TAÑADA VS.

TUVERA

136 SCRA 27 (April 24, 1985)

FACTS:

Invoking the right of the people to be informed on matters of public concern as well as the principle that
laws to be valid and enforceable must be published in the Official Gazette, petitioners filed for writ of
mandamus to compel respondent public officials to publish and/or cause to publish various presidential
decrees, letters of instructions, general orders, proclamations, executive orders, letters of
implementations and administrative orders.

The Solicitor General, representing the respondents, moved for the dismissal of the case, contending
that petitioners have no legal personality to bring the instant petition.

ISSUE:

Whether or not publication in the Official Gazette is required before any law or statute becomes valid
and enforceable.

HELD:

Art. 2 of the Civil Code does not preclude the requirement of publication in the Official Gazette, even if
the law itself provides for the date of its effectivity. The clear object of this provision is to give the
general public adequate notice of the various laws which are to regulate their actions and conduct as
citizens. Without such notice and publication, there would be no basis for the application of the maxim
ignoratia legis nominem excusat. It would be the height of injustive to punish or otherwise burden a
citizen for the transgression of a law which he had no notice whatsoever, not even a constructive one.

The very first clause of Section 1 of CA 638 reads: there shall be published in the Official Gazette…. The
word “shall” therein imposes upon respondent officials an imperative duty. That duty must be enforced
if the constitutional right of the people to be informed on matter of public concern is to be given
substance and validity.

The publication of presidential issuances of public nature or of general applicability is a requirement of

due process. It is a rule of law that before a person may be bound by law, he must first be officially and
specifically informed of its contents. The Court declared that presidential issuances of general
application which have not been published have no force and effect.
TAÑADA VS. TUVERA

146 SCRA 446 (December 29, 1986)

FACTS:

This is a motion for reconsideration of the decision promulgated on April 24, 1985. Respondent argued
that while publication was necessary as a rule, it was not so when it was “otherwise” as when the
decrees themselves declared that they were to become effective immediately upon their approval.

ISSUES:

1. Whether or not a distinction be made between laws of general applicability and laws which are not as
to their publication;
2. Whether or not a publication shall be made in publications of general circulation.

HELD:

The clause “unless it is otherwise provided” refers to the date of effectivity and not to the requirement
of publication itself, which cannot in any event be omitted. This clause does not mean that the
legislature may make the law effective immediately upon approval, or in any other date, without its
previous publication.

“Laws” should refer to all laws and not only to those of general application, for strictly speaking, all laws
relate to the people in general albeit there are some that do not apply to them directly. A law without
any bearing on the public would be invalid as an intrusion of privacy or as class legislation or as an ultra
vires act of the legislature. To be valid, the law must invariably affect the public interest eve if it might
be directly applicable only to one individual, or some of the people only, and not to the public as a
whole.

All statutes, including those of local application and private laws, shall be published as a condition for
their effectivity, which shall begin 15 days after publication unless a different effectivity date is fixed by
the legislature.

Publication must be in full or it is no publication at all, since its purpose is to inform the public of the
content of the law.

Article 2 of the Civil Code provides that publication of laws must be made in the Official Gazette, and not
elsewhere, as a requirement for their effectivity. The Supreme Court is not called upon to rule upon the
wisdom of a law or to repeal or modify it if it finds it impractical.

The publication must be made forthwith, or at least as soon as possible.

PHILIPPINE VETERANS BANK EMPLOYEES UNION vs Vega

FACTS:

On January 2, 1992, the Congress enacted R.A. 7169 providing for the rehabilitation of Philippine
Veterans Bank. It was published in the Official Gazette in February 24, 1992. Thereafter, petitioners filed
with the labor tribunals their residual claims for benefits and for reinstatement upon reopening the
bank.

In May 1992, the Central Bank issued a certificate of authority allowing the PVB to reopen despite the
late mandate for rehabilitation and reopening, Judge Vega continued with the liquidation proceedings of
the bank alleging further that RA 7169 became effective only on March 10, 1992 or 15 days after its
publication in the Official Gazette on February 24, 1992.

ISSUE:
Whether or not RA 7169 became effective on January 2, 1992.

RULING:

Yes. RA 7169 expressly provided that it should take effect upon its approval. Aquino signed it into law on
January 2, 1992. Thereafter, said law became effective on said date. Its subsequent publication was not
necessary for its effectivity. RA 7169 is of internal nature and not have general application thus it took
effect on the date provided for and hence was rightfully invoked by the petitioners. The Supreme Court
upheld that while as a rule laws take effect after 15 days following completion of their publication in the
Official Gazette or in a newspaper of general circulation in the Philippines, the legislature has the
authority to provide for exceptions as indicated in the clause “unless otherwise provided”.

WILLIAM REAGAN V COMMISSIONER OF INTERNAL REVENUE

William Reagan is a US citizen assigned at Clark Air Base to help provide technical assistance to the US Air
Force (USAF). In April 1960 Reagan imported a 1960 Cadillac car valued at $6,443.83. Two months later,
he got permission to sell the same car provided that he would sell the car to a US citizen or a member of
the USAF. He sold it to Willie Johnson, Jr. for $6,600.00 as shown by a Bill of Sale. The sale took place
within Clark Air Base. As a result of this transaction, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue calculated the
net taxable income of Reagan to be at P17,912.34 and that his income tax would be P2,797.00. Reagan
paid the assessed tax but at the same time he sought for a refund because he claims that he is exempt.
Reagan claims that the sale took place in “foreign soil” since Clark Air Base, in legal contemplation is a
base outside the Philippines. Reagan also cited that under the Military Bases Agreement, he, by nature of
his employment, is exempt from Philippine taxation.
ISSUE: Is the sale considered done in a foreign soil not subject to Philippine income tax?
HELD: No. The Philippines is independent and sovereign, its authority may be exercised over its entire
domain. There is no portion thereof that is beyond its power. Within its limits, its decrees are supreme,
its commands paramount. Its laws govern therein, and everyone to whom it applies must submit to its
terms. That is the extent of its jurisdiction, both territorial and personal. On the other hand, there is
 nothing in the Military Bases Agreement that lends support to Reagan’s assertion. The Base has not
become foreign soil or territory. This country’s jurisdictional rights therein, certainly not excluding the
power to tax, have been preserved, the Philippines merely consents that the US exercise jurisdiction in
certain cases – this is just a matter of comity, courtesy and expediency. It is likewise noted that he indeed
is employed by the USAF and his income is derived from US source but the income derived from the sale
is not of US source hence taxable.

PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES V LORETA GOZO

Loreta Gozo bought a house and lot which was located inside the US Naval Reservation which is within
the territorial jurisdiction of Olongapo City. Upon the advice of an assistant in the Mayor’s Office and some
neighbors, she demolished the house standing thereon without acquiring the necessary permits and then
later on erected another house. She was then charged by the City Engineer’s Office for violating a
municipal order which requires her to secure permits for any demolition and/or construction within the
City. She was convicted in violation thereof by the lower court. She appealed and countered that the City
of Olongapo has no administrative jurisdiction over the said lot because it is within a Naval Base of a
foreign country.
ISSUE: Is the Municipal Ordinance enforceable within the US Naval Base?
HELD: Yes. The Philippine Government has not abdicated its sovereignty over the bases as part of the
Philippine territory or divested itself completely of jurisdiction over offenses committed therein. Under
the terms of the treaty, the United States Government has prior or preferential but not exclusive
jurisdiction of such offenses. The Philippine Government retains not only jurisdictional rights not granted,
but also all such ceded rights as the United States Military authorities for reasons of their own decline to
make use of (Military Bases Agreement). Hence, in the exercise of its sovereignty, the State through the
City of Olongapo does have administrative jurisdiction over the lot located within the US Naval Base.

LYNETTE GARVIDA V FLORENCIO SALES, JR

In 1996, Lynette Garvida filed her candidacy to the position of Chairman of the Sangguniang Kabataan (SK)
of a barangay in Bangui, Ilocos Norte. Her candidacy was opposed by her rival Florencio Sales, Jr. on the
ground that she is over 21 years old (21 years old, 9 months at the time of the filing). Nevertheless, the
trial court ordered that she be admitted as a candidate and the SK elections went on. Sales, in the
meantiume, filed a petition to cancel the certificate of candidacy of Garvida. When the elections results
came in, Garvida won with a vote of 78, while Sales got 76. Garvida was eventually proclaimed as winner
but had to face the petition filed by Sales.
Garvida, in her defense, averred that Section 424 of the Local Government Code (LGC) provides that
candidates for the SK must be at least 15 years of age and a maximum age of 21 years. Garvida states that
the LGC does not specify that the maximum age requirement is exactly 21 years hence said provision must
be construed as 21 years and a fraction of a year but still less than 22 years – so long as she does not
exceed 22 she is still eligible because she is still, technically, 21 years of age (although she exceeds it by 9
months).
ISSUE: Whether or not Garvida met the age requirement.
HELD: No. Section 424 of the Local Government Code provides that candidates for SK must be:

1. Filipino citizen;
2. an actual resident of the barangay for at least six months;
3. 15 but not more than 21 years of age; and
4. duly registered in the list of the Sangguniang Kabataan or in the official barangay list.

Issues: Whether or not COMELEC erred in the cancellation of her candidacy on the ground that she has
exceeded the age limit.

Whether or not COMELEC en banc acted within its jurisdiction in cancelling her certificate of candidacy.

Ruling: Petition dismissed. Lynette Garvida is declared ineligible for being over the age qualification for
candidacy in the May 6, 1996 elections of the Sangguniang Kabataan. The general rule is that an elective
official of the SAngguniang Kabataan must not be more than 21 years old on the day of his election. The
only exception is when the official reaches the age of 21 years during his incumbency.

RAFAEL YAPDIANGCO v. CONCEPCION B. BUENCAMINO

FACTS: On February 1, 1965, the fiscal filed information for slight physical injuries allegedly committed
by the petitioner on December 2, 1964. Since the information was filed after the prescribed 60-day
period, petitioner moved to quash the criminal prosecution on the ground of prescription. Respondent
contended that it was filed within the prescriptive period since the last day fell on a Sunday or legal
Holiday, therefore, should not be counted.

ISSUE: Whether period of prescription is interrupted by Sundays or Legal Holidays.

HELD: No. A Sunday or legal holiday does not interrupt nor stop the running of the prescriptive period as
a matter of statutory articulation. According to Article 91, the only exception is

the offender’s physical absence and no other cause can be sufficient to interrupt prescription.

The Court ruled that “Where the sixtieth and last day to file information falls on a Sunday or legal
holiday, the sixty-day period cannot be extended up to the next working day. Prescription has
automatically set in.”

The fiscal cannot file the information on the next following working day as it would tantamount to
extending the prescriptive period fixed by law. Therefore, the motion to quash the criminal prosecution
was granted on the valid ground of prescription.