Human Rights Law

Human Rights Law Monday 7:00-9:00 PM
Atty. Weng Santos Pokemon Digests

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1. City Government of Quezon City v. Ericta, 122 SCRA 759, Jun 24, 1983 (JERALD)
Facts: An ordinance was promulgated in Quezon City which approved the regulation of establishment of
private cemeteries in the said city. According to the ordinance, 6% of the total area of the private memorial
park shall be set aside for charity burial of deceased persons who are paupers and have been residents of
QC. Himlayang Pilipino, a private memorial park, contends that the taking or confiscation of property
restricts the use of property such that it cannot be used for any reasonable purpose and deprives the owner
of all beneficial use of his property. It also contends that the taking is not a valid exercise of police power,
since the properties taken in the exercise of police power are destroyed and not for the benefit of the public.
Issue: Whether or not the ordinance enacted by Quezon City is a valid exercise of police power.
Ruling: No.
The ordinance of Quezon City requiring memorial park operators to set aside at least six percent (6%) of
their cemetery for charity burial of deceased persons is not a valid exercise of police power, and one that
constitute taking of property without just compensation.
There is no reasonable relation between the setting aside of at least six (6) percent of the total area of all
private cemeteries for charity burial grounds of deceased paupers and the promotion of health, morals,
good order, safety, or the general welfare of the people. The ordinance is actually a taking without
compensation of a certain area from a private cemetery to benefit paupers who are charges of the
municipal corporation. Instead of building or maintaining a public cemetery for this purpose, the city passes
the burden to private cemeteries.
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject
to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries. When the Local Government
Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a Sangguniang Panlungsod may “provide
for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply
authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or expropriate private properties to construct
public cemeteries. This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation,
however, requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and
regulations requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and
other public facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety,
health, and convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the
development of communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the
regulation, in turn, are made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to
homeowners.
Additional info: (edward)
The respondent also stresses that the general welfare clause is not available as a source of power for the
taking of the property in this case because it refers to “the power of promoting the public welfare by
restraining and regulating the use of liberty and property.” The respondent points out that if an owner is
deprived of his property outright under the State’s police power, the property is generally not taken for
public use but is urgently and summarily destroyed in order to promote the general welfare
“We start the discussion with a restatement of certain basic principles. Occupying the forefront in the bill of
rights is the provision which states that ‘no person shall be deprived of life, liberty or property without due
process of law’ (Art. III, Section 1 subparagraph 1, Constitution). “On the other hand, there are three
inherent powers of government by which the state interferes with the property rights, namely: (1) police
power, (2) eminent domain, (3) taxation.
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These are said to exist independently of the Constitution as necessary attributes of sovereignty. “Police
power is defined by Freund as ‘the power of promoting the public welfare by restraining and regulating the
use of liberty and property’ (Quoted in Political Law by Tañada and Carreon, VII, p. 50). It is usually exerted
in order to merely regulate the use and enjoyment of property of the owner. If he is deprived of his property
outright, it is not taken for public use but rather to destroy in order to promote the general welfare.
In police power, the owner does not recover from the government for injury sustained in consequence
thereof.
It has been said that police power is the most essential of government powers, at times the most insistent,
and always one of the least limitable of the powers of government
“It seems to the court that Section 9 of Ordinance No. 6118, Series of 1964 of Quezon City is not a mere
police regulation but an outright confiscation. It deprives a person of his private property without due
process of law, nay, even without compensation.”
The expropriation without compensation of a portion of private cemeteries is not covered by Section 12(t) of
Republic Act 537, the Revised Charter of Quezon City which empowers the city council to prohibit the burial
of the dead within the center of population of the city and to provide for their burial in a proper place subject
to the provisions of general law regulating burial grounds and cemeteries.
When the Local Government Code, Batas Pambansa Blg. 337 provides in Section 177 (q) that a
Sangguniang panlungsod may “provide for the burial of the dead in such place and in such manner as
prescribed by law or ordinance” it simply authorizes the city to provide its own city owned land or to buy or
expropriate private properties to construct public cemeteries.
This has been the law and practise in the past. It continues to the present. Expropriation, however,
requires payment of just compensation. The questioned ordinance is different from laws and regulations
requiring owners of subdivisions to set aside certain areas for streets, parks, playgrounds, and other public
facilities from the land they sell to buyers of subdivision lots. The necessities of public safety, health, and
convenience are very clear from said requirements which are intended to insure the development of
communities with salubrious and wholesome environments. The beneficiaries of the regulation, in turn, are
made to pay by the subdivision developer when individual lots are sold to homeowners.
As a matter of fact, the petitioners rely solely on the general welfare clause or on implied powers of the
municipal corporation, not on any express provision of law as statutory basis of their exercise of power. The
clause has always received broad and liberal interpretation but we cannot stretch it to cover this particular
taking.
2. Tatel v. Municipality of Virac, 207 SCRA 157, Mar 11, 1992 (JUED)
Facts: Based on complaints received by the residents of barrio Sta. Elena against the disturbance caused
by the operation of the abaca bailing machine inside Tatel’s warehouse, Resolution 291 was enacted
by the Municipal Council of Virac declaring Tatel’s warehouse a public nuisance within the purview of
Article 694 of the Civil Code and directing the petitioner to remove and transfer said warehouse to a more
suitable place within two months from receipt of the said resolution. The municipal officials contend that
petitioner's warehouse was constructed in violation of Ordinance 13, prohibiting the construction of
warehouses near a block of houses either in the poblacion or barrios without maintaining the necessary
distance of 200 meters from said block of houses to avoid loss of lives and properties by accidental fire.
Tatel contends that said ordinance is unconstitutional, contrary to the due process and equal protection
clause of the Constitution and null and void for not having been passed in accordance with law.
ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO (it is constitutional)
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HELD: Ordinance 13, was passed by the Municipal Council of Virac in the exercise of its police power. It is
a settled principle of law that municipal corporations are agencies of the State for the promotion and
maintenance of local self-government and as such are endowed with the police powers in order to
effectively accomplish and carry out the declared objects of their creation.
Its authority emanates from the general welfare clause under the Administrative Code, which reads: The
municipal council shall enact such ordinances and make such regulations, not repugnant to law, as may be
necessary to carry into effect and discharge the powers and duties conferred upon it by law and such as
shall seem necessary and proper to provide for the health and safety, promote the prosperity, improve the
morals, peace, good order, comfort and convenience of the municipality and the inhabitants thereof, and for
the protection of property therein.
For an ordinance to be valid, it must not only be within the corporate powers of the municipality to enact but
must also be passed according to the procedure prescribed by law.
These principles require that a municipal ordinance

(1) must not contravene the Constitution or any statute
(2) must not be unfair or oppressive
(3) must not be partial or discriminatory
(4) must not prohibit but may regulate trade
(5) must be general and consistent with public policy, and
(6) must not be unreasonable.
Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.
In spite of its fractured syntax, what is regulated by the ordinance is the construction of warehouses
wherein inflammable materials are stored where such warehouses are located at a distance of 200 meters
from a block of houses and not the construction per se of a warehouse. The purpose is to avoid the loss
of life and property in case of fire which is one of the primordial obligation of the government.
The objections interposed by the petitioner to the validity of the ordinance have not been substantiated. Its
purpose is well within the objectives of sound government. No undue restraint is placed upon the
petitioner or for anybody to engage in trade but merely a prohibition from storing flammable
products in the warehouse because of the danger of fire to the lives and properties of the people
residing in the vicinity. As far as public policy is concerned, there can be no better policy than what
has been conceived by the municipal government.
3. People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, Aug 29, 1958 (FAYE)
Facts: Fajardo was mayor in Baao, Camarines Sur when the municipal council passed the ordinance that
prohibits the construction of a building that blocks the view of the town plaza. Moreover, it redirects the
grant of permission to the mayor.
After his incumbency, Fajardo applied for a permit to build a building beside the gasoline station near the
town plaza. His request was repeatedly denied. He continued with the construction under the rationale that
he needed a house to stay in because the old one was destroyed by a typhoon.
He was convicted and ordered to pay a fine and demolish the building due to its obstructing view. He
appealed to the CA, which in turn forwarded the petition due to the question of the ordinance’s
constitutionality.
Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?
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Held: No, petition granted.
Ratio: The ordinance doesn’t state any standard that limits the grant of power to the mayor. It is an
arbitrary and unlimited conferment.
Ordinances which thus invest a city council with a discretion which is purely arbitrary, and which may be
exercised in the interest of a favored few, are unreasonable and invalid. The ordinance should have
established a rule by which its impartial enforcement could be secured. All of the authorities cited above
sustain this conclusion.
The ordinance is unreasonable and oppressive, in that it operates to permanently deprive appellants of the
right to use their own property; hence, it oversteps the bounds of police power, and amounts to a taking of
appellants property without just compensation.
While property may be regulated to the interest of the general welfare, and the state may eliminate
structures offensive to the sight, the state may not permanently divest owners of the beneficial use of their
property and practically confiscate them solely to preserve or assure the aesthetic appearance of the
community.
Fajardo would be constrained to let the land be fallow and not be used for urban purposes. To do this
legally, there must be just compensation and they must be given an opportunity to be heard.
An ordinance which permanently so restricts the use of property that it can not be used for any reasonable
purpose goes, it is plain, beyond regulation and must be recognized as a taking of the property.
The validity was also refuted by the Admin Code which states:
SEC. 2243. Certain legislative powers of discretionary character. — The municipal council shall have
authority to exercise the following discretionary powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(c) To establish fire limits in populous centers, prescribe the kinds of buildings that may be constructed or
repaired within them, and issue permits for the creation or repair thereof, charging a fee which shall be
determined by the municipal council and which shall not be less than two pesos for each building permit
and one peso for each repair permit issued. The fees collected under the provisions of this subsection shall
accrue to the municipal school fund.
Since, there was absolutely no showing in this case that the municipal council had either established fire
limits within the municipality or set standards for the kind or kinds of buildings to be constructed or repaired
within them before it passed the ordinance in question, it is clear that said ordinance was not conceived and
promulgated under the express authority of sec. 2243 (c)
4. NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1, Jan 18, 1991 (MUSTANG)
Facts: Plaintiff National Power Corporation (Napocor ) had to construct its 230 KV Mexico-Limay
transmission lines, its lines have to pass the lands belonging to respondents Matias Cruz, heirs of Natalie
Paule and spouses Misericordia Gutierrez and Recardo Malit. Unsuccessful with its negotiations for the
acquisition of the right of way easements, Napocor was constrained to file eminent domain proceedings.
Trial court’s ordered that the defendant spouses were authorized to withdraw the fixed provisional value of
their land in the sum of P973.00 deposited by the plaintiff to cover the provisional value of the land to
proceed their construction and for the purpose of determining the fair and just compensation due the
defendants, the court appointed three commissioners, comprised of one representative of the plaintiff, one
for the defendants and the other from the court, who then were empowered to receive evidence, conduct
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ocular inspection of the premises, and thereafter, prepare their appraisals as to the fair and just
compensation to be paid to the owners of the lots.
The lower court rendered judgement ordered Napocor to pay defendant spouses the sum of P10.00 per
square meter as the fair and reasonable compensation for the right-of-way easement of the affected area
and P800.00 as attorney's fees'.
Napocor filed a motion for reconsideration contending that the Court of Appeals committed gross error by
adjudging the petitioner liable for the payment of the full market value of the land traversed by its
transmission lines, and that it overlooks the undeniable fact that a simple right-of-way easement transmits
no rights, except that of the easement.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner should be made to pay simple easement fee or full compensation for the
land traversed by its transmission lines.
RULING: In RP v. PLDT, the SC ruled that "Normally, the power of eminent domain results in the taking or
appropriation of the title to, and possession of, the expropriated property, but no cogent reason appears
why said power may not be availed of to impose only a burden upon the owner of the condemned property,
without loss of title or possession.
It is unquestionable that real property may, through expropriation, be subjected to an easement of right of
way." In this case, the easement is definitely a taking under the power of eminent domain. Considering the
nature and effect of the installation of the transmission lines, the limitations imposed by the NPC against the
use of the land (that no plant higher than 3 meters is allowed below the lines) for an indefinite period
deprives private respondents of its ordinary use.
For these reasons, the owner of the property expropriated is entitled to a just compensation which should
neither be more nor less, whenever it is possible to make the assessment, than the money equivalent of
said property. Just equivalent has always been understood to be the just and complete equivalent of the
loss which the owner of the thing expropriated has to suffer by reason of the expropriation. The price or
value of the land and its character at the time of taking by the Govt. are the criteria for determining just
compensation.
5. Punsalan v. Municipal Board of Manila, 95 Phil. 46, May 26, 1954 (YANA)
FACTS: Ordinance 3398 was approved by the municipal board of the City of Manila on 25 July 1950. It
imposes a municipal occupation tax on persons exercising various professions in the city and penalizes
non-payment of the tax by a fine of not more than P200 or by imprisonment of not more than 6 months, or
by both such fine and imprisonment in the discretion of the court. The ordinance was enacted pursuant to
paragraph (1) of section 18 of the Revised Charter of the City of Manila (as amended by RA 409), which
empowers the Municipal Board of said city to impose a municipal occupation tax, not to exceed P50 per
annum, on persons engaged in the various professions, such as those were Silvestre M. Punsalan, et. al.
belong. Punsalan, et. al. (2 lawyers, a medical practitioner, a public accountant, a dental surgeon and a
pharmacist) filed a suit in the Court of First Instance (CFI) of Manila in their own behalf and in behalf of
other professionals practicing in the City of Manila, calling for the annulment of Ordinance 3398 of the City
of Manila together with the provision of the Manila charter authorizing it and the refund of taxes collected
under the ordinance but paid under protest (as they have paid their occupation tax under Section 201 of the
National Internal Revenue Code [NIRC]). The lower court upheld the validity of the provision of law
authorizing the enactment of the ordinance but declared the ordinance itself illegal and void on the ground
that the penalty therein provided for non-payment of the tax was not legally authorized. Both parties
appealed to the Supreme Court.
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ISSUE: Whether professionals in Manila are being subjected to double taxation, in light of the municipal
occupation tax imposed against them by the City of Manila.
HELD: No. The Legislature may, in its discretion, select what occupations shall be taxed, and in the
exercise of that discretion it may tax all, or it may select for taxation certain classes and leave the others
untaxed. Manila, as the seat of the National Government and with a population and volume of trade many
times that of any other Philippine city or municipality, offers a more lucrative field for the practice of the
professions, so that it is but fair that the professionals in Manila be made to pay a higher occupation tax
than their brethren in the provinces.The ordinance imposes the tax upon every person "exercising" or
"pursuing" any one of the occupations named, but does not say that such person must have his office in
Manila. There is no distinction found in the ordinance between professionals having offices in manila and
outsiders who have no offices in the city but practice their profession therein. Where one tax is imposed by
the state and the other is imposed by the city, the argument against double taxation may not be invoked, as
there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be exacted with respect
to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political subdivisions thereof. There is
NO double taxation where one tax is imposed by the state and the other is imposed by the city, it being
widely recognized that there is nothing inherently obnoxious in the requirement that license fees or taxes be
enacted with respect to the same occupation, calling or activity by both the state and the political
subdivisions thereof.
Additional info - doc cutie pie
PARÁS, C. J., dissenting:

I am constrained to dissent from the decision of the majority upon the ground that the Municipal Board of
Manila cannot outlaw what Congress of the Philippines has already authorized.
The plaintiffs-appellants—two lawyers, a physician, an accountant, a dentist and a pharmacist— had

already paid the occupation tax under section 201 of the National Internal Revenue Code and are thereby
duly licensed to practice their respective professions throughout the Philippines; and yet they had been
required to pay another occupation tax under Ordinance No. 3398 for practising in the City of Manila.
This is a glaring example of contradiction—the license granted by the National Government is in effect
withdrawn by the City in case of non-payment of the tax under the ordinance. If it be argued that the
national occupation tax is collected to allow the professional residing in Manila to pursue his calling in other
places in the Philippines, it should then be exacted only from professionals practicing simultaneously in and
outside of Manila. At any rate, we are confronted with the following situation:
Whereas the professionals elsewhere pay only one occupation tax, in the City of Manila they have to pay
two, although all are on equal footing insofar as opportunities for earning money out of their pursuits are
concerned. The statement that practice in Manila is more lucrative than in the provinces, may be true
perhaps with reference only to a limited few, but certainly not to the general mass of practitioners in any
field. Again, provincial residents who have occasional or isolated practice in Manila may have to pay the
city tax.
This obvious discrimination or lack of uniformity cannot be brushed aside or justified by any trite
pronouncement that double taxation is legitimate or that legislation may validly affect certain classes.’
My position is that a professional who has paid the occupation tax under the National Internal Revenue
Code should be allowed to practice in Manila even without paying the similar tax imposed by Ordinance No.
3398.
6. Reyes v. National Housing Authority, 395 SCRA 494, Jan 20, 2003 (BRYAN)
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DOCTRINES:
INHERENT POWERS OF THE STATE; EMINENT DOMAIN; TAKING OF PRIVATE PROPERTY FOR
PUBLIC USE; NOT DEVIATED BY HAVING LOW COST HOUSING PROJECT. — The 1987 Constitution
explicitly provides for the exercise of the power of eminent domain over private properties upon payment of
just compensation. More specifically, Section 9, Article III states that private property shall not be taken for
public use without just compensation. The constitutional restraints are public use and just compensation.
Petitioners cannot insist on a restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by
contending that the contract for low cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled
doctrine that the concept of public use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. Here, as elsewhere, the
idea that "public use" is strictly limited to clear cases of "use by the public" has been abandoned. The term
"public use" has now been held to be synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare,"
and "public convenience." Thus, in Heirs of Juancho Ardona, et al. vs. Reyes, et al., it was specified that . . .
It is accurate to state then that at present whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare
satisfies the requirement of public use." The Constitution itself allows the State to undertake, for the
common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban land reform and
housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to underprivileged and
homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of private property for the
purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of the social justice provision
under Section 1, Article XIII of the Constitution.
"TAKING" THEREOF IS ABSOLUTE. — We likewise do not subscribe to petitioners' contention that the
stated public purpose was abandoned when respondent NHA failed to occupy the expropriated lots by
relocating squatters from the Metro Manila area. The expropriation judgment declared that respondent NHA
has a lawful right to take petitioners properties "for the public use or purpose of expanding the Dasmariñas
Resettlement Project." The taking here is absolute, without any condition, restriction or qualification.
Contrary to petitioners' submission, the ruling enunciated in the early case of Fery vs. Municipality of
Cabanatuan, is still good and sound doctrine, viz.: ". . . When land has been acquired for public use in fee
simple unconditionally, either by the exercise of eminent domain or by purchase, the former owner retains
no rights in the land, and the public use may be abandoned, or the land may be devoted to a different use,
without any impairment of the estate or title acquired, or any reversion to the former owner."
Facts: Respondent National Housing Authority (NHA) filed complaints for the expropriation of sugarcane
lands belonging to the petitioners. The stated public purpose of the expropriation was the expansion of
the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project to accommodate the squatters who were relocated from the
Metropolitan Manila area. The trial court rendered judgment ordering the expropriation of these lots and the
payment of just compensation. The Supreme Court affirmed the judgment of the lower court.
A few years later, petitioners contended that respondent NHA violated the stated public purpose for the
expansion of the Dasmariñas Resettlement Project when it failed to relocate the squatters from the
Metro Manila area, as borne out by the ocular inspection conducted by the trial court which showed that
most of the expropriated properties remain unoccupied. Petitioners likewise question the public nature of
the use by respondent NHA when it entered into a contract for the construction of low cost housing
units, which is allegedly different from the stated public purpose in the expropriation proceedings.
Hence, it is claimed that respondent NHA has forfeited its rights and interests by virtue of the expropriation
judgment and the expropriated properties should now be returned to herein petitioners.
ISSUE: Whether or not the judgment of expropriation was forfeited in the light of the failure of respondent
NHA to use the expropriated property for the intended purpose but for a totally different purpose.
HELD: The Supreme Court held in favor of the respondent NHA. Accordingly, petitioners cannot insist on a
restrictive view of the eminent domain provision of the Constitution by contending that the contract for low
cost housing is a deviation from the stated public use. It is now settled doctrine that the concept of public
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use is no longer limited to traditional purposes. The term "public use" has now been held to be
synonymous with "public interest," "public benefit," "public welfare," and "public convenience."
Thus, whatever may be beneficially employed for the general welfare satisfies the requirement of public
use."
In addition, the expropriation of private land for slum clearance and urban development is for a public
purpose even if the developed area is later sold to private homeowners, commercials firms, entertainment
and service companies, and other private concerns. Moreover, the Constitution itself allows the State to
undertake, for the common good and in cooperation with the private sector, a continuing program of urban
land reform and housing which will make at affordable cost decent housing and basic services to
underprivileged and homeless citizens in urban centers and resettlement areas. The expropriation of
private property for the purpose of socialized housing for the marginalized sector is in furtherance of social
justice.
7. City of Baguio v. NAWASA, 106 Phil. 144, Aug 31, 1959 (EDWARD)
FACTS: Plaintiff a municipal corporation filed a complaint against defendant a public corporation, created
under Act.1383.
It contends that the said act does not include within its purview the Baguio Water Works system, assuming
that it does, is unconstitutional because it deprives the plaintiff ownership, control and operation of said
water works without just compensation and due process of law. The defendant filed a motion to
dismiss on the ground that it is not a proper exercise of police power and eminent domain. The court denied
the motion and ordered the defendants to file an answer.
The court holds that the water works system of Baguio belongs to private property and cannot be
expropriated without just compensation. Sec. 8 of R.A.1383 provides for the exchange of the NAWASA
assets for the value of the water works system of Baguio is unconstitutional for this is not just
compensation. Defendants motion for reconsideration was denied hence this appeal.
Issue: Whether or not there is a valid exercise of police power of eminent domain.
Held: R.A. 1383 does not constitute a valid exercise of police power. The act does not confiscate, destroy
or appropriate property belonging to a municipal corporation. It merely directs that all water works belonging
to cities, municipalities and municipal districts in the Philippines to be transferred to the NAWASA.
The purpose is placing them under the control and supervision of an agency with a view to promoting
their efficient management, but in so doing does not confiscate them because it directs that they be paid
with equal value of the assets of NAWASA.
The Baguio water works system is not like a public road, the park, street other public property held in trust
by a municipal corporation for the benefit of the public. But it is a property of a municipal corporation, water
works cannot be taken away except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. Judgment
affirmed.
Additional info: (edwardo versoza)
"The decisions maintain that the property held by a municipal corporation in its private capacity is not
subject to the unrestricted control of the legislature, and the municipality cannot be deprived of such
property against its will, except by the exercise of eminent domain with payment of full compensation."
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But in so far as the municipality is thus authorized to exercise the functions of a private corporation, it is
clothed with the capacities of a private corporation and may claim its rights and immunities, even as against
the sovereign, and is subject to the liabilities of such a corporation, even as against third parties."
Does Republic Act No. 1383 provide for the automatic expropriation of the waterworks in question in the
light of our Constitution? In other words, does said law comply with the requirements of section 6, Article
XIII, in relation to section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution?
Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:
"SEC. 6. The State may, in the interest of National Welfare and defense, establish and operate industries
and means of transportation and communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to
public ownership utilities and other private enterprises to be operated by the Government."
Section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:
"(2) Private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation".
It is clear that the State may, in the interest of National welfare, transfer to public ownership any private
enterprise upon payment of just compensation. At the same time, one has to bear in mind that no person
can be deprived of his property except for public use and upon payment of just compensation. There is an
attempt to observe this requirement in Republic Act No. 1383 when in providing for the transfer of
appellee's waterworks system to a national agency it was directed that the transfer be made upon payment
of an equivalent value of the property.
Has this been implemented? Has appellant actually transferred to appellee any asset of the NAWASA that
may be considered just compensation for the property expropriated? There is nothing in the record to show
that such was done.
Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,without pronouncement as to costs.
8. Manosca v. CA, 252 SCRA 412, Jan 29, 1996 (ERICA)
ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents
FACTS: In this petition for review on certiorari, the Court is asked to resolve whether or not the “public use”
requirement of Eminent Domain is extant in the attempted expropriation by the Republic of a
492-square-meter parcel of land so declared by the National Historical Institute (“NHI”) as a national
historical landmark.
Petitioners inherited a 492 sq.m. land located at P. Burgos Street, Calzada, Taguig, Metro Manila. When
the parcel was ascertained by the NHI to have been the birth site of Felix Y. Manalo, the founder of Iglesia
Ni Cristo, it passed Resolution No. 1, Series of 1986, pursuant to Section 4 of Presidential Decree No. 260,
declaring the land to be a national historical landmark. It was approved by the Minister of Education,
Culture and Sports, while the Secretary of Justice, in his opinion on the legality of the measure, said in
part that “the birthsite of the founder of the Iglesia ni Cristo, the late Felix Y. Manalo, who,
admittedly, had made contributions to Philippine history and culture has been declared as a
national landmark. It has been held that places invested with unusual historical interest is a public use for
which the power of eminent domain may be authorized x x x. it is believed that the NHI… may initiate the
institution of condemnation proceedings for the purpose of acquiring the lot in question in accordance with
the procedure provided for in Rule 67 of the Revised Rules of Court.”
In May 1989, the Republic, through the OSG, instituted a complaint for expropriation before RTC Pasig for
and in behalf of the NHI. At the same time, it filed an urgent motion for the issuance of an order to permit it
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to take immediate possession of the property. The motion was opposed by petitioners. The trial court ruled
in favor of the Republic.
Petitioners moved to dismiss the complaint on the main thesis that the intended expropriation was not for a
public purpose and, incidentally, that the act would constitute an application of public funds, directly or
indirectly, for the use, benefit, or support of Iglesia ni Cristo, a religious entity, contrary to the provision of
Section 29(2), Article VI, of the 1987 Constitution. Motion was dismissed. Petitioners then lodged a petition
for certiorari and prohibition with the Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether or not the expropriation of the land in the case at bar is for public use.
HELD: YES. Petitioners ask about the so-called unusual interest that the expropriation of (Felix Manalo’s)
birthplace become so vital as to be a public use appropriate for the exercise of the power of eminent
domain” when only members of the Iglesia ni Cristo would benefit. This attempt to give some religious
perspective to the case deserves little consideration, for what should be significant is the principal objective
of, not the casual consequences that might follow from, the exercise of the power. The purpose in setting
up the marker is essentially to recognize the distinctive contribution of the late Felix Manalo to the
culture of the Philippines, rather than to commemorate his founding and leadership of the Iglesia ni
Cristo. The practical reality that greater benefit may be derived by members of the Iglesia ni Cristo than by
most others could well be true but such a peculiar advantage still remains to be merely incidental and
secondary in nature. Indeed, that only a few would actually benefit from the expropriation of property does
not necessarily diminish the essence and character of public use.
All considered, the Court finds the assailed decision to be in accord with law and jurisprudence. The petition
is DENIED.
In Short - Public use should not be restricted to the traditional uses. The taking is for a public use because
of the contribution of Felix Manalo to the culture and history of the Philippines.
Doc trines: may mailagay lang - doc
Constitutional Law; Eminent Domain; Words and Phrases; “Eminent Domain,” Explained; The constitutional
qualification that “private property shall not be taken for public use without just compensation” is intended to
provide a safeguard against possible abuse and so to protect as well the individual against whose property
the power is sought to be enforced.—Eminent domain, also often referred to as expropriation and, with less
frequency, as condemnation, is, like police power and taxation, an inherent power of sovereignty. It need
not be clothed with any constitutional gear to exist; instead, provisions in our Constitution on the subject are
meant more to regulate, rather than to grant, the exercise of the power. Eminent domain is generally so
described as “the highest and most exact idea of property remaining in the government” that may be
acquired for some public purpose through a method in the nature of a forced purchase by the State. It is a
right to take or reassert dominion over property within the state for public use or to meet a public exigency.
It is said to be an essential part of governance even in its most primitive form and thus inseparable from
sovereignty. The only direct constitutional qualification is that “private property shall not be taken for public
use without just compensation.” This proscription is intended to provide a safeguard against possible abuse
and so to protect as well the individual against whose property the power is sought to be enforced.
Words and Phrases; “Public Use,” Explained; The term “public use” must be considered in its general
concept of meeting a public need or a public exigency.—The term “public use,” not having been otherwise
defined by the constitution, must be considered in its general concept of meeting a public need or a public
exigency.
The validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question—it
is not at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses.—The
validity of the exercise of the power of eminent domain for traditional purposes is beyond question; it is not
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at all to be said, however, that public use should thereby be restricted to such traditional uses. The idea that
“public use” is strictly limited to clear cases of “use by the public” has long been discarded.
Just Compensation; Due Process; There is no denial of due process where the records of the case are
replete with pleadings that could have dealt with the provisional value of the property—what the law
prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard.—Petitioners contend that they have been denied due
process in the fixing of the provisional value of their property.
Petitioners need merely to be reminded that what the law prohibits is the lack of opportunity to be heard;
contrary to petitioners’ argument, the records of this case are replete with pleadings that could have dealt,
directly or indirectly, with the
provisional value of the property.
9. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S 84 (2003) (JERALD)

FACTS: Under the Alaska Sex Offender Registration Act, any sex offender or child kidnapper incarcerated
in Alaska must register with the Department of Public Safety, which maintains a central registry of sex
offenders. While some of the data is kept confidential, some, such as the offender's name, photograph, and
physical description, is published on the Internet. The Act's requirements are retroactive. John Doe I and
John Doe II were convicted of aggravated sex offenses before the Act's passage are thus covered by it.
Both brought suit, seeking to declare the Act void as applied to them under the Ex Post Facto Clause of
Article I Section 10 of the United States Constitution. The District Court ruled against them and the Court of
Appeals disagreed, holding that, because its effects were punitive, the Act violates the Ex Post Facto
Clause.
ISSUE: Does the Ex Post Facto Clause of Article I Section 10 prohibit the Alaska Sex Offender Registration
Act registration requirement as a retroactive punishment?
HELD: No. In a 6-3 opinion delivered by Justice Anthony M. Kennedy, the Court held that the Alaska Sex
Offender Registration Act's retroactive application does not violate the Ex Post Facto Clause because the
act is non-punitive. The Court reasoned that the act was clearly intended as a civil, non-punitive means of
identifying previous offenders for the protection of the public. The Court also found that the stigma, which
could result from registration, did not render the act effectively punitive, since the dissemination of the
registration information did not constitute the imposition of any significant affirmative disability or restraint.
Dissenting, Justice John Paul Stevens argued that the act could only cover those convicted of offenses
committed after the effective date of the act without violating the Ex Post Facto Clause. Justice Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, joined by Justice Stephen G. Breyer, dissented, arguing that the act was "ambiguous in intent
and punitive in effect" and that its retroactive application was incompatible with the Ex Post Facto Clause.
10. United States v. Cors :: 337 U.S 325 (1949) (FAYE)
FACTS: The respondent Cors had purchased a tugboat at auction, and after paying both the purchase
price, and conducting repairs, he had spent $8,574.78 on the boat. Months later in October 1942, the War
Shipping Administration requisitioned the tug for use in the war effort, offering Cors $9,000.
Cors accepted 75% of the Administration's compensation amount and sued for an additional $20,000, as he
was permitted to do by section 902(d) of the Merchant Marine Act (codified at 46 U.S.C. § 1242). For
purposes of the case, the boat's original cost was estimated to be $45,000; its replacement cost, $56,000;
and its present value $9,000. The Court also acknowledged that the improvements made to the ship had a
market value higher than the amount Cors expended, largely because he oversaw repairs himself.
The Merchant Marine Act contained a clause that, while awarding the "just compensation" for the
requisition, "in no case shall the value of the property taken or used be deemed enhanced by the causes
necessitating the taking or use." In the context of the war effort, the value of the ship at issue was tied to the
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increased value of the ship caused by the war itself. The Administration argued that this clause prevented
the value of the ship that was due to the war effort from being required as part of the just compensation.
Cors argued that this clause varied the understanding of just compensation in the 5th amendment's takings
clause, and was unconstitutional. Cors relied on Monongahela Navigation Co. v. United States, 148 U.S.
312 for this proposition.
ISSUE: WoN the increase in the market value of the ship due to the war effort should be included in
determining just compensation.
HELD: No. The Court rejected Cors' arguments, and the judgment of the lower court. In its reversal, the
Court indicated that market value, while relevant in some just compensation cases, was not the only
yardstick available. Stating "[i]t is not fair that the government be required to pay the enhanced price which
its demand alone has created", the Court rejected the pure market value test.
It is not fair that the government be required to pay the enhanced price which its demand alone has
created. That enhancement reflects elements of the value that was created by the urgency of its need for
the article. It does not reflect what 'a willing buyer would pay in cash to a willing seller,' United States v.
Miller, supra, 317 U.S. 374 , 147 A.L.R. 55, in a fair market. It represents what can be extracted from the
government whose demands in the emergency have created [337 U.S. 325 , 334] a sellers' market. In this
situation, as in the case of land included in a proposed project of the government, the enhanced value
reflects speculation as to what the government can be compelled to pay. That is a hold-up value, not a fair
market value. That is a value which the government itself created and hence in fairness should not be
required to pay.
III. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW
A. Definition
● What is human rights law? [Explain Exhaustively / Cite Sources] (JUED)
Human Rights are the basic rights and freedoms to which all human beings are entitled, like civil and
political rights, the right to life and liberty, freedom of thought and speech/expression, equality before the
law, social, cultural and economic rights, the right to food, the right to work, and the right to education. In
short, human rights are freedoms established by custom or international agreement that protect the
interests of humans and the conduct of governments in every nation.
Human rights are distinct from civil liberties, which are freedoms established by the law of a particular state
and applied by that state in its own jurisdiction.
Human rights laws have been defined by international conventions, by treaties, and by organizations,
particularly the United Nations. These laws prohibit practices such as torture, slavery, summary execution
without trial, and arbitrary detention or exile. Many human rights are secured by agreements between the
governments and those they govern, such as the U.S. Constitution. Others are protected by international
laws and pressure.
(https://www.hg.org/human-rights.html)
11. Simon, Jr v. Commision on Human Rights, 229 SCRA 117, January 05, 1994 (MARK)
Facts:
Ø A "Demolition Notice," dated 9 July 1990, signed by Carlos Quimpo (one of the petitioners) in his
capacity as an Executive Officer of the Quezon City Integrated Hawkers Management Council under
the Office of the City Mayor, was sent to, and received by, the private respondents (being the
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officers and members of the North EDSA Vendors Association, Incorporated). In said notice, the
respondents were given a grace-period of 3 days within which to vacate the questioned premises of
North EDSA to give way to the construction of the"People's Park".
Ø On 12 July 1990, private respondents, led by their President Roque Fermo, filed a letter-complaint
with the CHR against the petitioners, asking for a letter to be addressed to then Mayor Brigido
Simon, Jr. of Quezon City to stop the demolition of the private respondents' stalls, sari-sari stores,
and carinderia along North EDSA. CHR issued a preliminary order directing the petitioners to
desist from demolishing the stalls and shanties at North EDSA pending resolution of the
vendors/squatters' complaint before the Commission" and ordering said petitioners to
appear before the CHR.
Ø Petitioners started the demolition despite CHR’s order to desist. Respondents consequently asked
that petitioner’s be cited in contempt.
Ø Meanwhile, petitioners filed a motion to dismiss the complaint filed by respondents. They alleged
that the Commission has no jurisdiction over the complaint as it involved respondents’
privilege to engage in business, not their civil and political rights.
Ø In an Order, 11 dated 25 September 1990, the CHR cited the petitioners in contempt for carrying out
the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia despite the "order to desist", and it
imposed a fine of P500.00 on each of them. On 1 March 1991, the CHR issued an Order, denying
petitioner's' motion to dismiss. The CHR opined that "it was not the intention of the
(Constitutional) Commission to create only a paper tiger limited only to investigating civil
and political rights, but it (should) be (considered) a quasi-judicial body with the power to
provide appropriate legal measures for the protection of human rights of all persons within
the Philippines "
Ø Their Motion for Reconsideration having been denied, petitioners Simon Jr. et al filed a petition for
prohibition to enjoin the CHR from hearing private respondents’ complaint.
Issue/s: (1) WON CHR has jurisdiction to hear the complaint and grant the relief prayed for by
respondents. (2) WON the CHR can investigate the subject matter of respondents’ complaint.
Held:
No. Under the constitution, the CHR has no power to adjudicate.
No. Complaint does not involve civil and political rights.
Rationale:
Ø Art XIII, Section 18 of the Constitution provides that the CHR has the power to investigate, on its own
or on complaint by any party, all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political rights.
Ø In Cariño v. Commission on Human Rights, the Court through Justice Andres Narvasa observed
that:
The Commission on Human Rights . . . was not meant by the fundamental law to be another court
or quasi-judicial agency in this country, or duplicate much less take over the functions of the latter.
The most that may be conceded to the Commission in the way of adjudicative power is that it may
investigate, i.e., receive evidence and make findings of fact as regards claimed human rights
violations involving civil and political rights. But fact finding is not adjudication, and cannot be
likened to the judicial function of a court of justice, or even a quasi-judicial agency or official. The
function of receiving evidence and ascertaining therefrom the facts of a controversy is not a judicial
function, properly speaking. To be considered such, the faculty of receiving evidence and making
factual conclusions in a controversy must be accompanied by the authority of applying the law to
those factual conclusions to the end that the controversy may be decided or determined
authoritatively, finally and definitively, subject to such appeals or modes of review as may be
provided by law. This function, to repeat, the Commission does not have
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CHR’s investigative power encompasses all forms of human rights violations involving civil and political
rights.
Ø The term civil rights has been defined as referring to those rights that belong to every citizen of the
state or country, or, in wider sense, to all its inhabitants, and are not connected with the organization
or administration of the government. They include the rights of property, marriage, equal protection
of the laws, freedom of contract, etc. Political rights, on the other hand, are said to refer to the right
to participate, directly or indirectly, in the establishment or administration of government, the right of
suffrage, the right to hold public office, the right of petition and, in general, the rights appurtenant to
citizenship vis-a-vis the management of government.
Ø Recalling the deliberations of the Constitutional Commission, it is readily apparent that the delegates
envisioned a Commission on Human Rights that would focus its attention to the more severe cases
of human rights violations. Delegate Garcia, for instance, mentioned such areas as the "(1)
protection of rights of political detainees, (2) treatment of prisoners and the prevention of tortures,
(3) fair and public trials, (4) cases of disappearances, (5) salvagings and hamletting, and (6) other
crimes committed against the religious."
Ø In the particular case at hand, there is no cavil that what are sought to be demolished are the stalls,
sari-sari stores and carinderia, as well as temporary shanties, erected by private respondents on a
land which is planned to be developed into a "People's Park." Looking at the standards hereinabove
discoursed vis-a-vis the circumstances obtaining in this instance, we are not prepared to conclude
that the order for the demolition of the stalls, sari-sari stores and carinderia of the private
respondents can fall within the compartment of "human rights violations involving civil and political
rights" intended by the Constitution.
12. Risos-Vidal v. Commission on Elections, 747 SCRA 210, January 21, 2015 (include J. Leonen
dissent) (MUSTANG)
Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

Nature: Petition for Certiorari by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal (Risos-Vidal), pray to be declared the 2013 winning
candidate for Mayor of the City of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph Ejercito
Estrada’s (former President Estrada) disqualification to run for and hold public office.
Petitioner: Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal
Respondent: COMELEC and Joseph Ejercito Estrada
Facts:
In September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former President Estrada for the crime of plunder
and was sentenced to suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory penalties of civil
interdiction during the period of sentence and perpetual absolute disqualification. On October 25, 2007,
however, former President Gloria Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of pardon, to
former President Estrada, explicitly stating that he is restored to his civil and political rights.
In 2009, Estrada filed a Certificate of Candidacy for the position of President. None of the disqualification
cases against him prospered but he only placed second in the results.
In 2012, Estrada once more ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of Candidacy, this time
vying for a local elective post, that of the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against Estrada before the Comelec stating that
Estrada is disqualified to run for public office because of his conviction for plunder sentencing him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua with perpetual absolute disqualification. Petitioner relied on Section 40 of
the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC).
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The Comelec dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that President Estrada’s right to seek public
office has been effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections. Alfredo Lim, who garnered the second highest
votes, intervened and sought to disqualify Estrada for the same ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal
and praying that he be proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
Risos-Vidal, the petitioner in this case, filed a Petition for Disqualification against former President Estrada
before the COMELEC. She relied on Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC), which state respectively, that:
Sec. 40, Local Government Code:

SECTION 40. Disqualifications.- The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence; (b) Those removed
from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble minded. (Emphasis supplied.)
Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion, or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any public office, unless he has been
given plenary pardon or granted amnesty. (Emphases supplied.)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013,the COMELEC, Second Division, dismissed the petition for
disqualification
Issue: May former President Joseph Estrada run for public office despite having been convicted of the
crime of plunder which carried an accessory penalty of perpetual disqualification to hold public office?
Held: Yes. Estrada was granted an absolute pardon that fully restored all his civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the focal point of this controversy. The wording of
the pardon extended to former President Estrada is complete, unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise
unfettered by Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only reasonable, objective, and
constitutional interpretation of the language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
It is insisted that, since a textual examination of the pardon given to and accepted by former President
Estrada does not actually specify which political right is restored, it could be inferred that former President
Arroyo did not deliberately intend to restore former President Estrada’s rights of suffrage and to hold public
office, orto otherwise remit the penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Even if her intention was the
contrary, the same cannot be upheld based on the pardon’s text.
The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.
15
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The 1987 Constitution, specifically Section 19 of Article VII and Section 5 of Article IX-C, provides that the
President of the Philippines possesses the power to grant pardons, along with other acts of executive
clemency, to wit:
Section 19. Except in cases of impeachment, or as otherwise provided in this Constitution, the President
may grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures, after conviction by final
judgment.
He shall also have the power to grant amnesty with the concurrence of a majority of all the Members of the
Congress.
xxxx
Section 5. No pardon, amnesty, parole, or suspension of sentence for violation of election laws, rules, and
regulations shall be granted by the President without the favorable recommendation of the Commission.
It is apparent from the foregoing constitutional provisions that the only instances in which the President may
not extend pardon remain to be in: (1) impeachment cases; (2) cases that have not yet resulted in a final
conviction; and (3) cases involving violations of election laws, rules and regulations in which there was no
favorable recommendation coming from the COMELEC. Therefore, it can be argued that any act of
Congress by way of statute cannot operate to delimit the pardoning power of the President.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former President Estrada shows that both the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included in the pardon. The sentence
which states that “(h)e is hereby restored to his civil and political rights,” expressly remitted the accessory
penalties that attached to the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36
and 41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of the pardon that the accessory penalties
of civil interdiction and perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted together with the
principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section
12 of the OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a) of the LGC is worded in absolute terms,
Section 12 of the OEC provides a legal escape from the prohibition – a plenary pardon or amnesty. In other
words, the latter provision allows any person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public
office, whether local or national position.
The third preambular clause of the pardon did not operate to make the pardon conditional.
Contrary to Risos-Vidal’s declaration, the third preambular clause of the pardon, i.e., "[w]hereas, Joseph
Ejercito Estrada has publicly committed to no longer seek any elective position or office," neither makes the
pardon conditional, nor militate against the conclusion that former President Estrada’s rights to suffrage and
to seek public elective office have been restored.
This is especially true as the pardon itself does not explicitly impose a condition or limitation, considering
the unqualified use of the term "civil and political rights"as being restored. Jurisprudence educates that a
preamble is not an essential part of an act as it is an introductory or preparatory clause that explains the
reasons for the enactment, usually introduced by the word "whereas." Whereas clauses do not form part of
a statute because, strictly speaking, they are not part of the operative language of the statute. In this case,
the whereas clause at issue is not an integral part of the decree of the pardon, and therefore, does not by
itself alone operate to make the pardon conditional or to make its effectivity contingent upon the fulfilment of
the aforementioned commitment nor to limit the scope of the pardon.
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Besides, a preamble is really not an integral part of a law. It is merely an introduction to show its intent or
purposes. It cannot be the origin of rights and obligations. Where the meaning of a statute is clear and
unambiguous, the preamble can neither expand nor restrict its operation much less prevail over its text.
If former President Arroyo intended for the pardon to be conditional on Respondent’s promise never to seek
a public office again, the former ought to have explicitly stated the same in the text of the pardon itself.
Since former President Arroyo did not make this an integral part of the decree of pardon, the Commission is
constrained to rule that the 3rd preambular clause cannot be interpreted as a condition to the pardon
extended to former President Estrada
LEONEN, J Dissenting Opinion

The court must decide on whether these ambiguities shall be interpreted to benefit a convicted former
President, shown to have amassed ill-gotten wealth on a grand scale and to have betrayed the trust given
to him through the investiture of the highest office in the land; or to benefit the public which reposes its trust
on elected public officials. Many other public officials have been found liable for graft and corrupt practices
of far lesser scales than those for which Joseph Ejercito Estrada had been convicted. They now languish in
jails, deprived of liberties and entitlements. This case is not about their pardon. They continue to suffer the
penalties that their convictions entail, unlike the former President of the Republic of the Philippines.
That the 2010 disqualification cases were anchored on a constitutional provision relating to the executive
branch of government, while the present case is anchored on the provisions of the Local Government Code
on the disqualification of candidates for local elective offices, makes evident that the former entailed a
different subject matter. While the 2010 disqualification cases relate to Estrada’s bid for the presidency, the
present case relates to his bid to become Mayor of the City of Manila.
a. Joseph Ejercito Estrada: convicted, disqualified, and pardoned
It is not disputed that Estrada was found guilty beyond reasonable doubt and convicted for plunder by the
Sandiganbayan. This conviction stands unreversed and unmodified, whether by the Sandiganbayan, on
reconsideration, or by this court, on appeal. By this conviction, Estrada was sentenced to suffer the
accessory penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification. Per Article 30 of the Revised Penal Code, this
accessory penalty produces the effect of, among others, "[t]he deprivation of the right to vote in any election
for any popular elective office or to be elected to such office."
Apart from the specific penalty of perpetual absolute disqualification meted on Estrada on account of his
conviction, statutory provisions provide for the disqualification from elective public office of individuals who
have been convicted for criminal offenses involving moral turpitude117 and/or entailing a sentence of a
defined duration of imprisonment.
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code provides for disqualifications for elective offices in general:
Section 12. Disqualifications. - Any person who has been declared by competent authority insane or
incompetent, or has been sentenced by final judgment for subversion, insurrection, rebellion or for any
offense for which he has been sentenced to a penalty of more than eighteen months or for a crime involving
moral turpitude, shall be disqualified to be a candidate and to hold any office, unless he has been given
plenary pardon or granted amnesty.
This [sic] disqualifications to be a candidate herein provided shall be deemed removed upon the declaration
by competent authority that said insanity or incompetence had been removed or after the expiration of a
period of five years from his service of sentence, unless within the same period he again becomes
disqualified. (Emphasis supplied)
Section 40 of the Local Government Code provides for disqualifications for local elective offices in
particular:
17
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SECTION 40. Disqualifications. – The following persons are disqualified from running for any elective local
position:
(a) Those sentenced by final judgment for an offense involving moral turpitude or for an offense punishable
by one (1) year or more of imprisonment, within two (2) years after serving sentence;
(b) Those removed from office as a result of an administrative case;
(c) Those convicted by final judgment for violating the oath of allegiance to the Republic;
(d) Those with dual citizenship;
(e) Fugitives from justice in criminal or non-political cases here or abroad;
(f) Permanent residents in a foreign country or those who have acquired the right to reside abroad and
continue to avail of the same right after the effectivity of this Code; and
(g) The insane or feeble-minded. (Emphasis supplied)
It is with this backdrop of, on the one hand, Estrada’s conviction for plunder (with its concomitant penalty of
absolute perpetual disqualification), as well as the cited statutory disqualifications, and, on the other, the
pardon granted to Estrada, that this court must rule on whether Estrada was qualified to run for Mayor of
Manila in the May 13, 2013 elections.
B. Sources
● Law
● Philosophy
● Religion
IV. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS
A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)
● UDHR Preamble [Copy the Preamble] (YANA)
Whereas recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the
human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Whereas disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in barbarous acts which have outraged
the conscience of mankind, and the advent of a world in which human beings shall enjoy freedom of
speech and belief and freedom from fear and want has been proclaimed as the highest aspiration of the
common people,
Whereas it is essential, if man is not to be compelled to have recourse, as a last resort, to rebellion against
tyranny and oppression, that human rights should be protected by the rule of law,
Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,
Whereas the peoples of the United Nations have in the Charter reaffirmed their faith in fundamental human
rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person and in the equal rights of men and women and have
determined to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Whereas Member States have pledged themselves to achieve, in co-operation with the United Nations, the
promotion of universal respect for and observance of human rights and fundamental freedoms,
Whereas a common understanding of these rights and freedoms is of the greatest importance for the full
realization of this pledge,
Now, Therefore THE GENERAL ASSEMBLY proclaims THIS UNIVERSAL DECLARATION OF HUMAN
RIGHTS as a common standard of achievement for all peoples and all nations, to the end that every
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individual and every organ of society, keeping this Declaration constantly in mind, shall strive by teaching
and education to promote respect for these rights and freedoms and by progressive measures, national and
international, to secure their universal and effective recognition and observance, both among the peoples of
Member States themselves and among the peoples of territories under their jurisdiction.
13. Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region v. Olalia, Jr., 521 SCRA 470, April 19,
2007 (YANA)
DOCTRINE: Bail; Human Rights; The modern trend in public international law is the primacy placed on
the worth of the individual person and the sanctity of human rights.
This case discusses whether the right to bail guaranteed under the Bill of Rights extends to a prospective
extradite in an extradition proceeding.
On January 30, 1995, the Republic of the Philippines and the then British Crown Colony of Hong Kong
signed an "Agreement for the Surrender of Accused and Convicted Persons." It took effect on June 20,
1997.
The Petitioner is the Government of Hong Kong Special Administrative Region, represented by the
Philippine Department of Justice and the Respondents are Judge Felix Olalia and Juan Antonio Muñoz
FACTS: Private respondent Muñoz was charged before the Hong Kong Court with three (3) counts of the
offense of "accepting an advantage as agent," in violation of Section 9 (1) (a) of the Prevention of Bribery
Ordinance, Cap. 201 of Hong Kong. He also faces seven (7) counts of the offense of conspiracy to defraud,
penalized by the common law of Hong Kong. Warrants of arrest were issued against him. If convicted, he
faces a jail term of seven (7) to fourteen (14) years for each charge.
On September 13, 1999, the DOJ received from the Hong Kong Department of Justice a request for the
provisional arrest of private respondent. The RTC, Branch 19, Manila issued an Order of Arrest against
private respondent. That same day, the NBI agents arrested and detained him.
Private respondent filed a petition for bail which was opposed by petitioner. After hearing, Judge Bernardo,
Jr. issued an Order denying the petition for bail, holding that there is no Philippine law granting bail in
extradition cases and that private respondent is a high "flight risk." Judge Bernardo, Jr. inhibited himself
from further hearing the case, it was then raffled off to Branch 8 presided by respondent judge. Private
respondent filed a motion for reconsideration of the Order denying his application for bail and this was
granted by respondent judge.
Petitioner filed an urgent motion to vacate the above Order, but it was denied by respondent judge. Hence,
the instant petition.
ISSUE: Whether or not respondent judge acted with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess
of jurisdiction as there is no provision in the Constitution granting bail to a potential extraditee.
HELD: This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether private respondent is entitled to bail
on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence.
RATIO: The Philippines, along with the other members of the family of nations, committed to uphold the
fundamental human rights as well as value the worth and dignity of every person. Clearly, the right of a
prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of the various treaty
obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of human rights. Under
these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines should see to it that the
right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
Extradition is not a trial to determine the guilt or innocence of the potential extradite. Nor is it a full-blown
civil action, but one that is merely administrative in character. Its object is to prevent the escape of a person
accused or convicted of a crime and to secure his return to the state from which he fled, for the purpose of
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trial or punishment. It does not necessarily mean that in keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines
should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life, liberty, and due process. More so, where these rights
are guaranteed, not only by our Constitution, but also by international conventions, to which the Philippines
is a party. We should not, therefore, deprive an extraditee of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
In his Separate Opinion in Purganan, then Associate Justice Puno, proposed that a new standard which he
termed "clear and convincing evidence" should be used in granting bail in extradition cases. According to
him, this standard should be lower than proof beyond reasonable doubt but higher than preponderance of
evidence. The potential extraditee must prove by "clear and convincing evidence" that he is not a flight risk
and will abide with all the orders and processes of the extradition court.
In this case, there is no showing that private respondent presented evidence to show that he is not a flight
risk. Consequently, this case should be remanded to the trial court to determine whether private respondent
may be granted bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence."
WHEREFORE, we DISMISS the petition. This case is REMANDED to the trial court to determine whether
private respondent is entitled to bail on the basis of "clear and convincing evidence." If not, the trial court
should order the cancellation of his bail bond and his immediate detention; and thereafter, conduct the
extradition proceedings with dispatch.
ADDITIONAL NOTES/DOCTRINE:
The trends in international law:
(1) the growing importance of the individual person in public international law who, in the 20th century,
has gradually attained global recognition;
(2) the higher value now being given to human rights in the international sphere;
(3) the corresponding duty of countries to observe these universal human rights in fulfilling their treaty
obligations; and
(4) the duty of this Court to balance the rights of the individual under our fundamental law, on one hand,
and the law on extradition, on the other.
DOCTRINE: Pacta Sunt Servanda; While the time-honored principle of pacta sunt servanda demands that
the Philippines honor its obligations under the Extradition Treaty, it does not necessarily mean that in
keeping with its treaty obligations, the Philippines should diminish a potential extraditee’s rights to life,
liberty, and due process; An extraditee should not be deprived of his right to apply for bail, provided that a
certain standard for the grant is satisfactorily met.
Additional info -dokie pogi

While this Court in Purganan limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings, however, in
light of the various international treaties giving recognition and protection to human rights, particularly the
right to life and liberty, a reexamination of this Court’s ruling in Purganan is in order.
First, we note that the exercise of the State’s power to deprive an individual of his liberty is not necessarily
limited to criminal proceedings. Respondents in administrative proceedings, such as deportation
and quarantine, have likewise been detained.
Second, to limit bail to criminal proceedings would be to close our eyes to our jurisprudential history.
Philippine jurisprudence has not limited the exercise of the right to bail to criminal proceedings
only. This Court has admitted to bail persons who are not involved in criminal proceedings. In fact, bail has
been allowed in this jurisdiction to persons in detention during the pendency of administrative proceedings,
taking into cognizance the obligation of the Philippines under international conventions to uphold human
rights.
If bail can be granted in deportation cases, we see no justification why it should not also be allowed in
extradition cases. Likewise, considering that the Universal Declaration of Human Rights applies to
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deportation cases, there is no reason why it cannot be invoked in extradition cases. After all, both
are administrative proceedings where the innocence or guilt of the person detained is not in issue.
But while extradition is not a criminal proceeding, it is characterized by the following: (a) it entails a
deprivation of liberty on the part of the potential extraditee and (b) the means employed to attain the
purpose of extradition is also "the machinery of criminal law."
Obviously, an extradition proceeding, while ostensibly administrative, bears all earmarks of a criminal
process. A potential extraditee may be subjected to arrest, to a prolonged restraint of liberty, and
forced to transfer to the demanding state following the proceedings.
Clearly, the right of a prospective extraditee to apply for bail in this jurisdiction must be viewed in the light of
the various treaty obligations of the Philippines concerning respect for the promotion and protection of
human rights. Under these treaties, the presumption lies in favor of human liberty. Thus, the Philippines
should see to it that the right to liberty of every individual is not impaired.
While our extradition law does not provide for the grant of bail to an extraditee, however, there is no
provision prohibiting him or her from filing a motion for bail, a right to due process under the Constitution.
B. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR)
● ICCPR Preamble (BRYAN)
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human
beings enjoying civil and political freedom and freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if
conditions are created whereby everyone may enjoy his civil and political rights, as well as his economic,
social and cultural rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is
under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant,
Agree upon the following articles:
The rights protected under the ICCPR include:
Article 1 – Right to self-determination.
Article 2 – Right for recognition without discrimination.
Article 3 – Equal rights for men and women.
Article 4 – Right for State parties to take measures derogating from their obligations in times of public
emergencies, as long as consistent with other obligations under international law.
Article 5 – No restriction upon or derogation from any of the fundamental human rights
Article 6 – Right to life.
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Article 7 – Freedom from torture.
Article 8 – Right to not be enslaved.
Article 9 – Right to liberty and security of the person.
Article 10 – Rights of detainees.
Article 11 – Right to not be imprisoned merely on the ground of inability to fulfil a contractual obligation.
Article 12 – Freedom of movement and choice of residence for lawful residents.
Article 13 – Rights of aliens.
Article 14 – Equality before the courts and tribunals. Right to a fair trial.
Article 15 – No one can be guilty of an act of a criminal offence which did not constitute a criminal offence.
Article 16 – Right to recognition as a person before the law.
Article 17 – Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference.
Article 18 – Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.
Article 19 – Right to hold opinions without interference.
Article 20 – Propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.
Article 21 – Right of peaceful assembly.
Article 22 – Right to freedom of association with others.
Article 23 – Right to marry.
Article 24 – Children’s rights
Article 25 – Right to political participation.
Article 26 – Equality before the law.
Article 27 – Minority protection.
ADDITIONAL INFO:
BACKGROUND: The United Nations International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) attempts
to ensure the protection of civil and political rights. It was adopted by the United Nations’ General
Assembly on December 19, 1966, and it came into force on March 23, 1976. The International Covenant on
Economic Social and Cultural Rights, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, and the ICCPR and its
two Optional Protocols, are collectively known as the International Bill of Rights.
PURPOSE: The ICCPR recognizes the inherent dignity of each individual and undertakes to promote
conditions within states to allow the enjoyment of civil and political rights. Countries that have ratified the
Covenant are obligated “to protect and preserve basic human rights… [and] “compel[ed] to take
administrative, judicial, and legislative measures in order to protect the rights enshrined in the treaty and to
provide an effective remedy.” There are currently 74 signatories and 168 parties to the ICCPR.
CONTENT: The unifying themes and values of the ICCPR are found in Articles 2 and 3 and are based on
the notion of non-discrimination. Article 2 ensures that rights recognized in the ICCPR will be respected and
be available to everyone within the territory of those states who have ratified the Covenant (State Party).
Article 3 ensures the equal right of both men and women to the enjoyment of all civil and political rights set
out in the ICCPR.
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LIMITATIONS:
Article 4 of ICCPR allows for certain circumstances for States Parties to derogate from their responsibilities
under the Covenant, such as during times of public emergencies. However, State Parties may not derogate
from Articles 6, 7, 8 (paragraphs I and 2), 11, 15, 16 and 18.
OPTIONAL PROTOCOLS:
There are two optional protocols to the ICCPR which gives additional human rights protections.
First Optional Protocol:
This protocol allows victims claiming to be victims of human rights violations to be heard. The Human
Rights Committee (Committee), which is established by the Covenant, has the jurisdiction to receive,
consider and hear communications from victims. The first Optional Protocol came into force with the
Covenant. There are currently 35 signatories and 115 parties to this protocol.
Second Optional Protocol:
This protocol aims to abolish the death penalty. It was entered into force on July 11, 1991 and it currently
has 37 signatories and 81 parties.
ENFORCEMENT
Article 2(2) of ICCPR provides that State Parties are to take the “necessary steps…. to adopt such laws or
other measures as may be necessary to give effect to the rights recognized in the present Covenant.”
Countries that have ratified the ICCPR must takes steps in their own jurisdictions to recognize the
acceptance of this international covenant because, in “international law, a signature does not usually bind a
State. The treaty is usually subject to a future ratification, acceptance, approval or accession.” In Canada,
the accession process involves a series of reviews and consultation by the federal government and
followed by a tabling of the treaty in Parliament.
In addition to State Parties’ formally adopting and recognizing the ICCPR in their jurisdiction, Article 28 of
ICCPR provides for a Human Rights Committee (Committee) to be established for monitoring the State
Parties’ implementation of the Covenant. State Parties are required to submit reports to the Committee for
review, on measures used to adopt and give effect to the rights enshrined in the ICCPR.
As mentioned above, the First Optional Protocol allows victims of human rights violation to be heard by the
Committee. However the ICCPR also provides in Article 41 that a State Party who claims another State
Party is not fulfilling its obligations to implement ICCPR, may make written submissions to the Committee
for consideration. Also, non-governmental organizations (NGOs) may also participate in ensuring that
values under the ICCPR are protected by submitting ‘shadow reports’ and highlight areas for consideration
by the Committee.
14. In the Matter of the Allegations Contained in the Columns of Mr. Amado P. Macasaet Published
in Malaya Dated September 18, 19, 20, and 21, 2007 561 SCRA 395, August 08, 2008 (BRYAN)
DOCTRINE AS PER REYES:

FREEDOM of the press and judicial independence (kalayaan ng pamamahayag at kalayaang
panghukuman) two constitutional values which unfortunately clash in this case for indirect contempt of
court have to be weighed and balanced against each other.
This refers to the The Supreme Court’s order on Malaya publisher and columnist Amado “Jake” Macasaet
to explain in writing why he should not be cited for indirect contempt of court following his exposes on the
alleged bribery try on a Supreme Court justice. (Puro kasi showbiz, hearsay lang based ‘yung info. Parang
“Da Hu” sa mga tabloid na blind item)
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FACTS:
According to Supreme Court spokesman Midas Marquez, the Court wants Macasaet to explain what he
wrote in his columns in the wake of a denial issued by Cecilia Delis, the supposed secretary of the justice
whom he had tagged as the supposed recipient of the P10 million payoff, eventually identified, through the
series of column articles released in September 18, 19, 20 and 21, 2007.
The identity of the justice was later revealed by Newsbreak online magazine as Associate Justice Consuelo
Ynares Santiago. In his “Business Circuit” column, Macasaet wrote how Delis was said to have picked-up
five gift-wrapped boxes containing P10 million from the SC’s guardhouse. Macasaet wrote that Delis
discovered the money when she opened one of the boxes, thinking that it contained perishable
items. As a result of the discovery, Macasaet said Delis was fired by her boss.
Following the published stories and columns, Justice Santiago then called on the Tribunal to conduct an
investigation. Delis had earlier submitted her affidavit at the SC denying that she was the secretary being
referred to by Macasaet in his columns. In her letter to Macasaet dated Sept. 21, 2007, Delis also clarified
that she resigned from her job as a judicial staff officer of the SC’s Presidential Electoral Tribunal last March
15 and was not fired as a secretary as reported in the columns
It was reported that the alleged payoff may have to do with two cases of which Justice Santiago
penned the decision. One is the Piatco case, wherein Santiago ordered the dismissal of the graft case
against Henry Go, the former chair and president of the Philippine International Air Terminals Co. Inc
(Piatco), in connection with the voided contract to build the Ninoy Aquino International Airport Terminal 3 –
reversing an earlier Supreme Court decision. The other case, pending before the Supreme Court,
reportedly has to do with a dispute over an estimated P1.7-billion, 34-hectare prime property in Quezon
City.
A series of investigations was conducted from October 30, 2007 to March 10, 2008. They later
cross-examined on various dates. In its report of a one-page order, the High Court said that upon
evaluation of Macasaet’s “Business Circuit” columns published on Sept. 18, 19, 20 and 21, “certain
statements and innuendoes” tend to “impede, obstruct or degrade” the administration of justice under
Section 3 (d), Rule 71 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, particularly on the emphasized points by the
writer below:
1) From the column of Tuesday, September 18, 2007

The gift gives proof to the pernicious rumor that the courts are dirty. This time, the lady justice
is with a higher court. The court is like a basket of apples. There (are) a few which are rotten.
That makes the whole basket rotten. The names and reputation of highly-respected jurists must
be saved from suspicion that they are thieves.
2) From the column of Wednesday, September 19, 2007
The lady justice shamed her court. She should resign or be impeached. That is the only way the
soiled reputation of the Highest Court could be restored.
3) From the column of Thursday, September 20, 2007
Cecilia x x x you have a duty to save the sagging reputation of the Supreme Court.
Respondent contends that subject matter of his articles is within the exclusive jurisdiction of Congress. He
cites Section 2, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution which partly states that x x x members of the Supreme
Court x x x may be removed from office, on impeachment for, and conviction of x x x bribery x x x and
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Section 3(1), Article XI, which provides that [t]he House of Representatives shall have the exclusive power
to initiate all case of impeachment. Court disagrees.
ISSUE: WON no sanction should be imposed on Macasaet for indirect contempt of court in accordance
with Section 3 (d) of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure.
RULING: Yes. In observations and conclusion, the court found that the neither Macasaets columns in
Malaya, nor Ms. Vitugs story in Newsbreak have a leg to stand on and were found to be based on hearsay.
It was noted to be full of holes, inconsistencies, and contradictions, indicating that he did not exercise due
diligence, patience, and care in checking the veracity of the information fed to him, before giving it
publicity in his columns. Nor was he bothered by the damage that his columns would inflict on the
reputation of a member of the Highest Court and on the Court itself. The Committee likewise noted the
inconsistencies and assumptions of Macasaet, betraying lack of veracity of the alleged bribery.
Under the Rules of Civil Procedure, if the respondent is adjudged guilty of indirect contempt committed
against a Regional Trial Court or a court of equivalent or higher rank, he may be punished by a fine not
exceeding thirty thousand pesos or imprisonment not exceeding six months, or both.
The mass media in a free society uphold the democratic way of life. They provide citizens with relevant
information to help them make informed decisions about public issues affecting their lives. Affirming the
right of the public to know, they serve as vehicles for the necessary exchange of ideas through fair and
open debate. As the Fourth Estate in our democracy, they vigorously exercise their independence and
vigilantly guard against infringements. Over the years, the Philippine media have earned the reputation of
being the freest and liveliest in Asia.
Members of Philippine media have assumed the role of a watchdog and have been protective and
assertive of this role. They demand accountability of government officials and agencies. They have been
adversarial when they relate with any of the three branches of government. They uphold the citizens right to
know, and make public officials, including judges and justices, responsible for their deeds or misdeeds.
Through their watchdog function, the media motivate the public to be vigilant in exercising the citizens right
to an effective, efficient and corrupt-free government.
Accordingly, it has been consistently held that, while freedom of speech, of expression, and of the
press are at the core of civil liberties and have to be protected at all costs for the sake of
democracy, these freedoms are not absolute. For, if left unbridled, they have the tendency to be abused
and can translate to licenses, which could lead to disorder and anarchy. In the case, Respondent thus
admits to having written his articles as means to fish out the Lady Justice involved in an alleged
bribery fed to him by his source, with reckless disregard of whether or not such bribery indeed took
place. It defies reason why any responsible journalist would go on to publish any material in a newspaper
of general circulation without having ascertained even the five Ws and one H of the story.
DISSENTING OPINION (baka lang tanungin)
Mr. Justice Carpio assails the Committee proceedings as fatally defective for patent denial of due process
because when the witnesses the Committee summoned testified, the Committee monopolized the right to
propound questions to the witnesses, denying to Macasaet such right. He continues to say that [w]ith the
procedure the Committee adopted, Macasaet was reduced to a passive participant, unable to subject the
testimonies of adverse witnesses to rigorous probing under cross-examination. As matters stand, Macasaet
will be subjected to punitive sanctions based on evidence he had no opportunity to scrutinize.
In response, the court disagrees, because the proceedings of the Committee are presumed to be regular.
Assuming arguendo that Macasaet was not able to cross-examine his witnesses, this does not necessarily
mean that his right to due process of law was violated. The right of an accused to cross-examine the
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witnesses against him, although an adjunct of the Constitutional right to meet the witnesses face to face,
can be waived when not timely asserted. In the case of Macasaet, never did he assert his right to
cross-examine the witnesses against him despite the opportunity to do so.
15. Reyes v. Court of Appeals, 606 SCRA 580, December 03, 2009 (EDWARD)
Father Robert Reyes( The running priest) v. CA, Raul Gonzales (DOJ)
Facts:
● This case is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the court of appeals.
● Nov 30, 2007-petitioner was among those arrested in the Manila Peninsula Hotel siege. Petitioner
among with 50 others were brought to Camp Crame to await inquest proceedings.
● Dec 1 2007-upon request of the DILG, respondent DOJ Sec Raul Gonzales issued a Hold
Departure Order (HDO) No. 45 ordering respondent Commissioner of immigration to include in the
HDO list of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID) the name of the petitioner and 49
others.
● Dec 2 2007-after finding probable cause against petitioner and 36 others for the crime of rebellion.
The DOJ filed the information before the RTC of Makati City.
● Dec 13 2007-the RTC issued an order dismissing the charge for rebellion against petitioner and 17
others for lack of probable cause. The trial court said that there wasn’t enough evidence to
substantiate that they were part of the rebellion.
● Dec 18 2007-petitioner’s counsel Atty. Francisco Chavez wrote the DOJ secretary requesting the
lifting of the HDO in view of the dismissal of the criminal case against the petitioner.
● Jan 3 2008-petitioner filed a petition claiming that despite the dismissal of his criminal case his
name still stands in the HDO list—that when he flew to HK the BID officers still questioned but he
was still able to leave for HK. In short, nahhassle siya… petitioner further maintained that the
immediate recourse to the SC to the availment of the writ of amparo is exigent as the continued
restraint to his right to travel is illegal.
● Jan 24 2008-respondent represented by the OSG said that the secretary of justice had the right to
issue the HDO.
● RTC dismissed the petition for writ of amparo and CA affirmed.
● Petitioner maintains that the writ of amparo does not only exclusively apply to situations of
extrajudicial killings and enforced disappearances but encompasses the whole gamut of liberties
protected by the Constitution. Petitioner argues that “[liberty] includes the right to exist and the right
to be free from arbitrary personal restraint or servitude and includes the right of the citizens to be
free to use his faculties in all lawful ways.” Part of the right to liberty guaranteed by the Constitution
is the right of a person to travel.
Issue: WON petitioner’s right to liberty has been violated by the issuance of the HDO? WON right to travel
is covered by writ of amparo? NO. NO.
Held: The petition fails.
Ratio:
1) FIRST, defined what Amparo is:
Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides:

SECTION 1. Petition. – The petition for a writ of amparo is a remedy available to any person whose right to
life, liberty and security is violated or threatened with violation by an unlawful act or omission of a public
official or employee, or of a private individual or entity.
The writ shall cover extralegal killings and enforced disappearances or threats thereof.
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2) in Secretary of National Defense et al. v. Manalo et al.,[11] made a categorical pronouncement that the
Amparo Rule in its present form is confined to these two instances of “extralegal killings” and “enforced
disappearances,” or to threats thereof, thus:
x x x As the Amparo Rule was intended to address the intractable problem of “extralegal killings” and
“enforced disappearances,” its coverage, in its present form, is confined to these two instances or to threats
thereof. “Extralegal killings” are “killings committed without due process of law, i.e., without legal
safeguards or judicial proceedings.” On the other hand, “enforced disappearances” are “attended by the
following characteristics: an arrest, detention or abduction of a person by a government official or organized
groups or private individuals acting with the direct or indirect acquiescence of the government; the refusal of
the State to disclose the fate or whereabouts of the person concerned or a refusal to acknowledge the
deprivation of liberty which places such persons outside the protection of law.
3) Here, petitioner invokes this extraordinary remedy of the writ of amparo for the protection of his right to
travel. So what is covered by amparo?
1. Right to life: includes right to be secure in one's person; touches every aspect of man’s existence.
2. Right to liberty: the right to exist and the right to be free from arbitrary restraint or servitude.
3. Right to Security: freedom from fear. In UDHD and ICCPR, we are signatory.
As Such, UDHD and ICCPR in relation to AMPARO: (related sa topic, signatory tayo ng ICCPR and
defined right to security)
1. In the context of Section 1 of the Amparo Rule, freedom from fear is the right and any threat to the
rights to life, liberty or security is the actionable wrong. Fear is a state of mind, a reaction; threat is a
stimulus, a cause of action. Fear caused by the same stimulus can range from being baseless to
well-founded as people react differently. The degree of fear can vary from one person to another with the
variation of the prolificacy of their imagination, strength of character or past experience with the stimulus.
Thus, in the amparo context, it is more correct to say that the right to security is actually the freedom from
threat. Viewed in this light, the threatened with violation Clause in the latter part of Section 1 of the Amparo
Rule is a form of violation of the right to security mentioned in the earlier part of the provision.
2. Second, the right to security of person is a guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity or
security.
Article III, Section II of the 1987 Constitution guarantees that, as a general rule, ones body cannot be
searched or invaded without a search warrant. Physical injuries inflicted in the context of extralegal killings
and enforced disappearances constitute more than a search or invasion of the body. It may constitute
dismemberment, physical disabilities, and painful physical intrusion. As the degree of physical injury
increases, the danger to life itself escalates. Notably, in criminal law, physical injuries constitute a crime
against persons because they are an affront to the bodily integrity or security of a person.
3. Third, the right to security of person is a guarantee of protection of one’s rights by the
government.
Under Article III, Section 1 of the 1987 Constitution and the right to security of person (as freedom from
threat and guarantee of bodily and psychological integrity) under Article III, Section 2. The right to security
of person in this third sense is a corollary of the policy that the State guarantees full respect for human
rights under Article II, Section 11 of the 1987 Constitution. As the government is the chief guarantor of order
and security, the Constitutional guarantee of the rights to life, liberty and security of person is rendered
ineffective if government does not afford protection to these rights especially when they are under threat.
Protection includes conducting effective investigations, organization of the government apparatus to extend
protection to victims of extralegal killings or enforced disappearances (or threats thereof) and/or their
families, and bringing offenders to the bar of justice.
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4) The right to travel refers to the right to move from one place to another. As we have stated in Marcos v.
Sandiganbayan,[21] “xxx a person’s right to travel is subject to the usual constraints imposed by the very
necessity of safeguarding the system of justice. In such cases, whether the accused should be permitted to
leave the jurisdiction for humanitarian reasons is a matter of the court’s sound Discretion.
Wherefore:
In the case at bar, the restriction on petitioners right to travel as a consequence of the pendency of the
criminal case filed against him was not unlawful. Petitioner has also failed to establish that his right to travel
was impaired in the manner and to the extent that it AMOUNTED to a serious violation of his right to life,
liberty and security for which there exists no readily available legal recourse or remedy.
Petition dismissed. CA Decision Affirmed.
16. Disini, Jr. v. Secretary of Justice, 716 SCRA 237, February 18, 2014 (ERICA)
FACTS: Petitioners lament that libel provisions of the penal code and, in effect, the libel provisions of the
cybercrime law carry with them the requirement of “presumed malice” even when the latest jurisprudence
already replaces it with the higher standard of “actual malice” as a basis for conviction. Petitioners argue
that inferring “presumed malice” from the accused’s defamatory statement by virtue of Article 354 of the
penal code infringes on his constitutionally guaranteed freedom of expression.
ISSUE: (1) Whether or not Section 4(c)(4) of the Cybercrime Prevention Act on cyberlibel affected the
requirement of “actual malice” as opposed to “presumed malice” as basis for conviction of libel.
(2) Petitioners peddle the view that both the penal code and the Cybercrime Prevention Act
violate the country’s obligations under the International Covenant of Civil and Political Rights
(ICCPR). They point out that in Adonis v. Republic of the Philippines,47 the United Nations Human Rights
Committee (UNHRC) cited its General Comment 34 to the effect that penal defamation laws should
include the defense of truth.
RULING: (1) The prosecution bears the burden of proving the presence of actual malice in instances where
such element is required to establish guilt. The defense of absence of actual malice, even when the
statement turns out to be false, is available where the offended party is a public official or a public figure, as
in the cases of Vasquez (a barangay official) and Borjal (the Executive Director, First National Conference
on Land Transportation). Since the penal code and implicitly, the cybercrime law, mainly target libel against
private persons, the Court recognizes that these laws imply a stricter standard of “malice” to convict the
author of a defamatory statement where the offended party is a public figure. Society’s interest and the
maintenance of good government demand a full discussion of public affairs.
But, where the offended party is a private individual, the prosecution need not prove the presence of
malice. The law explicitly presumes its existence (malice in law) from the defamatory character of the
assailed statement. For his defense, the accused must show that he has a justifiable reason for the
defamatory statement even if it was in fact true.
(2) But General Comment 34 does not say that the truth of the defamatory statement should constitute an
all-encompassing defense. As it happens, Article 361 recognizes truth as a defense but under the condition
that the accused has been prompted in making the statement by good motives and for justifiable ends.
Thus:
Art. 361. Proof of the truth. — In every criminal prosecution for libel, the truth may be given in
evidence to the court and if it appears that the matter charged as libelous is true, and, moreover, that it was
published with good motives and for justifiable ends, the defendants shall be acquitted.
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Proof of the truth of an imputation of an act or omission not constituting a crime shall not be admitted,
unless the imputation shall have been made against Government employees with respect to facts related to
the discharge of their official duties.
In such cases if the defendant proves the truth of the imputation made by him, he shall be acquitted.
Besides, the UNHRC did not actually enjoin the Philippines, as petitioners urge, to decriminalize libel. It
simply suggested that defamation laws be crafted with care to ensure that they do not stifle freedom of
expression. Indeed, the ICCPR states that although everyone should enjoy freedom of expression, its
exercise carries with it special duties and responsibilities. Free speech is not absolute. It is subject
to certain restrictions, as may be necessary and as may be provided by law.
Note: Instrument: ICCPR

Article 19
1. Everyone shall have the right to hold opinions without interference.
2. Everyone shall have the right to freedom of expression; this right shall include freedom to seek,
receive and impart information and ideas of all kinds, regardless of frontiers, either orally, in writing or in
print, in the form of art, or through any other media of his choice.
3. The exercise of the rights provided for in paragraph 2 of this article carries with it special duties
and responsibilities. It may therefore be subject to certain restrictions, but these shall only be such as are
provided by law and are necessary:
(a) For respect of the rights or reputations of others;
(b) For the protection of national security or of public order (ordre public), or of public health or
morals.
C. International Covenant on Economic, Social, Cultural Rights (ICESCR)
● ICESCR Preamble [Copy the Preamble] (FAYE)
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Covenant,

Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed
in the Charter of the United Nations, recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable
rights of all members of the human family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Recognizing that these rights derive from the inherent dignity of the human person,
Recognizing that, in accordance with the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the ideal of free human
beings enjoying freedom from fear and want can only be achieved if conditions are created whereby
everyone may enjoy his economic, social and cultural rights, as well as his civil and political rights,
Considering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to promote universal respect
for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms,
Realizing that the individual, having duties to other individuals and to the community to which he belongs, is
under a responsibility to strive for the promotion and observance of the rights recognized in the present
Covenant,
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Agree upon the following articles:

(I didn’t include the articles kasi there are 15 and preamble lang naman diba?)
17. Central Bank Employees Association Inc. v. Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas, 446 SCRA 229,
December 15, 2004 (FAYE)
Can a provision of law, initially valid, become subsequently unconstitutional, on the ground that its
continued operation would violate the equal protection of the law? We hold that with the passage of the
subsequent laws amending the charter of seven (7) other governmental financial institutions (GFIs), the
continued operation of the last proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 7653,
constitutes invidious discrimination on the 2,994 rank-and-file employees of the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas
(BSP).|||
FACTS: On July 3, 1993, R.A. No. 7653 (the New Central Bank Act) took effect. It abolished the old Central
Bank of the Philippines, and created a new BSP.
On June 8, 2001, almost eight years after the effectivity of R.A. No. 7653, petitioner Central
Bank (now BSP) Employees Association, Inc., filed a petition for prohibition against BSP and the
Executive Secretary of the Office of the President, to restrain respondents from further implementing the
last proviso in Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, on the ground that it is unconstitutional.
Article II, Section 15(c) of R.A. No. 7653 provides:
Section 15.Exercise of Authority. — In the exercise of its authority, the Monetary Board
shall:
xxx xxx xxx
(c)establish a human resource management system which shall govern the selection,
hiring, appointment, transfer, promotion, or dismissal of all personnel. Such system shall
aim to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels of the Bangko Sentral in
accordance with sound principles of management.
A compensation structure, based on job evaluation studies and wage surveys and subject
to the Board's approval, shall be instituted as an integral component of the Bangko
Sentral's human resource development program: Provided, That the Monetary Board shall
make its own system conform as closely as possible with the principles provided for under
Republic Act No. 6758 [Salary Standardization Act]. Provided, however, That
compensation and wage structure of employees whose positions fall under salary grade 19
and below shall be in accordance with the rates prescribed under Republic Act No.6758.
[emphasis supplied]
The thrust of petitioner's challenge is that the above proviso makes an unconstitutional cut
between two classes of employees in the BSP, viz: (1) the BSP officers or those exempted from the
coverage of the Salary Standardization Law (SSL) (exempt class); and (2) the rank-and-file (Salary
Grade [SG] 19 and below), or those not exempted from the coverage of the SSL (non-exempt class). It
is contended that this classification is "a classic case of class legislation," allegedly not based on
substantial distinctions which make real differences, but solely on the SG of the BSP personnel's
position. Petitioner also claims that it is not germane to the purposes of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A.
No. 7653, the most important of which is to establish professionalism and excellence at all levels in the
BSP.
ISSUE: whether the last paragraph of Section 15(c), Article II of R.A. No. 7653, runs afoul of the
constitutional mandate that "No person shall be . . . denied the equal protection of the laws.|||
RULING: Yes
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UNDER THE PRESENT STANDARDS OF EQUAL PROTECTION, SECTION 15(c), ARTICLE II OF
R.A. NO. 7653 IS VALID.|| THE ENACTMENT, HOWEVER, OF SUBSEQUENT LAWS — EXEMPTING
ALL OTHER RANK-AND-FILE EMPLOYEES OF GFIs FROM THE SSL — RENDERS THE
CONTINUED APPLICATION OF THE CHALLENGED PROVISION A VIOLATION OF THE EQUAL
PROTECTION CLAUSE.|||
Jurisprudential standards for equal protection challenges indubitably show that the classification created
by the questioned proviso, on its face and in its operation, bears no constitutional infirmities.
It is settled in constitutional law that the "equal protection" clause does not prevent the
Legislature from establishing classes of individuals or objects upon which different rules shall operate —
so long as the classification is not unreasonable.
Congress is allowed a wide leeway in providing for a valid classification. The equal protection
clause is not infringed by legislation which applies only to those persons falling within a specified class.
If the groupings are characterized by substantial distinctions that make real differences, one class may
be treated and regulated differently from another. The classification must also be germane to the
purpose of the law and must apply to all those belonging to the same class.
In the case at bar, it is clear in the legislative deliberations that the exemption of officers (SG 20
and above) from the SSL was intended to address the BSP's lack of competitiveness in terms of
attracting competent officers and executives. It was not intended to discriminate against the
rank-and-file. If the end-result did in fact lead to a disparity of treatment between the officers and the
rank-and-file in terms of salaries and benefits, the discrimination or distinction has a rational basis and
is not palpably, purely, and entirely arbitrary in the legislative sense.
That the provision was a product of amendments introduced during the deliberation of the
Senate Bill does not detract from its validity. As early as 1947 and reiterated in subsequent cases, this
Court has subscribed to the conclusiveness of an enrolled bill to refuse invalidating a provision of law,
on the ground that the bill from which it originated contained no such provision and was merely inserted
by the bicameral conference committee of both Houses.
Moreover, it is a fundamental and familiar teaching that all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute. An act of the legislature, approved by the executive,
is presumed to be within constitutional limitations. To justify the nullification of a law, there must be a
clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution, not a doubtful and equivocal breach.
In our jurisdiction, the standard and analysis of equal protection challenges in the main have followed
the "rational basis" test, coupled with a deferential attitude to legislative classifications and a reluctance
to invalidate a law unless there is a showing of a clear and unequivocal breach of the Constitution. ||
(Discussion under international law)
The principle of equality has long been recognized under international law. Article 1 of the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights proclaims that all human beings are born free and equal in
dignity and rights. Non-discrimination, together with equality before the law and equal protection of the
law without any discrimination, constitutes basic principles in the protection of human rights.
Most, if not all, international human rights instruments include some prohibition on discrimination
and/or provisions about equality. The general international provisions pertinent to discrimination and/or
equality are the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR); the International Covenant
on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (ICESCR); the International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination (CERD); the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of
Discrimination against Women (CEDAW); and the Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC).
In the broader international context, equality is also enshrined in regional instruments such as
the American Convention on Human Rights; the African Charter on Human and People's Rights; the
European Convention on Human Rights; the European Social Charter of 1961 and revised Social
Charter of 1996; and the European Union Charter of Rights (of particular importance to European
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states). Even the Council of the League of Arab States has adopted the Arab Charter on Human Rights
in 1994, although it has yet to be ratified by the Member States of the League.
The equality provisions in these instruments do not merely function as traditional "first
generation" rights, commonly viewed as concerned only with constraining rather than requiring State
action. Article 26 of the ICCPR requires "guarantee[s]" of "equal and effective protection against
discrimination" while Articles 1 and 14 of the American and European Conventions oblige States Parties
"to ensure . . . the full and free exercise of [the rights guaranteed] . . . without any discrimination" and to
"secure without discrimination" the enjoyment of the rights guaranteed. These provisions impose a
measure of positive obligation on States Parties to take steps to eradicate discrimination.
In the employment field, basic detailed minimum standards ensuring equality and prevention of
discrimination, are laid down in the ICESCR and in a very large number of Conventions administered by
the International Labour Organisation, a United Nations body. Additionally, many of the other
international and regional human rights instruments have specific provisions relating to employment.
Breaches of the right to equal protection occur directly or indirectly. A classification may be
struck down if it has the purpose or effect of violating the right to equal protection. International law
recognizes that discrimination may occur indirectly, as the Human Rights Committee took into account
the definitions of discrimination adopted by CERD and CEDAW in declaring that:
. . . "discrimination" as used in the [ICCPR] should be understood to imply any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference which is based on any ground such as race, colour,
sex, language, religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or
other status, and which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise by all persons, on an equal footing, of all rights and freedoms.
(emphasis supplied)
Thus, the two-tier analysis made in the case at bar of the challenged provision, and its
conclusion of unconstitutionality by subsequent operation, are in cadence and in consonance with the
progressive trend of other jurisdictions and in international law. There should be no hesitation in using
the equal protection clause as a major cutting edge to eliminate every conceivable irrational
discrimination in our society. Indeed, the social justice imperatives in the Constitution, coupled with the
special status and protection afforded to labor, compel this approach.
In the case at bar, the challenged proviso operates on the basis of the salary grade or
officer-employee status. It is akin to a distinction based on economic class and status, with the higher
grades as recipients of a benefit specifically withheld from the lower grades. Officers of the BSP now
receive higher compensation packages that are competitive with the industry, while the poorer,
low-salaried employees are limited to the rates prescribed by the SSL. The implications are quite
disturbing: BSP rank-and-file employees are paid the strictly regimented rates of the SSL while
employees higher in rank — possessing higher and better education and opportunities for career
advancement — are given higher compensation packages to entice them to stay. Considering that
majority, if not all, the rank-and-file employees consist of people whose status and rank in life are less
and limited, especially in terms of job marketability, it is they — and not the officers — who have the real
economic and financial need for the adjustment. This is in accord with the policy of the Constitution "to
free the people from poverty, provide adequate social services, extend to them a decent standard of
living, and improve the quality of life for all." Any act of Congress that runs counter to this constitutional
desideratum deserves strict scrutiny by this Court before it can pass muster.
To be sure, the BSP rank-and-file employees merit greater concern from this Court. They
represent the more impotent rank-and-file government employees who, unlike employees in the private
sector, have no specific right to organize as a collective bargaining unit and negotiate for better terms
and conditions of employment, nor the power to hold a strike to protest unfair labor practices. Not only
are they impotent as a labor unit, but their efficacy to lobby in Congress is almost nil as R.A. No. 7653
effectively isolated them from the other GFI rank-and-file in compensation. These BSP rank-and-file
employees represent the politically powerless and they should not be compelled to seek a political
solution to their unequal and iniquitous treatment. Indeed, they have waited for many years for the
32
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legislature to act. They cannot be asked to wait some more for discrimination cannot be given any
waiting time. Unless the equal protection clause of the Constitution is a mere platitude, it is the Court's
duty to save them from reasonless discrimination.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, we hold that the continued operation and implementation of the last
proviso of Section 15(c), Article II of Republic Act No. 7653 is unconstitutional.
D. Convention on Rights of the Child
● Convention on the Rights of the Child (CRC) Preamble [Copy the Preamble] (JERALD)
Convention on the Rights of the Child
Adopted and opened for signature, ratification and accession by General Assembly resolution 44/25
of 20 November 1989 entry into force 2 September 1990, in accordance with article 49
Preamble
The States Parties to the present Convention:
Considering that, in accordance with the principles proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations,
recognition of the inherent dignity and of the equal and inalienable rights of all members of the human
family is the foundation of freedom, justice and peace in the world,
Bearing in mind that the peoples of the United Nations have, in the Charter, reaffirmed their faith in
fundamental human rights and in the dignity and worth of the human person, and have determined to
promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom,
Recognizing that the United Nations has, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and in the
International Covenants on Human Rights, proclaimed and agreed that everyone is entitled to all the rights
and freedoms set forth therein, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status,
Recalling that, in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the United Nations has proclaimed that
childhood is entitled to special care and assistance,
Convinced that the family, as the fundamental group of society and the natural environment for the growth
and well-being of all its members and particularly children, should be afforded the necessary protection and
assistance so that it can fully assume its responsibilities within the community,
Recognizing that the child, for the full and harmonious development of his or her personality, should grow
up in a family environment, in an atmosphere of happiness, love and understanding,
Considering that the child should be fully prepared to live an individual life in society, and brought up in the
spirit of the ideals proclaimed in the Charter of the United Nations, and in particular in the spirit of peace,
dignity, tolerance, freedom, equality and solidarity,
Bearing in mind that the need to extend particular care to the child has been stated in the Geneva
Declaration of the Rights of the Child of 1924 and in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child adopted by
the General Assembly on 20 November 1959 and recognized in the Universal Declaration of Human
Rights, in the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (in particular in articles 23 and 24), in the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights (in particular in article 10) and in the
statutes and relevant instruments of specialized agencies and international organizations concerned with
the welfare of children,
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Bearing in mind that, as indicated in the Declaration of the Rights of the Child, "the child, by reason of his
physical and mental immaturity, needs special safeguards and care, including appropriate legal protection,
before as well as after birth",
Recalling the provisions of the Declaration on Social and Legal Principles relating to the Protection and
Welfare of Children, with Special Reference to Foster Placement and Adoption Nationally and
Internationally; the United Nations Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (The
Beijing Rules); and the Declaration on the Protection of Women and Children in Emergency and Armed
Conflict, Recognizing that, in all countries in the world, there are children living in exceptionally difficult
conditions, and that such children need special consideration,
Taking due account of the importance of the traditions and cultural values of each people for the protection
and harmonious development of the child, Recognizing the importance of international cooperation for
improving the living conditions of children in every country, in particular in the developing countries.
18. Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265,
October 09, 2007 (JERALD)
The Court and all parties involved are in agreement that the best nourishment for an infant is mother’s milk.
There is nothing greater than for a mother to nurture her beloved child straight from her bosom. The ideal
is, of course, for each and every Filipino child to enjoy the unequaled benefits of breastmilk. But how should
this end be attained?
FACTS: Before the Court is a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, seeking to nullify
Administrative Order (A.O.) No. 2006-0012 entitled, Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations of
Executive Order No. 51, Otherwise Known as The “Milk Code,” Relevant International Agreements,
Penalizing Violations Thereof, and for Other Purposes (RIRR).
Petitioner posits that the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulation (RIRR) is not valid as it contains
provisions that are not constitutional and go beyond the law it is supposed to implement. Named as
respondents are the Health Secretary, Undersecretaries, and Assistant Secretaries of the Department of
Health (DOH). For purposes of herein petition, the DOH is deemed impleaded as a co-respondent since
respondents issued the questioned RIRR in their capacity as officials of said executive agency.
Executive Order No. 51 (Milk Code) was issued by President Corazon Aquino on October 28, 1986 by
virtue of the legislative powers granted to the president under the Freedom Constitution. One of the
preambular clauses of the Milk Code states that the law seeks to give effect to Article 112 of the
International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS), a code adopted by the World Health
Assembly (WHA) in 1981. From 1982 to 2006, the WHA adopted several Resolutions to the effect that
breastfeeding should be supported, promoted and protected, hence, it should be ensured that nutrition and
health claims are not permitted for breastmilk substitutes.
In 1990, the Philippines ratified the International Convention on the Rights of the Child. Article 24 of said
instrument provides that State Parties should take appropriate measures to diminish infant and child
mortality, and ensure that all segments of society, specially parents and children, are informed of the
advantages of breastfeeding. On May 15, 2006, the DOH issued herein assailed RIRR which was to take
effect on July 7, 2006.
However, on June 28, 2006, petitioner, representing its members that are manufacturers of breastmilk
substitutes, filed the present Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition with Prayer for the Issuance of a
Temporary Restraining Order (TRO) or Writ of Preliminary Injunction.
ISSUE: Whether Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 or the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations
(RIRR) issued by the Department of Health (DOH) is unconstitutional.
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HELD: The Supreme Court PARTIALLY GRANTED the petition. Sections 4(f) and 11 (prohibition on
advertising, promotions or sponsorship of infant formula, breast milk substitutes and other related products)
and 46 (corresponding sanctions) of Administrative Order No. 2006-0012 dated May 12, 2006 are declared
NULL and VOID for being ultra vires.
The Court notes that the following international instruments invoked by respondents, namely: (1) The
United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child; (2) The International Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights; and (3) the Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against
Women, only provide in general terms that steps must be taken by State Parties to diminish infant and child
mortality and inform society of the advantages of breastfeeding, ensure the health and well-being of
families, and ensure that women are provided with services and nutrition in connection with pregnancy and
lactation. Said instruments do not contain specific provisions regarding the use or marketing of breastmilk
substitutes.
The international instruments that do have specific provisions regarding breast milk substitutes are the
ICMBS and various WHA Resolutions.
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law.
Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to Article VII, Section 21 of the
Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless
concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus, treaties or conventional
international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to be transformed into
municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The ICMBS and WHA Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds
of all members of the Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However,
the ICMBS which was adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local
legislation, the Milk Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this
jurisdiction and not the ICMBS per se.
The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at this point that
the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other forms
of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk
Code expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed
if such materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
The primacy of breastfeeding for children is emphasized as a national health policy but nowhere in A.O. No.
2005-0014 is it declared that as part of such health policy, the advertisement or promotion of breastmilk
substitutes should be absolutely prohibited; The national policy of protection, promotion and support of
breast-feeding cannot automatically be equated with a total ban on advertising for breastmilk substitutes; In
view of the enactment of the Milk Code which does not contain a total ban on the advertising and promotion
of breastmilk substitutes, it follows that a total ban policy could be implemented only pursuant to a law
amending the Milk Code passed by the constitutionally authorized branch of government, the
legislature—only the provisions of the Milk Code, but not those of subsequent World Health Assembly
(WHA) Resolutions, can be validly implemented by the Department of Health (DOH).
The Department of Health’s (DOH’s) power under the Milk Code to control information regarding breastmilk
vis-à-vis breastmilk substitutes is not absolute as the power to control does not encompass the power to
35
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absolutely prohibit the advertising, marketing, and promotion of breastmilk substitutes. However, Section
26(c) of the Revised Implementing Rules and Regulations (RIRR) which requires containers and labels to
state that the product offered is not a substitute for breastmilk, is a reasonable means of enforcing Section
8(b) of the Milk Code and deterring circumvention of the protection and promotion of breastfeeding as
embodied in Section 2 of the Milk Code.
The absolute ban on advertising prescribed under Sections 4(f) and 11 of the Revised Implementing
Rules and Regulations (RIRR) is unduly restrictive and is more than necessary to further the
avowed governmental interest of promoting the health of infants and young children.
V. HUMAN RIGHTS AND THE 1987 CONSTITUTION
A. The Recognition and Guarantee of Human Rights in the 1987 Constitution
B. Transformation Clause
19. Pharmaceutical and Healthcare Association of the Philippines v. Duque III, 535 SCRA 265,
October 09, 2007 (SUPRA) (JERALD)
Doctrine - Transformation and Incorporation Clause:
Under the 1987 Constitution, international law can become part of the sphere of domestic law either by
transformation or incorporation. The transformation method requires that an international law be
transformed into a domestic law through a constitutional mechanism such as local legislation. The
incorporation method applies when, by mere constitutional declaration, international law is deemed to have
the force of domestic law. Treaties become part of the law of the land through transformation pursuant to
Article VII, Section 21 of the Constitution which provides that “[n]o treaty or international agreement shall be
valid and effective unless concurred in by at least two-thirds of all the members of the Senate.” Thus,
treaties or conventional international law must go through a process prescribed by the Constitution for it to
be transformed into municipal law that can be applied to domestic conflicts.
The International Code of Marketing of Breastmilk Substitutes (ICMBS) and World Health Assembly (WHA)
Resolutions are not treaties as they have not been concurred in by at least two-thirds of all members of the
Senate as required under Section 21, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. However, the ICMBS which was
adopted by the WHA in 1981 had been transformed into domestic law through local legislation, the Milk
Code. Consequently, it is the Milk Code that has the force and effect of law in this jurisdiction and not the
ICMBS per se. The Milk Code is almost a verbatim reproduction of the ICMBS, but it is well to emphasize at
this point that the Code did not adopt the provision in the ICMBS absolutely prohibiting advertising or other
forms of promotion to the general public of products within the scope of the ICMBS. Instead, the Milk Code
expressly provides that advertising, promotion, or other marketing materials may be allowed if such
materials are duly authorized and approved by the Inter-Agency Committee (IAC).
Section 2, Article II of the 1987 Constitution, to wit: “SECTION 2. The Philippines renounces war as an
instrument of national policy, adopts the generally accepted principles of international law as part of
the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace, equality, justice, freedom, cooperation and amity
with all nations (Emphasis supplied),” embodies the incorporation method.
Generally accepted principles of international law, by virtue of the incorporation clause of the Constitution,
form part of the laws of the land even if they do not derive from treaty obligations; “Generally accepted
principles of international law” refers to norms of general or customary international law which are binding
on all states, i.e., renunciation of war as an instrument of national policy, the principle of sovereign
immunity, a person’s right to life, liberty and due process, and pacta sunt servanda, among others.
C. Incorporation Clause
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Refer to foregoing discussion.
● 1987 Phil. Constitution. Art 2, Sec 2
Art 2. Section 2. The Philippines renounces war as an instrument of national policy, adopts the generally
accepted principles of international law as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
equality, justice, freedom, cooperation, and amity with all nations.
20. Bayan Muna v. Romulo, 641 SCRA 244, February 01, 2011 (JUED)
FACTS: This petition for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition under Rule 65 assails and seeks to nullify
the Non-Surrender Agreement concluded by and between the Republic of the Philippines (RP) and the
United States of America (USA).
Having a key determinative bearing on this case is the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal
Court (ICC) with "the power to exercise its jurisdiction over persons for the most serious crimes of
international concern x x x and shall be complementary to the national criminal jurisdictions."
RP, through Charge d’Affaires Enrique A. Manalo, signed the Rome Statute which, by its terms, is "subject
to ratification, acceptance or approval" by the signatory states. As of the filing of the instant petition, only 92
out of the 139 signatory countries appear to have completed the ratification, approval and concurrence
process. The Philippines is not among the 92.
Ambassador Francis J. Ricciardone sent US Embassy Note proposing the terms of the non-surrender
bilateral agreement (Agreement, hereinafter) between the USA and the RP. RP, represented by then DFA
Secretary Ople, agreed with and accepted the US proposals embodied under the US Embassy Note
adverted to and put in effect the Agreement with the US government. Agreement aims to protect what it
refers to and defines as "persons" of the RP and US from frivolous and harassment suits that might be
brought against them in international tribunals. It is reflective of the increasing pace of the strategic security
and defense partnership between the two countries.
The Agreement pertinently provides as follows:
1. For purposes of this Agreement, "persons" are current or former Government officials, employees
(including contractors), or military personnel or nationals of one Party.
2. Persons of one Party present in the territory of the other shall not, absent the express consent of the first
Party,
(a) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any international tribunal for any purpose, unless such
tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, or
(b) be surrendered or transferred by any means to any other entity or third country, or expelled to a third
country, for the purpose of surrender to or transfer to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has
been established by the UN Security Council.
3. When the [US] extradites, surrenders, or otherwise transfers a person of the Philippines to a third
country, the [US] will not agree to the surrender or transfer of that person by the third country to any
international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been established by the UN Security Council, absent the
express consent of the Government of the Republic of the Philippines [GRP].
4. When the [GRP] extradites, surrenders, o

r otherwise transfers a person of the [USA] to a third country, the [GRP] will not agree to the surrender or
37
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transfer of that person by the third country to any international tribunal, unless such tribunal has been
established by the UN Security Council, absent the express consent of the Government of the [US].
5. This Agreement shall remain in force until one year after the date on which one party notifies the other of
its intent to terminate the Agreement. The provisions of this Agreement shall continue to apply with respect
to any act occurring, or any allegation arising, before the effective date of termination.
Upon query of Sol Gen Alfredo L. Benipayo on the status of the non-surrender agreement, Ambassador
Ricciardone replied that the exchange of diplomatic notes constituted a legally binding agreement under
international law; and that, under US law, the said agreement did not require the advice and consent of the
US Senate.
Petitioner imputes grave abuse of discretion to respondents in concluding and ratifying the Agreement and
prays that it be struck down as unconstitutional, or at least declared as without force and effect.
For their part, respondents question petitioner’s standing to maintain a suit and counter that the Agreement,
being in the nature of an executive agreement, does not require Senate concurrence for its efficacy. And for
reasons detailed in their comment, respondents assert the constitutionality of the Agreement.
ISSUE:
WON the [RP] president and the [DFA] Secretary gravely abused their discretion amounting to lack
or excess of jurisdiction for concluding the RP-US Non-Surrender Agreement, when the Philippine
Government has already signed the Rome Statute [ICC] although this is pending ratification by the
Philippine Senate.
WON there is jurisdictional conflict between the Philippines, as party to the non-surrender
agreement, and the International Criminal Court.
HELD:
1.) Petitioner contends the Agreements validity through its form. Petitioners’ contention––perhaps taken
unaware of certain well-recognized international doctrines, practices, and jargons––is untenable.
One of these is the doctrine of incorporation, as expressed in Section 2, Article II of the
Constitution, wherein the Philippines adopts the generally accepted principles of international law
and international jurisprudence as part of the law of the land and adheres to the policy of peace,
cooperation, and amity with all nations. An exchange of notes falls "into the category of
intergovernmental agreements," which is an internationally accepted form of international
agreement. An "exchange of notes" is a record of a routine agreement, that has many similarities
with the private law contract.
It is fairly clear from the foregoing disquisition that E/N BFO-028-03 (the exchange of notes)––be it
viewed as the Non-Surrender Agreement itself, or as an integral instrument of acceptance thereof or
as consent to be bound––is a recognized mode of concluding a legally binding international written
contract among nations.
2.) Contrary to petitioner’s pretense, the Agreement does not contravene or undermine, nor does it
differ from, the Rome Statute. Far from going against each other, one complements the other. As a
matter of fact, the principle of complementarity underpins the creation of the International Criminal
Court. As aptly pointed out by respondents and admitted by petitioners, the jurisdiction of the
International Criminal Court is to "be complementary to national criminal jurisdictions [of the
signatory states]."
38
___________________________________________________________________________________
Note:
Under the premise of complementarity, the primary jurisdiction for any case lies first with the state’s
national judicial systems. A state is given a chance to exercise complementarity by informing the
International Criminal Court of its choice to investigate and prosecute its own nationals through its
own domestic courts. Thus, the State has the primary jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute its
own nationals in its custody who may have committed the grave international crimes specified in the
Rome Statute.
21. Vinuya v. Romulo, 732 SCRA 575, August 12, 2014 (MARK)
FACTS: This is an original Petition for Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with an application for
the issuance of a writ of preliminary mandatory injunction against the Office of the Executive Secretary, the
Secretary of the DFA, the Secretary of the DOJ, and the OSG.
Petitioners are all members of the MALAYA LOLAS, a non-stock, non-profit organization registered with the
SEC, established for the purpose of providing aid to the victims of rape by Japanese military forces in the
Philippines during the Second World War.
Petitioners claim that since 1998, they have approached the Executive Department through the DOJ, DFA,
and OSG, requesting assistance in filing a claim against the Japanese officials and military officers who
ordered the establishment of the “comfort women” stations in the Philippines. But officials of the Executive
Department declined to assist the petitioners, and took the position that the individual claims of the comfort
women for compensation had already been fully satisfied by Japan’s compliance with the Peace Treaty
between the Philippines and Japan.
Hence, this petition where petitioners pray for this court to (a) declare that respondents committed grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of discretion in refusing to espouse their claims for the
crimes against humanity and war crimes committed against them; and (b) compel the respondents to
espouse their claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan before the
International Court of Justice (ICJ) and other international tribunals.
Respondents maintain that all claims of the Philippines and its nationals relative to the war were dealt with
in the San Francisco Peace Treaty of 1951 and the bilateral Reparations Agreement of 1956.
On January 15, 1997, the Asian Women’s Fund and the Philippine government signed a Memorandum of
Understanding for medical and welfare support programs for former comfort women. Over the next five
years, these were implemented by the Department of Social Welfare and Development.
ISSUE: WON the Executive Department committed grave abuse of discretion in not espousing petitioners’
claims for official apology and other forms of reparations against Japan.
RULING: Petition lacks merit. From a Domestic Law Perspective, the Executive Department has the
exclusive prerogative to determine whether to espouse petitioners’ claims against Japan.
Political questions refer “to those questions which, under the Constitution, are to be decided by the people
in their sovereign capacity, or in regard to which full discretionary authority has been delegated to the
legislative or executive branch of the government. It is concerned with issues dependent upon the wisdom,
not legality of a particular measure.”
39
___________________________________________________________________________________
One type of case of political questions involves questions of foreign relations. It is well-established that “the
conduct of the foreign relations of our government is committed by the Constitution to the executive and
legislative–‘the political’–departments of the government, and the propriety of what may be done in the
exercise of this political power is not subject to judicial inquiry or decision.” are delicate, complex, and
involve large elements of prophecy. They are and should be undertaken only by those directly responsible
to the people whose welfare they advance or imperil.
But not all cases implicating foreign relations present political questions, and courts certainly possess the
authority to construe or invalidate treaties and executive agreements. However, the question whether the
Philippine government should espouse claims of its nationals against a foreign government is a foreign
relations matter, the authority for which is demonstrably committed by our Constitution not to the courts but
to the political branches. In this case, the Executive Department has already decided that it is to the best
interest of the country to waive all claims of its nationals for reparations against Japan in the Treaty of
Peace of 1951. The wisdom of such decision is not for the courts to question.
The President, not Congress, has the better opportunity of knowing the conditions which prevail in foreign
countries, and especially is this true in time of war. He has his confidential sources of information. He has
his agents in the form of diplomatic, consular and other officials.
The Executive Department has determined that taking up petitioners’ cause would be inimical to our
country’s foreign policy interests, and could disrupt our relations with Japan, thereby creating serious
implications for stability in this region. For the to overturn the Executive Department’s determination would
mean an assessment of the foreign policy judgments by a coordinate political branch to which authority to
make that judgment has been constitutionally committed.
From a municipal law perspective, certiorari will not lie. As a general principle, where such an extraordinary
length of time has lapsed between the treaty’s conclusion and our consideration – the Executive must be
given ample discretion to assess the foreign policy considerations of espousing a claim against Japan, from
the standpoint of both the interests of the petitioners and those of the Republic, and decide on that basis if
apologies are sufficient, and whether further steps are appropriate or necessary.
In the international sphere, traditionally, the only means available for individuals to bring a claim within the
international legal system has been when the individual is able to persuade a government to bring a claim
on the individual’s behalf. By taking up the case of one of its subjects and by resorting to diplomatic action
or international judicial proceedings on his behalf, a State is in reality asserting its own right to ensure, in
the person of its subjects, respect for the rules of international law.
Within the limits prescribed by international law, a State may exercise diplomatic protection by whatever
means and to whatever extent it thinks fit, for it is its own right that the State is asserting. Should the natural
or legal person on whose behalf it is acting consider that their rights are not adequately protected, they
have no remedy in international law. All they can do is resort to national law, if means are available, with a
view to furthering their cause or obtaining redress. All these questions remain within the province of
municipal law and do not affect the position internationally.
Even the invocation of jus cogens norms and erga omnes obligations will not alter this analysis. Petitioners
have not shown that the crimes committed by the Japanese army violated jus cogens prohibitions at the
time the Treaty of Peace was signed, or that the duty to prosecute perpetrators of international crimes is an
erga omnes obligation or has attained the status of jus cogens.
40
___________________________________________________________________________________
The term erga omnes (Latin: in relation to everyone) in international law has been used as a legal term
describing obligations owed by States towards the community of states as a whole. Essential distinction
should be drawn between the obligations of a State towards the international community as a whole, and
those arising vis-à-vis another State in the field of diplomatic protection. By their very nature, the former are
the concern of all States. In view of the importance of the rights involved, all States can be held to have a
legal interest in their protection; they are obligations erga omnes.
The term “jus cogens” (literally, “compelling law”) refers to norms that command peremptory authority,
superseding conflicting treaties and custom. Jus cogens norms are considered peremptory in the sense
that they are mandatory, do not admit derogation, and can be modified only by general international norms
of equivalent authority
WHEREFORE, the Petition is hereby DISMISSED.
41

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Human Rights Law Monday 7:00-9:00 PM

Atty. Weng Santos Pokemon Digests

Additional info: (edward)

ISSUE​: WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO (it is constitutional)

These principles require that a municipal ordinance

Ordinance 13 meets these criteria.

3. People v. Fajardo, 104 Phil. 443, Aug 29, 1958 (FAYE)

Issue:​ Is the ordinance constitutional?

4. NAPOCOR v. Gutierrez, 193 SCRA 1, Jan 18, 1991 (MUSTANG)

Additional info - doc cutie pie

PARÁS, C. ​J​., dissenting:

The plaintiffs-appellants—two lawyers, a physician, an accountant, a dentist and a pharmacist— had

Additional info: (edwardo versoza)

Section 6, Article XIII of our Constitution provides:

Section 1(2), Article III, of our Constitution provides:

Wherefore, the decision appealed from is affirmed,without pronouncement as to costs.

8. Manosca v. CA, 252 SCRA 412, Jan 29, 1996 (ERICA)

ALEJANDRO ​MANOSCA​, et al. ​petitioners vs.​ ​COURT OF APPEALS​, et al.,​ ​respondents

Doc trines: may mailagay lang - doc

9. Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S 84 (2003) (JERALD)

10. United States v. Cors :: 337 U.S 325 (1949) (FAYE)

III. HUMAN RIGHTS LAW

● What is human rights law? [Explain Exhaustively / Cite Sources] (JUED)

Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, ​J.:

Sec. 40, Local Government Code:

Sec. 12, Omnibus Election Code:

The pardoning power of the President ​cannot be limited by legislative action​.

The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.

LEONEN, ​J Dissenting Opinion

a. Joseph Ejercito Estrada: convicted, disqualified, and pardoned

IV. INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS

A. Universal Declaration of Human Rights (UDHR)

● UDHR Preamble [Copy the Preamble] (YANA)

Whereas it is essential to promote the development of friendly relations between nations,

Additional info -dokie pogi

● ICCPR Preamble (BRYAN)

The States Parties to the present Covenant,

Agree upon the following articles:

The rights protected under the ICCPR include:

Article 1 – Right to self-determination.

Article 2 – Right for recognition without discrimination.

Article 3 – Equal rights for men and women.

Article 6 – Right to life.

Article 7 – Freedom from torture.

Article 8 – Right to not be enslaved.

Article 9 – Right to liberty and security of the person.

Article 10 – Rights of detainees.

Article 12 – Freedom of movement and choice of residence for lawful residents.

Article 13 – Rights of aliens.

Article 16 – Right to recognition as a person before the law.

Article 17 – Freedom from arbitrary or unlawful interference.

Article 18 – Right to freedom of thought, conscience and religion.

Article 19 – Right to hold opinions without interference.

Article 20 – Propaganda for war shall be prohibited by law.

Article 21 – Right of peaceful assembly.

Article 22 – Right to freedom of association with others.

Article 23 – Right to marry.

Article 24 – Children’s rights

Article 25 – Right to political participation.

Article 26 – Equality before the law.

Article 27 – Minority protection.

First Optional Protocol:

Second Optional Protocol:

DOCTRINE AS PER REYES:

ISSUE: WON Ordinance No. 13 is unconstitutional. NO (it is constitutional)

Issue: Is the ordinance constitutional?

PARÁS, C. J., dissenting:

ALEJANDRO MANOSCA, et al. petitioners vs. COURT OF APPEALS, et al., respondents

Ponente: LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

The pardoning power of the President cannot be limited by legislative action.

LEONEN, J Dissenting Opinion

Held: The petition fails.

Section 1 of the Rule on the Writ of Amparo provides: