages, also in the amount of P50,000.00, for each
count of Rape must be both reduced to P30,000.00,
respectively, in line with current jurisprudence. [51] Also,
the amount of exemplary damages awarded in the
amount of P25,000.00 must be increased to P30,000.00
for each count of Rape. [52]
Criminal Case No. 03-0255
It is beyond cavil that when the sexual abuse was
committed by Ireno, AAA was only eight (8) years old.
Hence, the provisions of R.A. No. 7610, or The Special
Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation
and Discrimination Act, should be applied.
Thus, the appropriate imposable penalty should be that
provided in Section 5 (b), Article III of R.A. No. 7610,
which is reclusion temporal in its medium period which is
fourteen (14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day to
seventeen (17) years and four (4) months. As the crime
was committed by the father of the offended party, the
alternative circumstance of relationship should be
appreciated. In crimes against chastity, such as Acts of
Lasciviousness, relationship is always
aggravating. [53] Therefore, Ireno should be meted the
indeterminate penalty of thirteen (13) years, nine (9)
months and eleven (11) days of reclusion temporal, as
minimum, to sixteen (16) years, five (5) months and ten
(10) days of reclusion temporal, as maximum.
Moreover, the award in the amount of P15,000.00 as
moral damages and a fine in the amount of P15,000.00,
is proper in line with current jurisprudence. [54] However,
civil indemnity ex delicto in the amount of P20,000.00
should also be awarded. [55] In view of the presence of
the aggravating circumstance of relationship, the amount
of P15,000.00 as exemplary damages should likewise
be awarded. [56]
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision of the
Court of Appeals, dated March 31, 2009 in CA-G.R. CR-
H.C. No. 03133, is AFFIRMED with MODIFICATIONS:
1. In Criminal Case Nos. 03-0254, 03-0256, and 03-
0257, IRENO BONAAGUA y BERCE is hereby
sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten (10)
years of prision mayor, as minimum, to seventeen (17)
years and four (4) months of reclusion temporal, as
maximum, for each count. He is likewise ordered to pay
AAA the amounts of P30,000.00 as civil indemnity,
P30,000.00 as moral damages, and P30,000.00 as
exemplary damages for each count of Qualified Rape
Through Sexual Assault or a total of P90,000.00 for each
count.
2. In Criminal Case No. 03-0255, IRENO BONAAGUA
y BERCE is meted to suffer the indeterminate penalty of
thirteen (13) years, nine (9) months and eleven (11) days
of reclusion temporal, as minimum, to sixteen (16) years,
five (5) months and ten (10) days of reclusion temporal,
as maximum. In addition to moral damages and fine, he
is likewise ordered to pay P20,000.00 as civil indemnity
and P15,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 173988 October 8, 2014
FELINA ROSALDES, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
The petitioner, a public schoolteacher, was charged with
and found guilty of child abuse, a violation of Republic
Act No. 7610.1 The victim was her own Grade 1 pupil
whom she physically maltreated for having accidentally
bumped her knee while she was drowsing off on a
bamboo sofa as he entered the classroom. Her
maltreatment left him with physical injuries, as duly
certified by a physician.
Whether or not the petitioner thereby committed child
abuse is the question that this appeal must determine, in
light of the Court's pronouncement in Bongalon v. People
of the Philippines2 that:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610. Only when the laying of hands
is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended by the
accused to debase, degrade or demean the intrinsic
worth and dignity of the child as a human being should it
be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is punished
under the Revised Penal Code.
Antecedents
The State, through the Office ofthe Solicitor General,
summed up the factual antecedents in its comment, 3 as
follows:
On February 13, 1996, seven yearold Michael Ryan
Gonzales, then a Grade 1 pupil at Pughanan Elementary
School located in the Municipality of Lambunao, Iloilo,
was hurriedly entering his classroom when he
accidentally bumped the knee of his teacher, petitioner
Felina Rosaldes, who was then asleep on a bamboo
sofa (TSN, March 14, 1997, pp. 5-6). Roused from
sleep, petitioner asked Michael Ryan to apologize to her.
When Michael did not obey but instead proceeded to his
seat (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 6), petitioner went to
Michael and pinched him on his thigh. Then, she held
him up by his armpits and pushed him to the floor. As he
fell, Michael Ryan’s body hit a desk. As a result, he lost
consciousness. Petitioner proceeded topick Michael
Ryan up by his ears and repeatedly slammed him down
on the floor. Michael Ryan cried (TSN, March 14, 1997,
p. 6; TSN, November 13, 1997, p. 7).
After the incident, petitioner proceeded to teach her
class. During lunch break, Michael Ryan, accompanied
by two of his classmates, Louella Loredo and Jonalyn
Gonzales, went home crying and told his mother about
the incident (TSN, March 14, 1997, p. 7). His mother and
his Aunt Evangeline Gonzales reported the incident to
their Barangay Captain, Gonzalo Larroza (TSN,
February 1, 1999, p. 4) who advised them to have
Michael Ryan examined by a doctor. Michael Ryan’s
aunt and Barangay Councilman Ernesto Ligante brought
him to the Dr. Ricardo Y. Ladrido Hospital where he was
examined by Dr. Teresita Castigador. They, likewise,
reported the incident to the Police Station (TSN, July 27,
1997, p. 6; TSN, February 1, 1999, p. 4).
The medical certificate issued by Dr. Teresita Castigador
reads, in part:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external
ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-
L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1
cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially
at the area of femoral head.
The petitioner was criminally charged with child abusein
the Regional Trial Court in Iloilo City (RTC), and the case
was assigned to Branch 27 of that court. The information
alleged as follows: The Provincial Prosecutor of Iloilo,
upon approval and Directive of the Deputy
OMBUDSMAN for the Visayas accuses FELINA
ROSALDES of the crime of VIOLATION OF CHILD
ABUSE LAW
(Section 10 (a) of R.A. 7610), committed as follows:
That on or about the 13th day of February 1996, in the
Municipality of Lambunao, Province of Iloilo, Philippines
and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, being a public school teacher in
Grade 1 of Pughanan Elementary School, with a Salary
Grade below 26, under the DECS, did then and there
willfully, unlawfully and feloniously maltreat her pupil
Michael Ryan Gonzales, a seven year old child, by
pinching him on different parts of his body, and
thereafter slumping him to the ground, thereby causing
Michael Ryan Gonzales to lose his consciousness and
has suffered injuries on different parts of his body.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
On June 26, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment
convicting the petitioner of child abuse,5 disposing as
follows:
WHEREFORE, finding the accused guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Section 10 (a), Article VI
of R.A. 7610, the Court sentences her to an
indeterminate prison term ranging from four (4) years,
two (2) months and one (1) day of prision correccional,
as minimum, to six (6) years and one (1) day of prision
mayor, as maximum, and to pay the costs.
No pronouncement as to civil liability, the same not
having been proved.
SO ORDERED.6
On appeal, the CA affirmed the conviction of the
petitioner through its assailed decision promulgated on
May 11, 2005,7 with a modification of the penalty, viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is
hereby rendered by us DISMISSING the appeal filed in
this case and AFFIRMING the decision rendered on
June 26, 2003 by the court a quo in Criminal Case No.
46893 with the MODIFICATION that the
accusedappellant is sentenced to suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, two (2) months
and one (1) day of prision correccional, as the minimum
of it, to ten (10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor,
as the maximum thereof.
IT IS SO ORDERED.8
In her petition for review on certiorari,9 the petitioner
submits that:
I
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by
holding that the acts of the petitioner constitute child
abuse penalized under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act
No. 7610[,] and notunder the Revised Penal Code.
II
The Court of Appeals erred in convicting the petitioner by
holding that petitioner’s constitutional right to due
process and her right to be informed of the nature and
cause of the accusation against her was not violated
when the essential elements of the crime charged were
not properly recited in the information.10
Countering, the State, through the OSG, insists that the
issues the petitioner is raising are mainly factual and,
therefore, not reviewable under the mode of appeal
chosen; that the affirmance of her conviction by the CA
was in accord with the pertinent law and jurisprudence,
and supported by the overwhelming evidence of the trial;
and that the information charging her with child abuse
was sufficient in form and substance.11
Ruling of the Court
The appeal lacks merit.
First of all, the State correctly contends that the
petitioner could raise only questions of law in her present
recourse. Under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, the
appeal is limited to questionsof law. The immediate
implication of the limitation is to have the findings of fact
by the CA, which affirmed the findings of fact by the trial
court, conclude the Court by virtue of its not being a trier
of fact. As such, the Court cannot analyze or weigh the
evidence all over again.
It is true that the limitation of the review to errors of law
admits of exceptions. Under Section 4, Rule 3 of the
Internal Rules of the Supreme Court, the following
situations are the exceptions in which the Court may
review findings of fact by the lower courts, to wit: (a) the
conclusion is a finding grounded entirely on speculation,
surmise and conjecture; (b) the inference made is
manifestly mistaken; (c) there is grave abuse of
discretion; (d) the judgment is based on a
misapprehension of facts; (e) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (f) the collegial appellate courts went beyond
the issues of the case, and their findings are contrary to
the admissions of both appellant and appellee; (g) the
findings of fact of the collegial appellate courts are
contrary to those of the trial court; (h) said findings of
fact are conclusions without citation of specific evidence
on which they are based; (i) the facts set forth in the
petition aswell as in the petitioner’s main and reply briefs
are not disputed by the respondents; (j) the findings of
fact of the collegial appellate courts are premised on the
supposed evidence, but are contradicted by the
evidence on record; and (k) all other similar and
exceptional cases warranting a review of the lower
courts’ findings of fact. A further exception is recognized
when the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts
not disputed bythe parties, which, if properly considered,
would justify a different conclusion.12 Yet, none of the
exceptions applies herein.
Secondly, the petitioner contends that she did not
deliberately inflict the physical injuries suffered by
MichaelRyan to maltreat or malign him in a manner that
would debase, demean or degrade his dignity. She
characterizes her maltreatment as anact of discipline
that she as a school teacher could reasonably do
towards the development of the child. She insists that
her act further came under the doctrine of in loco
parentis.
The contention of the petitioner is utterly bereft of merit.
Although the petitioner, as a school teacher, could duly
discipline Michael Ryan as her pupil, her infliction of the
physical injuries on him was unnecessary, violent and
excessive. The boy even fainted from the violence
suffered at her hands.13 She could not justifiably claim
that she acted only for the sake of disciplining him. Her
physical maltreatment of him was precisely prohibited by
no less than the Family Code, which has expressly
banned the infliction of corporal punishmentby a school
administrator, teacher or individual engaged in child care
exercising special parental authority (i.e., in loco
parentis), viz:
Article 233. The person exercising substitute parental
authority shall have the same authority over the person
of the child as the parents.
In no case shall the school administrator, teacher or
individual engaged in child care exercising special
parental authority inflict corporal punishment upon the
child. (n)
Proof of the severe results of the petitioner’s physical
maltreatment of Michael Ryan was provided by Dr.
Teresita Castigador, the Medico-Legal Officer of the Dr.
Ricardo Y. Ladrido Memorial Hospital in Iloilo who
examined the victim at about 1:00 o’clock in the
afternoon of February 13, 1996, barely three hours from
the timethe boy had sustained his injuries. Her Medical
Report stated as follows:
1. Petechiae and tenderness of both external
ears 1x2 cm. and 1x1 cm.;
2. Lumbar pains and tenderness at area of L3-
L4;
3. Contusions at left inner thigh 1x1 and 1x1
cm.;
4. Tenderness and painful on walking especially
at the area of femoral head.
Reflecting her impressions of the physical injuries based
on the testimonial explanations of Dr. Castigador, the
trial judge observed in the decision of June 26, 2003:
A petechiae (wound no. 1), according to Dr. Castigador
is a discoloration of the skin caused by the extravasation
of blood beneath it. She opined that the petechiae and
tenderness of the ears of the victim could have been
caused by pinching. As to the lumbar pain and
tenderness at the third and fourth level of the vertebrae
(wound no. 2), the doctor testified that during her
examination of the victim the latter felt pain when she put
pressure on the said area. She stated that this could be
caused by pressure or contact with a hard object.
Wound No. 3 is located on the victim’sleft inner thigh.
According to her this could not have been caused by
ordinary pinching with pressure. Wound No. 4 is located
on the upper part of the left thigh. Dr. Castigador testified
that she noticed that the boy was limping as he walked.14
Section 3 of RepublicAct No. 7610 defines child
abusethusly:
xxxx
(b) "Child abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs
for survival, such as food and shelter; or
 (4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
In the crime charged against the petitioner, therefore, the
maltreatment may consist of an act by deedsor by
wordsthat debases, degrades or demeans the intrinsic
worth and dignity of a child as a human being. The act
need not be habitual. The CA concluded that the
petitioner "went overboard in disciplining Michael Ryan,
a helpless and weak 7-year old boy, when she pinched
hard Michael Ryan on the left thigh and when she held
him in the armpits and threw him on the floor[; and as]
the boy fell down, his body hit the desk causing him to
lose consciousness [but instead] of feeling a sense of
remorse, the accused-appellant further held the boy up
by his ears and pushed him down on the floor."15 On her
part, the trial judge said that the physical pain
experienced by the victim had been aggravated by an
emotional trauma that caused him to stop going to
school altogether out of fear of the petitioner, compelling
his parents to transfer him to another school where he
had to adjust again.16 Such established circumstances
proved beyond reasonable doubt thatthe petitioner was
guilty of child abuse by deeds that degraded and
demeaned the intrinsic worth and dignity of Michael
Ryan as a human being.
It was also shown that Michael Ryan’s physical
maltreatment by the petitioner was neither her first or
only maltreatment of a child. Prosecution witness Louella
Loredo revealed on cross examination that she had also
experienced the petitioner’s cruelty.17 The petitioner was
also convicted by the RTC in Iloilo City (Branch 39) in
Criminal Case No. 348921 for maltreatment of another
childnamed Dariel Legayada.18 Such previous incidents
manifested that the petitioner had "a propensity for
violence," as the trial judge stated in her decision of
June 26, 2003.19
Thirdly, the petitioner submits that the information
charging her with child abuse was insufficient in form
and substance, in that the essential elements of the
crime charged were not properly alleged therein; and
that her constitutional and statutory right to due process
of law was consequently violated.
The petitioner’s submission deserves scant
consideration.
Under Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of Court, the
information is sufficient if it states the name of the
accused; the designation of the offense given by the
statute; the acts or omissions complained of as
constituting the offense; the name of the offended party;
the proximate date of the commission of the offense; and
the place where the offense was committed.
The information explicitly averred the offense of child
abusecharged against the petitioner in the context of the
statutory definition of child abuse found in Section 3 (b)
of Republic Act No. 7610, supra, and thus complied with
the requirements of Section 6, Rule 110 of the Rules of
Court. Moreover, the Court should no longer entertain
the petitioner’s challenge against the sufficiency of the
information in form and substance. Her last chance to
pose the challenge was prior to the time she pleaded to
the information through a motion to quash on the ground
that the information did not conform substantially to the
prescribed form, or did not charge an offense. She did
not do so, resulting in her waiver of the challenge.
Fourthly, the RTC did not grant civil damages as civil
liability ex delictobecause no evidence had been
adduced thereon.20 The CA saw nothing wrong with the
omission by the trial court. The explanation tendered by
the trial judge for the omission was misplaced, however,
because even without proof of the actual expenses, or
testimony on the victim’s feelings, the lower courts still
had the authority to define and allow civil liability arising
from the offense and the means to fix their extent. The
child abuse surely inflicted on Michael Ryan physical
and emotional trauma as well as moral injury. It cannot
also be denied that his parents necessarily spent for his
treatment. We hold that both lower courts committed a
plain error that demands correction by the Court. Indeed,
as the Court pointed out in Bacolod v. People,21 it was
"imperative that the courts prescribe the proper penalties
when convicting the accused, and determine the civil
liability to be imposed on the accused, unless there has
been a reservation of the action to recover civil liability or
a waiver of its recovery," explaining the reason for doing
so in the following manner:
It is not amiss to stress that both the RTC and the CA
disregarded their express mandate under Section 2,
Rule 120 of the Rules of Courtto have the judgment, if it
was of conviction, state: "(1) the legal qualification of the
offense constituted by the acts committed by the
accused and the aggravating or mitigating
circumstances which attended its commission; (2) the
participation ofthe accused in the offense, whether as
principal, accomplice, or accessory after the fact; (3) the
penalty imposed upon the accused; and (4) the civil
liability or damages caused by his wrongful act or
omission to be recovered from the accused by the
offended party, if there is any, unless the enforcement of
the civil liability by a separate civil action has been
reserved or waived." Their disregard compels us to actas
we now do lest the Court be unreasonably seen as
tolerant of their omission. That the Spouses Cogtas did
not themselves seek the correction of the omission by an
appeal is no hindrance to this action because the Court,
as the final reviewing tribunal, has not only the authority
but also the duty to correct at any time a matter of law
and justice.1âwphi1
We also pointedly remind all trial and appellate courts to
avoid omitting reliefs that the parties are properly entitled
to by law or in equity under the established facts. Their
judgments will not be worthy of the name unless they
thereby fully determine the rights and obligations of the
litigants. It cannot be otherwise, for only by a full
determination of such rights and obligations would they
betrue to the judicial office of administering justice and
equity for all. Courts should then be alert and cautious in
their rendition of judgments of conviction in criminal
cases. They should prescribe the legal penalties, which
is what the Constitution and the law require and expect
them to do. Their prescription of the wrong penalties will
be invalid and ineffectual for being done without
jurisdiction or in manifest grave abuse of discretion
amounting to lack of jurisdiction. They should also
determine and set the civil liability ex delictoof the
accused, in order to do justice to the complaining victims
who are always entitled to them. The Rules of Court
mandates them to do so unless the enforcement of the
civil liability by separate actions has been reserved or
waived.22
Moral damages should be awarded to assuage the
moral and emotional sufferings of the victim, and in that
respect the Court believes and holds that ₱20,000.00 is
reasonable. The victim was likewise entitled to
exemplary damages, considering that Article 2230 of the
Civil Code authorizes such damages if at least one
aggravating circumstance attended the commission of
the crime. The child abuse committed by the petitioner
was aggravated her being a public school teacher, a
factor in raising the penalty to its maximum period
pursuantto Section 31(e) of Republic Act No. 7610. The
amount of ₱20,000.00 as exemplary damages is
imposed on in order to set an example for the public
good and as a deterrent to other public school teachers
who violate the ban imposed by Article 233 of the Family
Code, supra, against the infliction of corporal
punishment on children under their substitute parental
authority. The lack of proof of the actual expenses for the
victim’s treatmentshould not hinder the granting of a
measure of compensation in the formof temperate
damages, which, according to Article 2224 of the Civil
Code, may be recovered when some pecuniary loss has
been suffered butits amount cannot be proved with
certainty. There being no question aboutthe injuries
sustained requiring medical treatment, temperate
damages ofat least ₱20,000.00 are warranted, for it
would be inequitable not to recognize the need for the
treatment. Lastly, interest of 6% per annum shall be
charged on all the items of civil liability, to be reckoned
from the finality of this decision until full payment.
The penalty for the child abusecommitted by the
petitioner is that prescribed in Section 10(a) of Republic
Act No. 7610, viz:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and Other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child's Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or to be responsible for
other conditions prejudicial to the child's development
including those covered by Atiicle 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
The CA revised the penalty fixed by the R TC by
imposing the indeterminate penalty of four years, two
months and one day of prision correccional, as
minimum, to 10 years and one day of prision mayor, as
the maximum, on the ground that the offense was
aggravated by the petitioner being a public
schoolteacher.23 It cited Section 3 l(e) of Republic Act
No. 7610, which commands that the penalty provided in
the Act "shall be imposed in its maximum period if the
offender is a public officer or employee." Her being a
public schoolteacher was alleged in the information and
established by evidence as well as admitted by her. The
revised penalty was erroneous, however, because
Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610 punishes the
crime committed by the petitioner with prision mayor in
its minimum period, whose three periods are six years
and one day to six years and eight months, for the
minimum period; six years, eight months and one day to
seven years and four months, for the medium period;
and seven years, four months and one day to eight
years, for the maximum period. The maximum of the
indeterminate sentence should come from the maximum
period, therefore, and the Court fixes it at seven years,
four months and one day of prision mayor. The minimum
of the indeterminate sentence should come from prision
correccional in the maximum period, the penalty next
lower than prision mayor in its minimum period, whose
range is from four years, two months and one day to six
years.1âwphi1 Accordingly, the minimum of the
indeterminate sentence is four years, nine months and
11 days, and the maximum is seven years, four months
and one day of prision mayor.
WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision
promulgated on May 11, 2005, subject to the
MODIFICATIONS that: (a) the petitioner shall suffer the
indeterminate penalty of four (4) years, nine (9) months
and eleven (11) days of prision correccional, as
minimum, to seven (7) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day of pr is ion mayor, as the maximum; (b) the
petitioner shall pay to Michael Ryan Gonzales
₱20,000.00 as moral damages, ₱20,000.00 as
exemplary damages, and ₱20,000.00 as temperate
damages, plus interest at the rate of 6% per annum on
each item of the civil liability reckoned from the finality of
this decision until full payment; and (c) the petitioner
shall pay the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
G.R. No. 169533 March 20, 2013
GEORGE BONGALON, Petitioner,
vs.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Respondent.
DECISION
BERSAMIN, J.:
Not every instance of the laying of hands on a child
constitutes the crime of child abuse under Section 10 (a)
of Republic Act No. 7610.1 Only when the laying of
hands is shown beyond reasonable doubt to be intended
by the accused to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of the child as a human being
should it be punished as child abuse. Otherwise, it is
punished under the Revised Penal Code.
The Case
On June 22, 2005,2 the Court of Appeals (CA) affirmed
the conviction of the petitioner for the crime of child
abuse under Section 10 (a) of Republic Act No. 7610.
Antecedents
On June 26, 2000, the Prosecutor’s Office of Legazpi
City charged the petitioner in the Regional Trial Court
(RTC) in Legazpi City with child abuse, an act in
violation of Section 10(a) of Republic Act No. 7610,
alleging as follows:
That on or about the 11th day of May 2000, in the City of
Legazpi Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did then
and there wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously commit on
the person of JAYSON DELA CRUZ, a twelve year-old,
Grade VI pupil of MABA Institute, Legazpi City, acts of
physical abuse and/or maltreatment by striking said
JAYSON DELA CRUZ with his palm hitting the latter at
his back and by slapping said minor hitting his left cheek
and uttering derogatory remarks to the latter’s family to
wit: "Mga hayop kamo, para dayo kamo digdi, Iharap mo
dito ama mo" (You all animals, you are all strangers
here. Bring your father here), which acts of the accused
are prejudicial to the child’s development and which
demean the intrinsic worth and dignity of the said child
as a human being.
CONTRARY TO LAW.3
The Prosecution showed that on May 11, 2002, Jayson
Dela Cruz (Jayson) and Roldan, his older brother, both
minors, joined the evening procession for the Santo Niño
at Oro Site in Legazpi City; that when the procession
passed in front of the petitioner’s house, the latter’s
daughter Mary Ann Rose, also a minor, threw stones at
Jayson and called him "sissy"; that the petitioner
confronted Jayson and Roldan and called them names
like "strangers" and "animals"; that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand, and slapped Jayson
on the face;4 that the petitioner then went to the brothers’
house and challenged Rolando dela Cruz, their father, to
a fight, but Rolando did not come out of the house to
take on the petitioner; that Rolando later brought Jayson
to the Legazpi City Police Station and reported the
incident; that Jayson also underwent medical treatment
at the Bicol Regional Training and Teaching
Hospital;5 that the doctors who examined Jayson issued
two medical certificates attesting that Jayson suffered
the following contusions, to wit: (1) contusion .5 x 2.5
scapular area, left; and (2) +1x1 cm. contusion left
zygomatic area and contusion .5 x 2.33 cm. scapular
area, left.6
On his part, the petitioner denied having physically
abused or maltreated Jayson. He explained that he only
talked with Jayson and Roldan after Mary Ann Rose and
Cherrylyn, his minor daughters, had told him about
Jayson and Roldan’s throwing stones at them and about
Jayson’s burning Cherrylyn’s hair. He denied shouting
invectives at and challenging Rolando to a fight, insisting
that he only told Rolando to restrain his sons from
harming his daughters.7
To corroborate the petitioner’s testimony, Mary Ann Rose
testified that her father did not hit or slap but only
confronted Jayson, asking why Jayson had called her
daughters "Kimi" and why he had burned Cherrlyn’s hair.
Mary Ann Rose denied throwing stones at Jayson and
calling him a "sissy." She insisted that it was instead
Jayson who had pelted her with stones during the
procession. She described the petitioner as a loving and
protective father.8
Ruling of the RTC
After trial, the RTC found and declared the petitioner
guilty of child abuse as charged, to wit:9
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing considerations,
judgment is hereby rendered finding the accused
GEORGE BONGALON @ "GI" GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Violation of Republic Act No. 7610,
and is hereby ordered to undergo imprisonment of six (6)
years and one (1) day to eight (8) years of prision mayor
in its minimum period.
SO ORDERED.
Ruling of the CA
On appeal, the petitioner assailed the credibility of the
Prosecution witnesses by citing their inconsistencies. He
contended that the RTC overlooked or disregarded
material facts and circumstances in the records that
would have led to a favorable judgment for him. He
attacked the lack of credibility of the witnesses
presented against him, citing the failure of the
complaining brothers to react to the incident, which was
unnatural and contrary to human experience.
The CA affirmed the conviction, but modified the
penalty,10 viz:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the decision dated
October 20, 2003 of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 9
of Legazpi City is hereby AFFIRMED with
MODIFICATION in that accused-appellant George
Bongalon is sentenced to suffer the indeterminate
penalty of (4) years, two (2) months and one (1) day of
prision correccional, as minimum term, to six (6) years,
eight (8) months and 1 day of prision mayor as the
maximum term.
Further, accused-appellant is ordered to pay the victim,
Jayson de la Cruz the additional amount of ₱5,000 as
moral damages.
SO ORDERED.
Issues
The petitioner has come to the Court via a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court.11
The petitioner asserts that he was not guilty of the crime
charged; and that even assuming that he was guilty, his
liability should be mitigated because he had merely
acted to protect her two minor daughters.
Ruling of the Court
At the outset, we should observe that the petitioner has
adopted the wrong remedy in assailing the CA’s
affirmance of his conviction. His proper recourse from
the affirmance of his conviction was an appeal taken in
due course. Hence, he should have filed a petition for
review on certiorari. Instead, he wrongly brought a
petition for certiorari. We explained why in People v.
Court of Appeals:12
The special civil action for certiorari is intended for the
correction of errors of jurisdiction only or grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. Its
principal office is only to keep the inferior court within the
parameters of its jurisdiction or to prevent it from
committing such a grave abuse of discretion amounting
to lack or excess of jurisdiction. As observed in Land
Bank of the Philippines v. Court of Appeals, et al. "the
special civil action for certiorari is a remedy designed for
the correction of errors of jurisdiction and not errors of
judgment. The raison d’etre for the rule is when a court
exercises its jurisdiction, an error committed while so
engaged does not deprived it of the jurisdiction being
exercised when the error is committed. If it did, every
error committed by a court would deprive it of its
jurisdiction and every erroneous judgment would be a
void judgment. In such a scenario, the administration of
justice would not survive. Hence, where the issue or
question involved affects the wisdom or legal soundness
of the decision–not the jurisdiction of the court to render
said decision–the same is beyond the province of a
special civil action for certiorari. The proper recourse of
the aggrieved party from a decision of the Court of
Appeals is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45 of the Revised Rules of Court.
It is of no consequence that the petitioner alleges grave
abuse of discretion on the part of the CA in his petition.
The allegation of grave abuse of discretion no more
warrants the granting of due course to the petition as
one for certiorari if appeal was available as a proper and
adequate remedy. At any rate, a reading of his
presentation of the issues in his petition indicates that he
thereby imputes to the CA errors of judgment, not errors
of jurisdiction. He mentions instances attendant during
the commission of the crime that he claims were really
constitutive of justifying and mitigating circumstances;
and specifies reasons why he believes Republic Act No.
7610 favors his innocence rather than his guilt for the
crime charged.13 The errors he thereby underscores in
the petition concerned only the CA’s appreciation and
assessment of the evidence on record, which really are
errors of judgment, not of jurisdiction.
Even if we were to treat the petition as one brought
under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, it would still be
defective due to its being filed beyond the period
provided by law. Section 2 of Rule 45 requires the filing
of the petition within 15 days from the notice of judgment
to be appealed. However, the petitioner received a copy
of the CA’s decision on July 15, 2005, 14 but filed the
petition only on September 12, 2005,15 or well beyond
the period prescribed by the Rules of Court.
The procedural transgressions of the petitioner
notwithstanding, we opt to forego quickly dismissing the
petition, and instead set ourselves upon the task of
resolving the issues posed by the petition on their merits.
We cannot fairly and justly ignore his plea about the
sentence imposed on him not being commensurate to
the wrong he committed. His plea is worthy of another
long and hard look. If, on the other hand, we were to
outrightly dismiss his plea because of the procedural
lapses he has committed, the Court may be seen as an
unfeeling tribunal of last resort willing to sacrifice justice
in order to give premium to the rigidity of its rules of
procedure. But the Rules of Court has not been intended
to be rigidly enforced at all times. Rather, it has been
instituted first and foremost to ensure justice to every
litigant. Indeed, its announced objective has been to
secure a "just, speedy and inexpensive disposition of
every action and proceeding."16 This objective will be
beyond realization here unless the Rules of Court be
given liberal construction and application as the noble
ends of justice demand. Thereby, we give primacy to
substance over form, which, to a temple of justice and
equity like the Court, now becomes the ideal ingredient
in the dispensation of justice in the case now awaiting
our consideration.
The petitioner’s right to liberty is in jeopardy. He may be
entirely deprived of such birthright without due process
of law unless we shunt aside the rigidity of the rules of
procedure and review his case. Hence, we treat this
recourse as an appeal timely brought to the Court.
Consonant with the basic rule in criminal procedure that
an appeal opens the whole case for review, we should
deem it our duty to correct errors in the appealed
judgment, whether assigned or not.17
The law under which the petitioner was charged, tried
and found guilty of violating is Section 10 (a), Article VI
of Republic Act No. 7610, which relevantly states:
Section 10. Other Acts of Neglect, Abuse, Cruelty or
Exploitation and other Conditions Prejudicial to the
Child’s Development. –
(a) Any person who shall commit any other acts of child
abuse, cruelty or exploitation or be responsible for other
conditions prejudicial to the child’s development
including those covered by Article 59 of Presidential
Decree No. 603, as amended, but not covered by the
Revised Penal Code, as amended, shall suffer the
penalty of prision mayor in its minimum period.
xxxx
Child abuse, the crime charged, is defined by Section 3
(b) of Republic Act No. 7610, as follows:
Section 3. Definition of terms. –
xxxx
(b) "Child Abuse" refers to the maltreatment, whether
habitual or not, of the child which includes any of the
following:
(1) Psychological and physical abuse, neglect,
cruelty, sexual abuse and emotional
maltreatment;
(2) Any act by deeds or words which debases,
degrades or demeans the intrinsic worth and
dignity of a child as a human being;
(3) Unreasonable deprivation of his basic needs
for survival, such as food and shelter; or
(4) Failure to immediately give medical
treatment to an injured child resulting in serious
impairment of his growth and development or in
his permanent incapacity or death.
xxxx
Although we affirm the factual findings of fact by the
RTC and the CA to the effect that the petitioner struck
Jayson at the back with his hand and slapped Jayson on
the face, we disagree with their holding that his acts
constituted child abuse within the purview of the above-
quoted provisions. The records did not establish beyond
reasonable doubt that his laying of hands on Jayson had
been intended to debase the "intrinsic worth and dignity"
of Jayson as a human being, or that he had thereby
intended to humiliate or embarrass Jayson. The records
showed the laying of hands on Jayson to have been
done at the spur of the moment and in anger, indicative
of his being then overwhelmed by his fatherly concern
for the personal safety of his own minor daughters who
had just suffered harm at the hands of Jayson and
Roldan. With the loss of his self-control, he lacked that
specific intent to debase, degrade or demean the
intrinsic worth and dignity of a child as a human being
that was so essential in the crime of child abuse.
It is not trite to remind that under the well-recognized
doctrine of pro reo every doubt is resolved in favor of the
petitioner as the accused. Thus, the Court should
consider all possible circumstances in his favor.18
What crime, then, did the petitioner commit?
Considering that Jayson’s physical injury required five to
seven days of medical attention,19 the petitioner was
liable for slight physical injuries under Article 266 (1) of
the Revised Penal Code, to wit:
Article 266. Slight physical injuries and maltreatment. —
The crime of slight physical injuries shall be punished:
1. By arresto menor when the offender has inflicted
physical injuries which shall incapacitate the offended
party for labor from one to nine days, or shall require
medical attendance during the same period.
xxxx
The penalty for slight physical injuries is arresto menor,
which ranges from one day to 30 days of
imprisonment.20 In imposing the correct penalty,
however, we have to consider the mitigating
circumstance of passion or obfuscation under Article 13
(6) of the Revised Penal Code,21 because the petitioner
lost his reason and self-control, thereby diminishing the
exercise of his will power.22 Passion or obfuscation may
lawfully arise from causes existing only in the honest
belief of the accused.23 It is relevant to mention, too, that
in passion or obfuscation, the offender suffers a
diminution of intelligence and intent. With his having
acted under the belief that Jayson and Roldan had
thrown stones at his two minor daughters, and that
Jayson had burned Cherrlyn’s hair, the petitioner was
entitled to the mitigating circumstance of passion.
Arresto menor is prescribed in its minimum period (i.e.,
one day to 10 days) in the absence of any aggravating
circumstance that offset the mitigating circumstance of
passion. Accordingly, with the Indeterminate Sentence
Law being inapplicable due to the penalty imposed not
exceeding one year,24 the petitioner shall suffer a straight
penalty of 10 days of arresto menor.
The award of moral damages to Jayson is appropriate.
Such damages are granted in criminal cases resulting in
physical injuries.25 The amount of ₱5,000.00 fixed by the
lower courts as moral damages is consistent with the
current jurisprudence.26
WHEREFORE, we SET ASIDE the decision of the Court
of Appeals; and ENTER a new judgment: (a) finding
petitioner George Bongalon GUlLTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of SLIGHT PHYSICAL INJURIES
under paragraph 1, Article 266, of the Revised Penal
Code; (b) sentencing him to suffer the penalty of 10 days
of arresto menor; and (c) ordering him to pay Jayson
Dela Cruz the amount of ₱5,000.00 as moral damages,
plus the costs of suit.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9231 December 19, 2003
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE ELIMINATION OF THE
WORST FORMS OF CHILD LABOR AND AFFORDING
STRONGER PROTECTION FOR THE WORKING
CHILD, AMENDING FOR THIS PURPOSE REPUBLIC
ACTNO. 7610, AS AMENDED, OTHERWISE KNOWN
AS THE "SPECIAL PROTECTION OF CHILDREN
AGAINST CHILD ABUSE, EXPLOITATION AND
DISCRIMINATION ACT"
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 7610, as
amended, otherwise known as the "Special Protection of
Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act", is hereby amended to read as
follows:
"Sec. 2. Declaration of State Policy and
Principles. - It is hereby declared to be the
policy of the State to provide special protection
to children from all forms of abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation and discrimination, and
other conditions prejudicial to their development
including child labor and its worst forms;
provide sanctions for their commission and
carry out a program for prevention and
deterrence of and crisis intervention in
situations of child abuse, exploitation and
discrimination. The State shall intervene on
behalf of the child when the parent, guardian,
teacher or person having care or custody of the
child fails or is unable to protect the child
against abuse, exploitation and discrimination
or when such acts against the child are
committed by the said parent, guardian, teacher
or person having care and custody of the same.
"It shall be the policy of the State to protect and
rehabilitate children gravely threatened or
endangered by circumstances which affect or
will affect their survival and normal
development and over which they have no
control.
"The best interests of children shall be the
paramount consideration in all actions
concerning them, whether undertaken by public
or private social welfare institutions, courts of
law, administrative authorities, and legislative
bodies, consistent with the principle of First Call
for Children as enunciated in the United
Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child.
Every effort shall be exerted to promote the
welfare of children and enhance their
opportunities for a useful and happy life."
Section 2. Section 12 of the same Act, as amended, is
hereby further amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 2. Employment of Children - Children
below fifteen (15) years of age shall not be
employed except:
"1) When a child works directly under
the sole responsibility of his/her
parents or legal guardian and where
only members of his/her family are
employed: Provided, however, That
his/her employment neither endangers
his/her life, safety, health, and morals,
nor impairs his/her normal
development: Provided, further, That
the parent or legal guardian shall
provide the said child with the
prescribed primary and/or secondary
education; or
"2) Where a child's employment or
participation in public entertainment or
information through cinema, theater,
radio, television or other forms of
media is essential: Provided, That the
employment contract is concluded by
the child's parents or legal guardian,
with the express agreement of the
child concerned, if possible, and the
approval of the Department of Labor
and Employment: Provided, further,
That the following requirements in all
instances are strictly complied with:
"(a) The employer shall
ensure the protection, health,
safety, morals and normal
development of the child;
"(b) The employer shall
institute measures to prevent
the child's exploitation or
discrimination taking into
 account the system and level
of remuneration, and the
duration and arrangement of
working time; and
"(c) The employer shall
formulate and implement,
subject to the approval and
supervision of competent
authorities, a continuing
program for training and skills
acquisition of the child.
"In the above-exceptional cases where
any such child may be employed, the
employer shall first secure, before
engaging such child, a work permit
from the Department of Labor and
Employment which shall ensure
observance of the above
requirements.
"For purposes of this Article, the term
"child" shall apply to all persons under
eighteen (18) years of age."
Section 3. The same Act, as amended, is hereby further
amended by adding new sections to be denominated as
Sections 12-A, 12-B, 12-C, and 12-D to read as follows:
"Sec. 2-A. Hours of Work of a Working Child. -
Under the exceptions provided in Section 12 of
this Act, as amended:
"(1) A child below fifteen (15) years of age may
be allowed to work for not more than twenty
(20) hours a week: Provided, That the work
shall not be more than four (4) hours at any
given day;
"(2) A child fifteen (15) years of age but below
eighteen (18) shall not be allowed to work for
more than eight (8) hours a day, and in no case
beyond forty (40) hours a week;
"(3) No child below fifteen (15) years of age
shall be allowed to work between eight o'clock
in the evening and six o'clock in the morning of
the following day and no child fifteen (15) years
of age but below eighteen (18) shall be allowed
to work between ten o'clock in the evening and
six o'clock in the morning of the following day."
"Sec. 12-B. Ownership, Usage and
Administration of the Working Child's Income. -
The wages, salaries, earnings and other
income of the working child shall belong to
him/her in ownership and shall be set aside
primarily for his/her support, education or skills
acquisition and secondarily to the collective
needs of the family: Provided, That not more
than twenty percent (20%) of the child's income
may be used for the collective needs of the
family.
"The income of the working child and/or the
property acquired through the work of the child
shall be administered by both parents. In the
absence or incapacity of either of the parents,
the other parent shall administer the same. In
case both parents are absent or incapacitated,
the order of preference on parental authority as
provided for under the Family Code shall apply.
"Sec. 12-C. Trust Fund to Preserve Part of the
Working Child's Income. - The parent or legal
guardian of a working child below eighteen (18)
years of age shall set up a trust fund for at least
thirty percent (30%) of the earnings of the child
whose wages and salaries from work and other
income amount to at least two hundred
thousand pesos (P200,000.00) annually, for
which he/she shall render a semi-annual
accounting of the fund to the Department of
Labor and Employment, in compliance with the
provisions of this Act. The child shall have full
control over the trust fund upon reaching the
age of majority.
"Sec. 12-D. Prohibition Against Worst Forms of
Child Labor. - No child shall be engaged in the
worst forms of child labor. The phrase "worst
forms of child labor" shall refer to any of the
following:
"(1) All forms of slavery, as defined
under the "Anti-trafficking in Persons
Act of 2003", or practices similar to
slavery such as sale and trafficking of
children, debt bondage and serfdom
and forced or compulsory labor,
including recruitment of children for
use in armed conflict; or
"(2) The use, procuring, offering or
exposing of a child for prostitution, for
the production of pornography or for
pornographic performances; or
"(3) The use, procuring or offering of a
child for illegal or illicit activities,
including the production and trafficking
of dangerous drugs and volatile
substances prohibited under existing
laws; or
"(4) Work which, by its nature or the
circumstances in which it is carried
out, is hazardous or likely to be
harmful to the health, safety or morals
of children, such that it:
"a) Debases, degrades or
demeans the intrinsic worth
and dignity of a child as a
human being; or
"b) Exposes the child to
physical, emotional or sexual
abuse, or is found to be
highly stressful
psychologically or may
prejudice morals; or
"c) Is performed
underground, underwater or
at dangerous heights; or
"d) Involves the use of
dangerous machinery,
equipment and tools such as
power-driven or explosive
power-actuated tools; or
 "e) Exposes the child to
physical danger such as, but
not limited to the dangerous
feats of balancing, physical
strength or contortion, or
which requires the manual
transport of heavy loads; or
"f) Is performed in an
unhealthy environment
exposing the child to
hazardous working
conditions, elements,
substances, co-agents or
processes involving ionizing,
radiation, fire, flammable
substances, noxious
components and the like, or
to extreme temperatures,
noise levels, or vibrations; or
"g) Is performed under
particularly difficult
conditions; or
"h) Exposes the child to
biological agents such as
bacteria, fungi, viruses,
protozoans, nematodes and
other parasites; or
"i) Involves the manufacture
or handling of explosives and
other pyrotechnic products."
Section 4. Section 13 of the same Act is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 13. Access to Education and Training for
Working Children - "a) No child shall be
deprived of formal or non-formal education. In
all cases of employment allowed in this Act, the
employer shall provide a working child with
access to at least primary and secondary
education.
"b) To ensure and guarantee the access of the
working child to education and training, the
Department of Education (DEPED) shall: (1)
formulate, promulgate, and implement relevant
and effective course designs and educational
programs; (2) conduct the necessary training
for the implementation of the appropriate
curriculum for the purpose; (3) ensure the
availability of the needed educational facilities
and materials; and (4) conduct continuing
research and development program for the
necessary and relevant alternative education of
the working child.
"c) The DEPED shall promulgate a course
design under its non-formal education program
aimed at promoting the intellectual, moral and
vocational efficiency of working children who
have not undergone or finished elementary or
secondary education. Such course design shall
integrate the learning process deemed most
effective under given circumstances."
Section 5. Section 14 of the same Act is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 14. Prohibition on the Employment of
Children in Certain Advertisements. - No child
shall be employed as a model in any
advertisement directly or indirectly promoting
alcoholic beverages, intoxicating drinks,
tobacco and its byproducts, gambling or any
form of violence or pornography."
Section 6. Section 16 of the same Act, is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 16. Penal Provisions -
"a) Any employer who violates Sections 12, 12-
A, and Section 14 of this act, as amended, shall
be penalized by imprisonment of six (6) months
and one (1) day to six (6) years or a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00)
but not more than Three hundred thousand
pesos (P300,000.00) or both at the discretion of
the court.
"b) Any person who violates the provision of
Section 12-D of this act or the employer of the
subcontractor who employs, or the one who
facilitates the employment of a child in
hazardous work, shall suffer the penalty of a
fine of not less than One hundred thousand
pesos (P100,000.00) but not more than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00), or imprisonment
of not less than twelve (12) years and one (1)
day to twenty (20) years, or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
"c) Any person who violates Sections 12-D(1)
and 12-D(2) shall be prosecuted and penalized
in accordance with the penalty provided for by
R. A. 9208 otherwise known as the "Anti-
trafficking in Persons Act of
2003": Provided, That Such penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
"d) Any person who violates Section 12-D (3)
shall be prosecuted and penalized in
accordance with R.A. 9165, otherwise known
as the "Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act
of 2002"; Provided, That such penalty shall be
imposed in its maximum period.
"e) If a corporation commits any of the
violations aforecited, the board of
directors/trustees and officers, which include
the president, treasurer and secretary of the
said corporation who participated in or
knowingly allowed the violation, shall be
penalized accordingly as provided for under this
Section.
"f) Parents, biological or by legal fiction, and
legal guardians found to be violating Sections
12, 12-A, 12-B and 12-C of this Act shall pay a
fine of not less than Ten thousand pesos
(P10,000.00) but not more than One hundred
thousand pesos (P100,000.00), or be required
to render community service for not less than
thirty (30) days but not more than one (1) year,
or both such fine and community service at the
discretion of the court: Provided, That the
maximum length of community service shall be
imposed on parents or legal guardians who
have violated the provisions of this Act three (3)
times; Provided, further, That in addition to the
community service, the penalty of imprisonment
 of thirty (30) days but not more than one (1)
year or both at the discretion of the court, shall
be imposed on the parents or legal guardians
who have violated the provisions of this Act
more than three (3) times.
"g) The Secretary, of Labor and Employment or
his/her duly authorized representative may,
after due notice and hearing, order the closure
of any business firm or establishment found to
have violated any of the provisions of this Act
more than three (3) times. He/she shall likewise
order the immediate closure of such firm or
establishment if:
"(1) The violation of any provision of
this Act has resulted in the death,
insanity or serious physical injury of a
child employed in such establishment;
or
"(2) Such firm or establishment is
engaged or employed in prostitution or
in obscene or lewd shows.
"h) In case of such closure, the employer shall
be required to pay the employee(s) the
separation pay and other monetary benefits
provided for by law."
Section 7. The same Act is hereby further amended by
adding a new section to be denominated as Section 16-
A, to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Trust Fund from Fines and
Penalties - The fine imposed by the court shall
be treated as a Trust Fund, administered by the
Department of Labor and Employment and
disbursed exclusively for the needs, including
the costs of rehabilitation and reintegration into
the mainstream of society of the working
children who are victims of the violations of this
Act, and for the programs and projects that will
prevent acts of child labor."
Section 8. Section 27 of the same Act is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"Sec. 27. Who May File a Complaint -
Complaints on cases of unlawful acts
committed against children as enumerated
herein may be filed by the following:
"(a) Offended party;
"(b) Parents or guardians;
"(c) Ascendant or collateral relative
within the third degree of
consanguinity;
"(d) Officer, social worker or
representative of a licensed child-
caring institution;
"(e) Officer or social worker of the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development;
"(f) Barangay chairman of the place
where the violation occurred, where
the child is residing or employed; or
"(g) At least three (3) concerned,
responsible citizens where the
violation occurred."
Section 9. The same Act is hereby further amended by
adding new sections to Section 16 to be denominated as
Sections 16-A, 16-B and 16-C to read as follows:
"Sec. 16-A. Jurisdiction - The family courts shall
have original jurisdiction over all cases
involving offenses punishable under this
Act: Provided, That in cities or provinces where
there are no family courts yet, the regional trial
courts and the municipal trial courts shall have
concurrent jurisdiction depending on the
penalties prescribed for the offense charged.
"The preliminary investigation of cases filed
under this Act shall be terminated within a
period of thirty (30) days from the date of filing.
"If the preliminary investigation establishes
a prima facie case, then the corresponding
information shall be filed in court within forty
eight (48) hours from the termination of the
investigation.
"Trial of cases under this Act shall be
terminated by the court not later than ninety
(90) days from the date of filing of information.
Decision on said cases shall be rendered within
a period of fifteen (15) days from the date of
submission of the case.
"Sec. 15. Exemptions from Filing Fees. - When
the victim of child labor institutes a separate
civil action for the recovery of civil damages,
he/she shall be exempt from payment of filing
fees.
"Sec. 16-C. Access to Immediate Legal,
Medical and Psycho-Social Services - The
working child shall have the right to free legal,
medical and psycho-social services to be
provided by the State."
Section 10. Implementing Rules and Regulations - The
Secretary of Labor and Employment, in coordination with
the Committees on Labor and Employment of both
Houses of Congress, shall issue the necessary
Implementing Rules and Regulations (IRR) to effectively
implement the provisions of this Act, in consultation with
concerned public and private sectors, within sixty (60)
days from the effectivity of this Act.
Such rules and regulations shall take effect
upon their publication in two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Section 11. Separability Clause. - If any provision of this
Act is declared invalid or unconstitutional, the validity of
the remaining provisions hereof shall remain in full force
and effect.
Section 12. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, or
rules inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are
hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 13. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days from the date of its complete publication in
the Official Gazette or in at least two (2) national
newspapers of general circulation.
Republic Act No. 9208 May 26, 2003
AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO ELIMINATE
TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS ESPECIALLY WOMEN
AND CHILDREN, ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS FOR THE
PROTECTION AND SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED
PERSONS, PROVIDING PENALTIES FOR ITS
VIOLATIONS, AND FOR OTHER
Be it enacted by the Senate and the House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Title. This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby declared
that the State values the dignity of every human person
and guarantees the respect of individual rights. In pursuit
of this policy, the State shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures and development of programs
that will promote human dignity, protect the people from
any threat of violence and exploitation, eliminate
trafficking in persons, and mitigate pressures for
involuntary migration and servitude of persons, not only
to support trafficked persons but more importantly, to
ensure their recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration
into the mainstream of society.
It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal rights
and inherent human dignity of women and men as
enshrined in the United Nations Universal Declaration on
Human Rights, United Nations Convention on the Rights
of the Child, United Nations Convention on the
Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families. United
Nations Convention Against Transnational Organized
Crime Including its Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children and all other relevant and universally accepted
human rights instruments and other international
conventions to which the Philippines is a signatory.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. - As used in this Act:
(a) Trafficking in Persons - refers to the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the person, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person for
the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment, transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as
"trafficking in persons" even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.
(b) Child - refers to a person below eighteen
(18) years of age or one who is over eighteen
(18) but is unable to fully take care of or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because of a
physical or mental disability or condition.
(c) Prostitution - refers to any act, transaction,
scheme or design involving the use of a person
by another, for sexual intercourse or lascivious
conduct in exchange for money, profit or any
other consideration.
(d) Forced Labor and Slavery - refer to the
extraction of work or services from any person
by means of enticement, violence, intimidation
or threat, use of force or coercion, including
deprivation of freedom, abuse of authority or
moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or deception.
(e) Sex Tourism - refers to a program organized
by travel and tourism-related establishments
and individuals which consists of tourism
packages or activities, utilizing and offering
escort and sexual services as enticement for
tourists. This includes sexual services and
practices offered during rest and recreation
periods for members of the military.
(f) Sexual Exploitation - refers to participation
by a person in prostitution or the production of
pornographic materials as a result of being
subjected to a threat, deception, coercion,
abduction, force, abuse of authority, debt
bondage, fraud or through abuse of a victim's
vulnerability.
(g) Debt Bondage - refers to the pledging by the
debtor of his/her personal services or labor or
those of a person under his/her control as
security or payment for a debt, when the length
and nature of services is not clearly defined or
when the value of the services as reasonably
assessed is not applied toward the liquidation
of the debt.
(h) Pornography - refers to any representation,
through publication, exhibition, cinematography,
indecent shows, information technology, or by
whatever means, of a person engaged in real
or simulated explicit sexual activities or any
representation of the sexual parts of a person
for primarily sexual purposes.
(i) Council - shall mean the Inter-Agency
Council Against Trafficking created under
Section 20 of this Act.
Section 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. - It shall be
unlawful for any person, natural or juridical, to commit
any of the following acts:
(a) To recruit, transport, transfer; harbor,
provide, or receive a person by any means,
including those done under the pretext of
domestic or overseas employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(b) To introduce or match for money, profit, or
material, economic or other consideration, any
 person or, as provided for under Republic Act
No. 6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign
national, for marriage for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling or trading
him/her to engage in prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) To offer or contract marriage, real or
simulated, for the purpose of acquiring, buying,
offering, selling, or trading them to engage in
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor or slavery, involuntary servitude or
debt bondage;
(d) To undertake or organize tours and travel
plans consisting of tourism packages or
activities for the purpose of utilizing and offering
persons for prostitution, pornography or sexual
exploitation;
(e) To maintain or hire a person to engage in
prostitution or pornography;
(f) To adopt or facilitate the adoption of persons
for the purpose of prostitution, pornography,
sexual exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(g) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport or abduct a
person, by means of threat or use of force,
fraud, deceit, violence, coercion, or intimidation
for the purpose of removal or sale of organs of
said person; and
(h) To recruit, transport or adopt a child to
engage in armed activities in the Philippines or
abroad.
Section 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in Persons. -
The following acts which promote or facilitate trafficking
in persons, shall be unlawful:
(a) To knowingly lease or sublease, use or
allow to be used any house, building or
establishment for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(b) To produce, print and issue or distribute
unissued, tampered or fake counseling
certificates, registration stickers and certificates
of any government agency which issues these
certificates and stickers as proof of compliance
with government regulatory and pre-departure
requirements for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(c) To advertise, publish, print, broadcast or
distribute, or cause the advertisement,
publication, printing, broadcasting or distribution
by any means, including the use of information
technology and the internet, of any brochure,
flyer, or any propaganda material that promotes
trafficking in persons;
(d) To assist in the conduct of
misrepresentation or fraud for purposes of
facilitating the acquisition of clearances and
necessary exit documents from government
agencies that are mandated to provide pre-
departure registration and services for
departing persons for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(e) To facilitate, assist or help in the exit and
entry of persons from/to the country at
international and local airports, territorial
boundaries and seaports who are in possession
of unissued, tampered or fraudulent travel
documents for the purpose of promoting
trafficking in persons;
(f) To confiscate, conceal, or destroy the
passport, travel documents, or personal
documents or belongings of trafficked persons
in furtherance of trafficking or to prevent them
from leaving the country or seeking redress
from the government or appropriate agencies;
and
(g) To knowingly benefit from, financial or
otherwise, or make use of, the labor or services
of a person held to a condition of involuntary
servitude, forced labor, or slavery.
Section 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. - The
following are considered as qualified trafficking:
(a) When the trafficked person is a child;
(b) When the adoption is effected through
Republic Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the
"Inter-Country Adoption Act of 1995" and said
adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
(c) When the crime is committed by a
syndicate, or in large scale. Trafficking is
deemed committed by a syndicate if carried out
by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another. It
is deemed committed in large scale if
committed against three (3) or more persons,
individually or as a group;
(d) When the offender is an ascendant, parent,
sibling, guardian or a person who exercises
authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
(e) When the trafficked person is recruited to
engage in prostitution with any member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
(f) When the offender is a member of the
military or law enforcement agencies; and
(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS).
Section 6. Confidentiality. - At any stage of the
investigation, prosecution and trial of an offense under
this Act, law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges,
court personnel and medical practitioners, as well as
parties to the case, shall recognize the right to privacy of
the trafficked person and the accused. Towards this end,
law enforcement officers, prosecutors and judges to
whom the complaint has been referred may, whenever
necessary to ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, and
after considering all circumstances for the best interest
of the parties, order a closed-door investigation,
prosecution or trial. The name and personal
circumstances of the trafficked person or of the accused,
or any other information tending to establish their
identities and such circumstances or information shall
not be disclosed to the public.
In cases when prosecution or trial is conducted behind
closed-doors, it shall be unlawful for any editor,
publisher, and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in case of television
and radio, producer and director of a film in case of the
movie industry, or any person utilizing tri-media facilities
or information technology to cause publicity of any case
of trafficking in persons.
Section 8. Prosecution of Cases. - Any person who has
personal knowledge of the commission of any offense
under this Act, the trafficked person, the parents,
spouse, siblings, children or legal guardian may file a
complaint for trafficking.
Section 9. Venue. - A criminal action arising from
violation of this Act shall be filed where the offense was
committed, or where any of its elements occurred, or
where the trafficked person actually resides at the time
of the commission of the offense: Provided, That the
court where the criminal action is first filed shall acquire
jurisdiction to the exclusion of other courts.
Section 10. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following
penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the
offenses enumerated in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of committing any of
the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20)
years and a fine of not less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of committing any of
the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years
and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of qualified
trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00)
but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00);
(d) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
(e) If the offender is a corporation, partnership,
association, club, establishment or any juridical
person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, partner, manager, and/or any
responsible officer who participated in the
commission of the crime or who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its
commission;
(f) The registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and license to
operate of the erring agency, corporation,
association, religious group, tour or travel
agent, club or establishment, or any place of
entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked
permanently. The owner, president, partner or
manager thereof shall not be allowed to operate
similar establishments in a different name;
(g) If the offender is a foreigner, he shall be
immediately deported after serving his
sentence and be barred permanently from
entering the country;
(h) Any employee or official of government
agencies who shall issue or approve the
issuance of travel exit clearances, passports,
registration certificates, counseling certificates,
marriage license, and other similar documents
to persons, whether juridical or natural,
recruitment agencies, establishments or other
individuals or groups, who fail to observe the
prescribed procedures and the requirement as
provided for by laws, rules and regulations,
shall be held administratively liable, without
prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The
concerned government official or employee
shall, upon conviction, be dismissed from the
service and be barred permanently to hold
public office. His/her retirement and other
benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and
(i) Conviction by final judgment of the adopter
for any offense under this Act shall result in the
immediate rescission of the decree of adoption.
Section 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. - Any person
who buys or engages the services of trafficked persons
for prostitution shall be penalized as follows:
(a) First offense - six (6) months of community
service as may be determined by the court and
a fine of Fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00);
and
(b) Second and subsequent offenses -
imprisonment of one (1) year and a fine of One
hundred thousand pesos (P100,000.00).
Section 12. Prescriptive Period. - Trafficking cases
under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10) years: Provided,
however, That trafficking cases committed by a
syndicate or in a large scale as defined under Section 6
shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
The prescriptive period shall commence to run from the
day on which the trafficked person is delivered or
released from the conditions of bondage and shall be
interrupted by the filing of the complaint or information
and shall commence to run again when such
proceedings terminate without the accused being
convicted or acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for
any reason not imputable to the accused.
Section 13. Exemption from Filing Fees. - When the
trafficked person institutes a separate civil action for the
recovery of civil damages, he/she shall be exempt from
the payment of filing fees.
Section 14. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the Proceeds
and Instruments Derived from Trafficking in Persons. - In
addition to the penalty imposed for the violation of this
Act, the court shall order the confiscation and forfeiture,
in favor of the government, of all the proceeds and
properties derived from the commission of the crime,
unless they are the property of a third person not liable
for the unlawful act; Provided, however, That all awards
for damages shall be taken from the personal and
separate properties of the offender; Provided,
further, That if such properties are insufficient, the
balance shall be taken from the confiscated and forfeited
properties.
When the proceeds, properties and instruments of the
offense have been destroyed, diminished in value or
otherwise rendered worthless by any act or omission,
directly or indirectly, of the offender, or it has been
concealed, removed, converted or transferred to prevent
the same from being found or to avoid forfeiture or
confiscation, the offender shall be ordered to pay the
amount equal to the value of the proceeds, property or
instruments of the offense.
Section 15. Trust Fund. - All fines imposed under this
Act and the proceeds and properties forfeited and
confiscated pursuant to Section 14 hereof shall accrue to
a Trust Fund to be administered and managed by the
Council to be used exclusively for programs that will
prevent acts of trafficking and protect, rehabilitate,
reintegrate trafficked persons into the mainstream of
society. Such programs shall include, but not limited to,
the following:
(a) Provision for mandatory services set forth in
Section 23 of this Act;
(b) Sponsorship of a national research program
on trafficking and establishment of a data
collection system for monitoring and evaluation
purposes;
(c) Provision of necessary technical and
material support services to appropriate
government agencies and non-government
organizations (NGOs);
(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars
to provide venue for consensus building
amongst the public, the academe, government,
NGOs and international organizations; and
(e) Promotion of information and education
campaign on trafficking.
Section 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in
Persons. - The government shall establish and
implement preventive, protective and rehabilitative
programs for trafficked persons. For this purpose, the
following agencies are hereby mandated to implement
the following programs;
(a) Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) - shall
make available its resources and facilities
overseas for trafficked persons regardless of
their manner of entry to the receiving country,
and explore means to further enhance its
assistance in eliminating trafficking activities
through closer networking with government
agencies in the country and overseas,
particularly in the formulation of policies and
implementation of relevant programs.
The DFA shall take necessary measures for the
efficient implementation of the Machine
Readable Passports to protect the integrity of
Philippine passports, visas and other travel
documents to reduce the incidence of trafficking
through the use of fraudulent identification
documents.
It shall establish and implement a pre-marriage,
on-site and pre-departure counseling program
on intermarriages.
(b) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) - shall implement
rehabilitative and protective programs for
trafficked persons. It shall provide counseling
and temporary shelter to trafficked persons and
develop a system for accreditation among
NGOs for purposes of establishing centers and
programs for intervention in various levels of
the community.
(c) Department of Labor and Employment
(DOLE) - shall ensure the strict implementation
and compliance with the rules and guidelines
relative to the employment of persons locally
and overseas. It shall likewise monitor,
document and report cases of trafficking in
persons involving employers and labor
recruiters.
(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) - shall ensure
the prosecution of persons accused of
trafficking and designate and train special
prosecutors who shall handle and prosecute
cases of trafficking. It shall also establish a
mechanism for free legal assistance for
trafficked persons, in coordination with the
DSWD, Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and other NGOs and volunteer groups.
(e) National Commission on the Role of Filipino
Women (NCRFW) - shall actively participate
and coordinate in the formulation and
monitoring of policies addressing the issue of
trafficking in persons in coordination with
relevant government agencies. It shall likewise
advocate for the inclusion of the issue of
trafficking in persons in both its local and
international advocacy for women's issues.
(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) - shall strictly
administer and enforce immigration and alien
administration laws. It shall adopt measures for
the apprehension of suspected traffickers both
at the place of arrival and departure and shall
ensure compliance by the Filipino
fiancés/fiancées and spouses of foreign
nationals with the guidance and counseling
requirement as provided for in this Act.
(g) Philippine National Police (PNP) - shall be
the primary law enforcement agency to
undertake surveillance, investigation and arrest
of individuals or persons suspected to be
engaged in trafficking. It shall closely
coordinate with various law enforcement
agencies to secure concerted efforts for
effective investigation and apprehension of
suspected traffickers. It shall also establish a
system to receive complaints and calls to assist
trafficked persons and conduct rescue
operations.
 (h) Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) - shall implement an
effective pre-employment orientation seminars
and pre-departure counseling programs to
applicants for overseas employment. It shall
likewise formulate a system of providing free
legal assistance to trafficked persons.
(i) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG) - shall institute a
systematic information and prevention
campaign and likewise maintain a databank for
the effective monitoring, documentation and
prosecution of cases on trafficking in persons.
(j) Local government units (LGUs) - shall
monitor and document cases of trafficking in
persons in their areas of jurisdiction, effect the
cancellation of licenses of establishments which
violate the provisions of this Act and ensure
effective prosecution of such cases. They shall
also undertake an information campaign
against trafficking in persons through the
establishment of the Migrants Advisory and
Information Network (MAIN) desks in
municipalities or provinces in coordination with
DILG, Philippine Information Agency (PIA),
Commission on Filipinos Overseas (CFO),
NGOs and other concerned agencies. They
shall encourage and support community based
initiatives which address the trafficking in
persons.
In implementing this Act, the agencies
concerned may seek and enlist the assistance
of NGOs, people's organizations (Pos), civic
organizations and other volunteer groups.
Section 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked Persons. -
Trafficked persons shall be recognized as victims of the
act or acts of trafficking and as such shall not be
penalized for crimes directly related to the acts of
trafficking enumerated in this Act or in obedience to the
order made by the trafficker in relation thereto. In this
regard, the consent of a trafficked person to the intended
exploitation set forth in this Act shall be irrelevant.
Section 18. Preferential Entitlement Under the Witness
Protection Program. - Any provision of Republic Act No.
6981 to the contrary notwithstanding, any trafficked
person shall be entitled to the witness protection
program provided therein.
Section 19. Trafficked Persons Who are Foreign
Nationals. - Subject to the guidelines issued by the
Council, trafficked persons in the Philippines who are
nationals of a foreign country shall also be entitled to
appropriate protection, assistance and services available
to trafficked persons under this Act: Provided, That they
shall be permitted continued presence in the Philippines
for a length of time prescribed by the Council as
necessary to effect the prosecution of offenders.
Section 20. Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking. -
There is hereby established an Inter-Agency Council
Against Trafficking, to be composed of the Secretary of
the Department of Justice as Chairperson and the
Secretary of the Department of Social Welfare and
Development as Co-Chairperson and shall have the
following as members:
(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign Affairs;
(b) Secretary, Department of Labor and
Employment;
(c) Administrator, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration;
(d) Commissioner, Bureau of Immigration;
(e) Director-General, Philippine National Police;
(f) Chairperson, National Commission on the
Role of Filipino Women; and
(g) Three (3) representatives from NGOs, who
shall be composed of one (1) representative
each from among the sectors representing
women, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) and
children, with a proven record of involvement in
the prevention and suppression of trafficking in
persons. These representatives shall be
nominated by the government agency
representatives of the Council, for appointment
by the President for a term of three (3) years.
The members of the Council may designate
their permanent representatives who shall have
a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or
its equivalent to meetings, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the
Council in accordance with existing budget and
accounting, rules and regulations.
Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall
have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate a comprehensive and integrated
program to prevent and suppress the trafficking
in persons;
(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of
this Act;
(c) Monitor and oversee the strict
implementation of this Act;
(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the
various member agencies to effectively address
the issues and problems attendant to trafficking
in persons;
(e) Coordinate the conduct of massive
information dissemination and campaign on the
existence of the law and the various issues and
problems attendant to trafficking through the
LGUs, concerned agencies, and NGOs;
(f) Direct other agencies to immediately
respond to the problems brought to their
attention and report to the Council on action
taken;
(g) Assist in filing of cases against individuals,
agencies, institutions or establishments that
violate the provisions of this Act;
(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of
trafficked persons in cooperation with DOLE,
DSWD, Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA), Commission
 on Higher Education (CHED), LGUs and
NGOs;
(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office,
agency, or instrumentality of the government or
from NGOs and other civic organizations such
assistance as may be needed to effectively
implement this Act;
(j) Complement the shared government
information system for migration established
under Republic Act No. 8042, otherwise known
as the "Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos
Act of 1995" with data on cases of trafficking in
persons, and ensure that the proper agencies
conduct a continuing research and study on the
patterns and scheme of trafficking in persons
which shall form the basis for policy formulation
and program direction;
(k) Develop the mechanism to ensure the
timely, coordinated, and effective response to
cases of trafficking in persons;
(l) Recommend measures to enhance
cooperative efforts and mutual assistance
among foreign countries through bilateral
and/or multilateral arrangements to prevent and
suppress international trafficking in persons;
(m) Coordinate with the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC),
Department of Trade and Industry (DTI), and
other NGOs in monitoring the promotion of
advertisement of trafficking in the internet;
(n) Adopt measures and policies to protect the
rights and needs of trafficked persons who are
foreign nationals in the Philippines;
(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and
providing the necessary intervention or
assistance to trafficked persons; and
(p) Exercise all the powers and perform such
other functions necessary to attain the
purposes and objectives of this Act.
Section 22. Secretariat to the Council. - The Department
of Justice shall establish the necessary Secretariat for
the Council.
Section 23. Mandatory Services to Trafficked Persons. -
To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and reintegration into
the mainstream of society, concerned government
agencies shall make available the following services to
trafficked persons:
(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free legal services which shall include
information about the victims' rights and the
procedure for filing complaints, claiming
compensation and such other legal remedies
available to them, in a language understood by
the trafficked person;
(d) Medical or psychological services;
(e) Livelihood and skills training; and
(f) Educational assistance to a trafficked child.
Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism
that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration of the trafficked persons shall be adopted
and carried out.
Section 24. Other Services for Trafficked Persons. -
(a) Legal Assistance. - Trafficked persons shall
be considered under the category "Overseas
Filipino in Distress" and may avail of the legal
assistance created by Republic Act No. 8042,
subject to the guidelines as provided by law.
(b) Overseas Filipino Resource Centers. - The
services available to overseas Filipinos as
provided for by Republic Act No. 8042 shall
also be extended to trafficked persons
regardless of their immigration status in the
host country.
(c) The Country Team Approach. - The country
team approach under Executive Order No. 74
of 1993, shall be the operational scheme under
which Philippine embassies abroad shall
provide protection to trafficked persons insofar
as the promotion of their welfare, dignity and
fundamental rights are concerned.
Section 25. Repatriation of Trafficked Persons. - The
DFA, in coordination with DOLE and other appropriate
agencies, shall have the primary responsibility for the
repatriation of trafficked persons, regardless of whether
they are documented or undocumented.
If, however, the repatriation of the trafficked persons
shall expose the victims to greater risks, the DFA shall
make representation with the host government for the
extension of appropriate residency permits and
protection, as may be legally permissible in the host
country.
Section 26. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with
DFA, shall endeavor to include offenses of trafficking in
persons among extraditable offenses.
Section 27. Reporting Requirements. - The Council
shall submit to the President of the Philippines and to
Congress an annual report of the policies, programs and
activities relative to the implementation of this Act.
Section 28. Funding. - The heads of the departments
and agencies concerned shall immediately include in
their programs and issue such rules and regulations to
implement the provisions of this Act, the funding of which
shall be included in the annual General Appropriations
Act.
Section 29. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The
Council shall promulgate the necessary implementing
rules and regulations within sixty (60) days from the
effectivity of this Act.
Section 30. Non-restriction of Freedom of Speech and
of Association, Religion and the Right to Travel.
- Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a restriction
of the freedom of speech and of association, religion and
the right to travel for purposes not contrary to law as
guaranteed by the Constitution.
Section 31. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is held unconstitutional or
invalid, the other sections or provisions hereof shall not
be affected thereby.
Section 32. Repealing clause. - All laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders and rules and regulations, or
parts thereof, inconsistent with the provisions of this Act
are hereby repealed or modified accordingly: Provided,
That this Act shall not in any way amend or repeal the
provision of Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as
the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse,
Exploitation and Discrimination Act".
Section 33. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect fifteen
(15) days from the date of its complete publication in at
least two (2) newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 211465, December 03, 2014
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, Plaintiff-
Appellee, v. SHIRLEY A. CASIO, Accused-Appellant.
DECISION
LEONEN, J.:
“Chicks mo dong?”1
With this sadly familiar question being used on the
streets of many of our cities, the fate of many desperate
women is sealed and their futures vanquished. This case
resulted in the rescue of two minors from this pernicious
practice. Hopefully, there will be more rescues.
Trafficking in persons is a deplorable crime. It is
committed even though the minor knew about or
consented to the act of trafficking.
This case involves Republic Act No. 9208, 2 otherwise
known as the “Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003.” 3
Accused Shirley A. Casio was charged for the violation
of Republic Act No. 9208, Section 4(a), qualified by
Section 6(a). The information against accused, dated
May 5, 2008, states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
That on or about the 3 rd day of May 2008, at about 1:00
o’clock A.M., in the City of Cebu, Philippines, and within
the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the said
accused, with deliberate intent, with intent to gain, did
then and there hire and/or recruit AAA, a minor, 17 years
old and BBB for the purpose of prostitution and sexual
exploitation, by acting as their procurer for different
customers, for money, profit or any other consideration,
in Violation of Sec. 4, Par. (a), Qualified by Sec. 6, Par.
( a), of R.A. 9208 (Qualified Trafficking in Persons).
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
The facts, as found by the trial court and the Court of
Appeals, are as follows:
On May 2, 2008, International Justice Mission (IJM),5 a
non-governmental organization, coordinated with the
police in order to entrap persons engaged in human
trafficking in Cebu City.6
Chief PSI George Ylanan, SPO1 Felomino Mendaros,
SPO1 Fe Altubar, PO1 Albert Luardo, and PO1 Roy
Carlo Veloso composed the team of police
operatives.7 PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso were
designated as decoys, pretending to be tour guides
looking for girls to entertain their guests.8 IJM provided
them with marked money, which was recorded in the
police blotter.9
The team went to Queensland Motel and rented Rooms
24 and 25. These rooms were adjacent to each other.
Room 24 was designated for the transaction while Room
25 was for the rest of the police team. 10
PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso proceeded to D.
Jakosalem Street in Barangay Kamagayan, Cebu City’s
red light district. Accused noticed them and called their
attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” (Do you like girls,
guys?).11
During trial, PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso testified that
their conversation with accused went as
follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused:Chicks mo dong? (Do you like girls, guys?)
PO1 Unya mga bag-o? Kanang batan-on kay naa mi
Luardo: guests naghulat sa motel. (Are they new? They
must be young because we have guests
waiting at the motel.)
Naa, hulat kay magkuha ko. (Yes, just wait and
Accused:
I’ll get them.)12
At that point, PO1 Luardo sent a text message to PSI
Ylanan that they found a prospective subject. 13
After a few minutes, accused returned with AAA and
BBB, private complainants in this case.14
Accused:Kining duha kauyon mo ani? (Are you satisfied
with these two?)
PO1 Maayo man kaha na sila modala ug kayat?
Veloso: (Well, are they good in sex?)15
Accused gave the assurance that the girls were good in
sex. PO1 Luardo inquired how much their services
would cost. Accused replied, “Tag kinientos” (P500.00).16
PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo convinced accused to
come with them to Queensland Motel. Upon proceeding
to Room 24, PO1 Veloso handed the marked money to
accused.17
As accused counted the money, PO1 Veloso gave PSI
Ylanan a missed call. This was their pre-arranged signal.
The rest of the team proceeded to Room 24, arrested
accused, and informed her of her constitutional rights.
The police confiscated the marked money from
accused.18 Meanwhile, AAA and BBB “were brought to
Room 25 and placed in the custody of the
representatives from the IJM and the DSWD.” 19
During trial, AAA testified that she was born on January
27, 1991. This statement was supported by a copy of her
certificate of live birth.20
AAA narrated that in 2007, she worked as a house
helper in Mandaue City. In March 2008 she stopped
working as a house helper and transferred to Cebu City.
She stayed with her cousin, but she subsequently
moved to a boarding house. It was there where she met
her friend, Gee Ann. AAA knew that Gee Ann worked in
a disco club. When Gee Ann found out that AAA was no
longer a virgin, she offered AAA work. AAA agreed
because she needed the money in order to help her
father. AAA recalled that she had sex with her first
customer. She was paid P200.00 and given an additional
P500.00 as tip. For the first few weeks, Gee Ann
provided customers for AAA. Eventually, Gee Ann
brought her to Barangay Kamagayan, telling her that
there were more customers in that area. 21
AAA stated that she knew accused was a pimp because
AAA would usually see her pimping girls to customers in
Barangay Kamagayan.22 AAA further testified that on
May 2, 2008, accused solicited her services for a
customer. That was the first time that she was pimped by
accused.23 Accused brought her, BBB, and a certain
Jocelyn to Queensland Motel.24
AAA testified that Jocelyn stayed in the taxi, while she
and BBB went to Room 24. It was in Room 24 where the
customer paid Shirley. The police rushed in and told AAA
and BBB to go to the other room. AAA was then met by
the Department of Social Welfare and Development
personnel who informed her that she was rescued and
not arrested.25
AAA described that her job as a prostitute required her to
display herself, along with other girls, between 7 p.m. to
8 p.m. She received P400.00 for every customer who
selected her.26
The prosecution also presented the police operatives
during trial. PSI Ylanan, SPO1 Mendaros, and SPO1
Altubar testified that after PO1 Veloso had made the
missed call to PSI Ylanan, they “rushed to Room 24 and
arrested the accused.”27 SPO1 Altubar retrieved the
marked money worth P1,000.00 from accused’s right
hand “and upon instruction from PCINSP Ylanan
recorded the same at the ‘police blotter prior operation’. .
. .”28
The trial court noted that AAA requested assistance from
the IJM “in conducting the operation against the
accused.”29
Version of the accused
In defense, accused testified that she worked as a
laundrywoman. On the evening of May 2, 2008, she
went out to buy supper. While walking, she was stopped
by two men on board a blue car. The two men asked her
if she knew someone named Bingbing. She replied that
she only knew Gingging but not Bingbing. The men
informed her that they were actually looking for
Gingging, gave her a piece of paper with a number
written on it, and told her to tell Gingging to bring
companions. When accused arrived home, she
contacted Gingging. Gingging convinced her to come
because allegedly, she would be given money by the two
males.30
Ruling of the trial court
The Regional Trial Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City found
accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt and
held31 that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Accused had consummated the act of trafficking of
person[s] . . . as defined under paragraph (a), Section 3
of R.A. 9208 for the purpose of letting her engage in
prostitution as defined under paragraph [c] of the same
Section; the act of “sexual intercourse” need not have
been consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. the
‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust
money” of Php1,000.00 already consummated the said
act.
. . . .
WHEREFORE, the Court finds accused, SHIRLEY A.
CASIO, GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of trafficking
in persons under paragraph (a), Section 4 as qualified
under paragraph (a), Section 6 of R.A. 9208 and
sentenced to suffer imprisonment of TWENTY (20)
YEARS and to pay a fine of ONE MILLION
(Php1,000,000.00).
Finally, accused is ordered to pay the costs of these
proceedings.
SO ORDERED[.]32
Ruling of the Court of Appeals
The Court of Appeals affirmed the findings of the trial
court but modified the fine and awarded moral damages.
The dispositive portion of the
decision33 reads:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the
instant appeal is hereby DENIED. The assailed Decision
dated 10 August 2010 promulgated by the Regional Trial
Court, Branch 14 in Cebu City in Crim. Case No. CBU-
83122 is AFFIRMED WITH MODIFICATIONS. The
accused-appellant is accordingly sentenced to suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of Php2,000,000
and is ordered to pay each of the private complainants
Php150,000 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.34
Accused filed a notice of appeal35 on August 28, 2013,
which the Court of Appeals noted and gave due course
in its resolution36 dated January 6, 2014.
The case records of CA-G.R. CEB-CR No. 01490 were
received by this court on March 17, 2014. 37
In the resolution38 dated April 29, 2014, this court
resolved to notify the parties that they may file their
respective supplemental briefs within 30 days from
notice. This court also required the Superintendent of the
Correctional Institution for Women to confirm the
confinement of accused.39
Counsel for accused40 and the Office of the Solicitor
General41 filed their respective manifestations, stating
that they would no longer file supplemental briefs
considering that all issues had been discussed in the
appellant’s brief and appellee’s brief filed before the
Court of Appeals. Through a letter42 dated June 17,
2014, Superintendent IV Rachel D. Ruelo confirmed
accused’s confinement at the Correctional Institution for
Women since October 27, 2010.
The sole issue raised by accused is whether the
prosecution was able to prove her guilt beyond
reasonable doubt.
However, based on the arguments raised in accused’s
brief, the sole issue may be dissected into the following:
(1)Whether the entrapment operation conducted by the
police was valid, considering that there was no prior
surveillance and the police did not know the subject of
the operation;43
(2)Whether the prosecution was able to prove accused’s
guilt beyond reasonable doubt even though there was
no evidence presented to show that accused has a
history of engaging in human trafficking;44 and
(3)Whether accused was properly convicted of trafficking
in persons, considering that AAA admitted that she
works as a prostitute.45
Arguments of accused
Accused argues that there was no valid entrapment.
Instead, she was instigated into committing the
crime.46 The police did not conduct prior surveillance and
did not even know who their subject was. 47Neither did
the police know the identities of the alleged victims.
Accused further argues that under the subjective test,
she should be acquitted because the prosecution did not
present evidence that would prove she had a history of
engaging in human trafficking or any other offense. She
denied being a pimp and asserted that she was a (d) “Child” shall mean any person under eighteen years
laundrywoman.48 In addition, AAA admitted that she of age.
worked as a prostitute. Thus, it was her decision to Senator Loren Legarda, in her sponsorship speech,
display herself to solicit customers. 49 stated that the “Anti-Trafficking Act will serve as the
enabling law of the country’s commitment to [the]
Arguments of the plaintiff-appellee protocol.”59

The Office of the Solicitor General, counsel for plaintiff-
appellee People of the Philippines, argued that the trial
court did not err in convicting accused because
witnesses positively identified her as the person who
solicited customers and received money for AAA and
BBB.50 Entrapment operations are valid and have been
recognized by courts.51 Likewise, her arrest in flagrante
delicto is valid.52 Hence, the trial court was correct in
stating that accused had “fully consummated the act of
trafficking of persons. . .”53
We affirm accused Shirley A. Casio’s conviction.
I.
Background of Republic Act No. 9208
The United Nations Convention against Transnational
Organized Crime (UN CTOC) was “adopted and opened
for signature, ratification and accession”54 on November
15, 2000. The UN CTOC is supplemented by three
protocols: (1) the Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children; (2) the Protocol against the Smuggling of
Migrants by Land, Sea and Air; and, (3) the Protocol
against the Illicit Manufacturing of and Trafficking in
Firearms, their Parts and Components and
Ammunition.55
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada also delivered a
sponsorship speech and described trafficking in persons
as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Trafficking in human beings, if only to emphasize the
gravity of its hideousness, is tantamount to modern-day
slavery at work. It is a manifestation of one of the most
flagrant forms of violence against human beings. Its
victims suffer the brunt of this insidious form of violence.
It is exploitation, coercion, deception, abduction, rape,
physical, mental and other forms of abuse, prostitution,
forced labor, and indentured servitude.
. . . .
As of this time, we have signed the following: the
Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination Against Women; the 1995 Convention on
the Rights of the Child; the United Nations Convention
on the Protection of Migrant Workers and their Families;
and the United Nations’ Resolution on Trafficking in
Women and Girls, among others.
Moreover, we have also expressed our support for the
United Nations’ Convention Against Organized Crime,
including the Trafficking Protocol in October last year.
At first glance, it appears that we are very responsive to
the problem. So it seems.

On December 14, 2000, the Philippines signed the
United Nations “Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and
Punish Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children” (Trafficking Protocol).56 This was ratified by the
Philippine Senate on September 30, 2001.57 The
Trafficking Protocol’s entry into force was on December
25, 2003.58
In the Trafficking Protocol, human trafficking is defined
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Article 3 explained:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Use of terms
For the purposes of this Protocol:
(a) “Trafficking in persons” shall mean the recruitment,
transportation, transfer, harbouring or receipt of persons,
by means of the threat or use of force or other forms of
coercion, of abduction, of fraud, of deception, of the
abuse of power or of a position of vulnerability or of the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another
person, for the purpose of exploitation. Exploitation shall
include, at a minimum, the exploitation of the prostitution
of others or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced
labour or services, slavery or practices similar to slavery,
servitude or the removal of organs;
(b) The consent of a victim of trafficking in persons to the
intended exploitation set forth in subparagraph (a) of this
article shall be irrelevant where any of the means set
forth in subparagraph (a) have been used;
Despite these international agreements, we have yet to
come up with a law that shall squarely address human
trafficking.60
During the interpellation of Republic Act No. 9208, then
numbered as Senate Bill No. 2444, Senator Teresa
Aquino-Oreta asked if there was a necessity for an anti-
trafficking law when other laws exist that cover
trafficking.61
Senator Luisa Ejercito Estrada
At present, Mr. President, the relevant laws to the
trafficking issue are the Revised Penal Code, Republic
Act No. 8042 or the Migrant Workers and Overseas
Filipino Act, R[epublic] A[ct] No. 6955 or the Mail-Order
Bride Act, and Republic Act No. 8239 or the Philippine
Passport Act. These laws address issues such as illegal
recruitment, prostitution, falsification of public documents
and the mail-order bride scheme. These laws do not
respond to the issue of recruiting, harboring or
transporting persons resulting in prostitution, forced
labor, slavery and slavery-like practices. They only
address to one or some elements of trafficking
independent of their results or
consequence.62 (Emphasis supplied)
Thus, Republic Act No. 9208 was enacted in order to
fully address the issue of human trafficking. Republic Act
No. 9208 was passed on May 12, 2003, and approved
on May 26, 2003.
II.
Elements of trafficking in persons

(c) The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harbouring The elements of trafficking in persons can be derived
or receipt of a child for the purpose of exploitation shall from its definition under Section 3(a) of Republic Act No.
be considered “trafficking in persons” even if this does 9208, thus:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
not involve any of the means set forth in subparagraph (1)The act of “recruitment, transportation, transfer or
(a) of this article; harbouring, or receipt of persons with or without the
 victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders.”
(2)The means used which include “threat or use of force,
or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another;
and
(3)The purpose of trafficking is exploitation which
includes “exploitation or the prostitution of others or
other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.”63
On January 28, 2013, Republic Act No. 1036464 was
approved, otherwise known as the “Expanded Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012.” Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208 was amended by Republic Act
No. 10364 as follows:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
“SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this Act:
“(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to the recruitment,
obtaining, hiring, providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or receipt of persons
with or without the victim’s consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders by means of threat, or use of
force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation which includes at
a minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of others
or other forms of sexual exploitation, forced labor or
services, slavery, servitude or the removal or sale of
organs.
“The recruitment, transportation, transfer, harboring,
adoption or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation or when the adoption is induced by any form
of consideration for exploitative purposes shall also be
considered as ‘trafficking in persons’ even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the preceding
paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
Under Republic Act No. 10364, the elements of
trafficking in persons have been expanded to include the
following acts:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
(1)The act of “recruitment, obtaining, hiring, providing,
offering, transportation, transfer, maintaining,
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within or across
national borders;”
(2)The means used include “by means of threat, or use
of force, or other forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of position, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or benefits to achieve
the consent of a person having control over another
person”
(3)The purpose of trafficking includes “the exploitation or
the prostitution of others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services, slavery,
servitude or the removal or sale of organs” (Emphasis
supplied)
The Court of Appeals found that AAA and BBB were
recruited by accused when their services were peddled
to the police who acted as decoys. 65 AAA was a child at
the time that accused peddled her services.66 AAA also
stated that she agreed to work as a prostitute because
she needed money.67Accused took advantage of AAA’s
vulnerability as a child and as one who need money, as
proven by the testimonies of the witnesses.68
III.
Knowledge or consent of the minor is not a defense
under Republic Act No. 9208.
Accused claims that AAA admitted engaging in
prostitution even before May 2, 2008. She concludes
that AAA was predisposed to having sex with
“customers” for money.69 For liability under our law, this
argument is irrelevant. As defined under Section 3(a) of
Republic Act No. 9208, trafficking in persons can still be
committed even if the victim gives consent.
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
a. Trafficking in Persons - refers to the
recruitment, transportation, transfer or
harboring, or receipt of persons with or without
the victim's consent or knowledge, within or
across national borders by means of threat or
use of force, or other forms of coercion,
abduction, fraud, deception, abuse of power or
of position, taking advantage of the vulnerability
of the persons, or, the giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the consent of
a person having control over another person for
the purpose of exploitation which includes at a
minimum, the exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual exploitation,
forced labor or services, slavery, servitude or
the removal or sale of organs.
The recruitment transportation, transfer,
harboring or receipt of a child for the purpose of
exploitation shall also be considered as
“trafficking in persons” even if it does not
involve any of the means set forth in the
preceding paragraph.70(Emphasis supplied)
The victim’s consent is rendered meaningless due to the
coercive, abusive, or deceptive means employed by
perpetrators of human trafficking.71 Even without the use
of coercive, abusive, or deceptive means, a minor’s
consent is not given out of his or her own free will.
Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 enumerates the
different acts of trafficking in persons. Accused was
charged under Section 4(a), which
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. — It shall be
unlawful for any person, natural or judicial, to commit
any of the following acts.
a. To recruit, transport, transfer, harbor, provide, or
receive a person by any means, including those done
under the pretext of domestic or overseas employment
or training or apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual exploitation, forced
labor, slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;72
Republic Act No. 9208 further enumerates the instances
when the crime of trafficking in persons is qualified.
SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons. — The following
are considered as qualified trafficking:
a. When the trafficked person is a child;
b. When the adoption is effected through Republic
Act No. 8043, otherwise known as the “Inter-
Country Adoption Act of 1995” and said
adoption is for the purpose of prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation, forced labor,
slavery, involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
c. When the crime is committed by a syndicate, or
in large scale. Trafficking is deemed committed
by a syndicate if carried out by a group of three
(3) or more persons conspiring or confederating
 with one another. It is deemed committed in
large scale if committed against three (3) or
more persons, individually or as a group;
d. When the offender is an ascendant, parent,
sibling, guardian or a person who exercise
authority over the trafficked person or when the
offense is committed by a public officer or
employee;
e. When the trafficked person is recruited to
engage in prostitution with any member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
f. When the offender is a member of the military
or law enforcement agencies; and
g. When by reason or on occasion of the act of
trafficking in persons, the offended party dies,
becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS). (Emphasis supplied)73
Section 3 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208 defines “child”
as:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. — As used in this Act:
. . . .
b. Child - refers to a person below eighteen (18) years of
age or one who is over eighteen (18) but is unable to
fully take care of or protect himself/herself from
abuse, neglect, cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.74
Based on the definition of trafficking in persons and the
enumeration of acts of trafficking in persons, accused
performed all the elements in the commission of the
offense when she peddled AAA and BBB and offered
their services to decoys PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo in
exchange for money. The offense was also qualified
because the trafficked persons were minors.
Here, AAA testified as to how accused solicited her
services for the customers waiting at Queensland Motel.
AAA also testified that she was only 17 years old when
accused peddled her. Her certificate of live birth was
presented as evidence to show that she was born on
January 27, 1991.
The prosecution was able to prove beyond reasonable
doubt that accused committed the offense of trafficking
in persons, qualified by the fact that one of the victims
was a child. As held by the trial
court:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[T]he act of “sexual intercourse” need not have been
consummated for the mere “transaction” i.e. that
‘solicitation’ for sex and the handing over of the “bust
money” of Php.1,000.00 already consummated the said
act.75
IV.
Validity of the entrapment operation
In People v. Doria,76 this court discussed the objective
test and the subjective test to determine whether there
was a valid entrapment
operation:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
. . . American federal courts and a majority of state
courts use the “subjective” or “origin of intent” test laid
down in Sorrells v. United States to determine whether
entrapment actually occurred. The focus of the inquiry is
on the accused's predisposition to commit the offense
charged, his state of mind and inclination before his
initial exposure to government agents. All relevant facts
such as the accused's mental and character traits, his
past offenses, activities, his eagerness in committing the
crime, his reputation, etc., are considered to assess his
state of mind before the crime. The predisposition test
emphasizes the accused's propensity to commit the
offense rather than the officer's misconduct and reflects
an attempt to draw a line between a “trap for the unwary
innocent and the trap for the unwary criminal.” If the
accused was found to have been ready and willing to
commit the offense at any favorable opportunity, the
entrapment defense will fail even if a police agent used
an unduly persuasive inducement.
Some states, however, have adopted the “objective” test.
. . . Here, the court considers the nature of the police
activity involved and the propriety of police conduct. The
inquiry is focused on the inducements used by
government agents, on police conduct, not on the
accused and his predisposition to commit the crime. For
the goal of the defense is to deter unlawful police
conduct. The test of entrapment is whether the conduct
of the law enforcement agent was likely to induce a
normally law-abiding person, other than one who is
ready and willing, to commit the offense; for purposes of
this test, it is presumed that a law-abiding person would
normally resist the temptation to commit a crime that is
presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully.
(Emphasis supplied, citations omitted)77
Accused argued that in our jurisprudence, courts usually
apply the objective test in determining the whether there
was an entrapment operation or an
instigation.78 However, the use of the objective test
should not preclude courts from also applying the
subjective test. She pointed out
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Applying the “subjective ” test it is worth invoking that
accused-appellant procures income from being a laundry
woman. The prosecution had not shown any proof
evidencing accused-appellant’s history in human
trafficking or engagement in any offense. She is not
even familiar to the team who had has [sic] been
apprehending human traffickers for quite some
time.79 (Citations omitted)
Accused further argued that the police should have
conducted a prior surveillance before the entrapment
operation.
Time and again, this court has discussed the difference
between entrapment and instigation. In Chang v.
People,80 this court explained
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
There is entrapment when law officers employ ruses and
schemes to ensure the apprehension of the criminal
while in the actual commission of the crime. There is
instigation when the accused is induced to commit the
crime. The difference in the nature of the two lies in the
origin of the criminal intent. In entrapment, the mens
rea originates from the mind of the criminal. The idea
and the resolve to commit the crime comes from him. In
instigation, the law officer conceives the commission of
the crime and suggests to the accused who adopts the
idea and carries it into execution.81
Accused contends that using the subjective test, she
was clearly instigated by the police to commit the
offense. She denied being a pimp and claimed that she
earned her living as a laundrywoman. On this argument,
we agree with the finding of the Court of
Appeals:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
[I]t was the accused-appellant who commenced the
transaction with PO1 Luardo and PO1 Veloso by calling
their attention on whether they wanted girls for that
evening, and when the officers responded, it was the
accused-appellant who told them to wait while she would
fetch the girls for their perusal.82
This shows that accused was predisposed to commit the
offense because she initiated the transaction. As testified
by PO1 Veloso and PO1 Luardo, accused called out
their attention by saying “Chicks mo dong?” If accused (1) A criminal offense resulting in physical injuries;
had no predisposition to commit the offense, then she
most likely would not have asked PO1 Veloso and PO1 (2) Quasi-delicts causing physical injuries;
Luardo if they wanted girls.
(3) Seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts;
The entrapment would still be valid using the objective
test. The police merely proceeded to D. Jakosalem (4) Adultery or concubinage;
Street in Barangay Kamagayan. It was accused who
asked them whether they wanted girls. There was no (5) Illegal or arbitrary detention or arrest;
illicit inducement on the part of the police for the accused
to commit the crime. (6) Illegal search;

When accused was arrested, she was informed of her (7) Libel, slander or any other form of defamation;
constitutional rights.83 The marked money retrieved from
her was recorded in the police blotter prior to the (8) Malicious prosecution;
entrapment operation and was presented in court as
evidence.84 (9) Acts mentioned in Article 309;

On accused’s alibi that she was merely out to buy her
supper that night, the Court of Appeals noted that
accused never presented Gingging in court. Thus, her
alibi was unsubstantiated and cannot be given
credence.85
With regard to the lack of prior surveillance, prior
surveillance is not a condition for an entrapment
operation’s validity.86 In People v. Padua87 this court
underscored the value of flexibility in police
operations:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
A prior surveillance is not a prerequisite for the validity of
an entrapment or buy-bust operation, the conduct of
which has no rigid or textbook method. Flexibility is a
trait of good police work. However the police carry out its
entrapment operations, for as long as the rights of the
accused have not been violated in the process, the
courts will not pass on the wisdom thereof. The police
officers may decide that time is of the essence and
dispense with the need for prior surveillance. 88 (Citations
omitted)
This flexibility is even more important in cases involving
trafficking of persons. The urgency of rescuing the
victims may at times require immediate but deliberate
action on the part of the law enforcers.
V.
Imposition of fine and award of damages
The Court of Appeals properly imposed the amount of
P2,000,000.00. Section 10 (b) of Republic Act No. 9208
provides that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. — The following
penalties and sanctions are hereby established for the
offenses enumerated in this Act:
. . . .
c. Any person found guilty of qualified trafficking under
Section 6 shall suffer the penalty of life imprisonment
and a fine of not less than Two million pesos
(P2,000,000.00) but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00);
However, we modify by raising the award of moral
damages from P150,000.0089 to P500,000.00. We also
award exemplary damages in the amount of
P100,000.00. These amounts are in accordance with the
ruling in People v. Lalli90 where this court held
that:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
The payment of P500,000 as moral damages and
P100,000 as exemplary damages for the crime of
Trafficking in Persons as a Prostitute finds basis in
Article 2219 of the Civil Code, which
states:chanroblesvirtuallawlibrary
Art. 2219. Moral damages may be recovered in the
following and analogous cases:
(10) Acts and actions referred to in Articles 21, 26, 27,
28, 29, 30, 32, 34, and 35.
....
The criminal case of Trafficking in Persons as a
Prostitute is an analogous case to the crimes of
seduction, abduction, rape, or other lascivious acts. In
fact, it is worse. To be trafficked as a prostitute without
one’s consent and to be sexually violated four to five
times a day by different strangers is horrendous and
atrocious. There is no doubt that Lolita experienced
physical suffering, mental anguish, fright, serious
anxiety, besmirched reputation, wounded feelings, moral
shock, and social humiliation when she was trafficked as
a prostitute in Malaysia. Since the crime of Trafficking in
Persons was aggravated, being committed by a
syndicate, the award of exemplary damages is likewise
justified.91
Human trafficking indicts the society that tolerates the
kind of poverty and its accompanying desperation that
compels our women to endure indignities. It reflects the
weaknesses of that society even as it convicts those
who deviantly thrive in such hopelessness. We should
continue to strive for the best of our world, where our
choices of human intimacies are real choices, and not
the last resort taken just to survive. Human intimacies
enhance our best and closest relationships. It serves as
a foundation for two human beings to face life’s joys and
challenges while continually growing together with many
shared experiences. The quality of our human
relationships defines the world that we create also for
others.
Regardless of the willingness of AAA and BBB,
therefore, to be trafficked, we affirm the text and spirit of
our laws. Minors should spend their adolescence
moulding their character in environments free of the
vilest motives and the worse of other human beings. The
evidence and the law compel us to affirm the conviction
of accused in this case.
But this is not all that we have done. By fulfilling our
duties, we also express the hope that our people and our
government unite against everything inhuman. We
contribute to a commitment to finally stamp out slavery
and human trafficking.
There are more AAA’s and BBBs out there. They, too,
deserve to be rescued. They, too, need to be shown that
in spite of what their lives have been, there is still much
good in our world.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, we AFFIRM the
decision of the Court of Appeals dated June 27, 2013,
finding accused Shirley A. Casio guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of violating Section 4(a), qualified by
Section 6(a) of Republic Act No. 9208, and sentencing
her to suffer the penalty of life imprisonment and a fine
of P2,000,000.00, with the MODIFICATION that
accused-appellant shall not be eligible for parole under
Act No. 4103 (Indeterminate Sentence Law) in
accordance with Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9346. 92
The award of damages is likewise MODIFIED as follows:
Accused is ordered to pay each of the private
complainants:
(1) P500,000.00 as moral damages; and
(2) P100,000.00 as exemplary damages.
SO ORDERED.
REPUBLIC ACT No. 10364
AN ACT EXPANDING REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9208,
ENTITLED "AN ACT TO INSTITUTE POLICIES TO
ELIMINATE TRAFFICKING IN PERSONS
ESPECIALLY WOMEN AND CHILDREN,
ESTABLISHING THE NECESSARY INSTITUTIONAL
MECHANISMS FOR THE PROTECTION AND
SUPPORT OF TRAFFICKED PERSONS, PROVIDING
PENALTIES FOR ITS VIOLATIONS AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES"
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. – This Act shall be known as the
"Expanded Anti-Trafficking in Persons Act of 2012″.
Section 2. Section 2 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – It is hereby
declared that the State values the dignity of
every human person and guarantees the
respect of individual rights. In pursuit of this
policy, the State shall give highest priority to the
enactment of measures and development of
programs that will promote human dignity,
protect the people from any threat of violence
and exploitation, eliminate trafficking in
persons, and mitigate pressures for involuntary
migration and servitude of persons, not only to
support trafficked persons but more importantly,
to ensure their recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration into the mainstream of society.
"It shall be a State policy to recognize the equal
rights and inherent human dignity of women
and men as enshrined in the United Nations
Universal Declaration on Human Rights, United
Nations Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Discrimination Against Women,
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child, United Nations Convention on the
Protection of Migrant Workers and their
Families, United Nations Convention Against
Transnational Organized Crime Including its
Protocol to Prevent, Suppress and Punish
Trafficking in Persons, Especially Women and
Children and all other relevant and universally
accepted human rights instruments and other
international conventions to which the
Philippines is a signatory."
Section 3. Section 3 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 3. Definition of Terms. – As used in this
Act:
"(a) Trafficking in Persons – refers to
the recruitment, obtaining, hiring,
providing, offering, transportation,
transfer, maintaining, harboring, or
receipt of persons with or without the
victim’s consent or knowledge, within
or across national borders by means
of threat, or use of force, or other
forms of coercion, abduction, fraud,
deception, abuse of power or of
position, taking advantage of the
vulnerability of the person, or, the
giving or receiving of payments or
benefits to achieve the consent of a
person having control over another
person for the purpose of exploitation
which includes at a minimum, the
exploitation or the prostitution of
others or other forms of sexual
exploitation, forced labor or services,
slavery, servitude or the removal or
sale of organs.
"The recruitment, transportation,
transfer, harboring, adoption or receipt
of a child for the purpose of
exploitation or when the adoption is
induced by any form of consideration
for exploitative purposes shall also be
considered as ‘trafficking in persons’
even if it does not involve any of the
means set forth in the preceding
paragraph.
"(b) Child – refers to a person below
eighteen (18) years of age or one who
is over eighteen (18) but is unable to
fully take care of or protect
himself/herself from abuse, neglect,
cruelty, exploitation, or discrimination
because of a physical or mental
disability or condition.
"(c) Prostitution – refers to any act,
transaction, scheme or design
involving the use of a person by
another, for sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct in exchange for
money, profit or any other
consideration.
"(d) Forced Labor – refers to the
extraction of work or services from any
person by means of enticement,
violence, intimidation or threat, use of,
force or coercion, including deprivation
of freedom, abuse of authority or
moral ascendancy, debt-bondage or
deception including any work or
service extracted from any person
under the menace of penalty.
"(e) Slavery – refers to the status or
condition of a person over whom any
or all of the powers attaching to the
right of ownership are exercised.
 "(f) Involuntary Servitude – refers to a
condition of enforced and compulsory
service induced by means of any
scheme, plan or pattern, intended to
cause a person to believe that if he or
she did not enter into or continue in
such condition, he or she or another
person would suffer serious harm or
other forms of abuse or physical
restraint, or threat of abuse or harm, or
coercion including depriving access to
travel documents and withholding
salaries, or the abuse or threatened
abuse of the legal process.
"(g) Sex Tourism – refers to a program
organized by travel and tourism-
related establishments and individuals
which consists of tourism packages or
activities, utilizing and offering escort
and sexual services as enticement for
tourists. This includes sexual services
and practices offered during rest and
recreation periods for members of the
military.
"(h) Sexual Exploitation – refers to
participation by a person in
prostitution, pornography or the
production of pornography, in
exchange for money, profit or any
other consideration or where the
participation is caused or facilitated by
any means of intimidation or threat,
use of force, or other forms of
coercion, abduction, fraud, deception,
debt bondage, abuse of power or of
position or of legal process, taking
advantage of the vulnerability of the
person, or giving or receiving of
payments or benefits to achieve the
consent of a person having control
over another person; or in sexual
intercourse or lascivious conduct
caused or facilitated by any means as
provided in this Act.
"(i) Debt Bondage – refers to the
pledging by the debtor of his/her
personal services or labor or those of
a person under his/her control as
security or payment for a debt, when
the length and nature of services is not
clearly defined or when the value of
the services as reasonably assessed
is not applied toward the liquidation of
the debt.
"(j) Pornography – refers to any
representation, through publication,
exhibition, cinematography, indecent
shows, information technology, or by
whatever means, of a person engaged
in real or simulated explicit sexual
activities or any representation of the
sexual parts of a person for primarily
sexual purposes.
"(k) Council – shall mean the Inter-
Agency Council Against Trafficking
created under Section 20 of this Act."
Section 4. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Acts of Trafficking in Persons. – It
shall be unlawful for any person, natural or
juridical, to commit any of the following acts:
"(a) To recruit, obtain, hire, provide,
offer, transport, transfer, maintain,
harbor, or receive a person by any
means, including those done under
the pretext of domestic or overseas
employment or training or
apprenticeship, for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, or sexual
exploitation;
"(b) To introduce or match for money,
profit, or material, economic or other
consideration, any person or, as
provided for under Republic Act No.
6955, any Filipino woman to a foreign
national, for marriage for the purpose
of acquiring, buying, offering, selling or
trading him/her to engage in
prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(c) To offer or contract marriage, real
or simulated, for the purpose of
acquiring, buying, offering, selling, or
trading them to engage in prostitution,
pornography, sexual exploitation,
forced labor or slavery, involuntary
servitude or debt bondage;
"(d) To undertake or organize tours
and travel plans consisting of tourism
packages or activities for the purpose
of utilizing and offering persons for
prostitution, pornography or sexual
exploitation;
"(e) To maintain or hire a person to
engage in prostitution or pornography;
"(f) To adopt persons by any form of
consideration for exploitative purposes
or to facilitate the same for purposes
of prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(g) To adopt or facilitate the adoption
of persons for the purpose of
prostitution, pornography, sexual
exploitation, forced labor, slavery,
involuntary servitude or debt bondage;
"(h) To recruit, hire, adopt, transport,
transfer, obtain, harbor, maintain,
provide, offer, receive or abduct a
person, by means of threat or use of
force, fraud, deceit, violence, coercion,
or intimidation for the purpose of
removal or sale of organs of said
person;
"(i) To recruit, transport, obtain,
transfer, harbor, maintain, offer, hire,
provide, receive or adopt a child to
engage in armed activities in the
Philippines or abroad;
 "(j) To recruit, transport, transfer,
harbor, obtain, maintain, offer, hire,
provide or receive a person by means
defined in Section 3 of this Act for
purposes of forced labor, slavery, debt
bondage and involuntary servitude,
including a scheme, plan, or pattern
intended to cause the person either:
"(1) To believe that if the
person did not perform such
labor or services, he or she
or another person would
suffer serious harm or
physical restraint; or
"(2) To abuse or threaten the
use of law or the legal
processes; and
"(k) To recruit, transport, harbor,
obtain, transfer, maintain, hire, offer,
provide, adopt or receive a child for
purposes of exploitation or trading
them, including but not limited to, the
act of baring and/or selling a child for
any consideration or for barter for
purposes of exploitation. Trafficking for
purposes of exploitation of children
shall include:
"(1) All forms of slavery or
practices similar to slavery,
involuntary servitude, debt
bondage and forced labor,
including recruitment of
children for use in armed
conflict;
"(2) The use, procuring or
offering of a child for
prostitution, for the
production of pornography, or
for pornographic
performances;
"(3) The use, procuring or
offering of a child for the
production and trafficking of
drugs; and
"(4) The use, procuring or
offering of a child for illegal
activities or work which, by its
nature or the circumstances
in which it is carried out, is
likely to harm their health,
safety or morals; and
"(l) To organize or direct other persons to
commit the offenses defined as acts of
trafficking under this Act."
Section 5. A new Section 4-A is hereby inserted in
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-A. Attempted Trafficking in Persons.
– Where there are acts to initiate the
commission of a trafficking offense but the
offender failed to or did not execute all the
elements of the crime, by accident or by reason
of some cause other than voluntary desistance,
such overt acts shall be deemed as an attempt
to commit an act of trafficking in persons. As
such, an attempt to commit any of the offenses
enumerated in Section 4 of this Act shall
constitute attempted trafficking in persons.
"In cases where the victim is a child, any of the
following acts shall also be deemed as
attempted trafficking in persons:
"(a) Facilitating the travel of a child
who travels alone to a foreign country
or territory without valid reason
therefor and without the required
clearance or permit from the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development, or a written permit or
justification from the child’s parent or
legal guardian;
"(b) Executing, for a consideration, an
affidavit of consent or a written
consent for adoption;
"(c) Recruiting a woman to bear a
child for the purpose of selling the
child;
"(d) Simulating a birth for the purpose
of selling the child; and
"(e) Soliciting a child and acquiring the
custody thereof through any means
from among hospitals, clinics,
nurseries, daycare centers, refugee or
evacuation centers, and low-income
families, for the purpose of selling the
child."
Section 6. A new Section 4-B is hereby inserted in
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-B. Accomplice Liability. – Whoever
knowingly aids, abets, cooperates in the
execution of the offense by previous or
simultaneous acts defined in this Act shall be
punished in accordance with the provisions of
Section 10(c) of this Act."
Section 7. A new Section 4-C is hereby inserted in
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 4-C. Accessories. – Whoever has the
knowledge of the commission of the crime, and
without having participated therein, either as
principal or as accomplices, take part in its
commission in any of the following manners:
"(a) By profiting themselves or
assisting the offender to profit by the
effects of the crime;
"(b) By concealing or destroying the
body of the crime or effects or
instruments thereof, in order to
prevent its discovery;
"(c) By harboring, concealing or
assisting in the escape of the principal
of the crime, provided the accessory
acts with abuse of his or her public
 functions or is known to be habitually
guilty of some other crime.
"Acts defined in this provision shall be punished
in accordance with the provision of Section
10(d) as stated thereto."
Section 8. Section 5 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 5. Acts that Promote Trafficking in
Persons. – The following acts which promote or
facilitate trafficking in persons, shall be
unlawful:
"(a) xxx
"(b) To produce, print and issue or
distribute unissued, tampered or fake
counseling certificates, registration
stickers, overseas employment
certificates or other certificates of any
government agency which issues
these certificates, decals and such
other markers as proof of compliance
with government regulatory and pre-
departure requirements for the
purpose of promoting trafficking in
persons;
"(c) xxx
"(d) xxx
"(e) xxx
"(f) xxx
"(g) xxx
"(h) To tamper with, destroy, or cause
the destruction of evidence, or to
influence or attempt to influence
witnesses, in an investigation or
prosecution of a case under this Act;
"(i) To destroy, conceal, remove,
confiscate or possess, or attempt to
destroy, conceal, remove, confiscate
or possess, any actual or purported
passport or other travel, immigration or
working permit or document, or any
other actual or purported government
identification, of any person in order to
prevent or restrict, or attempt to
prevent or restrict, without lawful
authority, the person’s liberty to move
or travel in order to maintain the labor
or services of that person; or
"(j) To utilize his or her office to impede
the investigation, prosecution or
execution of lawful orders in a case
under this Act."
Section 9. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9208 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Qualified Trafficking in Persons.
– Violations of Section 4 of this Act shall be
considered as qualified trafficking:
"x x x
"(d) When the offender is a spouse, an
ascendant, parent, sibling, guardian or a person
who exercises authority over the trafficked
person or when the offense is committed by a
public officer or employee;
"x x x
"(f) When the offender is a member of the
military or law enforcement agencies;
"(g) When by reason or on occasion of the act
of trafficking in persons, the offended party
dies, becomes insane, suffers mutilation or is
afflicted with Human Immunodeficiency Virus
(HIV) or the Acquired Immune Deficiency
Syndrome (AIDS);
"(h) When the offender commits one or more
violations of Section 4 over a period of sixty
(60) or more days, whether those days are
continuous or not; and
"(i) When the offender directs or through
another manages the trafficking victim in
carrying out the exploitative purpose of
trafficking."
Section 10. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 7. Confidentiality. – At any stage of the
investigation, rescue, prosecution and trial of an
offense under this Act, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors, judges, court personnel,
social workers and medical practitioners, as
well as parties to the case, shall protect the
right to privacy of the trafficked person.
Towards this end, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors and judges to whom the complaint
has been referred may, whenever necessary to
ensure a fair and impartial proceeding, and
after considering all circumstances for the best
interest of the parties, order a closed-door
investigation, prosecution or trial. The name
and personal circumstances of the trafficked
person or any other information tending to
establish the identity of the trafficked person
and his or her family shall not be disclosed to
the public.
"It shall be unlawful for any editor, publisher,
and reporter or columnist in case of printed
materials, announcer or producer in case of
television and radio, producer and director of a
film in case of the movie industry, or any person
utilizing tri-media facilities or electronic
information technology to cause publicity of the
name, personal circumstances, or any
information tending to establish the identity of
the trafficked person except when the trafficked
person in a written statement duly notarized
knowingly, voluntarily and willingly waives said
confidentiality.
"Law enforcement officers, prosecutors, judges,
court personnel, social workers and medical
practitioners shall be trained on the importance
of maintaining confidentiality as a means to
 protect the right to privacy of victims and to
encourage victims to file complaints."
Section 11. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Initiation and Prosecution of Cases. –
"(a) Initiation of Investigation. – Law
enforcement agencies are mandated to
immediately initiate investigation and counter-
trafficking-intelligence gathering upon receipt of
statements or affidavit from victims of
trafficking, migrant workers, or their families
who are in possession of knowledge or
information about trafficking in persons cases.
"(b) Prosecution of Cases. – Any person who
has personal knowledge of the commission of
any offense under this Act, such as the
trafficked person, the parents, spouse, siblings,
children or legal guardian may file a complaint
for trafficking.
"(c) Affidavit of Desistance. – Cases involving
trafficking in persons should not be dismissed
based on the affidavit of desistance executed
by the victims or their parents or legal
guardians. Public and private prosecutors are
directed to oppose and manifest objections to
motions for dismissal.
"Any act involving the means provided in this
Act or any attempt thereof for the purpose of
securing an Affidavit of Desistance from the
complainant shall be punishable under this
Act."
Section 12. Section 10 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 10. Penalties and Sanctions. – The
following penalties and sanctions are hereby
established for the offenses enumerated in this
Act:
"(a) Any person found guilty of committing any
of the acts enumerated in Section 4 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of twenty (20)
years and a fine of not less than One million
pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (P2,000,000.00);
"(b) Any person found guilty of committing any
of the acts enumerated in Section 4-A of this
Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of
fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"(c) Any person found guilty of Section 4-B of
this Act shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment
of fifteen (15) years and a fine of not less than
Five hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00)
but not more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"In every case, conviction shall cause and carry
the automatic revocation of the license or
registration of the recruitment agency involved
in trafficking. The license of a recruitment
agency which trafficked a child shall be
automatically revoked.
"(d) Any person found, guilty of committing any
of the acts enumerated in Section 5 shall suffer
the penalty of imprisonment of fifteen (15) years
and a fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not more
than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"(e) Any person found guilty of qualified
trafficking under Section 6 shall suffer the
penalty of life imprisonment and a fine of not
less than Two million pesos (P2,000,000.00)
but not more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00);
"(f) Any person who violates Section 7 hereof
shall suffer the penalty of imprisonment of six
(6) years and a fine of not less than Five
hundred thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos (P1,000,000.00);
"(g) If the offender is a corporation, partnership,
association, club, establishment or any juridical
person, the penalty shall be imposed upon the
owner, president, partner, manager, and/or any
responsible officer who participated in the
commission of the crime or who shall have
knowingly permitted or failed to prevent its
commission;
"(h) The registration with the Securities and
Exchange Commission (SEC) and license to
operate of the erring agency, corporation,
association, religious group, tour or travel
agent, club or establishment, or any place of
entertainment shall be cancelled and revoked
permanently. The owner, president, partner or
manager thereof shall not be allowed to operate
similar establishments in a different name;
"(i) If the offender is a foreigner, he or she shall
be immediately deported after serving his or her
sentence and be barred permanently from
entering the country;
"(j) Any employee or official of government
agencies who shall issue or approve the
issuance of travel exit clearances, passports,
registration certificates, counseling certificates,
marriage license, and other similar documents
to persons, whether juridical or natural,
recruitment agencies, establishments or other
individuals or groups, who fail to observe the
prescribed procedures and the requirement as
provided for by laws, rules and regulations,
shall be held administratively liable, without
prejudice to criminal liability under this Act. The
concerned government official or employee
shall, upon conviction, be dismissed from the
service and be barred permanently to hold
public office. His or her retirement and other
benefits shall likewise be forfeited; and
"(k) Conviction, by final judgment of the adopter
for any offense under this Act shall result in the
immediate rescission of the decree of
adoption."
Section 13. Section 11 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 11. Use of Trafficked Persons. – Any
person who buys or engages the services of a
trafficked person for prostitution shall be
penalized with the following: Provided, That the
Probation Law (Presidential Decree No. 968)
shall not apply:
"(a) Prision Correccional in its
maximum period to prision mayor or
six (6) years to twelve (12) years
imprisonment and a fine of not less
than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) but not more than One
hundred thousand pesos
(P100,000.00): Provided,
however, That the following acts shall
be exempted thereto:
"(1) If an offense under paragraph (a)
involves sexual intercourse or
lascivious conduct with a child, the
penalty shall be reclusion temporal in
its medium period to reclusion
perpetua or seventeen (17) years to
forty (40) years imprisonment and a
fine of not less than Five hundred
thousand pesos (P500,000.00) but not
more than One million pesos
(P1,000,000.00);
"(2) If an offense under paragraph (a)
involves carnal knowledge of, or
sexual intercourse with, a male or
female trafficking victim and also
involves the use of force or
intimidation, to a victim deprived of
reason or to an unconscious victim, or
a victim under twelve (12) years of
age, instead of the penalty prescribed
in the subparagraph above the penalty
shall be a fine of not less than One
million pesos (P1,000,000.00) but not
more than Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) and imprisonment
of reclusionperpetua or forty (40)
years imprisonment with no possibility
of parole; except that if a person
violating paragraph (a) of this section
knows the person that provided
prostitution services is in fact a victim
of trafficking, the offender shall not be
likewise penalized under this section
but under Section 10 as a person
violating Section 4; and if in
committing such an offense, the
offender also knows a qualifying
circumstance for trafficking, the
offender shall be penalized under
Section 10 for qualified trafficking. If in
violating this section the offender also
violates Section 4, the offender shall
be penalized under Section 10 and, if
applicable, for qualified trafficking
instead of under this section;
"(b) Deportation. – If a foreigner
commits any offense described by
paragraph (1) or (2) of this section or
violates any pertinent provision of this
Act as an accomplice or accessory to,
or by attempting any such offense, he
or she shall be immediately deported
after serving his or her sentence and
be barred permanently from entering
the country; and
"(c) Public Official. – If the offender is
a public official, he or she shall be
dismissed from service and shall
suffer perpetual absolute
disqualification to hold public, office, in
addition to any imprisonment or fine
received pursuant to any other
provision of this Act."
Section 14. Section 12 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 12. Prescriptive Period. – Trafficking
cases under this Act shall prescribe in ten (10)
years: Provided, however, That trafficking
cases committed by a syndicate or in a large
scale as defined under Section 6, or against a
child, shall prescribe in twenty (20) years.
"The prescriptive period shall commence to run
from the day on which the trafficked person is
delivered or released from the conditions of
bondage, or in the case of a child victim, from
the day the child reaches the age of majority,
and shall be interrupted by the filing of the
complaint or information and shall commence
to run again when the proceedings terminate
without the accused being convicted or
acquitted or are unjustifiably stopped for any
reason not imputable to the accused."
Section 15. Section 16 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 16. Programs that Address Trafficking in
Persons. – The government shall establish and
implement preventive, protective and
rehabilitative programs for trafficked persons.
For this purpose, the following agencies are
hereby mandated to implement the following
programs:
"(a) Department of Foreign Affairs
(DFA) – shall make available its
resources and facilities overseas for
trafficked persons regardless of their
manner of entry to the receiving
country, and explore means to further
enhance its assistance in eliminating
trafficking activities through closer
networking with government agencies
in the country and overseas,
particularly in the formulation of
policies and implementation of
relevant programs. It shall provide
Filipino victims of trafficking overseas
with free legal assistance and counsel
to pursue legal action against his or
her traffickers, represent his or her
interests in any criminal investigation
or prosecution, and assist in the
application for social benefits and/or
regular immigration status as may be
allowed or provided for by the host
country. The DFA shall repatriate
trafficked Filipinos with the consent of
the victims.
"The DFA shall take necessary
measures for the efficient
implementation of the Electronic
Passporting System to protect the
integrity of Philippine passports, visas
and other travel documents to reduce
the incidence of trafficking through the
use of fraudulent identification
documents.
"In coordination with the Department
of Labor and Employment, it shall
provide free temporary shelters and
other services to Filipino victims of
trafficking overseas through the
migrant workers and other overseas
Filipinos resource centers established
overseas under Republic Act No.
8042, as amended.
"(b) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD) – shall
implement rehabilitative and protective
programs for trafficked persons. It
shall provide counseling and
temporary shelter to trafficked persons
and develop a system for accreditation
among NGOs for purposes of
establishing centers and programs for
intervention in various levels of the
community. It shall establish free
temporary shelters, for the protection
and housing of trafficked persons to
provide the following basic services to
trafficked persons:
"(1) Temporary housing and
food facilities;
"(2) Psychological support
and counseling;
"(3) 24-hour call center for
crisis calls and technology-
based counseling and referral
system;
"(4) Coordination with local
law enforcement entities; and
"(5) Coordination with the
Department of Justice,
among others.
"The DSWD must conduct information
campaigns in communities and
schools teaching parents and families
that receiving consideration in
exchange for adoption is punishable
under the law. Furthermore,
information campaigns must be
conducted with the police that they
must not induce poor women to give
their children up for adoption in
exchange for consideration.
"(c) Department of Labor and
Employment (DOLE) – shall ensure
the strict implementation and
compliance with the rules and
guidelines relative to the employment
of persons locally and overseas. It
shall likewise monitor, document and
report cases of trafficking in persons
involving employers and labor
recruiters.
"(d) Department of Justice (DOJ) –
shall ensure the prosecution of
persons accused of trafficking and
designate and train special
prosecutors who shall handle and
prosecute cases of trafficking. It shall
also establish a mechanism for free
legal assistance for trafficked persons,
in coordination with the DSWD,
Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP)
and other NGOs and volunteer
groups.
"(e) Philippine Commission on Women
(PCW) – shall actively participate and
coordinate in the formulation and
monitoring of policies addressing the
issue of trafficking in persons in
coordination with relevant government
agencies. It shall likewise advocate for
the inclusion of the issue of trafficking
in persons in both its local and
international advocacy for women’s
issues.
"(f) Bureau of Immigration (BI) – shall
strictly administer and enforce
immigration and alien administration
laws. It shall adopt measures for the
apprehension of suspected traffickers
both at the place of arrival and
departure and shall ensure
compliance by the Filipino
fiancés/fiancées and spouses of
foreign nationals with the guidance
and counseling requirement as
provided for in this Act.
"(g) Philippine National Police (PNP)
and National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI) – shall be the primary law
enforcement agencies to undertake
surveillance, investigation and arrest
of individuals or persons suspected to
be engaged in trafficking. They shall
closely coordinate with each other and
with other law enforcement agencies
to secure concerted efforts for
effective investigation and
apprehension of suspected traffickers.
They shall also establish a system to
receive complaints and calls to assist
trafficked persons and conduct rescue
operations.
"(h) Philippine Overseas Employment
Administration (POEA) and Overseas
Workers and Welfare Administration
(OWWA) – POEA shall implement Pre-
Employment Orientation Seminars
(PEOS) while Pre-Departure
Orientation Seminars (PDOS) shall be
conducted by the OWWA. It shall
likewise formulate a system of
providing free legal assistance to
trafficked persons, in coordination with
the DFA.
"The POEA shall create a blacklist of
recruitment agencies, illegal recruiters
and persons facing administrative, civil
and criminal complaints for trafficking
filed in the receiving country and/or in
the Philippines and those agencies,
illegal recruiters and persons involved
in cases of trafficking who have been
rescued by the DFA and DOLE in the
receiving country or in the Philippines
even if no formal administrative, civil
or criminal complaints have been
filed: Provided, That the rescued
victims shall execute an affidavit
attesting to the acts violative of the
anti-trafficking law. This blacklist shall
be posted in conspicuous places in
concerned government agencies and
shall be updated bi-monthly.
"The blacklist shall likewise be posted
by the POEA in the shared
government information system, which
is mandated to be established under
Republic Act No. 8042, as amended.
"The POEA and OWWA shall accredit
NGOs and other service providers to
conduct PEOS and PDOS,
respectively. The PEOS and PDOS
should include the discussion and
distribution of the blacklist.
"The license or registration of a
recruitment agency that has been
blacklisted may be suspended by the
POEA upon a review of the complaints
filed against said agency.
"(i) Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG) – shall
institute a systematic information and
prevention campaign in coordination
with pertinent agencies of government
as provided for in this Act. It shall
provide training programs to local
government units, in coordination with
the Council, in ensuring wide
understanding and application of this
Act at the local level.
"(j) Commission on Filipinos Overseas
– shall conduct pre-departure
counseling services for Filipinos in
intermarriages. It shall develop a
system for accreditation of NGOs that
may be mobilized for purposes of
conducting pre-departure counseling
services for Filipinos in intermarriages.
As such, it shall ensure that the
counselors contemplated under this
Act shall have the minimum
qualifications and training of guidance
counselors as provided for by law.
"It shall likewise assist in the conduct
of information campaigns against
trafficking in coordination with local
government units, the Philippine
Information Agency, and NGOs.
"(k) Local government units (LGUs) –
shall monitor and document cases of
trafficking in persons in their areas of
jurisdiction, effect the cancellation of
licenses of establishments which
violate the provisions of this Act and
ensure effective prosecution of such
cases. They shall also undertake an
information campaign against
trafficking in persons through the
establishment of the Migrants Advisory
and Information Network (MAIN)
desks in municipalities or provinces in
coordination with the DILG, Philippine
Information Agency (PIA), Commission
on Filipinos Overseas (CFO), NGOs
and other concerned agencies. They
shall encourage and support
community-based initiatives which
address the trafficking in persons.
"In implementing this Act, the agencies
concerned may seek and enlist the
assistance of NGOs, people’s
organizations (POs), civic
organizations and other volunteer
groups."
Section 16. A new Section 16-A is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 16-A. Anti-Trafficking in Persons
Database. – An anti-trafficking in persons
central database shall be established by the
Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking
created under Section 20 of this Act. The
Council shall submit a report to the President of
the Philippines and to Congress, on or before
January 15 of every year, with respect to the
preceding year’s programs and data on
trafficking-related cases.
"All government agencies tasked under the law
to undertake programs and render assistance
to address trafficking in persons shall develop
their respective monitoring and data collection
systems, and databases, for purposes of
ensuring efficient collection and storage of data
on cases of trafficking in persons handled by
their respective offices. Such data shall be
submitted to the Council for integration in a
central database system.
"For this purpose, the Council is hereby tasked
to ensure the harmonization and
standardization of databases, including
minimum data requirements, definitions,
reporting formats, data collection systems, and
data verification systems. Such databases shall
have, at the minimum, the following information:
"(a) The number of cases of trafficking
in persons, sorted according to status
of cases, including the number of
cases being investigated, submitted
for prosecution, dropped, and filed
and/or pending before the courts and
the number of convictions and
acquittals;
"(b) The profile/information on each
case;
"(c) The number of victims of
trafficking in persons referred to the
agency by destination countries/areas
and by area of origin; and
"(d) Disaggregated data on trafficking
victims and the accused/defendants."
Section 17. Section 17 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 17. Legal Protection to Trafficked
Persons. – Trafficked persons shall be
recognized as victims of the act or acts of
trafficking and as such, shall not be penalized
for unlawful acts committed as a direct result of,
or as an incident or in relation to, being
trafficked based on the acts of trafficking
enumerated in this Act or in obedience to the
order made by the trafficker in relation thereto.
In this regard, the consent of a trafficked person
to the intended exploitation set forth in this Act
shall be irrelevant.
"Victims of trafficking for purposes of
prostitution as defined under Section 4 of this
Act are not covered by Article 202 of the
Revised Penal Code and as such, shall not be
prosecuted, fined, or otherwise penalized under
the said law."
Section 18. A new Section 17-A is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-A. Temporary Custody of Trafficked
Victims. – The rescue of victims should be done
as much as possible with the assistance of the
DSWD or an accredited NGO that services
trafficked victims. A law enforcement officer, on
a reasonable suspicion that a person is a victim
of any offense defined under this Act including
attempted trafficking, shall immediately place
that person in the temporary custody of the
local social welfare and development office, or
any accredited or licensed shelter institution
devoted to protecting trafficked persons after
the rescue."
Section 19. A new Section 17-B is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-B. Irrelevance of Past Sexual
Behavior, Opinion Thereof or Reputation of
Victims and of Consent of Victims in Cases of
Deception, Coercion and Other Prohibited
Means. – The past sexual behavior or the
sexual predisposition of a trafficked person
shall be considered inadmissible in evidence for
the purpose of proving consent of the victim to
engage in sexual behavior, or to prove the
predisposition, sexual or otherwise, of a
trafficked person. Furthermore, the consent of a
victim of trafficking to the intended exploitation
shall be irrelevant where any of the means set
forth in Section 3(a) of this Act has been used."
Section 20. A new Section 17-C is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 17-C. Immunity from Suit, Prohibited
Acts and Injunctive Remedies. – No action or
suit shall be brought, instituted or maintained in
any court or tribunal or before any other
authority against any: (a) law enforcement
officer; (b) social worker; or (c) person acting in
compliance with a lawful order from any of the
above, for lawful acts done or statements made
during an authorized rescue operation,
recovery or rehabilitation/intervention, or an
investigation or prosecution of an anti-trafficking
case: Provided, That such acts shall have been
made in good faith.
"The prosecution of retaliatory suits against
victims of trafficking shall be held in abeyance
pending final resolution and decision of criminal
complaint for trafficking.
"It shall be prohibited for the DFA, the DOLE,
and the POEA officials, law enforcement
officers, prosecutors and judges to urge
complainants to abandon their criminal, civil
and administrative complaints for trafficking.
"The remedies of injunction and attachment of
properties of the traffickers, illegal recruiters
and persons involved in trafficking may be
issued motu proprio by judges."
Section 21. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking. – There is hereby established an
Inter-Agency Council Against Trafficking, to be
composed of the Secretary of the Department
of Justice as Chairperson and the Secretary of
the Department of Social Welfare and
Development as Co-Chairperson and shall
have the following as members:
"(a) Secretary, Department of Foreign
Affairs;
"(b) Secretary, Department of Labor
and Employment;
"(c) Secretary, Department of the
Interior and Local Government;
"(d) Administrator, Philippine Overseas
Employment Administration;
"(e) Commissioner, Bureau of
Immigration;
"(f) Chief, Philippine National Police;
"(g) Chairperson, Philippine
Commission on Women;
"(h) Chairperson, Commission on
Filipinos Overseas;
"(i) Executive Director, Philippine
Center for Transnational Crimes; and
"(j) Three (3) representatives from
NGOs, who shall include one (1)
representative each from among the
sectors representing women, overseas
Filipinos, and children, with a proven
record of involvement in the
prevention and suppression of
trafficking in persons. These
representatives shall be nominated by
the government agency
representatives of the Council, for
appointment by the President for a
term of three (3) years.
 "The members of the Council may designate
their permanent representatives who shall have
a rank not lower than an assistant secretary or
its equivalent to meetings, and shall receive
emoluments as may be determined by the
Council in accordance with existing budget and
accounting rules and regulations."
Section 22. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Secretariat to the Council. – The
Department of Justice shall establish the
necessary Secretariat for the Council.
"The secretariat shall provide support for the
functions and projects of the Council. The
secretariat shall be headed by an executive
director, who shall be appointed by the
Secretary of the DOJ upon the
recommendation of the Council. The executive
director must have adequate knowledge on,
training and experience in the phenomenon of
and issues involved in trafficking in persons and
in the field of law, law enforcement, social work,
criminology, or psychology.
"The executive director shall be under the
supervision of the Inter-Agency Council Against
Trafficking through its Chairperson and Co-
Chairperson, and shall perform the following
functions:
"(a) Act as secretary of the Council
and administrative officer of its
secretariat;
"(b) Advise and assist the Chairperson
in formulating and implementing the
objectives, policies, plans and
programs of the Council, including
those involving mobilization of
government offices represented in the
Council as well as other relevant
government offices, task forces, and
mechanisms;
"(c) Serve as principal assistant to the
Chairperson in the overall supervision
of council administrative business;
"(d) Oversee all council operational
activities;
"(e) Ensure an effective and efficient
performance of council functions and
prompt implementation of council
objectives, policies, plans and
programs;
"(f) Propose effective allocations of
resources for implementing council
objectives, policies, plans and
programs;
"(g) Submit periodic reports to the
Council on the progress of council
objectives, policies, plans and
programs;
"(h) Prepare annual reports of all
council activities; and
"(i) Perform other duties as the
Council may assign."
Section 23. A new Section 26-A is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 26-A. Extra-Territorial Jurisdiction. – The
State shall exercise jurisdiction over any act
defined and penalized under this Act, even if
committed outside the Philippines and whether
or not such act or acts constitute an offense at
the place of commission, the crime being a
continuing offense, having been commenced in
the Philippines and other elements having been
committed in another country, if the suspect or
accused:
"(a) Is a Filipino citizen; or
"(b) Is a permanent resident of the
Philippines; or
"(c) Has committed the act against a
citizen of the Philippines.
"No prosecution may be commenced against a
person under this section if a foreign
government, in accordance with jurisdiction
recognized by the Philippines, has prosecuted
or is prosecuting such person for the conduct
constituting such offense, except upon the
approval of the Secretary of Justice.
"The government may surrender or extradite
persons accused of trafficking in the Philippines
to the appropriate international court if any, or
to another State pursuant to the applicable
extradition laws and treaties."
Section 24. Section 28 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended, to read as follows:
"SEC. 28. Funding. – The amount necessary to
implement the provisions of this Act shall be
charged against the current year’s
appropriations of the Inter-Agency Council
Against Trafficking under the budget of the DOJ
and the appropriations of the other concerned
departments. Thereafter, such sums as may be
necessary for the continued implementation of
this Act shall be included in the annual General
Appropriations Act."1âwphi1
Section 25. A new Section 28-A is hereby inserted into
Republic Act No. 9208, to read as follows:
"SEC. 28-A. Additional Funds for the Council. –
The amount collected from every penalty, fine
or asset derived from any violation of this Act
shall be earmarked as additional funds for the
use of the Council. The fund may be
augmented by grants, donations and
endowment from various sources, domestic or
foreign, for purposes related to their functions,
subject to the existing accepted rules and
regulations of the Commission on Audit."
Section 26. Section 32 of Republic Act No. 9208 of the
Repealing Clause is hereby amended to read as follows:
 "SEC. 32. Repealing Clause. – Article 202 of
the Revised Penal Code, as amended, and all
laws, acts, presidential decrees, executive
orders, administrative orders, rules and
regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are deemed amended,
modified or repealed
accordingly: Provided, That this Act shall not in
any way amend or repeal the provisions of
Republic Act No. 7610, otherwise known as the
‘Special Protection of Child Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act.’"
Section 27. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9208 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 33. Effectivity. – This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days following its complete
publication in at least two (2) newspapers of
general circulation."
Approved,
Republic Act No. 6955 June 13, 1990
AN ACT TO DECLARE UNLAWFUL THE PRACTICE
OF MATCHING FILIPINO WOMEN FOR MARRIAGE
TO FOREIGN NATIONALS ON A MAIL ORDER BASIS
AND OTHER SIMILAR PRACTICES, INCLUDING THE
ADVERTISEMENT, PUBLICATION, PRINTING OR
DISTRIBUTION OF BROCHURES, FLIERS AND
OTHER PROPAGANDA MATERIALS IN
FURTHERANCE THEREOF AND PROVIDING
PENALTY THEREFORE
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. It is the policy of the State to ensure and
guarantee the enjoyment of the people of a decent
standard of living. Towards this end, the State shall take
measures to protect Filipino women from being exploited
in utter disregard of human dignity in their pursuit of
economic upliftment.
Section 2. Pursuant thereto, it is hereby declared
unlawful:
(a) For a person, natural or juridical,
association, club or any other entity to commit,
directly or indirectly, any of the following acts:
(1) To establish or carry on a business
which has for its purpose the matching
of Filipino women for marriage to
foreign nationals either on a mail-order
basis or through personal introduction;
(2) To advertise, publish, print or
distribute or cause the advertisement,
publication, printing or distribution of
any brochure, flier, or any propaganda
material calculated to promote the
prohibited acts in the preceding
subparagraph;
(3) To solicit, enlist or in any manner
attract or induce any Filipino woman to
become a member in any club or
association whose objective is to
match women for marriage to foreign
nationals either on a mail-order basis
or through personal introduction for a
fee;
(4) To use the postal service to
promote the prohibited acts in
subparagraph 1 hereof.1awphi1©alf
(b) For the manager or officer-in-charge or
advertising manager of any newspaper,
magazine, television or radio station, or other
media, or of an advertising agency, printing
company or other similar entities, to knowingly
allow, or consent to, the acts prohibited in the
preceding paragraph.
Section 3. In case of violation of this Act by an
association, club, partnership, corporation, or any other
entity, the incumbent officers thereof who have
knowingly participated in the violation of this Act shall be
held liable.1awphil©a1f
Section 4. Any person found guilty by the court to have
violated any of the acts herein prohibited shall suffer an
imprisonment of not less than six (6) years and one (1)
day but not more than eight (8) years, and a fine of not
less than Eight thousand pesos (P8,000) but not more
than Twenty thousand pesos (P20,000): Provided, That
if the offender is a foreigner, he shall be immediately
deported and barred forever from entering the country
after serving his sentence and payment of fine.
Section 5. Nothing in this Act shall be interpreted as a
restriction on the freedom of speech and of association
for purposes not contrary to law as guaranteed by the
Constitution.
Section 6. All laws, decrees, orders, instructions, rules
and regulations, or parts thereof inconsistent with this
Act are hereby repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 7. This Act shall take effect upon its publication
for two (2) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation.
Approved: June 13, 1990
INSERT HERE R.A 10906 (naka PDF kasi)
REPUBLIC ACT No. 7877
AN ACT DECLARING SEXUAL HARASSMENT
UNLAWFUL IN THE EMPLOYMENT, EDUCATION OR
TRAINING ENVIRONMENT, AND FOR OTHER
PURPOSES.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Title. - This Act shall be known as the "Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State shall value
the dignity of every individual, enhance the development
of its human resources, guarantee full respect for human
rights, and uphold the dignity of workers, employees,
applicants for employment, students or those undergoing
training, instruction or education. Towards this end, all
forms of sexual harassment in the employment,
education or training environment are hereby declared
unlawful.
Section 3. Work, Education or Training -Related, Sexual
Harassment Defined. - Work, education or training-
related sexual harassment is committed by an employer,
employee, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or moral
ascendancy over another in a work or training or
education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of
whether the demand, request or requirement for
submission is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment
environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a
condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or
continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual
favorable compensation, terms of
conditions, promotions, or privileges;
or the refusal to grant the sexual favor
results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in any
way would discriminate, deprive
ordiminish employment opportunities
or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the
employee's rights or privileges under
existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive
environment for the employee.
(b) In an education or training environment,
sexual harassment is committed:
(1) Against one who is under the care,
custody or supervision of the offender;
(2) Against one whose education,
training, apprenticeship or tutorship is
entrusted to the offender;
(3) When the sexual favor is made a
condition to the giving of a passing
grade, or the granting of honors and
scholarships, or the payment of a
stipend, allowance or other benefits,
privileges, or consideration; or
(4) When the sexual advances result
in an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the student, trainee or
apprentice.
Any person who directs or induces another to
commit any act of sexual harassment as herein
defined, or who cooperates in the commission
thereof by another without which it would not
have been committed, shall also be held liable
under this Act.
Section 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a
Work-related, Education or Training Environment. - It
shall be the duty of the employer or the head of the
work-related, educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of
sexual harassment and to provide the procedures for the
resolution, settlement or prosecution of acts of sexual
harassment. Towards this end, the employer or head of
office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and
regulations in consultation with and joint1y
approved by the employees or students or
trainees, through their duly designated
representatives, prescribing the procedure for
the investigation of sexual harassment cases
and the administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a bar to
prosecution in the proper courts for unlawful
acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued pursuant
to this subsection (a) shall include, among
others, guidelines on proper decorum in the
workplace and educational or training
institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum and
investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the
case may be, with officers and employees,
teachers, instructors, professors, coaches,
trainors, and students or trainees to increase
understanding and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the
committee shall be composed of at least one
(1) representative each from the management,
the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file
employees.
In the case of the educational or training
institution, the committee shall be composed of
at least one (1) representative from the
administration, the trainors, instructors,
professors or coaches and students or trainees,
as the case may be.
The employer or head of office, educational or
training institution shall disseminate or post a
copy of this Act for the information of all
concerned.
Section 5. Liability of the Employer, Head of Office,
Educational or Training Institution. - The employer or
head of office, educational or training institution shall be
solidarily liable for damages arising from the acts of
sexual harassment committed in the employment,
education
or training environment if the employer or head of office,
educational or training institution is informed of such acts
by the offended party and no immediate action is taken.
Section 6. Independent Action for Damages. - Nothing
in this Act shall preclude the victim of work, education or
training-related sexual harassment from instituting a
separate and independent action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Section 7. Penalties. - Any person who violates the
provisions of this Act shall, upon conviction, be penalized
by imprisonment of not less than one (1) month nor more
than six (6) months, or a fine of not less than Ten
thousand pesos (P10,000) nor more than Twenty
thousand pesos (P20,000), or both such fine and
imprisonment at the discretion of the court.
Any action arising from the violation of the provisions of
this Act shall prescribe in three (3) years.
Section 8. Separability Clause. - If any portion or
provision of this Act is declared void or unconstitutional,
the remaining portions or provisions hereof shall not be
affected by such declaration.
Section 9. Repealing Clause. - All laws, decrees, orders,
rules and regulations, other issuances, or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
Section 10. Effectivity Clause.- This Act shall take effect
fifteen (15) days after its complete publication in at least
two (2) national newspapers of general circulation.
G.R. No. 155831 February 18, 2008
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, petitioner,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 155840 February 18, 2008
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, petitioner,
vs.
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO V.
ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive Secretary;
ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity as Chairman of the
National Labor Relations Commission (in lieu of
RAUL T. AQUINO, in his capacity as Acting Chairman
of the National labor Relations Commission); and
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO, respondents.
x-------------------------x
G.R. No. 158700 February 18, 2008
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, represented
by the OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO
G. ROMULO, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary, petitioners,
vs.
ROGELIO I. RAYALA, respondent.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced
"superiority" which is enough to dampen an employee’s
spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects her
sense of judgment; it changes her life.1
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review
on Certiorari assailing the October 18, 2002 Resolution
of the CA’s Former Ninth Division2 in CA-G.R. SP No.
61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001
Decision3 of the Court of Appeals’ Eleventh Division,
which had affirmed the Decision of the Office of the
President (OP) dismissing from the service then National
Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio
I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual
antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo
(Domingo), then Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC,
filed a Complaint for sexual harassment against Rayala
before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the
Department of Labor and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit
narrating the incidences of sexual harassment
complained of, thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang
ako ni Chairman Rayala ng mga salitang "Lot,
gumaganda ka yata?"
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na
ako ni Chairman at hahawakan ang aking
balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay
nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng
diktasyon. Sa mga pagkakataong ito,
kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari
sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na
nangyari na noon tungkol sa mga sekretarya
niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga mahahalay na
panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako
ay nasa 8th Floor, may nagsabi sa akin na
kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung
nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may
koreksyon daw na gagawin sa mga papel na
tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para gawin ito.
Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman
Rayala sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako
ni Chairman na sumunod sa kaniyang silid.
Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba
ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol
sa mga personal na bagay sa aking buhay. Ang
ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang,
kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na
raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo
nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
 Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso
mo ay kumuha ka ng Law at ako ang
bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa ang
Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa
kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko
kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo.
Ayusin mo ang dapat ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-
aalinlangan. Natatakot at kinakabahan na
kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya
magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa
akin kung saan-saan opisina o kaya ay
tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang
pera. Ayaw ko ng may makaka-alam
nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa
diyan sa labas. But I don’t give them a
damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa kanila.
Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako
ng 8th Floor at pumunta ako sa officemate ko na
si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari
sa akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang
kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay binilang namin
ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong
piso (PHP 3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko
raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay natatakot
ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay
EC Perlita Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang
nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera at
noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong
isauli na nga ito ngunit hindi ako nagkaroon ng
pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging bisita.
Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes,
Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay
may tinanong din sa akin si Chairman Rayala
na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at
tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang
mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa
amin ang may ka live-in.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon
ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan
ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin
ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok
sa kwarto ni Chairman Rayala. Ito ay sa
kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng
kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza
Ocampo, ay naka-leave kaya ako ang nag-
asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang
mabigyan ko na ng fax tone yung kausap ko,
pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa
dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala. Tinitingnan
ako sa mata at ang titig niya ay umuusad mula
ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may
mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring
petsa, may nag-aapply na sekretarya sa
opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung
applicant, mag-papainterview po yata
sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap
smear muna siya
Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex.
(Alex Lopez, Chief of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag
ni Chairman Rayala sa kaniyang opisina upang
kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA
Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang
talata, may pumasok na bisita si Chairman, si
Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza
Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman.
Nang maka-alis na si Ms. Pangilinan,
pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako.
Lumapit sa likuran ko si Chairman, hinawakan
ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng kanang
kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang
nag-didikta. Huminto siya pagkatapos, at
nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking
kanang balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay
pinagapang niya ito sa kanang bahagi ng aking
leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at
saka kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay
sa pamamagitan ng aking kaliwang kamay. At
saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin
niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya
pero halos hindi ko na maintindihan ang na-
isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman
ko.4
After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave
of absence and asked to be immediately transferred.
Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No.
250, the Rules and Regulations Implementing RA 7877
in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary
referred the Complaint to the OP, Rayala being a
presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary
Laguesma to investigate the allegations in the Complaint
and create a committee for such purpose. On December
4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative
Order (AO) No. 280, Series of 1998,5 constituting a
Committee on Decorum and Investigation (Committee)
in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-
Sexual Harassment Act of 1995.6
The Committee heard the parties and received their
respective evidence. On March 2, 2000, the Committee
submitted its report and recommendation to Secretary
Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged
and recommended the imposition of the minimum
penalty provided under AO 250, which it erroneously
stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a
copy of the Committee Report and Recommendation to
the OP, but with the recommendation that the penalty
should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day,
in accordance with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary
Zamora, issued AO 119,7 the pertinent portions of which
read:
Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on
record, I concur with the findings of the
Committee as to the culpability of the
respondent [Rayala], the same having been
established by clear and convincing evidence.
However, I disagree with the recommendation
that respondent be meted only the penalty of
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day
considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondent’s situation is the
undeniable circumstance that he took
advantage of his position as the superior of the
complainant. Respondent occupies the highest
position in the NLRC, being its Chairman. As
head of said office, it was incumbent upon
respondent to set an example to the others as
to how they should conduct themselves in
public office, to see to it that his subordinates
work efficiently in accordance with Civil Service
Rules and Regulations, and to provide them
with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-
workers treat each other with respect, courtesy
and cooperation, so that in the end the public
interest will be benefited (City Mayor of
Zamboanga vs. Court of Appeals, 182 SCRA
785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the
utmost integrity and strictest discipline (Gano
vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a
public servant must exhibit at all times the
highest sense of honesty and integrity, and
"utmost devotion and dedication to duty" (Sec.
4 (g), RA 6713), respect the rights of others and
shall refrain from doing acts contrary to law,
and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the
Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public
office is a public trust, and enjoins all public
officers and employees to serve with the
highest degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty
and efficiency (Section 1, Article XI, 1987
Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see
respondent’s acts not just [as] a failure to give
due courtesy and respect to his co-employees
(subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and
behavior but defiance of the basic norms or
virtues which a government official must at all
times uphold, one that is contrary to law and
"public sense of morality." Otherwise stated,
respondent – to whom stricter standards must
apply being the highest official [of] the NLRC –
had shown an attitude, a frame of mind, a
disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to
remain in the service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing,
respondent Rogelio I. Rayala, Chairman,
National Labor Relations Commission, is found
guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and
immoral conduct and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service effective
upon receipt of this Order.
SO ORDER[ED].
Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP
denied in a Resolution8 dated May 24, 2000. He then
filed a Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer
for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on
June 14, 2000.9 However, the same was dismissed in a
Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for disregarding the
hierarchy of courts.10 Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration11 on August 15, 2000. In its
Resolution12 dated September 4, 2000, the Court
recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition
to the Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.
The CA rendered its Decision13 on December 14, 2001.
It held that there was sufficient evidence on record to
create moral certainty that Rayala committed the acts he
was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete
with details. Her straightforward and uninhibited
testimony was not emasculated by the
declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his
witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not
proven any vicious motive for Domingo and her
witnesses to invent their stories. It is very
unlikely that they would perjure themselves only
to accommodate the alleged conspiracy to oust
petitioner from office. Save for his empty
conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to
substantiate his contrived conspiracy. It is a
hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be
proved by positive and convincing evidence
(People v. Noroña, 329 SCRA 502 [2000]).
Besides, it is improbable that the complainant
would concoct a story of sexual harassment
against the highest official of the NLRC and
thereby expose herself to the possibility of
losing her job, or be the subject of reprisal from
her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she
was not telling the truth.
It also held that Rayala’s dismissal was proper. The CA
pointed out that Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful
and immoral conduct in violation of RA 6713, the Code
of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees. It held that the OP was correct in
concluding that Rayala’s acts violated RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding
the Chairmanship of the National Labor
Relations Commission, entrusted with the
sacred duty of administering justice. Occupying
as he does such an exalted position,
Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for
the honor bestowed upon him. He must
comport himself at all times in such a manner
that the conduct of his everyday life should be
beyond reproach and free from any impropriety.
That the acts complained of were committed
within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded
the objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By
daring to violate the complainant within the
solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala
placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His
disgraceful and immoral conduct warrants his
removal from office.14
Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:
IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the
instant petition is hereby DISMISSED and
Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the
Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P.
Case No. 00-E-9118 dated May 24, 2000 are
AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.15
Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration.
Justices Vasquez and Tolentino voted to affirm the
December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes
dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty
imposable is suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day.16 Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a Special
Division of Five was constituted.17 In its October 18,
2002 Resolution, the CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December
[14], 2001 is MODIFIED to the effect that the
penalty of dismissal is DELETED and instead
the penalty of suspension from service for the
maximum period of one (1) year is HEREBY
IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of the
challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.
Domingo filed a Petition for Review 18 before this Court,
which we denied in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for
having a defective verification. She filed a Motion for
Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the
petition was reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review19 with this
Court essentially arguing that he is not guilty of any act
of sexual harassment.
Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for
Reconsideration of the CA’s October 18, 2002
Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public
respondents’ Motion for Reconsideration, (sic)
is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.20
On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation
of the three (3) petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CA’s resolution modifying the
penalty imposed by the Office of the President. She
raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the
penalty for the respondent from dismissal to
suspension from service for the maximum
period of one year. The President has the
prerogative to determine the proper penalty to
be imposed on an erring Presidential
appointee. The President was well within his
power when he fittingly used that prerogative in
deciding to dismiss the respondent from the
service.21
She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a
presidential appointee, is lodged with the President who
has control of the entire Executive Department, its
bureaus and offices. The OP’s decision was arrived at
after affording Rayala due process. Hence, his dismissal
from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with the
President.22
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the
same was not intended to cover cases against
presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to the
instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the disciplining
authority, and thus, the AO does not circumscribe the
power of the President to dismiss an erring presidential
appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
COURT OF APPEALS, THE ACTS OF
HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT CONSTITUTE
SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN BY
THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE
OF AQUINO vs. ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS
IN THE APPLICATION OF EXISTING LAWS.
II. CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT
IS AN INDISPENSABLE ELEMENT IN A
CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT. THE
HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS
FINDING THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS
MALUM PROHIBITUM.
III. THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE
OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS,
HAS MISAPPLIED AND EXPANDED THE
DEFINITION OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN
THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No. 7877,
BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS
COUNTER TO THE RECENT
PRONOUNCEMENTS OF THIS HONORABLE
SUPREME COURT.23
Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,24 Rayala argues that the case
is the definitive ruling on what constitutes sexual
harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual harassment
to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand,
request, or requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is
made a pre-condition to hiring, re-employment, or
continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results
in discrimination against the employee.
Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and
establish any sexual favor, demand, or request from
petitioner in exchange for her continued employment or
for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed
to him are without malice or ulterior motive. It was
merely Domingo’s perception of malice in his alleged
acts – a "product of her own imagination" 25 – that led her
to file the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OP’s interpretation, as
upheld by the CA, that RA 7877 is malum
prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is
unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is
considered an offense against a particular person, not
against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is
an essential element of the offense because the law
requires as a conditio sine qua non that a sexual favor
be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain
specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with
the perpetrator’s deliberate intent to commit the
offense.26
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts
proscribed in RA 7877. In particular, he assails the
definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment.
– Sexual harassment may be committed in any
of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of
affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors
including but not limited to going out on dates,
outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature
or for purposes of sexual gratification which is
generally annoying, disgusting or offensive to
the victim.27
He posits that these acts alone without corresponding
demand, request, or requirement do not constitute
sexual harassment as contemplated by the law.28 He
alleges that the rule-making power granted to the
employer in Section 4(a) of RA 7877 is limited only to
procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer the power to promulgate rules which would
provide other or additional forms of sexual harassment,
or to come up with its own definition of sexual
harassment.29
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the
Philippines may validly dismiss respondent
Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for
committing acts of sexual harassment.30
The Republic argues that Rayala’s acts constitute sexual
harassment under AO 250. His acts constitute
unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are
acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally
annoying or offensive to the victim.31
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CA’s
reduction of the penalty imposed by the OP. Rayala’s
dismissal is valid and warranted under the
circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC
Chairman solely rests upon the President, limited only by
the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250
provides only a one (1) year suspension, it will not
prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of
dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala
is a presidential appointee, he is still subject to the Civil
Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law, disgraceful
and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala,
constitute grave misconduct punishable by dismissal
from the service.32 The Republic adds that Rayala’s
position is invested with public trust and his acts violated
that trust; thus, he should be dismissed from the service.
This argument, according to the Republic, is also
supported by Article 215 of the Labor Code, which states
that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until he
reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior.33 Since
Rayala’s security of tenure is conditioned upon his good
behavior, he may be removed from office if it is proven
that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be
summed up in two ultimate questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?
Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue
raised by Rayala. He accuses the Office of the Solicitor
General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of forum
shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of
the decision in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a
comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an
adverse judgment or order has been rendered in one
forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special
civil action for certiorari.34 It consists of filing multiple
suits involving the same parties for the same cause of
action, either simultaneously or successively, for the
purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.35
There is forum shopping when the following elements
concur: (1) identity of the parties or, at least, of the
parties who represent the same interest in both actions;
(2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as
the latter is founded on the same set of facts; and (3)
identity of the two preceding particulars such that any
judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res
judicata in the action under consideration or will
constitute litis pendentia.36
Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases,
we note that the CA rendered the assailed Resolution on
October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its Motion for
Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other
hand, Rayala filed his petition before this Court on
November 21, 2002. While the Republic’s Motion for
Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA,
on December 2, 2002, it was directed by this Court to file
its Comment on Rayala’s petition, which it submitted on
June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the
Republic filed its own Petition for Review with this Court
on July 3, 2003. It cited in its "Certification and
Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping" (sic), that there
was a case involving the same facts pending before this
Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With respect to
Domingo’s petition, the same had already been
dismissed on February 19, 2003. Domingo’s petition was
reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution was
received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it
had filed its own petition.37
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG
is guilty of forum shopping. We must point out that it was
Rayala who filed the petition in the CA, with the Republic
as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CA’s December 21, 2001
Decision, which led to a more favorable ruling, i.e., the
lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year
suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling
(Domingo and the Republic) had the right to question the
same on motion for reconsideration. But Domingo
directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did
Rayala. When the Republic opted to file a motion for
reconsideration, it was merely exercising a right. That
Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases
before the SC did not take away this right. Thus, when
this Court directed the Republic to file its Comment on
Rayala’s petition, it had to comply, even if it had an
unresolved motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it
be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG "file[d]
multiple suits involving the same parties for the same
cause of action, either simultaneously or successively,
for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment."
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.
It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated
on the case were unanimous in upholding the findings of
the Committee and the OP. They found the assessment
made by the Committee and the OP to be a "meticulous
and dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the
complainant (Domingo), the respondent (Rayala), and
their respective witnesses." 38 They differed only on the
appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of – and
was guilty of sexual harassment – is, therefore, the
common factual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA.
It should be remembered that when supported by
substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasi-
judicial and administrative bodies are accorded great
respect and even finality by the courts.39 The principle,
therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.40
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule.
There appears no valid ground for this Court to review
the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the
Investigating Committee. These findings are now
conclusive on the Court. And quite significantly, Rayala
himself admits to having committed some of the acts
imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute
sexual harassment, because Domingo did not allege in
her complaint that there was a demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her
continued employment or for her promotion to a higher
position.41 Rayala urges us to apply to his case our ruling
in Aquino v. Acosta.42
We find respondent’s insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability
rule, which states that the wrongful acts or omissions of
a public officer may give rise to civil, criminal and
administrative liability. An action for each can proceed
independently of the others.43 This rule applies with full
force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction
is RA 7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related
sexual harassment in this wise:
Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related
Sexual Harassment Defined. – Work, education
or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, manager,
supervisor, agent of the employer, teacher,
instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other
person who, having authority, influence or
moral ascendancy over another in a work or
training or education environment, demands,
requests or otherwise requires any sexual favor
from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission
is accepted by the object of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment
environment, sexual harassment is committed
when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in
the hiring or in the employment, re-employment
or continued employment of said individual, or
in granting said individual favorable
compensation, terms, conditions, promotions,
or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or
classifying the employee which in a way would
discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said
employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the
employee’s rights or privileges under existing
labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an
intimidating, hostile, or offensive environment
for the employee.
This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties,
defines the criminal aspect of the unlawful act of sexual
harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6,
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action
for damages and other affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the
procedure for administrative cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office
in a Work-related, Education or Training
Environment. – It shall be the duty of the
employer or the head of the work-related,
educational or training environment or
institution, to prevent or deter the commission
of acts of sexual harassment and to provide the
procedures for the resolution, settlement or
prosecution of acts of sexual harassment.
Towards this end, the employer or head of
office shall:
(a) Promulgate appropriate rules and
regulations in consultation with and
jointly approved by the employees or
students or trainees, through their duly
designated representatives,
prescribing the procedure for the
investigation or sexual harassment
cases and the administrative sanctions
therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a
bar to prosecution in the proper courts
for unlawful acts of sexual
harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued
pursuant to this section (a) shall
include, among others, guidelines on
proper decorum in the workplace and
educational or training institutions.
(b) Create a committee on decorum
and investigation of cases on sexual
harassment. The committee shall
conduct meetings, as the case may
be, with other officers and employees,
teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or
trainees to increase understanding
and prevent incidents of sexual
harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases
constituting sexual harassment.
In the case of a work-related environment, the
committee shall be composed of at least one
(1) representative each from the management,
the union, if any, the employees from the
supervisory rank, and from the rank and file
employees.
In the case of the educational or training
institution, the committee shall be composed of
at least one (1) representative from the
administration, the trainors, teachers,
instructors, professors or coaches and students
or trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or
training institution shall disseminate or post a
copy of this Act for the information of all
concerned.
The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayala’s culpability is
not to be determined solely on the basis of Section 3, RA
7877, because he is charged with the administrative
offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual
harassment.44 It should be enough that the CA, along
with the Investigating Committee and the Office of the
President, found substantial evidence to support the
administrative charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayala’s acts strictly by the
standards set in Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be
administratively liable. It is true that this provision calls
for a "demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor."
But it is not necessary that the demand, request or
requirement of a sexual favor be articulated in a
categorical oral or written statement. It may be
discerned, with equal certitude, from the acts of the
offender. Holding and squeezing Domingo’s shoulders,
running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear,
having inappropriate conversations with her, giving her
money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of
future privileges, and making statements with
unmistakable sexual overtones – all these acts of Rayala
resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for
a sexual favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayala’s claim, it is not essential
that the demand, request or requirement be made as a
condition for continued employment or for promotion to a
higher position. It is enough that the respondent’s acts
result in creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive
environment for the employee.45 That the acts of Rayala
generated an intimidating and hostile environment for
Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding
of the Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that
Domingo reported the matter to an officemate and, after
the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and
requested transfer to another unit.
Rayala’s invocation of Aquino v. Acosta46 is misplaced,
because the factual setting in that case is different from
that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty. Susan Aquino,
Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax
Appeals (CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now
Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta of sexual harassment.
She complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta
allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm
around her shoulder. The case was referred to CA
Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her
report, Justice Salonga found that "the complainant
failed to show by convincing evidence that the acts of
Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in
a `beso-beso’ fashion, were carried out with lustful and
lascivious desires or were motivated by malice or ill
motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of
the kissing incidents were done on festive and special
occasions," and they "took place in the presence of other
people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or
happiness of the moment." Thus, Justice Salonga
concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the
respondent's pecks on the cheeks of the
complainant should be understood in the
context of having been done on the occasion of
some festivities, and not the assertion of the
latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta
in his kissing escapades. The busses on her
cheeks were simply friendly and innocent,
bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that
respondent judge kisses other people on the
cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without
malice, was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P.
Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem and Ms. Ma.
Fides Balili, who stated that they usually
practice 'beso-beso' or kissing on the cheeks,
as a form of greeting on occasions when they
meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New
Year's Day and even Valentine's Day, and it
does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's
 birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco
Bactat, a lawyer who belongs to complainant's
department, further attested that on occasions
like birthdays, respondent judge would likewise
greet her with a peck on the cheek in a 'beso-
beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several
festive occasions, female employees of the
CTA pecked respondent judge on the cheek
where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's
well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed
transpired on those six occasions. Judge
Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her
cheek were merely forms of greetings, casual
and customary in nature. No evidence of intent
to sexually harass complainant was apparent,
only that the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were
given malicious connotations by the
complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to
anyone what happened to her. Undeniably,
there is no manifest sexual undertone in all
those incidents.47
This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge
Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in
the case at bench. While in Aquino, the Court interpreted
the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or
special occasions and with other people present, in the
instant case, Rayala’s acts of holding and squeezing
Domingo’s shoulders, running his fingers across her
neck and tickling her ear, and the inappropriate
comments, were all made in the confines of Rayala’s
office when no other members of his staff were around.
More importantly, and a circumstance absent in Aquino,
Rayala’s acts, as already adverted to above, produced a
hostile work environment for Domingo, as shown by her
having reported the matter to an officemate and, after
the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and
requesting transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him.
First, he argues that AO 250 does not cover the NLRC,
which, at the time of the incident, was under the DOLE
only for purposes of program and policy coordination.
Second, he posits that even assuming AO 250 is
applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its coverage
because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO
250 covers Rayala is of no real consequence. The
events of this case unmistakably show that the
administrative charges against Rayala were for violation
of RA 7877; that the OP properly assumed jurisdiction
over the administrative case; that the participation of the
DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary,
was limited to initiating the investigation process,
reception of evidence of the parties, preparation of the
investigation report, and recommending the appropriate
action to be taken by the OP. AO 250 had never really
been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it was to
serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the
Committee in the orderly conduct of the investigation.
Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that
sexual harassment is an offense malum prohibitum. He
argues that intent is an essential element in sexual
harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were
done allegedly without malice, he should be absolved of
the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is
an administrative case for sexual harassment. Thus,
whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in
se or malum prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayala’s allegations that the charges
were filed because of a conspiracy to get him out of
office and thus constitute merely political harassment. A
conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing
evidence. His bare assertions cannot stand against the
evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already
ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as
fact. Moreover, he has not proven any ill motive on the
part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be
ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On
the contrary, ill motive is belied by the fact that Domingo
and her witnesses – all employees of the NLRC at that
time – stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant
consequences for coming forward and charging their
boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his
right to due process. He accuses the Committee on
Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA 7877.
He also scored the OP’s decision finding him guilty of
"disgraceful and immoral conduct" under the Revised
Administrative Code and not for violation of RA 7877.
Considering that he was not tried for "disgraceful and
immoral conduct," he argues that the verdict is a "sham
and total nullity."
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due
process. In previous cases, this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process
has been recognized to include the following:
(1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect
a respondent’s legal rights; (2) a real
opportunity to be heard personally or with the
assistance of counsel, to present witnesses and
evidence in one’s favor, and to defend one’s
rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent
jurisdiction and so constituted as to afford a
person charged administratively a reasonable
guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality;
and (4) a finding by said tribunal which is
supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in
the records or made known to the parties
affected.48
The records of the case indicate that Rayala was
afforded all these procedural due process safeguards.
Although in the beginning he questioned the authority of
the Committee to try him,49 he appeared, personally and
with counsel, and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even
in criminal cases, the designation of the offense is not
controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the
complaint, nor the designation of the offense
charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere
conclusions of law made by the prosecutor, but
the description of the crime charged and the
particular facts therein recited. The acts or
omissions complained of must be alleged in
such form as is sufficient to enable a person of
common understanding to know what offense is
intended to be charged, and enable the court to
pronounce proper judgment. No information for
 a crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately
and clearly allege the elements of the crime
charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and
circumstances are necessary to be included
therein must be determined by reference to the
definitions and essentials of the specified
crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to
inform the accused of the nature of the
accusation against him so as to enable him to
suitably prepare his defense.50
It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment
amounts to disgraceful and immoral conduct.51 Thus,
any finding of liability for sexual harassment may also be
the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that
Rayala committed sexual harassment, we now
determine the proper penalty to be imposed.
Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He
alleges that under the pertinent Civil Service Rules,
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1)
day to one (1) year. He also argues that since he is
charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of
imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is
suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year, while the penalty for the second offense is
dismissal.52 On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI
of the Omnibus Rules Implementing Book V of the
Administrative Code of 198753 and Section 52 A(15) of
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service54 both provide that the first offense of
disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1)
year. A second offense is punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall
hold office during good behavior until he or she
reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner removed
for cause as provided by law or becomes
incapacitated to discharge the duties of the office.55
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the
proper disciplining authority, who would determine
whether there is a valid cause for the removal of Rayala
as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by
the phrase "for cause as provided by law." Thus, when
the President found that Rayala was indeed guilty of
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did
not have unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other
than the penalty provided by law for such offense. As
cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of
either the administrative offense of sexual harassment or
for disgraceful and immoral conduct is suspension of six
(6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. Accordingly,
it was error for the Office of the President to impose
upon Rayala the penalty of dismissal from the service, a
penalty which can only be imposed upon commission of
a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala
took advantage of his high government position, it still
could not validly dismiss him from the service. Under
the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in
the Civil Service,56 taking undue advantage of a
subordinate may be considered as an aggravating
circumstance57 and where only aggravating and no
mitigating circumstances are present, the maximum
penalty shall be imposed.58Hence, the maximum penalty
that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1)
year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman,
with the rank equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not
unavailing that rigid standards of conduct may be
demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,59 this
Court, in upholding the liability of therein respondent
Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated
by the fact that complainant is one of his
subordinates over whom he exercises control
and supervision, he being the executive judge.
He took advantage of his position and power in
order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of he being in loco
parentis over his subordinate employees,
respondent was the one who preyed on them,
taking advantage of his superior position.
In yet another case, this Court declared:
As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound
by more exacting work ethics. He failed to live
up to his higher standard of responsibility when
he succumbed to his moral perversity. And
when such moral perversity is perpetrated
against his subordinate, he provides a
justifiable ground for his dismissal for lack of
trust and confidence. It is the right, nay, the
duty of every employer to protect its employees
from oversexed superiors.60
It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example
on how his employees should conduct themselves in
public office, so that they may work efficiently in a
healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he
should set a good example.61
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain
effort to effect his exoneration. He even puts Domingo’s
character in question and casts doubt on the morality of
the former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his
dismissal from the service. Unfortunately for him, these
are not significant factors in the disposition of the case. It
is his character that is in question here and sadly, the
inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the
October 18, 2002 Resolution of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 61026 is AFFIRMED. Consequently,
the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and 158700
are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic Act No. 9344
AN ACT ESTABLISHING A COMPREHENSIVE
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM,
CREATING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
COUNCIL UNDER THE DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE,
APPROPRIATING FUNDS THEREFOR AND FOR
OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
TITLE
GOVERNING PRINCIPLES
CHAPTER 1 the law.
TITLE, POLICY AND DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 1. Short Title and Scope. - This Act shall be
known as the "Juvenile Justice and Welfare Act of
2006."It shall cover the different stages involving
children at risk and children in conflict with the law from
prevention to rehabilitation and reintegration.
SEC. 2. Declaration of State Policy. - The following
State policies shall be observed at all times:
(a) The State recognizes the vital role of
children and youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral,
spiritual, intellectual and social well-being. It
shall inculcate in the youth patriotism and
nationalism, and encourage their involvement in
public and civic affairs.
(b) The State shall protect the best interests of
the child through measures that will ensure the
observance of international standards of child
protection, especially those to which the
Philippines is a party. Proceedings before any
authority shall be conducted in the best interest
of the child and in a manner which allows the
child to participate and to express
himself/herself freely. The participation of
children in the program and policy formulation
and implementation related to juvenile justice
and welfare shall be ensured by the concerned
government agency.
(c) The State likewise recognizes the right of
children to assistance, including proper care
and nutrition, and special protection from all
forms of neglect, abuse, cruelty and
exploitation, and other conditions prejudicial to
their development.
(d) Pursuant to Article 40 of the United Nations
Convention on the Rights of the Child, the State
recognizes the right of every child alleged as,
accused of, adjudged, or recognized as having
infringed the penal law to be treated in a
manner consistent with the promotion of the
child's sense of dignity and worth, taking into
account the child's age and desirability of
promoting his/her reintegration. Whenever
appropriate and desirable, the State shall adopt
measures for dealing with such children without
resorting to judicial proceedings, providing that
human rights and legal safeguards are fully
respected. It shall ensure that children are dealt
with in a manner appropriate to their well-being
by providing for, among others, a variety of
disposition measures such as care, guidance
and supervision orders, counseling, probation,
foster care, education and vocational training
programs and other alternatives to institutional
care.
(e) The administration of the juvenile justice
and welfare system shall take into
consideration the cultural and religious
perspectives of the Filipino people, particularly
the indigenous peoples and the Muslims,
consistent with the protection of the rights of
children belonging to these communities.
I (f) The State shall apply the principles of
restorative justice in all its laws, policies and
programs applicable to children in conflict with
SEC. 3. Liberal Construction of this Act. - In case of
doubt, the interpretation of any of the provisions of this
Act, including its implementing rules and regulations
(IRRs), shall be construed liberally in favor of the child in
conflict with the law.
SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. - The following terms as
used in this Act shall be defined as follows:
(a) "Bail" refers to the security given for the
release of the person in custody of the law,
furnished by him/her or a bondsman, to
guarantee his/her appearance before any court.
Bail may be given in the form of corporate
security, property bond, cash deposit, or
recognizance.
(b) "Best Interest of the Child" refers to the
totality of the circumstances and conditions
which are most congenial to the survival,
protection and feelings of security of the child
and most encouraging to the child's physical,
psychological and emotional development. It
also means the least detrimental available
alternative for safeguarding the growth and
development of the child.
(e) "Child" refers to a person under the age of
eighteen (18) years.
(d) "Child at Risk" refers to a child who is
vulnerable to and at the risk of committing
criminal offenses because of personal, family
and social circumstances, such as, but not
limited to, the following:
(1) being abused by any person
through sexual, physical,
psychological, mental, economic or
any other means and the parents or
guardian refuse, are unwilling, or
unable to provide protection for the
child;
(2) being exploited including sexually
or economically;
(3) being abandoned or neglected,
and after diligent search and inquiry,
the parent or guardian cannot be
found;
(4) coming from a dysfunctional or
broken family or without a parent or
guardian;
(5) being out of school;
(6) being a streetchild;
(7) being a member of a gang;
(8) living in a community with a high
level of criminality or drug abuse; and
 (9) living in situations of armed
conflict.
(e) "Child in Conflict with the Law" refers to a
child who is alleged as, accused of, or
adjudged as, having committed an offense
under Philippine laws.
(f) "Community-based Programs" refers to the
programs provided in a community setting
developed for purposes of intervention and
diversion, as well as rehabilitation of the child in
conflict with the law, for reintegration into
his/her family and/or community.
(g) "Court" refers to a family court or, in places
where there are no family courts, any regional
trial court.
(h) "Deprivation of Liberty" refers to any form of
detention or imprisonment, or to the placement
of a child in conflict with the law in a public or
private custodial setting, from which the child in
conflict with the law is not permitted to leave at
will by order of any judicial or administrative
authority.
(i) "Diversion" refers to an alternative, child-
appropriate process of determining the
responsibility and treatment of a child in conflict
with the law on the basis of his/her social,
cultural, economic, psychological or educational
background without resorting to formal court
proceedings.
(j) "Diversion Program" refers to the program
that the child in conflict with the law is required
to undergo after he/she is found responsible for
an offense without resorting to formal court
proceedings.
(k) "Initial Contact With-the Child" refers to the
apprehension or taking into custody of a child in
conflict with the law by law enforcement officers
or private citizens. It includes the time when the
child alleged to be in conflict with the law
receives a subpoena under Section 3(b) of Rule
112 of the Revised Rules of Criminal Procedure
or summons under Section 6(a) or Section 9(b)
of the same Rule in cases that do not require
preliminary investigation or where there is no
necessity to place the child alleged to be in
conflict with the law under immediate custody.
(I) "Intervention" refers to a series of activities
which are designed to address issues that
caused the child to commit an offense. It may
take the form of an individualized treatment
program which may include counseling, skills
training, education, and other activities that will
enhance his/her psychological, emotional and
psycho-social well-being.
(m) "Juvenile Justice and Welfare System"
refers to a system dealing with children at risk
and children in conflict with the law, which
provides child-appropriate proceedings,
including programs and services for prevention,
diversion, rehabilitation, re-integration and
aftercare to ensure their normal growth and
development.
(n) "Law Enforcement Officer" refers to the
person in authority or his/her agent as defined
in Article 152 of the Revised Penal Code,
including a barangay tanod.
(0) "Offense" refers to any act or omission
whether punishable under special laws or the
Revised Penal Code, as amended.
(p) "Recognizance" refers to an undertaking in
lieu of a bond assumed by a parent or
custodian who shall be responsible for the
appearance in court of the child in conflict with
the law, when required.
(q) "Restorative Justice" refers to a principle
which requires a process of resolving conflicts
with the maximum involvement of the victim,
the offender and the community. It seeks to
obtain reparation for the victim; reconciliation of
the offender, the offended and the community;
and reassurance to the offender that he/she
can be reintegrated into society. It also
enhances public safety by activating the
offender, the victim and the community in
prevention strategies.
(r) "Status Offenses" refers to offenses which
discriminate only against a child, while an adult
does not suffer any penalty for committing
similar acts. These shall include curfew
violations; truancy, parental disobedience and
the like.
(s) "Youth Detention Home" refers to a 24-hour
child-caring institution managed by accredited
local government units (LGUs) and licensed
and/or accredited nongovernment organizations
(NGOs) providing short-term residential care for
children in conflict with the law who are
awaiting court disposition of their cases or
transfer to other agencies or jurisdiction.
(t) "Youth Rehabilitation Center" refers to a 24-
hour residential care facility managed by the
Department of Social Welfare and Development
(DSWD), LGUs, licensed and/or accredited
NGOs monitored by the DSWD, which provides
care, treatment and rehabilitation services for
children in conflict with the law. Rehabilitation
services are provided under the guidance of a
trained staff where residents are cared for
under a structured therapeutic environment with
the end view of reintegrating them into their
families and communities as socially
functioning individuals. Physical mobility of
residents of said centers may be restricted
pending court disposition of the charges against
them.
(u) "Victimless Crimes" refers to offenses where
there is no private offended party.
CHAPTER 2
PRINCIPLES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 5. Rights of the Child in Conflict with the Law. -
Every child in conflict with the law shall have the
following rights, including but not limited to:
(a) the right not to be subjected to torture or
other cruel, inhuman or degrading treatment or
punishment;
(b) the right not to be imposed a sentence of
capital punishment or life imprisonment, without
the possibility of release;
(c) the right not to be deprived, unlawfully or
arbitrarily, of his/her liberty; detention or
imprisonment being a disposition of last resort,
and which shall be for the shortest appropriate
period of time;
(d) the right to be treated with humanity and
respect, for the inherent dignity of the person,
and in a manner which takes into account the
needs of a person of his/her age. In particular, a
child deprived of liberty shall be separated from
adult offenders at all times. No child shall be
detained together with adult offenders. He/She
shall be conveyed separately to or from court.
He/She shall await hearing of his/her own case
in a separate holding area. A child in conflict
with the law shall have the right to maintain
contact with his/her family through
correspondence and visits, save in exceptional
circumstances;
(e) the right to prompt access to legal and other
appropriate assistance, as well as the right to
challenge the legality of the deprivation of
his/her liberty before a court or other
competent, independent and impartial authority,
and to a prompt decision on such action;
(f) the right to bail and recognizance, in
appropriate cases;
(g) the right to testify as a witness in hid/her
own behalf under the rule on examination of a
child witness;
(h) the right to have his/her privacy respected
fully at all stages of the proceedings;
(i) the right to diversion if he/she is qualified and
voluntarily avails of the same;
(j) the right to be imposed a judgment in
proportion to the gravity of the offense where
his/her best interest, the rights of the victim and
the needs of society are all taken into
consideration by the court, under the principle
of restorative justice;
(k) the right to have restrictions on his/her
personal liberty limited to the minimum, and
where discretion is given by law to the judge to
determine whether to impose fine or
imprisonment, the imposition of fine being
preferred as the more appropriate penalty;
(I) in general, the right to automatic suspension
of sentence;
(m) the right to probation as an alternative to
imprisonment, if qualified under the Probation
Law;
(n) the right to be free from liability for perjury,
concealment or misrepresentation; and
(o) other rights as provided for under existing
laws, rules and regulations.
The State further adopts the provisions of the United
Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration
of Juvenile Justice or "Beijing Rules", United Nations
Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency or
the "Riyadh Guidelines", and the United Nations Rules
for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of Liberty.
SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal Responsibility. - A
child fifteen (15) years of age or under at the time of the
commission of the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to an
intervention program pursuant to Section 20 of this Act.
A child above fifteen (15) years but below eighteen (18)
years of age shall likewise be exempt from criminal
liability and be subjected to an intervention program,
unless he/she has acted with discernment, in which
case, such child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
The exemption from criminal liability herein established
does not include exemption from civil liability, which shall
be enforced in accordance with existing laws.
SEC. 7. Determination ofAge. - The child in conflict
with the law shall enjoy the presumption of minority.
He/She shall enjoy all the rights of a child in conflict with
the law until he/she is proven to be eighteen (18) years
old or older. The age of a child may be determined from
the child's birth certificate, baptismal certificate or any
other pertinent documents. In the absence of these
documents, age may be based on information from the
child himself/herself, testimonies of other persons, the
physical appearance of the child and other relevant
evidence. In case of doubt as to the age of the child, it
shall be resolved in his/her favor.
Any person contesting the age of the child in conflict with
the law prior to the filing of the information in any
appropriate court may file a case in a summary
proceeding for the determination of age before the
Family Court which shall decide the case within twenty-
four (24) hours from receipt of the appropriate pleadings
of all interested parties.
If a case has been fiied against the child in conflict with
the law and is pending in the appropriate court, the
person shall file a motion to determine the age of the
child in the same court where the case is pending.
Pending hearing on the said motion, proceedings on the
main case shall be suspended.
In all proceedings, law enforcement officers,
prosecutors, judges and other government officials
concerned shall exert all efforts at determining the age of
the child in conflict with the law.
TITLE II
STRUCTURES IN THE ADMINISTRATION OF
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE
SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC). - A Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC) is hereby created and attached to the
Department of Justice and placed under its
administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be chaired
by an undersecretary of the Department of Social
Welfare and Development. It shall ensure the effective
implementation of this Act and coordination among the
following agencies:
(a) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC);
(b) Department of Education (DepEd);
(c) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG);
(d) Public Attorney's Office (PAO);
(e) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
(f) Parole and Probation Administration (PPA)
(g) National Bureau of Investigation (NBI);
(h) Philippine National Police (PNP);.
(i) Bureau of Jail Management and Penology
(BJMP);
(i) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(k) Technical Education and Skills Development
Authority (TESDA);
(l) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(m) Other institutions focused on juvenile
justice and intervention programs.
The JJWC shall be composed of representatives, whose
ranks shall not be lower than director, to be designated
by the concerned heads of the following departments or
agencies:
(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
(b) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
(c) Council for the Welfare of Children (CWC)
(d) Department of Education (DepEd);
(e) Department of the Interior and Local
Government (DILG)
(f) Commission on Human Rights (CHR);
(g) National Youth Commission (NYC); and
(h) Two (2) representatives from NGOs, one to
be designated by the Secretary of Justice and
the other to be designated by the Secretary of
Social Welfare and Development.
The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15) days from
the effectivity of this Act. The Secretary of Justice and
the Secretary of Social Welfare and Development shall
determine the organizational structure and staffing
pattern of the JJWC.
The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of the Court
Administrator and the Philippine Judicial Academy to
ensure the realization of its mandate and the proper
discharge of its duties and functions, as herein provided.
SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. - The
JJWC shall have the following duties and functions:
(a) To oversee the implementation of this Act;
(b) To advise the President on all matters and
policies relating to juvenile justice and welfare;
(c) To assist the concerned agencies in the
review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the formulation of new
ones in line with the provisions of this Act;
(d) To periodically develop a comprehensive 3
to 5-year national juvenile intervention program,
with the participation of government agencies
concerned, NGOs and youth organizations;
(e) To coordinate the implementation of the
juvenile intervention programs and activities by
national government agencies and other
activities which may have an important bearing
on the success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs relating to
juvenile justice and welfare shall be adopted in
consultation with the JJWC;
(f) To formulate and recommend policies and
strategies in consultation with children for the
prevention of juvenile delinquency and the
administration of justice, as well as for the
treatment and rehabilitation of the children in
conflict with the law;
(g) To collect relevant information and conduct
continuing research and support evaluations
and studies on all matters relating to juvenile
justice and welfare, such as but not limited to:
(1) the performance and results
achieved by juvenile intervention
programs and by activities of the local
government units and other
government agencies;
(2) the periodic trends, problems and
causes of juvenile delinquency and
crimes; and
(3) the particular needs of children in
conflict with the law in custody.
The data gathered shall be used by the JJWC
in the improvement of the administration of
juvenile justice and welfare system.
The JJWC shall set up a mechanism to ensure
that children are involved in research and policy
development.
(h) Through duly designated persons and with
the assistance of the agencies provided in the
preceding section, to conduct regular
 inspections in detention and rehabilitation
facilities and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check compliance
with the standards provided herein and to make
the necessary recommendations to appropriate
agencies;
(i) To initiate and coordinate the conduct of
trainings for the personnel of the agencies
involved in the administration of the juvenile
justice and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program;
(j) To submit an annual report to the President
on the implementation of this Act; and
(k) To perform such other functions as may be
necessary to implement the provisions of this
Act.
SEC. 10. Policies and Procedures on Juvenile
Justice and Welfare. - All government agencies
enumerated in Section 8 shall, with the assistance of the
JJWC and within one (1) year from the effectivity of this
Act, draft policies and procedures consistent with the
standards set in the law. These policies and procedures
shall be modified accordingly in consultation with the
JJWC upon the completion of the national juvenile
intervention program as provided under Section 9 (d).
SEC. 11. Child Rights Center (CRC). - The existing
Child Rights Center of the Commission on Human
Rights shall ensure that the status, rights and interests of
children are upheld in accordance with the Constitution
and international instruments on human rights. The CHR
shall strengthen the monitoring of government
compliance of all treaty obligations, including the timely
and regular submission of reports before the treaty
bodies, as well as the implementation and dissemination
of recommendations and conclusions by government
agencies as well as NGOs and civil society.
TITLE III
PREVENTION OF JUVENILE DELINQUENCY
CHAPTER 1 COMPREHENSIVE
THE ROLE OF THE DIFFERENT SECTORS
SEC. 12. The Family. - The family shall be responsible
for the primary nurturing and rearing of children which is
critical in delinquency prevention. As far as practicable
and in accordance with the procedures of this Act, a
child in conflict with the law shall be maintained in
his/her family.
SEC. 13. The Educational System. - Educational
institutions shall work together with families, community
organizations and agencies in the prevention of juvenile
delinquency and in the rehabilitation and reintegration of
child in conflict with the law. Schools shall provide
adequate, necessary and individualized educational
schemes for children manifesting difficult behavior and
children in conflict with the law. In cases where children
in conflict with the law are taken into custody or detained
in rehabilitation centers, they should be provided the
opportunity to continue learning under an alternative
learning system with basic literacy program or non-
formal education accreditation equivalency system.
SEC. 14. The Role of the Mass Media. - The mass
media shall play an active role in the promotion of child
rights, and delinquency prevention by relaying consistent
messages through a balanced approach. Media
practitioners shall, therefore, have the duty to maintain
the highest critical and professional standards in
reporting and covering cases of children in conflict with
the law. In all publicity concerning children, the best
interest of the child should be the primordial and
paramount concern. Any undue, inappropriate and
sensationalized publicity of any case involving a child in
conflict with the law is hereby declared a violation of the
child's rights.
SEC. 15. Establishment and Strengthening of Local
Councils for the Protection of Children. - Local
Councils for the Protection of Children (LCPC) shall be
established in all levels of local government, and where
they have already been established, they shall be
strengthened within one (1) year from the effectivity of
this Act. Membership in the LCPC shall be chosen from
among the responsible members of the community,
including a representative from the youth sector, as well
as representatives from government and private
agencies concerned with the welfare of children.
The local council shall serve as the primary agency to
coordinate with and assist the LGU concerned for the
adoption of a comprehensive plan on delinquency
prevention, and to oversee its proper implementation.
One percent (1%) of the internal revenue allotment of
barangays, municipalities and cities shall be allocated for
the strengthening and implementation of the programs of
the LCPC: Provided, That the disbursement of the fund
shall be made by the LGU concerned.
SEC. 16. Appointment of Local Social Welfare and
Development Officer. - All LGUs shall appoint a duly
licensed social worker as its local social welfare and
development officer tasked to assist children in conflict
with the law.
SEC. 17. The Sangguniang Kabataan. - The
Sangguniang Kabataan (SK) shall coordinate with the
LCPC in the formulation and implementation of juvenile
intervention and diversion programs in the community.
CHAPTER 2
JUVENILE INTERVENTION
PROGRAM
SEC. 18. Development of a Comprehensive Juvenile
Intervention Program. - A Comprehensive juvenile
intervention program covering at least a 3-year period
shall be instituted in LGUs from the barangay to the
provincial level.
The LGUs shall set aside an amount necessary to
implement their respective juvenile intervention
programs in their annual budget.
The LGUs, in coordination with the LCPC, shall call on
all sectors concerned, particularly the child-focused
institutions, NGOs, people's organizations, educational
institutions and government agencies involved in
delinquency prevention to participate in the planning
process and implementation of juvenile intervention
programs. Such programs shall be implemented
consistent with the national program formulated and
designed by the JJWC. The implementation of the
comprehensive juvenile intervention program shall be
reviewed and assessed annually by the LGUs in
coordination with the LCPC. Results of the assessment
shall be submitted by the provincial and city
governments to the JJWC not later than March 30 of
every year.
SEC. 19. Community-based Programs on Juvenile
Justice and Welfare. - Community-based programs on
juvenile justice and welfare shall be instituted by the
LGUs through the LCPC, school, youth organizations
and other concerned agencies. The LGUs shall provide
community-based services which respond to the special
needs, problems, interests and concerns of children and
which offer appropriate counseling and guidance to them
and their families. These programs shall consist of three
levels:
(a) Primary intervention includes general
measures to promote social justice and equal
opportunity, which tackle perceived root causes
of offending;
(b) Secondary intervention includes measures
to assist children at risk; and
(c) Tertiary intervention includes measures to
avoid unnecessary contact with the formal
justice system and other measures to prevent
re-offending.
TITLE IV
TREATMENT OF CHILDREN BELOW THE AGE OF
CRIMINAL RESPONSIBILITY
SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. - If it has been determined that the child
taken into custody is fifteen (15) years old or below, the
authority which will have an initial contact with the child
has the duty to immediately release the child to the
custody of his/her parents or guardian, or in the absence
thereof, the child's nearest relative. Said authority shall
give notice to the local social welfare and development
officer who will determine the appropriate programs in
consultation with the child and to the person having
custody over the child. If the parents, guardians or
nearest relatives cannot be located, or if they refuse to
take custody, the child may be released to any of the
following: a duly registered nongovernmental or religious
organization; a barangay official or a member of the
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children (BCPC);
a local social welfare and development officer; or when
and where appropriate, the DSWD. If the child referred
to herein has been found by the Local Social Welfare
and Development Office to be abandoned, neglected or
abused by his parents, or in the event that the parents
will not comply with the prevention program, the proper
petition for involuntary commitment shall be filed by the
DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and Development
Office pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 603,
otherwise ,known as "The Child and Youth Welfare
Code".
TITLE V 1. Whether handcuffs or other
JUVENILE JUSTICE AND WELFARE SYSTEM
CHAPTER I
INITIAL CONTACT WITH THE CHILD
SEC. 21. Procedure for Taking the Child into
Custody. - From the moment a child is taken into
custody, the law enforcement officer shall:
(a) Explain to the child in simple language and
in a dialect that he/she can understand why
he/she is being placed under custody and the
offense that he/she allegedly committed;
(b) Inform the child of the reason for such
custody and advise the child of his/her
constitutional rights in a language or dialect
understood by him/her;
(e) Properly identify himself/herself and present
proper identification to the child;
(d) Refrain from using vulgar or profane words
and from sexually harassing or abusing, or
making sexual advances on the child in conflict
with the law;
(e) Avoid displaying or using any firearm,
weapon, handcuffs or other instruments of force
or restraint, unless absolutely necessary and
only after all other methods of control have
been exhausted and have failed;
(f) Refrain from subjecting the child in conflict
with the law to greater restraint than is
necessary for his/her apprehension;
(g) Avoid violence or unnecessary force;
(h) Determine the age of the child pursuant to
Section 7 of this Act;
(i) Immediately but not later than eight (8) hours
after apprehension, turn over custody of the
child to the Social Welfare and Development
Office or other accredited NGOs, and notify the
child's apprehension. The social welfare and
development officer shall explain to the child
and the child's parents/guardians the
consequences of the child's act with a view
towards counseling and rehabilitation, diversion
from the criminal justice system, and
reparation, if appropriate;
(j) Take the child immediately to the proper
medical and health officer for a thorough
physical and mental examination. The
examination results shall be kept confidential
unless otherwise ordered by the Family Court.
Whenever the medical treatment is required,
steps shall be immediately undertaken to
provide the same;
(k) Ensure that should detention of the child in
conflict with the law be necessary, the child
shall be secured in quarters separate from that
of the opposite sex and adult offenders;
(l) Record the following in the initial
investigation:
instruments of restraint were used,
and if so, the reason for such;
 2. That the parents or guardian of a
child, the DSWD, and the PA0 have
been informed of the apprehension
and the details thereof; and
3. The exhaustion of measures to
determine the age of a child and the
precise details of the physical and
medical examination or the failure to
submit a child to such examination;
and
(m) Ensure that all statements signed by the
child during investigation shall be witnessed by
the child's parents or guardian, social worker, or
legal counsel in attendance who shall affix
his/her signature to the said statement.
A child in conflict with the law shall only be searched by
a law enforcement officer of the same gender and shall
not be locked up in a detention cell.
SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. - The law
enforcement officer shall, in his/her investigation,
determine where the case involving the child in conflict
with the law should be referred.
The taking of the statement of the child shall be
conducted in the presence of the following: (1) child's
counsel of choice or in the absence thereof, a lawyer
from the Public Attorney's Office; (2) the child's parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, as the case may be; and
(3) the local social welfare and development officer. In
the absence of the child's parents, guardian, or nearest
relative, and the local social welfare and development
officer, the investigation shall be conducted in the
presence of a representative of an NGO, religious group,
or member of the BCPC.
After the initial investigation, the local social worker
conducting the same may do either of the following:
(a) Proceed in accordance with Section 20 if
the child is fifteen (15) years or below or above
fifteen (15) but below eighteen (18) years old,
who acted without discernment; and
(b) If the child is above fifteen (15) years old but
below eighteen (18) and who acted with
discernment, proceed to diversion under the
following chapter.
CHAPTER
DIVERSION
SEC. 23. System of Diversion. - Children in conflict
with the law shall undergo diversion programs without
undergoing court proceedings subject to the conditions
herein provided:
(a) Where the imposable penalty for the crime
committee is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the law enforcement officer or
Punong Barangay with the assistance of the
local social welfare and development officer or
other members of the LCPC shall conduct
mediation, family conferencing and conciliation
and, where appropriate, adopt indigenous
modes of conflict resolution in accordance with
the best interest of the child with a view to
accomplishing the objectives of restorative
justice and the formulation of a diversion
program. The child and his/her family shall be
present in these activities.
(b) In victimless crimes where the imposable
penalty is not more than six (6) years
imprisonment, the local social welfare and
development officer shall meet with the child
and his/her parents or guardians for the
development of the appropriate diversion and
rehabilitation program, in coordination with the
BCPC;
(c) Where the imposable penalty for the crime
committed exceeds six (6) years imprisonment,
diversion measures may be resorted to only by
the court.
SEC. 24. Stages Where Diversion May be
Conducted. - Diversion may be conducted at the
Katarungang Pambarangay, the police investigation or
the inquest or preliminary investigation stage and at all
1evels and phases of the proceedings including judicial
level.
SEC. 25. Conferencing, Mediation and Conciliation. -
A child in conflict with law may undergo conferencing,
mediation or conciliation outside the criminal justice
system or prior to his entry into said system. A contract
of diversion may be entered into during such
conferencing, mediation or conciliation proceedings.
SEC. 26. Contract of Diversion. - If during the
conferencing, mediation or conciliation, the child
voluntarily admits the commission of the act, a diversion
program shall be developed when appropriate and
desirable as determined under Section 30. Such
admission shall not be used against the child in any
subsequent judicial, quasi-judicial or administrative
proceedings. The diversion program shall be effective
and binding if accepted by the parties concerned. The
acceptance shall be in writing and signed by the parties
concerned and the appropriate authorities. The local
social welfare and development officer shall supervise
the implementation of the diversion program. The
diversion proceedings shall be completed within forty-
five (45) days. The period of prescription of the offense
shall be suspended until the completion of the diversion
proceedings but not to exceed forty-five (45) days.
The child shall present himself/herself to the competent
authorities that imposed the diversion program at least
once a month for reporting and evaluation of the
effectiveness of the program.
2
Failure to comply with the terms and conditions of the
contract of diversion, as certified by the local social
welfare and development officer, shall give the offended
party the option to institute the appropriate legal action.
The period of prescription of the offense shall be
suspended during the effectivity of the diversion
program, but not exceeding a period of two (2) years.
SEC. 27. Duty of the Punong Barangay When There
is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall under
Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her parents or
guardian does not consent to a diversion, the Punong
Barangay handling the case shall, within three (3) days
from determination of the absence of jurisdiction over the
case or termination of the diversion proceedings, as the
case may be, forward the records of the case of the child
to the law enforcement officer, prosecutor or the
appropriate court, as the case may be. Upon the
issuance of the corresponding document, certifying to (a) At the level of the Punong Barangay:
the fact that no agreement has been reached by the
parties, the case shall be filed according to the regular (1) Restitution of property;
process.
(2) Reparation of the damage caused;
SEC. 28. Duty of the Law Enforcement Officer When
There is No Diversion. - If the offense does not fall
under Section 23(a) and (b), or if the child, his/her (3) Indemnification for consequential
parents or guardian does not consent to a diversion, the damages;
Women and Children Protection Desk of the PNP, or
other law enforcement officer handling the case of the (4) Written or oral apology;
child under custody, to the prosecutor or judge
concerned for the conduct of inquest and/or preliminary (5) Care, guidance and supervision
investigation to determine whether or not the child orders;
should remain under custody and correspondingly
charged in court. The document transmitting said
records shall display the word "CHILD" in bold letters. (6) Counseling for the child in conflict
with the law and the child's family;
SEC. 29. Factors in Determining Diversion
Program. - In determining whether diversion is (7)Attendance in trainings, seminars
appropriate and desirable, the following factors shall be and lectures on:
taken into consideration:
(i) anger management skills;
(a) The nature and circumstances of the
offense charged; (ii) problem solving and/or
conflict resolution skills;
(b) The frequency and the severity of the act;
(iii) values formation; and
(c) The circumstances of the child (e.g. age,
maturity, intelligence, etc.); (iv) other skills which will aid
the child in dealing with
(d) The influence of the family and environment situations which can lead to
on the growth of the child; repetition of the offense;

(e) The reparation of injury to the victim; (8) Participation in available

community-based programs, including
community service; or
(f) The weight of the evidence against the child;

(9) Participation in education, vocation

(g) The safety of the community; and and life skills programs.

(h) The best interest of the child. (b) At the level of the law enforcement officer
and the prosecutor:
SEC. 30. Formulation of the Diversion Program. - In
formulating a diversion program, the individual (1) Diversion programs specified
characteristics and the peculiar circumstances of the under paragraphs (a)(1) to (a)(9)
child in conflict with the law shall be used to formulate an herein; and
individualized treatment.

(2) Confiscation and forfeiture of the

The following factors shall be considered in formulating a proceeds or instruments of the crime;
diversion program for the child:

(c) At the level of the appropriate court:

(a) The child's feelings of remorse for the
offense he/she committed;
(1) Diversion programs specified
under paragraphs(a)and (b) above;
(b) The parents' or legal guardians' ability to
guide and supervise the child;
(2) Written or oral reprimand or
citation;
(c) The victim's view about the propriety of the
measures to be imposed; and
(3) Fine:
(d) The availability of community-based
programs for rehabilitation and reintegration of (4) Payment of the cost of the
the child. proceedings; or

SEC. 31. Kinds of Diversion Programs. - The (5) Institutional care and custody.
diversion program shall include adequate socio-cultural
and psychological responses and services for the child. CHAPTER 3
At the different stages where diversion may be resorted PROSECUTION
to, the following diversion programs may be agreed
upon, such as, but not limited to:
SEC. 32. Duty of the Prosecutor's Office. - There shall
be a specially trained prosecutor to conduct inquest,
preliminary investigation and prosecution of cases
involving a child in conflict with the law. If there is an
allegation of torture or ill-treatment of a child in conflict
with the law during arrest or detention, it shall be the
duty of the prosecutor to investigate the same.
SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing of
Information. - The prosecutor shall conduct a
preliminary investigation in the following instances: (a)
when the child in conflict with the law does not qualify for
diversion: (b) when the child, his/her parents or guardian
does not agree to diversion as specified in Sections 27
and 28; and (c) when considering the assessment and
recommendation of the social worker, the prosecutor
determines that diversion is not appropriate for the child
in conflict with the law.
Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of
complaint, the prosecutor shall notify the Public
Attorney's Office of such service, as well as the personal
information, and place of detention of the child in conflict
with the law.
Upon determination of probable cause by the prosecutor,
the information against the child shall be filed before the
Family Court within forty-five (45) days from the start of
the preliminary investigation.
CHAPTER 4 provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
COURT PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 34. Bail. - For purposes of recommending the
amount of bail, the privileged mitigating circumstance of
minority shall be considered.
SEC. 35. Release on Recognizance. - Where a child is
detained, the court shall order:
(a) the release of the minor on recognizance to
his/her parents and other suitable person;
(b) the release of the child in conflict with the
law on bail; or
(c) the transfer of the minor to a youth detention
home/youth rehabilitation center.
The court shall not order the detention of a child in a jail
pending trial or hearing of his/her case.
SEC. 36. Detention of the Child Pending Trial. -
Children detained pending trial may be released on bail
or recognizance as provided for under Sections 34 and
35 under this Act. In all other cases and whenever
possible, detention pending trial may be replaced by
alternative measures, such as close supervision,
intensive care or placement with a family or in an
educational setting or home. Institutionalization or
detention of the child pending trial shall be used only as
a measure of last resort and for the shortest possible
period of time.
Whenever detention is necessary, a child will always be
detained in youth detention homes established by local
governments, pursuant to Section 8 of the Family Courts
Act, in the city or municipality where the child resides.
In the absence of a youth detention home, the child in
conflict with the law may be committed to the care of the
DSWD or a local rehabilitation center recognized by the
government in the province, city or municipality within
the jurisdiction of the court. The center or agency
concerned shall be responsible for the child's
appearance in court whenever required.
SEC. 37. Diversion Measures. - Where the maximum
penalty imposed by law for the offense with which the
child in conflict with the law is charged is imprisonment
of not more than twelve (12) years, regardless of the fine
or fine alone regardless of the amount, and before
arraignment of the child in conflict with the law, the court
shall determine whether or not diversion is appropriate.
SEC. 38. Automatic Suspension of Sentence. - Once
the child who is under eighteen (18) years of age at the
time of the commission of the offense is found guilty of
the offense charged, the court shall determine and
ascertain any civil liability which may have resulted from
the offense committed. However, instead of pronouncing
the judgment of conviction, the court shall place the child
in conflict with the law under suspended sentence,
without need of application: Provided, however, That
suspension of sentence shall still be applied even if the
juvenile is already eighteen years (18) of age or more at
the time of the pronouncement of his/her guilt.
Upon suspension of sentence and after considering the
various chcumstances of the child, the court shall
impose the appropriate disposition measures as
Conflict with the Law.
SEC. 39. Discharge of the Child in Conflict with the
Law. - Upon the recommendation of the social worker
who has custody of the child, the court shall dismiss the
case against the child whose sentence has been
suspended and against whom disposition measures
have been issued, and shall order the final discharge of
the child if it finds that the objective of the disposition
measures have been fulfilled.
The discharge of the child in conflict with the law shall
not affect the civil liability resulting from the commission
of the offense, which shall be enforced in accordance
with law.
SEC. 40. Return of the Child in Conflict with the Law
to Court. - If the court finds that the objective of the
disposition measures imposed upon the child in conflict
with the law have not been fulfilled, or if the child in
conflict with the law has willfully failed to comply with the
conditions of his/her disposition or rehabilitation
program, the child in conflict with the law shall be
brought before the court for execution of judgment.
If said child in conflict with the law has reached eighteen
(18) years of age while under suspended sentence, the
court shall determine whether to discharge the child in
accordance with this Act, to order execution of sentence,
or to extend the suspended sentence for a certain
specified period or until the child reaches the maximum
age of twenty-one (21) years.
SEC. 41. Credit in Service of Sentence. - The child in
conflict with the law shall be credited in the services of
his/her sentence with the full time spent in actual
commitment and detention under this Act.
SEC. 42. Probation as an Alternative to
Imprisonment. - The court may, after it shall have
convicted and sentenced a child in conflict with the law,
and upon application at any time, place the child on
probation in lieu of service of his/her sentence taking into
account the best interest of the child. For this purpose,
Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 968, otherwise
known as the "Probation Law of 1976", is hereby
amended accordingly.
CHAPTER 5 with the law placed in an institution shall be given special
CONFIDENTIALITY OF RECORDS AND
PROCEEDINGS
SEC. 43. Confedentiality of Records and
Proceedings. - All records and proceedings involving
children in conflict with the law from initial contact until
final disposition of the case shall be considered
privileged and confidential. The public shall be excluded
during the proceedings and the records shall not be
disclosed directly or indirectly to anyone by any of the
parties or the participants in the proceedings for any
purpose whatsoever, except to determine if the child in
conflict with the law may have his/hes sentence
suspended or if he/she may be granted probation under
the Probation Law, or to enforce the civil liability imposed
in the criminal action.
The component authorities shall undertake all measures
to protect this confidentiality of proceedings, including
non-disclosure of records to the media, maintaining a
separate police blotter for cases involving children in
conflict with the law and adopting a system of coding to
conceal material information which will lead to the child's
identity. Records of a child in conflict with the law shall
not be used in subsequent proceedings for cases
involving the same offender as an adult, except when
beneficial for the offender and upon his/her written
consent.
A person who has been in conflict with the law as a child
shall not be held under any provision of law, to be guilty
of perjury or of concealment or misrepresentation by
reason of his/her failure to acknowledge the case or
recite any fact related thereto in response to any inquiry
made to him/her for any purpose.
TITLE VI
REHABILITATION AND REINTEGRATION
SEC. 44. Objective of Rehabilitation and
Reintegration. - The objective of rehabilitation and
reintegration of children in conflict with the law is to
provide them with interventions, approaches and
strategies that will enable them to improve their social
functioning with the end goal of reintegration to their
families and as productive members of their
communities.
SEC. 45. Court Order Required. - No child shall be
received in any rehabilitation or training facility without a
valid order issued by the court after a hearing for the
purpose. The details of this order shall be immediately
entered in a register exclusively for children in conflict
with the law. No child shall be admitted in any facility
where there is no such register.
SEC. 46, Separate Facilities from Adults. - In all
rehabilitation or training facilities, it shall be mandatory
that children shall be separated from adults unless they
are members of the same family. Under no other
circumstance shall a child in conflict with the law be
placed in the same confinement as adults.
The rehabilitation, training or confinement area of
children in conflict with the law shall provide a home
environment where children in conflict with the law can
be provided with quality counseling and treatment.
SEC. 47. Female Children. - Female children in conflict
attention as to their personal needs and problems. They
shall be handled by female doctors, correction officers
and social workers, and shall be accommodated
separately from male children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 48. Gender-Sensitivity Training. - No personnel
of rehabilitation and training facilities shall handle
children in conflict with the law without having undergone
gender sensitivity training.
SEC. 49. Establishment of Youth Detention Homes. -
The LGUs shall set aside an amount to build youth
detention homes as mandated by the Family Courts Act.
Youth detention homes may also be established by
private and NGOs licensed and accredited by the
DSWD, in consultation with the JJWC.
SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child in
Conflict with the Law. - The expenses for the care and
maintenance of a child in conflict with the law under
institutional care shall be borne by his/her parents or
those persons liable to support him/her: Provided, That
in case his/her parents or those persons liable to support
him/her cannot pay all or part of said expenses, the
municipality where the offense was committed shall pay
one-third (1/3) of said expenses or part thereof; the
province to which the municipality belongs shall pay one-
third (1/3) and the remaining one-third (1/3) shall be
borne by the national government. Chartered cities shall
pay two-thirds (2/3) of said expenses; and in case a
chartered city cannot pay said expenses, part of the
internal revenue allotments applicable to the unpaid
portion shall be withheld and applied to the settlement of
said obligations: Provided, further, That in the event that
the child in conflict with the law is not a resident of the
municipality/city where the offense was committed, the
court, upon its determination, may require the
city/municipality where the child in conflict with the law
resides to shoulder the cost.
All city and provincial governments must exert effort for
the immediate establishment of local detention homes
for children in conflict with the law.
SEC. 51. Confinement of Convicted Children in
Agricultural Camps and other Training Facilities. - A
child
in conflict with the law may, after conviction and upon
order of the court, be made to serve his/her sentence, in
lieu of confinement in a regular penal institution, in an
agricultural camp and other training facilities that may be
established, maintained, supervised and controlled by
the BUCOR, in coordination with the DSWD.
SEC. 52. Rehabilitation of Children in Conflict with
the Law. - Children in conflict with the law, whose
sentences are suspended may, upon order of the court,
undergo any or a combination of disposition measures
best suited to the rehabilitation and welfare of the child
as provided in the Supreme Court Rule on Juveniles in
Conflict with the Law.
If the community-based rehabilitation is availed of by a
child in conflict with the law, he/she shall be released to
parents, guardians, relatives or any other responsible
person in the community. Under the supervision and
guidance of the local social welfare and development
officer, and in coordination with his/her parents/guardian,
the child in conflict with the law shall participate in
community-based programs, which shall include, but not
limited to:
(1) Competency and life skills development;
(2) Socio-cultural and recreational activities;
(3) Community volunteer projects;
(4) Leadership training;
(5) Social services;
(6) Homelife services;
(7) Health services; .
(8) Spiritual enrichment; and
(9) Community and family welfare services.
In accordance therewith, the family of the child in conflict
with the law shall endeavor to actively participate in the
community-based rehabilitation.
Based on the progress of the youth in the community, a
final report will be forwarded by the local social welfare
and development officer to the court for final disposition
of the case.
If the community-based programs are provided as
diversion measures under Chapter II, Title V, the
programs enumerated above shall be made available to
the child in conflict with the law.
SEC. 53. Youth Rehabilitation Center. - The youth
rehabilitation center shall provide 24-hour group care,
treatment and rehabilitation services under the guidance
of a trained staff where residents are cared for under a
structured therapeutic environment with the end view of
reintegrating them in their families and communities as
socially functioning individuals. A quarterly report shall
be submitted by the center to the proper court on the
progress of the children in conflict with the law. Based on
the progress of the youth in the center, a final report will
be forwarded to the court for final disposition of the case.
The DSWD shall establish youth rehabilitation centers in
each region of the country.
SEC. 54. Objectives of Community Based
Programs. - The objectives of community-based
programs are as follows:
(a) Prevent disruption in the education or
means of livelihood of the child in conflict with
the law in case he/she is studying, working or
attending vocational learning institutions;
(b) Prevent separation of the child in conflict
with the law from his/her parents/guardians to
maintain the support system fostered by their
relationship and to create greater awareness of
their mutual and reciprocal responsibilities;
(c) Facilitate the rehabilitation and
mainstreaming of the child in conflict with the
law and encourage community support and
involvement; and
(d) Minimize the stigma that attaches to the
child in conflict with the law by preventing jail
detention.
SEC. 55. Criteria of Community-Based Programs. -
Every LGU shall establish community-based programs
that will focus on the rehabilitation and reintegration of
the child. All programs shall meet the criteria to be
established by the JJWC which shall take into account
the purpose of the program, the need for the consent of
the child and his/her parents or legal guardians, and the
participation of the child-centered agencies whether
public or private.
SEC. 56. After-Care Support Services for Children in
Conflict with the Law. - Children in conflict with the law
whose cases have been dismissed by the proper court
because of good behavior as per recommendation of the
DSWD social worker and/or any accredited NGO youth
rehabilitation center shall be provided after-care services
by the local social welfare and development officer for a
period of at least six (6) months. The service includes
counseling and other community-based services
designed to facilitate social reintegration, prevent re-
offending and make the children productive members of
the community.
TITLE VII
GENERAL PROVISIONS
CHAPTER 1
EXEMPTING PROVISIONS
SEC. 57. Status Offenees. - Any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if committed by
an adult shall not be considered an offense and shall not
be punished if committed by a child.
SEC. 58. Offenses Not Applicable to Children. -
Persons below eighteen (18) years of age shall be
exempt from prosecution for the crime of vagrancy and
prostitution under Section 202 of the Revised Penal
Code, of mendicancy under Presidential Decree No.
1563, and sniffing of rugby under Presidential Decree
No. 1619, such prosecution being inconsistent with the
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the
Child: Provided, That said persons shall undergo
appropriate counseling and treatment program.
SEC. 59. Exemption from the Application of Death
Penalty. - The provisions of the Revised Penal Code, as
amended, Republic Act No. 9165, otherwise known as
the Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs Act of 2002, and
other special laws notwithstanding, no death penalty
shall be imposed upon children in conflict with the law.
CHAPTER 2
PROHIBITED ACTS
SEC. 60. Prohibition Against Labeling and
Shaming. - In the conduct of the proceedings beginning
from the initial contact with the child, the competent
authorities must refrain from branding or labeling
children as young criminals, juvenile delinquents,
prostitutes or attaching to them in any manner any other
derogatory names. Likewise, no discriminatory remarks
and practices shall be allowed particularly with respect to
the child's class or ethnic origin.
SEC. 61. Other Prohibited Acts. - The following and
any other similar acts shall be considered prejudicial and
detrimental to the psychological, emotional, social,
spiritual, moral and physical health and well-being of the
child in conflict with the law and therefore, prohibited:
(a) Employment of threats of whatever kind and
nature;
(b) Employment of abusive, coercive and
punitive measures such as cursing, beating,
stripping, and solitary confinement;
(c) Employment of degrading, inhuman end
cruel forms of punishment such as shaving the
heads, pouring irritating, corrosive or harmful
substances over the body of the child in conflict
with the law, or forcing him/her to walk around
the community wearing signs which embarrass,
humiliate, and degrade his/her personality and
dignity; and
(d) Compelling the child to perform involuntary
servitude in any and all forms under any and all
instances.
CHAPTER 3 law under their custody.
PENAL PROVISION
SEC. 62. Violation of the Provisions of this Act or
Rules or Regulations in General. - Any person who
violates any provision of this Act or any rule or regulation
promulgated in accordance thereof shall, upon
conviction for each act or omission, be punished by a
fine of not less than Twenty thousand pesos
(P20,000.00) but not more than Fifty thousand pesos
(P50,000.00) or suffer imprisonment of not less than
eight (8) years but not more than ten (10) years, or both
such fine and imprisonment at the discretion of the court,
unless a higher penalty is provided for in the Revised
Penal Code or special laws. If the offender is a public
officer or employee, he/she shall, in addition to such fine
and/or imprisonment, be held administratively liable and
shall suffer the penalty of perpetual absolute
disqualification.
CHAPTER 4 convicted and are serving sentence at the time of the
APPROPRIATION PROVISION
SEC. 63. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to
carry out the initial implementation of this Act shall be
charged to the Office of the President. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in the
succeeding General Appropriations Act.
An initial amount of Fifty million pesos (P50,000,000.00)
for the purpose of setting up the JJWC shall be taken
from the proceeds of the Philippine Charity Sweepstakes
Office.
TITLE VIII
TRANSITORY PROVISIONS
SEC. 64. Children in Conflict with the Law Fifteen
(15) Years Old and Below. - Upon effectivity of this Act,
cases of children fifteen (15) years old and below at the
time of the commission of the crime shall immediately be
dismissed and the child shall be referred to the
appropriate local social welfare and development officer.
Such officer, upon thorough assessment of the child,
shall determine whether to release the child to the
custody of his/her parents, or refer the child to
prevention programs as provided under this Act. Those
with suspended sentences and undergoing rehabilitation
at the youth rehabilitation center shall likewise be
released, unless it is contrary to the best interest of the
child.
SEC. 65. Children Detained Pending Dial. - If the child
is detained pending trial, the Family Court shall also
determine whether or not continued detention is
necessary and, if not, determine appropriate alternatives
for detention.
If detention is necessary and he/she is detained with
adults, the court shall immediately order the transfer of
the child to a youth detention home.
SEC. 66. Inventory of "Locked-up" and Detained
Children in Conflict with the Law. - The PNP, the
BJMP and the BUCOR are hereby directed to submit to
the JJWC, within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act, an inventory of all children in conflict with the
SEC. 67. Children Who Reach the Age of Eighteen
(18) Years Pending Diversion and Court
Proceedings. - If a child reaches the age of eighteen
(18) years pending diversion and court proceedings, the
appropriate diversion authority in consultation with the
local social welfare and development officer or the
Family Court in consultation with the Social Services and
Counseling Division (SSCD) of the Supreme Court, as
the case may be, shall determine the appropriate
disposition. In case the appropriate court executes the
judgment of conviction, and unless the child in conflict
the law has already availed of probation under
Presidential Decree No. 603 or other similar laws, the
child may apply for probation if qualified under the
provisions of the Probation Law.
SEC. 68. Children Who Have Been Convicted and
are Serving Sentence. - Persons who have been
effectivity of this Act, and who were below the age of
eighteen (18) years at the time the commission of the
offense for which they were convicted and are serving
sentence, shall likewise benefit from the retroactive
application of this Act. They shall be entitled to
appropriate dispositions provided under this Act and their
sentences shall be adjusted accordingly. They shall be
immediately released if they are so qualified under this
Act or other applicable law.
TITLE IX
FINAL PROVISIONS
SEC. 69. Rule Making Power. - The JJWC shall issue
the IRRs for the implementation of the provisions of this
act within ninety (90) days from the effectivity thereof.
SEC. 70. Separability Clause. - If, for any reason, any
section or provision of this Act is declared
unconstitutional or invalid by the Supreme Court, the
other sections or provisions hereof not dfected by such
declaration shall remain in force and effect.
SEC. 71. Repealing Clause. - All existing laws, orders,
decrees, rules and regulations or parts thereof
inconsistent with the provisions of this Act are hereby
repealed or modified accordingly.
SEC. 72. Effectivity. - This Act shall take effect after
fifteen (15) days from its publication in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 10630
AN ACT STRENGTHENING THE JUVENILE JUSTICE
SYSTEM IN THE PHILIPPINES, AMENDING FOR THE
PURPOSE REPUBLIC ACT NO. 9344, OTHERWISE
KNOWN AS THE "JUVENILE JUSTICE AND
WELFARE ACT OF 2006" AND APPROPRIATING
FUNDS THEREFOR
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. The Title of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows: "An Act Establishing a
Comprehensive Juvenile Justice and Welfare System,
Creating the Juvenile justice and Welfare Council under
the Department of Social Welfare and Development,
Appropriating Funds Therefor, and for Other Purposes."
Section 2. Section 4 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 4. Definition of Terms. – The following
terms as used in this Act shall be defined as
follows:
"x x x
"(s) ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ – refers to a 24-hour child-
caring institution established, funded and
managed by local government units (LGUs)
and licensed and/or accredited nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) providing short-term
residential care for children in conflict with the
law who are above fifteen (15) but below
eighteen (18) years of age who are awaiting
court disposition of their cases or transfer to
other agencies or jurisdiction.
"Part of the features of a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ is an
intensive juvenile intervention and support
center. This will cater to children in conflict with
the law in accordance with Sections 20, 20-A
and 20-B hereof.
"A multi-disciplinary team composed of a social
worker, a psychologist/mental health
professional, a medical doctor, an
educational/guidance counselor and a "(h) National Bureau of Investigation
Barangay Council for the Protection of Children
(BCPC) member shall operate the ‘Bahay Pag-
asa’. The team will work on the individualized
intervention plan with the child and the child’s
family.
"x x x."
Section 3. Section 6 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 6. Minimum Age of Criminal
Responsibility. – A child fifteen (15) years of
age or under at the time of the commission of
the offense shall be exempt from criminal
liability. However, the child shall be subjected to
an intervention program pursuant to Section 20
of this Act.
"A child is deemed to be fifteen (15) years of
age on the day of the fifteenth anniversary of
his/her birthdate.
"A child above fifteen (15) years but below
eighteen (18) years of age shall likewise be
exempt from criminal liability and be subjected
to an intervention program, unless he/she has
acted with discernment, in which case, such
child shall be subjected to the appropriate
proceedings in accordance with this Act.
"The exemption from criminal liability herein
established does not include exemption from
civil liability, which shall be enforced in
accordance with existing laws."
Section 4. Section 8 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 8. Juvenile Justice and Welfare Council
(JJWC). – A Juvenile Justice and Welfare
Council (JJWC) is hereby created and attached
to the Department of Social Welfare and
Development and placed under its
administrative supervision. The JJWC shall be
chaired by an Undersecretary of the
Department of Social Welfare and
Development. It shall ensure the effective
implementation of this Act and coordination
among the following agencies:
"(a) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(b) Council for the Welfare of Children
(CWC);
"(c) Department of Education
(DepED);
"(d) Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG);
"(e) Public Attorney’s Office (PAO);
"(f) Bureau of Corrections (BUCOR);
"(g) Parole and Probation
Administration (PPA);
(NBI);
"(i) Philippine National Police (PNP);
"(j) Bureau of Jail Management and
Penology (BJMP);
 "(k) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR);
"(l) Technical Education and Skills
Development Authority (TESDA);
"(m) National Youth Commission
(NYC); and
"(n) Other institutions focused on
juvenile justice and intervention
programs.
"The JJWC shall be composed of
representatives, whose ranks shall not be lower
than director, to be designated by the
concerned heads of the following departments
or agencies and shall receive emoluments as
may be determined by the Council in
accordance with existing budget and
accounting rules and regulations:
"(1) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(2) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
"(3) Council for the Welfare of Children
(CWC);
"(4) Department of Education
(DepED);
"(5) Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG);
"(6) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR);
"(7) National Youth Commission
(NYC);
"(8) Two (2) representatives from
NGOs, to be designated by the
Secretary of Social Welfare and
Development, to be selected based on
the criteria established by the Council;
"(9) Department of Health (DOH); and
"(10) One (1) representative each from
the League of Provinces, League of
Cities, League of Municipalities and
League of Barangays.
"There shall be a Regional Juvenile Justice and
Welfare Committee (RJJWC) in each region.
The RJJWCs will be under the administration
and supervision of the JJWC. The RJJWC shall
be chaired by the director of the regional office
of the DSWD. It shall ensure the effective
implementation of this Act at the regional and
LGU levels and the coordination among its
member agencies.
"The RJJWC will be composed of permanent
representatives who shall have a rank not lower
than an assistant regional director or its
equivalent to be designated by the concerned
department heads from the following agencies
and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with
existing budget and accounting rules and
regulations:
"(i) Department of Justice (DOJ);
"(ii) Department of Social Welfare and
Development (DSWD);
"(iii) Department of Education
(DepED);
"(iv) Department of the Interior and
Local Government (DILG);
"(v) Commission on Human Rights
(CHR);
"(vi) Department of Health (DOH);
"(vii) Two (2) representatives from
NGOs operating within the region
selected by the RJJWC based on the
criteria established by the JJWC;
"(viii) One (1) sectoral representative
from the children or youth sector within
the region; and
"(ix) One (1) representative from the
League of Provinces/ Cities/
Municipalities/ Barangays of the
Philippines.
"The JJWC shall convene within fifteen (15)
days from the effectivity of this Act. The
Secretary of Social Welfare and Development
shall determine the organizational structure and
staffing pattern of the JJWC national secretariat
and the RJJWC secretariat.
"In the implementation of this Act, the JJWC
shall consult with the various leagues of local
government officials.
"The JJWC shall coordinate with the Office of
the Court Administrator and the Philippine
Judicial Academy to ensure the realization of its
mandate and the proper discharge of its duties
and functions, as herein provided."
Section5. Section 9 of Republic Act No. 9344 is hereby
amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 9. Duties and Functions of the JJWC. –
The JJWC shall have the following duties and
functions:
"(a) To oversee the implementation of
this Act;
"(b) To advise the President on all
matters and policies relating to
juvenile justice and welfare;
"(c) To assist the concerned agencies
in the review and redrafting of existing
policies/regulations or in the
formulation of new ones in line with
the provisions of this Act;
"(d) To periodically develop a
comprehensive 3 to 5-year national
juvenile intervention program, with the
participation of government agencies
concerned, NGOs and youth
organizations;
"(e) To coordinate the implementation
of the juvenile intervention programs
and activities by national government
agencies and other activities which
may have an important bearing on the
success of the entire national juvenile
intervention program. All programs
relating to juvenile justice and welfare
shall be adopted in consultation with
the JJWC;
"(f) To consult with the various leagues
of local government officials in the
formulation and recommendation of
policies and strategies for the
prevention of juvenile delinquency and
the promotion of juvenile justice and
welfare;
"(g) To formulate and recommend
policies and strategies in consultation
with children for the prevention of
juvenile delinquency and the
administration of justice, as well as for
the treatment and rehabilitation of the
children in conflict with the law;
"(h) To collect relevant information and
conduct continuing research and
support evaluations and studies on all
matters relating to juvenile justice and
welfare, such as, but not limited to:
"(1) The performance and
results achieved by juvenile
intervention programs and by
activities of the local
government units and other
government agencies;
"(2) The periodic trends,
problems and causes of
juvenile delinquency and
crimes; and
"(3) The particular needs of
children in conflict with the
law in custody.
"The data gathered shall be used by
the JJWC in the improvement of the
administration of juvenile justice and
welfare system.
"The JJWC shall submit an annual
report to Congress on the
implementation of the provisions of
this Act.
"The JJWC shall set up a mechanism
to ensure that children are involved in
research and policy development.
"(i) Through duly designated persons
and with the assistance of the
agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections
in detention and rehabilitation facilities
and to undertake spot inspections on
their own initiative in order to check
compliance with the standards
provided herein and to make the
necessary recommendations to
appropriate agencies;
"(j) To initiate and coordinate the
conduct of trainings for the personnel
of the agencies involved in the
administration of the juvenile justice
and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program;
"(k) To submit an annual report to the
President on the implementation of
this Act; and
"(l) To perform such other functions as
may be necessary to implement the
provisions of this Act."
"SEC. 9-A. Duties and Functions of the
RJJWC. – The RJJWC shall have the following
duties and functions:
"(a) To oversee and ensure the
effective implementation of this Act at
the regional level and at the level of
the LGUs;
"(b) To assist the concerned agencies
in the implementation and in
compliance with the JJWC’s adopted
policies/regulations or provide
substantial inputs to the JJWC in the
formulation of new ones in line with
the provisions of this Act;
"(c) To assist in the development of the
comprehensive 3 to 5-year local
juvenile intervention program, with the
participation of concerned LGUs,
NGOs and youth organizations within
the region and monitor its
implementation;
"(d) To coordinate the implementation
of the juvenile intervention programs
and activities by national government
agencies and other activities within the
region;
"(e) To oversee the programs and
operation of the intensive juvenile
intervention and support center
established within the region;
"(f) To collect relevant regional
information and conduct continuing
research and support evaluations and
studies on all matters relating to
juvenile justice and welfare within the
region, such as, but not limited to:
"(1) Performance and results
achieved by juvenile
 intervention programs and by
activities of the LGUs and
other government agencies
within the region;
"(2) The periodic trends,
problems and causes of
juvenile delinquency and
crimes from the LGU level to
the regional level; and
"(3) The particular needs of
children in conflict with the
law in custody within their
regional jurisdiction.
"The data gathered shall be forwarded
by the RJJWC to the JJWC on an
annual basis and as may be deemed
necessary by the JJWC.
"(g) Through duly designated persons
and with the assistance of the
agencies provided in the preceding
section, to conduct regular inspections
in detention and rehabilitation facilities
within the region and to undertake
spot inspections on their own initiative
in order to check compliance with the
standards provided herein and to
make the necessary reports and
recommendations to appropriate
agencies and to the JJWC;
"(h) To initiate and coordinate the
conduct of trainings for the personnel
of the agencies involved in the
administration of the juvenile justice
and welfare system and the juvenile
intervention program within the region;
"(i) To submit an annual report to the
JJWC on the implementation of this
Act; and
"(j) To perform such other functions as
may be determined by the JJWC to
implement the provisions of this Act."
Section 6. Section 20 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 20. Children Below the Age of Criminal
Responsibility. – If it has been determined that
the child taken into custody is fifteen (15) years
old or below, the authority which will have an
initial contact with the child, in consultation with
the local social welfare and development
officer, has the duty to immediately release the
child to the custody of his/her parents or
guardian, or in the absence thereof, the child’s
nearest relative. The child shall be subjected to
a community-based intervention program
supervised by the local social welfare and
development officer, unless the best interest of
the child requires the referral of the child to a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ managed
by LGUs or licensed and/or accredited NGOs
monitored by the DSWD.
"The local social welfare and development
officer shall determine the appropriate
programs for the child who has been released,
in consultation with the child and the person
having custody over the child. If the parents,
guardians or nearest relatives cannot be
located, or if they refuse to take custody, the
child may be released to any of the following:
"(a) A duly registered
nongovernmental or religious
organization;
"(b) A barangay official or a member of
the Barangay Council for the
Protection of Children (BCPC);
"(c) A local social welfare and
development officer; or, when and
where appropriate, the DSWD.
"If the child has been found by the local social
welfare and development officer to be
dependent, abandoned, neglected or abused
by his/her parents and the best interest of the
child requires that he/she be placed in a youth
care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’, the child’s
parents or guardians shall execute a written
authorization for the voluntary commitment of
the child: Provided, That if the child has no
parents or guardians or if they refuse or fail to
execute the written authorization for voluntary
commitment, the proper petition for involuntary
commitment shall be immediately filed by the
DSWD or the Local Social Welfare and
Development Office (LSWDO) pursuant to
Presidential Decree No. 603, as amended,
otherwise known as ‘The Child and Youth
Welfare Code’ and the Supreme Court rule on
commitment of children: Provided, further, That
the minimum age for children committed to a
youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ shall be
twelve (12) years old."
"SEC. 20-A. Serious Crimes Committed by
Children Who Are Exempt From Criminal
Responsibility. – A child who is above twelve
(12) years of age up to fifteen (15) years of age
and who commits parricide, murder, infanticide,
kidnapping and serious illegal detention where
the victim is killed or raped, robbery, with
homicide or rape, destructive arson, rape, or
carnapping where the driver or occupant is
killed or raped or offenses under Republic Act
No. 9165 (Comprehensive Dangerous Drugs
Act of 2002) punishable by more than twelve
(12) years of imprisonment, shall be deemed a
neglected child under Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended, and shall be mandatorily
placed in a special facility within the youth care
faculty or ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ called the Intensive
Juvenile Intervention and Support Center
(IJISC).
"In accordance with existing laws, rules,
procedures and guidelines, the proper petition
for involuntary commitment and placement
under the IJISC shall be filed by the local social
welfare and development officer of the LGU
where the offense was committed, or by the
DSWD social worker in the local social welfare
and development officer’s absence, within
twenty-four (24) hours from the time of the
receipt of a report on the alleged commission of
said child. The court, where the petition for
involuntary commitment has been filed shall
decide on the petition within seventy-two (72)
hours from the time the said petition has been
filed by the DSWD/LSWDO. The court will
determine the initial period of placement of the
child within the IJISC which shall not be less
than one (1) year. The multi-disciplinary team of
the IJISC will submit to the court a case study
and progress report, to include a psychiatric
evaluation report and recommend the
reintegration of the child to his/her family or the
extension of the placement under the IJISC.
The multi-disciplinary team will also submit a
report to the court on the services extended to
the parents and family of the child and the
compliance of the parents in the intervention
program. The court will decide whether the
child has successfully completed the center-
based intervention program and is already
prepared to be reintegrated with his/her family
or if there is a need for the continuation of the
center-based rehabilitation of the child. The
court will determine the next period of
assessment or hearing on the commitment of
the child."
"SEC. 20-B. Repetition of Offenses. – A child
who is above twelve (12) years of age up to
fifteen (15) years of age and who commits an
offense for the second time or
oftener: Provided, That the child was previously
subjected to a community-based intervention
program, shall be deemed a neglected child
under Presidential Decree No. 603, as
amended, and shall undergo an intensive
intervention program supervised by the local
social welfare and development
officer: Provided, further, That, if the best
interest of the child requires that he/she be
placed in a youth care facility or ‘Bahay Pag-
asa’, the child’s parents or guardians shall
execute a written authorization for the voluntary
commitment of the child: Provided, finally, That
if the child has no parents or guardians or if
they refuse or fail to execute the written
authorization for voluntary commitment, the
proper petition for involuntary commitment shall
be immediately filed by the DSWD or the
LSWDO pursuant to Presidential Decree No.
603, as amended."
"SEC. 20-C. Exploitation of Children for
Commission of Crimes. – Any person who, in
the commission of a crime, makes use, takes
advantage of, or profits from the use of
children, including any person who abuses
his/her authority over the child or who, with
abuse of confidence, takes advantage of the
vulnerabilities of the child and shall induce,
threaten or instigate the commission of the
crime, shall be imposed the penalty prescribed
by law for the crime committed in its maximum
period."
"SEC. 20-D. Joint Parental Responsibility. –
Based on the recommendation of the multi-
disciplinary team of the IJISC, the LSWDO or
the DSWD, the court may require the parents of
a child in conflict with the law to undergo
counseling or any other intervention that, in the
opinion of the court, would advance the welfare
and best interest of the child.
"As used in this Act, ‘parents’ shall mean any of
the following:
"(a) Biological parents of the child; or
"(b) Adoptive parents of the child; or
"(c) Individuals who have custody of
the child.
"A court exercising jurisdiction over a child in
conflict with the law may require the attendance
of one or both parents of the child at the place
where the proceedings are to be conducted.
"The parents shall be liable for damages unless
they prove, to the satisfaction of the court, that
they were exercising reasonable supervision
over the child at the time the child committed
the offense and exerted reasonable effort and
utmost diligence to prevent or discourage the
child from committing another offense."
"SEC. 20-E. Assistance to Victims of Offenses
Committed by Children. – The victim of the
offense committed by a child and the victim’s
family shall be provided the appropriate
assistance and psychological intervention by
the LSWDO, the DSWD and other concerned
agencies."
Section 7. Section 22 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 22. Duties During Initial Investigation. –
The law enforcement officer shall, in his/her
investigation, determine where the case
involving the child in conflict with the law should
be referred.
"The taking of the statement of the child shall
be conducted in the presence of the following:
(1) child’s counsel of choice or in the absence
thereof, a lawyer from the Public Attorney’s
Office; (2) the child’s parents, guardian, or
nearest relative, as the case may be; and (3)
the local social welfare and development
officer. In the absence of the child’s parents,
guardian, or nearest relative, and the local
social welfare and development officer, the
investigation shall be conducted in the
presence of a representative of an NGO,
religious group, or member of the BCPC.
"The social worker shall conduct an initial
assessment to determine the appropriate
interventions and whether the child acted with
discernment, using the discernment
assessment tools developed by the DSWD.
The initial assessment shall be without
prejudice to the preparation of a more
comprehensive case study report. The local
social worker shall do either of the following:
"(a) Proceed in accordance with
Section 20 if the child is fifteen (15)
years or below or above fifteen (15)
but below eighteen (18) years old, who
acted without discernment; and
"(b) If the child is above fifteen (15)
years old but below eighteen (18) and
who acted with discernment, proceed
to diversion under the following
chapter."
Section 8. Section 33 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 33. Preliminary Investigation and Filing
of Information. – The prosecutor shall conduct a
preliminary investigation in the following
instances: (a) when the child in conflict with the
law does not qualify for diversion; (b) when the
child, his/her parents or guardian does not
agree to diversion as specified in Sections 27
and 28; and (c) when considering the
assessment and recommendation of the social
worker, the prosecutor determines that
diversion is not appropriate for the child in
conflict with the law.
"Upon serving the subpoena and the affidavit of
complaint, the prosecutor shall notify the Public
Attorney’s Office of such service, as well as the
personal information, and place of detention of
the child in conflict with the law.
"Upon determination of probable cause by the
prosecutor, the information against the child
shall be filed before the Family Court within
forty-five (45) days from the start of the
preliminary investigation. The information must
allege that the child acted with discernment."
Section 9. Section 49 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 49. Establishment of ‘Bahay Pag-Asa’. –
Each province and highly-urbanized city (the
LGUs) shall be responsible for building, funding
and operating a ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ within their
jurisdiction following the standards that will be
set by the DSWD and adopted by the JJWC.
"Every ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ will have a special
facility called the IJISC. This Center will be
allocated for children in conflict with the law in
accordance with Sections 20, 20-A and 20-B
hereof. These children will be required to
undergo a more intensive multi-disciplinary
intervention program. The JJWC in partnership
with, but not limited to, the DSWD, the DOH,
the DepED and the DILG, will develop and set
the standards for the implementation of the
multi-disciplinary intervention program of the
IJISC. Upon institutionalization of the IJISC
program, the JJWC will continue to monitor and
provide technical assistance to the multi-
disciplinary teams operating the said centers."
Section 10. Section 50 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 50. Care and Maintenance of the Child
in Conflict with the Law. – x x x
"The LGUs expected expenditures on the local
juvenile intervention program for children at risk
and children in conflict with the law shall be
included in the LGUs annual budget. Highly-
urbanized cities and provincial governments
should include a separate budget for the
construction and maintenance of the ‘Bahay
Pag-asa’ including the operation of the IJISC
within the ‘Bahay Pag-asa’."
Section 11. Section 57 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 57. Status Offenses. – Any conduct not
considered an offense or not penalized if
committed by an adult shall not be considered
an offense and shall not be punished if
committed by a child."
"SEC. 57-A. Violations of Local Ordinances. –
Ordinances enacted by local governments
concerning juvenile status offenses such as,
but not limited to, curfew violations, truancy,
parental disobedience, anti-smoking and anti-
drinking laws, as well as light offenses and
misdemeanors against public order or safety
such as, but not limited to, disorderly conduct,
public scandal, harassment, drunkenness,
public intoxication, criminal nuisance,
vandalism, gambling, mendicancy, littering,
public urination, and trespassing, shall be for
the protection of children. No penalty shall be
imposed on children for said violations, and
they shall instead be brought to their residence
or to any barangay official at the barangay hall
to be released to the custody of their parents.
Appropriate intervention programs shall be
provided for in such ordinances. The child shall
also be recorded as a ‘child at risk’ and not as a
‘child in conflict with the law’. The ordinance
shall also provide for intervention programs,
such as counseling, attendance in group
activities for children, and for the parents,
attendance in parenting education seminars."
Section 12. Mandatory Registry of Children in Conflict
with the Law. – All duty-bearers, including
barangay/BCPC workers, law enforcers, teachers,
guidance counselors, social workers and prosecutors
who will receive report, handle or refer cases of children
in conflict with the law, shall ensure a faithful recordation
of all pertinent information, such as age, residence,
gender, crime committed or accused of and the details of
the intervention or diversion, as the case may be, under
which they will undergo or has undergone, of all children
in conflict with the law to guarantee the correct
application of the provisions of this Act and other laws.
The JJWC shall lead in the establishment of a
centralized information management system on children
in conflict with the law. This provision is however without
prejudice to Section 43 of this Act.
Section 13. Section 63 of Republic Act No. 9344 is
hereby amended to read as follows:
"SEC. 63. Appropriations. – The amount
necessary to carry out the provisions of this Act
shall be charged against the current year’s
appropriations of the JJWC under the budget of
the Department of Justice. Thereafter, such
sums as may be necessary for the continued
implementation of this Act shall be included in
the budget of the DSWD under the annual
General Appropriations Act: Provided, That the
amount of Four hundred million pesos
(P400,000,000.00) shall be appropriated for the
construction of ‘Bahay Pag-asa’ rehabilitation
centers in provinces or cities with high
incidence of children in conflict with the law to
be determined and identified by the DSWD and
the JJWC on a priority basis: Provided,
further, That the said amount shall be coursed
through the Department of Public Works and
 Highways (DPWH) for its proper
implementation.
"The LGUs concerned shall make available,
from its own resources or assets, their
counterpart share equivalent to the national
government contribution of Five million pesos
(P5,000,000.00) per rehabilitation center.
"In addition, the Council may accept donations,
grants and contributions from various sources,
in cash or in kind, for purposes relevant to its
functions, subject to the usual government
accounting and auditing rules and regulations."
Section 14. Implementing Rules and Regulations. – The
JJWC shall promulgate the necessary rules and
regulations within sixty (60) days from the effectivity of
this Act.
Section 15. Separability Clause. – If any provision of
this Act is held unconstitutional, other provisions not
affected thereby shall remain valid and binding.
Section 16. Repealing Clause. – All laws, decrees,
ordinances and rules inconsistent with the provisions of
this Act are hereby modified or repealed accordingly.
Section 17. Effectivity Clause. – This Act shall take
effect fifteen (15) days after the completion of its
publication in the Official Gazette or in at least two (2)
national newspapers of general circulation.
Approved,
Republic Act No. 9775
AN ACT DEFINING THE CRIME OF CHILD
PORNOGRAPHY, PRESCRIBING PENALTIES
THEREFOR AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled:
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known as
the "Anti-Child Pornography Act of 2009."
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - The State recognizes
the vital role of the youth in nation building and shall
promote and protect their physical, moral, spiritual,
intellectual, emotional, psychological and social well-
being. Towards this end, the State shall:
(a) Guarantee the fundamental rights of every
child from all forms of neglect, cruelty and other
conditions prejudicial to his/her development;
(b) Protect every child from all forms of
exploitation and abuse including, but not limited
to:
(1) the use of a child in pornographic
performances and materials; and
(2) the inducement or coercion of a
child to engage or be involved in
pornography through whatever means;
and
(c) Comply with international treaties to which
the Philippines is a signatory or a State party
concerning the rights of children which include,
but not limited to, the Convention on the Rights
of the Child, the Optional Protocol to the
Convention on the Rights of the Child of the
Child on the Sale of Children, Child Prostitution
and Child Pornography, the International Labor
Organization (ILO) Convention No.182 on the
Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labor
and the Convention Against Transnational
Organized Crime.
Section 3. Definition of Terms. -
(a) "Child" refers to a person below eighteen
(18) years of age or over, but is unable to fully
take care of himself/herself from abuse,
neglect, cruelty, exploitation or discrimination
because of a physical or mental disability or
condition.
For the purpose of this Act, a child shall also
refer to:
(1) a person regardless of age who is
presented, depicted or portrayed as a
child as defined herein; and
(2) computer-generated, digitally or
manually crafted images or graphics of
a person who is represented or who is
made to appear to be a child as
defined herein.
(b) "Child pornography" refers to any
representation, whether visual, audio, or written
combination thereof, by electronic, mechanical,
digital, optical, magnetic or any other means, of
child engaged or involved in real or simulated
explicit sexual activities.
(c) "Explicit Sexual Activity" includes actual or
simulated -
(1) As to form:
(i) sexual intercourse or lascivious act
including, but not limited to, contact
involving genital to genital, oral to
genital, anal to genital, or oral to anal,
whether between persons of the same
or opposite sex;
(2) bestiality;
(3) masturbation;
(4) sadistic or masochistic abuse;
(5) lascivious exhibition of the genitals,
buttocks, breasts, pubic area and/or
anus; or
(6) use of any object or instrument for
lascivious acts
(d) "Internet address" refers to a website,
bulletin board service, internet chat room or
news group, or any other internet or shared
network protocol address.
 (e) "Internet cafe or kiosk" refers to an
establishment that offers or proposes to offer
services to the public for the use of its
computer/s or computer system for the purpose
of accessing the internet, computer games or
related services.
(f) "Internet content host" refers to a person
who hosts or who proposes to host internet
content in the Philippines.
(g) "Internet service provider (ISP)" refers to a
person or entity that supplies or proposes to
supply, an internet carriage service to the
public.
(h) "Grooming" refers to the act of preparing a
child or someone who the offender believes to
be a child for sexual activity or sexual
relationship by communicating any form of child
pornography. It includes online enticement or
enticement through any other means.
(i) "Luring" refers to the act of communicating,
by means of a computer system, with a child or
someone who the offender believes to be a
child for the purpose of facilitating the
commission of sexual activity or production of
any form of child pornography.(2) Bestiality;
(j) "Pandering" refers to the act of offering,
advertising, promoting, representing or
distributing through any means any material or
purported material that is intended to cause
another to believe that the material or purported
material contains any form of child
pornography, regardless of the actual content of
the material or purported material.
(k) "Person" refers to any natural or juridical
entity.
Section 4. Unlawful or Prohibited Acts. - It shall be
unlawful for any person:
(a) To hire, employ, use, persuade, induce or
coerce a child to perform in the creation or
production of any form of child pornography;
(b) To produce, direct, manufacture or create
any form of child pornography;
(c) To publish offer, transmit, sell, distribute,
broadcast, advertise, promote, export or import
any form of child pornography;
(d) To possess any form of child pornography
with the intent to sell, distribute, publish, or
broadcast: Provided. That possession of three
(3) or more articles of child pornography of the
same form shall be prima facie evidence of the
intent to sell, distribute, publish or broadcast;
(e) To knowingly, willfully and intentionally
provide a venue for the commission of
prohibited acts as, but not limited to, dens,
private rooms, cubicles, cinemas, houses or in
establishments purporting to be a legitimate
business;
(f) For film distributors, theaters and
telecommunication companies, by themselves
or in cooperation with other entities, to
distribute any form of child pornography;
(g) For a parent, legal guardian or person
having custody or control of a child to knowingly
permit the child to engage, participate or assist
in any form of child pornography;
(h) To engage in the luring or grooming of a
child;
(i) To engage in pandering of any form of child
pornography;
(j) To willfully access any form of child
pornography;
(k) To conspire to commit any of the prohibited
acts stated in this section. Conspiracy to
commit any form of child pornography shall be
committed when two (2) or more persons come
to an agreement concerning the commission of
any of the said prohibited acts and decide to
commit it; and
(l) To possess any form of child pornography.
Section 5. Syndicated Child Pornography - The crime of
child pornography is deemed committed by a syndicate if
carried out by a group of three (3) or more persons
conspiring or confederating with one another and shall
be punished under Section 15(a) of this Act.
Section 6. Who May File a Complaint. - Complaints on
cases of any form of child pornography and other
offenses punishable under this Act may be filed by the
following:
(a) Offended party;
(b) Parents or guardians;
(c) Ascendant or collateral relative within the
third degree of consanguinity;
(d) Officer, social worker or representative of a
licensed child-caring institution;
(e) Officer or social worker of the Department of
Social Welfare and Development (DSWD);
(f) Local social welfare development officer;
(g) Barangay chairman;
(h) Any law enforcement officer;
(i) At least three (3) concerned responsible
citizens residing in the place where the violation
occurred; or
(j) Any person who has personal knowledge of
the circumstances of the commission of any
offense under this Act.
Section 7. Appointment of Special Prosecutors. - The
Department of Justice (DOJ) shall appoint or designate
special prosecutors to prosecute cases for the violation
of this Act.
Section 8. Jurisdiction. - Jurisdiction over cases for the
violation of this Act shall be vested in the Family Court
which has territorial jurisdiction over the place where the
offense or any of its essential elements was committed
pursuant to Republic Act No. 8369, otherwise known as
"Family Courts Act of 1997".
Section 9. Duties of an Internet Service Provider (ISP). -
All internet service providers (ISPs) shall notify the
Philippine National Police (PNP) or the National Bureau
of Investigation (NBI) within seven (7) days from
obtaining facts and circumstances that any form of child
pornography is being committed using its server or
facility. Nothing in this section may be construed to
require an ISP to engage in the monitoring of any user,
subscriber or customer, or the content of any
communication of any such person: Provided, That no
ISP shall be held civilly liable for damages on account of
any notice given in good faith in compliance with this
section.
Furthermore, an ISP shall preserve such evidence for
purpose of investigation and prosecution by relevant
authorities.
An ISP shall, upon the request of proper authorities,
furnish the particulars of users who gained or attempted
to gain access to an internet address which contains any
form of child pornography.
All ISPs shall install available technology, program or
software to ensure that access to or transmittal of any
form of child pornography will be blocked or filtered.
An ISP who shall knowingly, willfully and intentionally
violate this provision shall be subject to the penalty
provided under Section 15(k) of this Act.
The National Telecommunications Commission (NTC)
shall promulgate within ninety (90) days from the
effectivity of this Act the necessary rules and regulations
for the implementation of this provision which shall
include, among others, the installation of filtering
software that will block access to or transmission of any
form of the child pornography.
Section 10. Responsibility of Mall Owners/Operators
and Owners or Lessors of Other Business
Establishments. - All mall owners/operators and owners
or lessors of other business establishments shall notify
the PNP or the NBI within seven (7) days from obtaining
facts and circumstances that child pornography is being
committed in their premises. Provided, That public
display of any form of child pornography within their
premises is a conclusive presumption of the knowledge
of the mall owners/operators and owners or lessors of
other business establishments of the violation of this
Act: Provided, further, That a disputable presumption of
knowledge by mall owners/operators and owners or
lessors of other business establishments should know or
reasonably know that a violation of this Act is being
committed in their premises.
Photo developers, information technology professionals,
credit card companies and banks and any person who
has direct knowledge of any form of child pornography
activities shall have the duty to report any suspected
child pornography materials or transactions to the proper
authorities within seven (7) days from discovery thereof.
Any willful and intentional violation of this provision shall
be subject to the penalty provided under Section 15(l) of
this Act.
Section 11. Duties of an Internet Content Host. - An
internet content host shall:
(a) Not host any form of child pornography on
its internet address;
(b) Within seven (7) days, report the presence
of any form of child pornography, as well as the
particulars of the person maintaining, hosting,
distributing or in any manner contributing to
such internet address, to the proper authorities;
and
(c) Preserve such evidence for purposes of
investigation and prosecution by relevant
authorities.
An internet content host shall, upon the request of
proper authorities, furnish the particulars of users who
gained or attempted to gain access to an internet
address that contains any form of child pornography.
An internet content host who shall knowingly, willfully
and intentionally violate this provision shall be subject to
the penalty provided under Section 15(j) of this Act:
Provided, That the failure of the internet content host to
remove any form of child pornography within forty-eight
(48) hours from receiving the notice that any form of
child pornography is hitting its server shall be conclusive
evidence of willful and intentional violation thereof.
Section 12. Authority to Regulate Internet Café or
Kiosk. - The local government unit (LGU) of the city or
municipality where an internet café or kiosk is located
shall have the authority to monitor and regulate the
establishment and operation of the same or similar
establishments in order to prevent violation of the
provisions of this Act.
Section 13. Confidentiality. - The right to privacy of the
child shall be ensured at any stage of the investigation,
prosecution and trial of an offense under this Act.
Towards this end, the following rules shall be observed:
(a) The judge, prosecutor or any officer of the
law to whom the complaint has been referred to
may, whenever necessary to ensure a fair and
impartial proceeding and after considering all
circumstances for the best interest of the child
conduct a closed-door investigation,
prosecution or trial;
(b) The name and personal circumstances of
the child, including the child's immediate family,
or any other information tending to establish
his/her identity shall not be disclosed to the
public;
(c) Any record regarding a child shall be
confidential and kept under seal. Except upon
written request and order of the court, a record
shall be released only to the following:
(1) Members of the court staff for
administrative use;
(2) The prosecuting attorney;
 (3) Defense counsel;
(4) The guardian ad litem;
(5) Agents of investigating law
enforcement agencies and
(6) Other persons as determined by
the court.
(d) Any form of child pornography that is part of
the court records shall be subject to a
protective order that provides as follows:
(1) Any form of child pornography may
be viewed only by the parties, their
counsel, their expert witness and
guardian ad litem;
(2) Neither form of child pornography
nor any portion thereof shall be
divulged to any other person, except
as necessary for investigation,
prosecution or trial; and
(3) No person shall be granted access
to any form of child pornography or
any part thereof unless he/she signs a
written affirmation that he/she has
received and read a copy of the
protection order; that he/she submits
to the jurisdiction of the court with
respect to the protective order; and
that, in case of violation thereof,
he/she will be subject to the contempt
power of the court; and
(e) In cases when prosecution or trial is
conducted behind closed doors, it shall be
unlawful for any editor, publisher and reporter
or columnist in case of printed materials,
announcer or producer in case of television and
radio, producer and director of a film in case of
the movie industry, or any person utilizing the
tri-media facilities or information technology to
publish or broadcast the names of the victims of
any case of child pornography.
Any violation of this provision shall be subject to the
penalty provided for under Section 15(m) of this Act.
Section 14. Care, Custody and Treatment of a Child
Victim. - The DSWD shall ensure that the child who is a
victim of any form of child pornography is provided
appropriate care, custody and support for their recovery
and reintegration in accordance with existing laws.
The child and his family shall be entitled to protection as
well as to the rights and benefits of witnesses
under Republic Act No. 6981, otherwise known as "The
Witness Protection, Security and Benefit Act".
The child shall also be considered as a victim of a violent
crime defined under Section 3(d) of Republic Act No.
7309, otherwise known as "An Act Creating a Board of
Claims under the Department of Justice for Victims of
Unjust Imprisonment or Detention and Victims of Violent
Crimes and for Other Purposes", so that the child may
claim compensation therein.
Section 15. Penalties and Sanctions. - The following
penalties and sanctions are hereby established for
offenses enumerated in this Act:
(a) Any person found guilty of syndicated child
pornography as defined in Section 5 of this Act
shall suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and a fine of not less than Two million
pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not more than
Five million pesos (Php5,000,000.00);
(b) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(a), (b) and (c) of this Act shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its maximum
period and a fine of not less than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than
Two million (Php2,000,000.00);
(c) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(d), (e) and (f) of this Act shall suffer the
penalty of reclusion temporal in its medium
period and a fine of not less than Seven
hundred fifty thousand pesos (Php750,000.00)
but not more than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00);
(d) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(g) of this Act shall suffer the penalty
of reclusion temporal in its minimum period and
a fine of not less than Five hundred thousand
pesos (Php500,000.00) but not more than
Seven hundred thousand pesos
(Php700,000.00);
(e) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(h) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its maximum period and a fine of not
less than Three hundred thousand pesos
(Php300,000.00) but not more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);
(f) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(I) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision
mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not
less than Three hundred thousand pesos
(php300,000.00) but not more than Five
hundred thousand pesos (Php500,000.00);
(g) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(j) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its maximum period and a fine of
not less than Two hundred thousand pesos
(Php200,000.00) but not more than Three
hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00);
(h) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(k) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccionalin its medium period and a fine of
not less than One hundred thousand pesos
(php100,000.00) but not more than Two
hundred fifty thousand pesos (php250,000.00);
(i) Any person found guilty of violating Section
4(l) of this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not
less than Fifty thousand pesos (Php50,000.00)
but not more than One hundred thousand
pesos (Php100,000.00);
(j) Any person found guilty of violating Section
11 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of prision
correccional in its medium period and a fine of
 not less than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) for the first
offense. In the case of a subsequent offense,
the penalty shall be a fine not less than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but not more
than Three million pesos (Php3,000,000.00)
and revocation of its license to operate and
immediate closure of the establishment;
(k) Any ISP found guilty of willfully and
knowingly failing to comply with the notice and
installation requirements under Section 9 of this
Act shall suffer the penalty of a fine of not less
than Five hundred thousand pesos
(Php500,000.00) but not more than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) for the first offense. In
case of subsequent offense, the penalty shall
be a fine of not less than One million pesos
(Php1,000,000.00) but not more than Two
million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) and revocation
of its license to operate;
(l) Any mall owner-operator and owner or lessor
of other business establishments including
photo developers, information technology
professionals, credit card companies and
banks, found guilty of willfully and knowingly
failing to comply with the notice requirements
under Section 10 of this Act shall suffer the
penalty of a fine of not less than One million
pesos (Php1,000,000.00) but not more than
Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) for the
first offense. In the case of a subsequent
offense, the penalty shall be a fine of not less
than Two million pesos (Php2,000,000.00) but
not more than Three million pesos
(Php3,000,000.00) and revocation of its license
to operate and immediate closure of the
establishment; and
(m) Any person found guilty of violating Section
13 of this Act shall suffer the penalty of arresto
mayor in its minimum period and a fine of not
less than One hundred thousand pesos
(Php100,000.00) but not more than Three
hundred thousand pesos (Php300,000.00).
Section 16. Common Penal Provisions. -
(a) If the offender is a parent, ascendant,
guardian, step-parent or collateral relative
within the third degree of consanguinity or
affinity or any person having control or moral
ascendancy over the child, the penalty provided
herein shall be in its maximum
duration; Provided, That this provision shall not
apply to Section 4(g) of this Act;
(b) If the offender is a juridical person, the
penalty shall be imposed upon the owner,
manager, partner, member of the board of
directors and/or any responsible officer who
participated in the commission of the crime or
shall have knowingly permitted or failed to
prevent its commissions;
(c) If the offender is a foreigner, he/she shall be
immediately deported after the complete
service of his/her sentence and shall forever be
barred from entering the country; and
(d) The penalty provided for in this Act shall be
imposed in its maximum duration if the offender
is a public officer or employee.
Section 17. Confiscation and Forfeiture of the
Proceeds, Tools and Instruments Used in Child
Pornography. - In addition to the penalty imposed for the
violation of this Act, the court shall order the confiscation
and forfeiture in favor of the government of all the
proceeds, tools and instruments used in the commission
of the crime, unless they are the property of a third
person not liable for the unlawful act; Provided, however,
That all awards for damages shall be taken from the
personal and separate properties of the
offender; Provided, further, That if such properties are
insufficient, the deficiency shall be taken from the
confiscated and forfeited proceeds, tools and
instruments.
All proceeds derived from the sale of properties used for
the commission of any form of child pornography shall
accrue to the special account of the DSWD which shall
be used exclusively for the implementation of this Act.
When the proceeds, tools and instruments used in the
commission of the offense have been destroyed
diminished in value or otherwise rendered worthless by
any act or omission, directly or indirectly, of the offender,
or it has been concealed, removed, converted or
transferred to prevent the same from being found or to
avoid forfeiture or confiscation, the offender shall be
ordered to pay the amount equal to the value of the
proceeds, tools and instruments used in the commission
of the offense.1avvphi1
Section 18. Mandatory Services to Victims of Child
Pornography. - To ensure recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration into the mainstream of society concerned
government agencies and the LGUs shall make
available the following services to victims of any form of
child pornography:
(a) Emergency shelter or appropriate housing;
(b) Counseling;
(c) Free legal services, which shall include
information about the victim's rights and the
procedure for filing of complaints, claims for
compensation and such other legal remedies
available to them in a language understood by
the child;
(d) Medical or psychological services;
(e) Livelihood and skills training; and
(f) Educational assistance.
Sustained supervision and follow through mechanism
that will track the progress of recovery, rehabilitation and
reintegration of the child victims shall adopted and
carried out.
Section 19. Programs for Victims of Child
Pornography. The Inter-Agency Council Against Child
Pornography created under Section 20 of this Act shall
develop and implement the necessary programs that will
prevent any form of child pornography, as well as
protect, heal and reintegrate the child into the
mainstream of society. Such programs shall include beat
but not limited to the following:
 (a) Provision of mandatory services including
counseling free legal services, medical or
psychological services, livelihood and skills
training and educational assistance to the child
pursuant to Section 18 of this Act;
(b) Sponsorship of a national research program
on any form of child pornography and other
acts covered by the law and the establishment
of a data collection system for monitoring and
evaluation purposes;
(c) Provision of necessary technical and
material support services to appropriate
government agencies and nongovernmental
organizations:
(d) Sponsorship of conferences and seminars
to provide venue for consensus building
amongst the public, the academe , government,
nongovernmental and international
organizations and
(e) Promotion of information and education
campaign.
Section 20. Inter - Agency Council against Child
Pornography. - There is hereby established an Inter-
Agency Council against Child Pornography to be
composed of the Secretary of the DSWD as chairperson
and the following as members:
(a) Secretary of the Department of Justice:
(b) Secretary of the Department of Labor and
Employment
(c) Secretary of the Department of Science and
Technology
(d) Chief of the Philippine National Police;
(e) Chairperson of the Commission on
Information and Communications Technology;
(g) Commissioner of the National
Telecommunications Commission;
(h) Executive Director of the Council for the
Welfare of Children;
(i) Executive Director of the Philippine Center
for Transnational Crimes;
(j) Executive Director of the Optical Media
Board;
(k) Director of the National Bureau of
Investigation; and
(l) Three (3) representatives from children's
nongovernmental organizations. These
representatives shall be nominated by the
government agency representatives of the
Council for appointment by the President for a
term of three (3) years and may be renewed
upon renomination and reappointment by the
Council and the President respectively.
The members of the Council mat designate their
permanent representatives, who shall have a rank not
lower than assistant secretary or its equivalent, to
meetings and shall receive emoluments as may be
determined by the Council in accordance with existing
budget and accounting rules and regulations.
The DSWD shall establish the necessary Secretariat for
the Council.
Section 21. Functions of the Council. - The Council shall
have the following powers and functions:
(a) Formulate comprehensive and integrated
plans and programs to prevent and suppress
any form of child pornography;
(b) Promulgate rules and regulations as may be
necessary for the effective implementation of
this Act;
(c) Monitor and oversee the strict
implementation of this Act;
(d) Coordinate the programs and projects of the
various members agencies effectively address
the issues and problems attendant to child
pornography;
(e) Conduct and coordinate massive
information disseminations and campaign on
the existence of the law and the various issues
and problems attendant to child pornography;
(f) Direct other agencies to immediately
respond to the problems brought to their
attention and report to the Council on the action
taken;
(g) Assist in the filling of cases against
individuals, agencies, institutions or
establishments that violate the provisions of this
Act;
(h) Formulate a program for the reintegration of
victims of child pornography;
(i) Secure from any department, bureau, office,
agency or instrumentality of the government or
from NGOs and other civic organizations such
assistance as may be needed to effectively
implement this Act;
(j) Complement the shared government
information system relative to child abuse and
exploitation and ensure that the proper
agencies conduct a continuing research and
study on the patterns and schemes of any form
of child pornography which form basis for policy
formulation and program direction;
(k) develop the mechanism to ensure the
timely, coordinated and effective response to
cases of child pornography;
(l) Recommend measures to enhance
cooperative efforts and mutual assistance
among foreign countries through bilateral
and/or multilateral arrangements to prevent and
suppress any form of child pornography;
 (m) Adopt measures and policies to protect the
rights and needs of the victims of child
pornography who are foreign nationals in the
Philippines;
(n) maintain a database of cases of child
pornography;
(o) Initiate training programs in identifying and
providing the necessary intervention or
assistance to victims of child pornography.
(p) Submit to the President and the
Congressional Oversight committee credited
herein the annual report on the policies, plans,
programs and activities of the Council relative
to the implementation of this Act; and
(q) Exercise all the powers and perform such
other functions necessary to attain the
purposes and objectives of this Act.
Section 22. Child Pornography as a Transnational
Crime. - Pursuant to the Convention on transnational
Organized Crime, the DOJ may execute the request of a
foreign state for assistance in the investigation or
prosecution of any form of child pornography by: (1)
conducting a preliminary investigation against the
offender and, if appropriate, to file the necessary
charges in court; (2) giving information needed by the
foreign state; and (3) to apply for an order of forfeiture of
any proceeds or monetary instrument or properly located
in the Philippines used in connection with child
pornography in the court; Provided, That if the DOJ
refuses to act on the request of for delaying the
execution thereof: Provided, further, That the principles
of mutuality and reciprocity shall, for this purpose, be at
all times recognized.
Section 23. Extradition. - The DOJ, in consultation with
the Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA), shall endeavor
to include child pornography among extraditable
offenses in future treaties.
Section 24. Congressional Oversight Committee. -There
is hereby created a Congressional Oversight Committee
composed of five (5) members from the Senate and five
(5) members from the House of Representatives. The
members from the Senate shall be appointed by the
Senate President based on proportional representation
of the parties or coalition therein with at least one (1)
member representing the Minority. The members from
the House of Representative shall be appointed by the
Speaker, also based on proportional representation of
the parties or coalitions therein with the Chair of the
House of Committee on Welfare of Children and at least
one (1) member representing the Minority
The Committee shall be headed by the respective Chairs
of the Senate Committee on Youth, Women and Family
relations and the House of Representatives Committee
on Justice. The Secretariat of the Congressional
Oversight Committee shall come from the existing
Secretariat personnel of the Committees of the Senate
and the House of Representatives concerned.
The Committee shall monitor and ensure the effective
implementation of this Act, determine inherent weakness
and loopholes in the law. Recommend the necessary
remedial legislator or administrative measures and
perform such other duties and functions as may be
necessary to attain the objectives of this Act.
Section 25. Appropriations. - The amount necessary to
implement the provisions of the Anti-Child Pornography
Act and the operationalization of the Inter-Agency
Council Against Child Pornography shall be included in
the annual General Appropriations Act.
Section 26. Implementing Rules and Regulations. - The
Inter- Agency Council Against Child pornography shall
promulgate the necessary implementing rules and
regulations within ninety (90) days from the effectivity of
this Act.
Section 27. Suppletory Application of the Revised Penal
Code. - The Revised penal Code shall be suppletorily
applicable to this Act.
Section 28. Separability Clause. - If any part of this Act
is declared unconstitutional or invalid, the other
provisions not affected thereby shall continue to be in full
force and effect.
Section 29. Repealing Clause. - All laws, presidential
decrees, executive orders, administrative orders, rules
and regulations inconsistent with or contrary to the
provisions of this Act are deemed amended, modified or
repealed accordingly.
Section 30. Effectivity. - This Act shall effect after fifteen
(15) days following its complete publication in the Official
Gazette or in at least two (2) newspapers of general
circulation.
Approved,
Republic Act No. 9710 August 14, 2009
AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE MAGNA CARTA OF
WOMEN
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of
Representatives of the Philippines in Congress
assembled::
Section 1. Short Title. - This Act shall be known
as "The Magna Carta of Women".
Section 2. Declaration of Policy. - Recognizing that the
economic, political, and sociocultural realities affect
women's current condition, the State affirms the role of
women in nation building and ensures the substantive
equality of women and men. It shall promote
empowerment of women and pursue equal opportunities
for women and men and ensure equal access to
resources and to development results and outcome.
Further, the State realizes that equality of men and
women entails the abolition of the unequal structures
and practices that perpetuate discrimination and
inequality. To realize this, the State shall endeavor to
develop plans, policies, programs, measures, and
mechanisms to address discrimination and inequality in
the economic, political, social, and cultural life of women
and men.
The State condemns discrimination against women in all
its forms and pursues by all appropriate means and
without delay the policy of eliminating discrimination
against women in keeping with the Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women (CEDAW) and other international instruments
consistent with Philippine law. The State shall accord
women the rights, protection, and opportunities available
to every member of society.
The State affirms women's rights as human rights and
shall intensify its efforts to fulfill its duties under
international and domestic law to recognize, respect,
protect, fulfill, and promote all human rights and
fundamental freedoms of women, especially
marginalized women, in the economic, social, political,
cultural, and other fields without distinction or
discrimination on account of class, age, sex, gender,
language, ethnicity, religion, ideology, disability,
education, and status. The State shall provide the
necessary mechanisms to enforce women's rights and
adopt and undertake all legal measures necessary to
foster and promote the equal opportunity for women to
participate in and contribute to the development of the
political, economic, social, and cultural realms.
The State, in ensuring the full integration of women's
concerns in the mainstream of development, shall
provide ample opportunities to enhance and develop
their skills, acquire productive employment and
contribute to their families and communities to the fullest
of their capabilities.
In pursuance of this policy, the State reaffirms the right
of women in all sectors to participate in policy
formulation. planning, organization, implementation,
management, monitoring, and evaluation of all
programs, projects, and services. It shall support
policies, researches, technology, and training programs
and other support services such as financing,
production, and marketing to encourage active
participation of women in national development.
Section 3. Principles of Human Rights of Women. -
Human rights are universal and inalienable. All people in
the world are entitled to them. The universality of human
rights is encompassed in the words of Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, which states
that all human beings are free and equal in dignity and
rights.
Human rights are indivisible. Human rights are inherent
to the dignity of every human being whether they relate
to civil, cultural, economic, political, or social issues.
Human rights are interdependent and interrelated. The
fulfillment of one right often depends, wholly or in part,
upon the fulfillment of others.
All individuals are equal as human beings by virtue of
the inherent dignity of each human person. No one,
therefore, should suffer discrimination on the basis of
ethnicity, gender, age, language, sexual orientation,
race, color, religion, political, or other opinion, national,
social, or geographical origin, disability, property, birth, or
other status as established by human rights standards.
All people have the right to participate in and access
information relating to the decision- making processes
that affect their lives and well-being. Rights-based
approaches require a high degree of participation by
communities, civil society, minorities, women, young
people, indigenous peoples, and other identified groups.
States and other duty-bearers are answerable for the
observance of human rights. They have to comply with
the legal norms and standards enshrined in international
human rights instruments in accordance with the
Philippine Constitution. Where they fail to do so,
aggrieved rights-holders are entitled to institute
proceedings for appropriate redress before a competent
court or other adjudicator in accordance with the rules
and procedures provided by law.
CHAPTER II
DEFINITION OF TERMS
Section 4. Definitions. - For purposes of this Act, the
following terms shall mean:
(a) "Women Empowerment" refers to the
provision, availability, and accessibility of
opportunities, services, and observance of
human rights which enable women to actively
participate and contribute to the political,
economic, social, and cultural development of
the nation as well as those which shall provide
them equal access to ownership, management,
and control of production, and of material and
informational resources and benefits in the
family, community, and society.
(b) "Discrimination Against Women" refers to
any gender-based distinction, exclusion, or
restriction which has the effect or purpose of
impairing or nullifying the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise by women, irrespective
of their marital status, on a basis of equality of
men and women, of human rights and
fundamental freedoms in the political,
economic, social, cultural, civil, or any other
field.
It includes any act or omission, including by
law; policy, administrative measure, or practice,
that directly or indirectly excludes or restricts
women in the recognition and promotion of their
rights and their access to and enjoyment of
opportunities, benefits, or privileges.
A measure or practice of general application is
discrimination against women if it fails to
provide for mechanisms to offset or address
sex or gender-based disadvantages or
limitations of women, as a result of which
women are denied or restricted in the
recognition and protection of their rights and in
their access to and enjoyment of opportunities,
benefits, or privileges; or women, more than
men, are shown to have suffered the greater
adverse effects of those measures or practices.
Provided, finally, That discrimination
compounded by or intersecting with other
grounds, status, or condition, such as ethnicity,
age, poverty, or religion shall be considered
discrimination against women under this Act.
(c) "Marginalization" refers to a condition where
a whole category of people is excluded from
useful and meaningful participation in political,
economic, social, and cultural life.
(d) "Marginalized" refers to the basic,
disadvantaged, or vulnerable persons or groups
who are mostly living in poverty and have little
or no access to land and other resources, basic
social and economic services such as health
care, education, water and sanitation,
employment and livelihood opportunities,
housing, social security, physical infrastructure;
and the justice system.
These include, but are not limited to, women in
the following sectors and groups:
(1) "Small Farmers and Rural
Workers" refers to those who are
engaged directly or indirectly in small
farms and forest areas, workers in
commercial farms and plantations,
whether paid or unpaid, regular or
season-bound. These shall include.
but are not limited to, (a) small farmers
who own or are still amortizing for
lands that is not more than three (3)
hectares, tenants, leaseholders, and
stewards; and (b) rural workers who
are either wage earners, self-
employed, unpaid family workers
directly and personally engaged in
agriculture, small-scale mining,
handicrafts, and other related farm
and off-farm activities;
(2) "Fisherfolk" refers to those directly
or indirectly engaged in taking,
culturing, or processing fishery or
aquatic resources. These include, but
are not to be limited to, women
engaged in fishing in municipal waters,
coastal and marine areas, women
workers in commercial fishing and
aquaculture, vendors and processors
of fish and coastal products, and
subsistence producers such as shell-
gatherers, managers, and producers
of mangrove resources, and other
related producers:
(3) "Urban Poor" refers to those
residing in urban and urbanizable slum
or blighted areas, with or without the
benefit of security of abode, where the
income of the head of the family
cannot afford in a sustained manner to
provide for the family's basic needs of
food, health, education, housing, and
other essentials in life;
(4) "Workers in the Formal Economy"
refers to those who are employed by
any person acting directly or indirectly
in the interest of an employer in
relation to an employee and shall
include the government and all its
branches, subdivisions, and
instrumentalities, all government-
owned and -controlled corporations
and institutions, as well as nonprofit
private institutions or organizations;
(5) "Workers in the Informal Economy"
refers to self-employed, occasionally
or personally hired, subcontracted,
paid and unpaid family workers in
household incorporated and
unincorporated enterprises, including
home workers, micro-entrepreneurs
and producers, and operators of sari-
sari stores and all other categories
who suffer from violation of workers'
rights:
(6) "Migrant Workers" refers to
Filipinos who are to be engaged, are
engaged, or have been engaged in a
remunerated activity in a State of
which they are not legal residents,
whether documented or
undocumented;
(7) "Indigenous Peoples" refers to a
group of people or homogenous
societies identified by self-ascription
and ascription by other, who have
continuously lived as organized
community on communally bounded
and defined territory, and who have,
under claims of ownership since time
immemorial, occupied; possessed
customs, tradition, and other
distinctive cultural traits, or who have,
through resistance to political, social,
and cultural inroads of colonization,
non- indigenous religions and culture,
became historically differentiated from
the majority of Filipinos. They shall
likewise include peoples who are
regarded as indigenous on account of
their descent from the populations
which inhabited the country, at the
dime of conquest or colonization, or at
the time of inroads of non-indigenous
religions and cultures, or the
establishment of present state
boundaries, who retain some or all of
their own social, economic, cultural,
and political institutions, but who may
have been displaced from their
traditional domains or who may have
resettled outside their ancestral
domains as defined under Section
3(h), Chapter II of Republic Act No.
8371, otherwise known as "The
Indigenous Peoples Rights Act of
1997" (IPRA of 1997);
(8) "Moro" refers to native peoples
who have historically inhabited
Mindanao, Palawan, and Sulu, and
who are largely of the Islamic faith;
(9) "Children" refers to those who are
below eighteen (18) years of age or
over but are unable to fully take care
of themselves or protect themselves
from abuse, neglect, cruelty,
exploitation, or discrimination because
of a physical or mental disability or
condition;
(10) "Senior Citizens" refers to those
sixty (60) years of age and above;
(11) "Persons with Disabilities" refers
to those who are suffering from
restriction or different abilities, as a
result of a mental, physical, or sensory
impairment to perform an activity in
the manner or within the range
considered normal for a human being;
and
(12) "Solo Parents" refers to those
who fall under the category of a solo
parent defined under Republic Act No.
8972, otherwise known as the "Solo
Parents Welfare Act of 2000".
(e) "Substantive Equality" refers to the full and
equal enjoyment of rights and freedoms
contemplated under this Act. It
encompasses de jure and de facto equality and
also equality in outcomes.
(f) "Gender Equality" refers to the principle
asserting the equality of men and women and
their right to enjoy equal conditions realizing
their full human potentials to contribute to and
benefit from the results of development, and
with the State recognizing that all human
beings are free and equal in dignity and rights.
(g) "Gender Equity" refers to the policies,
instruments, programs, services, and actions
that address the disadvantaged position of
women in society by providing preferential
treatment and affirmative action. Such
temporary special measures aimed at
accelerating de facto equality between men and
women shall not be considered discriminatory
but shall in no way entail as a consequence the
maintenance of unequal or separate standards.
These measures shall be discontinued when
the objectives of equality of opportunity and
treatment have been achieved.
(h) "Gender and Development (GAD)" refers to
the development perspective and process that
are participatory and empowering, equitable,
sustainable, free from violence, respectful of
human rights, supportive of self-determination
and actualization of human potentials. It seeks
to achieve gender equality as a fundamental
value that should be reflected in development
choices; seeks to transform society's social,
economic, and political structures and
questions the validity of the gender roles they
ascribed to women and men; contends that
women are active agents of development and
not just passive recipients of development
assistance; and stresses the need of women to
organize themselves and participate in political
processes to strengthen their legal rights.
(i) "Gender Mainstreaming" refers to the
strategy for making women's as well as men's
concerns and experiences an integral
dimension of the design, implementation,
monitoring, and evaluation of policies and
programs in all political, economic, and societal
spheres so that women and men benefit
equally and inequality is not perpetuated. It is
the process of assessing the implications for
women and men of any planned action,
including legislation, policies, or programs in all
areas and at all levels.
(j) "Temporary Special Measures" refers to a
variety of legislative, executive, administrative,
and regulatory instruments, policies, and
practices aimed at accelerating this de facto
equality of women in specific areas. These
measures shall not be considered
discriminatory but shall in no way entail as a
consequence the maintenance of unequal or
separate standards. They shall be discontinued
when their objectives have been achieved.
(k) "Violence Against Women" refers to any act
of gender-based violence that results in, or is
likely to result in, physical, sexual, or
psychological harm or suffering to women,
including threats of such acts, coercion, or
arbitrary deprivation of liberty, whether
occurring in public or in private life. It shall be
understood to encompass, but not limited to,
the following:
(1) Physical, sexual, psychological,
and economic violence occurring in
the family, including battering, sexual
abuse of female children in the
household, dowry-related violence,
marital rape, and other traditional
practices harmful to women, non-
spousal violence, and violence related
to exploitation;
(2) Physical, sexual, and psychological
violence occurring within the general
community, including rape, sexual
abuse, sexual harassment, and
intimidation at work, in educational
institutions and elsewhere, trafficking
in women, and prostitution; and
(3) Physical, sexual, and psychological
violence perpetrated or condoned by
the State, wherever it occurs.
It also includes acts of violence against women
as defused in Republic Acts No. 9208 and
9262.
(l) "Women in the Military" refers to women
employed in the military, both in the major and
technical services, who are performing combat
and/or noncombat functions, providing security
to the State, and protecting the people from
various forms of threat. It also includes women
trainees in all military training institutions.
(m) "Social Protection" refers to policies and
programs that seek to reduce poverty and
vulnerability to risks and enhance the social
status and rights of all women, especially the
marginalized by promoting and protecting
livelihood and employment, protecting against
hazards and sudden loss of income, and
improving people's capacity to manage risk. Its
components are labor market programs, social
insurance, social welfare, and social safety
nets.
CHAPTER III
DUTIES RELATED TO THE HUMAN RIGHTS OF
WOMEN
The State, private sector, society in general, and all
individuals shall contribute to the recognition, respect,
and promotion of the rights of women defined and
guaranteed under this Act.
Section 5. The State as the Primary Duty-Bearer. -
The State, as the primary duty-bearer, shall:
(a) Refrain from discriminating against women
and violating their rights;
(b) Protect women against discrimination and
from violation of their rights by private
corporations, entities, and individuals; and
(c) Promote and fulfill the rights of women in all
spheres, including their rights to substantive
equality and non-discrimination.
The State shall fulfill these duties through law, policy,
regulatory instruments, administrative guidelines, and
other appropriate measures, including temporary special
measures.
Recognizing the interrelation of the human rights of
women, the State shall take measures and establish
mechanisms to promote the coherent and integrated
implementation, and enforcement of this Act and related
laws, policies, or other measures to effectively stop
discrimination against and advance the rights of women.
The State shall keep abreast with and be guided by
progressive developments in human rights of women
under international law and design of policies, laws, and
other measures to promote the objectives of this Act.
Section 6. Duties of the State Agencies and
Instrumentalities. - These duties of the State shall
extend to all state agencies, offices, and
instrumentalities at all levels and government-owned and
-controlled corporations, subject to the Constitution and
pertinent laws, policies, or administrative guidelines that
define specific duties of state agencies and entities
concerned.
Section 7. Suppletory Effect. - This chapter shall be
deemed integrated into and be suppletory to other
provisions of this Act, particularly those that guarantee
specific rights to women and define specific roles and
require specific conduct of state organs.
CHAPTER IV
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT
Section 8. Human Rights of Women. - All rights in the
Constitution and those rights recognized under
international instruments duly signed and ratified by the
Philippines, in consonance with Philippine law, shall be
rights of women under this Act to be enjoyed without
discrimination.
Section 9. Protection from Violence. - The State shall
ensure that all women shall be protected from all forms
of violence as provided for in existing laws. Agencies of
government shall give priority to the defense and
protection of women against gender-based offenses and
help women attain justice and healing.
Towards this end, measures to prosecute and reform
offenders shall likewise be pursued.
(a) Within the next five (5) years, there shall be an
incremental increase in the recruitment and training of
women in the police force, forensics and medico-legal,
legal services, and social work services availed of by
women who are victims of gender-related offenses until
fifty percent (50%) of the personnel thereof shall be
women.
(b) Women shall have the right to protection and security
in situations of armed conflict and militarization. Towards
this end, they shall be protected from all forms of
gender-based violence, particularly rape and other forms
of sexual abuse, and all forms of violence in situations of
armed conflict. The State shall observe international
standards for the protection of civilian population in
circumstances of emergency and armed conflict. It shall
not force women, especially indigenous peoples, to
abandon their lands, territories, and means of
subsistence, or relocate them in special centers for
military purposes under any discriminatory condition.
(c) All government personnel involved in the protection
and defense of women against gender-based violence
shall undergo a mandatory training on human rights and
gender sensitivity pursuant to this Act.
(d) All local government units shall establish a Violence
Against Women's Desk in every barangay to ensure that
violence against women cases are fully addressed in a
gender-responsive manner.
Section 10. Women Affected by Disasters,
Calamities, and Other Crisis Situations. - Women
have the right to protection and security in times of
disasters, calamities, and other crisis situations
especially in all phases of relief, recovery, rehabilitation,
and construction efforts. The State shall provide for
immediate humanitarian assistance, allocation of
resources, and early resettlement, if necessary. It shall
also address the particular needs of women from a
gender perspective to ensure their full protection from
sexual exploitation and other sexual and gender- based
violence committed against them. Responses to disaster
situations shall include the provision of services, such as
psychosocial support, livelihood support, education,
psychological health, and comprehensive health
services, including protection during pregnancy.
Section 11. Participation and Representation. - The
State shall undertake temporary special measures to
accelerate the participation and equitable representation
of women in all spheres of society particularly in the
decision-making and policy-making processes in
government and private entities to fully realize their role
as agents and beneficiaries of development.
The State shall institute the following affirmative action
mechanisms so that women can participate meaningfully
in the formulation, implementation, and evaluation of
policies, plans, and programs for national, regional, and
local development:
(a) Empowerment within the Civil Service. -
Within the next five (5) years, the number of
women in third (3rd) level positions in
government shall be incrementally increased to
achieve a fifty-fifty (50-50) gender balance;
(b) Development Councils and Planning
Bodies. - To ensure the participation of women
in all levels of development planning and
program implementation, at least forty percent
(40%) of membership of all development
councils from the regional, provincial, city,
municipal and barangay levels shall be
composed of women;
(c) Other Policy and Decision-Making Bodies. -
Women's groups shall also be represented in
international, national, and local special and
decision-making bodies;
(d) International Bodies. - The State shall take
all appropriate measures to ensure the
opportunity of women, on equal terms with men
and without any discrimination, to represent
their governments at the international level and
to participate in the work of international
organizations;
(e) Integration of Women in Political Parties. -
The State shall provide incentives to political
parties with women's agenda. It shall likewise
encourage the integration of women in their
 leadership hierarchy, internal policy-making
structures, appointive, and electoral nominating
processes; and
(f) Private Sector. - The State shall take
measures to encourage women leadership in
the private sector in the form of incentives.
Section 12. Equal Treatment Before the Law. - The
State shall take steps to review and, when necessary,
amend and/or repeal existing laws that are
discriminatory to women within three (3) years from the
effectivity of this Act.
Section 13. Equal Access and Elimination of
Discrimination in Education, Scholarships, and
Training. - (a) The State shall ensure that gender
stereotypes and images in educational materials and
curricula are adequately and appropriately revised.
Gender-sensitive language shall be used at all times.
Capacity-building on gender and development (GAD),
peace and human rights, education for teachers, and all
those involved in the education sector shall be pursued
toward this end. Partnerships between and among
players of the education sector, including the private
sector, churches, and faith groups shall be encouraged.
(b) Enrollment of women in nontraditional skills training
in vocational and tertiary levels shall be encouraged.
(c) Expulsion and non-readmission of women faculty due
to pregnant;- outside of marriage shall be outlawed. No
school shall turn out or refuse admission to a female
student solely on the account of her having contracted
pregnancy outside of marriage during her term in school.
Section 14. Women in Sports. - The State shall
develop, establish, and strengthen programs for the
participation of women and girl-children in competitive
and noncompetitive sports as a means to achieve
excellence, promote physical and social well-being,
eliminate gender-role stereotyping, and provide equal
access to the full benefits of development for all persons
regardless of sex, gender identity, and other similar
factors.
For this purpose, all sports-related organizations shall
create guidelines that will establish and integrate
affirmative action as a strategy and gender equality as a
framework in planning and implementing their policies,
budgets, programs, and activities relating to the
participation of women and girls in sports.
The State will also provide material and nonmaterial
incentives to local government units, media
organizations, and the private sector for promoting,
training, and preparing women and girls for participation
in competitive and noncompetitive sports, especially in
local and international events, including, but not limited
to, the Palarong Pambansa, Southeast Asian Games,
Asian Games, and the Olympics.
No sports event or tournament will offer or award a
different sports prize, with respect to its amount or value,
to women and men winners in the same sports
category: Provided, That the said tournament, contest,
race, match, event, or game is open to both
sexes: Provided, further, That the sports event or
tournament is divided into male or female divisions.
The State shall also ensure the safety and well-being of
all women and girls participating in sports, especially, but
not limited to, trainees, reserve members, members,
coaches, and mentors of national sports teams, whether
in studying, training, or performance phases, by
providing them comprehensive health and medical
insurance coverage, as well as integrated medical,
nutritional, and healthcare services.
Schools, colleges, universities, or any other learning
institution shall take into account its total women student
population in granting athletic scholarship. There shall
be a pro rata representation of women in the athletic
scholarship program based on the percentage of women
in the whole student population.
Section 15. Women in the Military. - The State shall
pursue appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
of women in the military, police, and other similar
services, including revising or abolishing policies and
practices that restrict women from availing of both
combat and noncombat training that are open to men, or
from taking on functions other than administrative tasks,
such as engaging in combat, security-related, or field
operations. Women in the military shall be accorded the
same promotional privileges and opportunities as men,
including pay increases, additional remunerations and
benefits, and awards based on their competency and
quality of performance. Towards this end, the State shall
ensure that the personal dignity of women shall always
be respected.
Women in the military, police, and other similar services
shall be provided with the same right to employment as
men on equal conditions. Equally, they shall be accorded
the same capacity as men to act in and enter into
contracts, including marriage.
Further, women in the military, police; and other similar
services shall be entitled to leave benefits such as
maternity leave, as provided for by existing laws.
Section 16. Nondiscriminatory and Nonderogatory
Portrayal of Women in Media and Film. - The State
shall formulate policies and programs for the
advancement of women in collaboration with
government and nongovernment media-related
organizations. It shall likewise endeavor to raise the
consciousness of the general public in recognizing the
dignity of women and the role and contribution of women
in the family; community, and the society through the
strategic use of mass media.
For this purpose, the State shall ensure allocation of
space; airtime, and resources, strengthen programming,
production, and image-making that appropriately present
women's needs, issues, and concerns in all forms of
media, communication, information dissemination, and
advertising.
The State, in cooperation with all schools of journalism,
information, and communication, as well as the national
media federations and associations, shall require all
media organizations and corporations to integrate into
their human resource development components regular
training on gender equality and gender-based
discrimination, create and use gender equality guidelines
in all aspects of management, training, production,
information, dissemination, communication, and
programming; and convene a gender equality committee
that will promote gender mainstreaming as a framework
and affirmative action as a strategy, and monitor and
evaluate the implementation of gender equality
guidelines.
Section 17. Women's Right to Health. - (a)
Comprehensive Health Services. - The State shall, at all
times, provide for a comprehensive, culture-sensitive,
and gender-responsive health services and programs
covering all stages of a woman's life cycle and which
addresses the major causes of women's mortality and
morbidity: Provided, That in the provision for
comprehensive health services, due respect shall be
accorded to women's religious convictions, the rights of
the spouses to found a family in accordance with their
religious convictions, and the demands of responsible
parenthood, and the right of women to protection from
hazardous drugs, devices, interventions, and
substances.
Access to the following services shall be ensured:
(1) Maternal care to include pre- and post-natal
services to address pregnancy and infant
health and nutrition;
(2) Promotion of breastfeeding;
(3) Responsible, ethical, legal, safe, and
effective methods of family planning;
(4) Family and State collaboration in youth
sexuality education and health services without
prejudice to the primary right and duty of
parents to educate their children;
(5) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract infections, including sexually
transmitted diseases, HIV, and AIDS;
(6) Prevention and management of
reproductive tract cancers like breast and
cervical cancers, and other gynecological
conditions and disorders;
(7) Prevention of abortion and management of
pregnancy-related complications;
(8) In cases of violence against women and
children, women and children victims and
survivors shall be provided with comprehensive
health services that include psychosocial,
therapeutic, medical, and legal interventions
and assistance towards healing, recovery, and
empowerment;
(9) Prevention and management of infertility
and sexual dysfunction pursuant to ethical
norms and medical standards;
(10) Care of the elderly women beyond their
child-bearing years; and
(11) Management, treatment, and intervention
of mental health problems of women and girls.
In addition, healthy lifestyle activities are
encouraged and promoted through programs
and projects as strategies in the prevention of
diseases.
(b) Comprehensive Health Information and Education. -
The State shall provide women in all sectors with
appropriate, timely, complete, and accurate information
and education on all the above-stated aspects of
women's health in government education and training
programs, with due regard to the following:
(1) The natural and primary right and duty of
parents in the rearing of the youth and the
development of moral character and the right of
children to be brought up in an atmosphere of
morality and rectitude for the enrichment and
strengthening of character;
(2) The formation of a person's sexuality that
affirms human dignity; and
(3) Ethical, legal, safe, and effective family
planning methods including fertility awareness.
Section 18. Special Leave Benefits for Women. - A
woman employee having rendered continuous
aggregate employment service of at least six (6) months
for the last twelve (12) months shall be entitled to a
special leave benefit of two (2) months with full pay
based on her gross monthly compensation following
surgery caused by gynecological disorders.
Section 19. Equal Rights in All Matters Relating to
Marriage and Family Relations. - The State shall take
all appropriate measures to eliminate discrimination
against women in all matters relating to marriage and
family relations and shall ensure:
(a) the same rights to enter into and leave
marriages or common law relationships referred
to under the Family Code without prejudice to
personal or religious beliefs;
(b) the same rights to choose freely a spouse
and to enter into marriage only with their free
and full consent. The betrothal and the
marriage of a child shall have no legal effect;
(c) the joint decision on the number and
spacing of their children and to have access to
the information, education and means to enable
them to exercise these rights;
(d) the same personal rights between spouses
or common law spouses including the right to
choose freely a profession and an occupation;
(e) the same rights for both spouses or
common law spouses in respect of the
ownership, acquisition, management,
administration, enjoyment, and disposition of
property;
(f) the same rights to properties and resources,
whether titled or not, and inheritance, whether
formal or customary; and
(g) women shall have equal rights with men to
acquire, change, or retain their nationality. The
State shall ensure in particular that neither
marriage to an alien nor change of nationality
by the husband during marriage shall
automatically change the nationality of the wife,
render her stateless or force upon her the
nationality of the husband. Various statutes of
other countries concerning dual citizenship that
may be enjoyed equally by women and men
shall likewise be considered.
Customary laws shall be respected: Provided, however,
That they do not discriminate against women.
CHAPTER V private ownership is not possible, such
RIGHTS AND EMPOWERMENT OF MARGINALIZED
SECTORS
Women in marginalized sectors are hereby guaranteed
all civil, political, social, and economic rights recognized,
promoted, and protected under existing laws including,
but not limited to, the Indigenous Peoples Rights Act, the
Urban Development and Housing Act, the
Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law, the Fisheries
Code, the Labor Code, the Migrant Workers Act, the
Solo Parents Welfare Act, and the Social Reform and
Poverty Alleviation Act.
Section 20. Food Security and Productive
Resources. - The State recognizes the contribution of
women to food production and shall ensure its
sustainability and sufficiency with the active participation
of women. Towards this end, the State shall guarantee,
at all times, the availability in the market of safe and
health-giving food to satisfy the dietary needs of the
population, giving particular attention to the specific
needs of poor girl-children and marginalized women,
especially pregnant and lactating mothers and their
young children. To further address this, the State shall
ensure:
(a) Right to Food. - The State shall guarantee
the availability of food in quantity and quality
sufficient to satisfy the dietary needs of
individuals, the physical and economic
accessibility for everyone to adequate food that
is culturally acceptable and free from unsafe
substances and culturally accepted, and the
accurate and substantial information to the
availability of food, including the right to full,
accurate, and truthful information about safe
and health-giving foods and how to produce
and have regular and easy access to them;
(b) Right to Resources for Food Production. -
The State shall guarantee women a vital role in
food production by giving priority to their rights
to land, credit, and infrastructure support,
technical training, and technological and
marketing assistance. The State shall promote
women-friendly technology as a high priority
activity in agriculture and shall promote the right
to adequate food by proactively engaging in
activities intended to strengthen access to,
utilization of, and receipt of accurate and
substantial information on resources and
means to ensure women's livelihood, including
food security:
(1) Equal status shall be given to
women and men, whether married or
not, in the titling of the land and
issuance of stewardship contracts and
patents;
(2) Equal treatment shall be given to
women and men beneficiaries of the
agrarian reform program, wherein the
vested right of a woman agrarian
reform beneficiary is defined by a
woman's relationship to tillage, i.e.,
her direct and indirect contribution to
the development of the land;
(3) Customary rights of women to the
land, including access to and control
of the fruits and benefits, shall be
recognized in circumstances where
as ancestral domain claims:
(4) Information and assistance in
claiming rights to the land shall be
made available to women at all times;
(5) Equal rights to women to the
enjoyment, use, and management of
land, water, and other natural
resources within their communities or
ancestral domains;
(6) Equal access to the use and
management of fisheries and aquatic
resources, and all the rights and
benefits accruing to stakeholders in
the fishing industry;
(7) Equal status shall be given to
women and men in the issuance of
stewardship or lease agreements and
other fishery rights that may be
granted for the use and management
of coastal and aquatic resources. In
the same manner, women's
organizations shall be given equal
treatment as with other marginalized
fishers organizations in the issuance
of stewardship or lease agreements or
other fishery rights for the use and
management of such coastal and
aquatic resources which may include
providing support to women-engaged
coastal resources;
(8) There shall be no discrimination
against women in the deputization of
fish wardens;
(9) Women-friendly and sustainable
agriculture technology shall be
designed based on accessibility and
viability in consultation with women's
organizations;
(10) Access to small farmer-based and
controlled seeds production and
distribution shall be ensured and
protected;
(11) Indigenous practices of women in
seed storage and cultivation shall be
recognized, encouraged, and
protected;
(12) Equal rights shall be given to
women to be members of farmers'
organizations to ensure wider access
to and control of the means of
production;
(13) Provide opportunities for
empowering women fishers to be
involved in the control and
management, not only of the catch
and production of aquamarine
resources but also, to engage in
entrepreneurial activities which will
add value to production and marketing
ventures; and
 (14) Provide economic opportunities
for the indigenous women. particularly
access to market for their produce.
In the enforcement of the foregoing, the requirements of
law shall be observed at all times.
Section 21. Right to Housing. - The State shall
develop housing programs for women that are localized,
simple, accessible, with potable water, and electricity,
secure, with viable employment opportunities and
affordable amortization. In this regard, the State shall
consult women and involve them in community planning
and development, especially in matters pertaining to
land use, zoning, and relocation.
Section 22. Right to Decent Work. - The State shall
progressively realize and ensure decent work standards
for women that involve the creation of jobs of acceptable
quality in conditions of freedom, equity, security, and
human dignity.
(a) Decent work involves opportunities for work that are
productive and fairly remunerative as family living wage,
security in the workplace, and social protection for
families, better prospects for personal development and
social integration, freedom for people to express their
concerns organize, participate in the decisions that affect
their lives, and equality of opportunity and treatment for
all women and men.
(b) The State shall further ensure:
(1) Support services and gears to protect them
from occupational and health hazards taking
into account women's maternal functions;
(2) Support services that will enable women to
balance their family obligations and work
responsibilities including, but not limited to, the
establishment of day care centers and breast-
feeding stations at the workplace, and providing
maternity leave pursuant to the Labor Code and
other pertinent laws;
(3) Membership in unions regardless of status
of employment and place of employment; and
(4) Respect for the observance of indigenous
peoples' cultural practices even in the
workplace.
(c) In recognition of the temporary nature of overseas
work, the State shall exert all efforts to address the
causes of out-migration by developing local employment
and other economic opportunities for women and by
introducing measures to curb violence and forced and
involuntary displacement of local women. The State shall
ensure the protection and promotion of the rights and
welfare of migrant women regardless of their work
status, and protect them against discrimination in wages,
conditions of work, and employment opportunities in host
countries.
Section 23. Right to Livelihood, Credit, Capital, and
Technology. - The State shall ensure that women are
provided with the following:
(a) Equal access to formal sources of credit and
capital;
(b) Equal share to the produce of farms and
aquatic resources; and
(c) Employment opportunities for returning
women migrant workers taking into account
their skills and qualifications. Corollarily, the
State shall also promote skills and
entrepreneurship development of returning
women migrant workers.
Section 24. Right to Education and Training. - The
State shall ensure the following:
(a) Women migrant workers have the
opportunity to undergo skills training, if they so
desire, before taking on a foreign job, and
possible retraining upon return to the country:
(b) Gender-sensitive training and seminars; and
(c) Equal opportunities in scholarships based
on merit and fitness, especially to those
interested in research and development aimed
towards women-friendly farm technology.
Section 25. Right to Representation and
Participation. - The State shall ensure women's
participation in policy-making or decision-making bodies
in the regional, national, and international levels. It shall
also ensure the participation of grassroots women
leaders in decision and policy-making bodies in their
respective sectors including, but not limited to, the
Presidential Agrarian Reform Council (PARC) and its
local counterparts; community-based resource
management bodies or mechanisms on forest
management and stewardship; the National Fisheries
and Aquatic Resources Management Council (NFARMC)
and its local counterparts; the National Commission on
Indigenous Peoples; the Presidential Commission for the
Urban Poor; the National Anti-Poverty Commission; and,
where applicable, the local housing boards.
Section 26. Right to Information. - Access to
information regarding policies on women, including
programs, projects, and funding outlays that affect them,
shall be ensured.
Section 27. Social Protection. -
(a) The Social Security System (SSS) and the
Philippine Health Insurance Corporation
(PhilHealth) shall support indigenous and
community-based social protection schemes.
(b) The State shall institute policies and
programs that seek to reduce the poverty and
vulnerability to risks and enhance the social
status and rights of the marginalized women by
promoting and protecting livelihood and
employment, protecting against hazards and
sudden; loss of income, and improving people's
capacity to manage risks.
(c) The State shall endeavor to reduce and
eventually eliminate transfer costs of
remittances from abroad through appropriate
bilateral and multilateral agreements. It shall
likewise provide access to investment
opportunities for remittances in line with
national development efforts.
 (d) The State shall establish a health insurance
program for senior citizens and indigents.
(e) The State shall support women with
disabilities on a community-based social
protection scheme.
Section 28. Recognition and Preservation of Cultural
Identity and Integrity. - The State shall recognize and
respect the rights of Moro and indigenous women to
practice, promote, protect, and preserve their own
culture, traditions, and institutions and to consider these
rights in the formulation and implementation of national
policies and programs. To this end, the State shall adopt
measures in consultation with the sectors concerned to
protect their rights to their indigenous knowledge
systems and practices, traditional livelihood, and other
manifestations of their cultures and ways of life:
Provided, That these cultural systems and practices are
not discriminatory to women.
Section 29. Peace and Development. - The peace
process shall be pursued with the following
considerations:
(a) Increase the number of women participating
in discussions and decision-making in the
peace process, including membership in peace
panels recognizing women's role in conflict-
prevention and peace-making and in
indigenous system of conflict resolution;
(b) Ensure the development and inclusion of
women's welfare and concerns in the peace
agenda in the overall peace strategy and
women's participation in the planning,
implementation, monitoring, and evaluation of
rehabilitation and rebuilding of conflict-affected
areas;
(c) The institution of measures to ensure the
protection of civilians in conflict-affected
communities with special consideration for the
specific needs of women and girls:
(d) Include the peace perspective in the
education curriculum and other educational
undertakings; and
(e) The recognition and support for women's
role in conflict-prevention, management,
resolution and peacemaking, and in indigenous
systems of conflict resolution.
Section 30. Women in Especially Difficult
Circumstances. - For purposes of this Act, "Women in
Especially Difficult Circumstances" (WEDC) shall refer to
victims and survivors of sexual and physical abuse,
illegal recruitment, prostitution, trafficking, armed conflict,
women in detention, victims and survivors of rape and
incest, and such other related circumstances which have
incapacitated them functionally. Local government units
are therefore mandated to deliver the necessary
services and interventions to WEDC under their
respective jurisdictions.
Section 31. Services and Interventions. - WEDC shall
be provided with services and interventions as
necessary such as, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Temporary and protective custody;
(b) Medical and dental services;
(c) Psychological evaluation;
(d) Counseling;
(e) Psychiatric evaluation;
(f) Legal services;
(g) Productivity skills capability building;
(h) Livelihood assistance;
(i) Job placement;
(j) Financial assistance: and
(k) Transportation assistance.
Section 32. Protection of Girl-Children. - (a) The State
shall pursue measures to eliminate all forms of
discrimination against girl-children in education, health
and nutrition, and skills development.
(b) Girl-children shall be protected from all forms of
abuse and exploitation.
(c) Equal access of Moro and indigenous girl-children in
the Madaris, schools of living culture and traditions, and
the regular schools shall be ensured.
(d) Gender-sensitive curriculum, including legal literacy,
books, and curriculum in the Madaris and schools of
living culture and traditions shall be developed.
(e) Sensitivity of regular schools to particular Moro and
indigenous practices, such as fasting in the month of
Ramadan, choice of clothing (including the wearing
of hijab), and availability of halal food shall be ensured.
Section 33. Protection of Senior Citizens. - The State
shall protect women senior citizens from neglect,
abandonment, domestic violence, abuse, exploitation,
and discrimination. Towards this end, the State shall
ensure special protective mechanisms and support
services against violence, sexual abuse, exploitation,
and discrimination of older women.
Section 34. Women are entitled to the recognition and
protection of their rights defined and guaranteed under
this Act including their right to nondiscrimination.
Section 35. Discrimination Against Women is
Prohibited. - Public and private entities and individuals
found to have committed discrimination against women
shall be subject to the sanctions provided in Section 41
hereof. Violations of other rights of women shall be
subject to sanctions under pertinent laws and
regulations.
CHAPTER VI
INSTITUTIONAL MECHANISMS
Section 36. Gender Mainstreaming as a Strategy for
Implementing the Magna Carta of Women. - Within a
period prescribed in the implementing rules and
regulations, the National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall assess its gender
mainstreaming program for consistency with the
standards under this Act. It shall modify the program
accordingly to ensure that it will be an effective strategy
for implementing this Act and attaining its objectives.
All departments, including their attached agencies,
offices, bureaus, state universities and colleges,
government-owned and -controlled corporations, local
government units, and other government
instrumentalities shall adopt gender mainstreaming as a
strategy to promote women's human rights and eliminate
gender discrimination in their systems, structures,
policies, programs, processes, and procedures which
shall include, but not limited to, the following:
(a) Planning, budgeting, monitoring and
evaluation for GAD. GAD programs addressing
gender issues and concerns shall be designed
and implemented based on the mandate of
government agencies and local government
units, Republic Act No. 7192, gender equality
agenda of the government and other GAD-
related legislation, policies, and commitments.
The development of GAD programs shall
proceed from the conduct of a gender audit of
the agency or the local government unit and a
gender analysis of its policies, programs,
services and the situation of its clientele; the
generation and review of sex-disaggregated
data; and consultation with gender/women's
rights advocates and agency/women clientele.
The cost of implementing GAD programs shall
be the agency's or the local government unit's
GAD budget which shall be at least five percent
(5%) of the agency's or the local government
unit's total budget appropriations.
Pursuant to Republic Act No. 7192, otherwise
known as the Women in Development and
Nation Building Act, which allocates five percent
(5%) to thirty percent (30%) of overseas
development assistance to GAD, government
agencies receiving official development
assistance should ensure the allocation and
proper utilization of such funds to gender-
responsive programs that complement the
government GAD funds and annually report
accomplishments thereof to the National
Economic and Development Authority (NEDA)
and the Philippine Commission on Women
(PCW).
The utilization and outcome of the GAD budget
shall be annually monitored and evaluated in
terms of its success in influencing the gender-
responsive implementation of agency programs
funded by the remaining ninety-five percent
(95%) budget.
The Commission on Audit (COA) shall conduct
an annual audit on the use of the GAD budget
for the purpose of determining its judicious use
and the efficiency, and effectiveness of
interventions in addressing gender issues
towards the realization of the objectives of the
country's commitments, plans, and policies on
women empowerment, gender equality, and
GAD.
Local government units are also encouraged to
develop and pass a GAD Code based on the
gender issues and concerns in their respective
localities based on consultation with their
women constituents and the women's
empowerment and gender equality agenda of
the government. The GAD Code shall also
serve as basis for identifying programs,
activities, and projects on GAD.
Where needed, temporary gender equity
measures shall be provided for in the plans of
all departments, including their attached
agencies, offices, bureaus, state universities
and colleges, government-owned and
-controlled corporations, local government
units, and other government instrumentalities.
To move towards a more sustainable, gender-
responsive, and performance-based planning
and budgeting, gender issues and concerns
shall be integrated in, among others, the
following plans:
(1) Macro socioeconomic plans such
as the Medium-Term Philippine
Development Plan and Medium-Term
Philippine Investment Plan;
(2) Annual plans of all departments,
including their attached agencies,
offices, bureaus, state universities and
colleges, and government-owned and
-controlled corporations; and
(3) Local plans and agenda such as
executive-legislative agenda,
comprehensive development plan
(CDP), comprehensive land use plan
(CLUP), provincial development and
physical framework plan (PDPFP),
and annual investment plan.
(b) Creation and/or Strengthening of the GAD
Focal Points (GFP). All departments, including
their attached agencies, offices, bureaus, state
universities and colleges, government- owned
and -controlled corporations, local government
units, and other government instrumentalities
shall establish or strengthen their GAD Focal
Point System or similar GAD mechanism to
catalyze and accelerate gender mainstreaming
within the agency or local government unit.
The GAD Focal Point System shall be
composed of the agency head or local chief
executive, an executive committee with an
Undersecretary (or its equivalent), local
government unit official, or office in a strategic
decision-making position as Chair; and a
technical working group or secretariat which is
composed of representatives from various
divisions or offices within the agency or local
government unit.
The tasks and functions of the members of the
GFP shall form part of their regular key result
areas and shall be given due consideration in
their performance evaluation.
(c) Generation and Maintenance of GAD
Database. All departments, including their
attached agencies, offices, bureaus, state
universities and colleges, government-owned
and - controlled corporations, local government
units, and other government instrumentalities
shall develop and maintain a GAD database
containing gender statistics and
 sexdisaggregated data that have been
systematically gathered, regularly updated; and
subjected to; gender analysis for planning,
programming, and policy formulation.
Section 37. Gender Focal Point Officer in Philippine
Embassies and Consulates. - An officer duly trained on
GAD shall be designated as the gender focal point in the
consular section of Philippine embassies or consulates.
Said officer shall be primarily responsible in handling
gender concerns of women migrant workers. Attached
agencies shall cooperate in strengthening the Philippine
foreign posts' programs for the delivery of services to
women migrant workers.
Section 38. National Commission on the Role of
Filipino Women (NCRFW). - The National Commission
on the Role of Filipino Women (NCRFW) shall be
renamed as the Philippine Commission on Women
(PCW), the primary policymaking and coordinating body
of the women and gender equality concerns under the
Office of the President. The PCW shall be the overall
monitoring body and oversight to ensure the
implementation of this Act. In doing so, the PCW may
direct any government agency and instrumentality, as
may be necessary, to report on the implementation of
this Act and for them to immediately respond to the
problems brought to their attention in relation to this Act.
The PCW shall also lead in ensuring that government
agencies are capacitated on the effective
implementation of this Act. The chairperson shall
likewise report to the President in Cabinet meetings on
the implementation of this Act.
To the extent possible, the PCW shall influence the
systems, processes, and procedures of the executive,
legislative, and judicial branches of government vis-a-vis
GAD to ensure the implementation of this Act.
To effectively and efficiently undertake and accomplish
its functions, the PCW shall revise its structure and
staffing pattern with the assistance of the Department of
Budget and Management.
Section 39. Commission on Human Rights (CHR). -
The Commission, acting as the Gender and
Development Ombud, consistent with its mandate, shall
undertake measures such as the following:
(a) Monitor with the PCW and other state
agencies, among others, in developing
indicators and guidelines to comply with their
duties related to the human rights of women,
including their right to nondiscrimination
guaranteed under this Act;
(b) Designate one (1) commissioner and/or its
Women's Human Rights Center to be primarily
responsible for formulating and implementing
programs and activities related to the promotion
and protection of the human rights of women,
including the investigations and complaints of
discrimination and violations of their rights
brought under this Act and related laws and
regulations;
(c) Establish guidelines and mechanisms,
among others, that will facilitate access of
women to legal remedies under this Act and
related laws, and enhance the protection and
promotion of the rights of women, especially
marginalized women;
(d) Assist in the filing of cases against
individuals, agencies, institutions, or
establishments that violate the provisions of this
Act; and
(e) Recommend to the President of the
Philippines or the Civil Service Commission any
possible administrative action based on
noncompliance or failure to implement the
provisions of this Act.
Section 40. Monitoring Progress and Implementation
and Impact of this Act. - The PCW, in coordination with
other state agencies and the CHR, shall submit to
Congress regular reports on the progress of the
implementation of this Act highlighting the impact thereof
on the status and human rights of women: Provided,
That the second report shall include an assessment of
the effectiveness of this Act and recommend
amendments to improve its provisions: Provided, finally,
That these reports shall be submitted to Congress every
three (3) years or as determined in the implementing
rules and regulations.
Section 41. Penalties. - Upon finding of the CHR that a
department, agency, or instrumentality of government,
government-owned and -controlled corporation, or local
government unit has violated any provision of this Act
and its implementing rules and regulations, the sanctions
under administrative law, civil service, or other
appropriate laws shall be recommended to the Civil
Service Commission and/or the Department of the
Interior and Local Government. The person directly
responsible for the violation as well as the head of the
agency or local chief executive shall be held liable under
this Act.
If the violation is committed by a private entity or
individual, the person directly responsible for the
violation shall be liable to pay damages.
Filing a complaint under this Act shall not preclude the
offended party from pursuing other remedies available
under the law and to invoke any of the provisions of
existing laws especially those recently enacted laws
protecting women and children, including the Women in
Development and Nation Building Act (Republic Act No.
7192), the Special Protection of Children Against Child
Abuse, Exploitation and Discrimination Act (Republic Act
No. 7610), the Anti-Sexual Harassment Act of 1995
(Republic Act No. 7877), the Anti-Rape Law of 1997
(Republic Act No. 8353), the Rape Victim Assistance and
Protection Act of 1998 (Republic Act No. 8505), the Anti-
Trafficking in Persons Act of 2003 (Republic Act No.
9208) and the Anti- Violence Against Women and Their
Children Act of 2004 (Republic Act No. 9262). If violence
has been proven to be perpetrated by agents of the
State including, but not limited to, extrajudicial killings,
enforced disappearances, torture, and internal
displacements, such shall be considered aggravating
offenses with corresponding penalties depending on the
severity of the offenses.
Section 42. Incentives and Awards. - There shall be
established an incentives and awards system which
shall be administered by a board under such rules and
regulations as may be promulgated by the PCW to
deserving entities, government agencies, and local
government units for their outstanding performance in
upholding the rights of women and effective
implementation of gender-responsive programs.
Section 43. Funding. - The initial funding requirements
for the implementation of this Act shall be charged
against the current appropriations of the agencies
concerned. Thereafter, such sums as may be necessary
for the implementation of this Act shall be included in the
agencies' yearly budgets under the General
Appropriations Act.

The State shall prioritize allocation of all available

resources to effectively fulfill its obligations specified
under this Act. The State agencies' GAD budgets, which
shall be at least five percent (5%) of their total budgetary
allocation, shall also be utilized for the programs and
activities to implement this Act.

Section 44. Implementing Rules and Regulations. -

As the lead agency, the PCW shall, in coordination with
the Commission on Human Rights and all concerned
government departments and agencies including, as
observers, both Houses of Congress through the
Committee on Youth, Women and Family Relations
(Senate) and the Committee on Women and Gender
Equality (House of Representatives) and with the
participation of representatives from nongovernment
organizations (NGOs) and civil society groups with
proven track record of involvement and promotion of the
rights and welfare of Filipino women and girls identified
by the PCW, formulate the implementing rules and
regulations (IRR) of this Act within one hundred eighty
(180) days after its effectivity.

Section 45. Separability Clause. - If any provision or

part hereof is held invalid or unconstitutional, the
remainder of the law or the provisions not otherwise
affected shall remain valid and subsisting.

Section 46. Repealing Clause. - Any law, presidential

decree or issuance, executive order, letter of instruction,
administrative order, rule, or regulation contrary to, or
inconsistent with, the provisions of this Act is hereby
repealed, modified, or amended accordingly.

Section 47. Effectivity Clause. - This Act shall take

effect fifteen (15) days after its publication in at least two
(2) newspapers of general circulation.

Approved,