CHAPTER III (1) That it is discriminatory and denies the equal protection of the laws;
THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE (2) That it is violative of the due process clause of the Constitution: and.
1. The scope of Equal protection Clause
In City of Manila v. Laguio, Jr., the meaning and scope of equal protection:
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. Similar subjects, in other words,
should not be treated differently, so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate
against others. The guarantee means that no person or class of persons shall be denied the
same protection of laws which is enjoyed by other persons or other classes in like
circumstances. The “equal protection of the laws is a pledge of the protection of equal laws.”
It limits governmental discrimination. The equal protection clause extends to artificial persons
but only insofar as their property is concerned.
2. Requisites for a valid classification
Legislative bodies are allowed to classify the subjects of legislation. If the classification is
reasonable, the law may operate only on some and not all of the people without violating the
equal protection clause. The classification must, as an indispensable requisite, not be arbitrary.
To be valid, it must conform to the following requirements:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
2.1. THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. CAYAT
Cayat, a native of Baguio, Benguet, Mountain Province, was sentenced by the justice of the
peace court of Baguio for, being a member of the non-Christian tribes, receiving, acquiring and
have in his possession and under his control or custody, one bottle of A-1-1 gin, an intoxicating
liquor, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes
have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of Act No. 1639.
Act No. 1639 reads:
SEC. 2. It shall be unlawful for any native of the Philippine Islands who is a member of a non-
Christian tribe within the meaning of the Act Numbered Thirteen hundred and ninety-seven,
to buy, receive, have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or
intoxicating liquors of any kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the
members of such tribes have been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of
this Act.
The accused challenges the constitutionality of the Act on the following grounds:
(3) That it is improper exercise of the police power of the state.
The government contends that the law is a practicable means of bringing about the
advancement of Non-Christians in civilization and material prosperity." (See, Act No. 253.)
ISSUE:
Whether or not there the ACt violates the Equal Protection Clause.
HELD:
It is an established principle of constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal protection of
the laws is not equal protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable
classification. And the classification, to be reasonable, (1) must rest on substantial distinctions;
(2) must be germane to the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions
only; and (4) must apply equally to all members of the same class.
Act No. 1639 satisfies these requirements. The classification rests on real and substantial, not
merely imaginary or whimsical, distinctions. It is not based upon "accident of birth or
parentage," as counsel to the appellant asserts, but upon the degree of civilization and culture.
"The term 'non-Christian tribes' refers, not to religious belief, but, in a way, to the geographical
area, and, more directly, to natives of the Philippine Islands of a low grade of civilization,
usually living in tribal relationship apart from settled communities." This distinction is
unquestionably reasonable, for the Act was intended to meet the peculiar conditions existing
in the non-Christian tribes. The exceptional cases of certain members thereof who at present
have reached a position of cultural equality with their Christian brothers, cannot affect the
reasonableness of the classification thus established.
That it is germane to the purposes of law cannot be doubted. The prohibition "to buy, receive,
have in his possession, or drink any ardent spirits, ale, beer, wine, or intoxicating liquors of any
kind, other than the so-called native wines and liquors which the members of such tribes have
been accustomed themselves to make prior to the passage of this Act.," is unquestionably
designed to insure peace and order in and among the non-Christian tribes. It has been the sad
experience of the past that the free use of highly intoxicating by the non-Christian tribes have
often resulted in lawlessness and crimes, thereby hampering the efforts of the government to
raise their standard of life and civilization.
The law is not limited in its application to conditions existing at the time of its enactment. It is
intended to apply for all times as long as those conditions exist
That it may be unfair in its operation against a certain number non-Christians by reason of their
degree of culture, is not an argument against the equality of its application.
2.1 ASSOCIATION OF SMALL LANDOWNERS V SEC OF AGRARIAN REFORM, JULY 14, 1989
These are four consolidated cases questioning the constitutionality of the Comprehensive
Agrarian Reform Act (R.A. No. 6657 and related laws i.e., Agrarian Land Reform Code or R.A.
No. 3844).
Brief background: Article XIII of the Constitution on Social Justice and Human Rights includes a
call for the adoption by the State of an agrarian reform program. The State shall, by law,
undertake an agrarian reform program founded on the right of farmers and regular
farmworkers, who are landless, to own directly or collectively the lands they till or, in the case
of other farmworkers, to receive a just share of the fruits thereof. RA 3844 was enacted in
1963. P.D. No. 27 was promulgated in 1972 to provide for the compulsory acquisition of private
lands for distribution among tenant-farmers and to specify maximum retention limits for
landowners. In 1987, President Corazon Aquino issued E.O. No. 228, declaring full land
ownership in favor of the beneficiaries of PD 27 and providing for the valuation of still unvalued
lands covered by the decree as well as the manner of their payment. In 1987, P.P. No. 131,
instituting a comprehensive agrarian reform program (CARP) was enacted; later, E.O. No. 229,
providing the mechanics for its (PP131’s) implementation, was also enacted. Afterwhich is the
enactment of R.A. No. 6657, Comprehensive Agrarian Reform Law in 1988. This law, while
considerably changing the earlier mentioned enactments, nevertheless gives them suppletory
effect insofar as they are not inconsistent with its provisions.
[Two of the consolidated cases are discussed below]
G.R. No. 78742: (Association of Small Landowners vs Secretary)
The Association of Small Landowners in the Philippines, Inc. sought exception from the land
distribution scheme provided for in R.A. 6657. The Association is comprised of landowners of
ricelands and cornlands whose landholdings do not exceed 7 hectares. They invoke that since
their landholdings are less than 7 hectares, they should not be forced to distribute their land
to their tenants under R.A. 6657 for they themselves have shown willingness to till their own
land. In short, they want to be exempted from agrarian reform program because they claim to
belong to a different class.
G.R. No. 79777: (Manaay vs Juico)
Nicolas Manaay questioned the validity of the agrarian reform laws (PD 27, EO 228, and 229)
on the ground that these laws already valuated their lands for the agrarian reform program
and that the specific amount must be determined by the Department of Agrarian Reform
(DAR). Manaay averred that this violated the principle in eminent domain which provides that
only courts can determine just compensation. This, for Manaay, also violated due process for
under the constitution, no property shall be taken for public use without just compensation.
Manaay also questioned the provision which states that landowners may be paid for their land
in bonds and not necessarily in cash. Manaay averred that just compensation has always been
in the form of money and not in bonds.
ISSUES:
1. Whether or not there was a violation of the equal protection clause.
2. Whether or not there is a violation of due process.
3. Whether or not just compensation, under the agrarian reform program, must be in terms
of cash.
HELD:
1. No. The Association had not shown any proof that they belong to a different class exempt
from the agrarian reform program. Under the law, classification has been defined as the
grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain particulars and different from
each other in these same particulars. To be valid, it must conform to the following
requirements:
(1) it must be based on substantial distinctions;
(2) it must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) it must apply equally to all the members of the class.
Equal protection simply means that all persons or things similarly situated must be treated
alike both as to the rights conferred and the liabilities imposed. The Association have not
shown that they belong to a different class and entitled to a different treatment. The argument
that not onlylandowners but also owners of other properties must be made to share the
burden of implementing land reform must be rejected. There is a substantial distinction
between these two classes of owners that is clearly visible except to those who will not see.
There is no need to elaborate on this matter. In any event, the Congress is allowed a wide
leeway in providing for a valid classification. Its decision is accorded recognition and respect
by the courts of justice except only where its discretion is abused to the detriment of the Bill
of Rights. In the contrary, it appears that Congress is right in classifying small landowners as
part of the agrarian reform program.
2. No. It is true that the determination of just compensation is a power lodged in the courts.
However, there is no law which prohibits administrative bodies like the DAR from determining
just compensation. In fact, just compensation can be that amount agreed upon by the
landowner and the government – even without judicial intervention so long as both parties
agree. The DAR can determine just compensation through appraisers and if the landowner
agrees, then judicial intervention is not needed. What is contemplated by law however is that,
the just compensation determined by an administrative body is merely preliminary. If the
landowner does not agree with the finding of just compensation by an administrative body,
then it can go to court and the determination of the latter shall be the final determination. This
is even so provided by RA 6657:
Section 16 (f): Any party who disagrees with the decision may bring the matter to the court of
proper jurisdiction for final determination of just compensation.
3. No. Money as [sole] payment for just compensation is merely a concept in traditional
exercise of eminent domain. The agrarian reform program is a revolutionary exercise of
eminent domain. The program will require billions of pesos in funds if all compensation have
to be made in cash – if everything is in cash, then the government will not have sufficient
money hence, bonds, and other securities, i.e., shares of stocks, may be used for just
compensation.
2.4 JAMES M. IMBONG vs. HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR.,
Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and
Reproductive Health Act of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said
Act. (equal protection of law).
The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a
violation of the equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the
Constitution, which states that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick
elderly, disabled, women, and children and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to
paupers.
The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of
the RH Law prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues
and desire to have children. In addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children
a couple may have and does not impose conditions upon couples who intend to have children.
The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program
under Section 14 is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private
educational institutions especially with respect to religious instruction and to consider their
sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health education.
Discussion on procedure
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited
by four exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners
must possess locus standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest
opportunity; and (d) the issue of constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that
is appropriate or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of
the court would amount to an advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely
a theoretical question or issue. There ought to be an actual and substantial controversy
admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as distinguished from an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to the
requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe
for adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual
challenging it. For a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that
something has then been accomplished or performed by either branch before a court may
come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the existence of an immediate or
threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show that he has
sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is
launched to assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all
otherrights in the First Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press,
and the right of the people to peaceably assemble, and to petition the Government for a
redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to religious freedom, freedom of the
press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s freedom of
expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in
a case such that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged
governmental act. It requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure
the concrete adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so
largely depends for illumination of difficult constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a
matter of procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens,
taxpayers, and legislators when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of
transcendental importance, of overreaching significance to society, or of paramount public
interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to
employ in the title of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or
catalogue all the contents and the minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with
if the title is comprehensive enough as to include the general object which the statute seeks
to effect, andwhere, as here, the persons interested are informed of the nature, scope and
consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede
legislation.” The one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must
not be “so uncertain that the average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose
of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its contents, or which is misleading, either in referring
to or indicating one subject where another or different one is really embraced in the act, or in
omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it
confers no rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal
contemplation, as inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this
view, the court in passing upon the question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the
statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It simply refuses to recognize it and
determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence. But certain legal
effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid
portion(s), usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid
portion can stand independently as law.
Biraogo vs. THE PHIIPPINE TRUTHCOMMISSION OF 2010, GR NO. 192935
Pres. Aquino signed E. O. No. 1 establishing Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 (PTC) dated
July 30, 2010.
PTC is a mere ad hoc body formed under the Office of the President with the primary task to
investigate reports of graft and corruption committed by third-level public officers and
employees, their co-principals, accomplices and accessories during the previous
administration, and to submit its finding and recommendations to the President, Congress and
the Ombudsman. PTC has all the powers of an investigative body. But it is not a quasi-judicial
body as it cannot adjudicate, arbitrate, resolve, settle, or render awards in disputes between
contending parties. All it can do is gather, collect and assess evidence of graft and corruption
and make recommendations. It may have subpoena powers but it has no power to cite people
in contempt, much less order their arrest. Although it is a fact-finding body, it cannot
determine from such facts if probable cause exists as to warrant the filing of an information in
our courts of law.
Petitioners asked the Court to declare it unconstitutional and to enjoin the PTC from
performing its functions. They argued that:
(a) E.O. No. 1 violates separation of powers as it arrogates the power of the Congress to create
a public office and appropriate funds for its operation.
(b) The provision of Book III, Chapter 10, Section 31 of the Administrative Code of 1987 cannot
legitimize E.O. No. 1 because the delegated authority of the President to structurally
reorganize the Office of the President to achieve economy, simplicity and efficiency does not
include the power to create an entirely new public office which was hitherto inexistent like the
“Truth Commission.”
(c) E.O. No. 1 illegally amended the Constitution and statutes when it vested the “Truth
Commission” with quasi-judicial powers duplicating, if not superseding, those of the Office of
the Ombudsman created under the 1987 Constitution and the DOJ created under the
Administrative Code of 1987.
(d) E.O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause as it selectively targets for investigation and
prosecution officials and personnel of the previous administration as if corruption is their
peculiar species even as it excludes those of the other administrations, past and present, who
may be indictable.
Respondents, through OSG, questioned the legal standing of petitioners and argued that:
1] E.O. No. 1 does not arrogate the powers of Congress because the President’s executive
power and power of control necessarily include the inherent power to conduct investigations
to ensure that laws are faithfully executed and that, in any event, the Constitution, Revised
AdministrativeCode of 1987, PD No. 141616 (as amended), R.A. No. 9970 and settled
jurisprudence, authorize the President to create or form such bodies.
2] E.O. No. 1 does not usurp the power of Congress to appropriate funds because there is no
appropriation but a mere allocation of funds already appropriated by Congress.
3] The Truth Commission does not duplicate or supersede the functions of the Ombudsman
and the DOJ, because it is a fact-finding body and not a quasi-judicial body and its functions do
not duplicate, supplant or erode the latter’s jurisdiction.
4] The Truth Commission does not violate the equal protection clause because it was validly
created for laudable purposes.
ISSUES:
1. WON the petitioners have legal standing to file the petitions and question E. O. No. 1;
2. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the principle of separation of powers by usurping the powers of
Congress to create and to appropriate funds for public offices, agencies and commissions;
3. WON E. O. No. 1 supplants the powers of the Ombudsman and the DOJ;
4. WON E. O. No. 1 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD:
The power of judicial review is subject to limitations, to wit: (1) there must be an actual case
or controversy calling for the exercise of judicial power; (2) the person challenging the act must
have the standing to question the validity of the subject act or issuance; otherwise stated, he
must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement; (3) the question of constitutionality must
be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the issue of constitutionality must be the very lis
mota of the case.
1. The petition primarily invokes usurpation of the power of the Congress as a body to which
they belong as members. To the extent the powers of Congress are impaired, so is the power
of each member thereof, since his office confers a right to participate in the exercise of the
powers of that institution.
Legislators have a legal standing to see to it that the prerogative, powers and privileges vested
by the Constitution in their office remain inviolate. Thus, they are allowed to question the
validity of any official action which, to their mind, infringes on their prerogatives as legislators.
With regard to Biraogo, he has not shown that he sustained, or is in danger of sustaining, any
personal and direct injury attributable to the implementation of E. O. No. 1.
 Locus standi is “a right of appearance in a court of justice on a given question.” In private suits,
standing is governed by the “real-parties-in interest” rule. It provides that “every action must
be prosecuted or defended in the name of the real party in interest.” Real-party-in interest is
“the party who stands to be benefited or injured by the judgment in the suit or the party
entitled to the avails of the suit.”
Difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
“public right” in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He has to show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. He has to make
out a sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a
“citizen” or “taxpayer.
The person who impugns the validity of a statute must have “a personal and substantial
interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result.” The
Court, however, finds reason in Biraogo’s assertion that the petition covers matters of
transcendental importance to justify the exercise of jurisdiction by the Court. There are
constitutional issues in the petition which deserve the attention of this Court in view of their
seriousness, novelty and weight as precedents
The Executive is given much leeway in ensuring that our laws are faithfully executed. The
powers of the President are not limited to those specific powers under the Constitution. One
of the recognized powers of the President granted pursuant to this constitutionally-mandated
duty is the power to create ad hoc committees. This flows from the obvious need to ascertain
facts and determine if laws have been faithfully executed. The purpose of allowing ad hoc
investigating bodies to exist is to allow an inquiry into matters which the President is entitled
to know so that he can be properly advised and guided in the performance of his duties relative
to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
2. There will be no appropriation but only an allotment or allocations of existing funds already
appropriated. There is no usurpation on the part of the Executive of the power of Congress to
appropriate funds. There is no need to specify the amount to be earmarked for the operation
of the commission because, whatever funds the Congress has provided for the Office of the
President will be the very source of the funds for the commission. The amount that would be
allocated to the PTC shall be subject to existing auditing rules and regulations so there is no
impropriety in the funding.
3. PTC will not supplant the Ombudsman or the DOJ or erode their respective powers. If at all,
the investigative function of the commission will complement those of the two offices. The
function of determining probable cause for the filing of the appropriate complaints before the
courts remains to be with the DOJ and the Ombudsman. PTC’s power to investigate is limited
to obtaining facts so that it can advise and guide the President in the performance of his duties
relative to the execution and enforcement of the laws of the land.
4. Court finds difficulty in upholding the constitutionality of Executive Order No. 1 in view of
its apparent transgression of the equal protection clause enshrined in Section 1, Article III (Bill
of Rights) of the 1987 Constitution.
Equal protection requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. It requires public bodies and
institutions to treat similarly situated individuals in a similar manner. The purpose of the equal
protection clause is to secure every person within a state’s jurisdiction against intentional and
arbitrary discrimination, whether occasioned by the express terms of a statue or by its
improper execution through the state’s duly constituted authorities.
There must be equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. Equal
protection clause permits classification. Such classification, however, to be valid must pass the
test of reasonableness. The test has four requisites: (1) The classification rests on substantial
distinctions; (2) It is germane to the purpose of the law; (3) It is not limited to existing
conditions only; and (4) It applies equally to all members of the same class.
The classification will be regarded as invalid if all the members of the class are not similarly
treated, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Executive Order No. 1 should be struck down as violative of the equal protection clause. The
clear mandate of truth commission is to investigate and find out the truth concerning the
reported cases of graft and corruption during the previous administration only. The intent to
single out the previous administration is plain, patent and manifest.
Arroyo administration is but just a member of a class, that is, a class of past administrations.
It is not a class of its own. Not to include past administrations similarly situated constitutes
arbitrariness which the equal protection clause cannot sanction. Such discriminating
differentiation clearly reverberates to label the commission as a vehicle for vindictiveness and
selective retribution. Superficial differences do not make for a valid classification.
The PTC must not exclude the other past administrations. The PTC must, at least, have the
authority to investigate all past administrations.
The Constitution is the fundamental and paramount law of the nation to which all other laws
must conform and in accordance with which all private rights determined and all public
authority administered. Laws that do not conform to the Constitution should be stricken down
for being unconstitutional.
WHEREFORE, the petitions are GRANTED. Executive Order No. 1 is hereby declared
UNCONSTITUTIONAL insofar as it is violative of the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
2. 6 Arroyo vs DOJ and COMELEC
Facts:
Acting on the discovery of alleged new evidence and surfacing of new witnesses
indicating the occurrence of a massive electoral fraud, the COMELEC issued Resolution No.
9266 approving the creation of a joint committee with the Department of Justice (DOJ), which
shall conduct preliminary investigation on the alleged election offenses and anomalies
committed during the 2004 and 2007 elections.
 On August 15, 2011, the COMELEC and the DOJ issued Joint Order No. 001-2011
creating and constituting a Joint Committee and Fact-Finding Team on the 2004 and 2007
National Elections electoral fraud and manipulation cases composed of officials from the DOJ
and COMELEC. In its initial report, the Fact-Finding Team concluded that manipulation of the
results in the May 14, 2007 senatorial elections in the provinces of North and South Cotabato
and Maguindanao were indeed perpetrated. The Fact-Finding Team recommended that herein
petitioners Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo (GMA), et al. to be subjected to preliminary investigation
for electoral sabotage.
After the conduct of the preliminary investigation, the COMELEC en banc adopted a
resolution ordering that information(s) for the crime of electoral sabotage be filed against
GMA, et al. while that the charges against Jose Miguel Arroyo, among others, should be
dismissed for insufficiency of evidence. Consequently, GMA, et al. assailed the validity of the
creation of COMELEC-DOJ Joint Panel and of Joint Order No. 001-2011 before the Supreme
Court and further contended that the said Joint Order is violative of the equal protection
clause.
Issue: WON Joint Order No. 001-2011 issued by COMELEC and DOJ violates the equal
protection clause.
Held: The equal protection guarantee exists to prevent undue favor or privilege. It is intended
to eliminate discrimination and oppression based on inequality. Recognizing the existence of
real differences among men, it does not demand absolute equality. It merely requires that all
persons under like circumstances and conditions shall be treated alike both as to privileges
conferred and liabilities enforced. Unlike the matter addressed by the Court’s ruling in Biraogo
v. Philippine Truth Commission of 2010, Joint Order No. 001-2011 cannot be nullified on the
ground that it singles out the officials of the Arroyo Administration and, therefore, it infringes
the equal protection clause.
The Philippine Truth Commission of 2010 was expressly created for the purpose of
investigating alleged graft and corruption during the Arroyo Administration since Executive
OrderNo. 177 specifically referred to the “previous administration”; while the Joint Committee
was created for the purpose of conducting preliminary investigation of election offenses
during the 2004 and 2007 elections. While GMA and Mike Arroyo were among those subjected
to preliminary investigation, not all respondents therein were linked to GMA as there were
public officers who were investigated upon in connection with their acts in the performance
of their official duties. Private individuals were also subjected to the investigation by the Joint
Committee.
Moreover, as has been practiced in the past, complaints for violations of election
laws may be filed either with the COMELEC or with the DOJ. The COMELEC may even initiate,
motu proprio, complaints for election offenses. Pursuant to law and the COMELEC’s own Rules,
investigations may be conducted either by the COMELEC itself through its law department or
through the prosecutors of the DOJ. These varying procedures and treatment do not, however,
mean that respondents are not treated alike. Thus, petitioners’ insistence of infringement of
their constitutional right to equal protection of the law is misplaced. Hence, petitions are
dismissed.
2.7 Quinto V. COMELEC
Facts:
Pursuant to its constitutional mandate to enforce and administer election laws,
COMELEC issued Resolution No. 8678, the Guidelines on the Filing of Certificates of Candidacy
(CoC) and Nomination of Official Candidates of Registered Political Parties in Connection with
the May 10, 2010 National and Local Elections. Sections 4 and 5 of Resolution No. 8678
provide:
SEC. 4. Effects of Filing Certificates of Candidacy.—a) Any person holding a
public appointive office or position including active members of the Armed Forces of
the Philippines, and other officers and employees in government-owned or
controlled corporations, shall be considered ipso facto resigned from his office upon
the filing of his certificate of candidacy.
b) Any person holding an elective office or position shall not be considered
resigned upon the filing of his certificate of candidacy for the same or any other
elective office or position.
Alarmed that they will be deemed ipso facto resigned from their offices the moment
they file their CoCs, petitioners Eleazar P. Quinto and Gerino A. Tolentino, Jr., who hold
appointive positions in the government and who intend to run in the coming elections, filed
the instant petition for prohibition and certiorari, seeking the declaration of the afore-quoted
Section 4(a) of Resolution No. 8678 as null and void. Petitioners also contend that Section 13
of R.A. No. 9369, the basis of the assailed COMELEC resolution, contains two conflicting
provisions. These must be harmonized or reconciled to give effect to both and to arrive at a
declaration that they are not ipso facto resigned from their positions upon the filing of their
CoCs.
Issue:
Whether the second proviso in the third paragraph of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and Section
4(a) of COMELEC Resolution No. 8678 are violative of the equal protection clause
Held: Yes.
In considering persons holding appointive positions as ipso facto resigned from their
posts upon the filing of their CoCs, but not considering as resigned all other civil servants,
specifically the elective ones, the law unduly discriminates against the first class. The fact alone
that there issubstantial distinction between those who hold appointive positions and those
occupying elective posts, does not justify such differential treatment.
In order that there can be valid classification so that a discriminatory governmental
act may pass the constitutional norm of equal protection, it is necessary that the four (4)
requisites of valid classification be complied with, namely:
(1) It must be based upon substantial distinctions;
(2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law;
(3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only; and
(4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
The first requirement means that there must be real and substantial differences
between the classes treated differently. As illustrated in the fairly recent Mirasol v.
Department of Public Works and Highways, a real and substantial distinction exists between a
motorcycle and other motor vehicles sufficient to justify its classification among those
prohibited from plying the toll ways. Not all motorized vehicles are created equal—a two-
wheeled vehicle is less stable and more easily overturned than a four-wheel vehicle.
Nevertheless, the classification would still be invalid if it does not comply with the
second requirement—if it is not germane to the purpose of the law.
The third requirement means that the classification must be enforced not only for
the present but as long as the problem sought to be corrected continues to exist. And, under
the last welfare development, interior and local government, and foreign affairs). With the fact
that they both head executive offices, there is no valid justification to treat them differently
when both file their CoCs for the elections. Under the present state of our law, the Vice-
President, in the example, running this time, let us say, for President, retains his position during
the entire election period and can still use the resources of his office to support his campaign.
As to the danger of neglect, inefficiency or partisanship in the discharge of the
functions of his appointive office, the inverse could be just as true and compelling. The public
officer who files his certificate of candidacy would be driven by a greater impetus for excellent
performance to show his fitness for the position aspired for.
There is thus no valid justification to treat appointive officials differently from the
elective ones. The classification simply fails to meet the test that it should be germane to the
purposes of the law. The measure encapsulated in the second proviso of the third paragraph
of Section 13 of R.A. No. 9369 and in Section 66 of the OEC violates the equal protection clause.
requirement, the classification would be regarded as invalid if all the members of the
class are not treated similarly, both as to rights conferred and obligations imposed.
Applying the four requisites to the instant case, the Court finds that the differential
treatment of persons holding appointive offices as opposed to those holding elective ones is
not germane to the purposes of the law.
The obvious reason for the challenged provision is to prevent the use of a
governmental position to promote one’s candidacy, or even to wield a dangerous or coercive
influence on the electorate. The measure is further aimed at promoting the efficiency,
integrity, and discipline of the public service by eliminating the danger that the discharge of
official duty would be motivated by political considerations rather than the welfare of the
public. The restriction is also justified by the proposition that the entry of civil servants to the
electoral arena, while still in office, could result in neglect or inefficiency in the performance
of duty because they would be attending to their campaign rather than to their office work.
If we accept these as the underlying objectives of the law, then the assailed provision
cannot be constitutionally rescued on the ground of valid classification. Glaringly absent is the
requisite that the classification must be germane to the purposes of the law. Indeed, whether
one holds an appointive office or an elective one, the evils sought to be prevented by the
measure remain. For example, the Executive Secretary, or any Member of the Cabinet for that
matter, could wield the same influence as the Vice-President who at the same time is
appointed to a Cabinet post (in the recent past, elected Vice-Presidents were appointed to
take charge of national housing, social
2.8 Gutierrez v. DBM, G.R. No. 153266, March 18, 2010
Facts: Congress enacted in 1989 Republic Act (R.A.) 6758, called the Compensation and
Position Classification Act of 1989 to rationalize the compensation of government employees.
Its Section 12 directed the consolidation of allowances and additional compensation already
being enjoyed by employees into their standardized salary rates. But it exempted certain
additional compensations that the employees may be receiving from such consolidation.
Pursuant to the above, the Department of Budget and Management (DBM) issued
NCC 59 dated September 30, 1989,covering the offices of the national government, state
universities and colleges, and local government units. NCC 59 enumerated the specific
allowances and additional compensations which were deemed integrated in the basic salaries
and these included the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA) and Inflation Connected Allowance
(ICA). The DBM re-issued and published NCC 59 on May 3, 2004.
The DBM also issued Budget Circular 2001-03 dated November 12, 2001,clarifying
that only the exempt allowances under Section 12 of R.A. 6758 may continue to be granted
the employees; all others were deemed integrated in the standardized salary rates. Thus, the
payment of allowances and compensation such as COLA, amelioration allowance, and ICA,
among others, which were already deemed integrated in the basic salary were unauthorized.
On May 16, 2002 employees of the Office of the Solicitor General filed a petition for
certiorari and mandamus, questioning the propriety of integrating their COLA into their
standardized salary rates. Employees of other offices of the national government followed suit.
On October 26, 2005 the DBM issued National Budget Circular 2005-502 which provided that
all Supreme Court rulings on the integration of allowances, including COLA, of government
employeessince the consolidated cases covering the national government employees are still
pending with this Court. Consequently, the payment of allowances and other benefits to them,
such as COLA and ICA, remained prohibited until otherwise provided by law or ruled by this
Court. The circular further said that all agency heads and other responsible officials and
employees found to have authorized the grant of COLA and other allowances and benefits
already integrated in the basic salary shall be personally held liable for such payment.
Issue: Whether or not the grant of COLA to military and police personnel to the exclusion of
other government employees violates the equal protection clause
Held: Petitioners contend that the continued grant of COLA to military and police personnel
under CCC 10 and NCC 59 to the exclusion of other government employees violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution.
But as respondents pointed out, while it may appear that petitioners are questioning
the constitutionality of these issuances, they are in fact attacking the very constitutionality of
Section 11 of R.A. 6758. It is actually this provision which allows the uniformed personnel to
continue receiving their COLA over and above their basic pay, thus:
Section 11. Military and Police Personnel. - The base pay of uniformed
personnel of the Armed Forces of the Philippines and the Integrated National Police
shall be as prescribed in the salary schedule for these personnel in R.A. 6638 and R.A.
6648. The longevity pay of these personnel shall be as prescribed under R.A. 6638,
and R.A. 1134 as amended by R.A. 3725 and R.A. 6648: Provided, however, That the
longevity pay of uniformed personnel of the Integrated National Police shall include
those services rendered as uniformed members of the police, jail and fire
departments of the local government units prior to the police integration.
All existing types of allowances authorized for uniformed personnel of the
Armed Forces of the Philippines and Integrated National Police such as cost of living
allowance, longevity pay, quarters allowance, subsistence allowance, clothing
allowance, hazard pay and other allowances shall continue to be authorized.
Nothing is more settled than that the constitutionality of a statute cannot be attacked
collaterally because constitutionality issues must be pleaded directly and not collaterally.
The Court is not persuaded that the continued grant of COLA to the uniformed
personnel to the exclusion of other national government officials run afoul the equal
protection clause of the Constitution. The fundamental right of equal protection of the laws
is not absolute, but issubject to reasonable classification. If the groupings are characterized
by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may be treated and
regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the purpose
of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
To be valid and reasonable, the classification must satisfy the following
requirements: (1) it must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) it must be germane to the
purpose of the law; (3) it must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) it must apply
equally to all members of the same class.
Certainly, there are valid reasons to treat the uniformed personnel differently from other
national government officials. Being in charge of the actual defense of the State and the
maintenance of internal peace and order, they are expected to be stationed virtually anywhere
in the country. They are likely to be assigned to a variety of low, moderate, and high-cost areas.
Since their basic pay does not vary based on location, the continued grant of COLA is intended
to help them offset the effects of living in higher cost areas.
2.9 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation vs The Bureau of Internal Revenue
FACTS:
The Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation (PAGCOR) was created by P.D. No. 1067-
A in 1977. Obviously, it is a government owned and controlled corporation (GOCC).
In 1998, R.A. 8424 or the National Internal Revenue Code of 1997 (NIRC) became effective.
Section 27 thereof provides that GOCC’s are NOT EXEMPT from paying income taxation but it
exempted the following GOCCs:
1. GSIS
2. SSS
3. PHILHEALTH
4. PCSO
5. PAGCOR
But in May 2005, R.A. 9337, a law amending certain provisions of R.A. 8424, was passed.
Section 1 thereof excluded PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR was subjected to
pay income taxation. In September 2005, the Bureau of Internal Revenue issued the
implementing rules and regulations (IRR) for R.A. 9337. In the said IRR, it identified PAGCOR as
subject to a 10% value added tax (VAT) upon items covered by Section 108 of the NIRC (Sale
of Services and Use or Lease of Properties).
PAGCOR questions the constitutionality of Section 1 of R.A. 9337 as well as the IRR. PAGCOR
avers that the said provision violates the equal protection clause. PAGCOR argues that it
issimilarly situated with SSS, GSIS, PCSO, and PHILHEALTH, hence it should not be excluded
from the exemption.
ISSUE: Whether or not PAGCOR should be subjected to income taxation.
HELD: Yes. Section 1 of R.A. 9337 is constitutional. It was the express intent of Congress to
exclude PAGCOR from the exempt GOCCs hence PAGCOR is now subject to income taxation.
PAGCOR’s contention that the law violated the constitution is not tenable. The equal
protection clause provides that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated alike,
both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed.
The general rule is, ALL GOCC’s are subject to income taxation. However, certain classes of
GOCC’s may be exempt from income taxation based on the following requisites for a valid
classification under the principle of equal protection:
1) It must be based on substantial distinctions.
2) It must be germane to the purposes of the law.
3) It must not be limited to existing conditions only.
4) It must apply equally to all members of the class.
When the Supreme Court looked into the records of the deliberations of the lawmakers when
R.A. 8424 was being drafted, the SC found out that PAGCOR’s exemption was not really based
on substantial distinctions. In fact, the lawmakers merely exempted PAGCOR from income
taxation upon the request of PAGCOR itself. This was changed however when R.A. 9337 was
passed and now PAGCOR is already subject to income taxation.
Anent the issue of the imposition of the 10% VAT against PAGCOR, the BIR had overstepped
its authority. Nowhere in R.A. 9337 does it state that PAGCOR is subject to VAT. Therefore,
that portion of the IRR issued by the BIR is void. In fact, Section 109 of R.A. 9337 expressly
exempts PAGCOR from VAT. Further, PAGCOR’s charter exempts it from VAT.
To recapitulate, PAGCOR is subject to income taxation but not to VAT.
2.10 Roma Drug vs RTC G.R. No. 149907 April 16, 2009
FACTS:
The petitioner Roma Drug was among the 6 local drugstores in Pampanga raided by the joint
NBI and BFAD inspectors where various medicines were found and seized on the strength of a
search warrant issued by the RTC of Pampanga and upon the request of Glaxo Smith kline, a
registered corporation and the authorized Philippine distributor of the medicines seized from
said drugstores. The NBI proceeded in filing a complaint against petitioner for violation of
Section 4 (in relation to Sections 3and 5) of Republic Act No. 8203, also known as the Special
Law on Counterfeit Drugs (SLCD), with the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor in San Fernando,
Pampanga. The law prohibits the sale of counterfeit drugs, which include an "unregistered
imported drug product". The term "unregistered" signifies lack of registration with the Bureau
of Patent, Trademark and Technology Transfer of a trademark of a drug in the name of a
natural or juridical person. Theseized drugs are identical in content with their Philippine-
registered counterparts. No claim was made that the drugs were adulterated in any way or
mislabeled atthe least.
Their classification as "counterfeit" is based solely on the fact that they were imported from
abroad and not purchased from Philippine-registered owner of the patent or trademark of the
drugs.
Petitioner Roma Drug challenged the constitutionality of the SLCD during the preliminary
investigation but the provincial prosecutors issued a resolution recommending that Rodriguez,
the owner of Roma Drug, be charged with violation of Section 4 of the SLCD. Thus, Roma Drug
filed a Petition for Prohibition before the Supreme Court questing the RTC-Guagua Pampanga
and the Provincial Prosecutor to desist from further prosecuting Rodriguez, and that
Sections3(b)(3), 4 and 5 of the SLCD be declared unconstitutional. The Court issued a
temporary restraining order enjoining the RTC from proceeding with the trial against
Rodriguez, and the BFAD, the NBI and Glaxo Smith kline from prosecuting the petitioners.
Glaxo Smith kline and the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) have opposed the petition. On
the constitutional issue, Glaxo Smithkline asserts the rule that the SLCD is presumed
constitutional. The OSG invokes the presumption of constitutionality of statutes and asserts
that there is no clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution presented by the SLCD.
ISSUE:
WON RA 9502 impliedly abrogates the provisions of RA 8203 (SLCD) with which the petitioner
is criminally charged? Yes
HELD:
(petition granted, writ of prohibition issued, TRO made permanent)
It may be that Rep. Act No. 9502 (Universally Accessible Cheaper and Quality Medicines Act of
2008) did not expressly repeal any provision of the SLCD. However, it is clear that the SLCD's
classification of "unregistered imported drugs" as "counterfeit drugs," and of corresponding
criminal penalties therefore are irreconcilably in the imposition conflict with Rep. Act No. 9502
since the latter indubitably grants private third persons the unqualified right to import or
otherwise use such drugs.
Where a statute of later date, such as Rep. Act No. 9502, clearly reveals an intention on the
part of the legislature to abrogate a prior act on the subject that intention must be given effect
. When a subsequent enactment covering a field of operation co-terminus with a prior statute
cannot by any reasonable construction be given effect while the prior law remains in operative
existence because of irreconcilable conflict between the two acts, the latest legislative
expression prevails and the prior law yields to the extent of the conflict. Irreconcilable
inconsistency between two laws embracing the same subject may exist when the later law
nullifies the reason or purpose of the earlier act, so that the latter loses all meaning and
function.
Legis posteriors priores contrarias abrogant
For the reasons above-stated, the prosecution of petitioner is no longer warranted and the
quested writ of prohibition should accordingly be issued
2.11 People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56
FACTS: January 8, 1934: Mariano Cu Unjieng was convicted in a criminal case filed against him
by the Hongkong and Shanghai Banking Corporation (HSBC). He filed for reconsideration which
was elevated to the SC and the SC remanded the appeal to the lower court for a new trial.
· November 27, 1936: While awaiting new trial, Mariano Cu Unjieng filed an application for
probation, alleging that the he is innocent of the crime he was convicted of.
· June 18, 1937: Judge Tuason of the Manila CFI directed the appeal to the Insular Probation
Office.
· Insular Probation Office denied the application for probation
· April 5, 1937: hearing was set by Judge Jose Vera concerning the petition for probation
· Judge Vera upon another request by petitioner allowed the petition to be set for hearing.
· The City Prosecutor countered alleging that Vera has no power to place Cu Unjieng under
probation because it is in violation of Sec. 11 Act No. 4221 which provides that the act of
Legislature granting provincial boards the power to provide a system of probation to convicted
person. Nowhere in the law is stated that the law is applicable to a city like Manila because it
is only indicated therein that only provinces are covered. And even if the law covers Manila, it
isunconstitutional because Sec 1 Art 3 of the Constitution provides equal protection of laws
for the reason that its applicability is not uniform throughout the islands. The said law provides
absolute discretion to provincial boards and this also constitutes undue delegation of power
because providing probation, in effect, is granting freedom, as in pardon.
HSBC filed contentions to the Act 4221 or The Probation Law stating that it goes against
the constitutional guarantees on equal protection of the laws and unduly delegate
power.
ISSUE: Whether equal protection is violated when the probation law provides that “ only in
those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for the salary of a
probation officer” may the probation system be applied.
HELD: The challenged section of Act No. 4221 in section 11 which reads as follows: This Act
shall apply only in those provinces in which the respective provincial boards have provided for
the salary of a probation officer at rates not lower than those now provided for provincial
fiscals. Said probation officer shall be appointed by the Secretary of Justice and shall be subject
to the direction of the Probation Office. This only means that only provinces that can provide
appropriation for a probation officer may have a system of probation within their locality. This
would mean to say that convicts in provinces where no probation officer is instituted may not
avail of their right to probation.
There is no difference between a law, which denies equal protection, and a law that permits
such denial. A law may appear to be fair on its face and impartial in appearance, yet, if it
permits of unjust and illegal discrimination, it is within the constitutional prohibition.
Note: Does it deny equal protection of the laws?
Yes. Due to the undue delegation of legislative power, there could be arbitrary
application of the law in the different provinces. Statutes may be adjudged
unconstitutional because of their effect in operation. It is possible that all the provinces
could choose to have a probationary officer, or all could choose not to have one, and then
equal protection would be maintained, but since this is just a likely outcome, and it is still
possible that there could be obnoxious discrimination based on each independent
provincial board, the Supreme Court strikes Sec. 11 of Act No. 4221 on this level as well.
2.12 Imelda Marcos vs Court of Appeals
Facts: Imelda Marcos : charged for violating the circular, which consolidated the various rules
and regulations promulgated by the CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions
including those on gold and silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms, associations, or
corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization
from the CB or without being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10 thereof
all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from
abroad to submit reports of such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB
department and to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within 90 days
from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular is punishable as a criminal
offense under Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).
CB cir no. : which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad without permission from the Central Bank. Several
informations were filed against her.
-another circulars were issued CB C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 or
Further Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation that allowed residents, firms, associations
and corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad however Imelda questioned
these ng Central Bank Circular No. 960 The circular, which consolidated the various rules and
regulations promulgated by the CB concerning foreign exchange non-trade transactions
including those on gold and silver, prohibits in its Section 4 residents, firms, associations, or
corporations from maintaining foreign exchange accounts abroad without prior authorization
from the CB or without being permitted by CB regulations; and requires in Section 10 thereof
all residents who habitually earn or receive foreign exchange from invisibles locally or from
abroad to submit reports of such earnings or receipts in prescribed form with the proper CB
department and to register with the Foreign Exchange Department of the CB within 90 days
from October 21, 1983. Violation of the provisions of the circular is punishable as a criminal
offense under Section 34 of R.A. No. 265, as amended (the Central Bank Act).
CB cir no. : which banned residents, firms, associations and corporations from maintaining
foreign exchange accounts abroad without permission from the Central Bank. Several
informations were filed against her.
-another circulars were issued CB C.B. Circ. 1318 and C.B. Circ. 1353 or Further
Liberalizing Foreign Exchange Regulation that allowed residents, firms, associations and
corporations to maintain foreign exchange accounts abroad however Imelda questioned these
Equal protection
SC held that: “[Marcos’s] lamentations that the aforementioned provisions are
discriminatory because they are aimed at her and her co- accused do not assume the dignity
of a legal argument since they are unwarranted conjectures belied by even the text of the
circulars alone. Hence, as respondent appellate court correctly concludes, the foregoing facts
clearly disprove petitioner’s claim that her constitutional right to equal protection of the law
was violated. Should she nonetheless desire to pursue such objection, she may always adduce
additional evidence at the trial of these cases since that is the proper stage therefor, and not
at their present posture.”
Himagan vs People
Ishmael Himagan was a policeman assigned in Davao City. He was charged for the murder of
Benjamin Machitar, Jr. and for the attempted murder of Benjamin’s younger brother, Barnabe.
Pursuant to Section 47 of Republic Act No. 6975, Himagan was placed into suspension pending
the murder case. The law provides that:
Upon the filing of a complaint or information sufficient in form and substance against a
member of the PNP for grave felonies where the penalty imposed by law is six (6) years and
one (1) day or more, the court shall immediately suspend the accused from office until the
case is terminated. Such case shall be subject to continuous trial and shall be terminated
within ninety (90) days from arraignment of the accused.
Himagan assailed the suspension averring that Section 42 of P.D. 807 of the Civil Service
Decree provides that his suspension should be limited to ninety (90) days only. He claims that
an imposition of preventive suspension of over 90 days is contrary to the Civil Service Law and
would be a violation of his constitutional right to equal protection of laws .
ISSUE: Whether or not Sec 47, RA 6975 violates equal protection guaranteed by the
Constitution.
HELD: No. The language of the first sentence of Sec 47 of RA 6975 is clear, plain and free from
ambiguity. It gives no other meaning than that the suspension from office of the member of
the PNP charged with grave offense where the penalty is six years and one day or more shall
last until the termination of the case. The suspension cannot be lifted before the termination
of the case. The second sentence of the same Section providing that the trial must be
terminated within ninety (90) days from arraignment does not qualify or limit the first
sentence. The two can stand independently of each other. The first refers to the period of
suspension. The second deals with the time from within which the trial should be finished.
The reason why members of the PNP are treated differently from the other classes of persons
charged criminally or administratively insofar as the application of the rule on preventive
suspension is concerned is that policemen carry weapons and the badge of the law which can
be used to harass or intimidate witnesses against them, as succinctly brought out in the
legislative discussions.
If a suspended policeman criminally charged with a serious offense is reinstated to his post
while his case is pending, his victim and the witnesses against him are obviously exposed to
constant threat and thus easily cowed to silence by the mere fact that the accused is in uniform
and armed. the imposition of preventive suspension for over 90 days under Sec 47 of RA 6975
does not violate the suspended policeman’s constitutional right to equal protection of the
laws.
Suppose the trial is not terminated within ninety days from arraignment, should the
suspension of accused be lifted?
The answer is certainly no. While the law uses the mandatory word “shall” before the phrase
“be terminated within ninety (90) days”, there is nothing in RA 6975 that suggests that the
preventive suspension of the accused will be lifted if the trial is not terminated within that
period. Nonetheless, the Judge who fails to decide the case within the period without
justifiable reason may be subject to administrative sanctions and, in appropriate cases where
the facts so warrant, to criminal or civil liability. If the trial is unreasonably delayed without
fault of the accused such that he is deprived of his right to a speedy trial, he is not without a
remedy. He may ask for the dismissal of the case. Should the court refuse to dismiss the case,
the accused can compel its dismissal by certiorari, prohibition or mandamus, or secure his
liberty by habeas corpus.
Phil. Judges Assoc. vs Prado
Section 35 of Republic Act No. 7354 authorized the Philippine Postal Corporation (PPC) to
withdraw franking privileges from certain government agencies. Franking privilege is a
privilege granted to certain agencies to make use of the Philippine postal service free of charge.
In 1992, a study came about where it was determined that the bulk of the expenditure of the
postal service comes from the judiciary’s use of the postal service (issuance of court
processes). Hence, the postal service recommended that the franking privilege be withdrawn
from the judiciary. AS a result, the PPC issued a circular withdrawing the said franking privilege.
The Philippine Judges Association (PJA) assailed the circular and questioned the validity of
Section 35 of RA 7354. PJA claimed that the said provision is violative of the equal protection
clause.
ISSUE: Whether or not the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is valid.
HELD: No. The Supreme Court ruled that there is a violation of the equal protection clause. The
judiciary needs the franking privilege so badly as it is vital to its operation. Evident to that need
is the high expense allotted to the judiciary’s franking needs. The Postmaster cannot be
sustained in contending that the removal of the franking privilege from the judiciary is in order
to cut expenditure. This is untenable for if the Postmaster would intend to cut expenditure by
removing the franking privilege of the judiciary, then they should have removed the franking
privilege all at once from all the other departments. If the problem is the loss of revenues from
the franking privilege, the remedy is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of the
government, including those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for
some and withdrawing it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction
between those favored, which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely
needs it. The problem is not solved by violating the Constitution.
The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
persons or things without distinction (it is true that the postmaster withdraw the franking
privileges from other agencies of the government but still, the judiciary is different because its
operation largely relies on the mailing of court processes). This might in fact sometimes result
in unequal protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons,
regardless of age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What
the clause requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification.
By classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
particulars and different from all others in these same particulars.
In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
withdrawn, Sec 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not belong. If
it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of Congress for the
franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar and in fact greater
need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege.
Gumabon vs. Director of Prisons
Mario Gumabon et al were charged with rebellion punished under Art. 134 of the Revised
Penal Code. Their offense was complexed with multiple murder, robbery, arson, and
kidnapping. They were all sentenced to reclusion perpetua. Their sentence had become final
and executory when the Hernandez Doctrine was promulgated by the Supreme Court. The
Hernandez Doctrine simply states that murder cannot be complexed with rebellion because
murder, a regular crime, is necessarily absorbed by rebellion. Hence, without such complexion,
the penalty must be lower than reclusion perpetua. Gumabon asserted that a non-application
of the Hernandez Doctrine will lead to a deprivation of a constitutional right, namely, the denial
of equal protection. Gumabon et al, nonetheless, were convicted by Court of First Instance but
they were convicted for the very same rebellion for which Hernandez and others were
convicted – (The law under which they [Gumabon et al] were convicted is the very same law
under which the latter [Hernandez et al] were convicted.) It had not and has not been changed.
For the same crime, committed under the same law, how can the SC, in conscience, allow
Gumabon et al to suffer life imprisonment, while others can suffer only prision mayor?
ISSUE: Whether or not Gumabon et al is entitled to the effects of the Hernandez Doctrine.
HELD: Yes. The SC ruled in favor of Gumabon et al. The continued incarceration after the
twelve-year period when such is the maximum length of imprisonment in accordance with the
controlling doctrine, when others similarly convicted have been freed, is fraught with
implications at war with equal protection. That is not to give it life. On the contrary, it would
render it nugatory. Otherwise, what would happen is that for an identical offense, the only
distinction lying in the finality of the conviction of one being before the Hernandez ruling and
the other after, a person duly sentenced for the same crime would be made to suffer different
penalties. If Gumabon et al would continue to endure imprisonment, then this would be
repugnant to equal protection, people similarly situated were not similarly dealt with.
What is required under this constitutional guarantee is the uniform operation of legal norms
so that all persons under similar circumstances would be accorded the same treatment both
in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. As was noted in a recent decision:
Favoritism and undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection
and security shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are
analogous. If law be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class
should be treated in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally
binding on the rest.
Lacson vs Sandiganbayan
On May 18, 1995, alleged members of the Kuratong Baleleng Gang were shot to death. The
incident was later sensationalized as a rub out. This implicated case Panfilo Lacson, who, at the
time of the “rub out” was then the PNP Chief, among others, as the ones responsible. They
were accused of multiple murder. The case reached the Sandiganbayan. In 1996, Lacson et
al filed separate motions questioning the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan. They aver that
the cases fall within the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court pursuant to Section 2 (par a and
c) of Republic Act No. 7975 also known as “An Act To Strengthen The Functional And Structural
Organization Of The Sandiganbayan, Amending For That Purpose Presidential Decree 1606, As
Amended”.
They contend that the said law limited the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan to cases where
one or more of the “principal accused” are government officials with Salary Grade (SG) 27 or
higher, or PNP officials with the rank of Chief Superintendent (Brigadier General) or higher.
The highest ranking principal accused in the amended informations has the rank of only a Chief
Inspector, and none has the equivalent of at least SG 27.
In 1997, Republic Act No. 8249 was passed which basically expanded the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. The law was authored by Lagman and Neptali Gonzales. Lacson assailed the
law as it was introduced by the authors thereof in bad faith as it was made to precisely suit
the situation in which Lacson’s cases were in at the Sandiganbayan by restoring jurisdiction
thereover to it, thereby violating his right to procedural due process and the equal protection
clause of the Constitution. Further, from the way the Sandiganbayan has foot-dragged for nine
(9) months the resolution of a pending incident involving the transfer of the cases to the
Regional Trial Court, the passage of the law may have been timed to overtake such resolution
to render the issue therein moot, and frustrate the exercise of petitioner’s vested rights under
the old Sandiganbayan law (RA 7975).
ISSUE: Whether or not the right to equal protection by Lacson et al has been violated with the
passage of RA 8249.
HELD: No. The SC ruled that RA 8249 did not violate the right of Lacson et al to equal
protection. No concrete evidence and convincing argument were presented to warrant a
declaration of an act of the entire Congress and signed into law by the highest officer of the
co-equal executive department as unconstitutional. Every classification made by law is
presumed reasonable. Thus, the party who challenges the law must present proof of
arbitrariness. It is an established precept in constitutional law that the guaranty of the equal
protection of the laws is not violated by a legislation based on reasonable classification. The
classification is reasonable and not arbitrary when there is concurrence of four elements,
namely:
(1) it must rest on substantial distinction;
(2) it must be germane to the purpose of the law;
(3) must not be limited to existing conditions only, and
(4) must apply equally to all members of the same class
The classification between those pending cases involving the concerned public officials whose
trial has not yet commenced and whose cases could have been affected by the amendments
of the Sandiganbayan jurisdiction under R.A. 8249, as against those cases where trial had
already started as of the approval of the law, rests on substantial distinction that makes real
differences. In the first instance, evidence against them were not yet presented, whereas in
the latter the parties had already submitted their respective proofs, examined witness and
presented documents. Since it is within the power of Congress to define the jurisdiction of
courts subject to the constitutional limitations, it can be reasonably anticipated that an
alteration of that jurisdiction would necessarily affect pending cases, which is why it has to
provide for a remedy in the form of a transitory provision. Thus, Lacson et al cannot claim that
Secs 4 and 7 placed them under a different category from those similarly situated as them.
Precisely, par A of Sec 4 provides that it shall apply to “all cases involving” certain public
officials and, under the transitory provision in Sec 7, to “all cases pending in any court.”
Contrary to petitioner and intervenors’ arguments, the law is not particularly directed only to
the Kuratong Baleleng cases. The transitory provision does not only cover cases which are in
the Sandiganbayan but also in “any court.” It just happened that the Kuratong Baleleng cases
are one of those affected by the law. Moreover, those cases where trial had already begun are
not affected by the transitory provision under Sec 7 of the new law (R.A. 8249).
2.17 Basco vs PAGCOR
FACTS: Petitioners filed a petition seeking to annul the PAGCOR Charter – PD 1869 based on
the following grounds:
A. It constitutes a waiver of a right prejudicial to a third person with a right recognized by law.
It waived the Manila City government's right to impose taxes and license fees, which is
recognized by law;
B. For the same reason stated in the immediately preceding paragraph, the law has intruded
into the local government's right to impose local taxes and license fees. This, in contravention
of the constitutionally enshrined principle of local autonomy;
C. It violates the equal protection clause of the constitution in that it legalizes PAGCOR —
conducted gambling, while most other forms of gambling are outlawed, together with
prostitution, drug trafficking and other vices;
D. It violates the avowed trend of the Cory government away from monopolistic and crony
economy, and toward free enterprise and privatization. (p. 2, Amended Petition; p. 7, Rollo)
PAGCOR was created by virtue of PD 1067-A “to establish, operate and maintain
gambling casinos on land or water within the territorial jurisdiction of the Philippines”. PD 1869
was created to regulate and centralize all games of chance authorized by existing franchise or
permitted by law, under the following declared policy.
ISSUE: WON the legalization of gambling conducted by PAGCOR violates equal protection
clause.
HELD: The legalization of PAGCOR – conducted gambling does not violate equal protection
clause because there is a substantial distinction between PAGCOR and the other
establishments conducting gambling.
The petitioners' posture ignores the well-accepted meaning of the clause "equal
protection of the laws." The clause does not preclude classification of individuals who may be
accorded different treatment under the law as long as the classification is not unreasonable or
arbitrary (Itchong v. Hernandez, 101 Phil. 1155). A law does not have to operate in equal force
on all persons or things to be conformable to Article III, Section 1 of the Constitution (DECS v.
San Diego, G.R. No. 89572, December 21, 1989).
The "equal protection clause" does not prohibit the Legislature from establishing
classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate (Laurel v. Misa, 43
O.G. 2847). The Constitution does not require situations which are different in fact or opinion
to be treated in law as though they were the same (Gomez v. Palomar, 25 SCRA 827).
PAGCOR has a dual role, to operate and to regulate gambling casinos. The latter role is
governmental, which places it in the category of an agency or instrumentality of the
Government. It is reported that PAGCOR is the third largest source of government revenue,
next to the Bureau of Internal Revenue and the Bureau of Customs. In 1989 alone, PAGCOR
earned P3.43 Billion, and directly remitted to the National Government a total of P2.5 Billion
in form of franchise tax, government's income share, the President's Social Fund and Host
Cities' share. In addition, PAGCOR sponsored other socio-cultural and charitable projects on its
own or in cooperation with various governmental agencies, and other private associations and
organizations. In its 3 1/2 years of operation under the present administration, PAGCOR
remitted to the government a total of P6.2 Billion. As of December 31, 1989, PAGCOR was
employing 4,494 employees in its nine (9) casinos nationwide, directly supporting the
livelihood of Four Thousand Four Hundred Ninety-Four (4,494) families.
2.18Tatad vs Secretary of Finance
FACTS: The petitions at bar challenge the constitutionality of Republic Act No. 8180 entitled
"An Act Deregulating the Downstream Oil Industry and For Other Purposes. Francisco Tatad
seeks annulment of Sec. 5 (b) of RA No. 8180, which provides:
Section 5 b) Any law to the contrary notwithstanding and starting with the effectivity of this
Act, tariff duty shall be imposed and collected on imported crude oil at the rate of three
percent (3%) and imported refined petroleum products at the rate of seven percent (7%),
except fuel oil and LPG, the rate for which shall be the same as that for imported crude oil:
Provided, That beginning on January 1, 2004 the tariff rate on imported crude oil and refined
petroleum products shall be the same: Provided, further, That this provision may be amended
only by an Act of Congress.
Tatad argue that the imposition of different tariff rates on imported crude oil and
imported refined petroleum products violates the equal protection clause. Petitioner contends
that the 3%-7% tariff differential unduly favors the three existing oil refineries and
discriminates against prospective investors in the downstream oil industry who do not have
their own refineries and will have to source refined petroleum products from abroad.
The three existing oil refineries at that time were Petron, Shell, and Caltex. They are
the only companies that could import crude oil since they are the only ones with refineries.
Since the deregulation, new players have entered but none of them belong to the same class
as Petron, Shell, and Caltex. These players were limited to importing refined petroleum
products since theydo not have the same refineries as that of the big 3. Also, there is no
showing that any of these new players intends to install any refinery and effectively compete
with these dominant oil companies. Hence, the big three oil companies were the only ones
subjected to the 3% tariff while the smaller companies were subjected to the 7% tariff.
ISSUE: WON RA 8180 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause of the
Constitution
HELD: RA 8180 is unconstitutional and should be struck down.
Before deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX had no real competitors but did not
have a free run of the market because government controls both the pricing and non-pricing
aspects of the oil industry. After deregulation, PETRON, SHELL and CALTEX remain
unthreatened by real competition yet are no longer subject to control by government with
respect to their pricing and non-pricing decisions. The aftermath of R.A. No. 8180 is a
deregulated market where competition can be corrupted and where market forces can be
manipulated by oligopolies.
In the cases at bar, it cannot be denied that our downstream oil industry is operated
and controlled by an oligopoly, a foreign oligopoly at that. Petron, Shell and Caltex stand as
the only major league players in the oil market. All other players belong to the lilliputian league.
As the dominant players, Petron, Shell and Caltex boast of existing refineries of various
capacities. The tariff differential of 4% therefore works to their immense benefit. Yet, this is
only one edge of the tariff differential. The other edge cuts and cuts deep in the heart of their
competitors. It erects a high barrier to the entry of new players. New players that intend to
equalize the market power of Petron, Shell and Caltex by building refineries of their own will
have to spend billions of pesos. Those who will not build refineries but compete with them will
suffer the huge disadvantage of increasing their product cost by 4%. They will be competing
on an uneven field. The argument that the 4% tariff differential is desirable because it will
induce prospective players to invest in refineries puts the cart before the horse. The first need
is to attract new players and they cannot be attracted by burdening them with heavy
disincentives. Without new players belonging to the league of Petron, Shell and Caltex,
competition in our downstream oil industry is an idle dream.
2.19 Taxicab Operators vs. BOT, September 30, 1982
FACTS:
Taxicab Operators of Metro Manila, Inc. (TOMMI) is a domestic corporation composed of
taxicab operators, who are grantees of Certificates of Public Convenience to operate taxicabs
within the City of Manila and to any other place in Luzon accessible to vehicular traffic.
Petitioners Ace Transportation Corporation and Felicisimo Cabigao are two of the members of
TOMMI, each being an operator and grantee of such certificate of public convenience.
The Board of Transportation issued Memorandum Circular No. 77-42 which aims to phase out
and replace old and dilapidated taxis. This policy is intended, among other reasons, to
insurethat only safe and comfortable units are used as public conveyances and to assure the
commuting public of their comfort, convenience, and safety. The BOT’s studies and inquiries
reveal that after six years of operation, a taxi operator has not only covered the cost of his
taxis, but has made reasonable profit for his investments. In the policy, all taxis of Model 1971
and earlier are ordered to be withdrawn from public service.
The taxi operators filed a petition with the BOT seeking to nullify the said memorandum or to
stop its implementation; to allow the registration and operation in 1981 and subsequent years
of taxicabs of model 1974, as well as those of earlier models which were phased-out, provided
that, at the time of registration, they are roadworthy and fit for operation.
The petitioners allege that the memorandum violates their right to equal protection because
it is being enforced in Metro Manila only and is directed solely towards the taxi industry. We
have already discussed this in class. It is reasonable for the BOT to enforce the policy in Metro
Manila because taxis there are in continuous operation, practically 24 hours everyday in three
shifts of eight hours per shift. While in provincial areas, an example given by Atty. Gacayan, is
in Baguio City where taxis do not operate for 24 hours. Taxis in Baguio city could be fit for
operation probably until ten years. Taxis in Metro Manila are subjected to heavier traffic
pressure and more constant use.
ISSUE: Whether the taxi operators’ right to equal protection is violated.
HELD:
Their right to equal protection is not violated. It must be recalled that the equal protection
clause does not imply that the same treatment be accorded all and sundry. It applies to things
or persons Identically or similarly situated. It permits of classification of the object or subject
of the law provided classification is reasonable or based on substantial distinction, which make
for real differences, and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. What is
required under the equal protection clause is the uniform operation by legal means so that all
persons under Identical or similar circumstance would be accorded the same treatment both
in privilege conferred and the liabilities imposed
2.20 Bautista vs. Juinio
FACTS: An energy conservation measure, Letter of Instruction No. 869, was issued in response
to the protracted oil crisis that dates back to 1974. The LOI prohibited the use of private motor
vehicles with H (heavy) and EH (extra heavy) plates on weekends and holidays from 12am,
Saturday morning to 5:00 a.m. Monday morning, or 1:00 a.m. of the holiday to 5:00 a.m. of
the day after the holiday. The classifications of S (service), T (truck), DPL (diplomatic), CC
(consular corps), and TC (tourist cars) were exceptions to the LOI. The LOI was issued with the
purpose to curb down the consumption of petroleum, H and EH vehicles being bigger vehicles
which meant that they consumed more petroleum. Although the implementation of the LOI
was referred to as laudable by the petitioners Mary Concepcion and Enrique Bautista, they
claimed that the provision banning the use of H and EH vehicles is unfair, discriminatory,
amounting to an arbitrary classification and thus in contravention of the equal protection
clause.
Petitioners claim that it is discriminatory since there are smaller vehicles, although not
classified as H or EH, consume just as much petroleum. They contend that there is no rational
justification for the ban being imposed on H and EH vehicles. The LOI restricts their freedom
to enjoy their cars while those with smaller cars may enjoy theirs.
ISSUE: Whether LOI No. 869 violates the equal protection clause.
HELD: The SC held that Bautista was not able to make merit out of her contention. The
classification on cars on its face cannot be characterized as an affront to reason. The ideal
situation is for the law’s benefits to be available to all, that none be placed outside the sphere
of its coverage. Only thus could chance and favor be excluded and the affairs of men governed
by that serene and impartial uniformity, which is of the very essence of the idea of law. The
actual, given things as they are and likely to continue to be, cannot approximate the ideal. Nor
is the law susceptible to the reproach that it does not take into account the realities of the
situation. . . . To assure that the general welfare be promoted, which is the end of law, a
regulatory measure may cut into the rights to liberty and property. Those adversely affected
may under such circumstances invoke the equal protection clause only if they can show that
the governmental act assailed, far from being inspired by the attainment of the common weal
was prompted by the spirit of hostility, or at the very least, discrimination that finds no support
in reason. It suffices then that the laws operate equally and uniformly on all persons under
similar circumstances or that all persons must be treated in the same manner, the conditions
not being different, both in the privileges conferred and the liabilities imposed. Favoritism and
undue preference cannot be allowed. For the principle is that equal protection and security
shall be given to every person under circumstances, which if not identical are analogous. If law
be looked upon in terms of burden or charges, those that fall within a class should be treated
in the same fashion, whatever restrictions cast on some in the group equally binding on the
rest.
2.21. Dumlao vs. COMELEC
FACTS:
Patricio Dumlao, Romeo B. Igot, and Alfredo Salapatan Jr. filed a petition questioning the
constitutionality of certain provisions of Batas Pambansa Blg. 51, 52, and 53. The petition
states that Dumlao, is a former Governor of Nueva Vizcaya who has filed his candidacy for said
position of Governor in the forthcoming elections of January 30, 1980. On the other hand, Igot
is a taxpayer, a qualified voter and a member of the bar while Salapantan is also a taxpayer,
voter, and a resident of San Miguel, Iloilo. Petitioner Dumlao specifically questions section 4
of BP 52 which disqualifies any retired elective provincial city or municipal official who has
received retirement benefits and who shall be 65 years at the end of the term of office from
running to the same elective post he has retired from. He asserts that this provision is
discriminatory and contrary to the equal protection and due process guarantees of the
constitution. On their part, Igot and Salapantan Jr. assails the validity of Section 4 of BP 21,
Sections 1,4, and 6 of BP 22, and the accreditation of some political parties by the COMELEC,
as authorized by BP 53, on the ground that it is contrary to Section 9(1) Art. XIIC of the
Constitution. The said section of the Constitution provides that bona fide candidates shall be
free from any harassment and discrimination which makes the accreditation unconstitutional.
ISSUE: Whether or not section 4 of BP 22 is discriminatory and contrary the equal protection
and due process guarantees of the Constitution.
HELD: No. Sec 4 of BP 22 is not contrary to the safer guard of due process and equal protection.
The constitutional guarantee of equal protection of the laws is subject to rational classification.
In the case of 65-year old elective official, who has retired from a provincial, city, or municipal
office, the reason to disqualify him from running for the same office is the need for new bloods.
The tiredness of the retiree for government work is present, and what is emphatically
significant is that the retired employee has already declared himself tired and unavailable for
some government work. The purpose of the law is to allow the emergence of the younger
blood in the government. Thus, the provision does not deny equal protection since the legal
classification is not arbitrary and unreasonable.
2.22 Villegas vs. HIU
FACTS:
On February 22, 1968, Ordinance No. 6537 entitled AN ORDINANCE MAKING IT
UNLAWFUL FOR ANY PERSON NOT A CITIZEN OF THE PHILIPPINES TO BE EMPLOYED IN ANY
PLACE OF EMPLOYMENT OR TO BE ENGAGED IN ANY KIND OF TRADE, BUSINESS OR
OCCUPATION WITHIN THE CITY OF MANILA WITHOUT FIRST SECURING AN EMPLOYMENT
PERMIT FROM THE MAYOR OF MANILA; AND FOR OTHER PURPOSES was passed by the
Municipal Board of Manila and was later signed by Mayor Antonio J. Villegas on March 27,
1968. Section 1 of said act prohibits aliens to engaged in any occupation or business without
first securing an employment permit from the Mayor of Manila and paying P 50 00 as permit
fee with the exception of persons in the diplomatic or consular missions of foreign countries,
or in the technical assistance programs of both the Philippine Government and any foreign
government, and those working in their respective households, and members of religious
orders of congregations, sect or denomination, who are not paid monetarily or in kind.
Violations of this ordinance are punishable by an imprisonment of not less than three to six
months or fine of not less than P 100.00 but not more than P 200.00 or both such fine and
imprisonment, upon conviction.
Private respondent Hiu Chiong Tsai Pao Ho who was employed in Manila, filed a
petition on May 4, 1968 with the CFI of Manila, Branch 1 praying for the issuance of the writ
of preliminary injunction and restraining order to stop the enforcement of the ordinance and
for it to be declared null and void. He raised in the petition that the ordinance is null and void
since it is discriminatory and violative of the rule of the uniformity of taxation being a revenue
measure imposed to aliens. He also averred that it is a violation of the fundamental principles
of the proper delegation of legislative power, of due process and of the equal protection rule
of the Constitution. Respondent Judge Francisco Arca then issued the writ on May 24, 1968
and rendered judgement declaring Ordinance No, 6537 as nulland void and making the writ of
preliminary injunction permanent.
On March 27, 1969, Mayor Villegas filed a petition alleging that it cannot be declared null and
void on the ground that it is a violation of the rule of uniformity and taxation since it is not a
tax or revenue measure but an exercise of the police power of the state for being regulatory
in nature.
ISSUE:
1. Whether or not Ordinace No. 6537 is null or void.
2. Whether or not it violates the due process of law and the equal protection rule.
HELD:
1. Yes. Ordinance No. 6537 is null and void. The contention that it is not a purely tax or revenue
measure because its principal purpose is regulatory in nature has no merit. While it is true that
the first part which requires aliens to secure permits is regulatory in nature, the second part
which requires the payment of P 50. 00 from aliens is an obvious revenue measure. There is
no logic in exacting said amount from aliens who have been cleared from employment which
implies that its real purpose is to raise money in the guise or regulation. Also, the P 50 00 is
unreasonable because it fails to consider the differences in situation among those who are
required to pay. The same amount will be collected from every employed alien whether he is
casual or permanent, part time or full time or whether he is a lowly employee or a highly paid
executive. Further, it has been held in the ruling case laws of Chinese Flour Importers
Association vs. Price Stabilization board and in Primicias vs. being regulatory in nature.
2. Yes. The ordinance in question violates the due process of law and the equal protection rule.
Requiring a person to secure a permit before he can be employed is equivalent to denying him
the basic right for livelihood. While it is true that the Philippines as a State is not obliged to
admit aliens within its territory, once an alien is admitted, he cannot be deprived of
life(involving livelihood) without due process of law. The shelter of protection should be given
to all persons, both aliens and citizens.
2.23 CENIZA V COMELEC
FACTS:
Pursuant to Batas Blg 51 (enacted 22 Dec 1979), COMELEC adopted Resolution No.
1421 which effectively bars voters in chartered cities (unless otherwise provided by their
charter), highly urbanized (those earning above P40 M) cities, and component cities (whose
charters prohibit them) from voting in provincial elections. The City of Mandaue, on the
other hand, is a component city NOT a chartered one or a highly urbanized one. So when
COMELEC added Mandaue to the list of 20 cities that cannot vote in provincial elections,
Ceniza, in behalf of the other members of DOERS (Democracy or Extinction: Resolved to
Succeed) questioned the constitutionality of BB 51 and the COMELEC resolution. They said
that the regulation/restriction of voting being imposed is a curtailment of the right to
suffrage. Further, petitioners claim thatpolitical and gerrymandering motives were behind
the passage of Batas Blg. 51 and Section 96 of the Charter of Mandaue City. They contend
that the Province of Cebu is politically and historically known as an opposition bailiwick and
of the total 952,716 registered voters in the province, close to one-third (1/3) of the entire
province of Cebu would be barred from voting for the provincial officials of the province of
Cebu. Ceniza also said that the constituents of Mandaue never ratified their charter. Ceniza
likewise aver that Sec 3 of BB 885 insofar as it classifies cities including Cebu City as highly
urbanized as the only basis for not allowing its electorate to vote for the provincial officials is
inherently and palpably unconstitutional in that such classification is not based on substantial
distinctions germane to the purpose of the law which in effect provides for and regulates the
exercise of the right of suffrage, and therefore such unreasonable classification amounts to a
denial of equal protection.
ISSUE: Whether or not there is a violation of equal protection.

HELD: The thrust of the 1973 Constitution is towards the fullest autonomy of local
government units. In the Declaration of Principles and State Policies, it is stated that “The
State shall guarantee and promote the autonomy of local government units to ensure their
fullest development as self-reliant communities. The petitioners allegation of
gerrymandering is of no merit, it has no factual or legal basis. The Constitutional requirement
that the creation, division, merger, abolition, or alteration of the boundary of a province, city,
municipality, or barrio should be subject to the approval by the majority of the votes cast in a
plebiscite in the governmental unit or units affected is a new requirement that came into
being only with the 1973 Constitution. It is prospective in character and therefore cannot
affect thecreation of the City of Mandaue which came into existence on 21 June 1969.
The
classification of cities into highly urbanized cities and component cities on the basis of their
regular annual income is based upon substantial distinction. The revenue of a city would
show whether or not it is capable of existence and development as a relatively independent
social, economic, and political unit. It would also show whether the city has sufficient
economic or industrial activity as to warrant its independence from the province where it is
geographically situated. Cities with smaller income need the continued support of the
provincial government thus justifying the continued participation of the voters in the election
of provincial officials in some instances.
The petitioners also contend that the voters in
Mandaue City are denied equal protection of the law since the voters in other component
cities are allowed to vote for provincial officials. The contention is without merit. The
practice of allowing voters in one component city to vote for provincial officials and denying
the same privilege to voters in another component city is a matter of legislative discretion
which violates neither the Constitution nor the voter’s right of suffrage.
.24 UNIDO V. COMELEC
FACTS:
In 1981, the BP proposed amendments to the 1973 Constitution. The amendments
were to be placed to a plebiscite for the people’s approval. The YES vote was being advanced
by KBL – Marcos’ Party. While the NO vote was being advanced by UNIDO. To ensure parity
and equality, COMELEC issued Resolutions 1467-1469 w/c basically provided that there be
equal opportunity, equal time and equal space on media use forcampaigns for both sides. On
12 Mar 1981, Marcos campaigned for the YES vote via TV and radio from 9:30pm to 11:30pm.
The same was broadcasted live by 26 TV stations and 248 radio stations nationwide. UNIDO
petitioned before the COMELEC that they be granted the same opportunity as Marcos has
pursuant to Res’ns 1467-69. COMELEC denied the demand. UNIDO assailed the denial as a
denial of equal protection before the laws.

ISSUE: Whether or not UNIDO was denied equal
protection by virtue of COMELEC’s denial of their request.

HELD: The SC ruled that UNIDO
was not denied due process nor were they not afforded equal protection. It is the considered
view of the SC that when Marcos conducted his ‘pulong-pulong’ or consultation with the
people on March 12, 1981, he did so in his capacity as President/Prime Minister of the
Philippines and not as the head of any political party. Under the Constitution, the ‘Prime
Minister and the Cabinet shall be responsible . . . for the program of government and shall
determine the guidelines of national policy’. In instances where the head of state is at the same
time the president of the political party that is in power, it does not necessarily follow that he
speaks with two voices when he dialogues with the governed. The president is accorded
certain privileges that the opposition may not have. Further, the SC cannot compel TV stations
and radio stations to give UNIDO free air time as they are not party to this case. UNIDO must
sought contract with these TV stations and radio stations at their own expense.
2.25 RUFINO V. NUÑEZ vs SANDIGANBAYAN
FACTS: Nunez was accused of falsification of public and commercial documents committed in
connivance with his other co-accused, all public officials, in several cases. He filed a petition
for certiorari and prohibition before the SC because he says that the Presidential Decree
creating the Sandiganbayan (PD 1486) is unconstitutional and violative of the due process,
equal protection, and ex post facto clauses of the Constitution.
ON EQUAL PROTECTION OF LAWS:
Nunez says the creation of the Sandiganbayan violated the equal protection clause because,
while other estafa indictees can appeal on both the matter of law and facts on two appellate
courts (Court of Appeals and SC), public servants like Nunez can only appeal once (Supreme
Court), and said appeal is limited only to questions of law.
Issue: Does PD 1486 violate the equal protection clause?
HELD: NO, there is valid classification. In People v Vera, “valid classification "must be based
on substantial distinctions which make real differences; it must be germane to the purposes
of the law; it must not be limited to existing conditions only, and must apply equally to each
member of the class.” To repeat, the Constitution specifically makes mention of the creation
of a special court, the Sandiganbayan precisely in response to a problem, the urgency of which
cannot be denied, namely, dishonesty in the public service. A different procedure for the
accused therein, whether a private citizen as petitioner is or a public official, is not necessarily
offensive to the equal protection clause of the Constitution. It has been held in Chiong v
Cuaderno that the Bill of Rights must give way to a specific provision, and that is one
“reserving to Filipino citizens of the public services or utilities”.
J. MAKASIAR’S DISSENTING OPINION:
YES, it violates the equal protection clause and due process of law. The Constitution merely
authorizes the creation of the Sandiganbayan with limited jurisdiction over public servants of
the government. The Bill of Rights still restricts the power of the lawmaker in creating PD 1486,
hence has no right to limit the right of appeal as stated in the Bill of Rights. By limiting the
right to appeal, the right to due process is also violated.
2.26 Sison vs Ancheta 130 SCRA 654
FACTS: Antero Sison assails the validity of Section I of BP 135, which provides for rates of tax
on citizens or residents on (a) taxable compensation income, (b) taxable net income, (c)
royalties, prizes, and other winnings, (d) interest from bank deposits and yield or any other
monetary benefit from deposit substitutes and from trust fund and similar arrangements, (e)
dividends and share of individual partner in the net profits of taxable partnership, (f) adjusted
gross income.
Sison says, this violates the equal protection clause, as well as due process and Art VI Sec 7(1)
on uniformity of taxation because he would be unduly discriminated against by the imposition
of higher rates of tax upon his income arising from the exercise of his profession vis-a-vis those
which are imposed upon fixed income or salaried individual taxpayers.
ISSUE: Does Sec. I BP 135 violate the equal protection clause?
HELD: NO, it does not. There is constant reiteration of the SC of the view that classification, if
rational in character, is allowable. As a matter of fact, in a leading case of Lutz v Araneta, the
court went so far as to hold "at any rate, it is inherent in the power to tax that a state be free
to select the subjects of taxation, and it has been repeatedly held that 'inequalities which
result from a singling out of one particular class for taxation, or exemption infringe no
constitutional limitation”. Equality and uniformity in taxation means that all taxable articles
or kinds of property of the same class shall be taxed at the same rate. The taxing power has
the authority to make reasonable and natural classifications for purposes of taxation. As
clarified by Justice Tuason in Manila Race Horse Trainers Assoc. v. De la Fuente, where "the
differentiation" complained of "conforms to the practical dictates of justice and equity" it "is
not discriminatory within the meaning of this clause and is therefore uniform."
Citizen’s Surety vs Puno
In 1956, Resolution 542 was passed by the Register of Deeds Manila which provided that only
Filipino laborers whose wages do not exceed P180.00/month or P6.00/day and at the same
time residents of Manila may be allowed to purchase lands in Barrio Obrero, Tondo, Manila.
On 10 Oct 1966, Maria Barcelon mortgaged her 180 sq. m. land located in Barrio Obrero to
CSICI. CSICI foreclosed the property due to nonpayment and later bought the land. CSICI later
sought to register and consolidate the land before the Register of Deeds but then Justice Puno
denied the request pursuant to Res’n 542 as CSICI does not meet the qualification. CSICI
averred that Res’n 542 is null and void. It averred: “As may be seen from Sec 4 of Res’n 542,
only laborers earning not more than P180.00 a month, or P5.00 a day are qualified to buy Lands
in Barrio Obrero. Employees working in offices or establishments and earning as much but who
are not laborers cannot buy lands in that area. Also persons who are engaged in some calling
or occupation earning as much are not also qualified. It should not be overlooked that the
intention of the pertinent provisions of the Charter of the City of Manila contained in Sections
97, 98 and 100 of said Charter is to help the poor people of Manila to acquire residential lands
on easy terms.” CSICI points out that there is no substantial difference between these laborers
to those mentioned in the Resolution.
ISSUE: Whether or not Resolution 542 violates equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled against CSICI. CSICI, which is a corporation and not a lowly paid worker, is
not competent to raise this claim. For even if the SC sustain it, no benefit can accrue to CSICI
who will nonetheless be disqualified to acquire the lot. Moreover, in the absence of manifest
abuse of power, the SC not vent to substitute their judgment for that of the City of Manila
which is tasked by its Charter “to acquire private lands in the city and to subdivide the same
into home lots for sale on easy terms to residents, giving first priority to the bona-fide tenants
or occupants of said lands, and second priority to laborers and low-salaried employees.”
Obviously, the questioned resolution merely seeks to implement the Charter provision.
Peralta vs COMELEC
Peralta was an independent candidate in the April 1978 Interim Batasang Pambansa Elections.
He, along with others, assailed the constitutionality of PD 1269 or the 1978 Election Code.
Secs140 and 155, sub-paragraphs 26 to 28, of the 1978 Election Code, grants the voter the
option to vote either for individual candidates by filling in the proper spaces in the ballot the
names of candidates he desires to elect, or to vote for all the candidates of a political party,
group or aggrupation by simply writing in the space provided for in the ballot the name of the
political party, group or aggrupation (office-block ballot). Peralta was vehement in contending
that the optional block voting scheme is violative of this provision of the Constitution: “Bona
fide candidates for any public office shall be free from any form of harassment and
discrimination.” He sought the shelter of its protection for himself and other independent
candidates who, according to him, would be thus made to suffer if the assailed provision is not
nullified. Essentially, in terms of individual rights, he would raise a due process and equal
protection question. The main objection of Peralta against the optional straight party voting
provided for in the Code is that an independent candidate would be discriminated against
because by merely writing on his ballot the name of a political party, a voter would have voted
for all the candidates of that party, an advantage which the independent candidate does not
enjoy. In effect, it is contended that the candidate who is not a party-member is deprived of
the equal protection of the laws, as provided in Sec 1 of Article IV, in relation to Sec 9 of Article
XII, of the 1973 Constitution.
ISSUE: Whether or not the 1978 Election Code is violative of equal protection.
HELD: The SC ruled that the 1978 Election Code is valid. Before a voter prepares his ballot, the
voter will be able to read all the names of the candidates. No candidate will receive more than
one vote, whether he is voted individually or as a candidate of a party group or aggrupation.
The voter is free to vote for the individual candidates or to vote by party, group or aggrupation.
The choice is his. No one can compel him to do otherwise. In the case of candidates, the
decision on whether to run as an independent candidate or to join a political party, group or
aggrupation is left entirely to their discretion. Certainly, before filing his certificate of
candidacy, a candidate is aware of the advantages under the law accruing to candidates of a
political party or group. If he wishes to avail himself of such alleged advantages as an official
candidate of a party, he is free to do so by joining a political party group or aggrupation. In
other words, the choice is his. In making his decision, it must be assumed that the candidate
had carefully weighed and considered the relative advantages and disadvantages of either
alternative. So long as the application of the rule depends on his voluntary action or decision,
he cannot, after exercising his discretion, claim that he was the victim of discrimination.
2.29ORMOC SUGAR COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellant, vs.THE TREASURER OF ORMOC
CITY, THE MUNICIPAL BOARD OF ORMOC CITY, HON. ESTEBAN C. CONEJOS as Mayor of
Ormoc City and ORMOC CITY, defendants-appellees.
G.R. No. L-23794 February 17, 1968
FACTS:
On January 29, 1964, the Municipal Board of Ormoc City passed Ordinance No. 4,
Series of 1964, imposing "on any and all productions of centrifugal sugar milled at the Ormoc
Sugar Company, Inc., in Ormoc City a municipal tax equivalent to one per centum (1%) per
export sale to the United States of America and other foreign countries."
Payments for said tax were made, under protest, by Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. on
March 20, 1964 for P7,087.50 and on April 20, 1964 for P5,000, or a total of P12,087.50.
On June 1, 1964, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. filed a complaint against the City of
Ormoc as well as its Treasurer, Municipal Board and Mayor, alleging that the afore-stated
ordinance is unconstitutional for being violative of the equal protection clause and the rule of
uniformity of taxation, aside from being an export tax forbidden under Section 2287 of the
Revised Administrative Code. It further alleged that the tax is neither a production nor a license
tax which Ormoc City under Section 15-kk of its charter and under Section 2 of Republic Act
2264, otherwise known as the Local Autonomy Act, is authorized to impose; and that the tax
amounts to a customs duty, fee or charge in violation of paragraph 1 of Section 2 of Republic
Act 2264 because the tax is on both the sale and export of sugar.
ISSUES: Whether the ordinance violates the equal protection clause
HELD: The Constitution in the bill of rights provides: ". . . nor shall any person be denied the
equal protection of the laws." (Sec. 1 [1], Art. III) In Felwa vs. Salas, We ruled that the equal
protection clause applies only to persons or things identically situated and does not bar a
reasonable classification of the subject of legislation, and a classification is reasonable where
(1) it is based on substantial distinctions which make real differences; (2) these are germane
to the purpose of the law; (3) the classification applies not only to present conditions but also
to future conditions which are substantially identical to those of the present; (4) the
classification applies only to those who belong to the same class.
A perusal of the requisites instantly shows that the questioned ordinance is discriminatory, for
it taxes only centrifugal sugar produced and exported by the Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc. and
none other. At the time of the taxing ordinance's enactment, Ormoc Sugar Company, Inc., it is
true, was the only sugar central in the city of Ormoc. Still, the classification, to be reasonable,
should be in terms applicable to future conditions as well. The taxing ordinance should not be
singular and exclusive as to exclude any subsequently established sugar central, of the same
class as plaintiff, for the coverage of the tax. As it is now, even if later a similar company is set
up, it cannot be subject to the tax because the ordinance expressly points only to Ormoc City
Sugar Company, Inc. as the entity to be levied upon.
Appellant, however, is not entitled to interest; on the refund because the taxes were not
arbitrarily collected (Collector of Internal Revenue v. Binalbagan). At the time of collection, the
ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise

ordinance provided a sufficient basis to preclude arbitrariness, the same being then presumed
constitutional until declared otherwise

2.30 ROQUE FLORES, petitioner, vs. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, NOBELITO RAPISORA,

respondents. G.R. No. 89604 April 20, 1990

FACTS:

The petitioner, Roque Flores, was proclaimed by the board of canvassers as having
received the highest number of votes for kagawad in Brgy. Poblacion, Tayum, Abra, and thus
became punong barangay pursuant to Sec 5 RA 6679. He was voted punong barangay during
the elections, a separate position as that of Kagawad. The private respondent, Nobelito
Rapisora, protected the result and filed a protect before the MCTC Tayum. He argued that the
ballot, which only indicated Flores´, should be declared stray votes and should not be divided
equally to them.

In his defense, the petitioner argued that in accordance with the Omnibus Election
Code, the 4 questioned votes should be entitled to him under the equity of the incumbent rule,
which states that if there are 2 or more candidates with the same full name and one of them
is an incumbent and the ballot is written only on such full name, the vote is counted in favor
of the incumbent. The lower court sustained the contention of the private respondent and
subsequently declared him as the punong barangay.

Hence this petition. The petitioner argued that by not following the rule stated, he is
deprived of his right to equal protection of the law since he is also an incumbent punong
barangay running for election, thereby he should be entitled by the rule.

ISSUES: Was the petitioner considered an incumbent to be entitled under the rule?

HELD: No. Under the new rule Resolution 2022- A passed by the Comelec, Barangay Captains
who filed their candidacy for the office of Kagawad, which is another office, shall be deemed
resigned in their former office. In his filing of candidacy, it stated that he is running for kagawad
and not as a punong barangay. Thus, pursuant to the resolution, he deemed to resign his
position as punong barangay when he filed for his candidacy as a kagawad. The rule cannot
thus then be applied to the petitioner since pursuant to the resolution, he is not considered as
an incumbent punong barangay, he is not within the same class as that of the incumbents. The
court cannot sustain the argument of the petitioner that since RA 669 speaks of 7 candidates
for kagawad, the foremost of them is the punong barangay, he should be regarded as running
for the same office.

The court maintained that the position of punong barangay is different from that of kagawad.