TAMARGO vs. CA et al; G.R. No.
85044; June 3, 1992 In the instant case, however, to hold that parental authority had been
FACTS:
Adelberto Bundoc, then a minor of 10 years of age, shot Jennifer Tamargo
with an air rifle which resulted in her death. Accordingly, a civil complaint for
damages was filed with the RTC of Vigan, Ilocos Sur by petitioners, parents of
Jennifer, against respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents with
whom he was living at the time of the tragic incident. In addition to this case
for damages, a criminal information or Homicide through Reckless
Imprudence was filed against Adelberto, who was acquitted and exempted
from criminal liability on the ground that he bad acted without discernment.
Prior to the incident the spouses Rapisura had filed a petition to adopt the
minor Adelberto before the then CFI of Ilocos Sur. This petition for adoption
was granted after Adelberto had shot and killed Jennifer.
In their Answer, respondent spouses, Adelberto’s natural parents, claimed
that not they, but rather the adopting parents were indispensable parties to
the action since parental authority had shifted to the adopting parents from
the moment the successful petition for adoption was filed.
The trial court ruled against the adopting parents, who filed an MR which
was later denied for being filed beyond the reglementary period. Petitioners
went to the CA on a petition for mandamus and certiorari questioning the
trial court’s decision. The CA dismissed the petition, ruling that petitioners
had lost their right to appeal. Hence this petition for review
ISSUE: Who should be responsible for the tortuous act of the minor
Adelberto, his natural parents or adopting parents?
HELD: Petition for Review is hereby GRANTED DUE COURSE and the Decision
of the CA is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. Petitioners’ complaint filed
before the trial court is hereby REINSTATED and this case is REMANDED to
that court for further proceedings
Natural parents.
It is not disputed that Adelberto’s voluntary act of shooting Jennifer with an
air rifle gave rise to a cause of action on quasi-delict against him. As Article
2176 of the Civil Code provides:
Whoever by act or omission causes damage to another, there being fault or
negligence, is obliged to pay for the damage done. Such fault or negligence, if
there is no pre-existing contractual relation between the parties, is called
aquasi-delict . . .
Upon the other hand, the law imposes civil liability upon the father and, in
case of his death or incapacity, the mother, for any damages that may be
caused by a minor child who lives with them. Article 2180 of the Civil Code
reads:
The obligation imposed by article 2176 is demandable not only for one’s own
acts or omissions, but also for those of persons for whom one is responsible.
The father and, in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are responsible
for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their company.
xxx xxx xxx
The responsibility treated of in this Article shall cease when the person
herein mentioned prove that they observed all the diligence of a good father
of a family to prevent damage. (Emphasis supplied)
The natural parent spouses rely on Article 36 of the Child and Youth Welfare
Code 8 which reads as follows:
Art. 36. Decree of Adoption. — If, after considering the report of the
Department of Social Welfare or duly licensed child placement agency and
the evidence submitted before it, the court is satisfied that the petitioner is
qualified to maintain, care for, and educate the child, that the trial custody
period has been completed, and that the best interests of the child will be
promoted by the adoption, a decree of adoption shall be entered, which shall
be effective he date the original petition was filed. The decree shall state the
name by which the child is thenceforth to be known.
The Bundoc spouses further argue that the above Article 36 should be read in
relation to Article 39 of the same Code:
Art. 39. Effect of Adoption. — The adoption shall:
(2) Dissolve the authority vested in the natural parents, except where the
adopter is the spouse of the surviving natural parent;
Xxx and urge that their Parental authority must be deemed to have been
dissolved as of the time the Petition for adoption was filed.
The Court is not persuaded. As earlier noted, under the Civil Code, the basis
of parental liability for the torts of a minor child is the relationship existing
between the parents and the minor child living with them and over whom,
the law presumes, the parents exercise supervision and control.
Article 221 of the Family Code of the Philippines insisted upon the requisite
that the child, doer of the tortious act, shall have been in the actual custody
of the parents sought to be held liable for the ensuing damage:
Art. 221. Parents and other persons exercising parental authority shall be
civilly liable for the injuries and damages caused by the acts or omissions of
their unemancipated children living in their company and under their
parental authority subject to the appropriate defenses provided by law.
retroactively lodged in the Rapisura spouses so as to burden them with
liability for a tortious act that they could not have foreseen and which they
could not have prevented (since they were at the time in the United States
and had no physical custody over the child Adelberto) would be unfair and
unconscionable. Such a result, moreover, would be inconsistent with the
philosophical and policy basis underlying the doctrine of vicarious liability.
Put a little differently, no presumption of parental dereliction on the part of
the adopting parents, the Rapisura spouses, could have arisen since
Adelberto was not in fact subject to their control at the time the tort was
committed
NOTES: (On why this petition was accepted by the SC) In view, however, of
the nature of the issue raised in the instant petition, and in order that
substantial justice may be served, the Court, invoking its right to suspend the
application of technical rules to prevent manifest injustice, elects to treat the
notice of appeal as having been seasonably filed before the trial court, and
the motion (and supplemental motion) for reconsideration filed by petitioner
in the trial court as having interrupted the reglementary period for appeal.
Dismissal of appeal; purely on technical grounds is frowned upon where the
policy of the courts is to encourage hearings of appeal on their merits.
San Fernando v. Firme; G.R. N. L-579 ; [April 8, 1991]
Facts:
The case was filed by petitioner, which is a municipal corporation existing
under and in accordance with the laws of the Republic of the Philippines.
A collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney owned by the Estate of
Macario Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck owned by Tanquilino Velasquez
and a dump truck of the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union and driven
by Alfredo Bislig. Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney
including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained
and four others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.
The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the
Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney. However, the defendants filed a Third
Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of
petitioner. Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as
lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of
action and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney
as the proximate cause of the collision.
The trial court rendered a decision ordering the petitioner and Bislig to pay
the plaintiffs. The owner and driver of the jeepney were absolved from
liability. Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration which was dismissed for
having been filed out of time.
ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner was liable.
RULING: The petitioner cannot be held liable by virtue of the non-suability of
the State.
The general rule Is that the State may not be sued except when it gives
consent to be sued (Article XVI, Sec. 3 of the Constitution.) Express consent
may be embodied in a general law or a special law. The standing consent of
the State to be sued in case of money claims involving liability arising
from contracts is found in Act No. 3083. Consent is implied when the
government enters into business contracts and also when the State files a
complaint. Municipal corporations are agencies of the State when they are
engaged in governmental functions and therefore should enjoy the sovereign
immunity from suit. Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the
performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can
sue and be sued. However, the circumstance that a state is suable does not
necessarily mean that it is liable; on the other hand, it can never be held
liable if it does not first consent to be sued. Liability is not conceded by the
mere fact that the state has allowed itself to be sued. When the state does
waive its sovereign immunity, it is only giving the plaintiff the chance to
prove, if it can, that the defendant is liable.”
Municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the
competence to sue and be sued. Nevertheless, they are generally not liable
for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and
can be held answerable only if it can be shown that they were acting in a
proprietary capacity Here, the driver of the dump truck of the municipality
insists that “he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and
gravel for the repair of San Fernando’s municipal streets.” In the absence of
any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance
of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131 of the
Revised Rules of Court.
Hence, the SC held that the driver of the dump truck was
performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office. Municipality cannot be
held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then
engaged in the discharge of governmental functions.