MAGALLONA v. ERMITA, G.R.

187167, August 16, 2011

Facts:

In 1961, Congress passed R.A. 3046 demarcating the maritime baselines of the Philippines as an
Archepelagic State pursuant to UNCLOS I of 9158, codifying the sovereignty of State parties over their
territorial sea. Then in 1968, it was amended by R.A. 5446, correcting some errors in R.A. 3046 reserving
the drawing of baselines around Sabah.

In 2009, it was again amended by R.A. 9522, to be compliant with the UNCLOS III of 1984. The
requirements complied with are: to shorten one baseline, to optimize the location of some basepoints
and classify KIG and Scarborough Shoal as ‘regime of islands’.

Petitioner now assails the constitutionality of the law for three main reasons:

1. it reduces the Philippine maritime territory under Article 1;

2. it opens the country’s waters to innocent and sea lanes passages hence undermining our sovereignty
and security; and

3. treating KIG and Scarborough as ‘regime of islands’ would weaken our claim over those territories.

Issue: Whether R.A. 9522 is constitutional?

Ruling:

1. UNCLOS III has nothing to do with acquisition or loss of territory. it is just a codified norm that
regulates conduct of States. On the other hand, RA 9522 is a baseline law to mark out basepoints along
coasts, serving as geographic starting points to measure. it merely notices the international community
of the scope of our maritime space.

2. If passages is the issue, domestically, the legislature can enact legislation designating routes within
the archipelagic waters to regulate innocent and sea lanes passages. but in the absence of such,
international law norms operate.

the fact that for archipelagic states, their waters are subject to both passages does not place them in
lesser footing vis a vis continental coastal states. Moreover, RIOP is a customary international law, no
modern state can invoke its sovereignty to forbid such passage.

3. On the KIG issue, RA 9522 merely followed the basepoints mapped by RA 3046 and in fact, it
increased the Phils.’ total maritime space. Moreover, the itself commits the Phils.’ continues claim of
sovereignty and jurisdiction over KIG.

If not, it would be a breach to 2 provisions of the UNCLOS III:

Art. 47 (3): ‘drawing of basepoints shall not depart to any appreciable extent from the general
configuration of the archipelago’.

Art 47 (2): the length of baselines shall not exceed 100 mm.

KIG and SS are far from our baselines, if we draw to include them, we’ll breach the rules: that it should
follow the natural configuration of the archipelago.
TAÑADA VS. ANGARA

272 SCRA 18

Facts:

On April 15, 1994, respondent Navarro, Secretary of Department of Trade and Industry and a
representative of the Philippine government, signed in the Final Act Embodying the Results of the
Uruguay Round of Multilateral Negotiations. Bys signing the Final Act, the Philippines agreed to submit
the agreement establishing the World Trade Organization that require the Philippines, among others,
“to place nationals and products of member-countries on the same footing as Filipinos and local
products”. To that effect, the President ratified and submitted the same to the Senate for its
concurrence pursuant to Section21, Article VII of the Constitution. Hence the petitioner assailed the
WTO Agreement for violating the mandate of the 1987 Constitution to “develop a self-reliant and
independent national economy effectively controlled by Filipinos . . . (to) give preference to qualified
Filipinos (and to) promote the preferential use of Filipino labor, domestic materials and locally produced
goods”.

Issue: Whether the provisions of the Agreement Establishing the World Trade Organization contravene
the provisions of Sec. 19, Art. II, and Secs. 10 and 12, Art. XII, all of the 1987 Philippines Constitution.

Held:

The court ruled the petition in favor of the respondents.

Article II of the Constitution is a "declaration of principles and state policies." These principles in Article
II are not intended to be self-executing principles ready for enforcement through the courts. They are
used by the judiciary as aids or as guides in the exercise of its power of judicial review, and by the
legislature in its enactment of laws.

The provisions of Sec. 10 and 12, Article XII of the Constitution, general principles relating to the national
economy and patrimony, is enforceable only in regard to “the grants or rights, privileges and
concessions covering national economy and patrimony” and not to every aspect of trade and commerce.
While the Constitution mandates a bias in favor of Filipino goods, services, labor and enterprises, at the
same time, it recognizes the need for business exchange with the rest of the world on the bases of
equality and reciprocity and limits protection of Filipino enterprises only against foreign competition and
trade practices that are unfair. In other words, the Constitution did not intend to pursue an isolationist
policy.

On the other hand, there is no basis on the contention that under WTO, local industries will all be wiped
out and that Filipino will be deprived of control of the economy, in fact, WTO recognizes need to protect
weak economies like the Philippines.
 Arigo vs Swift
Case Digest GR 206510 Sept 14, 2014

Facts:

In 2013, the USS Guardian of the US Navy ran aground on an area near the Tubbataha Reefs, a
marine habitat of which entry and certain human activities are prevented and afforded
protection by a Philippine law. The grounding incident prompted the petitioners to seek for
issuance of Writ of Kalikasan with TEPO from the SC.

Among those impleaded are US officials in their capacity as commanding officers of the US
Navy. As petitioners argued, they were impleaded because there was a waiver of immunity
from suit between US and PH pursuant to the VFA terms.

Petitioners claimed that the grounding, salvaging and post-salvaging operations of the USS
Guardian violated their constitutional rights to a balanced and healthful ecology since these
events caused and continue to cause environmental damage of such magnitude as to affect
other provinces surrounding the Tubbataha Reefs. Aside from damages, they sought a directive
from the SC for the institution of civil, administrative and criminal suits for acts committed in
violation of environmental laws and regulations in connection with the grounding incident.
They also prayed for the annulment of some VFA provisions for being unconstitutional.

Issue 1: W/N the US Government has given its consent to be sued through the VFA

No. The general rule on state’s immunity from suit applies in this case.

First, any waiver of State immunity under the VFA pertains only to criminal jurisdiction and not
to special civil actions such as for the issuance of the writ of kalikasan. Hence, contrary to
petitioners’ claim, the US government could not be deemed to have waived its immunity from
suit.

Second, the US respondents were sued in their official capacity as commanding officers of the
US Navy who have control and supervision over the USS Guardian and its crew. Since the
satisfaction of any judgment against these officials would require remedial actions and the
appropriation of funds by the US government, the suit is deemed to be one against the US
itself. Thus, the principle of State Immunity – in correlation with the principle of States as
sovereign equals “par in parem non habet non imperium” – bars the exercise of jurisdiction by
the court over their persons.

Issue 2: W/N the US government may still be held liable for damages caused to the
Tubbataha Reefs

Yes. The US government is liable for damages in relation to the grounding incident under the
customary laws of navigation.

The conduct of the US in this case, when its warship entered a restricted area in violation of RA
10067 and caused damage to the TRNP reef system, brings the matter within the ambit of
Article 31 of the UNCLOS. While historically, warships enjoy sovereign immunity from suit as
extensions of their flag State, Art. 31 of the UNCLOS creates an exception to this rule in cases
where they fail to comply with the rules and regulations of the coastal State regarding passage
through the latter’s internal waters and the territorial sea.

Although the US to date has not ratified the UNCLOS, as a matter of long-standing policy, the
US considers itself bound by customary international rules on the “traditional uses of the
oceans”, which is codified in UNCLOS.

As to the non-ratification by the US, it must be noted that the US’ refusal to join the UNCLOS
was centered on its disagreement with UNCLOS’ regime of deep seabed mining (Part XI) which
considers the oceans and deep seabed commonly owned by mankind. Such has nothing to do
with the acceptance by the US of customary international rules on navigation. (Justice Carpio)

Hence, non-membership in the UNCLOS does not mean that the US will disregard the rights of
the Philippines as a Coastal State over its internal waters and territorial sea. It is thus expected
of the US to bear “international responsibility” under Art. 31 in connection with the USS
Guardian grounding which adversely affected the Tubbataha reefs
Republic vs. Sandoval 220 SCRA 124

Facts: Farmer-rallyists marched to Malacanang calling for a genuine land

reform program. There was a marchers-police confrontation which resulted in
the death of 12 rallyists and scores were wounded. As a result, then Pres.
Aquino issued AO 11 creating the Citizens Mendiola Commission for the purpose
of conducting an investigation. The most significant recommendation of the
Commission was for the heirs of the deceased and wounded victims to
be compensated by the government. Based on such recommendation, the
victims of Mendiola massacre filed an action for damages against
the Republic and the military/police officers involved in the incident.

Issues:
(1) Whether or not there is a valid waiver of immunity
(2) Whether or not the State is liable for damages

Held: The Court held that there was no valid waiver of immunity as
claimed by the petitioners. The recommendation made by the Commission to
indemnify the heirs of the deceased and the victims does not in any way mean
that liability attaches to the State. AO 11 merely states the purpose of the
creation of the Commission and, therefore, whatever is the finding of the
Commission only serves as the basis for a cause of action in the event any party
decides to litigate the same. Thus, the recommendation of the
Commission does not in any way bind the State.

The State cannot be made liable because the military/police officers who
allegedly were responsible for the death and injuries suffered by the marchers
acted beyond the scope of their authority. It is a settled rule that the State as a
person can commit no wrong. The military and police officers who were
responsible for the atrocities can be held personallyliable for damages as they
exceeded their authority, hence, the acts cannot be considered official.
Department of Agriculture vs NLRC 227 scra 693
Facts:
The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed
and requested by National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC).

Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a

contract for security services to be provided by the latter to the said
governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by
Sultan Security Agency in the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several
guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month
pay, uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime
pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security agency.

The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable
with the security agency for the payment of money claims of the complainant
security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus,
the decision became final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of
execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA
and the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor
vehicles of the DA.

The petitioner charges the NLRC with grave abuse of discretion for refusing to
quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming
jurisdiction over a money claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls
under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly,
the petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-
suability of the State.
The private respondents, on the other hand, argue that the petitioner has
impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with
Sultan Security Agency.

Issues:
Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case.

Discussions:
Act No. 3083, aforecited, gives the consent of the State to be “sued upon any
moneyed claim involving liability arising from contract, express or implied.
However, the money claim should first be brought to the Commission on Audit.
Act 3083 stands as the general law waiving the State’s immunity from suit, subject
to its general limitation expressed in Section 7 thereof that ‘no execution shall
issue upon any judgment rendered by any Court against the Government of the
(Philippines), and that the conditions provided in Commonwealth Act 327 for
filing money claims against the Government must be strictly observed.

Rulings:
No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any
circumstances. The State may at times be sued. The general law waiving the
immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine
government “consents and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving
liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties.”
In this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its
being a governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor
that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character. But the
claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.
Manila Prince Hotel vs Government Service Insurance System scra 267 408
Pursuant to the privatization program of the government, the Government Service
Insurance System (GSIS) decided to sell 30-51% of the Manila Hotel Corporation. Two
bidders participated, Manila Prince Hotel (MPH) and the Malaysian Firm Renong Berhad
(RB). MPH’s bid was at P41.58/per share while RB’s bid was at P44.00/share. RB was the
highest bidder hence it was logically considered as the winning bidder but is yet to be
declared so. Pending declaration, MPH matches RB’s bid and invoked the Filipino First
Policy enshrined under par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution which provides:

Section 10. The Congress shall, upon recommendation of the economic and planning
agency, when the national interest dictates, reserve to citizens of the Philippines or to
corporations or associations at least sixty per centum of whose capital is owned by such
citizens, or such higher percentage as Congress may prescribe, certain areas of
investments. The Congress shall enact measures that will encourage the formation and
operation of enterprises whose capital is wholly owned by Filipinos.

In the grant of rights, privileges, and concessions covering the national economy and
patrimony, the State shall give preference to qualified Filipinos.

The State shall regulate and exercise authority over foreign investments within its
national jurisdiction and in accordance with its national goals and priorities.

But GSIS refused to accept said offer. In turn MPH filed a petition for TRO against GSIS to
avoid the perfection/consummation of the sale to RB. TRO was granted.

RB then assailed the TRO issued in favor of MPH arguing among others that:

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. XII of the 1987 Constitution needs an implementing law because it is
merely a statement of principle and policy (not self-executing);
Even if said passage is self-executing, Manila Hotel does not fall under national
patrimony.
ISSUE: Whether or not RB should be admitted as the highest bidder and hence be
proclaimed as the legit buyer of shares.

HELD: No. MPH should be awarded the sale pursuant to Art 12 of the 1987 Const. This is
in light of the Filipino First Policy.

Par. 2, Sec. 10, Art. 12 of the 1987 Constitution is self executing. The Constitution is the
fundamental, paramount and supreme law of the nation, it is deemed written in every
statute and contract.

Manila Hotel falls under national patrimony. Patrimony in its plain and ordinary meaning
pertains to heritage. When the Constitution speaks of national patrimony, it refers not
only to the natural resources of the Philippines, as the Constitution could have very well
used the term natural resources, but also to the cultural heritage of the Filipinos. It also
refers to our intelligence in arts, sciences and letters. Therefore, we should develop not
only our lands, forests, mines and other natural resources but also the mental ability or
faculty of our people. Note that, for more than 8 decades (9 now) Manila Hotel has bore
mute witness to the triumphs and failures, loves and frustrations of the Filipinos; its
existence is impressed with public interest; its own historicity associated with our
struggle for sovereignty, independence and nationhood.

Herein resolved as well is the term Qualified Filipinos which not only pertains to
individuals but to corporations as well and other juridical entities/personalities. The
term “qualified Filipinos” simply means that preference shall be given to those citizens
who can make a viable contribution to the common good, because of credible
competence and efficiency. It certainly does NOT mandate the pampering and
preferential treatment to Filipino citizens or organizations that are incompetent or
inefficient, since such an indiscriminate preference would be counter productive and
inimical to the common good.

In the granting of economic rights, privileges, and concessions, when a choice has to be
made between a “qualified foreigner” and a “qualified Filipino,” the latter shall be
chosen over the former
Imbong vs Ochoa 721 scra 146
IMBONG VS OCHOA
G.R. No. 204819 April 8, 2014
JAMES M. IMBONG and LOVELY-ANN C. IMBONG, for themselves and in behalf of their minor children,
LUCIA CARLOS IMBONG and BERNADETTE CARLOS IMBONG and MAGNIFICAT CHILD
DEVELOPMENT CENTER, INC., Petitioners,
vs.
HON. PAQUITO N. OCHOA, JR., Executive Secretary, HON. FLORENCIO B. ABAD, Secretary,
Department of Budget and Management, HON. ENRIQUE T. ONA, Secretary, Department of Health, HON.
ARMIN A. LUISTRO, Secretary, Department of Education, Culture and Sports and HON. MANUELA.
ROXAS II, Secretary, Department of Interior and Local Government, Respondents.

Facts:
Republic Act (R.A.) No. 10354, otherwise known as the Responsible Parenthood and Reproductive Health Act
of 2012 (RH Law), was enacted by Congress on December 21, 2012.
Challengers from various sectors of society are questioning the constitutionality of the said Act. The
petitioners are assailing the constitutionality of RH Law on the following grounds:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:

1. The RH Law violates the right to life of the unborn.

2. The RH Law violates the right to health and the right to protection against hazardous products.
3. The RH Law violates the right to religious freedom.
4. The RH Law violates the constitutional provision on involuntary servitude.
5. The RH Law violates the right to equal protection of the law.
6. The RH Law violates the right to free speech.
7. The RH Law is “void-for-vagueness” in violation of the due process clause of the Constitution.
8. The RH Law intrudes into the zone of privacy of one’s family protected by the Constitution

PROCEDURAL: Whether the Court may exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Power of Judicial Review

2. Actual Case or Controversy
3. Facial Challenge
4. Locus Standi
5. Declaratory Relief
6. One Subject/One Title Rule
Issue/s:
SUBSTANTIAL ISSUES:
Whether or not (WON) RA 10354/Reproductive Health (RH) Law is unconstitutional for violating the:

1. Right to life
2. Right to health
3. Freedom of religion and right to free speech
4. Right to privacy (marital privacy and autonomy)
5. Freedom of expression and academic freedom
6. Due process clause
7. Equal protection clause
8. Prohibition against involuntary servitude

PROCEDURAL:
Whether the Court can exercise its power of judicial review over the controversy.

1. Actual Case or Controversy

2. Facial Challenge
3. Locus Standi
4. Declaratory Relief
5. One Subject/One Title Rule

Discussions:
PROCEDURAL
Judicial Review Jurisprudence is replete with the rule that the power of judicial review is limited by four
exacting requisites: (a) there must be an actual case or controversy; (b) the petitioners must possess locus
standi; (c) the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity; and (d) the issue of
constitutionality must be the lis mota of the case.
Actual Controversy: An actual case or controversy means an existing case or controversy that is appropriate
or ripe for determination, not conjectural or anticipatory, lest the decision of the court would amount to an
advisory opinion. It must concern a real, tangible and not merely a theoretical question or issue. There ought to
be an actual and substantial controversy admitting of specific relief through a decree conclusive in nature, as
distinguished from an opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical state of facts. Corollary to
the requirement of an actual case or controversy is the requirement of ripeness. A question is ripe for
adjudication when the act being challenged has had a direct adverse effect on the individual challenging it. For
a case to be considered ripe for adjudication, it is a prerequisite that something has then been accomplished or
performed by either branch before a court may come into the picture, and the petitioner must allege the
existence of an immediate or threatened injury to himself as a result of the challenged action. He must show
that he has sustained or is immediately in danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of the act
complained of
Facial Challenge: A facial challenge, also known as a First Amendment Challenge, is one that is launched to
assail the validity of statutes concerning not only protected speech, but also all other rights in the First
Amendment. These include religious freedom, freedom of the press, and the right of the people to peaceably
assemble, and to petition the Government for a redress of grievances. After all, the fundamental right to
religious freedom, freedom of the press and peaceful assembly are but component rights of the right to one’s
freedom of expression, as they are modes which one’s thoughts are externalized.
Locus Standi: Locus standi or legal standing is defined as a personal and substantial interest in a case such
that the party has sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result of the challenged governmental act. It
requires a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure the concrete adverseness which
sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
constitutional questions.
Transcendental Importance: the Court leans on the doctrine that “the rule on standing is a matter of
procedure, hence, can be relaxed for non-traditional plaintiffs like ordinary citizens, taxpayers, and legislators
when the public interest so requires, such as when the matter is of transcendental importance, of overreaching
significance to society, or of paramount public interest.”
One Subject-One Title: The “one title-one subject” rule does not require the Congress to employ in the title
of the enactment language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue all the contents and the
minute details therein. The rule is sufficiently complied with if the title is comprehensive enough as to include
the general object which the statute seeks to effect, and where, as here, the persons interested are informed of
the nature, scope and consequences of the proposed law and its operation. Moreover, this Court has invariably
adopted a liberal rather than technical construction of the rule “so as not to cripple or impede legislation.” The
one subject/one title rule expresses the principle that the title of a law must not be “so uncertain that the
average person reading it would not be informed of the purpose of the enactment or put on inquiry as to its
contents, or which is misleading, either in referring to or indicating one subject where another or different one
is really embraced in the act, or in omitting any expression or indication of the real subject or scope of the
act.”
Declaration of Unconstitutionality: Orthodox view: An unconstitutional act is not a law; it confers no
rights; it imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is, in legal contemplation, as
inoperative as though it had never been passed. Modern view: Under this view, the court in passing upon the
question of constitutionality does not annul or repeal the statute if it finds it in conflict with the Constitution. It
simply refuses to recognize it and determines the rights of the parties just as if such statute had no existence.
But certain legal effects of the statute prior to its declaration of unconstitutionality may be recognized.
Requisites for partial unconstitutionality: (1) The Legislature must be willing to retain the valid portion(s),
usually shown by the presence of a separability clause in the law; and (2) The valid portion can stand
independently as law.

Ruling/s:
SUBSTANTIAL

1. Majority of the Members of the Court believe that the question of when life begins is a scientific and
medical issue that should not be decided, at this stage, without proper hearing and evidence. However,
they agreed that individual Members could express their own views on this matter.
Article II, Section 12 of the Constitution states: “The State recognizes the sanctity of family life and shall
protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution. It shall equally protect the life of the
mother and the life of the unborn from conception.”
In its plain and ordinary meaning (a canon in statutory construction), the traditional meaning of “conception”
according to reputable dictionaries cited by the ponente is that life begins at fertilization. Medical sources also
support the view that conception begins at fertilization.
The framers of the Constitution also intended for (a) “conception” to refer to the moment of “fertilization” and
(b) the protection of the unborn child upon fertilization. In addition, they did not intend to ban all
contraceptives for being unconstitutional; only those that kill or destroy the fertilized ovum would be
prohibited. Contraceptives that actually prevent the union of the male sperm and female ovum, and those that
similarly take action before fertilization should be deemed non-abortive, and thus constitutionally permissible.
The intent of the framers of the Constitution for protecting the life of the unborn child was to prevent the
Legislature from passing a measure prevent abortion. The Court cannot interpret this otherwise. The RH Law
is in line with this intent and actually prohibits abortion. By using the word “or” in defining
abortifacient (Section 4(a)), the RH Law prohibits not only drugs or devices that prevent implantation but also
those that induce abortion and induce the destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb. The RH Law
recognizes that the fertilized ovum already has life and that the State has a bounded duty to protect it.
However, the authors of the IRR gravely abused their office when they redefined the meaning of abortifacient
by using the term “primarily”. Recognizing as abortifacients only those that “primarily induce abortion or the
destruction of a fetus inside the mother’s womb or the prevention of the fertilized ovum to reach and be
implanted in the mother’s womb” (Sec. 3.01(a) of the IRR) would pave the way for the approval of
contraceptives that may harm or destroy the life of the unborn from conception/fertilization. This violates
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution. For the same reason, the definition of contraceptives under the IRR
(Sec 3.01(j)), which also uses the term “primarily”, must be struck down.

2. The RH Law does not intend to do away with RA 4729 (1966). With RA 4729 in place, the Court believes
adequate safeguards exist to ensure that only safe contraceptives are made available to the public. In
fulfilling its mandate under Sec. 10 of the RH Law, the DOH must keep in mind the provisions of RA
4729: the contraceptives it will procure shall be from a duly licensed drug store or pharmaceutical
company and that the actual distribution of these contraceptive drugs and devices will be done following a
prescription of a qualified medical practitioner.

Meanwhile, the requirement of Section 9 of the RH Law is to be considered “mandatory” only after these
devices and materials have been tested, evaluated and approved by the FDA. Congress cannot determine that
contraceptives are “safe, legal, non-abortificient and effective”.

3. The Court cannot determine whether or not the use of contraceptives or participation in support of modern
RH measures (a) is moral from a religious standpoint; or, (b) right or wrong according to one’s dogma or
belief. However, the Court has the authority to determine whether or not the RH Law contravenes the
Constitutional guarantee of religious freedom.

The State may pursue its legitimate secular objectives without being dictated upon the policies of any one
religion. To allow religious sects to dictate policy or restrict other groups would violate Article III, Section 5 of
the Constitution or the Establishment Clause. This would cause the State to adhere to a particular religion, and
thus, establishes a state religion. Thus, the State can enhance its population control program through the RH
Law even if the promotion of contraceptive use is contrary to the religious beliefs of e.g. the petitioners.
4. Section 23A (2)(i) of the RH Law, which permits RH procedures even with only the consent of the spouse
undergoing the provision (disregarding spousal content), intrudes into martial privacy and autonomy and
goes against the constitutional safeguards for the family as the basic social institution. Particularly, Section
3, Article XV of the Constitution mandates the State to defend: (a) the right of spouses to found a family
in accordance with their religious convictions and the demands of responsible parenthood and (b) the right
of families or family associations to participate in the planning and implementation of policies and
programs that affect them. The RH Law cannot infringe upon this mutual decision-making, and endanger
the institutions of marriage and the family.

The exclusion of parental consent in cases where a minor undergoing a procedure is already a parent or has had
a miscarriage (Section 7 of the RH Law) is also anti-family and violates Article II, Section 12 of the
Constitution, which states: “The natural and primary right and duty of parents in the rearing of the youth for
civic efficiency and the development of moral character shall receive the support of the Government.” In
addition, the portion of Section 23(a)(ii) which reads “in the case of minors, the written consent of parents or
legal guardian or, in their absence, persons exercising parental authority or next-of-kin shall be required only
in elective surgical procedures” is invalid as it denies the right of parental authority in cases where what is
involved is “non-surgical procedures.”
However, a minor may receive information (as opposed to procedures) about family planning services. Parents
are not deprived of parental guidance and control over their minor child in this situation and may assist her in
deciding whether to accept or reject the information received. In addition, an exception may be made in life-
threatening procedures.

5. The Court declined to rule on the constitutionality of Section 14 of the RH Law, which mandates the State
to provide Age-and Development-Appropriate Reproductive Health Education. Although educators might
raise their objection to their participation in the RH education program, the Court reserves its judgment
should an actual case be filed before it.

Any attack on its constitutionality is premature because the Department of Education has not yet formulated a
curriculum on age-appropriate reproductive health education.
Section 12, Article II of the Constitution places more importance on the role of parents in the development of
their children with the use of the term “primary”. The right of parents in upbringing their youth is superior to
that of the State.
The provisions of Section 14 of the RH Law and corresponding provisions of the IRR supplement (rather than
supplant) the right and duties of the parents in the moral development of their children.
By incorporating parent-teacher-community associations, school officials, and other interest groups in
developing the mandatory RH program, it could very well be said that the program will be in line with the
religious beliefs of the petitioners.

6. The RH Law does not violate the due process clause of the Constitution as the definitions of several terms
as observed by the petitioners are not vague.

The definition of “private health care service provider” must be seen in relation to Section 4(n) of the RH Law
which defines a “public health service provider”. The “private health care institution” cited under Section 7
should be seen as synonymous to “private health care service provider.
The terms “service” and “methods” are also broad enough to include providing of information and rendering of
medical procedures. Thus, hospitals operated by religious groups are exempted from rendering RH service and
modern family planning methods (as provided for by Section 7 of the RH Law) as well as from giving RH
information and procedures.
The RH Law also defines “incorrect information”. Used together in relation to Section 23 (a)(1), the terms
“incorrect” and “knowingly” connote a sense of malice and ill motive to mislead or misrepresent the public as
to the nature and effect of programs and services on reproductive health.

7. To provide that the poor are to be given priority in the government’s RH program is not a violation of the
equal protection clause. In fact, it is pursuant to Section 11, Article XIII of the Constitution, which states
that the State shall prioritize the needs of the underprivileged, sick elderly, disabled, women, and children
and that it shall endeavor to provide medical care to paupers.

The RH Law does not only seek to target the poor to reduce their number, since Section 7 of the RH Law
prioritizes poor and marginalized couples who are suffering from fertility issues and desire to have children. In
addition, the RH Law does not prescribe the number of children a couple may have and does not impose
conditions upon couples who intend to have children. The RH Law only seeks to provide priority to the poor.
The exclusion of private educational institutions from the mandatory RH education program under Section 14
is valid. There is a need to recognize the academic freedom of private educational institutions especially with
respect to religious instruction and to consider their sensitivity towards the teaching of reproductive health
education

8. The requirement under Sec. 17 of the RH Law for private and non-government health care service
providers to render 48 hours of pro bonoRH services does not amount to involuntary servitude, for two
reasons. First, the practice of medicine is undeniably imbued with public interest that it is both the power
and a duty of the State to control and regulate it in order to protect and promote the public welfare.
Second, Section 17 only encourages private and non-government RH service providers to render pro
bono Besides the PhilHealth accreditation, no penalty is imposed should they do otherwise.

However, conscientious objectors are exempt from Sec. 17 as long as their religious beliefs do not allow them
to render RH service, pro bono or otherwise

PROCEDURAL

1. In this case, the Court is of the view that an actual case or controversy exists and that the same is ripe for
judicial determination. Considering that the RH Law and its implementing rules have already taken effect
and that budgetary measures to carry out the law have already been passed, it is evident that the subject
petitions present a justiciable controversy. As stated earlier, when an action of the legislative branch is
seriously alleged to have infringed the Constitution, it not only becomes a right, but also a duty of the
Judiciary to settle the dispute.
Moreover, the petitioners have shown that the case is so because medical practitioners or medical providers are
in danger of being criminally prosecuted under the RH Law for vague violations thereof, particularly public
health officers who are threatened to be dismissed from the service with forfeiture of retirement and other
benefits. They must, at least, be heard on the matter now.

2. In this jurisdiction, the application of doctrines originating from the U.S. has been generally maintained,
albeit with some modifications. While the Court has withheld the application of facial challenges to
strictly penal statues, it has expanded its scope to cover statutes not only regulating free speech, but also
those involving religious freedom, and other fundamental rights. The underlying reason for this
modification is simple. For unlike its counterpart in the U.S., this Court, under its expanded jurisdiction, is
mandated by the Fundamental Law not only to settle actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, but also to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the
Government. Verily, the framers of Our Constitution envisioned a proactive Judiciary, ever vigilant with
its duty to maintain the supremacy of the Constitution.

Consequently, considering that the foregoing petitions have seriously alleged that the constitutional human
rights to life, speech and religion and other fundamental rights mentioned above have been violated by the
assailed legislation, the Court has authority to take cognizance of these kindred petitions and to determine if
the RH Law can indeed pass constitutional scrutiny. To dismiss these petitions on the simple expedient that
there exist no actual case or controversy, would diminish this Court as a reactive branch of government, acting
only when the Fundamental Law has been transgressed, to the detriment of the Filipino people.

3. Even if the constitutionality of the RH Law may not be assailed through an “as-applied challenge, still, the
Court has time and again acted liberally on the locus standi requirement. It has accorded certain
individuals standing to sue, not otherwise directly injured or with material interest affected by a
Government act, provided a constitutional issue of transcendental importance is invoked. The rule on
locus standi is, after all, a procedural technicality which the Court has, on more than one occasion, waived
or relaxed, thus allowing non-traditional plaintiffs, such as concerned citizens, taxpayers, voters or
legislators, to sue in the public interest, albeit they may not have been directly injured by the operation of
a law or any other government act.

The present action cannot be properly treated as a petition for prohibition, the transcendental importance of the
issues involved in this case warrants that the Court set aside the technical defects and take primary jurisdiction
over the petition at bar. One cannot deny that the issues raised herein have potentially pervasive influence on
the social and moral well being of this nation, specially the youth; hence, their proper and just determination is
an imperative need. This is in accordance with the well-entrenched principle that rules of procedure are not
inflexible tools designed to hinder or delay, but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Their
strict and rigid application, which would result in technicalities that tend to frustrate, rather than promote
substantial justice, must always be eschewed.

4. Most of the petitions are praying for injunctive reliefs and so the Court would just consider them as
petitions for prohibition under Rule 65, over which it has original jurisdiction. Where the case has far-
 reaching implications and prays for injunctive reliefs, the Court may consider them as petitions for
prohibition under Rule 65.
5. The RH Law does not violate the one subject/one bill rule. In this case, a textual analysis of the various
provisions of the law shows that both “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” are interrelated
and germane to the overriding objective to control the population growth. As expressed in the first
paragraph of Section 2 of the RH Law:

SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. – The State recognizes and guarantees the human rights of all persons including
their right to equality and nondiscrimination of these rights, the right to sustainable human development, the
right to health which includes reproductive health, the right to education and information, and the right to
choose and make decisions for themselves in accordance with their religious convictions, ethics, cultural
beliefs, and the demands of responsible parenthood.
Considering the close intimacy between “reproductive health” and “responsible parenthood” which bears to the
attainment of the goal of achieving “sustainable human development” as stated under its terms, the Court finds
no reason to believe that Congress intentionally sought to deceive the public as to the contents of the assailed
legislation.
Accordingly, the Court declares R.A. No. 10354 as NOT UNCONSTITUTIONAL except with respect to the
following provisions which are declared UNCONSTITUTIONAL:
1) Section 7 and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they: a) require private health facilities
and non-maternity specialty hospitals and hospitals owned and operated by a religious group to refer patients,
not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health facility
which is conveniently accessible; and b) allow minor-parents or minors who have suffered a miscarriage
access to modem methods of family planning without written consent from their parents or guardian/s;
2) Section 23(a)(l) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and or refuses to disseminate information regarding
programs and services on reproductive health regardless of his or her religious beliefs.
3) Section 23(a)(2)(i) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they allow a married
individual, not in an emergency or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to undergo
reproductive health procedures without the consent of the spouse;
4) Section 23(a)(2)(ii) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR insofar as they limit the requirement of
parental consent only to elective surgical procedures.
5) Section 23(a)(3) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5.24 thereof, insofar
as they punish any healthcare service provider who fails and/or refuses to refer a patient not in an emergency
or life-threatening case, as defined under Republic Act No. 8344, to another health care service provider within
the same facility or one which is conveniently accessible regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
6) Section 23(b) and the corresponding provision in the RH-IRR, particularly Section 5 .24 thereof, insofar as
they punish any public officer who refuses to support reproductive health programs or shall do any act that
hinders the full implementation of a reproductive health program, regardless of his or her religious beliefs;
7) Section 17 and the corresponding prov1s10n in the RH-IRR regarding the rendering of pro bona
reproductive health service in so far as they affect the conscientious objector in securing PhilHealth
accreditation; and
8) Section 3.0l(a) and Section 3.01 G) of the RH-IRR, which added the qualifier “primarily” in defining
abortifacients and contraceptives, as they are ultra vires and, therefore, null and void for contravening Section
4(a) of the RH Law and violating Section 12, Article II of the Constitution.
 >NORTH COTABATO VS. GRP GR NO. 183591
>FACTS: The Memorandum of Agreement on the Ancestral Domain (MOA-AD) brought about by the
Government of the republic of the Philippines (GRP) and the Moro Islamic Liberation Front (MILF) as an
aspect of Tripoli Agreement of Peace in 2001 is scheduled to be signed in Kuala Lumpur, Malaysia.
This agreement was petitioned by the Province of North Cotabato for Mandamus and Prohibition with
Prayer for the Issuance of Writ of Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order. The
agreement mentions “Bangsamoro Juridical Entity” (BJE) to which it grants the authority and jurisdiction
over the Ancestral Domain and Ancestral Lands of the Bangsamoro; authority and jurisdiction over all
natural resources within internal waters. The agreement is composed of two local statutes: the organic
act for autonomous region in Muslim Mindanao and the Indigenous People’s Rights Act (IPRA).
ISSUE: Whether or not the GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public
consultation and the right to information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and Whether
or not the MOA-AD brought by the GRP and MILF is constitutional
HELD:GRP violated the Constitutional and statutory provisions on public consultation and the right to
information when they negotiated and initiated the MOA-AD and it are unconstitutional because it is
contrary to law and the provisions of the constitution thereof.
REASONING: The GRP is required by this law to carry out public consultations on both national and local
levels to build consensus for peace agenda and process and the mobilization and facilitation of people’s
participation in the peace process.
Article III (Bill of Rights)

Sec. 7. The right of people on matters of public concern shall be recognized, access to official records
and to documents and papers pertaining to official acts, transactions, or decisions, as well as to
government research data used as basis for policy development shall be afforded the citizen, subject to
such limitations as may be provided by law.

Article II
Sec. 28. Subject to reasonable conditions prescribed by law , that state adopts and implements a policy
of full public disclosure of all its transactions involving public interest.

LGC (1991), “require all national agencies and officers to conduct periodic consultations. No project or
program be implemented unless such consultations are complied with and approval mus be obtained.”

Article VII (Executive Department)

Sec. 21. No treaty or international agreement shall be valid and effective unless concurred in by at least
two-thirds of all the Members of the Senate.

Article X. (Local Government)

Sec. 1. The territorial and political subdivisions of the Republic of the Philippines are the province, cities,
municipalities and barangays. There shall be autonomous regions on Muslim Mindanao and the
Cordillera as hereinafter provided.
Sec. 15. There shall be created autonomous regions in Muslim Mindanao and in the Cordilleras
consisting of provinces, cities, municipalities and geographical areas sharing common and distinctive
historical and cultural heritage, economic and social structures and other relevant characteristics within
the framework of this constitution and the national sovereignty as well as territorial integrity of the
Republic of the Philippines.

Section 16. The President shall exercise general supervision over autonomous regions to ensure that
laws are faithfully executed.

Sec. 18. The creation of autonomous region shall be effective when approved by a majority of the votes
cast by the constituents units in a plebiscite called for the purpose, provided that only provinces, cities
and geographic areas voting favourably in such plebiscite shall be included in the autonomous region.

Sec. 20. Within its territorial jurisdiction and subject to the provisions of this Constitution and national
laws, the organic act of autonomous regions shall provide for legislative powers over:
1. Administrative organization;
2. Creation of sources of revenues;
3. Ancestral domain and natural resources;
4. Personal, family, and property relations;
5. Regional urban and rural planning development;
6. Economic, social, and tourism development;
7. Educational policies;
8. Preservation and development of the cultural heritage; and
9. Such other matters as may be authorized by law for the promotion of the general welfare of the
people of the region.

The President has sole authority in the treaty-making.

ARTICLE XVII (AMENDMENTS OR REVISIONS)

Section 1. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution may be proposed by:
1. The Congress, upon a vote of three-fourths of all its Members; or
2. A constitutional convention.

Section 4. Any amendment to, or revision of, this Constitution under Section 1 hereof shall be valid
when ratified by a majority of the votes cast in a plebiscite which shall be held not earlier than sixty days
nor later than ninety days after the approval of such amendment or revision.

MOA-AD states that all provisions thereof which cannot be reconciled with the present constitution and
laws “shall come into force upon signing of a comprehensive compact and upon effecting the necessary
changes to the legal framework.” The president’s authority is limited to proposing constitutional
amendments. She cannot guarantee to any third party that the required amendments will eventually be
put in place nor even be submitted to a plebiscite. MOA-AD itself presents the need to amend therein.
Oposa vs FactoranNatural and Environmental Laws; Constitutional Law: Intergenerational Responsibility

GR No. 101083; July 30 1993

FACTS:

A taxpayer’s class suit was filed by minors Juan Antonio Oposa, et al., representing their generation and
generations yet unborn, and represented by their parents against Fulgencio Factoran Jr., Secretary of
DENR. They prayed that judgment be rendered ordering the defendant, his agents, representatives and
other persons acting in his behalf to:

1. Cancel all existing Timber Licensing Agreements (TLA) in the country;

2. Cease and desist from receiving, accepting, processing, renewing, or appraising new TLAs;

and granting the plaintiffs “such other reliefs just and equitable under the premises.” They alleged that
they have a clear and constitutional right to a balanced and healthful ecology and are entitled to
protection by the State in its capacity as parens patriae. Furthermore, they claim that the act of the
defendant in allowing TLA holders to cut and deforest the remaining forests constitutes a
misappropriation and/or impairment of the natural resources property he holds in trust for the benefit
of the plaintiff minors and succeeding generations.

The defendant filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the following grounds:

1. Plaintiffs have no cause of action against him;

2. The issues raised by the plaintiffs is a political question which properly pertains to the
legislative or executive branches of the government.

ISSUE:

Do the petitioner-minors have a cause of action in filing a class suit to “prevent the misappropriation or
impairment of Philippine rainforests?”

HELD:

Yes. Petitioner-minors assert that they represent their generation as well as generations to come. The
Supreme Court ruled that they can, for themselves, for others of their generation, and for the
succeeding generation, file a class suit. Their personality to sue in behalf of succeeding generations is
based on the concept of intergenerational responsibility insofar as the right to a balanced and healthful
ecology is concerned. Such a right considers the “rhythm and harmony of nature” which indispensably
include, inter alia, the judicious disposition, utilization, management, renewal and conservation of the
country’s forest, mineral, land, waters, fisheries, wildlife, offshore areas and other natural resources to
the end that their exploration, development, and utilization be equitably accessible to the present as
well as the future generations.

Needless to say, every generation has a responsibility to the next to preserve that rhythm and harmony
for the full enjoyment of a balanced and healthful ecology. Put a little differently, the minor’s assertion
of their right to a sound environment constitutes at the same time, the performance of their obligation
to ensure the protection of that right for the generations to come.
Resident Marine Mammals vs Secretary of Department of Energy

Case Digest GR 180771 April 21 2015

Facts:

In 2002, the Department of Energy entered into a Geophysical Survey and Exploration Contract with
JAPEX, a 100% Japanese corporation, which was later converted to a service contract, known as SC-46,
for the exploration, development and utilization of petroleum resources in an area that basically affects
the Tanon Strait. The President at that time was not a signatory to the SC-46 and such contract was not
submitted to the Congress for review.

Tanon Strait is a narrow passage of water in Cebu which harbors a biodiversity of marine life and is
declared by laws as a protected seascape. When JAPEX started its seismic surveys and drilling activities
over the area, petitions were filed assailing the constitutionality of SC-46. One petition protesting the
activities for its ecological impact was in the name of “Resident Marine Mammals” – which are literally
toothed whales, turtles and such, joined in by human petitioners referred to as “Stewards”, in their
representative as well as personal capacity. Pres. Arroyo was also impleaded as an unwilling co-
petitioner, purportedly because of her express declaration and undertaking under the ASEAN Charter to
protect habitats and other environmental concerns.

FIDEC, an organization committed to the welfare of marginal fisherfolk in the area, also questioned the
SC-46 on the ground that service contracts are no longer allowed under the 1987 Constitution, and that
if it were, SC-46 is still null and void because it did not comply with the Constitution, most especially the
safeguards that the Court laid down in La Bugal B’laan case.

Remedial Law

Issue 1: W/N the “Resident Marine Mammals”, or animals in general, have standing as the real party-in-
interests in this suit

Yes. The Rules of Procedure for Environmental Cases allows filing of a citizen’s suit. A citizen’s suit under
this rule allows any Filipino citizen to file an action for the enforcement of environmental law on behalf
of minors or generations yet unborn. It is essentially a representative suit that allows persons who are
not real parties in interest to institute actions on behalf of the real party in interest.
Dissent

Issue 2: W/N the name of former President Arroyo impleaded in the petition as an unwilling co-plaintiff
is proper

No. The name of Pres Arroyo as an unwilling plaintiff impleaded in the petition should be stricken from
the title of the case.

First, under Rule 3, Sec 10 of the ROC, when the consent of a party who should be joined as plaintiff
cannot be obtained, he or she may be made a party defendant. This will put the unwilling party under
the jurisdiction of the court, which may properly implead him or her through its processes. The unwilling
party’s name cannot be simply included in the petition without her knowledge or consent, as this would
be a denial of due process.

Second, impleading the former President for an act she made in performance of the functions of her
office is contrary to the public policy against embroiling Presidents in suits.

Political Law

Issue 3: W/N service contracts are no longer allowed by the 1987 Constitution

No. As settled in the La Bugal case, the deletion of the words “service contracts” in the 1987
Constitution did not amount to a ban on them per se. In fact, the deliberations of the members of the
Constitutional Commission show that in deliberating on Art XII Sec 2(4), they were actually referring to
service contracts as understood in the 1973 Constitution. The framers, in short, used the term “service
contracts” in referring to agreements involving technical or financial assistance.

Issue 4: W/N SC-46 is valid

No. The SC-46 is not valid because it did not comply with the Art XII, Sec 2 (4) of the Constitution. First, it
was not crafted in accordance with a general law that provides standards, terms and conditions; second,
it was not signed by the President for and on behalf of the Philippine government; and third, it was not
reported by the President to the Congress within 30 days of execution.
U.P. v. Dizon, G.R.No. 18112, August 23, 2012

FACTS: On August 30, 1990, UP entered into an agreement with Stern builders Corp for the construction
of extension building in UPLB. Stern Builders submitted 3 billings but UP only paid for 2, the 3rd was not
paid due to disallowance of COA. When the disallowance was lifted, UP still failed to pay. So Stern
Builders sued them. UP failed to file an appeal during the 15-day period. When they appealed on June 3,
2022 arguing that they only received the copy on may 31, 2002, RTC denied it and issued a writ of
execution on October 4, 2002. UP files with CA for certiorari but was likewise denied. On December 21,
2004, RTC judge Dizon orders the release of the garnished funds from UP. On January 10, 2005, UP files
for certiorari the decision of CA. Petition was granted and TRO filed. After the 60-day period of TRO, RTC
directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP. On July 8, 2005, Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of
check because the certiorari is pending. On September 16, 2005, UP files for certiorari which was denied
on December 2005 but UP files for petition for review. On January 3, 2007, RTC judge Yadao replaced
Dizon, ordered the withdrawal. On January 22, 2007, UP filed TRO with SC which was granted. UP files
petition for review for RTC’s decision to withdraw funds.

ISSUE:W/N the fresh-period rule in Neypes v CA can be givenretroactive application

HELD: Yes. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of
retroactivity or is not subject to the general rule prohibiting retroactive operation of statutes. Rather, its
retroactivity is already given since by the nature of rules of procedure, no vested right is impinged in its
application.

[CONSTI I | LEGARDA | D2017]Date

Aug 23 2012
Title
GR No. 171182 UP vs. Dizon
Ponente
Bersamin
Doctrine
Retroactivity of Procedural/Remedial Statues
Law
Article 4 of NCC | Article 2252 of NCC
FACTS

Petitioner UP contracted respondent Stern Builders Inc. for the extension and renovation of the
CASBuilding in UPLB

When UP failed to pay in the amount of P273k due COA disallowance, respondent filed a case
against UPin RTC QC that resulted in the decision to garnish public funds amounting to P16M
On Nov 28, 2001 RTC rendered a decision in favor of respondent. UP failed to file an appeal
during the15-day reglementary period after promulgation of said decision.

UP files for appeal only on June 3 2002, arguing that the UP OLS only received a copy May
31 2002.RTC denied said appeal since it has been filed out of time.

RTC issues writ of execution Oct 4 2002

UP files to CA and SC for certiorari to assail decision due to the denial of due course

petition denied

On Dec 21 2004, RTC respondent Judge Dizon orders for the release of garnished funds of UP

On Jan 10 2005, UP files for certiorari to assail said decision to CA petition granted and TRO
filed

After 60-day TRO, RTC directs sheriff to receive the check from DBP

On July 8, 2005 Respondent Dizon ordered the non-withdrawal of check on basis the certiorari
ispending

On Sept 16 2005, UP files for certiorari

–
denied on Dec 2005 but UP files for petition for review

On Jan 2006, Dizon denies motion to withdraw since UP is filing for petition to CA

On Jan 3 2007, RTC Judge Yadao (replaced Dizon) now ordered the withdrawal

On Jan 22 2007, UP filed for TRO to SC

–
granted

UP files petition of review for RTC decision to withdraw funds

ISSUES

WoN the finality of the Nov 28 2001 decision can be challenged

WoN the fresh-period rule announced in Neypes v CA can be given retroactive application
HELD
Petition GRANTED. CA decision REVERSED and SET ASIDE. RTC order for garnishment of
fundsANNULED
. Awards for actual damages, moral damages, and attorney’s fees in RTC decision DELETED.
Can the finality of the Nov 28 2001 decision be challenged?

YES. As a general rule, once a decision has become final and executory, the prevailing party
should notbe deprived of reaping the fruits of victory. But an exception to this would be when
circumstancestranspire after the finality of the decision to render the execution unjust
and inequitable.

In the present case, SC rules that the non-acceptance of RTC to the appeal made by UP for the
Nov 28
2001 decision was inequitable and was a clear violation to UP’s right to due process:

The service of the denial for MR was defective since it was not given to the counsel of
record,the OLS, but to Atty Nolasco of UPLB Legal. Only by May 31 2002 did OLS receive a copy

The filing of the notice of appeal on Jun 3 was well within the reglementary period (as per
thefresh-period rule)

For equity, the fresh-period rule should and must apply in this case

QED the finality of RTC decision is set asideCan

the fresh-period rule announced in Neypes v CA be given retroactive application?

YES. The retroactive effect of a procedural law does not come within the legal conception of
“retroactivity” or is not subject to
the general rule prohibiting the retroactive operation of statutes (Sec4, NCC)
–
rather, its retroactivity is already given since, by the nature of rules of procedure, no
vestedright is impinged in its application (Sec 2252, NCC)

In the present case, the retroactive application of the fresh-period rule need not even be
questionedsince the rule came into effect in 1998 by the Neypes v CA judgment