Article 246 (Parricide)
The court found him guilty of parricide but with three
People vs. Tomotorgo
[G.R. No. L-47941, April 30, 1985]
NATURE: Appealed decision rendered by the CFI.
FACTS: Magdalena de los Santos, the wife of Jaime Tomotorgo, had
been persistently asking her husband to sell the conjugal home and
that their family transfer to the house of her husband's in-laws.
Tomotorgo would not accede to his wife's request. He did not like to
abandon the house wherein he and his wife were then living.
Furthermore, he had no inclination to leave because he has many
plants and improvements on the land which he was then farming.
On June 23, 1977, at about seven o'clock in the morning,
the accused left his home to work on his farm Upon his return, he
found his wife and his three-month old baby already gone. He finally
saw his wife carrying his infant son and bringing a bundle of clothes
some 200m away from their home. He asked and pleaded with his
wife that she should return home with their child but she adamantly
refused to do so. When appellant sought to take the child from his
wife, the latter threw the baby on the grassy portion of the trail
hereby causing the latter to cry. This conduct of his wife aroused the
ire of the herein accused. Incensed with wrath and his anger beyond
control, appellant picked lip a piece of wood nearby and started
hitting his wife with it until she fell to the ground complaining of
severe pains on her chest. Realizing what he had done, the accused
picked his wife in his arms and brought her to their home. He then
returned to the place where the child was thrown and he likewise
took this infant home. Soon thereafter, Magdalena de los Santos
died despite the efforts of her husband to alleviate her pains.
After the accused changed the dress of his wife, he reported
the tragic incident to the Barangay Captain of their place who
brought him to Policeman Arellosa to whom the accused
surrendered. He also brought with him the piece of wood he used in
beating his wife.
He was charged with parricide and pleaded not
guilty. Upon realizing the gravity of his offense, he changed his plea
to guilty.
mitigating circumstances – voluntary surrender, plea of guilty and
that he acted upon an impulse so powerful as naturally to have
produced passion and obfuscation.
He was given the penalty of reclusion perpetua. Appellant
claims that the court handed him the wrong punishment. Appellant
claims that article 49 of the Revised Penal Code prescribes the
proper applicable penalty when the crime committed is different
from what was intended. If the penalty prescribed for the felony
committed is higher than the offense which the accused wanted to
commit, the penalty corresponding to the later shall be imposed as
the maximum period. Appellant avers that the penalty for the felony
committed by him – parricide – was higher than that which he
intended to commit – physical injuries.
ISSUE: W/N accused is guilty of physical injuries only and not
parricide.
HELD: NO
RATIO: Accused is guilty of parricide. Article 4 of the Revised Penal
Code expressly states that criminal liability shall be incurred by any
person committing a felony (delito) although the wrongful act be
different from that which he intended and that the accused is liable
for all the consequences of his felonious acts.
Article 49 of the RPC does not apply to cases where more
serious consequences not intended by the offender result from his
felonious act because under Art. 4 (1) of the same code, he is liable
for all the direct and natural consequences of his unlawful act. His
lack of intentiosn to commit a grave wrong is at best mitigating.
The reference made by the accused to Article 263 of the
Revised Penal Code which prescribes graduated penalties for the
corresponding physical injuries committed is entirely misplaced and
irrelevant considering that in this case the victim died very soon
after she was assaulted. The court held that the fact that the
appellant intended to maltreat the victim only or inflict physical
imjuries does not exempt him from liability for the resulting and
more serious crime committed.
People v. Bohol; G.R. No. 178198 December 10, 2008
NACHURA, J.:
This is an appeal interposed by appellant Evelyn Bohol seeking the
reversal of the Court of Appeals (CA) Decision 1 dated December 28,
2006 which in turn affirmed with modification the Regional Trial Court2
(RTC) Decision3 dated November 25, 2004.
The facts of the case follow:
The victim, Steven Alston Davis (Steven), a 31-year old British
national, was the Chief Technology Officer of JC Software, a local
subsidiary of Hong Kong based corporation JADECOOL
Entertainment. Together with his business associate and long-time
friend Michael Thomas Dunn (Michael), a Canadian citizen, Steven
resided at a two-storey apartment unit at No. 5958 Firmina Street,
Barangay Poblacion, Makati City.4
Steven married appellant Evelyn Bohol in Hong Kong sometime in
March 1997, when the latter was only 17 years old. Together with their
two minor children, Steven and the appellant shared a house at No.
1823 Fifth Street, Villasol Subdivision in Angeles City, Pampanga.
Steven spent his weekdays in the Makati apartment, and stayed with
his family in Angeles City during weekends.5
On July 17, 2002, Steven and Michael worked until around ten o’clock
in the evening at the principal office of JC Software in Makati. At about
10:45 p.m., they headed to their rented apartment. Steven proceeded
to his room, did some computer work, then went to sleep. At about
11:30 p.m., Michael went to the airport to fetch his girlfriend Jennifer
Castillo (Jennifer), who was then arriving from Hong Kong. Michael
and Jennifer returned to the apartment at one o’clock in the morning
of July 18, 2002. They went to bed a short moment thereafter. 6
At around two o’clock in the morning, Jennifer told Michael that a
person seemed to be moving and flashing a light outside their room.
Suspecting that the person outside the room was Steven, and that the
latter was just trying to play a practical joke on them, Michael inquired
"What are you doing tonight?" Instead of Steven answering back,
three men with drawn handguns suddenly entered their room. These
three individuals were later positively identified during the trial to be
Arnold Adoray (Arnold), Alexander Dagami (Alexander), and accused-
turned-state-witness Robin Butas (Robin). Arnold, whose gun was
aimed at Michael, asked, "Ito ba? Ito ba?" Alexander thereafter
grabbed Jennifer by the hand and locked her inside Michael’s
bathroom. After taking Michael’s keys, wallet, and cellular phone, the
three men proceeded to Steven’s room.7 Upon seeing the then
sleeping Steven, Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the former,
hitting the latter at the back. The three men then hurriedly left the
house.8 After he was sure that Arnold, Alexander and Robin were no
longer inside the apartment, Michael immediately went to Steven’s
room. There, Michael saw the lifeless body of Steven. After checking
Steven’s pulse, Michael administered cardiopulmonary resuscitation
(CPR) on the former’s chest but he no longer made any response. 9
Thereafter, Philippine National Police (PNP) personnel arrived at the
scene of the crime; then an ambulance took Steven’s body to the
Makati Medical Center where he was pronounced dead on arrival. 10
Michael made numerous attempts to reach the appellant by phone
immediately after the incident, but his efforts were all in vain. Finally,
he was able to contact her through her mobile phone at around six
o’clock in the morning; the former immediately informed the latter of
the killing of her husband. When Michael met Evelyn at ten o’clock in
the morning, he readily observed that appellant showed no signs of
sadness or mourning despite the violent death of her husband.11
After the autopsy of the cadaver in the afternoon of July 18, 2002, the
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Medico-Legal officer found that
Steven sustained four gunshot wounds at the upper left portion of his
back, including four bullet holes at the back of his upper left arm, just
below the shoulder.12
Arnold and Alexander were thus charged with murder on August 16,
2002.13 Trial thereafter ensued. The information was later amended 14
charging the appellant, together with Robin, with the crime of murder,
in conspiracy with Arnold and Alexander. The accusatory portion of
the information reads:
 That on or about the 18th day of July, 2002, in the City of
Makati, Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with an
automatic pistol and revolver, conspiring and confederating
together, and all of them mutually helping and aiding one
another, with intent to kill, and by means of treachery and
evident premeditation, did then and there willfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, and shot one STEVEN
ALSTON DAVIS, on the different parts of his body, thereby
inflicting upon the latter serious and mortal gunshot wound
which directly caused his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.15
Considering that at the time the appellant was arrested, the trial of the
case, in which Arnold and Alexander were eventually convicted,16 was
almost complete, a separate trial for the appellant was held. Upon
arraignment, the appellant pleaded "Not guilty." 17 To ensure
impartiality, the presiding judge inhibited himself, and the case of the
appellant was re-raffled to Branch 141.
It appears that Robin was discharged as a state witness.18 Robin
contended that the appellant was responsible for inducing/persuading
him, Arnold, and Alexander to perpetrate the killing of Steven. He
further stated that the appellant and Arnold (as in fact admitted to him
by the appellant) were having a love affair, as he would oftentimes see
them caress and kiss each other in the living room of their house in
Angeles City. Robin also testified that, at about eleven o’clock in the
evening of July 17, 2002, appellant roused him from sleep and
required him to join them.19 Robin then rode a white car together with
Arnold, Alexander and the appellant, who acted as the guide in
proceeding towards Steven’s apartment. Upon reaching Steven’s
place, appellant gave Arnold the keys of the house, and forthwith
ordered the group to alight from the car. Upon gaining entry, the three
performed all the acts of execution. Riding the same car, Arnold,
Alexander, Robin and Evelyn returned to Angeles City. Even as they
were traveling, Evelyn warned them never to tell anybody about the
incident. Robin, however, divulged the violent incident to his wife Gina
Bohol Butas (Gina), Evelyn’s sister. In essence, the material points of
Robin’s testimony were wholly corroborated by Gina. According to
Gina, the appellant admitted that she was in love with Arnold. She
added that the appellant confided to her the plan to kill Steven in order
for the appellant and Arnold to freely stay together.20
By way of defense, appellant theorized that it was physically
impossible for her to have a direct and material participation in the
killing of Steven as she was absent from the scene of the crime, and
she lacked the ill motive to orchestrate the murder of her husband.
She also contended that she was at home with her children at the time
of the commission of the felony.21
On November 25, 2004, the RTC rendered a Decision22 finding the
appellant guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder, qualified by
treachery, and sentenced her to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua. The court also made her liable to pay civil indemnity in the
amount of P50,000.00.
The court found sufficient evidence to establish conspiracy to kill
Steven. It likewise held that treachery was adequately proven, thus,
establishing the crime of murder. It, however, refused to recognize the
aggravating circumstance of evident premeditation because of
insufficiency of evidence. It is undisputed that the appellant was
married to Steven; however, the trial court concluded that she could
not be held liable for parricide in view of the nullity of their marriage,
for having been contracted at the time when appellant was only 17
years old.23
This decision was affirmed by the CA in its Decision dated December
28, 2006, with an added award of P50,000.00 representing moral
damages due the heirs of Steven.24
In her final attempt to seek the reversal of her conviction, appellant
comes before this Court, raising the following as lone error:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN CONVICTING THE
ACCUSED-APPELLANT DESPITE THE FACT THAT HER
GUILT FOR THE CRIME OF MURDER WAS NOT PROVEN
BEYOND REASONABLE DOUBT.25
Appellant bewails the fact that the trial and the appellate courts
accorded great weight to the testimony of Robin. She posits that
having turned state witness, Robin was motivated to testify solely by
his desire to be exculpated from liability. 26 Appellant adds that her
motive to kill Steven was not established at all.27 She further avers that
her conviction should not have been based on Robin’s testimony, or
on the weakness of the evidence for the defense.28 Lastly, appellant
insists that in no way could she be convicted of murder for lack of
sufficient evidence to prove the qualifying circumstance of treachery. 29
After a careful review of the records and evidence presented, we find
no cogent reason to reverse the decision of the RTC, as affirmed by
the CA. Nevertheless, we deem it proper to discuss the issues raised
by the appellant.
First, whether Robin’s testimony is credible. As this Court has
consistently said, where the culpability or innocence of an accused
would hinge on the issue of the credibility of witnesses, the findings of
fact of the CA affirming those of the trial court, duly supported by
sufficient and convincing evidence, must be accorded the highest
respect, even finality, by this Court, and are not to be disturbed on
appeal.30 The only exception is when certain facts of substance and
value have been overlooked which, if considered, might affect the
result of the case.31
Moreover, as enunciated in People v. Bocalan,32 the simple fact that
Robin was originally charged with the appellant as a co-conspirator
but was later discharged as a state witness and was no longer
prosecuted for the crime charged does not render his testimony
incredible or lessen its probative weight. Otherwise stated, the
barefaced fact that Robin was charged as a co-conspirator in the
commission of the crime before he was discharged as a state witness
does not disqualify him as a witness or discredit his testimony. 33 While
his testimony should be taken with caution, there is no reason why it
cannot be given credence, it appearing that the same was
corroborated by the testimony of his wife who happens to be
appellant’s sister. Besides, appellant offered no evidence to show that
Robin was actuated by an ill or devious motive to testify against her.
Appellant’s claim that Robin testified against her only because he was
motivated by his desire to be exculpated from his liability as a co-
conspirator is likewise bereft of merit. Considering his close
relationship with the appellant, the latter being his sister-in-law, there
was no other reason for Robin to have testified against the appellant
except his desire to tell the truth. This was bolstered by the fact that
appellant’s own sister corroborated Robin’s testimony. More
importantly, Robin’s testimony was corroborated by physical
evidence, namely, the autopsy report that Steven sustained four
gunshot wounds at the upper left portion of his back, including four
bullet holes at the back of his upper left arm, just below the shoulder, 34
which was thus consistent with his testimony that upon seeing Steven
who was then asleep, Arnold fired four consecutive shots upon the
former, hitting him at the back.35
Second, whether appellant was correctly convicted of murder. Murder
is committed by any person who, not falling within the provisions of
Article 24636 of the Revised Penal Code (RPC), kills another, if the
killing is committed with treachery.37 There is treachery when the
offender commits any of the crimes against persons, employing
means, methods or forms which tend directly and specially to ensure
its execution, without risk to himself arising from the defense which the
offended party might make.38 Hence, for treachery to be appreciated,
two conditions must be met, to wit: (1) the employment of means,
methods or manner of execution that would ensure the offender’s
safety from any defense or retaliatory act on the part of the offended
party; and (2) the offender’s deliberate or conscious choice of means,
method or manner of execution.39
The essence of treachery is the sudden and unexpected attack by an
aggressor on an unsuspecting victim, depriving the latter of any real
chance to defend himself and thereby ensuring its commission without
risk to himself.40
The circumstances obtaining in the instant case show that treachery
attended the killing of the victim. It is undisputed that the killing
occurred at around two o’clock in the morning, an hour when generally
people are asleep. The witnesses are also one in saying that upon
entering Steven’s room, the assailants immediately shot the former
and caused the latter’s death. Both the testimonial and the physical
sets of evidence also show that Steven was shot from behind.
Evidently, the victim was caught unaware, totally defenseless against
the armed invaders.41
While it is true that appellant did not directly participate in shooting
Steven, nevertheless, evidence clearly shows that she was part of the
conspiracy to commit the crime. There is conspiracy when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it.42 It must be proved with the same quantum of
evidence as the crime itself. However, direct proof is not required, as
conspiracy may be proved by circumstantial evidence. It may be
established through the collective acts of the accused before, during
and after the commission of a felony that all the accused aimed at the
same object, one performing one part and the other performing
another for the attainment of the same objective; and that their acts,
though apparently independent, were in fact concerted and
cooperative, indicating closeness of personal association, concerted
action and concurrence of sentiments.43
In the present case, the CA correctly outlined the circumstances
showing the appellant’s participation, viz.:
First, Evelyn [appellant herein] provided for the effective and
compelling inducement for Arnold to carry into effect the killing
of Steven. Second, Evelyn personally summoned and
"recruited" Robin to come along with them for possible backup
or perhaps as "additional ammunition" in case of resistance or
retaliation on the part of their target. Third, it is apparent that
the three men were not aware of Steven’s location, and thus
Evelyn acted as the guide who directed the group towards the
residence of Steven at Makati. And fourth, Evelyn provided
the group with the keys in order for them to enter the
apartment with ease and unnoticed.44
Indubitably, conspiracy was established.
Appellant seeks refuge in the defense of alibi which we have
consistently regarded as the much abused sanctuary of felons and
which is considered as an argument with a bad reputation. It is, to say
the least, the weakest defense which must be taken with caution being
easily fabricated.45 Such defense cannot prevail over the positive
identification of appellant as one of the conspirators in killing Steven.
Though she did not participate in the actual shooting of Steven, it was
sufficiently established that she traveled from Angeles City to Makati
City, together with the assailants; she waited for the assailants inside
the car; and she traveled back to Angeles City, again with her co-
conspirators, after the commission of the felony. Furthermore,
appellant failed to establish that it was physically impossible for her to
have been at the scene of the crime at the time of its commission.
Angeles City is only a few kilometers away from Makati and only a few
hours of travel by land. This is coupled by the fact that when Michael
was trying to reach her through her mobile and residence phones, she
was not available until six o’clock in the morning, which was only about
four hours after the incident. Clearly, it was possible for her to be at
the place where the felony was committed. Besides, as earlier
discussed, considering the appellant’s participation as a co-
conspirator, her absence from the place of commission does not
negate her culpability.
We would like to clarify at this point that although admittedly, appellant
was the wife of the victim, she could not be convicted of parricide as
provided in Article 246 of the RPC. Records show that appellant’s
relationship with the victim was not alleged in the information.46 Hence,
she can be convicted only of murder.
Under Article 248 of the RPC, the penalty imposed for the crime of
murder is reclusion perpetua to death. There being no aggravating or
mitigating circumstance, the penalty imposed on appellant is reclusion
perpetua. The prison term imposed by the trial court and as affirmed
by the CA is, therefore, correct.
Lastly, whether the damages awarded to the heirs of Steven are
proper. We affirm the award of civil indemnity and moral damages but
we deem it proper to order the payment of an additional amount of
P25,000.00 as exemplary damages.
Civil indemnity is mandatory and granted to the heirs of the victim even
without need of proof other than the commission of the crime. The
amount of P50,000.00 awarded by the trial and appellate courts is in
line with prevailing jurisprudence.47
As to moral damages, the same is mandatory in cases of murder and
homicide, without need of allegation and proof other than the death of
the victim.48 The amount of P50,000.00 was, therefore, correctly
awarded.
In addition, exemplary damages should be awarded to the heirs of the
victim, since the qualifying circumstance of treachery was proven by
the prosecution.49 When a crime is committed with an aggravating
circumstance, either qualifying or generic, an award of P25,000.00 as
exemplary damages is justified under Article 2230 of the New Civil
Code. This kind of damage is intended to serve as a deterrent to
serious wrongdoings, and as a vindication of undue sufferings and
wanton invasion of the rights of an injured or a punishment for those
guilty of outrageous conduct.50
WHEREFORE, we AFFIRM the December 28, 2006 Decision of the
Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-HC No. 00551 finding appellant
Evelyn Bohol y Talaogan guilty beyond reasonable doubt of murder,
with the MODIFICATION that the victim’s heirs are also entitled to the
award of exemplary damages of P25,000.00.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Gamez; G.R. No. 202847 October 23, 2013
REYES, J.:
For review1 is the Decision2 dated May 25, 2011 of the Court of
Appeals CA) in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 which affirmed the
Judgment3 dated May 9, 2006 of the Regional Trial Court RTC) of
Burauen, Leyte, Branch 15 convicting and sentencing accused-
appellant Antero Gamez y Baltazar accused-appellant) to reclusion
perpetua for the crime of parricide.
The Facts
Accused-appellant was accused of killing his own father, Apolinario
Gamez (Apolinario) through an Information articulating the following
criminal charges, viz:
That on or about the 21st day of August, 2004, in the Municipality of
Burauen, Province of Leyte, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with intent to kill and
with treachery, did then and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously
attack, assault, hack and wound one APOLINARIO GAMEZ y
AMORILLO, his father, with the use of a long bladed weapon
(sundang) and sickle (sarad) which the accused provided himself for
the purpose, thereby hitting and inflicting upon Apolinario Gamez y
Amorillo multiple hacking and incised wounds on the different parts of
his body which were the direct and approximate cause of his death.
CONTRARY TO LAW.4
When arraigned, he entered a "Not Guilty" plea. He thereafter desired
to amend his plea to "Guilty" during the pre-trial conference held on
September 26, 2005 but the RTC denied the said plea bargaining. In
view however of the accused-appellant’s invocation of self-defense,
an inverted trial scheme ensued.5
Through the testimonies of the accused-appellant himself, Dr. Irene
Astilla Dacut, his attending physician, and eyewitness Bienvenido
Buhalog, the defense narrated the events that culminated into the
encounter that claimed Apolinario’s life.6
The accused-appellant and 69-year old Apolinario had a less than
ideal father and son relationship with the former claiming that the latter
did not treat him well when he was a child. Their relationship got more
strained when Apolinario meddled with the accused-appellant’s
personal relationship with his wife. Apolinario apparently told the
accused-appellant that his wife was being unfaithful. The unsolicited
information irked the accused-appellant.
On August 21, 2004, the accused-appellant had a drinking spree in
his house at Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte, with his two brothers,
Nicolas and Cornelio from 12 noon until 3:00 p.m. As he was about to
go out of the kitchen door, the accused-appellant saw Apolinario
standing at the doorway with a long bolo. Apolinario appeared to be
drunk.
To prevent any commotion, Nicolas held Apolinario but he was able to
free himself from his son’s grip. The accused-appellant then spoke to
Apolinario: " I think that you are looking for me and I believe it is since
last night ." An argument ensued between them. In order not to prolong
the spat, the accused-appellant and his brothers took their father to
his nipa hut about 500 meters away. But before the accused-appellant
could leave, he got into another argument with Apolinario.
The accused-appellant then set out to the place where he gathered
tuba while his brothers went back to his house. After gathering tuba
and tethering his carabao, the accused-appellant proceeded home.
He met Apolinario along a pathway. With no one to pacify them, they
decided to resume their quarrel.
The accused-appellant first remarked: "Father, what are the words
that you uttered?" to which Apolinario responded, "It is better if one of
us will perish." Apolinario then instantaneously hacked the accused-
appellant with a long bolo hitting him twice on the head for which he
sustained a 5-centimeter long and scalp-deep incised wound with
fracture of the underlying bone and another 5-cm long incised wound
on the frontal right portion of his head.
The accused-appellant fell to his knees as Apolinario delivered
another blow which the former was able to parry by raising his left arm.
The accused-appellant was wounded on the left 3rd interdigital space
posterior to his palm.
The accused-appellant then held Apolinario’s hands, grabbed the bolo
and used the same to hack the latter several times, the count of which
escaped the accused-appellant’s consciousness as he was already
dizzy. The accused-appellant thereafter left the scene and went home.
His brother brought him to the hospital upon seeing that his head was
teeming with blood. He was hospitalized for six (6) days before he was
taken to the municipal hall by the police officers.
The rebuttal evidence for the prosecution, on the other hand,
principally consisted of the testimony of Maura Anadia (Maura),
Apolinario’s daughter and the accused-appellant’s sister. According to
Maura, at around 4:30 p.m. of August 21, 2004, she was with her
father at their house located at Barangay Gamay, Burauen, Leyte
when his elder brother, the accused-appellant, arrived. He was
carrying a long bolo and a scythe was tucked on his waist.
He approached her and said: "Will you join the killing spree today
including your child that you are carrying? "before turning to Apolinario
with this query: "What are the stories that you were talking?"
Frightened, Maura ran away and hid at a grassy portion near the
house. She then saw her father flee but the accused-appellant gave
him a chase. Apolinario was able to run for about 20 m before the
accused-appellant was able to catch up.
The accused-appellant then hacked the unarmed Apolinario on the
right side of his head using the bolo. Apolinario fell down and the
accused-appellant finished him off by slashing his neck with the
scythe. Maura thereafter left to report the incident to the police.
The autopsy conducted on Apolinario’s cadaver by Dr. Leonita Azores,
MD,7 showed that he sustained two (2) fatal wounds one of which
almost decapitated his head while the other hit the parietal aspect
thereof exposing the skin and connective tissue. Apolinario also
obtained two (2) incised wounds on his neck and left forearm and two
(2) lacerations on his fingers. He perished at the crime scene.8
Ruling of the RTC
In its Judgment9 dated May 9, 2006, the RTC found that both the
prosecution and the defense deliberately withheld vital details of the
incident. The prosecution did not reveal that the initial unlawful
aggression was committed by Apolinario who, based on medical
records, hacked the accused-appellant in the parietal area of his head.
The defense, on the other hand, concealed that accused-appellant
pursued the victim after the latter fled. These findings completed the
sequence of the incident and revealed that the accused-appellant’s
claim of self-defense is unmeritorious.
The RTC held that when accused-appellant hacked and killed
Apolinario, the unlawful aggression which the latter initially perpetrated
has already ceased because he has already ran away for 20 m.
Hence, accused-appellant’s act was not self-defense but rather one of
retaliation which, in turn, props up the conclusion that he intentionally
killed his father. The decretal portion of the RTC decision thus reads:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, this Court finds the accused
ANTERO GAMEZ y Baltazar GUILTY BEYOND REASONABLE
DOUBT of the crime of Parricide penalized under Art. 246 of the
Revised Penal Code and considering the presence of one (1)
mitigating circumstance without any aggravating to offset it, hereby
sentences him to suffer imprisonment of RECLUSION PERPETUA; to
pay the Heirs of Apolinario Gamez Php50,000.00 as civil indemnity for
his death and to pay the costs of this suit.
The accused who underwent preventive imprisonment since August
21, 2004 shall be credited with the full time during which he was
deprived of his liberty if he agreed voluntarily and in writing to abide
by the same disciplinary rules imposed upon convicted prisoners,
otherwise, he will be entitled to only four-fifths (4/5) thereof.10
Ruling of the CA
The CA adopted the RTC’s findings and similarly concluded that the
accused-appellant put up retaliation and not self-defense because the
aggression proffered by the victim has already ended when the
accused-appellant attacked him. From the time Apolinario ran away
and was disarmed by the accused-appellant, the aggression originally
heaved by the former has ceased. Hence, when the accused-
appellant chased and hacked Apolinario several times, self-defense
can no longer be invoked. The CA affirmed the conviction and
sentence rendered by the RTC as well as the award of civil indemnity
but an additional award of moral damages was granted for Apolinario’s
heirs. The CA Decision11 dated May 25, 2011 disposed thus:
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing premises, the assailed May 9,
2006 Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Burauen, Leyte, Branch
15, in CRIM. CASE NO. Bn-05-03-4125, is hereby AFFIRMED with
modification. Aside from the civil indemnity already awarded, the
accused is also hereby directed to pay the heirs of Apolinario Gamez
the amount of Php50,000.00 as moral damages in accordance with
the recent jurisprudence.
No pronouncement as to cost.
SO ORDERED.12
The accused-appellant manifested before the Court that in the present
review, he is adopting the arguments contained in his Brief filed before
the CA whereby he argued that his guilt for the crime of parricide was
not proved beyond reasonable doubt and that the trial court erred in
ruling that he failed to prove self-defense.
The Court’s Ruling
The Court affirms the accused-appellant’s conviction.
The arguments proffered by the accused-appellant essentially attack
the evaluation by the trial court of the testimony of the prosecution’s
principal witness, Maura, and its ruling that the same satisfactorily
repudiate his claim of self-defense.
This Court has consistently adhered to the rule that the matter of
assigning values to declarations on the witness stand is best and most
competently performed by the trial judge, who had the unmatched
opportunity to observe the witnesses and to assess their credibility by
the various indicia available but not reflected on the record. Hence,
the corollary principle that absent any showing that the trial court
overlooked substantial facts and circumstances that would affect the
final disposition of the case, appellate courts are bound to give due
deference and respect to its evaluation of the credibility of an
eyewitness and his testimony as well as its probative value amidst the
rest of the other evidence on record.13
We see no compelling reason to depart from the foregoing tenets
especially in view of the accused-appellant’s failure to identify
significant details, which if considered, will alter the outcome of the trial
court’s judgment and the affirmation accorded it by the CA. At any rate,
an examination of the records at hand shows that the factual basis of
accused-appellant’s plea of self-defense cannot relieve him from
criminal liability.
Self-defense, when invoked, as a justifying circumstance implies the
admission by the accused that he committed the criminal act. 14
Generally, the burden lies upon the prosecution to prove the guilt of
the accused beyond reasonable doubt rather than upon the accused
that he was in fact innocent. However, if the accused admits killing the
victim, but pleads self-defense, the burden of evidence is shifted to
him to prove such defense by clear, satisfactory and convincing
evidence that excludes any vestige of criminal aggression on his
part.15
In order to escape criminal liability, it becomes incumbent upon the
accused to prove by clear and convincing evidence the concurrence
of the following requisites under the second paragraph of Article 11 of
the Revised Penal Code, viz: (1) unlawful aggression; (2) reasonable
necessity of the means employed to prevent or repel it; and (3) lack of
sufficient provocation on the part of the person defending himself. 16
Unlawful aggression is a condition sine qua non for the justifying
circumstance of self-defense. Without it, there can be no self-defense,
whether complete or incomplete, that can validly be invoked.17 "There
is an unlawful aggression on the part of the victim when he puts in
actual or imminent danger the life, limb, or right of the person invoking
self-defense. There must be actual physical force or actual use of a
weapon."18 It is present only when the one attacked faces real and
immediate threat to one’s life. It must be continuous; otherwise, it does
not constitute aggression warranting self-defense.19
Here, the accused-appellant, miserably failed to discharge his burden
of proving that unlawful aggression justifying self-defense was present
when he killed Apolinario.
The aggression initially staged by Apolinario was not of the continuous
kind as it was no longer present when the accused-appellant injured
Apolinario. As testified by the accused-appellant himself, he was able
to grab the bolo from Apolinario. From that point on, the aggression
initially staged by Apolinario ceased to exist and the perceived threat
to the accused-appellant’s life was no longer attendant.
Hence, the accused-appellant was no longer acting in self-defense,
when he, despite having already disarmed Apolinario, ran after the
latter for about 20 m and then stabbed him. The accused-appellant’s
claim of self-defense is further negated by the fatal incision on
Apolinario’s neck that almost decapitated his head, a physical
evidence which corroborates Maura’s testimony that after stabbing
Apolinario with the bolo, the accused-appellant pulled out the scythe
on his waist and used the same to slash Apolinario’s neck. The use of
a weapon different from that seized from the victim and the nature of
the injury inflicted show the accused-appellant’s determined resolve to
kill Apolinario.
When unlawful aggression ceases, the defender no longer has any
justification to kill or wound the original aggressor. The assailant is no
longer acting in self-defense but in retaliation against the original
aggressor. Retaliation is not the same as self-defense. In retaliation,
the aggression that was begun by the injured party already ceased
when the accused attacked him; while in self-defense the aggression
still existed when the aggressor was injured by the accused.20
The CA was thus correct in upholding the findings and conclusions of
the RTC, thus:
Although, it is supported by the medical report, that the accused-
appellant was indeed initially attacked by the victim, the act of the
accused-appellant of going after the victim, who was already running
away from the accused-appellant after the latter has gained
possession of the weapon, is anathema to the self-defense theory
invoked by the accused appellant.
xxxx
In the instant case, the trial court gave credence to the testimony of
the prosecution witness that the victim tried to run away from the
accused-appellant but the accused-appellant ran after him. When the
accused-appellant was able to overtake the victim, the latter was
hacked on the right side of his head. To finish him off, the accused-
appellant slashed the victim’s neck with the use of a scythe until the
victim (his own father) died. Thus, assuming arguendo that the father
was indeed the first aggressor, the aggression ceased the moment the
accused-appellant disarmed him and the victim tried to run away from
the accused-appellant. When the accused-appellant then continued to
chase his 69 year-old father and hacked several times the already
disarmed victim, self-defense can no longer be invoked.21
In fine, there is no justifiable cause exempting the accused-appellant
from criminal liability and the courts a quo were correct in convicting
him for parricide.
Parricide is committed when: (1) a person is killed; (2) the deceased
is killed by the accused; and (3) the deceased is the father, mother, or
child, whether legitimate or illegitimate, or a legitimate other ascendant
or other descendant, or the legitimate spouse of the accused.22 Here,
it is an undisputed fact that Apolinario was the accused-appellant’s
father.
Under Article 246 of the Revised Penal, the crime of parricide is
punishable by reclusion perpetua to death.1âwphi1 It must be noted
that the declaration of the RTC in its Judgment dated May 9, 2006 on
the presence of a mitigating circumstance is not supported by any
allegation or evidence on record. Nonetheless, in view of Republic Act
(R.A.) No. 934623 prohibiting the imposition of death penalty, the
courts a quo correctly sentenced the accused-appellant to reclusion
perpetua.24
It must be emphasized, however, that the accused-appellant shall not
be eligible for parole pursuant to Section 3 of R.A. No. 9346 which
states that "persons convicted of offenses punished with reclusion
perpetua , or whose sentences will be reduced to reclusion perpetua ,
by reason of this Act, shall not be eligible for parole under Act No.
4180, otherwise known as the Indeterminate Sentence Law, as
amended."25
The award of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity to the heirs of Apolinario
is proper and in line with current jurisprudence.26 Civil indemnity is
mandatory upon proof of the fact of death of the victim and the
culpability of the accused for such death.27 The award of ₱50,000.0028
as moral damages is likewise correct. Even in the absence of any
allegation and proof of the heirs’ emotional suffering, it has been
recognized that the loss of a loved one to a violent death brings
emotional pain and anguish.29
The Court finds that an award of exemplary damages in the amount of
₱30,000.0030 is in order considering that the qualifying circumstance
of relationship is present in the crime of parricide.31
Lastly, in conformity with current policy, we impose on all the monetary
awards for damages an interest at the legal rate of six percent (6%)
per annum from the date of finality of this judgment until fully paid.32
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the Decision dated May 25,
2011 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. CR-H.C. No. 00671 finding
the accused-appellant, Antero Gamez y Baltazar, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of Parricide, is hereby AFFIRMED
WITH MODIFICATIONS. Antero Gamez y Baltazar is sentenced to
suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua without eligibility for parole and
ordered to pay the heirs of the victim, Apolinario Gamez, the amounts
of ₱50,000.00 as civil indemnity, ₱50,000.00 as moral damages and
₱30,000.00 as exemplary damages. The award of damages shall earn
legal interest at the rate of six percent (6) per annum from the finality
of this judgment until fully paid.
SO ORDERED.
DEATH UNDER EXCEPTIONAL CIRCUMSTANCES
People v. Abarca; G.R. No. 74433 September 14, 1987
SARMIENTO, J.:
This is an appeal from the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Palo,
Leyte, sentencing the accused-appellant Francisco Abarca to death
for the complex crime of murder with double frustrated murder.
The case was elevated to this Court in view of the death sentence
imposed. With the approval of the new Constitution, abolishing the
penalty of death and commuting all existing death sentences to life
imprisonment, we required the accused-appellant to inform us whether
or not he wished to pursue the case as an appealed case. In
compliance therewith, he filed a statement informing us that he wished
to continue with the case by way of an appeal.
The information (amended) in this case reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
The undersigned City Fiscal of the City of Tacloban
accuses Francisco Abarca of the crime of Murder with
Double Frustrated Murder, committed as follows:
That on or about the 15th day of July, 1984, in the City
of Tacloban, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
deliberate intent to kill and with evident premeditation,
and with treachery, armed with an unlicensed firearm
(armalite), M-16 rifle, did then and there wilfully,
unlawfully and feloniously attack and shot several
times KHINGSLEY PAUL KOH on the different parts
of his body, thereby inflicting upon said KHINGSLEY
PAUL KOH gunshot wounds which caused his
instantaneous death and as a consequence of which
also caused gunshot wounds to LINA AMPARADO
and ARNOLD AMPARADO on the different parts of
their bodies thereby inflicting gunshot wounds which
otherwise would have caused the death of said Lina
Amparado and Arnold Amparado, thus performing all
the acts of execution which should have produced the
crimes of murders as a consequence, but
nevertheless did not produce it by reason of causes
independent of his will, that is by the timely and able
medical assistance rendered to Lina Amparado and
Arnold Amparado which prevented their death. 1
xxx xxx xxx
On arraignment, the accused-appellant pleaded not guilty. The
Solicitor General states accurately the facts as follows:
Khingsley Paul Koh and the wife of accused
Francisco Abarca, Jenny, had illicit relationship. The
illicit relationship apparently began while the accused
was in Manila reviewing for the 1983 Bar
examinations. His wife was left behind in their
residence in Tacloban, Leyte (pp. 45-47, 65, tsn,
Sept. 24, 1984).
On July 15, 1984, the accused was in his residence
in Tacloban, Leyte. On the morning of that date he
went to the bus station to go to Dolores, Eastern
Samar, to fetch his daughter. However, he was not
able to catch the first trip (in the morning). He went
back to the station in the afternoon to take the 2:00
o'clock trip but the bus had engine trouble and could
not leave (pp. 5-8, tsn, Nov. 28, 1985). The accused,
then proceeded to the residence of his father after
which he went home. He arrived at his residence at
the V & G Subdivision in Tacloban City at around 6:00
o'clock in the afternoon (pp. 8-9, tsn, Id.).
Upon reaching home, the accused found his wife,
Jenny, and Khingsley Koh in the act of sexual
intercourse. When the wife and Koh noticed the
accused, the wife pushed her paramour who got his
revolver. The accused who was then peeping above
the built-in cabinet in their room jumped and ran away
(pp. 9-13, tsn, Id.).
 The accused went to look for a firearm at Tacloban
City. He went to the house of a PC soldier, C2C Arturo
Talbo, arriving there at around 6:30 p.m. He got
Talbo's firearm, an M-16 rifle, and went back to his
house at V & G Subdivision. He was not able to find
his wife and Koh there. He proceeded to the "mahjong
session" as it was the "hangout" of Kingsley Koh. The
accused found Koh playing mahjong. He fired at
Kingsley Koh three times with his rifle (pp. 13-19, tsn,
Id.). Koh was hit. Arnold and Lina Amparado who
were occupying a room adjacent to the room where
Koh was playing mahjong were also hit by the shots
fired by the accused (pp. 34-49, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984).
Kingsley Koh died instantaneously of
cardiorespiratory arrest due to shock and hemorrhage
as a result of multiple gunshot wounds on the head,
trunk and abdomen (pp. 28-29, tsn, Sept. 24, 1984;
see also exh. A): Arnold Amparado was hospitalized
and operated on in the kidney to remove a bullet (pp.
17-23, tsn, Oct. 17, 1984; see also exh. C). His wife,
Lina Amparado, was also treated in the hospital as
she was hit by bullet fragments (p. 23, tsn, Id.). Arnold
Amparado who received a salary of nearly P1,000.00
a month was not able to work for 1-1/2 months
because of his wounds. He spent P15,000.00 for
medical expenses while his wife spent Pl,000.00 for
the same purpose (pp. 24-25, tsn, Id. ). 2
On March 17, 1986, the trial court rendered the appealed judgment,
the dispositive portion whereof reads as follows:
xxx xxx xxx
WHEREFORE, finding the accused, Francisco
Abarca guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of murder with double frustrated
murder as charged in the amended information, and
pursuant to Art. 63 of the Revised Penal Code which
does not consider the effect of mitigating or
aggravating circumstances when the law prescribes a
single indivisible penalty in relation to Art. 48, he is
hereby sentenced to death, to indemnify the heirs of
Khingsley Paul Koh in the sum of P30,000,
complainant spouses Arnold and Lina Amparado in
the sum of Twenty Thousand Pesos (P20,000.00),
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency, and to pay the costs.
It appears from the evidence that the deceased
Khingsley Paul Koh and defendant's wife had illicit
relationship while he was away in Manila; that the
accused had been deceived, betrayed, disgraced and
ruined by his wife's infidelity which disturbed his
reasoning faculties and deprived him of the capacity
to reflect upon his acts. Considering all these
circumstances this court believes the accused
Francisco Abarca is deserving of executive clemency,
not of full pardon but of a substantial if not a radical
reduction or commutation of his death sentence.
Let a copy of this decision be furnished her
Excellency, the President of the Philippines, thru the
Ministry of Justice, Manila.
SO ORDERED. 3
xxx xxx xxx
The accused-appellant assigns the following errors committed by the
court a quo:
I.
IN CONVICTING THE ACCUSED FOR THE CRIME AS CHARGED
INSTEAD OF ENTERING A JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION UNDER
ARTICLE 247 OF THE REVISED PENAL CODE;
II.
IN FINDING THAT THE KILLING WAS AMENDED BY THE
QUALIFYING CIRCUMSTANCE OF TREACHERY. 4
The Solicitor General recommends that we apply Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code defining death inflicted under exceptional
circumstances, complexed with double frustrated murder. Article 247
reads in full:
ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. — Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro.
If he shall inflict upon them physical injuries of any
other kind, he shall be exempt from punishment.
These rules shall be applicable, under the same
circumstances, to parents with respect to their
daughters under eighteen years of age, and their
seducers, while the daughters are living with their
parents.
Any person who shall promote or facilitate prostitution
of his wife or daughter, or shall otherwise have
consented to the infidelity of the other spouse shall
not be entitled to the benefits of this article.
We agree with the Solicitor General that the aforequoted provision
applies in the instant case. There is no question that the accused
surprised his wife and her paramour, the victim in this case, in the act
of illicit copulation, as a result of which, he went out to kill the deceased
in a fit of passionate outburst. Article 247 prescribes the following
elements: (1) that a legally married person surprises his spouse in the
act of committing sexual intercourse with another person; and (2) that
he kills any of them or both of them in the act or immediately thereafter.
These elements are present in this case. The trial court, in convicting
the accused-appellant of murder, therefore erred.
Though quite a length of time, about one hour, had passed between
the time the accused-appellant discovered his wife having sexual
intercourse with the victim and the time the latter was actually shot,
the shooting must be understood to be the continuation of the pursuit
of the victim by the accused-appellant. The Revised Penal Code, in
requiring that the accused "shall kill any of them or both of them . . .
immediately" after surprising his spouse in the act of intercourse, does
not say that he should commit the killing instantly thereafter. It only
requires that the death caused be the proximate result of the outrage
overwhelming the accused after chancing upon his spouse in the
basest act of infidelity. But the killing should have been actually
motivated by the same blind impulse, and must not have been
influenced by external factors. The killing must be the direct by-product
of the accused's rage.
It must be stressed furthermore that Article 247, supra, does not define
an offense. 5 In People v. Araque, 6 we said:
xxx xxx xxx
As may readily be seen from its provisions and its
place in the Code, the above-quoted article, far from
defining a felony, merely provides or grants a privilege
or benefit — amounting practically to an exemption
from an adequate punishment — to a legally married
person or parent who shall surprise his spouse or
daughter in the act of committing sexual intercourse
with another, and shall kill any or both of them in the
act or immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon
them any serious physical injury. Thus, in case of
death or serious physical injuries, considering the
enormous provocation and his righteous indignation,
the accused — who would otherwise be criminally
liable for the crime of homicide, parricide, murder, or
serious physical injury, as the case may be — is
punished only with destierro. This penalty is mere
banishment and, as held in a case, is intended more
for the protection of the accused than a punishment.
(People vs. Coricor, 79 Phil., 672.) And where
physical injuries other than serious are inflicted, the
offender is exempted from punishment. In effect,
therefore, Article 247, or the exceptional
circumstances mentioned therein, amount to an
exempting circumstance, for even where death or
serious physical injuries is inflicted, the penalty is so
greatly lowered as to result to no punishment at all. A
different interpretation, i.e., that it defines and
penalizes a distinct crime, would make the
exceptional circumstances which practically exempt
the accused from criminal liability integral elements of
the offense, and thereby compel the prosecuting
officer to plead, and, incidentally, admit them, in the
information. Such an interpretation would be illogical
if not absurd, since a mitigating and much less an
exempting circumstance cannot be an integral
element of the crime charged. Only "acts or omissons
. . . constituting the offense" should be pleaded in a
complaint or information, and a circumstance which
mitigates criminal liability or exempts the accused
therefrom, not being an essential element of the
offense charged-but a matter of defense that must be
proved to the satisfaction of the court-need not be
pleaded. (Sec. 5, Rule 106, Rules of Court; U.S. vs.
Campo, 23 Phil., 368.)
That the article in question defines no crime is made
more manifest when we consider that its counterpart
in the old Penal Code (Article 423) was found under
the General Provisions (Chapter VIII) of Title VIII
covering crimes against persons. There can, we think,
hardly be any dispute that as part of the general
provisions, it could not have possibly provided for a
distinct and separate crime.
xxx xxx xxx
We, therefore, conclude that Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code does not define and provide for
a specific crime, but grants a privilege or benefit to the
accused for the killing of another or the infliction of
serious physical injuries under the circumstances
therein mentioned. ... 7
xxx xxx xxx
Punishment, consequently, is not inflicted upon the accused. He is
banished, but that is intended for his protection. 8
It shall likewise be noted that inflicting death under exceptional
circumstances, not being a punishable act, cannot be qualified by
either aggravating or mitigating or other qualifying circumstances, We
cannot accordingly appreciate treachery in this case.
The next question refers to the liability of the accused-appellant for the
physical injuries suffered by Lina Amparado and Arnold Amparado
who were caught in the crossfire as the accused-appellant shot the
victim. The Solicitor General recommends a finding of double
frustrated murder against the accused-appellant, and being the more
severe offense, proposes the imposition of reclusion temporal in its
maximum period pursuant to Article 48 of the Revised Penal Code.
This is where we disagree. The accused-appellant did not have the
intent to kill the Amparado couple. Although as a rule, one committing
an offense is liable for all the consequences of his act, that rule
presupposes that the act done amounts to a felony. 9
But the case at bar requires distinctions. Here, the accused-appellant
was not committing murder when he discharged his rifle upon the
deceased. Inflicting death under exceptional circumstances is not
murder. We cannot therefore hold the appellant liable for frustrated
murder for the injuries suffered by the Amparados.
This does not mean, however, that the accused-appellant is totally free
from any responsibility. Granting the fact that he was not performing
an illegal act when he fired shots at the victim, he cannot be said to be
entirely without fault. While it appears that before firing at the
deceased, he uttered warning words ("an waray labot kagawas,") 10 Esquierdo, and to reclusion perpetua, to pay P50,000.00 and the costs
that is not enough a precaution to absolve him for the injuries for the death of his wife, Tita T. Oyanib.4
sustained by the Amparados. We nonetheless find negligence on his
part. Accordingly, we hold him liable under the first part, second On September 11, 1995, Iligan City Prosecutor Ulysses V. Lagcao
paragraph, of Article 365, that is, less serious physical injuries through filed with the Regional Trial Court, Iligan City two (2) separate
simple imprudence or negligence. (The records show that Arnold informations charging accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza with
Amparado was incapacitated for one and one-half months; 11 there is murder and parricide, as follows:
no showing, with respect to Lina Amparado, as to the extent of her
injuries. We presume that she was placed in confinement for only ten Criminal Case No. 6012</P>
to fourteen days based on the medical certificate estimating her
recovery period.) 12
"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
For the separate injuries suffered by the Amparado spouses, we the said accused, armed with a deadly weapon to wit: a
therefore impose upon the accused-appellant arresto mayor (in its
hunting knife about six inches long and with intent to kill and
medium and maximum periods) in its maximum period, arresto to
evident premeditation and by means of treachery, did then
being the graver penalty (than destierro). 13
and there willfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault,
stab and wound one Jesus Esquierdo, thereby inflicting upon
WHEREFORE, the decision appealed from is hereby MODIFIED. The him the following physical injuries, to wit:
accused-appellant is sentenced to four months and 21 days to six
months of arresto mayor. The period within which he has been in
Cardiorespiratory arrest
confinement shall be credited in the service of these penalties. He is
Hypovolemic shock irreversible
furthermore ordered to indemnify Arnold and Lina Amparado in the
Multiple organ injury
sum of P16,000.00 as and for hospitalization expense and the sum of
Multiple stab wound chest & abdomen
P1,500.00 as and for Arnold Amparado's loss of earning capacity. No
special pronouncement as to costs.
and as a result thereof the said Jesus Esquierdo died.
IT IS SO ORDERED.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code with the aggravating circumstances (sic) of
People v. Oyanib; G.R. Nos. 130634-35 March 12, 2001
evident premeditation."5

PARDO, J.:
Criminal Case No. 6018

Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza appeals from the joint decision 1

"That on or about September 4, 1995, in the City of Iligan,
of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City finding him guilty
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court,
beyond reasonable doubt of homicide and parricide and sentencing the said accused, having conceived and (sic) deliberate intent
him to an indeterminate penalty2 of six (6) months one day (1) to six
to kill his wife Tita Oyanib, did then and there willfully,
(6) years of prision correccional as minimum to six (6) years one (1)
unlawfully and feloniously and with evident premeditation,
day to eight (8) years of prision mayor as maximum,3 and to pay
P50,000.00 civil indemnity and the costs for the death of Jesus
 attack, assault, stab and wound his wife, as a result of said
attack, the said Tita Oyanib died.
"Contrary to and in violation of Article 246 of the Revised
Penal Code."6
The prosecutor recommended no bail for the temporary liberty of
accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza in both cases.
On September 11, 1995, accused voluntarily surrendered to the police
authorities7 and was immediately detained at the Iligan City Jail.8
On January 17, 1996, the trial court arraigned accused Manolito
Oyanib y Mendoza by reading the informations against him and
translating them into the Visayan dialect.9 He pleaded not guilty to both
charges.
As the two (2) cases arose from the same set of facts, the trial court
conducted a joint trial.
Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza (hereafter Manolito) and Tita T.
Oyanib (hereafter Tita) were married on February 3, 1979 10 and had
two (2) children, Desilor and Julius. They lived in Purok 1, Tambacan,
Iligan City.
In 1994, due to marital differences, Manolito and Tita separated, with
Manolito keeping custody of their two (2) children. Tita rented a room
at the second floor of the house of Edgardo Lladas (hereafter
Edgardo), not far from the place where her family lived.
At about 9:30 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while Edgardo and
his family were watching TV at the sala located at the ground floor of
their house at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City, they heard a
commotion coming from the second floor rented by Tita. The
commotion and the noise lasted for quite some time. When it died
down, Edgardo went upstairs to check.11
Upstairs, Edgardo saw Tita wearing a duster, bloodied and sprawled
on the floor. He saw Manolito stabbing Jesus Esquierdo (hereafter
Jesus) while sitting on the latter's stomach. Jesus was wearing a pair
of long black pants. When Edgardo asked Manolito what he was
doing, accused told Edgardo not to interfere.
Thereafter, Edgardo left the house and called the police. Meanwhile,
the neighbors brought Tita to the hospital. She died on the way to the
hospital.12
SPO3 Eduard Tubil, police investigator, General Investigation Office,
Iligan City Police Command, Precinct I, Poblacion, Iligan City said that
at about 9:00 in the evening of September 4, 1995, while he was on
duty, he received an information regarding a stabbing incident at the
Llagas residence at Purok 3-A, Tambacan, Iligan City.13
At the crime scene, SPO3 Tubil saw the lifeless body of Jesus lying
face up with several stab wounds in different parts of the body. Jesus
was clad in t-shirt and long pants. From the crime scene, he recovered
a knife. Afterwards, he went to Dr. Uy Hospital to check on Tita; he
was informed that she was dead. Manolito was the suspect in the
killing of Jesus and Tita.14 The incident was recorded in the police
blotter as Entry No. 137138.15
On September 5, 1995, Dr. Leonardo A. Labanon, Medico-Legal
Officer, Iligan City examined the bodies of Jesus and Tita.16 Jesus
sustained multiple stab wounds, and those inflicted in the right and left
chests and stomach were fatal.17 The cause of death was
"cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock irreversible, multiple
organ injury and multiple stab wound chest and abdomen."18
Likewise, Tita sustained several stab wounds, with the fatal wounds
inflicted in the left chest and right side of the abdomen. The cause of
death was "cardiorespiratory arrest, hypovolemic shock and multiple
stab wound."19
As heretofore stated, in 1994, following a series of arguments,
Manolito and Tita decided to live separately. Manolito retained custody
of their two (2) children. Immediately after the separation, Tita stayed
at her friend Merlyn's house for two (2) months. Afterwards, she
transferred to the Lladas residence, located at Purok 3, G. Tambacan,
Iligan City, and rented the second floor.20 The rented space consisted
mainly of a sala with one adjoining room. It was arranged in a manner
that if one enters the main entrance door, one is immediately led to
the sala and from the sala, directly to the door of the adjoining room.
Despite their separation, Manolito tried to win Tita back and exerted
all efforts towards reconciliation for the sake of the children. However,
Tita was very reluctant to reconcile with Manolito.21 In fact, she was
very open about her relationship with other men and would flaunt it in
front of Manolito. One time, he chanced upon his wife and her
paramour, Jesus, in a very intimate situation by the hanging bridge at
Brgy. Tambacan, Iligan City.22 Manolito confronted Tita and Jesus
about this. He censured his wife and reminded her that she was still
his wife. They just ignored him; they even threatened to kill him. 23
In the evening of September 4, 1995, after supper, his daughter
Desilor handed Manolito a letter from the Iligan City National High
School. The letter mentioned that his son Julius failed in two (2)
subjects and invited his parents to a meeting at the school. Because
he had work from 8:00 in the morning until 5:00 in the afternoon the
next day, Manolito went to Tita's house to ask her to attend the school
meeting in his behalf.24
Upon reaching Tita's rented place, he heard "sounds of romance"
(kissing) coming from the inside. He pried open the door lock using a
hunting knife. He caught his wife Tita and Jesus having sexual
intercourse. Jesus was on top of Tita and his pants were down to his
knees.
Upon seeing him, Jesus kicked Manolito in the cheek. Manolito
immediately stabbed Jesus. Though Jesus was 5'9" in height and
weighed about 70 kg., the suddenness of the assault caused him to
lose his balance and fall down. Manolito took advantage of this
opportunity and stabbed Jesus in the stomach. Tita left the room upon
seeing Manolito, only to come back armed with a Tanduay bottle. She
hit Manolito in the head, while at the same time shouting "kill him Jake,
kill him Jake."25
In the commotion, Manolito stabbed Jesus, hitting him in the abdomen.
Jesus fell down and Manolito stabbed him again. Meanwhile, Tita
stabbed Manolito in the arm with the broken Tanduay bottle. This
angered Manolito and he stabbed Tita in the left breast. He stabbed
her three (3) more times in different parts of her body. Tita fell near the
lifeless body of her paramour. It was at this point that Edgardo, the
owner of the house Tita was renting, appeared from the ground floor
and inquired about what had happened. Manolito told Edgardo not to
interfere because he had nothing to do with it.
Thereafter, Manolito left the house of Edgardo and went to Kilumco,
Camague, Iligan City and stayed at the wake of his friend's neighbor.
He threw away the knife he used in stabbing his wife and her
paramour. At around 4:00 in the morning of the following day, he went
to Camague Highway to catch a bus for Lentogan, Aurora,
Zamboanga. While in Lentogan, he heard over radio DXIC that there
was a call for him to surrender. He heeded the call and gave himself
up to the police authorities in Precinct 2, Nonocan, Iligan City. 26
When asked why he was carrying a knife when he went to his wife's
place, Manolito said that he brought it for self-defense. Prior to the
incident, he received threats from his wife and her paramour, Jesus,
that they would kill him so they could live together.27
After trial, on May 26, 1997, the trial court promulgated a joint decision
finding accused guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crimes
charged. The dispositive portion reads:
"WHEREFORE, in the light of the foregoing findings and
pronouncements and having carefully observed the
demeanor of witnesses, this Court hereby declares accused
MANOLITO OYANIB y Mendoza GUILTY beyond reasonable
doubt of the crime of Homicide (Crim. Case No. II-6012) and
Parricide (Crim. Case No. II-6018) and and appreciating the
two (2) mitigating circumstances of passion or obfuscation
and voluntary surrender without any aggravating
circumstances to consider, this Court sentences accused
Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza to suffer an imprisonment as
follows:
 "1) In Criminal Case No. II-6012:
To an Indeterminate Penalty ranging from SIX (6)
MONTHS ONE (1) DAY to SIX (6) YEARS as
Minimum to Six (6) YEARS ONE (1) DAY to EIGHT
(8) YEARS as Maximum; to indemnify heirs of Jesus
Esquierdo the sum of P50,000.00 as civil indemnity,
and to pay the costs.
2.) In Criminal Case No. II-6018:
To RECLUSION PERPETUA pursuant to Republic
Act No. 7659; to indemnify heirs of his wife
P50,000.00 as civil indemnity and to pay the costs.
"It is likewise ordered that the aforesaid imprisonment is
subject to the forty (40) years limitation prescribed in Article
70 of the Revised Penal Code.
"Accused is likewise entitled to full credit of his preventive
imprisonment.
"SO ORDERED.
"Iligan City, Philippines, May 26, 1997.
"MAXIMO B. RATUNIL
Presiding Judge"28
On June 17, 1997, accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza interposed
an appeal from the joint decision of the trial court to the Supreme
Court.29
Accused admitted the killings. He argued that he killed them both
under the exceptional circumstances provided in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. He raised several errors allegedly committed by
the trial court, which boiled down to the basic issue of whether accused
is entitled to the exceptional privilege under Article 247 of the Revised
Penal Code. 30 He questioned the trial court's appreciation of the facts
and the evidence, contending that it ignored and overlooked vital
pieces of physical evidence material to the defense of the accused,
like the photograph of the lifeless body of Jesus. Accused contends
that the photograph graphically showed that Jesus' pants were wide
open, unzipped and unbuttoned, revealing that he was not wearing
any underwear, lending credence to his defense that he caught his
wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse. On the other
hand, the Solicitor General submitted that accused-appellant failed to
discharge the burden of proving, by clear and convincing evidence,
that he killed the victims under the exceptional circumstances
contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code. Hence, the
trial court did not err in denying him the exempting privilege under the
Article. 31
We find the appeal meritorious.
At the outset, accused admitted killing his wife and her paramour. He
invoked Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as an absolutory and
an exempting cause. "An absolutory cause is present 'where the act
committed is a crime but for reasons of public policy and sentiment
there is no penalty imposed."'32
Having admitted the killing, it is incumbent upon accused to prove the
exempting circumstances to the satisfaction of the court in order to be
relieved of any criminal liability. Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code
prescribes the following essential elements for such a defense: (1) that
a legally married person surprises his spouse in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person; (2) that he kills any of them or
both of them in the act or immediately thereafter; and (3) that he has
not promoted or facilitated the prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or
that he or she has not consented to the infidelity of the other spouse.33
Accused must prove these elements by clear and convincing
evidence, otherwise his defense would be untenable. "The death
caused must be the proximate result of the outrage overwhelming the
accused after chancing upon his spouse in the act of infidelity. Simply
put, the killing by the husband of his wife must concur with her flagrant
adultery."34
There is no question that the first element is present in the case at bar.
The crucial fact that accused must convincingly prove to the court is
that he killed his wife and her paramour in the act of sexual intercourse
or immediately thereafter.
After an assiduous analysis of the evidence presented and the
testimonies of the witnesses, we find accused to have acted within the
circumstances contemplated in Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
Admittedly, accused-appellant surprised his wife and her lover in the
act of sexual intercourse.
To the mind of the court, what actually happened was that accused
chanced upon Jesus at the place of his wife. He saw his wife and
Jesus in the act of having sexual intercourse. Blinded by jealousy and
outrage, accused stabbed Jesus who fought off and kicked the
accused. He vented his anger on his wife when she reacted, not in
defense of him, but in support of Jesus. Hence, he stabbed his wife as
well several times. Accused Manolito Oyanib y Mendoza surrendered
to the police when a call for him to surrender was made.
The law imposes very stringent requirements before affording the
offended spouse the opportunity to avail himself of Article 247,
Revised Penal Code. As the Court put it in People v. Wagas:35
"The vindication of a Man's honor is justified because of the
scandal an unfaithful wife creates; the law is strict on this,
authorizing as it does, a man to chastise her, even with death.
But killing the errant spouse as a purification is so severe as
that it can only be justified when the unfaithful spouse is
caught in flagrante delicto; and it must be resorted to only with
great caution so much so that the law requires that it be
inflicted only during the sexual intercourse or immediately
thereafter."
WHEREFORE, the Court REVERSES the appealed decision of the
Regional Trial Court, Branch 02, Iligan City in Criminal Cases Nos. II-
6012 and II-6018. The Court sentences accused Manolito Oyanib y
Mendoza to two (2) years and four (4) months of destierro. 36 He shall
not be permitted to enter Iligan City, nor within a radius of one hundred
(100) kilometers from Iligan city.37
Costs de oficio.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Puedan; G.R. No. 139576 September 2, 2002
PANGANIBAN, J.:
By invoking the defense of surprising his spouse in the very act of
sexual intercourse with the victim, the accused admits authorship of
the killing. Having waived his constitutional right to be presumed
faultless, he now bears the burden of proving his innocence.
Furthermore, his flight negates his self-righteous proclamation of
being the victim of in flagrante adultery. Indeed, if what he claims is
true, he should have reported the incident to the authorities
immediately, instead of hiding from them for over three years.
The Case
Rogelio Puedan appeals the June 16, 1999 Decision1 of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) of the City of Malaybalay (Branch 8) in Criminal Case
No. 7482-95, finding him guilty of murder and sentencing him to
reclusion perpetua, as follows:
"WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered finding
accused Rogelio Puedan guilty beyond reasonable
doubt of murder qualified by treachery. In the absence
of any other aggravating and/or a mitigating
circumstance, accused is hereby sentenced to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua, and to indemnify
the heirs of his victim Florencio Ilar the sum of
P50,000.00."2
The Information3 dated June 20, 1995, charged appellant in these
words:
 "That on or about the 21st day of February, 1995, in
the morning, at Purok 2, [B]arangay Paitan,
Municipality of Quezon, [P]rovince of Bukidnon,
Philippines, and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, with
intent to kill [and] by means of treachery and evident
premeditation, armed with a sharp bladed instrument
(flamingo), did then and there wilfully, unlawfully and
criminally attack, assault and stab FLORENCIO ILAR,
hitting and inflicting upon the latter the following, to
wit:
- Multiple stab wounds
which caused the instant[an]eous death of
FLORENCIO ILAR, to the damage and prejudice of
the legal heirs of FLORENCIO ILAR in such amount
as may be allowed by law."4
Upon his arraignment on June 9, 1998,5 appellant, assisted by his
counsel,6 pleaded not guilty. After trial in due course, the court a quo
rendered the assailed Decision.
The Facts
Version of the Prosecution
In its Brief,7 the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) presents the
prosecution’s version of the facts as follows:
"In the morning of February 21, 1995, Florencio Ilar,
accompanied by his six-year old grandson, Reymark
Anthony Ilar, went to the house of Luceno Tulo to buy
a piglet.
"Luceno Tulo was fashioning out a mortar (for
pounding palay) near his house when Florencio and
his grandson arrived.
"Florencio told Luceno that he wanted to buy a piglet
from him.
"Appellant Roger Puedan suddenly arrived and
stabbed Florencio five (5) times, first in the abdomen,
with a sharp, pointed knife locally known as
‘plamingco’. Terrified of what he witnessed, Luceno
fled towards the house of his neighbor. Young
Reymark ran back to his parents’ house and told his
mother, Erlinda Ilar, what transpired.
"Erlinda Ilar ran swiftly to Luceno’s place but Florencio
was already dead when she arrived. Florencio was
bathed in his own blood and lying by the side of the
rice paddy.
"The body of Florencio Ilar remained where it had
fallen until the arrival of the police later that day."8
(Citations omitted)
Version of the Defense
Appellant contends that he deserves acquittal, because the killing falls
under the exceptional circumstance referred to in Article 247 of the
Revised Penal Code. He claims to have surprised his spouse whom
he had caught in the act of committing sexual intercourse with another
person. Appellant narrates his version of the facts in the following
manner:
"The defense had a different version of the incident
that led to the death of Florencio Ilar. To lay the basis
of the questionable character of the deceased[,] [t]he
defense presented the testimony of JENNEFER
NADELA, who claimed that she was once a house
help in the residence of the Ilars’. During her stay,
which lasted only from July 1 to July 30, 1992, the
deceased used to fondle her private parts against her
will. The deceased likewise proposed an amorous
relationship with her, in exchange for some money,
which she declined.1âwphi1.nêt
"Corroborative of the testimony of Nadela, anent the
character of the deceased, was the testimony of
witness VINESA QUINTERO. Quintero’s father and
the deceased were drinking buddies. Sometime in
December 1982, when she took her vacation at her
parent’s house, her father and Florencio Ilar had a
drinking session. When the duo were through
drinking, she washed the drinking glasses of their
kitchen. Florencio Ilar, however, followed her inside
the kitchen and without warning embraced and kissed
her. Ilar then proposed that they go outside in
exchange for some amount of money. She declined
the proposition. The incident was repeated during the
next weekend when her father and Ilar had another
drinking session. The witness likewise averred that
she heard one of Florencio Ilar’s daughter-in-law,
Erlinda, confiding to her mother that Florencio Ilar was
a sex maniac, who was bent on molesting her.
"LEAH PUEDAN, the wife of the accused, admitted
having an illicit relationship with the deceased,
Florencio Ilar. The illicit relationship had been going
on for two years and was known in their barangay,
except her husband. On February 21, 1995, at about
8:00 o’clock in the morning, Florencio Ilar came to
their house, while she was breast feeding her child,
and was looking for her husband, Roger Puedan.
When she retorted that Roger was out putting the
carabao in a shade, Florencio then suggested that
they have a quick sexual intercourse, and ordered her
to remove her skirt and panty, while also undressing
himself. While they were having sex, Roger suddenly
appeared and was stunned by what he saw. Roger
then struck Florencio with his bolo and the two men
grappled with each other. She then gathered her
young child and ran away from the house.
"Accused ROGER PUEDAN, testifying on his behalf,
averred that Florencio Ilar was one of the patrons in
the ricefields [where] he works. As such patron,
Florencio usually [brought] him wine and ‘pulutan’
which they partook at his house. On February 21,
1995, at around 8:00 o’clock in the morning, he
brought his carabao to a shade. Upon his return, he
heard some noises emanating from their bedroom.
His curiosity aroused, he went inside the room and
found the already undressed Florencio having sexual
intercourse with his wife. Shaken and dumbfounded
by the revelation, he shouted invectives upon the
copulating pair and found a bolo to stab them. The
first thrust was parried by Florencio, who grappled for
the bolo and wrestled with him. As they wrestled with
each other, they fell to the ground, and his hand was
freed from the grip of Florencio. He then stabbed
Florencio and hit him on the stomach. He then
proceeded upstairs in search of his wife, who had
already fled."9 (Citations omitted)
Ruling of the Trial Court
The RTC opined that the prosecution witnesses "were straightforward
and candid in relating the incident."10 Moreover, "[n]o motive has been
shown, and the court did not find any, why they would fabricate a
story."11 They were able to establish the fact that appellant suddenly
stabbed Florencio Ilar, who was then buying a piglet outside Luceno
Tulo’s house.
One of the investigating policemen, SPO4 Antonio B. Inihao, testified
that they found Florencio’s body slumped lifeless on a rice paddy near
Tulo’s house. This fact, according to the trial court, belied the claim of
appellant that it was outside his house where he had killed Florencio.
The body remained where it had fallen, unmoved and untouched, until
the policemen arrived a few hours later. It was properly clad in a shirt
and a pair of buttoned pants. Had appellant really surprised his wife
having sexual intercourse with him, Florencio would not have had the
opportunity to put on and button up his pants, parry the immediate bolo
thrust of appellant then grapple with him.
Appellant thereafter fled and was finally arrested on March 16, 1998,
or about three years after the killing. The trial court observed that his
flight was a strong indication of his guilt.
Conformably, the RTC overruled the contention of appellant that the
killing should be treated under Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code.
It further said that treachery qualified the killing to murder.
Hence, this appeal.12
Issues
In his Brief, appellant raises the following alleged errors for our
consideration:
"I
The court a quo gravely erred in finding accused-
appellant, Roger or Rogelio Puedan, guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the offense charged.
"II
The court a quo gravely erred in finding the accused
guilty of the crime of murder despite the clear failure
of the prosecution to establish the particulars leading
to the stabbing incident."13
In short, appellant argues that (1) Article 247 of the Revised Penal
Code should be applied in his favor, and (2) treachery should not be
appreciated as a qualifying circumstance.
The Court’s Ruling
The appeal has no merit.
First Issue
Exceptional Circumstance
By raising Article 247 of the Revised Penal Code as his defense,
appellant admits that he killed the victim. This provision reads as
follows:
"ART. 247. Death or physical injuries inflicted under
exceptional circumstances. – Any legally married
person who, having surprised his spouse in the act of
committing sexual intercourse with another person,
shall kill any of them or both of them in the act or
immediately thereafter, or shall inflict upon them any
serious physical injury, shall suffer the penalty of
destierro. x x x"
By invoking this defense, appellant waives his right to the
constitutional presumption of innocence and bears the burden of
proving the following:
"1. That a legally married person (or a parent)
surprises his spouse (or his daughter, under 18 years
of age and living with him), in the act of committing
sexual intercourse with another person.
"2. That he or she kills any or both of them or inflicts
upon any or both of them any serious physical injury
in the act or immediately thereafter.
"3. That he has not promoted or facilitated the
prostitution of his wife (or daughter) or that he or she
has not consented to the infidelity of the other
spouse."14
To satisfy this burden, appellant must prove that he actually surprised
his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto, and that he killed the man
during or immediately thereafter. However, all that appellant
established was Florencio’s promiscuity, which was inconsequential
to the killing. What is important is that his version of the stabbing
incident is diametrically opposed to the convincing accounts of
Prosecution Witnesses Luceno Tulo, Reymark Anthony Ilar, Erlinda Q Now, at the time you were making a mortar,
Ilar and Policeman Inihao. where was this incident [happening], at your front, at
your back or at your side?
Appellant assails the credibility of the prosecution witnesses by
alleging that Tulo was not at the crime scene when the stabbing A On my side. (Witness referring to his right side).
occurred. Without elaborating on the particulars that led to the
incident, appellant claims that Reymark and Erlinda merely Q How far were you [from] them when this incident
underscored the fact that Florencio had been stabbed. Thus, appellant happened?
argues that these witnesses were not able to contradict his defense.
A Just more than a meter.
Well-settled is the rule that the evaluation of the credibility of witnesses
and their testimonies is best undertaken by the trial court, because it COURT: (to witness)
had the opportunity to observe them firsthand and to note their
demeanor and conduct on the witness stand. For this reason, its
findings on such matters, absent any arbitrariness or oversight of facts Q You mean, while Florencio Ilar was there to buy
or circumstances of weight and substance, are final and conclusive [a] piglet you continued to work on your mortar?
upon this Court and will not to be disturbed on appeal.15
A Yes, Your Honor.
In this case, the RTC found the prosecution witnesses to be credible
and convincing. It observed that Tulo, Reymark and Erlinda were Q Before Roger Puedan actually stabbed
candid and straightforward in relating their versions of the stabbing Florencio Ilar, did you see him coming?
incident. Tulo narrated that he was outside his house fashioning a
mortar when Florencio -- accompanied by his then five-year-old A He came suddenly, he passed this way.
grandson, Reymark -- arrived in order to buy a piglet. Standing about
a meter away, Tulo recounted that appellant suddenly appeared and (Witness pointing to his front side).
stabbed Florencio on the abdomen with a knife. Tulo testified thus:
Q He passed by in front of you or by your side?
"Q Yes, you said that Roger Puedan stabbed
Florencio Ilar, did you see him [stab] Florencio Ilar?
A On my front, as I was making a mortar.
A That was the time when I turned my head as I
Q Was he running, walking fast or was walking
was making a mortar.
naturally?
Q You mean, that was the time you saw Puedan
A He was walking fast.
[stab] Ilar?

Q Did you hear Puedan say anything when he

A Yes.
stabbed Florencio Ilar?
 A No, Your honor. "Q How many times [was he] stabbed by Roger?

Q What did he use in stabbing Florencio Ilar? A Five (5) times.

A A knife. (plamingco). Q What instrument did Roger use in stabbing your

Lolo?
Q Where was Florencio Ilar hit?
A A knife.
A On his abdomen.
Q Where did Roger Puedan stab your Lolo, in what
Q What was the position of Florencio Ilar when he place?
was stabbed?
A In the rice paddies.
A He was standing on my side."16
COURT: (to witness)
After witnessing the knife thrust, Tulo out of fear immediately ran to
his neighbor’s house. He explained: Q Were you able to see all the incident?

"Q Now, after you saw this Puedan [stab] Ilar, what A Yes, Your Honor.
did you do?
Q You were at the rice paddies also?
A I ran away.
A Yes, Your Honor.
Q How many times did you see Puedan stab Ilar?
Q Why were you there?
A Only once.
A Because he asked me to accompany him.
Q And you said you ran away, towards where?
Q Who asked you?
A To my neighbor."17
A Lolo."19
Minutes later, Tulo with some other people went back to the crime
scene and found Florencio already dead, lying several meters away There had been no untoward incident between appellant and
from the former’s house.18 Florencio immediately before the stabbing, as shown by Reymark’s
testimony:
Similarly, young Reymark testified that appellant had stabbed his
grandfather Florencio five times. He testified thus: "COURT: (to witness)
Q Were you and your Lolo able to reach the house A On his abdomen."20
of Ceno before he was stabbed?
Reymark at first stated in his testimony that, before being stabbed, his
A Yes, Your Honor. grandfather had not been able to talk to Tulo. From the boy’s
statement, appellant concludes that Tulo was not at or even near the
Q So your Lolo was able to talk with Ceno? crime scene.21 This inconsistency was clarified when the trial court
again questioned Reymark, who this time stated that his grandfather
A No. had indeed been able to see Tulo on that fateful morning.22 As posited
by the prosecution, such inconsistency in the testimony of Reymark
may be explained by the fact that he was very young when the incident
Q Why? happened -- only five years of age -- and was still very young when he
testified on the witness stand three years later. Nonetheless, it was
A Because [he] was stabbed. established that he and his grandfather were at Tulo’s place to buy a
piglet, that the boy himself saw his Lolo stabbed by appellant, and that
Q So he was still walking towards Ceno before he Tulo was there but disappeared immediately after the first knife thrust.
was stabbed?
Even assuming arguendo that Tulo was not at the crime scene,
A Not yet. Reymark’s testimony is sufficient to prove that appellant actually
stabbed Florencio.
xxx xxx xxx
Appellant further alleges that Erlinda, who was the first to arrive at the
Q Did Roger Puedan and your Lolo have a fight locus criminis, did not see Tulo anywhere. This allegation, however, is
before your Lolo was stabbed? consistent with the testimony of Tulo that he ran to his neighbor’s
house right after the first knife thrust.
A No.
Furthermore, the physical evidence shows that Florencio lay dead
near Tulo’s -- not appellant’s -- house. Erlinda testified that his body
Q Did they have [an] argument?
remained unmoved and untouched where it had fallen until the
policemen came.23 In addition, SPO4 Antonio Inihao’s testimony on
A No, Your Honor. the attendant circumstances inspires belief. He testified that the body
lay 80 meters away from appellant’s house and only about 15 meters
Q Who arrived at Ceno’s place first, your Lolo or away from Tulo’s.24 This statement contradicts the claim of appellant
Roger? that he and Florencio grappled outside the former’s house, where the
latter fell and was subsequently killed.
A Lolo.
When found, the body of Florencio was fully clothed in a shirt and a
Q Where was your Lolo hit the first time he was pair of pants, all its buttons intact.25 We agree with the RTC that had
stabbed? the victim been caught by surprise while engaged in the sex act, he
would not have had the opportunity to put on his pants, parry the
forthcoming bolo thrusts, and then grapple with appellant.
Appellant’s Flight
Further eroding the defense of appellant is the fact that he immediately
fled from the crime scene right after the stabbing incident. He hid for
about three years26 until he was arrested by the authorities on March
16, 1998.27 His flight betrays his defense, because he could have
easily relayed his story to the proper authorities, if he had indeed
caught his wife and Florencio in flagrante delicto.
Through flight, one impedes the course of justice by avoiding arrest,
detention, or the continuance of criminal proceedings. 28 As with self-
defense, the exceptional circumstance provided under Article 247 of
the Revised Penal Code may not prevail in the face of the flight of
appellant from the crime scene and his failure to inform the authorities
of the incident.29 Flight bespeaks guilt and gives credence to the
version of the prosecution in this case.30
Second Issue
Treachery
Similarly without merit is appellant’s contention that treachery did not
attend the killing. For treachery to be present, the means, methods or
forms of execution should give the person attacked no opportunity for
self-defense or retaliation. And it must be proven that such means,
methods or forms of execution were deliberately and consciously
adopted without danger to appellant.31
In the present case, the RTC correctly ruled that treachery attended
the killing. Appellant came from nowhere and suddenly stabbed the
unsuspecting Florencio five (5) times. He deliberately and consciously
adopted his mode of attack by lunging at the victim with his knife
without any warning whatsoever, giving the latter no opportunity to
defend himself.1âwphi1.nêt
WHEREFORE, the appeal is hereby DENIED and the assailed
Decision AFFIRMED. Costs against appellant.
SO ORDERED.
MURDER AND HOMICIDE
People v. Cabarrubias; G.R. Nos. L-94709-10 June 15, 1993
QUIASON, J.:
This is an appeal from the joint decision of the Regional Trial Court,
Branch 2, Bangued, Abra, in Criminal Cases Nos. 442 and 443,
convicting Ruben Cabarrubias alias "Amben" and Zosimo Antiporda
alias "Samong" of murder (Art. 248, Revised Penal Code). The
dispositive portion of the assailed decision reads as follows:
WHEREFORE, the Court finds both accused in
Criminal Cases Nos. 442 and 443 guilty beyond
reasonable doubt of the crime of murder as defined
and penalized in Art. 248 of the Revised Penal Code,
the killing of Jonalyn Espiritu in Criminal Case No. 442
being qualified by treachery and taking advantage of
superior strength with the aggravating circumstance
of nighttime; while the killing of Pedro Espiritu in
Criminal Case No. 443 is qualified by treachery with
the aggravating circumstance of nighttime, with no
mitigating circumstances proven in both cases, and
sentences them to suffer the penalty of reclusion
perpetua and to indemnify the families of their victims
the amount of P100,000.00 each, and to pay he costs
of these proceedings (Rollo, p.25).
The information filed in Criminal Case No. 442 against the accused
Ruben Cabarrubias reads as follows:
That on or about July 31, 1986, at about 7:00 o'clock
at night, at Barangay Patoc, in the municipality of
Bucay, Province of Abra, Philippines and within the
 jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the above-named
accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed
bolo, did then and there, wilfully, unlawfully and
feloniously assault, attack and stab one Jonalyn
Espiritu, an 8 year-old child, hitting her on her
abdominal cavity and on other parts of her body,
which multiple stab wounds caused her death shortly
thereafter (Rollo, p. 181).
The information filed in Criminal Case No. 443 against the accused
Zosimo Antiporda reads as follows:
That on or about July 13, 1986, at about 7:00 o'clock at night, at
Barangay Patoc, in the municipality of Bucay, Province of Abra,
Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this Honorable Court, the
above-named accused, with intent to kill, with treachery and evident
premeditation and while armed with a sharp-pointed bolo, did then and
there, wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously assault, attack and stab one
Pedro Espiritu, hitting him on his neck, which stab wound caused his
death shortly thereafter (Rollo, pp. 18-19).
At his arraignment, appellant Cabarrubias manifested his willingness
to plead guilty to the lesser offense of homicide in Criminal Case No.
442, and to assume responsibility to the charge in Criminal Case No.
443, but these manifestations were not accepted by the trial court
(Order, March 5, 1988; TSN, August 18, 1987, p. 2).
The arraignments proceeded with both appellants pleading not guilty.
The two cases were tried jointly "because of their proximity of time and
place of occurrence" (Decision, p. 2; Rollo, p. 19).
The records in the two cases show that at about P7:00 P. M. of July
13, 1986, Talledo Espiritu was at his house waiting for his 17-year old
son, Pedro, to come home from the fields. Pedro suddenly appeared
at the door, with a gaping wound on his neck and blood stains all over
his clothes. Embracing his father, Pedro told him that he was stabbed
by "Samong", referring to Antiporda. After identifying his assailant,
Pedro collapsed and he died a few moments later. Talledo then
shouted for help.
At about the same time, the screams of a child were heard, Domingo
Espiritu, a next-door neighbor of Talledo, ran outside his house to
where the screams were coming from. He saw his eight-year old
granddaughter, Jonalyn Espiritu, squatting on the ground about three
meters from Talledo's house. Domingo saw appellants running away
from the scene, with Antiporda heading towards the direction of the
house of Saturnina Belaras. Jonalyn told Domingo that she was
stabbed by "Nong Amben", referring to Cabarrubias.
Estefana Tubana, the adoptive mother of Jonalyn and who rushed to
her succor, was told by Jonalyn that she saw Antiporda stab Pedro
and that appellants chased her upon noticing her presence.
Saturnina Belaras, a neighbor of Talledo's, was washing dishes when
someone tried to forcibly open the door of her house. When she
opened the door, Antiporda entered and talked with Saturnina's son.
Antiporda did not stay long and hurriedly left the house when shouts
for help were heard.
Jonalyn died the following day, succumbing to five wounds.
Criminal Case No. 442
Cabarrubias admitted before the trial court to killing both Jonalyn
Espiritu and Pedro Espiritu. He testified that he went to see Pedro to
confront him about the latter's attempt to electrocute Cabarrubias'
sister with an electric fishing device. Pedro reacted by unsheathing his
bolo and attacking Cabarrubias, who was able to parry the attack and
stab Pedro. He claimed that after the traumatic incident, he was
possessed by a state of mind that bordered on insanity overpowered
by a force beyond his control. This was his explanation of why he
stabbed Jonalyn who happened to cross his path (Cabarrubias' Brief,
pp. 4-5, 7-9; Rollo, pp. 82-83, 85-87).
In this appeal, Cabarrubias asserts that he should have been
exempted from liability on the ground of insanity and of having acted
under the compulsion of an irresistible force.
Insanity was not invoked as a defense by Cabarrubias in the trial court
and no evidence was presented to overcome the presumption of
sanity. It is too late on appeal to raise the defense of insanity (People
v. Yagong, 181 SCRA 479 [1990]).
The evidence on record does not show any outward act of
Cabarrubias, indicating his "complete deprivation of intelligence" nor
"total deprivation of freedom of the will." On the other hand, as pointed
out by the Solicitor General, Cabarrubias was able to give a lucid
account of the series of events, from the moment he crossed path with
Jonalyn to the moment he stabbed her (Consolidated Brief for the
Appellee, pp. 28-31; Rollo, pp. 164-167). He was able to describe the
bolo he had used and to demonstrate how he used it (TSN, August
25, 1988, pp. 23-24).
There is also no showing in the record which would lead this Court to
a finding that Cabarrubias had acted under the compulsion of an
irresistible force.
Cabarrubias further contends that he should have been convicted of
homicide, not murder, and that the mitigating circumstances of lack of
intention to commit so grave a wrong as that committed and the
mitigating circumstance of passion or obfuscation, should have been
appreciated in his favor.
He alleges that he stabbed Jonalyn without any intention of killing her
but merely to stop her from screaming. He points out that Jonalyn did
not suffer any mortal wound as shown by the fact that after being
stabbed, she was still strong enough to assume a squatting position
and even answer question asked her by Domingo Espiritu. He further
claims that Jonalyn did not die as a result of the stabbing but of shock
and internal hemorrhage secondary to her wounds (Cabarrubias'
Brief, pp. 10-13, Rollo, pp. 88-91).
Contrary to the claim of Cabarrubias, the evidence shows that he
intended to kill Jonalyn. He used a bolo to inflict five incisions and
penetrating wounds on the head and torso of Jonalyn, a mere eigth-
year old child. The mitigating circumstance of lack of intent to commit
so grave a wrong as that committed cannot be appreciated where the
acts employed by the accused were reasonably sufficient to produce
the result that they actually produced—the victim (People v. Amit 32
SCRA 95 [1970]).
Cabarrubias asserts that Pedro's alleged act of attempting to
electrocute Cabarrubias' sister, Pedro's alleged unlawful aggression,
and Jonalyn's screams produced the passion and obfuscation that
deprived him of the time for reflection (Cabarrubias' Brief, pp. 13-15;
Rollo, pp. 91-93).
The circumstance of passion and obfuscation is not mitigating when
the accused acted in a spirit of lawlessness. Besides, the screams of
an eight-year old child are not provocative enough to generate a
sudden impulse of natural and uncontrolled fury (People v. Caliso, 58
Phil. 283 [1933]).
The trial court convicted Cabarrubias of murder qualified by treachery
and taking advantage of superior strength and aggravated by
nighttime.
The trial court is correct in finding Cabarrubias guilty of murder by
treachery. Killing a child is characterized by treachery even if the
manner of the assault is not shown because the weakness of the
victim due to her tender age results in the absence of any danger to
the accused (People v. Ganohon, 196 SCRA 431 [1991]).
However, taking advantage of superior strength was not alleged as a
qualifying circumstance in the information and, therefore, it cannot be
properly appreciated as such. Neither can it be appreciated as a
generic circumstance because it is absorbed in treachery.
Nighttime cannot be properly appreciated against Cabarrubias
because there is no evidence to show that the purposely sought this
circumstance to commit the crime or to facilitate the commission of the
crime (People v. De Los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707 [1991]). Granting that
nighttime attended the commission of the crime, this circumstances is
also absorbed in treachery.
Criminal Case No. 443
To bolster his defense of alibi, Antiporda relies on Cabarrubias'
testimony in open court admitting that he, not Antiporda, was the one
who stabbed to death Pedro Espiritu. Antiporda points to this
testimony of Cabarrubias, his lack of motive to kill Pedro and the dimly-
lit place of the stabbing, which made identification difficult, as sufficient
grounds to negate the weight of the dying declaration of Pedro
(Antiporda's Brief, pp. 6-9; Rollo, pp. 40-43).
The trial court dismissed Cabarrubias' version of the killing of Pedro
as a "shall concoction and confabulation to save the neck of his cousin
and constant companion, accused Zosimo Antiporda in Criminal Case
No. 443." (Decision, p. 4; Rollo, p. 21).
The version of Cabarrubias is uncorroborated and is contradicted by
the evidence of the prosecution, principally the dying declaration of
Pedro that he was stabbed by Antiporda, not by Cabarrubias. The
dying declaration of Jonalyn, as told to Estefana Tubana, also pointed
to Antiporda as the assailant of Pedro.
The trial court found no reason of doubt the credibility of Pedro in
making his ante mortem declaration and that of Talledo Espiritu in
conveying said declaration (Decision, p. 7; p. 24). We find no reason
to depart from the rule that the findings of the trial court on the
credibility of witnesses are given the highest degree of respect by the
appellate court (People v. Saulo, 211 SCRA 888 [1992]).
Anent the defense of alibi, this defense is unavailing where there is
affirmative evidence of the presence of the accused at the scene of
the crime at the time of its commission (People v. Plaza, 140 SCRA
277 [1985]; People v. Pigon, 173 SCRA 607 [1989]).
Lack of motive does not preclude conviction when the crime and the
participation of the accused therein are definitely established (People
v. Caranzo, 209 SCRA 232 [1992]).
We find, however, that the trial court erred in appreciating the
circumstance of treachery, which it considered to qualify the crime to
murder. Treachery cannot be appreciated in the absence of evidence
of the mode of attack; it cannot be presumed, but must be proved
positively (People v. Quilaton, 205 SCRA 279 [1992]).
Nighttime cannot be properly appreciated against Antiporda, there
being no evidence that it was purposely sought by him to commit the
offense (People v. De Los Reyes, 203 SCRA 707 [1991]).
Consequently, Antiporda can only be convicted of homicide, with no
modifying circumstance.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the decision of the trial court
is AFFIRMED with the following modifications.
In Criminal Case No. 442, appellant Ruben Cabarrubias is found guilty
of murder and sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua.
He is ordered to pay the heirs of Jonalyn Espiritu the amount of FIFTY
THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00) as indemnity.
In Criminal Case No. 443, appellant Zosimo Antiporda is found guilty
of homicide, and sentenced to suffer the indeterminate penalty of ten
(10) years and one (1) day of prision mayor, as minimum, to fourteen
(14) years, eight (8) months and one (1) day of reclusion temporal, as
maximum. He is ordered to indemnify the heirs of Pedro Espiritu in the
sum of FIFTY THOUSAND PESOS (P50,000.00).
SO ORDERED.
People v. Fuertes; G.R. No. 95891-92 February 28, 2000
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.:
For gathering firewood and quenching their thirst with coconuts
gathered from a tree inside a hacienda managed by Osmundo
Fuertes, Napoleon Aldeguer, aged 14, and Mateo Aldeguer, aged 16,
were bound, gagged, brutally hacked to death and thrown at the
bottom of a dried creek.
Indicted for the dastardly deeds were Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo",
Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" and "Jackie Pangalan", Edgar Gibone,
Francisco Salva @ Buchoy, and Rolando Tano @ "Boy Negro" and
"Brando" in two (2) Informations for Murder docketed as Criminal
Case Nos. 1582 and 1583.
Criminal Case No. 1582 charges —
That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati,
Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp
bladed/pointed instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill,
conspiring, confederating and mutually helping with one another,
with treachery and evident premeditation, did then and there
wilfully, unlawfully and feloniously attack, assault, hack and/or stab
with said weapons one NAPOLEON ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting
upon him mortal wounds which caused his death, and not contented
with that, sliced the left leg of the lifeless body of said Napoleon
Aldeguer.
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) adding ignominy
to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was
committed in consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
30
Criminal Case No. 1583 alleges —
That on or about November 1, 1986, in the Municipality of Mati,
Province of Davao Oriental, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of
this Honorable Court, the above-named accused, armed with sharp
bladed/pointed instruments (bolos) and with intent to kill, with
treachery and evident premeditation, conspiring, confederating and
mutually helping one another, did then and there wilfully, unlawfully
and feloniously attack, assault, hack and/or stab with said weapons
one MATEO ALDEGUER, thereby inflicting upon the latter mortal
wounds which caused his death, and not contented with that,
stabbed the abdomen of the lifeless body of said Mateo Aldeguer.
That the commission of the crime was attended by the aggravating
circumstances of (1) abuse of superior strength; (2) adding ignominy
to the natural effects of the crime; and (3) that the crime was
committed in consideration of a reward or promise.
CONTRARY TO LAW.
Accused Osmundo Fuertes @ "Dodo", Edgar Gibone, Francisco Salva
@ "Butchoy" and Rolando Tano @ Boy Negro, upon arraignment,
entered pleas of "not guilty" to both charges.1 Trial thereafter
proceeded against the four (4) accused because accused Agustin
Luyong @ "Jack", and "Jackie Pangalan" was still at large.
Accused Francisco Salva was, upon motion of the prosecution,2
discharged by the trial court in order to be utilized as a state witness.
Joint trial of the two cases, upon motion of the prosecution without
any objection from the defense,3 thereafter ensued.
Subsequently, accused Agustin Luyong @ "Jack" was apprehended
and committed to the Provincial Jail. On September 1, 1987, said
accused assisted by counsel, entered a plea of "guilty" upon
arraignment4 in both cases.
On the basis, among others, of his extra-judicial confession,5
executed in the presence of his defense counsel, narrating the
incident and his participation therein as well as the post-mortem
examination reports6 made by Dr. Gil G. Mantilla, Assistant Provincial
Health Officer, judgment7 was thereafter rendered against accused
Agustin Luyong @ "Jack", in a Decision dated September 14, 1987,
the dispositive portion of which read as follows:
WHEREFORE, IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, in Crim. Case No.
1582, the Court finds the accused Agustin Luyong alias "Jack" guilty
beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime of Murder for the
killing of Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr., and hereby sentences him to suffer
the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment), with the
accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the legal heirs
of the deceased Napoleon Aldeguer, Jr. in the sum of P30,000.00
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency, and Crim.
Case No. 1583, the Court likewise finds the accused Agustin Luyong
alias "Jack" guilty beyond reasonable doubt as principal of the crime
of Murder for the killing of Mateo Aldeguer, and hereby sentences
him to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua (life imprisonment),
with the accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify the
legal heirs of the victim, Mateo Aldeguer, in the sum of P30,000.00,
without subsidiary imprisonment in case of insolvency; and to pay
proportionate costs of these proceedings.
In the service of the above penalties, the rules provided in Art. 70 of
the Revised Penal Code shall apply.
SO ORDERED.
After a joint trial, accused Rolando Tano, Edgar Gibone and appellant
Osmundo Fuertes, were found guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the
offenses charged in a judgment dated December 4, 1989,8 the
dispositive portion of which reads:
WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing considerations:
(a) in Criminal Case No. 1582, the Court finds the accused Osmundo
Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and Rolando Tano alias "Boy
Negro" GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt as principals of the crime of
MURDER for the killing of Napoleon Aldeguer, and hereby sentences
each of them to suffer the penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the
accessory penalties provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and
severally, the heirs of the victim Napoleon Aldeguer, the sum of
THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS (P30,000,00);
(b) in Criminal Case No. 1583, the Court finds the accused Osmundo
Fuertes alias "Dodo", Edgar Gibone and Rolando Tano alias "Boy
Negro" GUILTY as principals of the crime of MURDER for the killing of
Mateo Aldeguer, and hereby sentences each of them to suffer the
penalty of RECLUSION PERPETUA, with the accessory penalties
provided for by law, to indemnify, jointly and severally, the heirs of
the victim Mateo Aldeguer the sum of THIRTY THOUSAND PESOS
(P30,000.00), plus the costs of the proceedings.1âwphi1.nêt
The rules provided in Article 70 of the Revised Penal Code shall be
observed in the service of the above sentences.
SO ORDERED.
Dissatisfied, accused Osmundo Fuertes @ Dodo interposed this
appeal alleging —
I. THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN GIVING CREDENCE TO,
AND RELYING HEAVILY ON, THE TESTIMONY OF PROSECUTION
WITNESS FRANCISCO SALVA.
II. THAT THE TRIAL COURT GRAVELY ERRED IN FINDING THAT A
CONSPIRACY EXISTED AMONG THE ACCUSED.

31
The prosecution's version of the incident as summed in the people's
brief:
In the morning of November 1, 1986, Francisco Salva was riding on a
horse and pasturing some cows and carabaos within the premises of
Hacienda Ong located in Lumagaob, Barrio Sainz, Mati, Davao
Oriental.9
Thereupon, he saw two boys gathering young coconuts.10 Salva
approached the two boys and asked them why they were gathering
young coconuts and the two boys replied that "they were thirsty".11
Thereafter, Salva reported the matter to appellant (who was
overseer of the Hacienda) and the latter promptly ordered Salva and
some other persons including accused Edgar Gibone to board a jeep
which he drove to the place where the two boys were gathering
coconuts.12 When they arrived at the place, the two boys were
already on a hill, prompting appellant and his group to chase them,
but they failed to catch them.13
Thereafter, appellant and his companions returned to appellant' s
house bringing with them two bundles of firewood allegedly
gathered and left by the two boys. When they arrived at appellant's
house, appellants and his companions "ate" and thereafter appellant
sent somebody to fetch accused Rolando Tano and Jack.14
Later in the afternoon, Rolando Tano and Jack arrived at appellant's
house. Thereupon, Salva and Edgar Gibone were summoned by
appellant and were instructed to go with Rolando Tano and Jack to
the place where the two boys were earlier seen gathering coconuts
to apprehend them should they return.15 Upon arriving at the place,
they allegedly hid in the "Canyan tree" and after a while the two boys
appeared. After a brief chase, they were able to catch the two boys.
32
The two boys were "hand-tied" and brought to the house of Joaquin
Reyes.16
Upon reaching the house of Joaquin Reyes, Jack ordered Salva and
Gibone to hide.17 Thereafter, Jack and Tano asked Felisa Reyes, the
wife of Joaquin Reyes, for water to drink and also instructed the latter
to fetch appellant at the latter's house.18
Felisa Reyes complied with the request and proceeded to appellant's
house and informed the latter that two persons were waiting for him
in her house. She described the two persons to appellant who, in
turn, told her that said persons were Jack and Boy Negro.19
Thereafter, appellant instructed Felisa Reyes to go home as he and
his companions "will just follow".20 Felisa Reyes went back home and
after a while appellant, together with two other persons arrived.
Upon seeing the two boys, appellant allegedly started scolding them
and called them thieves.21
After scolding the two boys, appellant and jack had a conversation
during which they allegedly agreed that the two boys be killed.22
Thereafter, appellant and his two companions left. Jack then ordered
Salva and Gibone to proceed to the "dead creek" which they
promptly did.
Later on, Jack, Rolando Tano and the two boys also arrived at the
"dead creek" followed by appellant.23
At the ''dead creek", Jack removed the shirts of the two boys upon
being ordered to do so by appellant.24 Jack and Rolando Tano tore
the shirts and with the torn shirts covered the mouths of the two
boys.25 Jack stabbed the smaller of the two boys, who was later
identified as Napoleon Aldeguer, with a bolo at the latter's
abdomen.26 Upon being stabbed, Napoleon fell to the ground as Jack
kept on stabbing him.27
Jack handed the bolo to Rolando Tano and the latter started stabbing AGE : 16 Years Old
the other boy who was later identified as Mateo Aldeguer.28
ADDRESS : Mapantad, Mati, Davao Oriental
Rolando Tano handed the bolo to Edgar Gibone who was threatened
TIME EXAMINED : 5:45 P.M.
by Jack that should he not stab Mateo Aldeguer, he will, in turn, be
stabbed by Jack. Edgar Gibone complied by stabbing Mateo PLACE EXAMINED : Padilla Funeral Parlor Rizal Extension, Mati, Davao
Aldeguer.29 Oriental.
Edgar Gibone was instructed by Jack to hand the bolo to Salva but the FINDINGS
latter refused to accept the bolo prompting Jack to threaten him with
death. Salva accepted the bolo and hacked the left thigh of Napoleon 1. Hacked Wound Neck, Right Side, 2 Inches along the level of the
Aldeguer as instructed by Jack.30 Jaw;

Jack took the bolo from Salva and hacked the neck of Napoleon 2. Stabbed Wound,
Aldeguer.31 2 Inches Anterior Axillary Line below The Clavicle.
After stabbing the Aldeguers, Jack and Rolando Tano left and 1/2 Inch below the Right Nipple, 2 Inches Mid-Axillary 2 Inches along
"followed" the dead creek. Appellant Edgar Gibone and Salva left and the 12th Rib;
proceeded to the house of one Nardo where appellant allegedly
warned Gibone and Salva "not to reveal what happened.32 1 1/4 Epigastric Area;

Later in the day, Rolando Tano and Jack allegedly arrived at the house
of appellant and were met by the latter in his office where he gave
each a small envelope.33
In the afternoon of November 2, 1986, the bodies of Napoleon and
Mateo Aldeguer were found in Hacienda Ong.
1 Inch Anterior Axillary from the Nippele (sic);
1 1/2 Inches located below the Nipple or the 6th Rib;
1/2 Inches Middle Third, Left Arm;
2 Inches, right Side, Posterior axillary line;

The Postmortem Examination Reports34 Issued By Dr. Gil Mantilla 2 Inches, Left Scapular Angle;
who examined the bodies of the victims contained the following
1 1/2 Inches, along the Lumbar Vertebra;
findings:
RIGOR MORTIS
NAME : MATEO ALDEGUER
— Present
SEX : Male
POST MORTEM LIVIDITY

33
— Present 1 Inch at the Right Sternal Line, at the Level of the 4th Vertebral(sic),
Right:
CAUSE OF DEATH
At the 8th Rib, Mid-Axillary Line, Right;
— Severe Hemorrhage, Secondary to Stabbed Wounds. Wounds and
Incised 2 Inches at the Mid-Scapular region, 2 inches at the Scapular Angle,
Left;

2 Inches at the 8th Posterior Rib, 1 Inch Left from the Mid-Spinal
Column;
SGD. GIL G. MANTILLA
3. Incised Wound, Middle Third, Left Thigh, dorsal Side, 3 Inches by 4
Assistant Provincial Health Officer Inches.

POST MORTEM EXAMINATION REPORT RIGOR MORTIS

NAME : NAPOLEON C. ALDEGUER, JR. — Present

SEX : Male POST MORTEM LIVIDITY

AGE : 14 Years Old — Present

ADDRESS : Mapantad, Mati Davao Oriental CAUSE OF DEATH

TIME EXAMINED : 5:30 P.M. — Severe Hemorrhage, Secondary to Stabbed Wounds and Incised
Wounds
PLACE EXAMINED :Padilla Funeral Parlor Rizal Extension, Mati, Davao
Oriental. SGD. GIL G. MANTILLA

FINDINGS Assistant Provincial Health Officer

1. Incised Wound, At the Level of Adam's Apple, 4 Inches Cutting the
Trachea and Carotid Arteries;
2. Stabbed Wound,
2 Inches, Mid Clavicular Area, 1 Inch below the Clavicle;
1/2 Inch below the Nipple, 5th inter Costal Space;
Accused-appellant Osmundo Fuertes had a different story to tell. He
declared that he had nothing to do with the twin killings.35 He
testified that as of November 1, 1986, he was the overseer of
Hacienda Ong, having been employed in that capacity since 1972.36
On that fateful day of November 1, 1986, he was at home.37 The first
thing he did in the morning was to take a bath.38 Thereafter, he
checked the daily time record and prepared the payroll.39 At around

34
5:00 p.m.. Francisco Salva who was watering the plants went upstairs
and informed. him that there were persons looking for him. Upon
going downstairs he saw Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan who asked him if
he saw her brothers,40 the two victims. He replied that he did not
see them.31 Thereafter, he together with his wife, two children —
namely, Osmundo Jr. and John-Ayster Tucayao, Allan Pisetas, Edgar
Gibone, Mauricio Homejas and Francsico Salva, Jr. had supper at 6:00
p.m.42 While having supper, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived with
some companions also looking for the Aldeguer boys.43 He likewise
told Valles that he did not see them.44 Later at around 9:00 p.m.
when they were already sleeping, they were roused by a shout from
the gate.45 When he went downstairs to verify who it was, he came
upon P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan and other
companions who were still looking for the two victims.46 He allowed
the group to go to the playground of the house and upon the latter's
request that they be permitted to search the bodega and the
surrounding areas of the hacienda he gave them his permission and
accompanied them going to the bodega. He even gave them a
flashlight to use but they only saw copra, big baskets and a pail.47
Accused-appellant further declared that on November 2, 1986 at 6:00
a.m., he, his wife, his sons, Osmundo Jr. and John, Edgar Gibone,
Francisco Salva and Ayster Tucayao went to the San Nicolas Tolentino
church.48 From there, they proceeded to the Madang public market
to buy vegetables and at the same time to meet his children from
Davao City, namely, Estella and Ana Grace.49 From the public market,
they proceeded back to the hacienda arriving at around 9:30 a.m.50
While they were having breakfast, he heard someone calling outside.
Upon peeping out of the window to verify who it was, he found out
that the callers were policemen inquiring about the Aldeguer boys.51
Again, he told the police that he did not see the victims. The
policemen declined his offer to have breakfast settling for a drink of
35
water instead, then left.52 After lunch, at around 2:00 p.m. accused-
appellant presided at a purok meeting being its president.53 At
around 4:00 p.m., while the meeting was still going on, a jeep with
policemen on board arrived.54 One of the policemen alighted and
informed accused-appellant that the two Aldeguer boys had been
found, that they were dead and that the bodies were already at the
funeral parlor.55 After informing accused-appellant of the
whereabouts of the two victims, the police left and the purok
meeting continued, ending at 4:30 p.m.56 At around 5:00 p.m. while
accused-appellant was at home, one Juan Talaboc, an ex-policeman
came.57 Upon apprising Talaboc about what transpired on that
afternoon, particularly the discovery of the two dead bodies, Talaboc
advised accused-appellant to transfer to the Mati poblacion warning
him that it was dangerous to stay. Talaboc cited several violent
incidents which resulted in the shooting of a policeman at Matiao;
the killing of a father and son at Pomoanon and the slaying of an ex-
councilman in Mapantad.58
Testifying that he feared for his safety and that of his family, accused-
appellant ordered his wife to pack up everything and immediately
proceeded to the place of Police Chief Cipriano Sefuentes at past 6:00
p.m.59 Upon being advised by Sefuentes to check in at a hotel
because his life was in danger, accused-appellant decided to proceed
to the house of one Captain Serrano at Capitol Hill, Mati, Davao
arriving therein at 8:00 p.m.60 Accused-appellant and his family
stayed at the Serrano residence up to the time of his arrest.61
Greta Fuertes, the wife of the accused-appellant corroborated her
husband's story practically echoing the latter's account point by
point. She testified that she and accused-appellant had four children,
two of whom are in Davao City while the other two are living in
Hacienda Ong.62 On November 1, 1986, she and her husband were
at home.63 In the afternoon of the same day while her husband was
playing with their two sons,64 Francisco Salva @ Butsoy informed
them that Bebing Aldeguer-Banudan was looking for her brothers.65
Later, Barrio Captain Joel Valles arrived also looking for the Aldeguer
boys.66 At 9:00 p.m. of the same day, Pat. Merlin Cagucay, Bebing
Aldeguer-Banudan and other companions arrived again looking for
her brothers.67 Her husband lent a flashlight to Napoleon Aguinaldo
and together with the group, her husband went to the copra drier.68
She further testified that on November 2, 1986, they went to the
Catholic church and attended the first mass at 6:00 a.m.69 Thereafter,
they proceeded to the public market to buy some things and to meet
their two children from Davao City.70 They returned to the hacienda
at 9:30 a.m.71 After lunch, they attended a purok meeting until 4:30
p.m. when policemen arrived and talked with her husband.72 Later,
retired policeman Talaboc informed her husband that their lives were
in danger as a result of which they hastily left and proceeded to
Captain Serrano's house at Capitol Hill with their four children where
they slept.73
Accused-appellant, in sum, denies any participation in the commission
of the crime claiming that he is being framed by P/Cpl. Merlin Cagucay
and P/Maj. Cipriano Sefuentes who wanted to extort P50,000.00 from
him. Accused-appellant also claim that Francisco Salva is a "coached"
witness whose credibility is suspect, hence, his guilt cannot be
predicated thereon. He likewise points out certain excerpts from the
testimony of self-confessed killer Agustin Luyong allegedly clearing
him of any participation in the crime charged. He concludes that "the
passion and outrage which attended the commission of the crime
should not blur the evidence" which points to his innocence.
We disagree.
While it is true, as pointed out by accused-appellant, that the
challenged decision convicting him of the crime charged rests mainly
on the testimony of Francisco Salva @ Butsoy who was initially
accused together with appellant but was subsequently discharged and
utilized as a state witness, a circumspect scrutiny of the record
discloses that appellant's conviction is not predicated solely on Salva's
testimony. Appellant's conviction is amply supported by the mass of
36
the evidence on record. Particularly damaging to accused-appellant's
pretensions at innocence is the following Sworn Statement74 of
Agustin Luyong who entered a plea of guilty and was convicted on the
basis thereof,75" viz:
Q4: — Of your own personal knowledge, do you know who killed the
aforesaid minors?
A: — Yes, sir. They were killed by me and Boy Negro in the presence
of Francisco Salva and Edgar Gibone at a dried creek (logot) outside
the Ong Hacienda at Sitio Lomogaob, Barangay Sainz, Mati, Davao
Oriental.
Q5: — Will you please narrate to me in brief the circumstances which
led to the killing of Napoleon and Mateo Aldeguer?
A: — In the afternoon of November 1, 1986, at about 3:00 o'clock,
more or less, while I was in the house of the grandparents of Boy
Negro at Mapantad, Barangay Sainz, Mati, Davao Oriental, the
Manager of Ong Hacienda, arrived and then and there requested Boy
Negro and myself to go to Ong Hacienda and help him apprehend the
two boys, should they come back, who at about 10:00 o'clock that
morning were seen eating stolen young coconuts inside the (sic) who
according to Osmundo "Dodo" Fuertes, they chased but failed to catch
because they (young boys) run fast. Because of the request of Boy
Negro and myself went to the Ong Hacienda at past. 3:00 o'clock that
afternoon of November 1, 1986. At about 4:00 o'clock, more or less,
two young boys who at that time I do not know, but were identified by
Francisco Salva alias "Buchoy" and Edgar Gibone, as the persons
whom they chased in the morning but escaped, appeared. Then and
there Boy Negro, Francisco Salva, and Edgar Gibone including myself
chased and caught the two minors and immediately brought them to
the house of Joaquin Reyes near the Ong Hacienda. Shortly after we
arrived the house of Joaquin Reyes, I requested Mrs. Reyes to go and
informed Dodo Fuertes that we already caught the two boys. Mrs.
Reyes left and not long afterwards, Dodo Fuertes with companions
arrived, investigated the two boys and later signal me to go to inside
the sala of the house of Joaquin Reyes and there hired me to kill these
two boys at and for a price of P5,000.00 of which he immediately give
me P200.00 as down payment with the assurance and promise to pay
the full balance of P4,800.00 after I shall have accomplished the job
because according to Dodo Fuertes, he will get the money from Mr.
Bernardo Ong, the owner of the Ong Hacienda.
Q6: — After your short conversation with Dodo Fuertes, as stated
above, what happened next, if any?
A: — Immediately after coming out from the sala, Boy Negro and
myself hogtied one of the boys while Dodo Fuertes hogtied the other
one.
Q7: — After that, what happened next?
A: — Dodo Fuertes left with his companion, and at about 6:00 o'clock
that evening, Boy Negro, Francisco Salva, Edgar Gibone and myself
brought the two boys to the dried creek (logot) and there, despite of
the pleadings of the two young boys for us not to kill them, Boy Negro
and myself took turns in stabbing them to death, after which I let
Francisco Salva and Edgar Gibone stab the deceased also they will
not reveal the incident to anyone.
Q8: — Before Dodo Fuertes left the house of Joaquin Reyes, did he
not have any conversation with the two boys?
A: — There was sir, The two young boys as a matter of fact, pleaded
and asked forgiveness saying, "PASAYLOA INTAWON KAMI NONG,
DUHA RA BITAO KADTO KA BUTONG, AMO LANG BAYARAN."
Which in English means, "Sir forgive us for the two young coconuts
that we got, we will just pay them" to which Dodo Fuertes got mad and
said, "DILI KANA MAHIMO, ANG ORDER KANAKO NI MR. ONG
MAO NGA PATYON ANG SI BISAN KINSANG MADAKPAN NGA
MANGAWAT SA SULOD SA HACIENDA." Which in English means,
"No, that cannot be done because the order to me by Mr. Ong is,
whoever is caught stealing anything inside the hacienda must be
killed."
Q9: — By the way, when did you come to know Dodo Fuertes for the
first time?
37
A: — It was in the month of April, 1986 when while passing inside the
Ong Hacienda with Boy Negro, Dodo Fuertes called us to his house
where we ate cooked banana[s].
Q10: — After you and your group killed the two young boys, where did
you go?
A: — I went home to the house of my parents-in-law at Magsaysay
Beach, Mati, Davao Oriental, there I went into hiding.
xxx xxx xxx
Q15: — Can you still pictured (sic) the face of the person whom you
know the person who induces (sic) and hired you to kilt the two minor
victims? (At this juncture, Agustin Luyong was brought yo (sic) the Mati
Provincial Jail to pinpoint the person whom (sic) really knows to be
Osmundo "Dodo" Fuertes.)
Q16: — Now, we are at the Mati, Provincial Jail, Mati, Davao Or. Can
you pinpoint to me where is Dodo Fuertes?
A: — Yes, sir. That person, and I positively identified him as the person
who induces and hired me to kill the two minor victims, (Investigator
observed hat Agustin D. Luyong is pointing to the person of Osmundo
"Dodo " Fuertes from among several prisoners at Mati Provincial Jail).
Q17: — Were you able and (sic) questioned fairly and enough so that
you were states (sic) or say what you wanted to say in this
investigation?
A: — Yes, sir. I would like to inform you that I would like to add [to] this
statement I have.
Q18: — What else can you say?
A: — For the information of the proper government authorities, I really
admitted that I am the one who killed the two minor victims, I did that
because of the assurance given to me by Dodo Fuertes [that he would
pay me] the price of P5,000.00 which in return he fails (sic) to give me,
and I ask this through my defense counsel of my own choice that if
ever will be punished of the crime committed I am willing to suffer for
the it so long as also Dodo Fuertes would also suffer for the
consequences he does. That's all I can say.
Equally damaging to the cause of accused-appellant is the Sworn
Statement of Edgar Gibone76 which reads:
Q-12: — What was the action made by the manager upon receiving
the report of Francisco Salva, alias Buchoy, if you know?
A: — Mr. Osmundo Fuertes got his Air Rifle and called myself, Buchoy,
Allan Posidas, Ayster Tucayao, Ernesto Conejos to go with him to
apprehend the two boys, but before we could reach them, they fled
away and our group tried to chase the two but [they] were able to
escape and Dodo Fuertes was mad and angry because we failed to
catch the two boys.
Q-13: — What transpired, more if any?
A: — Dodo Fuertes called us and said "lets go home" and ordered us
to load the two bundles of coconut palms (dried) left behind by the two
boys into his service jeep and we bring (sic) it to the compound.
Q-14: — In the afternoon of the same day, can you recall where were
you?
A: — I was in the house of [t]he manager inside the Hacienda
Compound? (sic)
Q-15: — What time was that?
A: — At about 3:30 o'clock, more or less.
Q-16: — While you were in the house of Dodo Fuertes, do you know
if there is any unusual incident that transpired?
A: — Osmundo Fuertes hired alias Jack and alias Brando to kill the
two boys if they will come back inside the Hacienda.
Q-17: — How do you know that Osmundo Fuertes alias Dodo hired
alias Jack and alias Brando to kill the two boys?
38
A: — Because I was present when Osmundo Fuertes and alias Jack
were having a conversations (sic) while alias Brando was waiting
outside the house.
Q-18: — Can you tell us what was that conversations (sic) about?
A: — I heard Dodo Fuertes telling allias Jack that he will not allow
anybody to enter the hacienda compound as ordered by the owner.
He ordered alias Jack to kill the two boys and to kill the thieves who
ever [may be] seen inside the Hacienda Ong.
Q-19: — What was the answer of alias Jack in response to the order
of Dodo Fuertes to kill the two boys, if you know?
A: — Alias Jack assured to kill the two boys and to kill the thieves who
ever [they may be] seen inside the Hacienda Ong.
Q-20: — After their conversation, what more that (sic) transpired?
A: — Dodo Fuertes handed an airmail envelope containing money to
alias Jack and told alias Jack to proceed to the place where the two
boys filed the two bundles of dried coconut palms and told me to guide
or accompany alias Jack and alias Brando with Buchoy because he is
very certain that the two boys will go back to get the dried coconut
palms.
Q-21: — Where did Dodo Fuertes get the airmail envelopes, If you
know?
A: — I saw the two airmail envelopes placed on the table where Dodo
Fuertes and alias Jack were having conversation and after their
conversation, Dodo Fuertes handed the envelop[es] to alias Jack and
alias Brando, respectively.
Q-22: — How do you know that the said airmail envelopes contained
money?
A: — I saw money because the envelop was half opened.
Q-23: — Do you know if how much [was] the money that was put inside
the two envelops (sic)?
A: — I do not know, sir.
Q-24: — After Dodo Fuertes gave an envelope to alias Jack and alias
Brando, what did the two do?
A: — Alias Jack, alias Brando, Buchoy and myself proceeded to the
place where the two boys were gathering dried coconut palms and
stealing young coconut[s] (butong).
Q-25: — Please tell us if (sic) what happened when you arrived at the
said place together with alias Jack, alias Brando and Buchoy?
A: — When we arrived at the said place, we saw the two boys inside
the hacienda and they managed to run but finally we caught and
apprehended them outside [the] fence of the Hacienda Ong.
Q-26: — Do you know the names of the two boys before they were
apprehend?
A: — I do not know their names but when they were apprehended they
identified themselves as Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q-27: — After you had caught the two boys, what happened?
A: — Boy Brando ordered me to hogtie Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon
Aldeguer with the use of the nylon ropes.
Q-28: — From the place where you had abducted the boys, where did
you go?
A: — We brought the two boys leading to the Dacalos Coconut
plantation, and passed by the house of Samuel Baay employee of Dr.
Dacalos.
Q-29: — What was your purpose in passing the house of Samuel
Baay?
A: — Alias Jack and Boy Negro passed by the house of Samuel Baay
and asked water.
Q-30: — From there where did you go?
39
A: — We proceeded to the house of Juaquin Reyes.
Q-31. — What happened when you reached the house of Juaquin
Reyes?
A: — I was told to hide at the back of the house of Juaquin Reyes with
Francisco Salva and they removed the nylon rope that were (sic) used
in tying Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q-32: — When you hide (sic) at the house of Juaquin Reyes, where
did alias Jack and alias Boy Negro go?
A: — They proceeded to the house of Juaquin Reyes with the two boys
already untied.
Q-33: — When alias Jack and alias Boy Brando were in the house of
Juaquin Reyes, can you recall if there was another unsual (sic)
incident that transpired?
A: — There was, we saw one Felisa Reyes going to the Hacienda
Ong.
Q-34: — Do you know where did Felisa go?
A: — We came to know later on that Felisa Reyes went to the house
of Dodo Fuertes as requested by Alias Jack and Alias Boy Negro to
inform Dodo Fuertes that they are waiting for him in their house.
Q-35: — Did Dodo Fuertes go to the house of Juaquin Reyes?
A: — Yes, Sir.
Q-36: — Who were the companions of Dodo Fuertes in going to the
house of Juaquin Reyes, if there is (sic) any?
A: — Samuel Arceno and Antonio Gibone.
Q-37: — Did Dodo Fuertes meet Alias Jack and Alias Boy Negro at
the house of Juaquin Reyes?
A: — Yes, Sir.
Q-38: — From the house of Juaquin Reyes where did you go?
A: — After Dodo Fuertes had left the house of Juaquin Reyes we
brought Mateo Aldeguer and Napoleon Aldeguer loading to the deep
creek or ravine between two hills, a distance of 150 meters more or
less from the house of Juaquin Reyes.
Q-39: — While on your way, was there any unusual incident that
transpired?
A: — The mouths of Napoleon Aldeguer and Mateo Aldeguer were
covered/wrapped by their own clothes by Alias Jack and Alias Boy
Negro, respectively and we proceeded to the place where they were
being killed (sic).
Q-40: — You said that Napoleon Aldeguer and Mateo Aldeguer were
being killed (sic) where was this two boys killed?
A: — At the deep clip (sic) between two hills.
Q-41: — Who killed Napoleon Aldeguer?
A: — Alias Jack stabbed him with the use of the sharp and pointed
bolo.
Q-42: — How many times did Alias Jack stabbed (sic) Napoleon
Aldeguer?
A: — I cannot exactly remember but many times.
Q-43: — How did Alias Jack stabbed (sic) or killed (sic) Napoleon
Aldeguer?
A: — Alias Jack stabbed Napoleon Aldeguer on his stomach and at
the back.
Q-44: — It appearing in the dead body of Napoleon Aldeguer that the
neck was cut or sliced, who sliced the neck?
A: — Alias Jack Sir.
Q-45: — At what time was the killing incident done?
A: — At about 6:00 o'clock in the evening, because it was already dark.
40
Q-46: — Showing to you this picture of the dead wearing short pants
without dress, the breast is lying flat on the ground, do you know or
recognize this picture?
A: — Yes, Sir, I recognized it as the picture of Napoleon Aldeguer that
was stabbed or killed by Alias Jack. (The picture of the dead body of
Napoleon Aldeguer was positively identified by the affiant to be the
same picture of Napoleon Aldeguer that was killed by Alias Jack).
Q-47: — It appearing on the picture that portion of the flesh of the left
leg of Napoleon Aldeguer as you have recognized, was sliced, and
who sliced the flesh?
A: — Francisco Salva alias Buchoy upon order of Alias Jack.
Q-48: — What was your participation in the stabbing or killing, if any?
A: — I have stabbed Mateo Aldeguer once upon order of Jack, and I
have no participation in killing Napoleon Aldeguer.
Q-49: — What was the participation of Boy Negro in the killing?
A: — He was the one who killed Mateo Aldeguer and who stabbed him
with the use of the bolo, the same bolo used in the killing of Napoleon
Aldeguer.
Q-50: — Victim Mateo Aldeguer sustained a cut or sliced wound on
the neck, who sliced or cut the neck?
A: — Alias Boy Negro, Sir.
Q-51: — Showing you this picture of the dead without dress with stab
wounds on the body with bloodstain, do you know or recognized him?
A: — That is the picture of the dead body of Mateo Aldeguer, the one
stabbed or killed by alias Boy Negro.
Q-52: — Do you know if who cut or sliced the neck of Mateo Aldeguer,
please tell us if you know?
A: — Alias Boy Negro, Sir.
Q-53: — What did they do (Jack and Boy Negro), after killing Napoleon
and Mateo Aldeguer?
A: — Their dead bodies were transferred to the other side of the hills
and I asked permission from Jack and Negro that I will go ahead to
pasture carabaos and cows.
Q: Can you tell the Honorable Court, what that incident was?
A: There were two boys who arrived in our house, one is white
and other is black, and their ages were from 16 to 19 years old,
respectively, if I am not mistaken and together with them were two
young boys, male.

Q-54: — Did they permit you to go ahead? xxx xxx xxx

A: — Yes, Sir, because they know my work. Q: Now, when Dodo Fuertes arrived in your house with Antonio
Gibone and Samuel Arceño, can you tell the Court what did Dodo
Q-55: — From that place where the two dead bodies were transferred, Fuertes do?
do you know if what did they do with the dead bodies, please tell us if
you know? A: When Dodo Fuertes arrived in our house, he went upstairs
and upon seeing the two boys, he said, now you were already caught
A: — I have learned that the dead bodies were dragged to the dead and you are picking things in the hacienda, you are thieves.
creek by alias Jack and alias Boy Negro.
Q: Now, what else did Dodo Fuertes do while he was in your
The foregoing statements of Luyong and Gibone were executed house?
separately in the presence of lawyers personally chosen by them and
after they were informed of their constitutional rights to remain silent A: After scolding the two boys, Jack called him to our kitchen.
and to counsel. It also appears that the above statements were not
merely subscribed and sworn to before Fiscals Salvador M. Bijis and Q: Did he go, when Jack called him?
Nino A. Batingana, respectively, but they also bear certifications that A: Yes, together with Jack.
show clearly that the statements of Luyong and Gibone were given
freely and intelligently. Writing finis to any further pretensions of ATTY. MANIWANG:
innocence by the accused-appellant are the following excerpts from
It was Jack who called Dodo.
the testimony of Felisa Reyes:
ATTY. VALENTEROS, JR.:
Q: Now, on November 1, 1986, at about 4:00 o'clock in the
afternoon, more or less, can you tell the Honorable Court where were Q: What did he do there?
you?
A: They have (sic) a secret conversation, which we can not hear.
A: I was in our residence.
Q: How long did they talk with each other?
Q: Now, during said time and date while you were in your house,
can you recall of any incident that happened. A: If I am not mistaken, about five minutes.

A: Yes. Q: Now, after their conversation, can you tell the Court, what
happened?
ATTY. VALENTEROS, JR:

41
A: After that secret conversation, they went back to the balcony
and then Jack called Dodo Fuertes, what to do, and according to Dodo
Fuertes "I am entrusting them to you, take care of them".77
As, a crime, murder is looked upon as "[o]one of the instances when
man descend to a level lower than that of a beast, for it is non-
instinctive killing, a deliberate destruction of a member of the same
species for reasons other than survival."78 Nowhere is it more evident
than this case.
From the above-quoted testimonies of Luyong and Gibone on how the
crimes were committed, there is no doubt that conspiracy attended the
commission of the crime. "[C]onspiracy exists when two or more
persons come to an agreement concerning the commission of a felony
and decide to commit it. The agreement may be deduced from the
manner in which the offense was committed:79 or from the acts of the
accused before, during and after the commission of the crime
indubitably pointing to and indicating a joint purpose, a concert of
action and a community of interest."80 It is not essential that there be
proof of the previous agreement to commit the crime. It is sufficient
that the form and manner in which the attack was accomplished clearly
indicate unity of action and purpose.81
Conspiracy is undoubtedly present in the case at bar since all the
accused performed concerted acts in pursuit of a joint purpose: they
lay in wait for the two (2) victims, captured, hogtied and gagged them
and finally took turns in stabbing and hacking them to death with bolos
— at the instigation of herein accused-appellant who promised and, in
fact, paid Agustin Luyong @ Jack and Rolando Tano @ Brando/Boy
Negro sums of money enclosed in small envelopes.82 Parenthetically,
the records show that accused-appellant even took active part in
trussing up the victims before they were brought to the place where
they were killed.83 Conspiracy having been established, "[a]ll the
conspirators are liable as co-principals regardless of the manner and
extent of their participation since in the contemplation of law, the act
of one is the act of all."84
Treachery, likewise, attended the killing of the two (2) victims. There
is treachery when the offender commits the crime employing means,
42
methods or forms in the execution thereof which tend directly and
specially to insure its execution, without risk to himself arising from any
defense which the offended party might make.85 For treachery to be
appreciated, it must be shown that; 1.] the means of execution
employed gave the person attacked no opportunity to defend himself
or retaliate; and 2.] the means of execution was deliberately or
consciously adopted.85
In this case, the means, method and form of execution employed gave
the victims no opportunity to defend themselves to retaliate; they,
likewise, were deliberately adopted by the malefactors to ensure that
their persons would endangered87 considering that the victims' hands
were tied behind their backs with nylon ropes and their mouths were
gagged with their shirts before the accused commenced taking turns
in hacking them with bolos.88 The obvious helplessness of the victims
when they were killed and even as they pleaded their lives need not
be overemphasized.1âwphi1.nêt
The aggravating circumstance of abuse of superior strength, although
alleged, is absorbed in treachery and can no longer be appreciated
separately.89 In this connection, it bears stressing that when treachery
qualifies the crime to murder, the generic aggravating circumstance of
abuse of superior strength is necessarily included in the former.90
Stated differently, when treachery qualifies the crime to murder, it
absorb abuse of superior strength and the latter can not be
appreciated even as a generic aggravating circumstance.91
Evident premeditation must likewise be appreciated in the commission
of the offenses. Evident premeditation can be presumed where, as in
this case, conspiracy is directly established.92 The essence of evident
premeditation is that the execution of the criminal act is preceded by
cool thought and reflection upon the resolution to carry out the criminal
intent during the space of time sufficient to arrive at a calm
judgment.95 Its requisites are: 1.] the time the accused determined to
commit the crime; 2.] an act manifestly indicating that the accused has
clung to his determination: 3.] a sufficient lapse of time between such
determination and execution to allow him to reflect upon the
circumstances of his act.94
In this case, when accused-appellant was informed by Francisco
Salva in the morning of that fateful day of November 1, 1986 that he
saw the two (2) victims gathering young coconuts at the hacienda
grounds, appellant promptly ordered Salva and some others, including
Edgar Gibone, to board a jeep which he drove to the place where the
victims were seen gathering coconuts95 with the intention of pursuing
them. Although they gave chase, appellant and his group failed to
catch the two (2) boys who were already on the crest of a hill at the
time.96 The chase was then called off and the pursuers returned to
appellant's house where he sent somebody to fetch Agustin Luyong
@ Jack and Rolado Tano @ Boy Negro/Brando.97
Later in the afternoon, Jack and Boy Negro/Brando arrived at
appellant's house where the latter ordered them to catch the victims
and to kill them98 should they return.99 The two boys indeed returned
and were caught by Jack and Boy Negro/Brando who "hand-tied" them
and brought them to the house of Joaquin Reyes.100 Appellant was
then fetched from his house upon the capture of the victims,101
where, after castigating the two boys and calling them thieves,102
ordered Jack and Boy Negro/Brando to kill them.103
Evident premeditation indicates deliberate planning and
preparation.104 The foregoing facts show too clearly that the killing of
the victims were calculated and premeditated. In this case, accused-
appellant had more than ample time to coolly reflect upon the
consequences of his act when the victims were able to escape the first
time they were pursued by appellant and his group. Instead, appellant
had Jack and Boy Negro/Brando summoned and ordered them to
catch the victims and kill them if they returned. Appellant was afforded
even more time to contemplate on the repercussions of his deed when
Jack and Boy Negro/Brando set out to do his bidding. However,
instead, of desisting from his murderous inclinations, accused-
appellant clung to his resolve when Jack and Boy Negro/Brando
returned with the two victims and ordered them killed.
Likewise, there can be no question that the crimes were committed in
consideration of a price promise or reward (precio promesa o
recompensa) considering that Agustin Luyong @ Jack was hired by
43
accused-appellant for a price of 5,000.00 to kill the two (2) victims and
in fact received P200.00 contained in an airmail envelope as down
payment with the assurance that the balance would be paid after the
job.105 However while this circumstance is qualifying in murder, it
would merely be generic aggravating if it concurs with other qualifying
circumstances like treachery,106 as in this case.
The aggravating circumstance of ignominy (ignominia), although
alleged can not be appreciated in this case. Ignominy is a
circumstance pertaining to the moral order which adds disgrace and
obloquy to the material injury caused by the crime.107 The clause
"Which add ignominy to the natural effects of the act" contemplates a
situation where the means employed or the circumstances tend to
make the effects of the crime more humiliating or to put the offended
party to shame.108 In this case there is no showing that the offenses
were perpetrated in a manner which tended to make its effects more
humiliating to the victims.
Neither can the act slicing the left leg of Napoleon Aldeguer's lifeless
body nor the stabbing of Mateo Aldeguer's corpse in the stomach be
considered indications of ignominia because what is required is that
the crime be committed in a manner that tends to make its effects more
humiliating to the victim, that is, add to his moral suffering.109 Thus, it
was held that the fact that the accused sliced and took the flesh from
the thighs, legs and shoulders of the victim with a knife after killing the
victim did not add ignominy to the natural effects of the acts.110
Before its amendment by R. A. No. 7659, Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code reads:
Art. 248. Murder. — Any person who, not falling within the provisions
of Article 246 shall kill another, shall be guilty of murder and, shall be
punished by reclusion temporal in its maximum period to death if
committed with any of the following attendant circumstances:
1. With treachery, taking advantage of superior strength, with the aid
of armed men, or employing means to weaken the defense or of
means or persons to insure or afford impunity.
2. In consideration of a price, reward or promise.
3. By means of inundation, fire, poison, explosion, shipwreck,
stranding of a vessel, derailment or assault upon a railroad, fall of an
airship, by means of motor vehicles, or with the use of any other
means, involving great waste and ruin.
4. On occasion of nay of the calamities enumerated in the preceding
paragraph, or of an earthquake, eruption of a volcano, destructive
cyclone, epidemic or public calamity.
5. With evident premeditation.
6. With cruelty, by deliberately and inhumanly augmenting the
suffering of the victim, or outraging or scoffing at his person or corpse.
Considering the presence of several aggravating circumstances with
no mitigating circumstance the penalty in its maximum period which is
death111 would be imposable under Article 64 of the Revised Penal
Code. Fortunately for accused-appellant, since the crimes were
committed during the suspension of the imposition of the death penalty
and prior to its reimposition under Republic Act No. 7659, the
imposable penalty is reclusion perpetua.112 This penalty is single and
indivisible, thus, it shall be imposed regardless of any attending
aggravating or mitigating circumstances.113
The civil indemnity which is awarded without need of further proof
other than the death of the victim is affirmed.114 Conformably,
however, with controlling jurisprudence, the civil indemnity should be
increased to P50,000.00.115
The trial court, in sentencing the accused-appellant, erroneously
equated reclusion perpetua to life imprisonment. This Court once
again reiterates that the penalties imprisonment and reclusion
perpetua are not the same.
While "life imprisonment" may appear to be the English translation of
reclusion perpetua, in reality, it goes deeper than that. First, "life
imprisonment" is invariably imposed for serious offenses penalized by
special laws, while reclusion perpetua is prescribed under the Revised
44
Penal Code. Second, "life imprisonment", unlike reclusion perpetua,
does not carry with it any accessory penalty; Third, "life imprisonment"
does not appear to have any definite extent or duration, while reclusion
perpetua entails imprisonment for at least thirty (30) years after which
the convict becomes eligible for pardon, although the maximum period
thereof shall in no case exceed forty (40) years.116
WHEREFORE, with the sole modification that the civil indemnity for
the heirs of the victims be increased to Fifty Thousand Pesos
(P50,000.00), the Decision appealed from is hereby AFFIRMED in all
other respects.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Baluntong; G.R. No. 182061 March 15, 2010
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
Ferdinand T. Baluntong (appellant) appeals from the August 13,
2007 Decision1 of the Court of Appeals to which the Court had
earlier referred the present case for intermediate review following
People v. Mateo.2
In its challenged Decision, the appellate court affirmed appellant’s
conviction by the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43, of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder, following his
indictment for such offense in an Information reading:
That on or about the 31st day of July 1998, at about 10:30 in the
evening at Barangay Danggay, Municipality of Roxas, Province of
Oriental Mindoro, Philippines and within the jurisdiction of this
Honorable Court, the above-named accused, did, then and there,
with malice aforethought and with deliberate intent to kill, set on
fire, the house of Celerina Solangon, causing the complete
destruction of the said house and the death of Celerina Solangon
and Alvin Savarez, and inflicting serious physical injuries on Josua
(sic) Savarez, thereby performing all the acts of execution which
would produce the crime of murder as a consequance (sic) but
which, nevertheless do not produce it by reason of causes
independent of the will of the perpetrator.3 x x x x (underscoring
supplied)
Gathered from the records of the case is the following version of
the prosecution:
At around 10:30 p.m. of July 31, 1998, while then 12-year old
Jovelyn Santos (Jovelyn) was sleeping in the house of her
grandmother Celerina Solangon (Celerina) at Barangay Dangay,
Roxas, Oriental Mindoro, she was awakened by heat emanating
from the walls of the house. She thus roused her cousin Dorecyll
and together they went out of the house.
Jovelyn saw appellant putting dry hay (dayami) around the house
near the terrace where the fire started, but appellant ran away
when he saw her and Dorecyll.
Appellant’s neighbor, Felicitas Sarzona (Felicitas), also saw
appellant near Celerina’s house after it caught fire, following which,
appellant fled on seeing Jovelyn and Dorecyll stepping out of the
house, as other neighbors repaired to the scene to help contain the
flames. Felicitas also saw Celerina, who was at a neighbor’s house
before the fire started, enter the burning house and resurface with
her grandsons Alvin and Joshua.
Celerina and Alvin sustained third degree burns which led to their
death. Joshua sustained second degree burns.
Upon the other hand, appellant, denying the charge, invoked alibi,
claiming that he, on his mother Rosalinda’s request, went to
Caloocan City on July 15, 1998 (16 days before the incident) and
stayed there until February 1999. Rosalinda corroborated
appellant’s alibi.
By Decision of February 28, 2003, the trial court found appellant
guilty as charged, disposing as follows:
45
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
(a) The court finds accused Ferdinand Baluntong GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of the complex crime of Double Murder with
Frustrated Murder punishable under Article 248 of the Revised
Penal Code as amended by Republic Act 7659 in relation to Article
48 of the Revised Penal Code and is hereby sentenced to suffer
the supreme penalty of DEATH to be executed in accordance with
the existing law;
xxxx
(c) Accused Ferdinand Baluntong is also ordered to pay the heirs
of Celerina Suba Solangon the sum of P50,000.00 as
compensatory damages and the heirs of Elvin [sic] Savariz the
following: (I) the sum of ₱50,000.00 as compensatory damages (II)
the sum of ₱16,500.00 as actual damages; and (III) the sum of
₱50,000.00 as moral damages.
SO ORDERED.4 (emphasis in the original; italics and underscoring
supplied)
In affirming the trial court’s conviction of appellant, the appellate
court brushed aside appellant’s claim that the prosecution failed to
prove his guilt beyond reasonable doubt. The appellate court,
however, modified the trial court’s decision by reducing the penalty
to reclusion perpetua in light of the passage of Republic Act No.
9346,5 and by additionally awarding exemplary damages to the
heirs of the victims (Celerina and Alvin), and temperate damages
to Joshua representing his "hospitalization and recuperation." Thus
the appellate court disposed:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the February 28, 2003
Decision of the Regional Trial Court of Roxas, Oriental Mindoro,
Branch 43, is MODIFIED as follows:
 1. Accused-appellant FERDINAND BALUNTONG y A: The fire was at the rear portion going up, sir.
TALAGA is found GUILTY beyond reasonable doubt of the
complex crime of Double Murder with Frustrated Murder Q: How far was Balentong (sic) from that burning
and is hereby sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion portion of the house?
perpetua.
A: He was just infront (sic) of the house, sir.
2. Accused-appellant is further required to pay the heirs of
the victims the amount of P25,000.00 as exemplary Q: How far from the burning portion of the house?
damages and the amount of P25,000.00 as temperate
damages for the hospitalization and recuperation of
A: About two (2) meters away, sir.
Joshua Savariz.
Q: The two (2) meters from the front portion or two
3. In all other respects, the February 28, 2003 Decision of
(2) meters from the burning portion?
the regional trial court is hereby AFFIRMED.6 (italics and
emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)
A: About two (2) meters, sir.
In his Brief, appellant raises doubt on prosecution witness Felicitas’
claim that she saw appellant fleeing away from the burning house, Q: From the burning portion?
it being then 10:30 p.m. and, therefore, dark. He raises doubt too
on Jovelyn’s claim that she saw appellant, given her failure to ask A: Yes, sir.7 (underscoring supplied)
him to stop putting dried hay around the house if indeed her claim
were true. JOVELYN:

After combing through the records of the case, the Court finds that Q: How big was the fire when according to you, you
the trial court, as well as the appellate court, did not err in finding saw the back of this Ferdinand Balontong (sic)?
that appellant was the malefactor.
A: It is already considerable size, Your Honor.
There should be no doubt on prosecution witnesses Felicitas’ and
Jovelyn’s positive identification of their neighbor-herein appellant Q: What effect has this fire in the illumination in that
as the person they saw during the burning of the house, given, vicinity, regarding visibility of that vicinity?
among other things, the illumination generated by the fire. Consider
the following testimonies of Felicitas and Jovelyn: A: The surrounding was illuminated by that fire,
Your Honor.8 (underscoring supplied)
FELICITAS:
Appellant’s alibi must thus fail.
Q: Which portion of the house was on fire when you
saw Balentong (sic) for the first time?

46
In determining the offense committed by appellant, People v.
Malngan9 teaches:
[I]n cases where both burning and death occur, in order to
determine what crime/crimes was/were perpetrated – whether
arson, murder or arson and homicide/murder, it is de rigueur to
ascertain the main objective of the malefactor: (a) if the main
objective is the burning of the building or edifice, but death results
by reason or on the occasion of arson, the crime is simply arson,
and the resulting homicide is absorbed; (b) if, on the other hand,
the main objective is to kill a particular person who may be in a
building or edifice, when fire is resorted to as the means to
accomplish such goal the crime committed is murder only; lastly,
(c) if the objective is, likewise, to kill a particular person, and in fact
the offender has already done so, but fire is resorted to as a means
to cover up the killing, then there are two separate and distinct
crimes committed – homicide/murder and arson. (emphasis and
underscoring partly in the original; emphasis partly supplied)
Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1613, "Amending the Law on
Arson," reads:
Section 3. Other Cases of Arson. ─ The penalty of Reclusion
Temporal to Reclusion Perpetua shall be imposed if the property
burned is any of the following:
xxxx
2. Any inhabited house or dwelling;
The Court finds that there is no showing that appellant’s main
objective was to kill Celerina and her housemates and that the fire
was resorted to as the means to accomplish the goal.
In her Affidavit executed on August 11, 1998,10 Felicitas stated that
what she knew is that Celerina wanted appellant, who was renting
a house near Celerina’s, to move out.
47
How Felicitas acquired such "knowledge" was not probed into,
however, despite the fact that she was cross-examined thereon.11
Absent any concrete basis then to hold that the house was set on
fire to kill the occupants, appellant cannot be held liable for double
murder with frustrated murder. This is especially true with respect
to the death of Celerina, for even assuming arguendo that
appellant wanted to kill her to get even with her in light of her
alleged desire to drive him out of the neighboring house, Celerina
was outside the house at the time it was set on fire. She merely
entered the burning house to save her grandsons.
While the above-quoted Information charged appellant with
"Double Murder with Frustrated Murder," appellant may be
convicted of Arson. For the only difference between a charge for
Murder under Article 248 (3) of the Revised Penal Code and one
for Arson under the Revised Penal Code, as amended by Section
3 (2) of P.D. No. 1613, lies in the intent in pursuing the act.
As reflected above, as it was not shown that the main motive was
to kill the occupants of the house, the crime would only be arson,
the homicide being a mere consequence thereof, hence, absorbed
by arson.12
When there is variance between the offense charged in the
complaint or information and that proved, and the offense charged
is included or necessarily includes the offense proved, conviction
shall be for the offense proved which is included in the offense
charged, or the offense charged which is included in the offense
proved.13
Under Section 5 of P.D. 1613, the penalty of reclusion perpetua to
death is imposed when death results. In the light of the passage of
Republic Act No. 9346,14 the penalty should be reclusion perpetua.
A word on the damages awarded.
The appellate court affirmed the award of compensatory damages
to the heirs of Celerina. But entitlement thereto was not proven.
The appellate court likewise affirmed the award of compensatory
damages, actual damages, and moral damages to the heirs of
Alvin. Compensatory damages and actual damages are the same,
however.15 Since the trial court awarded the duly proven actual
damages of ₱16,500.00 representing burial expenses, the award
of compensatory damages of ₱50,000.00 does not lie. It is
gathered from the evidence, however, that Alvin was hospitalized
for five days,16 hence, an award of ₱8,500.00 as temperate
damages for the purpose would be reasonable. 1avvph!l
As for the award to Alvin of moral damages, the records do not
yield any basis therefor.
More. The appellate court awarded exemplary damages "to the
heirs of the victims," clearly referring to the deceased Celerina and
Alvin. Absent proof of the presence of any aggravating
circumstances, however, the award does not lie.17
When death occurs due to a crime, the grant of civil indemnity
requires no proof other than the death of the victim. The heirs of
Celerina are thus entitled to an award of ₱50,000.00 as civil
indemnity ex delicto.18 And so are Alvin’s.
The appellate court’s award of temperate damages of ₱25,000.00
to Joshua is in order.
WHEREFORE, the assailed Court of Appeals Decision of August
13, 2007 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE, and a NEW one is
rendered as follows:
Appellant, Ferdinand T. Baluntong, is found GUILTY beyond
reasonable doubt of Simple Arson under Sec. 3(2) of P.D. No. 1613
and is sentenced to suffer the penalty of reclusion perpetua with
no eligibility for parole.
48
Appellant is ORDERED to pay the amount of ₱50,000.00 to the
heirs of Celerina Solangon, and the same amount to the heirs of
Alvin Savariz, representing civil indemnity.
Appellant is likewise ORDERED to pay the amount of ₱16,500.00
to the heirs of Alvin as actual damages for burial expenses, and
₱8,500.00 as temperate damages for hospitalization expenses.
Appellant is further ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages to the heirs of Celerina.
Finally, appellant is ORDERED to pay ₱25,000.00 as temperate
damages to Joshua Savariz.
SO ORDERED.
People v. Likiran
G.R. No. 201858, June 4, 2014
Pre-Trial
See: Rule 118 Section 1 (Pre-trial; Mandatory in Criminal Cases)
Rule 118 Section 2 (Rule 118 Section 2. Pre-trial agreement)
FACTS: The incident that led to the death of Sareno happened on the
wee hours of March 19, 2000 in Barangay Bugca-on, Lantapon,
Bukidnon. It was the eve of the town fiesta and a dance was being
held at the basketball court. Prosecution witnesses Dagangon,
Mercado, and Goloceno testified that on said night, they were at the
dance together with Sareno at around 8:00 p.m. After a few hours,
while Mercado and Goloceno were inside the dance area, Jerome
Likiran, the accused's brother, punched Mercado on the mouth.
Goloceno was about to assist Mercado when he saw that Jerome was
armed with a short firearm while the accused was holding a hunting
knife, so he backed off. Dagangon and Sareno, who were outside the
dance area, heard the commotion. Afterwards, Jerome approached
Sareno and shot him several times. With Sareno fallen, the accused
stabbed him on the back. It was Dagangon who saw the incident first-
hand as he was only three meters from where Sareno was. Dagangon
was able to bring Sareno to the hospital only after Jerome and the
accused left, but Sareno was already dead at that point. Sareno
suffered multiple gunshot wounds and a stab wound at the left
scapular area.
The accused however, denied any involvement in the crime. While he
admitted that he was at the dance, he did not go outside when the
commotion happened. He and Jerome stayed within the area where
the sound machine was located and they only heard the gunshots
outside. Other witnesses testified in the accused's defense, with
Indanon testifying that he saw the stabbing incident and that it was
some other unknown person, and not the accused, who was the
culprit; and Quiñopa stating that he was with the accused and Jerome
inside the dance hall at the time the commotion occurred.
The RTC found that the prosecution was able to establish the
accused's culpability. Prosecution witness Dagangon’s positive
identification of the accused was held sufficient by the RTC to convict
the latter of the crime of murder. The RTC also rejected the accused's
defense of denial as it was not supported by evidence. It also ruled
that alibi cannot favor the accused since he failed to prove that it was
impossible for him to be at the scene of the crime.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the RTC decision in toto. The CA
sustained the findings of the RTC as regards the identity of the
accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime. The CA,
49
nevertheless, deviated from the RTC’s conclusion that there was
conspiracy between Jerome and the accused, and that abuse of
superior strength attended the commission of the crime. According
to the CA, the information failed to contain the allegation of
conspiracy, and the evidence for the prosecution failed to establish
that Jerome and the accused ganged up on the victim. The CA,
however, sustained the RTC’s finding of treachery.
The accused-appellant protested his conviction. According to him,
the prosecution failed to establish his guilt beyond reasonable doubt.
Specifically, the he argued that the prosecution failed to prove the
identity of the assailant and his culpability.
ISSUE: Whether or not the evidence on record establishing that the
victim was shot by another person can render the information of
murder by stabbing charged against the accused invalid
HELD:
No.
The accused asserted that the information charged him of murder
committed by attacking, assaulting, stabbing and shooting Sareno,
thereby causing his instantaneous death. The accused argued that
the evidence on record established that Sareno was in fact shot by
some other person. At this juncture, the Court notes that the
testimony of Dagangon, indeed, identified two assailants – the
accused and his brother, Jerome; however, it was only the accused
who was charged with the death of Sareno. Defense witnesses also
testified that Jerome died on March 12, 2005.
The CA disregarded the accused's contention and ruled that "the
cause of death was not made an issue in the court a quo" and the
Certificate of Death was admitted during the pre-trial conference as
proof of the fact and cause of death. And even assuming that the
cause of death was an issue, the CA still held the accused liable for
the death of Sareno.
The pre-trial agreement issued by the RTC states that one of the
matters stipulated upon and admitted by the prosecution and the
defense was that the Certificate of Death issued by Dr. Dael of the
Bukidnon Provincial Hospital and reviewed by the Rural Health
Physician of Malaybalay City "is admitted as proof of fact and cause
of death due to multiple stab wound scapular area." Stipulation of
facts during pre-trial is allowed by Rule 118 of the Revised Rules of
Criminal Procedure. Section 2 of Rule 118, meanwhile, prescribes
that all agreements or admissions made or entered during the pre-
trial conference shall be reduced in writing and signed by the accused
and counsel, otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. In
this case, while it appears that the pre-trial agreement was signed
only by the prosecution and defense counsel, the same may
nevertheless be admitted given that the defense failed to object to
its admission. Moreover, a death certificate issued by a municipal
health officer in the regular performance of his duty is prima facie
evidence of the cause of death of the victim.
More importantly, the accused is criminally liable for the natural and
logical consequence resulting from his act of stabbing Sareno. It may
be that he was not the shooter, it is nevertheless true that the stab
wound he inflicted on Sareno contributed to the latter’s death.
If a person inflicts a wound with a deadly weapon in such a manner
as to put life in jeopardy and death follows as a consequence of their
felonious act, it does not alter its nature or diminish its criminality to
prove that other causes cooperated in producing the factual result.
The offender is criminally liable for the death of the victim if his
50
delictual act caused, accelerated or contributed to the death of the
victim.
The Court finds no cogent reason to disturb the findings and
conclusions of the RTC, as affirmed by the CA, including their
assessment of the credibility of the witnesses. Factual findings of the
trial court are, except for compelling or exceptional reasons,
conclusive to the Court especially when fully supported by evidence
and affirmed by the CA.
The first duty of the prosecution is not to prove the crime but to
prove the identity of the criminal. In this case, the identity of the
accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime has been adequately
established by the prosecution, more particularly by the testimony of
Dagangon. The Court cannot sustain the accused's argument that it
was impossible for Dagangon to see the assailant considering that
there was no evidence to show that the place where the crime
occurred was lighted. As found by the CA, Dagangon was only three
meters away from the accused and Jerome and had a good view of
them. Moreover, there was no distraction that could have disrupted
Dagangon’s attention. He even immediately identified the accused
and Jerome during police investigation, and there is no showing that
Dagangon was informed by the police beforehand that the accused
was one of the suspects. Positive identification by a prosecution
witness of the accused as one of the perpetrators of the crime is
entitled to greater weight than alibi and denial. Such positive
identification gains further ground in the absence of any ill motive on
the part of a witness to falsely testify against an accused.
In this case, the testimony of the prosecution witnesses all point to
the fact that the shooting and stabbing of Sareno was actually a spur
of the moment incident, a result of the brawl that happened during
the barrio dance. The prosecution failed to show that the accused
and his brother Jerome deliberately planned the means by which
they would harm Sareno. In fact, what was revealed by the
prosecution evidence was that Sareno was an innocent bystander
who unfortunately became a target of the accused and Jerome’s
rampage. Consequently, the accused should be liable only for the
lesser crime of Homicide.
(f) such matters as will promote a fair and expeditious trial of the
criminal and civil aspects of the case.
Rule 118 Section 2. Pre-trial agreement. All agreements or
admissions made or entered during the pre-trial conference shall be
reduced in writing and signed by the accused and counsel,
otherwise, they cannot be used against the accused. The
agreements covering the matters referred to in section 1 of this Rule
shall be approved by the court.

The Decision of the Court of Appeals was MODIFIED in that accused

was found guilty of the lesser crime of HOMICIDE.

RATIO: Rule 118 Section 1. Pre-trial; Mandatory in Criminal Cases.

In all criminal cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, Regional
Trial Court, Metropolitan Trial Court, Municipal Trial Court in Cities,
Municipal Trial Court and Municipal Circuit Trial Court, the court
shall, after arraignment and within thirty (30) days from the date
the court acquires jurisdiction over the person of the accused, unless
a shorter period is provided for in special laws or circulars of the
Supreme Court, order a pre-trial conference to consider the
following:

(a) plea bargaining;

(b) stipulation of facts;

(c) marking for identification of evidence of the parties;

(d) waiver of objections to admissibility of evidence;

(e) modification of the order of trial if the accused admits the charge
but interposes a lawful defense;

51