Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11848 May 31, 1962
IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE DECEASED IRENE SANTOS.
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, Administrator, ADELA SANTOS GUTIERREZ, movant-appellee,
vs.
JOSE D. VILLEGAS, and RIZALINA SANTOS RIVERA, oppositors-appellants.
Perkins and Ponce Enrile for movant-appellee.
Delgado, Flores and Macapagal for oppositors-appellants.
PAREDES, J.:
On November 11, 1954, Irene Santos died intestate, leaving as her only heirs her
surviving spouse Jose D. Villegas and two nieces — daughters of a deceased
brother, Rizalina Santos Rivera and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Thereafter, the surviving
spouse filed with the Rizal CFI, Pasay City Branch, a petition for Letters of
Administration (Sp. Proc. No. 2100), and was appointed administrator of the estate.
In the petition, he named as intestate heirs, besides himself, Rizalina Santos Rivera
and Adela Santos Gutierrez. Under date of January 15, 1955, in the above-
mentioned Special Proceedings, an unverified manifestation signed by Adela
Gutierrez, accompanied by a public instrument entitled "Kasulatan ng Bilihan at
Salinan", dated January 12, 1955, was presented to the Probate Court, stating
among others, the following —
The undersigned hereby solemnly manifests . . . that all her rights, interests and
participation in the estate subject of this proceeding now belong to her sister,
Rizalina Santos Rivera, and that hereafter she will not take part in the above-
entitled proceedings and is not entitled to the service of any pleadings, motion,
order or decision filed or promulgated therein.
In a verified manifestation presented before the probate Court on January 25,
1955, Adela averred that the deed of assignment of her rights, participation and
interest in the estate of Irene Santos and the first manifestation were obtained thru
fraud practiced by the administrator upon her and were vitiated by mistake or
undue influence. Therein, she narrated that sometime in December, 1954, due to
stringent financial conditions, she (Adela) requested the administrator for an
advance of P2,000.00 from the estate. The administrator refused on the ground
that it is against the law, but suggested that she might obtain a loan from her sister
Rizalina, offering to help. After Christmas of 1954, the administrator informed Adela
that he was able to secure the conformity of Rizalina to give her a loan of
P10,000.00 instead of only P2,000.00. When Adela expressed surprise over the
amount, the administrator replied that he only wanted to help her get started in
business. On January 12, 1955, Adela was brought by Villegas and Rizalina to the
office of their lawyer, where she was made to sign a document she could not
read. On January 13, 1955, the lawyer asked Adela to sign another document,
which he said was to be presented in Court and explained the contents of the
document signed the day before. It was only then that Adela came to know that
said document was a deed of sale.1 When Adela protested, Villegas told her that
the matter could be discussed better in his house in Malabon. On arriving at
Malabon, Villegas informed Adela that the amount of P50,000.00 which Rizalina
was paying for her share in the inheritance, was probably more than what she
would get in the estate, because the estate is not valuable and had plenty of
debts. Villegas handed to Adela P6,800.00 in cash and a check drawn, by Rizalina
on the Prudential Bank for P3,200.00. Although Adela did not want to accept the
money, Villegas refused to take them back. When she was made to sign the deed
of assignment, Adela did not know the true value of the estate, which she now
estimates to be no less than P1,000.000.00. In the same manifestation, Adela stated
that a complaint for annulment of the Deed of Assignment was being prepared;
that she was tendering the full amount of P10,000.00 to Villegas or Rizalina; that she
was placing the above facts within the knowledge of the Court so that no action
be taken giving value to the alleged deed of assignment and in order that she
(Adela) might be notified of each and all pleadings or orders connected with the
proceedings. The administrator Villegas and Rizalina filed exceptions and/or
objections to the Manifestation, denying the allegations of fraud, undue influence
and the like.
In a motion dated September 7, 1955, filed with the CFI of Pasay, Adela asked the
Court to transfer Special Proceedings No. 2100, to Branch I (Pasig), alleging that
the complaint for the nullity of the Deed of Assignment filed with the Rizal CFI had
been assigned to said Branch I; and that the transfer would save time and effort on
the part of all concerned. The motion was strongly opposed by the administrator
who stated, among others —
That in the final distribution of the estate to the heirs, the share corresponding to
the movant Adela Santos Gutierrez may be ordered withheld by this Court (if due
motion therefor shall have been presented to this Court) until the validity of the
deed of assignment shall have been resolved by Branch I of the Court of First
Instance of Rizal.
On September 16, 1955, the motion to transfer was denied.
On February 9, 1956, Adela presented with the Probate Court, a motion praying
that the administrator and/or his attorneys be required to furnish her all copies of
pleadings filed or to be filed in the intestate proceedings, it appearing that the
administrator presented pleadings in Court without serving her copies thereof.
An opposition was interposed by the administrator, who alleged that the movant,
although originally a party to the probate proceeding, has voluntarily and
expressly desisted from being so, and that having assigned by sale, all her rights,
interests and participations in the estate, she has no longer any legal standing in
the case. On March 12, 1956, the Court (Judge Emilio Rilloraza, presiding)
promulgated the following order —
. . ., the Court is of the opinion that the said motion should be, as it is hereby,
granted and the said administrator and/or his attorneys are hereby directed to
furnish Adela Santos Gutierrez, through counsel, all copies of the pleadings filed
and to be filed in this case, except those mentioned in said motion within a
reasonable time upon notice hereof.
The Clerk of Court should see to it that before receiving for filing by the
administrator or the other legal heir, Rizalina Santos Rivera, and/or their respective
counsel, any pleadings, motion, etc., that copies thereof have been furnished
Adela Santos Gutierrez through counsel.
A series of long pleadings were presented by the parties, following a motion of
reconsideration, containing arguments and authorities sustaining their respective
theories. On June 2, 1956, vacation Judge Jesus Y. Perez, handed down an Order,
the material portions of which follow —
Spec Pro 4 1
xxx xxx xxx
The only question for determination in this incident is whether or not Adela Santos
Gutierrez has a right to intervene in this probate proceeding. The Administrator
contends that she has no such right because she had already assigned all her
rights to her sister, Rizalina Santos Rivera.
Although at the outset, Adela Santos Gutierrez bad the right to intervene herein as
one of the legal heirs of the deceased Irene Santos, yet, when she filed her
manifestation, accompanied by the Deed of Sale and Assignment, informing this
Court that she had assigned all her rights and interest as such heir to her sister,
Rizalina Santos Rivera, said Adela Santos Gutierrez had ceased to have any
interest in this estate and without such interest, she could no longer intervene in this
proceeding. The assignment, it copy of which is attached to the record, is in the
form of a public deed which is entitled to be accorded the presumption of validity
so that until the same is annulled in the corresponding action filed by Adela Santos
Gutierrez in the Pasig Branch of this Court, her interest would merely be a
contingent one, that is, depending upon the contingency of a decision declaring
such annulment of the deed of assignment. This contingent interest of Adela
Santos Gutierrez is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this
proceedings, unless otherwise provided by law, the interest required in order that a
person may be a party, must be material and direct, and not indirect or
contingent (II Moran's Rules of Court, 1952 Ed., pp. 391-92). We quote the following
from Moran's Rules of Court:
xxx xxx xxx
In the same way, since the interest of Adela Santos Gutierrez to be considered as
heir is dependent upon the contingency that she would succeed in her case for
annulment of the Deed of Assignment in the Court of First Instance of Rizal, her
contingent interest is not sufficient to make her an interested party in this
proceeding.
WHEREFORE, the Court hereby sustains the motion for reconsideration filed by the
administrator and hereby sets aside the order of March 12, 1956.1äwphï1.ñët
Adela Santos Gutierrez, on June 26, 1956, moved for the reconsideration of the
above Order, contending that her motion on February 8, 1956, was not a leave for
intervention (Rule 13). At most, the rule on transfer of interestpendente lite (Sec. 20,
Rule 3), should be applicable, not that of intervention. On August 10, 1956, Judge
Rilloraza, who had already returned from vacation, set aside the order of Judge
Perez, stating —
..., this Court is of the opinion that the order of this Court dated June 2, 1956 should
be, as it is hereby set aside.
Let the administrator and/or his attorney furnish henceforth Adela Santos Gutierrez,
through counsel, copies of all pleadings, motions, etc., to be filed in this case.
The above Order is now the subject of the instant appeal, the administrator and
Rizalina Santos Rivera assigning three (3) errors allegedly committed by the court a
quo, all of which pose a singular issue, viz., whether Adela Santos Gutierrez is still
entitled to be furnished with pleadings filed by the administrator in the probate
proceedings and orders therein issue by the lower court.
The order appealed from being interlocutory, cannot be the subject of an appeal.
Even on this plane alone, the appeal should be dismissed. Of course, appellants
cited the case of Tengco v. San Jose, G.R. No. L-8162, Aug. 30, 1955, wherein We
considered the appeal as petition for certiorari. That case, however, has no
parallel to the one now under consideration. It was one for mandamus for the
purpose of compelling the Judge to give due course to an appeal. Considering
that in order for certiorari and mandamus to prosper, allegations to the effect that
the court has no jurisdiction, or it acted in excess thereof or with grave abuse of
discretion, must appear, which is not obtaining in the instant case (because it is an
ordinary appeal), it becomes peremptory that the present appeal is not in order.
Moreover, it cannot be successfully denied that Adela Santos Gutierrez is an
indispensable party to the proceedings in question. Her interest in the estate is not
inchoate, it was established at the time of death of Irene Santos on November 11,
1954. While it is true that she executed a deed of assignment, it is also a fact that
she asked the same to be annulled, which action is now pending before the Rizal
CFI, Pasig Branch. Although Adela had filed a manifestation dropping herself from
the proceedings and presenting therewith the supposed Deed of Assignment, the
record, nevertheless fails to show that action thereon had been taken by the
probate Court. Every act intended to put an end to indivision among co-heirs and
legatees or devisees is deemed to be a partition, although it should purport to be
a sale, an exchange, a compromise, or any other transaction (Art. 1082, NCC). No
serious argument can be offered to deny the co-heirship of appellee in the estate
under probate. It appearing (if We assume the due execution of the Deed of
Assignment), that the transaction is in the nature of extrajudicial partition, court
approval is imperative, and the heirs cannot just divest the court of its jurisdiction
over the estate and over their persons, by the mere act of assignment and
desistance. Thus, in the case of Sandoval v. Santiago, G.R. No. L-1723, May 30,
1949, this Court said: ". . . and the heirs of the deceased Marquez could not divest
the Court of First Instance of its already acquired jurisdiction by the mere fact of
dividing and distributing extrajudicially the estate of the deceased among
themselves". But even if the partition had been judicially approved on the basis of
the alleged deed of assignment, an aggrieved heir does not lose her standing in
the probate court.
In our opinion, the court that approved the partition and the agreement in
ratification thereof may annul both whenever, as it is here alleged, the approval
was obtained by deceit or fraud, and the petition must be filed in the courts of the
intestate proceedings, for it is generally admitted that probate courts are
authorized to vacate any decree or judgment procured by fraud, not only while
the proceedings in the course of which it was issued are pending, but even, as in
this case, within a reasonable time thereafter. (Trillana v. Crisostomo, G.R. No. L-
3378, Aug. 22, 1951; Espinosa v. Barrios. 70 Phil. 311).
We agree with appellee that the motion in question is not one of intervention, but
solely a plea to enforce a right and that is to receive pleadings and orders related
to the case. Evidently, the use of the word "intervention" in the manifestation and
pleadings presented by Adela was resorted to for want of another appropriate
word. In effect, all she wanted to convey was that she should participate or
continue taking part in the case for being an original party therein. It was her belief
that in filing the manifestation dropping herself from the proceedings (but which
she later informed the court to have been secured thru fraud), her standing might
have been affected. Intervention as contemplated by the Rules is a proceeding in
a suit or action by which a third person is permitted by the court to make himself a
party, either joining plaintiff in claiming what is sought by the complaint, or uniting
with defendant in resisting the claims of plaintiff, or demanding something
Spec Pro 4 2
adversely to both of them; the act or proceeding by which a third
person becomes a party in a suit pending between others; the admission, by leave
of court, of a person not an original party to pending legal proceedings, which
such person becomes a party thereto for the protection of some right or interest
alleged by him to be affected by such proceedings (Judge of Camarines Sur, et
al. vs. David, et al., G.R. No. 45454, April 12, 1939, cited in Francisco's Rules of Court,
Vol. I, Part I, p. 639, emphasis supplied). The circumstances stated above do not fit
the status of Adela in the probate proceedings; she was not a third person; she
was an original party therein.
We see no prejudice to be suffered by the administrator and Rizalina, if they are
required to furnish copies of their pleadings to appellee. On the contrary, doing so,
will give appellee her day in court and provide protection to the administrator
himself.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, We find the Order appealed from to be in conformity
with the law and jurisprudence. The same should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all
respects, with costs against the appellants Jose D. Villegas and Rizalina Santos
Rivera, in both instances.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera and Dizon,
JJ., concur.
Bengzon, C.J., is on leave.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23372 June 14, 1967
IN RE: INTESTATE ESTATE OF THE LATE PIO DURAN. CIPRIANO DURAN and MIGUEL
DURAN, petitioners-appellants,
vs.
JOSEFINA B. DURAN, movant-oppositor and appellee.
A. C. Aguilar, N. J. Quisumbing and E. Quisumbing-Fernando for petitioners-
appellants.
Bausa, Ampil and Suarez for movant-oppositor-appellee.
BENGZON J.P, J.:
Pio Duran died without testament on February 28, 1961 in Guinobatan Albay.
Among his alleged heirs are Josefina Duran, as surviving spouse; several brothers
and sisters; nephews and nieces.
Subsequent to his death, on June 2, 1962, Cipriano Duran, one of the surviving
brothers, executed a public instrument assigning and renouncing his hereditary
rights to the decedent's estate in favor of Josefina Duran, for the consideration of
P2,500.00.
A year later, on June 8, 1963, Cipriano Duran filed in the Court of First Instance of
Albay a petition for intestate proceedings to settle Pio Duran's estate, further asking
that he be named the administrator. An ex parte motion to be appointed special
administrator was also filed by him.
Against said petition, Josefina Duran filed on August 9, 1963 an opposition, praying
for its dismissal upon the ground that the petitioner is not an "interested person" in
the estate, in view of the deed of transfer and renunciation the estate, in view of
afore-stated, attaching a copy of the same; in the alternative, she asked to be
appointed administratrix.
Replying to this, Cipriano alleged, on September 11, 1963, alleged in his opposition
to the motion to dismiss, that Josefina Duran was not the decedent's wife. Anent
the deed of assignment, he contended that the same was procured thru fraud,
with gross inadequacy of price and vitiated by lesion.
Still later, another brother of the decedent, Miguel Duran, filed on September 14,
1963, a petition to be joined as co-petitioner of Cipriano. Josefina Duran moved to
strike out said petition as an improper attempt to intervene in the case. She also
filed a reply to Cipriano's opposition to her motion to dismiss. In turn, Miguel filed an
opposition to Josefina's motion to strike out.1äwphï1.ñët
Acting on said motions, on June 3, 1964, the Court of First Instance issued an order
dismissing the petition of Cipriano for his lack of interest in the estate. Said lack of
interest was premised on the deed of transfer executed by Cipriano, regarding
which the court declared itself without power to examine in said proceedings,
collaterally, the alleged fraud, inadequacy of price and lesion that would render it
rescissible or voidable. And with the petition's dismissal, Miguel's petition to be
joined as co-petitioner was deemed without leg to stand on.
Appeal to Us directly, on questions of law, was taken by Cipriano and Miguel
Duran.
The Rules of Court provides that a petition for administration and settlement of an
estate must be filed by an "interested person" (See. 2, Rule 79). Appellants contend
that the deed of assignment executed by Cipriano did not operate to render him
a person without interest in the estate. Relying on In re Irene Santos, L-11848, May
31, 1962, they argue that an assignment by one heir of his share in the estate to a
co-heir amounts to a partition needing approval by the settlement court to be
effective; and that the assigning heir does not lose his status as a person interested
in the estate, even after said assignment is approved by the court.
The situation in the Santos case involves an assignment between co-
heirs pendente lite, during the course of settlement proceedings, properly and
validly commenced. At the time of said assignment, therefore, the settlement
court had already acquired jurisdiction over the properties of estate. As a result,
any assignment regarding the same had to be approved by said court. And since
the approval the court is not deemed final until the estate is closed the assigning
heir remains an interested person in proceedings even after said approval, which
can be vacated is given.
In the present case, however, the assignment took place when no settlement
proceedings was pending. The properties subject matter of the assignment were
not under the jurisdiction of a settlement court. Allowing that the assignment must
be deemed a partition as between the assignor and assignee, the same does not
need court approval to be effective as between the parties. An extrajudicial
partition is valid as between the participants even if the requisites of Sec. 1, Rule 74
for extrajudicial partition are not followed, since said requisites are for purposes of
binding creditors and non-participating heirs only (Hernandez v. Andal, 78 Phil.
196). Should it be contended that said partition was attended with fraud, lesion or
inadequacy of price, the remedy is to rescind or to annul the same in an action for
that purpose. And in the meanwhile, assigning heir cannot initiate a settlement
proceedings, for until the deed of assignment is annulled or rescinded, it is deemed
Spec Pro 4 3
valid and effective against him, so that he is left without that "interest" in the estate
required to petite for settlement proceedings.
Anent appellant Miguel Duran, he sought in his petition below to "join petitioner
Cipriano Duran as co-petitioner in the latter's petition . . . and incorporates herein
by adoption all the allegations made in said petition." (Record on Appeal, pp. 45-
46). The same, therefore, amounted to a petition to intervene in the settlement
proceedings. As aptly ruled by the court a quo, since there was really no
settlement proceedings in the first place, the petition to intervene must be denied.
Finally, although Josefina Duran prayed to be appointed administratrix, her doing
so did not amount to ratification of the petition for settlement under the ruling
in Eusebio v. Valmores, 97 Phil. 163, since she did so merely by way of an
alternative prayer, should her motion to dismiss fail. And said motion to dismiss was
properly sustained.
Wherefore, the dismissal order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against
appellants. So ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar, Sanchez and Castro,
JJ., concur.
SECOND DIVISION
The antecedents are as follows:
On 15 January 2001, respondent herein, Felicidad A. Tayag-Gallor, filed a petition
for the issuance of letters of administration over the estate of Ismael
Tayag.[3] Respondent alleged in the petition, docketed as Special Proceeding No.
5994 (SP 5994), that she is one of the three (3) illegitimate children of the late Ismael
Tayag and Ester C. Angeles. The decedent was married to petitioner herein,
Victoria C. Tayag, but the two allegedly did not have any children of their own.
On 7 September 2000, Ismael Tayag died intestate, leaving behind two (2) real
properties both of which are in the possession of petitioner, and a motor vehicle
which the latter sold on 10 October 2000 preparatory to the settlement of the
decedents estate.Petitioner allegedly promised to give respondent and her
brothers P100,000.00 each as their share in the proceeds of the sale. However,
petitioner only gave each of them half the amount she promised.

VICTORIA C. TAYAG, G.R. No. 174680 Respondent further averred that on 20 November 2000, petitioner has caused the
Petitioner, annotation of 5 September 1984 affidavit executed by Ismael Tayag declaring the
Present: properties to be the paraphernal properties of petitioner. The latter allegedly
intends to dispose of these properties to the respondents and her brothers
prejudice.
QUISUMBING, J.,
- versus - Chairperson,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA,
CHICO-NAZARIO, and Petitioner opposed the petition, asserting that she purchased the properties
VELASCO, JR., JJ. subject of the petition using her own money. She claimed that she and Ismael
FELICIDAD A. TAYAG-GALLOR, Tayag got married in Las Vegas, Nevada, USA on 25 October 1973, and that they
Respondent. have an adopted daughter, Carmela Tayag, who is presently residing in the USA. It
Promulgated: is allegedly not true that she is planning to sell the properties. Petitioner prayed for
March 24, 2008 the dismissal of the suit because respondent failed to state a cause of action.[4]

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x In a Motion[5] dated 31 August 2001, petitioner reiterated her sole ownership of the
properties and presented the transfer certificates of title thereof in her name. She
DECISION also averred that it is necessary to allege that respondent was acknowledged and
recognized by Ismael Tayag as his illegitimate child. There being no such
allegation, the action becomes one to compel recognition which cannot be
TINGA, J.: brought after the death of the putative father. To prevent further encroachment
upon the courts time, petitioner moved for a hearing on her affirmative defenses.

This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking the reversal of the Decision [1] of the The Motion was denied in an Order[6] dated 3 April 2003. Petitioners motion for
Court of Appeals dated 29 May 2006, and its Resolution[2] dated 28 August 2006 in reconsideration was likewise denied in an Order [7] dated 16 July 2003.
CA-G.R. SP No. 79205.

Spec Pro 4 4

The appellate court, in a Decision[8] dated 29 May 2006, upheld the denial of
petitioners motion and directed the trial court to proceed with the case with
dispatch. The Court of Appeals ruled, in essence, that the allegation that
respondent is an illegitimate child suffices for a cause of action, without need to
state that she had been recognized and acknowledged as such. However,
respondent still has to prove her allegation and, correspondingly, petitioner has the
right to refute the allegation in the course of the settlement proceedings.
The Court of Appeals denied reconsideration in a Resolution [9] dated 28 August
2006.
In her Petition[10] 17 dated September 2006, petitioner asserts that respondent
should not be allowed to prove her filiation in the settlement of Ismael Tayags
estate. If, following the case of Uyguanco v. Court of Appeals,[11] the claim of
filiation may no longer be proved in an action for recognition, with more reason
that it should not be allowed to be proved in an action for the settlement of the
decedents estate. Thus, petitioner claims, respondent may no longer maintain an
action to prove that she is the illegitimate child of the decedent after the latters
death.
Unfortunately, the two-page Comment,[12] dated 17 April 2007, fails to shed any
more light on the present controversy.
The Reply[13] dated 3 September 2007 reiterates the arguments in the petition.
The main issue in this case is deceptively simple. As crafted by the Court of
Appeals, it is whether respondents petition for the issuance of letters of
administration sufficiently states a cause of action considering that respondent
merely alleged therein that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent, without
stating that she had been acknowledged or recognized as such by the latter. The
appellate court held that the mere allegation that respondent is an illegitimate
child suffices.
Rule 79 of the Rules of Court provides that a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration must be filed by an interested person. In Saguinsin v.
Lindayag,[14] the Court defined an interested party as one who would be
benefited by the estate, such as an heir, or one who has a claim against the
estate, such as a creditor. This interest, furthermore, must be material and direct,
not merely indirect or contingent.
Hence, where the right of the person filing a petition for the issuance of letters of
administration is dependent on a fact which has not been established or worse,
can no longer be established, such contingent interest does not make her an
interested party.Here lies the complication in the case which the appellate court
had not discussed, although its disposition of the case is correct.
Essentially, the petition for the issuance of letters of administration is a suit for the
settlement of the intestate estate of Ismael Tayag. The right of respondent to
maintain such a suit is dependent on whether she is entitled to successional rights
as an illegitimate child of the decedent which, in turn, may be established through
voluntary or compulsory recognition.
Voluntary recognition must be express such as that in a record of birth appearing
in the civil register, a final judgment, a public instrument or private handwritten
instrument signed by the parent concerned.[15] The voluntary recognition of an
illegitimate child by his or her parent needs no further court action and is,
therefore, not subject to the limitation that the action for recognition be brought
during the lifetime of the putative parent.[16] Judicial or compulsory recognition, on
the other hand, may be demanded by the illegitimate child of his parents and
must be brought during the lifetime of the presumed parents.[17]
Petitioners thesis is essentially based on her contention that by Ismael Tayags
death, respondents illegitimate filiation and necessarily, her interest in the
decedents estate which the Rules require to be material and direct, may no longer
be established.Petitioner, however, overlooks the fact that respondents
successional rights may be established not just by a judicial action to compel
recognition but also by proof that she had been voluntarily acknowledged and
recognized as an illegitimate child.
In Uyguangco v. Court of Appeals, supra, Graciano Uyguangco, claiming to be an
illegitimate child of the decedent, filed a complaint for partition against the latters
wife and legitimate children. However, an admission was elicited from him in the
course of his presentation of evidence at the trial that he had none of the
documents mentioned in Article 278[18] of the 1950 Civil Code to show that he was
the illegitimate son of the decedent. The wife and legitimate children of the
decedent thereupon moved for the dismissal of the case on the ground that he
could no longer prove his alleged filiation under the applicable provision of the
Civil Code.
The Court, applying the provisions of the Family Code which had then already
taken effect, ruled that since Graciano was claiming illegitimate filiation under the
second paragraph of Article 172 of the Family Code, i.e., open and continuous
possession of the status of an illegitimate child, the action was already barred by
the death of the alleged father.
In contrast, respondent in this case had not been given the opportunity to present
evidence to show whether she had been voluntarily recognized and
acknowledged by her deceased father because of petitioners opposition to her
petition and motion for hearing on affirmative defenses. There is, as yet, no way to
determine if her petition is actually one to compel recognition which had already
been foreclosed by the death of her father, or whether indeed she has a material
and direct interest to maintain the suit by reason of the decedents voluntary
acknowledgment or recognition of her illegitimate filiation.
Spec Pro 4 5

We find, therefore, that the allegation that respondent is an illegitimate child of the
decedent suffices even without further stating that she has been so recognized or
acknowledged. A motion to dismiss on the ground of failure to state a cause of
action in the complaint hypothetically admits the truth of the facts alleged
therein.[19] Assuming the fact alleged to be true, i.e., that respondent is the
decedents illegitimate child, her interest in the estate as such would definitely be
material and direct. The appellate court was, therefore, correct in allowing the
proceedings to continue, ruling that, respondent still has the duty to prove the
allegation (that she is an illegitimate child of the decedent), just as the petitioner
has the right to disprove it, in the course of the settlement proceedings.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals
dated 29 May 2006 and its Resolution dated 28 August 2006 are AFFIRMED. No
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40502 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, and HONORABLE SEVERO A. MALVAR, Presiding Judge,
Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch Vl, petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS, * PRECIOSA B. GARCIA and AGUSTINA B.
GARCIA, respondents.
G.R. No. L-42670 November 29, 1976
VIRGINIA GARCIA FULE, petitioner,
vs.
HONORABLE ERNANI C. PAÑO, Presiding Judge of Court of First Instance of Rizal,
Quezon City, Branch XVIII, and PRECIOSA B. GARCIA, respondents.
Francisco Carreon for petitioners.
Augusto G. Gatmaytan for private respondents.
MARTIN, J.:
These two interrelated cases bring to Us the question of what the word "resides" in
Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules Of Court, referring to the situs of the
settlement of the estate of deceased persons, means. Additionally, the rule in the
appointment of a special administrator is sought to be reviewed.
On May 2, 1973, Virginia G. Fule filed with the Court of First Instance of Laguna, at
Calamba, presided over by Judge Severo A. Malvar, a petition for letters of
administration, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. 27-C, alleging, inter alia, "that on April 26,
1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in
the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba,
Laguna, and in other places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court." At the
same time, she moved
ex parte for her appointment as special administratrix over the estate. On even
date, May 2, 1973, Judge Malvar granted the motion.
A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on May 8, 1973,
contending that the order appointing Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix was
issued without jurisdiction, since no notice of the petition for letters of administration
has been served upon all persons interested in the estate; there has been no delay
or cause for delay in the proceedings for the appointment of a regular
administrator as the surviving spouse of Amado G. Garcia, she should be preferred
in the appointment of a special administratrix; and, Virginia G. Fule is a debtor of
the estate of Amado G. Garcia. Preciosa B. Garcia, therefore, prayed that she be
appointed special administratrix of the estate, in lieu of Virginia G. Fule, and as
regular administratrix after due hearing.
While this reconsideration motion was pending resolution before the Court,
Preciosa B. Garcia filed on May 29, 1973 a motion to remove Virginia G. Fule as
special administratrix alleging, besides the jurisdictional ground raised in the
motion for reconsideration of May 8, 1973 that her appointment was obtained
through erroneous, misleading and/or incomplete misrepresentations; that Virginia
G. Fule has adverse interest against the estate; and that she has shown herself
unsuitable as administratrix and as officer of the court.
In the meantime, the notice of hearing of the petition for letters of administration
filed by Virginia G. Fule with the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna, was
published on May 17, 24, and 31, 1973, in the Bayanihan, a weekly publication of
general circulation in Southern Luzon.
On June 6, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia received a "Supplemental Petition for the
Appointment of Regular Administrator ' filed by Virginia G. Fule. This supplemental
petition modified the original petition in four aspects: (1) the allegation that during
the lifetime of the deceased Amado G. Garcia, he was elected as Constitutional
Delegate for the First District of Laguna and his last place of residence was at
Calamba, Laguna; (2) the deletion of the names of Preciosa B. Garcia and
Agustina Garcia as legal heirs of Amado G. Garcia; (3) the allegation that Carolina
Carpio, who was simply listed as heir in the original petition, is the surviving spouse
of Amado G. Garcia and that she has expressly renounced her preferential right to
the administration of the estate in favor of Virginia G. Fule; and (4) that Virginia G.
Fule be appointed as the regular administratrix. The admission of this supplemental
petition was opposed by Preciosa B. Garcia for the reason, among others, that it
attempts to confer jurisdiction on the Court of First Instance of Laguna, of which the
court was not possessed at the beginning because the original petition was
deficient.
On July 19, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed an opposition to the original and
supplemental petitions for letters of administration, raising the issues of jurisdiction,
venue, lack of interest of Virginia G. Fule in the estate of Amado G. Garcia, and
disqualification of Virginia G Fule as special administratrix.
An omnibus motion was filed by Virginia G. Fule on August 20, 1973, praying for
authority to take possession of properties of the decedent allegedly in the hands of
third persons as well as to secure cash advances from the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc. Preciosa B. Garcia opposed the motion,
calling attention to the limitation made by Judge Malvar on the power of the
special administratrix, viz., "to making an inventory of the personal and real
properties making up the state of the deceased."
Spec Pro 4 6
However, by July 2, 1973, Judge Malvar and already issued an order, received by
Preciosa B. Garcia only on July 31, 1973, denying the motion of Preciosa B. Garcia
to reconsider the order of May 2, 1973, appointing Virginia G. Fule as special
administratrix, and admitting the supplementation petition of May 18,1973.
On August 31, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia moved to dismiss the petition, because (1)
jurisdiction over the petition or over the parties in interest has not been acquired by
the court; (2) venue was improperly laid; and (3) Virginia G. Fule is not a party in
interest as she is not entitled to inherit from the deceased Amado G. Garcia.
On September 28, 1973, Preciosa B. Garcia filed a supplemental motion to
substitute Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, reasoning that the said Virginia
G. Fule admitted before before the court that she is a full-blooded sister of Pablo G.
Alcalde, an illegitimate son of Andrea Alcalde, with whom the deceased Amado
G. Garcia has no relation.
Three motions were filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on November 14, 1973, one, to
enjoin the special administratrix from taking possession of properties in the hands
of third persons which have not been determined as belonging to Amado G.
Garcia; another, to remove the special administratrix for acting outside her
authority and against the interest of the estate; and still another, filed in behalf of
the minor Agustina B. Garcia, to dismiss the petition for want of cause of action,
jurisdiction, and improper venue.
On November 28, 1973, Judge Malvar resolved the pending omnibus motion of
Virgina G. Fule and the motion to dismiss filed by Preciosa B. Garcia. Resolving the
motion to dismiss, Judge Malvar ruled that the powers of the special administratrix
are those provided for in Section 2, Rule 80 of the Rules of Court, 1 subject only to
the previous qualification made by the court that the administration of the
properties subject of the marketing agreement with the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association should remain with the latter; and that the
special administratrix had already been authorized in a previous order of August
20, 1973 to take custody and possession of all papers and certificates of title and
personal effects of the decedent with the Canlubang Sugar Planters Cooperative
Marketing Association, Inc. Ramon Mercado, of the Canlubang Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc., was ordered to deliver to Preciosa B.
Garcia all certificates of title in her name without any qualifying words like "married
to Amado Garcia" does not appear. Regarding the motion to dismiss, Judge
Malvar ruled that the issue of jurisdiction had already been resolved in the order of
July 2, 1973, denying Preciosa B. Garcia's motion to reconsider the appointment of
Virginia G. Fule and admitting the supplemental petition, the failure of Virginia G.
Fule to allege in her original petition for letters of administration in the place of
residence of the decedent at the time of his death was cured. Judge Malvar further
held that Preciosa B. Garcia had submitted to the jurisdiction of the court and had
waived her objections thereto by praying to be appointed as special and regular
administratrix of the estate.
An omnibus motion was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on December 27, 1973 to
clarify or reconsider the foregoing order of Judge Malvar, in view of previous court
order limiting the authority of the special administratrix to the making of an
inventory. Preciosa B. Garcia also asked for the resolution of her motion to dismiss
the petitions for lack of cause of action, and also that filed in behalf of Agustina B.
Garcia. Resolution of her motions to substitute and remove the special
administratrix was likewise prayed for.
On December 19, 1973, Judge Malvar issued two separate orders, the first, denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motions to substitute and remove the special administratrix,
and the second, holding that the power allowed the special administratrix enables
her to conduct and submit an inventory of the assets of the estate.
On January 7, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia moved for reconsideration of the foregoing
orders of November 28, 1973 and December 19, 1973, insofar as they sustained or
failed to rule on the issues raised by her: (a) legal standing (cause of action) of
Virginia G. Fule; (b) venue; (c) jurisdiction; (d) appointment, qualification and
removal of special administratrix; and (e) delivery to the special administratrix of
checks and papers and effects in the office of the Calamba Sugar Planters
Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.
On March 27, 1973, Judge Malvar issued the first questioned order denying
Preciosa B. Garcia's motion for reconsideration of January 7, 1974. On July 19,
1974, Judge Malvar issued the other three questioned orders: one, directing Ramon
Mercado, of the Calamba Sugar Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.,
to furnish Virginia G. Fule, as special administratrix, copy of the statement of
accounts and final liquidation of sugar pool, as well as to deliver to her the
corresponding amount due the estate; another, directing Preciosa B. Garcia to
deliver to Virginia G. Fule two motor vehicles presumably belonging to the estate;
and another, directing Ramon Mercado to deliver to the court all certificates of title
in his possession in the name of Preciosa B. Garcia, whether qualified with the word
"single" or "married to Amado Garcia."
During the hearing of the various incidents of this case (Sp. Proc. 27-C) before
Judge Malvar, 2 Virginia G. Fule presented the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia showing that his residence at the time of his death was Quezon City. On her
part, Preciosa B. Garcia presented the residence certificate of the decedent for
1973 showing that three months before his death his residence was in Quezon City.
Virginia G. Fule also testified that Amado G. Garcia was residing in Calamba,
Laguna at the time of his death, and that he was a delegate to the 1971
Constitutional Convention for the first district of Laguna.
On July 26, 1974, Preciosa B. Garcia and Agustina B. Garcia commenced a special
action for certiorari and/or prohibition and preliminary injunction before the Court
of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. No. 03221-SP. primarily to annul the proceedings
before Judge Malvar in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna,
or, in the alternative, to vacate the questioned four orders of that court, viz., one
dated March 27, 1974, denying their motion for reconsideration of the order
denying their motion to dismiss the criminal and supplemental petitions on the
issue, among others, of jurisdiction, and the three others, all dated July 19, 1974,
directing the delivery of certain properties to the special administratrix, Virginia G.
Fule, and to the court.
On January 30, 1975, the Court of Appeals rendered judgment annulling the
proceedings before Judge Severo A. Malvar in Sp. Proc. 27-C of the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, for lack of jurisdiction.
Denied of their motion for reconsideration on March 31, 1975, Virginia G. Fule
forthwith elevated the matter to Us on appeal by certiorari. The case was docketed
as G.R. No. L-40502.
However, even before Virginia G. Fule could receive the decision of the Court of
Appeals, Preciosa B. Garcia had already filed on February 1, 1975 a petition for
letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Quezon City
Spec Pro 4 7
Branch, docketed as Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, over the same intestate estate of
Amado G. Garcia. On February 10, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia urgently moved for her
appointment as special administratrix of the estate. Judge Vicente G. Ericta
granted the motion and appointed Preciosa B. Garcia as special administratrix
upon a bond of P30,000.00. Preciosa B. Garcia qualified and assumed the office.
For the first time, on February 14, 1975, Preciosa B. Garcia informed Judge Ericta of
the pendency of Sp. Proc. No. 27-C before Judge Malvar of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna, and the annulment of the proceedings therein by the Court of
Appeals on January 30, 1975. She manifested, however, her willingness to withdraw
Sp. Proc. Q-19738 should the decision of the Court of Appeals annulling the
proceedings before the Court of First Instance of Laguna in Sp. Proc. No. 27-C have
not yet become final, it being the subject of a motion for reconsideration.
On March 10, 1973, Judge Ericta ordered the suspension of the proceedings before
his court until Preciosa B. Garcia inform the court of the final outcome of the case
pending before the Court of Appeals. This notwithstanding, Preciosa B. Garcia filed
on December 11, 1975, an "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations."
On December 13, 1975, Virginia G. Fule filed a "Special Appearance to Question
Venue and Jurisdiction" reiterating the grounds stated in the previous special
appearance of March 3, 1975, and calling attention that the decision of the Court
of Appeals and its resolution denying the motion for reconsideration had been
appealed to this Court; that the parties had already filed their respective briefs;
and that the case is still pending before the Court.
On December 17, 1975, Judge Ernani Cruz Pano, who succeeded Judge Ericta,
issued an order granting Preciosa B. Garcia's "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay
Estate Obligations" in that the payments were for the benefit of the estate and that
there hangs a cloud of doubt on the validity of the proceedings in Sp. Proc. No. 27-
C of the Court of First Instance of Laguna.
A compliance of this Order was filed by Preciosa B. Garcia on January 12,1976.
On February 4,1974, VIRGINIA G. FULE instituted G.R. No. L-42670, a petition for
certiorari with temporary restraining order, to annul the proceedings in Sp. Proc.
No. Q-19738 and to restrain Judge Ernani Cruz Paño from further acting in the case.
A restraining order was issued on February 9, 1976.
We dismiss the appeal in G.R. No. L-40502 and the petition for certiorari in G.R. No.
L-42670 for the reasons and considerations hereinafter stated.
1. Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: "If the decedent is an
inhabitant of the Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an
alien, his will shall be proved, or letters of administration granted, and his estate
settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in which he resides at the time
of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court of First
Instance of any province in which he had estate. The court first taking cognizance
of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction to the
exclusion of all other courts. The jurisdiction assumed by a court, so far as it
depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the location of his estate,
shall not be contested in a suit or proceeding, except in an appeal from that court,
in the original case, or when the want of jurisdiction appears on the record." With
particular regard to letters of administration, Section 2, Rule 79 of the Revised Rules
of Court demands that the petition therefor should affirmatively show the existence
of jurisdiction to make the appointment sought, and should allege all the
necessary facts, such as death, the name and last residence of the decedent, the
existence, and situs if need be, of assets, intestacy, where this is relied upon, and
the right of the person who seeks administration, as next of kin, creditor, or
otherwise, to be appointed. The fact of death of the intestate and his last residence
within the country are foundation facts upon which all subsequent proceedings in
the administration of the estate rest, and that if the intestate was not an inhabitant
of the state at the time of his death, and left no assets in the state, no jurisdiction is
conferred on the court to grant letters of administration. 3
The aforequoted Section 1, Rule 73 (formerly Rule 75, Section 1), specifically the
clause "so far as it depends on the place of residence of the decedent, or of the
location of the estate," is in reality a matter of venue, as the caption of the Rule
indicates: "Settlement of Estate of Deceased Persons. Venue and Processes. 4 It
could not have been intended to define the jurisdiction over the subject matter,
because such legal provision is contained in a law of procedure dealing merely
with procedural matters. Procedure is one thing; jurisdiction over the subject matter
is another. The power or authority of the court over the subject matter "existed and
was fixed before procedure in a given cause began." That power or authority is not
altered or changed by procedure, which simply directs the manner in which the
power or authority shall be fully and justly exercised. There are cases though that if
the power is not exercised conformably with the provisions of the procedural law,
purely, the court attempting to exercise it loses the power to exercise it legally.
However, this does not amount to a loss of jurisdiction over the subject matter.
Rather, it means that the court may thereby lose jurisdiction over the person or that
the judgment may thereby be rendered defective for lack of something essential
to sustain it. The appearance of this provision in the procedural law at once raises
a strong presumption that it has nothing to do with the jurisdiction of the court over
the subject matter. In plain words, it is just a matter of method, of convenience to
the parties. 5
The Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, confers upon Courts of First Instance
jurisdiction over all probate cases independently of the place of residence of the
deceased. Because of the existence of numerous Courts of First Instance in the
country, the Rules of Court, however, purposedly fixes the venue or the place
where each case shall be brought. A fortiori, the place of residence of the
deceased in settlement of estates, probate of will, and issuance of letters of
administration does not constitute an element of jurisdiction over the subject
matter. It is merely constitutive of venue. And it is upon this reason that the Revised
Rules of Court properly considers the province where the estate of a deceased
person shall be settled as "venue." 6
2. But, the far-ranging question is this: What does the term "resides" mean? Does it
refer to the actual residence or domicile of the decedent at the time of his death?
We lay down the doctrinal rule that the term "resides" connotes ex vi termini "actual
residence" as distinguished from "legal residence or domicile." This term "resides,"
like, the terms "residing" and "residence," is elastic and should be interpreted in the
light of the object or purpose of the statute or rule in which it is employed. 7 In the
application of venue statutes and rules — Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of
Court is of such nature — residence rather than domicile is the significant factor.
Even where the statute uses the word "domicile" still it is construed as meaning
residence and not domicile in the technical sense. Some cases make a distinction
between the terms "residence" and "domicile" but as generally used in statutes
fixing venue, the terms are synonymous, and convey the same meaning as the
Spec Pro 4 8
term "inhabitant." 8In other words, "resides" should be viewed or understood in its
popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or physical habitation of a person,
actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in a place and
actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. 9 Residence simply requires
bodily presence as an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily
presence in that place and also an intention to make it one's domicile. 10 No
particular length of time of residence is required though; however, the residence
must be more than temporary. 11
3. Divergent claims are maintained by Virginia G. Fule and Preciosa B. Garcia on
the residence of the deceased Amado G. Garcia at the time of his death. In her
original petition for letters of administration before the Court of First Instance of
Calamba, Laguna, Virginia G. Fule measely stated "(t)hat on April 26,1973, Amado
G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate in the City of
Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in
other places within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court." Preciosa B. Garcia
assailed the petition for failure to satisfy the jurisdictional requirement and improper
laying of venue. For her, the quoted statement avers no domicile or residence of
the deceased Amado G. Garcia. To say that as "property owner of Calamba,
Laguna," he also resides in Calamba, Laguna, is, according to her, non sequitur.
On the contrary, Preciosa B. Garcia claims that, as appearing in his death
certificate presented by Virginia G. Fule herself before the Calamba court and in
other papers, the last residence of Amado G. Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue,
Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Parenthetically, in her amended petition, Virginia
G. Fule categorically alleged that Amado G. Garcia's "last place of residence was
at Calamba, Laguna."
On this issue, We rule that the last place of residence of the deceased Amado G.
Garcia was at 11 Carmel Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City, and not at
Calamba, Laguna. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the
decedent at the time of his death. 12 As it is, the death certificate of Amado G.
Garcia, which was presented in evidence by Virginia G. Fule herself and also by
Preciosa B. Garcia, shows that his last place of residence was at 11 Carmel
Avenue, Carmel Subdivision, Quezon City. Aside from this, the deceased's
residence certificate for 1973 obtained three months before his death; the
Marketing Agreement and Power of Attorney dated November 12, 1971 turning
over the administration of his two parcels of sugar land to the Calamba Sugar
Planters Cooperative Marketing Association, Inc.; the Deed of Donation dated
January 8, 1973, transferring part of his interest in certain parcels of land in
Calamba, Laguna to Agustina B. Garcia; and certificates of titles covering parcels
of land in Calamba, Laguna, show in bold documents that Amado G. Garcia's last
place of residence was at Quezon City. Withal, the conclusion becomes
imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule's petition for letters of administration
was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna.
Nevertheless, the long-settled rule is that objection to improper venue is subject to
waiver. Section 4, Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court states: "When improper
venue is not objected to in a motion to dismiss, it is deemed waived." In the case
before Us the Court of Appeals had reason to hold that in asking to substitute
Virginia G. Fule as special administratrix, Preciosa B. Garcia did not necessarily
waive her objection to the jurisdiction or venue assumed by the Court of First
Instance of Calamba, Laguna, but availed of a mere practical resort to alternative
remedy to assert her rights as surviving spouse, while insisting on the enforcement
of the Rule fixing the proper venue of the proceedings at the last residence of the
decedent.
4. Preciosa B. Garcia's challenge to Virginia G. Fule's appointment as special
administratrix is another issue of perplexity. Preciosa B. Garcia claims preference to
the appointment as surviving spouse. Section 1 of Rule 80 provides that "(w)hen
there is delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause
including an appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may
appoint a special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the
deceased until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or
administrators appointed. 13 Formerly, the appointment of a special administrator
was only proper when the allowance or disallowance of a will is under appeal. The
new Rules, however, broadened the basis for appointment and such appointment
is now allowed when there is delay in granting letters testamentary or
administration by any cause e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. 14 Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not
lies in the probate court. 15 That, however, is no authority for the judge to become
partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his passions to rule,
his judgment. Exercise of that discretion must be based on reason, equity, justice
and legal principle. There is no reason why the same fundamental and legal
principles governing the choice of a regular administrator should not be taken into
account in the appointment of a special administrator. 16 Nothing is wrong for the
judge to consider the order of preference in the appointment of a regular
administrator in appointing a special administrator. After all, the consideration that
overrides all others in this respect is the beneficial interest of the appointee in the
estate of the decedent. 17 Under the law, the widow would have the right of
succession over a portion of the exclusive property of the decedent, besides her
share in the conjugal partnership. For such reason, she would have as such, if not
more, interest in administering the entire estate correctly than any other next of kin.
The good or bad administration of a property may affect rather the fruits than the
naked ownership of a property. 18
Virginia G. Fule, however, disputes the status of Preciosa B. Garcia as the widow of
the late Amado G. Garcia. With equal force, Preciosa B. Garcia maintains that
Virginia G. Fule has no relation whatsoever with Amado G. Garcia, or that, she is a
mere illegitimate sister of the latter, incapable of any successional rights. 19 On this
point, We rule that Preciosa B. Garcia is prima facie entitled to the appointment of
special administratrix. It needs be emphasized that in the issuance of such
appointment, which is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator
is appointed, 20 the appointing court does not determine who are entitled to share
in the estate of the decedent but who is entitled to the administration. The issue of
heirship is one to be determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of
the court on the relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis
of distribution. 21 The preference of Preciosa B. Garcia is with sufficient reason. In a
Donation Inter Vivos executed by the deceased Amado G. Garcia on January 8,
1973 in favor of Agustina B. Garcia, he indicated therein that he is married to
Preciosa B. Garcia. 22 In his certificate of candidacy for the office of Delegate to
the Constitutional Convention for the First District of Laguna filed on September 1,
1970, he wrote therein the name of Preciosa B. Banaticla as his spouse. 23 Faced
Spec Pro 4 9
with these documents and the presumption that a man and a woman deporting
themselves as husband and wife have entered into a lawful contract of marriage,
Preciosa B. Garcia can be reasonably believed to be the surviving spouse of the
late Amado G. Garcia. Semper praesumitur pro matrimonio. 24
5. Under these circumstances and the doctrine laid down in Cuenco vs. Court of
Appeals, 25 this Court under its supervisory authority over all inferior courts may
properly decree that venue in the instant case was properly assumed by and
transferred to Quezon City and that it is in the interest of justice and avoidance of
needless delay that the Quezon City court's exercise of jurisdiction over the
settlement of the estate of the deceased Amado G. Garcia and the appointment
of special administratrix over the latter's estate be approved and authorized and
the Court of First Instance of Laguna be disauthorized from continuing with the
case and instead be required to transfer all the records thereof to the Court of First
Instance of Quezon City for the continuation of the proceedings.
6. Accordingly, the Order of Judge Ernani Cruz Pano of December 17, 1975,
granting the "Urgent Petition for Authority to Pay Estate Obligations" filed by
Preciosa B. Garcia in Sp. Proc. No. Q-19738, subject matter of G.R. No. L-42670, and
ordering the Canlubang Sugar Estate to deliver to her as special administratrix the
sum of P48,874.70 for payment of the sum of estate obligations is hereby upheld.
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the petitions of petitioner Virginia Garcia Fule in G.R.
No. L-40502 and in G.R. No. L42670 are hereby denied, with costs against
petitioner.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Aquino and Concepcion, Jr., JJ., concur.
Muñoz Palma, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-48585 March 3, 1980
FELICIANO DE GUZMAN, petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE TEOFILO GUADIZ, JR., Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva
Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, and JULIAN VILLEGAS, NATIVIDAD VILLEGAS, GEMINIANO
VILLEGAS, CESAR VILLEGAS, MAXIMO MATIAS, ROSARIO VILLEGAS MATIAS, ANA
MARIE V. MATIAS, and LOURDES V. MATIAS, respondents.
C. C. Paralejo for petitioner.
A.R. Reyes respondents.
FERNANDEZ, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari instituted b Feliciano de Guzman against Honorable
Teofilo Guadiz, Jr. Judge of the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V,
Gapan, and Julian Villegas, Natividad Villegas, Geminiano Villegas, Cesar Villegas,
Maximo Matias, Rosario Villegas Matias, Ana Marie V. Matias, and Lourdes V.
Matias, seeking the following relief.
WHEREFORE, petitioner most respectively prays:
a) That respondents be ordered to answer this petition;
b) That after hearing the Order of respondent Judge dated December 23, 1977
denying petitioner's Motion for Appointment of a Special Administrator and
consequently, the Order dated July 15, 1978 denying petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration be annulled and that said respondent Judge be declared to
have committed a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in refusing the appointment of the Special Administrator;
c) That respondent Judge be directed to appoint a Special Administrator pending
the probate of the Last Will of Catalina Bajacan.
Petitioner respectfully prays for such other relief just and equitable in the premises.
Manila, Philippines, August 14, 1978. 1
On August 31, 1978, without giving due course to the instant petition, this Court
adopted a resolution directing the respondents to comment thereon within ten
(10) days from notice thereof. 2
The respondents filed on October 10, 1978 their comment dated October 9, 1978. 3
Meanwhile, on September 29, 1978, the petitioner submitted a Constancia
manifesting that the respondent judge cancelled the hearing on the petition for
probate of the will scheduled on September 20, 1978 "pending the outcome of the
case before the Supreme Court." 4
On October 18. 1978, this Court resolved: a) to GIVE DUE COURSE to the petition;
and b) to REQUIRE (1) the petitioner to deposit P80.40 for costs and clerk's
commission within five (5) days from notice thereof, and (2) both parties to submit
simultaneous memoranda within thirty (30) days from notice thereof. 5
Both petitioner and respondents having filed their respective memoranda, 6 on
December 6, 1978, this Court resolved to declare this case submitted for decision. 7
The record discloses that on March 16, 1977, the petitioner filed a petition with the
Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V, Gapan, docketed as Special
Proceeding No. 865 8 for the probate of a will alleged to have been executed by
one Catalina Bajacan instituting the herein petitioner as sole and universal heir and
naming him as executor; that Catalina Bajacan died on February 3, 1977; that on
May 10, 1977, the private respondents filed a motion to dismiss and/or opposition
contending, among others, that all the real properties of Catalina Bajacan are
now owned by them by virtue of a Deed of Donation Intervivos executed on June
19, 1972 by Arcadia Bajacan and Catalina Bajacan in their favor; 9 that on
September 30, 1977, the respondent judge resolved to defer resolution on the said
motion to dismiss until the parties shall have presented their evidence; 10 that a
motion for the appointment of a special administrator 11 was filed by the petitioner
on September 23, 1977 alleging that the unresolved motion to dismiss would
necessarily delay the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor; that
the decedent's estate consists of eighty (80) hectares of first class agricultural rice
land, more or less, yielding fifty thousand pesos (P50,000.00) worth of rice harvested
twice a year; that somebody representing the estate should collect and receive
the palay harvests pending the probate of the will; that on December 23, 1977, the
respondent judge issued an order denying the motion for appointment of a special
administrator, the pertinent portion of which reads:
The appointment of a special administrator is predicated on the necessity of
enabling somebody to take care of the properties where there is a considerable
delay in the appointment of a regular administrator. In the present case, since the
properties covered by the will are undoubtedly in the possession of the oppositors
Spec Pro 4 10
who claim to be the owners thereof, the Court sees no necessity of appointing a
special administrator.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby denies the motion for the
appointment of a special administrator filed by the petitioner dated September 22,
1977 ... 12
that on June 5, 1978, the petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration of the order
dated December 23, 1977 13 ; that said motion was also denied by the respondent
judge in an order dated June 9, 1978 which states:
In a motion for reconsideration filed by the petitioner on June 5, 1978 praying for a
reconsideration of the Order dated Dec. 23, 1977, which denied the motion for
appointment of a Special Administrator filed by him, it is alleged that the Court
made a premature determination of ownership and possession of the oppositors
over the properties of the estate of Catalina Bajacan. This assertion is not accurate.
What the Court merely stated in said Order is that the oppositors, who claim to be
the owners, are in possession of the properties covered by the Will.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court hereby:
xxx xxx xxx
(b) denies the motion for reconsideration filed by petitioner on June 5, 1978. 14
The main issue in this case is whether the respondent judge presiding the Court of
First Instance of Nueva Ecija, Branch V. Gapan, acted with grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in issuing the order dated
December 23, 1977 denying petitioner's motion for the appointment of a special
administrator and the order dated June 9, 1978, denying petitioner's motion for
reconsideration.
It is the petitioner's contention that the respondent judge acted with grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction because the facts warrant
the appointment of a special administrator of the estate of Catalina Bajacan.
Rule 80, Sec. 1, of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1 — Appointment of Special Administrator — When there is delay in
granting letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an
appeal from the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a
special administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased
until the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed.
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special
administrator 15 should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance
or disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. 16 This discretion, however, must be
sound, that is, not whimsical, or Contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal
principle. 17
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot
agree among themselves. 18 Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase "by any cause" includes those incidents which
transpired in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of
the will and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be
prolonged necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.
The facts justifying the appointment of a special administrator are:
(1) Delay in the hearing of the petition for the probate of the win.
(2) The basis of the private respondents' claim to the estate of Catalina Bajacan
and opposition to the probate of the will is a deed of donation dated June 19,
1972 allegedly executed by the deceased Catalina Bajacan and her late sister
Arcadia Bajacan in their favor. 19
There is an immediate need to file an action for the annulment of such deed of
donation in behalf of the estate. Precisely, the petitioner filed Civil Case No. 1080 in
the Court of First Instance of Nueva Ecija Branch V, against the herein private
respondents. The case was dismissed by the respondent judge in an order dated
June 9, 1978 on the ground that the petitioner has no personality to file the action
because although he is named heir in the will, the said will is not yet probated. 20 In
the meantime there is nobody to sue in order to protect the interest of the estate
considering that the probate of the will and the appointment of an executor will
take time.
Upon the filing of this petition, the respondent judge, on motion of the private
respondents, postponed the hearing of the probate of the will which was then
scheduled on August 23, 1978 to September 20, 1978. Again, in view of the motion
for reconsideration of the private respondents dated September 4, 1978, the
respondent judge issued an order dated September 12, 1978, which in part reads:
... the hearing of this case scheduled on September 20, 1978 is hereby cancelled
pending the outcome of the case before the Supreme Court. 21
The reasons for the appointment of a special administrator are:
The reason for the practice of appointing a special administrator rests in the fact
that estates of decedents frequently become involved in protracted litigation,
thereby being exposed to great waste and losses if there is no authorized agent to
collect the debts and preserve the assets in the interim. The occasion for such an
appointment usually arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is .delayed. No temporary
administration can be granted where there is an executor in being capable of
acting, however. 22
Principal object of appointment of temporary administrator is to preserve estate
until it can pass into hands of person fully authorized to administer it for benefit of
creditors and heirs. 23
It appears that the estate the properties registered under the Torrens system in the
name of the deceased Catalina Bajacan consisting of eighty (80) hectares of first
class agricultural land. It is claimed that these 80 hectares produce P50,000.00
worth of palay each harvest twice a year. Obviously there is an immediate need
for a special administrator to protect the interests of the estate as regards the
products.
All the facts which warrant the appointment of a special administrator in
accordance with Rule 80, Sec. 1 of the Revised Rules of Court are present in the
case at bar.
The respondent judge opined that there is no need for the appointment of a
special administrator in this case because the respondents are already in
Spec Pro 4 11
possession of the properties covered by the will. The respondent judge has failed to
distinguish between the partisan possession of litigants from that of the neutral
possession of the special administrator under the Rules of Court. When appointed,
a special administrator is regarded, not as a representative of the agent of the
parties suggesting the appointment, but as the administrator in charge of the
estate, and in fact, as an officer of the court. 24 The accountability which the court.
which attaches to the office of a special administrator to be appointed by the
court is absent from the personal possession of private respondents.
The only way to test the validity of the alleged donation in favor of the private
respondents is to appoint a special adiu administrator who will have the personality
to file the corresponding action. In view of all the foregoing, respondent judge
committed a grave abuse of discretion in denying the petitioner's motion for
appointment of a special administrator.
WHEREFORE, the petition for a writ of certiorari is hereby granted and the Order of
the respondent judge dated December 23, 1977, denying petitioner's motion for
appointment of a special administrator and the order dated June 9, ,978 denying
the petitioner's motion for reconsideration are set aside. The respondent judge is
ordered forthwith to appointment a special administrator pending the probate of
the last will of Catalina Bajacan in Special Proceeding No. 865, without
pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.
SECOND DIVISION
HEIRS OF BELINDA DAHLIA G.R. No. 162934
A. CASTILLO, namely, BENA
JEAN, DANIEL, MELCHOR, Present:
MICHAEL and DANIBEL, all
surnamed CASTILLO, PUNO, J., Chairman,
Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR.,
TINGA, and
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO,* JJ.
Promulgated:
DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL,
Respondent. November 11, 2005
x--------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
CALLEJO, SR., J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals
(CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, as well as its Resolution[2] denying the motion for
reconsideration thereof.
On January 25, 1989, Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel, wife of Lorenzo B. Almoradie, died in
Malabon City, Metro Manila, leaving behind a sizable inheritance consisting mostly
of real estate and shares of stock.[3]
A little over a month after Crisantas death, her mother, Crisanta Santiago Vda. de
Yanga, commenced an intestate proceeding before the Regional Trial Court (RTC)
of Malabon City, Branch 72, docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 192-MN. She alleged,
among others, that to her knowledge, her daughter died intestate leaving an
estate with an estimated net value of P1,500,000.00 and that such estate was
being managed by her wastrel and incompetent son-in-law, Lorenzo, and by two
other equally incompetent persons. She prayed that letters of administration be
issued to her son, Mariano Yanga, Jr., also the brother of the deceased, and that
she be awarded her share of the estate of her daughter after due
hearing.[4] However, the RTC appointed Lorenzo as administrator.
Meantime, the marriage between Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and Lorenzo Almoradie
was declared void for being bigamous. The RTC then removed Lorenzo as
administrator and appointed Mariano, Jr. in his stead.[5]
On October 16, 1989, one Belinda Dahlia Y. Almoradie Castillo, claiming to be the
only legitimate child of Lorenzo and Crisanta, filed a motion for
intervention.[6] Resolution on this motion was, however, held in abeyance pending
some incidents in the CA.
On November 3, 1989, Roberto Y. Gabriel, the legally adopted son of Crisanta Y.
Gabriel, filed before the RTC of Malabon City a petition for probate of an alleged
will and for the issuance of letters testamentary in his favor. The petition was
docketed as Spec. Proc. No. 211-MN. [7] He alleged that he discovered his mothers
will on October 25, 1989 in which he was instituted as the sole heir of the testatrix,
and designated as alternate executor for the named executor therein, Francisco S.
Yanga, a brother of Crisanta, who had predeceased the latter sometime in 1985 or
1986.
On June 2, 1990, Belinda Castillo died.
The two (2) special proceedings were consolidated. On May 15, 1991,
the RTC issued an Order dismissing the intestate proceedings, Spec. Proc. No. 192-
MN.[8] Mariano Yanga, Jr. questioned the dismissal of the intestate proceedings
before the appellate court via a petition for certiorari (CA-G.R. SP No. 25897).
On July 8, 1991, the probate court appointed Roberto Y. Gabriel as special
administrator of his mothers estate.[9]
Spec Pro 4 12
On May 23, 2001, the heirs of Belinda, namely, Bena Jean, Daniel, Melchor,
Michael, and Danibel, all surnamed Castillo, filed a Motion[10] praying that they be
substituted as party-litigants in lieu of their late mother Belinda, who died in 1990.
On April 16, 2001, Roberto Gabriel died. His widow, Dolores L. Gabriel, filed a
Manifestation and Motion[11] where she informed the
probate court of her husbands death and prayed that she be admitted as
substitute in place of her late husband, and be appointed as administratrix of the
estate of Crisanta Gabriel as well. She alleged that she had a bachelors degree in
law and had worked for several years in a law office.[12]
On August 14, 2001, the heirs of Belinda opposed Dolores manifestation and
motion. They averred that Dolores was not Crisanta Gabriels next of kin, let alone
the lawful wife of the late Roberto.[13] This elicited a Reply[14] from Dolores where
she refuted these allegations.
On August 24, 2001, Bena Jean filed a Motion for Appointment as Administrator of
the Estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel[15] praying that she be appointed administratrix of
the estate of her grandmother Crisanta.
On October 11, 2001, Dolores opposed the motion of Bena Jean, claiming that the
latter has neither proven her kinship with Crisanta Gabriel nor shown any particular
qualification to act as administratrix of the estate.[16]
On November 28, 1991, the CA dismissed the petition for certiorari of Mariano
Yanga, Jr. in CA-G.R. SP No. 25897.
In a Resolution[17] dated December 5, 2001, the lower court appointed Dolores as
special administratrix upon a bond of P200,000.00. The probate court merely noted
the motion for substitution filed by the heirs of Belinda,
stating that they were mere strangers to the case and that their cause could
better be ventilated in a separate proceeding. According to the trial court
Contrary to the assertions of Oppositors Heirs of Belinda A. Castillo, movant Dolores
L. Gabriel has amply proven her kinship with petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel, and
therefore her kinship, by operation of law, with decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel. In the
probate proceedings, this Court has the power to determine questions as to who
are the heirs of the decedent , the recognition of a natural child , the validity of
disinheritance effected by the testator and the status of a woman who claims to
be the lawful wife of the decedent. ...
Guided by the foregoing precepts, this Court is of the opinion, and so holds, that
movant Dolores L. Gabriel has established her claim that she is the lawfully wedded
wife of petitioner Roberto Y. Gabriel and that the previous marriage between
petitioner and one Lucita V. Cruz was already long dissolved prior to the
celebration of marriage between petitioner and movant Dolores L. Gabriels
marriage in July 4, 1997.
And even assuming that movant Dolores L. Gabriels lawful relationship with
petitioner, and corollarily with the decedent, was not proven, the stringent rules
regarding the order of preference in the appointment of an Administrator does not
find application in the instant case for what is at stake here is the appointment of a
Special Administrator as such position was vacated by the death of the previously
appointed Special Administrator in the person of petitioner herein. The reason for
the relaxation of the rules regarding the appointment of a Special Administrator is
the nature of its position, being merely temporary and will subsist only until a regular
administrator or executor is appointed.
In view thereof, movant Dolores L. Gabriel is hereby appointed as Special
Administrator of the estate of decedent Crisanta Y. Gabriel, and upon posting of a
bond in the amount of P200,000.00 pursuant to the mandate of Section 4, Rule 81
of the Rules of Court, may assume the functions and duties of such Special
Administrator.
SO ORDERED.[18]
The heirs of Belinda moved to reconsider.[19] In the meantime, Dolores took her
oath of office on January 11, 2002.[20]
The probate court denied the motion for reconsideration filed by Belindas heirs in
its Order[21] dated March 19, 2002. The said heirs then filed with the CA a petition
for certiorari with prayer for a temporary restraining order or/and preliminary
injunction against Dolores and the probate court. The case was docketed as CA-
G.R. SP No. 70645. They prayed, among others, that Bena Jean be appointed as
the regular administratrix of Crisanta Gabriels estate, thus
WHEREFORE, premises considered, petitioners most respectfully pray that:
1. Upon filing of this petition and in order not to prejudice the rights of petitioners, a
temporary restraining order and/or writ of preliminary injunction be issued against
respondent Dolores L. Gabriel enjoining her to cease and desist from acting as
special administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Y. Gabriel;
2. After hearing and consideration, a writ of preliminary injunction be issued against
respondent Dolores L. Gabriel to cease and desist from acting as special
administratrix of Crisanta Y. Gabriel until further order from this Honorable Court;
3. An Order be issued nullifying and setting aside the assailed Orders dated
December 5, 2001 and March 19, 2002 both issued by the respondent Judge for
having been rendered with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack of
jurisdiction and for this Honorable Court to issue a new one by appointing
petitioner Bena Jean A. Castillo as regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Y.
Gabriel.
Petitioner likewise prays for such other just, fair and equitable relief under the
premises.[22]
Spec Pro 4 13
On October 30, 2003, the appellate court dismissed the petition in CA-G.R. SP No.
70645. It ruled that the probate court did not commit grave abuse of discretion in
appointing Dolores as special administratrix.[23]
The heirs of Belinda Dahlia Castillo, now the petitioners, filed the instant petition for
review on certiorari against Dolores Lacuata-Gabriel, assigning the following errors
A The petition is without merit.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE DECISION DATED OCTOBER 30, 2003 RENDERED BY THE
HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS IS BASED ON A MISAPPREHENSION OF FACTS.
WITH DUE RESPECT, THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT
PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL IS ENTITLED TO THE
ADMINISTRATION OF THE ESTATE OF CRISANTA Y. GABRIEL, SHE BEING THE HEIR OF
HER DECEASED HUSBAND WHOSE ESTATE IS THE FORMER ESTATE OF HIS ADOPTING
MOTHER CRISANTA AS THE SAME IS CONTRARY TO THE LAW ON SUCCESSION.
C that the preference of private respondent Dolores Gabriel is with sufficient reason.
THE APPOINTMENT OF PRIVATE RESPONDENT DOLORES LACUATA-GABRIEL IS
CONTRARY TO THE RULING LAID DOWN BY THIS HONORABLE COURT IN THE CASE OF
GONZALEZ VS. GUIDO, 190 SCRA 112.
D own estate which he inherited from Crisanta passed on to his surviving widow,
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN RULING THAT IT IS SECTION 1, RULE 80
AND NOT SECTION 6, RULE 78 OF THE RULES OF COURT WHICH IS APPLICABLE IN THIS
CASE.[24]
The assigned errors in this case boil down to the propriety of the appointment of
respondent as special administratrix of the estate left by Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel.
The petitioners argue that since the respondent does not have any right to inherit
from their grandmother, either by her own right or by the right of representation,
she is not qualified to be appointed as administratrix of the estate; in contrast, they
are Crisanta Gabriels only compulsory heirs. They insist that the respondents late
husband, Roberto, was just a nephew of the decedent and not a legally adopted
son as he claimed to be. Even assuming
this claim was true, the fact that the respondent is not naturally related to the
decedent by blood in the direct descending line makes it unfair to appoint her as
the special administratrix. Citing jurisprudence, the petitioners explain that the
principal consideration in the appointment of administrator of a deceased persons
estate is the applicants interest therein. This is the same consideration which
Section 6,[25] Rule 78 of the Rules of Court takes into account in establishing the
order of preference in the appointment of such administrators. The underlying
assumption behind this rule, the petitioners insist, is that those who will reap the
benefit of a wise, speedy, economical administration of the estate, or suffer the
consequences of waste, improvidence or mismanagement, have the highest
interest and most influential motive to administer the estate correctly. Lastly, the
petitioners posit that since CA-G.R. SP No. 25897 had long been dismissed by the
CA, a regular administrator of the said estate should now be appointed.
In ruling against the petitioners and dismissing their petition, the CA ratiocinated as
follows:
The appointment of a special administrator lies entirely in the discretion of the
court. The order of preference in the appointment of a regular administrator under
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court does not apply to the selection of a special
administrator. In the issuance of such appointment, which is but temporary and
subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed, the court determines who is
entitled to the administration of the estate of the decedent. On this point, We hold
The facts of this case show that Roberto Gabriel the legally adopted son of
Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel survived Crisantas death. When Crisanta died on January
25, 1989, her estate passed on to her surviving adopted son Roberto. When
Roberto himself later died on April 16, 2001, pursuant to the law on succession, his
private respondent.
While it is true, as petitioners submit, that private respondent is neither a compulsory
nor a legal heir of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel and is considered a third person to the
estate of Crisanta, nonetheless, private respondent is undeniably entitled to the
administration of the said estate because she is an heir of her husband Roberto,
whose estate is the former estate of his adopting mother Crisanta.[26]
The ruling of the CA is correct. The Court has repeatedly held that the appointment
of a special administrator lies in the sound discretion of the probate court.[27] A
special administrator is a representative of a decedent appointed by the probate
court to care for and preserve his estate until an executor or general administrator
is appointed.[28] When appointed, a special administrator is regarded not as a
representative of the agent of the parties suggesting the appointment, but as the
administrator in charge of the estate, and, in fact, as an officer of the court. [29] As
such officer, he is subject to the supervision and control of the probate court and is
expected to work for the best interests of the entire estate, especially its smooth
Spec Pro 4 14
administration and earliest settlement.[30] The principal object of appointment of
temporary administrator is to preserve the estate until it can pass into hands of
person fully authorized to administer it for the benefit of creditors and heirs.[31] In
many instances, the appointment of administrators for the estates of decedents
frequently become involved in protracted litigations, thereby exposing such
estates to great waste and losses unless an authorized agent to collect the debts
and preserve the assets in the interim is appointed. The occasion for such an
appointment, likewise, arises where, for some cause, such as a pendency of a suit
concerning the proof of the will, regular administration is delayed.[32]
Section 1, Rule 80 of the Revised Rules of Court provides:
Section 1. Appointment of Special Administrator. When there is delay in granting
letters testamentary or of administration by any cause including an appeal from
the allowance or disallowance of a will, the court may appoint a special
administrator to take possession and charge of the estate of the deceased until
the questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
appointed.
The new Rules have broadened the basis for the appointment of an administrator,
and such appointment is allowed when there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or administration by any cause, e.g., parties cannot agree among
themselves. Nevertheless, the discretion to appoint a special administrator or not
lies in the probate court.[33] In De Guzman v. Guadiz, Jr.,[34] the Court further
elucidated
Under the above rule, the probate court may appoint a special administrator
should there be a delay in granting letters testamentary or of administration
occasioned by any cause including an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of a will. Subject to this qualification, the appointment of a special
administrator lies in the discretion of the Court. This discretion, however, must be
sound, that is, not whimsical, or contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The basis for appointing a special administrator under the Rules is broad enough to
include any cause or reason for the delay in granting letters testamentary or of
administration as where a contest as to the will is being carried on in the same or in
another court, or where there is an appeal pending as to the proceeding on the
removal of an executor or administrator, or in cases where the parties cannot
agree among themselves. Likewise, when from any cause general administration
cannot be immediately granted, a special administrator may be appointed to
collect and preserve the property of the deceased.
It is obvious that the phrase by any cause includes those incidents which transpired
in the instant case clearly showing that there is a delay in the probate of the will
and that the granting of letters testamentary will consequently be prolonged
necessitating the immediate appointment of a special administrator.[35]
As enunciated above, the probate court has ample jurisdiction to appoint
respondent as special administratrix. The deceased Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel left a
document purporting to be her will where her adopted son, Roberto, was named
as the sole heir of all her properties. However, pending probate of the will, Roberto
died leaving his widow, the respondent herein, as his sole heir. Thus, the respondent
has much stake in Crisantas estate in case the latters will is allowed probate. It
needs to be emphasized that in the appointment of a special administrator (which
is but temporary and subsists only until a regular administrator is appointed), the
probate court does not determine the shares in the decedents estate, but merely
appoints who is entitled to administer the estate. The issue of heirship is one to be
determined in the decree of distribution, and the findings of the court on the
relationship of the parties in the administration as to be the basis of
distribution.[36] Thus, the preference of respondent is sound, that is, not whimsical, or
contrary to reason, justice, equity or legal principle.
The petitioners strenuous invocation of Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court is
misplaced. The rule refers to the appointment of regular administrators of estates;
Section 1, Rule 80, on the other hand, applies to the appointment of a special
administrator. It has long been settled that the appointment of special
administrators is not governed by the rules regarding the appointment of regular
administrators.[37] Thus, in Roxas v. Pecson,[38] this Court ruled:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under Section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now Section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. ... As the law does not
say who shall be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the
appointee must have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the
person to be appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or
contrary to reason, justice or equity.
On the plea of the petitioners for this Court to appoint their co-petitioner, Bena
Jean Castillo, as the regular administratrix of the estate of Crisanta Yanga-Gabriel,
the matter should be addressed to the probate court for its consideration. It is not
for this Court to preempt the discretion of the probate court and appoint a regular
administrator in the present action.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DENIED. The Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70645, dated October 30, 2003, and its Resolution of March 26, 2004
are AFFIRMED. Costs against the petitioners.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
Spec Pro 4 15
FIRST DIVISION
G.R. No. L-59821 August 30, 1982
ROWENA F. CORONA, petitioner,
vs.
THE COURT OF APPEALS, ROMARICO G. VITUG, AVELINO L. CASTILLO, NICANOR
CASTILLO, KATHLEEN D. LUCHANGCO, GUILLERMO LUCHANGCO, JR., ANTONIO
LUCHANGCO, RODOLFO TORRES, REYNALDO TORRES and PURISIMA T.
POLINTAN, respondents.
N.J. Quisumbing for petitioner.
Jose F. Tiburcio for respondents Luchangcos, Torres and Polintan.
Ricardo S. Inton for respondents Castillos.
Rufino V. Javier for respondent Vitug.
& unwilling to serve besides the fact that the Executrix appointed, is not the next of
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:1äwphï1.ñët
A Petition to review on certiorari the judgment of the Court of Appeals 1 (CA-G.R.
No. 12404-SP) of August 11, 1981, upholding the appointment by the Court of First
Instance of Rizal, Pasig, Branch VI, of respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as Special
Administrator, although in the Will of his deceased wife, she had disinherited him,
as well as the Appellate Court's Resolution of February 17, 1982 denying
reconsideration.
On November 10, 1980, Dolores Luchangco Vitug died in New York, U.S.A., leaving
two Wills: one, a holographic Will dated October 3, 1980, which excluded her
husband, respondent Romarico G. Vitug, as one of her heirs, and the other, a
formal Will sworn to on October 24, 1980, or about three weeks thereafter, which
expressly disinherited her husband Romarico "for reason of his improper and
immoral conduct amounting to concubinage, which is a ground for legal
separation under Philippine Law"; bequeathed her properties in equal shares to her
sisters Exaltacion L. Allarde, Vicenta L. Faustino and Gloria L. Teoxon, and her
nieces Rowena F. Corona and Jennifer F. Way; and appointed Rowena F. Corona,
herein petitioner, as her Executrix.
On November 21, 1980, Rowena filed a petition for the probate of the Wills before
the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch VI (Spec.Procs. No. 9398), and for the
appointment of Nenita P. Alonte as Administrator because she (Rowena) is
presently employed in the United Nations in New York City.
On December 2, 1980, upon Rowena's urgent Motion, the Probate Court
appointed Nenita P. Alonte as Special Administratrix, upon a P100,000.00 bond.
On December 12, 1980, the surviving husband, Romarico Vitug, filed an
"Opposition and Motion" and prayed that the Petition for Probate be denied and
that the two Wills be disallowed on the ground that they were procured through
undue and improper pressure and influence, having been executed at a time
when the decedent was seriously ill and under the medical care of Dr. Antonio P.
Corona,, petitioner's husband, and that the holographic Will impaired his legitime.
Romarico further prayed for his appointment as Special Administrator because the
Special Administratrix appointed is not related to the heirs and has no interest to be
protected, besides, the surviving spouse is qualified to administer.
Oppositions to probate with almost Identical arguments and prayers were also filed
by respondent (1) Avelino L. Castillo and Nicanor Castillo, legitimate children of
Constancia Luchangco, full blood sister of the decedent; (2) Guillermo
Luchangco, full blood brother of the decedent; (3) Rodolfo Torres, Reynaldo Torres,
and Purisima Torres Polintan, all legitimate children of the deceased Lourdes
Luchangco Torres, full blood sister of the decedent.
On December 18, 1980, Nenita P. Alonte posted her bond and took her oath of
office before a Notary Public.
On February 6, 1981, the Probate Court set aside its Order of December 2, 1980
appointing Nenita as Special Administratrix, and appointed instead the surviving
husband, Romarico as Special Administrator with a bond of P200,000.00, essentially
for the reasons that under Section 6, Rule 78, of the Rules of Court, the surviving
spouse is first in the order of preference for appointment as Administrator as he has
an interest in the estate; that the disinheritance of the surviving spouse is not
among the grounds of disqualification for appointment as Administrator; that the
next of kin is appointed only where the surviving spouse is not competent or is
kin but merely a niece, and that the decedent's estate is nothing more than half of
the unliquidated conjugal partnership property.
Petitioner moved for reconsideration with an alternate Motion for the appointment
of co-Special Administrators to which private respondents filed their Opposition.
Reconsideration having been denied, petitioner resorted to a Petition for certiorari
before the Court of Appeals to annul, for having been issued with grave abuse of
discretion, the Order setting aside the appointment of Nenita as Special
Administratrix and appointing in her stead the surviving spouse Romarico.
On August 11, 1981, the Court of Appeals found no grave abuse of discretion on
the part of the Probate Court and dismissed the Petition stating that the Probate
Court strictly observed the order of preference established by the Rules; that
petitioner though named Executrix in the alleged Will, declined the trust and
instead nominated a stranger as Special Administrator; that the surviving husband
has legitimate interests to protect which are not adverse to the decedent's estate
which is merely part of the conjugal property; and that disinheritance is not a
disqualification to appointment as Special Administrator besides the fact that the
legality of the disinheritance would involve a determination of the intrinsic validity
of the Will which is decidedly premature at this stage.
On March 24, 1982, petitioner elevated the case to this Court for review on
certiorari after her Motion for Reconconsideration was turned down by the Court
of Appeals.
Petitioner stresses that the order of preference laid down in the Rules should not be
followed where the surviving spouse is expressly disinherited, opposes probate, and
clearly possesses an adverse interest to the estate which would disqualify him from
the trust.
The three sets of Oppositors, all respondents herein, in the Comments which they
respectively filed, essentially claimed lack of grave abuse of discretion on the part
of the Appellate Court in upholding the appointment of the surviving husband as
Special Administrator; that certiorari is improper and unavailing as the
appointment of a Special Administrator is discretionary with the Court and is
unappealable; that co-administratorship is impractical and unsound and as
between the surviving husband, who was responsible for the accumulation of the
estate by his acumen and who must be deemed to have a beneficial interest in
the entire estate, and a stranger, respondent Court had made the correct choice;
and that the legality of the disinheritance made by the decedent cannot affect
the appointment of a Special Administrator.
Spec Pro 4 16
This Court, in resolving to give due course to the Petition taking into account the
allegations, arguments and issues raised by the parties, is of the considered opinion
that petitioner's nominee, Nenita F. Alonte, should be appointed as co-Special
Administrator. The executrix's choice of Special Administrator, considering her own
inability to serve and the wide latitude of discretion given her by the testatrix in her
Will (Annex "A-1"), is entitled to the highest consideration. Objections to Nenita's
appointment on grounds of impracticality and lack of kinship are over-shadowed
by the fact that justice and equity demand that the side of the deceased wife
and the faction of the surviving husband be represented in the management of
the decedent's estate. 2
En passant, it is apropos to remind the Special Administrators that while they may
have respective interests to protect, they are officers of the Court subject to the
supervision and control of the Probate Court and are expected to work for the
best interests of the entire estate, its smooth administration, and its earliest
settlement.
WHEREFORE, modifying the judgment under review, the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Branch VI, is hereby ordered, in Special Proceedings No. 9398 pending before
it, to appoint Nenita F. Alonte as co-Special Administrator, properly bonded, who
shall act as such jointly with the other Special Administrator on all matters affecting
the estate.
No costs.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Plana, Vasquez and Relova, JJ.,
concur.1äwphï1.ñët
Gutierrez, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-10907 June 29, 1957
AUREA MATIAS, petitioner,
vs.
HON. PRIMITIVO L. GONZALEZ, ETC., ET AL., respondents.
J. Gonzales Orense for petitioner.
Venancio H. Aquino for respondents.
CONCEPCION, J.:
Petitioner Aurea Matias seeks a writ of certiorari to annul certain orders of Hon.
Primitivo L. Gonzales, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Cavite, in
connection with Special Proceedings No. 5213 of said court, entitled "Testate
Estate of the Deceased Gabina Raquel."
On May 15, 1952, Aurea Matias initiated said special proceedings with a petition
for the probate of a document purporting to be the last will and testament of her
aunt, Gabina Raquel, who died single on May 8, 1952, at the age of 92 years. The
heir to the entire estate of the deceased — except the properties bequeathed to
her other niece and nephews, namely, Victorina Salud, Santiago Salud, Policarpio
Salud, Santos Matias and Rafael Matias — is, pursuant to said instrument, Aurea
Matias, likewise, appointed therein as executrix thereof, without bond. Basilia
Salud, a first cousin of the deceased, opposed the probate of her alleged will,
and, after appropriate proceedings, the court, presided over by respondent
Judge, issued an order, dated February 8, 1956, sustaining said opposition and
denying the petition for probate. Subsequently, Aurea Matias brought the matter
on appeal to this Court (G.R. No. L-10751), where it is now pending decision.
Meanwhile, or on February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud moved for the dismissal of
Horacio Rodriguez, as special administrator of the estate of the deceased, and the
appointment, in his stead of Ramon Plata. The motion was set for hearing on
February 23, 1956, on which date the court postponed the hearing to February 27,
1956. Although notified of this order, Rodriguez did not appear on the date last
mentioned. Instead, he filed an urgent motion praying for additional time within
which to answer the charges preferred against him by Basilia Salud and for
another postponement of said hearing. This motion was not granted, and Basilia
Salud introduced evidence in support of said charges, whereupon respondent
Judge by an order, dated February 27, 1956, found Rodriguez guilty of abuse of
authority and gross negligence, and, accordingly, relieved him as special
administrator of the estate of the deceased and appointed Basilia Salud as special
administratrix thereof, to "be assisted and advised by her niece, Miss Victorina
Salud," who "shall always act as aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud." Said
order, likewise, provided that "Basilia Salud shall be helped by Mr. Ramon Plata . . .
who is hereby appointed as co-administrator."
On March 8, 1956, Aurea Matins asked that said order of February 27, 1956, be set
aside and that she be appointed special co-administratrix, jointly with Horacio
Rodriguez, upon the ground that Basilia Salud is over eighty (80) years of age,
totally blind and physically incapacitated to perform the duties of said office, and
that said movant is the universal heiress of the deceased and the person
appointed by the latter as executrix of her alleged will. This motion was denied in
an order dated March 10, 1956, which maintained "the appointment of the three
above named persons" — Basilia Salud, Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud — "for
the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel pending final decision
on the probate of the alleged will of said decedent." However, on March 17, 1956,
Basilia Salud tendered her resignation as special administratrix by reason of
physical disability, due to old age, and recommended the appointment, in her
place, of Victorina Salud. Before any action could be taken thereon, or on March
21, 1956, Aurea Matias sought a reconsideration of said order of March 10, 1956.
Moreover, on March 24, 1956, she expressed her conformity to said resignation, but
objected to the appointment, in lieu of Basilia Salud, of Victorina Salud, on
account of her antagonism to said Aurea Matias — she (Victorina Salud) having
been the principal and most interested witness for the opposition to the probate of
the alleged will of the deceased — and proposed that the administration of her
estate be entrusted to the Philippine National Bank, the Monte de Piedad, the
Bank of the Philippine Islands, or any other similar institution authorized by law
therefor, should the court be reluctant to appoint the movant as special
administratrix of said estate. This motion for reconsideration was denied on March
26, 1956.
Shortly afterwards, or on June 18, 1956, respondents Ramon Plata and Victorina
Salud requested authority to collect the rents due, or which may be due, to the
estate of the deceased and to collect all the produce of her lands, which was
granted on June 23, 1956. On June 27, 1956, said respondents filed another motion
praying for permission to sell the palay of the deceased then deposited in different
rice mills in the province of Cavite, which respondent judge granted on June 10,
Spec Pro 4 17
1956. Later on, or on July 10, 1956, petitioner instituted the present action against
Judge Gonzales, and Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata, for the purpose of
annulling the above mentioned orders of respondent Judge, upon the ground that
the same had been issued with grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or
excess of jurisdiction.
In support of this pretense, it is argued that petitioner should have preference in the
choice of special administratrix of the estate of the decedent, she (petitioner)
being the universal heiress to said estate and, the executrix appointed in the
alleged will of the deceased, that until its final disallowance — which has not, as
yet, taken place she has a special interest in said estate, which must be protected
by giving representation thereto in the management of said estate; that, apart
from denying her any such representation, the management was given to persons
partial to her main opponent, namely, Basilia Salud, inasmuch as Victorina Salud is
allied to her and Ramon Plata is a very close friend of one of her (Basilia Salud's)
attorneys; that Basilia Salud was made special administratrix despite her obvious
unfitness for said office, she being over eighty (80) years of age and blind; that said
disability is borne out by the fact that on March 17, 1956, Basilia Salud resigned as
special administratrix upon such ground; that the Rules of Court do not permit the
appointment of more than one special administrator; that Horacio Rodriguez was
removed without giving petitioner a chance to be heard in connection therewith;
and that Ramon Plata and Victorina Salud were authorized to collect the rents
due to the deceased and the produce of her lands, as well to sell her palay,
without previous notice to the petitioner herein.
Upon the other hand, respondents maintain that respondent Judge acted with the
scope of his jurisdiction and without any abuse of discretion; that petitioner can
not validly claim any special interest in the estate of the deceased, because the
probate of the alleged will and testament of the latter — upon which petitioner
relies — has been denied; that Horacio Rodriguez was duly notified of the
proceedings for his removal; and that Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata have not
done anything that would warrant their removal.
Upon a review of the record, we find ourselves unable to sanction fully the acts of
respondent Judge, for the following reasons:
1. Although Horacio Rodriguez had notice of the hearing of the motion for his
removal, dated February 17, 1956, the record shows that petitioner herein received
copy of said motion of February 24, 1956, or the date after that set for the hearing
thereof. Again, notice of the order of respondent Judge, dated February 23, 1956,
postponing said hearing to February 27, 1956, was not served on petitioner herein.
2. In her motion of February 17, 1956, Basilia Salud prayed for the dismissal of
Horacio Rodriguez, and the appointment of Ramon Plata, as special administrator
of said estate. Petitioner had, therefore, no notice that her main opponent, Basilia
Salud, and the latter's principal witness, Victorina Salud, would be considered for
the management of said. As a consequence, said petitioner had no opportunity to
object to the appointment of Basilia Salud as special administratrix, and of
Victorina Salud, as her assistant and adviser, and the order of February 27, 1956, to
this effect, denied due process to said petitioner.
3. Said order was issued with evident knowledge of the physical disability of Basilia
Salud. Otherwise respondent Judge would not have directed that she "be assisted
and advised by her niece Victorina Salud," and that the latter "shall always act as
aide, interpreter and adviser of Basilia Salud."
4. Thus, respondent Judge, in effect, appointed three (3) special administrators —
Basilia Salud, Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. Indeed, in the order of March 10,
1956, respondent Judge maintained "the appointment of the three (3) above-
named persons for the management of the estate of the late Gabina Raquel."
5. Soon after the institution of said Special Proceedings No. 5213, an issue arose
between Aurea Matias and Basilia Salud regarding the person to be appointed
special administrator of the estate of the deceased. The former proposed Horacio
Rodriguez, whereas the latter urged the appointment of Victorina Salud. By an
order dated August 11, 1952, the Court, then presided over by Hon. Jose Bernabe,
Judge, decided the matter in favor of Horacio Rodriguez and against Victorina
Salud, upon the ground that, unlike the latter, who, as a pharmacist and employee
in the Santa Isabel Hospital, resides In the City of Manila, the former, a practicing
lawyer and a former public prosecutor, and later, mayor of the City of Cavite, is a
resident thereof. In other words, the order of resident thereof. In other words, the
order of respondent Judge of February 27, 1956, removing Rodriguez and
appointing Victorina Salud to the management of the estate, amounted to a
reversal of the aforementioned order of Judge Bernabe of August 11, 1952.
6. Although the probate of the alleged will and testament of Gabina Raquel was
denied by respondent Judge, the order to this effect is not, as yet, final and
executory. It is pending review on appeal taken by Aurea Matias. The probate of
said alleged will being still within realm of legal possibility, Aurea Matias has — as
the universal heir and executrix designated in said instrument — a special interest
to protect during the pendency of said appeal. Thus, in the case of Roxas vs.
Pecson* (46 Off. Gaz., 2058), this Court held that a widow, designated as executrix
in the alleged will and testament of her deceased husband, the probate of which
had denied in an order pending appeal, "has . . . the same beneficial interest after
the decision of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending
appeal, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the
appellate court."
7. The record shows that there are, at least two (2) factions among the heirs of the
deceased, namely, one, represented by the petitioner, and another, to which
Basilia Salud and Victorina Salud belong. Inasmuch as the lower court had
deemed it best to appoint more than one special administrator, justice and equity
demands that both factions be represented in the management of the estate of
the deceased.
The rule, laid down in Roxas vs. Pecson (supra), to the effect that "only one special
administrator may be appointed to administrator temporarily" the estate of the
deceased, must be considered in the light of the facts obtaining in said case. The
lower court appointed therein one special administrator for some properties
forming part of said estate, and a special administratrix for other properties thereof.
Thus, there were two (2) separate and independent special administrators. In the
case at bar there is only one (1) special administration, the powers of which shall
be exercised jointly by two special co-administrators. In short, the Roxas case is not
squarely in point. Moreover, there are authorities in support of the power of courts
to appoint several special co-administrators (Lewis vs. Logdan, 87 A. 750; Harrison
vs. Clark, 52 A. 514; In re Wilson's Estate, 61 N.Y.S. 2d., 49; Davenport vs. Davenport,
60 A. 379).
Wherefore, the orders complained of are hereby annulled and set aside. The lower
court should re-hear the matter of removal of Horacio Rodriguez and appointment
Spec Pro 4 18
of special administrators, after due notice to all parties concerned, for action in
conformity with the views expressed herein, with costs against respondents
Victorina Salud and Ramon Plata. It is so ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-2211 December 20, 1948
NATIVIDAD I. VDA. DE ROXAS, petitioner,
vs.
POTENCIANO PECSON, Judge of First Instance of Bulacan, MARIA ROXAS and
PEDRO ROXAS,respondents.
Claro M. Recto and Francisco A. Rodrigo for petitioner.
Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr., and Gerardo M. Alfonso for respondents.
FERIA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari filed against the respondent judge of the Court of First
Instance of Bulacan.
The facts in this case may be summarily stated as follows: Pablo M. Roxas died
leaving properties in Bulacan. The other respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas, sister
and brother respectively of the deceased, filed on August 3, 1946, a petition for
the administration of the latter's estate, in special intestate proceeding No. 1707 of
the Court of First Instance of Bulacan, and Maria Roxas was appointed special
administratrix upon an ex-parte petition. On August 10, 1946, the petitioner
Natividad Vda. de Roxas, widow of Pablo M. Roxas, filed a petition for the probate
of an alleged will of her deceased husband, and for her appointment as executrix
of his estate designated is said will, and the petition was docketed as special
proceeding No. 172 of the same court. In said will the deceased bequeathed one-
half of his estate to his widow, the herein petitioner, and the other half to Reynaldo
Roxas, an adulterous child 9 years old of the decedent. Upon agreement of both
parties, the intestate proceeding No. 170 was dismissed and ordered closed by the
court.
In view of the opposition to the probate of the will by the respondents Maria and
Pedro Roxas, the petitioner was appointed on September 10, 1946, special
administratrix and qualified as such over the objection of the respondents Maria
and Pedro Roxas, who sought the appointment of Maria as such. The said
respondents filed on October 21, 1946, a motion for reconsideration of the order of
the court appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, with an alternative
prayer that Maria Roxas be appointed as special co-administratrix, which motion
was not acted upon.
After hearing on December 15, 1947, the respondent judge rendered a decision
denying the probate of the will presented by the petitioner on the ground that the
attesting witnesses did not sign their respective names in the presence of the
testator, from which the petitioner has appealed, and the appeal is now pending.
On December 29, 1947, the respondents Maria and Pedro Roxas renewed their
petition for the appointment of Maria Roxas as special administratrix or special co-
administratrix, and on May 5, 1948, the respondent judge rendered his resolution
appointing the petitioner Natividad I. Vda. de Roxas as special administratrix only
of all the conjugal properties of the deceased, and Maria Roxas as special
administratrix of all capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased
Pablo M. Roxas.
The present petition for certiorari has been filed with this Court against the last
order or resolution of the Court of First Instance of Bulacan based on the ground
that the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in appointing
two special co-administratices of the estate of the deceased Pablo Roxas, one of
the capital or properties belonging exclusively to the deceased, and another of his
conjugal properties with his wife (now widow), the petitioner.
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De
Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106.) As the law does not say who shall
be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity.
There is nothing wrong in that the respondent judge, in exercising his discretion and
appointing the petitioner as special administratrix, had taken into consideration
the beneficial interest of the petitioner in the estate of the decedent and her
being designated in the will as executrix thereof. But the respondent's subsequent
act of appointing her as special administratrix only of the conjugal or community
property, and Maria Roxas as special administratrix of the capital or exclusive
property of the decedent, does not seem to be in conformity with logic or reason.
The petitioner has or claims to have the same beneficial interest after the decision
of the court disapproving the will, which is now pending on appeal, as she had
prior to it, because the decision is not yet final and may be reversed by the
appellate court.
Besides, even if the will is not probated, the widow in the present case would have,
under the law, the right of usufruct over one-half of the exclusive property of the
decedent, besides her share in the conjugal partnership. The beneficial interest
required as a qualification for appointment as administrator of the estate of a
decedent is the interest in the whole estate and not only in some part thereof. The
petitioner being entitled to one-half in usufruct of all the exclusive properties of the
decedent, she would have as much if not more interest in administering the entire
estate correctly, in order to reap the benefit of a wise, speedy, economical
administration of the state, and not suffer the consequences of the waste,
improvidence or mismanagement thereof. The good or bad administration of the
property may affect rather the fruits than the naked ownership of a property.
However, for the decision of the question involved in this proceeding it is not
necessary for us to determine whether or not the respondent judge has acted with
grave abuse of discretion in rendering the resolution complained of for the reasons
just stated, in view of our conclusion that the respondent judge acted in excess of
the court's jurisdiction in appointing two separate special administratices of the
Spec Pro 4 19
estate of the decedent: one of the conjugal or community property and another
of the capital or exclusive property of the deceased Pablo M. Roxas.
According to section 2, Rule 75, taken from section 685 of the former Code of Civil
Procedure, Act No. 190, as amended, "when the marriage is dissolved by the
death of the husband or wife, the community property shall be inventoried,
administered, and liquidated, and the debts thereof paid, in the testate or
intestate proceedings of the deceased spouse." That is the reason why, according
to section 4, Rule 78, the "letters testamentary, or letters of administration with the
will annexed, shall extend to all the estate of the testator in the Philippines," and
section 6, Rule 79, provides for appointment of one administrator in case of
intestacy, except in certain cases in which two or more joint, but not separate and
independent, administrators may be appointed under section 3, Rule 82. Therefore
the administrator appointed to administer and liquidate the exclusive property of a
deceased spouse shall also administer, liquidate and distribute the community
property, because the estate of a deceased spouse which is to be settled, that is,
administered, liquidated and distributed, consists not only of the exclusive
properties of the decedent, but also of one-half of the assets of the conjugal
partnership, if any, which may pertain to the deceased, as determined after the
liquidation thereof in accordance with the provisions of articles 1421 to 1424 of the
Civil Code.
There is absolutely no reason for appointing two separate administrators, specially
if the estate to be settled is that of a deceased husband as in the present case, for
according to articles 1422 and 1423 of the Civil Code, only after the dowry and
parapherna of the wife and the debts, charges, and obligations of the conjugal
partnership have been paid, the capital or exclusive property of the husband may
be liquidated and paid in so far as the inventoried estate may reach; and if the
estate inventoried should not be sufficient to pay the dowry and the parapherna
of the wife and the debts, charges and obligations of the partnership, the provision
of Title XVII of the Civil Code relating to concurrence and preference of credits
shall be observed. If two separate administrators are appointed as done in the
present case, in every action which one of them may institute to recover properties
or credit of the deceased, the defendant may raise the question or set up the
defense that the plaintiff has no cause of action, because the property or credit in
issue belongs to the class which is being administered by the other administrator,
which can not be done if the administrator of the entire estate is only one.
As under the law only one general administrator may be appointed to administer,
liquidate and distribute the estate of a deceased spouse, it clearly follows that only
one special administrator may be appointed to administer temporarily said estate,
because a special administrator is but a temporary administrator who is appointed
to act in lieu of the general administrator. "When there is delay in granting letters
testamentary or of administration occasioned by an appeal from the allowance or
disallowance of will, or from any other cause, the court may appoint a special
administrator to collect and take charge of the estate of the deceased until the
questions causing the delay are decided and executors or administrators
thereupon appointed," (sec. 1, Rule 81). Although his powers and duties are limited
to "collect and take charge of the goods, chattels, rights, credits, and estate of the
deceased and preserve the same for the executor or administrator afterwards
appointed, and for that purpose may commence and maintain suits as
administrator, and may sell such perishable and other property as the court orders
sold. A special administrator shall not be liable to pay any debts of the deceased."
(Section 2, Rule 81.)lawphil.net
In view of all the foregoing, we hold that the court below has no power to appoint
two special administratices of the estate of a deceased husband or wife, one of
the community property and another of the exclusive property of the decedent,
and therefore the respondent judge acted in excess of the court's jurisdiction in
rendering or issuing the order complained of, and therefore said order is hereby set
aside, with costs against the respondents. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-30289 March 26, 1929
SERAPIA DE GALA, petitioner-appellant,
vs.
APOLINARIO GONZALES and SINFOROSO ONA, opponents-appellants.
Sumulong, Lavides & Hilado for petitioner-appellant.
Godofredo Reyes for opponent-appellant Gonzales.
Ramon Diokno for opponent-appellant Ona.
OSTRAND, J.:
On November 23, 1920, Severina Gonzales executed a will in which Serapia de
Gala, a niece of Severina, was designated executrix. The testatrix died in
November, 1926, leaving no heirs by force of law, and on December 2, 1926,
Serapia, through her counsel, presented the will for probate. Apolinario Gonzales,
a nephew of the deceased, filed an opposition to the will on the ground that it
had not been executed in conformity with the provisions of section 618 of the
Code of Civil Procedure. On April 2, 1927, Serapia de Gala was appointed special
administratrix of the estate of the deceased. She returned an inventory of the
estate on March 31, 1927, and made several demands upon Sinforoso Ona, the
surviving husband of the deceased, for the delivery to her of the property
inventoried and of which he was in possession.
On September 20, 1928, the Court of First Instance ordered Sinforoso Ona to deliver
to Serapia de Gala all the property left by the deceased. Instead of delivering the
property as ordered, Sinforoso filed a motion asking the appointment of Serapia de
Gala as special administratrix be cancelled and that he, Sinforoso, be appointed
in her stead. The motion was opposed by both Apolinario Gonzales and by Serapia
de Gala, but on March 3, 1928, it was nevertheless granted, Serapia was removed,
and Sinforoso was appointed special administrator in her place, principally on the
ground that he had possession of the property in question and that his
appointment would simplify the proceedings.
In the meantime and after various continuances and delays, the court below in an
order dated January 20, 1928, declared the will valid and admitted it to probate.
All of the parties appealed, Serapia de Gala from the order removing her from the
office of special administratrix, and Apolinario Gonzales and Sinforoso Ona from
the order probating the will.
Serapia's appeal requires but little discussion. The burden of the argument of her
counsel is that a special administrator cannot be removed except for one or more
of the causes stated in section 653 of the Code of Civil Procedure. But that section
Spec Pro 4 20
can only apply to executors and regular administrators, and the office of a special
administrator is quite different from that of regular administrator. The appointment
of a special administrator lies entirely in the sound discretion of the court; the
function of such an administrator is only to collect and preserve the property of the
deceased and to return an inventory thereof; he cannot be sued by a creditor
and cannot pay any debts of the deceased. The fact that no appeal can be
taken from the appointment of a special administrator indicates that both his
appointment and his removal are purely discretionary, and we cannot find that
the court below abused its discretion in the present case. In removing Serapia de
Gala and appointing the present possessor of the property pending the final
determination of the validity of the will, the court probably prevented useless
litigation.
The appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales argue that the will in
question was not executed in the form prescribed by section 618 of the Code of
Civil Procedure as amended by Act No. 2645. That section reads as follows:
No will, except as provided in the preceding section, shall be valid to pass any
estate, real or personal, nor charge or affect the same, unless it be written in the
language or dialect known by the testator and signed by him, or by the testator's
name written by some other person in his presence, and by his express direction,
and attested and subscribed by three or more credible witnesses in the presence
of the testator and of each other. The testator or the person requested by him to
write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall also sign, as
aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin, and said pages shall
be numbered correlatively in letters placed on the upper part of each sheet. The
attestation shall state the number of sheets or pages used, upon which the will is
written, and the fact that the testator signed the will and every page thereof, or
caused some other person to write his name, under his express direction, in the
presence of three witnesses, and the latter witnessed and signed the will and all
pages thereof in the presence of the testator and of each other.
The principal points raised by the appeal are (1) that the person requested to sign
the name of the testatrix signed only the latter's name and not her own; (2) that
the attestation clause does not mention the placing of the thumb-mark of the
testatrix in the will; and (3) that the fact that the will had been signed in the
presence of the witnesses was not stated in the attestation clause but only in the
last paragraph of the body of the will.
The first point can best be answered by quoting the language of this court in the
case of the Estate of Maria Salva, G. R. No. 26881:1
An examination of the will in question disclosed that it contains five pages. The
name of the old woman, Maria Salva, was written on the left hand margin of the
first four pages and at the end of the will. About in the center of her name she
placed her thumb-mark. About in the center of her name she placed her thumb-
mark. The three witnesses likewise signed on the left-hand margin and at the end
of the will.
On these facts, the theory of the trial judge was that under the provisions of section
618 of the Code of Civil Procedure, as amended by Act No. 2645, it was essential
to the validity of the will that the person writing the name of the maker of the will
also sign. Under the law prior to the amendment, it had been held by this court
that where a testator is unable to write and his name is signed by another at his
request, in his presence and in that of the subscribing witnesses thereto, it is
unimportant, so far as the validity of the will is concerned, whether the person who
writes the name of the testator signs his own or not. (Barut vs. Cabacungan (1912),
21 Phil., 461). But his Honor, the trial judge emphasizes that the amendment
introduced into the law the following sentence: 'The testator or the person
requested by him to write his name and the instrumental witnesses of the will, shall
also sign, as aforesaid, each and every page thereof, on the left margin . . ..' This
requirement, it is said, was not lived up to in this instance.
There is, however, an entirely different view which can be taken of the situation.
This is that the testatrix placed her thumb-mark on the will in the proper places.
When, therefore, the law says that the will shall be 'signed' by the testator or
testatrix, the law is fulfilled not only by the customary written signature but by the
testator or testatrix' thumb-mark. The construction put upon the word 'signed' by
most courts is the original meaning of a signum or sign, rather than the derivative
meaning of a sign manual or handwriting. A statute requiring a will to be 'signed' is
satisfied if the signature is made by the testator's mark. (28 R. C. L., pp. 116-117).
The opinion quoted is exactly in point. The testatrix thumb-mark appears in the
center of her name as written by Serapia de Gala on all of the pages of the will.
The second and third points raised by Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales are
sufficiently refuted by quoting the last clause of the body of the will together with
the attestation clause, both of which are written in the Tagalog dialect. These
clauses read as follows:
Sa katunayang ang kasulatang ito, na may anim na dahon, ay siyang naglalaman
ng aking huling tagubilin, at sa hindi ko kaalamang lumagda ng aking pangalan,
ipinamanhik ko sa aking pamankin na si Serapia de Gala na isulat ang aking
pangalan at apellido, at sa tapat ay inilagda ko ang titik ng kanang daliri kong
hinlalaki, sa walkas at sa bawat isa sa anim (6) na dahon ng kasulatang ito, at ito's
ginawa niya sa kautusan at sa harap ko at ng tatlong saksing nagpapatutuo sa
huli ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo ng Nobiembre ng 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
Pinatutunayan namin na ang kasulatang ito na binubuo ng anim (6) na dahon na
pinirmahan sa harap namin ni Serapia de Gala sa kahilingan ni Severina Gonzales
sa wakas at sa mga gilid ng bawa't isa sa anim (6) na dahon at isinaysay na ang
kasulatang ito ay siyang huling habilin o testamento ni Severina Gonzales, ay
pinirmahan namin, bilang mga saksi sa wakas at sa gilid ng bawa't dahon sa
harap at sa kahilingan ng tinurang testadora, at ang bawat isa sa amin ay
pumirma sa harap ng lahat at bawat isa sa amin, ngayon ika dalawang po't tatlo
ng noviembre ng taong 1920 ng taong 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
The translation in English of the clauses quoted reads as follows:
In virtue of this will, consisting of six pages, that contains my last wish, and because
of the fact that I cannot sign my name, I request my niece Serapia de Gala to
write my name, and above this I placed my right thumb-mark at the end of this will
and to each of the six pages of this document, and this was done at my direction
and in the presence of three attesting witnesses, this 23rd of November, 1920.
(Sgd.) SEVERINA GONZALES
We certify that this document, which is composed of six (6) sheets and was signed
in our presence by Serapia de Gala at the request of Severina Gonzales at the end
Spec Pro 4 21
and on the margins of each of the six (6) sheets and was declared to contain the
last will and testament of Severina Gonzales, was signed by us as witnesses at the
end and on the margins of each sheet in the presence and at the request of said
testatrix, and each of us signed in the presence of all and each of us, this 23rd day
of November of the year 1920.
(Sgd.) ELEUTERIO NATIVIDAD
JUAN SUMULONG
FRANCISCO NATIVIDAD
As will be seen, it is not mentioned in the attestation clause that the testatrix signed
by thumb-mark, but it does there appear that the signature was affixed in the
presence of the witnesses, and the form of the signature is sufficiently described
and explained in the last clause of the body of the will. It maybe conceded that
the attestation clause is not artistically drawn and that, standing alone, it does not
quite meet the requirements of the statute, but taken in connection with the last
clause of the body of the will, it is fairly clear and sufficiently carries out the
legislative intent; it leaves no possible doubt as to the authenticity of the
document.
The contention of the appellants Sinforoso Ona and Apolinario Gonzales that the
fact that the will had been signed in the presence of the witnesses was not stated
in the attestation clause is without merit; the fact is expressly stated in that clause.
In our opinion, the will is valid, and the orders appealed from are hereby affirmed
without costs. So ordered.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19159 September 29, 1964
GLICERIA C. LIWANAG, Special Administratrix of the Estate of Pio D.
Liwanag, petitioner,
vs.
HON. Luis B. REYES, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Manila and ROTEGAAN
FINANCING, INC.,respondents.
C. M. Baltazar & A. R. Narvasa for petitioner.
A. P. Abaya & A. A. Bautista for respondents.
REGALA, J.:
This is a petition for certiorari to annul the orders of the Court of First Instance of
Manila appointing a receiver and deferring action on the motion to dismiss in Civil
Case No. 48154. A preliminary injunction was issued upon the filing of this petition.
On July 14, 1960, the late Pio D. Liwanag executed in favor of the Rotegaan
Financing, Inc., a real estate mortgage on a parcel of residential land with the
building and improvements thereon, at M. H. del Pilar Street, Manila, to secure the
payment of a loan in the amount of one hundred and eighty thousand pesos
(P180,000.00), Philippine Currency, with interest at the rate of 12% per annum on
said loan. It was stipulated in the mortgage contract that the total amount of
mortgage debt be fully paid a year thereafter, or on or before July 14, 1961. Before
the one year period expired, the mortgagor Pio D. Liwanag died intestate.
As the total mortgage obligation of the deceased was not fully paid within the
stipulated period, the mortgagee Rotegaan Financing, Inc., on September 21,
1961, instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila, a complaint for foreclosure
against the Estate of Pio D. Liwanag and Gliceria Liwanag as administratrix of the
estate. The action also prayed for the appointment of a receiver.
The defendant Gliceria Liwanag filed a motion to dismiss the complaint for
foreclosure, on the theory that she may not be sued as special administratrix.
The said defendant also filed opposition to the prayer for the issuance of a writ of
receivership, on the theory that the property subject of the foreclosure
proceeding's is in custodia legis, since administration proceedings had already
been instituted for the settlement of the estate of the deceased.
In two separate orders, the writ of receivership was issued, despite opposition, and
action on the motion to dismiss was deferred "until after the trial of this case on the
merits because there is a possibility that the estate of the deceased may be in a
position to pay the amounts claimed by the plaintiff, in which case the latter may
choose to file its claim against the decedent in the office of the Clerk of Court, and
waive the mortgage."
Motion for reconsideration filed by the defendant having been denied, the latter
filed this petition for certiorari, alleging abuse of discretion on the part of the lower
court in issuing the questioned orders. As prayed for, a writ of preliminary injunction
was issued upon the filing of the petition.
The case raises the following fundamental issues: first, the correctness of the action
for foreclosure against the special administratrix, and second, the propriety of the
appointment of a receiver.
Section 7 of Rule 86 of the New Rules of Court provides that a creditor holding a
claim against the deceased, secured by a mortgage or other collateral security,
may pursue any of these remedies: (1) abandon his security and prosecute his
claim in the testate or intestate proceeding and share in the general distribution of
the assets of the estate; (2) foreclose his mortgage or realize upon his security by
an action in court, making the executor or administrator a party defendant, and if
there is a deficiency after the sale of the mortgaged property, he may prove the
same in the testate or intestate proceedings; and (3) rely exclusively upon his
mortgage and foreclose it any time within the ordinary period of limitations, and if
he relies exclusively upon the mortgage, he shall not be admitted as creditor of the
estate, and shall not share in the distribution of the assets.
Obviously, the herein respondent has chosen the second remedy, having filed his
action for foreclosure against the administratrix of the property.
Now the question arises as to whether the petitioner herein can be sued as special
administratrix. The Rules of Court do not expressly prohibit making the special
administratrix a defendant in a suit against the estate. Otherwise, creditors would
find the adverse effects of the statute of limitations running against them in cases
where the appointment of a regular administrator is delayed. So that if We are now
to deny the present action on this technical ground alone, and the appointment
of a regular administrator will be delayed, the very purpose for which the
mortgage was constituted will be defeated.1awphîl.nèt
The next point to be considered is whether or not there was abuse of discretion on
the part of the lower court in the issuance of its order for the appointment of a
receiver. This should be answered in the negative. It is to be noted that the
contract of mortgage between the deceased and the Rotegaan Financing, Inc.,
provides:
Spec Pro 4 22
... In case of judicial foreclosure, the Mortgagor hereby consents to the
appointment of the president of the mortgagee corporation or any of its officers as
receiver, without any bond, to take charge of the mortgaged property at once,
and to hold possession of the same, and the rents and profits derived from the
mortgaged property, before the sale, less the costs and expenses of the
receivership, the expenses of collection and attorney's fees, which shall be fifteen
per cent (15%) of the total indebtedness then unpaid, exclusive of all costs and
fees allowed by law, shall be applied first to the payment of the interest and then
to the capital of the indebtedness secured hereby. (Emphasis supplied)
It was therefore, the will of the deceased himself that, in case of foreclosure, the
property be put into the hands of a receiver, and this provision should be
respected by the administratrix of the estate. The cases cited by petitioner in favor
of the theory that property in custodia legis can not be given to a receiver is not
applicable, considering that this is an action to enforce a superior lien on certain
property of the estate and the appointment of a receiver, which is a very
convenient and feasible means of preserving and administering the property, has
been agreed upon by the contracting parties.
Wide latitude of discretion is usually given to the trial courts in the matter of
receivership and unless that discretion is exercised arbitrarily, We are not to
interfere. (See Motoomull v. Arieta, et al., G.R. No. L-15972, May 31, 1963.)
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the two orders complained of are affirmed. The
petition is hereby dismissed and the preliminary injunctive writ heretofore issued
dissolved. With costs against petitioner.
Bengzon, C.J., Bautista Angelo, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Paredes, Makalintal,
Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Dizon, J., concurs in the result.
Barrera, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-15388 January 31, 1961
DORA PERKINS ANDERSON, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
IDONAH SLADE PERKINS, oppositor-appellant.
Ponce Enrile, S. Reyna, Montecillo and Belo for petitioner-appellee.
Lazaro A. Marquez and J. D. Quirino for oppositor-appellant.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
Appeal against an order of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Special
Proceedings No. 29636 authorizing the special administrator of the testate estate of
the late Eugene Arthur Perkins to sell at public auction certain personal properties
left by the deceased.
It appears that said special proceedings were commenced on May 10, 1956, by a
petition presented by Dora Perkin Anderson for the probate of the supposed last
will and testament of the late Eugene Arthur Perkins, who died in Manila on April
28, 1956 allegedly possessed of personal and real properties with a probable value
of P5,000,000. On the same date of the filing of the aforesaid petition, petitioner
Dora Perkins Anderson also filed a urgent petition for the appointment of Alfonso
Ponce Enrile as special administrator of the estate, and on the same day, the court
issued an order appointing Alfonso Ponce Enrile as such special administrator upon
his posting of a bond in the amount of P50,000. On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade
Perkins, surviving spouse of the deceased entered an opposition to the probate of
the will presented by petitioner Dora Perkins Anderson. On September 28, 1956 the
special administrator submitted an inventory of all the assets which have come to
his knowledge as belonging to the deceased Eugene Arthur Perkins at the time of
his death.
About two years later, or on September 4, 1958, the special administrator
submitted to the court a petition seeking authority to sell, or give away to some
charitable or educational institution or institutions, certain personal effects left by
the deceased, such as clothes, books, gadgets, electrical appliances, etc., which
were allegedly deteriorating both physically and in value, in order to avoid their
further deterioration and to save whatever value migh be obtained in their
disposition. When the motion was heard on September 25, 1958, the court required
the administrator to submit a specification of the properties sought to be sold, and
in compliance therewith, the special administrator, on October 21, 1958, submitted
to the court, in place of a specification, a copy of the inventory of the personal
properties belonging to the estate with the items sought to be sold marked with a
check in red pencil, with the statement that said items were too voluminous to
enumerate.
On July 9, 1956, Idonah Slade Perkins filed an opposetion to the proposed sale.
Reasons, for the opposition were that (1) most of the properties sought to be sold
were conjugal properties of herself and her deceased husband; and (2) that
unauthorized removal of fine pieces of furniture belonging to the estate had been
made.
The opposition notwithstanding, the lower court, on December 2, 1958, approved
the proposed sale, authorizing the Sheriff of Manila to conduct the same.
Oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins moved to reconsider this order on the grounds (1)
that said order in effect authorized the special administrator to sell the entire
personal estate of the deceased, contrary to Rule 81, section 2. Rules of Court; (2)
that said order was issued without a showing that the goods and chattels sought to
be sold were perishable, pursuant to Rule 81, section 2, Rules of Court; (3) that the
personalty sought to be sold represented the lifetime savings and collections of
oppositor; (4) that there is evidence on record showing unauthorized withdrawals
from the properties of the estate, and the sale of the inventoried lot would prevent
identification and recovery of the articles removed; and (5) that there is also
evidence showing oppositor's separate rights to a substantial part of the personal
estate.
On February 23, 1959, the lower court denied the above motion for
reconsideration. Whereupon, oppositor Idonah Slade Perkins appealed to this
court.
Appellant first claims that the personal properties sought to be sold not being
perishable, the special administrator has no legal authority to sell them. This
argument is untenable, because section 2, Rule 81, of the Rules of Court,
specifically provides that the special administrator "may sell such perishable and
other property as the court orders sold", which shows that the special
administrator's power to sell is not limited to "perishable" property only.
Spec Pro 4 23
It is true that the function of a special administrator is only to collect and preserve
the property of the deceased until a regular administrator is appointed (sec. 2,
Rule 81; De Gala v. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 104; Collins v. Henry, 118 S.E. 729, 155 Ga. 886;
Sqydelko v. Smith's Estate, 244 N.W. 149, 259 Mich. 519). But it is not alone the
specific property of the estate which is to be preserved, but its value as well, as
shown by the legal provision for the sale by a special administrator of perishable
property (Cao vs. Cascade Silver Mines & Mills, et al., 213 P. 109 66 Mont. 488). It is
in line with this general power of the special administrator to preserve not only the
property of the estate but also its value, that section 2, Rule 81, also empowers
such administrator to sell "other proerty as the court ordered sold;" .
There is, however, a serious obstacle to the proposed sale, namely, the vigorous
opposition presented thereto the appellant, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
on the ground that she is allegedly entitled to a large portion of the personal
properties in question, either because the were conjugal property of herself and
the deceased, or because they are her own, exclusive, personal property. Indeed
the records show that up to the time the propose sale was asked for and judicially
approved, no proceeding had as yet been taken, or even started, to segregate
the alleged exclusive property of the oppositor-appellant from the mass of the
estate supposedly left by the deceased or to liquidate the conjugal partnership
property of the oppositor-appellant and the deceased. Until, therefore the issue of
the ownership of the properties sought to be sold is heard and decided, and the
conjugal partnership liquidated; or, at least, an agreement be reached with a
appellant as to which properties of the conjugal partnership she would not mind
being sold to preserve their value the proposed sale is clearly premature. After all,
most of the items sought to be sold — pieces of furniture, kitchen and dinner ware,
electrical appliances, various gadget and books — can easily be protected and
preserved with proper care and storage measures in either or both of two
residential houses (in Manila and in Baguio City left by the deceased, so that no
reasons of extreme urgency justify the proposed sale at this time over the strong
opposition and objection of oppositor-appellant who may later be adjudged
owner of a substantial portion of the personal estate in question.
The special administrator claims in his brief that t oppositor-appellant should have
indicated the alleged "fine furniture" which she did not want sold and that her
refusal to do so is an indication of her unmeritorious claim. But it does not appear
that appellant was given a reasonable opportunity to point out which items in the
inventory she did not want sold. In fact, her opposition to the proposed sale and
later her motion for reconsideration to the order approving the same were
overruled by the court without so much as stating reasons why the grounds for her
opposition were not well-founded; the records do not even show that an inquiry
was made as to the validity of the grounds of her opposition.
WHEREFORE, the lower court's order of December 2, 1958 authorizing the special
administrator to sell certain personal properties of the estate is set aside, with costs
against the special administrator Alfonso Ponce Enrile and petition-appellee Dora
Perkins Anderson.
Paras, C.J., Bengzon, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Barrera, Paredes
and Dizon, JJ., concur.
Gutierrez David, J., took no part.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
G.R. No. 160671 April 30, 2008
LUIS L. CO, petitioner,
vs.
HON. RICARDO R. ROSARIO, in his capacity as the Presiding Judge of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 66, Makati City, ELIZABETH RACHEL CO, ASTRID MELODY CO-LIM,
GENEVIEVE CO-CHUN, CAROL CO, KEVIN CO, EDWARD CO and the ESTATE OF LIM
SEE TE, respondents.
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:
For the resolution of the Court is a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court questioning the October 28, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals (CA) in CA-G.R. SP No. 72055.
The relevant facts and proceedings follow.
On March 4, 1998, the Regional Trial Court (RTC) OF Makati City, Branch 66, in Sp.
Proc. No. M-4615, appointed petitioner and Vicente O. Yu, Sr. as the special
administrators of the estate of the petitioner’s father, Co Bun Chun.2 However, on
motion of the other heirs, the trial court set aside petitioner’s appointment as
special co-administrator.3 Petitioner consequently, nominated his son, Alvin Milton
Co (Alvin, for brevity), for appointment as co-administrator of the estate.4 On
August 31, 1998, the RTC appointed Alvin as special co-administrator.5
Almost four years thereafter, the RTC, acting on a motion6 filed by one of the heirs,
issued its January 22, 2002 Order7 revoking and setting aside the appointment of
Alvin. The trial court reasoned that Alvin had become unsuitable to discharge the
trust given to him as special co-administrator because his capacity, ability or
competence to perform the functions of co-administrator had been beclouded by
the filing of several criminal cases against him, which, even if there was no
conviction yet, had provided the heirs ample reason to doubt his fitness to handle
the subject estate with utmost fidelity, trust and confidence.
Aggrieved, petitioner moved for the reconsideration of the said Order, but this was
denied in the RTC Order8 of May 14, 2002.
Subsequently, petitioner brought the matter to the CA on petition
for certiorari under Rule 65. In the aforesaid challenged October 28, 2003
Decision,9 the appellate court affirmed the revocation of the appointment and
dismissed the petition. Thus, the instant petition for review on certiorari under Rule
45.
The petition is bereft of merit.
We affirm the appellate court’s ruling that the trial court did not act with grave
abuse of discretion in revoking Alvin’s appointment as special co-administrator.
Settled is the rule that the selection or removal of specialadministrators is not
governed by the rules regarding the selection or removal
of regular administrators. 10 Courts may appoint or remove special administrators
based on grounds other than those enumerated in the Rules, at their
discretion.11 As long as the said discretion is exercised without grave abuse, higher
courts will not interfere with it. 12 This, however, is no authority for the judge to
become partial, or to make his personal likes and dislikes prevail over, or his
Spec Pro 4 24
passions to rule, his judgment. The exercise of such discretion must be based on
reason, equity, justice and legal principles.13
Thus, even if a special administrator had already been appointed, once the court
finds the appointee no longer entitled to its confidence, it is justified in withdrawing
the appointment and giving no valid effect thereto.14 The special administrator is
an officer of the court who is subject to its supervision and control and who is
expected to work for the best interest of the entire estate, especially with respect
to its smooth administration and earliest settlement. 15
In this case, we find that the trial court’s judgment on the issue of Alvin’s removal as
special co-administrator is grounded on reason, equity, justice and legal principle.
It is not characterized by patent and gross capriciousness, pure whim and abuse,
arbitrariness or despotism, as to be correctible by the writ of certiorari.16 In fact, the
appellate court correctly observed that:
In ruling to revoke the appointment of Alvin Milton Co, the lower court took into
consideration the fiduciary nature of the office of a special administrator which
demands a high degree of trust and confidence in the person to be appointed.
The court a quo observed that, burdened with the criminal charges of falsification
of commercial documents leveled against him (sic), and the corresponding
profound duty to defend himself in these proceedings, Alvin Milton Co’s ability and
qualification to act as special co-administrator of the estate of the decedent are
beclouded, and the recall of his appointment is only proper under the attendant
circumstances. Such reasoning by the court a quo finds basis in actual logic and
probability. Without condemning the accused man (sic) as guilty before he is
found such by the appropriate tribunal, the court merely declared that it is more
consistent with the demands of justice and orderly processes that the petitioner’s
son, who is already bidden to defend himself against criminal charges for
falsification in other fora be relieved of his duties and functions as special
administrator, to avoid conflicts and possible abuse.
The Court finds no grave abuse of discretion attending such ruling, as it was
reached based on the court a quo’s own fair assessment of the circumstances
attending the case below, and the applicable laws.17
As a final note, the Court observes that this prolonged litigation on the simple issue
of the removal of a special co-administrator could have been avoided if the trial
court promptly appointed a regular administrator. We, therefore, direct the trial
court to proceed with the appointment of a regular administrator as soon as
practicable.
WHEREFORE, the petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED. The October 28,
2003 Decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 72055 is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-11435 December 27, 1957
HON. MATEO L. ALCASID, as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Albay, ANTONIO
CONDA, as regular administrator of the estate of Jose V. Samson, JOSEFINA N.
SAMSON, GLENDA SAMSON, MANUEL SAMSON and FELIX SAMSON, petitioners,
vs.
AMADO V. SAMSON, JESUS V. SAMSON, PURIFICACION SAMSON MORALES;
DOLORES SAMSON-ACAYAN and PAZ SAMSON-YOROBE, respondents.
Moises C. Kallos for petitioners.
Ramon C. Fernandez for respondents.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
On October 18, 1954, herein respondents filed an application in the Court of First
Instance of Albay for the issuance of letters of administration in favor in one of
them, Jesus V. Samson, for the estate of the late Jose V. Samson. On the same
date, Jesus V. Samson was appointed special administrator of the estate.
The application was opposed by petitioners Josefina N. Samson, the widow of Jose
V. Samson and her three minor children Glenda N. Samson, Manuel N. Samson and
Felix N. Samson. They asked for the granting of letters of administration in favor of
Josefina N. Samson, in the place of Jesus V. Samson. After hearing that dragged
for almost two years, Judge Alcasid, on March 12, 1956, issued an order appointing
Antonio Conda, Municipal Treasurer of Libon, Albay, as regular administrator. In
that order the special administrator Jesus V. Samson was instructed at the same
time, the "twenty (20) days from the receipt of this order he shall turn over all the
properties and funds of the estate in his possession to the regular administrator as
soon as the latter qualified." Antonio Conda put up the bond fixed by the court
and, on March 19,1956, letters of administration were issued in his favor. On April 3,
1956, upon motion of the widow, the court issued an order requiring the special
administrator to "deliver the properties and funds of the estate now in his possession
to the regular administrator within three (3) days from receipt of this order" (Annex
B).
It also appears that on March 27, 1956, respondents filed an appeal from the order
of the court granting letters of administration in favor of Antonio Conda and their
record on appeal was approved on April 17, 1956. On April 20, 1956, they filed a
motion seeking to set aside the approval of the bond posted by Antonio Conda as
well as the letters of administration issued in his favor. This motion having been
denied through an order issued on May 9, 1956, respondents resorted to the
appellate courts.
The Court of Appeals upon certiorari applied for by the special administrator and
the heirs siding with him, held that, on the authority of our decision in Cotia vs.
Pecson, 1 49 Off. Gaz., 4313, the order appointing Antonio Conda as regular
administrator was stayed by the appeal taken against it, and thereafter, Conda
should not have been allowed to qualify in the meantime, unless execution
pending appeal should be ordered for special reasons pursuant to Rule 39, section
2 of the Rules of Court; and that "should the special administrator be found, after
due process of law, unfit to continue", he "could be dismissed and another
appointed to look after the interests of the estate until the appeal filed against
Conda's appointment is finally disposed of". For these reasons, the Court of
Appeals set aside the appointment of Conda and annulled his bond.
Against this decision, the interested parties applied to this Court for a review. We
granted certiorari.lawphi1.net
This Court has repeatedly decided that the appointment and removal of a special
administrator are interlocutory proceedings incidental to the main case, and lie in
Spec Pro 4 25
the sound discretion of the court. (Roxas vs. Pecson, 2 46 Off. Gaz. 2058; Junquera
vs. Barromeo, 3 52 Off. Gaz., 7611; DeGala vs. Gonzales, 53 Phil. 106; Garcia vs.
Flores, 101 Phil. 781, 54 Off. Gaz., 4049).
Thus, in Roxas vs. Pecson, supra, this Court ruled:
It is well settled that the statutory provisions as to the prior or preferred right of
certain persons to the appointment of administrator under section 1, Rule 81, as
well as the statutory provisions as to causes for removal of an executor or
administrator under section 653 of Act No. 190, now section 2, Rule 83, do not
apply to the selection or removal of special administrator. (21 Am. Jur., 833; De
Gala vs. Gonzales and Ona, 53 Phil., 104, 106). As the law does not say who shall
be appointed as special administrator and the qualifications the appointee must
have, the judge or court has discretion in the selection of the person to be
appointed, discretion which must be sound, that is, not whimsical or contrary to
reason, justice or equity.
It is well to mark that, in the present case, the special administrator was not
actually removed by the court, but that he was superseded by the regular
administrator by operation of law. Rule 81, section 3, of the Rules of Court
specifically provides that—
When letters testamentary or of administration are granted on the estate of the
deceased, the power of the special administrator shall cease, and shall forthwith
deliver to the executor or administrator the goods, chattels, money and estate of
the deceased in his hands.lawphi1.net
No question of abuse of discretion can therefore arise on account of the order of
April 8, 1956, requiring Jesus V. Samson to turn over the administration to the
regular administrator, such result being ordained by law. Upon the other hand, the
conditions of the estate justified the appointment and qualification of a regular
administrator, because the special administration had lasted nearly two years, and
the prompt settlement of the estate had been unduly delayed. The Albay court
said in its order of March 12:
. . . It is also the sense of this Court that the appointment of any of their immediate
relations would not end the bitter conflict that has so far raged as can be seen
from the voluminous records of this case which have accumulated within a very
short time. The appointment of a disinterested person as regular administrator
would be conducive to a smooth and peaceful administration of the properties of
the estate. At any rate, the appointment of Jesus V. Samson as special
administrator was but done in a state of emergency.
These reasons were supplemented by the order of May 9, 1956:
It is certainly against the interests of justice and a frustration of the policy of those
rules to extend unduly the time within which estates should be administered and to
keep thereby the property from the possession and use of those who are entitled
thereto. The view advanced by counsel for the special administrator that the
appointment of regular administrator cannot be effective until after the appeal
interposed by the special administrator is finally determined by the appellate court
is contrary to the spirit of the policy of the Rules of court above referred to and
would unduly delay the prompt settlement of the estate of the deceased Jose V.
Samson, specially considering that this special proceeding was commenced as far
back as October 18, 1954, or more than one and one-half years ago, and that the
notice of the creditors, as provided in section 1, Rule 87, of the Rules of Court,
cannot be even issued until after letters of administration have been granted by
the court to the regular administrator. (Decision, Ct. App., p.4) .
Even assuming that the rule in Cotia vs. Pecson, 49 Off. Gaz., 4313 (tho it actually
dealt with the removal of a regular administrator) is applicable to the case at bar,
in the sense that the appointment of a new administrator should be made
effective pending appeal only if Rule 39, section 2 (execution pending appeal) is
complied with, such compliance exists in the present case, for the order of April 3,
1956 (issued upon motion of herein petitioners) that required the special
administrator to turn over the properties and funds of the estate to the regular
administrator, was in effect a special order for the carrying out of the regular
administration notwithstanding the of respondents that was not perfected until
April 12, 1956; while the special reasons for immediately carrying the order into
effect are given in the order of March 12, as supplemented by that of May 9, 1956,
heretofore quoted. We find these reasons sufficient (cf. De Borja vs. Encarnacion,
Phil., 239).
The fact that these reasons were not expressed in the very order of April 3, 1956, is
not by itself fatal or constitutive of abuse of discretion; for while Rule 39, section 2,
prescribes that execution pending appeal may issue for good reasons to be stated
in a special order, this Court has decided that the element that gives validity to an
order of immediate execution is the existence of good reasons, if they may be
found distinctly somewhere in the record, altho not expressly stated in the order of
execution itself (Lusk vs. Stevens, 54 Phil. 154; Guevarra vs. Court of First Instance of
Laguna, 70 Phil. 48; People's Bank vs. San Jose, 96 Phil., 895, 51 Off. Gaz., [6] 2918;
Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court [1957 ed.,] Vol. I, p. 540).
All told, the case boils down to this: The removal of the special administrator is at
the court's sound discretion, and the orders of March 12, and May 9, 1956 show
that there were good reasons to terminate the special administration. This being so,
the heirs can not seek to prolong the tenure of the removed special administrator
by appealing Conda's appointment as regular administrator. It may be argued
that during the appeal, the estate should be under special administration; but it
does not appear that Amadeo Samson and his partisans have so asked the court
nor have they proposed another administrator and therefore, their complaint
against the court's action is unmeritorious.
A minor procedural point must be noted. In special proceedings, the judge whose
order is under attack is merely a nominal party; wherefore, a judge in his capacity
should not be made to appear as a party seeking reversal of a decision that is
unfavorable to the action taken by him. A decent regard for the judicial hierarchy
bars a judge from suing against the adverse opinion of a higher court and counsel
should realize the fact and not include the Judge's name in ulterior proceedings.
We see no abuse of discretion in the orders of the Court of First Instance
complained of. The decision of the Court of Appeals is reversed and the original
petition for certiorari filed by the special administrator is ordered dismissed, and the
writ denied, with costs against the respondents in this Court, Jesus V. Samson at al.
So ordered.
Bengzon, Paras, C.J., Padilla, Montemayor, Reyes, A., Bautista Angelo, Labrador,
Concepcion, Endencia, and Felix, JJ., concur.
Spec Pro 4 26
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-18498 March 30, 1967
TESTATE ESTATE OF VITO BORROMEO. JOSE H. JUNQUERA, petitioner-appellee,
vs.
CRISPIN BORROMEO, ET AL., oppositors-appellants.
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES, intervenor-appellant.
Benjamin A. Rallon for oppositor-appellant Fortunato Borromeo.
Crispen Baizas and Associates for heirs oppositors-appellants Tomas Borromeo and
Amelia Borromeo.
Office of the Solicitor General for intervenor oppositor-appellant Republic.
Miguel Cuenco and Fernando S. Ruiz for heirs oppositors-appellants Crispin
Borromeo, Teofilo Borromeo, et al.
Filiberto Leonardo for petitioner-appellee.
DIZON, J.:
Vito Borromeo, a widower and permanent resident of the City of Cebu, died on
March 13, 1952, in Parañaque, Rizal, at the age of 88 years, without forced heirs
but leaving extensive properties in the province of Cebu.
On April 19 of the same year, Jose H. Junquera, filed with the Court of First Instance
of said province a petition for the probate of a one page document as the last will
left by said deceased, devising all his properties to Tomas, Fortunato and Amelia,
all surnamed Borromeo, in equal and undivided shares, and designating Junquera
as executor thereof (Special Proceedings No. 916-R). The document — now in the
record as Exhibit "A" — was dated May 17, 1946, drafted in Spanish, and allegedly
signed, and thumbmarked by said deceased, in the presence of Dr. Cornelio G.
Gandionco, Eusebio Cabiluna and Filiberto Leonardo as attesting witnesses. On
June 14, 1952, the probate court appointed Junquera as special administrator of
the estate.
On November 14 of the same year, Teofilo Borromeo filed an opposition to the
probate of the will based on the following grounds: (1) that the formalities required
by law had not been complied with; (2) that the testator was mentally incapable
of making a will at the time of its execution; (3) that the will was procured by
undue and improper influence, on the part of the beneficiaries and/or some other
person; (4) that the signature of the testator was procured by fraud; and (5) that
the testator acted by mistake or did not intend the instrument he signed to be his
will at the time he affixed his signature thereto.
Upon motion of the abovenamed oppositor, on June 9, 1953, the Court removed
Junquera as special administrator and appointed Dr. Patricio Beltran in his place.
On November 27, 1953, Vitaliana Borromeo, a niece of the deceased, filed her
own opposition to the probate of the will, on the ground that the signature "Vito
Borromeo" appearing thereon was a forgery. Other oppositions were subsequently
filed by Patrocinio Borromeo de Tabotabo (her opposition was later withdrawn),
Lilia Morre de Tabotabo, Lamberto Morre, Patricia Morre de Ranario, Aurora Morre
de Borromeo, Ramon Ocampo, Isagani Morre and Rosario Morre, invoking
substantially the same grounds mentioned heretofore.
Meanwhile, Tomas, Amelia and Fortunato Borromeo, manifestly on behalf of the
"Cebu Arcade Company, T. L. Borromeo y Cia.", a duly organized partnership
controlled by them, filed a motion to exclude from the inventory of the Estate
previously filed by the new special administrator, thirteen parcels of land situated in
the City of Cebu with a total area of 2,148 square meters, alleging that during his
lifetime the deceased testator had sold said lots to them, as evidenced by the
document now in the record as Exhibit F-1 executed on May 17, 1945, confirming
the alleged previous sale. After due hearing, the court, in its order of July 16, 1954,
denied the motion for exclusion, ruling that movants' remedy was to file a
separate accion reivindicatoria against the administrator.
On October 28, 1955, the Republic of the Philippines filed a motion for leave to
intervene and join the oppositors in contesting the probate of the will, on the
ground that, should the estate be adjudicated the latter by intestacy, it stood to
collect a considerable amount by way of estate and inheritance taxes. In its order
of December 10 of the same year, the Court allowed the intervention.
After a prolonged trial, on May 28, 1960, the Court rendered a decision denying
the probate of the will and declaring itself without jurisdiction to pass upon the
question of ownership over the thirteen lots which the Cebu Arcade etc. claimed
as its own. All the parties appealed — the proponents of the will from the portion of
the decision denying probate, and the oppositors and the Republic of the
Philippines, from that portion thereof where the court refused to decide the
question of ownership of the thirteen lots already mentioned.
The proponents of the disputed will, mainly with the testimony of the three attesting
witnesses, Cornelio Gandionco, Filiberto Leonardo and Eusebio Cabiluna, sought
to prove the following facts:
In the morning of May 17, 1945, Tomas Borromeo, complying with the request of
Vito Borromeo, went to the house of Atty. Filiberto Leonardo to request him to be a
witness at the execution of the latter's last will. Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, who at the
time happened to be in the house of Leonardo, was likewise requested to act as
such. Together, the three went to the residence of Vito Borromeo at Ramos Street,
Cebu City. Upon their arrival the third witness, Eusebio Cabiluna, who was living on
the ground floor of the house, was asked to come upstairs. Thereafter, in their
presence, Vito Borromeo executed first, the document Exhibit "F" (deed of
confirmation of an alleged previous sale to Cebu Arcade Company, T. L.
Borromeo y Cia.) witnessed by Gandionco and Cabiluna. Later, Vito Borromeo,
being of sound and disposing mind, and without pressure or influence exerted on
him, dictated the substance of his will to Tomas Borromeo, who in turn typewrote it
in proper legal language. The document was then read by Vito Borromeo, who
later signed and thumbmarked it (Exhibit "A") and carbon copies thereof (Exhibits
"E" and "K") in the presence of the attesting witnesses, who, in turn, signed the will
and its copies in the presence of Vito Borromeo and of each other.
Proponents also placed the Rev. Fr. Julio Corres, a Spanish Catholic priest who was
the confessor of Vito Borromeo from 1942 to 1946, the Rev. Fr. Sergio Alfafara, who
was his confessor from 1946 to 1947, and Vicenta Mañacap, a mid-wife who lived
in the testator's house and had served him from May 1945 up to his death on
March 30, 1952 on the witness stand. The gist of their testimony is to the effect that
at the time of the execution of the will, Vito Borromeo was still strong and could
move around freely with the aid of a cane; that he was still mentally alert and was
a man of strong will; that his right hand was unimpaired and he could write with it
unaided; that as a matter of fact — according to Vicenta Mañacap — he still
Spec Pro 4 27
wrote personal letters to Tomas Borromeo, could eat by himself and even played
the piano.
On the other hand, the oppositors presented several witnesses who testified that
the signatures purporting to be those of Vito Borromeo on the document Exhibit "A"
and its copies were forgeries; that they were too good and too perfect signatures
and, therefore, quite impossible for the deceased — an ailing man already 82
years old on May 17, 1945 — to write; that he was found "positive for bacillus
leprosy" by Dr. Antonio Garcia as early as 1926 or 1927, having been treated for it
consistently by injections of chaulmoogra oil administered by Dr. Max Borromeo
and Dr. Cornelio Gandionco; that Vito Borromeo's usual signatures during his better
days had always been characterized by certain flourishes, technically called
"rubric"; that Vito Borromeo had also reared and educated two of the oppositors,
Crispin Borromeo and the late Teofilo Borromeo and there was no conceivable
reason why they were left out in the will, if any such will had really been made by
him knowingly; that the testamentary witness Cornelio Gandionco, is a nephew of
the other witness, Filiberto Leonardo, and was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, a
sister of Tomas Borromeo, one of the instituted heirs; that the third testamentary
witness, Eusebio Cabiluna is the real father of Fortunato Borromeo, another
instituted heir, who admittedly grew up and was reared by Vito Borromeo and his
wife Juliana Evangelista since he was barely three months; that Amelia Borromeo,
the third instituted heir, is a younger sister of Tomas Borromeo and dependent upon
him; that on May 17, 1945, the deceased's leprosy was so far advanced that the
fingers of his right hand were already hardened and atrophied, this making it
difficult, if not impossible, for him to write; and that on the same date, his sense of
hearing and his eyesight had been considerably impaired, his eyes being always
watery due to the progress of his leprosy.
The oppositors also presented Felipe Logan of the National Bureau of Investigation
and Jose G. Villanueva, as handwriting experts, who testified, after examining the
supposed signatures of the deceased in Exhibit "A" and comparing them with his
accepted standard signatures, that the questioned signatures were forgeries. The
proponents, however, presented their own handwriting expert, Martin Ramos, who
testified to the contrary.
The trial court refused to believe the testimony of the attesting witnesses and, as a
result, denied the petition for probate, because, in its opinion, they appeared not
to be "wholly disinterested persons" and because of the serious discrepancies in
their testimonies with respect to the number of copies made of the disputed
document. The court also found that the physical condition of the deceased at
the time of the execution of the questioned document was such that it was highly
improbable, if not impossible, for him to have affixed his signatures on the
documents Exhibits A, E and K in the spontaneous and excellent manner they
appear to have been written. Thus, the court was also led to believe the testimony
of the handwriting experts for oppositors, — adverse to the genuineness of the
signatures of Vito Borromeo on the questioned document — more than that of the
handwriting expert presented by the proponents of the will.
It seems clear, therefore, that the main issue to be decided in the present appeal is
whether or not the evidence of record is sufficient to prove the due execution of
the will in question.1äwphï1.ñët
It must be conceded that in this jurisdiction, the subscribing witnesses to a
contested will are regarded as the best witnesses in connection with its due
execution. It is similarly true, however, that to deserve full credit, their test, testimony
must be reasonable and unbiased, and that, as in the case of any other witness,
their testimony may be overcome by any competent evidence — direct or
circumstantial (Board, etc. vs. Shasser, 10 Kan. 585, 168 Pac. 836 [1917]).
It is also an appellate practice of long standing in this jurisdiction to accord great
weight to the findings of fact made by the trial court and not to disturb them unless
said court had failed to consider material facts and circumstances or had given
undue weight to, or misconstrued the testimony of particular witnesses, the reason
for this being that the trial judge had full opportunity to hear and observe the
conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying and was consequently in
a better position than the reviewing court to determine the question of their
credibility. While this is not applicable to the present case because His Honor, the
judge who penned the appealed decision was not the same judge before whom
the evidence of the parties was presented, it must be stated that, judging from the
carefully written decision under review, it was only after a thorough study of the
record that His Honor arrived at the conclusion that the subscribing witnesses do
not appear to be wholly disinterested persons.
On the matter of the number of copies made of the questioned will allegedly
signed by the testator and the three subscribing witnesses, His Honor found that
Cabiluna was very uncertain and confused; that a certain stage of his
examination, he said that only two copies of the will were prepared — the original
and one carbon copy — while at another stage he affirmed that he did not know
whether or not there was a duplicate and that all he could say was that he had
affixed his signature three times (Transcript, Marquiala, August 22, 1958, pp. 49-50).
In truth, however, he really signed six (6) times — twice on the original and twice on
each of the two copies. Adding confusion to the situation is the answer he gave
when he was asked if Vito Borromeo also signed the carbon copy, to which his
answer was "I did not see" (Idem., p. 50).
On the other hand, the other subscribing witness, Atty. Filiberto Leonardo, testified
categorically that there were only the original and one carbon copy of the will
and that the testator and all the subscribing witnesses signed both (Transcript,
Marquiala, December 23, 1953, pp. 167, 210, and 218). However, the naked and
highly disturbing fact is that, contrary to what is inferable from the vacillating
testimony of Cabiluna and the categorical assertion of Atty. Leonardo, the
proponents of the questioned will themselves presented three copies of said will;
the original, a carbon duplicate copy and a carbon triplicate copy, now in the
record as Exhibits A, E and K, respectively.
While it is true that the testimony of these subscribing witnesses was given around
eight years after the alleged execution of the questioned will, still we believe that
the transaction in which they claim to have taken an important part is of such
character and importance that it can not be a very easy matter for anyone of
them to have a hazy recollection of the number of copies signed by the testator
and by them. Stranger still would it be for them to say something in open
contradiction with the reality on the matter. If, as may be clearly deduced from
their testimony — Cabiluna and Leonardo's — there was only the original and one
copy signed by the testator and the subscribing witnesses, why is it that three —
original and two copies — were really in existence and were produced in court
during the trial?
Spec Pro 4 28
In the case of the third subscribing witness, Dr. Cornelio Gandionco, the imputation
was made by two witnesses, Dr. Teofilo Borromeo and Judge Crispin Borromeo,
that he was the fiance of Angeles Borromeo, sister of Tomas Borromeo, who is one
of the three heirs instituted in the questioned will, evidently to show that he is not a
completely disinterested witness. The evidence to this effect appears to have
remained unimpeached, although the proponents of the will could have done it
by calling on Dr. Gandionco himself or on Angeles Borromeo to deny the
imputation.
Moreover, the evidence also disclose that Dr. Gandionco was the uncle of the
other subscribing witness, Atty. Leonardo, and that, in fact, they were living
together at the time of the alleged execution of the will. This circumstance —
apparently trivial — can not be taken lightly because in view of appellee's claim
that Angeles Borromeo was the fiance of Dr. Gandionco, it would not be
unreasonable to entertain the suspicion that both subscribing witnesses were not
wholly disinterested. Material to this point is the fact established by the evidence
that Atty. Leonardo was the notary public before whom the document Exhibit 4-A
— which purports to convey to a partnership controlled by the heirs instituted in the
questioned will thirteen parcels of land situated in the commercial center of Cebu
City — was supposedly acknowledged by the testator on the same date May 17,
1945.
In the light of the foregoing, We can not see our way clear to holding that the trial
court erred in refusing to give full credit to the testimony of the three subscribing
witnesses.
It has also been held that the condition and physical appearance of a questioned
document constitute a valuable factor which, if correctly evaluated in the light of
surrounding circumstances, may help in determining whether it is genuine or
forged. Subscribing witnesses may forget or exaggerate what they really know,
saw, heard or did; they may be biased and, therefore, tell only half truths to
mislead the court or favor one party to the prejudice of the other. This can not be
said of the condition and physical appearance of the questioned document itself.
Both, albeit silently, will reveal the naked truth, hiding nothing, forgetting nothing,
and exaggerating nothing. For this reason, independently of the conflicting
opinions expressed by the handwriting experts called to the witness stand by the
parties, we have carefully examined and considered the physical appearance
and condition of the original and two copies of the questioned will found in the
record — particularly the signatures attributed to the testator — and We have
come to the conclusion that the latter could not have been written by him.
Upon the face of the original and two copies of the contested will (Exhibits A, E
and K) appear a total of six alleged signatures of the testator. They are all well
written along a practically straight line, without any visible sign of tremor or lack of
firmness in the hand that wrote them. In fact, in the respects just adverted to, they
appear better written than the unquestioned signatures, of attesting witnesses
Gandionco and Cabiluna, inspite of the fact that on the date of the alleged
execution of the will (May 17, 1945) the testator was considerably older and in a
much poorer physical condition than they. According to the evidence, the
testator was then a sick man, eighty-two years old, with the entire left half of his
body paralyzed since six years before, while the oldest attesting witness (Cabiluna)
was around sixty-five years of age and Leonardo and Gandionco were only forty-
four and forty-five years old respectively, and were all in good health. Despite the
obviously very poor physical condition of the testator, Leonardo claims that he
signed the alleged will unaided, writing his name thereon slowly but continuously or
without interruption, and that, on the same occasion, he signed his name several
times not only on the original of the will and its copies but also on the original and
several copies of the alleged confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and on his residence
certificate. Considering all the attendant circumstances, we agree with the lower
court that Vito Borromeo could not have written the questioned signatures.
In view of what has been said heretofore, We find it unnecessary to examine and
consider in detail the conflicting testimony of the handwriting experts presented by
the parties: Martin Ramos by the proponents of the will, to sustain the genuineness
of the questioned signatures, and Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva, by the
oppositors, to prove that said signatures are forgeries. We shall limit ourselves in this
connection to quoting with approval the following portion of the appealed
decision:
What the Court finds to be a weakness in the conclusions of Martin Ramos, based
on his comparative examination of the questioned and standard signatures of Vito
Borromeo, is his apparent assumption that all the signatures were made by Vito
Borromeo under equality or similarity of circumstances, that is, that in all instances
Vito Borromeo had normal use of both of his hands, — the right and the left. He
failed to take into account that when Vito Borromeo allegedly affixed those
signatures on May 17, 1945 on Exhibits 'A', 'E', and 'K' the left portion of his body,
including the left hand, was already paralyzed, and Vito Borromeo was
represented to have written his name alone by himself and unaided. Maybe, if he
was previously apprised of those circumstances, he would hesitate to make the
conclusion that those flawless signatures reading Vito Borromeo, written straight
and in a form as good as, if not better than, the signatures of three much younger
attesting witnesses, were positively in the handwriting of the 82-year old, ailing, and
paralytic Vito Borromeo. The Court consequently, finds itself not disposed to adopt
his conclusions, but on the contrary is inclined toward the views of the other two
experts witnesses, Felipe Logan and Jose G. Villanueva.
As stated at the outset, the contested will is claimed to have been signed
and thumbmarked by the testator. An examination of the thumbmarks, however,
readily shows that, as the lower court found, the same are "glaringly far from being
distinct and clear"; that "they are not a possible means of identification" nor can
"they possibly be identified to be those of Vito Borromeo, or for that matter, of any
other person whatsoever". It is, therefore, obvious, that they are of little use in the
resolution of the issue before Us.
We shall now consider the appeal, taken by the oppositors and the Republic of the
Philippines from that portion of the decision where the lower court declined to
decide with finality the question of who owns the thirteen parcels of land subject-
matter of the confirmatory sale Exhibit F-1 and whether or not they should be
included in or excluded from the inventory of properties of the Estate of the
deceased Vito Borromeo.
It appears that on February 11, 1954 Tomas, Amelia, and Fortunato Borromeo,
through counsel, filed a motion for the exclusion from the inventory of the Estate of
the thirteen lots therein mentioned, with a total area of 2,348 square meters,
claiming that the same had been sold by the deceased Vito Borromeo during his
lifetime to the Cebu Arcade, T. L. Borromeo y Cia. This motion for exclusion was
denied by the lower court in its order of July 16, 1954, and the ruling was reiterated
Spec Pro 4 29
in the appealed decision "for the same reasons and considerations" upon which it
rejected the probate of the will. The ruling on the matter, however, was expressly
made provisional in nature.
We believe, and so hold, that the resolution of the lower court on this matter is
correct because said court, acting in its capacity as a probate court, had no
jurisdiction to determine with finality the question of ownership involved. That such
matter must be litigated in a separate action has been the established
jurisprudence in this jurisdiction (Ongsinco vs. Borja, L-7635, July 25, 1955; Mallari vs.
Mallari, L-4656, February 23, 1953; Garcia vs. Martin, G.R. No. L-9233, June 29, 1957;
Cordova vs. Ocampo, 73 Phil. 661; Pascual vs. Pascual, 73 Phil. 561 and others),
except where a party merely prays for the inclusion or exclusion from the inventory
of any particular property, in which case the probate court may pass upon
provisionally, the question of inclusion or exclusion, but without prejudice to its final
determination in an appropriate separate action (Garcia vs. Garcia, 67 Phil. 353;
Marcelino vs. Antonio, 70 Phil. 388; Guinguing vs. Abuton, 48 Phil. 144, 147).
In view of all the foregoing, the decision appealed from is affirmed, with costs.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. 43351 February 26, 1937
Intestate estate of the deceased Baldomero Cosme.
ROSARIO COSME DE MENDOZA, administratrix-appellee,
vs.
JANUARIO PACHECO and RAYMUNDO CORDERO, sureties-appellants.
Vicente J. Francsico and Estanislao A. Fernandez, Jr. for appellants.
R. Gonzales Lloret for appellee.
LAUREL, J.:
The facts in this case are not disputed. Manuel Soriano was former administrator of
the estate of Baldomero Cosme in civil case No. 5494, Court of First Instance of
Laguna. To assure faithful performance of his duties as such administrator, he filed
a bond for P5,000, with the herein appellants, Januario Pacheco and Raymundo
Cordero, as sureties. Soriano's account, upon approval, showed him indebted to
the estate in the sum of P23,603.21. Unable to turn this amount over to the estate
upon demand of Rosario Cosme, the new administratrix, the lower court ordered
the execution of his bond on November 4, 1932, after notice duly served upon the
sureties. Sometime later, the court approved a settlement had between the
adminstratrix and the ex-administrator, whereby the latter ceded certain real
properties to the estate reducing on that account his indebtedness to the estate
from P23,603.21 to P5,000. As to this last amount, "La administradora se atiene a la
orden de ejecucion de la fianza suscrita por los fiadores Januario Pacheco y
Raymundo Cordero" (Record on Appeal, p. 2). Subsequently, the administratrix
had the public sale thereof to collect this amount of P5,000. Separate motions to
he discharged from the bond were filed by sureties Pacheco and Cordero. Both
motions were denied. A motion by Cordero to reconsider the order of denial met a
like fate. Brought on appeal to this court, the appeal was dismissed. The dispositive
part of the decision of this court (G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de Mendoza vs. Pacheco
and Cordero [60 Phil., 1057]) reads as follows:
The motion of October 1, 1933, was filed only on behalf of Raymundo Cordero who
filed no motion for reconsideration of the order of execution of November 4, 1932,
and took no appeal therefrom. Being of the opinion that the trial court correctly
held that said order had become final, the motion of October 31, 1933, for
reconsideration (if such it may be called) came too late. The judgment is therefore
affirmed with costs against the appellants.
When the case was remanded to the lower court, the sureties filed a motion
challenging, for the first time, the jurisdiction of the trial court to issue the order of
November 4, 1932, executing the bond. The trial court denied the motion in view of
the decision of this court. The case is elevated here for the second time on appeal.
Appellants assign the following error:
The lower court erred in refusing: (a) To declare null and void its order of execution
of the ex-administrator's bond of November 4, 1932, as well as the writs of
execution issued in virtue thereof; (b) to accordingly vacate said order of
November 4, 1932, and order the release of the properties of the herein sureties-
appellants attached in pursuance of the writs of execution issued against them by
virtue of said order; and (c) to order the suspension of the execution of the said
order of November 4, 1932, until this case is finally decide.
In the discussion of the foregoing assignment of error in their brief (pp. 9-23), the
appellants take in six propositions. One question, however, — that of jurisdiction of
the Court of First Instance of Laguna to order the execution of the administrator's
bond — is decisive of this appeal. Appellants, sureties upon the bond, press the
point that the order in suit is an absolute nullity for lack of power in the issuing court.
"In vain," they tell us, "have we searched our statute books, especially the part of
our Code of Civil Procedure regarding probate jurisdiction, to find whether our
Courts of First Instance, acting as probate courts, have the power to order the
execution of an administrator's bond." Neither their failure to assail that jurisdiction
when they ought nor the subsequent affirmance of the order by this court, they
say, could revive an order dead from its inception.
To begin with, it lies within discretion of the court to select an administrator of the
estate of a deceased person (Capistrano vs. Nadurata, 46 Phil., 726, 727). Before
an administrator, or an executor, enters upon the execution of his trust, and letters
testamentary or of administration are issued, the person to whom they are issued is
required to give a bond in such reasonable sum as the court directs, with one or
more sufficient sureties, conditioned upon the faithful performance of his trust
(Code of Civil Procedure, sec. 643, 662). The administrator is accountable on his
bond along with the sureties for the performance of certain legal obligations.
(Tan vs. Go Chiong Lee, 46 Phil., 200, 205. See also, Stovall vs. Banks, 10 Wall., 583,
588; 19 Law. ed., 1036; Long vs.O'Fallon, 19 How., 116; 15 Law. ed., 550.)
It is clear that a Court of First Instance, exercising probate jurisdiction, is
empowered to require the filing of the administrator's bond, to fix the amount
thereof, and to hold it accountable for any breach of the administrator's duty.
Possessed, as it is, with an all-embracing power over the administrator's bond and
over administration proceedings, a Court of First Instance in a probate proceeding
cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable
for the very purpose for which it was filed. It is true that the law does not say
expressly or in so many words that such court has power to execute the bond of an
Spec Pro 4 30
administrator, but by necessary and logical implication, the power is there as
eloquently as if it were phrased in unequivocal term. When the accountability of
an administrator's bond is spoken of in the very provisions dealing with and bearing
directly on administration proceedings, it would involve a strained construction to
hold, as appellants would have us do, that where an administrator is held liable for
a devastravit for having squandered and misapplied property which he was in
duty bound to marshal and conserve, the estate is without a remedy to go against
the administrator's bond in the same probate proceedings, but in an action
outside of and separate from it. In this connection, it should be observed that
section 683 of the Code of Civil Procedure provides that "Upon the settlement of
the account of an executor or administrator, trustee, or guardians, a person liable
as surety in respect to such amount may, upon application, be admitted as a
party to such accounting, and may have the right to appeal as hereinafter
provided." There is here afforded to a person who may be held liable as surety in
respect to an administrator's account the right, upon application, to be admitted
as a party to their accounting, from which we may not unreasonably infer that a
surety, like the appellants in the case before us, may be charged with liability upon
the bond during the process of accounting, that is, within the recognized confines
of probate proceedings, and not in an action apart and distinct from such
proceedings.
Appellants in their brief direct our attention to several cases decided by this court
holding that Courts of First Instance, as probate courts, have no power to
adjudicate on claims of other persons on property forming part of the estate, by
title adverse to the deceased (Guzman vs. Anog and Anog, 37 Phil., 61, 62); on the
legal usufruct of the widow (Sahagun vs. De Gorosita, 7 Phil., 347, 351), and on the
validity of testamentary dispositions (Castañeda vs. Alemany, 3 Phil., 426, 428). We
have carefully examined these cases in relation to the facts and circumstances of
the case at bar. We take the view, however, that the execution of an
administrator's bond, unlike the questions involved in the cited cases, clearly stands
upon a different footing, and is as necessary a part and incident of the
administration proceeding as the filing of such bond or the fixing of its amount.
Particularly is this true in the present case where Soriano's indebtedness to the sate
in the amount of P23,603.21, subsequently reduced to P5,000, is conceded on all
sides, and all that the trial court had to do was to see that said amount was turned
over to the estate.
It is the duty of courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estates of the
deceased person by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy or
repair any injury that may be done thereto (Dariano vs.Fernandez Fidalgo, 14 Phil.,
62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil., 129, 134). "Probate and like courts have a special
jurisdiction only, and their powers as to ancillary or incidental questions must of
necessity to exercise within certain limitations; but such powers include the right to
try questions which arise incidentally in a cause over which such courts have
jurisdiction and the determination of which are necessary to a lawful exercise of
the powers expressly conferred in arriving at a decision. . . . There seems, however,
to be a general tendency, in the absence of express and specific restrictions to the
contrary, to uphold the exercise by these court of such incidental powers as are,
within the purview of their grant of authority, reasonably necessary to enable them
to accomplish the objects for which they were invested with jurisdiction and to
perfect the same. And it has been held that statutes conferring jurisdiction on such
courts, being remedial and for the advancement of justice, should receive a
favorable construction, such as will give them the force and efficiency intended by
the legislature." (15 C. J., 813, 814.) The tendency in the United States indeed has
been towards the enlargement of the powers of probate courts. In the beginning
these courts were possessed but limited powers. Having originated from the
ecclesiastical courts of England, their jurisdiction, following their English patterns
was practically limited to the probate of wills, the granting of administrators, and
the suing for legacies (Plant vs. Harrion, 74 N. Y. Sup., 411, 441; 36 Misc. Rep., 649;
Chadwick vs. Chadwick, 13 Pac., 385, 388; 6 Mont., 566; 3 Bl. Comm., pp. 95-98).
But, though they still are often unadvisedly described, particularly in Connecticut
(Griffin vs. Pratt, 3 Conn., 513), as courts of limited, inferior or special jurisdiction,
they have outgrown their limitations and have become courts with considerably
increased powers (Woerner, The American Law of Administration [2d], sec. 145;
Plant vs. Harrison, supra).
What has been said sufficiently determinative of the appeal before us. We wish,
however, to say a word on a salutary consideration of policy which has been
invariably followed by this court in cases of this nature. We refer to the dispatch
and economy with which administration of the estates of deceased persons
should be terminated and settled. It will be recalled that the appellants could
have raised the question of jurisdiction now pressed upon us in civil case No. 5494
of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and on appeal of that case to this court
once before (G. R. No. 40998 [60 Phil., 1057]). They not failed to avail of that right
but failed to appeal from the order complained of (Vide, Decision of this court in
G. R. No. 40998, Cosme de Mendoza vs. Pacheco and Cordero). The questions
raised in the appeal at bar, appellant's second attempt to go about and frustrate
the order in question, could have been passed upon once for all in the case
referred to. We cannot encourage a practice that trenches violently upon the
settled jurisprudence of this court that the policy and purpose of administration
proceedings is ". . . to close up, and not to continue an estate . . ." (Lizarraga
Hermanos vs. Abada, 40 Phil., 124, 133), and that ". . . the State fails wretchedly in
its duty to its citizens if the machinery furnished by it for the division and distribution
of the property of a decedent is so cumbersome, unwidely and expensive that a
considerable portion of the sate is absorbed in the process of such division. Where
administration is necessary, it ought to be accomplished consumes any
considerable portion of the property which it was designed to distribute is a failure.
. . ." (McMicking vs. Sy Conbieng, 21 Phil., 211, 220.)
The order appealed from is hereby affirmed, with costs against the appellants. So
ordered.
Avanceña, C.J., Abad Santos, Imperial, Diaz and Concepcion, JJ., concur.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6637 September 30, 1954
WARNER BARNES AND CO., LTD., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
LUZON SURETY CO., INC., defendant-appellant.
Spec Pro 4 31
Tolentino and Garcia and Domingo R. Cruz for appellant.
Hilado and Hilado and Reyes and Castro for appellee.
PARAS, C.J.:
On September 17, 1952, the plaintiffs, Warner, Barnes and Co., Ltd., filed a
complaint in the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental against the
defendant, Luzon Surety Co., Inc., of the recovery of the sum of P6,000, plus the
costs and P1,500 for attorney's fees. The basis of the complaint was a bond in the
sum of P6,000 filed by Agueda Gonzaga as administratrix of the Intestate Estate of
Agueda Gonzaga on or about January 6, 1951, in Special Proceedings No. 452 of
the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental, the condition being that said
bond would be void if the administratrix "faithfully prepares and presents to the
Court, within three months from the date of his appointment, a correct inventory of
all the property of the deceased which may have come into his possession or into
the possession of any other person representing him according to law, if he
administers all the property of the deceased which at any time comes into his
possession or into the possession of any other person representing him; faithfully
pays all debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays
whatever dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a
just and true account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any
other date that he may required so to do, and faithfully executes all orders and
decrees of said court." It was alleged in the complaint that the plaintiff had a duly
approved claim against the Estate of Aguedo Gonzaga in the sum of P6,485.02,
plus 2 per cent annual interest compounded monthly from October 1, 1941; that
the administratrix violated the conditions of her bond "(a) by failing to file an
inventory of the assets and funds of the estate that had come into her hands, more
particularly, the sum of P67,861.22 that she had received form the United States
Philippine War Damage Commission; (b) by failing to pay or discharge the
approved claim of the plaintiff; (c) by failing to render a true and just account of
her administration in general, and of the said war damage payments in
particular."; that the defendant, as surety in the bond, failed to pay to the plaintiff,
notwithstanding the latter's demand, the sum of P6,000, in partial satisfaction of
plaintiff's unpaid claim which, after deduction the sum of P3,000 previously paid
upon account by the administratrix, amounted to P8,186.68 as of August 31, 1952.
The defendant filed an answer setting up the special defenses that the complaint
did not state a cause of action; that its maximum liability under the surety bond is
P6,000; that if it were not for the untimely death of the judicial administratrix, she
would have been able to fully comply with her duties and obligations; that the
administratrix, up to her death, had not yet been authorized by the court in Special
Proceedings No. 452 to pay plaintiff's claim; that the defendant's liability had been
extinguished; that damages or attorney's fees cannot be recovered under the
surety bond.
On January 6, 1953, the plaintiff filed a motion for summary judgment, alleging that
"the special defenses relied upon by the defendant in her Answer raise only
questions of law, and the plaintiff believes that said defendant cannot produce
counter-affidavits that would raise any 'genuine issues as to any material facts.' This
motion was accompanied by Exhibits "A" to "H", Exhibits "A" being an affidavit of
Atty. Luis G. Hilado who signed the complaint.
As the defendant did not file counter-affidavits so as to raise genuine issues as to
any material fact, although a copy of the motion for summary judgment was
served upon it eleven days prior to the date of the hearing thereon, the Court of
First Instance of Negros Occidental rendered on January 17, 1953, a summary
judgment sentencing the defendant to pay to the plaintiff the sum of P6,000, P900
for attorney's fees, plus the costs. From this judgment the defendant appealed.
Under the first assignment of error, the appellant contends that the lower court had
no jurisdiction to pass upon its liability under the bond in question, because it is only
the probate court that can hold a surety accountable for any breach by the
administratrix of her duty, citing the case of Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil., 134. It
is, however, noteworthy that while the citation is to the effect that the probate
court has jurisdiction over the forefeiture or enforcement of an administrator's
bond, it was not held therein that the same matter may not be litigated in an
ordinary civil action brought before the court of first instance.
Under the second assignment of error, the appellant claims that there are genuine
controversies between the parties litigant, and that, contrary to the allegations of
the complaint, the administratrix made a return to the court of the war damage
payments she received; the administratrix cannot be charged with having failed to
pay plaintiff's claim because there is no showing that she was ever authorized to
pay approved claims; the administratrix may be presumed to have rendered an
accounting of her administration, likely in 1948, in accordance with section 8 of
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court. In answer, it is sufficient to state that the allegations
that the administratrix failed to file an inventory, to pay the plaintiff's claim, and to
render a true and just account of her administration, are factual and remained
uncontroverted by counter-affidavits which the appellant could have easily filed.
It is also argued for the appellant that the supporting affidavit Exhibit "A" is
insufficient, being signed merely by the lawyer, and not by a party to the case or
an officer of the plaintiff firm. This is without merit, since Exhibit A contains an
express statement that the affiant, Atty. Luis G. Hilado, had "personal knowledge of
the facts" alleged therein; and this cannot be negatived by appellant's
speculation to the contrary.
Under the third and fourth assignments of error, it is insisted for the appellant that
the bond in question was executed in favor of the Republic of the Philippines and
that the proper procedure would seem to be that it might be enforced in the
administration proceedings were it was filed. This view is likewise not tenable.
Though nominally payable to the Republic of the Philippines, the bond is expressly
for the benefit of the heirs, legatees and creditors of the Estate of the deceased
Aguedo Gonzaga. There is no valid reason why a creditor may not directly in his
name enforce said bond in so far as he is concerned.
Under the fifth assignment of error, it is alleged that the plaintiffs should have first
filed a claim against the Estate of the deceased administratrix Agueda Gonzaga,
in conformity with section 6 of Rule 87 of the Rules of Court providing that "Where
the obligation of the decedent is joint and several with another debtor, the claim
shall be filed against the decedent as if he were the only debtor, without prejudice
to the right of the estate to recover contribution from the other debtor." Apart from
the fact that his defense was not pleaded either in a motion to dismiss or in the
answer and was therefore waived (section 10, Rule 9 of the Rules of Court), it
appears that even as late as September 17, 1952, when the present complaint was
filed, (more than two years after the death of Agueda Gonzaga), there were no
proceedings for the administration of her estate, with the result that section 6 of
Rule 87 loses its applicability. Moreover, it is to be noted that the appellant had
Spec Pro 4 32
also chosen to file a third-party complaint in the present case against Romualdo
Araneta, joint and several counter-guarantor of the deceased administratrix,
instead of presenting a claim against the latter's estate.
In its sixth assignment of error, the lower court is alleged to have erred in sentencing
the appellant to pay attorney's fees in the sum of P900, in excess of the limit of its
bond. This contention is tenable. Under section 3 of Rule 36 of the Rules of Court, a
summary judgment may be rendered upon proper motion except as to the
amount of damages.1âwphïl.nêt
There being no proof regarding the amount of attorney's fees claimed by the
plaintiff, no judgment thereon may be rendered herein. It is, however, argued by
the counsel for appellee that said fees are in pursuance of article 2208 of the Civil
Code, providing that attorney's fees cannot be recovered except "where the
defendant acted in gross and evident bad faith in refusing to satisfy the plaintiff's
plainly valid, just and demandable claim"; and it alleged in the complaint that the
appellant had so acted in this case. While the provision cited authorizes the
collection of attorney's fees under the situation contemplated herein, it does not
dispense with the effect of section 3 of Rule 36.
Wherefore, it being understood that the defendant-appellant is sentenced to pay
to the plaintiff-appellee only the sum of P6,000, plus the cost, the same is hereby
affirmed.
Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. L-40517 January 31, 1984
LUZON SURETY COMPANY, INC., plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
PASTOR T. QUEBRAR and FRANCISCO KILAYKO, defendants-appellants.
Tolentino & Garcia & D. R. Cruz for plaintiff-appellee.
Zoilo V. dela Cruz, Jr. for defendants-appellants.
MAKASIAR, J.:
This is an appeal from the judgement of the Court of First Instance of Manila in Civil
Case No. 52790 dated November 3, 1964 which was certified to this Court by the
Court of Appeals in its resolution dated March 20, 1975.
On August 9, 1954, plaintiff-appellee issued two administrator's bond in the amount
of P15,000.00 each, in behalf of the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, as
administrator in Special Proceedings Nos. 3075 and 3076 of the Court of First
Instance of Negros Occidental, entitled " Re Testate Estate of A. B. Chinsuy," and
Re Testate Estate of Cresenciana Lipa," respectively, (pp. 8-12, 17-21, ROA; p. 9
rec.). In consideration of the suretyship wherein the plaintiff-appellee Luzon Surety
Company, Inc. was bound jointly and severally with the defendant appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar, the latter, together with Francisco Kilayko, executed two
indemnity agreements, where among other things, they agreed jointly and
severally to pay the plaintiff-appellee "the sum of Three Hundred Pesos (P300.00) in
advance as premium thereof for every 12 months or fraction thereof, this ... or any
renewal or substitution thereof is in effect" and to indemnify plaintiff-appellee
against any and all damages, losses, costs, stamps taxes, penalties, charges and
expenses, whatsoever, including the 15% of the amount involved in any litigation,
for attomey's fees (pp. 12-16, 21-25. ROA; p. 9, rec.).
For the first year, from August 9, 1954 to August 9, 1955, the defendants-appellants
paid P304.50 under each indemnity agreement or a total of P609.00 for premiums
and documentary stamps.
On June 6, 1957, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental approved the
amended Project of Partition and Accounts of defendant-appellant (p. 87, ROA;
p. 9, rec.).
On May 8, 1962, the plaintiff-appellee demanded from the defendants-appellants
the payment of the premiums and documentary stamps from August 9,1955.
On October 17, 1962, the defendants-appellants ordered a motion for
cancellation and/or reduction of executor's bonds on the ground that "the heirs of
these testate estates have already received their respective shares" (pp. 69-70,
ROA, p. 9, rec.).
On October 20, 1962, the Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental acting on
the motions filed by the defendants-appellants ordered the bonds cancelled.
Plaintiff-appellee's demand amounted to P2,436.00 in each case, hence, a total of
P4,872.00 for the period of August 9, 1955 to October 20, 1962. The defendants-
appellants to pay the said amount of P4,872.00.
On January 8, 1963, the plaintiff-appellee filed the case with the Court of First
Instance of Manila During the pre-trial the parties presented their documentary
evidences and agreed on the ultimate issue - "whether or not the administrator's
bonds were in force and effect from and after the year that they were filed and
approved by the court up to 1962, when they were cancelled." The defendants-
appellants offered P1,800.00 by way of amicable settlement which the plaintiff-
appellee refused.
The lower court allowed the plaintiff to recover from the defendants-appellants,
holding that:
We find for the plaintiff it is clear from the terms of the Order of the Court in which
these bond were filed, that the same were in force and effect from and after filling
thereof up to and including 20 October, 1962, when the same werecancelled. It
follows that the defendants are liable under the terms of the Indemnity
Agreements, notwithstanding that they have not expressly sought the renewal of
these bonds bemuse the same were in force and effect until they were cancelled
by order of the Court. The renewal of said bonds is presumed from the fact that the
defendants did not ask for the cancellation of the same; and their liability springs
from the fact that defendant Administrator Pastor Quebrar, benefited from the
bonds during their lifetime.
We find no merit in defendants' claim that the Administrator's bonds in question are
not judicial bonds but legal or conventional bonds only, since they were
constituted by virtue of Rule 82, Sec. 1 of the Old Rule of Court. Neither is there
merit in defendants, claim that payments of premiums and documentary stamps
were conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds, since it was the
defendants' duty to pay for the premiums as long as the bonds were in force and
effect. Finally, defendants' claim that they are not liable under the Indemnity
Agreements is also without merit since the under of defendants under said
Indemnity Agreements; includes the payment of yearly pre for the bonds.
Spec Pro 4 33
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered in favor of the plaintiff and against the
defendants, ordering the tsn the defendant to pay the plaintiff, jointly and
severally, the amount of P6,649.36 plus interest at the legal rate from 27 July 1964
until fully paid and the sum equivalent to 10% of the total amount due as and or
attorney's fees, and costs (pp. 92-94, ROA; p. 9, rec.).
Defendants-appellants appealed to the Court of Appeals. On March 20, 1975, the
Court of Appeals in a resolution certified the herein case to this Court after finding
that this case involves only errors or questions of law.
1. The proper determination of the liability of the surety and of the principal on the
bond must depend primarily upon the language of the bond itself. The bonds
herein were required by Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. While a bond is
nonetheless a contract because it is required by statute (Midland Co. vs. Broat 52
NW 972), said statutory bonds are construed in the light of the statute creating the
obligation secured and the purposes for which the bond is required, as expressed
in the statute (Michael vs. Logan, 52 NW 972; Squires vs. Miller, 138 NW 1062). The
statute which requires the giving of a bond becomes a part of the bond and
imparts into the bond any conditions prescribed by the statute (Scott vs. United
States Fidelity Co., 252 Ala 373, 41 So 2d 298; Employer's Liability Assurance Corp.
vs. Lunt, 82 Ariz 320, 313 P2d 393).
The bonds in question herein contain practically the very same conditions in Sec. 1,
Rule 81 of the Rules of Court. Pertinent provision of the administrator's bonds is as
follows:
Therefore, if the said Pastor T. Quebrar faithfully prepares and presents to the Court,
within three months from the date of his appointment, a correct inventory of all the
property of the deceased which may have come into his possession or into the
possession of any other person representing him according to law, if he administers
all the property of the deceased which at any time comes into his possession or
into the possession of any other person representing him; faithfully pays all the
debts, legacies, and bequests which encumber said estate, pays whatever
dividends which the Court may decide should be paid, and renders a just and true
account of his administrations to the Court within a year or at any other date that
he may be required so to do, and faithfully executes all orders and decrees of said
Court, then in this case this obligation shall be void, otherwise it shall remain full
force and effect (p. 9, 18, ROA p. 9, rec.).
Section 1 of Rule 81 of the Rules of Court requires the administrator/executor to put
up a bond for the purpose of indemnifying the creditors, heirs, legatees and the
estate. It is conditioned upon the faithful performance of the administrator's trust
(Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 134).
Having in mind the purpose and intent of the law, the surety is then liable under the
administrator's bond, for as long as the administrator has duties to do as such
administrator/executor. Since the liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of
the administrator and embraces the performance of every duty he is called upon
to perform in the course of administration (Deobold vs. Oppermann, 111 NY 531, 19
NE 94), it follows that the administrator is still duty bound to respect the indemnity
agreements entered into by him in consideration of the suretyship
It is shown that the defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar, still had something to
do as an administrator/executor even after the approval of the amended project
of partition and accounts on June 6, 1957.
The contention of the defendants-appellants that the administrator's bond ceased
to be of legal force and effect with the approval of the project of partition and
statement of accounts on June 6, 1957 is without merit. The defendant-appellant
Pastor T. Quebrar did not cease as administrator after June 6, 1957, for
administration is for the purpose of liquidation of the estate and distribution of the
residue among the heirs and legatees. And liquidation means the determination of
all the assets of the estate and payment of all the debts and expenses(Flores vs.
Flores, 48 Phil. 982). It appears that there were still debts and expenses to be paid
after June 6, 1957.
And in the case of Montemayor vs. Gutierrez (114 Phil. 95), an estate may be
partitioned even before the termination of the administration proceedings. Hence,
the approval of the project of partition did not necessarily terminate the
administration proceedings. Notwithstanding the approval of the partition, the
Court of First Instance of Negros Occidental still had jurisdiction over the
administration proceedings of the estate of A.B. Chinsuy and Cresenciana Lipa.
2. The sureties of an administration bond are liable only as a rule, for matters
occurring during the term covered by the bond. And the term of a bond does not
usually expire until the administration has been closed and terminated in the
manner directed by law (Hartford Accident and Indemnity Co. vs. White, 115 SW
2d 249). Thus, as long as the probate court retains jurisdiction of the estate,
the bond contemplates a continuing liability (Deobold vs. Oppermann, supra)
notwithstanding the non-renewal of the bond by the defendants-appellants.
It must be remembered that the probate court possesses an all-embracing power
over the administrator's bond and over the administration proceedings and it
cannot be devoid of legal authority to execute and make that bond answerable
for the every purpose for which it was filed (Mendoza vs. Pacheco, 64 Phil. 1-05). It
is the duty of the courts of probate jurisdiction to guard jealously the estate of the
deceased persons by intervening in the administration thereof in order to remedy
or repair any injury that may be done thereto (Dariano vs. Fernandez Fidalgo, 14
Phil. 62, 67; Sison vs. Azarraga, 30 Phil. 129, 134).
3. In cases like these where the pivotal point is the interpretation of the contracts
entered into, it is essential to scrutinize the very language used in the contracts. The
two Indemnity Agreements provided that:
The undersigned, Pastor T. Quebrar and Dr. Francisco Kilayko, jointly and severally,
bind ourselves unto the Luzon Surety Co., Inc. ... in consideration of it having
become SURETY upon Civil Bond in the sum of Fifteen Thousand Pesos (P15,000.00)
... in favor of the Republic of the Philippines in Special Proceeding ... dated August
9, 1954, a copy of which is hereto attached and made an integral part
hereof (emphasis supplied; pp. 12-13, 21, ROA p. 9, rec.),
To separately consider these two agreements would then be contrary to the intent
of the parties in making them integrated as a whole.
The contention then of the defendants-appellants that both the Administrator's
Bonds and the Indemnity Agreements ceased to have any force and effect, the
former since June 6, 1957 with the approval of the project of partition and the
latter since August 9, 1955 with the non-payment of the stated premiums, is without
merit. Such construction of the said contracts entered into would render futile the
purpose for which they were made.
To allow the defendants-appellants to evade their liability under the Indemnity
Agreements by non-payment of the premiums would ultimately lead to giving the
Spec Pro 4 34
administrator the power to diminish or reduce and altogether nullify his liability This rule of construction is not applicable in the herein case because there is no
under the Administrator's Bonds. As already stated, this is contrary to the intent and ambiguity in the language of the bond and more so when the bond is read in
purpose of the law in providing for the administrator's bonds for the protection of connection with the statutory provision referred to.
the creditors, heirs, legatees, and the estate. With the payment of the premium for the first year, the surety already assumed the
4. Moreover, the lower court was correct in holding that there is no merit in the risk involved, that is, in case defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar defaults in his
defendants' claim that payments of premiums and documentary stamps are administrative duties. The surety became liable under the bond for the faithful
conditions precedent to the effectivity of the bonds. administration of the estate by the administrator/executor. Hence, for as long as
It is worthy to note that there is no provision or condition in the bond to the effect defendant-appellant Pastor T. Quebrar was administrator of the estates, the bond
that it will terminate at the end of the first year if the premium for continuation was held liable and inevitably, the plaintiff-appellee's liability subsists since the
thereafter is not paid. And there is no clause by which its obligation is avoided or liability of the sureties is co-extensive with that of the administrator.
even suspended by the failure of the obligee to pay an annual premium (U.S. vs. WHEREFORE, THE DECISION OF THE COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF MANILA DATED
Maryland Casualty Co. DCMD 129 F. Supp; Dale vs. Continental Insurance Co., 31 NOVEMBER 3, 1964 IS HEREBY AFFIRMED. WITH COSTS AGAINST DEFENDANTS-
SW 266; Equitable Insurance C. vs. Harvey, 40 SW 1092). APPELLANTS.
It was held in the case of Fourth and First Bank and Trust Co. vs. Fidelity and Deposit Concepcion, Jr., Guerrero, Abad Santos, De Castro and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Co. (281 SW 785), that "at the end of the first year, the bond went on, whether or Aquino, J., took no part.
not the premium was paid or not ... Even on a failure to pay an annual premium,
the contract ran on until affirmative action was taken to avoid it. The obligation of
the bond was therefore continuous." And in United States vs. American Surety Co.
of New York (172 F2d 135), it was held that "under a surety bond securing faithful
performance of duties by postal employee, liability for default of employee
occurring in any one year would continue, whether or not a renewal premium was
paid for a later year."
The payment of the annual premium is to be enforced as part of the consideration,
and not as a condition Woodfin vs. Asheville Mutual Insurance Co., 51 N.C. 558); for
the payment was not made a condition to the attaching or continuing of the
contract (National Bank vs. National Surety Co., 144 A 576). The premium is the
consideration for furnishing the bonds and the obligation to pay the same subsists
for as long as the liability of the surety shall exist (Reparations Commission vs.
Universal Deep-Sea Fishing Corp., L-21996, 83 SCRA 764, June 27, 1978). And in
Arranz vs. Manila Fidelity and Surety Co., Inc. (101 Phil. 272), the "premium is the
consideration for furnishing the bond or the guaranty. While the liability of the
surety subsists the premium is collectible from the principal. Lastly, in Manila Surety
and Fidelity Co., Inc. vs. Villarama (107 Phil. 891), it was held that "the one-year
period mentioned therein refers not to the duration or lifetime of the bond, but
merely to the payment of premiums, and, consequently, does not affect at all the
effectivity or efficacy of such bond. But such non- payment alone of the premiums
for the succeeding years ... does not necessarily extinguish or terminate the
effectivity of the counter-bond in the absence of an express stipulation in the
contract making such non-payment of premiums a cause for the extinguishment or
termination of the undertaking. ...There is no necessity for an extension or renewal
of the agreement because by specific provision thereof, the duration of the
counter-bond was made dependent upon the existence of the original bond."
5. It is true that in construing the liability of sureties, the principle of strictissimi
juris applies (Asiatic Petroleum Co. vs, De Pio, 46 Phil. 167; Standard Oil Co. of N.Y.
vs. Cho Siong, 53 Phil. 205); but with the advent of corporate surety, suretyship
became regarded as insurance where, usually, provisions are interpreted most
favorably to the insured and against the insurer because ordinarily the bond is
prepared by the insurer who then has the opportunity to state plainly the term of its
obligation (Surety Co. vs. Pauly, 170 US 133, 18 S. Ct. 552.,42 L. Ed. 972).
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