SECOND DIVISION Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals
Petitioner filed a special civil action for certiorari and mandamus with the Court of Appeals questioning
[G.R. No. 131977. February 4, 1999]
PEDRO MENDOZA, petitioner, vs. RAY ALLAS and GODOFREDO OLORES, respondents.
Before us, petitioner prays for the execution of the decision of the trial court[1] granting his petition
for quo warranto which ordered his reinstatement as Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation
Service, and the payment of his back salaries and benefits.
Petitioner Pedro Mendoza joined the Bureau of Customs in 1972. He held the positions of Port Security
Chief from March 1972 to August 1972, Deputy Commissioner of Customs from August 1972 to
September 1975, Acting Commissioner of Customs from September 1975 to April 1977 and Customs
Operations Chief I from October 1987 to February 1988.[2] On March 1, 1988, he was appointed Customs
Service Chief of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service (CIIS). In 1989, the position of
Customs Service Chief was reclassified by the Civil Service as "Director III" in accordance with Republic
Act No. 6758 and National Compensation Circular No. 50. Petitioner's position was thus categorized as
"Director III, CIIS" and he discharged the function and duties of said office.
On April 22, 1993, petitioner was temporarily designated as Acting District Collector, Collection District X,
Cagayan de Oro City. In his place, respondent Ray Allas was appointed as "Acting Director III" of the
CIIS. Despite petitioner's new assignment as Acting District Collector, however, he continued to receive
the salary and benefits of the position of Director III.
In September 1994, petitioner received a letter from Deputy Customs Commissioner Cesar Z. Dario,
informing him of his termination from the Bureau of Customs, in view of respondent Allas' appointment
as Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos. The pertinent portion of the letter reads:
"Effective March 4, 1994, Mr. Ray Allas was appointed Director III by President Fidel V. Ramos and as a
consequence, [petitioner's] services were terminated without prejudice to [his] claim for all government
benefits due [him]."
Attached to the letter was the appointment of respondent Ray Allas as "Director III, CIIS, Bureau of
Customs, vice Pedro Mendoza."
Petitioner wrote the Customs Commissioner demanding his reinstatement with full back wages and
without loss of seniority rights. No reply was made.
On December 2, 1994, petitioner filed a petition for quo warranto against respondent Allas before the
Regional Trial Court, Paranaque, Branch 258.[3] The case was tried and on September 11, 1995, a decision
was rendered granting the petition. The court found that petitioner was illegally terminated from office
without due process of law and in violation of his security of tenure, and that as he was deemed not to
have vacated his office, the appointment of respondent Allas to the same office was void ab initio. The
court ordered the ouster of respondent Allas from the position of Director III, and at the same time
directed the reinstatement of petitioner to the same position with payment of full back salaries and
other benefits appurtenant thereto.
Respondent Allas appealed to the Court of Appeals. On February 8, 1996, while the case was pending
before said court, respondent Allas was promoted by President Ramos to the position of Deputy
Commissioner of Customs for Assessment and Operations. As a consequence of this promotion,
petitioner moved to dismiss respondent's appeal as having been rendered moot and academic. The
Court of Appeals granted the motion and dismissed the case accordingly. The order of dismissal became
final and entry of judgment was made on March 19, 1996.[4]
On May 9, 1996, petitioner filed with the court a quo a Motion for Execution of its decision. On July 24,
1996, the court denied the motion on the ground that the contested position vacated by respondent
Allas was now being occupied by respondent Godofredo Olores who was not a party to the quo
warranto petition.[5]
the order of the trial court.[6] On November 27, 1997, the Court of Appeals dismissed the
petition.[7] Hence, this recourse.
Petitioner claims that:
"The Court of Appeals grossly erred in holding that a writ of execution may no longer be issued,
considering that respondent Olores who was not a party to the case now occupies the subject
position."[8]
The instant petition arose from a special civil action for quo warranto under Rule 66 of the Revised Rules
of Court. Quo warranto is a demand made by the state upon some individual or corporation to show by
what right they exercise some franchise or privilege appertaining to the state which, according to the
Constitution and laws of the land, they cannot legally exercise except by virtue of a grant or authority
from the state.[9] In other words, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a
person to the use or exercise of a franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his
claim is not well-founded, or if he has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege.[10] The action may be
commenced for the Government by the Solicitor General or the fiscal[11] against individuals who usurp a
public office, against a public officer whose acts constitute a ground for the forfeiture of his office, and
against an association which acts as a corporation without being legally incorporated.[12] The action may
also be instituted by an individual in his own name who claims to be entitled to the public office or
position usurped or unlawfully held or exercised by another.[13]
Where the action is filed by a private person, he must prove that he is entitled to the controverted
position, otherwise respondent has a right to the undisturbed possession of the office.[14] If the court
finds for the respondent, the judgment should simply state that the respondent is entitled to the
office.[15] If, however, the court finds for the petitioner and declares the respondent guilty of usurping,
intruding into, or unlawfully holding or exercising the office, judgment may be rendered as follows:
"Sec. 10. Judgment where usurpation found.-- When the defendant is found guilty of usurping, intruding
into, or unlawfully holding or exercising an office, position, right, privilege, or franchise, judgment shall
be rendered that such defendant be ousted and altogether excluded therefrom, and that the plaintiff or
relator, as the case may be, recover his costs. Such further judgment may be rendered determining the
respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege, or franchise of all the parties to the action
as justice requires."
If it is found that the respondent or defendant is usurping or intruding into the office, or unlawfully
holding the same, the court may order:
(1) The ouster and exclusion of the defendant from office;
(2) The recovery of costs by plaintiff or relator;
(3) The determination of the respective rights in and to the office, position, right, privilege or franchise of
all the parties to the action as justice requires.[16]
The character of the judgment to be rendered in quo warranto rests to some extent in the discretion of
the court and on the relief sought.[17] In the case at bar, petitioner prayed for the following relief:
"WHEREFORE, it is respectfully prayed that respondent be ousted and altogether excluded from the
position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs, and
petitioner be seated to the position as the one legally appointed and entitled thereto.
Other reliefs, just or equitable in the premises, are likewise prayed for."[18]
In granting the petition, the trial court ordered that:
"WHEREFORE, viewed in the light of the foregoing, judgment is hereby rendered granting this petition
for quo warranto by:
1. Ousting and excluding respondent Ray Allas from the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs; and
2. Reinstating petitioner Pedro C. Mendoza, Jr. to the position of Director III, Customs Intelligence and
Investigation Service of the Bureau of Customs with full back wages and other monetary benefits
appurtenant thereto from the time they were withheld until reinstated."[19]
The trial court found that respondent Allas usurped the position of "Director III, Chief of the Customs
Intelligence and Investigation Service." Consequently, the court ordered that respondent Allas be ousted
from the contested position and that petitioner be reinstated in his stead. Although petitioner did not
specifically pray for his back salaries, the court ordered that he be paid his "full back wages and other
monetary benefits" appurtenant to the contested position "from the time they were withheld until
reinstated."
The decision of the trial court had long become final and executory, and petitioner prays for its
execution. He alleges that he should have been reinstated despite respondent Olores' appointment
because the subject position was never vacant to begin with. Petitioner's removal was illegal and he was
deemed never to have vacated his office when respondent Allas was appointed to the same. Respondent
Allas' appointment was null and void and this nullity allegedly extends to respondent Olores, his
successor-in-interest.[20]
Ordinarily, a judgment against a public officer in regard to a public right binds his successor in office. This
rule, however, is not applicable in quo warranto cases.[21] A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the
respondent's successor in office, even though such successor may trace his title to the same source. This
follows from the nature of the writ of quo warranto itself. It is never directed to an officer as such, but
always against the person-- to determine whether he is constitutionally and legally authorized to
perform any act in, or exercise any function of the office to which he lays claim.[22] In the case at bar, the
petition for quo warranto was filed by petitioner solely against respondent Allas. What was threshed out
before the trial court was the qualification and right of petitioner to the contested position as against
respondent Ray Allas, not against Godofredo Olores. The Court of Appeals did not err in denying
execution of the trial court's decision.
Petitioner has apprised this Court that he reached the compulsory retirement age of sixty-five (65) years
on November 13, 1997. Reinstatement not being possible, petitioner now prays for the payment of his
back salaries and other benefits from the time he was illegally dismissed until finality of the trial court's
decision.[23]
Respondent Allas cannot be held personally liable for petitioner's back salaries and benefits. He was
merely appointed to the subject position by the President of the Philippines in the exercise of his
constitutional power as Chief Executive. Neither can the Bureau of Customs be compelled to pay the said
back salaries and benefits of petitioner. The Bureau of Customs was not a party to the petition for quo
warranto.[24]
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is denied and the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No.
41801 is affirmed.
SO ORDERED.
MENDOZA v. ALLAS
FACTS
Petitioner became part of the Bureau of Customs in 1972, and received promotions until he became
Director III of the Customs Intelligence and Investigation Service. In 1993, he was temporarily designated
as Acting District Collector, while respondent was temporarily appointed to take his old position. In 1994,
a letter was sent to petitioner, stating that he is terminated from the services of the Bureau of Customs.
He filed a petition for quo warranto against Allas, which the court granted. Allas appealed, but
became moot and academic when Allas was appointed as Deputy Commissioner of
Customs Assessment and Operations. When Mendoza filed for motion for execution of its decision, it
was denied because Godofredo Olores was appointed to take his old position. CA affirmed the decision.
ISSUE
Whether or not a petition for quo warranto extends to the position claimed?
HELD
NO, a petition for quo warranto is a proceeding to determine the right of a person to use or exercise of a
franchise or office and to oust the holder from its enjoyment, if his claim is not well-founded, or if he
has forfeited his right to enjoy the privilege. A judgment in quo warranto does not bind the successor
in office, even though the successor’s title comes from the same source. It is always directed to a person,
in this case, Allas. Olores had never become part of the case; hence the decision cannot extend to him.
Since Mendoza has reached the age of retirement, he cannot be reappointed. Neither can he claim from
Allas his back wages, nor compel the Bureau of Customs to pay said back wages.
MA. LUTGARDA P. CALLEJA, G.R. No. 168696
JOAQUIN M. CALLEJA, JR.,
JADELSON PETER P.
CALLEJA, MA. JESSICA T. Present:
FLORES, MERCIE C. TIPONES
and PERFECTO NIXON C. PANGANIBAN, CJ., Chairperson,
TABORA, YNARES-SANTIAGO,
Petitioners, AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
CALLEJO, SR. and
- versus - CHICO-NAZARIO, JJ.
JOSE PIERRE A. PANDAY,
AUGUSTO R. PANDAY and Promulgated:
MA. THELNA P. MALLARI,
Respondents. February 28, 2006
This resolves the petition for review on certiorari assailing the Order[1] of the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur, Branch 58 (RTC-Br. 58) issued on July 13, 2005.
The antecedent facts are as follows.
On May 16, 2005, respondents filed a petition with the Regional Trial Court of San
Jose, Camarines Sur for quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory
Injunction, Damages and Issuance of Temporary Restraining Order against herein
petitioners. Respondents alleged that from 1985 up to the filing of the petition with the trial court, they
had been members of the board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated, but
sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and stockholders of said
corporation, forcibly and with the aid of armed men usurped the powers which supposedly belonged to
respondents.
On May 24, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued an Order transferring the case to the Regional Trial Court
in Naga City. According to RTC-Br. 58, since the verified petition showed petitioners therein (herein
respondents) to be residents of Naga City, then pursuant to Section 7, Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure, the action for quo warranto should be brought in the Regional Trial Court exercising
jurisdiction over the territorial area where the respondents or any of the respondents resides. However,
the Executive Judge of RTC, Naga City refused to receive the case folder of the subject case
for quo warranto, stating that improper venue is not a ground for transferring a quo warranto case to
another administrative jurisdiction.
The RTC-Br. 58 then proceeded to issue and serve summons on herein petitioners (respondents
below). Petitioner Tabora filed his Answer dated June 8, 2005, raising therein the affirmative defenses of
(1) improper venue, (2) lack of jurisdiction, and (3) wrong remedy of quo warranto. Thereafter, the other
petitioners also filed their Answer, also raising the same affirmative defenses. All the parties were then
required to submit their respective memoranda.
On July 13, 2005, RTC-Br. 58 issued the assailed Order, the pertinent portions of which read as follows:
It is undisputed that the plaintiffs cause of action involves controversies arising out of intra-corporate
relations, between and among stockholders, members or associates of the St. John Hospital Inc. which
originally under PD 902-A approved on March 11, 1976 is within the original and exclusive jurisdiction of
the Securities and Exchange Commission to try and decide in addition to its regulatory and adjudicated
functions (Section 5, PD 902-A). Upon the advent of RA 8799 approved on July 19, 2000, otherwise
known as the Securities and Regulation Code, the Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated in
Section 5, Presidential Decree 902-A were transferred []to the Court of general jurisdiction or the
appropriate Regional Trial Court with a proviso that the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority
may designate the Regional Trial Court branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these
cases. Pursuant to this mandate of RA 8799, the Supreme Court in the exercise of said mandated
authority, promulgated on November 21, 2000, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC which took effect 15 December
2000 designated certain branches of the Regional Trial Court to try and decide Securities and Exchange
Commission Cases arising within their respective territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National
Capital Region and within the respective provinces in the First to Twelve Judicial Region. Accordingly, in
the Province of Camarines Sur, (Naga City) RTC Branch 23 presided by the Hon. Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr. was
designated as special court (Section 1, A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC).
Subsequently, on January 23, 2001, supplemental Administrative Circular No. 8-01 which took effect
on March 1, 2001 was issued by the Supreme Court which directed that all SEC cases originally assigned
or transmitted to the regular Regional Trial Court shall be transferred to branches of the Regional Trial
Court specially designated to hear such cases in accordance with A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC.
On March 13, 2001, A.M. No. 01-2-04 SC was promulgated and took effect on April 1, 2001.
From the foregoing discussion and historical background relative to the venue and jurisdiction to try and
decide cases originally enumerated in Section 5 of PD 902-A and later under Section 5.2 of RA 8799, it is
evident that the clear intent of the circular is to bestow the juridiction to try and decide these cases to
the special courts created under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC. . . .
Under Section 8, of the Interim Rules, [a] Motion to Dismiss is among the prohibited pleadings. On
the otherhand, the Supreme Court under Administrative Order 8-01 has directed the transfer from the
regular courts to the branches of the Regional Trial Courts specially designated to try and decide intra-
corporate dispute.
In the light of the above-noted observations and discussion, the Motion to Dismiss is DENIED pursuant to
the Interim Rules of Procedure for Intra-Corporate Controversies (A.M. No. 01-2-04-SC) which mandates
that motion to dismiss is a prohibited pleading (Section 8) and in consonance with Administrative Order
8-01 of the Supreme Court dated March 1, 2001, this case is hereby ordered remanded to the Regional
Trial Court Branch 23, Naga City which under A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC has been designated as special court
to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under R.A. 8799.
The scheduled hearing on the prayer for temporary restraining order and preliminary injunction set
on July 18, 2005 is hereby cancelled.
For reasons of comity the issue of whether Quo Warranto is the proper remedy is better left to the court
of competent jurisdiction to rule upon.
SO ORDERED. [2]
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration of the foregoing Order and, instead, immediately
elevated the case to this Court via a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure.
The petition raises the following issues:
I interlocutory order, in the interest, however, of arresting the perpetuation of an apparent error
WHETHER A BRANCH OF THE REGIONAL TRIAL COURT WHICH HAS NO JURISDICTION TO TRY AND DECIDE
A CASE HAS AUTHORITY TO REMAND THE SAME TO ANOTHER CO-EQUAL COURT IN ORDER TO CURE THE
DEFECTS ON VENUE AND JURISDICTION
II
WHETHER OR NOT ADMINISTRATIVE CIRCULAR NO. 8-01 DATED JANUARY 23, 2001 WHICH TOOK EFFECT
ON MARCH 1, 2001 MAY BE APPLIED IN THE PRESENT CASE WHICH WAS FILED ON MAY 16, 2005. [3]
In their Comment, respondents argue that the present petition should be denied due course and
dismissed on the grounds that (1) an appeal under Rule 45 is inappropriate in this case because the
Order dated July 13, 2005 is merely an interlocutory order and not a final order as contemplated under
Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure; (2) a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 is the
wrong remedy under A.M. No. 04-9-07-SC, which provides that all decisions and final orders in cases
falling under the Interim Rules of Corporate Rehabilitation and the Interim Rules of Procedure Governing
Intra-Corporate Controversies under Republic Act No. 8799 shall be appealable to the Court of Appeals
through a petition for review under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court; and (3) the petition was intended
merely to delay the proceedings in the trial court because when the case was transferred to Branch 21 of
the Regional Trial Court, said court granted petitioners motion to hold the proceedings in view of the
present petition pending before this Court.
Subsequently, petitioners also filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that
on January 12, 2006, respondent Jose Pierre Panday, with the aid of 14 armed men, assaulted the
premises of St. John Hospital in Naga City, taking away the daily hospital collections estimated
at P400,000.00.
The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order of July 13, 2005. It
is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure governs appeals from judgments
or final orders.[4] The Order dated July 13, 2005 is basically a denial of herein petitioners prayer in their
Answer for the dismissal of respondents case against them. As a consequence of the trial courts refusal
to dismiss the case, it then directed the transfer of the case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court
that had been designated as a special court to hear cases formerly cognizable by the SEC. Verily, the
order was merely interlocutory as it does not dispose of the case completely, but leaves something more
to be done on its merits. Such being the case, the assailed Order cannot ordinarily be reviewed through a
petition under Rule 45. As we held in Tolentino v. Natanauan, [5] to wit:
In the case of Bangko Silangan Development Bank vs. Court of Appeals, the Court reiterated the well-
settled rule that:
. . . an order denying a motion to dismiss is merely interlocutory and therefore not appealable, nor can it
be the subject of a petition for review on certiorari. Such order may only be reviewed in the ordinary
course of law by an appeal from the judgment after trial. The ordinary procedure to be followed in that
event is to file an answer, go to trial, and if the decision is adverse, reiterate the issue on appeal from the
final judgment.[6]
It appears, however, that the longer this case remains unresolved, the greater chance there is for more
violence between the parties to erupt. In Philippine Airlines v. Spouses Kurangking,[7] the Court
proceeded to give due course to a case despite the wrong remedy resorted to by the petitioner therein,
stating thus:
While a petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45 would ordinarily be inappropriate to assail an
committed below that could only serve to unnecessarily burden the parties, the Court has resolved to
ignore the technical flaw and, also, to treat the petition, there being no other plain, speedy and
adequate remedy, as a special civil action for certiorari. Not much, after all, can be gained if the Court
were to refrain from now making a pronouncement on an issue so basic as that submitted by the
parties.[8]
In this case, the basic issue of which court has jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the SEC
under Section 5, Presidential Decree No. 902-A (P.D. No. 902-A), and the propensity of the parties to
resort to violence behoove the Court to look beyond petitioners technical lapse of filing a petition for
review on certiorari instead of filing a petition for certiorari under Rule 65 with the proper court. Thus,
the Court shall proceed to resolve the case on its merits.
It should be noted that allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the
offices, powers and functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a
case for an intra-corporate controversy.[9] Prior to the enactment of R.A. No. 8799, the Court, adopting
Justice Jose Y. Ferias view, declared in Unilongo v. Court of Appeals [10] that Section 1, Rule 66 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure is limited to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated, while [a]ctions of quo warranto against corporations, or against
persons who usurp an office in a corporation, fall under the jurisdiction of the Securities and Exchange
Commission and are governed by its rules. (P.D. No. 902-A as amended).[11]
However, R.A. No. 8799 was passed and Section 5.2 thereof provides as follows:
5.2. The Commissions jurisdiction over all cases enumerated under Section 5 of Presidential Decree No.
902-A is hereby transferred to the Courts of general jurisdiction or the appropriate Regional Trial Court:
Provided, That the Supreme Court in the exercise of its authority may designate the Regional Trial Court
branches that shall exercise jurisdiction over these cases. xxx
Therefore, actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which were
formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD 902-A, have been transferred
to the courts of general jurisdiction. But, this does not change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of
Civil Procedure does not apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a private
corporation. Presently, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 reads thus:
Section 1. Action by Government against individuals. An action for the usurpation of a public office,
position or franchise may be commenced by a verified petition brought in the name of the Republic of
the Philippines against
(a) A person who usurps, intrudes into, or unlawfully holds or exercises a public office, position or
franchise;
xxxx
As explained in the Unilongo[12] case, Section 1(a) of Rule 66 of the present Rules no longer contains the
phrase or an office in a corporation created by authority of law which was found in the old Rules. Clearly,
the present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp a public office,
position or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations which act as corporations
without being legally incorporated despite the passage of R.A. No. 8799. It is, therefore, The Interim
Rules of Procedure Governing Intra-Corporate Controversies Under R.A. No. 8799 (hereinafter the
Interim Rules) which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court
since what is being questioned is the authority of herein petitioners to assume the office and act as the
board of directors and officers of St. John Hospital, Incorporated.
The Interim Rules provide thus:
Section 1. (a) Cases covered. These Rules shall govern the procedure to be observed in civil cases
involving the following:
xxxx
(2) Controversies arising out of intra-corporate, partnership, or association relations, between and
among stockholders, members, or associates, and between, any or all of them and the corporation,
partnership, or association of which they are stockholders, members, or associates, respectively;
(3) Controversies in the election or appointment of directors, trustees, officers, or managers of
corporations, partnerships, or associations;
xxxx
SEC. 5. Venue. All actions covered by these Rules shall be commenced and tried in the Regional Trial
Court which has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation, partnership, or association
concerned.xxx (Emphasis ours)
Pursuant to Section 5.2 of R.A. No. 8799, the Supreme Court promulgated A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
(effective December 15, 2000) designating certain branches of the Regional Trial Courts to try and decide
cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission. For the Fifth Judicial Region, this
Court designated the following branches of the Regional Trial Court, to wit:
Camarines Sur (Naga City) Branch 23, Judge Pablo M. Paqueo, Jr.
Albay (Legaspi City) Branch 4, Judge Gregorio A. Consulta
Sorsogon (Sorsogon) Branch 52, Judge Honesto A. Villamor
Subsequently, the Court promulgated A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, effective July 1, 2003, which provides that:
1. The Regional Courts previously designated as SEC Courts through the: (a) Resolutions of this Court
dated 21 November 2000, 4 July 2001, 12 November 2002, and 9 July 2002, all issued in A.M. No. 00-11-
03-SC, (b) Resolution dated 27 August 2001 in A.M. No. 01-5-298-RTC; and (c) Resolution dated 8 July
2002 in A.M. No. 01-12-656-RTC are hereby DESIGNATED and shall be CALLED as Special Commercial
Courts to try and decide cases involving violations of Intellectual Property Rights which fall within their
jurisdiction and those cases formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission;
xxxx
4. The Special Commercial Courts shall have jurisdiction over cases arising within their respective
territorial jurisdiction with respect to the National Capital Judicial Region and within the respective
provinces with respect to the First to Twelfth Judicial Regions. Thus, cases shall be filed in the Office of
the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court; (Emphasis ours)
The next question then is, which branch of the Regional Trial Court has jurisdiction over the present
action for quo warrato? Section 5 of the Interim Rules provides that the petition should be commenced
and tried in the Regional Trial Court that has jurisdiction over the principal office of the corporation. It is
undisputed that the principal office of the corporation is situated at Goa, Camarines Sur. Thus, pursuant
to A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, it is the Regional Trial Court designated as Special
Commercial Courts in Camarines Sur which shall have jurisdiction over the petition
for quo warranto filed by herein respondents.
Evidently, the RTC-Br. 58 in San Jose, Camarines Sur is bereft of jurisdiction over respondents petition
for quo warranto. Based on the allegations in the petition, the case was clearly one involving an intra-
corporate dispute. The trial court should have been aware that under R.A. No. 8799 and the
aforementioned administrative issuances of this Court, RTC-Br. 58 was never designated as a Special
Commercial Court; hence, it was never vested with jurisdiction over cases previously cognizable by the
SEC.
Such being the case, RTC-Br. 58 did not have the requisite authority or power to order the transfer of the
case to another branch of the Regional Trial Court. The only action that RTC-Br. 58 could take on the
matter was to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction. In HLC Construction and Development Corp. v.
Emily Homes Subdivision Homeowners Association,[13] the Court held that the trial court, having no
jurisdiction over the subject matter of the complaint, should dismiss the same so the issues therein could
be expeditiously heard and resolved by the tribunal which was clothed with jurisdiction.
Note, further, that respondents petition for quo warranto was filed as late as 2005. A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC
took effect as early as July 1, 2003 and it was clearly provided therein that such petitions shall be filed in
the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court. Since
the official station of the designated Special Commercial Court for Camarines Sur is the Regional Trial
Court in Naga City, respondents should have filed their petition with said court. A.M. No. 00-11-03-SC
having been in effect for four years and A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC having been in effect for almost two years
by the time respondents filed their petition, there is no cogent reason why respondents were not aware
of the appropriate court where their petition should be filed.
The ratiocination of RTC-Br.58 that Administrative Circular No. 08-2001 authorized said trial court to
order the transfer of respondents petition to the Regional Trial Court of Naga City is specious because as
of the time of filing of the petition, A.M. No. 03-03-03-SC, which clearly stated that cases formerly
cognizable by the SEC should be filed with the Office of the Clerk of Court in the official station of the
designated Special Commercial Court, had been in effect for almost two years. Thus, the filing of the
petition with the Regional Trial Court of San Jose, CamarinesSur, which had no jurisdiction over those
kinds of actions, was clearly erroneous.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GIVEN DUE COURSE and GRANTED. The Order of the Regional Trial Court of
San Jose, Camarines Sur dated July 13, 2005 is SET ASIDE for being NULL and VOID. The petition
for quo warranto in Civil Case No. T-1007 (now re-docketed as SEC Case No. RTC 2005-0001), entitled
Jose Pierre A. Panday, et al. v. Sps. Joaquin M. Calleja, Jr., et al. is ordered DISMISSED.
SO ORDERED.
RTC denied MTD pursuant to the Interim Rules of Procedure forIntra-Corporate Controversies being a
prohibited pleading. Case was remanded to the RTC Br 23, Naga city which under AM No.00-11-03-SC
has been designated as special court to try and decide intra-corporate controversies under RA 8799 or
the SRC.
Petitioners no longer moved for reconsideration and instead immediately elevated the case to this Court
via petition for review on certiorari under Rule 45.
Petitioners filed an Urgent Motion to Restore Status Quo Ante, alleging that respondent Jose Pierre
Panday, with the aid of 14armed men, assaulted the premises of St. John Hospital takingaway the daily
hospital collections.
ISSUE: W/N a petition for quo warranto lies against respondents?
SC: The Court notes that, indeed, petitioners chose the wrong remedy to assail the Order remanding the
case to RTC Naga. It is hornbook principle that Rule 45 of the 1997 RoC governs appeals from judgments
or final orders. The said Order is a denial of petitioner’s prayer in their Answer for the dismissal of
respondents case against them which is considered an interlocutory order. It should be noted that
allegations in a complaint for quo warranto that certain persons usurped the offices, powers and
functions of duly elected members of the board, trustees and/or officers make out a case for an intra-
corporate controversy. The present Rule 66 only applies to actions of quo warranto against persons who
usurp a public office, position, or franchise; public officers who forfeit their office; and associations
which act as corporations without being legally incorporated despite the passage of RA 8799. It is,
therefore, The Interim Rules of Procedure Granting Intra-Corporate Controversies Under RA No.8799
which applies to the petition for quo warranto filed by respondents before the trial court since what is
being questioned is the authority of respondents to assume the office and act as the BoD and officers of
St. John Hospital, Inc

Calleja v Panday GR 168696 (Feb 28, 2006)

Respondents filed a petition with the RTC of CamSur for

Quo warranto with Damages and Prayer for Mandatory and Prohibitory Injunction, Damages and
Issuance of TRO against petitioners.

Respondents alleged that since 1985 they had been members ofthe board of directors and officers of St.
John Hospital, Inc., but sometime in May 2005, petitioners, who are also among the incorporators and
stockholders of said corporation, forcibly usurpedthe powers which supposedly belonged to
respondents.

RTC CamSur issued an Order transferring the case to the RTC inNaga City. According to RTC CamSur,
since the verified petition showed petitioners (herein respondents) to be residents of Naga,then
pursuant to Sec. 7, Rule 66 of the RoC,
the action for quo warranto should be brought in the RTC exercising jurisdiction overthe territorial area
where the respondents or any of the respondents resides.
However, exec judge of RTC refused to receive the case.

Petitioners raised affirmative defenses such as improper venue, lack of jurisdiction, and
wrong remedy of quo warranto.