Poe vs.

COMELEC
Facts:
Petitioner Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares was found abandoned as a
newborn infant in the Parish Church of Jaro, Iloilo on Sept. 3, 1968. After passing the
parental care and custody over petitioner by Edgardo Militar to Emiliano Militar and
his wife, she has been reported and registered as a foundling and issued a Foundling
Certificate and Certificate of Live Birth, thus was given the name, Mary Grace
Natividad Contreras Militar.

When the petitioner reached the age of five (5), celebrity spouses Ronal Allan Kelley
(aka Fernando Poe, Jr) and Jesusa Sonora Poe (aka Susan Roces) filed a petition foe her
adoption. The trial court granted their petition and ordered that her name be changed to
Mary Grace Natividad Sonora Poe.

Petitioner registered as a voter in San Juan City at the age of 18 in 1986; in 1988, she
applied and was issued Philippine Passport by the DFA; in 1993 and 1998, she renewed
her passport.

She left for the United States (U.S.) in 1988 to continue her studies after enrolling and
pursuing a degree in Development Studies at the University of the Philippines. She
graduated in 1991 from Boston College where she earned her Bachelor of Arts degree
in Political Studies.

She married Teodoro Misael Daniel V. Llamanzares, a citizen of both the Philippines
and the U.S., in San Juan City and decided to flew back to the U.S. after their wedding.
She gave birth to her eldest child while in the U.S.; and her two daughters in the
Philippines.

She became a naturalized American citizen in 2001. She came back to the Philippines
to support her father’s candidacy for president in the May 2004 elections and gave birth
to her youngest daughter. They then returned to the U.S. in 2004 but after few months,
she rushed back to the Philippines to attend to her ailing father. After her father’s death,
the petitioner and her husband decided to move and reside permanently in the
Philippines in 2005 and immediately secured a TIN, then her children followed suit;
acquired property where she and her children resided.

In 2006, She took her Oath of Allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines pursuant to
RA No. 9225 or the Citizenship retention and Re-acquisition Act of 2003; she filed a
sworn petition to reacquire Philippine citizenship together with petitions for derivative
citizenship on behalf of her three children which was granted. She registered as a voter;
secured Philippine passport; appointed and took her oath as Chairperson of the MTRCB
after executing an affidavit of Renunciation of American citizenship before the Vice
Consul of the USA and was issued a Certificate of Loss of Nationality of the USA in
2011.

In 2012, she filed with the COMELEC her Certificate of Candidacy (COC) for Senator
for the 2013 Elections wherein she answered “6 years and 6 months” to the question
“Period of residence in the Philippines before May 13, 2013.” Petitioner obtained the
highest number of votes and was proclaimed Senator on 16 May 2013.

On 15 October 2015, petitioner filed her COC for the Presidency for the May 2016
Elections. In her COC, the petitioner declared that she is a natural-born citizen and that
her residence in the Philippines up to the day before 9 May 2016 would be ten (10)
years and eleven (11) months counted from 24 May 2005. The petitioner attached to
her COC an “Affidavit Affirming Renunciation of U.S.A. Citizenship” subscribed and
sworn to before a notary public in Quezon City on 14 October 2015.

Petitions were filed before the COMELEC to deny or cancel her candidacy on the
ground particularly, among others, that she cannot be considered a natural-born Filipino
citizen since she cannot prove that her biological parents or either of them were
Filipinos. The COMELEC en banc cancelled her candidacy on the ground that she was
in want of citizenship and residence requirements, and that she committed material
misrepresentations in her COC.

On certiorari, the Supreme Court reversed the ruling and held (9-6 votes) that Poe is
qualified as a candidate for Presidency. Three justices, however, abstained to vote on
the natural-born citizenship issue.
Issue:
Whether or not Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares is a natural-born Filipino
citizen.

Held:
Yes. Mary Grace Natividad S. Poe-Llamanzares may be considered a natural-born
Filipino.

It ruled that a foundling is a natural-born citizen of the Philippines as there is no

restrictive language which would definitely exclude foundlings as they are already
impliedly so recognized.
There are also no provisions in the Constitution with intent or language permitting
discrimination against foundlings as the three Constitutions guarantee the basic right to
equal protection of the laws.

Foundlings are citizens under international law as this is supported by some treaties,
adhering to the customary rule to presume foundlings as having born of the country in
which the foundling is found.

ANTONIO BENGSON III, petitioner, vs. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL and TEODORO C. CRUZ, respondents.

DECISION
KAPUNAN, J.:

The citizenship of respondent Teodoro C. Cruz is at issue in this case, in view of the
constitutional requirement that "no person shall be a Member of the House of Representatives
unless he is a natural-born citizen."[1]
Respondent Cruz was a natural-born citizen of the Philippines. He was born in San Clemente,
Tarlac, on April 27, 1960, of Filipino parents. The fundamental law then applicable was the 1935
Constitution.[2]
On November 5, 1985, however, respondent Cruz enlisted in the United States Marine Corps
and, without the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, took an oath of allegiance to the United
States. As a consequence, he lost his Filipino citizenship for under Commonwealth Act No. 63,
Section 1(4), a Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship by, among others, "rendering service to or
accepting commission in the armed forces of a foreign country." Said provision of law reads:

Section 1. How citizenship may be lost. -- A Filipino citizen may lose his citizenship
in any of the following ways and/or events:

xxx

(4) By rendering services to, or accepting commission in, the armed forces of a
foreign country: Provided, That the rendering of service to, or the acceptance of such
commission in, the armed forces of a foreign country, and the taking of an oath of
allegiance incident thereto, with the consent of the Republic of the Philippines, shall
not divest a Filipino of his Philippine citizenship if either of the following
circumstances is present:

(a) The Republic of the Philippines has a defensive and/or offensive pact of alliance
with said foreign country; or
(b) The said foreign country maintains armed forces on Philippine territory with the
consent of the Republic of the Philippines: Provided, That the Filipino citizen
concerned, at the time of rendering said service, or acceptance of said commission,
and taking the oath of allegiance incident thereto, states that he does so only in
connection with his service to said foreign country; And provided, finally, That any
Filipino citizen who is rendering service to, or is commissioned in, the armed forces
of a foreign country under any of the circumstances mentioned in paragraph (a) or (b),
shall not be permitted to participate nor vote in any election of the Republic of the
Philippines during the period of his service to, or commission in, the armed forces of
said country. Upon his discharge from the service of the said foreign country, he shall
be automatically entitled to the full enjoyment of his civil and political rights as a
Filipino citizen x x x.

Whatever doubt that remained regarding his loss of Philippine citizenship was erased by his
naturalization as a U.S. citizen on June 5, 1990, in connection with his service in the U.S. Marine
Corps.
On March 17, 1994, respondent Cruz reacquired his Philippine citizenship through
repatriation under Republic Act No. 2630.[3] He ran for and was elected as the Representative of
the Second District of Pangasinan in the May 11, 1998 elections. He won by a convincing margin
of 26,671 votes over petitioner Antonio Bengson III, who was then running for reelection.
Subsequently, petitioner filed a case for Quo Warranto Ad Cautelam with respondent House
of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) claiming that respondent Cruz was not qualified to
become a member of the House of Representatives since he is not a natural-born citizen as required
under Article VI, Section 6 of the Constitution.[4]
On March 2, 2000, the HRET rendered its decision[5] dismissing the petition for quo
warranto and declaring respondent Cruz the duly elected Representative of the Second District of
Pangasinan in the May 1998 elections. The HRET likewise denied petitioner's motion for
reconsideration of the decision in its resolution dated April 27, 2000.[6]
Petitioner thus filed the present petition for certiorari assailing the HRET's decision on the
following grounds:

1. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it ruled that private respondent is a natural-born citizen of
the Philippines despite the fact that he had ceased being such in view of the loss and
renunciation of such citizenship on his part.

2. The HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting to
excess of jurisdiction, when it considered private respondent as a citizen of the
Philippines despite the fact that he did not validly acquire his Philippine citizenship.

3. Assuming that private respondent's acquisition of Philippine citizenship was

invalid, the HRET committed serious errors and grave abuse of discretion, amounting
to excess of jurisdiction, when it dismissed the petition despite the fact that such
reacquisition could not legally and constitutionally restore his natural-born status.[7]

The issue now before us is whether respondent Cruz, a natural-born Filipino who became an
American citizen, can still be considered a natural-born Filipino upon his reacquisition of
Philippine citizenship.
Petitioner asserts that respondent Cruz may no longer be considered a natural-born Filipino
since he lost his Philippine citizenship when he swore allegiance to the United States in 1995, and
had to reacquire the same by repatriation. He insists that Article IV, Section 2 of the Constitution
expressly states that natural-born citizens are those who are citizens from birth without having to
perform any act to acquire or perfect such citizenship.
Respondent on the other hand contends that he reacquired his status as a natural-born citizen
when he was repatriated since the phrase "from birth" in Article IV, Section 2 refers to the innate,
inherent and inborn characteristic of being a natural-born citizen.
The petition is without merit.
The 1987 Constitution enumerates who are Filipino citizens as follows:
(1) Those who are citizens of the Philippines at the time of the adoption of this Constitution;
(2) Those whose fathers or mothers are citizens of the Philippines;
(3) Those born before January 17, 1973 of Filipino mothers, who elect Philippine citizenship upon
reaching the age of majority, and
(4) Those who are naturalized in accordance with law.[8]
There are two ways of acquiring citizenship: (1) by birth, and (2) by naturalization. These
ways of acquiring citizenship correspond to the two kinds of citizens: the natural-born citizen, and
the naturalized citizen. A person who at the time of his birth is a citizen of a particular country, is
a natural-born citizen thereof.[9]
As defined in the same Constitution, natural-born citizens "are those citizens of the Philippines
from birth without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship."[10]
On the other hand, naturalized citizens are those who have become Filipino citizens through
naturalization, generally under Commonwealth Act No. 473, otherwise known as the Revised
Naturalization Law, which repealed the former Naturalization Law (Act No. 2927), and by
Republic Act No. 530.[11] To be naturalized, an applicant has to prove that he possesses all the
qualifications[12] and none of the disqualifications[13] provided by law to become a Filipino citizen.
The decision granting Philippine citizenship becomes executory only after two (2) years from its
promulgation when the court is satisfied that during the intervening period, the applicant has (1)
not left the Philippines; (2) has dedicated himself to a lawful calling or profession; (3) has not been
convicted of any offense or violation of Government promulgated rules; or (4) committed any act
prejudicial to the interest of the nation or contrary to any Government announced policies.[14]
Filipino citizens who have lost their citizenship may however reacquire the same in the
manner provided by law. Commonwealth Act. No. 63 (C.A. No. 63), enumerates the three modes
by which Philippine citizenship may be reacquired by a former citizen: (1) by naturalization, (2)
by repatriation, and (3) by direct act of Congress.[15]
Naturalization is a mode for both acquisition and reacquisition of Philippine citizenship. As a
mode of initially acquiring Philippine citizenship, naturalization is governed by Commonwealth
Act No. 473, as amended. On the other hand, naturalization as a mode for reacquiring Philippine
citizenship is governed by Commonwealth Act No. 63.[16] Under this law, a former Filipino citizen
who wishes to reacquire Philippine citizenship must possess certain qualifications [17] and none of
the disqualifications mentioned in Section 4 of C.A. 473.[18]
Repatriation, on the other hand, may be had under various statutes by those who lost their
citizenship due to: (1) desertion of the armed forces;[19] (2) service in the armed forces of the allied
forces in World War II;[20] (3) service in the Armed Forces of the United States at any other
time;[21] (4) marriage of a Filipino woman to an alien;[22] and (5) political and economic necessity.[23]
As distinguished from the lengthy process of naturalization, repatriation simply consists of
the taking of an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines and registering said oath in
the Local Civil Registry of the place where the person concerned resides or last resided.
In Angat v. Republic,[24] we held:

xxx. Parenthetically, under these statutes [referring to RA Nos. 965 and 2630], the
person desiring to reacquire Philippine citizenship would not even be required to file a
petition in court, and all that he had to do was to take an oath of allegiance to the
Republic of the Philippines and to register that fact with the civil registry in the place
of his residence or where he had last resided in the Philippines. [Italics in the
original.][25]

Moreover, repatriation results in the recovery of the original nationality.[26] This means that
a naturalized Filipino who lost his citizenship will be restored to his prior status as a naturalized
Filipino citizen. On the other hand, if he was originally a natural-born citizen before he lost his
Philippine citizenship, he will be restored to his former status as a natural-born Filipino.
In respondent Cruz's case, he lost his Filipino citizenship when he rendered service in the
Armed Forces of the United States. However, he subsequently reacquired Philippine citizenship
under R.A. No. 2630, which provides:

Section 1. Any person who had lost his Philippine citizenship by rendering service to,
or accepting commission in, the Armed Forces of the United States, or after separation
from the Armed Forces of the United States, acquired United States citizenship, may
reacquire Philippine citizenship by taking an oath of allegiance to the Republic of the
Philippines and registering the same with Local Civil Registry in the place where he
resides or last resided in the Philippines. The said oath of allegiance shall contain a
renunciation of any other citizenship.

Having thus taken the required oath of allegiance to the Republic and having registered the
same in the Civil Registry of Magantarem, Pangasinan in accordance with the aforecited provision,
respondent Cruz is deemed to have recovered his original status as a natural-born citizen, a status
which he acquired at birth as the son of a Filipino father.[27] It bears stressing that the act of
repatriation allows him to recover, or return to, his original status before he lost his Philippine
citizenship.
Petitioner's contention that respondent Cruz is no longer a natural-born citizen since he had to
perform an act to regain his citizenship is untenable. As correctly explained by the HRET in its
decision, the term "natural-born citizen" was first defined in Article III, Section 4 of the 1973
Constitution as follows:

Sec. 4. A natural-born citizen is one who is a citizen of the Philippines from birth
without having to perform any act to acquire or perfect his Philippine citizenship.

Two requisites must concur for a person to be considered as such: (1) a person must be a
Filipino citizen from birth and (2) he does not have to perform any act to obtain or perfect his
Philippine citizenship.
Under the 1973 Constitution definition, there were two categories of Filipino citizens which
were not considered natural-born: (1) those who were naturalized and (2) those born before January
17, 1973,[28] of Filipino mothers who, upon reaching the age of majority, elected Philippine
citizenship. Those "naturalized citizens" were not considered natural-born obviously because they
were not Filipinos at birth and had to perform an act to acquire Philippine citizenship. Those born
of Filipino mothers before the effectivity of the 1973 Constitution were likewise not considered
natural-born because they also had to perform an act to perfect their Philippine citizenship.
The present Constitution, however, now considers those born of Filipino mothers before the
effectivity of the 1973 Constitution and who elected Philippine citizenship upon reaching the
majority age as natural-born. After defining who are natural-born citizens, Section 2 of Article IV
adds a sentence: "Those who elect Philippine citizenship in accordance with paragraph (3), Section
1 hereof shall be deemed natural-born citizens." Consequently, only naturalized Filipinos are
considered not natural-born citizens. It is apparent from the enumeration of who are citizens under
the present Constitution that there are only two classes of citizens: (1) those who are natural-born
and (2) those who are naturalized in accordance with law. A citizen who is not a naturalized
Filipino, i.e., did not have to undergo the process of naturalization to obtain Philippine citizenship,
necessarily is a natural-born Filipino. Noteworthy is the absence in said enumeration of a separate
category for persons who, after losing Philippine citizenship, subsequently reacquire it. The reason
therefor is clear: as to such persons, they would either be natural-born or naturalized depending on
the reasons for the loss of their citizenship and the mode prescribed by the applicable law for the
reacquisition thereof. As respondent Cruz was not required by law to go through naturalization
proceedings in order to reacquire his citizenship, he is perforce a natural-born Filipino. As such,
he possessed all the necessary qualifications to be elected as member of the House of
Representatives.
A final point. The HRET has been empowered by the Constitution to be the "sole judge" of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the members of the House.[29] The
Court's jurisdiction over the HRET is merely to check "whether or not there has been a grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction" on the part of the latter.[30] In the absence
thereof, there is no occasion for the Court to exercise its corrective power and annul the decision
of the HRET nor to substitute the Court's judgment for that of the latter for the simple reason that
it is not the office of a petition for certiorari to inquire into the correctness of the assailed
decision.[31] There is no such showing of grave abuse of discretion in this case.
WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby DISMISSED.

NICOLAS LEWIS vs. COMELEC

DECISION

GARCIA, J.:

In this petition for certiorari and mandamus, petitioners, referring to themselves

as "duals" or dual citizens, pray that they and others who retained or reacquired
Philippine citizenship under Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9225, the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of 2003, be allowed to avail themselves of the
mechanism provided under the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003[1] (R.A.
9189) and that the Commission on Elections (COMELEC) accordingly be ordered
to allow them to vote and register as absentee voters under the aegis of R.A. 9189.

The facts:

Petitioners are successful applicants for recognition of Philippine citizenship under

R.A. 9225 which accords to such applicants the right of suffrage, among others.
Long before the May 2004 national and local elections, petitioners sought
registration and certification as "overseas absentee voter" only to be advised by the
Philippine Embassy in the United States that, per a COMELEC letter to the
Department of Foreign Affairs dated September 23, 2003[2], they have yet no right
to vote in such elections owing to their lack of the one-year residence requirement
prescribed by the Constitution. The same letter, however, urged the different
Philippine posts abroad not to discontinue their campaign for voters registration, as
the residence restriction adverted to would contextually affect merely certain
individuals who would likely be eligible to vote in future elections.
Prodded for clarification by petitioner Loida Nicolas-Lewis in the light of the ruling
in Macalintal vs. COMELEC [3] on the residency requirement, the COMELEC
wrote in response:

Although R.A. 9225 enjoys the presumption of constitutionality , it is the

Commission's position that those who have availed of the law cannot exercise the
right of suffrage given under the OAVL for the reason that the OAVL was not
enacted for them. Hence, as Filipinos who have merely re-acquired their citizenship
on 18 September 2003 at the earliest, and as law and jurisprudence now stand, they
are considered regular voters who have to meet the requirements of residency,
among others under Section 1, Article 5 of the Constitution. [4]

Faced with the prospect of not being able to vote in the May 2004 elections owing
to the COMELEC's refusal to include them in the National Registry of Absentee
Voters, petitioner Nicolas-Lewis et al., [5] filed on April 1, 2004 this petition for
certiorari and mandamus.

A little over a week before the May 10, 2004 elections, or on April 30, 2004, the
COMELEC filed a Comment,[6] therein praying for the denial of the petition. As may
be expected, petitioners were not able to register let alone vote in said elections.

On May 20, 2004, the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) filed a Manifestation
(in Lieu of Comment), therein stating that all qualified overseas Filipinos, including
dual citizens who care to exercise the right of suffrage, may do so , observing,
however, that the conclusion of the 2004 elections had rendered the petition moot
and academic.[7]

The holding of the 2004 elections had, as the OSG pointed out, indeed rendered the
petition moot and academic, but insofar only as petitioners participation in such
political exercise is concerned. The broader and transcendental issue tendered or
subsumed in the petition, i.e., the propriety of allowing duals to participate and vote
as absentee voter in future elections, however, remains unresolved.

Observing the petitioners and the COMELECs respective formulations of the

issues, the same may be reduced into the question of whether or not petitioners and
others who might have meanwhile retained and/or reacquired Philippine citizenship
pursuant to R.A. 9225 may vote as absentee voter under R.A. 9189.
The Court resolves the poser in the affirmative, and thereby accords merit to the
petition.

In esse, this case is all about suffrage. A quick look at the governing provisions on
the right of suffrage is, therefore, indicated.
We start off with Sections 1 and 2 of Article V of the Constitution, respectively
reading as follows:

SECTION 1. Suffrage may be exercised by all citizens of the Philippines not

otherwise disqualified by law, who are at least eighteen years of age, and who shall
have resided in the Philippinesfor at least one year and in the place wherein they
propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the election. xxx.

SEC 2. The Congress shall provide a system for absentee voting by qualified
Filipinos abroad.

In a nutshell, the aforequoted Section 1 prescribes residency requirement as a

general eligibility factor for the right to vote. On the other hand, Section 2 authorizes
Congress to devise a system wherein an absentee may vote, implying that
a non-resident may, as an exception to the residency prescription in the preceding
section, be allowed to vote.

In response to its above mandate, Congress enacted R.A. 9189 - the OAVL[8] -
identifying in its Section 4 who can vote under it and in the following section who
cannot, as follows:
Section 4. Coverage. All citizens of the Philippines abroad, who are not otherwise
disqualified by law, at least eighteen (18) years of age on the day of elections, may
vote for president, vice-president, senators and party-list representatives.
Section 5. Disqualifications. The following shall be disqualified from voting under
this Act:

(a) Those who have lost their Filipino citizenship in accordance with Philippine
laws;

(b) Those who have expressly renounced their Philippine citizenship and who have
pledged allegiance to a foreign country;

(c) Those who have [been] convicted in a final judgment by a court or tribunal of
an offense punishable by imprisonment of not less than one (1) year, including
 those who have been found guilty of Disloyalty as defined under Article 137 of the
Revised Penal Code, .;

(d) An immigrant or a permanent resident who is recognized as such in the host

country, unless he/she executes, upon registration, an affidavit prepared for the
purpose by the Commission declaring that he/she shall resume actual physical
permanent residence in the Philippines not later than three (3) years from approval
of his/her registration under this Act. Such affidavit shall also state that he/she has
not applied for citizenship in another country. Failure to return shall be the cause
for the removal of the name of the immigrant or permanent resident from the
National Registry of Absentee Voters and his/her permanent disqualification to
vote in absentia.

(e) Any citizen of the Philippines abroad previously declared insane or

incompetent by competent authority . (Words in bracket added.)

Notably, Section 5 lists those who cannot avail themselves of the absentee voting
mechanism. However, Section 5(d) of the enumeration respecting Filipino
immigrants and permanent residents in another country opens an exception and
qualifies the disqualification rule. Section 5(d) would, however, face a constitutional
challenge on the ground that, as narrated in Macalintal, it -

violates Section 1, Article V of the 1987 Constitution which requires that the voter
must be a resident in the Philippines for at least one year and in the place where he
proposes to vote for at least six months immediately preceding an election. [The
challenger] cites Caasi vs. Court of Appeals [9] to support his claim [where] the
Court held that a green card holder immigrant to the [US] is deemed to have
abandoned his domicile and residence in the Philippines.

[The challenger] further argues that Section 1, Article V of the Constitution does
not allow provisional registration or a promise by a voter to perform a condition to
be qualified to vote in a political exercise; that the legislature should not be allowed
to circumvent the requirement of the Constitution on the right of suffrage by
providing a condition thereon which in effect amends or alters the aforesaid
residence requirement to qualify a Filipino abroad to vote. He claims that the right
of suffrage should not be granted to anyone who, on the date of the election, does
not possess the qualifications provided for by Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution.[10] (Words in bracket added.)

As may be recalled, the Court upheld the constitutionality of Section 5(d) of R.A.
9189 mainly on the strength of the following premises:
 As finally approved into law, Section 5(d) of R.A. No. 9189 specifically
disqualifies an immigrant or permanent resident who is recognized as such in the
host country because immigration or permanent residence in another country
implies renunciation of one's residence in his country of origin. However, same
Section allows an immigrant and permanent resident abroad to register as voter for
as long as he/she executes an affidavit to show that he/she has not abandoned his
domicile in pursuance of the constitutional intent expressed in Sections 1 and 2 of
Article V that allcitizens of the Philippines not otherwise disqualified by law must
be entitled to exercise the right of suffrage and, that Congress must establish a
system for absentee voting; for otherwise, if actual, physical residence in the
Philippines is required, there is no sense for the framers of the Constitution to
mandate Congress to establish a system for absentee voting.

Contrary to the claim of [the challenger], the execution of the affidavit itself is not
the enabling or enfranchising act. The affidavit required in Section 5(d) is not only
proof of the intention of the immigrant or permanent resident to go back and resume
residency in the Philippines, but more significantly, it serves as an explicit
expression that he had not in fact abandoned his domicile of origin. Thus, it is not
correct to say that the execution of the affidavit under Section 5(d) violates the
Constitution that proscribes provisional registration or a promise by a voter to
perform a condition to be qualified to vote in a political exercise. [11]

Soon after Section 5(d) of R.A. 9189 passed the test of constitutionality, Congress
enacted R.A. 9225 the relevant portion of which reads:
SEC. 2. Declaration of Policy. It is hereby declared the policy of the State that all
Philippine citizens who become citizens of another country shall be deemed not to
have lost their Philippine citizenship under the conditions of this Act.

SEC. 3. Retention of Philippine Citizenship. Any provision of law to the contrary

notwithstanding, natural-born citizens of the Philippines who have lost their
Philippine citizenship by reason of their naturalization as citizens of a foreign
country are hereby deemed to have re-acquired Philippine citizenship upon taking
the following oath of allegiance to the Republic:

xxx xxx xxx

Natural-born citizens of the Philippines who, after the effectivity of this Act,
become citizens of a foreign country shall retain their Philippine citizenship upon
taking the aforesaid oath.

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.
 SEC. 5. Civil and Political Rights and Liabilities. Those who retain or re-acquire
Philippine citizenship under this Act shall enjoy full civil and political rights and
be subject to all attendant liabilities and responsibilities under existing laws of
the Philippines and the following conditions:

(1) Those intending to exercise their right of suffrage must meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution, Republic Act
No. 9189, otherwise known as The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003
and other existing laws;

(2) Those seeking elective public office in the Philippines shall meet the
qualifications for holding such public office as required by the Constitution
and existing laws and, at the time of the filing of the certificate of candidacy,
make a personal and sworn renunciation of any and all foreign citizenship ;

3) xxx xxx xxx.

(4) xxx xxx xxx;

(5) That right to vote or be elected or appointed to any public office in the
Philippines cannot be exercised by, or extended to, those who:

(a) are candidates for or are occupying any public office in the
country of which they are naturalized citizens; and/or

(b) are in active service as commissioned or non-commissioned

officers in the armed forces of the country which they are naturalized
citizens.

After what appears to be a successful application for recognition of Philippine

citizenship under R.A. 9189, petitioners now invoke their right to enjoy political
rights, specifically the right of suffrage, pursuant to Section 5 thereof.

Opposing the petitioners bid, however, respondent COMELEC invites attention to

the same Section 5 (1) providing that duals can enjoy their right to vote, as an adjunct
to political rights, only if they meet the requirements of Section 1, Article V of the
Constitution, R.A. 9189 and other existing laws. Capitalizing on what at first blush
is the clashing provisions of the aforecited provision of the Constitution, which, to
repeat, requires residency in the Philippines for a certain period, and R.A. 9189
which grants a Filipino non-resident absentee voting rights,[12] COMELEC argues:
 4. DUALS MUST FIRST ESTABLISH THEIR DOMICILE/ RESIDENCE IN
THE PHILIPPINES

4.01. The inclusion of such additional and specific requirements in RA 9225

is logical. The duals, upon renouncement of their Filipino
citizenship and acquisition of foreign citizenship, have practically
and legally abandoned their domicile and severed their legal ties to
the homeland as a consequence. Having subsequently acquired a
second citizenship (i.e., Filipino) then, duals must, for purposes of
voting, first of all, decisively and definitely establish their domicile
through positive acts; [13]

The Court disagrees.

As may be noted, there is no provision in the dual citizenship law - R.A. 9225 -
requiring "duals" to actually establish residence and physically stay in
the Philippines first before they can exercise their right to vote. On the contrary,
R.A. 9225, in implicit acknowledgment that duals are most likely non-residents,
grants under its Section 5(1) the same right of suffrage as that granted an absentee
voter under R.A. 9189. It cannot be overemphasized that R.A. 9189 aims, in essence,
to enfranchise as much as possible all overseas Filipinos who, save for the residency
requirements exacted of an ordinary voter under ordinary conditions, are qualified
to vote. Thus, wrote the Court in Macalintal:
It is clear from these discussions of the Constitutional Commission that [it] intended
to enfranchise as much as possible all Filipino citizens abroad who have not
abandoned their domicile of origin. The Commission even intended to extend to
young Filipinos who reach voting age abroad whose parents domicile of origin is
in the Philippines, and consider them qualified as voters for the first time.

It is in pursuance of that intention that the Commission provided for Section 2

[Article V] immediately after the residency requirement of Section 1. By the
doctrine of necessary implication in statutory construction, , the strategic location
of Section 2 indicates that the Constitutional Commission provided for an exception
to the actual residency requirement of Section 1 with respect to qualified Filipinos
abroad. The same Commission has in effect declared that qualified Filipinos who
are not in the Philippines may be allowed to vote even though they do not satisfy
the residency requirement in Section 1, Article V of the Constitution.
That Section 2 of Article V of the Constitution is an exception to the residency
requirement found in Section 1 of the same Article was in fact the subject of debate
when Senate Bill No. 2104, which became R.A. No. 9189, was deliberated upon on
the Senate floor, thus:

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, this bill should be looked into in

relation to the constitutional provisions. I think the sponsor and I
would agree that the Constitution is supreme in any statute that we
may enact.
Let me read Section 1, Article V, of the Constitution .
xxx xxx xxx
Now, Mr. President, the Constitution says, who shall have resided
in the Philippines. They are permanent immigrants. They have
changed residence so they are barred under the Constitution. This is
why I asked whether this committee amendment which in fact does
not alter the original text of the bill will have any effect on this?

Senator Angara. Good question, Mr. President. And this has been
asked in various fora. This is in compliance with the
Constitution. One, the interpretation here of residence is
synonymous with domicile.

As the gentleman and I know, Mr. President, domicile is the intent

to return to one's home. And the fact that a Filipino may have been
physically absent from the Philippines and may be physically a
resident of the United States, for example, but has a clear intent to
return to the Philippines, will make him qualified as a resident of
the Philippines under this law.

This is consistent, Mr. President, with the constitutional mandate

that we that Congress must provide a franchise to overseas Filipinos.

If we read the Constitution and the suffrage principle literally as

demanding physical presence, then there is no way we can provide
for offshore voting to our offshore kababayan, Mr. President.

Senator Arroyo. Mr. President, when the Constitution says, in

Section 2 of Article V, it reads: The Congress shall provide a system
for securing the secrecy and sanctity of the ballot as well as a system
for absentee voting by qualified Filipinos abroad.

The key to this whole exercise, Mr. President, is qualified. In other

words, anything that we may do or say in granting our compatriots
abroad must be anchored on the proposition that they are
 qualified. Absent the qualification, they cannot vote. And
residents (sic) is a qualification.

xxx xxx xxx

Look at what the Constitution says In the place wherein they

propose to vote for at least six months immediately preceding the
election.
Mr. President, all of us here have run (sic) for office.

I live in Makati. My neighbor is Pateros . We are separated only by

a creek. But one who votes in Makati cannot vote in Pateros unless
he resides in Pateros for six months. That is how restrictive our
Constitution is. .
As I have said, if a voter in Makati would want to vote in Pateros,
yes, he may do so. But he must do so, make the transfer six months
before the election, otherwise, he is not qualified to vote.

xxx xxx xxx

Senator Angara. It is a good point to raise, Mr. President. But it is a

point already well-debated even in the constitutional commission of
1986. And the reason Section 2 of Article V was placed
immediately after the six-month/one-year residency requirement
is to demonstrate unmistakably that Section 2 which authorizes
absentee voting is an exception to the six-month/one-year
residency requirement. That is the first principle, Mr. President,
that one must remember.

The second reason, Mr. President, is that under our jurisprudence

residency has been interpreted as synonymous with domicile.

But the third more practical reason, is, if

we follow the interpretation of the gentleman, then it is legally
and constitutionally impossible to give a franchise to vote to
overseas Filipinos who do not physically live in the country,
which is quite ridiculous because that is exactly the whole point
of this exercise to enfranchise them and empower them to
vote. [14] (Emphasis and words in bracket added; citations omitted)

Lest it be overlooked, no less than the COMELEC itself admits that the Citizenship
Retention and Re-Acquisition Act expanded the coverage of overseas absentee
voting.According to the poll body:
 1.05 With the passage of RA 9225 the scope of overseas absentee voting has been
consequently expanded so as to include Filipinos who are also citizens of other
countries, subject, however, to the strict prerequisites indicated in the pertinent
provisions of RA 9225; [15]

Considering the unison intent of the Constitution and R.A. 9189 and the expansion
of the scope of that law with the passage of R.A. 9225, the irresistible conclusion is
that "duals" may now exercise the right of suffrage thru the absentee voting scheme
and as overseas absentee voters. R.A. 9189 defines the terms adverted to in the
following wise:
Absentee Voting refers to the process by which qualified citizens of
the Philippines abroad exercise their right to vote;
Overseas Absentee Voter refers to a citizen of the Philippines who is qualified to
register and vote under this Act, not otherwise disqualified by law, who is abroad
on the day of elections;

While perhaps not determinative of the issue tendered herein, we note that the
expanded thrust of R.A. 9189 extends also to what might be tag as the next
generation of "duals". This may be deduced from the inclusion of the provision on
derivative citizenship in R.A. 9225 which reads:

SEC. 4. Derivative Citizenship. The unmarried child, whether legitimate,

illegitimate or adopted, below eighteen (18) years of age, of those who re-acquire
Philippine citizenship upon effectivity of this Act shall be deemed citizens of the
Philippines.

It is very likely that a considerable number of those unmarried children below eigh
teen (18) years of age had never set foot in the Philippines. Now then, if the next
generation of "duals" may nonetheless avail themselves the right to enjoy full civil
and political rights under Section 5 of the Act, then there is neither no rhyme nor
reason why the petitioners and other present day "duals," provided they meet the
requirements under Section 1, Article V of the Constitution in relation to R.A. 9189,
be denied the right of suffrage as an overseas absentee voter. Congress could not
have plausibly intended such absurd situation.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the Court rules
and so holds that those who retain or re-acquire Philippine citizenship
under Republic Act No. 9225, the Citizenship Retention and Re-Acquisition Act of
2003, may exercise the right to vote under the system of absentee voting in Republic
Act No. 9189, the Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003.
SO ORDERED.

ERNESTO S. MERCADO, petitioner, vs. EDUARDO BARRIOS MANZANO

and the COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondents.

DECISION
MENDOZA, J.:

Petitioner Ernesto S. Mercado and private respondent Eduardo B. Manzano were candidates
for vice mayor of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections. The other one was Gabriel V.
Daza III.The results of the election were as follows:

Eduardo B. Manzano 103,853

Ernesto S. Mercado 100,894
Gabriel V. Daza III 54,275[1]

The proclamation of private respondent was suspended in view of a pending petition for
disqualification filed by a certain Ernesto Mamaril who alleged that private respondent was not a
citizen of the Philippines but of the United States.
In its resolution, dated May 7, 1998,[2] the Second Division of the COMELEC granted the
petition of Mamaril and ordered the cancellation of the certificate of candidacy of private
respondent on the ground that he is a dual citizen and, under 40(d) of the Local Government Code,
persons with dual citizenship are disqualified from running for any elective position. The
COMELECs Second Division said:

What is presented before the Commission is a petition for disqualification of Eduardo

Barrios Manzano as candidate for the office of Vice-Mayor of Makati City in the May
11, 1998 elections. The petition is based on the ground that the respondent is an
American citizen based on the record of the Bureau of Immigration and
misrepresented himself as a natural-born Filipino citizen.

In his answer to the petition filed on April 27, 1998, the respondent admitted that he is
registered as a foreigner with the Bureau of Immigration under Alien Certificate of
Registration No. B-31632 and alleged that he is a Filipino citizen because he was born
in 1955 of a Filipino father and a Filipino mother. He was born in the United States,
San Francisco, California, on September 14, 1955, and is considered an American
citizen under US Laws. But notwithstanding his registration as an American citizen,
he did not lose his Filipino citizenship.

Judging from the foregoing facts, it would appear that respondent Manzano is both a
Filipino and a US citizen. In other words, he holds dual citizenship.

The question presented is whether under our laws, he is disqualified from the position
for which he filed his certificate of candidacy. Is he eligible for the office he seeks to
be elected?

Under Section 40(d) of the Local Government Code, those holding dual citizenship
are disqualified from running for any elective local position.

WHEREFORE, the Commission hereby declares the respondent Eduardo Barrios

Manzano DISQUALIFIED as candidate for Vice-Mayor of Makati City.

On May 8, 1998, private respondent filed a motion for reconsideration.[3] The motion remained
pending even until after the election held on May 11, 1998.
Accordingly, pursuant to Omnibus Resolution No. 3044, dated May 10, 1998, of the
COMELEC, the board of canvassers tabulated the votes cast for vice mayor of Makati City but
suspended the proclamation of the winner.
On May 19, 1998, petitioner sought to intervene in the case for disqualification. [4] Petitioners
motion was opposed by private respondent.
The motion was not resolved. Instead, on August 31, 1998, the COMELEC en banc rendered
its resolution. Voting 4 to 1, with one commissioner abstaining, the COMELEC en banc reversed
the ruling of its Second Division and declared private respondent qualified to run for vice mayor
of the City of Makati in the May 11, 1998 elections.[5] The pertinent portions of the resolution of
the COMELEC en banc read:

As aforesaid, respondent Eduardo Barrios Manzano was born in San Francisco,

California, U.S.A. He acquired US citizenship by operation of the United States
Constitution and laws under the principle of jus soli.

He was also a natural born Filipino citizen by operation of the 1935 Philippine
Constitution, as his father and mother were Filipinos at the time of his birth. At the
age of six (6), his parents brought him to the Philippines using an American passport
as travel document. His parents also registered him as an alien with the Philippine
Bureau of Immigration. He was issued an alien certificate of registration. This,
however, did not result in the loss of his Philippine citizenship, as he did not renounce
Philippine citizenship and did not take an oath of allegiance to the United States.
It is an undisputed fact that when respondent attained the age of majority, he
registered himself as a voter, and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998,
which effectively renounced his US citizenship under American law. Under
Philippine law, he no longer had U.S. citizenship.

At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division,
adopted on May 7, 1998, was not yet final. Respondent Manzano obtained the highest
number of votes among the candidates for vice-mayor of Makati City, garnering one
hundred three thousand eight hundred fifty three (103,853) votes over his closest rival,
Ernesto S. Mercado, who obtained one hundred thousand eight hundred ninety four
(100,894) votes, or a margin of two thousand nine hundred fifty nine (2,959)
votes. Gabriel Daza III obtained third place with fifty four thousand two hundred
seventy five (54,275) votes. In applying election laws, it would be far better to err in
favor of the popular choice than be embroiled in complex legal issues involving
private international law which may well be settled before the highest court
(Cf. Frivaldo vs. Commission on Elections, 257 SCRA 727).

WHEREFORE, the Commission en banc hereby REVERSES the resolution of the

Second Division, adopted on May 7, 1998, ordering the cancellation of the
respondents certificate of candidacy.

We declare respondent Eduardo Luis Barrios Manzano to be QUALIFIED as a

candidate for the position of vice-mayor of Makati City in the May 11, 1998,
elections.

ACCORDINGLY, the Commission directs the Makati City Board of Canvassers,

upon proper notice to the parties, to reconvene and proclaim the respondent Eduardo
Luis Barrios Manzano as the winning candidate for vice-mayor of Makati City.

Pursuant to the resolution of the COMELEC en banc, the board of canvassers, on the evening
of August 31, 1998, proclaimed private respondent as vice mayor of the City of Makati.
This is a petition for certiorari seeking to set aside the aforesaid resolution of the COMELEC
en banc and to declare private respondent disqualified to hold the office of vice mayor of Makati
City.Petitioner contends that

[T]he COMELEC en banc ERRED in holding that:

A. Under Philippine law, Manzano was no longer a U.S. citizen when he:

1. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he attained the age of majority when he
was already 37 years old; and,
2. He renounced his U.S. citizenship when he (merely) registered himself as a voter
and voted in the elections of 1992, 1995 and 1998.

B. Manzano is qualified to run for and or hold the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the
City of Makati;

C. At the time of the May 11, 1998 elections, the resolution of the Second Division
adopted on 7 May 1998 was not yet final so that, effectively, petitioner may not be
declared the winner even assuming that Manzano is disqualified to run for and hold
the elective office of Vice-Mayor of the City of Makati.

We first consider the threshold procedural issue raised by private respondent

Manzano whether petitioner Mercado has personality to bring this suit considering that he was not
an original party in the case for disqualification filed by Ernesto Mamaril nor was petitioners
motion for leave to intervene granted.

I. PETITIONER'S RIGHT TO BRING THIS SUIT

Private respondent cites the following provisions of Rule 8 of the Rules of Procedure of the
COMELEC in support of his claim that petitioner has no right to intervene and, therefore, cannot
bring this suit to set aside the ruling denying his motion for intervention:

Section 1. When proper and when may be permitted to intervene. Any person allowed
to initiate an action or proceeding may, before or during the trial of an action or
proceeding, be permitted by the Commission, in its discretion to intervene in such
action or proceeding, if he has legal interest in the matter in litigation, or in the
success of either of the parties, or an interest against both, or when he is so situated as
to be adversely affected by such action or proceeding.

....

Section 3. Discretion of Commission. In allowing or disallowing a motion for

intervention, the Commission or the Division, in the exercise of its discretion, shall
consider whether or not the intervention will unduly delay or prejudice the
adjudication of the rights of the original parties and whether or not the intervenors
rights may be fully protected in a separate action or proceeding.

Private respondent argues that petitioner has neither legal interest in the matter in litigation nor an
interest to protect because he is a defeated candidate for the vice-mayoralty post of Makati City
[who] cannot be proclaimed as the Vice-Mayor of Makati City even if the private respondent be
ultimately disqualified by final and executory judgment.
 The flaw in this argument is it assumes that, at the time petitioner sought to intervene in the
proceedings before the COMELEC, there had already been a proclamation of the results of the
election for the vice mayoralty contest for Makati City, on the basis of which petitioner came out
only second to private respondent. The fact, however, is that there had been no proclamation at
that time. Certainly, petitioner had, and still has, an interest in ousting private respondent from the
race at the time he sought to intervene. The rule in Labo v. COMELEC,[6] reiterated in several
cases,[7] only applies to cases in which the election of the respondent is contested, and the question
is whether one who placed second to the disqualified candidate may be declared the winner. In the
present case, at the time petitioner filed a Motion for Leave to File Intervention on May 20, 1998,
there had been no proclamation of the winner, and petitioners purpose was precisely to have private
respondent disqualified from running for [an] elective local position under 40(d) of R.A. No.
7160. If Ernesto Mamaril (who originally instituted the disqualification proceedings), a registered
voter of Makati City, was competent to bring the action, so was petitioner since the latter was a
rival candidate for vice mayor of Makati City.
Nor is petitioners interest in the matter in litigation any less because he filed a motion for
intervention only on May 20, 1998, after private respondent had been shown to have garnered the
highest number of votes among the candidates for vice mayor. That petitioner had a right to
intervene at that stage of the proceedings for the disqualification against private respondent is clear
from 6 of R.A. No. 6646, otherwise known as the Electoral Reforms Law of 1987, which provides:

Any candidate who has been declared by final judgment to be disqualified shall not be
voted for, and the votes cast for him shall not be counted. If for any reason a candidate
is not declared by final judgment before an election to be disqualified and he is voted
for and receives the winning number of votes in such election, the Court or
Commission shall continue with the trial and hearing of the action, inquiry, or protest
and, upon motion of the complainant or any intervenor, may during the pendency
thereof order the suspension of the proclamation of such candidate whenever the
evidence of guilt is strong.

Under this provision, intervention may be allowed in proceedings for disqualification even
after election if there has yet been no final judgment rendered.
The failure of the COMELEC en banc to resolve petitioners motion for intervention was
tantamount to a denial of the motion, justifying petitioner in filing the instant petition for
certiorari. As the COMELEC en banc instead decided the merits of the case, the present petition
properly deals not only with the denial of petitioners motion for intervention but also with the
substantive issues respecting private respondents alleged disqualification on the ground of dual
citizenship.
This brings us to the next question, namely, whether private respondent Manzano possesses
dual citizenship and, if so, whether he is disqualified from being a candidate for vice mayor of
Makati City.

II. DUAL CITIZENSHIP AS A GROUND FOR DISQUALIFICATION

 The disqualification of private respondent Manzano is being sought under 40 of the Local
Government Code of 1991 (R.A. No. 7160), which declares as disqualified from running for any
elective local position: . . . (d) Those with dual citizenship. This provision is incorporated in the
Charter of the City of Makati.[8]
Invoking the maxim dura lex sed lex, petitioner, as well as the Solicitor General, who sides
with him in this case, contends that through 40(d) of the Local Government Code, Congress has
command[ed] in explicit terms the ineligibility of persons possessing dual allegiance to hold local
elective office.
To begin with, dual citizenship is different from dual allegiance. The former arises when, as
a result of the concurrent application of the different laws of two or more states, a person is
simultaneously considered a national by the said states.[9] For instance, such a situation may arise
when a person whose parents are citizens of a state which adheres to the principle of jus
sanguinis is born in a state which follows the doctrine of jus soli. Such a person, ipso facto and
without any voluntary act on his part, is concurrently considered a citizen of both
states. Considering the citizenship clause (Art. IV) of our Constitution, it is possible for the
following classes of citizens of the Philippines to possess dual citizenship:
(1) Those born of Filipino fathers and/or mothers in foreign countries which follow the
principle of jus soli;
(2) Those born in the Philippines of Filipino mothers and alien fathers if by the laws of their
fathers country such children are citizens of that country;
(3) Those who marry aliens if by the laws of the latters country the former are considered
citizens, unless by their act or omission they are deemed to have renounced Philippine citizenship.
There may be other situations in which a citizen of the Philippines may, without performing
any act, be also a citizen of another state; but the above cases are clearly possible given the
constitutional provisions on citizenship.
Dual allegiance, on the other hand, refers to the situation in which a person simultaneously
owes, by some positive act, loyalty to two or more states. While dual citizenship is involuntary,
dual allegiance is the result of an individuals volition.
With respect to dual allegiance, Article IV, 5 of the Constitution provides: Dual allegiance of
citizens is inimical to the national interest and shall be dealt with by law. This provision was
included in the 1987 Constitution at the instance of Commissioner Blas F. Ople who explained its
necessity as follows:[10]

. . . I want to draw attention to the fact that dual allegiance is not dual citizenship. I
have circulated a memorandum to the Bernas Committee according to which a dual
allegiance  and I reiterate a dual allegiance  is larger and more threatening than that
of mere double citizenship which is seldom intentional and, perhaps, never
insidious. That is often a function of the accident of mixed marriages or of birth on
foreign soil. And so, I do not question double citizenship at all.
What we would like the Committee to consider is to take constitutional cognizance of
the problem of dual allegiance. For example, we all know what happens in the
triennial elections of the Federation of Filipino-Chinese Chambers of Commerce
which consists of about 600 chapters all over the country. There is a Peking ticket, as
well as a Taipei ticket. Not widely known is the fact that the Filipino-Chinese
community is represented in the Legislative Yuan of the Republic of China in
Taiwan. And until recently, the sponsor might recall, in Mainland China in the
Peoples Republic of China, they have the Associated Legislative Council for overseas
Chinese wherein all of Southeast Asia including some European and Latin countries
were represented, which was dissolved after several years because of diplomatic
friction. At that time, the Filipino-Chinese were also represented in that Overseas
Council.

When I speak of double allegiance, therefore, I speak of this unsettled kind of

allegiance of Filipinos, of citizens who are already Filipinos but who, by their acts,
may be said to be bound by a second allegiance, either to Peking or Taiwan. I also
took close note of the concern expressed by some Commissioners yesterday, including
Commissioner Villacorta, who were concerned about the lack of guarantees of
thorough assimilation, and especially Commissioner Concepcion who has always
been worried about minority claims on our natural resources.

Dual allegiance can actually siphon scarce national capital to Taiwan, Singapore,
China or Malaysia, and this is already happening. Some of the great commercial
places in downtown Taipei are Filipino-owned, owned by Filipino-Chinese it is of
common knowledge in Manila. It can mean a tragic capital outflow when we have to
endure a capital famine which also means economic stagnation, worsening
unemployment and social unrest.

And so, this is exactly what we ask that the Committee kindly consider incorporating
a new section, probably Section 5, in the article on Citizenship which will read as
follows: DUAL ALLEGIANCE IS INIMICAL TO CITIZENSHIP AND SHALL BE
DEALT WITH ACCORDING TO LAW.

In another session of the Commission, Ople spoke on the problem of these citizens with dual
allegiance, thus:[11]

. . . A significant number of Commissioners expressed their concern about dual

citizenship in the sense that it implies a double allegiance under a double sovereignty
which some of us who spoke then in a freewheeling debate thought would be
repugnant to the sovereignty which pervades the Constitution and to citizenship itself
which implies a uniqueness and which elsewhere in the Constitution is defined in
terms of rights and obligations exclusive to that citizenship including, of course, the
obligation to rise to the defense of the State when it is threatened, and back of this,
Commissioner Bernas, is, of course, the concern for national security. In the course of
those debates, I think some noted the fact that as a result of the wave of
naturalizations since the decision to establish diplomatic relations with the Peoples
Republic of China was made in 1975, a good number of these naturalized Filipinos
still routinely go to Taipei every October 10; and it is asserted that some of them do
renew their oath of allegiance to a foreign government maybe just to enter into the
spirit of the occasion when the anniversary of the Sun Yat-Sen Republic is
commemorated. And so, I have detected a genuine and deep concern about double
citizenship, with its attendant risk of double allegiance which is repugnant to our
sovereignty and national security. I appreciate what the Committee said that this could
be left to the determination of a future legislature. But considering the scale of the
problem, the real impact on the security of this country, arising from, let us say,
potentially great numbers of double citizens professing double allegiance, will the
Committee entertain a proposed amendment at the proper time that will prohibit, in
effect, or regulate double citizenship?

Clearly, in including 5 in Article IV on citizenship, the concern of the Constitutional

Commission was not with dual citizens per se but with naturalized citizens who maintain their
allegiance to their countries of origin even after their naturalization. Hence, the phrase dual
citizenship in R.A. No. 7160, 40(d) and in R.A. No. 7854, 20 must be understood as referring to
dual allegiance. Consequently, persons with mere dual citizenship do not fall under this
disqualification. Unlike those with dual allegiance, who must, therefore, be subject to strict process
with respect to the termination of their status, for candidates with dual citizenship, it should suffice
if, upon the filing of their certificates of candidacy, they elect Philippine citizenship to terminate
their status as persons with dual citizenship considering that their condition is the unavoidable
consequence of conflicting laws of different states. As Joaquin G. Bernas, one of the most
perceptive members of the Constitutional Commission, pointed out: [D]ual citizenship is just a
reality imposed on us because we have no control of the laws on citizenship of other countries. We
recognize a child of a Filipino mother. But whether or not she is considered a citizen of another
country is something completely beyond our control.[12]
By electing Philippine citizenship, such candidates at the same time forswear allegiance to the
other country of which they are also citizens and thereby terminate their status as dual citizens. It
may be that, from the point of view of the foreign state and of its laws, such an individual has not
effectively renounced his foreign citizenship. That is of no moment as the following discussion on
40(d) between Senators Enrile and Pimentel clearly shows:[13]
SENATOR ENRILE. Mr. President, I would like to ask clarification of line 41, page 17: Any person
with dual citizenship is disqualified to run for any elective local position. Under the present
Constitution, Mr. President, someone whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines but his father is
a foreigner is a natural-born citizen of the Republic. There is no requirement that such a natural
born citizen, upon reaching the age of majority, must elect or give up Philippine citizenship.
On the assumption that this person would carry two passports, one belonging to the country of his or her
father and one belonging to the Republic of the Philippines, may such a situation disqualify the
person to run for a local government position?
 SENATOR PIMENTEL. To my mind, Mr. President, it only means that at the moment when he would
want to run for public office, he has to repudiate one of his citizenships.
SENATOR ENRILE. Suppose he carries only a Philippine passport but the country of origin or the
country of the father claims that person, nevertheless, as a citizen? No one can renounce. There are
such countries in the world.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Well, the very fact that he is running for public office would, in effect, be an
election for him of his desire to be considered as a Filipino citizen.
SENATOR ENRILE. But, precisely, Mr. President, the Constitution does not require an election. Under
the Constitution, a person whose mother is a citizen of the Philippines is, at birth, a citizen without
any overt act to claim the citizenship.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. Yes. What we are saying, Mr. President, is: Under the Gentlemans example,
if he does not renounce his other citizenship, then he is opening himself to question. So, if he is
really interested to run, the first thing he should do is to say in the Certificate of Candidacy that: I
am a Filipino citizen, and I have only one citizenship.
SENATOR ENRILE. But we are talking from the viewpoint of Philippine law, Mr. President. He will
always have one citizenship, and that is the citizenship invested upon him or her in the Constitution
of the Republic.
SENATOR PIMENTEL. That is true, Mr. President. But if he exercises acts that will prove that he also
acknowledges other citizenships, then he will probably fall under this disqualification.
This is similar to the requirement that an applicant for naturalization must renounce all
allegiance and fidelity to any foreign prince, potentate, state, or sovereignty[14] of which at the time
he is a subject or citizen before he can be issued a certificate of naturalization as a citizen of the
Philippines. In Parado v. Republic,[15] it was held:

[W]hen a person applying for citizenship by naturalization takes an oath that he

renounces his loyalty to any other country or government and solemnly declares that
he owes his allegiance to the Republic of the Philippines, the condition imposed by
law is satisfied and complied with. The determination whether such renunciation is
valid or fully complies with the provisions of our Naturalization Law lies within the
province and is an exclusive prerogative of our courts. The latter should apply the law
duly enacted by the legislative department of the Republic. No foreign law may or
should interfere with its operation and application. If the requirement of the Chinese
Law of Nationality were to be read into our Naturalization Law, we would be
applying not what our legislative department has deemed it wise to require, but what a
foreign government has thought or intended to exact. That, of course, is absurd. It
must be resisted by all means and at all cost. It would be a brazen encroachment upon
the sovereign will and power of the people of this Republic.

III. PETITIONER'S ELECTION OF PHILIPPINE CITIZENSHIP

 The record shows that private respondent was born in San Francisco, California on September
4, 1955, of Filipino parents. Since the Philippines adheres to the principle of jus sanguinis, while
the United States follows the doctrine of jus soli, the parties agree that, at birth at least, he was a
national both of the Philippines and of the United States. However, the COMELEC en banc held
that, by participating in Philippine elections in 1992, 1995, and 1998, private respondent
effectively renounced his U.S. citizenship under American law, so that now he is solely a
Philippine national.
Petitioner challenges this ruling. He argues that merely taking part in Philippine elections is
not sufficient evidence of renunciation and that, in any event, as the alleged renunciation was made
when private respondent was already 37 years old, it was ineffective as it should have been made
when he reached the age of majority.
In holding that by voting in Philippine elections private respondent renounced his American
citizenship, the COMELEC must have in mind 349 of the Immigration and Nationality Act of the
United States, which provided that A person who is a national of the United States, whether by
birth or naturalization, shall lose his nationality by: . . . (e) Voting in a political election in a foreign
state or participating in an election or plebiscite to determine the sovereignty over foreign
territory. To be sure this provision was declared unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court
in Afroyim v. Rusk[16] as beyond the power given to the U.S. Congress to regulate foreign
relations. However, by filing a certificate of candidacy when he ran for his present post, private
respondent elected Philippine citizenship and in effect renounced his American citizenship. Private
respondents certificate of candidacy, filed on March 27, 1998, contained the following statements
made under oath:
6. I AM A FILIPINO CITIZEN (STATE IF NATURAL-BORN OR
NATURALIZED) NATURAL-BORN
....
10. I AM A REGISTERED VOTER OF PRECINCT NO. 747-A, BARANGAY SAN
LORENZO, CITY/MUNICIPALITY OF MAKATI, PROVINCE OF NCR .
11. I AM NOT A PERMANENT RESIDENT OF, OR IMMIGRANT TO, A FOREIGN
COUNTRY.
12. I AM ELIGIBLE FOR THE OFFICE I SEEK TO BE ELECTED. I WILL SUPPORT AND
DEFEND THE CONSTITUTION OF THE PHILIPPINES AND WILL MAINTAIN TRUE
FAITH AND ALLEGIANCE THERETO; THAT I WILL OBEY THE LAWS, LEGAL
ORDERS AND DECREES PROMULGATED BY THE DULY CONSTITUTED
AUTHORITIES OF THE REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES; AND THAT I IMPOSE THIS
OBLIGATION UPON MYSELF VOLUNTARILY, WITHOUT MENTAL RESERVATION
OR PURPOSE OF EVASION. I HEREBY CERTIFY THAT THE FACTS STATED
HEREIN ARE TRUE AND CORRECT OF MY OWN PERSONAL KNOWLEDGE.
The filing of such certificate of candidacy sufficed to renounce his American citizenship,
effectively removing any disqualification he might have as a dual citizen. Thus, in Frivaldo v.
COMELEC it was held:[17]

It is not disputed that on January 20, 1983 Frivaldo became an American. Would the
retroactivity of his repatriation not effectively give him dual citizenship, which under
Sec. 40 of the Local Government Code would disqualify him from running for any
elective local position? We answer this question in the negative, as there is cogent
reason to hold that Frivaldo was really STATELESS at the time he took said oath of
allegiance and even before that, when he ran for governor in 1988. In his Comment,
Frivaldo wrote that he had long renounced and had long abandoned his American
citizenshiplong before May 8, 1995. At best, Frivaldo was stateless in the
interimwhen he abandoned and renounced his US citizenship but before he was
repatriated to his Filipino citizenship.

On this point, we quote from the assailed Resolution dated December 19, 1995:

By the laws of the United States, petitioner Frivaldo lost his American citizenship
when he took his oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government when he ran for
Governor in 1988, in 1992, and in 1995.Every certificate of candidacy contains an
oath of allegiance to the Philippine Government.

These factual findings that Frivaldo has lost his foreign nationality long before the
elections of 1995 have not been effectively rebutted by Lee. Furthermore, it is basic
that such findings of the Commission are conclusive upon this Court, absent any
showing of capriciousness or arbitrariness or abuse.

There is, therefore, no merit in petitioners contention that the oath of allegiance contained in
private respondents certificate of candidacy is insufficient to constitute renunciation of his
American citizenship. Equally without merit is petitioners contention that, to be effective, such
renunciation should have been made upon private respondent reaching the age of majority since
no law requires the election of Philippine citizenship to be made upon majority age.
Finally, much is made of the fact that private respondent admitted that he is registered as an
American citizen in the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation and that he holds an American
passport which he used in his last travel to the United States on April 22, 1997. There is no merit
in this. Until the filing of his certificate of candidacy on March 21, 1998, he had dual
citizenship. The acts attributed to him can be considered simply as the assertion of his American
nationality before the termination of his American citizenship. What this Court said in Aznar v.
COMELEC[18] applies mutatis mutandis to private respondent in the case at bar:

. . . Considering the fact that admittedly Osmea was both a Filipino and an American,
the mere fact that he has a Certificate stating he is an American does not mean that he
is not still a Filipino. . . . [T]he Certification that he is an American does not mean that
he is not still a Filipino, possessed as he is, of both nationalities or
citizenships. Indeed, there is no express renunciation here of Philippine citizenship;
truth to tell, there is even no implied renunciation of said citizenship. When We
consider that the renunciation needed to lose Philippine citizenship must be express, it
stands to reason that there can be no such loss of Philippine citizenship when there is
no renunciation, either express or implied.

To recapitulate, by declaring in his certificate of candidacy that he is a Filipino citizen; that

he is not a permanent resident or immigrant of another country; that he will defend and support
the Constitution of the Philippines and bear true faith and allegiance thereto and that he does so
without mental reservation, private respondent has, as far as the laws of this country are concerned,
effectively repudiated his American citizenship and anything which he may have said before as a
dual citizen.
On the other hand, private respondents oath of allegiance to the Philippines, when considered
with the fact that he has spent his youth and adulthood, received his education, practiced his
profession as an artist, and taken part in past elections in this country, leaves no doubt of his
election of Philippine citizenship.
His declarations will be taken upon the faith that he will fulfill his undertaking made under
oath. Should he betray that trust, there are enough sanctions for declaring the loss of his Philippine
citizenship through expatriation in appropriate proceedings. In Yu v. Defensor-Santiago,[19] we
sustained the denial of entry into the country of petitioner on the ground that, after taking his oath
as a naturalized citizen, he applied for the renewal of his Portuguese passport and declared in
commercial documents executed abroad that he was a Portuguese national. A similar sanction can
be taken against any one who, in electing Philippine citizenship, renounces his foreign nationality,
but subsequently does some act constituting renunciation of his Philippine citizenship.
WHEREFORE, the petition for certiorari is DISMISSED for lack of merit.
SO ORDERED.
MOY YA LIM VS COMM ON IMMIGRATION
FACTS:

Lau Yuen Yeung applied for a passport visa to enter the Philippines as a non-
immigrant on 8 February 1961. In the interrogation made in connection with
her application for a temporary visitor's visa to enter the Philippines, she
stated that she was a Chinese residing at Kowloon, Hongkong, and that she
desired to take a pleasure trip to the Philippines to visit her great grand uncle,
Lau Ching Ping. She was permitted to come into the Philippines on 13 March
1961 for a period of one month.

On the date of her arrival, Asher Y. Cheng filed a bond in the amount of
P1,000.00 to undertake, among others, that said Lau Yuen Yeung would
actually depart from the Philippines on or before the expiration of her
authorized period of stay in this country or within the period as in his
discretion the Commissioner of Immigration or his authorized representative
might properly allow.

After repeated extensions, Lau Yuen Yeung was allowed to stay in the
Philippines up to 13 February 1962. On 25 January 1962, she contracted
marriage with Moy Ya Lim Yao alias Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim an alleged
Filipino citizen. Because of the contemplated action of the Commissioner of
Immigration to confiscate her bond and order her arrest and immediate
deportation, after the expiration of her authorized stay, she brought an action
for injunction. At the hearing which took place one and a half years after her
arrival, it was admitted that Lau Yuen Yeung could not write and speak either
English or Tagalog, except for a few words. She could not name any Filipino
neighbor, with a Filipino name except one, Rosa. She did not know the
names of her brothers-in-law, or sisters-in-law. As a result, the Court of First
Instance of Manila denied the prayer for preliminary injunction. Moya Lim
Yao and Lau Yuen Yeung appealed.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Lau Yuen Yeung ipso facto became a Filipino citizen upon
her marriage to a Filipino citizen.

HELD:

Under Section 15 of Commonwealth Act 473, an alien woman marrying a

Filipino, native born or naturalized, becomes ipso facto a Filipina provided
she is not disqualified to be a citizen of the Philippines under Section 4 of the
same law. Likewise, an alien woman married to an alien who is subsequently
naturalized here follows the Philippine citizenship of her husband the
moment he takes his oath as Filipino citizen, provided that she does not suffer
from any of the disqualifications under said Section 4. Whether the alien
woman requires to undergo the naturalization proceedings, Section 15 is a
parallel provision to Section 16. Thus, if the widow of an applicant for
naturalization as Filipino, who dies during the proceedings, is not required to
go through a naturalization proceedings, in order to be considered as a
Filipino citizen hereof, it should follow that the wife of a living Filipino
cannot be denied the same privilege.

This is plain common sense and there is absolutely no evidence that the
Legislature intended to treat them differently. As the laws of our country,
both substantive and procedural, stand today, there is no such procedure (a
substitute for naturalization proceeding to enable the alien wife of a
Philippine citizen to have the matter of her own citizenship settled and
established so that she may not have to be called upon to prove it everytime
she has to perform an act or enter into a transaction or business or exercise a
right reserved only to Filipinos), but such is no proof that the citizenship is
not vested as of the date of marriage or the husband's acquisition of
citizenship, as the case may be, for the truth is that the situation obtains even
as to native-born Filipinos. Everytime the citizenship of a person is material
or indispensible in a judicial or administrative case. Whatever the
corresponding court or administrative authority decides therein as to such
citizenship is generally not considered as res adjudicata, hence it has to be
threshed out again and again as the occasion may demand. Lau Yuen Yeung,
was declared to have become a Filipino citizen from and by virtue of her
marriage to Moy Ya Lim Yao al as Edilberto Aguinaldo Lim, a Filipino
citizen of 25 January 1962.