FELIZA P. DE ROY and VIRGILIO RAMOS vs.
COURT OF APPEALS and decision promulgated on August 17, 1987, a copy of which was
LUIS BERNAL, SR., GLENIA BERNAL, LUIS BERNAL, JR., HEIRS OF
MARISSA BERNAL, namely, GLICERIA DELA CRUZ BERNAL and LUIS
BERNAL, SR.
G.R. No. 80718, January 29, 1988
This special civil action for certiorari seeks to declare null and void two
(2) resolutions of the Special First Division of the Court of Appeals in
the case of Luis Bernal, Sr., et al. v. Felisa Perdosa De Roy, et al., CA-
G.R. CV No. 07286. The first resolution promulgated on 30 September
1987 denied petitioners' motion for extension of time to file a motion
for reconsideration and directed entry of judgment since the decision
in said case had become final; and the second Resolution dated 27
October 1987 denied petitioners' motion for reconsideration for having
been filed out of time.
At the outset, this Court could have denied the petition outright for not
being verified as required by Rule 65 section 1 of the Rules of Court.
However, even if the instant petition did not suffer from this defect,
this Court, on procedural and substantive grounds, would still resolve
to deny it.
The facts of the case are undisputed. The firewall of a burned-out
building owned by petitioners collapsed and destroyed the tailoring
shop occupied by the family of private respondents, resulting in injuries
to private respondents and the death of Marissa Bernal, a daughter.
Private respondents had been warned by petitioners to vacate their
shop in view of its proximity to the weakened wall but the former failed
to do so. On the basis of the foregoing facts, the Regional Trial Court.
First Judicial Region, Branch XXXVIII, presided by the Hon. Antonio M.
Belen, rendered judgment finding petitioners guilty of gross negligence
and awarding damages to private respondents. On appeal, the decision
of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the Court of Appeals in a
received by petitioners on August 25, 1987. On September 9, 1987, the
last day of the fifteen-day period to file an appeal, petitioners filed a
motion for extension of time to file a motion for reconsideration, which
was eventually denied by the appellate court in the Resolution of
September 30, 1987. Petitioners filed their motion for reconsideration
on September 24, 1987 but this was denied in the Resolution of
October 27, 1987.
This Court finds that the Court of Appeals did not commit a grave abuse
of discretion when it denied petitioners' motion for extension of time
to file a motion for reconsideration, directed entry of judgment and
denied their motion for reconsideration. It correctly applied the rule
laid down in Habaluyas Enterprises, Inc. v. Japzon, [G.R. No. 70895,
August 5, 1985,138 SCRA 461, that the fifteen-day period for appealing
or for filing a motion for reconsideration cannot be extended. In its
Resolution denying the motion for reconsideration, promulgated on
July 30, 1986 (142 SCRA 208), this Court en banc restated and clarified
the rule, to wit:
Beginning one month after the promulgation of this Resolution, the
rule shall be strictly enforced that no motion for extension of time to
file a motion for reconsideration may be filed with the Metropolitan or
Municipal Trial Courts, the Regional Trial Courts, and the Intermediate
Appellate Court. Such a motion may be filed only in cases pending with
the Supreme Court as the court of last resort, which may in its sound
discretion either grant or deny the extension requested.
Lacsamana v. Second Special Cases Division of the intermediate
Appellate Court, [G.R. No. 73146-53, August 26, 1986, 143 SCRA 643],
reiterated the rule and went further to restate and clarify the modes
and periods of appeal.
Bacaya v. Intermediate Appellate Court, stressed the prospective
application of said rule, and explained the operation of the grace
period, to wit:
In other words, there is a one-month grace period from the This Court likewise finds that the Court of Appeals committed no grave
promulgation on May 30, 1986 of the Court's Resolution in the abuse of discretion in affirming the trial court's decision holding
clarificatory Habaluyas case, or up to June 30, 1986, within which the petitioner liable under Article 2190 of the Civil Code, which provides
rule barring extensions of time to file motions for new trial or that "the proprietor of a building or structure is responsible for the
reconsideration is, as yet, not strictly enforceable. damage resulting from its total or partial collapse, if it should be due to
the lack of necessary repairs.
Since petitioners herein filed their motion for extension on February
27, 1986, it is still within the grace period, which expired on June 30, Nor was there error in rejecting petitioners argument that private
1986, and may still be allowed. respondents had the "last clear chance" to avoid the accident if only
they heeded the. warning to vacate the tailoring shop and , therefore,
This grace period was also applied in Mission v. Intermediate Appellate
petitioners prior negligence should be disregarded, since the doctrine
Court.
of "last clear chance," which has been applied to vehicular accidents, is
In the instant case, however, petitioners' motion for extension of time inapplicable to this case.
was filed on September 9, 1987, more than a year after the expiration
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the Court Resolved to DENY the
of the grace period on June 30, 1986. Hence, it is no longer within the
instant petition for lack of merit.
coverage of the grace period. Considering the length of time from the
expiration of the grace period to the promulgation of the decision of
the Court of Appeals on August 25, 1987, petitioners cannot seek
refuge in the ignorance of their counsel regarding said rule for their
failure to file a motion for reconsideration within the reglementary
period.

Petitioners contend that the rule enunciated in the Habaluyas case

should not be made to apply to the case at bar owing to the non-
publication of the Habaluyas decision in the Official Gazette as of the
time the subject decision of the Court of Appeals was promulgated.
Contrary to petitioners' view, there is no law requiring the publication
of Supreme Court decisions in the Official Gazette before they can be
binding and as a condition to their becoming effective. It is the
bounden duty of counsel as lawyer in active law practice to keep
abreast of decisions of the Supreme Court particularly where issues
have been clarified, consistently reiterated, and published in the
advance reports of Supreme Court decisions (G. R. s) and in such
publications as the Supreme Court Reports Annotated (SCRA) and law
journals.

GREGORIO R. ABAD vs. ILDEFONSO BLEZA
A.M. No. R-561-RTJ, October 13, 1986
CASE 1
In 1981, a shooting incident in a cockpit occurred where Gregorio Abad,
a colonel escaped death. In that incident, Abad had an argument with
one Potenciano Ponce and the latter’s bodyguard, Francisco Sabater Jr.
Sabater shot Abad and due to medical intervention, Abad survived.
Abad filed two separate criminal cases against Ponce and Sabater.
Ponce was acquitted due to insufficiency of evidence (because there
were conflicting testimonies) while Sabater was found guilty of
frustrated homicide but with mitigating circumstances of voluntary
surrender and lack of intent to kill.
Abad, not satisfied with Bleza’s decisions filed an administrative case
against Bleza,
CASE 2
Pacifico Ocampo was an employee of the Manila International Airport
Authority. He filed an administrative case against one Ricardo Ortiz.
After that, Ocampo alleged that Crisanto Cruz (perhaps a friend of
Ortiz? – not mentioned in the case), tried to persuade Ocampo not to
continue with the administrative case against Ortiz. Ocampo did not
accede so allegedly, Cruz filed a separate administrative complaint
against Ocampo. In turn, Ocampo filed a civil case against Cruz before
Judge Bleza. Ocampo alleged that the administrative case against him
was baseless and the same made him suffer embarrassment, mental
shock, anxieties, sleepless nights, and loss of appetite.
Ocampo won and Bleza ordered Cruz to pay for damages. Cruz filed an
administrative case against Bleza for allegedly knowingly rendering a
wrongful decision as Cruz averred that the administrative case was
based on Ocampo’s absenteeism, inefficiency and tardiness which were
all on record and same were presented as evidence which were even
(allegedly) uncontroverted.
ISSUE: Whether or not Bleza should be disciplined.
HELD:
No (in both cases). In the first case, Bleza erred in appreciating
the mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to kill in favor of Sabater –
but such error does not hold him administratively liable.
In Criminal Law, in cases of frustrated homicide there is inherently an
intention to kill for if otherwise, it would have been a case of physical
injuries. Bleza found Sabater guilty of frustrated homicide hence it is
error for him to appreciate lack of intention to kill as a mitigating
circumstance.
But as a matter of public policy, in the absence of fraud, dishonesty or
corruption, the acts of a judge in his judicial capacity are not subject to
disciplinary action, even though such acts are erroneous. Even on the
assumption that the judicial officer has erred in the appraisal of the
evidence, he cannot be held administratively or civilly liable for his
judicial action. A judicial officer cannot be called to account in a civil
action for acts done by him in the exercise of his judicial function,
however erroneous. Not every error or mistake of a judge in the
performance of his duties makes him liable therefor. To hold a judge
administratively accountable for every erroneous ruling or decision he
renders, assuming that he has erred, would be nothing short of
harassment and would make his position unbearable.
In the second case, the Supreme Court took notice of the fact that it is
on appeal before the Court of Appeals hence it is premature to decide
upon it. Only after the appellate court holds in a final judgment that a
trial judge’s alleged errors were committed deliberately and in bad
faith may a charge of knowingly rendering an unjust decision be leveled
against him.
 knowledge there is no action or proceeding pending in the SC,
CA or any other tribunal. Reviewing the records, the court finds that
the petition filed by MPA in GR no, 130150 then pending with the third
division was duly filed with a copy thereof furnished by registered mail
to counsel for FESC (atty Tria). It would be fair to conclude that when
FESC filed its petition GR no 130068, it would already have received a
copy of the copy of the petition by MPA. It was therefore encumbent
upon FESC to inform the court of the pending action. But considering
that it was a superfluity at that stage of the proceeding, it being
unnecessary to file such certification of non-forum shopping with a
mere motion for extension, the court disregarded such error. On the
other hand, it took the OSG, representing PPA, an ordinately and
unreasonably long period of time to file its comment, thus unduly
delaying the resolution of these cases. In GR no 130068, it took 210
days before the OSG filed its comment. FESC was not even furnished
with a copy. In G.R. no 130150 it took 180 days before comment was
filed. This disinclination of the OSG to seasonably file required
pleadings constitutes deplorable disservice to the public and can only
be categorized as inefficiency on the part of the govt law office.
Counsel for FESC, the law firm of Del Rosario and Del Rosario,
specifically its associate Tria is reprimanded and warned that a
repetition of the same acts shall be dealt with severely. The original
members of the legal team of the OSG are admonished and warned
that a repetition shall also be dealt with more stringently. Baka lang
itanong kung ano ruling: The decision of the CA is affirmed. Gavino,
MPA and FESC are declared solidarily liable with MPA entitled to
reimbursement from Gavino for such amount of the adjudged
pecuniary liability in excess of the amount equivalent to 75% of its
prescribed reserved fund.