HILADO v.

CA

Roberto S. Benedicto died intestate on 15 May 2000. He was survived by his wife, private respondent Julita Campos
Benedicto (administratrix Benedicto), and his only daughter, Francisca Benedicto-Paulino.

At the time of his death, two civil cases were pending against Benedicto involving the petitioners. Administratrix Benedicto,
then submitted an Inventory of the Estate, Lists of Personal and Real Properties, and Liabilities of the Estate of her deceased
husband, which included as among the liabilities, the liability corresponding to the two cases as P136,045,772.50 for Civil
Case No. 95-9137 andP35,198,697.40 for Civil Case No. 11178. Thereafter, the Manila RTC required private respondent to
submit a complete and updated inventory and appraisal report pertaining to the estate.

On September 24, 2001, petitioners filed with the Manila RTC: (1) Manifestation/Motion Ex Abundanti Cautela, praying
that they be furnished with copies of all processes and orders pertaining to the intestate proceedings; (2) Omnibus motion
praying that the Manila RTC set a deadline for the submission by private respondent of the required inventory of the
decedent’s estate; and (3) pleadings or motions with the Manila RTC, alleging lapses on the part of private respondent in
her administration of the estate, and assailing the inventory that had been submitted thus far as unverified, incomplete and
inaccurate.

On 2 January 2002, the Manila RTC issued an order denying the manifestation/motion, on the ground that petitioners are
not interested parties within the contemplation of the Rules of Court to intervene in the intestate proceedings. A petition
for certiorari was filed with the Court of Appeals. The petition argued in general that petitioners had the right to intervene
in the intestate proceedings of Roberto Benedicto, the latter being the defendant in the civil cases they lodged with the
Bacolod RTC. But on 27 February 2004, the Court of Appeals dismissed the petition and declared that the Manila RTC did
not abuse its discretion in refusing to allow petitioners to intervene in the intestate proceedings.

ISSUE

Whether the petitioners have the right to intervene in the intestate proceedings of the deceased Benedicto.

HELD

The disposition of the RTC and the Court of Appeals is correct. Petitioners be furnished with copies of all processes and
orders issued in connection with the intestate proceedings, as well as the pleadings filed by the administrator of the estate.

Petitioners' stated main purpose for accessing the records was to monitor prompt compliance with the Rules governing the
preservation and proper disposition of the assets of the estate, e.g., the completion and appraisal of the Inventory and the
submission by the Administratrix of an annual accounting appears legitimate, for, as the plaintiffs in the complaints for
sum of money against Roberto Benedicto, et al., they have an interest over the outcome of the settlement of his estate. They
are in fact "interested persons" under Rule 135, Sec. 2 of the Rules of Court x x x.

Nonetheless, in the instances that the Rules on Special Proceedings do require notice to any or all "interested parties" the
petitioners as "interested parties" will be entitled to such notice. The instances when notice has to be given to interested
parties are provided in: (1) Sec. 10, Rule 85 in reference to the time and place of examining and allowing the account of the
executor or administrator; (2) Sec. 7(b) of Rule 89 concerning the petition to authorize the executor or administrator to sell
personal estate, or to sell, mortgage or otherwise encumber real estates; and; (3) Sec. 1, Rule 90 regarding the hearing for
the application for an order for distribution of the estate residue.

A deadline be set for the submission by administratrix Benedicto to submit a verified and complete inventory of the estate,
and upon submission thereof Section 1 of Rule 83 requires the administrator to return to the court a true inventory and
appraisal of all the real and personal estate of the deceased within three (3) months from appointment, while Section 8 of
Rule 85 requires the administrator to render an account of his administration within one (1) year from receipt of the letters
testamentary or of administration.

We do not doubt that there are reliefs available to compel an administrator to perform either duty, but a person whose
claim against the estate is still contingent is not the party entitled to do so. Still, even if the administrator did delay in the
performance of these duties in the context of dissipating the assets of the estate, there are protections enforced and available
under Rule 88 to protect the interests of those with contingent claims against the estate.

On complaints against the general competence of the administrator, the proper remedy is to seek the removal of the
administrator in accordance with Section 2, Rule 82. While the provision is silent as to who may seek with the court the
removal of the administrator, we do not doubt that a creditor, even a contingent one, would have the personality to seek
such relief. After all, the interest of the creditor in the estate relates to the preservation of sufficient assets to answer for the
debt, and the general competence or good faith of the administrator is necessary to fulfill such purpose.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED, subject to the qualification that petitioners, as persons interested in the intestate
estate of Roberto Benedicto, are entitled to such notices and rights as provided for such interested persons in the Rules on
Settlement of Estates of Deceased Persons under the Rules on Special Proceedings. No pronouncements as to costs.
 FULE v. CA

Virginia G. Fule (illegitimate sister) filed with the CFI of Laguna a petition for letters of administration
alleging “that on April 26, 1973, Amado G. Garcia, a property owner of Calamba, Laguna, died intestate
in the City of Manila, leaving real estate and personal properties in Calamba, Laguna, and in other
places, within the jurisdiction of the Honorable Court.” At the same time, she moved ex parte for her
appointment as special administratrix over the estate. Judge Malvar granted the motion.

A motion for reconsideration was filed by Preciosa Garcia, the surviving spouse of the deceased,
contending that: 1) The decedent “resided” in QC for 3 months before his death as shown by his death
certificate and therefore have an improper venue; and 2) The CFI of Calamba lacks jurisdiction over
the petition.

CFI denied the motion. CA reversed and affirmed making Preciosa the administratrix. Thus, Fule
elevated the matter to the SC on appeal by certiorari.

ISSUEs

(a) Are venue and jurisdiction the same? How can it be determined in the present case?
(b) What does the word “resides” in Revised Rules of Court, Rule 73, Section 1 mean?
(c) Who is entitled as special administratix of the estate?

HELD

(a) No, jurisdiction is defined as the authority to try, hear and decide a case base on the merits or the
substance of the facts. It is a substantive aspect of the trial proceeding. It is granted by law or by the
constitution and cannot be waived or stipulated.

On the other hand, Rule 4 of Rules of Court define venue as the proper court which has jurisdiction
over the area wherein real property involved or a portion thereof is situated. Venue is the location
of the court with jurisdiction. It is more on convenience purposes. It’s more on procedural aspect of
the case. In some cases, it may be waived or stipulated by the parties.

Section 1, Rule 73 of the Revised Rules of Court provides: “If the decedent is an inhabitant of the
Philippines at the time of his death, whether a citizen or an alien, his will shall be proved, or letters
of administration granted, and his estate settled, in the Court of First Instance in the province in
which he resides at the time of his death, and if he is an inhabitant of a foreign country, the Court
of First Instance of any province in which he had estate.

(b) “Resides” should be viewed or understood in its popular sense, meaning, the personal, actual or
physical habitation of a person, actual residence or place of abode. It signifies physical presence in
a place and actual stay thereat. In this popular sense, the term means merely residence, that is,
personal residence, not legal residence or domicile. Residence simply requires bodily presence as
an inhabitant in a given place, while domicile requires bodily presence in that place and also an
intention to make it one’s domicile. No particular length of time of residence is required though;
however, the residence must be more than temporary.
(c) In the present case, SC ruled that the last place of residence of the deceased should be the venue of
the court. Amado G. Garcia was in Quezon City, and not at Calamba, Laguna base on his death
certificate. A death certificate is admissible to prove the residence of the decedent at the time of his
death.

Withal, the conclusion becomes imperative that the venue for Virginia C. Fule’s petition for letters
of administration was improperly laid in the Court of First Instance of Calamba, Laguna. Therefore
Preciosa B. Garcia was granted as a special administratix.
 CUENCO v. CA

(The court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decedent, shall exercise jurisdiction
to the exclusion of all other courts)

Senator Mariano Jesus Cuenco died in Manila. He was survived by his widow and two minor sons,
residing in Quezon City, and children of the first marriage, residing in Cebu. Lourdes, one of the
children from the first marriage, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration with the CFI Cebu,
alleging that the senator died intestate in Manila but a resident of Cebu with properties in Cebu and
Quezon City.

While the petition was still pending, Rosa Cayetano Cuenco, the second wife, filed a petition with CFI
of Rizal for the probate of the last will and testament, where she was named executrix. Rosa also filed
an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Cebu but this court held in abeyance resolution over the
opposition until CFI Quezon shall have acted on the probate proceedings.

Lourdes filed an opposition and motion to dismiss in CFI Quezon, on ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or improper venue, considering that CFI Cebu already acquired exclusive jurisdiction over the
case. The opposition and motion to dismiss were denied. Upon appeal, CA ruled in favor of Lourdes
and issued a writ of prohibition to CFI Quezon.

ISSUEs

Whether the CA erred in issuing the writ of prohibition.

Whether the CFI Quezon acted without jurisdiction or grave abuse of discretion in taking cognizance
and assuming exclusive jurisdiction over the probate proceedings in pursuance to CFI Cebu's order
expressly consenting in deference to the precedence of probate over intestate proceedings

HELD

The Supreme Court found that CA erred in law in issuing the writ of prohibition against the Quezon
City court from proceeding with the testate proceedings and annulling and setting aside all its orders
and actions, particularly its admission to probate the last will and testament of the deceased and
appointing petitioner-widow as executrix thereof without bond pursuant to the deceased testator's
wish.

On Venue and Jurisdiction

Under Rule 73, the court first taking cognizance of the settlement of the estate of a decent, shall exercise
jurisdiction to the exclusion of all other courts.

The residence of the decedent or the location of his estate is not an element of jurisdiction over the
subject matter but merely of venue. If this were otherwise, it would affect the prompt administration
of justice.

The court with whom the petition is first filed must also first take cognizance of the settlement of the
estate in order to exercise jurisdiction over it to the exclusion of all other courts.
 MONSERRAT v. IBANEZ

Vicenta Salamanca died intestate leaving as heirs 1 son and 4 daughters. Ramon (son) filed with the
CFI of Laguna a petition for his appointment as administrator of the properties of his deceased mother.
His sisters (respondents) opposed saying that they are all of age; the debts and obligations of the estate
has already been paid; that they did not want to be burdened with admin proceedings; and that
Ramon’s remedy was to sue for partition under Rule 74 of ROC.

Judge Ibanez issued an order stating that in accordance with Fule v. Fule, the proper remedy should be
an action for partition because all the heirs were of age and there were no debts of the estate. He
required the sisters to institute partition proceedings and that the litigation begun by Ramon will be
held in abeyance. The sisters filed an action for partition.

Ramon filed a special civil action alleging that the respondent judge had committed grave abuse of
discretion. He prayed for the court to proceed with the hearing of his petition for administration.
Petitioner Ramon asserts that it is not known whether there are any debts because these may be shown
only in the administration proceedings, but he did not assert otherwise when respondents’ affidavit
says that there was no debt.

He argues that only when the heirs do not have any dispute as to the bulk of hereditary estate but only
in the manner of partition does Section 1 Rule 74 of ROC apply, and that in this case ‘the parties are at
loggerheads as to the corpus of the hereditary estate because’ respondents’ succeeded in sequestering
some assets of the intestate’.

ISSUE

Whether the administration proceedings should be held in abeyance.

HELD

Yes. The case of Fule v. Fule applies: where there are no debts, the heirs are not bound to submit the
property to a judicial administration which is always long and costly, or to apply for an appointment
of an admin by the court. These proceedings are superfluous and unnecessary.

The creditors are protected even if, without benefit of the administration, the estate is distributed in an
action for partition. Questions as to what property belonged to the deceased (and to the heirs) may
properly be ventilated in the partition proceedings, especially where such property is in the hands of
one heir.

The questions he seeks to raise in the admin proceedings may equally de decided in the partition suit.
Since the sisters constitute 4/5 of the heirs, the majority interest usually gets to select the administrator.
The SC also said that the admin proceedings will be dismissed soon, inasmuch as the partition suit has
already been instituted, because the court has already intimated that the proceedings will be suspended
pending the presentation of the other suit.
G.R. No. L-19060 May 29, 1964

IGNACIO GERONA, MARIA CONCEPCION GERONA, FRANCISCO GERONA and DELFIN

GERONA,petitiAoners,
vs.
CARMEN DE GUZMAN, JOSE DE GUZMAN, CLEMENTE DE GUZMAN,
FRANCISCO DE GUZMAN, RUSTICA DE GUZMAN, PACITA DE GUZMAN and VICTORIA DE
GUZMANrespondents.

Manuel J. Serapio for petitioners.

D. F. Castro and Associates for respondents.

CONCEPCION, J.:

Appeal by certiorari from a decision of the Court of Appeals, affirming that of the Court of First Instance of
Bulacan.

In the complaint, filed with the latter court on September 4, 1958, petitioners herein, namely, Ignacio, Maria
Concepcion, Francisco and Delfin, all surnamed Gerona, alleged that they are the legitimate children of Domingo
Gerona and Placida de Guzman; that the latter, who died on August 9, 1941 was a legitimate daughter of Marcelo
de Guzman and his first wife, Teodora de la Cruz; that after the death of his first wife, Marcelo de Guzman
married Camila Ramos, who begot him several children, namely, respondents Carmen, Jose, Clemente,
Francisco, Rustica, Pacita and Victoria, all surnamed De Guzman; that Marcelo de Guzman died on September
11, 1945; that subsequently, or on May 6, 1948, respondents executed a deed of "extra-judicial settlement of the
estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman", fraudulently misrepresenting therein that they were the only
surviving heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, although they well knew that petitioners were, also, his
forced heirs; that respondents had thereby succeeded fraudulently in causing the transfer certificates of title to
seven (7) parcels of land, issued in the name of said deceased, to be cancelled and new transfer certificates of
title to be issued in their own name, in the proportion of 1/7th individual interest for each; that such fraud was
discovered by the petitioners only the year before the institution of the case; that petitioners forthwith demanded
from respondents their (petitioners) share in said properties, to the extent of 1/8th interest thereon; and that the
respondents refused to heed said demand, thereby causing damages to the petitioners. Accordingly, the latter
prayed that judgment be rendered nullifying said deed of extra-judicial settlement, insofar as it deprives them of
their participation of 1/18th of the properties in litigation; ordering the respondents to reconvey to petitioners their
aforementioned share in said properties; ordering the register of deeds to cancel the transfer certificates of title
secured by respondents as above stated and to issue new certificates of title in the name of both the petitioners
and the respondents in the proportion of 1/8th for the former and 7/8th for the latter; ordering the respondents to
render accounts of the income of said properties and to deliver to petitioners their lawful share therein; and
sentencing respondents to pay damages and attorney's fees.

In their answer, respondents maintained that petitioners' mother, the deceased Placida de Guzman, was not
entitled to share in the estate of Marcelo de Guzman, she being merely a spurious child of the latter, and that
petitioners' action is barred by the statute of limitations.

After appropriate proceedings, the trial court rendered a decision finding that petitioners' mother was a legitimate
child, by first marriage, of Marcelo de Guzman; that the properties described in the complaint belonged to the
conjugal partnership of Marcelo de Guzman and his second wife, Camila Ramos; and that petitioners' action has
already prescribed, and, accordingly, dismissing the complaint without costs. On appeal taken by the petitioners,
this decision as affirmed by the Court of Appeals, with costs against them.

Petitioners maintain that since they and respondents are co-heirs of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman, the
present action for partition of the latter's estate is not subject to the statute of limitations of action; that, if affected
by said statute, the period of four (4) years therein prescribed did not begin to run until actual discovery of the
fraud perpetrated by respondents, which, it is claimed, took place in 1956 or 1957; and that accordingly, said
period had not expired when the present action was commenced on November 4, 1958.

Petitioners' contention is untenable. Although, as a general rule, an action for partition among co-heirs does not
prescribe, this is true only as long as the defendants do not hold the property in question under an adverse title
(Cordova vs. Cordova, L-9936, January 14, 1948). The statute of limitations operates as in other cases, from the
moment such adverse title is asserted by the possessor of the property (Ramos vs. Ramos, 45 Phil. 362; Bargayo
v. Camumot, 40 Phil. 857; Castro v. Echarri, 20 Phil. 23).
When respondents executed the aforementioned deed of extra-judicial settlement stating therein that they are
the sole heirs of the late Marcelo de Guzman, and secured new transfer certificates of title in their own name,
they thereby excluded the petitioners from the estate of the deceased, and, consequently, set up a title adverse
to them. And this is why petitioners have brought this action for the annulment of said deed upon the ground that
the same is tainted with fraud. 1äwphï1.ñët

Although, there are some decisions to the contrary (Jacinto v. Mendoza, L-12540, February 28, 1959; Cuison v.
Fernandez, L-11764, January 31, 1959; Maribiles v. Quinto, L-10408, October 18, 1956; and Sevilla v. De los
Angeles, L-7745, November 18, 1955), it is already settled in this jurisdiction that an action for reconveyance of
real property based upon a constructive or implied trust, resulting from fraud, may be barred by the statute of
limitations (Candelaria v. Romero, L-12149, September 30, 1960; Alzona v. Capunita, L-10220, February 28,
1962).

Inasmuch as petitioners seek to annul the aforementioned deed of "extra-judicial settlement" upon the ground of
fraud in the execution thereof, the action therefor may be filed within four (4) years from the discovery of the
fraud (Mauricio v. Villanueva, L-11072, September 24, 1959). Such discovery is deemed to have taken place, in
the case at bar, on June 25, 1948, when said instrument was filed with the Register of Deeds and new certificates
of title were issued in the name of respondents exclusively, for the registration of the deed of extra-judicial
settlement constitute constructive notice to the whole world (Diaz v. Gorricho, L-11229, March 29, 1958; Avecilla
v. Yatco, L-11578, May 14, 1958; J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Magdangal, L-15539, January 30, 1962; Lopez v.
Gonzaga, L-18788, January 31, 1964).

As correctly stated in the decision of the trial court:

In the light of the foregoing it must, therefore, be held that plaintiffs learned at least constructively, of the
alleged fraud committed against them by defendants on 25 June 1948 when the deed of extra-judicial
settlement of the estate of the deceased Marcelo de Guzman was registered in the registry of deeds of
Bulacan, Plaintiffs' complaint in this case was not filed until 4 November 1958, or more than 10 years
thereafter. Plaintiff Ignacio Gerona became of age on 3 March 1948. He is deemed to have discovered
defendants' fraud on 25 June 1948 and had, therefore, only 4 years from the said date within which to
file this action. Plaintiff Maria Concepcion Gerona became of age on 8 December 1949 or after the
registration of the deed of extra-judicial settlement. She also had only the remainder of the period of 4
years from December 1949 within which to commence her action. Plaintiff Francisco Gerona became of
age only on 9 January 1952 so that he was still a minor when he gained knowledge (even if only
constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Likewise, plaintiff Delfin Gerona
became of legal age on 5 August 1954, so that he was also still a minor at the time he gained knowledge
(although constructive) of the deed of extra-judicial settlement on 25 June 1948. Francisco Gerona and
Delfin Gerona had, therefore, two years after the removal of their disability within which to commence
their action (Section 45, paragraph 3, in relation to Section 43, Act 190), that is, January 29, 1952, with
respect to Francisco, and 5 August 1954, with respect to Delfin.

WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is hereby affirmed, with costs against petitioners herein. It
is so ordered.
 G.R. No. L-39247 June 27, 1975

In the Matter of the Petition to Approve the Will of Leodegaria Julian

FELIX BALANAY, JR.,

vs.
HON. ANTONIO M. MARTINEZ, Judge of the Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch VI; AVELINA B. ANTONIO
and DELIA B. LANABAN

Facts of the case:

Leodegaria Julian died testate leaving her husband and 6 children as heirs. Her son Felix Balanay,
Jr. filed a petition for the probate of her will which contained the following declarations:

(a) that she was the owner of the "southern half of nine conjugal lots (par. II);
(b) that she was the absolute owner of two parcels of land which she inherited from her father (par. III);
(c) that it was her desire that her properties should not be divided among her heirs during her husband's lifetime and
that their legitimes should be satisfied out of the fruits of her properties; and
(d) that after her husband's death (he was eighty-two years old in 1973) her paraphernal lands and all the conjugal
lands (which she described as "my properties") should be divided and distributed in the manner set forth in that part
of her will. She devised and partitioned the conjugal lands as if they were all owned by her. She disposed of in the will
her husband's one half share of the conjugal assets.

Felix Balanay, Sr., though initially opposed to the probate for he was preterited, later on relented
and renounced his share in her estate. The CFI gave effect to the widower’s conformity and appointed
its clerk of court as special administrator. When a purported lawyer for Felix Balanay, Jr. came and filed a motion
for leave of court to withdraw probate of the will, the CFI declared the will void and converted the testate
proceedings into intestate proceedings and ordered the issuance of notice to creditors. Felix Balanay, Jr. filed a
Motion for Reconsideration before the lower court alleging that the purported lawyer was terminated hence
the withdrawal of the probate was unauthorized. The motion was denied, thus this present case.

Issue/s relevant to Special Proceedings:

Whether or not the probate court erred in passing upon the intrinsic validity of the will, before ruling on its
allowance or formal validity, and in declaring it void.

Ruling:

The Supreme Court ruled that in view of certain unusual provisions of the will, which are of dubious legality, and
because of the motion to withdraw the petition for probate (which the lower court assumed to have been filed with the
petitioner's authorization), the trial court acted correctly in passing upon the will's intrinsic validity even before
its formal validity had been established. The probate of a will might become an idle ceremony if on its face it
appears to be intrinsically void. Where practical considerations demand that the intrinsic validity of the will
be passed upon, even before it is probated, the court should meet the issue.1

But the probate court erred in declaring, in its order of February 28, 1974 that the will was void and in converting
the testate proceeding into an intestate proceeding notwithstanding the fact that in its order of June 18, 1973 , it gave
effect to the surviving husband's conformity to the will and to his renunciation of his hereditary rights which presumably
included his one-half share of the conjugal estate.

The rule is that "the invalidity of one of several dispositions contained in a will does not result in the invalidity of
the other dispositions, unless it is to be presumed that the testator would not have made such other dispositions if the
first invalid disposition had not been made”2. Where some of the provisions of a will are valid and others invalid, the
valid parts will be upheld if they can be separated from the invalid without defeating the intention of the testator or
interfering with the general testamentary scheme, or doing injustice to the beneficiaries.

1 (Nuguid vs. Nuguid, 64 O.G. 1527, 17 SCRA 449. Compare , April 30, 1965, 13 SCRA 693)
2 Art. 792, Civil Code