Admin Law Full Cases

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Definitions: Administrative Law and Administrative Agencies
1. Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 PHIL 221 (1940)
1.Public Service Commission; Commonwealth Act No. 146 as Amended by Commonwealth Act No.
454; Constitutionality; Delegation of Legislative Power.—Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution
provides, among other things, that no franchise, certificate, or any other form of authorization for
the operation of a public utility shall be "for a longer period than fifty years," and when it was
ordained, in section 15 of Com-monwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454,
that the Public Service Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of a certificate
that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time" and, in section 16 that "no such certificates
shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years," the National Assembly meant to give effect to
the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this, it has thereby also declared its will that the
period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has
been delegated to the commission, therefore, is the administrative function, involving the use of
discretion, to carry out the will of the National Assembly having in view, in addi-tion, the promotion
of "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself
exer-cise the function and authority thus conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not
make the provision in question constitutionally objectionable.
2. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—With the growing complexity of modern life, the multiplication of the subjects of
governmental regulation, and the increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a
constantly growing tendency toward the delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and
toward the approval of the practice by the courts. In harmony with such growing tendency, this
court, since the decision in the case of Campania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public
Utility Commis-sioners (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its
seal of approval to the "delegation of greater powers by the legislature." 3.Id.; Id.; Id.; Applicability
to Existing Certificates op Public Convenience.—Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of
Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public
Service Commission to prescribe the conditions "that the service can be acquired by the
Com-monwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumentality thereof
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PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission
upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," and "that
the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any
extension or amendment of certificates actually in force" and "to authorizations to renew and
increase equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the subject
and have found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing certificates of
public convenience. 4.Id.; Id.; Id.; Power op National Assembly to Amend or Alter Existing
Certificates op Public Convenience.—The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitution, logically
succeeded to the Congress of the United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise
or right granted prior to or after the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts
Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted, the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared
its will and purpose to amend or alter existing certificates of public convenience.
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5. Id.; Id.; Id.; Police Power.—Statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper
exercise by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
6. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not only the organic acts of the Public
Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility company operating or seeking to
operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. vs. Smith et al., 295 Fed., 385.) The
business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the public interest that there is super
induced upon it the right of public regulation. When private property is "affected with a public
interest it ceases to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one devotes his property to a use in
which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an interest in that use, and must
submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the extent of the interest he has thus
created. He may withdraw his grant by discontinuing the use, but so long as he maintains the use he
must submit to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far beyond question that it is well
settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over public utilities may be
exercised through boards of commissioners.
7. Id.; Id.; Id.; Id.—This right of the state to regulate public utilities is founded upon the police
power, and statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for
the protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not
unconstitutional, either as im-
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pairing the obligation of contracts, taking property without due process, or denying the equal
protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether or not private property shall be
devoted to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is ordinarily for the owner to decide;
and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he cannot complain that it becomes
subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp. 9, 10.) This is the more so in the
light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a
franchise nor a contract, confers no prop-erty right, and is a mere license or privilege.
8. Id.; Id.; Id.; Bight to be Heard and to Adduce Evidence; Case Remanded for Further Proceedings.—
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and con-stitutional, Held:
That the decision of the Public Service Com-mission should be reversed and the case remanded
thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. On the matter of limitation to
twenty-five (25) years of the life of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither
notice nor opportunity given the petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The commission
appears to have taken advantage of the petitioner to augment petitioner's equipment in imposing
the limitation of twenty-five (25) years which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of
years. This is, to say the least, irregular and should not be sanctioned. There are car-dinal primary
rights which must be respected even in proceed-ings of this character. The first of these rights is the
right to a hearing, which includes the right of the party interested or affected to present his own
case and submit evidence in support thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes, in Morgan vs.
U. S. (304 U. S., 1; 58 Sup. Ct., 773, 999; 82 Law. ed., 1129), "the liberty and property of the citizen
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shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be given
an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights which he
asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented.
PETITION for review on certiorari.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.
C. de G. Alvear for petitioner. Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.
Laurel, J.:
The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty
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years in the business of transporting passengers in the Provinces of Pangasinan and Tarlac and, to a
certain ex-tent, in the Provinces of Nueva Ecija and Zambales, by means of motor vehicles
commonly known as TPU buses, in accordance with the terms and conditions of the certif-icates of
public convenience issued in its favor by the former Public Utility Commission in cases Nos. 24948,
3U973, 36831, 32014 and 53090. On August 26, 1939, the petitioner filed with the Public Service
Commission an ap-plication for authorization to operate ten additional new Brockway trucks (case
No. 56641), on the ground that they were needed to comply with the terms and conditions of its
existing certificates and as a result of the application of the Eight Hour Labor Law. In the decision of
September 26, 1939, granting the petitioner's application for increase of equipment, the Public
Service Commission ordered:
"Y de acuerdo con lo que se provee por el artículo 15 de la Ley No. 146 del Commonwealth, tal como
ha sido enmendada por el artículo 1 de la Ley No. 454, por la presente se enmienda las condiciones
de los certificados de conveniencia pubhca expedidos en los expedientes Nos. 24948, 30973, 36831,
32014 y la autorización concedida en el expediente No. 53090, así que se consideran incorporadas
en los mismos las dos siguientes condiciones:
"Que los certificados de conveniencia publica y autorización arriba mencionados serán válidos y
subsistentes solamente durante el periodo de veinticinco (25) años, contados desde la fecha de la
promulgación de esta decision.
"Que la empresa de la solicitante podrá ser adquirida por el Commonwealth de Filipinas o por
alguna dependencia del mismo en cualquier tiempo que lo deseare previo pago del precio de costo
de su equipo útil, menos una depreciación razonable que se ha de fijar por la Comision al tiempo de
su adquisición."
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Not being agreeable to the two new conditions thus in-corporated in its existing certificates, the
petitioner filed on October 9, 1939 a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the Public
Service Commission on November 14,
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1939. Whereupon, on November 20, 1939, the present peti-tion for a writ of certiorari was
instituted in this court praying that an order be issued directing the secretary of the Public Service
Commission to certify forthwith to this court the records of all proceedings in case No. 56641; that
this court, after hearing, render a decision declaring section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454
unconstitutional and void; that, if this court should be of the opinion that section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454 is constitutional, a decision be rendered declaring that the provisions
thereof are not ap-plicable to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8, 1939. Stated in
the language of the petitioner, it is contended:
"1. That the legislative powers granted to the Public Service Commission by section 1 of
Commonwealth Act No. 454, without limitation, guide or rule except the un-fettered discretion and
judgment of the Commission, con-stitute a complete and total abdication by the Legislature of its
functions in the premises, and. for that reason, the Act, in so far as those powers are concerned, is
unconstitu-tional and void.
"2. That even if it be assumed that section 1 of Com-monwealth Act No. 454, is a valid delegation
of legislative powers, the Public Service Commission has exceeded its authority because: (a) The Act
applies only to future cer-tificates and not to valid and subsisting certificates issued prior to June 8,
1939, when said Act took effect, and (b) the Act, as applied by the Commission, violates
constitu-tional guarantees.
Section 15 of Commonwealth Act No. 146, as amended by section 1 of Commonwealth Act No. 454,
invoked by the respondent Public Service Commission in the decision com-plained of in the present
proceedings, reads as follows:
"With the exception of those enumerated in the preced-ing section, no public service shall operate
in the Philippines without possessing a valid and subsisting certificate from the Public Service
Commission, known as 'certificate of public convenience,' or 'certificate of convenience and public
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necessity,' as the case may be, to the effect that the opera-tion of said service and the authorization
to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner.
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"The Commission may prescribe as a condition for the issuance of the certificate provided in the
preceding par-agraph that the service can be acquired by the Common-wealth of the Philippines or
by any instrumentality thereof upon payment of the cost price of its useful equipment, less
reasonable depreciation; and likewise, that the certif-icate shall be valid only for a definite period of
time; and that the violation of any of these conditions shall produce the immediate cancellation of
the certificate without the necessity of any express action on the part of the Com-mission.
"In estimating the depreciation, the effect of the use of the equipment, its actual condition, the age
of the model, or other circumstances affecting its value in the market shall be taken into
consideration.
"The foregoing is likewise applicable to any extension or amendment of certificates actually in force
and to those which may hereafter be issued, to permits to modify itine-raries and time schedules of
public services and to author-izations to renew and increase equipment and properties."
Under the first paragraph of the aforequoted section 15 of Act No. 146, as amended, no public
service can operate without a certificate of public convenience or certificate of convenience and
public necessity to the effect that the operation of said service and the authorization to do business
will promote "public interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under the second paragraph, one
of the conditions which the Public Service Commission may pre-scribe for the issuance of the
certificate provided for in the first paragraph is that "the service can be acquired by the
Conmmonwealth of the Philippines or by any instrumental-ity thereof upon payment of the cost
price of its useful equipment, less reasonable depreciation," a condition which is virtually a
restatement of the principle already embodied
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in the Constitution, section 6 of Article XII, which provides that "the State may, in the interest of
national welfare and defense, establish and operate industries and means of transportation and
communication, and, upon payment of just compensation, transfer to public ownership utilities and
other private enterprises to be operated by the Govern-ment." Another condition which the
Commission may prescribe, and which is assailed by the petitioner, is that the certificate "shall be
valid only for a definite period of time." As there is a relation between the first and second
paragraphs of said section 15, the two provisions must be read and interpreted together. That is to
say, in issuing a certificate, the Commission must necessarily be satisfied that the operation of the
service under said certificate dur-ing a definite period fixed therein "will promote the public
interests in a proper and suitable manner." Under section 16 (a) of Commonwealth Act No. 146
which is a comple-ment of section 15, the Commission is empowered to issue certificates of public
convenience whenever it "finds that the operation of the public service proposed and the
author-ization to do business will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable manner."
Inasmuch as the period to be fixed by the Commission under section 15 is insepar-able from the
certificate itself, said period cannot be dis-regarded by the Commission in determining the question
whether the issuance of the certificate will promote the public interests in a proper and suitable
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manner. Con-versely, in determining "a definite period of time," the Commission will be guided by
"public interests," the only limitation to its power being that said period shall not ex-ceed fifty years
(sec. 16 (a), Commonwealth Act No. 146; Constitution, Art. XIII, sec. 8.) We have already ruled that
"public interest" furnishes a sufficient standard. (People vs. Fernandez and Trinidad, G. R. No.
45655, pro-mulgated June 15, 1938; People vs. Rosenthal and Osmeiia, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077,
promulgated June 12, 1939, citing New York Central Securities Corporation vs. U. S. A., 287 U. S. 12,
24, 25, 77 Law. ed. 138, 145, 146; Schenchter
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Poultry Corporation vs. U. S., 295 U. S. 495, 540, 79 Law. ed. 1570, 1585; Ferrazzini vs. Gsell, 34
Phil., 697, 711-712.)
Section 8 of Article XIII of the Constitution provides, among other things, that no franchise,
certificate, or any other form of authorization for the operation of a public utility shall be "for a
longer period than fifty years," and when it was ordained, in section 15 of Commonwealth Act No.
146, as amended by Commonwealth Act No. 454, that the Public Service Commission may prescribe
as a condition for the issuance of a certificate that it "shall be valid only for a definite period of time"
and, in section 16 (a) that "no such certificates shall be issued for a period of more than fifty years,"
the National Assembly meant to give effect to the aforesaid constitutional mandate. More than this,
it has thereby also declared its will that the period to be fixed by the Public Service Commission
shall not be longer than fifty years. All that has been delegated to the Commission, therefore, is the
administrative function, in-volving the use of discretion, to carry out the will of the National
Assembly having in view, in addition, the promo-tion of "public interests in a proper and suitable
manner." The fact that the National Assembly may itself exercise the function and authority thus
conferred upon the Public Service Commission does not make the provision in question
constitutionally objectionable.
The theory of the separation of powers is designed by its originators to secure action and at the
same time to forestall overaction which necessarily results from undue concentration of powers,
and thereby obtain efficiency and prevent despotism. Thereby, the "rule of law" was established
which narrows the range of governmental action and makes it a subject to control by certain legal
devices. As a corollary, we find the rule prohibiting delegation of legislative authority, and from the
earliest timeAmerican legal authorities have proceeded on the theory that legislative power must
be exercised by the legislature alone. It is frankness, however, to confess that as one delves into the
mass of judicial pronouncements, he finds a great deal of
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confusion. One thing, however, is apparent in the develop-ment of the principle of separation of
powers and that is that the maxim of delegatus non potest delegari or delegata potestas non potest
delegari, attributed to Bracton (De Le-gibus et Consuetedinious Angliae, edited by G. E. Wood-bine,
Yale University Press, 1922, vol. 2, p. 167) but which is also recognized in principle in the Roman
Law (D. 17.18.3), has been made to adapt itself to the complexities of modern governments, giving
rise to the adoption, within certain limits, of the principle of "subordinate legislation," not only in
the United States and England but in practically all modern governments. (People vs. Rosenthal and
Os-mefia, G. R. Nos. 46076 and 46077, promulgated June 12, 1939.) Accordingly, with the growing
complexity of mod-ern life, the multiplication of the subjects of governmental regulation, and the
increased difficulty of administering the laws, there is a constantly growing tendency toward the
delegation of greater powers by the legislature, and toward the approval of the practice by the
courts. (Dillon Catfish Drainage Dist. v. Bank of Dillon, 141 S. E. 274, 275, 143 S. Ct. 178; State v.
Knox County, 54 S. W. 2d. 973, 976, 165 Tenn. 319.) In harmony with such growing tendency, this
Court, since the decision in the case of Compania General de Tabacos de Filipinas vs. Board of Public
Utility Com-missioners (34 Phil., 136), relied upon by the petitioner, has, in instances, extended its
seal of approval to the "dele-gation of greater powers by the legislature." (Inchausti Steamship Co.
vs. Public Utility Commissioner, 44 Phil., 366; Alegre vs. Collector of Customs, 53 Phil., 394; Cebu
Autobus Co. vs. De Jesus, 56 Phil., 446; People vs. Fernan-dez & Trinidad, G. R. No, 45655,
promulgated June 15,1938; People vs. Rosenthal & Osrnena, G. R. Nos. 46076, 46077, promulgated
June 12, 1939; and Robb and Hilscher vs. People, G. R. No. 45866, promulgated June 12, 1939.)
Under the fourth paragraph of section 15 of Common-wealth Act No. 146, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 454, the power of the Public Service Commission to prescribe the
conditions "that the service can be acquired
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by the Commonwealth of the Philippines or by any instru-mentality thereof upon payment of the
cost price of its use-ful equipment, less reasonable depreciation and that the certificate shall be
valid only for a definite period of time" is expressly made applicable "to any extension or
amend-ment of certificates actually in force" and "to authoriza-tions to renew and increase
equipment and properties." We have examined the legislative proceedings on the sub-ject and have
found that these conditions were purposely made applicable to existing certificates of public
con-venience. The history of Commonwealth Act No. 454 reveals that there was an attempt to
suppress, by way of amendment, the sentence "and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only
for a definite period of time," but the attempt failed:
* * * * * * *
"Sr. Cuenco. Señor Presidente, para otra enmienda. En la misma página, líneas 23 y 24, pido que se
supriman las palabras 'and likewise, that the certificate shall be valid only for a definite period of
time.' Esta disposición del proyecto autoriza a la Comision de Servicios Publicos a fijar un plazo de
vigencia del certificado de conveniencia pública. Todo el mundo sabe que no se puede determinar
cuando los intereses del servicio público requieren la explotación de un servicio público y como ha
de saber la Comision de Ser-vicios Publicos, si en un tiempo determinado, la explotación de algunos
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buses en cierta ruta ya no tiene razon de ser, sobre todo, si se tiene en cuenta; que la explotación de
los servicios públicos depende de condiciones fluctuantes, así como del volumen del tráfico y de
otras condiciones. Además, el servicio público se concede por la Comision de Ser-vicios Públicos
cuando el interés público así lo exige. El interés público no tiene duración fija, no es permanente; es
un proceso más o menos indefinido en cuanto al tiempo. Se ha acordado eso en el caucus de anoche.
"El Presidente Pro Tempore. Que dice el Comité?
"Sr. Alano. El Comité siente tener que rechazar esa en-mienda, en vista de que esto de los
certificados de conve-
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niencia pública es igual que la franquicia: se puede exten-der. Si los servicios prestados por la
compañía durante el tiempo de su certificado lo requiere, puede pedir la extensión y se le
extenderá; pero no creo conveniente el que nosotros demos un certificado de conveniencia publica
de una manera que podria pasar de cincuenta años, porque sería anticonstitucional."
* * * * * * *
By a majority vote the proposed amendment was defeat-ed. (Sesión de 17 de mayo de 1939,
Asamblea Nacional.)
The petitioner is mistaken in the suggestion that, simply because its existing certificates had been
granted before June 8, 1939, the date when Commonwealth Act No. 454, amendatory of section 15
of Commonwealth Act No. 146, was approved, it must be deemed to have the right of hold-ing them
in perpetuity. Section 74 of the Philippine Bill provided that "no franchise, privilege, or concession
shall be granted to any corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." The Jones Law,
incorporating a similar mandate, provided, in section 28, that "no franchise or right shall be granted
to any indi-vidual, firm, or corporation except under the conditions that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the Congress of the United States." Lastly, the Con-stitution of
the Philippines provides, in section 8 of Article XIII, that "no franchise or right shall be granted to
any individual, firm, or corporation, except under the condition that it shall be subject to
amendment, alteration, or repeal by the National Assembly when the public interest so re-quires."
The National Assembly, by virtue of the Constitu-tion, logically succeeded to the Congress of the
United States in the power to amend, alter or repeal any franchise or right granted prior to or after
the approval of the Constitution; and when Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 were enacted,
the National Assembly, to the extent therein provided, has declared its will and purpose to amend
or alter existing certificates of public convenience.
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Upon the other hand, statutes enacted for the regulation of public utilities, being a proper exercise
by the state of its police power, are applicable not only to those public utilities coming into
existence after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation.
"Nor is there any merit in petitioner's contention, that, because of the establishment of petitioner's
operations prior to May 1, 1917, they are not subject to the regulations of the Commission. Statutes
for the regulation of public utilities are a proper exercise by the state of its police power. As soon as
the power is exercised, all phases of operation of established utilities, become at once subject to the
police power thus called into operation. Producers' Transportation Co. v. Railroad Commission, 251
U. S. 228, 40 Sup. Ct. 131, 64 Law. ed. 239, Law v. Railroad Commis-sion, 184 Cal. 737, 195 Pac. 423,
14 A. L. R. 249. The sta-tute is applicable not only to those public utilities coming into existence
after its passage, but likewise to those already established and in operation. The 'Auto Stage and
Truck Transportation Act' (Stats. 1917, c. 213) is a statute passed in pursuance of the police power.
The only distinction recognized in the statute between those established before and those
established after the passage of the act is in the method of the creation of their operative rights. A
certif-icate of public convenience and necessity is required for any new operation, but no such
certificate is required of any transportation company for the operation which was actually carried
on in good faith on May 1, 1917. This distinction in the creation of their operative rights in no way
affects the power of the Commission to supervise and regulate them. Obviously the power of the
Commission to hear and dispose of complaints is as effective against companies securing their
operative rights prior to May 1, 1917. Test against those subsequently securing such rights under a
certificate of public convenience and necessity. (Motor Transit Co. et al. v. Railroad Commission of
California et ai., 209 Pac. 586.)"
Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not
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only the organic acts of the Public Service Commission but are "a part of the charter of every utility
company operat-ing or seeking to operate a franchise" in the Philippines. (Streator Aqueduct Co. v.
Smith et al., 295 Fed. 385.) The business of a common carrier holds such a peculiar relation to the
public interest that there is superinduced upon it the right of public regulation. When private
prop-erty is "affected with a public interest it ceased to be juris privati only." When, therefore, one
devotes his property to a use in which the public has an interest, he, in effect, grants to the public an
interest in that use, and must submit to be controlled by the public for the common good, to the
extent of the interest he has thus created. He may with-draw his grant by discontinuing the use, but
so long as he maintains the use he must submit to control. Indeed, this right of regulation is so far
beyond question that it is well settled that the power of the state to exercise legislative control over
public utilities may be exercised through boards of commissioners. (Fisher vs. Yangco Steamship
Company, 31 Phil., 1, citing Munn vs. Illinois, 94 U. S. 113; Georgia R. & Bkg. Co. vs. Smith, 128 U. S.
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174; Budd vs. New York, 143 U. S. 517; New York etc. R. Co. vs. Bristol, 151 U. S. 556, 571;
Connecticut etc. R. Co. vs. Woodruff, 153 U. S. 689; Louisville etc. Ry Co. vs. Kentucky, 161 U. S. 677,
695.) This right of the state to regulate public util-ities is founded upon the police power, and
statutes for the control and regulation of utilities are a legitimate exercise thereof, for the
protection of the public as well as of the utilities themselves. Such statutes are, therefore, not
un-constitutional, either as impairing the obligation of con-tracts, taking property without due
process, or denying the equal protection of the laws, especially inasmuch as the question whether
or not private property shall be devoted to a public use and the consequent burdens assumed is
or-dinarily for the owner to decide; and if he voluntarily places his property in public service he
cannot complain that it becomes subject to the regulatory powers of the state. (51 C. J., sec. 21, pp.
9-10.) This is the more so
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in the light of authorities which hold that a certificate of public convenience constitutes neither a
franchise nor a contract, confers no property right, and is a mere license or privilege. (Burgess vs.
Mayor & Aldermen of Brockton, 235 Mass. 95, 100, 126 N. E. 456; Roberto vs. Commissioners of
Department of Public Utilities, 262 Mass. 583, 160 N. E. 321; Scheible vs. Hogan, 113 Ohio St. 83,
148 N. E. 581; Matz vs. Curtis [J. L.] Cartage Co. [1937], 132 Ohio St. 271, 7 N. E. [2d] 220; Manila
Yellow Taxicab Co. vs. Sabellano, 59 Phil., 773.)
Whilst the challenged provisions of Commonwealth Act No. 454 are valid and constitutional, we are,
however, of the opinion that the decision of the Public Service Commission should be reversed and
the case remanded thereto for further proceedings for the reason now to be stated. The Public
Service Commission has power, upon proper notice and hearing, "to amend, modify or revoke at
any time any certificate issued under the provisions of this Act, whenever the facts and
circumstances on the strength of which said certificate was issued have been misrepresented or
mate-rially changed." (Section 16, par. [m], Commonwealth Act No. 146.) The petitioner's
application here was for an increase of its equipment to enable it to comply with the conditions of
its certificates of public convenience. On the matter of limitation to twenty five (25) years of the life
of its certificates of public convenience, there had been neither notice nor opportunity given the
petitioner to be heard or present evidence. The Commission appears to have taken advantage of the
petitioner to augment peti-tioner's equipment in imposing the limitation of twenty-five (25) years
which might as well be twenty or fifteen or any number of years. This is, to say the least, irregular
and should not be sanctioned. There are cardinal primary rights which must be respected even in
proceedings of this character. The first of these rights is the right to a hear-ing, which includes the
right of the party interested or affected to present his own case and submit evidence in support
thereof. In the language of Chief Justice Hughes,
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in Morgan v. U. S., 304 U. S. 1, 58 S. Ct. 773, 999, 82 Law. ed. 1129, "the liberty and property of the
citizen shall be protected by the rudimentary requirements of fair play." Not only must the party be
given an opportunity to present his case and to adduce evidence tending to establish the rights
which he asserts but the tribunal must consider the evidence presented. (Chief Justice Hughes in
Morgan vs. U. S., 298 U. S. 468, 56 S. Ct. 906, 80 Law. ed. 1288.) In the language of this Court in
Edwards vs. McCoy (22 Phil., 598), "the right to adduce evidence, without the correspond-ing duty
on the part of the board to consider it, is vain. Such right is conspicuously futile if the person or
persons to whom the evidence is presented can thrust it aside with-out notice or consideration."
While the duty to deliberate does not impose the obligation to decide right, it does imply a necessity
which cannot be disregarded, namely, that of having something to support its decision. A decision
with absolutely nothing to support it is a nullity, at least when directly attacked. (Edwards vs.
McCoy, supra.) This principle emanates from the more fundamental principle that the genius of
constitutional government is contrary to the vesting of unlimited power anywhere. Law is both a
grant and a limitation upon power.
The decision appealed from is hereby reversed and the case remanded to the Public Service
Commission for further proceedings in accordance with law and this decision, with-out any
pronouncement regarding costs. So ordered. Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission,
70 Phil., 221, No. 47065 June 26, 1940
2. Manila Electric Company v. Pasay Transportation Co. (G.R. No. L-37878, November 25,
1932)
The preliminary and basic question presented by the petition of the Manila Electric Company,
requesting the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to fix the terms
upon which certain transportation companies shall be permitted to use the Pasig bridge of the
Manila Electric Company and the compensation to be paid to the Manila Electric Company by such
transportation companies, relates to the validity of section 11 of Act No. 1446 and to the legal right
of the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, to act on the petition. Act No.
1446 above referred to is entitled. "An Act granting a franchise to Charles M. Swift to construct,
maintain, and operate an electric railway, and to construct, maintain, and operate an electric light,
heat, and power system from a point in the City of Manila in an easterly direction to the town of
Pasig, in the Province of Rizal." Section 11 of the Act provides: "Whenever any franchise or right of
way is granted to any other person or corporation, now or hereafter in existence, over portions of
the lines and tracks of the grantee herein, the terms on which said other person or corporation shall
use such right of way, and the compensation to be paid to the grantee herein by such other person
or corporation for said use, shall be fixed by the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board
of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final."
When the petition of the Manila Electric Company was filed in this court, it was ordered that the
petitioner be required to serve copies on the Attorney-General and the transportation companies
affected by the petition. Thereafter, the Attorney-General disclaimed any interest in the
proceedings, and opposition was entered to the petition by a number of public utility operators. On
the submission of memoranda after an oral hearing, the petition was made ready for resolution.
12
Examining the statutory provision which is here invoked, it is first noted that power is attempted to
be granted to the members of the Supreme Court sitting as a board of arbitrators and to the
Supreme Court as an entity. It is next seen that the decision of a majority of the members of the
Supreme Court is made final. And it is finally observed that the franchise granted the Manila Electric
Company by the Government of the Philippine Islands, although only a contract between the parties
to it, is now made to effect the rights of persons not signatories to the covenant.
The law calls for arbitration which represents a method of the parties' own choice. A submission to
arbitration is a contract. The parties to an arbitration agreement may not oust the courts of
jurisdiction of the matters submitted to arbitration. These are familiar rules which find support in
articles 1820 and 1821 of the Civil Code. Citation of authority is hardly necessary, except that it
should be recalled that in the Philippines, and in the United States for that matter, it has been held
that a clause in a contract, providing that all matters in dispute between the parties shall be
referred to arbitrators and to them alone, is contrary to public policy and cannot oust the courts of
jurisdiction (Wahl and Wahl vs. Donaldson, Sims & Co. [1903], 2 Phil., 301; Puentebella vs. Negros
Coal Co. [1927], 50 Phil., 69; Vega vs. San Carlos Milling Co. [1924], 51 Phil., 908; District of
Columbia vs. Bailey [1897], 171 U. S., 161.)
We would not be understood as extending the principles governing arbitration and award too far.
Unless the arbitration agreement is such as absolutely to close the doors of the courts against the
parties, the courts should look with favor upon such amicable arrangements. We can also perceive a
distinction between a private contract for submission to arbitration and agreements to arbitrate
falling within the terms of a statute enacted for such purpose and affecting others than the parties
to a particular franchise. Here, however, whatever else may be said in extenuation, it remains true
that the decision of the board of arbitrators is made final, which if literally enforced would leave a
public utility, not a party to the contract authorized by Act No. 1446, without recourse to the courts
for a judicial determination of the question in dispute.
Counsel for the petitioner rely principally on the case of Tallassee Falls Mfg. Co. vs. Commissioner's
Court [1908], 158 Ala., 263. It was there held that an Act of a state legislature authorizing the
commissioners' court of a certain county to regulate and fix the rate of toll to be charged by the
owners of a bridge is not unconstitutional as delegating legislative power to the courts. But that is
not the question before us. Here the question is not one of whether or not there has been a
delegation of legislative authority to a court. More precisely, the issue concerns the legal right of the
members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators the decision of a majority of whom
shall be final, to act in that capacity.
We run counter to this dilemma. Either the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as a board of
arbitrators, exercise judicial functions, or the members of the Supreme Court, sitting as board of
arbitrators, exercise administrative or quasi judicial functions. The first case would appear not to
fall within the jurisdiction granted the Supreme Court. Even conceding that it does, it would
presuppose the right to bring the matter in dispute before the courts, for any other construction
would tend to oust the courts of jurisdiction and render the award a nullity. But if this be the proper
construction, we would then have the anomaly of a decision by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, taken therefrom to the courts and eventually coming before the
Supreme Court, where the Supreme Court would review the decision of its members acting as
arbitrators. Or in the second case, if the functions performed by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators, be considered as administrative or quasi judicial in nature, that
would result in the performance of duties which the members of the Supreme Court could not
13
lawfully take it upon themselves to perform. The present petition also furnishes an apt illustration
of another anomaly, for we find the Supreme Court as a court asked to determine if the members of
the court may be constituted a board of arbitrators, which is not a court at all.lawphil.net
The Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands represents one of the three divisions of power in our
government. It is judicial power and judicial power only which is exercised by the Supreme Court.
Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not sanction usurpations
by any other department of the government, so should it as strictly confine its own sphere of
influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on it by the Organic Act. The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions.
The Organic Act provides that the Supreme Court of the Philippine Islands shall possess and
exercise jurisdiction as heretofore provided and such additional jurisdiction as shall hereafter be
prescribed by law (sec. 26). When the Organic Act speaks of the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the
Supreme Court, it could not only mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the Supreme Court acting as
a court, and could hardly mean the exercise of "jurisdiction" by the members of the Supreme Court,
sitting as a board of arbitrators. There is an important distinction between the Supreme Court as an
entity and the members of the Supreme Court. A board of arbitrators is not a "court" in any proper
sense of the term, and possesses none of the jurisdiction which the Organic Act contemplates shall
be exercised by the Supreme Court.lawph!l.net
In the last judicial paper from the pen of Chief Justice Taney, it was said:
The power conferred on this court is exclusively judicial, and it cannot be required or
authorized to exercise any other. . . . Its jurisdiction and powers and duties being defined in
the organic law of the government, and being all strictly judicial, Congress cannot require or
authorize the court to exercise any other jurisdiction or power, or perform any other duty. . .
. The award of execution is a part, and an essential part of every judgment passed by a court
exercising judicial power. It is no judgment, in the legal sense of the term, without it.
Without such an award the judgment would be inoperative and nugatory, leaving the
aggrieved party without a remedy. It would be merely an opinion, which would remain a
dead letter, and without any operation upon the rights of the parties, unless Congress
should at some future time sanction it, and pass a law authorizing the court to carry its
opinion into effect. Such is not the judicial power confided to this court, in the exercise of its
appellate jurisdiction; yet it is the whole power that the court is allowed to exercise under
this act of Congress. . . . And while it executes firmly all the judicial powers entrusted to it,
the court will carefully abstain from exercising any power that is not strictly judicial in its
character, and which is not clearly confided to it by the Constitution. . . . (Gordon vs. United
States [1864], 2 Wall., 561; 117 U. S., 697 Appendix.)
Confirming the decision to the basic question at issue, the Supreme Court holds that section 11 of
Act No. 1446 contravenes the maxims which guide the operation of a democratic government
constitutionally established, and that it would be improper and illegal for the members of the
Supreme Court, sitting as a board of arbitrators, the decision of a majority of whom shall be final, to
act on the petition of the Manila Electric Company. As a result, the members of the Supreme Court
decline to proceed further in the matter.
14
3. Antonio H. Noblejas vs. Claudio Teehankee, et al. (G.R. No. L-28790, April 29, 1968)
Petition for a writ of prohibition with preliminary injunction to restrain the Secretary of Justice
from investigating the official actuations of the Commissioner of Land Registration, and to declare
inoperative his suspension by the Executive Secretary pending investigation.
The facts are not in dispute. Petitioner Antonio H. Noblejas is the duly appointed, confirmed and
qualified Commissioner of Land Registration, a position created by Republic Act No. 1151. By the
terms of section 2 of said Act, the said Commissioner is declared "entitled to the same
compensation, emoluments and privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance." The
appropriation laws (Rep. Acts 4642, 4856 and 5170) in the item setting forth the salary of said
officer, use the following expression:
1. One Land Registration Commissioner with the rank and privileges of district judge —
P19,000.00.
On March 7, 1968, respondent Secretary of Justice coursed to the petitioner a letter requiring him
to explain in writing not later than March 9, 1968 why no disciplinary action should be taken
against petitioner for "approving or recommending approval of subdivision, consolidation and
consolidated-subdivision plans covering areas greatly in excess of the areas covered by the original
titles." Noblejas answered and apprised the Secretary of Justice that, as he enjoyed the rank,
privileges, emoluments and compensation of a Judge of the Court of First Instance, he could only be
suspended and investigated in the same manner as a Judge of the Courts of First Instance, and,
therefore, the papers relative to his case should be submitted to the Supreme Court, for action
thereon conformably to section 67 of the Judiciary Act (R. A. No. 296) and Revised Rule 140 of the
Rules of Court.
On March 17, 1968, petitioner Noblejas received a communication signed by the Executive
Secretary, "by authority of the President", whereby, based on "finding that a prima facie case exists
against you for gross negligence and conduct prejudicial to the public interest", petitioner was
"hereby suspended, upon receipt hereof, pending investigation of the above charges."
On March 18, 1968, petitioner applied to this Court, reiterating the contentions advanced in his
letter to the Secretary of Justice, claiming lack of jurisdiction and abuse of discretion, and praying
for restraining writs. In their answer respondents admit the facts but denied that petitioner, as
Land Registration Commissioner, exercises judicial functions, or that the petitioner may be
considered a Judge of First Instance within the purview of the Judiciary Act and Revised Rules of
Court 140; that the function of investigating charges against public officers is administrative or
executive in nature; that the Legislature may not charge the judiciary with non-judicial functions or
duties except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties, as it would be in
violation of the principle of the separation of powers.
Thus, the stark issue before this Court is whether the Commissioner of Land Registration may only
be investigated by the Supreme Court, in view of the conferment upon him by the Statutes
heretofore mentioned (Rep. Act 1151 and Appropriation Laws) of the rank and privileges of a Judge
of the Court of First Instance.
15
First to militate against petitioner's stand is the fact that section 67 of the Judiciary Act providing
for investigation, suspension or removal of Judges, specifically recites that "No District Judge shall
be separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist in the judgment of the Supreme Court . . ." and it is nowhere claimed, much less shown, that
the Commissioner of Land Registration is a District Judge, or in fact a member of the Judiciary at all.
In the second place, petitioner's theory that the grant of "privileges of a Judge of First Instance"
includes by implication the right to be investigated only by the Supreme Court and to be suspended
or removed upon its recommendation, would necessarily result in the same right being possessed
by a variety of executive officials upon whom the Legislature had indiscriminately conferred the
same privileges. These favoured officers include (a) the Judicial Superintendent of the Department
of Justice (Judiciary Act, sec. 42); (b) the Assistant Solicitors General, seven in number (Rep. Act No.
4360); (c) the City Fiscal of Quezon City (R.A. No. 4495); (d) the City Fiscal of Manila (R. A. No.
4631) and (e) the Securities and Exchange Commissioner (R. A. No. 5050, s. 2). To adopt
petitioner's theory, therefore, would mean placing upon the Supreme Court the duty of
investigating and disciplining all these officials, whose functions are plainly executive, and the
consequent curtailment by mere implication from the Legislative grant, of the President's power to
discipline and remove administrative officials who are presidential appointees, and which the
Constitution expressly placed under the President's supervision and control (Constitution, Art. VII,
sec. 10[i]).
Incidentally, petitioner's stand would also lead to the conclusion that the Solicitor General, another
appointee of the President, could not be removed by the latter, since the Appropriation Acts confer
upon the Solicitor General the rank and privileges of a Justice of the Court of Appeals, and these
Justices are only removable by the Legislature, through the process of impeachment (Judiciary Act,
sec. 24, par. 2).
In our opinion, such unusual corollaries could not have been intended by the Legislature when it
granted these executive officials the rank and privileges of Judges of First Instance. This conclusion
gains strength when account is taken of the fact that in the case of the Judges of the Court of
Agrarian Relations and those of the Court of Tax Appeals, the organic statutes of said bodies
(Republic Act 1267, as amended by Act 1409; Rep. Act No. 1125) expressly provide that they are to
be removed from office for the same causes and in the same manner provided by law for Judges of
First Instance", or "members of the judiciary of appellate rank". The same is true of Judges of the
Court of Agrarian Relations (Comm. Act No. 103) and of the Commissioner of Public Service (Public
Service Act, Sec. 3). It is thereby shown that where the legislative design is to make the suspension
or removal procedure prescribed for Judges of First Instance applicable to other officers, provision
to that effect is made in plain and unequivocal language.
But the more fundamental objection to the stand of petitioner Noblejas is that, if the Legislature had
really intended to include in the general grant of "privileges" or "rank and privileges of Judges of the
Court of First Instance" the right to be investigated by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended or
removed only upon recommendation of that Court, then such grant of privileges would be
unconstitutional, since it would violate the fundamental doctrine of separation of powers, by
charging this court with the administrative function of supervisory control over executive officials,
and simultaneously reducing pro tanto the control of the Chief Executive over such officials.
Justice Cardozo ruled in In re Richardson et al., Connolly vs. Scudder (247 N. Y. 401, 160 N. E. 655),
saying:
16
There is no inherent power in the Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with
administrative functions except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial
duties.
The United States Supreme Court said in Federal Radio Commission vs. General Electric Co., et al.,
281 U.S. 469, 74 Law. Ed., 972, —
But this court cannot be invested with jurisdiction of that character, whether for purposes
of review or otherwise. It was brought into being by the judiciary article of the Constitution,
is invested with judicial power only and can have no jurisdiction other than of cases and
controversies falling within the classes enumerated in that article. It cannot give decisions
which are merely advisory; nor can it exercise or participate in the exercise of functions which
are essentially legislative or administrative. Keller v. Potomac Electric Power Co., supra (261
U.S. 444, 67 L. ed. 736, 43 Sup. Ct. Rep. 445) and cases cited; Postum Cereal Co. vs. California
Fig Nut Co. supra (272 U.S. 700, 701, 71 L. ed. 481, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 284); Liberty Warehouse
Co. v. Grannis, 273 U.S. 70, 74, 71 L. ed. 541, 544, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 282; Willing v. Chicago
Auditorium Asso. 277 U.S. 274, 289, 72 L. ed. 880, 884, 48 Sup. Ct. Rep. 507; Ex
parte Bakelite Corp. 279 U.S. 438, 449, 73 L. ed. 789, 793, 49 Sup. Ct. Rep. 411. (Federal
Radio Commission v. General Electric Company, 281 U.S. 469, 74 L. ed. 972.) (Emphasis
supplied.)
In this spirit, it has been held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should
not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duty not
pertaining to or connected with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the
Supreme Court to arbitrate disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila
Electric Co. vs. Pasay Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600).1äwphï1.ñët
Petitioner Noblejas seeks to differentiate his case from that of other executive officials by claiming
that under Section 4 of Republic Act No. 1151, he is endowed with judicial functions. The section
invoked runs as follows:
Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the

Register of Deeds is in doubt with regard to the proper step to be taken or memorandum to
be made in pursuance of any deed, mortgage, or other instrument presented to him for
registration, or where any party in interest does not agree with the Register of Deeds with
reference to any such matter, the question shall be submitted to the Commissioner of Land
Registration either upon the certification of the Register of Deeds, stating the question upon
which he is in doubt, or upon the suggestion in writing by the party in interest; and
thereupon the Commissioner, after consideration of the matter shown by the records
certified to him, and in case of registered lands, after notice to the parties and hearing, shall
enter an order prescribing the step to be taken or memorandum to be made. His decision in
such cases shall be conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds: Provided, further,
That, when a party in interest disagrees with the ruling or resolution of the Commissioner
and the issue involves a question of law, said decision may be appealed to the Supreme
Court within thirty days from and after receipt of the notice thereof.
Serious doubt may well be entertained as to whether the resolution of a consulta by a Register of
Deeds is a judicial function, as contrasted with administrative process. It will be noted that by
specific provision of the section, the decision of the Land Registration Commissioner "shall be
17
conclusive and binding upon all Registers of Deeds" alone, and not upon other parties. This
limitation1 in effect identifies the resolutions of the Land Registration Commissioner with those of
any other bureau director, whose resolutions or orders bind his subordinates alone. That the
Commissioner's resolutions are appealable does not prove that they are not administrative; any
bureau director's ruling is likewise appealable to the corresponding department head.
But even granting that the resolution of consultas by the Register of Deeds should constitute a
judicial (or more properly quasi judicial) function, analysis of the powers and duties of the Land
Registration Commissioner under Republic Act No. 1151, sections 3 and 4, will show that the
resolution of consultas are but a minimal portion of his administrative or executive functions and
merely incidental to the latter.
Conformably to the well-known principle of statutory construction that statutes should be given,
whenever possible, a meaning that will not bring them in conflict with the Constitution, 2 We are
constrained to rule that the grant by Republic Act 1151 to the Commissioner of Land Registration of
the "same privileges as those of a Judge of the Court of First Instance" did not include, and was not
intended to include, the right to demand investigation by the Supreme Court, and to be suspended
or removed only upon that Court's recommendation; for otherwise, the said grant of privileges
would be violative of the Constitution and be null and void. Consequently, the investigation and
suspension of the aforenamed Commissioner pursuant to sections 32 and 34 of the Civil Service
Law (R. A. 2260) are neither abuses of discretion nor acts in excess of jurisdiction.
WHEREFORE, the writs of prohibition and injunction applied for are denied, and the petition is
ordered dismissed. No costs.
4. Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1972)
Judges of First Instance; Department of Justice Circular 10 dated February 6, 1952 and Sections 5,
55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, apply only to judges actually holding trials and hearings
and making decisions and orders.—Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the Department of
Justice and Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act, as amended, apply to, and contemplate of,
judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and orders. They do not
apply to a judge who. although has taken his oath. has not started performing any judicial functions.
Constitutional law; Separation of powers; Supreme Court looks with disfavor at practice of detailing
a Judge of First Instance at Department of Justice, performing non-judicial functions.—The Supreme
Court does not look with favor at the practice of long standing, to be sure of judges being detailed in
the Department of Justice to assist the Secretary even if it were only in connection with his work of
exercising administrative authority over the courts. The line between what a judge may do and
what he may not do in collaborating or working with other offices or officers under the other great
depart-
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VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
107
18
Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.
ments of the government must always be kept clear and jealously observed, lest the principle of
separation of powers on which our government rests by mandate of the people thru the
Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly motivated by good intentions in the
interest of public service.
FERNANDO, J., concurring:
Constitutional law; Separation of powers; Judges performing non-judicial function cannot be

justified, under separation of powers.—While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
theory not to be enforced with pedantic vigor, the practical demands of government precluding its
doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a
position or perform a duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise
there is a plain departure from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide.
Only a higher court, as was emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a
subordinate of an executive or legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be
no exception to the rigidity of such norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of
adjudication.
ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
RESOLUTION
BARREDO, J.:
Administrative complaint filed by one Paz M. Garcia against the Honorable Catalino Macaraig, Jr.,
formerly Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna, Branch VI, now Undersecretary of Justice, in
his former capacity as judge, for alleged "dishonesty, violation of his oath of office as judge . . . gross
incompetence, violation of Republic Act 296 or the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, (particularly)
Sections 5, 55 and 58 thereof. committed '(allegedly) as follows:
"2. That from July 1, 1970 up to February 28, 1971 inclusive, as such incumbent Judge, respondent
herein, has not
108
108
SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED
submitted his monthly reports containing the number of cases filed, disposed of, decided and/or
resolved, the number of cases pending decisions for one month, two months to over three months,
together with the title, number, number of hours of court session held a day, etc., as evidenced by
the certificate issued by Hon. Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice, copy of
which is hereto attached as Annex 'A', Item No. 1, in violation of Circular No. 10 of the Dept. of
Justice dated February 6, 1952, copy of which is hereto attached as Annex 'B';
19
"3. That he has not submitted his certificate of service (New Judicial Form No. 86, Revised 1966)
from July to December, 1970 and from January to February, 1971 inclusive as evidenced by the
certificate issued by Judge Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, Dept. of Justice Annex 'A', Item No. 2
thereof;
"4. That as incumbent Judge of Branch VI, Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo and
knowing fully well that he has never performed his official duties or discharged the duties
appertaining to his office, he has collected and was paid his salaries from July to December, 1970
and from January to February 1971 as evidenced by the certificate issued by the cashier Mrs. Santos
of the Department of Justice hereto attached as Annex 'C' and the certificate of Mr. Pichay Annex 'A',
last paragraph thereof, aggravated by his repeated failure to submit the certificate of service in
flagrant violation of section 5 of the Judiciary Act of 1948 as amended which provides as follows:
'x x x District judges, judges of City Courts, and municipal Judges shall certify on their application
for leave, and upon salary vouchers presented by them for payment, or upon the payrolls upon
which their salaries are paid, that all special proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all
civil and criminal cases which have been under submission for decision or determination for a
period of ninety days or more have been determined and decided on or before the date of making
the certificate and xxx no salary shall be paid without such certificate' (Underscoring supplied).
"5. That his deliberate failure to submit the monthly reports from July to December, 1970 and from
January, 1971 to February, 1971 stating therein the number of .hours of session that the Court
holds daily, the accomplishments of the Court constitutes a clear violation of Sections 55 and 58 of
the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
"6. That by his deliberate violation of his Oath of Office as a District Judge of the Court of First
Instance of Laguna
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VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
109
and San Pablo, Branch VI he has manifested such moral bankruptcy as to deny his fitness to
perform or discharge official duties in the administration of justice.
"7. That on June 29, 1970, respondent Judge wrote to the Honorable Secretary of Justice informing
him that he was entering upon the performance of his duties, which letter of his reads in full:
'I have the honor to inform you that I am entering upon the performance of the duties of the office
of Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City (Branch VI) today, June 29,
1970.'
"That such actuation of deliberately telling a deliberate falsehood aggravates his moral bankruptcy
incompatible to the requirements of the highest degree of honesty, integrity and good moral
character appertaining to holding the position of Judge in the administration of justice."
Upon being so required, in due time, respondent f iled an answer alleging pertinently that:
"THE FACTS
"Respondent took his oath as Judge of the Court of First Instance of Laguna and San Pablo City with
station at Calamba on June 29, 1970. The court, being one of the 112 newly created CFI branches,
20
had to be organized from scratch. After consultations with the officials of the province of Laguna,
the municipality of Calamba and the Department of Justice, respondent decided to accept the offer
of the Calamba Municipal Government to supply the space for the courtroom and offices of the
court; to utilize the financial assistance promised by the Laguna provincial government for the
purchase of the necessary supplies and materials; and to rely on the national government for the
equipment needed by the court (Under Section 190 of the Revised Administrative Code, all these
items must be furnished by the provincial government. The provincial officials of Laguna, however,
informed the respondent that the province was not in a position to do so).
"As to the space requirements of the court, the Municipal Mayor of Calamba assured the respondent
that the court could be accommodated in the west wing of the Calamba municipal building as soon
as the office of the municipal treasurer and his personnel are transferred to another location. When
the projected transfer of the municipal treasurer's office was about to be effected, the treasurer and
several municipal councilors objected. The municipal mayor then requested the respondent
110
110
to look over some of the office spaces for rent in Calamba, with the commitment that the municipal
government will shoulder the payment of the rentals. Respondent's first choice was the second
floor of the Republic Bank branch in Calamba, but the negotiations failed when the owner of the
building refused to reduce the rent to P300 a month. The next suitable space selected by
respondent was the second floor of the Laguna Development Bank. After a month's negotiations,
the municipality finally signed a lease agreement with the owner on October 26, 1970. Another
month passed before the municipal government could release the amount necessary for the
improvements to convert the space that was rented, which was a big hall without partitions, into a
courtroom and offices for the personnel of the court and for the assistant provincial fiscal.
Thereafter, upon respondent's representations, the provincial government appropriated the
amount of P5,000 for the purchase of the supplies and materials needed by the court. Early in
December, 1970 respondent also placed his order for the necessary equipment with the Property
Officer of the Department of Justice but, unfortunately, the appropriation for the equipment of
courts of first instance was released only on December 23, 1970 and the procurement of the
equipment chargeable against this allotment is still under way (please see enclosed certification of
the Financial Officer of the Department of Justice marked Annex 'A').
"When respondent realized that it would be sometime before he could actually preside over his
court, he applied for an extended leave (during the 16 years he had worked in the Department of
Justice, respondent had, due to pressure of duties, never gone on extended leave, resulting in his
forfeiting all the leave benefits he had earned beyond the maximum ten months allowed by the
law). The Secretary of Justice, however, prevailed upon respondent to forego his leave and instead
to assist him, without being extended a formal detail, whenever respondent was not busy attending
to the needs of his court.
"Charges Have No Basis—

21
"Complainant has charged respondent with dishonesty, violation of his oath of office, grave
incompetence and violation of Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act.
"It is respectfully submitted that—
"A. Respondent's inability to perform his judicial duties under the circumstances mentioned above
does not constitute incompetence. Respondent was, like every lawyer who gets his first
appointment to the bench, eager to assume his judicial duties and rid himself of the stigma of being
'a judge without
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VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
111
a sala', but forces and circumstances beyond his control prevented him from discharging his judicial
duties.
"B. Respondent's collection of salaries as judge does not constitute dishonesty because aside from
the time, effort and money he spent in organizing the CFI at Calamba, he worked in the Department
of Justice (please see enclosed certification of Undersecretary of Justice Guillermo S. Santos marked
Annex 'B'). Indeed, even if respondent did no more than exert efforts to organize his court, he could,
as other judges have done, have collected his salaries as judge without being guilty of dishonesty.
"Incidentally, when respondent took his oath as CFI judge which position then carried a salary of
P19,000 per annum, he automatically ceased to be Chief of the Technical Staff of the Department of
Justice and Member of the Board of Pardons and Parole, positions from which he was receiving
P16,200 and P8,000 per annum, respectively. Also, in anticipation of the judicial duties which he
was about to assume, respondent took a leave of absence from his professorial lecturer's duties in
the U.P. College of Law where he was receiving approximately P600 a month.
"C. Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 dated February 6, 1952 of the
Department of Justice are not applicable to a Judge not actually discharging his judicial duties.
"The Department of Justice has never required judges who have not actually started to perform
their judicial duties to comply with the abovementioned statutory provisions and circular (please
see enclosed certification of Judge Eulalio D. Pichay, Judicial Superintendent, marked Annex 'C').
"Moreover, a reading of these sections and circular makes evident the folly of requiring a judge who
has not entered into the performance of his judicial duties to comply with them. Taking Section 5,
how could a judge who has not started to discharge his judicial duties certify that 'all special
proceedings, applications, petitions, motions, and all civil and criminal cases, which have been
under submission for decision or determination for a period of ninety days or more have been
determined and decided on or before the date of making the certificate.' And how could such a
judge hold court in his place of permanent station as required by Section 55; observe the hours of
daily sessions of the court as prescribed by Section 68; and render the reports required by Circular
22
No. 10 when his court is not yet in physical existence. Clearly, therefore, Sections 5, 55 and 58 of the
Judiciary Act and Circular No. 10 cannot apply to such a judge."
112
112
In view of the nature of the allegations of complainant and respondent in their respective complaint
and answer and considering, in the light thereof, that the material facts are more or less
undisputed, the Court feels that this case can be disposed of without any further proceeding.
After mature study and deliberation, the Court is convinced that the complaint must be dismissed.
To begin with, We cannot discern any tinge of dishonesty in the actuations of the respondent
complained of. As We see it, the situation is not exactly as complainant has attempted to portray it.
Complainant's theory is that respondent collected or received salaries as judge when in fact he has
never acted as such, since the date he took his oath up to the filing of the complaint. In the sense
that respondent has not yet performed any judicial function, it may be admitted that respondent
has not really performed the duties of judge. What is lost sight of, however, is that after taking his
oath and formally assuming this position as judge, respondent had a perfect right to earn the salary
of a judge even in /the extreme supposition that he did not perform any judicial function for he
could, while preparing 'himself for his new job or for any good reason, take a leave, as in fact, he had
planned to do, were it not for the request of the Secretary of Justice f for him to forego the idea and,
instead, help the Department in whatever way possible which would not, it must be presumed,
impair his position as a judge. This is more so, when, as in this case, the government offices or
officers in duty bound to furnish him the necessary place and facilities for his court and the
performance, of his functions have failed to provide him therewith without any fault on his part.
That respondent took it upon himself to personally work for early action on the part of the
corresponding officials in this direction and, in his spare time, made himself available to the
Department of Justice to assist the Secretary, what with his vast experience, having worked therein
for sixteen years, is, far from being dishonesty, to his credit. In the cir-
113
VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
113
cumstances, it was certainly not improper that he rendered some kind of service to the government,
since he was receiving salaries, while being unable to perform his regular duties as judge without
any fault on his part. As to whether or not in doing so he placed in jeopardy the independence of the
judiciary and failed to act according to the correct norm of conduct which a judge should observe
vis-a-vis service to the other departments of the government will be discussed anon. At this
juncture, the only point We settle is that complainant's theory of dishonesty cannot hold water.
23
Admittedly respondent has not prepared and submitted any of the reports of accomplishments and
status of cases in his sala which are usually required of judges under existing laws as well as the
corresponding circulars of the Department of Justice. The reason is simple. He has not ot yet started
performing any judicial functions. None of those laws and circulars apply to him, for all of them
contemplate judges who are actually holding trials and hearings and making decisions and others.
On the other hand, respondent could not be blamed for taking his oath as he did, for he had a valid
confirmed appointment in his favor. In other words, he simply made himself available for the
purpose for which he was appointed. That he could not actually hold office in the court to which he
was appointed was not of his making. The other officials in charge of providing him therewith seem
to have been caught unprepared and have not had enough time to have it ready. Conceivably, under
the law, with the permission of this Court, respondent could have been assigned to another court
pending all these preparations, but that is something within the initiative and control of the
Secretary of Justice and not of the respondent.
Of course, none of these is to be taken as meaning that this Court looks with favor at the practice of
long standing, to be sure, of judges being detailed in the Department of Justice to assist the
Secretary even if it were
114
114
only in connection with his work of exercising- administrative authority over the courts. The line
between what a judge may do and what he may not do in collaborating or working with other
offices or officers under the other great departments of the government must always be kept clear
and jealously observed, lest the principle of separation of powers on which our government rests
by mandate of the people thru the Constitution be gradually eroded by practices purportedly
motivated by good intentions in the interest of the public service. The fundamental advantages and
the necessity of the independence of said three departments from each other, limited only by the
specific constitutional precepts on check and balance between and among them, have long been
acknowledged as more paramount than the serving of any temporary or passing governmental
conveniences or exigencies. It is thus of grave importance to the judiciary under our present
constitutional scheme of government that no judge of even the lowest court in this Republic should
place himself in a position where his actuations on matters submitted to him for action or
resolution would be subject to review and prior approval and, worst still, reversal, before 'they can
have legal effect, by any authority other than the Court of Appeals or this Supreme Court, as the
case may be. Needless to say, this Court feels very strongly that it is best that this practice is
discontinued.
WHEREFORE, the herein administrative complaint is hereby dismissed. Let a copy of this resolution
be furnished the Secretary of Justice.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Zaldivar and Villamor, JJ., concur.
Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

24
Fernando, J., concurs fully and in addition submits a brief separate opinion.
Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando.
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VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
115
I join the rest of my brethren in yielding concurrence to the ably-written opinion of Justice Barredo.
Respondent Judge clearly should be exculpated of the charge filed against him. What is more the
opinion of the Court possesses the merit of setting forth in forthright and unequivocal language the
disapproval of the practice hitherto followed of having members of the judiciary perform non-
judicial functions, There is no doubt to my mind of its repugnancy to the f undamental concept of
separation of powers. It is to that aspect of the question as well as what, to my mind, is the doubtf ul
constitutionality of allowing the Secretary of Justice to exercise supervisory authority over lower
court judges that this brief concurring opinion addresses itself.
1. The doctrine of separation of powers, a basic concept under our Constitution,1 embodies the
principle 'of a tripartite division of governmental authority entrusted to Congress, the President,
and the Supreme Court as well as such inferior courts as may be created by law. Three departments
of government are thus provided for, the legislative vested with the lawmaking function, the
executive with the enf orcement of what has been thus enacted, and the judiciary with the
administration of justice, deciding cases according to law.2 The reason for such a doctrine is to
assure liberty, no one branch being enabled to arrogate unto itself the whole power to govern and
thus in a position to impose its unfettered will. If it were so, the rights of the individual could with
impunity be disregarded; he could be placed at its mercy. The three departments are coordinate
and coequal, each having
_______________
1 Cf. "The separation of powers is a fundamental principle in our system of government." Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139, 156 (1936) per Laurel, J.
2 Law covers not only statutes but likewise, treaties, executive orders to implement statutes, and
ordinances, municipal corporations being delegated with the competence of legislating over local
affairs.
116
116

25
exclusive cognizance of matters within its jurisdiction and supreme in its own sphere. That is to
guarantee independence, no interference being allowed on matters left to the exclusive concern of
each. Much. less is control by only one of the three departments of any or both of the others
permissible.3
It is to be admitted that the realities of government preclude the independence of each of the
departments from the other being absolute. This is so especially as between the legislative and
executive departments. What the former enacts, the latter implements. To paraphrase Roosevelt,
the letter of the Constitution requires a separation, but the impulse of a common purpose compels
cooperation. It could be carried to the extent of such powers being blended, without undue danger
to liberty as proved by countries having the parliamentary forms of government. This is especially
so in England and in Switzerland, where the tradition of freedom possesses strength and durability.
It does not admit of doubt, however, that of the three branches, the judiciary is entrusted with a
function the most sensitive and delicate. It passes upon controversies and disputes not only
between citizens but between citizens and government, the limits of whose authority must be
respected. In a system like ours, every exercise of governmental competence, whether coming from
the President or from the lowest official, may be challenged in court in an appropriate legal
proceeding. This is an aspect of the theory of checks and balance likewise provided for in the
Constitution.4 It is
_______________
3 Cf. Luzon Stevedoring Corp. v. Social Security Commission, L-26175, July 31, 1970, 34 SCRA 178.
4 As pointed out by Justice Laurel in the previously cited Angara decision, the President may
approve or disapprove legislation, his veto however being subject to be overriden; he may convene
the legislative body in special sessions; Congress may confirm or reject Presidential appointments;
it may apportion the jurisdiction of the courts and determine what funds to appropriate for their
support; it may impeach certain officials; and lastly as far as the judiciary is concerned, it has the
power of judicial review enabling it to annul executive or legislative acts.
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VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
117
Garcia, vs. Macaraig, Jr.
thus indispensable that judicial independence should, by all means, be made secure. Not only that.
The feeling that judges are not in any way subject to the influence of the executive and legislative
branches must be pervasive; otherwise, there would be loss of confidence in the administration of
justice. With that gone, the rule of law is placed in dire peril.
Nor is the force, to my mind, of the preceding observation blunted by the recognition that there
could be no precise delineation of the respective competence allotted. to the legislative, the
executive and the judicial departments under the Constitution. Necessarily, overlapping and
interlacing of functions could not entirely be avoided. For as observed by Justice Holmes in his
famous dissent in a case of Philippine origin:5 "The great ordinances of the Constitution do not
26
establish and divide fields of black and white. Even the more specific of them are found to terminate
in a penumbra shading gradually from one extreme to the other, x x x When we come to the
fundamental distinctions it is still more obvious that they must be received with. a certain latitude
or our government could not go on."6 Further on, he added: "It does not seem to need argument to
show that however we may disguise it by veiling words we do not and cannot carry out the
distinction between legislative and executive action with mathematical precision and divide the
branches into watertight compartments, were it ever so desirable to do so, which I am far from
believing that it is, of that the Constitution requires."7
2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the Judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a
_______________
5 Springer v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189 (1928).
6 Ibid., pp. 209-210.
7 Ibid., p. 211.
118
118
duty non-judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure
from its command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with.
nothing less.
It is apposite to quote from an: opinion of Justice Cardozo, as Chief Judge of the New York Court of
Appeals,8 when that Court nullified a section of a New York statute that would vest in a justice of its
Supreme Court the power to investigate at the instance of its governor. His opinion explained why:
"He is made the delegate of the Governor in aid of an executive act, the removal of a public officer. *
* * * At the word of command he is to give over the work of judging, and set himself to other work,
the work of probing and advising. His f indings when made will have none of the authority of a
judgment. To borrow Bacon's phrase, they will not 'give the rule or sentence.' They will not be
preliminary or ancillary to any rule or sentence to be pronounced by the judiciary in any of its
branches. They will be mere advice to the Governor, who may adopt them, or modify them, or reject
them altogether. From the beginnings of our history, the principle has been enforced that there is
no inherent power in Executive or Legislature to charge the judiciary with administrative functions
except when reasonably incidental to the fulfillment of judicial duties. * * * The exigencies of
government have made it necessary to relax as merely doctrinaire adherence to a principle so
27
flexible and practical, so largely a matter of sensible approximation, as that of the separation of
powers. Elasticity has not meant that what is of the es-
_______________
8 In re Richardson, 160 NE 655 (1928).
119
VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971
119
sence of the judicial function may be destroyed by turning the power to decide into a pallid
opportunity to consult and recommend * * *."9
Our holding today has been foreshadowed in Noblejas v. Teehankee,10 a 1968 decision, Justice
J.B.L. Reyes, who penned the opinion, first referred to the above Richardson decision as well as to
Federal Radio Commission v. General Electric Co.11 It went on to state: "In this spirit, it has been
held that the Supreme Court of the Philippines and its members should not and cannot be required
to exercise any power or to perform any trust or to assume any duly not pertaining to or connected
with the administration of judicial functions; and a law requiring the Supreme Court to arbitrate
disputes between public utilities was pronounced void in Manila Electric Co. vs. Pasay
Transportation Co. (57 Phil. 600)."12 It is clear from the above Noblejas decision that even prior to
the Constitution, there was a commitment to the principle that a member of the judiciary cannot be
asked to discharge non-judicial functions. For in Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Co.,13
mentioned therein, Justice Malcolm, speaking f or this Court, was quite explicit. Thus: "The Supreme
Court and its members should not and cannot be required to exercise any power or to perform any
trust or to assume any duty not pertaining to or connected with the administering of judicial
functions."14
_______________
9 Cf. Hayburn's Case, 2 Dall. 409 (1792); United States v Ferreira, 13 How. 40 (1851); Gordon v.
United States, 117 US 697 (1865); Matter of Sanborn, 148 US 222 (1893); Interstate Commerce
Commission v. Brimson, 154 US 447 (1894); Muskrat v. United States, 219 US 346 (1911); Tutun v.
United States, 270 US 738 (1926); Liberty Warehouse Co. v. Grannis, 273 US 70 (1927).
10 L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405.
11 281 US 469 (1930).
12 Noblejas v. Teehankee, L-28790, April 29, 1968, 23 SCRA 405, 409-410.
13 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
14 Ibid., p. 605.
28
120
120
3. Nonetheless, as now decided, respondent Judge Macaraig should not be held in any wise
accountable. No taint of bad faith can be attached to his conduct. What he was required to do was in
accordance with the practice heretofore followed by the Department of Justice. He is, under the
statute in force, under the administrative supervision of its head. Nor can the good faith of
Secretary of Justice Abad Santos be impugned. What was done by him was likewise in accordance
with what previous secretaries of justice were accustomed to do. The root of the evil then. is the
statutory authority of the Department of Justice over courts of first instance and other inferior
courts.15 While a distinction could be made between the performance of judicial functions which in
no way could be interfered with by the Department and the task of administration which is
executive in character, still the conferment of such competence to a department head, an alter ego
of the President, is, to my mind, not only unwise but of doubtful constitutionality. For in issuing
administrative rules and regulations over matters deemed non-judicial, they may trench upon the
discretion of judges which should be exercised according to their conscience alone. What is more,
the influence that the Secretary has over them is magnified. It is already unavoidable under our
scheme of government that they court his goodwill; their promotion may at times depend on it.
With this grant of authority, the assertion of independence becomes even more difficult. It is thus
objectionable in principle and pernicious in operation. That certainly is not the way to reduce to the
minimum any participation
_______________
15 Section 83, Administrative Code of 1917, as amended, reads as follows: "Bureaus and offices
under the Department of Justice.—The Department of Justice shall have executive supervision over
the Office of the Solicitor General, the Courts of First Instance and the Inferior Courts, the Public
Service Commission, the Bureau of Prisons, the General Land Registration Office, the Court of
Industrial Relations, the National Bureau of Investigation, the Bureau of Immigration, the Board of
Pardons and Parole, the Deportation Board and the Code Commission. The Office of the
Government Corporate Counsel shall be merged with the Office of the Solicitor General.***"
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VOL. 39, MAY 81, 1971
121
of the executive in judicial affairs arising from the power to appoint. As it is, even when the
government as the adverse party in criminal cases, tax suits, and other litigations is in the right, a
favorable decision from the lower courts could be looked upon with suspicion. The judiciary must
not only be independent; it must appear to be so.
29
The presence in the statute books of such power of administrative oversight then, is, to my mind,
anomalous. More specifically, were it not for such power granted the department head, respondent
Judge in this case could not have been called upon to assist the Secretary of Justice. Considering that
the Constitutional Convention is about to meet, it is to be hoped that it be made clear that the
Judiciary is to be totally freed from any supervisory authority of an executive department.
Administrative complaint dismissed. Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr., 39 SCRA 106, Adm. Case No. 198-J May
31, 1971
5. In re Judge Rodolfo Manzano, 166 SCRA 246 (1988)
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Administrative functions, defined; Case at bar.—An

examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended reveals that Provincial/City Committees on
Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—Receive complaints against any
apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be found to have committed abuses in
the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper authority for appropriate action;
Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice. It is evident that such Provincial/ City Committees on Justice
perform administrative functions. Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation
and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation
of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved
upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services, Inc. vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary).
Same; Same; Same; Doctrine of Separation of Powers; Members of the Supreme Court and other
Courts shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative
functions.—Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts
established by law shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or
administrative functions (Sections 12, Art. VIII, Constitution). Considering that membership of
Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice, which discharges
administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court is constrained to deny his
request. Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia
vs. Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth: While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative
theory not to be enforced with
_______________
* EN BANC.
247
VOL. 166, OCTOBER 5, 1988
247
In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano

30
pedantic rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it
cannot justify a member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-
judicial in character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its
command. The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was
emphasized by Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or
legislative official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of
such a norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.”
Same; Same; Same; Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges
should render assistance to said committees which may be reasonably incidental to the fulfillment
of their judicial duties.—This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude
of monastic insensibility or unbecoming indifference to Provincial/City Committee on Justice. As
incumbent RTC Judges, they form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and
performance in the adjudication of cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public
officials, they are trustees of an orderly society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City
Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render assistance to said Committees to help promote
the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only when such assistance may be reasonably
incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: Dissenting Opinion—
Constitutional Law; Administrative functions, defined.—Insofar as the term “quasi-judicial” is

concerned, it has a fairly dear meaning and Judges can confidently refrain from participating in the
work of any administrative agency which adjudicates disputes and controversies involving the
rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved in this case is where to draw the line
insofar as administrative functions are concerned. “Administrative functions” as used in Section 12
refers to the executive machinery of government and the performance by that machinery of
governmental acts. It refers to the management actions, determinations, and orders of executive
officials as they administer the laws and try to make government effective. There is an element of
positive action, of supervision or control.
248
248
Same; Same; RTC Judge Manzano may be allowed to become a member of the Provincial/City
Committee on Justice; Reasons.—Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which
reads: “Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the
conduct and affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and
regulations to better carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the
administrative agency by the organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and
Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary.)” we
can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not involve
31
any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the Committee on
Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions. Its work is
purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any study group
which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely deliberates on
problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the poor and needy
litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and limits itself to
recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to legislate or
administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
Same; Same; Same; Statutory Construction; Constitutional Provisions should be interpreted by its
spirit.—It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it
interprets provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimiting the
exercise of our jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of
constitutional interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our
powers and functions as they do to the provisions governing the other departments of government.
The Court should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency to meet the
responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The familiar
quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which vivifies
and not by the letter which killeth.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.: Dissenting—
Constitutional Law; Administrative Law; Constitutional prohibition is designation to quasi-judicial

bodies as the SEC, or administrative body like the BIR.—What I believe is contemplated by the
Consti-
249
249
tutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or
administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time positions involving running the affairs of
government, which will interfere with the discharge of judicial functions or totally remove a
Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.
Same; Same; Same; The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency or
judicial body; Reasons.—The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative
agency of government. It is a study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by
members of the Bench in said committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their
position. The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under EO No. 326
amending EO No. 856, need not be a cause for concern That supervision is confined to Committee
work and will by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
PADILLA, J.:
32
On 4 July 1988, Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano, Executive Judge, RTC, Bangui, Ilocos Norte, Branch 19,
sent this Court a letter which reads:
“Hon. Marcelo Fernan

Chief Justice of the Supreme Court
of the Philippines
Manila
Thru channels: Hon. Leo Medialdea

Court Administrator
Supreme Court of the Philippines
Sir:
By Executive Order RF6-04 issued on June 21, 1988 by the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos
Norte, Hon. Rodolfo C. Fariñas, I was designated as a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial
Committee on Justice created pursuant to Presidential Executive Order No. 856 of 12 December
1986, as amended by Executive Order No. 326 of June 1, 1988. In consonance with Executive Order
RF6-04, the Honorable Provincial Governor of Ilocos Norte issued my appointment as a member of
the Committee. For your ready reference, I am
250
250
enclosing herewith machine copies of Executive Order RF6-04 and the appointment.
Before I may accept the appointment and enter in the discharge of the powers and duties of the
position as member of the Ilocos (Norte) Provincial Committee on Justice, may I have the honor to
request for the issuance by the Honorable Supreme Court of a Resolution, as follows:
(1) Authorizing me to accept the appointment and to assume and discharge the powers and duties
attached to the said position;
(2) Considering my membership in the Committee as neither violative of the Independence of the
Judiciary nor a violation of Section 12, Article VIII, or of the second paragraph of Section 7, Article IX
(B), both of the Constitution, and will not in any way amount to an abandonment of my present
position as Executive Judge of Branch XIX, Regional Trial Court, First Judicial Region, and as a
member of the Judiciary; and
(3) Consider my membership in the said Committee as part of the primary functions of an Executive
Judge. May I please be favored soon by your action on this request.
Very respectfully yours,
(Sgd) RODOLFO U. MANZANO
Judge”
An examination of Executive Order No. 856, as amended, reveals that Provincial/City Committees
on Justice are created to insure the speedy disposition of cases of detainees, particularly those
33
involving the poor and indigent ones, thus alleviating jail congestion and improving local jail
conditions. Among the functions of the Committee are—
3.3 Receive complaints against any apprehending officer, jail warden, fiscal or judge who may be
found to have committed abuses in the discharge of his duties and refer the same to proper
authority for appropriate action;
3.5 Recommend revision of any law or regulation which is believed prejudicial to the proper
administration of criminal justice.
It is evident that such Provincial/City Committees on Justice perform administrative functions.

Administrative functions
251
251
are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and affairs of individuals for
their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better carry out the policy of the
legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the organic law of its
existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc., vs. Tapucar, SP-07599-R, 29
September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary).
Furthermore, under Executive Order No. 326 amending Executive Order No. 856, it is provided
that—
“SECTION 6. Supervision.—The Provincial/City Committees on Justice shall be under the

supervision of the Secretary of Justice. Quarterly accomplishment reports shall be submitted to the
Office of the Secretary of Justice.”
Under the Constitution, the members of the Supreme Court and other courts established by law
shall not be designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions (Section
12, Art. VIII, Constitution).
Considering that membership of Judge Manzano in the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on
Justice, which discharges administrative functions, will be in violation of the Constitution, the Court
is constrained to deny his request.
Former Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando in his concurring opinion in the case of Garcia vs.
Macaraig (39 SCRA 106) ably sets forth:
“2. While the doctrine of separation of powers is a relative theory not to be enforced with pedantic
rigor, the practical demands of government precluding its doctrinaire application, it cannot justify a
member of the judiciary being required to assume a position or perform a duty non-judicial in
character. That is implicit in the principle. Otherwise there is a plain departure from its command.
The essence of the trust reposed in him is to decide. Only a higher court, as was emphasized by
34
Justice Barredo, can pass on his actuation. He is not a subordinate of an executive or legislative
official, however eminent. It is indispensable that there be no exception to the rigidity of such a
norm if he is, as expected, to be confined to the task of adjudication. Fidelity to his sworn
responsibility no less than the maintenance of respect for the judiciary can be satisfied with nothing
less.”
252
252
This declaration does not mean that RTC Judges should adopt an attitude of monastic insensibility
or unbecoming indifference to Province/City Committee on Justice. As incumbent RTC Judges, they
form part of the structure of government. Their integrity and performance in the adjudication of
cases contribute to the solidity of such structure. As public officials, they are trustees of an orderly
society. Even as non-members of Provincial/City Committees on Justice, RTC judges should render
assistance to said Committees to help promote the laudable purposes for which they exist, but only
when such assistance may be reasonably incidental to the fullfilment of their judicial duties.
ACCORDINGLY, the aforesaid request of Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.
Cruz, Paras, Feliciano, Gancayco, Bidin, Sarmiento, Cortés, Medialdea and Regalado, JJ., concur.
Fernan (C.J.), I join J. Gutierrez’s dissent.
Narvasa and Griño-Aquino, JJ., join in Mr. Justice Gutierrez’s dissent.
Melencio-Herrera, J., joins the dissent of J. Gutierrez in a separate opinion.
Gutierrez, Jr., J., dissenting opinion.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.: DISSENTING OPINION
The Constitution prohibits the designation of members of the judiciary to any agency performing
quasi-judicial or administrative functions. (Section 12, Article VIII, Constitution.)
Insofar as the term “quasi-judicial” is concerned, it has a fairly clear meaning and Judges can
confidently refrain from participating in the work of any administrative agency which adjudicates
disputes and controversies involving the rights of parties within its jurisdiction. The issue involved
in this case is where to draw the line insofar as administrative functions are concerned.
“Administrative functions” as used in Section 12 refers to the executive machinery of government

and the performance by that machinery of governmental acts. It refers to the manage-
253
35
253
ment actions, determinations, and orders of executive officials as they administer the laws and try
to make government effective. There is an element of positive action, of supervision or control.
Applying the definition given in the opinion of the majority which reads:
“Administrative functions are those which involve the regulation and control over the conduct and
affairs of individuals for their own welfare and the promulgation of rules and regulations to better
carry out the policy of the legislature or such as are devolved upon the administrative agency by the
organic law of its existence (Nasipit Integrated Arrastre and Stevedoring Services Inc. v. Tapucar,
SP-07599-R, 29 September 1978, Black’s Law Dictionary.)”
we can readily see that membership in the Provincial or City Committee on Justice would not
involve any regulation or control over the conduct and affairs of individuals. Neither will the
Committee on Justice promulgate rules and regulations nor exercise any quasi-legislative functions.
Its work is purely advisory. I do not see anything wrong in a member of the judiciary joining any
study group which concentrates on the administration of justice as long as the group merely
deliberates on problems involving the speedy disposition of cases particularly those involving the
poor and needy litigants or detainees, pools the expertise and experiences of the members, and
limits itself to recommendations which may be adopted or rejected by those who have the power to
legislate or administer the particular function involved in their implementation.
We who are Judges cannot operate in a vacuum or in a tight little world of our own. The
administration of justice cannot be pigeonholed into neat compartments with Judges, Fiscals, Police,
Wardens, and various other officials concerned erecting watertight barriers against one another
and limiting our interaction to timidly peeping over these unnecessary and impractical barriers into
one another’s work, all the while blaming the Constitution for such a quixotic and unreal
interpretation. As intimated in the majority opinion, we should not be monastically insensible or
indifferent to projects or movements cogitating on possible solutions to our common problems of
justice and afterwards forwarding their findings to the people, public
254
254
or private, where these findings would do the most good.
The majority opinion suggests the giving of assistance by Judges to the work of the Committees on
Justice. Assistance is a vague term. Can Judges be designated as observers? Advisers? Consultants?
Is it the act of being “designated” which is proscribed by the Constitution or is it participation in the
36
prohibited functions? If Judges cannot become members, why should they be allowed or even
encouraged to assist these Committees? The line drawn by the majority is vague and unrealistic.
The constitutional provision is intended to shield Judges from participating in activities which may
compromise their independence or hamper their work. Studying problems involving the
administration of justice and arriving at purely recommendatory solutions do not in any way
involve the encroachment of the judiciary into executive or legislative functions or into matters
which are none of its concerns. Much less is it an encroachment of the other departments into
judicial affairs.
As the visible representation of the law and of justice in his community, the Judge should not shy
away from public activities which do not interfere with the prompt and proper performance of his
office, but which, in fact, enhance his effectiveness as a Judge. He cannot stop mingling in civic
intercourse or shut himself into solitary seclusion. The Committees on Justice will also be
immensely benefited by the presence of Judges in the study groups. The work of the Committees is
quite important. Let it not be said that the Judges—the officials most concerned with justice—have
hesitated to join in such a worthy undertaking because of a strained interpretation of their
functions.
It is well for this Court to be generally cautious, conservative or restrictive when it interprets
provisions of the Constitution or statutes vesting us with powers or delimiting the exercise of our
jurisdiction and functions. However, we should not overdo it. The basic principles of constitutional
interpretation apply as well to the provisions which define or circumscribe our powers and
functions as they do to the provisions governing the other departments of government. The Court
should not adopt a strained construction which impairs its own efficiency
255
255
to meet the responsibilities brought about by the changing times and conditions of society. The
familiar quotation is apt in this case—constitutional provisions are interpreted by the spirit which
vivifies and not by the letter which killeth.
I, therefore, dissent from the majority opinion and vote to allow Judge Rodolfo U. Manzano to
become a member of the Ilocos Norte Provincial Committee on Justice.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., dissenting:
I hesitate to give such a restrictive and impractical interpretation to Section 12, Article VIII of the
1987 Constitution, and thus join the dissent of Justice Gutierrez, Jr.
What I believe is contemplated by the Constitutional prohibition is designation, for example, to such
quasi-judicial bodies as the SEC, or administrative agencies like the BIR. Those are full-time
positions involving running the affairs of government, which will interfere with the discharge of
judicial functions or totally remove a Judge/Justice from the performance of his regular functions.
37
The Committee on Justice cannot be likened to such an administrative agency of government. It is a

study group with recommendatory functions. In fact, membership by members of the Bench in said
committee is called for by reason of the primary functions of their position.
The matter of supervision by the Secretary of Justice provided for under EO No. 326 amending EO
No. 856, need not be a cause for concern. That supervision is confined to Committee work and will
by no means extend to the performance of judicial functions per se.
Request denied. In Re: Rodolfo U. Manzano, 166 SCRA 246, Adm. Matter No. 88-7-1861-RTC
October 5, 1988
6. Puyat vs. De Guzman, Jr. (G.R. No. L-51122, March 25, 1982)
This suit for certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction is poised against the Order of
respondent Associate Commissioner of the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) granting
Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to intervene in SEC Case No. 1747.
A question of novel import is in issue. For its resolution, the following dates and allegations are
being given and made:
a) May 14,1979. An election for the eleven Directors of the International Pipe Industries
Corporation (IPI) a private corporation, was held. Those in charge ruled that the following were
elected as Directors:
Eugenio J. Puyat Eustaquio T.C. Acero

Erwin L. Chiongbian R. G. Vildzius
Edgardo P. Reyes Enrique M. Belo
Antonio G. Puyat Servillano Dolina
Jaime R. Blanco Juanito Mercado
Rafael R. Recto
Those named on the left list may be called the Puyat Group; those on the right, the Acero Group.
Thus, the Puyat Group would be in control of the Board and of the management of IPI.
b) May 25, 1979. The Acero Group instituted at the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) quo
warrantoproceedings, docketed as Case No. 1747 (the SEC Case), questioning the election of May
14, 1979. The Acero Group claimed that the stockholders' votes were not properly counted.
c) May 25-31, 1979. The Puyat Group claims that at conferences of the parties with respondent SEC
Commissioner de Guzman, Justice Estanislao A. Fernandez, then a member of the Interim Batasang
Pambansa, orally entered his appearance as counsel for respondent Acero to which the Puyat Group
objected on Constitutional grounds. Section 11, Article VIII, of the 1973 Constitution, then in force,
provided that no Assemblyman could "appear as counsel before ... any administrative body", and
SEC was an administrative body. Incidentally, the same prohibition was maintained by the April 7,
38
1981 plebiscite. The cited Constitutional prohibition being clear, Assemblyman Fernandez did not
continue his appearance for respondent Acero.
d) May 31, 1979. When the SEC Case was called, it turned out that:
(i) On May 15, 1979, Assemblyman Estanislao A. Fernandez had purchased from
Augusto A. Morales ten (10) shares of stock of IPI for P200.00 upon request of
respondent Acero to qualify him to run for election as a Director.
(ii) The deed of sale, however, was notarized only on May 30, 1979 and was sought
to be registered on said date.
(iii) On May 31, 1979, the day following the notarization of Assemblyman
Fernandez' purchase, the latter had filed an Urgent Motion for Intervention in the
SEC Case as the owner of ten (10) IPI shares alleging legal interest in the matter in
litigation.
e) July 17, 1979. The SEC granted leave to intervene on the basis of Atty. Fernandez' ownership of
the said ten shares. 1 It is this Order allowing intervention that precipitated the instant petition for
certiorari and Prohibition with Preliminary Injunction.
f) July 3, 1979. Edgardo P. Reyes instituted a case before the Court of First Instance of Rizal (Pasig),
Branch XXI, against N.V. Verenigde Bueinzenfabrieken Excelsior — De Maas and respondent
Eustaquio T. C. Acero and others, to annul the sale of Excelsior's shares in the IPI to respondent
Acero (CC No. 33739). In that case, Assemblyman Fernandez appeared as counsel for defendant
Excelsior In L-51928, we ruled that Assemblyman Fernandez could not appear as counsel in a case
originally filed with a Court of First Instance as in such situation the Court would be one "without
appellate jurisdiction."
On September 4, 1979, the Court en banc issued a temporary Restraining Order enjoining
respondent SEC Associate Commissioner from allowing the participation as an intervenor, of
respondent Assemblyman Estanislao Fernandez at the proceedings in the SEC Case.
The Solicitor General, in his Comment for respondent Commissioner, supports the stand of the
latter in allowing intervention. The Court en banc, on November 6, 1979, resolved to consider the
Comment as an Answer to the Petition.
The issue which will be resolved is whether or not Assemblyman Fernandez, as a then stockholder
of IPI may intervene in the SEC Case without violating Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution,
which, as amended, now reads:
SEC. 11.
No Member of the Batasang Pambansa shall appear as counsel before any court
without appellate jurisdiction.
before any court in any civil case wherein the Government, or any subdivision,
agency, or instrumentality thereof is the adverse party,
39
or in any criminal case wherein any officer or employee of the Government is

accused of an offense committed in relation to his office,
or before any administrative body.
Neither shall he, directly or indirectly be interested financially in any contract with,
or in any franchise or special privilege granted by the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including any government-owned or
controlled corporation, during his term of office.
He shall not accept employment to intervene in any cause or matter where he may
be called to act on account of his office. (Emphasis supplied)
What really has to be resolved is whether or not, in intervening in the SEC Case, Assemblyman
Fernandez is, in effect, appearing as counsel, albeit indirectly, before an administrative body in
contravention of the Constitutional provision.
Ordinarily, by virtue of the Motion for Intervention, Assemblyman Fernandez cannot be said to be
appearing as counsel. Ostensibly, he is not appearing on behalf of another, although he is joining the
cause of the private respondents. His appearance could theoretically be for the protection of his
ownership of ten (10) shares of IPI in respect of the matter in litigation and not for the protection of
the petitioners nor respondents who have their respective capable and respected counsel.
However, certain salient circumstances militate against the intervention of Assemblyman

Fernandez in the SEC Case. He had acquired a mere P200.00 worth of stock in IPI, representing ten
shares out of 262,843 outstanding shares. He acquired them "after the fact" that is, on May 30,
1979, after the contested election of Directors on May 14, 1979, after the quo warranto suit had
been filed on May 25, 1979 before SEC and one day before the scheduled hearing of the case before
the SEC on May 31, 1979. And what is more, before he moved to intervene, he had signified his
intention to appear as counsel for respondent Eustaquio T. C. Acero, 2 but which was objected to by
petitioners. Realizing, perhaps, the validity of the objection, he decided, instead, to "intervene" on
the ground of legal interest in the matter under litigation. And it maybe noted that in the case filed
before the Rizal Court of First Instance (L-51928), he appeared as counsel for defendant Excelsior,
co-defendant of respondent Acero therein.
Under those facts and circumstances, we are constrained to find that there has been an indirect
"appearance as counsel before ... an administrative body" and, in our opinion, that is a
circumvention of the Constitutional prohibition. The "intervention" was an afterthought to enable
him to appear actively in the proceedings in some other capacity. To believe the avowed purpose,
that is, to enable him eventually to vote and to be elected as Director in the event of an unfavorable
outcome of the SEC Case would be pure naivete. He would still appear as counsel indirectly.
A ruling upholding the "intervention" would make the constitutional provision ineffective. All an
Assemblyman need do, if he wants to influence an administrative body is to acquire a minimal
participation in the "interest" of the client and then "intervene" in the proceedings. That which the
Constitution directly prohibits may not be done by indirection or by a general legislative act which
is intended to accomplish the objects specifically or impliedly prohibited. 3
40
In brief, we hold that the intervention of Assemblyman Fernandez in SEC. No. 1747 falls within the
ambit of the prohibition contained in Section 11, Article VIII of the Constitution.
Our resolution of this case should not be construed as, absent the question of the constitutional
prohibition against members of the Batasan, allowing any stockholder, or any number of
stockholders, in a corporation to intervene in any controversy before the SEC relating to intra-
corporate matters. A resolution of that question is not necessary in this case.
WHEREFORE, respondent Commissioner's Order granting Atty. Estanislao A. Fernandez leave to

intervene in SEC Case No. 1747 is hereby reversed and set aside. The temporary Restraining Order
heretofore issued is hereby made permanent.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
7. Malaga vs. Penachos, Jr., G.R. No. 86695, 3 September 1992, 213 SCRA 516
Administrative Law; Government instrumentality, defined; Iloilo State College of Fisheries is a

government instrumentality; Applicability of P.D. 188.—The 1987 Administrative Code defines a
government instrumentality as follows: Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National
Government, not integrated within the department framework, vested with special functions or
jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if not all corporate powers, administering special funds,
and enjoying operational autonomy, usually through a charter. This term includes regulatory
agencies, chartered institutions, and government-owned or controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5)
Introductory Provisions). The same Code describes a chartered institution thus: Chartered
institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and vested by law
with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term includes the state
universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12) Introductory
Provisions). It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is
therefore covered by P.D. 1818.
Government contracts; Public bidding requirement; Injunctions in cases involving infrastructure

projects.—It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of
the administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
517
VOL. 213, SEPTEMBER 3, 1992
517
41
Malagas vs. Penachos, Jr.
What is involved here is non-compliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict
observance. The purpose of the rules implementing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and
to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the award of these contracts to the detriment of the
public. This purpose was defeated by the irregularities committed by PBAC. It has been held that
the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity for competition and
a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes any of these factors
destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its adoption.
Same; Same; Same.—P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities
committed by administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the
challenged restraining order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of
preliminary injunction should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private
respondent’s memorandum, however, that the subject project has already been “100% completed
as to the Engineering Standard.” This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary
injunction moot and academic.
Same; Same; Same; Liabilities of private respondents.—It has been held in a long line of cases that a
contract granted without the competitive bidding required by law is void, and the party to whom it
is awarded cannot benefit from it. It has not been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC
were induced by or participated in by any of the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the
private respondents for the prejudice sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies
described above.
PETITION for review of the decision of the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo City, Br. 25.
Salas, Villareal & Velasco for petitioners.
Virgilio A. Sindico for respondents.
CRUZ, J.:
This controversy involves the extent and applicability of P.D. 1818, which prohibits any court from
issuing injunctions in cases involving infrastructure projects of the government.
518
518
The facts are not disputed.

42
The Iloilo State College of Fisheries (henceforth ISCOF) through its Pre-qualification, Bids and
Awards Committee (henceforth PBAC) caused the publication in the November 25, 26, 28, 1988
issues of the Western Visayas Daily an Invitation to Bid for the construction of a Micro Laboratory
Building at ISCOF. The notice announced that the last day for the submission of pre-qualification
requirements (PRE C-1)** was December 2, 1988, and that the bids would be received and opened
on December 12, 1988, at 3 o’clock in the afternoon.1
Petitioners Maria Elena Malaga and Josieleen Najarro, respectively doing business under the name
of B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction, submitted their pre-qualification documents at
two o’clock in the afternoon of December 2, 1988. Petitioner Jose Occeña submitted his own PRE-C1
on December 5, 1988. All three of them were not allowed to participate in the bidding because their
documents were considered late, having been submitted after the cut-off time of ten o’clock in the
morning of December 2, 1988.
On December 12, 1988, the petitioners filed a complaint with the Regional Trial Court of Iloilo
against the chairman and members of PBAC in their official and personal capacities. The plaintiffs
claimed that although they had submitted their PREC1 on time, the PBAC refused without just cause
to accept them. As a result, they were not included in the list of prequalified bidders, could not
secure the needed plans and other documents, and were unable to participate in the scheduled
bidding.
In their prayer, they sought the resetting of the December 12, 1988 bidding and the acceptance of
their PRE-C1 documents. They also asked that if the bidding had already been conducted, the
defendants be directed not to award the project pending resolution of their complaint.
______________
** Implementing Rules and Regulations on PD 1594 (Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and
Regulations for Government Infrastructure Contracts) as amended. Official Gazette, Vol. 84, No. 23,
p. 3340-3365, June 6, 1988.
1 Annex A, Rollo, p. 134.
519
519
On the same date, Judge Lodrigio L. Lebaquin issued a restraining order prohibiting PBAC from
conducting the bidding and awarding the project.2
On December 16, 1988, the defendants filed a motion to lift the restraining order on the ground that
the Court was prohibited from issuing restraining orders, preliminary injunctions and preliminary
mandatory injunctions by P.D. 1818.
The decree reads pertinently as follows:

43
Section 1. No Court in the Philippines shall have jurisdiction to issue any restraining order,
preliminary injunction, or preliminary mandatory injunction in any case, dispute, or controversy
involving an infrastructure project, or a mining, fishery, forest or other natural resource
development project of the government, or any public utility operated by the government, including
among others public utilities for the transport of the goods or commodities, stevedoring and
arrastre contracts, to prohibit any person or persons, entity or government official from proceeding
with, or continuing the execution or implementation of any such project, or the operation of such
public utility, or pursuing any lawful activity necessary for such execution, implementation or
operation.
The movants also contended that the question of the propriety of a preliminary injunction had
become moot and academic because the restraining order was received late, at 2 o’clock in the
afternoon of December 12, 1988, after the bidding had been conducted and closed at eleven thirty
in the morning of that date.
In their opposition to the motion, the plaintiffs argued against the applicability of P.D. 1818,
pointing out that while ISCOF was a state college, it had its own charter and separate existence and
was not part of the national government or of any local political subdivision. Even if P.D. 1818 were
applicable, the prohibition presumed a valid and legal government project, not one tainted with
anomalies like the project at bar.
They also cited Filipinas Marble Corp. vs. IAC,3 where the Court allowed the issuance of a writ of
preliminary injunction
______________
2 Annex B, Rollo, p. 31.
3 142 SCRA 180.
520
520
despite a similar prohibition found in P.D. 385. The Court therein stated that:
The government, however, is bound by basic principles of fairness and decency under the due
process clause of the Bill of Rights. P.D. 385 was never meant to protect officials of government-
lending institutions who take over the management of a borrower corporation, lead that
corporation to bankruptcy through mismanagement or misappropriation of its funds, and who,
after ruining it, use the mandatory provisions of the decree to avoid the consequences of their
misdeeds (p. 188, italics supplied).
On January 2, 1989, the trial court lifted the restraining order and denied the petition for
preliminary injunction. It declared that the building sought to be constructed at the ISCOF was an
infrastructure project of the government falling within the coverage of P.D. 1818. Even if it were
44
not, the petition for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction would still fail because the
sheriff’s return showed that PBAC was served a copy of the restraining order after the bidding
sought to be restrained had already been held. Furthermore, the members of the PBAC could not be
restrained from awarding the project because the authority to do so was lodged in the President of
the ISCOF, who was not a party to the case.4
In the petition now before us, it is reiterated that P.D. 1818 does not cover the ISCOF because of its
separate and distinct corporate personality. It is also stressed again that the prohibition under P.D.
1818 could not apply to the present controversy because the project was vitiated with
irregularities, to wit:
1. The invitation to bid as published fixed the deadline of submission of pre-qualification document
on December 2, 1988 without indicating any time, yet after 10:00 o’clock of the given date, the
PBAC already refused to accept petitioners’ documents.
2. The time and date of bidding was published as December 12, 1988 at 3:00 p.m. yet it was held at
10:00 o’clock in the morning.
3. Private respondents, for the purpose of inviting bidders to participate, issued a mimeographed
“Invitation to Bid” form, which by
_______________
4 Annex F, Rollo, pp. 44-48.
521
521
law (P.D. 1594 and Implementing Rules, Exh. B-1) is to contain the particulars of the project subject
of bidding for the purposes of
(i) enabling bidders to make an intelligent and accurate bids;
(ii) for PBAC to have a uniform basis for evaluating the bids;
(iii) to prevent collusion between a bidder and the PBAC, by opening to all the particulars of a
project.
Additionally, the Invitation to Bid prepared by the respondents and the Itemized Bill of Quantities
therein were left blank.5 And although the project in question was a “Construction,” the private
respondents used an Invitation to Bid form for “Materials.”6
The petitioners also point out that the validity of the writ of preliminary injunction had not yet
become moot and academic because even if the bids had been opened before the restraining order
was issued, the project itself had not yet been awarded. The ISCOF president was not an
indispensable party because the signing of the award was merely a ministerial function which he
could perform only upon the recommendation of the Award Committee. At any rate, the complaint
had already been duly amended to include him as a party defendant.
In their Comment, the private respondents maintain that since the members of the board of
trustees of the ISCOF are all government officials under Section 7 of P.D. 1523 and since the
operations and maintenance of the ISCOF are provided for in the General Appropriations Law, it
45
should be considered a government institution whose infrastructure project is covered by P.D.

1818.
Regarding the schedule for pre-qualification, the private respondents insist that PBAC posted on
the ISCOF bulletin board an announcement that the deadline for the submission of pre-qualification
documents was at 10 o’clock of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids would be held at 1
o’clock in the afternoon of December 12, 1988. As of ten o’clock in the morning
______________
5 Exhibit E-2, Rollo of Exhibits.
6 Exhibit E-3-a, Rollo of Exhibits.
522
522
of December 2, 1988, B.E. construction and Best Built construction had filed only their letters of
intent. At two o’clock in the afternoon, B.E. and Best Built filed through their common
representative, Nenette Garuello, their pre-qualification documents which were admitted but
stamped “submitted late.” The petitioners were informed of their disqualification on the same date,
and the disqualification became final on December 6, 1988. Having failed to take immediate action
to compel PBAC to pre-qualify them despite their notice of disqualification, they cannot now come
to this Court to question the binding proper in which they had not participated.
In the petitioners’ Reply, they raise as an additional irregularity the violation of the rule that where
the estimated project cost is from P1M to P5M, the issuance of plans, specifications and proposal
book forms should be made thirty days before the date of bidding.7 They point out that these forms
were issued only on December 2, 1988, and not at the latest on November 12, 1988, the beginning
of the 30-day period prior to the scheduled bidding.
In their Rejoinder, the private respondents aver that the documents of B.E. and Best Built were
received although filed late and were reviewed by the Award Committee, which discovered that the
contractors had expired licenses. B.E.’s temporary certificate of Renewal of Contractor’s License
was valid only until September 30, 1988, while Best Built’s license was valid only up to June 30,
1988.
The Court has considered the arguments of the parties in light of their testimonial and documentary
evidence and the applicable laws and jurisprudence. It finds for the petitioners.
The 1987 Administrative Code defines a government instrumentality as follows:
Instrumentality refers to any agency of the National Government, not integrated within the
department framework, vested with special functions or jurisdiction by law, endowed with some if
not all corporate powers, administering special funds, and enjoying operational autonomy, usually
46
through a charter. This term includes regulatory agencies, chartered institutions, and government-
owned or
______________
7 Rollo, p. 87.
523
523
controlled corporations. (Sec. 2 (5) Introductory Provisions).
The same Code describes a chartered institution thus:
Chartered institution—refers to any agency organized or operating under a special charter, and
vested by law with functions relating to specific constitutional policies or objectives. This term
includes the state universities and colleges, and the monetary authority of the state. (Sec. 2 (12)
Introductory Provisions).
It is clear from the above definitions that ISCOF is a chartered institution and is therefore covered
by P.D. 1818.
There are also indications in its charter that ISCOF is a government instrumentality. First, it was
created in pursuance of the integrated fisheries development policy of the State, a priority program
of the government to effect the socio-economic life of the nation. Second, the Treasurer of the
Republic of the Philippines shall also be the ex-officio Treasurer of the state college with its
accounts and expenses to be audited by the Commission on Audit or its duly authorized
representative. Third, heads of bureaus and offices of the National Government are authorized to
loan or transfer to it, upon request of the president of the state college, such apparatus, equipment,
or supplies and even the services of such employees as can be spared without serious detriment to
public service. Lastly, an additional amount of P1.5M had been appropriated out of the funds of the
National Treasury and it was also decreed in its charter that the funds and maintenance of the state
college would henceforth be included in the General Appropriations Law.8
Nevertheless, it does not automatically follow that ISCOF is covered by the prohibition in the said
decree.
In the case of Datiles and Co. vs. Sucaldito,9 this Court interpreted a similar prohibition contained in
P.D. 605, the law after which P.D. 1818 was patterned. It was there declared that the prohibition
pertained to the issuance of injunctions or restrain-
______________
8 Presidential Decree No. 1523.

47
9 186 SCRA 704.
524
524
ing orders by courts against administrative acts in controversies involving facts or the exercise of
discretion in technical cases. The Court observed that to allow the courts to judge these matters
would disturb the smooth functioning of the administrative machinery. Justice Teodoro Padilla
made it clear, however, that on issues definitely outside of this dimension and involving questions
of law, courts could not be prevented by P.D. No. 605 from exercising their power to restrain or
prohibit administrative acts.
We see no reason why the above ruling should not apply to P.D. 1818.
There are at least two irregularities committed by PBAC that justified injunction of the bidding and
the award of the project.
First, PBAC set deadlines for the filing of the PRE-C1 and the opening of bids and then changed
these deadlines without prior notice to prospective participants.
Under the Rules Implementing P.D. 1594, prescribing policies and guidelines for government
infrastructure contracts, PBAC shall provide prospective bidders with the Notice to Prequalification
and other relevant information regarding the proposed work. Prospective contractors shall be
required to file their ARC-Contractors Confidential Application for Registration & Classifications &
the PRE-C2 Confidential Pre-qualification Statement for the Project (prior to the amendment of the
rules, this was referred to as PRE-C1) not later than the deadline set in the published Invitation to
Bid, after which date no PRE-C2 shall be submitted and received. Invitations to Bid shall be
advertised for at least three times within a reasonable period but in no case less than two weeks in
at least two newspapers of general circulations.10
PBAC advertised the pre-qualification deadline as December 2, 1988, without stating the hour
thereof, and announced that the opening of bids would be at 3 o’clock in the afternoon of December
12, 1988. This schedule was changed and a notice of such change was merely posted at the ISCOF
bulletin board.
______________
10 IB 13 1.2-19, Implementing Rules and Regulations of P.D. 1594 as amended.
525
525
48
The notice advanced the cut-off time for the submission of prequalification documents to 10 o’clock
in the morning of December 2, 1988, and the opening of bids to 1 o’clock in the afternoon of
December 12, 1988.
The new schedule caused the pre-disqualification of the petitioners as recorded in the minutes of
the PBAC meeting held on December 6, 1988. While it may be true that there were fourteen
contractors who were pre-qualified despite the change in schedule, this fact did not cure the defect
of the irregular notice. Notably, the petitioners were disqualified because they failed to meet the
new deadline and not because of their expired licenses.***
We have held that where the law requires a previous advertisement before government contracts
can be awarded, noncompliance with the requirement will, as a general rule, render the same void
and of no effect.11 The fact that an invitation for bids has been communicated to a number of
possible bidders is not necessarily sufficient to establish compliance with the requirements of the
law if it is shown that other possible bidders have not been similarly notified.12
Second, PBAC was required to issue to pre-qualified applicants the plans, specifications and
proposal book forms for the project to be bid thirty days before the date of bidding if the estimated
project cost was between P1M and P5M. PBAC has not denied that these forms were issued only on
December 2, 1988, or only ten days before the bidding scheduled for December 12, 1988. At the
very latest, PBAC should have issued them on November 12, 1988, or 30 days before the scheduled
bidding.
It is apparent that the present controversy did not arise from the discretionary acts of the
administrative body nor does it involve merely technical matters. What is involved here is
noncompliance with the procedural rules on bidding which required strict observance. The purpose
of the rules implement-
______________
*** B.E. & Best Built’s licenses were valid until June 30, 1989. (Ex. P & O respectively: both were
marked on December 28, 1988)
11 Caltex Phil. v. Delgado Bros., 96 Phil. 368.
12 51 CT. C1. 211, 214, 249, U.S. 313, 39 S. Ct. 300 25 Comp. Gen. 859.
526
526
ing P.D. 1594 is to secure competitive bidding and to prevent favoritism, collusion and fraud in the
award of these contracts to the detriment of the public. This purpose was defeated by the
irregularities committed by PBAC.
49
It has been held that the three principles in public bidding are the offer to the public, an opportunity
for competition and a basis for exact comparison of bids. A regulation of the matter which excludes
any of these factors destroys the distinctive character of the system and thwarts the purpose of its
adoption.13
In the case at bar, it was the lack of proper notice regarding the pre-qualification requirement and
the bidding that caused the elimination of petitioners B.E. and Best Built. It was not because of their
expired licenses, as private respondents now claim. Moreover, the plans and specifications which
are the contractors’ guide to an intelligent bid, were not issued on time, thus defeating the guaranty
that contractors be placed on equal footing when they submit their bids. The purpose of
competitive bidding is negated if some contractors are informed ahead of their rivals of the plans
and specifications that are to be the subject of their bids.
P.D. 1818 was not intended to shield from judicial scrutiny irregularities committed by
administrative agencies such as the anomalies above described. Hence, the challenged restraining
order was not improperly issued by the respondent judge and the writ of preliminary injunction
should not have been denied. We note from Annex Q of the private respondent’s memorandum,
however, that the subject project has already been “100% completed as to the Engineering
Standard.” This fait accompli has made the petition for a writ of preliminary injunction moot and
academic.
We come now to the liabilities of the private respondents.
It has been held in a long line of cases that a contract granted without the competitive bidding
required by law is void, and the party to whom it is awarded cannot benefit from it.14 It has not
_______________
13 Hannan v. Board of Education, 25 Okla. 372.
14 Johnson County Savings Bank, et al. v. City of Creston, 212 Iowa 929, 231 N.W. 705; Zottman v.
San Francisco, 20 Cal. 96, 81 Am.
527
527
been shown that the irregularities committed by PBAC were induced by or participated in by any of
the contractors. Hence, liability shall attach only to the private respondents for the prejudice
sustained by the petitioners as a result of the anomalies described above.
As there is no evidence of the actual loss suffered by the petitioners, compensatory damage may not
be awarded to them. Moral damages do not appear to be due either. Even so, the Court cannot close
its eyes to the evident bad faith that characterized the conduct of the private respondents, including
the irregularities in the announcement of the bidding and their efforts to persuade the ISCOF
50
president to award the project after two days from receipt of the restraining order and before they
moved to lift such order. For such questionable acts, they are liable in nominal damages at least in
accordance with Article 2221 of the Civil Code, which states:
“Art. 2221. Nominal damages are adjudicated in order that a right of the plaintiff, which has been
violated or invaded by the defendant may be vindicated or, recognized, and not for the purpose of
indemnifying the plaintiff for any loss suffered by him.
These damages are to be assessed against the private respondents in the amount of P10,000.00
each, to be paid separately for each of petitioners B.E. Construction and Best Built Construction. The
other petitioner, Occeña Builders, is not entitled to relief because it admittedly submitted its pre-
qualification documents on December 5, 1988, or three days after the deadline.
WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered: a) upholding the restraining order dated December 12,
1988, as not covered by the prohibition in P.D. 1818; b) ordering the chairman and the members of
the PBAC board of trustees, namely, Manuel R. Penachos, Jr., Alfredo Matangga, Enrico Ticar, and
Teresita Villanueva, to each pay separately to petitioners Maria Elena
______________
Dec. 96; Richardson v. Grant County (c.c.) 27 F. 495; People v. Gleason, 121 N.Y. 631; 25 N.E. 4;
Wagner v. Milwaukee, 196 Wis. 328, 220 N.W. 207.
528
528
Spartan Security & Detective Agency, Inc. vs. NLRC
Malaga and Josieleen Najarro nominal damages of P10,000.00 each; and c) removing the said
chairman and members from the PBAC board of trustees, or whoever among them is still
incumbent therein, for their malfeasance in office. Costs against PBAC.
Let a copy of this decision be sent to the Office of the Ombudsman.
SO ORDERED. Malagas vs. Penachos, Jr., 213 SCRA 516, G.R. No. 86695 September 3, 1992
8. Beja, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 97149, 31 March 1992, 207 SCRA 689
Administrative Law; Suspension; Preventive suspension distinct from the administrative penalty of
removal from office such as one mentioned in Sec. 8 (d) of P.D. No. 857.—Imposed during the
pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a penalty in itself. It is
merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be separated, for obvious
reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being investigated. Thus
51
preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative penalty of removal from office such as the
one mentioned in Sec. 8 (d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former may be imposed on a respondent
________________
* EN BANC.
690
690
Beja, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals
during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is the penalty which may only be
meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final disposition of the case.
Same; Same; The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may by himself and
without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors subject a respondent in an administrative case
to preventive suspension.—The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by
himself and without the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an
administrative case to preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by
Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857 aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the
“jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and
employees” in the PPA.
Same; Same; Preventive suspension may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has not finally
decided the administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the
preventive suspension has been exhausted.—Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension
is limited. It may be lifted even if the disciplining authority has not finally decided the
administrative case provided the ninety-day period from the effectivity of the preventive
suspension has been exhausted. The employee concerned may then be reinstated. However, the
said ninety-day period may be interrupted. Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any fault,
negligence or petition of a suspended employee may not be considered in the computation of the
said period. Thus, when a suspended employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or
a preliminary injunction inhibiting proceedings in an administrative case, the lifespan of such court
order should be excluded in the reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive suspension.
Same; Same; By vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General Manager, with the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the power to
investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with an
administrative offense.—Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a
mechanism for an administrative investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring
employees on the General Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law
impliedly grants said officials the power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant
Manager who may be charged with an administrative offense. During such investigation,
52
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VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
691
the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated, may subject the employee concerned to preventive
suspension. The investigation should be conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec.
38 of P.D. No. 807.
PETITION for certiorari to review the decisions of the Court of Appeals. Aldecoa, Jr., J.
Rogelio Zosa Bagabuyo for petitioner.
ROMERO, J.:
The instant petition for certiorari questions the jurisdiction of the Secretary of the Department of
Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and/or its Administrative Action Board (AAB) over
administrative cases involving personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager of the
Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), an agency attached to the said Department.
Petitioner Fidencio Y. Beja, Sr.1 was first employed by the PPA as arrastre supervisor in 1975. He
became Assistant Port Operations Officer in 1976 and Port Operations Officer in 1977. In February
1988, as a result of the reorganization of the PPA, he was appointed Terminal Supervisor.
On October 21, 1988, the PPA General Manager, Rogelio A. Dayan, filed Administrative Case No. 11-
04-88 against petitioner Beja and Hernando G. Villaluz for grave dishonesty, grave misconduct,
willful violation of reasonable office rules and regulations and conduct prejudicial to the best
interest of the service. Beja and Villaluz allegedly erroneously assessed storage fees resulting in the
loss of P38,150.77 on the part of the PPA. Consequently, they were preventively suspended for the
charges. After a preliminary investigation conducted by the district attorney for Region X,
Administrative Case No. 11-04-88 was “considered closed for lack of merit.”
On December 13, 1988, another charge sheet, docketed as Administrative Case No. 12-01-88, was
filed against Beja by the
_______________
1 Petitioner was referred to as “Fidencio Y. Beja” in the proceedings below. He appears as “Fidencio
Y. Beja, Sr.” for the first time in this forum.
692
692
53
PPA General manager also for dishonesty, grave misconduct, violation of reasonable office rules and
regulations, conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service and for being notoriously
undesirable. The charge consisted of six (6) different specifications of administrative offenses
including fraud against the PPA in the total amount of P218,000.00. Beja was also placed under
preventive suspension pursuant to Sec. 41 of P.D. No. 807.
The case was redocketed as Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 and thereafter, the PPA
general manager in-dorsed it to the AAB for “appropriate action.” At the scheduled hearing, Beja
asked for continuance on the ground that he needed time to study the charges against him. The AAB
proceeded to hear the case and gave Beja an opportunity to present evidence. However, on
February 20, 1989, Beja filed a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction before the
Regional Trial Court of Misamis Oriental.2 Two days later, he filed with the AAB a manifestation and
motion to suspend the hearing of Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-1-049-89 on account of the
pendency of the certiorari proceeding before the court. AAB denied the motion and continued with
the hearing of the administrative case.
Thereafter, Beja moved for the dismissal of the certiorari case below and proceeded to file before
this Court a petition for certiorari with preliminary injunction and/or temporary restraining order.
The case was docketed as G.R. No. 87352 captioned “Fidencio Y. Beja v. Hon. Reinerio O. Reyes, etc.,
et al.” In the en banc resolution of March 30, 1989, this Court referred the case to the Court of
Appeals for “appropriate action.”3 G.R. No. 87352 was docketed in the Court of Appeals as CA-G.R.
SP No. 17270.
Meanwhile, a decision was rendered by the AAB in Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-049-89. Its
dispositive portion reads:
________________
2 Case No. 89-053.
3 Two other cases involving substantially the same issues were likewise referred by the Court to
the Court of Appeals: G.R. Nos. 86468-69 (Leopoldo F. Bungubung v. Hon. Reinerio O. Reyes, et al.)
and G.R. No. 86646 (Reinerio O. Reyes, et al. vs. Cristeto O. Dinopol, et al.).
693
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
693
“WHEREFORE, judgment is hereby rendered, adjudging the following, namely:
a) That respondents Geronimo Beja, Jr. and Hernando Villaluz are exonerated from the charge
against them;
54
b) That respondent Fidencio Y. Beja be dismissed from the service;

c) That his leave credits and retirement benefits are declared forfeited;
d) That he be disqualified from re-employment in the government service;
e) That his eligibility is recommended to be cancelled. Pasig, Metro Manila, February 28, 1989.”
On December 10, 1990, after appropriate proceedings, the Court of Appeals also rendered a
decision4 in CA-G.R. SP No. 17270 dismissing the petition for certiorari for lack of merit. Hence,
Beja elevated the case back to this Court through an “appeal by certiorari with preliminary
injunction and/or temporary restraining order.”
We find the pleadings filed in this case to be sufficient bases for arriving at a decision and hence, the
filing of memoranda has been dispensed with.
In his petition, Beja assails the Court of Appeals for having “decided questions of substance in a way
probably not in accord with law or with the applicable decisions” of this Court.5 Specifically, Beja
contends that the Court of Appeals failed to declare that: (a) he was denied due process; (b) the PPA
general manager has no power to issue a preventive suspension order without the necessary
approval of the PPA board of directors; (c) the PPA general manager has no power to refer the
administrative case filed against him to the DOTC-AAB, and (d) the DOTC Secretary, the Chairman
of the DOTC-AAB and DOTC-AAB itself as an adjudicatory body, have no jurisdiction to try the
administrative case against him. Simply put, Beja challenges the legality of the preventive
suspension and the jurisdiction of the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB to initiate and hear
__________________
4 Penned by Justice Venancio D. Aldecoa, Jr. and concurred in by Justices Fidel P. Purisima and
Abelardo M. Dayrit.
5 Petition, p. 3; Rollo, p. 4.
694
694
administrative cases against PPA personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
Petitioner anchors his contention that the PPA general manager cannot subject him to a preventive
suspension on the following provision of Sec. 8, Art. V of Presidential Decree No. 857 reorganizing
the PPA:
“(d) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, appoint and remove personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager.” (Italics supplied.)
Petitioner contends that under this provision, the PPA Board of Directors and not the PPA General
Manager is the “proper disciplining authority.”6
55
As correctly observed by the Solicitor General, the petitioner erroneously equates “preventive
suspension” as a remedial measure with “suspension” as a penalty for administrative dereliction.
The imposition of preventive suspension on a government employee charged with an
administrative offense is subject to the following provision of the Civil Service Law, P.D. No. 807:
“Sec. 41. Preventive Suspension.—The proper disciplining authority may preventively suspend any
subordinate officer or employee under his authority pending an investigation, if the charge against
such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, or neglect in the
performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service.”
Imposed during the pendency of an administrative investigation, preventive suspension is not a

penalty in itself. It is merely a measure of precaution so that the employee who is charged may be
separated, for obvious reasons, from the scene of his alleged misfeasance while the same is being
investigated.7 Thus preventive suspension is distinct from the administrative pen-
________________
6 Petition, pp. 13-14; Rollo, pp. 14-15.
7 Bautista v. Peralta, L-21967, September 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 223, 225-226.
695
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
695
alty of removal from office such as the one mentioned in Sec. 8 (d) of P.D. No. 857. While the former
may be imposed on a respondent during the investigation of the charges against him, the latter is
the penalty which may only be meted upon him at the termination of the investigation or the final
disposition of the case.
The PPA general manager is the disciplining authority who may, by himself and without the
approval of the PPA Board of Directors, subject a respondent in an administrative case to
preventive suspension. His disciplinary powers are sanctioned, not only by Sec. 8 of P.D. No. 857
aforequoted, but also by Sec. 37 of P.D. No. 807 granting heads of agencies the “jurisdiction to
investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary actions against officers and employees” in the
PPA.
Parenthetically, the period of preventive suspension is limited. It may be lifted even if the
disciplining authority has not finally decided the administrative case provided the ninety-day
period from the effectivity of the preventive suspension has been exhausted. The employee
concerned may then be reinstated.8 However, the said ninety-day period may be interrupted.
Section 42 of P.D. No. 807 also mandates that any fault, negligence or petition of a suspended
employee may not be considered in the computation of the said period. Thus, when a suspended
employee obtains from a court of justice a restraining order or a preliminary injunction inhibiting
56
proceedings in an administrative case, the lifespan of such court order should be excluded in the
reckoning of the permissible period of the preventive suspension.9
With respect to the issue of whether or not the DOTC Secretary and/or the AAB may initiate and
hear administrative cases against PPA Personnel below the rank of Assistant General Manager, the
Court qualifiedly rules in favor of petitioner. The PPA was created through P.D. No. 505 dated July
11, 1974. Under that Law, the corporate powers of the PPA were vested in a governing Board of
Directors known as the Philip-
_______________
8 Sec. 42, P.D. No. 807.
9 Orbos v. Bungubung, G.R. No. 92358, November 21, 1990, 191 SCRA 563.
696
696
pine Port Authority Council. Sec. 5(i) of the same decree gave the Council the power “to appoint,
discipline and remove, and determine the composition of the technical staff of the Authority and
other personnel.”
On December 23, 1975, P.D. No. 505 was substituted by P.D. No. 857, Sec. 4(a) thereof created the
Philippine Ports Authority which would be “attached” to the then Department of Public Works,
Transportation and Communication. When Executive Order No. 125 dated January 30, 1987
reorganizing the Ministry of Transportation and Communications was issued, the PPA retained its
“attached” status.10 Even Executive Order No. 292 or the Administrative Code of 1987 classified the
PPA as an agency “attached” to the Department of Transportation and Communications (DOTC).
Sec. 24 of Book IV, Title XV, Chapter 6 of the same Code provides that the agencies attached to the
DOTC “shall continue to operate and function in accordance with the respective charters or laws
creating them, except when they conflict with this Code.”
Attachment of an agency to a Department is one of the three administrative relationships

mentioned in Book IV, Chapter 7 of the Administrative Code of 1987, the other two being
supervision and control and administrative supervision. “Attachment” is defined in Sec. 38 thereof
as follows:
“(3) Attachment.—(a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination shall be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
57
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency;
(b) Matters of day-to-day administration or all those pertaining to internal operations shall be left
to the discretion or judgment of the executive officer of the agency or corporation. In the event that
the
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10 Sec. 18(a).
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VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
697
Secretary and the head of the board or the attached agency or corporation strongly disagree on the
interpretation and application of policies, and the Secretary is unable to resolve the disagreement,
he shall bring the matter to the President for resolution and direction;
(c) Government-owned or controlled corporations attached to a department shall submit to the
Secretary concerned their audited financial statements within sixty (60) days after the close of the
fiscal year; and
(d) Pending submission of the required financial statements, the corporation shall continue to
operate on the basis of the preceding year’s budget until the financial statements shall have been
submitted. Should any government-owned or controlled corporation incur an operation deficit at
the close of its fiscal year, it shall be subject to administrative supervision of the department; and
the corporation’s operating and capital budget shall be subject to the department’s examination,
review, modification and approval.” (Italics supplied.)
An attached agency has a larger measure of independence from the Department to which it is
attached than one which is under departmental supervision and control or administrative
supervision. This is borne out by the “lateral relationship” between the Department and the
attached agency. The attachment is merely for “policy and program coordination.” With respect to
administrative matters, the independence of an attached agency from Departmental control and
supervision is further reinforced by the fact that even an agency under a Department’s
administrative supervision is free from Departmental interference with respect to appointments
and other personnel actions “in accordance with the decentralization of personnel functions” under
the Administrative Code of 1987.11 Moreover, the Administrative Code explicitly provides that
Chapter 8 of Book IV on supervision and control shall not apply to chartered institutions attached
to a Department.12
Hence, the inescapable conclusion is that with respect to the management of personnel, an attached
agency is, to a certain extent, free from Departmental interference and control. This is more
explicitly shown by P.D. No. 857 which provides:
_______________
11 Sec. 38 (2), par. (b).

58
12 Sec. 39 (2).
698
698
“SEC. 8. Management and Staff.—a) The President shall, upon the recommendation of the Board,
appoint the General Manager and the Assistant General Managers.
b) All other officials and employees of the Authority shall be selected and appointed on the basis of
merit and fitness based on a comprehensive and progressive merit system to be established by the
Authority immediately upon its organization and consistent with Civil Service rules and regulations.
The recruitment, transfer, promotion, and dismissal of all personnel of the Authority, including
temporary workers, shall be governed by such merit system.
c) The General Manager shall, subject to the approval of the Board, determine the staffing pattern
and the number of personnel of the Authority, define their duties and responsibilities, and fix their
salaries and emoluments. For professional and technical positions, the General Manager shall
recommend salaries and emoluments that are comparable to those of similar positions in other
government-owned corporations, the provisions of existing rules and regulations on wage and
position classification notwithstanding.
d)The General Manager shall, subject to the approval by the Board, appoint and remove personnel
below the rank of Assistant General Manager.
x x x x x x x x x” (Italics supplied.)
Although the foregoing section does not expressly provide for a mechanism for an administrative
investigation of personnel, by vesting the power to remove erring employees on the General
Manager, with the approval of the PPA Board of Directors, the law impliedly grants said officials the
power to investigate its personnel below the rank of Assistant Manager who may be charged with
an administrative offense. During such investigation, the PPA General Manager, as earlier stated,
may subject the employee concerned to preventive suspension. The investigation should be
conducted in accordance with the procedure set out in Sec. 38 of P.D. No. 807.13 Only after
gathering sufficient
_______________
13 “SEC. 38. Procedure in Administrative Cases Against Non-Presidential Appointees.—(a)

Administrative proceedings may be commenced against a subordinate officer or employee by the
head of department or office of equivalent rank, or head of local government, or chiefs of agencies,
or regional directors, or upon sworn written complaint of any other persons.
699
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
699
59
facts may the PPA General Manager impose the proper penalty in accordance with law. It is the
latter action which requires the
_______________
(b) In the case of a complaint filed by any other persons, the complainant shall submit sworn
statements covering his testimony and those of his witnesses together with his documentary
evidence. If on the basis of such papers a prima facie case is found not to exist, the disciplining
authority shall dismiss the case. If a prima facie case exists, he shall notify the respondent in
writing, of the charges against the latter, to which shall be attached copies of the complaint, sworn
statements and other documents submitted, and the respondent shall be allowed not less than
seventy-two hours after receipt of the complaint to answer the charges in writing under oath,
together with supporting sworn statements and documents, in which he shall indicate whether or
not he elects a formal investigation if his answer is not considered satisfactory. If the answer is
found satisfactory, the disciplining authority shall dismiss the case.
(c) Although a respondent does not request a formal investigation, one shall nevertheless be
conducted when from the allegations of the complaint and the answer of the respondent, including
the supporting documents, the merits of the case cannot be decided judiciously without conducting
such an investigation.
(d) The investigation shall be held not earlier than five days nor later than ten days from the date of
receipt of respondent’s answer by the disciplining authority, and shall be finished within thirty days
from the filing of the charges, unless the period is extended by the Commission in meritorious
cases. The decision shall be rendered by the disciplining authority within thirty days from the
termination of the investigation or submission of the report of the investigator, which report shall
be submitted within fifteen days from the conclusion of the investigation.
(e) The direct evidence for the complainant and the respondent shall consist of the sworn
statement and documents submitted in support of the complaint or answer, as the case may be,
without prejudice to the presentation of additional evidence deemed necessary but was unavailable
at the time of the filing of the complaint or answer, upon which the cross-examination, by
respondent and the complainant, respectively, shall be based. Following cross-examination, there
may be redirect and recross-examination.
(f) Either party may avail himself of the services of counsel and may require the attendance of
witnesses and the production of documentary evidence in his favor through the compulsory
process of
700
700
approval of the PPA Board of Directors.14
From an adverse decision of the PPA General Manager and the Board of Directors, the employee
concerned may elevate the matter to the Department Head or Secretary. Otherwise, he may appeal
directly to the Civil Service Commission. The permissive recourse to the Department Secretary is
sanctioned by the Civil Service Law (P.D. No. 807) under the following provisions:
60
“SEC. 37. Disciplinary Jurisdiction.—(a) The Commission shall decide upon appeal all
administrative disciplinary cases involving the imposition of a penalty of suspension for more than
thirty days, or fine in an amount exceeding thirty days salary, demotion in rank or salary or
transfer, removal or dismissal from office. A complaint may be filed directly with the Commission
by a private citizen against a government official or employee in which case it may hear and decide
the case or it may deputize any department or agency or official or group of officials to conduct the
investigation. The results of the investigation shall be submitted to the Commission with
recommendation as to the penalty to be imposed or other action to be taken.
“(b) The heads of departments, agencies and instrumentalities, provinces, cities and municipalities
shall have jurisdiction to investigate and decide matters involving disciplinary action against
officers and employees under their jurisdiction. The decisions shall be final in case the penalty
imposed is suspension for not more than thirty days or fine in an amount not exceeding thirty days’
salary. In case the decision rendered by a bureau or office head is appealable to the Commission,
the same may be initially appealed to the department and finally to the Commission and pending
appeal, the same shall be
_______________
subpoena or subpoena duces tecum.

(g) The investigation shall be conducted only for the purpose of ascertaining the truth and without
necessarily adhering to technical rules applicable in judicial proceedings. It shall be conducted by
the disciplining authority concerned or his authorized representative. The phrase any other party
shall be understood to be a complainant other than those referred to in subsection (a) hereof.”
14 Under the last paragraph of Sec. 36 of P.D. No. 807, the disciplining authority may impose the
penalty of removal from the service, transfer, demotion in rank, suspension for not more than one
year without pay, fine in an amount not exceeding six months’ salary, or reprimand.
701
VOL. 207, MARCH 31, 1992
701
executory except when the penalty is removal, in which case the same shall be executory only after
confirmation by the department head.
“x x x xxx x x x” (Italics supplied.)
It is, therefore, clear that the transmittal of the complaint by the PPA General Manager to the AAB
was premature. The PPA General Manager should have first conducted an investigation, made the
proper recommendation for the imposable penalty and sought its approval by the PPA Board of
Directors. It was discretionary on the part of the herein petitioner to elevate the case to the then
DOTC Secretary Reyes. Only then could the AAB take jurisdiction of the case.
The AAB, which was created during the tenure of Secretary Reyes under Office Order No. 88-318
dated July 1, 1988, was designed to act, decide and recommend to him “all cases of administrative
61
malfeasance, irregularities, grafts and acts of corruption in the Department.” Composed of a

Chairman and two (2) members, the AAB came into being pursuant to Administrative Order No. 25
issued by the President on May 25, 1987.15 Its special nature as a quasi-judicial administrative
body notwithstanding, the AAB is not exempt from the observance of due process in its
proceedings.16 We are not satisfied that it did so in this case the respondents protestation that
petitioner waived his right to be heard notwithstanding. It should be observed that petitioner was
precisely questioning the AAB’s jurisdiction when it sought judicial recourse.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED insofar as it upholds the power of
the PPA General Manager to subject petitioner to preventive suspension and REVERSED insofar as
it validates the jurisdiction of the DOTC and/or the AAB to act on Administrative Case No. PPA-AAB-
1-049-89 and rules that due process has been accorded the petitioner.
The AAB decision in said case is hereby declared NULL and VOID and the case is REMANDED to the
PPA whose General
_______________
15 Respondents’ Comment, p. 1; Rollo, p. 85.
16 Lupo v. Administrative Action Board, G.R. No. 89687, September 26, 1990, 190 SCRA 69.
702
702
Manager shall conduct with dispatch its reinvestigation.
The preventive suspension of petitioner shall continue unless after a determination of its duration,
it is found that he had served the total of ninety (90) days in which case he shall be reinstated
immediately.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Melencio-Herrera, Gutierrez, Jr., Cruz, Paras, Bidin, Griño-Aquino, Medialdea,
Regalado, Davide, Jr. and Nocon, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., On leave.
Padilla, J., No part; related to respondent Honorable Reinerio O. Reyes.
Bellosillo, J., No part.
Power of PPA General Manager affirmed; jurisdiction of DOTC reversed; AAB decision null and void.
62
Note.—Interruption on the administrative investigation caused by petitioner’s own fault or upon

his own request shall not be counted in computing the 90-day statutory limit of suspension (Layug
vs. Quisumbing, 182 SCRA 46). Beja, Sr. vs. Court of Appeals, 207 SCRA 689, G.R. No. 97149 March
31, 1992
9. Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, G.R. No. 115863, 31 March 1995, 243 SCRA 196
Civil Service Law; P.D. No. 1; Career Executive Service Board; Career Executive Service Board
(CESB) was created by P.D. No. 1 on September 1, 1974.—The controlling fact is that the Career
Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1,
1974 which adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
Same; Same; Same; As CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the legislature.—It
cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function.
Same; Same; Same; CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached
to respondent Commission.—From
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* EN BANC.
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VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
197
Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission
its inception, the CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to
respondent Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be
autonomous. It is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the
government with a broad and positive outlook.” The essential autonomous character of the CESB is
not negated by its attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made
to fall within the control of respondent Commission.
Administrative Law; Civil Service Law; Purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related
government agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.”—Under the
Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of attaching one functionally inter-related government
agency to another is to attain “policy and program coordination.” This is clearly etched out in
Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code.
PETITION for review of a resolution of the Civil Service Commission.

63
Mauricio Law Office for petitioner.
PUNO,J.:
The power of the Civil Service Commision to abolish the Career Executive Service Board is
challenged in this petition for certiorari and prohibition.
First the facts. Petitioner is the Deputy Director of the Philippine Nuclear Research Institute. She
applied for a Career Executive Service (CES) Eligibility and a CESO rank. On August 2, 1993, she was
given a CES eligibility. On September 15, 1993, she was recommended to the President for a CESO
rank by the Career Executive Service Board.1
All was not to turn well for petitioner. On October 1, 1993, respondent Civil Service Commission2
passed Resolution No. 93-4359,viz:
_______________
1 Together with twenty-six (26) others.
2 Patricia A. Sto. Tomas (Chairman), Ramon P. Ereneta, Jr., (member) and Thelma P. Gaminde
(member).
198
198
“RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359
“WHEREAS, Section 1(1) of Article IX-B provides that the Civil Service shall be administered by the
Civil Service Commission, x x x”;
“WHEREAS, Section 3, Article IX-B of the 1987 Philippine Constitution provides that ‘The Civil
Service Commission, as the central personnel agency of the government, is mandated to establish a
career service and adopt measures to promote morale, efficiency, integrity, responsiveness,
progressiveness and courtesy in the civil service, x x x’;
“WHEREAS, Section 12 (1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 grants the
Commission the power, among others, to administer and enforce the constitutional and statutory
provisions on the merit system for all levels and ranks in the Civil Service;
“WHEREAS, Section 7, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides,
among others, that ‘The Career Service shall be characterized by (1) entrance based on merit and
fitness to be determined as far as practicable by competitive examination, or based on highly
64
technical qualifications; (2) opportunity for advancement to higher career positions; and (3)
security of tenure;
“WHEREAS, Section 8(c), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 provides that
‘The third level shall cover positions in the Career Executive Service’;
“WHEREAS, the Commission recognizes the imperative need to consolidate, integrate and unify the
administration of all levels of positions in the career service:
“WHEREAS, the provisions of Section 17, Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of
1987 confers on the Commission the power and authority to effect changes in its organization as
the need arises.
“WHEREAS, Section 5, Article IX-A of the Constitution provides that the Civil Service Commission
shall enjoy fiscal autonomy and the necessary implications thereof;
“NOW, THEREFORE, foregoing premises considered, the Civil Service Commission hereby resolves
to streamline, reorganize and effect changes in its organizational structure. Pursuant thereto, the
Career Executive Service Board, shall now be known as the Office for Career Executive Service of
the Civil Service Commission. Accordingly, the existing personnel, budget, properties and
equipment of the Career Executive Service Board shall now form part of the Office for Career
Executive Service.”
The above resolution became an impediment to the appointment of petitioner as Civil Service
Officer, Rank IV. In a letter to
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VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
199
petitioner, dated June 7, 1994, the Honorable Antonio T. Carpio, Chief Presidential Legal Counsel,
stated:
“x x x
“On 1 October 1993, the Civil Service Commission issued CSC Resolution No. 93-4359 which
abolished the Career Executive Service Board.
“Several legal issues have arisen as a result of the issuance of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, including
whether the Civil Service Commission has authority to abolish the Career Executive Service Board.
Because these issues remain unresolved, the Office of the President has refrained from considering
appointments of career service eligibles to career executive ranks.
“x x x.
65
“You may, however, bring a case before the appropriate court to settle the legal issues arising from
the issuance by the Civil Service Commission of CSC Resolution No. 93-4359, for guidance of all
concerned.
“Thank you.”
Finding herself bereft of further administrative relief as the Career Executive Service Board which
recommended her CESO Rank IV has been abolished, petitioner filed the petition at bench to annul,
among others, Resolution No. 93-4359. The petition is anchored on the following arguments:
“A.
IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT COMMISSION USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE

FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ABOLISHED THE CESB, AN OFFICE CREATED BY LAW,
THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359;
“B.
ALSO IN VIOLATION OF THE CONSTITUTION, RESPONDENT CSC USURPED THE LEGISLATIVE

FUNCTIONS OF CONGRESS WHEN IT ILLEGALLY AUTHORIZED THE TRANSFER OF PUBLIC
MONEY, THROUGH THE ISSUANCE OF CSC RESOLUTION NO. 93-4359.”
200
200
Required to file its Comment, the Solicitor General agreed with the contentions of petitioner.
Respondent Commission, however, chose to defend its ground. It posited the following position:
“ARGUMENTS FOR PUBLIC RESPONDENT-CSC
“I. THE INSTANT PETITION STATES NO CAUSE OF ACTION AGAINST THE PUBLIC RESPONDENT-
CSC.
“II. THE RECOMMENDATION SUBMITTED TO THE PRESIDENT FOR APPOINTMENT TO A CESO
RANK OF PETITIONER EUGENIO WAS A VALID ACT OF THE CAREER EXECUTIVE SERVICE BOARD
OF THE CIVIL SERVICE COMMISSION AND IT DOES NOT HAVE ANY DEFECT.
“III. THE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT IS ESTOPPED FROM QUESTIONING THE VALIDITY OF THE
RECOMMENDATION OF THE CESB IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER EUGENIO SINCE THE PRESIDENT
HAS PREVIOUSLY APPOINTED TO CESO RANK FOUR (4) OFFICIALS SIMILARLY SITUATED AS SAID
PETITIONER. FURTHERMORE, LACK OF MEMBERS TO CONSTITUTE A QUORUM, ASSUMING
THERE WAS NO QUORUM, IS NOT THE FAULT OF PUBLIC RESPONDENT CIVIL SERVICE
COMMISSION BUT OF THE PRESIDENT WHO HAS THE POWER TO APPOINT THE OTHER
MEMBERS OF THE CESB.
“IV. THE INTEGRATION OF THE CESB INTO THE COMMISSION IS AUTHORIZED BY LAW (Sec.
12(1), Title I, Subtitle A, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987). THIS PARTICULAR ISSUE HAD
ALREADY BEEN SETTLED WHEN THE HONORABLE COURT DISMISSED THE PETITION FILED BY
66
THE HONORABLE MEMBERS OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES, NAMELY: SIMEON A.

DATUMANONG, FELICIANO R. BELMONTE, JR., RENATO V. DIAZ, AND MANUEL M. GARCIA IN G.R.
NO. 114380. THE AFOREMENTIONED PETITIONERS ALSO QUESTIONED THE INTEGRATION OF
THE CESB WITH THE COMMISSION.”
We find merit in the petition.3
_______________
3 On February 13, 1995, respondent CSC manifested that the President appointed petitioner to a
CESO rank on January 9, 1995. Her appointment, however, has not rendered moot the broader issue
of whether or not the abolition of Career Executive Service Board is valid.
201
VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
201
The controlling fact is that the Career Executive Service Board (CESB) was created by Presidential
Decree (P.D.) No. 1 on September 1, 19744 which adopted the Integrated Reorganization Plan.
Article IV, Chapter I, Part III of the said Plan provides:
“Article IV—Career Executive Service
“1. A Career Executive Service is created to form a continuing pool of well-selected and
development-oriented career administrators who shall provide competent and faithful service.
“2.A Career Executive Service Board, hereinafter referred to in this Chapter as the Board, is created
to serve as the governing body of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall consist of the
Chairman of the Civil Service Commission as presiding officer, the Executive Secretary and the
Commissioner of the Budget as ex-officio members and two other members from the private sector
and/or the academic community who are familiar with the principles and methods of personnel
administration.
“xx x
“5. The Board shall promulgate rules, standards and procedures on the selection, classification,
compensation and career development of members of the Career Executive Service. The Board shall
set up the organization and operation of the service.” (Italics supplied)
It cannot be disputed, therefore, that as the CESB was created by law, it can only be abolished by the
legislature. This follows an unbroken stream of rulings that the creation and abolition of public
offices is primarily a legislative function. As aptly summed up in AM JUR 2d on Public Officers and
Employees,5viz:
“Except for such offices as are created by the Constitution, the creation of public offices is primarily
a legislative function. In so far as the legislative power in this respect is not restricted by
constitutional provisions, it is supreme, and the legislature may decide for itself what offices are
suitable, necessary, or convenient. When in the exigencies of government it is necessary to create
and define duties, the legislative
_______________
67
4 P.D. No. 1 was later amended by P.D. No. 336 and P.D. No. 367 on the composition of the CESB;
P.D. No. 807 and E.O. No. 292 (Administrative Code of 1987) reiterated the functions of the CESB.
The General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993 also uniformly appropriated funds for the
CESB.
5 63 AM JUR 2d section 30.
202
202
department has the discretion to determine whether additional offices shall be created, or whether
these duties shall be attached to and become ex-officio duties of existing offices. An office created by
the legislature is wholly within the power of that body, and it may prescribe the mode of filling the
office and the powers and duties of the incumbent, and, if it sees fit, abolish the office.”
In the petition at bench, the legislature has not enacted any law authorizing the abolition of the
CESB. On the contrary, in all the General Appropriations Acts from 1975 to 1993, the legislature has
set aside funds for the operation of CESB. Respondent Commission, however, invokes Section 17,
Chapter 3, Subtitle A, Title I, Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 as the source of its power to
abolish the CESB. Section 17 provides:
“Section17. Organizational Structure.—Each office of the Commission shall be headed by a Director

with at least one Assistant Director, and may have such divisions as are necessary to carry out their
respective functions. As an independent constitutional body, the Commission may effect changes in
the organization as the need arises.”
But, as well pointed out by petitioner and the Solicitor General, Section 17 must be read together
with Section 16 of the said Code which enumerates the offices under the respondent Commission,
viz:
“SEC.16. Offices in the Commission.—The Commission shall have the following offices:
“(1)The Office of the Executive Director headed by an Executive Director, with a Deputy Executive
Director shall implement policies, standards, rules and regulations promulgated by the
Commission; coordinate the programs of the offices of the Commission and render periodic reports
on their operations, and perform such other functions as may be assigned by the Commission.
“(2)The Merit System Protection Board composed of a Chairman and two (2) members shall have
the following functions:
“x x x
“(3)The Office of Legal Affairs shall provide the Chairman with legal advice and assistance; render
counselling services; undertake legal studies and researches; prepare opinions and ruling in the
interpretation and application of the Civil
203
68
VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
203
Service law, rules and regulations; prosecute violations of such law, rules and regulations; and
represent the Commission before any court or tribunal.
“(4)The Office of Planning and Management shall formulate development plans, programs and
projects; undertake research and studies on the different aspects of public personnel management;
administer management improvement programs; and provide fiscal and budgetary services.
“(5)The Central Administrative Office shall provide the Commission with personnel, financial,
logistics and other basic support services.
“(6)The Office of Central Personnel Records shall formulate and implement policies, standards,
rules and regulations pertaining to personnel records maintenance, security, control and disposal;
provide storage and extension services; and provide and maintain library services.
“(7)The Office of Position Classification and Compensation shall formulate and implement policies,
standards, rules and regulations relative to the administration of position classification and
compensation.
“(8)The Office of Recruitment, Examination and Placement shall provide leadership and assistance
in developing and implementing the overall Commission programs relating to recruitment,
execution and placement, and formulate policies, standards, rules and regulations for the proper
implementation of the Commission’s examination and placement programs.
“(9)The Office of Career Systems and Standards shall provide leadership and assistance in the
formulation and evaluation of personnel systems and standards relative to performance appraisal,
merit promotion, and employee incentive benefits and awards.
“(10)The Office of Human Resource Development shall provide leadership and assistance in the
development and retention of qualified and efficient work force in the Civil Service; formulate
standards for training and staff development; administer service-wide scholarship programs;
develop training literature and materials; coordinate and integrate all training activities and
evaluate training programs.
“(11)The Office of Personnel Inspection and Audit shall develop policies, standards, rules and
regulations for the effective conduct or inspection and audit personnel and personnel management
programs and the exercise of delegated authority; provide technical and advisory services to Civil
Service Regional Offices and government agencies in the implementation of their personnel
programs and evaluation systems.
204
204
“(12)The Office of Personnel Relations shall provide leadership and assistance in the development
and implementation of policies, standards, rules and regulations in the accreditation of employee
associations or organizations and in the adjustment and settlement of employee grievances and
management of employee disputes.
“(13)The Office of Corporate Affairs shall formulate and implement policies, standards, rules and
regulations governing corporate officials and employees in the areas of recruitment, examination,
69
placement, career development, merit and awards systems, position classification and
compensation, performing appraisal, employee welfare and benefit, discipline and other aspects of
personnel management on the basis of comparable industry practices.
“(14)The Office of Retirement Administration shall be responsible for the enforcement of the
constitutional and statutory provisions, relative to retirement and the regulation for the effective
implementation of the retirement of government officials and employees.
“(15)The Regional and Field Offices.—The Commission shall have not less than thirteen (13)
Regional offices each to be headed by a Director, and such field offices as may be needed, each to be
headed by an official with at least the rank of an Assistant Director.”
As read together, the inescapable conclusion is that respondent Commission’s power to reorganize
is limited to offices under its control as enumerated in Section 16, supra. From its inception, the
CESB was intended to be an autonomous entity, albeit administratively attached to respondent
Commission. As conceptualized by the Reorganization Committee “the CESB shall be autonomous. It
is expected to view the problem of building up executive manpower in the government with a
broad and positive outlook.”6 The essential autonomous character of the CESB is not negated by its
attachment to respondent Commission. By said attachment, CESB was not made to fall within the
control of respondent Commission. Under the Administrative Code of 1987, the purpose of
attaching one functionally inter-related government agency to another is to attain “policy and
program coordi-
_______________
6 Reorganization Panel Reports, Vol. II, pp. 16 to 49 as cited in Petition, p. 17.
205
VOL. 243, MARCH 31, 1995
205
nation.” This is clearly etched out in Section 38(3), Chapter 7, Book IV of the aforecited Code, to wit:
“(3) Attachment.—a) This refers to the lateral relationship between the department or its
equivalent and the attached agency or corporation for purposes of policy and program
coordination. The coordination may be accomplished by having the department represented in the
governing board of the attached agency or corporation, either as chairman or as a member, with or
without voting rights, if this is permitted by the charter; having the attached corporation or agency
comply with a system of periodic reporting which shall reflect the progress of programs and
projects; and having the department or its equivalent provide general policies through its
representative in the board, which shall serve as the framework for the internal policies of the
attached corporation or agency.”
Respondent Commission also relies on the case of Datumanong, et al., vs. Civil Service Commission,
G.R. No. 114380 where the petition assailing the abolition of the CESB was dismissed for lack of
cause of action. Suffice to state that the reliance is misplaced considering that the cited case was
dismissed for lack of standing of the petitioner, hence, the lack of cause of action.
70
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petition is granted and Resolution No. 93-4359 of the respondent
Commission is hereby annulled and set aside. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Vitug, Kapunan, Mendoza and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, resolution annulled and set aside. Eugenio vs. Civil Service Commission, 243 SCRA
196, G.R. No. 115863 March 31, 1995
10. De la Llana vs. Alba, G.R. No. L-57883, 12 March 1982, 112 SCRA 294
Courts; Action; Petitioner de la Llana being a judge and the other petitioners as members of the Bar
have the requisite legal personality to question the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization
Act of 1980 (Batas 129).—The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved.
As far as Judge de la Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice
Laurel’s opinion in People v. Vera. Thus: “The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the
validity of a statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has
sustained, or will sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.” The other petitioners as
members of the bar and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of “any personal and
substantial interest” on the matter.
Same; Constitutional Law; The enactment into law of the Judiciary Organization Act of 1980 (Batas
129) was done in good faith,—The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the
enactment of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to
the facts. Petitioners should have exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its
antecedents. They have laid themselves open to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth.
On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization was organized. This
Executive Order was later amended by Executive Order No. 619-A, dated September 5 of that year.
It clearly specified the task assigned to it: “1. The Committee shall formulate plans on the
reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted within seventy (70) days from August 7,
1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the reorganization of the entire Judiciary which
shall embrace all lower courts, including the
________________
* EN BANC
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VOL. 112, FEBRUARY 25, 1982
295
De La Llana vs. Alba

71
Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts,
but excluding the Sandiganbayan.” On October 17, 1980, a Report was submitted by such
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: “The Committee on Judicial
Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at the outset its
appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today is a basic and
urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are problems, both
grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time, to borrow a
phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest opportunity, it is
not too much to say that the people’s faith in the administration of justice could be shaken. It is
imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that litigants, especially
those of modest means—much more so, the poorest and the humblest—can vindicate their rights in
an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in the way the courts
operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to those whose
interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the Committee
addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an institutional
reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since 1973 has been
empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal courts, has
proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for more efficient
administration does not suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in the judicial
system. It is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act became effective
on June 16, 1901.”
Same; Same; Same.—There is no denying, therefore, the need for “institutional reforms,”
characterized in the Report as “both pressing and urgent.” It is worth noting, likewise, as therein
pointed out that a major reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most
thorough after four generations. The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act enacted in June of
1901, amended in a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth.
Same; Same; Abolition of an office if done in good faith is valid.—Nothing is better settled in our law
than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a legitimate body if done in good faith
suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of Justice J.B.L. Reyes
296
296
in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. reiterated such a doctrine: “We find this point urged by respondents, to be
without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is here involved, but the
validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the Courts to decide. It is well-
known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal or separation of the incumbents. x
x x And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed never to have ceased to hold
office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of the case. As well-settled as the
rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal removal of its incumbent is the
principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in good faith.”
72
Same; Same; Public Officers; Removal from office should be distinguished from termination by
abolition of an office.—Removal is, of course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the
abolition of the office. There can be no tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in
law no occupant. In case of removal, there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his
position. It is in that sense that from the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of
security of tenure does not arise. Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the
effect is one of separation. As to its effect, no distinction exists between removal and the abolition of
the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He ceases to be a member of the judiciary.
Same; Same; Same; It will be in accordance with Constitutional principles that the Supreme Court
be consulted in the implementation of the Judiciary Reorganization law to preclude the plausibility
of the claim that the Supreme Court’s power of removal of judges is being ignored or disregarded
and thereby avoid any taint of unconstitutionality.—In the implementation of the assailed
legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional
construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and
that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a
failure to accord respect to the basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No
question of law is involved. If such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to
the action taken by either of the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of
deciding a case where the matter has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall
be appointed to the vacant positions created by the reorganization.
297
VOL. 112, MARCH 12, 1982
297
That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it properly belongs. There is no departure
therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power. Rather what is sought to be achieved by
this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to the charge that in the exercise of the
conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power of removal of the present
incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The challenged Act would thus be free
from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible except to those predisposed to
view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle
that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would
invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred. There is an obvious way to do so. The principle
that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any unconstitutional taint
must be applied.
Same; Same; Delegation to President of power to fix salary of new judges valid there being a clear
standard laid down by legislature.—Petitioners would characterize as an undue delegation of
legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the compensation and the allowances
of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful reading of the challenged Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising such an issue. The language of the
statute is quite clear. The questioned provision reads as follows: “Intermediate Appellate Justices,
Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial
73
Judges shall receive such compensation and allowances as may be authorized by the President
along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93 pursuant to Presidential Decree
No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.” The existence of a standard is thus clear.
Same; Same; Same.—It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may be carried out. Thereafter,
the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of the above guidelines
promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either express or implied. If
the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though does not have to be
spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the act considered as a
whole.” The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative departments under the
amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their implementation can be
accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency.
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Same; Same; Incumbents need not fear that they will not be appointed anew.—Certainly,
petitioners cannot be heard to argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to
take care that the laws be faithfully executed. In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected
continue functioning as before, “until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as
declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically
abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.” There is no ambiguity. The
incumbents of the courts thus automatically abolished “shall cease to hold office.” No fear need be
entertained by incumbents whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify
their being named anew, in legal contemplation, without any interruption in the continuity of their
service. It is equally reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government
service, private practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in
certain cases, a little more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents
deserve reappointment, it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a
reaffirmation of the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive.
Same; Same; Judges; The Justices of the Supreme Court sought to be disqualified from hearing the
case at bar did not have any hand in framing or in the discussion of Batas 129 and at all events their
involvement in judicial reform cannot be avoided.—In the morning of the hearing of this petition on
September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C.
Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera disqualified because the first-named was the Chairman
and the other two, members of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the
motion was denied. It was made clear then and there that not one of the three members of the
Court had any hand in the framing or in the discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not
consulted. They did not testify. The challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the
legislative body. Their work was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting
alternative plans for reorganization. That is more on the nature of scholarly studies. That they
undertook. There could be no possible objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has
had administrative supervision over inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to
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the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973
Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion
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that either the then Chairman or members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the
Philippines consulted members of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary.
It is not inappropriate to cite this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: “In the
twentieth century the Chief Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform.
A variety of conditions have been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among
them has been the creation of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform.” Also:
“Thus the Chief Justice cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the
federal level and, to the extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well.”
Same; Same; Judges should emulate the great common-law jurist who made clear that he would not
just blindly obey the King’s order but will do what becomes a judge.—That is to recall one of the
greatest Common Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly
obey the King’s order but “will do what becomes [him] as a judge.” So it was pointed out in the first
leading case stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano. The ponencia of
Justice Malcolm identified good judges with “men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government.” There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended
with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition
in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with
independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust re-posed in it. Nor should there be any
fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the
Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit
of any administration.
Barredo, J., concurring:
Courts; Constitutional Law; The critical situation of our Judiciary today calls for solutions which
though does not conform in the eyes of some to the letter of the Constitution is justified by its
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intent.—I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the light of this Court’s
doctrines about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence.
To put it differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court’s
judgment that Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am
convinced that the critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may not in the
eyes of some conform strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its
spirit and intent. As I have earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose
literal ironclad meanings we must feel hidebound, without regard to every Constitution’s desirable
inherent nature of adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and
fundamental intent and objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one
such adaptation that comes handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to
pursue. While, to be sure, it has the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges before the
end of their respective constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the
desirable end is achieved thru means that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is
constitutionally permissible.
Same; Same; Same.—I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances
have not combined to create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose
its faith and confidence in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court
could look with more sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all and sundry to know, however,
that notwithstanding this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from
being insubstantial, much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened
our eyes to how, despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed as to make it
possible for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright judiciary and
overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
Same; Same; How the President will make his choice is beyond the Court’s power to control.—
Section 44 of the Batasan’s Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold
office, leaving it to the President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts.
Thus, those who will not be appointed can be considered as “ceasing to hold their respective
offices”, or, as others would say they would be in fact removed. How the President will
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make his choices is beyond Our power to control. But even if some may be eased out even without
being duly informed of the reason therefor, much less being given the opportunity to be heard, the
past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest should serve as sufficent
assurance that when he ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn oath “to do justice to
every man”, hence, he will equip himself first with the fullest reliable information before he acts.
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This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal acquaintance with the character and
sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos.
Aquino, J., concurring:
Declaratory Relief; Jurisdiction; Practice and Pleadings; Constitutional Law; Supreme Court has no
jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief to test constitutionality of a law.—The petition should have
been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant declaratory relief and
prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law. The petition is
premature. No jurisdictional question is involved. There is no justiciable controversy wherein the
constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body
before enacting it looked into the constitutional angle.
Constitutional Law; Action; Petitioners have no personality to assail the Judiciary Reorganization
Act.—Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the
constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers. The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a
city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229,
which called for a referendum, De la Llana vs. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for
prohibition. He is not being removed from his position.
Guerrero, J., concurring:
Courts; Constitutional Law; Reforms sought to be made conducive to national interest.—I have no
doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are clearly
conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legislation, namely: (a) An
institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court, thirteen (13)
Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and
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Municipal Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A reapportionment of jurisdiction geared towards greater
efficiency; (c) A simplification of procedures; and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by
the Judiciary Act of 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines are
undoubtedly intended to improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and order.
Same; Same; The judicial system is plague with ills and devices are needed to make it workable and
economical.—Hence, from the standpoint of the general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The
notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets is too well-known to be ignored as are the
causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more practical, workable and economical. From the figures alone (301,497
pending cases in 1976; 351,943 in 1977; 404,686 in 1978; 426,911 in 1979; 441,332 in 1980; and
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450,063 as of February 3, 1982) the congested character of court dockets rising year after year is
staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.
Same; Same; Judiciary’s prestige has degenerated today to its lowest ebb; many dispensers of
justice corrupt; immoral and incompetent.—But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily
and promptly is the necessity to have Justices and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and
incorruptible, competent and efficient. The general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today
has deteriorated and degenerated to the lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual
basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and
immorality of many dispensers of justice. According to the compiled data, the total number of
Justices and Judges against whom administrative charges have been filed for various offenses,
misconduct, venalities and other irregularities reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court
of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2 Criminal Circuit Court Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic
Relations Court Judge. 38 City Judges, and 146 Municipal Judges.
Same; Same; Same.—The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with
either suspension, admonition, reprimand or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges.
1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53
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Municipal Judges. Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the
service. And these are 3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Same; Same; The legislative body acted in good faith and for an honest purpose in the light of
circumstances.—In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judicial system, it would be
absurd and unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and
honesty of purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly
performed. The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers but
also applies to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of legislative
bodies. Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there
is none in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and
credit to the lawmakers’ deep sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office
as the duly-elected representatives of the people.
Same; Same; The New Republic requires judicial activism.—Without detracting from the merits, the
force and brilliance of their advocacies based on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on
the social justification and the functional utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light
of contemporaneous events from which the New Republic emerged and evolved new ideals of
national growth and development, particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial
activism, perhaps similar to it, is necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.
Abad Santos, J., concurring and dissenting:

78
Constitutional Law; Courts; The Executive has no obligation to consult the Supreme Court in the
judiciary reorganization prescribed by law.—It has already been ruled that the statute does not
suffer from any constitutional infirmity because the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in
good faith. This being the case, I believe that the Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional
power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult with this Court
and to accord its views the fullest consideration. To require consultation will constitute an invasion
of executive territory which can be resented and even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there
could be an unconstitutional implementation of the questioned legislation is not congruent with the
basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
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304
De Castro, J., concurring:
Courts; Constitutional Law; It is the constitutional prerogative of the legislature to create and
abolish courts.—The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a
constitutional prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the
power to reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or
substantially different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of
constitutional law that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
Same; Same; Courts must first be created before the question of security of tenure should arise.—
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which
would thereafter arise the security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said
courts. In the natural order of things, therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure of
judges arises only after the courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of tenure
takes a secondary position to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to provide for a
fair and strong judicial system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and
urgent to provide for a new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts
would conduce more to its objective of improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter
involved is one of policy and wisdom into which the Courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot
inquire, much less interfere with.
Same; Same; The 1973 Constitution gave the President the power to replace incumbent members of
the Judiciary.—Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in
office until replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of
tenure, in the traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a
holdover tenure. How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint
should serve as the strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole guide in
implementing the law.
Same; Same; Judges appointed after 1973 were appointed by the President who should feel concern
to protect their rights.—As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present
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President, and he should feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may
rightfully claim to maintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being
ignored for
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no reason at all, much less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of nobility of heart.
Same; Same; The abolition of courts is not unconstitutional but its wrong implementation could be
unconstitutional.—From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation
of the law may there possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of
acknowledged honesty, industry and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness
would thereby be committed, but the abolition of the courts as decreed by the law is not by itself or
per se unconstitutional.
Same; Same; It is not proper to declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act unconstitutional before it
had a chance to prove its worth.—It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this
stage, before it has even been given a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all those
who helped by their exhaustive and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any
of the proper parties who could assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and actual,
not merely probable or hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly
contend to be an unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto
itself.
Same; Same; Same.—It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that
while in the implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a
categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely
not unconstitutional. Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law shall have been
implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the
people—the administration of justice—should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as
sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly
denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would seem to rest on an unsupportable
theory that they have a vested right to a public office.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring:
Courts; Constitutional Law; The legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to courts.—A
legislature is not bound to give
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306
security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the entire judicial system can be
changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the wheels of progress and the
imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To hold that tenure of Judges is superior
to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the existence of that power.
Same; Same; Same.—It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed, to their
Courts, from which they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action
for bad behavior. Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power of the
legislative to establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. If an inferior
Court is abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his position because
the abolished Court is not entailed to him.
Same; Same; Law abolishing courts enacted in response to a pressing need.—I am satisfied that the
challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an urgent and pressing
public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of tenure of all Judges or
legislating them out to the detriment of judicial independence. It should not be said of the Batasang
Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an unconstitutional and
evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1981
sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of public office, as clearly explained in
the main opinion.
Same; Same; Abolition of courts does not involved disciplining of judges of abolished courts.—
Absent the Court, it would be futile to speak of the Supreme Court’s power to discipline. Thus,
where the legislature has willed that the Courts be abolished, the power to discipline cannot pose
an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into play only when there is removal
from an existing judicial office, but not when that office is abolished. The reorganization of the
judicial system with the abolition of certain Courts is not an exercise of the power to discipline the
Judges of the abolished Courts.
Ericta, J., concurring:
Courts; Constitutional Law; Security of tenure cannot be invoked in the abolition of an office.—
Security of tenure cannot be in-
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81
voked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee but an abolition of his office.
(Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998; Baidoz vs. Office of the
President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between removal from office and
abolition of an office. Removal implies that the office subsists after ouster, while, in abolition, the
office no longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to exercise the rights and
duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
Same; Same; Implementation of the judiciary reorganization should be left exclusively to the
President.—Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be
adversely affected. But in a conflict between public interest and the individual interest of some
Judges and Justices, the public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the supreme law. The
implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of appointment is
the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should be left exclusively
to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President.
Plana, J., concurring and dissenting:
Courts; Constitutional Law; The President is under no obligation to consult the Supreme Court in
the implementation of Batas 129.—I believe the President is under no obligation to consult with the
Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the
President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory opinions.
Same; Same; Batas 129 specifies guidelines for its implementation.—As pointed out in the main
opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines for the implementation of the
delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would like to add however some
observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Same; Same; The Constitution has now eroded the hoary doctrine of non-delegation of legislative
powers.—In a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary doctrine
of non-delegation of legislative power, although it has retained some provisions of the old
Constitution which were predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time perhaps not so
much to authorize shifting of power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence
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of “undue” delegation of legislative power, as to avert the abdication thereof.
Concepcion, Jr., J.:
I concur in the result the abolition being in good faith.
Fernandez, J.:
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I concur provided that in the task of implementation by the Executive as far as the present Justices
and Judges who may be separated from the service, it would be in accordance with the tenets of
constitutionalism if this Court be consulted and that its view be respected.
Escolin, J.:
I concur.
Teehankee, J., dissenting:
Courts; Constitutional Law; Judges; The express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of
judges must prevail over the implied authority to abolish courts.—This reasoning that the express
guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good behavior unless removed from office
after hearing and due process or upon reaching the compulsory retirement age of seventy years
must override the implied authority of removing by legislation the judges has been further
strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new provisions of the 1973 Constitution that
transferred the administrative supervision over all courts and their personnel from the Chief
Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme Court and vested in the Supreme
Court exclusively “the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight
members, order their dismissal,” which power was formerly lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief
Executive.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the
1934 Constitutional Convention “frowned on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of
their offices or reorganization,” citing Professor Jose Aruego’s observation that the security of
judges’ tenure provision was intended to “help secure the independence of the judiciary” in
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that “during good behaviour, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor
removed by the Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever;
they may stay in office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to
discharge the duties of their office.
Same; Same; Same; Abolition of courts a mere indirect manner of removing judges.—The abolition
of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners. Remember that on
June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges-at-large and cadastral
judges (Rep. Act 296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were 114 positions of
judges of first instance. There was no reduction—there was increase—in the number of judges, nor
in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral Judges were eliminated; but
they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges; or if you please, there was a
mere change of designation from ‘Cadastral Judge or Judge-at-Large’ to ‘district judge’. Hence it
should be ruled that as their positions had not been ‘abolished’ de facto, but actually retained with
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another name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-
7115, March 30, 1954.) For it is not permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the
expediency of abolishing his office even as the office with same power is created with another
name.
Same; Same; Same; The test of whether the Judiciary Reorganization Act was enacted in good faith
or in bad faith is not the right test for the good faith of the law making body must be granted in
every legislation. What must be reconciled is its power to abolish from a mere implied power to
establish courts.—I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the
courts and consequent ouster of the incumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent
Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate concurring opinion in the pre-war case of Zandueta wherein
the Court dismissed the petition for quo warranto on the ground of petitioner Zandueta’s estoppel
and abandonment of office. Realistically viewed from the basis of the established legal
presumptions of validity and constitutionality of statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority of 10
members of the Supreme Court) and of good faith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a
case where the Court could speculate on the good or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act
without appearing to be imprudent and improper and declare that “the legislative power of
reorganization (is) sought to cloak an un-
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constitutional and evil purpose.” The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act must needs
be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as implied from the
power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the judges which is
essential for a free and independent judiciary.
Same; Same; Same; The maintenance of the Rule of Law requires a judiciary free from all sorts of
interference from the political powers that be.—Adherents of the Rule of Law are agreed that
indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent judiciary, sworn to
protect and enforce it without fear or favor—“free, not only from grant, corruption, ineptness and
incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political
powers that be,” to quote again from Justice Barredo’s separate concurring opinion. Hence, my
adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon in the Ocampo case,
supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by former Chief Justice
Roberto Concepcion that “any reorganization should at least allow the incumbents of the existing
courts to remain in office [the appropriate counterpart ‘new courts’] unless they are removed for
cause.”
Same; Same; Same; The urgent need is to strengthen the now feebled judiciary, not to make it more
enfeebled.—And now comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands of
personnel positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the
judiciary with the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and
independent judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already
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feeble judiciary, possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the purse, as decreed by former
Chief Justice Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion.
Same; Same; Same; There is no hard evidence of substantial number of judges being misfits; only
10-15 of 1,700 judges had been classified as corrupt or incompetent; hence, abolition of all offices is
arbitrary.—Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that “However, nowhere on public record is
there hard evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to
the effect that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the
undesirable category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupt. (Barredo, J., before the Committee on
Justice, Human Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980),” and that “(I)f this be the
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case, the unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an arbitrary
act, the effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent
without due process of law.” Nor would it be of any avail to beg the question and assert that due
process is not available in mass abolitions of courts.
Same; Same; Same; Judges who are counted upon to give due process of law should not he denied
the right to due process by being branded for life.—Judges of inferior courts should not be
summarily removed and branded for life in such reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse
reports as to their performance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign
from office upon being confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte
reports, without due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a
number of honest and competent judges were summarily removed while others who were
generally believed to be basket cases have remained in the services.
Same; Same; Same: The Judiciary Reorganization Act can properly be construed as allowing
reorganization of courts without the incumbent judges being booted out.—The constitutional
confrontation and conflict may well be avoided by holding that since the changes and provisions of
the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the “new courts” therein
provided as compared to the “abolished old courts” but provide for procedural changes, fixed
delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of courts for a more effective and efficient
disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges’ guaranteed security of tenure require that they be
retained in the corresponding “new courts.”
PETITION directly filed with the Supreme Court for the adjudication of the Constitutionality of
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
FERNANDO, C.J.;
This Court, pursuant to its grave responsibility of passing upon the validity of any executive or
legislative act in an appropriate cases, has to resolve the crucial issue of the constitutionality of
85
Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, entitled “An Act Reorganizing the Judiciary, Appropriating Funds
Therefor and for Other Purposes.” The task of judicial review, aptly
312
312
characterized as exacting and delicate, is never more so than when a conceded legislative power,
that of judicial reorganization,1 may possibly collide with the time-honored principle of the
independence of the judiciary2 as protected and safeguarded by this constitutional provision: “The
Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during good behavior
until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of their
office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote
of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.”3 For the assailed legislation mandates that
Justices and judges of inferior courts from the Court of Appeals to municipal circuit courts, except
the occupants of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals, unless appointed to the inferior
courts established by such Act, would be considered separated from the judiciary. It is the
termination of their incumbency that for petitioners justifies a suit of this character, it being alleged
that thereby the security of tenure provision of the Constitution has been ignored and disregarded.
That is the fundamental issue raised in this proceeding, erroneously entitled Petition for
Declaratory Relief and/or for Prohibition4 considered by this Court as an action for prohibi-
________________
1 Article X, Section 1, first sentence of the Constitution reads: “The judicial power shall be vested in
one Supreme Court and in such inferior courts as may be established by law.”
2 Cf. Borromeo v. Mariano, 41 Phil. 322 (1921) and People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
3 Article X, Section 7 of the Constitution.
4 It may be mentioned in passing that petitioners ignored the fact that an action for declaratory
relief should be filed in a Court of First Instance and apparently are unaware that there is no such
proceeding known in constitutional law to declare an act unconstitutional. So it has been
authoritatively ruled even prior to the 1935 Constitution, and much more so after its effectivity and
that of the present Constitution. That is the concept of judicial review as known in the Philippines, a
principle that goes back to the epochal decision of Chief Justice Marshall in Marbury v. Madison, 1
Cranch 137 (1803). This Court, then, as do lower courts, has the duty and the power to
313
VOL. 112, MARCH 12, 1982
313
86
tion, seeking to enjoin respondent Minister of the Budget, respondent Chairman of the Commission
on Audit, and respondent Minister of Justice from taking any action implementing Batas Pambansa
Blg. 129. Petitioners5 sought to bolster their claim by imputing lack of good faith in its enactment
and characterizing as an undue delegation of legislative power to the President his authority to fix
the compensation and allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed and the
determination of the date when the reorganization shall be deemed completed. In the very
comprehensive and scholarly Answer of Solicitor General Estelito P. Mendoza,6 it was pointed out
that there is no valid justification for the attack on the constitutionality of this statute, it being a
legitimate exercise of the power vested in the Batasang Pambansa to reorganize the judiciary, the
allegations of absence of good faith as well as the attack on the independence of the judiciary being
unwarranted and devoid of any support in law. A Supplemental Answer was likewise filed on
October 8, 1981, followed by a Reply of petitioners on October 13. After the hearing in the morning
and afternoon of October 15, in which not only petitioners and respondents were heard through
counsel but also the amici curiae,7 and thereafter submission of
________________
declare an act unconstitutional but only as an incident to its function of deciding cases. Cf. Angara v.
Electoral Commission, 63 Phil. 139 (1936); People v. Vera, 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
5 Gualberto J. de la Llana is the Presiding Judge of Branch II of the City Court of Olongapo. The other
petitioners are all members of the Philippine bar.
6 He was assisted by Assistant Solicitor General Reynato S. Puno.
7 The amici curiae who argued were Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, President, Philippine Constitution
Association; Dean Irene Cortes, former Dean, U.P. College of Law; Atty. Bellaflor Angara Castillo,
President, U.P. Women Lawyers Circle; Atty. Paz Veto Planas, President, Women Lawyers
Association; Atty. Raul Roco, Executive Vice-President, Integrated Bar of the Philippines; Atty.
Enrique Syquia, President, Philippine Bar Association; Atty. Rafael G. Suntay, for the Trial Lawyers
Association; and Senator Jose W. Diokno submitted memoranda. Atty. Raul Gonzales entered his
appearance for petitioner and argued by way of rebuttal. Atty. Ambrosio Padilla
314
314
the minutes of the proceeding on the debate on Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, this petition was deemed
submitted for decision.
The importance of the crucial question raised called for intensive and rigorous study of all the legal
aspects of the case. After such exhaustive deliberation in several sessions, the exchange of views
being supplemented by memoranda from the members of the Court, it is our opinion and so hold
that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional.
87
1. The argument as to the lack of standing of petitioners is easily resolved. As far as Judge de la
Llana is concerned, he certainly falls within the principle set forth in Justice Laurel’s opinion in
People v. Vera.8 Thus: “The unchallenged rule is that the person who impugns the validity of a
statute must have a personal and substantial interest in the case such that he has sustained, or will
sustain, direct injury as a result of its enforcement.”9 The other petitioners as members of the bar
and officers of the court cannot be considered as devoid of “any personal and substantial interest”
on the matter. There is relevance to this excerpt from a separate opinion in Aquino, Jr. v.
Commission on Elections:10 “Then there is the attack on the standing of petitioners, as vindicating
at most what they consider a public right and not protecting their rights as individuals. This is to
conjure the specter of the public right dogma as an inhibition to parties intent on keeping public
officials staying on the path of constitutionalism. As was so well put by Jaffe: ‘The protection of
private rights is an essential constituent of public interest and, conversely, without a well-ordered
state there could be no enforcement of private rights. Private and public interests are, both in a
substantive and procedural sense, aspects of the totality of the legal order.’ Moreover, petitioners
have convincingly shown that in their capacity as taxpayers, their standing to sue has been amply
demonstrated. There would be a retreat from the liberal ap-
________________
likewise submitted a memorandum, which the Court allowed to stay in ihe records.
8 65 Phil. 56 (1937).
9 Ibid, 89.
10 L-40004, January 31, 1975, 62 SCRA 275.
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VOL. 112, MARCH 12, 1982
315
proach followed in Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works, foreshadowed by the very decision of
People v. Vera where the doctrine was first fulry discussed, if we act differently now. I do not think
we are prepared to take that step. Respondents, however, would hark back to the American
Supreme Court doctrine in Mellon v. Frothingham, with their claim that what petitioners possess ‘is
an interest which is shared in common by other people and is comparatively so minute and
indeterminate as to afford any basis and assurance that the judicial process can act on it.’ That is to
speak in the language of a bygone era, even in the United States. For as Chief Justice Warren clearly
pointed out in the later case of Flast v. Cohen, the barrier thus set up if not breached has definitely
been lowered.”11
2. The imputation of arbitrariness to the legislative body in the enactment of Bata Pambansa Blg.
129 to demonstrate lack of good faith does manifest violence to the facts. Petitioners should have
exercised greater care in informing themselves as to its antecedents. They had laid themselves open
to the accusation of reckless disregard for the truth. On August 7, 1980, a Presidential Committee
88
on Judicial Reorganization was organized.12 This Executive Order was later amended by Executive
Order No. 619-A, dated September 5 of that year. It clearly specified the task assigned to it: “1. The
Committee shall formulate plans on the reorganization of the Judiciary which shall be submitted
within seventy (70) days from August 7, 1980 to provide the President sufficient options for the
reorganization of the entire Judiciary which shall embrace all lower courts, including the Court of
Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the City and Municipal Courts, and all Special Courts, but
excluding the Sandigan Bayan.”13 On October 17, 1980, a Report was sub
________________
11 Ibid, 308.
12 Executive Order No. 611. The writer of this opinion was designated as Chairman, and Minister
Ricardo C. Puno as Co-Chairman. Two members of the Court, Justices Ramon C. Aquino and
Ameurfina A. Melencio-Herrera, as well as a former member, retired Justice Felix Q. Antonio, were
named, to such body. Deputy Minister of Justice Jesus Borromeo completed the membership..
13 Executive Order No. 619-A.
316
316
mitted by such Committee on Judicial Reorganization. It began with this paragraph: “The
Committee on Judicial Reorganization has the honor to submit the following Report. It expresses at
the outset its appreciation for the opportunity accorded it to study ways and means for what today
is a basic and urgent need, nothing less than the restructuring of the judicial system. There are
problems, both grave and pressing, that call for remedial measures. The felt necessities of the time,
to borrow a phrase from Holmes, admit of no delay, for if no step be taken and at the earliest
opportunity, it is not too much to say that the people’s faith in the administration of justice could be
shaken. It is imperative that there be a greater efficiency in the disposition of cases and that
litigants, especially those of modest means—much more so, the poorest and the humblest—can
vindicate their rights in an expeditious and inexpensive manner. The rectitude and the fairness in
the way the courts operate must be manifest to all members of the community and particularly to
those whose interests are affected by the exercise of their functions. It is to that task that the
Committee addresses itself and hopes that the plans submitted could be a starting point for an
institutional reform in the Philippine judiciary. The experience of the Supreme Court, which since
1973 has been empowered to supervise inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals to the municipal
courts, has proven that reliance on improved court management as well as training of judges for
more efficient administration does not suffice. Hence, to repeat, there is need for a major reform in
the judicial system. It is worth noting that it will be the first of its kind since the Judiciary Act
became effective on June 16, 1901.”14 It went on to say: “It does not admit of doubt that the last
two decades of this century are likely to be attended with problems of even greater complexity and
delicacy. New social interests are pressing for recognition in the courts. Groups long inarticulate,
primarily those economically underprivileged, have found legal spokesmen and are asserting
89
grievances previously ignored. Fortunately, the judiciary has not proved inattentive. Its task has
thus become even more formidable. For so much grist is added to the mills of justice. Moreover,
________________
14 Report of the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, 5-6.
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317
they are likewise to be quite novel. The need for an innovative approach is thus apparent. The
national leadership, as is wellknown, has been constantly on the search for solutions that will prove
to be both acceptable and satisfactory. Only thus may there be continued national progress.”15
After which comes: “To be less abstract, the thrust is on development. That has been repeatedly
stressed—and rightly so. All efforts are geared to its realization. Nor, unlike in the past, was it to be
“considered as simply the movement towards economic progress and growth measured in terms of
sustained increases in per capita income and Gross National Product (GNP).”16 For the New
Society, its implication goes further than economic advance, extending to “the sharing, or more
appropriately, the democratization of social and economic opportunities, the substantiation of the
true meaning of social justice.”17 This process of modernization and change compels the
government to extend its field of activity and its scope of operations. The efforts towards reducing
the gap between the wealthy and the poor elements in the nation call for more regulatory
legislation. That way the social justice and protection to labor mandates of the Constitution could be
effectively implemented.”18 There is likelihood then “that some measures deemed inimical by
interests adversely affected would be challenged in court on grounds of validity. Even if the
question does not go that far, suits may be filed concerning their interpretation and application. * *
* There could be pleas for injunction or restraining orders. Lack of success of such moves would
not, even so, result in their prompt final disposition. Thus delay in the execution of the policies
embodied in law could thus be reasonably expected. That is not conducive to progress in dev-
________________
15 Ibid, 7.
16 Ibid, citing the President’s foreword to The Philippine Development Plan, 2.
17 Ibid.
18 Ibid, 8. The last sentence of this portion of the Report reads: “That is to achieve the
democratization and humanization of justice in what has been felicitously referred to by the First
Lady as a ‘compassionate society.’ ”
318
318
90
elopment.”19 For, as mentioned in such Report, equally of vital concern is the problem of clogged
dockets, which “as is well known, is one of the utmost gravity. Notwithstanding the most
determined efforts exerted by the Supreme Court, through the leadership of both retired Chief
Justice Querube Makalintal and the late Chief Justice Fred Ruiz Castro, from the time supervision of
the courts was vested in it under the 1973 Constitution, the trend towards more and more cases
has continued.”20 It is understandable why. With the accelerated economic development, the
growth of population, the increasing urbanization, and other similar factors, the judiciary is called
upon much oftener to resolve controversies. Thus confronted with what appears to be a crisis
situation that calls for a remedy, the Batasang Pambansa had no choice. It had to act, before the
ailment became even worse. Time was of the essence, and yet it did not hesitate to be duly mindful,
as it ought to be, of the extent of its coverage before enacting Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
3. There is no denying, therefore, the need for “institutional reforms,” characterized in the Report as
“both pressing and urgent.”21 It is worth noting, likewise, as therein pointed out, that a major
reorganization of such scope, if it were to take place, would be the most thorough after four
generations.”22 The reference was to the basic Judiciary Act enacted in June of 1901,23 amended in
a significant way, only twice previous to the Commonwealth. There was, of course, the creation of
the Court of Appeals in 1935, originally composed “of a Presiding Judge and ten appellate Judges,
who shall be appointed by the President of the Philippines, with the consent of the Commission on
Appointments of the National Assembly.”24 It could “sit en banc, but it may sit in two divisions, one
of six and another of five Judges, to transact
________________
19 Ibid, 8-9.
20 Ibid, 9-10.
21 Ibid, 10.
22 Ibid.
23 Act No. 136. Cf. Act No. 2347 and 4007.
24 Commonwealth Act No. 3.
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91
business, and the two divisions may sit at the same time.”25 Two years after the establishment of
independence of the Republic of the Philippines, the Judiciary Act of 194826 was passed. It
continued the existing system of regular inferior courts, namely, the Court of Appeals, Courts of
First Instance,27 the Municipal Courts, at present the City Courts, and the Justice of the Peace
Courts, now the Municipal Circuit Courts and Municipal Courts. The membership of the Court of
Appeals has been continuously increased.28 Under a 1978 Presidential Decree, there would be
forty-five members, a Presiding Justice and forty-four Associate Justices, with fifteen divisions.29
Special courts were likewise created. The first was the Court of Tax Appeals in 1954,30 next came
the Court of Agrarian Relations in 1955,31 and then in the same year a Court of the Juvenile and
Domestic Relations for Manila in 1955,32 subsequently followed by the creation of two other
________________
25 Ibid, Sec. 3, Under Commonwealth Act No. 259, the membership of the Court of Appeals was
increased to fifteen, with one Presiding Justice and fourteen Associate Justices. Three divisions
were created, five members in each division. The Act was approved on April 7, 1938. In 1945 after
the liberation of the Philippines, it was abolished by Executive Order No. 37 of President Sergio
Osmeña exercising his emergency powers under Commonwealth Act No. 671. It was established
anew under Republic Act No. 52, which took effect on October 4, 1946.
26 Republic Act No. 296.
27 Section 53 of this Act provided: “In addition to the District Judges mentioned in section forty-
nine hereof, there shall also be appointed eighteen Judges-at-large and fifteen Cadastral Judges who
shall not be assigned permanently to any judicial district; and who shall render duty in such district
or province as may from time to time, be designated by the Department Head.” This Section was
repealed by Republic Act No. 1186 (1954).
28 Cf. Republic Act no. 520 (1968) and Presidential Decree No. 289 (1973).
29 Presidential Decree No. 1482.
30 Republic Act No. 1125 (1954).
31 Republic Act No. 1267. It was amended by Presidential Decree No. 946 (1976).
32 Republic Act No. 1404, Subsequently, two more branches were added under Presidential Decree
No. 1439 (1978).
320
320
such courts for Iloilo and Quezon City in 1966.33 In 1967, Circuit Criminal Courts were established,
with the Judges having the same qualifications, rank, compensation, and privileges as judges of
Courts of First Instance.34
92
4. After the submission of such Report, Cabinet Bill No. 42, which later became the basis of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, was introduced. After setting forth the background as above narrated, its
Explanatory Note continues: “Pursuant to the President’s instructions, this proposed legislation has
been drafted in accordance with the guidelines of that report with particular attention to certain
objectives of the reorganization, to wit, the attainment of more efficiency in disposal of cases, a
reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out
of justice. In consultation with, and upon a consensus of, the governmental and parliamentary
leadership, however, it was felt that some options set forth in the Report be not availed of. Instead
of the proposal to confine the jurisdiction of the intermediate appellate court merely to appellate
adjudication, the preference has been opted to increase rather than diminish its jurisdiction in
order to enable it to effectively assist the Supreme Court. This preference has been translated into
one of the innovations in the proposed Bill.”35 In accordance with the parliamentary procedure, the
Bill was sponsored by the Chairman of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government to which it was referred. Thereafter, Committee Report No. 225 was submitted by such
Committee to the Batasang Pambansa recommending the approval with some amendments. In the
sponsorship speech of Minister Ricardo C. Puno, there was reference to the Presidential Committee
on Judicial Reorganization. Thus: “On October 17, 1980, the Presidential Committee on Judicial
Reorganization submitted its report to the President which contained the ‘Proposed Guidelines for
________________
33 Republic Act Nos. 4834 and 4836. In 1978, there was a Presidential Decree providing for
Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts in thirteen provinces and twenty-seven other cities.
34 Republic Act No. 5179.
35 Explanatory Note, 5-6.
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VOL. 112, MARCH 12, 1982
321
Judicial Reorganization.’ Cabinet Bill No. 42 was drafted substantially in accordance with the
options presented by these guidelines. Some options set forth in the aforesaid report were not
availed of upon consultation with and upon consensus of the government and parliamentary
leadership. Moreover, some amendments to the bill were adopted by the Committee on Justice,
Human Rights and Good Government, to which the bill was referred, following the public hearings
on the bill held in December of 1980. The hearings consisted of dialogues with the distinguished
members of the bench and the bar who had submitted written proposals, suggestions, and position
papers on the bill upon the invitation of the Committee on Justice, Human Rights and Good
Government.”36 Stress was laid by the sponsor that the enactment of such Cabinet Bill would,
firstly, result in the attainment “of more efficiency in the disposal of cases. Secondly, the
improvement in the quality of justice dispensed by the courts is expected as a necessary
consequence of the easing of the court’s dockets. Thirdly, the structural changes introduced in the
bill, together with the reallocation of jurisdiction and the revision of the rules of procedure, are
93
designated to suit the court system to the exigencies of the present day Philippine society, and
hopefully, of the foreseeable future.”37 It may be observed that the volume containing the minutes
of the proceedings of the Batasang Pambansa show that 590 pages were devoted to its discussion. It
is quite obvious that it took considerable time and effort as well as exhaustive study before the act
was signed by the President on August 14, 1981. With such a background, it becomes quite manifest
how lacking in factual basis is the allegation that its enactment is tainted by the vice of
arbitrariness. What appears undoubted and undeniable is the good faith that characterized its
enactment from its inception to the affixing of the Presidential signature.
5. Nothing is better settled in our law than that the abolition of an office within the competence of a
legitimate body if done in good faith suffers from no infirmity. The ponencia of
________________
36 Sponsorship Speech of Minister Puno, Volume Four, Third Regular Session, 1980-81, 2013.
37 Ibid.
322
322
Justice J.B.L. Reyes in Cruz v. Primicias, Jr. 38 reiterated such a doctrine: “We find this point urged
by respondents, to be without merit. No removal or separation of petitioners from the service is
here involved, but the validity of the abolition of their offices. This is a legal issue that is for the
Courts to decide. It is well-known rule also that valid abolition of offices is neither removal nor
separation of the incumbents. * * * And, of course, if the abolition is void, the incumbent is deemed
never to have ceased to hold office. The preliminary question laid at rest, we pass to the merits of
the case. As well-settled as the rule that the abolition of an office does not amount to an illegal
removal of its incumbent is the principle that, in order to be valid, the abolition must be made in
good faith.”39 The above excerpt was quoted with approval in Bendanillo, Sr. v. Provincial
Governor,40 two earlier cases enunciating a similar doctrine having preceded it.41 As with the
offices in the other branches of the government, so it is with the judiciary. The test remains whether
the abolition is in good faith. As that element is conspicuously present in the enactment of Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, then the lack of merit of this petition becomes even more apparent. The
concurring opinion of Justice Laurel in Zandueta v. De la Costa 42 cannot be
________________
38 L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998.
39 Ibid, 1003. Prior to such decision, the following cases had reaffirmed such a principle: Manalang
v. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 (1954); Rodriguez v. Montinola, 94 Phil. 964 (1954); Gacho v. Osmeña Jr.,
103 Phil. 837 (1958); Briones v. Osmeña Jr., 105 Phil. 588 (1958); Cuneta v. Court of Appeals, 111
Phil. 249 (1961); Facundo v. Hon. Pabalan. 114 Phil. 307 (1962); Alipio v. Rodriguez, 119 Phil. 59
(1963); Llanto v. Dimaporo, 123 Phil. 413 (1966); Ocampo v. Duque, 123 Phil. 842 (1966);
94
Guillergan v. Ganzon, 123 Phil. 1102 (1966); Abanilla v. Ticao, L-22271, July 26, 1966, 17 SCRA 652;
Cariño v. ACCFA, L-19808, Sept. 29, 1966, 18 SCRA 183; De la Maza v. Ochave, L-22336, May 23,
1967, 20 SCRA 142; Arao v. Luspo, L-23982, July 21, 1967, 20 SCRA 722.
40 L-28614, January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 34.
41 Enciso v. Remo, L-23670, September 30, 1969, 29 SCRA 580; Roque v. Ericta, L-30244,
September 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 156. Cf. City of Basilan v. Hechanova, L-23841, August 30, 1974, 58
SCRA 711.
42 66 Phil. 615 (1938).
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323
any clearer. This is a quo warranto proceeding filed by petitioner, claiming that he, and not
respondent, was entitled to the office of judge of the Fifth Branch of the Court of First Instance of
Manila. There was a Judicial Reorganization Act in 1936,43 a year after the inauguration of the
Commonwealth, amending the Administrative Code to organize courts of original jurisdiction
known as the Courts of First Instance. Prior to such statute, petitioner was the incumbent of such
branch. Thereafter, he received an ad interim appointment, this time to the Fourth Judicial District,
under the new legislation. Unfortunately for him, the Commission on Appointments of then
National Assembly disapproved the same, with respondent being appointed in his place. He
contested the validity of the Act insofar as it resulted in his being forced to vacate his position. This
Court did not rule squarely on the matter. His petition was dismissed on the ground of estoppel.
Nonetheless, the separate concurrence of Justice Laurel in the result reached, to repeat, reaffirms in
no uncertain terms the standard of good faith to preclude any doubt as to the abolition of an
inferior court, with due recognition of the security of tenure guarantee. Thus: “I am of the opinion
that Commonwealth Act No. 145 in so far as it reorganizes, among other judicial districts, the Ninth
Judicial District, and establishes an entirely new district comprising Manila and the provinces of
Rizal and Palawan, is valid and constitutional. This conclusion flows from the fundamental
proposition that the legislature may abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may
reorganize them territorially or otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and
commissions. Section 2, Article VIII of the Constitution vests in the National Assembly the power to
define, prescribe and apportion the jurisdiction of the various courts, subject to certain limitations
in the case of the Supreme Court. It is admitted that sec tion 9 of the same article of the Constitution
provides for the security of tenure of all the judges. The principles embodied in these two sections
of the same article of the Constitution must be coordinated and harmonized. A mere enunciation of
a principle will not decide actual cases and controversies of every
________________
43 Commonwealth Act No. 145.
324
95
324
sort. (Justice Holmes in Lochner vs. New York, 198 U.S., 45; 49 Law. ed; 937)”44 Justice Laurel
continued: “I am not insensible to the argument that the National Assembly may abuse its power
and move deliberately to defeat the constitutional provision guaranteeing security of tenure to all
judges. But, is this the case? One need not share the view of Story, Miller and Tucker on the one
hand, or the opinion of Cooley, Watson and Baldwin on the other, to realize that the application of a
legal or constitutional principle is necessarily factual and circumstantial and that fixity of principle
is the rigidity of the dead and the unprogressive. I do say, and emphatically, however, that cases
may arise where the violation of the constitutional provision regarding security of tenure is
palpable and plain, and that legislative power of reorganization may be sought to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose. When a case of that kind arises, it will be the time to make the
hammer fall and heavily. But not until then. I am satisfied that, as to the particular point here
discussed, the purpose was the fulfillment of what was considered a great public need by the
legislative department and that Commonwealth Act No. 145 was not enacted purposely to affect
adversely the tenure of judges or of any particular judge. Under these circumstances, I am for
sustaining the power of the legislative department under the Constitution. To be sure, there was
greater necessity for reorganization consequent upon the establishment of the new government
than at the time Acts Nos. 2347 and 4007 were approved by the defunct Philippine Legislature, and
although in the case of these two Acts there was an express provision providing for the vacation by
the judges of their offices whereas in the case of Commonwealth Act No. 145 doubt is engendered
by its silence, this doubt should be resolved in favor of the valid exercise of the legislative
power.”45
6. A few more words on the question of abolition. In the above-cited opinion of Justice Laurel in
Zandueta, reference was made to Act No. 234746 on the reorganization of the
________________
44 Ibid, 626.
45 Ibid, 626-627.
46 It likewise abolished the Court of Land Registration (1914).
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325
Courts of First Instance and to Act No. 400747 on the reorganization of all branches of the
government, including the courts of first instance. In both of them, the then Courts of First Instance
96
were replaced by new courts with the same appellation. As Justice Laurel pointed out, there was no
question as to the fact of abolition. He was equally categorical as to Commonwealth Act No. 145,
where also the system of the courts of first instance was provided for expressly. It was pointed out
by Justice Laurel that the mere creation of an entirely new district of the same court is valid and
constitutional, such conclusion flowing “from the fundamental proposition that the legislature may
abolish courts inferior to the Supreme Court and therefore may reorganize them territorially or
otherwise thereby necessitating new appointments and commissions.”48 The challenged statute
creates an intermediate appellate court,49 regional trial courts,50 metropolitan trial courts of the
national capital region,51 and other metropolitan trial courts,52 municipal trial courts in cities,53
as well as in municipalities,54 and municipal circuit trial courts.55 There is even less reason then to
doubt the fact that existing inferior
________________
47 1932.
48 66 Phil. 615, 626.
49 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Sections 3-12. It may be stated that the writer of this opinion as the
Chairman of the Committee on Reorganization, was for the establishment either of (1) a court of
general jurisdiction with an appellate as well as a trial division patterned after that of the system of
judicature found in the United Kingdom and in many Commonwealth countries or, in the
alternative, (2) of a circuit court of appeals. The Committee accepted such proposals and
incorporated them in the guidelines. Candor compels the admission that he entertained doubts as
to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new tribunal. It could be considered
though as part of an integrated scheme for the judicial reorganization as contemplated by the
Batasang Pambansa.
50 Ibid, Sections 13-24.
51 Ibid, Section 27.
326
326
courts were abolished. For the Batasang Pambansa, the establishment of such new inferior courts
was the appropriate response to the grave and argent problems that pressed for solution. Certainly,
97
there could be differences of opinion as to the appropriate remedy. The choice, however, was for
the Batasan to make, not for this Court, which deals only with the question of power. It bears
mentioning that in Brillo v. Enage 56 this Court, in an unanimous opinion penned by the late Justice
Diokno, citing Zandueta v. De la Costa, ruled: “La segunda cuestion que el recurrido plantea es que
la Carta de Tacloban ha abolido el puesto. Si efectivamente ha sido abolido el cargo, entonces ha
quedado extinguido el derecho de recur-rente a ocuparlo y a cobrar el salario correspondiente. Mc-
Culley vs. State, 46 LRA, 567. El derecho de un juez de desempenarlo hasta los 70 años de edad o se
incapacite no priva al Congreso de su facultad de abolir, fusionar o reorganizar juzgados no
constitucionales.”57 Nonetheless, such well-established principle was not held applicable to the
situation there obtaining, the Charter of Tacloban City creating a city court in place of the former
justice of the peace court. Thus: “Pero en el caso de autos el Juzgado de Tacloban no ha sido abolido.
Solo se le ha cambiado el nombis con el cambio de forma del gobierno local.”58 The present case is
anything but that. Petitioners did not and could not prove that the challenged statute was not
within the bounds of legislative authority.
7. This opinion then could very well stop at this point. The implementation of Batas Pambansa Blg.
129, concededly a task incumbent on the Executive, may give rise, however, to questions affecting a
judiciary that should be kept independent. The all-embracing scope of the assailed legislation as far
as all inferior courts from the Courts of Appeals to municipal courts are concerned, with the
exception solely of the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals59 gave rise, and
________________
56 94 Phil. 732 (1954).
57 Ibid, 734-735.
58 Ibid, 735.
59 According to Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 2: “The organization herein provided shall
include the Court of Appeals, the Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile
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327
understandably so, to misgivings as to its effect on such cherished ideal. The first paragraph of the
section on the transitory provision reads: “The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried
out in accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the
Courts of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal Courts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the
Courts of Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts
shall continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office.”60 There is all the more reason then why this Court has no choice but to inquire further into
the allegation by petitioners that the security of tenure provision, an assurance of a judiciary free
98
from extraneous influences, is thereby reduced to a barren form of words. The amended
Constitution adheres even more clearly to the long-established tradition of a strong executive that
antedated the 1935 Charter. As noted in the work of former Vice-Governor Hayden, a noted political
scientist, President Claro M. Recto of the 1934 Convention, in his closing address, in stressing such a
concept, categorically spoke of providing “an executive power which, subject to the fiscalization of
the Assembly, and of public opinion, will not only know how to govern, but will actually govern,
with a firm and steady hand, unembarrassed by vexatious interferences by other departments, or
by unholy alliances with this and that social group.”61 The above excerpt was cited with approval
by Justice Laurel in Planas v. Gil.62 and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of Agrarian Relations,
the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts.”
________________
60 Ibid, Section 44. Its last sentence reads: “The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred
to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions,
records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel.”
61 Hayden, The Philippines 67 (1945).
62 67 Phil. 62 (1939).
328
328
Moreover, under the 1981 Amendments, it may be affirmed that once again the principle of
separation of powers, to quote from the same jurist as ponente in Angara v. Electoral
Commission,63 “obtains not through express provision but by actual division.”64 The president,
under Article VII, “shall be the head of state and chief executive of the Republic of the
Philippines.”65 Moreover, it is equally therein expressly provided that all the powers he possessed
under the 1935 Constitution are once again vested in him unless the Batasang Pambansa provides
otherwise.”66 Article VII of the 1935 Constitution speaks categorically: “The Executive power shall
be vested in a President of the Philippines.”67 As originally framed, the 1973 Constitution created
the position of President as the “symbolic head of state.”68 In addition, there was a provision for a
Prime Minister as the head of government exercising the executive power with the assistance of the
Cabinet.69 Clearly, a modified parliamentary system was established. In the light of the 1981
amendments though, this Court in Free Telephone Workers Union v. Minister of Labor 70 could
state: “The adoption of certain aspects of a parliamentary system in the amended Constitution does
not alter its essentially presidential
________________
63 63 Phil. 139.
64 Ibid, 156.
99
65 Article VII, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution.
66 Section 16 of Article VII of the 1973 Constitution reads as follows: “All powers vested in the
President of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not
herein provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the
President unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise.”
67 Section 1, Article VII of the 1935 Constitution.
68 Article VII, Section 1 of the Constitution, in its original form.
69 According to Article IX, Section 1 of the 1973 Constitution prior to its being amended last year:
“The Executive power shall be exercised by the Prime Minister with the assistance of the Cabinet.
The Cabinet, headed by the Prime Minister, shall consist of the heads of ministries as provided by
law. The Prime Minister shall be the head of the Government.
70 G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981.
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329
character.”71 The retention, however, of the position of the Prime Minister with the Cabinet, a
majority of the members of which shall come from the regional representatives of the Batasang
Pambansa and the creation of an Executive Committee composed of the Prime Minister as
Chairman and not more than fourteen other members at least half of whom shall be members of the
Batasang Pambansa, clearly indicate the evolving nature of the system of government that is now
operative.72 What is equally apparent is that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative
departments. It is likewise undeniable that the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact
whatever legislation may be necessary to carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus
of the majority party. It is understandable then why in Fortun v. Labang 73 it was stressed that with
the provision transferring
________________
71 Ibid, 4. That characterization is in accordance with the Anglo-American concept of the

distinction between presidential and parliamentary systems. In the work of President Marcos
entitled, Marcos Notes for the Cancun Summit 1981, the Conference appears to have adopted such a
distinction. Countries with the presidential systems sent their presidents: C. Bendjedid of Algeria; A.
Sattar of Bangladesh; J. B. de Oliviera Figuereido of Brazil; F. Mitterand of France; A. Cheng of
Guyana; H. Boigny of Ivory Coast; Lopez Portillo of Mexico; A. S. Shagari of Nigeria; Ferdinand E.
Marcos of the Philippines; J. K. Nyerere of Tanzania; R. Reagan of the United States; L. Herrera
Campins of Venezuela; S. Kraigher of Yugoslavia. Likewise, countries under the parliamentary
system sent their Prime Ministers: P. E. Trudeau of Canada; Zhao Ziyang of China; M. H. Thatcher of
the United Kingdom; I. Gandhi of India; Z. Suzuki of Japan; N.O.T. Falldin of Sweden. While called
100
Chancellors, B. Kreisky of Austria and H. Schmidt of Germany hold such a position. Crown Prince
Fahd Bin Abdul Aziz of Saudi Arabia does not fall under either category.
72 Article IX, Section 1 and 3 of the amended Constitution. Section 3 reads in full: “There shall be an
Executive Committee to be designated by the President, composed of the Prime Minister as
Chairman, and not more than fourteen other members, at least half of whom shall be Members of
the Batasang Pambansa. The Executive Committee shall assist the President in the exercise of his
powers and functions and in the performance of his duties as he may prescribe.”
73 L-38383, May 27, 1981, 104 SCRA 607.
330
330
to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is a greater need “to
preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to all intents
and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches.”74
8. To be more specific, petitioners contend that the abolition of the existing inferior courts collides
with the security of tenure enjoyed by incumbent Justices and judges under Article X, Section 7 of
the Constitution. There was a similar provision in the 1935 Constitution. It did not, however, go as
far as conferring on this Tribunal the power to supervise administratively inferior courts.75
Moreover, this Court is empowered “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least
eight members, order their dismissal.”76 Thus it possesses the competence to remove judges.
Under the Judiciary Act, it was the President who was vested with such power.77 Removal is, of
course, to be distinguished from termination by virtue of the abolition of the office. There can be no
tenure to a non-existent office. After the abolition, there is in law no occupant. In case of removal,
there is an office with an occupant who would thereby lose his position. It is in that sense that from
the standpoint of strict law, the question of any impairment of security of tenure does not arise.
Nonetheless, for the incumbents of inferior courts abolished, the effect is one of separation. As to its
effect, no distinction
________________
74 Ibid, 615.
75 Article X, Section 6, provides: “The Supreme Court shall have administrative supervision over all
courts and the personnel thereof.”
76 Article X, Section 7.
77 According to Section 67 of the Judiciary Act of 1948; as amended: “No District Judge shall be
separated or removed from office by the President of the Philippines unless sufficient cause shall
exist, in the judgment of the Supreme Court, involving serious misconduct or inefficiency, for the
removal of said judge from office after the proper proceedings.” Cf. Section 97 as to removal of
101
municipal judges also by the President. Cf. People v. Linsangan, 62 Phil. 646 (1935); De los Santos v.
Mallare, 87 Phil. 289 (1950); Martinez v. Morfe, L-34022, March 24, 1972, 44 SCRA 22; and Pamil v.
Teleron, L-34854, November 20, 1978, 86 SCRA 413.
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331
exists between removal and the abolition of the office. Realistically, it is devoid of significance. He
ceases to be a member of the judiciary. In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore,
it would be in accordance with accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as
incumbent justices and judges are concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded
the fullest consideration. No fear need be entertained that there is a failure to accord respect to the
basic principle that this Court does not render advisory opinions. No question of law is involved. If
such were the case, certainly this Court could not have its say prior to the action taken by either of
the two departments. Even then, it could do so but only by way of deciding a case where the matter
has been put in issue. Neither is there any intrusion into who shall be appointed to the vacant
positions created by the reorganization. That remains in the hands of the Executive to whom it
properly belongs. There is no departure therefore from the tried and tested ways of judicial power.
Rather what is sought to be achieved by this liberal interpretation is to preclude any plausibility to
the charge that in the exercise of the conceded power of reorganizing the inferior courts, the power
of removal of the present incumbents vested in this Tribunal is ignored or disregarded. The
challenged Act would thus be free from any unconstitutional taint, even one not readily discernible
except to those predisposed to view it with distrust. Moreover, such a construction would be In
accordance with the basic principle that in the choice of alternatives between one which would save
and another which would invalidate a statute, the former is to be preferred.78 There is an obvious
way to do so. The principle that the Constitution enters into and forms part of every act to avoid any
unconstitutional taint must be applied. Nuñez v. Sandiganbayan,79 promulgated last January, has
this relevant excerpt: “It is true that other Sections of the Decree could have been so worded as to
avoid any constitutional objection. As of now, however, no ruling is called for. The view is given
expression in the concurring and dissenting opinion of
________________
78 Cf. Ginsburg, Judicial Repair of Legislation, 28 Cleveland State Law Review, 301-304 (1979).
79 G.R. Nos. 50581-50617, January 30, 1982.
332
332

102
Justice Makasiar that in such a case to save the Decree from the direct fate of invalidity, they must
be construed in such a way as to preclude any possible erosion on the powers vested in this Court
by the Constitution. That is a proposition too plain to be contested. It commends itself for
approval.”80 Nor would such a step be unprecedented. The Presidential Decree constituting
Municipal Courts into Municipal Circuit Courts, specifically provides: “The Supreme Court shall
carry out the provisions of this Decree through implementing orders, on a province-to-province
basis.”81 It is true there is no such provision in this Act, but the spirit that informs it should not be
ignored in the Executive Order contemplated under its Section 44.82 Thus Batas Pambansa Blg. 129
could stand the most rigorous test of constitutionality.83
9. Nor is there anything novel in the concept that this Court is called upon to reconcile or harmonize
constitutional provisions. To be specific, the Batasang Pambansa is expressly vested with the
authority to reorganize inferior courts and in the process to abolish existing ones. As noted in the
preceding paragraph, the termination of office of their oc-
________________
80 Ibid, 12.
81 Section 7, Presidential Decree No. 537 (1974).
82 Tanada v. Cuenco, 103 Phil. 1051 (1957) lends itself to the view that in the interpretation of the
fundamental law, the literal language is not necessarily controlling, if thereby a constitutional
objection could be plausibly raised.
83 The memoranda submitted by the Integrated Bar of the Philippines, the Philippine Bar
Association, the Women Lawyers Association of the Philippines, the U.P. Women Lawyers Circle, the
Philippine Women Lawyers Association, and the Philippine Trial Lawyers Association of the
Philippines were for dismissing the petition. The Philippine Lawyers Association was for granting
the petition. Amicus curiae Lorenzo Sumulong, President of the Philippine Constitution Association,
speaking on his own behalf, was of a similar mind. Amicus curiae Dean Irene Cortes, former Dean of
the U.P. College of Law, was for dismissing the petition, while amicus curiae Jose W. Diokno was for
granting it. A memorandum allowed to stay in the records by former Senator Ambrosio Padilla was
for granting it. The Court acknowledges the aid it received from the memoranda submitted.
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333
cupants, as a necessary consequence of such abolition, is hardly distinguishable from the practical
standpoint from removal, a power that is now vested in this Tribunal. It is of the essence of
constitutionalism to assure that neither agency is precluded from acting within the boundaries of
its conceded competence. That is why it has long been well-settled under the constitutional system
we have adopted that this Court cannot, whenever appropriate, avoid the task of reconciliation. As
Justice Laurel put it so well in the previously cited Angara decision, while in the main, “the
Constitution has blocked out with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
103
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government, the overlapping and
interlacing of functions and duties between the several departments, however, sometimes makes it
hard to say just where the one leaves off and the other begins.”84 It is well to recall another classic
utterance from the same jurist, even more emphatic in its affirmation of such a view, moreover
buttressed by one of those insights for which Holmes was so famous: “The classical separation of
government powers, whether viewed in the light of the political philosophy of Aristotle, Locke, or
Motesquieu, or of the postulations of Mabini, Madison, or Jefferson, is a relative theory of
government. There is more truism and actuality in interdependence than in independence and
separation of powers, for as observed by Justice Holmes in a case of Philippine origin, we cannot lay
down ‘with mathematical precision and divide the branches into water-tight compartments’ not
only because ‘the great ordinances of the Constitution do not establish and divide fields of black and
white’ but also because ‘even the more specific of them are found to terminate in a penumbra
shading gradually from one extreme to the other.’ ”85
________________
84 63 Phil. 139, 157 (1936).
85 Planas v. Gil, 67 Phil. 62, 73-74 (1939). The quotation from Justice Holmes came from Springer v.
Government of the Philippine Islands, 277 US 189, 211 (1928). He and Justice Brandeis dissented,
upholding the contention of the Filipino leaders that the President of the Senate and the Speaker of
the House of Representatives of the then Philippine Legislature could sit in a Board of Control with
power to vote government shares in corporations owned or controlled
334
334
This too from Justice Tuazon, likewise expressing with force and clarity why the need for
reconciliation or balancing is well-nigh unavoidable under the fundamental principle of separation
of powers: “The constitutional structure is a complicated system, and overlappings of governmental
functions are recognized, unavoidable, and inherent necessities of governmental coordination.”86
In the same way that the academe has noted the existence in constitutional litigation of right versus
right, there are instances, and this is one of them, where, without this attempt at harmonizing the
provisions in question, there could be a case of power against power. That we should avoid.
10. There are other objections raised but they pose no difficulty. Petitioners would characterize as
an undue delegation of legislative power to the President the grant of authority to fix the
compensation and the allowances of the Justices and judges thereafter appointed. A more careful
reading of the challenged Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 ought to have cautioned them against raising
such an issue. The language of the statute is quite clear. The questioned provisions reads as follows:
“Intermediate Appellate Justices, Regional Trial Judges, Metropolitan Trial Judges, Municipal Trial
Judges, and Municipal Circuit Trial Judges shall recieve such compensation and allowances as may
be authorized by the President along the guidelines set forth in Letter of Implementation No. 93
pursuant to Presidential Decree No. 985, as amended by Presidential Decree No. 1597.”87 The
existence of a standard is thus clear. The basic postulate that underlies the doctrine of non-
104
delegation is that it is the legislative body which is entrusted with the competence to make laws and
to alter and repeal them, the test being the completeness of the statute in all its terms and
provisions when enacted. As pointed out in Edu v. Ericta:88 “To avoid the taint of unlawful
delegation, by it. The majority sustained the opposite view, thus giving the then American
Governor-general such prerogative.
________________
86 Arnault v. Pecson, 87 Phil. 418, 426 (1950).
87 Chapter IV, Sec. 41 of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
88 L-32096, October 24, 1970, 35 SCRA 481. Cf. Agustin v. Edu, L-49112, February 2, 1979, 88 SCRA
195.
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335
there must be a standard, which implies at the very least that the legislature itself determines
matters of principle and lays down fundamental policy. Otherwise, the charge of complete
abdication may be hart to repel. A standard thus defines legislative policy, marks its limits, maps
out its boundaries and specifies the public agency to apply it. It indicates the circumstances under
which the legislative command is to be effected. It is the criterion by which legislative purpose may
be carried out. Thereafter, the executive or administrative office designated may in pursuance of
the above guidelines promulgate supplemental rules and regulations. The standard may be either
express or implied. If the former, the non-delegation objection is easily met. The standard though
does not have to be spelled out specifically. It could be implied from the policy and purpose of the
act considered as a whole.”89 The undeniably strong links that bind the executive and legislative
departments under the amended Constitution assure that the framing of policies as well as their
implementation can be accomplished with unity, promptitude, and efficiency. There is accuracy,
therefore, to this observation in the Free Telephone Workers Union decision: “There is accordingly
more receptivity to laws leaving to administrative and executive agencies the adoption of such
means as may be necessary to effectuate a valid legislative purpose. It is worth noting that a highly-
respected legal scholar, Professor Jaffe, as early as 1947, could speak of delegation as the ‘dynamo
of modern government.’ ”90 He warned against a “restrictive approach” which could be “a deterrent
factor to much-needed legislation.”91 Further on this point from the same opinion” “The spectre of
the non-delegation concept need not haunt, therefore, party caucuses, cabinet sessions or
legislative chambers.”92 Another objection based on the absence in the statute of what petitioners
refer to as a “definite time frame limitation” is equally bereft of merit. They ignore the categorical
language of this provision: “The Supreme Court shall submit to the President, within thirty (30)
________________
89 Ibid, 497.
105
90 G.R. No. 58184, October 30, 1981, 10.
91 Ibid, 11.
92 Ibid.
336
336
days from the date of the effectivity of this act, a staffing pattern for all courts constituted pursuant
to this Act which shall be the basis of the implementing order to be issued by the President in
accordance with the immediately succeeding section.”93 The first sentence of the next section is
even more categorical: “The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in accordance
with an Executive Order to be issued by the President.”94 Certainly petitioners cannot be heard to
argue that the President is insensible to his constitutional duty to take care that the laws be
faithfully executed.95 In the meanwhile, the existing inferior courts affected continue functioning as
before, “until the completion of the reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President.
Upon such declaration, the said courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office.”96 There is no ambiguity. The incumbents of the courts thus
automatically abolished “shall cease to hold office.” No fear need be entertained by incumbents
whose length of service, quality of performance, and clean record justify their being named anew,97
in legal contemplation without any interruption in the continuity of their service.98 It is equally
________________
93 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 43.
95 Article VII, Section 16 of the Amended Constitution provides: “All powers vested in the President
of the Philippines under the 1935 Constitution and the laws of the land which are not herein
provided for or conferred upon any official shall be deemed and are hereby vested in the President
unless the Batasang Pambansa provides otherwise.” Article VII, Section 10, par. (1) of the
Constitution reads: “The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus, or
offices, exercise general supervision over all local governments as may be provided by law, and take
care that the laws be faithfully executed.”
96 Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, Section 44.
97 This Court is ready with such a list to be furnished the President.
98 In the language of par. XI of the Proposed Guidelines for Judicial Reorganization: “The services of
those not separated shall be deemed uninterrupted. In such cases, efficiency, integrity, length of
service and other relevant factors shall be considered.”
106
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reasonable to assume that from the ranks of lawyers, either in the government service, private
practice, or law professors will come the new appointees. In the event that in certain cases a little
more time is necessary in the appraisal of whether or not certain incumbents deserve
reappointment. it is not from their standpoint undesirable. Rather, it would be a reaffirmation of
the good faith that will characterize its implementation by the Executive. There is pertinence to this
observation of Justice Holmes that even acceptance of the generalization that courts ordinarily
should not supply omissions in a law, a generalization qualified as earlier shown by the principle
that to save a statute that could be done, “there is no canon against using common sense in
construing laws as saying what they obviously mean.”99 Where then is the unconstitutional flaw?
11. On the morning of the hearing of this petition on September 8, 1981, petitioners sought to have
the writer of this opinion and Justices Ramon C. Aquino and Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera
disqualified because the first-named was the chairman and the other two, members of the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization. At the hearing, the motion was denied. It was made clear
then and there that not one of the three members of the Court had any hand in the framing or in the
discussion of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. They were not consulted. They did not testify. The
challenged legislation is entirely the product of the efforts of the legislative body.100 Their work
was limited, as set forth in the Executive Order, to submitting alternative plan for reorganization.
That is more in the nature of scholarly studies. That they undertook. There could be no possible
objection to such activity. Ever since 1973, this Tribunal has had administrative supervision over
inferior courts. It has had the opportunity to inform itself as to
________________
99 Cf. Roschen v. Ward, 279 US 337, 339 (1929).
100 From the standpoint of the writer of this opinion, as earlier noted, the assailed legislation did
not go far enough. It is certainly much more, to use the Lasswellian phrase of being a “relevant
modification of small particulars.” For some it could be characterized as a close of conservation and
a dash or innovation. That is, however, no argument against its validity which, to repeat, is solely a
question of power as far as this Court is concerned.
338
338
the way judicial business is conducted and how it may be improved. Even prior to the 1973
Constitution, it is the recollection of the writer of this opinion that either the then Chairman or
107
members of the Committee on Justice of the then Senate of the Philippines101 consulted members
of the Court in drafting proposed legislation affecting the judiciary. It is not inappropriate to cite
this excerpt from an article in the 1975 Supreme Court Review: “In the twentieth century the Chief
Justice of the United States has played a leading part in judicial reform. A variety of conditions have
been responsible for the development of this role, and foremost among them has been the creation
of explicit institutional structures designed to facilitate reform.”102 Also: “Thus the Chief Justice
cannot avoid exposure to and direct involvement in judicial reform at the federal level and, to the
extent issues of judicial federalism arise, at the state level as well.”103
12. It is a cardinal article of faith of our constitutional regime that it is the people who are endowed
with rights, to secure which a government is instituted. Acting as it does through public officials, it
has to grant them either expressly or impliedly certain powers. Those they exercise not for their
own benefit but for the body politic. The Constitution does not speak in the language of ambiguity:
“A public office is a public trust.”104 That is more than a moral adjuration. It is a legal imperative.
The law may vest in a public official certain rights. It does so to enable them to perform his
functions and fulfill his responsibilities more efficiently. It is from that standpoint that the security
of tenure provision to assure judicial independence is to be viewed. It is an added guarantee that
justices and judges can administer justice undeterred by any fear of reprisal or untoward
consequence. Their judgments then are even more likely to be inspired solely by their
________________
101 Former Senators Salvador H. Laurel and Jose W. Diokno.
102 Fish, William Howard Taft and Charles Evan Hughes, 1975 Supreme Court Review 123.
103 Ibid. Cf. Bickel, Mr. Taft Rehabilitates the Court, 79 Yale Law Journal 1 (1969).
104 Article XIII, Section 1, first sentence of the Constitution reads: “Public office is a public trust.”
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339
knowledge of the law and the dictates of their conscience, free from the corrupting influence of base
or unworthy motives. The independence of which they are assured is impressed with a significance
transcending that of a purely personal right. As thus viewed, it is not solely for their welfare. The
challenged legislation was thus subjected to the most rigorous scrutiny by this Tribunal, lest by lack
of due care and circumspection, it allows the erosion of that ideal so firmly embedded in the
national consciousness. There is this further thought to consider. Independence in thought and
action necessarily is rooted in one’s mind and heart. As emphasized by former Chief Justice Paras in
Ocampo v. Secretary of Justice,105 “there is no surer guarantee of judicial independence than the
God-given character and fitness of those appointed to the Bench. The judges may be guaranteed a
fixed tenure of office during good behavior, but if they are of such stuff as allows them to be
subservient to one administration after another, or to cater to the wishes of one litigant after
another, the independence of the judiciary will be nothing more than a myth or an empty ideal. Our
108
judges, we are confident, can be of the type of Lord Coke, regardless or in spite of the power of
Congress—we do not say unlimited but as herein exercised—to reorganize inferior courts.”106That
is to recall one of the greatest Common
________________
105 57 O.G. 147 (1955).
106 Ibid. 153. The per curiam minute resolution of the Court reads as follows: “In Ocampo et al. vs.
The Secretary of Justice et al., G.R. No. L-7910, the petition was denied, without costs, due to
insufficient votes to invalidate section 3 of Republic Act No. 1186. Chief Justice Paras, and Justices
Padilla, Reyes (A) and Labrador voted to uphold that particular section; Justices Pablo, Bengzon,
Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Concepcion and Reyes, J.B.L., believe it is unconstitutional” At 147.
Republic Act No. 1186, which took effect on June 19, 1954, abolished the positions of Judges-at-
Large and Cadastral Judges. There was a vigorous dissent from Justice Bengzon relying on certain
American State Supreme Court decisions notably from Indiana and Pennsylvania, but as noted in
the opinion of Justice Labrador, they could not be considered as applicable in view of the difference
in constitutional provisions. From Justices Montemayor and Bautista also came separate opinions
as to its un-constitutionality.
340
340
Law jurists, who at the cost of his office made clear that he would not just blindly obey the King’s
order but “will do what becomes [him] as a judge.” So it was pointed out in the first leading case
stressing the independence of the judiciary, Borromeo v. Mariano,107 The ponencia of Justice
Malcolm identified good judges with “men who have a mastery of the principles of law, who
discharge their duties in accordance with law, who are permitted to perform the duties of the office
undeterred by outside influence, and who are independent and self-respecting human units in a
judicial system equal and coordinate to the other two departments of government.”108 There is no
reason to assume that the failure of this suit to annul Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 would be attended
with deleterious consequences to the administration of justice. It does not follow that the abolition
in good faith of the existing inferior courts except the Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals
and the creation of new ones will result in a judiciary unable or unwilling to discharge with
independence its solemn duty or one recreant to the trust reposed in it. Nor should there be any
fear that less than good faith will attend the exercise of the appointing power vested in the
Executive. It cannot be denied that an independent and efficient judiciary is something to the credit
of any administration. Well and truly has it been said that the fundamental principle of separation
of powers assumes, and justifiably so, that the three departments are as one in their determination
to pursue the ideals and aspirations and to fulfill the hopes of the sovereign people as expressed in
the Constitution. There is wisdom as well as validity to this pronouncement of Justice Malcolm in
Manila Electric Co. v. Pasay Transportation Company,109 a decision promulgated almost half a
century ago: “Just as the Supreme Court, as the guardian of constitutional rights, should not
sanction usurpations by any other department or the government, so should it as strictly confine its
own sphere of influence to the powers expressly or by implication conferred on
109
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107 41 Phil. 322 (1921).
108 Ibid, 333.
109 57 Phil. 600 (1932).
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it by the Organic Act.”110 To that basic postulate underlying our constitutional system, this Court
remains committed.
WHEREFORE, the unconstitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 not having been shown, this
petition is dismissed. No costs.
Makasiar and Escolin, JJ., concur.
Teehankee, J., dissents in a separate opinion.
Barredo, J., concurs, his view being that “the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.” He submitted a
separate opinion.
Aquino, J., concurs in the result in a separate opinion, reiterating his view that the suit is
premature, but affirming expressly that the abolition was in good faith, emphasizing what was
stated by the Court in the opinion that “the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its
constitutional powers and prerogatives.’’
Concepcion, J., in the result, the abolition being in good faith.
Fernandez, J., I concur provided that in the task of implementation by the Executive as far as the
present Justices and judges who may be separated from the service, it would be in accordance with
the tenets of constitutionalism if this Court be consulted and that its view be respected.
Guerrero, J., I concur with a separate opinion.
Justice Guerrero’s last paragraph reads as follows: “This is the time and the moment to perform a
constitutional duty to
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110
110 Ibid, 605. The reference should now be to the Constitution, rather than an Organic Act of an
unincorporated American territory as the Philippines then was.
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affix my imprimatur and affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statemanship.”
Abad Santos, J., in a brief separate opinion, concurred, but dissented on the ground that the
statute being free from any constitutional infirmity, the “Executive is entitled to exercise its
constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions without any obligation to consult
with this Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration.”
Castro, J., concurs except as qualified in his separate opinion.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concurring in a separate opinion expresses “unqualified adherence” to the

decision of the Court that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not unconstitutional, with an expression of
her views on the constitutional questions involved, her opinion including the listing of safeguards
to avoid the possibility of unconstitutional application and expressing reliance on the “good faith of
the President” in its implementation.
Ericta, J., I concur with a fine expression of my views.
Plana, J., his qualification being that “the President is under no obligation to consult with the
Supreme Court and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal advice to the
President.” To that extent, he dissents from the opinion of the Court.
CONCURRING OPINION
BARREDO, J.:
I join the majority of my brethren in voting that the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, Batas
Pambansa Blg. 129, is not unconstitutional as a whole nor in any of its parts.
The issue of unconstitutionality raised by petitioners relates particularly to Section 44 of the Act
which reads as follows:
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“SEC. 44. Transitory provisions.—The provisions of this Act shall be immediately carried out in
accordance with an Executive Order to be issued by the President. The Court of Appeals, the Courts
of First Instance, the Circuit Criminal ts, the Juvenile and Domestic Relations Courts, the Courts of
Agrarian Relations, the City Courts, the Municipal Courts, and the Municipal Circuit Courts shall
continue to function as presently constituted and organized, until the completion of the
reorganization provided in this Act as declared by the President. Upon such declaration, the said
courts shall be deemed automatically abolished and the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold
office. The cases pending in the old Courts shall be transferred to the appropriate Courts
constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent functions, records, equipment,
property and the necessary personnel.
“The applicable appropriations shall likewise be transferred to the appropriate courts constituted
pursuant to this Act, to be augmented as may be necessary from the funds for organizational
changes as provided in Batas Pambansa Blg. 80. Said funding shall thereafter be included in the
annual General Appropriations Act.”
It is contended by petitioners that the provision in the above section which mandates that “upon
the declaration (by the President that the reorganization contemplated in the Act has been
completed), the said courts (meaning, the Court of Appeals and all other lower courts, except the
Sandiganbayan and the Court of Tax Appeals) shall be deemed abolished and the incumbents
thereof shall cease to hold office” trenches on all the constitutional safeguards and guarantees of
the independence of the judiciary, such as the security of tenure of its members (Section 7, Article X
of the Philippine Constitution of 1973), the prerogatives of the Supreme Court to administratively
supervise all courts and the personnel thereof (Section 6, Id.) and principally, the power of the
Supreme Court “to discipline judges of inferior courts and, by a vote of at least eight Members,
order their dismissal.” (Section 7, Id.)
On the other hand, respondents maintain that thru the above-quoted Section 44, the Batasan did
nothing more than to exercise the authority conferred upon it by Section 1 of the same Article of the
Constitution which provides that “(T)he Judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
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such inferior courts as may be established by law.” In other words, since all inferior courts are,
constitutionally speaking, mere creatures of the law (of the legislature), it follows that it is within
the legislature’s power to abolish or reorganize them even if in so doing, it might result in the
cessation from office of the incumbents thereof before the expiration of their respective
constitutionally-fixed tenures. Respondents emphasize that the legislative power in this respect is
broad and indeed plenary.
Viewing the problem before Us from the above perspectives, it would appear that our task is either
(1) to reconcile, on the one hand, the parliament’s power of abolition and reorganization with, on
the other, the security of tenure of members of the judiciary and the Supreme Court’s authority to
discipline and remove judges or (2) to declare that either the power of the Supreme Court or of the
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Batasan is more paramount than that of the other. I believe, however, that such a manner of looking
at the issue that confronts Us only confuses and compounds the task We are called upon to perform.
For how can there be a satisfactory and rational reconciliation of the pretended right of a judge to
continue as such, when the position occupied by him no longer exists? To suggest, as some do, that
the solution is for the court he is sitting in not to be deemed abolished or that he should in some
way be allowed to continue to function as judge until his constitutional tenure expires is obviously
impractical, if only because we would then have the absurd spectacle of a judiciary with old and
new courts functioning under distinct set-ups, such as a district court continuing as such in a region
where the other judges are regional judges or of judges exercising powers not purely judicial which
is offensive to the Constitution. The other suggestion that the incumbent of the abolished court
should be deemed appointed to the corresponding new court is even worse, since it would deprive
the appointing authority, the President, of the power to make his own choices and would,
furthermore, amount to an appointment by legislation which is a constitutional anachronism. More
on this point later.
Inasmuch as pursuant to the analysis of the majority of the Members of this Court, in fact and in
law, the structure of
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judicial system created by Batas Pambansa 129 is substantially different from that under the
Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended, hence the courts now existing are actually being abolished, why
do We have to indulge in any reconciliation or feel bound to determine whose power, that of the
Batasang Pambansa or that of this Court, should be considered more imperious? It being conceded
that the power to create or establish carries with it the power to abolish, and it is a legal axiom, or
at least a pragmatic reality, that the tenure of the holder of an office must of necessity end when his
office no longer exists, as I see it, We have no alternative than to hold that petitioners’ invocation of
the independence-of-the-judiciary principle of the Constitution is unavailing in the cases at bar. It is
as simple as that. I might hasten to add, in this connection, that to insist that what Batas Pambansa
129 is doing is just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system, assuming a close scrutiny might somehow support such a
conclusion, is pure wishful thinking, it being explicitly and unequivocally provided in the section in
question that said courts “are deemed abolished” and further, as if to make it most unmistakably
emphatic, that “the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.” Dura lex, sed lex. As a matter of
fact, I cannot conceive of a more emphatic way of manifesting and conveying the determined
legislative intent about it.
Now, why am I yielding to the above reasoning and conclusion? Why don’t I insist on championing
the cause of the independence of the judiciary by maintaining that the constitutional safeguards
thereof I have already enumerated earlier must be respected in any reorganization ordained by the
parliament? My answer is simple. Practically all the Members of the Court concede that what is
contemplated is not only general reorganization but abolition—in other words, not only a
rearrangement or remodelling of the old structure but a total demolition thereof to be followed by
the building of a new and different one. I am practically alone in contemplating a different view.
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True, even if I should appear as shouting in the wilderness, I would still make myself a hero in the
eyes of many justices and judges, members of the bar and
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concerned discerning citizens, all lovers of the judicial independence, but Understandably, I should
not be, as I am not, disposed to play such a role virtually at the expense not only of my distinguished
colleagues but of the Batasang Pambansa that framed the law and, most of all, the President who
signed and, therefore, sanctioned the Act as it is, unless I am absolutely sure that my position is
formidable, unssailable and beyond all possible contrary ratiocination, which I am not certain of, as
I shall demonstrate anon.
To start with, the jurisprudence, here and abroad, touching on the question now before Us cannot
be said to be clear and consistent, much less unshakeable and indubitably definite either way. None
of the local cases1 relied upon and discussed by the parties and by the Members of the Court during
the deliberations, such as Borromeo,2 Ocampo,3 Zandueta,4 Brillo,5 etc. can, to my mind, really
serve as reliable pole stars that could lead me to certainty of correctness.
Of course, my instict and passion for an independent judiciary are uncompromising and beyond
diminution. Indeed, my initial reactions, publicly known, about Batas Pambansa 129 explaining
academically its apparent tendency to invade the areas of authority of the Supreme Court, not to
speak of its dangerously impairing the independence of the judiciary, must have, I imagine, created
the impression that I would vote to declare the law unconstitutional. But, during the deliberations
of the Court, the combined wisdom of my learned colleagues was something I could not discount or
just brush aside. Pondering and thinking deeper about all relevant factors, I have come to the
conviction that at least on this day and hour there are justifiable grounds to uphold the Act, if only
to try how it will operate so that thereby the people may see that We are one with the President and
the Batasan in taking what ap-
________________
1 And I am not fond of borrowing ideas from supposed legal acumen of alien judicial figures no
matter their recognized reputation.
2 Borromeo vs. Mariano, 41 Phil. 330.
3 G.R. No. L-7910, January 18, 1955, 51 O.G. 147.
4 Zandueta vs. De la Cuesta, 66 Phil. 147.
5 Brillo vs. Mejia, 94 Phil. 732.
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pear to be immediate steps needed to relieve the people from a fast spreading cancer in the
judiciary of our country.
Besides, the Philippines has somehow not yet returned to complete normalcy. The improved
national discipline, so evident during the earlier days of martial law, has declined at a quite
discernible degree. Different sectors of society are demanding urgent reforms in their respective
fields. And about the most vehement and persistent, loud and clear, among their gripes, which as a
matter of fact is common to all of them, is that about the deterioration in the quality of performance
of the judges manning our courts and the slow and dragging pace of pending judicial proceedings.
Strictly speaking, this is, to be sure, something that may not necessarily be related to lack of
independence of the judiciary. It has more to do with the ineptness and/or corruption among and
corruptibility of the men sitting in the courts in some parts of the country. And what is worse, while
in the communities concerned, the malady is known to factually exist and is actually graver and
widespread, very few, if any, individuals or even associations and organized groups, truly incensed
and anxious to be of help, have the courage and possess the requisite legal evidence to come out
and file the corresponding charges with the Supreme Court. And I am not yet referring to similar
situations that are not quite openly known but nevertheless just as deleterious. On the other hand,
if all these intolerable instances should actually be formally brought to the Supreme Court, it would
be humanly impossible for the Court to dispose of them with desirable dispatch, what with the
thousands of other cases it has to attend to and the rather cumbersome strict requirements of
procedural due process it has to observe in each and every such administrative case, all of which
are time consuming. Verily, under the foregoing circumstances, it may be said that there is
justification for the patience of the people about the possibility of early eradication of this disease
or evil in our judiciary pictured above to be nearing the breaking point.
Withal, we must bear in mind that judicial reorganization becomes urgent and inevitable not alone
because of structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumbersomeness and
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348
technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force, but also when it becomes evident
that a good number of those occupying positions in the judiciary, make a mockery of justice and
take advantage of their office for selfish personal ends and yet, as already explained, those in
authority cannot expeditiously cope with the situation under existing laws and rules. It is my
personal assessment of the present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of
necessity two-pronged, as I have just indicated, for the most ideal judicial system with the most
perfect procedural rules cannot satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who
hold positions therein possess the character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee
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their devotion to duty and absolute impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and
corruption, including the usual importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the
powers that be. I am certain that the Filipino people feel happy that Batas Pambansa 129
encompasses both of these objectives, which indeed are aligned with the foundation of the principle
of independence of the judiciary.
The above premises considered, I have decided to tackle our problem from the viewpoint of the
unusual situation in which our judiciary is presently perilously situated. Needless to say, to all of us,
the Members of the Court, the constitutional guarantees of security of tenure and removal-only-by
the Supreme Court, among others, against impairment of the independence of the judiciary, which
is one of the bedrocks and, therefore, of the essence in any “democracy under a regime of justice,
peace, liberty and equality”, (Preamble of the 1973 Constitution), are priceless and should be
defended, most of all by the Supreme Court, with all the wisdom and courage God has individually
endowed to each of Us. Withal, we are all conscious of the fact that those safeguards have never
been intended to place the person of the judge in a singular position of privilege and untouchability,
but rather, that they are essentially part and parcel of what is required of an independent judiciary
where judges can decide cases and do justice to everyone before them ruat caelum. However, We
find Ourselves face to face with a situation in our judiciary which is
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of emergency proportions and to insist on rationalizing how those guarantees should be enforced
under such a circumstance seem to be difficult, aside from being controversial. And so, in a real
sense, We have to make a choice between adhering to the strictly legalistic reasoning pursued by
petitioners, on the one hand, and the broader and more practical approach, which as I have said is
within the spirit at least of the Constitution.
My concept of the Constitution is that it is not just a cluster of high sounding verbiages spelling
purely idealism and nobility in the recognition of human dignity, protection of individual liberties
and providing security and promotion of the general welfare under a government of laws. With all
emphasis and vehemence, I say that the fundamental law of the land is a living instrument which
translates and adapts itself to the demands of obtaining circumstances. It is written for all seasons,
except for very unusual instances that human ratiocination cannot justify to be contemplated by its
language even if read in its broadest sense and in the most liberal way. Verily, it is paramount and
supreme in peace and in war, but even in peace grave critical situations arise demanding recourse
to extraordinary solutions. Paraphrasing the Spanish adage, “Grandes males, grandes remedios”,
such inordinary problems justify exceptional remedies. And so, history records that in the face of
grave crises and emergencies, the most constitutionally idealistic countries have, at one time or
another, under the pressure of pragmatic considerations, adopted corresponding realistic
measures, which perilously tether along the periphery of their Charters, to the extent of creating
impressions, of course erroneous, that the same had been transgressed, although in truth their
integrity and imperiousness remained undiminished and unimpaired.
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The Philippines has but recently had its own experience of such constitutional approach. When
martial law was proclaimed here in 1972, there were those who vociferously shouted not only that
the President had acted arbitrarily and without the required factual bases contemplated in the
Commander-in-Chief clause of the 1935 Constitution, but more, that he had gone beyond the
traditional and universally recognized intent
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350
of said clause by utilizing his martial law powers not only to maintain peace and tranquility and
preserve and defend the integrity and security of the state but to establish a New Society. The
critics contended that martial law is only for national security, not for the imposition of national
discipline under a New Society.
Due to its relevancy to Our present discussion, it is well for everyone to bear in mind that in this
jurisdiction, this concept of martial law has already been upheld several times by this Court. I, for
one, accepted such a construction because I firmly believe that to impose martial law for the sole
end of suppressing an insurrection or rebellion without coincidentally taking corresponding
measures to eradicate the root causes of the uprising is utter folly, for the country would still
continue to lay open to its recurrence.
I have made the foregoing discourse, for it is fundamentally in the light of this Court’s doctrines
about the imposition of martial law as I have stated that I prefer to base this concurrence. To put it
differently, if indeed there could be some doubt as to the correctness of this Court’s judgment that
Batas Pambansa 129 is not unconstitutional, particularly its Section 44, I am convinced that the
critical situation of our judiciary today calls for solutions that may not in the eyes of some conform
strictly with the letter of the Constitution but indubitably justified by its spirit and intent. As I have
earlier indicated, the Charter is not just a construction of words to whose literal ironclad meanings
we must feel hidebound, without regard to every Constitution’s desirable inherent nature of
adjustability and adaptability to prevailing situations so that the spirit and fundamental intent and
objectives of the framers may remain alive. Batas Pambansa 129 is one such adaptation that comes
handy for the attainment of the transcendental objectives it seeks to pursue. While, to be sure, it has
the effect of factually easing out some justices and judges before the end of their respective
constitutional tenure sans the usual administrative investigation, the desirable end is achieved thru
means that, in the light of the prevailing conditions, is constitutionally permissible.
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Before closing, it may not be amiss for me to point out that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, aside from
what has been discussed about its effect on the guarantees of judicial independence, also preempts,
in some of its provisions, the primary rule-making power of the Supreme Court in respect to
procedure, practice and evidence. With the pardon of my colleagues, I would just like to say that the
Court should not decry this development too much. After all, the legislature is expressly
empowered by the Charter to do so, (Section 5(5), Article X of the Constitution of 1973) so much so,
that I doubt if the Court has any authority to alter or modify any rule the Batasang Pambansa
enunciates. Truth to tell, as Chairman of the Committee on the Revision of the Rules of Court, for
one reason or another, principally the lack of a clear consensus as to what some of my colleagues
consider very radical proposals voiced by me or my committee, We have regrettably procrastinated
long enough in making our procedural rules more practical and more conducive to speedier
disposal and termination of controversies by dealing more with substantial justice.
So also have We, it must be confessed, failed to come up to expectations of the framers of the
Constitution in our ways of disposing of administrative complaints against erring and
misconducting judges. Of course, We can excuse Ourselves with the explanation that not only are
We overloaded with work beyond human capability of its being performed expeditiously, but that
the strict requisites of due process which are time consuming have precluded Us from being more
expeditious and speedy.
I feel I must say all of these, because if the above-discussed circumstances have not combined to
create a very critical situation in our judiciary that is making the people lose its faith and confidence
in the administration of justice by the existing courts, perhaps the Court could look with more
sympathy at the stand of petitioners. I want all the sundry to know, however, that notwithstanding
this decision, the independence of the judiciary in the Philippines is far from being insubstantial,
much less meaningless and dead. Batas Pambansa 129 has precisely opened our eyes to how,
despite doubts and misgivings, the Constitution can be so construed
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352
as to make it possible for those in authority to answer the clamor of the people for an upright
judiciary and overcome constitutional roadblocks more apparent than real.
To those justices, judges, members of the bar and concerned citizens whose eyes may be dimming
with tears of disappointment and disenchantment because of the stand I have chosen to adopt in
these cases, may I try to assuage them by joining their fervent prayers that some other day,
hopefully in the near future, Divine Providence may dictate to another constitutional convention to
write the guarantees of judicial independence with ink of deeper hue and words that are definite,
clear, unambiguous and unequivocal, in drawing the line of demarcation between the Parliament
and the Judiciary in the manner that in His Infinite wisdom would most promote genuine and
impartial justice for our people, free, not only from graft, corruption, ineptness and incompetence
but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous influence of the political powers that be.
Presently, I am constrained from going along with any other view than that the Constitution allows
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abolition of existing courts even if the effect has to be the elimination of any incumbent judge and
the consequent cutting of his constitutional tenure of office.
I cannot close this concurrence without referring to the apprehensions in some quarters about the
choice that will ultimately be made of those who will be eased out of the judiciary in the course of
the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129. By this decision, the Court has in factual effect albeit
not in constitutional conception yielded generally to the Batasang Pambansa, and more specifically
to the President, its own constitutionally conferred power of removal of judges. Section 44 of the
Batasan’s Act declares that all of them shall be deemed to have ceased to hold office, leaving it to the
President to appoint those whom he may see fit to occupy the new courts. Thus, those who will not
be appointed can be considered as “ceasing to hold their respective offices”, or, as others would say
they would be in fact removed. How the President will make his choices is beyond Our power to
control. But even if some may be eased out even without being duly informed of the reason
therefor, much less being given the oppor-
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tunity to be heard, the past actuations of the President on all matters of deep public interest should
serve as sufficient assurance that when he ultimately acts, he will faithfully adhere to his solemn
oath “to do justice to every man”, hence, he will equip himself first with the fullest reliable
information before he acts. This is not only my individual faith founded on my personal
acquaintance with the character and sterling qualities of President Ferdinand E. Marcos. I dare say
this is the faith of the nation in a man who has led it successfully through crises and emergencies,
with justice to all, with malice towards none. 1 am certain, the President will deal with each and
every individual to be affected by this reorganization with the best light that God will give him
every moment he acts in each individual case as it comes for his decision.
AQUINO, J., concurring:
I concur in the result. The petitioners filed this petition for declaratory relief and prohibition “to
declare the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 (Batas Pambansa Blg. 129) un-constitutional”.
The petition should have been dismissed outright because this Court has no jurisdiction to grant
declaratory relief and prohibition is not the proper remedy to test the constitutionality of the law.
The petition is premature. No jurisdictional question is involved.
There is no justiciable controversy wherein the constitutionality of the said law is in issue. It is
presumed to be constitutional. The lawmaking body before enacting it looked into the
constitutional angle.
Seven of the eight petitioners are practising lawyers. They have no personality to assail the
constitutionality of the said law even as taxpayers.
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The eighth petitioner, Gualberto J. de la Llana, a city judge (who in 1977 filed a petition for
declaratory relief assailing Presidential Decree No. 1229, which called for a referendum, De la Llana
vs. Comelec, 80 SCRA 525), has no cause of action for prohibition. He is not being removed from his
position.
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The Judiciary Reorganization Law was enacted in utmost good faith and not “to cloak an
unconstitutional and evil purpose”. As ably expounded by the Chief Justice, in enacting the said law,
the lawmaking body acted within the scope of its constitutional powers and prerogatives.
CONCURRING OPINION
GUERRERO, J.:
I concur with my distinguished and learned colleagues in upholding the constitutionality of the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980. For the record, however, I would like to state my personal
convictions and observations on this case, a veritable landmark case, for whatever they may be
worth.
The legal basis of the Court’s opinion rendered by our esteemed Chief Justice having been
exhaustively discussed and decisively justified by him, a highly-respected expert and authority on
constitutional law, it would be an exercise in duplication to reiterate the same cases and
precedents. I am then constrained to approach the problem quite differently, not through the classic
methods of philosophy, history and tradition, but following what the well-known jurist, Dean
Pound, said that “the most significant advance in the modern science of law is the change from the
analytical to the functional attitude.”1 And in pursuing this direction, I must also reckon with and
rely on the ruling that “another guide to the meaning of a statute is found in the evil which it is
designed to remedy, and for this the court properly looks at contemporaneous events, the situation
as it existed, and as it was pressed upon the attention of the legislative body.”2
I have no doubt in my mind that the institutional reforms and changes envisioned by the law are
clearly conducive to the promotion of national interests. The objectives of the legisla-
________________
1 See Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 73.
2 Church of the Holy Trinity vs. U.S., 143 U.S. 457, cited in Willoughby On the Constitution of the
United States, 2nd ed., Vol. I, p. 61.
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tion, namely: (a) An institutional restructuring by the creation of an Intermediate Appellate Court,
thirteen (13) Regional Trial Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts and Municipal
Circuit Trial Courts; (b) A reappointment of jurisdiction geared towards greater efficiency; (c) A
simplification of procedures; and (d) The abolition of the inferior courts created by the Judiciary Act
of 1948 and other statutes, as approved by the Congress of the Philippines3 are undoubtedly
intended to improve the regime of justice and thereby enhance public good and order. Indeed, the
purpose of the Act as further stated in the Explanatory Note, which is “to embody reforms in the
structure, organization and composition of the Judiciary, with the aim of improving the
administration of justice, of decongesting judicial dockets, and coping with the more complex
problems on the present and forseeable future” cannot but “promote the welfare of society, since
that is the final cause of law.”4
Hence, from the standpoint of the general utility and functional value of the Judiciary
Reorganization Act, there should be no difficulty, doubt or disbelief in its legality and
constitutionality. That there are ills and evils plaguing the judicial system is undeniable. The
notorious and scandalous congestion of court dockets is too well-known to be ignored as are the
causes which create and produce such anomaly. Evident is the need to look for devices and
measures that are more practical, workable and economical.5
From the figures alone (301,497 pending cases in 1976; 351, 943 in 1977; 404,686 in 1978;
426,911 in 1979; 441,332 in 1980; and 450,063 as of February 3, 1982)6 the congested character of
court dockets rising year after year is staggering and enormous, looming like a legal monster.
________________
3 Explanatory Note, Cabinet Bill No. 42 which became Batas Pambansa Blg. 129, The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1980.
4 Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 66.
5 Chief Justice Castro, The Bar and the Congested Dockets, p. 5.
6 See Report of the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization. Also Report of Court
Administrator.
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356
But greater than the need to dispense justice speedily and promptly is the necessity to have Justices
and Judges who are fair and impartial, honest and incorruptible, competent and efficient. The
general clamor that the prestige of the Judiciary today has deteriorated and degenerated to the
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lowest ebb in public estimation is not without factual basis. Records in the Supreme Court attest to
the unfitness and incompetence, corruption and immorality of many dispensers of justice.
According to the compiled data, the total number of Justices and Judges against whom
administrative charges have been filed for various offenses, misconduct, venalities and other
irregularities reaches 322. Of this total, 8 are Justices of the Court of Appeals, 119 CFI Judges, 2
Criminal Circuit Judges, 8 CAR Judges, 1 Juvenile & Domestic Relations Court Judge, 38 City Judges,
and 146 Municipal Judges.
The Supreme Court has found 102 of them guilty and punished them with either suspension,
admonition, reprimand or fine. The number includes 1 CA Justice, 35 CFI Judges, 1 CCC Judge, 3 CAR
Judges, 1 JDRC Judge, 9 City Judges and 53 Municipal Judges.
Seventeen (17) Judges have been ordered dismissed and separated from the service. And these are
3 CFI, 1 CAR, 1 City Judge and 12 Municipal Judges.
Going over these administrative proceedings, it took an average of two-year period from the filing
of the charge to the dismissal of the respondent. In one case, the proceedings were terminated after
seven years. How long the pending administrative cases will be disposed of, only time will tell as an
increasing number of administrative cases are being filed by victims of judicial misconduct, abuse
and arbitrariness.
Excepting those who have been punished and dismissed from the service, there are many who have
been castigated and censured in final judgments of the Supreme Court upon appeal or review of the
decisions, orders and other acts of the respondent courts, Justices and Judges. To cite a few cases,
Our decisions have categorically pronounced respondents’ actuations, thus: “deplorable, giving no
credit to the Judiciary”7;
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7 See L-37399, May 29, 1974, 57 SCRA 123.
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“everything was irregular and violative of all pertinent and applicable rules. The whole proceedings
looked no more than a pre-arranged compromise between the accused and the Judge to flaunt the
law and every norm of propriety and procedure”8; “there was a deliberate failure of respondent
Judge to respect what is so clearly provided in the Rules of Court”9; “It is unfortunate that
respondent Judge failed to acquaint himself with, or misinterpreted, those controlling provisions
and doctrines”10; “The failure of the respondent Municipal Judge to yield obedience to
authoritative decisions of the Supreme Court and of respondent Court of First Instance Judge and
his deplorable insistence on procedural technicalities was called down in L-49828, July 25, 1981.
For peremptorily dismissing the third party complaint on the ground that the motion to dismiss
was ‘well-taken’ and respondent Judge did not elaborate, the Court remarked: “May his tribe
vanish.”11 In one case, We noted “There is here something unusual, but far from palliating the
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gravity of the error incurred, it merely exacerbated it. x x x it did render the due process
requirement nugatory, for instead of a fair and impartial trial, there was an idle form, a useless
ceremony.”12
It is dishonorable enough to be publicly and officially rebuked but to allow these Judges and their
ilk to remain and continue to preside in their courtrooms is a disgrace to the Judiciary. It is to be
deplored that the Supreme Court has not found time to exercise its power and authority in the
premises, for no charges or proceedings have been instituted against them. We have a list of these
crooked Judges whose actuations have been found to be patiently wrong and manifestly in-
defeasible. There ought to be no objection or compunction in weeding them out from the service. If
they are not booted out now, it will take from here to eternity to clean this Augean stable.
________________
8 See L-30355, May 31, 1978, 83 SCRA 437, 450.
9 See L-46542, July 21, 1978, 84 SCRA 198, 203.
10 See L-49995, April 8, 1981.
11 See G.R. No. 54452, July 20, 1981.
12 See L-36161, December 19, 1973.
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358
Candidly, one reason for writing this concurring opinion is to call attention to these evils, abuses
and wrongs which are surreptitiously but surely destroying the trust and faith of the people in the
integrity of the entire Judiciary. Some members of the Court felt that these revelations would be like
washing dirty linen in public. But these facts are of public and official records, nay court cases, and
sooner or later, Truth will come out.
In the light of these known evils and infirmities of the judicial system, it would be absurd and
unreasonable to claim that the legislators did not act upon them in good faith and honesty of
purpose and with legitimate ends. It is presumed that official duty has been regularly performed.13
The presumption of regularity is not confined to the acts of the individual officers but also applies
to the acts of boards, such as administrative board or bodies, and to acts of legislative bodies.14
Good faith is always to be presumed in the absence of proof to the contrary, of which there is none
in the case at bar. It could not be otherwise if We are to accord as We must, full faith and credit to
the lawmakers’ deep sense of public service and the judicious exercise of their high office as the
duly-elected representatives of the people.
It is conceded that the abolition of an office is legal if attendant with good faith.15 The question of
good faith then is the crux of the conflict at bar. Good faith in the enactment of the law does not
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refer to the wisdom of the measure, the propriety of the Act, or to its expediency. The questions
raised by petitioners and amicus curiae for their cause, viz: Why abolish all the courts? Why
legislate out the judges? Why not amend the Rules of Court only? Is abolition of all courts the
proper remedy to weed out corrupt and misfits in our Judiciary?—may not be inquired into by Us.
“It is not the pro-
________________
13 Rule 131, Section 5(m), Revised Rules of Court.
14 31 C.J.S. 810.
15 Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr., L-28573, June 13, 1968, 23 SCRA 998; Bendanillo, Sr. vs. Provincial
Governor, L-28614 January 17, 1974, 55 SCRA 34; Enciso vs. Remo, L-23670, Sept. 30, 1969, 29
SCRA 580; Roque vs. Ericta, L-30244, Sept. 28, 1973, 53 SCRA 156.
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vince of the courts to supervise legislation and keep it within the bounds of propriety and common
sense. That is primarily and exclusively a legislative concern.”16 The Courts “are not supposed to
override legitimate policy and x x x never inquire into the wisdom of the law.”17 Chief Justice
Fernando who penned the Morfe decision, writes that while “(i)t is thus settled, to paraphrase Chief
Justice Concepcion in Gonzales v. Commission on Elections, that only congressional power or
competence, not the wisdom of the action taken, may be the basis for declaring a statute invalid,”18
he adds that it is “useful to recall what was so clearly stated by Laurel that ‘the Judiciary in the
determination of actual cases and controversies must reflect the wisdom and justice of the people
as expressed through their representatives in the executive and legislative departments of the
government.’ ”19 In any case, petitioners have not shown an iota of proof of bad faith. There is no
factual foundation of bad faith on record. And I do not consider the statement in the sponsorship
speech for Cabinet Bill No. 42 of Minister of Justice Ricardo J. Puno that the Bill would be a more
efficient vehicle of “eliminating incompetent and unfit Judges” as indicative of impermissible
legislative motive.20
It may be true that while the remedy or solution formulated by the legislation will eradicate
hopefully or at least minimize the evils and ills that infect and pester the judicial body, it will result
in the actual removal of the Justices of the Court of Appeals and Judges of the lower courts. It is also
true that whether it is termed abolition of office or removal from office, the end-result is the same—
termination of the services of these incumbents. Indeed, the law may be harsh, but that is the law.
Dura lex sed lex.
The Justices and Judges directly affected by the law, being lawyers, should know or are expected to
know the nature and
________________
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16 Morfe vs. Mutuc, L-20387, Jan. 31, 1968, 22 SCRA 424, 450.
17 Ibid.
18 Chief Justice Fernando, The Constitution of the Philippines, p. 48.
19 Ibid., p. 46.
20 Journal of the Batasan, Third Regular Session, Feb. 3, 1981, p. 12
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concept of a public office. It is created for the purpose of effecting the ends for which government
has been instituted, which are for the common good, and not the profit, honor or private interest of
any one man, family or class of men. In our form of government, it is fundamental that public offices
are public trust, and that the person to be appointed should be selected solely with a view to the
public welfare.21 In the last analysis, a public office is a privilege in the gift of the State.22
There is no such thing as a vested interest or an estate in an office, or even an absolute right to hold
office. Excepting constitutional offices which provide for special immunity as regards salary and
tenure, no one can be said to have any vested right in an office or its salary. When an office is
created by the Constitution, it cannot be abolished by the legislature, but when created by the State
under the authority of the Constitution, it may be abolished by statute and the incumbent deprived
of his office.23 Acceptance of a judicial appointment must be deemed as adherence to the rule that
“when the court is abolished, any unexpired term is abolished also. The Judge of such a court takes
office with that encumbrance and knowledge.”24 “The Judge’s right to his full term and his full
salary are not dependent alone upon his good conduct, but also upon the contingency that the
legislature may for the public good, in ordaining and establishing the courts, from time to time
consider his office unnecessary and abolish it.”25
The removal from office of the incumbent then is merely incidental to the valid act of abolition of
the office as demanded by the superior and paramount interest of the people. The bad and the
crooked Judges must be removed. The good and the straight, sober Judges should be reappointed
but that is the sole power and prerogative of the President who, I am certain,
________________
21 Brown vs. Russel, 166 Mass. 14, cited in Gonzales, Administrative Law, Law on Public Officers
and Election Law, 2nd ed., p. 148.
22 42 Am. Jur. 881.
23 Ibid.
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24 Cherokee, County vs. Savage, 32 So. 2nd 803.
25 McCulley vs. State, 53 S.W. 134.
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will act according to the best interest of the nation and in accordance with his solemn oath of office
“to preserve and defend its Constitution, execute its laws, do justice to everyone x x x.” There and
then the proper balance between the desire to preserve private interest and the desideratum of
promoting the public good shall have been struck.26
The Supreme Court has been called the conscience of the Constitution. It may be the last bulwark of
constitutional government.27 It must, however, be remembered “that legislatures are ultimate
guardians of the liberties and welfare of the people in quite as great a degree as courts.”28 The
responsibility of upholding the Constitution rests not on the courts alone but on the legislatures as
well. It adheres, therefore, to the well-settled principle that “all reasonable doubts should be
resolved in favor of the constitutionality of a statute” for which reason it will not set aside a law as
violative of the Constitution ‘‘except in a clear case.”29
Finally, I view the controversy presented to Us as a conflict of opinions—on judicial independence,

whether impaired or strengthened by the law; on reorganization of the courts, whether abolition of
office or removal therefrom, and on delegation of legislative power, whether authorized or
unauthorized. Without detracting from the merits, the force and brilliance of their advocacies based
on logic, history and precedents, I choose to stand on the social justification and the functional
utility of the law to uphold its constitutionality. In the light of contemporaneous events from which
the New Republic emerged and evolved new ideals of national growth and development,
particularly in law and government, a kind or form of judicial activism, perhaps similar to it, is
necessary to justify as the ratio decidendi of Our judgment.
_________________
26 Answer of Solicitor General, par. 22, p. 29.
27 Laurel, con., Zandueta vs. de la Cuesta (1938), 66 Phil. 615
28 Missouri, K. & T. Co. vs. May, 194 U.S. 267, 270; People vs. Crane, 214 N.Y. 154, 173, cited in
Cardozo, The Nature of the Judicial Process, p. 90.
29 People vs. Vera (1937), 65 Phil. 56, See Chief Justice Fernando, The Power of Judicial Review, p.
110.
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126
362
This is the time and the moment to perform a constitutional duty to affix my imprimatur and
affirmance to the law, hopefully an act of proper judicial statesmanship.
ABAD SANTOS, J., Concurring and dissenting:
I agree with the learned Chief Justice of the Philippines that Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 is not
unconstitutional. Unlike Oscar Wilde, I choose not to yield to temptation by embellishing my
concurrence lest I be accrued of bringing coal to Newcastle. Accordingly, I will simply vote to
dismiss the petition.
However, I cannot agree with the Chief Justice when he says:
“x x x In the implementation of the assailed legislation, therefore, it would be in accordance with

accepted principles of constitutional construction that as far as incumbent justices and judges are
concerned, this Court be consulted and that its view be accorded the fullest consideration. There
would be no plausibility then to the allegation that there is an unconstitutional taint to the
challenged Act. Moreover, such a construction would be in accordance with the basic principle that
in the choice of alternatives between one which would save and another which would invalidate a
statute, the former is to be preferred.”
It has already been ruled that the statute does not suffer from any constitutional infirmity because
the abolition of certain judicial offices was done in good faith. This being the case, I believe that the
Executive is entitled to exercise its constitutional power to fill the newly created judicial positions
without any obligation to consult with this Court and to accord its views the fullest consideration.
To require consultation will constitute an invasion of executive territory which can be resented and
even repelled. The implicit suggestion that there could be an unconstitutional implementation of
the questioned legislation is not congruent with the basic conclusion that it is not unconstitutional.
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DE CASTRO, J.: Concurring:
I concur in the declaration that the law is not unconstitutional.
May I, however, submit this separate opinion more to avoid being misunderstood by my brethren in
the judiciary as not feeling for them as much concern as I should for their security of tenure which
is raised as the main argument against the constitutionality of the law, than by way of giving added
force or support to the main opinion so well-written by Our learned Chief Justice in his usual
127
scholarly fashion. I, therefore, limit myself to a discussion that the assailed statute is not
unconstitutional without having to suggest how it may be implemented in order that it could stand
the most rigid test of constitutionality, for in that area, what is involved is purely an executive act of
the President in whose wisdom, patriotism and sense of justice We should trust, in how he would
fulfill his sworn duties to see that the laws are faithfully executed and to do justice to every man.
Moreover, while I also concur in the dismissal of the petition, I do so on the additional ground that
petitioners have not fulfilled all the requisites for the exercise by this Court of its power of judicial
inquiry—the power to declare a law unconstitutional.
I
The creation and organization of courts inferior to the Supreme Court is a constitutional
prerogative of the legislature. This prerogative is plenary and necessarily implies the power to
reorganize said courts, and in the process, abolish them to give way to new or substantially
different ones. To contend otherwise would be to forget a basic doctrine of constitutional law that
no irrepealable laws shall be passed.1
The power to create courts and organize them is necessarily the primary authority from which
would thereafter arise the
________________
1 Constitution of the Philippines by Chief Justice Enrique M. Fernando, 1977 Edition, p. 177.
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364
security of tenure of those appointed to perform the functions of said courts. In the natural order of
things, therefore, since the occasion to speak of security of tenure of judges arises only after the
courts have first been brought into being, the right to security of tenure takes a secondary position
to the basic and primary power of creating the courts to provide for a fair and strong judicial
system. If the legislature, in the exercise of its authority, deems it wise and urgent to provide for a
new set of courts, and in doing so, it feels the abolition of the old courts would conduce more to its
objective of improving the judiciary and raising its standard, the matter involved is one of policy
and wisdom into which the courts, not even the Supreme Court, cannot inquire, much less interfere
with. By this secondary position it has to the primary power of the legislature to create courts, the
security of tenure given to the incumbents should not be a legal impediment to the exercise of that
basic power of creating the statutory courts which, by necessary implication, includes the power to
abolish them in order to create new ones. This primary legislative power is a continuing one, and
the resultant right of security of tenure of those appointed to said courts could not bring about the
exhaustion of that power. Unquestionably, the legislature can repeal its own laws, and that power
can never be exhausted without, as a consequence, violating a fundamental precept of
constitutional and representative government that no irrepealable laws shall be passed.
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If the creation of courts is a legislative prerogative their abolition is, therefore, a matter of
legislative intent. It involves the exercise of legislative power, an act of legislation which generally
concerns policy in the formation of which the courts have no say. Initially, when the legislature
creates the courts, it suffers from no limitation arising from the necessity of respecting the security
of tenure of judges who are not yet there. This inherent character of fullness and plenitude of the
power to create and abolish courts does not change when that same power is once more exercised
thereafter, as the need therefor is felt. Which only goes to show that when done in good faith and
motivated solely by the good and the well-being of the people, the exercise of the power is not
meant to be
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restricted, curtailed, much less exhausted by the so-called judicial security of tenure.
The passage of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is no more than the exercise of the power
vested by the Constitution on the legislative body of the Republic as described above. That power
carries with it the duty and responsibility of providing the people with the most effective and
efficient system of administration of justice. This is by far of more imperative and transcedental
importance than the security of tenure of judges which, admittedly, is one of the factors that would
conduce to independence of the judiciary—but first of all, a good, efficient and effective judiciary. A
judiciary wanting in these basic qualities does not deserve the independence that is meant only for
a judiciary that can serve best the interest and welfare of the people which is the most primordial
and paramount consideration, not a judiciary in which the people’s faith has been eroded, a
condition which the security of tenure, in some instances, may even be contributory.
In enacting the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980, the legislature is presumed to have been
motivated by no other objective than to provide the people the kind of judicial machinery that
would best serve their interest and welfare, in its belief that the present machinery is falling short
of that measure of public service. It should, likewise, be presumed that it has been led to this low
estimate of the utility and effectiveness of the present set-up of the judiciary after informing itself,
with the facilities at its command, such as the power of legislative investigation, of the actual
condition of the courts, particularly as to whether they continue to enjoy the trust, faith and
confidence of the public, and what the cause or causes are of their erosion, if not loss, as is the
keenly perceptible feeling of the people in general. Responsibility for this more or less extensive
slowdown of the delivery of judicial service can be laid on no other than either of the two
components of a court—the procedural laws or rules that govern the workings of the courts, or the
persons executing or applying them—or both.
When two interests conflict as what had given rise to the present controversy—the duty of the
legislature to provide
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366
129
society with a fair, efficient and effective judicial system, on one hand, and the right of judges to
security of tenure, on the other, the latter must of necessity yield to the former. One involves public
welfare and interest more directly and on a greater magnitude than the right of security of tenure of
the judges which is, as is easily discernible, more of a personal benefit to just a few, as indeed only
the judge affected could seek judicial redress of what he conceives to be its violation.
Herein lies the propriety of the exercise of “police power” of the State, if this concept which
underlies even the Constitution, has to be invoked as a constitutional justification of the passage of
the Act in question. That is, if a conflict between the primary power of the legislature to create
courts, and mere consequential benefit accorded to judges and justices after the creation of the
courts is indeed perceivable, which the writer fails to see, or, at least, would disappear upon a
reconciliation of the two apparently conflicting interests which, from the above disquisition, is not
hard to find. It is, without doubt, in the essence of the exercise of police power that a right
assertable by individuals may be infringed in the greater interest of the public good and general
welfare. This is demonstrated in how the rights and freedoms enumerated in the Bill of Rights
enjoyable by the entire people, not just by a handful in comparison, are made subject to the lawful
exercise of the police power of the State.
Viewed, therefore, from the abovementioned perspective, the general revamp of the judiciary
involving both its components—the court as an office or institution, and the judges and justices that
man them—should not find any legal obstacle in the security of tenure of judges. This security, after
all, is no more than as provided for all other officials and employees in the civil service of the
government in Section 3, Article XII-B of the Constitution which provides:
“No officer or employees in the civil service shall be suspended or dismissed except for cause as
provided by law.”
The provision of Article XVII, Section 10 of the Constitution gives to judicial officials no more than a
guarantee
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that their retirement age as fixed in the Constitution shall not be alterable at mere legislative
pleasure. The equivalent provision in the 1935 Constitution was inserted for the first time because
the retirement age before then was provided merely by statute not by the Constitution. If it comes
to their removal or suspension, what gives them constitutional protection is the aforequoted
provision which does not contemplate abolition of office when done in good faith, for removal
implies the existence of the office, not when it is abolished. Admittedly, as has been held, abolition
of office for no reason related to public welfare or for the good of the service, let alone when done in
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bad faith, amounts to an unlawful removal.2 The abolition of the courts as declared in the Act as a
result of a reorganization of the judiciary, as the Title of the law curtly but impressively announces,
can by no means, from any viewpoint, be so branded. And whether by said reorganization, the
present courts would be deemed abolished, as the law expresses such an unmistakable intent, the
matter is one for the sole and exclusive determination of the legislature. It rests entirely on its
discretion whether by the nature and extent of the changes it has introduced, it has done enough to
consider them abolished. To give the Supreme Court the power to determine the extent or nature of
the changes as to their structure, distribution and jurisdiction, before the clear intent to abolish
them, or to declare them so abolished, is given effect, would be to allow undue interference in the
function of legislation. This would be contrary to the primary duty of courts precisely to give effect
to the legislative intent as expressed in the law or as may be discovered therefrom.
From the above observation, it would be futile to insist that the present courts would not effectively
be abolished by the Act in question. It might be to arrogate power for Us to say that the changes the
law brings to the present judicial system, do not suffice for this Court to give effect to the clear
intent of
________________
2 Roque vs. Ericta, 53 SCRA 156; Abanilla vs. Ticao, 17 SCRA 652; Cruz vs. Primicias, Jr., 23 SCRA
998; Ocampo vs. Duque, 16 SCRA 962; Briones vs. Osmeña, 104 Phil. 588; Urgelio vs. Osmeña, Jr., 9
SCRA 317; Gacho vs. Osmeña, 94 Phil. 208.
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368
the legislative body. Where would the agrarian courts, the circuit criminal courts, the JDRC’s be in
the judicial structure as envisioned by the law? Are they not abolished by merger with the regional
trial courts, which by such merger, and by the other changes introduced by the law, would make
said courts different from the present Courts of First Instance which, as a consequence, may then be
considered abolished? Integrated as the present courts are supposed to be, changes somewhere in
the judicial machinery would necessarily affect the entire system.
The fact that the Supreme Court may specially assign courts to function as the special courts just
mentioned, does not mean that the changes wrought are only superficial or “cosmetic” as this term
has been used so often in the oral argument. Without the new law, these courts will remain fixed
and permanent where they are at present. Yet in the course of time, the need for their independent
existence may disappear, or that by changed conditions, where they are needed at present at a
certain place, the need for them may be somewhere else in later years, if maximum benefit at the
least expense is to be achieved, as always should be a most desirable goal and objective of
government.
Demonstrably then, the abolition of the courts is a matter of legislative intent into which no judicial
inquiry is proper, except perhaps if they intent is so palpably tainted with constitutional
repugnancy, which is not so in the instant case. We have, therefore, no occasion, as earlier
131
intimated, to speak of removal of judges when the reorganization of the judiciary would result in
the abolition of the courts other than the Supreme Court and the Court of Tax Appeals. Hence, the
provision of the Constitution giving to the Supreme Court power to dismiss a judge by a vote of
eight justices does not come into the vortex of the instant controversy. Its possible violation by the
assailed statute cannot happen, and may, therefore, not constitute an argument against the
constitutionality of the law.
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Former Justice Barrera, in a speech before the Philippine Bar Association,3 impliedly indorsed the
judicial revamp when he enumerated the qualities of a good judge that the appointing power
should consider in making new appointments to the judiciary upon its reorganization pursuant to
the questioned Act. The words of the eminent jurist may well reflect the favorable reaction of the
public in general to what the Act aims to achieve in the name of good and clean government. The
present judicial incumbents, who have not in any way, by their acts and behavior while in office,
tarnished the good image that the judiciary should have, therefore, have no cause for apprehension
that what they are entitled to under the Constitution by way of security of tenure will be denied
them, considering the publicly known aim and purpose of the massive judicial revamp, specially as
cherished with deep concern by the President who initiated the move when he created the Judiciary
Reorganization Committee to recommend needed and appropriate judicial reforms.
If the only obstacle to a verdict in favor of constitutionality of the law is its possible effect of
impairing the security of tenure of the incumbents, We may have the following facts to consider:
1 Under the 1973 Constitution all incumbent judges and justices may continue in office until
replaced or reappointed by the President. As to those judicial officials, no security of tenure, in the
traditional concept, attaches to their incumbency which is, in a real sense, only a holdover tenure.
How the President has exercised this immense power with admirable restraint should serve as the
strongest guarantee of how justice and fairness will be his sole guide in implementing the law.
2 As to the rest of the incumbents, they are all appointees of Our present President, and he should
feel concerned more than anyone else to protect whatever rights they may rightfully claim to
maintain their official standing and integrity. They need have no fear of being ignored for no reason
at all, much
________________
3 Delivered on Law Day, September 19, 1981 before the Philippine Bar Association.
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132
less for mere spirit of vindictiveness or lack of nobility of heart.
From the foregoing, it would become apparent that only in the implementation of the law may there
possibly be a taint of constitutional repugnancy, as when a judge of acknowledged honesty, industry
and competence is separated, because an act of arbitrariness would thereby be committed, but the
abolition of the courts as decreed by the law is not by itself or per se unconstitutional.
Consequently, the law, the result of serious and concerned study by a highly competent committee,
deserves to be given a chance to prove its worth in the way of improving the judiciary. If in its
implementation, any one, if at all, feels aggrieved, he can always seek judicial redress, if he can
make out a case of violation of his right of security of tenure with uncon-trovertible clarity, as when
the separation is very arbitrary in the peculiar circumstances of his case, for an act of arbitrariness,
under any constitution, is unpardonable.
II
This petition should also be dismissed for being premature, as is the stand of Justice Aquino. The
petition asks this Court to exercise its power of judicial inquiry, the power to declare a law
unconstitutional when it conflicts with the fundamental law (People vs. Vera, 65 Phil. 56). This
power has well-defined limits, for it can be exercised only when the following requisites are
present, to wit: (1) There must be an actual case or controversy; (2) The question of
constitutionality must be raised by the proper party; (3) He should do so at the earliest
opportunity, and (4) The determination of the constitutionality of the statute must be necessary to
a final determination of the case.
I am of the opinion that the petition does not present an actual controversy nor was it filed by the
proper parties.
The main ground for which the constitutionality of the Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 is
assailed is that it is violative of the security of tenure of justices and judges. The only persons who
could raise the question of constitutionality
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of the law are, therefore, the actual incumbents of the courts who would be separated from the
service upon the abolition of the courts affected by the law, on the theory as advanced by
petitioners that their judicial security of tenure would be violated. Olongapo City Judge de la Llana,
the only judge among the petitioners, has not been separated from the service. Nor is his separation
already a certainty, for he may be appointed to the court equivalent to his present court, or even
promoted to a higher court. Only when it has become certain that his tenure has been terminated
will an actual controversy arise on his allegation of a fact that has become actual, not merely
probable or hypothetical.
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The present petition may neither be allowed as a taxpayer suit. A taxpayer may bring an action to
raise the question of constitutionality of a statute only when no one else can more appropriately
bring the suit to defend a right exclusively belonging to him, and, therefore, would localize the
actual injury to his person, and to no other. For a “proper party” to invoke the power of judicial
inquiry, as one of the requisites in the exercise of such power, does not mean one having no better
right, one more personalized, than what he has as a member of the public in general. With the
incumbent judges undoubtedly being the ones under petitioners’ theory, who would suffer direct
and actual injury, they should exclude mere taxpayers who cannot be said to suffer as “direct” and
“actual” an injury as the judges and justices by the enforcement of the assailed statute, from the
right to bring the suit.
The validity of the foregoing observation becomes more evident when We consider that only after
the fate of the present incumbents is known, whether they have been actually separated or not,
would the present courts be declared abolished. For the law clearly continues their existence until
all the new courts have been filled up with new appointments, or at least such number as would be
equal to the number of actual incumbents, and they are the very courts to which they may lay claim
to the right to continue therein, so that the status of each and everyone of them has thereby been
made certain. Only then, upon the actual abolition of the courts, may there possibly be a violation of
the security of tenure, as contented,
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372
that would give rise to an “actual controversy” ih which the “proper party” can be no other than the
judges who feel aggrieved by their non-appointment to the new courts.
It would, therefore, not be proper to declare the law void at this stage, before it has even been given
a chance to prove its worth, as the legislature itself and all those who helped by their exhaustive
and scholarly study, felt it to be an urgent necessity, and before any of the proper parties who could
assail its constitutionality would know for a fact, certain and actual, not merely probable or
hypothetical, that they have a right violated by what they could possibly contend to be an
unconstitutional enforcement of the law, not by a law that is unconstitutional unto itself.
I am, therefore, for giving the law a chance to be put into application so as not to douse great
popular expectations for the courts to regain their highest level of efficiency had reputation for
probity. Inevitably, this is to be so since only when the law is fully implemented will all the courts
affected be declared abolished, undoubtedly to avoid an interregnum when the country is without
any court, except the Supreme Court, the Court of Tax Appeals and the Sandigan. Only then will it be
known whether an actual controversy would arise because any of the incumbents have been left
out in the restructured judiciary.
There would then be also a proper party to assail the constitutionality of the law, conformably to
the conditions requisite for the exercise of the power of judicial inquiry which by their stringent
character, together with the constitutional prescription of a comparatively higher vote to declare a
law unconstitutional, reveal a salutary principle of government that a law should, by all reasonable
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intendment and feasible means, be saved from the doom of unconstitutionality, the rule corollary
thereto being that if a law is susceptible to two interpretations, one of which would make it
constitutional, that interpretation should be adopted that will not kill the law.
It is to adhere to the above principles that the submission is made herein, that while in the
implementation of the law, constitutional repugnancy may not entirely be ruled out, a
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categorical ruling hereon not being necessary or desirable at the moment, the law itself is definitely
not unconstitutional.4 Any of the incumbent judges who feel injured after the law shall have been
implemented has adequate remedy in law, with full relief as would be proper. But surely, the
benefits envisioned by the law in the discharge of one of the basic duties of government to the
people—the administration of justice—should not be sacrificed, as it would be, if the law is, as
sought in the present petition, declared void right now, on the claim of a few of being allegedly
denied a right, at best of doubtful character, for the claim would seem to rest on an un-supportable
theory that they have a vested right to a public office.
Just one more point. The law in question is not self-executing in the sense that upon its effectivity,
certain judges and justices cease to be so by direct action of the law. This is what distinguishes the
Act in question from R.A. No. 1186 involved in the Ocampo case,5 which by its direct action, no act
of implementation being necessary, all the judges whose positions were abolished, automatically
ceased as such. The Act in question, therefore, is not as exposed to the same vulnerability to
constitutional attack as R.A. No. 1186 was. Yet by the operation of the Constitution with its wise
provision on how a law may be declared unconstitutional, R.A. No. 1186 stood the test for it to be
enforced to the fullness of its intent, which was, as in the law under consideration, identified with
public interest and general welfare, through a more efficient and effective judicial system as the
Judiciary Reorganization Act of 1980 seeks to establish.
Hence, the constitutionality of the law should not be assailed, and the law itself, striken down, on
the ground that some judges or justices may be removed or separated in violation of their security
of tenure. The law does not directly operate with that effect. It is in how the law would be
implemented that this
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4 Cf. G.R. No. 58184, Free Telephone Workers Union vs. The Honorable Minister of Labor and
Employment, promulgated on October 30, 1981.
5 Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 50 O.G. 147.
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feared eventuality may or may not occur. We would then be killing the law on a mere speculation if
We do so at this stage. This would be an injudicious act done in reckless disregard of the safeguards
built around a law to defend it when its constitutionality is attacked; first, the presumption that a
law is constitutional; second, when a law is susceptible to two interpretations one that would make
it constitutional, the other, unconstitutional, the former should be adopted; and third, the
Constitution itself which ordains that a law may not be declared unconstitutional except on the vote
of at least ten (10) members of the Supreme Court, more than what is required for an ordinary
decision of the Court en banc. This is not to mention the stringent requisites for the exercise of the
power of judicial inquiry as already adverted to, all designed to save the law from the dire fate of
unconstitutionality.
To the writer, the question before this Court is a simple matter of choosing between protecting
some judges from possible separation, as the implementation of the law to achieve its primary
purpose of improving the judiciary may have to result in, or serving the interest of the entire
society through an honest, efficient and effective judiciary. For, it is unthinkable that what is for the
good of the people as a whole could have been meant by the Constitution to be sacrificed for the
sake of only a few. The greatest good for the greatest number is an unwritten rule, more firm and
enduring than any of the postulates spread in our written Constitution. This, I might say, is the main
theme of this separate opinion, otherwise expressed in the well-known and time-honored maxim:
“Salus populi est suprema lex.”
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J., concurring:
There is unqualified adherence on my part to the dismissal of the Petition filed in this case. If I am
writing this separate concurrence, it is merely to state certain views I entertain in regards to the
constitutionality of Batas Pambansa Blg. 129.
The controversy in this case involves two constitutional provisions. Article X, Section 1, of the
Organic law provides that
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the legislative has the power to establish inferior Courts by law. Section 7 of the same Article reads:
“SEC. 7. The Members of the Supreme Court and judges of inferior courts shall hold office during
good behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the
duties of their office. The Supreme Court shall have the power to discipline judges of inferior courts
and, by a vote of at least eight Members, order their dismissal.”
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There should be no conflict between the two provisions. Both should be harmonized.
1. a) It is a fundamental proposition that the legislative power to create Courts ordinarily includes
the power to organize and to reorganize them, and that the power to abolish Courts is generally
coextensive with the power to create them. The power to abolish was not intended to be qualified
by the permanence of tenure (Opinion of Chief Justice Ricardo Paras in Ocampo vs. Secretary of
Justice, 51 O.G. 147 [1955], citing McCulley vs. State, 53 SW 134; Halsey vs. Gaines, 2 Lea 316). The
right of Judges to hold office during good behavior until they reach the age of 70 years, or become
incapacitated to discharge the duties of their office, does not deprive Congress of its power to
abolish, organize or reorganize inferior Courts (Brillo vs. Enage, 94 Phil. 732, 735, citing Zandueta
vs. de la Costa, 66 Phil. 615; 42 Am. Jur., Pub. Officer, 904-5). Judges of those Courts take office with
that encumbrance and knowledge.
“The legislative power to create a court carries with it the power to abolish it. When the court is
abolished any unexpired term is abolished also. The judge of such court takes office with that
encumbrance and knowledge. Perkins v. Corbin, 45 Ala. 103, 6 Am. Rep. 698; State, ex rel. Thomas v.
Gunter, 170 Ala. 165, 54 So 283, et al.”
The importance and the imperative of maintaining the independence of the Judiciary is undisputed.
At the same time, the power of Congress under the Constitution cannot be abridged. For, in the last
analysis, it is not the security of tenure per se that is the only safeguard to the independence of
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the Judiciary. It is the character and the mettle of the Judges who sit on the Bench. Has not the
impression been created in the public mind that there are those who have abused the prerogatives
of their judicial position knowing that they are untouchables by virtue of the permanence of their
tenure?
b) A distinction should be made between tenure of Judges and tenure of Courts. Section 1
heretofore mentioned refers to the “Judiciary” as a fundamental department of Government. Section
7 quoted above refers to the tenure of office of “individual” Judges (inclusive of Justices of inferior
Courts); that is to say, tenure of office is a matter concerning the individual Judge. This
“individuality” character of Section 7 is supported by the clause that the Supreme Court has the
power to discipline individual judges of inferior Courts.
A legislature is not bound to give security of tenure to Courts. Courts can be abolished. In fact, the
entire judicial system can be changed. If that system can no longer admit of change, woe to the
wheels of progress and the imperatives of growth in the development of the Judiciary. To hold that
tenure of Judges is superior to the legislative power to reorganize is to render impotent the exercise
of that power.
It may even be stated that, under Section 7, supra, Judges are entailed to their Courts, from which
they cannot be separated before retirement age except as a disciplinary action for bad behavior.
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Under Section 1, Courts are not entailed to their Judges, because the power of the legislative to
establish inferior Courts presupposes the power to abolish those Courts. If an inferior Court is
abolished, the Judge presiding that Court will necessarily have to lose his position because the
abolished Court is not entailed to him.
c) The constitutional guarantee of tenure of Judges applies only as their Courts exist. As long as
those Courts exist, the Judges cannot be ousted without just cause; that is the extent of the
constitutional provision relative to security of tenure of Judges. Upon declaration of the completion
of the reorganization as provided for in the Reorganization Act, the affected Courts “shall be
deemed automatically abolished.” There being no Courts, there are no offices for which tenure of
Judges
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may be claimed. By the abolition of those offices, the rights to them are necessarily extinguished
(Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903 [1954]).
2. I am satisfied that the challenged law was enacted by the Batasang Pambansa in response to an
urgent and pressing public need and not for the purpose of affecting adversely the security of
tenure of all Judges or legislating them out to the detriment of judicial independence It should not
be said of the Batasang Pambansa that its power of abolition of Courts has been used to disguise an
unconstitutional and evil purpose to defeat the security of tenure of Judges. The Judiciary
Reorganization Act of 1981 sufficiently complies with the bona fide rule in the abolition of public
office, as clearly explained in the main opinion. Besides, every presumption of good faith in its
actuations must be accorded a coordinate and coequal branch of government, supreme within the
limits of its own sphere, until that presumption is clearly overcome. There is no showing that the
Reorganization Act was motivated for personal or political reasons as to justify the interference by
the Court (Garvey vs. Lowell, 199 Mass, 47, 85 N.E. 182, 127 A.S.R. 468; State vs. Eduards, 40 Mont.
287; 106 Pac. 695, 19 R.C.L. 236; Llanto vs. Dimaporo, 16 SCRA 599 [1966]). Public interest and
public good, as the legislative body views it, must be balanced with tenure of Judges, which is an
individual right. Reverting to Section 1 and Section 7, supra, the former is the weightier, because
the “Judiciary” is of more importance to the welfare of the country than the tenure of office of an
individual Judge. If a Judge is removed without cause, there can be damage to the public welfare to
some extent, but maintenance of a Court that does not meet the requirements of progressive
Government, can cause incalculable prejudice to the people.
3. Nor does a conflict exist with the power of discipline vested in the Supreme Court by the present
Constitution reading: the Supreme Court shall have the power “to discipline Judges of inferior
Courts, and, by a vote of at least 8 members, order their dismissal.” Absent the Court, it would be
futile to speak of the Supreme Court’s power to discipline. Thus, where the legislature has willed
that the Courts be abolished, the
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138
power to discipline cannot pose an obstacle to the abolition. The power to discipline can come into
play only when there is removal from an existing judicial office, but not when that office is
abolished. The reorganization of the judicial system with the abolition of certain Courts is not an
exercise of the power to discipline the Judges of the abolished Courts.
It is of significance to note that the power to dismissal vested in the Supreme Court by the 1973
Constitution is delimited by its power to discipline. Absent any need for discipline and the power to
dismiss does not exist. Being circumscribed in scope, it may well be asked: does the grant of the
power of discipline and dismissal in the Supreme Court deprive the executive of the power of
removal? Is it not more in keeping with the allocation of powers in our government to state that the
Supreme Court shares its power to dismiss with the executive power of removal? For is not the
power of removal basically executive in nature, as an incident to the power of appointment, which
is the prerogative of the Chief Executive alone? As in the case of appointments, Section 5 (6), Article
X of the Constitution provides that the Supreme Court shall appoint its officials and employees.
However, is not this power shared with the power of appointment of the executive who appoints
some of the Court officials? These questions could lend themselves to an in-depth study in the
proper case.
4. The abolition would be no deprivation either of due process of law. A public office cannot be
regarded as the “property” of the incumbent. A public office is not a contract (Segovia vs. Noel, 47
Phil. 543 [1925]). A public office is a public trust (Section 1, Article XIII. 1973 Constitution). It is a
privilege in the gift of the State (Brown vs. Russell, 166 Mass. 14, 43 NE 1005, 32 LRA 253 cited also
in Tanada & Carreon, Political Law of the Philippines, Vol. 2, p. 537). The officers are the servants of
the people and not their rulers (22 R.C.L. 378-379, cited in Martin, Administrative Law, Law on
Public Officers and Election Law, p. 112, 1970 ed.). Besides, it bears stressing that there is no
removal from office but abolition of the office itself.
5. The questioned statute is in keeping with major reforms in other departments of government.
“The thrust is on
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development.” It is “the first major reorganization after four generations.” It does not provide for a
piecemeal change, which could be ineffective. It goes to the roots and does not just scratch the
surface of our judicial system. Its main objectives are an improved administration of justice, the
“attainment of more efficiency in the disposal of cases, a reallocation of jurisdiction, and a revision
of procedures which do not tend to the proper meting out of justice.” These aims are policy matters
of necessity in the pursuit of developmental goals within the Judiciary.
6. The Reorganization Act reorganizing the entire judicial system excluding the Supreme Court,
which is the only constitutional Court, and the Sandiganbayan. It envisages institutional reforms in
the Philippine judiciary. It does not simply change the names of the Courts. The facts herein are
139
dissimilar from those in Brillo vs. Enage (94 Phil. 732 [1954]) where the position of Justice of the
Peace, although ostensibly abolished, was merely changed to Municipal Judge after the municipality
of Tacloban was converted into a city with its own charter.
Significant among the institutional changes and procedural reforms are:
The Intermediate Appellate Court

This Court is now constituted into ten (10) divisions instead of fifteen (15), five members
composing each division, and a majority vote of three members being needed for a decision. This
obviates the cumbersome procedure, in case of dissent, of assigning two other members to
compose a “division of five”. It also allows flexibility in that any three members of a division,
arriving at unanimity, can promulgate a decision.
Now provided for is specialization into four (4) Civil Cases Divisions, two (2) Criminal Cases
Divisions and four (4) Special Cases Divisions. The specialization is expected to contribute to the
expeditious disposal of cases.
The Court has been given original jurisdiction to issue Writs of mandamus, prohibition, certiorari,
habeas corpus, quo war-
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380
ranto and auxiliary writs or processes whether or not in aid of its appellate jurisdiction. This would
undoubtedly ease the burden of the Supreme Court where numerous such cases are filed daily.
It has exclusive appellate jurisdiction over all final judgments, decisions, resolutions, orders or
awards of quasijudicial agencies, instrumentalities, boards or commissions, except those falling
within the exclusive appellate jurisdiction of the Supreme Court in accordance with the
Constitution.
The Intermediate Appellate Court would now have the power to try cases and conduct hearings,
receive evidence and perform any and all acts necessary to resolve factual issues raised in cases
falling within its original and appellate jurisdiction, including the power to grant and conduct new
trials or further proceedings (Sec. 9). This does away with the delays attendant to the remand of
cases to the lower trial Courts.
Regional Trial Courts

There are now thirteen (13) Judicial Regions, the same as the present administrative and Batasang
Pambansa Regions, instead of sixteen (16) Judicial Districts.
A Judge is appointed to a region, which is his official station. This ensures mobility since a Judge
may be assigned anywhere within the Region without applying the constitutional limitation of six
months. Additionally, it can remedy temporary inequalities of caseloads in trial Courts.
140
Specialized Courts are integrated into the Regional Trial Courts. Thus, Regional Trial Courts would
try all cases within its jurisdiction unless special cases are assigned to them, in which case, they
remain as Branches of Regional Trial Courts. Special procedures and technical rules governing
special Courts will continue to remain applicable in Branches assigned those special cases.
Metropolitan Trial Courts

There is one Metropolitan Trial Court with several Branches for large urban areas. The
appointment of Judges would be to a
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Metropolitan Trial Court although a Judge may be assigned by the Supreme Court to any Branch of
the Metropolitan Trial Court as demanded by the exigencies of the service.
The Supreme Court may designate certain Branches of said Courts to exercise special jurisdiction
over certain cases, unlike the present set-up where special jurisdiction applies only to cases of
traffic violations.
Municipal Trial Courts/Municipal Circuit Trial Courts

Municipal Trial Courts may now be designated by the Supreme Court to exercise special jurisdiction
over certain cases, thereby resulting in overall flexibility. They can also be circuitized with those in
cities not forming part of metropolitan areas.
One notable change between the old and the new set-up is that Judges of these Courts will now be
Presidential appointees unlike presently where the incumbent Judges are merely designated by the
Supreme Court in an Administrative Order to sit in existing Municipal Courts and Municipal Circuit
Courts.
7. There are innovative features in the Act that commend themselves:
a) The confusing and illogical areas of concurrent jurisdiction between trial Courts have been
entirely eliminated.
b) Under Section 39, there is a uniform period for appeal of fifteen (15) days counted from the
notice of the final order, resolution, award, judgment, or decision appealed from. A record on appeal
is no longer required to take an appeal. The entire original record is now to be transmitted.
c) Under Section 40, in deciding appealed cases, adoption by reference of findings of fact and
conclusions of law as set forth in the decision, order, or resolution appealed from, is also provided
for. This will expedite the rendition of decisions in appealed cases.
d) Section 42 provides for “a monthly longevity pay equivalent to 5% of the monthly basic pay for
Justices and
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Judges of the courts herein created for each five years of continuous, efficient, and meritorious
service rendered in the Judiciary, Provided that, in no case shall the total salary of each Justice or
Judge concerned, after this longevity pay is added, exceed the salary of the Justice or Judge next in
rank.” Thus, Justices and Judges who may not reach the top, where unfortunately there is not
enough room for all, may have the satisfaction of at least approximating the salary scale of those
above him depending on his length of service.
8. But while the law itself as written is constitutional, the manner in which it will be administered
should not be tainted with unconstitutionality (Myles Salt Co. vs. Board of Commrs., 239 US 478, 60
L. Ed. 392, 36 Set 204). To obviate the possibility of an unconstitutional exercise of power the
following safeguards are recommended and/or expected to be undertaken:
a) The President can be expected to indicate a reasonable time frame for the completion of the
reorganization provided for in the Act and the issuance of the corresponding implementing Order.
b) Appointments and their effectivity should be simultaneous with, or as close as possible, to the
declaration by the President of the completion of the reorganization under Section 44 to avoid any
detriment to the smooth and continuous functioning of the judicial machinery.
c) The services of those not separated should be deemed uninterrupted, as recommended by the
Committee on Judicial Reorganization (Article XI of its Report).
9. For the speedy implementation of the law, the Supreme Court can be expected to submit to the
President within thirty (30) days from the date of finality of its Decision the staffing pattern for all
Courts required by Section 43.
I am constrained to disagree with the suggestion of one of the amici curiae that the staffing pattern
be made to include the names of Judges. The staffing pattern for Judges is already clearly and
explicitly provided in the law itself which enumerates the various Judges and Justices in their
hierarchical order. Furthermore, to include the superior positions of
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Judges would depart from the traditional concept of a staffing pattern, which refers more to
personnel organization and corresponding salaries of inferior employees. It is also constitutionally
objectionable in that it would interfere with the prerogative of appointment intrinsically executive
in nature (Guevara vs. Inocentes, 16 SCRA 379 [1966]; Government of the Philippines vs. Springer,
50 Phil. 259 [1927]). The President may not be deprived of, nor be limited in, the full use of his
discretion in the appointment of persons to any public office. Nothing should so trench upon
executive choice as to be, in effect, judicial designation.
10. A word of explanation. If I had resolved not to inhibit myself in this case upon motion filed by
petitioners, it was because the Committee on Judicial Reorganization, of which I was privileged to
142
be a member, confined its work to the recommendation of options and guidelines in the task of
reorganization. The Committee had no part whatsoever in the drafting of the bill nor in the public
hearings conducted. In fact, some of its recommendations like the circuitization or regionalization
of the Intermediate Appellate Court, the appellation of members of the Judiciary, the confinement of
the jurisdiction of the Intermediate Appellate Court merely to appellate jurisdiction, the adoption of
the system found in the United Kingdom and in Commonwealth countries of having a Court of
general jurisdiction with trial and appellate divisions, were not availed of in the final Act.
11. Lastly, but by no means the least, I entertain no doubt that reliance can be placed on the good
faith of the President that all the deserving, upon considerations of “efficiency, integrity, length of
service and other relevant factors”, shall be appointed to a strengthened and revitalized judicial
system in the interest of public service; that appointments will not be unduly delayed; and that
appointees will be evaluated thoroughly to ensure quality and impartiality in the men and women
who will keep vigil over our judicial ramparts.
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CONCURRING OPINION
ERICTA, J.:
I concur in the view that the Judiciary reorganizaticn law is not unconstitutional. It does not violate
the principle of security of tenure of judges.
The Constitution grants to the Batasang Pambansa the power to create courts inferior to the
Supreme Court (Article X, Section 1). All existing inferior courts were created by law. No law is
irrepealable. The power to create an office includes the power to abolish the same. (Urgelio vs.
Osmeña, 9 SCRA 317; Maza vs. Ochave, 20 SCRA 142)
Security of tenure cannot be invoked when there is no removal of a public officer or employee but
an abolition of his office. (Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 94 Phil. 903; Cruz vs. Primicias, 23 SCRA 998;
Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354, 362) A distinction should be made between
removal from office and abolition of an office. Removal implies that the office subsists after ouster,
while, in abolition, the office no longer exists thereby terminating the right of the incumbent to
exercise the rights and duties of the office. (Canonigo vs. Ramiro, 31 SCRA 278)
The power of the legislative branch of the government to abolish courts inferior to the Supreme
Court has long been established. (Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, 51 O.G. 147). What is only needed
is that the abolition passes the test of good faith. It need only be shown that said abolition of the
courts is merely incidental to a bona fide reorganization. (Urgelio vs. Osmeña, supra.)
It is unthinkable to impute bad faith to the Presidential Committee on Judicial Reorganization

composed of four (4) distinguished members of the Supreme Court, the Minister of Justice and the
Deputy Minister of Justice, and to the members of the Batasang Pambansa whose combined efforts
after a careful study and deliberation resulted to the enactment of a bill now signed into law as
Batasang Pambansa Blg. 129. In his sponsorship speech, Justice Ricardo C. Puno
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declared the objectives of the Judiciary Reorganization Law to be the following: (1) the attainment
of more efficiency in the disposal of cases; (2) the improvement in the quality of decisions by the
courts that will result from the easing of court dockets; and (3) structural changes to meet the
exigencies of present day Philippine Society and of the foreseeable future.
Admittedly, in the implementation of the law, some Judges and Justices may be adversely affected.
But in a conflict between public interest and the individual interest of some Judges and Justices, the
public weal must prevail. The welfare of the people is the supreme law.
The implementation of the law will entail appointments to the new courts. The power of
appointment is the exclusive prerogative of the President. The implementation of the law should be
left exclusively to the wisdom, patriotism and statesmanship of the President.
PLANA, J.: Concurring and Dissenting:
As the lawmaking body has the power to create inferior courts and define, prescribe and apportion
their jurisdiction, so it has the power to abolish or replace them with other courts as long as the act
is done in good faith and not for the purpose of attaining an unconstitutional end. Good faith has
thus become the crucial issue in the case at bar.
Upon an examination of the legislative history of Batas Pambansa 129, as has been done in the main
opinion, it is manifest that actual, not merely presumed good faith attended its enactment. On this
basis, I concur in the opinion penned by the learned Chief Justice, qualified only by the following
observations:
1. Executive consultation with the Supreme Court.—I believe the President is under no obligation to
consult with the Supreme Court; and the Supreme Court as such is not called upon to give legal
advice to the President. Indeed, as the Supreme Court itself has said, it cannot give advisory
opinions (Bacolod—Murcia Planters’ Asso., Inc. vs. Bacolod—Murcia Milling Co., 30 SCRA 67; NWSA
vs. Court of Industrial Relations, 90 SCRA 629) even to the President.
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386
In the drafting of the present Constitution, there was an attempt to vest the Supreme Court with the
function of giving advisory opinions. The framers of the Constitution, however, did not see fit to
adopt the proposal.
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If the President should consult the Supreme Court on the implementation of Batas Pambansa 129
and the Supreme Court should give its advice (leaving aside the question of procedure), I believe
the President would be free to follow or disregard the advice; but, in either case, there would be no
guarantee that the implementing action would be upheld in one case or stricken down in the other.
2. Undue delegation of legislative powers.—
The petitioners have also assailed the constitutionality of Batas Pambansa 129 on the ground that a
provision thereof (regarding fixing of compensation and allowances for members of the Judiciary)
constitutes an undue delegation unto the President of legislative power.
As pointed out in the main opinion, the legislature has provided ample standards or guidelines for
the implementation of the delegated power, which makes the delegation inoffensive. I would like to
add however some observations on the doctrine of undue delegation of legislative power.
Under the old Constitution, when the abiding rule was separation of legislative and executive
powers, there was good reason to maintain the doctrine of non-delegation of legislative power.
Otherwise, the principle of separation of governmental powers could be negated via unbridled
delegation of legislative power. The 1973 Constitution has however radically changed the
constitutional set-up. There is now a commingling or fusion of executive and legislative powers in
the hands of the same group of officials. Cabinet members play a leading role in the legislative
process, and members of the Batasan actively discharge executive functions. The Prime Minister
indeed must come from its ranks. Under the circumstances, there is really not much sense in rigidly
upholding the principle of non-delegation of legislative power, at least vis-a-vis the Executive
Department. In a very real sense, the present Constitution has significantly eroded the hoary
doctrine of non-delegation of
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legislative power, although it has retained some provisions of the old Constitution which were
predicated on the principle of non-delegation, this time perhaps not so much to authorize shifting of
power and thereby correspondingly reduce the incidence of “undue” delegation of legislative
power, as to avert the abdication thereof.
“In times of war or other national emergency, the Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the
President for a limited period and subject to such restrictions as it may prescribe, to exercise
powers necessary and proper to carry out a declared national policy. Unless sooner withdrawn by
resolution of the Batasang Pambansa, such powers shall cease upon its next adjournment.” (Art.
VIII, Sec. 15.)
“The Batasang Pambansa may by law authorize the President to fix within specified limits, and
subject to such limitations and restrictions as it may impose, tariff rates, import and export quotas,
tonnage and wharfage dues, and other duties or imposts.” [Ibid., Sec. 17(2).]
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TEEHANKEE, J., dissenting:
Undoubtedly, no more crucial and transcendental issue of such magnitude has confronted the
Philippine judiciary than in the present case. The challenged Act, Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 by its
title would reorganize all existing courts (except the nine-member Sandiganbayan1 and the three-
member Court of Tax Appeals) and upon declaration by the President of the completion of the
reorganization would unprecedentedly deem all the said courts “automatically abolished” en masse
and “the incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office.”2 The total abolition involves a total of 1,663
judicial positions with 1,180 incumbent judges (and 483 vacancies) as of January 26, 1982 and the
Act would effect an increase of 230 judicial positions raising the total of judicial positions to be
filled by new appointments to 1,893. Notwithstanding the great deference due to enactments of the
Batasan, I regretably find myself unable
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1 With three vacancies.
2 Section 44, B.P. Blg. 129.
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to join the ranks of my esteemed colleagues in the majority who uphold the constitutionality of the
Act and have voted to dismiss the petition, for the following main considerations and reasons:
1. I go by the ruling of the numerical majority of seven Justices (namely, Pablo, Cesar Bengzon,
Montemayor, Jugo, Bautista, Roberto Concepcion and J.B.L. Reyes, JJ.) in the leading 1955 case of
Ocampo3 who fell short by one vote to reach the constitutionally required 2/3 majority (at the time
8 out of an 11-member Supreme Court) to declare un constitutional and invalid section 3 of
Republic Act 1186 abolishing the positions of 18 judges-at-large and 15 cadastral judges and
removing or legislating out the incumbent judges from office as against the contrary vote of a
minority of 4 Justices (namely, then Chief Justice Paras and Padilla, Alex Reyes and Labrador, JJ.)
with the paradoxical situation that the last three named Justices voted for the validity of the Act as a
remedial measure that abolished said positions without permanent station which subjected them to
a rigodon dejueces without the consent of the Supreme Court, which they considered as “repulsive
to an independent judiciary” and violative of an express prohibitory provision of the 1935
Constitution—while Justice Alex Reyes conceded that otherwise he would go with the majority that
“Congress may not, as a general rule, abolish a judicial post without allowing the incumbent to
finish his term of office.”
2. As then Associate, later Chief Justice Cesar Bengzon remarked in his separate opinion—“(T)he
[adverse] outcome of this litigation [sanctioning the ouster from office of the ten petitioners who
were presiding different Courts of First Instance, some as judges-at-large, others as cadastral
judges, upon the enactment on June 19, 1954 of R.A. 1186 abolishing the positions of judges-at-
large and cadastral judges] is apt to revive the speculation whether wittingly or unwittingly the
146
Constitution has further weakened the usually weak judicial department because of its ‘innovative’
requirement of a 2/3
________________
3 Ocampo vs. Secretary of Justice, G.R. No. L-1790. Jan. 18, 1955; 51 O.G. 147.
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majority vote of the Supreme Court to declare a statute unconstitutional, and ‘never in our history
has such a number of judges of first instance [totalling 33 positions] been ousted through judicial
reorganization.’ ”
His rationale that the express constitutional guaranty of security of tenure of judges “during good
behavior until they reach the age of seventy years or become incapacitated to discharge the duties
of their office”4 must prevail over the implied constitutional authority to abolish courts and to oust
the judges despite their constitutionally-secured tenure bears repeating thus:
“A careful analysis will perceive that whereas petitioners invoke an express guaranty or positive
definition of their term of office, the respondents rely on implied authority to abolish courts and the
positions of the respective judges. Accurately stated, respondents’ defense rests on a second
inference deduced from such implied power, because they reason out thusly: Congress has express
power to establish courts; therefore it has implicit power to abolish courts and the positions of
judges of such abolished courts (first inference); and therefore (second inference) Congress
likewise has power to eject the judges holding such positions.
“Resulting juridical situation. The implied authority invoked by respondents collides with the
express guaranty of tenure protecting the petitioners. Which shall prevail? Obviously the express
guaranty must override the implied authority. ‘Implications can never be permitted to contradict
the expressed intent or to defeat its purpose.’ x x x
xxx
“But the collision may be-should be-avoided, and both sections given validity, if one be considered a
proviso or exception to the other. In other words, under the Constitution the Congress may abolish
existing courts, provided it does not thereby remove the incumbent judges; such abolition to take
effect upon termination of their incumbency. The fundamental provisions on the matter are thereby
‘coordinated and harmonized’ as Justice Laurel suggested in his concurring opinion in Zandueta v.
De la Costa. To bring about
________________
4 Article X, section 7, 1973 Constitution, as amended (Art. VIII, sec. 9, 1935 Constitution).
390
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390
reconciliations is the great work of jurists. (Cardozo, Paradoxes of Legal Science, p. 6)”5
3. This reasoning that tho express guaranty of tenure protecting incumbent judges during good
behavior unless removed from office after hearing and due process or upon reaching the
compulsory retirement age of seventy years must override the implied authority of removing by
legislation the judges has been further strengthened and placed beyond doubt by the new
provisions of the 1973 Constitution that transferred the administrative supervision over all courts
and their personnel from the Chief Executive through the then Secretary of Justice to the Supreme
Court6 and vested in the Supreme Court exclusively “the power to discipline judges of inferior
courts and, by a vote of at least eight members, order their dismissal,”7 which power was formerly
lodged by the Judiciary Act in the Chief Executive.
As former Chief Justice Bengzon stressed in his opinion in Ocampo, the 1934 Constitutional
Convention “frowned on removal of judges of first instance through abolition of their offices or
reorganization,” citing Professor Jose Aruego’s observation that the security of judges’ tenure
provision was intended to “help secure the independence of the judiciary” in that “during good
behaviour, they may not be legislated out of office by the law-making body nor removed by the
Chief Executive for any reason and under the guise of any pretense whatsoever; they may stay in
office until they reach the age of seventy years, or become incapacitated to discharge the duties of
their office. (Aruego, The Framing of the Philippine Constitution, Vol. II, pp. 718-719)” He further
cited Aruego’s report that a proposed amendment to the effect that the prohibition against
transfers of judges to another district without the approval of the Supreme Court8 “should not be
applicable
________________
5 Cited in Chief Justice Fernando’s The 1973 Constitution, page 376; emphasis copied.
6 Art. X, sec. 6, 1973 Constitution.
7 Idem, Art. X, sec. 7.
8 Art. VIII, sec. 7, 1935 Constitution.
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391
to a reorganization of tribunals of justice or of districts, but the amendment was defeated easily
without debate”9 and logically concluded that “(N)ow, therefore, having vetoed the transfer of
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judges thru a re-organization, the Convention evidently could not have permitted the removal of
judges thru re-organization.”
Now, if the framers of the 1973 Constitution wished to dispel the strong doubts, to say the least in
the light of the 7 to 4 vote in the Ocampo case against removal of incumbent judges through
legislative action by abolition of their courts, then they would have so clearly provided for such
form of removal in the 1973 Constitution, but on the contrary as already stated they ruled out such
removal or ouster of judges by legislative action by vesting exclusively in the Supreme Court the
power of discipline and removal of judges of all inferior courts.
4. This being so, the fundamental point emphasized by former Chief Justice Bengzon that abolition
of the 33 judicial positions in the Ocampo case was “merely an indirect manner of removing the
petitioners-judges” while the “positions [that] were eliminated . . . were in fact substituted or
replaced by other positions of judges” applies with greater force in the case at bar which involves
an unprecedented total “abolition,” thus: “(C)all it reorganization, or legislation or removal or
abolition, this law disregards the constitutional assurance that these judges, once appointed, shall
hold office during good behaviour x x x [unless incapacitated and until retirement].
“The abolition of their offices was merely an indirect manner of removing these petitioners.
Remember that on June 19, 1954, there were 107 judges of first instance, district judges, judges-at-
large and cadastral judges (Rep. Act 296). After the passage of Republic Act No. 1186 there were
114 positions of judges of first instance. There was no reduction—there was increase—in the
number of judges, nor in the number of courts. The positions of Judges-at-Large and Cadastral
Judges were eliminated; but they were in fact substituted or replaced by other positions of judges;
or if you please, there was a mere
________________
9 Aruego, Framing of the Phil. Constitution, Vol. I, p. 513.
392
392
change of designation from ‘Cadastral Judge or Judge-at-Large’ to ‘district judge’. Hence it should be
ruled that as their positions had not been ‘abolished’ de facto, but actually retained with another
name, these petitioners are entitled to remain in the service. (Brillo v. Enage, G.R. No. L-7115, March
30, 1954.) For it is not permissible to effect the removal of one judge thru the expediency of
abolishing his office even as the office with same power is created with another name. (Brillo v.
Enage, Malone v. Williams, 118 tenn. 391, Gibbe’s Case 4 A.L.R., p. 211). In this view of the picture,
we believe, Congress could have, and should have—as suggested by Secretary Tuazon during the
hearings in Congress—directed in said Republic Act No. 1186 that ‘the present judges-at-large and
cadastral judges shall become district judges presiding such districts as may be fixed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments;’ or by the Secretary of Justice, as
originally proposed by Senator Laurel in connection with the same bill. Something similar was done
before, and it would not be objectionable as an encroachment on the President’s prerogative of
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appointment, because such judges had already been appointed to the judiciary before the passage
of the act, and the provision may be construed in the light of mere change of official designation
plus increase in salary.”
5. Concededly, the questioned Act effects certain changes and procedural reforms with more
specific delineation of jurisdiction as mentioned particularly in the majority opinion, but they do
not change the basic structure of the existing courts. The present Municipal Courts, Municipal
Circuit Courts and City Courts are restructured and redesignated as Municipal Trial Courts and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts and Metropolitan Trial Courts in the challenged Act. The Courts of
First Instance, Circuit Criminal Courts, Juvenile & Domestic Relations Courts and Courts of Agrarian
Relations are all restructured and redesignated to be known by the common name of Regional Trial
Courts with provision for certain branches thereof “to handle exclusively criminal cases, juvenile
and domestic relations cases, agrarian cases, urban land reform cases . . . . and/or such other special
cases as the Supreme Court may determine in the interest of a speedy and
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efficient administration of justice”10 and the Court of Appeals is restructured and redesignated as
the Intermediate Appellate Court with an increase in the number of Appellate Justices from the
present 45 to 50 but with a reduction of the number of divisions from 15 (composed of 3 Justices
each) to 10 (composed of 5 members each) such that it is feared that there is created a bottleneck at
the appellate level in the important task discharged by such appellate courts as reviewers of facts.
In my view, the “candid admission” by the Chief Justice in his opinion for the Court “that he
entertained doubts as to whether the intermediate court of appeals provided for is a new
tribunal”10a is equally applicable to all the other above-mentioned courts provided for in the
challenged Act as “new courts”. And the best proof of this is the plain and simple transitory
provision in section 44 thereof that upon the President’s declaration of completion of the
reorganization (whereby the “old courts” shall “be deemed automatically abolished and the
incumbents thereof shall cease to hold office”), “(T)he cases pending in the old Courts shall be
transferred to the appropriate Courts constituted pursuant to this Act, together with the pertinent
functions, records, equipment, property and the necessary personnel”, together with the
“applicable appropriations.” This could not have been possible without a specification and
enumeration of what specific cases of the “old courts” would be transferred to the particular “new
courts,” had these “new courts” not been manifestly and substantially the “old courts” with a change
of name—or as described by Justice Barredo to have been his first view, now discarded, in his
separate opinion: “just a renaming, and not a substantial and actual modification or alteration of the
present judicial structure or system” or “a rearrangement or remodeling of the old structure.”11
6. I do not subscribe to the test of good faith or bad faith in the abolition of the courts and
consequent ouster of the in-
________________
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10 Sec. 23, B.P. Blg. 129.
10a At page 16, m. 50.
11 At page 3 thereof.
394
394
cumbent judges from office as expounded by the late eminent Justice Jose P. Laurel in his separate
concurring opinion in the pre-war case of Zandueta12 wherein the Court dismissed the petition for
quo warranto on the ground of petitioner Zandueta’s estoppel and abandonment of office.13
Realistically viewed from the basis of the established legal presumptions of validity and
constitutionality of statutes (unless set aside by a 2/3 majority of 10 members of the Supreme
Court) and of good faith in their enactment, one is hard put to conjure a case where the Court could
speculate on the good or bad motives behind the enactment of the Act without appearing to be
imprudent and improper and declare that “the legislative power of reorganization (is) sought to
cloak an unconstitutional and evil purpose.” The good faith in the enactment of the challenged Act
must needs be granted. What must be reconciled is the legislative power to abolish courts as
implied from the power to establish them with the express constitutional guaranty of tenure of the
judges which is essential for a free and independent judiciary. Adherents of the Rule of Law are
agreed that indispensable for the maintenance of the Rule of Law is a free and independent
judiciary, sworn to protect and enforce, it without fear or favor—“free, not only from graft,
corruption, ineptness and incompetence but even from the tentacles of interference and insiduous
influence of the political powers that be,” to quote again from Justice Barredo’s separate concurring
opinion.14 Hence, my adherence to the 7-member majority opinion of former Chief Justice Bengzon
in the Ocampo case, supra, as restated by the Philippine Association of Law Professors headed by
former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion that “any reorganization should at least allow the
incumbents of the existing courts to remain in office [the appropriate counterpart ‘new courts’]
unless they are removed for cause.”
7. The “judges’ broader and stronger guarantees of tenure than ordinary civil servants” as stressed
by former Chief Justice Bengzon in his majority opinion in Ocampo is based on
________________
12 Zandueta vs. De la Costa, 66 Phil. 615 (1938).
13 See the Chief Justice opinion, pages 14-15.
14 At page 8 thereof.
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the judiciary’s status as a coequal and coordinate branch of government, whereas the long line of
Philippine cases upholding the legislative power to abolish offices refers to officers or employees in
the executive branch of government and “the underlying consideration must be borne in mind that
Manalang [the aggrieved petitioner] belonged to the Executive Department and because the
President approved the law, no question or encroachment by one branch on the other could be
apprehended or alleged.”15 This is not a matter of personal privilege for the incumbent judges but
as aptly stated by former U.P. Law Dean Irene Cortez in her memorandum as amicus curiae, “for the
judiciary whose independence is not only eroded but is in grave danger of being completely
destroyed.” Dean Cortez aptly stressed that “judicial independence is not a guarantee intended for
the Supreme Court alone, it extends to the entire court system and is even more vital to the courts
at the lowest levels because there are more of them and they operate closest to the people,” and
“(Particularly under the present form of modified parliamentary government with legislative and
executive functions overlapping and in certain areas merging, the judiciary is left to perform the
checking function in the performance of which its independence assumes an even more vital
importance.”
The extensive memoranda filed by Dean Cortez and other amici curiae such as former Senator Jose
W. Diokno who strongly urges the Court to strike down the Act “to prevent further destruction of
judicial independence,” former Senator Lorenzo Sumulong, president of the Philippine Constitution
Association who advocates for the Court’s adoption of the Bengzon majority opinion in the Ocampo
case so as to abide by “the elementary rule in the interpretation of constitutions that effect should
be given to all parts of the Constitution” and that the judges’ security of tenure guaranty should not
be “rendered meaningless and inoperative” former Solicitor General Arturo A. Alafriz, president of
the Philippine Lawyers’ Association who submits that the total abolition of all courts below the
Supreme Court (except the Sandiganbayan
________________
15 Citing Manalang vs. Quitoriano, 50 O.G. 2515.
396
396
and the Court of Tax Appeals) and the removal of the incumbent Justices and Judges “violates the
independence of the judiciary, their security of tenure and right to due process guaranteed them by
the Constitution” and Atty. Raul M. Gonzales, president of the National Bar Association of the
Philippines who invokes the Declaration of Delhi at the ICJ Conference in 1959, that “The principles
of unremovability of the Judiciary and their Security of Tenure until death or until a retiring age
fixed by statute is reached, is an important safeguard of the Rule of Law” have greatly helped in
fortifying my views.
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8. I had submitted in my memo of September 4, 1980 to the Presidential Committee on Judicial

Reorganization that “(W)hatever reorganization plans the committee may recommend to meet the
worldwide problem of congested court dockets, and to improve judicial services in the public
interest, it should be borne in mind that the members of the judiciary as the weakest branch of
government, yet called upon to safeguard the people’s rights and protect them from oppression,
official and otherwise, are entitled to security of tenure as guaranteed by the Constitution. Even
though the lower courts may be reshuffled or abolished in the process, the mandate and spirit of
the Constitution guaranteeing their security of tenure and maintaining the independence of the
judiciary should be respected, and they should be retained in the new courts.”
In the same vein, Dean Cortez warned of the dire consequences of giving the questioned provisions
of the Act the “absolutist sense which they appear to have at first blush” thus: “(T)o accept
legislative power to abolish courts asserted under Batas Pambansa Blg. 129 which sweeps through
practically the entire judiciary would be to open the door to future court abolitions in the guise of
reorganization. At this stage of our political development, the process of embarking upon a
modified parliamentary system may well usher in a situation where despite guarantees of judicial
tenure, each ruling party in the legislature or any alliance that can command a majority vote may
periodically undertake complete reorganization and remove judges, thus making of the judiciary a
veritable straw in the political wind,” and “(F)urthermore, what can result in
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the modified parliamentary system from the close working relationship between executive and
legislature is made manifest in Batas Pambansa Blg. 129. If the sweeping revamp provided were to
be carried out the President would appoint all of the justices and judges of the courts affected and
the whole membership in the judiciary from the highest to the lowest courts would be his
appointees. It is relevant to point out that it is precisely a situation like this that the Constitution
seeks to avoid when it provides staggered terms for the chairman and members of the
constitutional commissions which like the judiciary are guaranteed independence.”
9. The judges’ security of tenure was rendered nugatory by the Transitory Provisions of the 1973
Constitution which granted the incumbent President the unlimited power to remove and replace all
judges and officials16 (as-against the limited one-year period for the exercise of such power
granted President Quezon in the 1935 Constitution upon establishment of the Philippine
Commonwealth). Upon the declaration of martial law in September, 1972, justices and judges of all
courts, except the Supreme Court, had been required to hand in their resignations. There is listed a
total of 53 judges who were replaced or whose resignations were accepted by the President during
the period from September, 1972 to April, 1976. The power to replace even the judges appointed
after the effectivity on January 17, 1973 of the 1973 Constitution is yet invoked on behalf of the
President in the pending case of Tapucar vs. Famador 17 notwithstanding the generally held view
that such post-1973 Constitution appointed judges are not subject to the Replacement Clause of the
cited Transitory Provision. (In this case, petitioner judge appointed on January 30, 1976 as judge of
the Court of First Instance of Agusan del Norte and Butuan City, Branch I, invoked his constitutional
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security of tenure and questioned the appointment extended on February 26, 1980 to respondent
to replace him, although he had not been removed or otherwise dismissed from his position nor
had be resigned therefrom. (The Court per its March
________________
16 Art. XVII, sections 9 and 10.
17 G.R. No. 53467 filed on March 27, 1980.
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398
27, 1980 resolution ordered both to refrain from discharging the functions of the questioned
office.) And now comes this total abolition of 1,663 judicial positions (and thousands of personnel
positions) unprecedented in its sweep and scope. The urgent need is to strengthen the judiciary
with the restoration of the security of tenure of judges, which is essential for a free and independent
judiciary as mandated by the Constitution, not to make more enfeebled an already feeble judiciary,
possessed neither of the power of the sword nor the purse, as decried by former Chief Justice
Bengzon in his Ocampo majority opinion:
“Shall we have judges of the type of Lord Coke? Or judges, who, in his place, would have answered
I’ll do what his majesty pleases,’ judges who, afraid of ouster thru a judiciary reshuffle, would rather
serve the interests of the party in power or of the political boss, than the interests of justice?
“As it is, the Judicial Department is feeble enough. Shall we render it feebler with judges
precariously occupying their official seats? Judges performing their duties under the sword of
Damocles of future judicial reorganizations?”
10. The Chief Justice, in his opinion for the Court, equally stressed that “what is equally apparent is
that the strongest ties bind the executive and legislative departments. It is likewise undeniable that
the Batasang Pambansa retains its full authority to enact whatever legislation may be necessary to
carry out national policy as usually formulated in a caucus of the majority party. It is
understandable then why in Fortun vs. Labang 18 it was stressed that with the provision
transferring to the Supreme Court administrative supervision over the Judiciary, there is agreater
need ‘to preserve unimpaired the independence of the judiciary, especially so at present, where to
all intends and purposes, there is a fusion between the executive and the legislative branches,’ ”19
with the further observation that “many are the ways by which such independence could be
eroded.” In the cited case of Judge
________________
18 104 SCRA 607 (May 27, 1981).
19 Main opinion at page 21.

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Fortun (likewise penned by the Chief Justice for the Court), the Court issued a writ of prohibition
and certiorari ordering the dismissal of the criminal complaint filed with respondent fiscal Labang
by “disgruntled members of the bar with a record of losing cases” in the judge’s court and imposed
the penalty of censure on each and everyone of the private respondents-lawyers for the “unseemly
haste” with which they filed the criminal complaint, abetted by “the appearance of sheer
vindictiveness or oppressive exercise of state authority.” The Court marked the “violation of the
cardinal principles of fairness and due process that underlie the Rule of Law. Petitioner-Judge was
not heard; he was denied the opportunity to defend himself against the accusation. There was, on
the part of private respondents then, a failure to abide by a Resolution of the Integrated Bar
stressing that precisely integration could shield ‘the judiciary which traditionally cannot defend
itself except within its own forum, from the assaults that politics and self-interest may level at it,
and assist it to maintain its integrity, impartiality and independence,’ ” and that such subjection of a
judge to public “harassment and humiliation. . . can diminish public confidence in the courts.”
11. This brings us to the allegedly underlying need for B.P. Blg. 129 discussed in the course of
committee hearings of Cabinet Bill No. 42 and the deliberation on second reading in the Batasang
Pambansa to rid the judiciary of incompetent and corrupt judges and to restore confidence in the
integrity of the courts. The purge has been the constant subject of headlines and editorials, with the
Ministry of Justice’s Integrity Council reportedly screening and conducting “integrity tests” as to
new applicants and the incumbent judges20 and seeking “confidential information on corrupt and
incompetent judges to help the government purge the judiciary.”21 Prime Minister Cesar Virata
was quoted as saying that “there will be a purge of the corrupt and the misfits’ when the Judiciary
Reorganization Act is signed into law by President Marcos and implemented in coordination with
the Supreme Court.”22
________________
20 Phil. Daily Express issue of Aug. 24, 1981.
21 Times Journal issue of Aug. 16, 1981.
22 Evening Post issue of Aug. 11, 1981.
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400

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The public respondents’ answer sidesteps the issue of such purge contravening the rudiments of a
fair hearing and due process and submits that “no term of office is sacrosanct when demanded
before the altar of the public good.” The metropolitan papers reported the “anxiety gripping the
judiciary as the Ministry of Justice has reportedly been asked to collate information ‘on the
performance of the judges and on the qualifications of those slated to take over the positions of the
incompetent, the inefficient or those involved in ir-regularities.’ As stated in an editorial, ‘Somehow,
the uncertainty that now hovers over the judiciary has unduly subjected the judges to mental
torture since they do not know when or whether the axe will fall on them. Worse, the sword of
Damocles hanging over their heads could provoke them into seeking the help of people claiming to
have influence with the powers that be.”23
But Dean Cortez in her memorandum states that “However, nowhere on public record is there hard
evidence on this. The only figures given in the course of the committee hearings were to the effect
that out of some 1,700 members of the judiciary, between 10 to 15 were of the undesirable
category, i.e. misfit, incompetent or corrupts. (Barredo, J., before the Committee on Justice, Human
Rights and Good Government, December 4, 1980),” and that “(I)f this be the case, the
unprecedented, sweeping and wholesale abolition of judicial offices becomes an arbitrary act, the
effect of which is to assert the power to remove all the incumbents guilty or innocent without due
process of law.” Now would it be of any avail to beg the question and assert that due process is not
available in mass abolitions Of courts.
Justice Barredo, however, without citing any hard evidence, refers in his separate concurrence to
twin objectives of getting rid of “structural inadequacies of the system or of the cumber-someness
and technicality-peppered and dragging procedural rules in force” and of “a good number of those
occupying positions in the judiciary (who) make a mockery of justice and take
________________
23 Metropolitan papers of Aug. 8, 1980. Times Journal editorial of Aug. 31, 1980.
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advantage of their office for personal ends.” He adds that “it is my personal assessment of the
present situation in our judiciary that its reorganization has to be of necessity two-pronged, as I
have just indicated, for the most ideal judicial system with the most perfect procedural rules cannot
satisfy the people and the interests of justice unless the men who hold positions therein possess the
character, competence and sense of loyalty that can guarantee their devotion to duty and absolute
impartiality, nay, impregnability to all temptations of graft and corruption, including the usual
importunings and the fearsome albeit improper pressures of the powers that be,”24 and invokes
the adage of “grandes males, grandes remedios” to now uphold the validity of the Act.
Former Senator Diokno in his memorandum anticipates the argument that “great ills demand
drastic cures” thus: “Drastic, yes—but not unfair nor unconstitutional. One does not improve courts
by abolishing them, any more than a doctor cures a patient by killing him. The ills the judiciary
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suffers from were caused by impairing its independence; they will not be cured by totally
destroying that independence. To adopt such a course would only breed more perversity in the
administration of justice, just as the abuses of martial rule have bred more subversion.”
12. Finally, as stated by the 1975 Intergraded Bar of the Philippines 2nd House of Delegates, “It
would, indeed, be most ironical if Judges who are called upon to give due process cannot count it on
themselves. Observance of procedural due process in the separation of misfits from the Judiciary is
the right way to attain a laudable objective.
As stressed by the Chief Justice in the Fortun case, judges are entitled to the cardinal principles of
fairness and due pro-cess and the opportunity to be heard and defend themselves against the
accusations made against them and not to be subjected to harassment and humiliation, and the
Court will repudiate the “oppressive exercise of legal authority.” More so, are judges entitled to
such due process when what is at stake is their constitutionally guaranteed security of tenure
________________
24 At page 5.
402
402
and non-impairment of the independence of the judiciary and the proper exercise of the
constitutional power exclusively vested in the Supreme Court to discipline and remove judges after
fair hearing.
In sum, I see no reason to change the stand submitted by me to the Presidential Committee on
Judicial Reorganization that—Judges of inferior courts should not be summarily removed and
branded for life in such reorganization on the basis of confidential adverse reports as to their
performance, competence or integrity, save those who may voluntarily resign from office upon
being confronted with such reports against them. The trouble with such ex-parte reports, without
due process or hearing, has been proven from our past experience where a number of honest and
competent judges were summarily removed while others who were generally believed to be basket
cases have remained in the service; and
The power of discipline and dismissal of judges of all inferior courts, from the Court of Appeals
down, has been vested by the 1973 Constitution in the Supreme Court, and if the judiciary is to be
strengthened, it should be left to clean its own house upon complaint and with the cooperation of
the ag grieved parties and after due process and hearing.
The constitutional confrontation and conflict may well be avoided by holding that since the changes
and provisions of the challenged Act do not substantially change the nature and functions of the
“new courts” therein provided as compared to the “abolished old courts” but provide for procedural
changes, fixed delineation of jurisdiction and increases in the number of courts for a more effective
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and efficient disposition of court cases, the incumbent judges guaranteed security of tenure require
that they be retained in the corresponding “new courts.”
Petition dismissed.
Notes.—The constitutionality or unconstitutionality of legislation depends upon no other facts than

those existing at the time of the enactment thereof, unaffected by the acts or
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403
omissions of law enforcement agencies, particularly those that take place subsequently to the
passage or approval of the law. (Gonzales vs. Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 774).
The purpose of obtaining a judicial declaration of the nullity of a statute passed by Congress, it is
enough if the respondents or defendants named be the government officials who would give
operation and effect to official action allegedly tainted with unconstitutionality. (J.M. Tuason and
Company, Inc. vs. Land Tenure Administrations, 31 SCRA 413.)
But when the parts of the statute are so mutually dependant and connected, as conditions,
considerations, inducements, or compensation for each year, as to warrant a belief that the
legislature intended them as a whole and that if all could not be carried into effect, the legislature
would not pass the residue independently, then, if some parts are unconstitutional, all the
provisions which are thus dependent, conditional or connected must fall with them. (Lidasan vs.
Commission on Elections, 21 SCRA 496).
The unconstitutionality of an act must be shown. (De Agbayani vs. Philippine National Bank, 38
SCRA 429).
Public policy demands that the outcome of judicial proceedings should reflect maximum efficiency
and, as much as possible, excellence of performance on the part of those who man the courts.
(Kalalang vs. Fernandez, 49 SCRA 418).
Unless the contrary is shown, there is a presumption of regularity in the actions of the court.
(Amargo vs. Court of Appeals, 53 SCRA 64).
It is the duty of courts to dispense justice. (People vs. Bacong, 54 SCRA 288).
It is the duty of lower courts to refer to the rulings of the Supreme Court. (Republic vs. Guanzon, 61
SCRA 360).
It is the duty of the courts to enforce the Constitution. (William Lines, Inc. vs. City of Ozamis, 56
SCRA 590).
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Procedural rules are created to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. (Philippine
Bank of Communications vs. Court of Appeals, 54 SCRA 217). De La Llana vs. Alba, 112 SCRA 294,
No. L-57883 March 12, 1982
11. Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño, G.R. No. L-27811, 17 November 1967, 21 SCRA 895
Constitutional law; Presidential powers.—The President’s duty to execute the law is of

constitutional origin. So, too, in his control of all executive departments. Thus it is, that department
heads are men of his confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is in the privilege to
dismiss them at pleasure. Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit, then, is his authority
to go over, confirm, modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this
context, it may not be said that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a
department secretary.
Same; Delegation of powers; Acts of Executive Secretary acting by authority of the President are
those of President
_______________
3 Yap v. Republic, L-20372, May 14, 1966; Chan v. Republic, L-22352, June 30, 1966.
4 Kock Tee Yap v. Republic, L-20992, May 14, 1966.
896
896
Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño
himself.—It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise
in person. Not as correct, however, is it to say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his
Executive Secretary Acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person, for
the President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and administrative
functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the President. The
rule which has thus gained recognition is that under our constitutional set-up the Executive
Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue. Where the Executive Secretary acts
“by authority of the President,” his decision is that of the President. Such decision is to be given full
faith and credit by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted.
For, only the President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so.
Therefore, unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive,” that
remains the act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully assailed.
APPEAL from a decision of the Court of First Instance of Davao. Abbas, J.

159
Leopoldo M. Abellera for plaintiff-appellant.
Victorio Advincula for defendant Jose Paño.
Solicitor General for defendant Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive
Secretary.
SANCHEZ, J.:
The question—May the Executive Secretary, acting by authority of the President, reverse a decision
of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by the Executive Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources—yielded an affirmative answer from the lower court.1
Hence, this appeal certified to this Court by the Court of Appeals upon the provisions of Sections 17
and 31 of the Judiciary Act of 1948, as amended.
The undisputed controlling facts are:
In 1932, Jose Magallanes was a permittee and actual occupant of a 1,103-hectare pasture land
situated in Tam-
______________
1 Special Civil Case No. 2792, Court of First Instance of Davao, Branch II.
897
VOL. 21, NOVEMBER 17, 1967
897
langon, Municipality of Bansalan, Province of Davao.
On January 9, 1953, Magallanes ceded his rights and interests to a portion (392,7569 hectares) of
the above public land to plaintiff.
On April 13, 1954, the portion Magallanes ceded to plaintiff was officially released from the forest
zone as pasture land and declared agricultural land.
On January 26, 1955, Jose Pailo and nineteen other claimants2 applied for the purchase of ninety
hectares of the released area.
On March 29, 1955, plaintiff corporation in turn filed its own sales application covering the entire
released area. This was protested by Jose Paño and his nineteen companions upon the averment
that they are actual occupants of the part thereof covered by their own sales application.
160
The Director of Lands, following an investigation of the conflict, rendered a decision on July 31,
1956 giving due course to the application of plaintiff corporation, and dismissing the claim of Jose
Paño and his companions. A move to reconsider failed.
On July 5, 1957, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources—on appeal by Jose Pano for
himself and his companions—held that the appeal was without merit and dismissed the same.
The case was elevated to the President of the Philippines.
On June 25, 1958, Executive Secretary Juan Pajo, “[b]y authority of the President” decided the
controversy, modified the decision of the Director of Lands as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, and (1) declared that “it would be for the public interest that
appellants, who are mostly landless farmers who depend on the land for their existence, be
allocated that portion on which they have made improvements”; and (2) directed that the
controverted land (northern portion of
________________
2 Julian Balala, Magdalena Balala, Florencio Aguinaldo, Pedro Roguian, Carlos Francisco, Jose
Pascua, Agapito Viernes, Ricardo Villanueva, Cezario Butava, Vicente Riva, Pedro Ringor, Jose
Bartolome, Benjamin Simon, Carlos Villanueva. Esmio Simon, Gregorio Domingo, Fernando
Roguian, Severino Cape, and Sixto de la Cruz.
898
898
Block I, LC Map 1749, Project No. 27, of Bansalan, Davao, with Latian River as the dividing line)
“should be subdivided into lots of convenient sizes and allocated to actual occupants, without
prejudice to the corporation’s right to reimbursement for the cost of surveying this portion.” It may
be well to state, at this point, that the decision just mentioned, signed by the Executive Secretary,
was planted upon the facts as found in said decision.
Plaintiff corporation took the foregoing decision to the Court of First Instance praying that
judgment be rendered declaring: (1) that the decision of the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources has full force and effect; and (2) that the decision of the Executive Secretary is contrary
to law and of no legal force and effect.
And now subject of this appeal is the judgment of the court a quo dismissing plaintiff’s case.
Plaintiffs mainstay is Section 4 of Commonwealth Act 141. The precept there is that decisions of the
Director of Lands “as to questions of facts shall be conclu-. sive when approved” by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources. Plaintiff’s trenchment claim is that this statute is controlling not
only upon courts but also upon the President.
161
Plaintiff’s position is incorrect. The President’s duty to execute the law is of constitutional origin.3
So, too, is his control of all executive departments.4 Thus it is, that department heads are men of his
confidence. His is the power to appoint them; his, too, is the privilege to dismiss them at pleasure.
Naturally, he controls and directs their acts. Implicit then is his authority to go over, confirm,
modify or reverse the action taken by his department secretaries. In this context, it may not be said
that the President cannot rule on the correctness of a decision of a department secretary.
Particularly in reference to the decisions of the Director of Lands, as affirmed by the Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, the standard practice is to allow appeals from such decisions to
the Office of the Pres-
_______________
3 Section 7. Article VII. Philippine Constitution.
4 Section 10(1), Article VII, id.
899
899
ident.5 This Court has recognized this practice in several cases. In one, the decision of the Lands
Director as approved by the Secretary was considered superseded by that of the President’s
appeal.6 In other cases, failure to pursue or resort to this last remedy of appeal was considered a
fatal defect, warranting dismissal of the case, for non-exhaustion of all administrative remedies.7
Parenthetically, it may be stated that the right to appeal to the President reposes upon the
President’s power of control over the executive departments.8 And control simply means “the
power of an officer to alter or modify or nullify or set aside what a subordinate officer had done in
the performance of his duties and to substitute the judgment of the former for that of the latter.”9
This unquestionably negates the assertion that the President cannot undo an act of his department
secretary.
2. Plaintiff next submits that the decision of the Executive Secretary herein is an undue delegation
of power. The Constitution, petitioner asserts, does not contain any provision whereby the
presidential power of control may be delegated to the Executive Secretary. It is argued that it is the
constitutional duty of the President to act personally upon the matter.
It is correct to say that constitutional powers there are which the President must exercise in
person.10 Not
_________________
5 Castrillo, Law on Natural Resources, 1957 ed., p. 118.

162
6 Castillo vs. Rodriguez, L-17189, June 22, 1965. See also: Extensive Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co.,
Inc., L-22383 & L-22386, May 16, 1966.
7 Ham vs. Bachrach Motor Co., Inc., L-13677, October 31, 1960; Calo vs. Fuertes, L-16537, June 29,
1962.
8 Ham vs. Bachrach, supra; Suarez vs. Reyes, L-19828, February 28, 1963; Extensive Enterprises vs.
Sarbro & Co., supra, citinq Section 10(1) of Article VII of the Constitution.
9 Mondano vs. Silvosa, 97 Phil. 143, 148; also quoted in Ham vs. Bachrach, supra; Extensive
Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co.. supra.
10 Powers to suspend the writ of habeas corpus, to proclaim martial law [Sec. 10 (2), Art. VII, Phil
Constitution] and to grant reprieves, commutations, and pardons, and remit fines and forfeitures
[Sec. 10(6), idem] mentioned in Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, 67 Phil. 451, 462-463,
900
900
as correct, however, is it so say that the Chief Executive may not delegate to his Executive Secretary
acts which the Constitution does not command that he perform in person.11 Reason is not wanting
for this view. The President is not expected to perform in person all the multifarious executive and
administrative functions. The Office of the Executive Secretary is an auxiliary unit which assists the
President. The rule which has thus gained recognition is that “under our constitutional setup the
Executive Secretary who acts for and in behalf and by authority of the President has an undisputed
jurisdiction to affirm, modify, or even reverse any order” that the Secretary of Agriculture and
Natural Resources, including the Director of Lands, may issue.12
3. But plaintiff underscores the fact that the Executive Secretary is equal in rank to the other
department heads, no higher than anyone of them. From this, plaintiff carves the argument that one
department head, on the pretext that he is an alter ego of the President, cannot intrude into the
zone of action allocated to another department secretary. This argument betrays lack of
appreciation of the fact that where, as in this case, the Executive Secretary acts “[b]y authority of
the President”, his decision is that of the President’s. Such decision is to be given full faith and credit
by our courts. The assumed authority of the Executive Secretary is to be accepted. For, only the
President may rightfully say that the Executive Secretary is not authorized to do so. Therefore,
unless the action taken is “disapproved or reprobated by the Chief Executive”,13 that remains the
act of the Chief Executive, and cannot be successfully as-
______________
11 Executive Order 94, October 4, 1947, provides in Sec. 27 : that “[t]he Executive Secretary xxx
shall exercise such powers, functions, and duties as may be assigned to him by the President from
time to time x x x.”
163
12 Extensive Enterprises vs. Sarbro & Co., supra. See: Pajo vs. Ago, L-15414, June 30, 1960, and
citations at footnote 8 herein. See also: Martin, Revised Administrative Code, 1962 ed., Vol. III, pp.
868-869.
13 Villena vs. Secretary of Interior, supra, at p. 463. Cf. Ykalina vs. Oricio, 93 Phil. 1076, 1080.
901
901
sailed.14 No such disapproval or reprobation is even intimated in the record of this case.
For the reasons given, the judgment under review is hereby affirmed. Costs against plaintiff. So
ordered.
Concepcion, C.J., Reyes, J.B.L., Dizon, Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., Zaldivar, Castro and Angeles, JJ.,
concur.
Fernando, J., concurs and submits a separate concurring opinion.
The learned opinion of Justice Sanchez possesses merit and inspires assent. A further observation
may not be amiss concerning that portion thereof which speaks of “the standard practice” allowing
appeals from [decisions of Secretary of Natural Resources affirming the action taken by the Director
of Lands] to the Office of the President. That for me is more than a “standard practice.” It is sound
law. The constitutional grant to the President of the power of control over all executive
departments, bureaus and offices yields that implication.1
If this were all, there would be no need for an additional expression of my views. I feel constrained
to do so however in order to emphasize that the opinion of the Court appears to me to reflect with
greater fidelity the constitutional intent as embodied in the above provision vesting the power of
control in the Presidency.
The question asked in the opening paragraph of the opinion—“May the Executive Secretary, acting
by authority of the President, reverse a decision of the Director of Lands that had been affirmed by
the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources[?]”—merits but one answer. It must be in the
unqualified affirmative. So the Court holds. That is as it should be. Any other view would be highly
unorthodox.
Nonetheless, the thought seems to lurk in the opinion of a respectable number of members of the
bar that a provision as that found in the Public Land Act to the effect
____________
14 Pozon vs. Executive Secretary (CA.), 55 O.G. No. 18’ pp. 3302, 3305.
164
1 Article VII, Section 10(1) of the Constitution.
902
902
that decisions of Director of Lands on questions of facts shall be conclusive when approved by the
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources2 constitute a limitation of such power of control.
This view might have gained plausibility in the light of Ang-Angco vs. Castillo,3 where the
procedure set forth in the Civil Service Act in 1959 was held binding in so far as the President is
concerned in the case of disciplinary action taken against non-presidential appointees.
The argument that what the then Executive Secretary acting for the President did was justified by
the constitutional grant of control elicited no favorable response. The Court apparently was not
receptive to a more expansive view of such executive prerogative. This is not to say that what was
there decided was entirely lacking in justification. It is merely to suggest that it may contain
implications not in conformity with the broad grant of authority constitutionally conferred on the
President.
It is well-worth emphasizing-that the President unlike any other official in the Executive
Department is vested with both ‘‘constitutional and legal authority”4 as Justice Laurel noted. Care is
to be taken then lest by a too narrow interpretation what could reasonably be included in such
competence recognized by the Constitution be unduly restricted. If my reading of the opinion of
Justice Sanchez is correct, then there is a more hospitable scope accorded such power of control.
For me this is more in keeping with the fundamental law. Moreover there would be a greater
awareness on the part of all of the broad range of authority the President possesses by virtue of
such a provision.
Reference to the words of Justice Laurel, who was himself one of the leading framers of the
Constitution and thereafter, as a member of this Court, one of its most authoritative expounders in
the leading case of Villena vs.
_____________
2 Sec. 4, Commonwealth Act No. 941 (1936).
3 L-17169, November 30, 1963.
4 Planas v. Gil (1939), 69 Phil. 52, at p. 76.
903
903
165
Secretary of Interior,5 is not inappropriate. Their reverberating clang, to paraphrase Justice

Cardozo, should drown all weaker sounds. Thus: “After serious reflection, we have decided to
sustain the contention of the government in this case on the broad proposition, albeit not
suggested, that under the presidential type of government which we have adopted and considering
the departmental organization established and continued in force by paragraph 1, section 12,
Article VII, of our Constitution, all executive and administrative organizations are adjuncts of the
Executive Department, the heads of the various executive departments are assistants and agents of
the Chief Executive, and except in cases where the Chief Executive is required by the Constitution or
the law to act in person or the exigencies of the situation demand that he act personally, the
multifarious executive and administrative functions of the Chief Executive are performed by and
through the executive departments, and the acts of the secretaries of such departments, performed
and promulgated in the regular course of business, are, unless disapproved or reprobated by the
Chief Executive, presumptively the acts of the Chief Executive. (Runkle vs. United States [1887], 122
U.S., 543; 30 Law. ed., 1167; 7 Sup. St. Rep. 1141; see also U.S. vs. Eliason [1839] 16 Pet., 291; 10
Law. ed., 968; Jones vs. U.S. [1890], 137 U.S. 202; 34 Law. ed., 691; 11 Sup. Ct. Rep. 80; Wolsey vs.
Chapman [1880], 101 U.S. 775; 25 Law. ed. 915; Wilcox vs. Jackson [1836], 13 Pet. 498; 10 Law. ed.
264.)”
The opinion of Justice Laurel continues: “Fear is expressed by more than one member of this court
that the acceptance of the principle of qualified political agency in this and similar cases would
result in the assumption of responsibility by the President of the Philippines for acts of any member
of his cabinet, however illegal, irregular or improper may be these acts. The implications, it is said,
are serious. Fear, however, is no valid argument against the system once adopted, established and
operated. Fam-
_____________
5 67 Phil. 451 (1939). As far as presidential power of supervision over local governments is
concerned, its authority has been impaired by Hebron v. Reyes, 104 Phil. 175 (1958).
904
904
iliarity with the essential background of the type of government established under our Constitution,
in the light of certain well-known principles and practices that go with the system, should offer the
necessary explanation. With reference to the Executive Department of the government, there is one
purpose which is crystal clear and is readily visible without the projection of judicial searchlight,
and that is, the establishment of a single, not plural, Executive. The first section of Article VII of the
Constitution, dealing with the Executive Department, begin with the enunciation of the principle
that The executive power shall be vested in a President of the Philippines.’ This means that the
President of the Philippines is the Executive of the Government of the Philippines, and no other. The
heads of the executive departments occupy political positions and hold office in an advisory
166
capacity, and, in the language of Thomas Jefferson, ‘should be of the President’s bosom confidence’
(7 Writings, Ford ed., 498), and, in the language of Attorney-General Cushing, (7 Op.. Attorney-
General, 453), ‘are subject to the direction of the President/ Without minimizing the importance of
the heads of the various departments, their personality is in reality but the projection of that of the
President. Stated otherwise, and as forcibly characterized by Chief Justice Taft of the Supreme Court
of the United States, ‘each head of a department is, and must be the President’s alter ego in the
matters of that department where the President is required by law to exercise authority’ (Myers vs.
United States, 47 Sup. Ct. Rep. 21 at 30; 272 U.S. 52 at 133; 71 Law. ed., 160). Secretaries of
departments, of course, exercise certain powers under the law but the law cannot impair or in any
way affect the constitutional power of control and direction of the President. As a matter of
executive policy, they may be granted departmental autonomy as to certain matters but this is by
mere concession of the executive, in the absence of valid legislation in the particular field. If the
President, then, is the authority in the Executive Department, he assumes the corresponding
responsibility. The head of a department is a man of his confidence; he controls and directs his acts;
he appoints him and can remove him at pleasure; he is the executive, not any of his secre-
905
905
Phil. Association of Free Labor Unions vs. Tabigne
taries. It is therefore logical that he, the President, should be answerable for the acts of
administration of the entire Executive Department before his own conscience no less than before
that undefined power of public opinion which, in the language of Daniel Webster, is the last
repository of popular government. These are the necessary corollaries of the American presidential
type of government, and if there is any defect, it is attributable to the system itself. We cannot
modify the system unless we modify the Constitution, and we cannot modify the Constitution by
any subtle process of judicial interpretation or construction.” Lacson-Magallanes Co., Inc. vs. Paño,
21 SCRA 895, No. L-27811 November 17, 1967
12. Medalla vs. Sayo, G.R. No. L-54554, 30 March 1981, 103 SCRA 587
Administrative Law; Civil Service; Moot and Academic; The claim of lack of exhaustion of
administrative remedies is inapropos as the pleadings shown that there was such a prior
recourse.—Although Mackay’s Motions for Reconsideration were, in fact, still pending resolution by
Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, respectively, at the time private respondent
Mackay filed the Petition below, dismissal of said Petition can no longer be anchored on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla prays, considering that Manifestations
dated August 17 and 23, 1979 filed by the said parties before the Court a quo show that they had
resolved the incidents adversely against Mackay. That issue, therefore, has become moot and
academic.
Same; Same; Jurisdiction; Certiorari; A CFI may review by certiorari the decision of the Civil Service
Commissioner and the Presidential Executive Assistant.—In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below
to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of the Civil Service Commission and of the
Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should be no question but that the power of
judicial review should be upheld.
167
Same; Same; Supreme Court; Appeal; Instead of remanding the case to the CFI the Supreme Court
may resolve the issue on the merits where case involves public interest, such as contested position
of Caloocan City Hospital Administrator.—For the speedy determination of the controversy,
however, and considering that the position involved is infused with public interest, rather than
remand the case to the Court below for further proceedings, we hold that grave abuse of discretion
on the part of Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Merit Systems Board is absent.
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION
588
588
Medalla, Jr. vs. Sayo
Same; Same; Municipal Corporations; City Mayor’s power of appointment is subject to Civil Service
law and regulations.—To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No.
5502), it is clear that the power of appointment by the City mayor of heads of offices entirely paid
out of city funds is subject to Civil Service law, rules and regulations (ibid., section 19).
Same; Same; Same; Position of Chief of Clinic is next-in-rank to City Hospital Administrator.—But
while the qualifications of both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it
is clear that the position of Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to Hospital Administrator
under the organizational line-up of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackay’s appointment
as Assistant Hospital Administrator and subsequently Hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked
Mackay who was only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in-rank, Medalla is entitled to
appointment as Hospital Administrator.
Same; Same; Same; Same.—It is true that, as respondent City Mayor alleges, a local executive should
be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his
best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and
judgment. However, as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems
Board, upheld by the Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of
both petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a
careful study of the controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation of
Mackay’s appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.
PETITION for certiorari, mandamus and prohibition from the Decision of the Court of First Instance
of Rizal Br. XXXIII.
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:
168
In this Petition for “Certiorari, Mandamus and Prohibition”, seeking the dismissal of Civil Case No.
C-7770 below, we have, as factual background, the following:
589
VOL. 103, MARCH 30, 1981
589
Petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, Jr., is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City General Hospital,
Caloocan City. Private respondent, Dr. Honorato G. Mackay, was the Resident Physician thereat.
When the position of Assistant Hospital Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital
became vacant upon the resignation of the incumbent, former Caloocan City Mayor Alejandro A.
Fider designated and subsequently appointed, as Assistant Hospital Administrator, private
respondent Dr. Mackay, a Resident Physician in said hospital. Petitioner, Dr. Medalla, Jr., protested
Dr, Mackay’s designation and subsequent appointment alleging among others that, as Chief of
Clinics, he (Medalla) was next-in-rank. The then Acting City Mayor Virgilio P. Robles, who
succeeded former Mayor, no w Assemblyman Alejandro A. Fider, in his 4th Indorsement dated
September 20, 1978, sustained Mackay’s appointment stating:
“x x x as of April 18, 1978 when Dr. Honorato G. Mackay was promoted to Assistant Hospital
Administrator from his previous position of Resident Physician, he was next in rank to the said
higher position by reason of his having completed all academic requirements for the Certificate in
Hospital Administration x x x contrary to the claim of Dr. Eustaquio Medalla, Jr. in his letter of May
2, 1978.”
“x x x x x x x”
Dissatisfied, Medalla elevated his case to the Civil Service Commission on appeal. On December 29,
1978, the Civil Service Merit Systems Board issued Resolution No. 49 sustaining Medalla’s appeal
and revoking Mackay’s appointment as Assistant Hospital Administrator. The pertinent portion of
the aforestated Resolution reads:
“A perusal of the records shows that appellant Medalla is the Chief of Clinics of the Caloocan City
General Hospital; he is a holder of the Degree of Doctor of Medicine; he has completed the
requirements in Hospital Administration and is recommended for the title of Certificate in Hospital
Administration; he is also a candidate of a Masters degree in Hospital Administration He possesses
the First Grade eligibility (BA 1080) and had undergone relevant train-
590
590

169
ing in Hospital Administration. His performance rating is ‘Very Satisfactory’.
“On the other hand, appellee Mackay had been a Resident Physician, the position he held prior to
his promotion to the contested position. He is a holder of the degree of Doctor of Medicine and is a
First Grade eligible (BA 1080-Medical Board). He is a graduate student in Hospital Administration
and as completed all academic requirements for a certificate in Hospital Administration. His
performance rating is ‘Very Satisfactory’.
“A perusal of the organizational chart of the Ospital ng Caloocan approved by the Hospital
Administrator would show that the Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to the Assistant
Hospital Administrator. The Resident Physician is not a next lower position to the Assistant
Hospital Administrator. Therefore, Medalla and not Mackay is the person next in rank who may be
promoted to the position involved.
“Moreover, even on the basis of competence and qualifications to perform the duties of the position,
the records show that Dr. Medalla is more competent and qualified than Dr. Mackay. The
qualification relied upon by the Acting City Mayor in justifying the appointment of Dr. Mackay
which is his having completed the academic requirements for the Certificate in Hospital
Administration does not give Dr. Mackay the advantage inasmuch as Dr. Medalla has also completed
all the academic requirements for a certificate in Hospital Administration and is recommended for a
title of Certificate in Hospital Administration apart from being also a candidate for a Masters degree
in Hospital Administration.”1
“x x x x x”1
Upon automatic review by the Office of the President, pursuant to section 19(6), PD No. 807,
Presidential Executive Assistant Jacobo C. Clave rendered a Decision on April 24, 1979 declaring
that:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, and as recommended by Civil Service Commission, the

appointment of Dr. Honorato G. Mackay as Assistant Hospital Administrator in the Caloocan City
General Hospital is hereby revoked and the position awarded in favor of appellant Dr. Eustaquio M.
Medalla.”2
_______________
1 pp. 12-13, Rollo.
2 Annex “C”, p. 16, ibid.
591
VOL. 103, MARCH 30, 1981
591
The Acting City Mayor, on behalf o f Mackay, mo ved for reconsideration.

170
On May 7, 1979, totally disregarding the Decision of the Office of the President, the same Acting City
Mayor appointed Mackay, this time as Hospital Administrator, and designated Dr. Tantoco as his
Assistant, thereby again completely bypassing Medalla. Mackay took his oath of office on May 7,
1979.
On June 27, 1979, however, the Civil Service Commission, acting on Medalla’s protest, and besides
calling attention lo the penal provision of P.D. No. 807, disapproved Mackay’s appointment as follo
ws:
“Wherefore, premises considered and finding the protest of Dr. Medalla in order, the appointment
of Dr. Mackay as Hospital Administrator at P26,388 per annum effective May 7, 1979 is hereby
disapproved, it is hereby ordered that Dr. Medalla be appointed to the position of Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City Coneral Hospital.”3
On July 20, 1979, Mackay moved for reconsideration asserting 1) denial of due process of law
inasmuch as the contested Resolution/Decisions were issued ex-parte, and 2) that, the Civil Service
Commission can not ignore nor overrule an appointment made by a City Executive.
Without awaiting the resolution of his Motion for Keennsideration, Mackay filed, on July 23, 1979,
before the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Caloocan City, presided by respondent Judge, a Petition
for “Certiorari, Prohibition and Mandamus with Preliminary Injunction and Damages” (Civil Case
No. C7770) against Hon. Jacobo Clave, the Civil Service Commission, the Acting City Mayor, the City
Treasurer, and Medalla. praying that said respondents be restrained from implementing the
Decision of Hon. Jacobo Clave of April 24, 1979), the Resolution No. 49 of the Merit Systems Hoard
dated December 29, 1978, and the Decision of the Civil Service Commission of June 27, 1979. The
Court a quo issued the Restrain-
_______________
3 p. 20, ibid.
592
592
ing Order prayed for on July 25, 1979 enjoining implementation of the aforestated
Resolution/Decisions.
On August 2, 1979, Medalla moved to dissolve the Restraining Order and to dismiss the Petition
alleging mainly that Mackay had not exhausted his administrative remedies and that the latter’s
right to a Writ of Preliminary Injunction was not only dubious or debatable but was clearly non-
existent. Hon. Jacobo Clave and the Civil Service Commission likewise filed a Motion to Dismiss on
the same ground of failure to exhaust administrative remedies.
171
On August 13, 1979, Mackay moved to suspend proceedings pending final resolution by the Civil
Service Commission of his Motion for the reconsideration of the Decision of said Commission dated
June 27, 1979.
On September 24, 1979, the Trial Court denied both Motions to Dismiss filed by Medalla, on the one
hand, and Hon. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, on the other, holding that Mackay’s failure
to await resolution of his Motions for Reconsideration pending before the Office of the President
and the Civil Service Commission did not deprive him of a cause of action besides the fact that
according to the respective Manifestations of the said Offices, the Motions for Reconsideration had
already been resolved adversely against Mackay.
Acting on Medalla’s Motion for Reconsideration thereof as well as his Motion to Lift Restraining
Order, the Court a quo, in its Order of July 15, 1980, denied reconsideration but lifted the
Restraining Order “there being no showing that petitioner is entitled to the issuance of a Writ of
Preliminary Injunction.” Respondent Judge then set the case for hearing.
At this juncture, Medalla instituted this Petition before us praying that the Court a quo be restrained
from proceeding with the hearing and that judgment be rendered as follows:
“1. Ordering the Honorable Marcelino N. Sayo Judge of the Court of First Instance of Rizal, Branch
XXXIII, Caloocan City, to dismiss respondent Mackay’s petitions, on the ground of lack of jurisdiction
and/or non-exhaustion of administrative remedies resulting to a lack of cause of action;
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VOL. 103, MARCH 30, 1981
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2. Declaring the decision of the Office of the President (Annex ‘C’) and the Merit Systems Board
(Annex ‘E’) as valid and enforceable.”4
We issued a Restraining Order on August 27, 1980 enjoining respondents from proceeding with the
case below.
On November 7, 1980, we required petitioner Medalla to implead the Mayor of Caloocan City as
party-respondent, and the latter to comment on the Petition and to state whether he is ready to
issue an appointment to Medalla as Hospital Administrator, Medalla’s rights thereto having been
upheld by the Civil Service Merit Systems Board and by the Office of the President.
In his Compliance, Medalla included an additional prayer that the City Mayor of Caloocan be
ordered to immediately appoint him as Hospital Administrator and to pay him salary differentials.
In his Comment, the City Mayor of Caloocan invoked the privilege of an appointing authority to
determine who can best fulfill the functions of an office citing the case of Aguilar vs. Nieva, Jr.5 to
that effect. And as to the matter of his readiness to issue an appointment to Medalla, he manifested
his preference to withhold action pending Mackay’s unresolved Motion for Reconsideration of the
Decision of June 27, 1979 of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board.
172
Petitioner Medalla submits that the Trial Court erred in not dismissing Mackay’s Petition before it,
there being a clear showing of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, and that said Court was
devoid of jurisdiction in reviewing on Certiorari decisions of the Office of the President and of the
Civil service Commission rendered in the exercise of their quasijudicial functions.
Private respondent Mackay takes the contrary view and prays, instead, that the contested
Decisions/Resolution be declared null and void and respondent Judge ordered to proceed with the
hearing of the case below.
_______________
4 p. 9, ibid.
5 40 SCRA 113.
594
594
Although Mackay’s Motions for Reconsideration were, in fact, still pending resolution by Hon.
Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil Service Commission, respectively, at the time private respondent
Mackay filed the Petition below, dismissal of said Petition can no longer be anchored on the ground
of non-exhaustion of administrative remedies, as Medalla prays, considering that Manifestations
dated August 17 and 23, 1979 filed by the said parties before the Court a quo show that they had
resolved the incidents adversely against Mackay.6 That issue, therefore, has become moot and
academic.
In so far as jurisdiction of the Court below to review by Certiorari decisions and/or resolutions of
the Civil Service Commission and of the Presidential Executive Assistant is concerned, there should
be no question but that the power of judicial review should be upheld. The following rulings
buttress this conclusion:
“The objection to a judicial review of a Presidential act arises from a failure to recognize the most
important principle in our system of government, i.e., the separation of powers into three coequal
departments, the executive, the legislative and the judicial, each supreme within its own assigned
powers and duties. When a presidential act is challenged before the courts of just ice, it is not to be
implied therefrom that the Executive is being made subject and subordinate to the courts. The
legality of his acts are under judicial review, not because the Executive is inferior to the courts, but
because the law is above the Chief Executive himself, and the courts seek only to interpret, apply or
implement it (the law). A judicial review of the Presidents decision on a case of an employee
decided by the Civil Service Board of Appeals should be viewed in this light and the bringing of the
case to the Courts should be governed by the same principles as govern the judicial review of all
administrative acts of all administrative officers.’’7
——o0o——
173
_______________
6 see Order, September 24, 1979, p. 41, Rollo.
7 Montes vs. Civil Service Board of Appeals, et al., 101 Phil. 490, 492-493 (1957).
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595
“The courts may always examine into the exercise of power by a ministerial officer to the extent of
determining whether the particular power has been granted to the officer, whether it is a legal
power that could have been granted to him, and whether it has been exercised in a legal manner.
This jurisdiction does not depend upon an act of the legislature authorizing it, but inheres in the
courts of general jurisdiction as an essential function of the judicial department. (State Racing
Commission v. Latonia Agri. Asso. 123 SW 681).”8 (emphasis supplied).
For the speedy determination of the controversy, however, and considering that the position
involved is infused with public interest, rather than remand the case to the Court below for further
proceedings, we hold that grave abuse of discretion on the part of Hon. Jacobo C. Clave and the Civil
Service Merit Systems Board is absent.
To start with, under the Revised Charter of the City of Caloocan (RA No. 5502), it is clear that the
power of appointment by the City Mayor of heads of offices entirely paid out of city funds is subject
to Civil Service law, rules and regulations (ibid., section 19). The Caloocan City General Hospital is
one of the city departments provided for in the said law (ibid., sec. 17). The Hospital Administrator
is appointed by the City Mayor (ibid., section 66-B). The Hospital Administrator is the head of the
City General Hospital empowered to administer, direct, and coordinate all activities of the hospital
to carry out its objectives as to the care of the sick and the injured (ibid.).
Under section 19 (3) of the Civil Service Decree (PD No. 807, effective on October 6, 1975), the
recruitment or selection of employees for promotions is drawn from the next-in-rank.
“SEC. 19. Recruitment and Selection of Employees.—
xxx
(3) When a vacancy occurs in a position in the second level of the Career Service as defined in
Section 7. the employees in the government service who occupy the next lower positions in the
occupational group under which the vacant position is classified and in other functionally related
occupational groups and who are compe-
_______________
8 2 Am. Jur. 2d, Administrative Law § 566 p. 379.

174
596
596
tent, qualified and with the appropriate civil service eligibility shall be considered for promotion.”
Section 19 (6) of the same Decree provides for the administrative procedure by an aggrieved
employee in case of non-observance by the appointing authority of the next-in-rank rule, thus:
“Sec. 19(6) A qualified next-in-rank employee shall have the right to appeal initially to the
department head and finally to the Office of the President an appointment made x x x x (2) in favor
of one who is not next-in-rank, x x x x if the employee making the appeal is not satisfied with the
written special reason or reasons given by the appointing authority for such appointment: x x x x x
x. Before deciding a contested appointment, the Office of the President shall consult the Civil Service
Commission. For purposes of this Section, ‘qualified next-in-rank’ refers to an employee appointed
on a permanent basis to a position previously determined to be next-in-rank to the vacancy
proposed to be filled and who meets the requisites for appointment thereto as previously
determined by the appointing authority and approved by the Commission.”
The prescribed procedure has been followed by petitioner Medalla. He had appealed to the
department head and from thence, in view of the latter’s unfavorable action, to the Civil Service
Commission and thereafter to the Office of the President. Resolution No. 49 of the Civil Service
Merit Systems Board, its Decision of June 27, 1979, and the Decision of the Presidential Executive
Assistant dated April 24, 1979, were all rendered in Medalla’s favor. The special reason given by the
Acting City Mayor for Mackay’s appointment, which is, that he had completed all academic
requirements for the Certificate of Hospital Administration, is not tenable, since Medalla himself
was found to be in possession of the same qualification. But while the qualifications of both
petitioner Medalla and private respondent Mackay are at par, yet, it is clear that the position of
Chief of Clinics is the next lower position to Hospital Administrator under the organizational line-up
of the hospital. Consequently, at the time of Mackays appointment as Assistant Hospital
Administrator and subsequently Hospital Administrator, Medalla outranked Mackay who was
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597
only a Resident Physician and, therefore, as the next-in-rank, Medalla is entitled to appointment as
Hospital Administrator.
175
Respondent Mackay’s urging that he was denied due process deserves scant consideration
considering that subsequent developments in the case establish that he was heard on his Motions
for Reconsideration by both the Civil Service Commission and the Office of the President.
It is true that, as respondent City Mayor alleges, a local ex-ecutive should be allowed the choice of
men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and eligible, who in his best estimation are
possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity, knowledgeability, energy and judgment.9 However,
as reproduced heretofore, the Decision of the Civil Service Merit Systems Board, upheld by the
Office of the President, contains a judicious assessment of the qualifications of both petitioner
Medalla and private respondent Mackay for the contested position, revealing a careful study of the
controversy between the parties, which cannot be ignored. The revocation of Mackay’s
appointment reveals no arbitrariness nor grave abuse of discretion.
WHEREFORE, 1) the appointment extended to private respondent, Dr. Honorato C. Mackay, as

Hospital Administrator is hereby declared null and void; 2) respondent City Mayor of Caloocan City
is hereby ordered to extend an appointment to petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, as Hospital
Administrator of the Caloocan City General Hospital immediately upon notice of this Decision; 3)
petitioner, Dr. Eustaquio M. Medalla, shall receive all compensation and emoluments appertaining
to said position thenceforth, but without entitlement to salary differentials; and 4) respondent
Judge is hereby permanently enjoined from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 7770.
This Decision is immediately executory. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee (Chairman), Makasiar, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.
_______________
9 Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 381 (1971).
598
598
Petition granted.
Notes.—Laches does not attack by failure of the respondent to join other employees in filing an
action for quo warranto within one year from the time his cause of action to seek reinstatement
accrues where said respondent can reasonably be expected to rely on the outcome of the case filed
by his co-employees. (Cristobal vs. Melchor, 78 SCRA 175).
Where no element of bad faith was shown in the abolition of an office, the court will not compel
reinstatement of affected national officer. (Baldoz vs. Office of the President, 78 SCRA 354).
176
Lack of civil service eligibility of an appointee to an unclassified position, like a watchman does not
remove him from the protection of the Civil Service Law. (Balquidra vs. Court of First Instance, 80
SCRA 123).
Dismissal of an employee “for convenience” of the provincial government constitutes a liability of

the province not the personal liability of the province, in the absence of evidence to the contrary.
(Balquidra vs. Court of First Instance, 80 SCRA 123).
The security of tenure of appointive public officers in the civil service depends mainly on the nature
of their appointment, whether permanent, provisional or temporary. (Ata vs. Namocatcat, 47 SCRA
314).
The one next-in-rank, while he should be amo ng the first to be considered for the vacancy, if
qualified and eligible cannot claim any preferential right to appointment to the vacancy over others
equally certified to be qualified and eligible for appointment by transfer. (Oliveros-Torre vs. Bayot,
58 SCRA 272).
In order for public administration to be dynamic and responsive to the needs of the times, the local
executives should be allowed the choice of men of his confidence, provided they are qualified and
eligible, who in his best estimation are possessed of the requisite reputation, integrity,
knowledgeability, energy and judgment. (Claudio vs. Subido, 40 SCRA 481).
Unless Republic Act No. 5185 then speaks in no uncertain terms, the Commissioner of Civil Service,
a national official,
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VOL. 103, MARCH 31, 1981
599
Bondoc vs. People’s Bank and Trust Company
certainly cannot be held to be vested with the power to ignore, much less overrule, a decision
reached by City or provincial dignitary in whom the competence to appoint resides. (Claudio vs.
Subido, 40 SCRA 481).
Medalla, Jr. vs. Sayo, 103 SCRA 587, No. L-54554 March 30, 1981
13. Lianga Bay Logging Co. vs. Enage, G.R. No. L-30637, 6 July 1987, 152 SCRA 80
Bureau of Forestry; Jurisdiction; Bureau of Forestry has jurisdiction and authority over the
demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestration, occupancy and use of all public
forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish and for the taking of
forest products including stone and earth therefrom.—Respondent Judge erred in taking
cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for the determination anew of the
correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue had already been determined
by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Office of the
President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the matter properly belongs. Section
1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of Forestry, the jurisdiction and
177
authority over the demarcation, protection, management, reproduction, reforestation, occupancy,

and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over the granting of licenses for game and fish,
and for the taking of forest products, including stone and earth there from. The Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may repeal or modify the decision of the
Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests, whose decision is in turn appealable to
the Office of the President.
Same; Same; Decisions of Administrative Officers shall not be disturbed by the Courts except when
the former acted without or in excess of jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion.—In giving
due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess and
evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings, which is beyond its
competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence
already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment
for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of
the authority specifically vested in them by law.
________________
* FIRST DIVISION.
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Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage
Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will
generally not interfere with purely administrative matters which are addressed to the sound
discretion of government agencies and their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter
acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and
whimsical manner such that their action may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction. A doctrine
long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to determine
particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such office shall
prevail over the courts. The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this
jurisdiction, is that decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except
when the former have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of
discretion. Findings of administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because
their jurisdiction is confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times
even finality of such findings are supported by substantial evidence. As recently stressed by the
Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative boards or
commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and determine
promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial review in
case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable."
Judgment; Decision not considered binding on the parties until promulgation; Judgment becomes
valid and binding only when filed with the Clerk of Court.—lt is elementary that a draft of a decision
178
does not operate as judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for
filing and promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its
promulgation. Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of
Appeals, (where herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be
presumed that the judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the
court may still modify said order as the same is being put into writing And even if the order or
judgment has already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the
clerk for filing, it is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment
signed by the judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding
judgment. Prior thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore,
constitute the real judgment of the court."
82
82
Same; Same; Beliefs, suspicions and conjectives cannot overcome presumption of regularity and
legality of official actions.—The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the
nonrelease of the Leido "decision" allegedly denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and
the substitution thereof by the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial
review. Beliefs, suspicions and conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and
legality of official actions. It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties
regularly. It should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case
history in the Office of the President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated
August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2, 1968 and signed by Assistant Executive
Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision dated June 16,
-1966 and signed by himself).
Injunction; Courts of First Instance have power to issue writ limited to and operative only within
their respective provinces or districts.—Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued.
The provisions of law explicitly provide that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue
writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari, prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their
respective places, if the petition filed relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, within their jurisdiction. The jurisdiction or authority of the
Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of the writ of injunction is limited only
to acts which are being committed within the territorial boundaries of their respective provinces or
districts except where the sole issue is the legality of the decision of the administrative officials. In
the leading case of Palanan Lumber Plywood Co., Inc. v. Arranz, which involved a petition for
certriorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the same
respondent public officials as here and where the administrative proceedings taken were similar to
the case at bar, the Court laid down the rule that: "We agree with the petitioner that the respondent
Court acted without jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the petitioners
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry,
who have their official residences in Manila and Quezon City, outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela. Both the statutory provisions and the settled
jurisdiction of this Court unanimously affirm that the extraordinary
179
83
VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987
83
writs issued by the Court of First Instance are limited to and operative only within their respective
provinces and districts." A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to
a determination of a question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials
was legally correct or not. We thus declared in Director of Forestry v. Ruiz: "In Palanan Lumber &
Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-jurisdiction of courts of first instance to
issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside of their premises or districts. We went further
and said that when the petition filed with the courts of first instance not only questions the legal
correctness of the decision of administrative officials but also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of
the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ of injunction when the officials sought to
be restrained from enforcing the decision are not stationed within its territory. "To recapitulate,
insofar as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still stands that courts of first
instance have the power to issue writs limited to and operative only within their respective
provinces or districts."
PETITION for certiorari and prohibition to review the order of the Court of First Instance of Agusan,
Br. II. Lopez Enage, J.
TEEHANKEE, C.J.:
The Court grants the petition for certiorari and prohibition and holds that respondent judge, absent
any showing of grave abuse of discretion, has no competence nor authority to review anew the
decision in administrative proceedings of respondents public officials (director of forestry,
secretary of agriculture and natural resources and assistant executive secretaries of the Office of
the President) in determining the correct boundary line of the licensed timber areas of the
contending parties. The Court reaffirms the established principle that findings of fact by an
administrative board or agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and will
not be disturbed except where the board, agency and/or official(s) have gone beyond their
statutory authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without
regard to their duty or with grave abuse of discretion.
84
84

180
The parties herein are both forest concessionaries whose licensed areas are adjacent to each other.
The concession of petitioner Lianga Bay Logging Corporation Co., Inc. (hereinafter referred to as
petitioner Lianga) as described in its Timber License Agreement No. 49, is located in the
municipalities of Tago, Cagwait, Marihatag and Lianga, all in the Province of Surigao, consisting of
110,406 hectares, more or less, while that of respondent Ago Timber Corporation (hereinafter
referred to as respondent Ago) granted under Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-60 [New] is
located at Los Arcos and San Salvador, Province of Agusan, with an approximate area of 4,000
hectares. It was a part of a forest area of 9,000 hectares originally licensed to one Narciso Lansang
under Ordinary Timber License No. 584-'52.
Since the concessions of petitioner and respondent are adjacent to each other, they have a common
boundary—the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary—whereby the eastern boundary of
respondent Ago's concession is petitioner Lianga's western boundary. The western boundary of
petitioner Lianga is described as "x x x Corner 5, a point in the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao
Provincial boundary and Los Arcos-Lianga Road; thence following Agusan-Surigao Provincial
boundary in a general northerly and northwesterly and northerly directions about 39,500 meters
to Corner 6, a point at the intersection of the Agusan-Surigao Provincial boundary and Nalagdao
Creek x x x." The eastern boundary of respondent Ago's concession is described as "x x x point 4,
along the Agusan-Surigao boundary; thence following AgusanSurigao boundary in a general
southeasterly and southerly directions about 12,000 meters to point 5, a point along Los Arcos-
Lianga Road; x x x."1
Because of reports of encroachment by both parties on each other's concession areas, the Director
of Forestry ordered a survey to establish on the ground the common boundary of their respective
concession areas. Forester Cipriano Melchor undertook the survey and fixed the common boundary
as "Corner 5 of Lianga Bay Logging Company at Km. 10.2 in-
__________________
1 Decision of the Director of Forestry, dated March 20 1961 p 108, Rollo.
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VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987
85
stead of Km. 9.7 on the Lianga-Arcos Road and lines N90°E, 21,000 meters; N12°W, 21,150 meters;
N40°W, 3,000 meters; N31°W, 2,800 meters; N50°W, 1,700 meters" which respondent Ago
protested claiming that "its eastern boundary should be the provincial boundary line of Agusan-
Surigao as described in Section 1 of Art. 1693 of the Philippine Commission as indicated in the
green pencil in the attached sketch" of the areas as prepared by the Bureau of Forestry.2 The
Director of Forestry, after considering the evidence, found:
"That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation portrays a line (green line) far different in alignment
with the line (red) as indicated in the original License Control Map of this Office;
181
"That the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation (green line) does not conform to the distance of
6,800 meters from point 3 to point 4 of the original description of the area of Narciso Lansang but
would project said line to a distance of approximately 13,800 meters;
"That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would increase the area of Narciso Lansang
from 9,000 to 12,360 hectares;
"That to follow the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation would reduce the area of the Lianga Bay
Logging, Co., Inc. to 107,046 hectares instead of the area granted which is 110,406 hectares."
and ruled that "the claim of the Ago Timber Corporation runs counter to the intentions of this Office
is granting the license of Mr. Narciso Lansang; and further, that it also runs counter to the
intentions of this Office in granting the Timber License Agreement to the Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc. The intentions of this Office in granting the two licenses (Lansang and Lianga Bay Logging Co.,
Inc.) are patently manifest in that distances and bearings are the controlling factors. If mention was
ever made of the Agusan-Surigao boundary, as the common boundary line of both licensees, this
Office could not have meant the Agusan-Surigao boundary as described under Section 1 of Act 1693
of the Philippine Commission for were it so it could have been so easy for this Office to mention the
distance from point 3 to point 4 of Narciso Lansang as approximately 13,800 meters. This cannot be
considered a mistake considering that
_________________
2 P. 109, Rollo.
86
86
the percentage of error which is more or less 103% is too high an error to be committed by an
Office manned by competent technical men. The Agusan-Surigao boundary as mentioned in the
technical descriptions of both licensees, is, therefore, patently an imaginary line based on B.F.
License Control Map. Such being the case, it is reiterated that distance and bearings control the
description where an imaginary line exists.3 The decision fixed the common boundary of the
licensed areas of the Ago Timber Corporation and Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. as that indicated in
red pencil of the sketch attached to the decision.
In an appeal interposed by respondent Ago, docketed in the Department of Agriculture and Natural
Resources as DANR Case No. 2268, the then Acting Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources
Jose Y. Feliciano, in a decision dated August 9, 1965 set aside the appealed decision of the Director
of Forestry and ruled that "(T)he common boundary line of the licensed areas of the Ago Timber
Corporation and the Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc., should be that indicated by the green line on the
same sketch which had been made an integral part of the appealed decision."4
Petitioner elevated the case to the Office of the President, where in a decision dated June 16,1966,
signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr., the ruling of the then Secretary of
182
Agriculture and Natural Resources was affirmed.5 On motion for reconsideration, the Office of the
President issued another decision dated August 9, 1968 signed by then Assistant Executive
Secretary Gilberto Duavit reversing and overturning the decision of the then Acting Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources and affirming in toto and reinstating the decision, dated March
20, 1961, of the Director of Forestry.6
Respondent Ago filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision dated August 9, 1968 of the
Office of the President but after written opposition of petitioner Lianga, the same was
_________________
3 P. 109, Rollo, emphasis supplied.
4 P. 148, Rollo.
5 Pp. 149-154, Rollo.
6 Pp. 157-167, Rollo.
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VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987
87
denied in an order dated October 2,1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido,
Jr.7
On October 21, 1968, a new action was commenced by Ago Timber Corporation, as plaintiff, in the
Court of First Instance of Agusan, Branch II, docketed thereat as Civil Case No. 1253, against Lianga
Bay Logging Co., Inc., Assistant Executive Secretaries Jose J. Leido, Jr. and Gilberto M. Duavit and
Director of Forestry, as defendants, for "Determination of Correct Boundary Line of License Timber
Areas and Damages with Preliminary Injunction" reiterating once more the same question raised
and passed upon in DANR Case No. 2268 and insisting that "a judicial review of such divergent
administrative decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line of the
licensed areas in question."8
As prayed for, respondent judge issued a temporary restraining order on October 28, 1968, on a
bond of P20,000, enjoining the defendants from carrying out the decision of the Office of the
President. The corresponding writ was issued the next day, or on October 29,1968.9
On November 10,1968, defendant Lianga (herein petitioner) moved for dismissal of the complaint
and for dissolution of the temporary restraining order on grounds that the complaint states no
cause of action and that the court has no jurisdiction over the person of respondent public officials
and respondent corporation. It also submitted its opposition to plaintiff's (herein respondent
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary injunction.10 A supplemental motion was filed on
December 6, 1968.11
183
On December 19,1968, the lower court issued an order denying petitioner Lianga's motion to
dismiss and granting the writ of preliminary injunction prayed for by respondent Ago.12 Lianga's
Motion for Reconsideration of the Order was denied
_________________
7 P. 168, Rollo.
8 Pp. 124-138, Rollo.
9 Pp. 171-177, Rollo.
10 Pp. 178-212, Rollo.
11 Pp. 238-256.
12 Pp. 332-339, Rollo.
88
88
on May 9, 1969.13 Hence, this petition praying of the Court (a) to declare that the Director of
Forestry has the exclusive jurisdiction to determine the common boundary of the licensed areas of
petitioners and respondents and that the decision of the Office of the President dated August 9,
1968 is final and executory; (b) to order the dismissal of Civil Case No. 1253 in the Court of First
Instance of Agusan; (c) to declare that respondent Judge acted without jurisdiction or in excess of
jurisdiction and with grave abuse of discretion, amounting to lack of jurisdiction, in issuing the
temporary restraining order dated October 28, 1968 and granting the preliminary injunction per its
Order dated December 19, 1968; and (d) to annul the aforementioned orders.
After respondent's comments on the petition and petitioner's reply thereto, this Court on June 30,
1969 issued a restraining order enjoining in turn the enforcement of the preliminary injunction and
related orders issued by the respondent court in Civil Case No. 1253.14
The Court finds merit in the petition.
Respondent Judge erred in taking cognizance of the complaint filed by respondent Ago, asking for
the determination anew of the correct boundary line of its licensed timber area, for the same issue
had already been determined by the Director of Forestry, the Secretary of Agriculture and Natural
Resources and the Office of the President, administrative officials under whose jurisdictions the
matter properly belongs. Section 1816 of the Revised Administrative Code vests in the Bureau of
Forestry, the jurisdiction and authority over the demarcation, protection, management,
reproduction, reforestation, occupancy, and use of all public forests and forest reserves and over
the granting of licenses for game and fish, and for the taking of forest products, including stone and
earth therefrom. The Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, as department head, may
184
repeal or modify the decision of the Director of Forestry when advisable in the public interests,15
whose decision is in turn appealable to the Office of
________________
13 P. 381, Rollo.
14 P. 382, Rollo.
15 Sec. 79(c), Rev. Adm. Code.
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VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987
89
the President.16
In giving due course to the complaint below, the respondent court would necessarily have to assess
and evaluate anew all the evidence presented in the administrative proceedings,17 which is beyond
its competence and jurisdiction. For the respondent court to consider and weigh again the evidence
already presented and passed upon by said officials would be to allow it to substitute its judgment
for that of said officials who are in a better position to consider and weigh the same in the light of
the authority specifically vested in them by law. Such a posture cannot be entertained, for it is a
well-settled doctrine that the courts of justice will generally not interfere with purely
administrative matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies and
their expertise unless there is a clear showing that the latter acted arbitrarily or with grave abuse of
discretion or when they have acted in a capricious and whimsical manner such that their action
may amount to an excess or lack of jurisdiction.18
A doctrine long recognized is that where the law confines in an administrative office the power to
determine particular questions or matters, upon the facts to be presented, the jurisdiction of such
office shall prevail over the courts.19
The general rule, under the principles of administrative law in force in this jurisdiction, is that
decisions of administrative officers shall not be disturbed by the courts, except when the former
have acted without or in excess of their jurisdiction, or with grave abuse of discretion. Findings of
administrative officials and agencies who have acquired expertise because their jurisdiction is
confined to specific matters are generally accorded not only respect but at times even finality of
such findings are supported by substantial evidence.20 As recently
________________
16 Executive Order No. 19, dated April 2,1966.
17 Ganitano v. Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 16 SCRA 534.

185
18 Ibid.
19 R.B. Industrial Development Co. Ltd. vs. Enage, 24 SCRA 365.
20 Comm. of Customs v. Valencia, 100 Phil. 165. See also Special Events and Central Shipping Office
Workers Union v. San Miguel
90
90
stressed by the Court, "in this era of clogged court dockets, the need for specialized administrative
boards or commissions with the special knowledge, experience and capability to hear and
determine promptly disputes on technical matters or essentially factual matters, subject to judicial
review in case of grave abuse of discretion, has become well nigh indispensable."21
The facts and circumstances in the instant case are similar to the earlier case of Pajo, et al. v. Ago, et
al.22 (where therein respondent Pastor Ago is the president of herein respondent Ago Timber
Corporation). In the said case, therein respondent Pastor Ago, after an adverse decision of the
Director of Forestry, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and Executive Secretary in
connection with his application for renewal of his expired timber licenses, filed with the Court of
First instance of Agusan a petition for certiorari, prohibition and damages with preliminary
injunction alleging that the rejection of his application for renewal by the Director of Forestry and
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and its affirmance by the Executive Secretary
constituted an abuse of discretion and was therefore illegal. The Court held that "there can be no
question that petitioner Director of Forestry has jurisdiction over the grant or renewal of
respondent Ago's timber license (Sec. 1816, Rev. Adm. Code); that petitioner Secretary of
Agriculture and Natural Resources as department head, is empowered by law to affirm, modify or
reject said grant or renewal of respondent Ago's timber license by petitioner Director of Forestry
(Sec. 79[c], Rev. Adm. Code); and that petitioner Executive Secretary, acting for and in behalf and by
authority of the President has, likewise, jurisdiction to affirm, modify or reverse the orders
regarding the grant or renewal of said timber license by the two aforementioned of-
________________
Corporation, 122 SCRA 557 citing International Hardwood and Veneer Co., of the Philippines v. Hon.
Vicente Leogardo, et al., 117 SCRA 967; Genconsu Free Workers Union vs. Inciong, 91 SCRA 311; Dy
Keh Beng v. International Labor and Marine Union of the Phil., 90 SCRA 162.
21 Abejo vs. De la Cruz, G.R. No. 63558, May 19, 1987.
22 108 Phil. 905 (1960).
91
VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987

186
91
ficials." The Court went on to say that, "(I)n the case of Espinosa, et al. v. Makalintal, et al. (79 Phil.
134; 45 Off. Gaz. 712), we held that the powers granted to the Secretary of Agriculture and
Commerce (Natural Resources) by law regarding the disposition of public lands such as granting of
licenses, permits, leases, and contracts or approving, rejecting, reinstating, or cancelling
applications or deciding conflicting applications, are all executive and administrative in nature. It is
a well-recognized principle that purely administrative and discretionary functions may not be
interfered with by the courts. In general, courts have no supervising power over the proceedings
and actions of the administrative departments of the government. This is generally true with
respect to acts involving the exercise of judgment or discretion, and findings of act. Findings of fact
by an administrative board, agency or official, following a hearing, are binding upon the courts and
will not be disturbed except where the board, agency or official has gone beyond his statutory
authority, exercised unconstitutional powers or clearly acted arbitrarily and without regard to his
duty or with grave abuse of discretion. And we have repeatedly held that there is grave abuse of
discretion justifying the issuance of the writ of certiorari only when there is capricious and
whimsical exercise of judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. (Abad Santos v. Province of
Tarlac, 67 Phil. 480; Tan vs. People, 88 Phil. 609)"
Respondent Ago contends that the motion filed by petitioner Lianga for reconsideration of the
decision of the Office of the President was denied in an alleged "decision" dated August 15, 1966,
allegedly signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Jose J. Leido, Jr. that, "however, for some
mysterious, unknown if not anomalous reasons and/or illegal considerations, the 'decision'
allegedly dated August 15, 1966 (Annex "D") was never released" and instead a decision was
released on August 9, 1968, signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit, which
reversed the findings and conclusions of the Office of the President in its first decision dated June
16,1966 and signed by then Assistant Executive Secretary Leido.
It is elementary that a draft of a decision does not operate as
92
92
SUPREME COURT REPORT ANNOTATED
judgment on a case until the same is duly signed and delivered to the clerk for filing and
promulgation. A decision cannot be considered as binding on the parties until its promuigation.23
Respondent should be aware of this rule. In still another case of Ago v. Court of Appeals,24 (where
herein respondent Ago was the petitioner) the Court held that, "While it is to be presumed that the
judgment that was dictated in open court will be the judgment of the court, the court may still
modify said order as the same is being put into writing. And even if the order or judgment has
already been put into writing and signed, while it has not yet been delivered to the clerk for filing, it
is still subject to amendment or change by the judge. It is only when the judgment signed by the
judge is actually filed with the clerk of court that it becomes a valid and binding judgment. Prior
187
thereto, it could still be subject to amendment and change and may not, therefore, constitute the
real judgment of the court.''
Respondent alleges "that in view of the hopelessly conflicting decisions of the administrative bodies
and/or offices of the Philippine government, and the important questions of law and fact involved
therein, as well as the well-grounded fear and suspicion that some anomalous, illicit and unlawful
considerations had intervened in the concealment of the decision of August 15, 1966 (Annex "D") of
Assistant Executive Secretary Gilberto M. Duavit, a judicial review of such divergent administrative
decisions is necessary in order to determine the correct boundary line of the licensed areas in
question and restore the faith and confidence of the people in the actuations of our public officials
and in our system of administration of justice."
The mere suspicion of respondent that there were anomalies in the non-release of the Leido
"decision" allegedly denying petitioner's motion for reconsideration and the substitution thereof by
the Duavit decision granting reconsideration does not justify judicial review. Beliefs, suspicions and
conjectures cannot overcome the presumption of regularity and legality of
________________
23 Vda. de Potenciano v. Gruenberg, 4 SCRA 127.
24 6 SCRA 530 (1962); see also People v. Soria, 22 SCRA 948; Comia v. Nicolas, 29 SCRA 492.
93
VOL. 152, JULY 16, 1987
93
official actions.25 It is presumed that an official of a department performs his official duties
regularly.26 It should be noted, furthermore, that as hereinabove stated with regard to the case
history in the Office of the President, Ago's motion for reconsideration of the Duavit decision dated
August 9, 1968 was denied in the Order dated October 2,1968 and signed by Assistant Executive
Secretary Leido himself (who thereby joined in the reversal of his own first decision dated June 16,
1966 and signed by himself).
The Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-'60[New] which approved the transfer to respondent Ago of
the 4,000 hectares from the forest area originally licensed to Narciso Lansang, stipulates certain
conditions, terms and limitations, among which were: that the decision of the Director of Forestry
as to the exact location of its licensed areas is final; that the license is subject to whatever decision
that may be rendered on the boundary conflict between the Lianga Bay Logging Co. and the Ago
Timber Corporation; that the terms and conditions of the license are subject to change at the
discretion of the Director of Forestry and the license may be made to expire at an earlier date.
Under Section 1834 of the Revised Administrative Code, the Director of Forestry, upon granting any
license, may prescribe and insert therein such terms, conditions, and limitations, not inconsistent
with law, as may be deemed by him to be in the public interest. The license operates as a contract
between the government and respondent. Respondent, therefore, is estopped from questioning the
terms and stipulation thereof.
188
Clearly, the injunctive writ should not have been issued. The provisions of law explicitly provide
that Courts of First Instance shall have the power to issue writ of injunction, mandamus, certiorari,
prohibition, quo warranto and habeas corpus in their respective places,27 if the petition filed
relates to the acts or omissions of an inferior court, or of a corporation,
_________________
25 Tolentino vs. Catoy, 82 Phil. 300.
26 Quien v. Serina, 17 SCRA 567; Phil. International Surety Co., Inc. v. Court of Tax Appeals, 19 SCRA
617; People v. Pineda, 20 SCRA 748; People v. Cortes, 20 SCRA 1228.
27 Section 44(h) of the Judiciary Act of 1948.
94
94
board, officer or person, within their jurisdiction.28
The jurisdiction or authority of the Court of First Instance to control or restrain acts by means of
the writ of injunction is limited only to acts which are being committed within the territorial
boundaries of their respective provinces or districts29 except where the sole issue is the legality of
the decision of the administrative officials.30
In the leading case of Palanan Lumber Plywood Co., Inc. v. Arranz,31 which involved a petition for
certriorari and prohibition filed in the Court of First Instance of Isabela against the same
respondent public officials as here and where the administrative proceedings taken were similar to
the case at bar, the Court laid down the rule that: "We agree with the petitioner that the respondent
Court acted without jurisdiction in issuing a preliminary injunction against the petitioners
Executive Secretary, Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources and the Director of Forestry,
who have their official residences in Manila and Quezon City, outside of the territorial jurisdiction
of the respondent Court of First Instance of Isabela. Both the statutory provisions and the settled
jurisdiction of this Court unanimously affirm that the extraordinary writs issued by the Court of
First Instance are limited to and operative only within their respective provinces and districts."
A different rule applies only when the point in controversy relates solely to a determination of a
question of law whether the decision of the respondent administrative officials was legally correct
or not.32 We thus declared in Director of
_____________
28 Section 4, Rule 65, Rules of Court.
29 Director of Forestry v. King, 38 SCRA 559.

189
30 Gayacao v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., 13 SCRA 763; Zamboanga General Utilities Inc. v.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 20 SCRA 881; Macailing v. Andrada, 31 SCRA 126.
31 22 SCRA 1186.
32 Gayacao v. Hon. Executive Secretary, et al., 13 SCRA 753; Zamboanga General Utilities Inc. vs.
Secretary of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 20 SCRA 881; Macailing, et al. vs. Andrada et al., 31
SCRA 126.
95
VOL. 152, JULY 16. 1987
95
Forestry v. Ruiz:33 "In Palanan Lumber & Plywood Co., Inc., supra, we reaffirmed the rule of non-
jurisdiction of courts of first instance to issue injunctive writs in order to control acts outside of
their premises or districts. We went further and said that when the petition filed with the courts of
first instance not only questions the legal correctness of the decision of administrative officials but
also seeks to enjoin the enforcement of the said decision, the court could not validly issue the writ
of injunction when the officials sought to be restrained from enf orcing the decision are not
stationed within its territory.
"To recapitulate, insofar as injunctive or prohibitory writs are concerned, the rule still stands that
courts of first instance have the power to issue writs limited to and operative only within their
respective provinces or districts."
The writ of preliminary injunction issued by respondent court is furthermore void, since it appears
that the forest area described in the injunctive writ includes areas not licensed to respondent Ago.
The forest area referred to and described therein comprises the whole area originally licensed to
Narciso Lansang under the earlier Ordinary Timber License No. 58452. Only a portion of this area
was in fact transferred to respondent Ago as described in its Ordinary Timber License No. 1323-
'60[New].
It is abundantly clear that respondent court has no jurisdiction over the subject matter of Civil Case
No. 1253 of the Court of First Instance of Agusan nor has it jurisdiction to decide on the common
boundary of the licensed areas of petitioner Lianga and respondent Ago, as determined by
respondents public officials against whom no case of grave abuse of discretion has been made.
Absent a cause of action and jurisdiction, respondent Judge acted with grave abuse of discretion
and excess, if not lack, of jurisdiction in refusing to dismiss the case under review and in issuing the
writ of preliminary injunction enjoining the enforcement of the final decision dated August 9, 1968
and the order affirming the same dated October 2,1968 of the Office of the President.
ACCORDINGLY, the petition for certiorari and prohibition
______________
190
33 38 SCRA 559.
96
96
Kapisanang Manggagawang Pinagyakap vs. National Labor Relations Commission
is granted. The restraining order heretofore issued by the Court against enforcement of the
preliminary injunction and related orders issued by respondent judge is the case below is made
permanent and the respondent judge or whoever has taken his place is hereby ordered to dismiss
Civil Case No. 1253.
SO ORDERED. Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Lopez Enage, 152 SCRA 80, No. L-30637 July 16, 1987
II. CONTROL OF ADMINISTRATIVE ACTION
Role of the Ombudsman
14. Concerned Officials of the MWSS v. Vasquez, 240 SCRA 502 (1995)
Constitutional Law; Due Process; Administrative Law; In administrative proceedings, technical

rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully
equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.—The essence of due process is an opportunity to
be heard. One may be heard, not solely by verbal presentation but also, and perhaps even many
times more creditably and practicable than oral argument, through pleadings. In administrative
proceedings, moreover, technical rules of procedure and evidence are not strictly applied;
administrative due process cannot be fully equated to due process in its strict judicial sense.
Same; Ombudsman; Jurisdiction; The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of
the Ombudsman encompasses ‘all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have
been committed by any officer or employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof,
_______________
* EN BANC.
503
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
503
191
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. Vasquez
during his tenure of office.—Indeed, in Deloso v. Domingo, this Court had occasion to explain not
only the rationale for the creation of an office of the Ombudsman but also the grant to it of broad
investigative authority, thus: “The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987
Constitution and for the grant to it of broad investigative authority, is to insulate said office from
the long tentacles of officialdom that are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others
involved in the prosecution of erring public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure
and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances
committed by public officers. lt was deemed necessary, therefore, to create a special office to
investigate all criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or
omissions complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office.
The Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses
‘all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.’ ”
Same; Same; Same; Powers, Functions and Duties of the Ombudsman.—To begin with, the powers,
functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized into the following
headings: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions; Authority to
Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement Preventive
Measures.
Same; Same; Same; Investigatory Power and Public Assistance Duties.—Although the Solicitor-
General has practically enumerated all the constitutional and statutory provisions describing the
ample authority and responsibilities of the Ombudsman, the particular aspect of his functions that,
however, really finds relevance to the present case relates to his investigatory power and public
assistance duties which can be found in the first and second paragraphs, respectively, of Section 13,
Article XI, of the Constitution, along with the corresponding provisions of the Ombudsman Act. This
much can be gleaned from the findings of the Office of the Ombudsman leading to its questioned
orders.
Same; Same; Same; Administrative Law; Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System; The
Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed
jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of
MWSS.—While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate
504
504
any act or omission which “x x x appears illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient” may be yielded, it is
difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and the Ombudsman Act have intended
to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an exercise of judgment or discretion by an
agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion is lawfully vested. It would seem to us
192
that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged orders, has not only directly assumed
jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of discretion by, the Board of Trustees of
MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award Contract APM-01 appears to be yet
pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of Trustees.
Same; Same; Same; Same; Same; The assailed 19th October 1992 Order is more of an undue
interference in the adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere
directive requiring the proper observance of and compliance with the law.—We can only view the
assailed 19th October 1992 Order to be more of an undue interference in the adjudicative
responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring the proper
observance of and compliance with the law.- The report submitted by the FactFinding and
Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals its predisposition against the use of
fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal, matter. The fact-finding report has dealt with such
matters as (1) the wall thickness of pipes; (2) the joints; (3) the pipe laying procedure; (4) the
technical expertise of the MWSS, on the one hand, and the fiberglass proponents, on the other; and
(5) the supposed negative international feedback on the use of fiberglass pipes.
Administrative Law; Public Bidding; PBAC was guided by the rule that bids should be evaluated
based on the required documents submitted before the opening of bids.—PBAC was evidently
guided by the rule that bids should be evaluated based on the required documents submitted
before, and not after, the opening of bids, that should further dispel any indiscriminate or whimsical
exercise of discretion on its part.
Same; Same; MWSS is the agency that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the
projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with its development plans.—The
MWSS, a government-owned and controlled corporation created by law through R.A. No. 6234, is
charged with the construction, maintenance and operation of waterwork system to insure an
uninterrupted and adequate
505
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
505
supply and distribution of potable water. It is the agency that should be in the best position to
evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to decide which bid is compatible with
its development plans. The exercise of this discretion is a policy decision that necessitates, among
other things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison, evaluation, and deliberation—matters that
can best be discharged by it. MWSS has passed Resolution No. 32–93 to likewise show its approval
of the technical specifications for fiberglass. All these should deserve weight.
Same; Courts; Courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the sound discretion of
government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under the special technical
knowledge and training of such agencies.—In Razon, Inc. v. PPA, we have said that neither this
Court nor Congress, and now perhaps the Ombudsman, could be expected to have the time and
technical expertise to look into matters of this nature. While we cannot go so far as to say that
193
MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-how in the waterworks system, by the very
nature of its functions, however, it obviously must enjoy an advantage over other agencies on the
subject at hand. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy Executive Secretary, citing numerous
cases, this Court has held: “Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and
multifarious problems caused by unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand
clear. A long line of cases establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which
are addressed to the sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of
activities coming under the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.”
Same; Same; Issues involved, dealing on basically technical matters, deserve to be disentangled
from undue interference from courts and so from the Ombudsman as well.—It stands to reason for,
in Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, we have further observed: ‘The discretion to accept or
reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies entrusted with that function.
The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide latitude that the Courts will
not interfere therewith. unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to a fraudulent award.”
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTION in the Supreme Court. Certiorari with Preliminary Injunction or Restraining
Order.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court,
506
506
VITUG, J.:
The Ombudsman, in its 19th October 1992 Order,1 directed the Board of Trustees of Metropolitan
Waterworks and Sewerage System (“MWSS”) (a) to set aside the recommendation of its
Prequalification, Bids and Awards Committee for Construction Services and technical Equipment
(“PBAC-CSTE”) that Contract No. APM-01 be given to a contractor offering fiberglass pipes and (b)
to instead award the contract to a complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of
Presidential Decree No. 1594.2 The subsequent motion for reconsideration was denied by the
Ombudsman in its Order of 01 March 1993.
These two Orders are now sought to be annulled in this petition for certiorari, with prayer for
preliminary injunction or a restraining order, lodged by the “Concerned Officials of the
Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System”3 led by its farmer Administrator Teofilo I.
Asuncion, Let us first touch on the factual backdrop.
In order to provide about 1.3 million liters of water daily to about 3.8 million people in the
metropolitan area,4 MWSS launched the Angat Water Supply Optimization Project (“AWSOP”)
consisting of several phases. The entire project would be, in most part, financed by funds loaned by
the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund (“OECF”) of Japan to the national government and
_______________
194
1 Case No. OMB-0–92–0750, entitled “Members of the Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes
Manufacturers Association (PLDPPMA) v. Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and
Sewerage System (MWSS).
2 Entitled “Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure
Contracts.”
3 Petitioners have identified themselves as “Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks

and Sewerage System” because that is how they were so designated in the complaint before the
Ombudsman. PLDPPMA maintains that the complaint is against the MWSS officials concerned with
the bidding. It was primarily directed against then Administrator Teofilo Asuncion’s predecessor,
former MWSS Administrator Luis Sison. (Rollo, p. 223).
4 Rollo, p. 10.
507
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
507
allocated to MWSS in the form of equity.5 With the completion of the construction of the main
aqueduct from Angat Dam all the way down to La Mesa Dam in Novaliches, Quezon City, from
where water mains for the distribution system of the entire Metro Manila begin, MWSS focused its
attention to the Distribution System Phase of the AWSOP. The projects were denominated Projects
APM-01 and APM-02 which consist of the construction of the Distribution System Phase of the
AWSOP, that would particularly call for the supply of labor, materials and equipment, and of the
installation of new watermains (43,305 linear meters for APM-01 and 31,491 linear meters for
APM-02),6 comprising of fittings, valves and pipes of different sizes.7 Under Clause IB-34 of the
contract documents for APM-01 and APM-02, the permitted alternative pipe materials for the
projects were to include the following items:
“(millimeters)
Asbestos Cement Pipe (ACP)
- 100 mm to 600 mm
Cast Iron Pipe (CIP)
- 50 and larger
Polyethylene Pipe (PE)
- 50 mm to 250 mm
195
Polyvinyl Chloride Pipe (PVC)
- 50 mm to 250 mm
Ductile Iron Pipe (DIP)
- 50 mm and larger
Steel Pipe (SP)
- 400 mm and larger
Fiberglass Pressure Pipe (FPP)
- 300 mm and larger”8
On 30 August 1991, MWSS caused the publication in two (2) leading newspapers of an “Invitation
for Pre-qualification and Bids” for Projects APM-01 and APM-02. Since the aforesaid projects were
opened for international competitive bidding, copies of the “Invitation for Pre-qualification and
Bids” were sent to the respective embassies and trade missions of member countries of the OECF.
The advertisement and invitation to prospective bidders announced that “(g)oods and services to
be supplied under (the) contract must have their origin from countries de-
_______________
5 Rollo, p. 86,
6 Rollo, p. 86.
7 Rollo, p. 70.
8 Rollo, p. 86.
508
508
fined in the Guidelines for Procurement of Goods under OECF loans” and that “(j)oint ventures
between foreign and domestic firms are encouraged.” While there were twenty-five (25)
prospective applicants who secured pre-qualification documents, only fourteen (14) contractors
submitted corresponding applications to the PBAC-CSTE.
On 20 November 1991, the PBAC-CSTE, after evaluating the applications for pre-qualification,
issued a report9 concluding that only eleven (11)10 out of the fourteen (14) contractors were
196
_______________
9 Annex “A,” Comment of Private Respondent, Rollo, pp. 297–302.
10 PREQUALIFIED APPLICANTS
CONTRACTOR
REMARKS
1.
PHESCO, Inc.
Bid on both but award is limited to
one contract
2.
China Estate Const. &
Eligible for award of two contracts
Eng’g. Corp.
3.
FF Cruz & Co., Inc.
4.
Kurimoto Ltd.
Bid and award on both contracts
5.
197
DM Consunji Inc.
6.
Eng’g. Equipment Inc.
one contract
7.
SAMWHAN CORP.
8.
DYWIDAG/TITAN Const./
Tierra Mgmt. Corp./
Green Jade Const.
Consortium
9.
Philippine Golden M
198
Eng’g. Ltd./Shanghai
Baogung Metallurgical
Const. Corp./Phil.
Valve Mfg. Corp./MMRR
Const./Golden City
Eng’g. Corp. Joint
Venture)
10.
J.V. Angeles Const.

199
one contract only
11.
C.M. Pancho Const.,
Bid and award on both contracts
Inc./MIESCOR/JE Manalo
& CO. Consortium. (Rollo, p. 301)
509
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
509
pre-qualified to bid for the 31st March 1992 scheduled bidding covering both the APM-01 and
APM-02 proposed contracts. The major factors considered in the evaluation were the applicants’
financial condition, technical qualification and experience to undertake the project under bid.
Meanwhile, private respondent Philippine Large Diameter Pressure Pipes Manufacturers’

Association (“PLDPPMA”),11 sent seven (7) letters, between 13 January and 23 March 1992, to the
MWSS requesting clarification, as well as offering some suggestions, on the technical specifications
for APM-01 and APM-02.
The first letter, dated 13 January 1992,12 sought clarification on the design criteria of thickness
used for fiberglass and ductile iron pipes which varied from the standard thickness given by
manufacturers.
The second letter, dated 29 January 1992,13 suggested that all alternative pipes for Projects APM-
01 and APM-02 should have the same design criteria on stiffness class, pressure class, rating,
elevated temperature and wall thickness and should be manufactured in accordance with American
Water Works Association (“AWWA”) standards,
200
PLDPPMA, in its third letter of 13 February 1992,14 sought to be elaborated on the imposition of
the testing procedure of stiffness factor on steel pipes used in Fiberglass Reinforced Pipes (“FRP”)
and suggested that the 5-year minimum experience by manufacturers be required for alternative
pipes.
In its fourth letter, dated 25 February 1992,15 PLDPPMA reiterated their request that the deflection
allowance of 3% under the AWWA standards on steel pipes be also applied to all alternative pipes
and suggested that a comparative study should
_______________
11 The members of the association include the International Pipe Industries Corporation, Italit
Asbestos Cement Corporation, Mayer Steel Pipe Corporation, Goodyear Steel Pipe Corporation and
City Industrial Corporation. (Rollo, p. 308).
12 Rollo, pp. 307–308.
13 Rollo, pp. 309–312.
14 Rollo, pp. 313–314.
15 Rollo, p. 88.
510
510
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) us. Vasquez
be undertaken by the MWSS on the feasibility of using filament wound fiberglass pipes (“FRP”) and
centrifugally cast fiberglass pipes (“GRP”).
In their fifth letter, dated 05 March 1992,16 PLDPPMA appealed to the MWSS to have steel pipes
placed in equal footing with other alternative pipes, specifically filament wound and centrifugally
cast fiberglass pipes, in order to avoid an unfair requirement on stiffness value.
In their penultimate letter of 16 March 1992,17 PLDPPMA informed MWSS of their computation for
wall thicknesses and stiffness values for cement lined/cement coated and epoxy lined/ coal tar
enamel coated steel pipes based on AWWA standards.
Finally, in their seventh letter of 23 March 1992,18 PLDPPMA reiterated their request for
correcting the specifications for steel and fiberglass pipes, particularly on wall thicknesses and
deflections, because of MWSS Addendum #5 where the wall thicknesses for steel pipes were noted
to be more than the wall thicknesses computed in the previously agreed agenda.
Former Administrator Luis Sison issued, between 10 February and 24 March 1992, six (6) addenda
to the bidding documents that embodied the meritorious suggestions of PLDPPMA on various
technical specifications. In his 24th March 1992 letter to the PLDPPMA, in response to the latter’s
201
23rd March 1992 (seventh) letter, Sison explained that the additional thickness for steel pipes was
so required in order to serve as a pipe corrosion allowance to counter imperfection in the
preparation and application of lining and coating, the limited service life of epoxy resin lining and
the corrosive element of the local soil.
The bidding was conducted by PBAC on the previously scheduled date of 31 March 1992, The
prequalified bidders using steel and fiberglass pipes submitted their respective bid proposals. The
approved agency cost estimate for Project APM-01 was Three Hundred Sixty Six Million Six
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (P366,650,000.00).19 The three (3) lowest bidders for the
_______________
16 Rollo, pp. 318–319.
17 Rollo, pp. 320–321.
18 Rollo, p. 322.
19 Rollo, p. 425.
511
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
511
said project (APM-01) were the following:
“BIDDER
BID PRICE
1.
DYWIDAG/TITAN/WILPER
P267,345,574.00
PLDPPMA/GREEN JADE
202
(Joint Venture)
2.
F.F. CRUZ & CO., INC.
P268,815,729.00
3.
J.V. ANGELES CONST. CORP./
JA DEVT. CORP.
P278,205,457.0020
while the three lowest bidders for Project APM-02 included:
“BIDDER
BID PRICE
1.
ENG’G. EQUIPMENT, INC. (EEI)
P219,574,538.00
2.
FF CRUZ & CO., INC.
P233,533,537.00
3.
J.V. ANGELES CONST. CORP./

203
JA DEVT. CORP.
P277,304,604.00”21
In APM-01, Joint Venture and F.F. Cruz and Co., Inc. proposed to use fiberglass pipes. In APM-02,
Eng’g. Equipment Inc. and F.F. Cruz likewise proffered to use fiberglass pipes.
After the three lowest bidders for both projects were known, a meeting was held on 27 May 1992
by the PBAC-CSTE, composed of MWSS Deputy Administrator for Engineering Eduardo M. Del
Fierro, as Acting Chairman, and Deputy Administrator for Construction Teofilo I. Asuncion, Deputy
Administrator for Operations Ruben A. Hernandez, Acting Chief of Legal Office Precioso E.
Remolacio, and Project Manager Cesar S. Guevarra, as members, to decide on what should be done
about Contract APM-01. Three of the members, namely, Hernandez, Guevarra and Asuncion,
recommended to reject all bids and conduct a rebidding for the contract on the following grounds:
“a. Ambiguity of Addendum No. 6—The Addendum is subject to different interpretations because
there was no illustrations provided. Further, it could also be said that some contractors did not use
the FRP
_______________
20 Rollo, p. 262.
21 Rollo, p. 262.
512
512
because said Addendum was not clearly explained.

“b. There was no provision for maintenance/repair materials for bidders who opted to use FRP
which is relatively new pipe to be used in the country. It was suggested that a 5% to 10% allowance
be provided for maintenance purposes.
“c. Further review of pipe design should be made by the Consultant (NJS) in order to accommodate
the load to be carried in the Umiray-Angat Loop.”22
Precioso E. Remolacio abstained; he felt that “technical evaluation (was) more essential in deciding
the issues in (the) Contract.” For his part, Acting Chairman Eduardo M. del Fierro recommended
that no rebidding should be undertaken and that an award should be made to either the lowest or
the second lowest bidder.
On 29 May 1992, PBAC-CSTE met again to discuss and evaluate the bids in APM-02. Here again,
three members, namely, Guevarra, Hernandez and Asuncion, opined that a rebidding should be
conducted, while Acting Chairman del Fierro and Remolacio believed that the contract should be
awarded to the lowest bidder.
Finally, on 02 June 1992, the PBAC-CSTE formally submitted its report23 on its bid evaluation on
APM-01. The PBAC-CSTE held that while Joint Venture’s bid might have been the lowest it was,
204
however, invalid due to its failure to acknowledge Addendum No. 6, a major consideration, that
could not be waived. It accordingly recommended that the contract be instead awarded to the
second lowest but complying bidder, F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc., subject to the latter’s manifestation that it
would only hire key personnel with experience in the installation of fiberglass pressure pipes (due
to PBAC-CSTE’s observation in the report that the company and its key personnel did not have
previous experience in the installation of fiberglass reinforced pipes). Acting Chairman del Fierro,
together with members Guevarra and Asuncion, approved the PBAC-CSTE’s findings and
recommendation. Hernandez and Remolacio both disagreed with the find-
_______________
22 Rollo, p. 478.
23 Rollo, pp. 421–436.
513
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
513
ings of the PBAC-CSTE; the former opted for a rebidding while the latter batted for awarding the
contract to Joint Venture.
On the following day, or on 03 June 1992, the MWSS Board Committee on Construction
Management and the Board Committee on Engineering, acting jointly on the recommendation of
Administrator Sison, recommended that Contract No. APM-01 be awarded to F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.,
being the lowest complying bidder.24
Prior thereto, or on 07 April 1992 (seven days after the submission of the bid proposals on 31
March 1992), private respondent PLDPPMA, through its President Ramon Pastor, filed with the
Office of the Ombudsman a letter-complaint25 (docketed Case No. OMB-0–92–0750) protesting the
public bidding conducted by the MWSS for Projects APM-01 and APM-02, detailing charges of an
“apparent plan” on the part of the MWSS to favor suppliers of fiberglass pipes, and urging the
Ombudsman to conduct an investigation thereon and to hold in abeyance the award of the
contracts, PLDPPMA’s letter-complaint, in part, read:
“Even before the bidding had started, there appears to be an apparent plan on the part of the MWSS
to favor a particular supplier of pipes for the project considering the following events:
“Firstly, the bid documents particularly the specifications for alternative pipes when first released
in December 1991 whimsically and arbitrarily set such rigid standards for steel pipes so that MWSS
had to issue six addenda to the bidding documents and had to postpone the bidding several times in
a vain attempt to correct the apparent prejudice against the use of steel pipes for the APM 01 and
02 projects;
“Secondly, despite our prior agreement with MWSS Engineering Department that the alternative
pipes to be used for the project should comply ‘with internationally accepted AWWA specifications,
205
the bidding specifications was written arbitrarily and in complete disregard of AWWA
specifications increased by 1 mm. the thickness required for steel pipes thereby effectively
increasing the cost of steel pipes for the APM 01 project bid by about P30 Million, or more than
twice the difference between the lowest bid and the bid that utilized steel pipes;
_______________
24 Rollo, pp. 417–420.
25 Rollo, pp. 406–407.
514
514
“Thirdly, despite the fact that it was/is of common knowledge that FRP and GRP (Fiberglass) pipes
have had a long history of failures in the United States such that even MWSS Pre-qualification,
Bidding and Awards Committee resolved in a meeting held in March 1992 not to use FRP and GRP
pipes for large projects, bids utilizing such pipes were still accepted for the APM 01 and 02 projects;
and
“Lastly, the undue preference for the use of GRP pipes became more apparent when the supposed
lowest bidder for the APM 01 project (who did not participate in the bidding for APM 02 project),
and the supposed lowest bidder for the APM 02 Project (who also did not participate in the bidding
for APM 01 project), both submitted bids utilizing GRP pipes.”
On 10 June 1992, the Ombudsman referred PLDPPMA’s 07th April 1992 letter-complaint to the
MWSS Board of Trustees for comment along with a directive to it to hold in abeyance the awarding
of the subject contract.26 MWSS asked for an extension of time within which to submit its comment
but called, at the same time, the attention of the Ombudsman to Presidential Decree No. 181827
prohibiting the issuance of restraining orders/ injunctions in cases involving government
infrastructure projects.
After the submission by the parties of their respective pleadings, the case was referred to the Fact-
Finding and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman for investigation and report. On 14
September 1992, a fact-finding report28 was submitted to, and approved by, the Ombudsman
which became the basis for the issuance of the now challenged order, dated 19 October 1992,29
reading as follows:
“ln view of the findings of this Office on the above-entitled case as contained in the Fact-Finding
Report, dated September 14,1992, of the Fact Finding Investigation Bureau (copy attached), and
pursuant to the
_______________
26 Rollo, p. 69.
206
27 Entitled “Prohibiting Courts from Issuing Restraining Orders or Preliminary Injunctions in Cases
Involving Infrastructure and Natural Resources Development Projects Of, and Public Utilities
Operated By, the Government.”
28 Rollo, pp. 84–113.
29 Rollo, p. 83.
515
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
515
Powers, Functions and Duties of the Office of the Ombudsman as mandated under Section 15 of
Republic Act 6770 (Ombudsman Act), the MWSS Board of Trustees is hereby directed to:
1) Set aside the recommendation of the MWSS Pre-qualification, Bids and Awards Committee for
Construction Services and Technical Equipment(PBAC-CSTE) to award Contract APM01 to a
contractor offering fiberglass pipes;
2) Award the subject contract to a complying and responsive bidder pursuant to the provisions of
PD 1594, Prescribing Policies, Guidelines, Rules and Regulations for Government Infrastructure
Contracts.
‘The Board of Trustees is further directed to inform this Office of the action taken thereon.
“SO ORDERED.”
A motion by herein petitioners for the reconsideration of the order was denied on 01 March
1993.30 Thus, the present recourse. Petitioners cite to us the following reasons for its petition for
certiorari.
“I.
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN ACTED BEYOND THE COMPETENCE OF HIS OFFICE WHEN HE

ASSUMED JURISDICTION OVER THE COMPLAINT AT BAR NOTWITHSTANDING THAT THE SAME IS
CLEARLY AMONG THE GASES EXCEPTED BY SECTION 20 OF THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989 (RA
NO. 6770) WHICH ENUMERATED THE ADMINISTRATIVE ACT OR OMISSION THAT MAY NOT BE
THE SUBJECT OF INVESTIGATION BY HIS OFFICE.
“II.
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN, AFTER HAVING TAKEN COGNIZANCE OF THE COMPLAINT,

ARBITRARILY ISSUED A DIRECTIVE IN THE NATURE OF A RESTRAINING ORDER OR WRIT OF
PRELIMINARY INJUNCTION TO PETITIONERS TO HOLD IN
_______________
207
30 Rollo, pp. 226–239.
516
516
ABEYANCE THE AWARDING OF THE CONTRACT X X X UNTIL FURTHER ORDER FROM THIS
OFFICE,’ A POWER OR AUTHORITY NOT VESTED IN HIS OFFICE.
“III
“RESPONDENT OMBUDMAN ACTED WITHOUT JURISDICTION IN ISSUING THE ORDER OF

OCTOBER 19,1992 AS WELL AS THE ORDER OF MARCH 1, 1993, CONSIDERING THAT UNDER THE
LAW THE OMBUDSMAN’S JURISDICTION CANNOT AND SHOULD NOT BE EXPANDED TO INCLUDE
THE DECISION MAKING POWER OVER A CIVIL ADJUDICATORY MATTER SUCH AS THE MWSS
BIDDING PROCESS.
“IV
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW, AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, BY ARBITRARILY AND
CAPRICIOUSLY INTERFERING WITH THE EXERCISE OF SOUND DISCRETION BY THE MWSS WHlCH
IS A SPECIALIZED AGENCY OF GOVERNMENT WITH WHICH EVEN COURTS OF JUSTICE
GENERALLY DO NOT INTERFERE, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT HE HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
THE ORDERS.
“V
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED A GRAVE ERROR OF LAW, AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION TANTAMOUNT TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN ISSUING THE SUBJECT
ORDERS IN GROSS DISREGARD OF THE CARDINAL PRINCIPLES OF DUE PROCESS OF LAW IN
ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS. ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT HE HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE
SAID ORDERS.
“VI
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW, AND ACTED WITH GRAVE
ABUSE OF DISCRETION AMOUNTING TO LACK OF JURISDICTION, IN GROSSLY MISAPPREHENDING
THE RECORD BY FAILING TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE FINDINGS OF EXPERTS THAT THE MWSS
SPECIFI-
517
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
517
208
CATIONS ARE FAIR, AND BY CONCLUDING BASELESSLY THAT MWSS FORMULATED ITS
SPECIFICATIONS TO FAVOR FIBERGLASS PIPES OVER STEEL PIPES, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT
HE HAS JURISDICTION TO ISSUE THE SUBJECT ORDERS.
“VII
“RESPONDENT OMBUDSMAN COMMITTED GRAVE ERROR OF LAW, AND ACTED ARBITRARILY

AND CAPRICIOUSLY, IN IMPLYING BASELESSLY THAT MWSS ACTED UNFAIRLY, OPPRESSIVELY
AND WITH GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION, ASSUMING ARGUENDO THAT HE HAS JURISDICTION
TO ISSUE THE SUBJECT ORDERS.
“VIII
IN CONSEQUENCE, THE ORDERS OF OCTOBER 19, 1992 AND MARCH 1, 1993 MUST BE REVERSED,
ANNULLED AND SET ASIDE.”31
After the required pleadings were filed by the parties, this Court, in its resolution of 19 May 1994
gave due course to the petition and required the parties to submit memoranda. In compliance
therewith, the parties filed their respective memoranda, petitioners (MWSS) on 07 July 1994, the
Solicitor-General on 28 June 1994, and PLDPPMA on 19 July 1994. Meanwhile, a motion for leave to
intervene and to admit an attached petition-in-intervention was filed by Titan Construction
Corporation on 30 June 1994. Petitioners opposed Titan’s intervention. This Court, ultimately,
denied the motion for leave to intervene.
The various alleged errors raised by petitioners can be grouped into two basic issues, i.e., (a)
whether or not the rudiments of due process have been properly observed in the issuance of the
assailed 19th October 1992 and 01st March 1993 orders of the Ombudsman; and, more pivotal than
the first, (b) whether or not the Ombudsman has jurisdiction to take cognizance of PLDPPMA’s
complaint and to correspondingly issue its challenged orders directing the Board of Trustees of the
MWSS to set aside
_______________
31 Rollo, pp. 722–725.
518
518
the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE.
Relative to the first issue, we are more than convinced, after a scrutiny of the records of this case,
that petitioners have been amply accorded the opportunity to be heard.
209
Petitioners were asked to comment on the letter-complaint of PLDPPMA. On 25 June 1992,

petitioners moved for an extension of time within which to comment. On 16 July 1992, petitioners
filed their letter-comment. Responding to the reply of PLDPPMA, petitioners later filed a rejoinder.
When an adverse order was rendered against them, petitioners moved for its reconsideration,
albeit to no avail.
The essence of due process is an opportunity to be heard.32 One may be heard, not solely by verbal
presentation but also, and perhaps even many times more creditably and practicable than oral
argument, through pleadings.33 In administrative proceedings, moreover, technical rules of
procedure and evidence are not strictly applied; administrative due process cannot be fully equated
to due process in its strict judicial sense.34
On the threshold matter that puts to issue the Ombudsman’s directive to the Board of Trustees of
MWSS to set aside the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to award Contract No. APM-01 to the
lowest complying bid, we find, this time, the petition to be impressed with merit.
Petitioners maintain that while Republic Act (“R.A.”) No. 6770, otherwise known as the
Ombudsman Act of 1989, extends certain well-defined powers and authority to the Office of the
Ombudsman to, among other functions, investigate and prosecute complaints filed therewith, the
same law, however, expresses limits to the exercise of such jurisdictional powers and authority.
Section 20 of the Act is cited; viz:
“Sec. 20. Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman may not conduct the necessary investigation of
any administrative act or omission complained of if it believes that:
_______________
32 Crespo v. Provincial Board of Nueva Ecija, 160 SCRA 66.
33 Mutuc v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 43.
34 Asiaworld Publishing House, Inc. v. Ople, 152 SCRA 219; Manuel v. Villena, 37 SCRA 745.
519
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
519
“(1) The complainant has an adequate remedy in another judicial or quasi-judicial body;
“(2) The complaint pertains to a matter outside the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman;
“(3) The complaint is trivial, frivolous, vexatious or made in bad faith;
“(4) The complainant has no sufficient personal interest in the subject matter of the grievance; or
“(5) The complaint was filed after one year from the occurrence of the act or omission complained
of.”
Petitioners contend that PLDPPMA’s complaint falls under exceptions (1) to (4) of Sec. 20 of R.A.
No. 6770, and that, therefore, the Ombudsman should not have taken cognizance of the complaint.
210
Asserting, upon the other hand, that the Ombudsman has jurisdiction over PLDPPMA’s complaint,
the Solicitor-General enumerates various constitutional and statutory provisions; to wit:”
(a) Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution providing thusly:

“Sec. 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions and duties:
"(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or
inefficient.
“(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
Government, or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government-
owned or controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty
required by law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of
duties.
“(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure
compliance therewith.
“(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or transactions entered
into
520
520
by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action.
“(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of
its responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
“(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
“(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
Government and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency.
“(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.”
(b) Section 13 of Republic Act No. 6770 which reads:
“SEC. 13. Mandate.—The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
or controlled corporations, and enforce their administrative, civil and criminal liability in every
case where the evidence warrants in order to promote efficient service by the Government to the
people.”
211
(c) Section 15, paragraphs (1) to (7), of Republic Act No. 6770 which reproduced verbatim the
aforequoted provisions of Section 13 of the 1987 Constitution with some additional salient
statutory provisions; hence:
“SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
powers, functions and duties:
“x x x xxx xxx
“(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
investigation or inquiry, including the power to examine and have access to bank accounts and
records;
“(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
with the same penalties provided therein;
“(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or
521
VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
521
performance of the powers, functions and duties herein or hereinafter provided;

“(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
“The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.”
(d) And, finally, Section 26 of the Ombudsman Act which expresses, as follows:
“SEC. 26. Inquiries.—(1) The Office of the Ombudsman shall inquire into acts or omissions of a
public officer, employee, office or agency which, from the reports or complaints it has received, the
Ombudsman or his Deputies consider to be:
“(a) contrary to law or regulation;

“(b) unreasonable, unfair, oppressive, irregular or inconsistent with the general course of the
operations and functions of a public officer, employee, office or agency;
“(c) an error in the application or interpretation of law, rules or regulations, or a gross or palpable
error in the appreciation of facts;
“(d) based on improper motives or corrupt considerations;
“(e) unclear or inadequately explained when reasons should have been revealed; or
“(f) inefficiently performed or otherwise objectionable.
“2. The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the
same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal
citing the reasons therefor. If it finds a reasonable ground to investigate further, it shall first furnish
the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to
submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt thereof. If the answer is found
satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
212
“3. When the complaint consists in delay or refusal to perform a duty required ed by law, or when
urgent action is necessary to protect or preserve the rights of the complainant, the Office of the
Ombudsman shall take steps or measures and issue such orders directing the officer, employee,
office or agency concerned to:
522
522
“(a) expedite the performance of duty;

“(b) cease or desist from the performance of a prejudicial act;
“(c) correct the omission;
“(d) explain fully the administrative act in question; or
“(e) take any steps as may be necessary under the circumstances to protect and preserve the rights
of the complainant.
“4. Any delay or refusal to comply with the referral or directive of the Ombudsman or any of his
Deputies shall constitute a ground for administrative disciplinary action against the officer or
employee to whom it was addressed.”
On the basis of all the foregoing provisions of law, the SolicitorGeneral insists that the authority of
the Ombudsman is sufficiently broad enough to cloth it with sufficient power to look into the
alleged irregularities in the bidding conducted on 31 March 1992 leading to the recommendation
made by the PBAC-CSTE on contract APM-01. He argues that even if no criminal act could be
attributed to the former MWSS Administrator and members of the PBAC-CSTE, ‘the questioned
report could still be embraced in the all-encompassing phrase “all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance, and non-feasance,” and falls within the scope of the constitutional provision calling for
an investigation of “any act or omission of any public official, employee, office or agency, when such
act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.”
Indeed, in Deloso v. Domingo,35 this Court had occasion to explain not only the rationale for the
creation of an office of the Ombudsman but also the grant to it of broad investigative authority,
thus:
“The reason for the creation of the Ombudsman in the 1987 Constitution and for the grant to it of
broad investigative authority,, is to insulate said office from the long tentacles of officialdom that
are able to penetrate judges’ and fiscals’ offices, and others involved in the prosecution of erring
public officials, and through the exertion of official pressure and influence, quash, delay, or dismiss
investigations into malfeasances and misfeasances committed by public officers. lt was deemed
necessary, therefore, to create a special office to investigate all
_______________
35 191 SCRA 545, 550–551.
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VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995

213
523
criminal complaints against public officers regardless of whether or not the acts or omissions
complained of are related to or arise from the performance of the duties of their office. The
Ombudsman Act makes perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses ‘all
kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance, and non-feasance that have been committed by any officer or
employee as mentioned in Section 13 hereof, during his tenure of office.’ ”
To begin with, the powers, functions and duties of the Ombudsman have generally been categorized
into the following headings: Investigatory Power; Prosecutory Power; Public Assistance Functions;
Authority to Inquire and Obtain Information; and Function to Adopt, Institute and Implement
Preventive Measures.
Although the Solicitor-General has practically enumerated all the constitutional and statutory
provisions describing the ample authority and responsibilities of the Ombudsman, the particular
aspect of his functions that, however, really finds relevance to the present case relates to his
investigatory power and public assistance duties which can be found in the first and second
paragraphs, respectively, of Section 13, Article XI, of the Constitution, along with the corresponding
provisions of the Ombudsman Act This much can be gleaned from the findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman leading to its questioned orders. We quote:
“a. There is an evident plan on the part of the MWSS under then Administrator Sison to favor
suppliers of fiberglass when it prescribed rigid standards for steel pipes but set lenient
requirements for pipes made of fiberglass, for the following reasons:
“1. MWSS management rely on the AWWA standards for fiberglass pipe but neglect the same
AWWA standards for steel pipes. The MWSS management under Administrator Sison disregarded
the AWWA specifications by increasing 1mm thickness for steel pipes.
“2. Complainant sent seven letters to the MWSS questioning and making suggestions on the rules of
the bidding it set but only one was answered by Administrator Sison dated and received (by the
complainant) after the bidding.
“3. The MWSS' original specification for stiffness of fiberglass (36 psi) was [c]hanged to 54 psi
(pounds per square inch) in
524
524
its Addendum No. 1 as a result of the complaints of the PLDPPMA Members. But in its Addendum
No. 4, the MWSS reverted to the original stiffness class of 36 psi. In the letter-comment dated July
26, 1992 of the MWSS, thru Acting Administrator Teofilo I. Asuncion, the MWSS tried to mislead
this office by stating that the stiffness class of fiberglass pipes was increased from 36 psi to 54 psi
when in truth, as appearing in its Addendum No. 4, the MWSS reverted to the original stiffness class
of 36 psi. There is nothing in the subsequent Addenda (Nos. 5 and 6) that will show that the MWSS
finally settled for the stiffness class of 54 psi.
214
“4. The MWSS failed to prescribe specific pipe laying procedure for fiberglass pipes. Contrary to the
claim of the MWSS that pipe laying for fiberglass pipes is not a complicated procedure as it is
similar with other types of pipes, the installation of fiberglass pipes seems to be a critical factor in
the successful implementation of a project as shown in the findings of experts, attached by the
MWSS in its motion, and quoted as follows: x x x
“5. The MWSS failed to include in the Specifications a provision for the maintenance/repair
materials for bidders who opted to use fiberglass pipes. The importance of a provision for repair of
fiberglass pipes can be inferred in the findings of experts cited by the MWSS and quoted as follows:
xxx
“6. The MWSS tried to limit the acceptable joints for fiberglass pipes favorable to a fiberglass
manufacturer by issuing Addendum No. 6 which was undated. The provision of Addendum No. 6
The only acceptable joints are gasketted Bell and Spigot and Mechanical Type’ appears to be vague
and ambiguous as it cannot be determined clearly whether the bidders will be using the Bell and
Spigot type of Joint or Mechanical Type of Joint. As stated in the Report, the cost of the Bell and
Spigot Joint is cheaper than the cost of Mechanical Type of Joint. Moreover, it was only on June 1,
1992 or two (2) months after the bidding that the MWSS issued clarification to the effect that
fiberglass pipes bidders can use either the Bell and Spigot type or Mechanical type.
“7. In connection with Addendum No. 6, this office recently got hold of a copy of a letter dated
January 31, 1992 (found on Folder I, records) of Joseph Albanese, Gruppo Sarplast, Milan, Italy
(Manufacturer/Supplier of fiberglass pipes for F.F. Cruz & Co., Inc.), addressed to Felipe Cruz. The
letter was officially stamped/received by the Office of the MWSS Administrator on February 12,
1992. It also has a marginal notation of ‘Attention:
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Mr. Veriño From: Mr. F.F. Cruz.’ The pertinent portion of the letter in the light of Addendum No. 6 is
quoted as follows:
“8)
Conclusion ‘During the pre-bid meeting our friends should say: our Spec TS-23 is a general one, but-
for this case only the pipes produced with discontinuing filament winding will be accepted and only
bell and spigot joint.’
‘The existence of such a letter in such a situation can only mean that F.F. Cruz and Sarplast, Italy had
previous communications with the top officials of the MWSS even before the opening of the bids on
March 31, 1992. Clearly, the issuance of Addendum No. 6 would only fit well for F.F. Cruz Co., Inc.
and Sarplast who is proposing the use of discontinuous filament winding fiberglass pipe with bell
and Spigot joint.’
“b. MWSS has no experience and sufficient knowledge on the use of fiberglass pipes.
“c. The Contractors who proposed to use fiberglass pipes have no track record or experience in the
installation of the same. Thus, they are not qualified to undertake projects pursuant to the
provisions of PD 1594 and under the guidelines of the Overseas Economic Cooperation Fund.
“d. The would-be manufacturers of fiberglass pipes has no manufacturing plant at this stage and
there is no guarantee whether such manufacturing plants will be operational.
“e. There is no assurance that the manufacturers of fiberglass would be able to produce the kind of
pipe desired.”36
215
In sum, the Office of the Ombudsman has considered three issues: (1) whether or not the technical
specifications prescribed by the MWSS in projects APM 01 and 02 have been so designed as to
really favor Fiberglass Pipes-Contractors/Bidders; (2) whether or not the MWSS has the technical
knowledge and expertise with fiberglass pipes; and (3) whether or not the contractors and local
manufacturers of fiberglass pipes have the experience and qualification to undertake the APM-01
and APM02 projects.
While the broad authority of the Ombudsman to investigate any act or omission which “x x x
appears illegal, unjust, improper,
_______________
36 Rollo, pp. 752–756.
526
526
or inefficient” may be yielded, it is difficult to equally concede, however, that the Constitution and
the Ombudsman Act have intended to likewise confer upon it veto or revisory power over an
exercise of judgment or discretion by an agency or officer upon whom that judgment or discretion
is lawfully vested. It would seem to us that the Office of the Ombudsman, in issuing the challenged
orders, has not only directly assumed jurisdiction over, but likewise preempted the exercise of
discretion by, the Board of Trustees of MWSS. Indeed, the recommendation of the PBAC-CSTE to
award Contract APM-01 appears to be yet pending consideration and action by the MWSS Board of
Trustees.
We can only view the assailed 19th October 1992 Order to be more of an undue interference in the
adjudicative responsibility of the MWSS Board of Trustees rather than a mere directive requiring
the proper observance of and compliance with the law. The report submitted by the Fact-Finding
and Intelligence Bureau of the Office of the Ombudsman reveals its predisposition against the use of
fiberglass pipes, a technical, rather than a legal, matter. The fact-finding report has dealt with such
matters as (1) the wall thickness of pipes; (2) the joints; (3) the pipe laying procedure; (4) the
technical expertise of the MWSS, on the one hand, and the fiberglass proponents, on the other; and
(5) the supposed negative international feedback on the use of fiberglass pipes.
The question could be asked: Was the 31st March 1992 bidding really that faulty? During the
bidding, the people present were the PBAC members, a COA representative, the bidders and the
general public. The eleven (11) prequalified contractors, according to the prequalification
evaluation37 of the PBAC, possessed the required experience, technical qualification and financial
condition to undertake the project. It should not be amiss to mention that the PBAC, under the
implementing rules and regulations of P.D. No. 1594,38 was tasked with the responsibility “for the
conduct of prequalification, bidding, evaluation of bids and recommending award of contracts.” In
evaluating the bids, PBAC stated in its
_______________
216
37 Rollo, pp. 299–301.
38 IB 2.1.
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527
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) us. Vasquez
report that it had examined the three lowest bids. Part of PBAC’s review was to verify whether the
proposed pipe materials were in conformity with the permitted alternative materials specified in
Clause IB-34 of the bid document.39 In thereafter recommending that the award be made to F.F.
Cruz, Inc., instead of Joint Venture, PBAC explained:
“As presented above, evaluation of the bid results touches on a number of parameters to determine
whether the bids are -substantially responsive to the bidding documents and has offered the lowest
evaluated bid, and that the bidder has the capacity and resources to effectively carry out the
Contract Works.’ The evaluation was conducted as fairly and accurately as possible to come up with
a recommendation that satisfies the interest of the MWSS which in the final analysis, shall bear the
consequences if the contract is not fully performed. Conclusions of the important issues are
hereunder presented,
“A.Establishing the validity of the Bid of the Lowest Bidder

“The deficiencies with respect to the bidding requirements enumerated in Section 4.2.1, page 4
were discussed to wit:
a) Authority of the Signing Official

b) Acknowledgment of Addenda received
c) Currency Exchange Rate
“After the discussion, the PBAC agreed that the deficiencies on the a) authority of the signing official
and the c) currency exchange rate may be waived as they do not affect the validity of the bid. PBAC
believes that the authority given to Fernando M. Sopot by the Consortium in the Joint Venture
Agreement substantially complies with Clause IB-20–7 of the Contract Documents. On the currency
exchange rate, in the absence of BF-14, the MWSS may provide the exchange rate.
_______________
39 Asbestos Cement Pipe (ACP)
Cast Iron Pipe (CIP)
Polyethylene Pipe (PE)
Polyvinyl Chloride Pipe (PVC)
Ductile Iron Pipe (DIP)

217
Steel Pipe (SP)
Fiberglass Pressure Pipe (FPP)
528
528
“With regard to the acknowledgement of Addendum No. 6, which is a material provision of the
documents, it is ascertained that the Joint Venture has not made allowance for the provision of said
Addenda. The Joint Venture indicated in the bid, as originally submitted, the acknowledgement of
Addenda #1 to #5 only. The alteration made during the bidding acknowledging Addendum #6 was
done after the 12 noon deadline of submittal of bids and, hence, cannot be entertained. Moreover,
the person who made the alteration is also not authorized to make such alteration and affix his
signature to the bid.
“It is’ therefore, the position of the PBAC that the deficiency in the acknowledgment of Addendum
No. 6 is a major defect and cannot be waived as it affects the validity of the bid of the Consortium.
The bid has to be rejected as non-complying.
“The lowest complying bid becomes the bid submitted by the second lowest Bidder, F.F. CRUZ, &
GO., INC. as discussed above.”40
PBAC was evidently guided by the rule that bids should be evaluated based on the required
documents submitted before, and not after, the opening of bids,41 that should further dispel any
indiscriminate or whimsical exercise of discretion on its part.
The MWSS, a government-owned and controlled corporation created by law through R.A. No.
6234,42 is charged with the construction, maintenance and operation of waterwork system to
insure an uninterrupted and adequate supply and distribution of potable water.43 It is the agency
that should be in the best position to evaluate the feasibility of the projections of the bidders and to
decide which bid is compatible with its development plans. The exercise of this discretion is a
policy decision that necessitates, among other things, prior inquiry, investigation, comparison,
evaluation, and deliberation—matters that can best be discharged by it.44 MWSS has passed
Resolution No. 32–9345 to likewise show its approval of the technical specifications for fiberglass.
All these should deserve weight.
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40 Rollo, pp. 432–433.
41 Republic v. Capulong, 199 SCRA 134.
42 67 O.G. No. 40, pp. 7866–7875.

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43 Sections 1 and 3 (f), R.A. No. 6234.
44 See Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President, 205 SCRA 705.
45 Rollo, p. 240.
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VOL. 240, JANUARY 25, 1995
529
In Razon Inc. v. PPA,46 we have said that neither this Court nor Congress, and now perhaps the
Ombudsman, could be expected to have the time and technical expertise to Iook into matters of this
nature, While we cannot go so far as to say that MWSS would have the monopoly of technical know-
how in the waterworks system, by the very nature of its functions, however, it obviously must enjoy
an advantage over other agencies on the subject at hand. In Felipe Ysmael, Jr. & Co., Inc. vs. Deputy
Executive Secretary,47 citing numerous cases,48 this Court has held:
“Thus, while the administration grapples with the complex and multifarious problems caused by
unbridled exploitation of these resources, the judiciary will stand clear. A long line of cases
establish the basic rule that the courts will not interfere in matters which are addressed to the
sound discretion of government agencies entrusted with the regulation of activities coming under
the special technical knowledge and training of such agencies.”
It stands to reason for, in Bureau Veritas v. Office of the President,49 we have further observed:
“The discretion to accept or reject a bid and award contracts is vested in the Government agencies
entrusted with that function. The discretion given to the authorities on this matter is of such wide
latitude that the Courts will not interfere therewith, unless it is apparent that it is used as a shield to
a fraudulent award.”
All considered, it is our view that the issues here involved, dealing, such as they do, on basically
technical matters, deserve
_______________
46 151 SCRA 233.
47 190 SCRA 673.
48 Lianga Bay Logging Co., Inc. vs. Enage, 152 SCRA 800; Lacuesta vs. Herrera, 62 SCRA 116;
Manuel vs. Villena, 37 SCRA 745; Villegas vs. Auditor General, 18 SCRA 877; Ganitano vs. Secretary
of Agriculture and Natural Resources, 16 SCRA 543; Suarez vs. Reyes, 7 SCRA 461; Pajo vs. Ago, 108
Phil. 905; Coloso vs. Board of Accountancy, 92 Phil. 938; Espinosa vs. Makalintal, 79 Phil. 134.
49 Supra., note 37.

219
530
530
to be disentangled from undue interference from courts and so from the Ombudsman as well
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED, The questioned 19 October 1992 Order of the Ombudsman
as well as its 01 March 1993 Order are hereby ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Regalado, Davide, Jr., Romero, Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason,
Puno, Kapunan and Mendoza, JJ., concur.
Francisco, J., Took no part in deliberations.
Petition granted. Orders annulled and set aside.
Notes.—The Ombudsman’s power under Section 15, paragraph (1) of Republic Act No. 6770 is not
an exclusive authority but rather a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged.
(Sanchez vs. Demetriou, 227 SCRA 627 [1993])
While it is a fundamental rule that an administrative agency has only such powers as are expressly
granted to it by law, it is likewise a settled rule that an administrative agency has also such powers
as are necessarily implied in the exercise of its express powers. (Laguna Lake Development
Authority vs. Court of Appeals, 231 SCRA 292 [1994])
Concerned Officials of the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS) vs. Vasquez,
240 SCRA 502, G.R. No. 109113 January 25, 1995
15. Lastimosa v. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497 (1995)
Administrative Law; Ombudsman; The power to investigate and prosecute include the investigation
and prosecution of any crime committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or
omissions complained of are related to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his
official duty.—The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate and prosecute on its own
or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient.” This power
has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime committed by a public
official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related to, or connected with,
or arise from, the performance of his official duty. It is enough that the act or omission was
committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a public official like a
municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
220
Same; Same; The Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance.—In the exercise
of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31 of the
Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides: Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.—
The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal,
state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to
assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Thosedesignated or deputized to assist
him as herein provided shall be under his supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
Same; Same; When a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the “supervision and control” of the
Ombudsman which means he is subject to the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve,
reverse or
_______________
* EN BANC.
498
498
Lastimosa vs. Vasquez
modify his (prosecutor’s) decision.—It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor
had already conducted the preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the
Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary
investigation had been given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the
nature of the offense to be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the
Ombudsman. This is because under §31 of the Ombudsman’s Act, when a prosecutor is deputized,
he comes under the “supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to
the power of the Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor’s)
decision. Petitioner cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as
directed by the Ombudsman.
Same; Same; Contempt; Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to “punish
for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the
same penalties provided therein.”—§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the
Ombudsman the power to “punish for contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under
the same procedure and with the same penalties provided therein.” There is no merit in the
argument that petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt
because their refusal arose out of an administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the
Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner herself says in another context, the preliminary
investigation of a case, of which the filing of an information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
Same; Same; Suspension; Prior notice and hearing not required since suspension not being a
penalty but only a preliminary step in an administrative investigation.—Petitioner contends that
her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her and Provincial
221
Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because, at any rate,
the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without merit. Prior
notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a preliminary step
in an administrative investigation.
Same; Same; Same; Whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the
Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him.—As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier,
however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the determination of the Ombudsman by
taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary hearing as in bail petitions in cases
involving capital offenses is not
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499
required. In rejecting a similar argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in
that case: The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to
decide when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770,
which expressly left such determination of guilt to the “judgment” of the Ombudsman on the basis
of the administrative complaint.
Same; Same; Same; Preventive suspension of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor is justified to the
end that the proper prosecution of the case may not be hampered.—Given the attitude displayed by
petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case against Mayor Rogelio
Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the proper prosecution of that
case may not be hampered. In addition, because the charges against the two prosecutors involve
grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these charges, if proven, can lead to a
dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in ordering their preventive suspension.
Same; Same; Same; The preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus according to
law.—On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that “the preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay.” Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus
according to law.
REGALADO,J., Concurring Opinion:
Administrative Law; Ombudsman; Suspension; The longer period of six (6) months for preventive
suspension is induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of
the Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterent
against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part.—The longer period of six (6)
months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was evidently induced by a desire
to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the Office of the Ombudsman over
public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent against illegal, unjust, improper and
222
inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by the Constitution to undertake such
task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable it to perform its mission. This
intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional provisions creating said office and
500
500
from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770. Significantly, it is the only body authorized to
investigate even officials removable by impeachment.
PETITION for review of an Order of the Ombudsman.
MENDOZA,J.:
This case requires us to determine the extent to which the Ombudsman may call upon government
prosecutors for assistance in the investigation and prosecution of criminal cases cognizable by his
office and the conditions under which he may do so.
Petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa is First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu. Because she and the
Provincial Prosecutor refused, or at any rate failed, to file a criminal charge as ordered by the
Ombudsman, an administrative complaint for grave misconduct, insubordination, gross neglect of
duty and maliciously refraining from prosecuting crime was filed against her and the Provincial
Prosecutor and a charge for indirect contempt was brought against them, both in the Office of the
Ombudsman. In the meantime the two were placed under preventive suspension. This is a petition
for certiorari and prohibition filed by petitioner to set aside the orders of the Ombudsman with
respect to the two proceedings.
The background of this case is as follows:
On February 18, 1993 Jessica Villacarlos Dayon, public health nurse of Santa Fe, Cebu, filed a
criminal complaint for frustrated rape and an administrative complaint for immoral acts, abuse of
authority and grave misconduct against the Municipal Mayor of Santa Fe, Rogelio Ilustrisimo.1 The
cases were filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Visayas where they were docketed as OMB-VIS-
(CRIM)-93-0140 and OMB-VIS-(ADM)-93-0036, respectively.
_______________
1 Petition for Certiorari and Prohibition, Annex A, Rollo, pp. 42-43.
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223
501
The complaint was assigned to a graft investigation officer who, after an investigation, found no
prima facie evidence and accordingly recommended the dismissal of the complaint. After reviewing
the matter, however, the Ombudsman, Hon. Conrado Vasquez, disapproved the recommendation
and instead directed that Mayor Ilustrisimo be charged with attempted rape in the Regional Trial
Court.2
Accordingly, in a letter dated May 17, 1994, the Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas, respondent Arturo
C. Mojica, referred the case to Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar for the “filing of
appropriate information with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City, ...”3 The case was eventually
assigned to herein petitioner, First Assistant Provincial Prosecutor Gloria G. Lastimosa.
It appears that petitioner conducted a preliminary investigation on the basis of which she found
that only acts of lasciviousness had been committed.4 With the approval of Provincial Prosecutor
Kintanar, she filed on July 4, 1994 an information for acts of lasciviousness against Mayor
Ilustrisimo with the Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Santa Fe.5
In two letters written to the Provincial Prosecutor on July 11, 1994 and July 22, 1994, Deputy
Ombudsman Mojica inquired as to any action taken on the previous referral of the case, more
specifically the directive of the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.6
As no case for attempted rape had been filed by the Prosecutor’s Office, Deputy Ombudsman Mojica
ordered on July 27, 1994 Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and petitioner Lastimosa to show cause
why they should not be punished for contempt for “refusing and failing to obey the lawful
directives” of the Office of the Ombudsman.7
_______________
2 Annex B, Rollo, pp. 47-52.
3 Annex D, Rollo, p. 54.
4 Annex H, Rollo, pp. 59-69.
5 Annex I, Rollo, p. 70.
6 Annex E & F, Rollo, pp. 55-57.
7 Rollo, p. 72.
502
502

224
For this purpose a hearing was set on August 1, 1994. Petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor
were given until August 3, 1994 within which to submit their answer.8 An answer9 was timely filed
by them and hearings were thereupon conducted. It appears that earlier, on July 22, 1994, two
cases had been filed against the two prosecutors with the Office of the Ombudsman for Visayas by
Julian Menchavez, a resident of Santa Fe, Cebu. One was an administrative complaint for violation of
Republic Act No. 6713 and P.D. No. 807 (the Civil Service Law)10 and another one was a criminal
complaint for violation of §3(e) of Republic Act No. 3019 and Art. 208 of the Revised Penal Code.11
The complaints were based on the alleged refusal of petitioner and Kintanar to obey the orders of
the Ombudsman to charge Mayor Ilustrisimo with attempted rape.
In the administrative case (OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189) respondent Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas

Mojica issued an order on August 15, 1994, placing petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa and Provincial
Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months,12
pursuant to Rule 111, §9 of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman (Administrative
Order No. 7), in relation to §24 of R.A. No. 6770. The order was approved by Ombudsman Conrado
M. Vasquez on August 16, 1994 and on August 18, 1994 Acting Secretary of Justice Ramon J. Liwag
designated Eduardo Concepcion of Region VII as Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
On the other hand, the Graft Investigation Officer II, Edgardo G. Canton, issued orders13 in the two
cases, directing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar to submit their counter affidavits and
controverting evidence.
On September 6, 1994, petitioner Gloria G. Lastimosa filed the present petition for certiorari and
prohibition to set aside the following orders of the Office of the Ombudsman and Depart-
_______________
8 Annex O, Rollo, p. 80.
9 Annex Q, Rollo, pp. 83-90.
10 OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189.
11 OMB-VIS-(CRIM)-94-0475.
12 Annex V, Rollo, pp. 95-96.
13 Annexes FF and GG, Rollo, pp. 110 and 118.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
503
ment of Justice:
225
(a) Letter dated May 17, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman for Visayas Arturo C. Mojica and related
orders, referring to the Office of the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor the records of OMB-VIS-CRIM-93-
0140, entitled Jessica V. Dayon vs. Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, “for filing of the appropriate action
(for Attempted Rape) with the Regional Trial Court of Danao City.”
(b) Order dated July 27, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica and related orders directing petitioner
and Cebu Provincial Prosecutor Oliveros E. Kintanar to explain in writing within three (3) days
from receipt why they should not be punished for Indirect Contempt of the Office of the
Ombudsman “for refusing and failing. . . to file the appropriate Information for Attempted Rape
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.”
(c) The 1st Indorsement dated August 9, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Ramon J. Liwag, ordering
the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to comply with the directive of the Office of the Ombudsman
that a charge for attempted rape be filed against respondent Mayor Ilustrisimo in recognition of the
authority of said Office.
(d) Order dated August 15, 1994 of Deputy Ombudsman Mojica, duly approved by Ombudsman
Conrado Vasquez, and related orders in OMB-VIS-(ADM)-94-0189, entitled Julian Menchavez vs.
Oliveros Kintanar and Gloria Lastimosa, placing petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar
under preventive suspension for a period of six (6) months, without pay.
(e) The 1st Indorsement dated August 18, 1994 of Acting Justice Secretary Liwag directing Assistant
Regional State Prosecutor Eduardo O. Concepcion (Region VII) to implement the letter dated August
15, 1994 of Ombudsman Vasquez, together with the Order dated August 15, 1994, placing
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension.
(f) Department Order No. 259 issued by Acting Secretary Liwag on August 18, 1994, designating
Assistant Regional State Prosecutor Concepcion Acting Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu.
Petitioner raises a number of issues which will be discussed not necessarily in the order they are
stated in the petition.
I.
The pivotal question in this case is whether the Office of the Ombudsman has the power to call on
the Provincial Prosecutor
504
504
to assist it in the prosecution of the case for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo. Lastimosa
claims that the Office of the Ombudsman and the prosecutor’s office have concurrent authority to
investigate public officers or employees and that when the former first took cognizance of the case
against Mayor Ilustrisimo, it did so to the exclusion of the latter. It then became the duty of the
Ombudsman’s office, according to petitioner, to finish the preliminary investigation by filing the
information in court instead of asking the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor to do so. Petitioner
contends that the preparation and filing of the information were part and parcel of the preliminary
investigation assumed by the Office of the Ombudsman and the filing of information in court could
not be delegated by it to the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor. Petitioner defends her actuations in
conducting a preliminary investigation as having been made necessary by the insistence of the
Ombudsman to delegate the filing of the case to her office.
226
In any event, petitioner contends, the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case
against the mayor because the crime involved (rape) was not committed in relation to a public
office. For this reason it is argued that the Office of the Ombudsman has no authority to place her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar under preventive suspension for refusing to follow his orders
and to cite them for indirect contempt for such refusal.
Petitioner’s contention has no merit. The Office of the Ombudsman has the power to “investigate
and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.”14 This power has been held to include the investigation and prosecution of any crime
committed by a public official regardless of whether the acts or omissions complained of are related
to, or connected with, or arise from, the performance of his official duty.15 It is enough that the act
or omission was committed by a public official. Hence, the crime of rape, when committed by a
public
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14 Ombudsman Act of 1989, (R.A. No. 6770) §15(1).
15 Deloso v. Domingo, 191 SCRA 545 (1990).
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official like a municipal mayor, is within the power of the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute.
In the exercise of his power, the Ombudsman is authorized to call on prosecutors for assistance. §31
of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770) provides:
Designation of Investigators and Prosecutors.—The Ombudsman may utilize the personnel of his
office and/or designate or deputize any fiscal, state prosecutor or lawyer in the government service
to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist in the investigation and prosecution of certain
cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him as herein provided shall be under his
supervision and control. (Emphasis added)
It was on the basis of this provision that Ombudsman Conrado Vasquez and Deputy Ombudsman
Arturo C. Mojica ordered the Provincial Prosecutor of Cebu to file an information for attempted
rape against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo.
It does not matter that the Office of the Provincial Prosecutor had already conducted the
preliminary investigation and all that remained to be done was for the Office of the Provincial
Prosecutor to file the corresponding case in court. Even if the preliminary investigation had been
given over to the Provincial Prosecutor to conduct, his determination of the nature of the offense to
be charged would still be subject to the approval of the Office of the Ombudsman. This is because
227
under §31 of the Ombudsman’s Act, when a prosecutor is deputized, he comes under the
“supervision and control” of the Ombudsman which means that he is subject to the power of the
Ombudsman to direct, review, approve, reverse or modify his (prosecutor’s) decision.16 Petitioner
cannot legally act on her own and refuse to prepare and file the information as directed by the
Ombudsman.
II.
The records show that despite repeated orders of the Ombudsman, petitioner refused to file an
information for attempted rape against Mayor Ilustrisimo, insisting that after investigating the
_______________
16 ADMINISTRATIVE CODE OF 1987, Bk IV, Ch. 7, §38(1).
506
506
complaint in the case she found that he had committed only acts of lasciviousness.
§15(g) of the Ombudsman Act gives the Office of the Ombudsman the power to “punish for
contempt, in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and with the same
penalties provided therein.” There is no merit in the argument that petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar cannot be held liable for contempt because their refusal arose out of an
administrative, rather than judicial, proceeding before the Office of the Ombudsman. As petitioner
herself says in another context, the preliminary investigation of a case, of which the filing of an
information is a part, is quasi judicial in character.
Whether petitioner’s refusal to follow the Ombudsman’s orders constitutes a defiance, disobedience
or resistance of a lawful process, order or command of the Ombudsman thus making her liable for
indirect contempt under Rule 71, §3 of the Rules of Court is for respondents to determine after
appropriate hearing. At this point it is important only to note the existence of the contempt power
of the Ombudsman as a means of enforcing his lawful orders.
III.
Neither is there any doubt as to the power of the Ombudsman to discipline petitioner should it be
found that she is guilty of grave misconduct, insubordination and/or neglect of duty, nor of the
Ombudsman’s power to place her in the meantime under preventive suspension. The pertinent
provisions of the Ombudsman Act of 1989 state:
§21.Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall

have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
228
§24. Preventive Suspension.—The Ombudsman or his Deputy may suspend any officer or employee
under his authority pending an investigation, if in his judgment the evidence of guilt is strong, and
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, op-
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
507
pression or grave misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty; (b) the charges would warrant
removal from the service; or (c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case
filed against him.
The preventive suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the
Ombudsman but not more than six months, without pay, except when the delay in the disposition of
the case by the Office of the Ombudsman is due to the fault, negligence or petition of the
respondent, in which case the period of such delay shall not be counted in computing the period of
suspension herein provided.
A.
Petitioner contends that her suspension is invalid because the order was issued without giving her
and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar the opportunity to refute the charges against them and because,
at any rate, the evidence against them is not strong as required by §24. The contention is without
merit. Prior notice and hearing is not required, such suspension not being a penalty but only a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. As held in Nera v. Garcia:17
In connection with the suspension of petitioner before he could file his answer to the
administrative complaint, suffice it to say that the suspension was not a punishment or penalty for
the acts of dishonesty and misconduct in office, but only as a preventive measure. Suspension is a
preliminary step in an administrative investigation. If after such investigation, the charges are
established and the person investigated is found guilty of acts warranting his removal, then he is
removed or dismissed. This is the penalty. There is, therefore, nothing improper in suspending an
officer pending his investigation and before the charges against him are heard and be given an
opportunity to prove his innocence. (Emphasis added)
It is true that, under §24 of the Ombudsman’s Act, to justify the preventive suspension of a public
official, the evidence against him should be strong, and any of the following circumstances is
present:
_______________
17 106 Phil. 1031 (1960). Accord, Buenaseda v. Flavier, 226 SCRA 645 (1993).
508
508
229
(a) the charge against such officer or employee involves dishonesty, oppression or grave
misconduct or neglect in the performance of duty;
(b) the charges would warrant removal from the service; or
(c) the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the case filed against him.
As held in Buenaseda v. Flavier,18 however, whether the evidence of guilt is strong is left to the
determination of the Ombudsman by taking into account the evidence before him. A preliminary
hearing as in bail petitions in cases involving capital offenses is not required. In rejecting a similar
argument as that made by petitioner in this case, this Court said in that case:
The import of the Nera decision is that the disciplining authority is given the discretion to decide
when the evidence of guilt is strong. This fact is bolstered by Section 24 of R.A. No. 6770, which
expressly left such determination of guilt to the “judgment” of the Ombudsman on the basis of the
administrative complaint ...19
In this case, respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica justified the preventive suspension of
petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar on the following grounds:
A careful assessment of the facts and circumstances of the herein cases and the records pertaining
thereto against respondents [Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] clearly leads to
the conclusion that the evidence on record of guilt is strong and the charges involved offenses of
grave misconduct, gross neglect of duty and dishonesty which will warrant respondents [Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] removal from the service. Moreover, considering the
unabashed attitude of respondents in openly announcing various false pretexts and alibis to justify
their stubborn disregard for the lawful directives of the Ombudsman as their official position in
their pleadings filed in OMB-VIS-0-94-0478 and in print and broadcast media, the probability is
strong that public service more particularly in the prosecution of cases referred by the Office of the
Ombudsman to the Cebu Provincial Prosecutor’s office will be disrupted and prejudiced and the
records of said cases even be tampered with if respondents
_______________
18 226 SCRA 645 (1993).
19 At 655.
509
VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
509
[Provincial Prosecutor Kintanar and herein petitioner] are allowed to stay in the Cebu Provincial
Prosecutor’s Office during the pendency of these proceedings.
230
Indeed respondent Deputy Ombudsman Mojica had personal knowledge of the facts justifying the
preventive suspension of petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor since the acts alleged in the
administrative complaint against them were done in the course of their official transaction with the
Office of the Ombudsman. The administrative complaint against petitioner and Provincial
Prosecutor Kintanar was filed in connection with their designation as deputies of the Ombudsman
in the prosecution of a criminal case against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo. Respondent Deputy
Ombudsman did not have to go far to verify the matters alleged in the administrative complaint to
determine whether the evidence of guilt of petitioner and Provincial Prosecutor was strong for the
purpose of placing them under preventive suspension.
Given the attitude displayed by petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor toward the criminal case
against Mayor Rogelio Ilustrisimo, their preventive suspension is justified to the end that the
proper prosecution of that case may not be hampered.20 In addition, because the charges against
the two prosecutors involve grave misconduct, insubordination and neglect of duty and these
charges, if proven, can lead to a dismissal from public office, the Ombudsman was justified in
ordering their preventive suspension.
B.
Petitioner questions her preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay and contends that it
should only be for ninety (90) days on the basis of cases decided by this Court. Petitioner is in error.
She is referring to cases where the law is either silent or expressly limits the period of suspension
to ninety (90) days. With respect to the first situation, we ruled in the case of Gonzaga v.
Sandiganbayan21 that—
_______________
20 Cf. Lacson v. Roque, 92 Phil. 456, 469 (1953).
21 201 SCRA 417, 427-8 (1991).
510
510
To the extent that there may be cases of indefinite suspension imposed either under Section 13 of
Rep. Act 3019, or Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807, it is best for the guidance of all concerned that this
Court set forth the rules on the period of preventive suspension under the aforementioned laws, as
follows:
1. Preventive suspension under Section 13, Rep. Act 3019 as amended shall be limited to a
maximum period of ninety (90) days, from issuances thereof, and this applies to all public officers,
(as defined in Section 2(b) of Rep. Act 3019) who are validly charged under said Act.
2. Preventive suspension under Section 42 of Pres. Decree 807 shall apply to all officers or
employees whose positions are embraced in theCivil Service, as provided under Sections 3 and 4 of
said Pres. Decree 807, and shall be limited to a maximum period of ninety (90) days from issuance,
except where there is delay in the disposition of the case, which is due to the fault, negligence or
231
petition of the respondent, in which case the period of delay shall both be counted in computing the
period of suspension herein stated; provided that if the person suspended is a presidential
appointee, the continuance of his suspension shall be for a reasonable time as the circumstances of
the case may warrant.
On the other hand, petitioner and the Provincial Prosecutor were placed under preventive
suspension pursuant to §24 of the Ombudsman Act which expressly provides that “the preventive
suspension shall continue until the case is terminated by the Office of the Ombudsman but not more
than six months, without pay.” Their preventive suspension for six (6) months without pay is thus
according to law.
C.
Nor is there merit in petitioner’s claim that the contempt charge should first be resolved before any
action in the administrative complaint case can be taken because the contempt case involves a
prejudicial question. There is simply no basis for this contention. The two cases arose out of the
same act or omission and may proceed hand in hand, or one can be heard before the other.
Whatever order is followed will not really matter.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the Motion to Lift Order of Preventive
Suspension is DENIED.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
511
SO ORDERED.
Narvasa (C.J.), Feliciano, Padilla, Bidin, Davide, Jr., Bellosillo, Melo, Quiason, Puno, Vitug, Kapunan
and Francisco, JJ., concur.
Regalado, J., Pls. see concurring opinion.
Romero, J., On leave.
CONCURRING OPINION
REGALADO,J.:
I concur and welcome this opportunity to make some observations on the matter of the power of
the Ombudsman to preventively suspend petitioner for six (6) months without pay, and which
petitioner assails in the case at bar.
It would, of course, be a handy expedient to just refer petitioner to the provisions of Section 24 of
Republic Act No. 6770 which expressly grants that authority to respondent Ombudsman.
Conveniently, we would merely need to remind petitioner that for this Court to limit such authority
to suspend to a lesser period would, in effect, be constitutive of judicial legislation. But I will go a
little further by essaying the rationale for such conferment of a more extended authority to the
232
Ombudsman on the issue of preventive suspension,vis-a-vis the provisions on preventive

suspension in other enactments, and thereby dispel lingering doubts or misgivings thereon.
It is true that the Civil Service Decree allows a maximum preventive suspension of only ninety (90)
days.1 However, a comparison of the grounds therefor2 with those provided for in the Ombudsman
Act3 will readily show that there is in the latter the added requirement that the evidence of guilt is
strong and the additional ground that “the respondent’s continued stay in office may prejudice the
case filed against him.” Further, in the
_______________
1 Section 42, Presidential Decree No. 807.
2 Section 41, id.
3 Section 24, Republic Act No. 6770.
512
512
aforecited Section 41 of the Civil Service Decree, preventive suspension may be imposed on the
mere simple showing that the charge involves dishonesty, oppression or grave misconduct, neglect
in the performance of duty, or if there are reasons to believe that the respondent is guilty of charges
which would warrant his removal from the service; whereas in Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770,
it is required that such charges must be supported by strong evidence of guilt in order to justify
preventive suspension.
On the other hand, the still shorter period of sixty (60) days prescribed in the Local Government
Code of 19914 as the maximum period for the preventive suspension of local elective officials is
justifiable and deemed sufficient not only because the respondent involved is elected by the people,
but more precisely because such preventive suspension may only be ordered “after the issues are
joined.” That means that before the order of suspension is issued, all the preliminary requirements
and exchanges had been completed and the respondent had already filed his counter-affidavits to
the affidavits of the complainant and the latter’s witnesses. At that stage, the case is ready for
resolution if the parties would not opt for a formal hearing.
The preparatory procedures before such stage is reached undoubtedly necessitate and consume a
lot of time. Yet, it will be noted that those preliminary steps are included in the case of the period of
preventive suspension ordered even before issues are joined, as in preventive suspension by the
Ombudsman pursuant to the aforecited Section 24 of Republic Act No. 6770. They conceivably
include the service of the subpoena or order for the respondent to file his counter-affidavits, the
usual resort to motions for extension of time to comply with the same, the improvident recourse to
the Supreme Court to suspend, annul or otherwise delay the proceedings, as well as the filing and
resolution of motions to dismiss or for a bill of particulars or for the inhibition of the investigating
233
officer, the denial of which motions is often also brought all over again to this Court on petitions for
certiorari.
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VOL. 243, APRIL 6, 1995
513
An illustration of how the proceedings can be delayed by such procedural maneuvers is afforded by
the case of Buenaseda, et al. vs. Flavier, et al.,5 the decision in which was ultimately promulgated by
this Court on September 21, 1993. The petitioners therein questioned through repeated resourceful
submissions the order of preventive suspension issued by the Ombudsman on January 7, 1992 and
it took more than twenty (20) months before said order could eventually be reviewed on the merits
and finally sustained by the Supreme Court.
That is not all. Even after the formal hearing is scheduled, respondents can easily resort to the same
dilatory tactics usually employed by an accused in regular court trials in criminal actions. Such
stratagems can obviously result in the continued occupancy by the respondent of his office and, in
the language of the law, could “prejudice the case filed against him.”
The longer period of six (6) months for preventive suspension under Republic Act No. 6770 was
evidently induced by a desire to more meaningfully emphasize and implement the authority of the
Office of the Ombudsman over public officials and employees in order to serve as a deterrent
against illegal, unjust, improper and inefficient conduct on their part. As the agency mandated by
the Constitution to undertake such task, it was invested with the corresponding authority to enable
it to perform its mission. This intention is easily deducible from the pertinent constitutional
provisions creating said office and from the express provisions of Republic Act No. 6770.
Significantly, it is the only body authorized to investigate even officials removable by
impeachment.6
For purposes of the present case, therefore, and specifically on the issue subject of this concurring
opinion, it would be advisable to recall what we said in Buenaseda, to wit:
“The purpose of RA No. 6770 is to give the Ombudsman such powers as he may need to perform
efficiently the task committed to him by the Constitution. Such being the case, said statute,
particularly its provisions dealing with procedure, should be given such interpretation that will
effectuate the purposes and objective of the Constitution. Any interpretation that will hamper the
work of the Ombudsman should be
_______________
5 G.R. No. 196719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645.

234
514
514
Alforte vs. Santos
avoided.
“A statute granting powers to an agency created by the Constitution should be liberally construed
for the advancement of the purposes and objectives for which it was created (Cf. Department of
Public Utilities v. Arkansas, Louisiana Gas, Co., 200 Ark. 983, 142 S.W. [2d] 213 [1940]; Wallace v.
Feehan, 206 Ind. 522, 190 N.E. 438 [1934]).”
On the foregoing considerations, which are much a matter of judicial and legislative experience, it is
puerile for petitioner to impugn the expanded authority of preventive suspension as now granted
by law to the Ombudsman. In fact, in certain situations, the maximum allowable period may even
prove too short to subserve the intended purpose of the law.
Petition dismissed. Lastimosa vs. Vasquez, 243 SCRA 497, G.R. No. 116801 April 6, 1995
16. Dolalas v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 118808, December 24, 1996
Under consideration is the petition for certiorari with prayer for preliminary injunction and/or
restraining order dated January 16, 1995. Petitioners, Judge Ana Maria I. Dolalas, Evelyn K. Obido
and Wilberto B. Carriedo — Presiding Judge, Clerk of Court and Clerk II, respectively of the
Municipal Circuit Trial Court of Kabasalan, Zamboanga del Sur, were charged "administratively" by
private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. for "miscarriage of justice, dishonesty, gross neglect of
duty, unnecessary delay in the administration of justice and for failure to prosecute Criminal Case
no. 5881 for an unreasonable length of time" before public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao.
The letter-complaint addressed to the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao dated July 6, 1994 arose
out of said criminal case of alarms and scandals filed against private respondent by a police officer.
Private respondent alleged that after submitting his counter-affidavit relative to the said criminal
case before petitioner's court, there has been no pre-conference, arraignment or pre-trial held or
conducted by petitioner judge. Private respondent claimed that the said criminal case was
maliciously filed by one P/Sgt. Salutillo in connivance with petitioner judge in order to discourage
the former from instituting a criminal complaint against said police officer's men for abuse of
authority and police brutality with physical injury.1
Private respondent also claimed that said criminal case filed against him has been unnecessarily
delayed in that P/Sgt. Salutillo and petitioner-judge "totally failed to prosecute" their own malicious
action within a reasonable length of time thus prejudicing the constitutional right of the former to
235
an impartial investigation and a fair and speedy trial. Said criminal case against private respondent
also held in abeyance his own complaint against the police officers allegedly to his prejudice.2
On the basis of the letter-complaint filed by herein private respondent, Graft Investigation Officer I
Melinda Alconsel Dayanghirang of public respondent Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao directed
petitioners to submit their respective counter-affidavits. Petitioners' motion to dismiss dated
September 14, 1994 as well as their motion for reconsideration dated December 2, 1994 were
denied by public respondent, hence the petition before this Court.
In this petition, petitioners pray that for the preservation of their rights pending this proceeding, a
preliminary injunction and/or restraining order be issued against the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao commanding said office to desist from further proceeding with the case against the
petitioners. A temporary restraining order was issued by this Court in a resolution dated May 23,
1995.
Petitioner was basically being charged with "undue delay in the disposition of the said criminal
case" filed before petitioner's court. The issue posed, therefore, in this petition is whether or not the
Office of the Ombudsman may take cognizance of the complaint against petitioner for purposes of
investigation and possible prosecution in accordance with its mandate under Section 13 (1) and (2)
of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution3 for alleged violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices
Act.4
Petitioner-judge contends that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to initiate an
investigation into the alleged "undue delay in the disposition of the case" as said charge relates to a
judge's performance of her official duties over which the Supreme Court has administrative control
and supervision, as mandated under section 6, Rule VIII of the 1987 Constitution.5 Public
respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao, however, contends that referral to the Supreme Court is not
essential in this case as what will be investigated is not whether there was undue delay in the
disposition of a simple criminal case for five years, which it admits is administrative in nature. It
added that what is sought to be determined by the investigation is whether or not any undue delay
in the disposition of the alarms and scandals case resulted in injury to private respondent through
manifest partiality, evident bad faith or gross inexcusable negligence and/or undue advantage to
any party, in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act.
This Court agrees with petitioner-judge. The complaint against petitioner-judge before the Office of
the Ombudsman is basically administrative in nature. In essence, petitioner-judge is being charged
with having violated Rule 1.02, Canon 16 and Rule 3.05, Canon 37 of the Code of Judicial Conduct.
It must be borne in mind that the resolution of the administrative charge of unduly delaying the
disposition of the said criminal case involves the determination of whether, in resolving the alarms
and scandals case, petitioner-judge acted in accordance with the guidelines provided in the Rules of
Court and in the Administrative Circulars in pursuance of the ideals embodied in the Code of
Judicial Conduct. Such is clearly an administrative matter. Unquestionably, this Court is mandated
of the 1987 Constitution to assume under section 6, Article VIII of the 1987 Constitution to assume
administrative supervision over all courts and the personnel thereof.
This Court, in the case of Sanz Maceda v. Vasquez, 221 SCRA 464, held that:
236
Article VIII, section 6 of the 1987 Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court
administrative supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of
the Court of Appeals down to the lowest municipal trial court clerk. By virtue of this power,
it is only the Supreme Court that can oversee the judge's and court personnel's compliance
with all laws, and take the proper administrative action against them if they commit any
violation thereof. No Other branch of government may intrude into this power, without
running afoul of the doctrine of separation of powers.
Public respondent Ombudsman cannot justify its investigation of petitioner on the powers
granted to it by the Constitution, for such a justification not only runs counter to the specific
mandate of the Constitution granting supervisory powers to the Supreme Court over all
courts and their personnel, but likewise undermines the independence of the judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao is DIRECTED to

REFER the complaint filed by private respondent Benjamin Villarante, Jr. to this Court for
appropriate action.
SO ORDERED.
17. BIR v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 115103, April 11, 2002
Graft Investigation Officer II Christopher S. Soquilon of the Office of the Ombudsman

(OMBUDSMAN, for brevity) received information from an informer-for-reward regarding allegedly
anomalous grant of tax refunds to Distillera Limtuaco & Co., Inc. (Limtuaco, for brevity) and La
Tondea Distilleries, Inc. Upon receipt of the information, Soquilon recommended[1] to then
Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez that the case be docketed and subsequently assigned to him for
investigation.[2]
On November 29, 1993, the Ombudsman issued a subpoena duces tecum[3] addressed to Atty.
Millard Mansequiao of the Legal Department of the Bureau of Internal Revenue (BIR) ordering him
to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
The BIR, through Assistant Commissioner for Legal Service Jaime M. Maza, asked that it be
excused from complying with the subpoena duces tecum because (a) the Limtuaco case was pending
investigation by Graft Investigation Officer II Napoleon S. Baldrias; and (b) the investigation thereof
and that of La Tondea was mooted when the Sandiganbayan ruled in People v. Larin[4] that the legal
issue was no longer in question since the BIR had ruled that the ad valorem taxes were erroneously
paid and could therefore be the proper subject of a claim for tax credit.[5]
Without resolving the issues raised by the BIR, the Ombudsman issued another subpoena duces
tecum, dated December 9, 1993, addressed to BIR Commissioner Liwayway Vinzons-Chato ordering
her to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring the complete original case dockets of the refunds
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.[6]
The BIR moved to vacate the subpoena duces tecum arguing that (a) the second subpoena duces
tecum was issued without first resolving the issues raised in its Manifestation and Motion dated
December 8, 1993; (b) the documents required to be produced were already submitted to Graft
Investigation Officer II Baldrias; (c) the issue of the tax credit of ad valorem taxes has already been
resolved as proper by the Sandiganbayan; (d) the subpoena duces tecum partook of the nature of an
237
omnibus subpoena because it did not specifically described the particular documents to be
produced; (e) there was no clear showing that the tax case dockets sought to be produced
contained evidence material to the inquiry; (f) compliance with the subpoena duces tecum would
violate Sec. 269[7] of the National Internal Revenue Code (NLRC) on unlawful divulgence of trade
secrets and Sec. 277[8] on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade secrets; and (g) Limtuaco and La
Tondea had the right to rely on the correctness and conclusiveness of the decisions of the
Commissioner of Internal Revenue.[9]
The Ombudsman denied[10] the Motion to Vacate the Subpoena Duces Tecum, pointing out that
the Limtuaco tax refund case then assigned to Baldrias was already referred to the Fact-Finding and
Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman for consolidation with Case No. OMB-0-93-3248. The
Ombudsman also claimed that the documents submitted by the BIR to Baldrias were incomplete
and not certified. It insisted that the issuance of the subpoena duces tecum was not a fishing
expedition considering that the documents required for production were clearly and particularly
specified.
The BIR moved to reconsider[11] the respondents Order dated February 15, 1994 alleging that
(a) the matter subject of the investigation was beyond the scope of the jurisdiction of the
Ombudsman; (b) the subpoena duces tecum was not properly issued in accordance with law; and
(c) non-compliance thereto was justifiable. The BIR averred it had the exclusive authority whether
to grant a tax credit and that the jurisdiction to review the same was lodged with the Court of Tax
Appeals and not with the Ombudsman.
According to the BIR, for a subpoena duces tecum to be properly issued in accordance with law,
there must first be a pending action because the power to issue a subpoena duces tecum is not an
independent proceeding. The BIR noted that the Ombudsman issued the assailed subpoena duces
tecum based only on the information obtained from an informer-for-reward and the report of Asst.
Comm. Imelda L. Reyes. The BIR added that the subpoena duces tecum suffered from a legal
infirmity for not specifically describing the documents sought to be produced.
Finding no valid reason to reverse its Order dated February 15, 1994, the Ombudsman denied
the motion for reconsideration and reiterated its directive to the BIR to produce the
documents.[12] Instead of complying, the BIR manifested its intention to elevate the case on
certiorari to this Court.[13] The Ombudsman thus ordered Asst. Comm. Maza to show cause why he
should not be cited for contempt for contumacious refusal to comply with the subpoena duces
tecum.[14]
However, before the expiration of the period within which Asst. Comm. Maza was required to
file a reply to the show cause order of the Ombudsman, the BIR filed before this Court the instant
Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition and Preliminary Injunction and Temporary Restraining Order.[15]
Petitioner BIR insists that the investigative power of the Ombudsman is not
unbridled. Particularly on the issue of tax refunds, the BIR maintains that the Ombudsman could
validly exercise its power to investigate only when there exists an appropriate case and subject to
the limitations provided by law.[16] Petitioner opines that the fact-finding investigation by the
Ombudsman is not the proper case as it is only a step preliminary to the filing of recovery actions on
the tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
This Court is not persuaded. No less than the 1987 Constitution enjoins that the Ombudsman
and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints filed in any form or
manneragainst public officials or employees of the government, or any subdivision, agency or
instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled corporations, and shall, in
appropriate case, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.[17]
238
Clearly, there is no requirement of a pending action before the Ombudsman could wield its
investigative power. The Ombudsman could resort to its investigative prerogative on its own[18] or
upon a complaint filed in any form or manner. Even when the complaint is verbal or written,
unsigned or unverified, the Ombudsman could, on its own, initiate the investigation.[19] Thus
There can be no objection to this procedure in the Office of the Ombudsman where anonymous
letters suffice to start an investigation because it is provided in the Constitution itself. In the second
place, it is apparent that in permitting the filing of complaints in any form and manner, the framers
of the Constitution took into account the well-known reticence of the people which keep them from
complaining against official wrongdoings. As this Court had occasion to point out, the Office of the
Ombudsman is different from other investigatory and prosecutory agencies of the government
because those subject to its jurisdiction are public officials who, through official pressure and
influence, can quash, delay or dismiss investigations held against them. On the other hand
complainants are more often than not poor and simple folk who cannot afford to hire lawyers.[20]
The term in an appropriate case has already been clarified by this Court in Almonte v.
Vasquez,[21] thus
Rather than referring to the form of complaints, therefore, the phrase in an appropriate case in Art.
XI, 12 means any case concerning official act or omission which is alleged to be illegal, unjust,
improper, or inefficient, The phrase subject to such limitations as may be provided by law refers to
such limitations as may be provided by Congress or, in the absence thereof, to such limitations as
may be imposed by courts.
Plainly, the pendency of an action is not a prerequisite before the Ombudsman can start its
own investigation.
Petitioner next avers that the determination of granting tax refunds falls within its exclusive
expertise and jurisdiction and that its findings could no longer be disturbed by the Ombudsman
purportedly through its investigative power as it was a valid exercise of discretion. Petitioner
suggests that what respondent should have done was to appeal its decision of granting tax credits
to Limtuaco and La Tondea to the Court of Tax Appeals since it is the proper forum to review the
decisions of the Commissioner of Internal Revenue.
This contention of the BIR is baseless. The power to investigate and to prosecute which was
granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and unqualified.[22] The Ombudsman Act makes it
perfectly clear that the jurisdiction of the Ombudsman encompasses all kinds of malfeasance,
misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee xxx during his
tenure of office.[23]
Concededly, the determination of whether to grant a tax refund falls within the exclusive
expertise of the BIR. Nonetheless, when there is a suspicion of even just a tinge of impropriety in
the grant of the same, the Ombudsman could rightfully ascertain whether the determination was
done in accordance with law and identify the persons who may be held responsible thereto. In that
sense, the Ombudsman could not be accused of unlawfully intruding into and intervening with the
BIRs exercise of discretion.
As correctly posited by the Office of the Solicitor General
xxx (T)he Ombudsman undertook the investigation not as an appellate body exercising the power
to review decisions or rulings rendered by a subordinate body, with the end view of affirming or
239
reversing the same, but as an investigative agency tasked to discharge the role as protector of the
people[24] pursuant to his authority to investigate xxx any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or
inefficient.[25] The OSG insists that the mere finality of petitioners ruling on the subject of tax refund
cases is not a legal impediment to the exercise of respondents investigative authority under the
Constitution and its Charter (RA 6770) which xxx is so encompassing as to include all kinds of
malfeasance, misfeasance and nonfeasance that have been committed by any officer or employee
during his tenure of office.[26]
Indeed, the clause any [illegal] act or omission of any public official is broad enough to embrace
any crime committed by a public official. The law does not qualify the nature of the illegal act or
omission of the public official or employee that the Ombudsman may investigate. It does not
require that the act or omission be related to or be connected with or arise from the performance of
official duty.[27]
Petitioner fears that the fact-finding investigation being conducted by respondent would only
amount to a general inquisitorial examination on the case dockets with a view to search through
them to gather evidence[28] considering that the subpoena duces tecum did not describe with
particularity the documents sought to be produced.
This Court is unimpressed. We agree with the view taken by the Solicitor General that the
assailed subpoena duces tecum indeed particularly and sufficiently described the records to be
produced. There is every indication that petitioner knew precisely what records were being
referred to as it even suggested that the tax dockets sought to be produced may not contain
evidence material to the inquiry and that it has already submitted the same to Baldrias.
The records do not show how the production of the subpoenaed documents would necessarily
contravene Sec. 269[29] of the National Internal Revenue Code (NIRC) on unlawful divulgence of
trade secrets and Sec. 277[30] of the same Code on procuring unlawful divulgence of trade
secrets. The documents sought to be produced were only the case dockets of the tax
refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea which are public records, and the subpoena duces
tecum were directed to the public officials who have the official custody of the said records. We find
no valid reason why the trade secrets of Limtuaco and La Tondea would be unnecessarily disclosed
if such official records, subject of the subpoena duces tecum, were to be produced by the petitioner
BIR to respondent Office of the Ombudsman.
Assuming, for the sake of argument, that the case dockets of the tax refunds which were
granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea contain trade secrets, that fact, however, would not justify their
non-production before the Ombudsman. As this Court has underscored in Almote v. Vasquez[31] -
At common law a governmental privilege against disclosure is recognized with respect to state
secrets bearing on military, diplomatic and similar matters. This privilege is based upon public
interest of such paramount importance as in and of itself transcending the individual interests of a
private citizen, even though, as a consequence thereof, the plaintiff cannot enforce his legal rights
xxx
In the case at bar, there is no claim that military or diplomatic secrets will be disclosed by the
production of records pertaining to the personnel of EIB. Indeed, EIIBs function is the gathering and
evaluation of intelligence reports and information regarding illegal activities affecting the national
economy, such as, but not limited to economic sabotage, smuggling, tax evasion, dollar
salting. Consequently, while in cases which involve state secrets it may be sufficient to determine
240
from the circumstances of the case that there is reasonable danger that compulsion of the evidence
will expose military maters without compelling production, no similar excuse can be made for a
privilege resting on other consideration.
Above all, even if the subpoenaed documents are treated as presumptively privileged, this decision
would only justify ordering their inspection in camera but not their nonproduction xxx
Besides, under the facts of this case, petitioner should not have concerned itself with possibly
violating the pertinent provisions of the NLRC on unlawful divulgence or unlawful procurement of
trade secrets considering Rule V of the Rules of Procedure of the Office of the
Ombudsman[32] which provides that
(a) Any person whose testimony or production of documents or other evidence is necessary to
determine the truth in any inquiry, hearing, or proceeding being conducted by the Office of the
Ombudsman or under its authority in the performance or furtherance or its constitutional functions
and statutory objectives, including preliminary investigation, may be granted immunity from
criminal prosecution by the Ombudsman, upon such terms and conditions as the Ombudsman may
determine, taking into account the pertinent provisions of the Rules of Court xxx
With regard to the manner in which the investigation was conducted, petitioner asserts that
the investigation conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman violated due process, inasmuch as it
commenced its investigation by issuing the subpoena duces tecum without first furnishing
petitioner with a summary of the complaint and requiring it to submit a written answer.[33] The
Ombudsman labels this assertion of the BIR as premature maintaining that it is only when the
Ombudsman finds reasonable ground to investigate further that it is required to furnish respondent
with the summary of the complaint. The Ombudsman insists that in the instant case, it has yet to
make that determination.
On this score, we rule in favor of petitioner BIR. Records show that immediately upon receipt
of the information from an informer-for-reward, Graft Investigator Soquilon, in a Memorandum
dated November 26, 1993 addressed to then Ombudsman Conrado M. Vasquez, requested that the
case be docketed and assigned to him for a full-blown fact-finding investigation.[34] In his
Memorandum, Soquilon averred that he is certain that these refunds can be recovered by reason of
the Tanduay precedent xxx and using the power of this Office, we will not only bring back to the
government multi-million illegal refunds but, like the Tanduay case, we will be establishing graft
and corruption against key BIR officials.[35] In a marginal note dated November 26,
1993,[36] Ombudsman Vasquez approved the docketing of the case and its assignment to Soquilon.
Likewise, in the Preliminary Evaluation Sheet[37] of the Office of the Ombudsman, the Fact Finding
Investigation Bureau of the Ombudsman was named as complainant against Concerned High
Ranking and Key Officials of the Bureau of Internal Revenue who granted multi-million tax refunds
to Limtuaco and La Tondea Distilleries for alleged violation of RA 3019. On November 29, 1993 and
December 9, 1993 Soquilon issued the assailed subpoena duces tecum requiring the concerned BIR
officials to appear before the Ombudsman and to bring with them the complete case dockets of the
tax refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea.
It is our view and we hold that the procedure taken by the respondent did not comply with the
safeguards enumerated in Sec. 26, (2) of RA 6770 or the Ombudsman Act of 1989, which clearly
provides that
241
(2) The Office of the Ombudsman shall receive complaints from any source in whatever form
concerning an official act or omission. It shall act on the complaint immediately and if it finds the
same entirely baseless, it shall dismiss the same and inform the complainant of such dismissal
citing the reasons therefore. If it finds a reasonable, ground to investigate further, it shall first
furnish the respondent public officer or employee with a summary of the complaint and require
him to submit a written answer within seventy-two hours from receipt hereof. If the answer is
found satisfactory, it shall dismiss the case.
The procedure which was followed by the respondent likewise contravened the Rules of
Procedure of the Office of the Ombudsman,[38] Sec. 4, Rule 11 of which provides that
(a) If the complaint is not under oath or is based only on official reports, the investigating officer
shall require the complaint or supporting witnesses to execute affidavits to substantiate the
complaints.
(b) After such affidavits have been secured, the investigating officer shall issue an order, attaching
thereto a copy of the affidavits and other supporting documents, directing the respondent to
submit, within ten (10) days from receipt thereof, his counter-affidavits and controverting evidence
with proof of service thereof on the complainant. The complainant may file reply affidavits within
ten (10) days after service of the counter-affidavits xxx
It is clear from the initial comments of Soquilon in his Memorandum to Ombudsman Vasquez
that he undoubtedly found reasonable grounds to investigate further. In fact, he recommended that
the case be docketed immediately and assigned to him for a full-blown fact-finding investigation.
Even during that initial stage, Soquilon was convinced that the granting of the tax refunds was so
anomalous that he assured Ombudsman Vasquez of the eventual recovery of the tax refunds and
the prosecution and conviction of key BIR officials for graft and corruption.
We commend the graft investigators of the Office of the Ombudsman in their efforts to cleanse
our bureaucracy of scalawags. Sometimes, however, in their zeal and haste to pin down the culprits
they tend to circumvent some procedures. In this case, Graft Investigation Officer Soquilon forgot
that there are always two (2) sides to an issue and that each party must be given every opportunity
to air his grievance or explain his side as the case may be. This is the essence of due process.
The law clearly provides that if there is a reasonable ground to investigate further, the
investigator of the Office of the Ombudsman shall first furnish the respondent public officer or
employee with a summary of the complaint and require him to submit a written answer within
seventy-two (72) hours from receipt thereof. In the instant case, the BIR officials concerned were
never furnished by the respondent with a summary of the complaint and were not given the
opportunity to submit their counter-affidavits and controverting evidence. Instead, they were
summarily ordered to appear before the Ombudsman and to produce the case dockets of the tax
refunds granted to Limtuaco and La Tondea. They are aggrieved in that, from the point of view of
the respondent, they were already deemed probably guilty of granting anomalous tax
refunds. Plainly, respondent Office of the Ombudsman failed to afford petitioner with the basics of
due process in conducting its investigation.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The respondent Office of the Ombudsman is
prohibited and ordered to desist from proceeding with Case No. OMB-0-93-3248; and its Orders
dated November 29, 1993, December 9, 1993 and February 15, 1994 are hereby ANNULLED and
SET ASIDE.
242
SO ORDERED.
18. Ombudsman v. ENOC, G.R. No. 145957-68, January 25, 2002
This is a petition for review on certiorari of the order,[1] dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional
Trial Court, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao del Sur, dismissing Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97)
against respondents.
The antecedent facts are as follows:
Respondents were employed at the Office of the Southern Cultural Communities (OSCC), Davao
del Sur, Provincial Office, Digos, Davao del Sur with salaries below grade 27, as follows:
1. Mr. Ruben Enoc, Provincial Officer
2. Ms. Susana B. Abawag, Special Disbursing Officer
3. Mr. Dominador D. Dala, Supply Officer
4. Mr. Teodoro Yos, Inspector
5. Ms. Leticia Lagunsay, Employee
6. Ms. Emma Ligason-Bernales, Public Health Nurse I
7. Ms. Elvira I. Lim, Development Management Officer (DMO) II
8. Dr. Carlos L. Denia, Medical Officer IV
9. Mr. Diomedes E. Mirafuentes, DMO II
10. Ms. Evangeline Gallito, Employee
11. Ms. Josefina Labo-Tungal, Officer-In-Charge, OSCC Bansalan Sub-Office[2]
They were charged with 11 counts of malversation through falsification, based on alleged
purchases of medicine and food assistance for cultural community members, and one count of
violation of R.A. No. 3019, 3(e), in connection with the purchases of supplies for the OSCC without
bidding/canvass. As none of the respondents has the rank required under R.A. No. 8249[3] to be
tried for the said crimes in the Sandiganbayan, the informations were filed by the Ombudsman in
the Regional Trial Court of Digos, Davao del Sur, where they were docketed as Criminal Case Nos.
374(97) to 385(97), and assigned to Branch 19 of the court.
Respondents moved to quash the informations invoking the ruling in Uy v.
Sandiganbayan[4] that the Ombudsman has no authority to prosecute graft cases falling within the
jurisdiction of regular courts. This motion was granted by the RTC and the cases were dismissed
without prejudice, however, to their refiling by the appropriate officer.
The Office of the Ombudsman filed the instant petition contending that
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT HELD THAT THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO JURISDICTION TO
INVESTIGATE, FILE INFORMATION, AND PROSECUTE CASES BEFORE THE REGULAR COURTS.
I. THE JURISDICTION OF THE HONORABLE SANDIGANBAYAN IS NOT PARALLEL TO, NOR

TO BE EQUATED WITH, THE BROADER JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN;
243
II. THE PHRASE PRIMARY JURISDICTION OF THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER
CASES COGNIZABLE BY THE SANDIGANBAYAN AS USED IN SECTION 15 (1), R.A. No.
6770 IS NOT A DELIMITATION OF ITS JURISDICTION SOLELY TO SANDIGANBAYAN
CASES; AND
III. THE AUTHORITY OF THE OFFICE OF THE SPECIAL PROSECUTOR TO PROSECUTE
CASES BEFORE THE SANDIGANBAYAN CANNOT BE CONFUSED WITH THE BROADER
INVESTIGATORY AND PROSECUTORIAL POWERS OF THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN.[5]
Respondents were required to comment but only respondent Carlos L. Denia did so. He
acknowledges that:
In view of the [March 20, 2001] pronouncement of the Honorable Court in the case of George Uy v.
Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105665-70 that the Office of the Ombudsman is authorized to investigate
and prosecute all cases involving public officials and employees, without distinction as to their rank
and the nature of their act or omission, the filing of the subject Informations by the said office were
not defective.[6]
In turn, petitioner filed a Manifestation invoking the very same resolution promulgated
on March 20, 2001 in Uy v. Sandiganbayan reconsidering the ruling that the prosecutory power of
the Ombudsman extended only to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan.
Indeed, this Court has reconsidered the said ruling and held that the Ombudsman has powers
to prosecute not only graft cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan but also those
cognizable by the regular courts. It held:
The power to investigate and to prosecute granted by law to the Ombudsman is plenary and
unqualified. It pertains to any act or omission of any public officer or employee when such act
or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. The law does not make a
distinction between cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and those cognizable by regular
courts. It has been held that the clause any illegal act or omission of any public official is broad
enough to embrace any crime committed by a public officer or employee.
The reference made by RA 6770 to cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, particularly in Section
15(1) giving the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan, and
Section 11(4) granting the Special Prosecutor the power to conduct preliminary investigation and
prosecute criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the Sandiganbayan, should not be construed as
confining the scope of the investigatory and prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to such cases.
Section 15 of RA 6770 gives the Ombudsman primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the
Sandiganbayan. The law defines such primary jurisdiction as authorizing the Ombudsman to take
over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of the government, the investigation of such cases.
The grant of this authority does not necessarily imply the exclusion from its jurisdiction of cases
involving public officers and employees cognizable by other courts. The exercise by the
Ombudsman of his primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan is not
incompatible with the discharge of his duty to investigate and prosecute other offenses committed
by public officers and employees. Indeed, it must be stressed that the powers granted by the
legislature to the Ombudsman are very broad and encompass all kinds of malfeasance, misfeasance
and non-feasance committed by public officers and employees during their tenure of office.
244
Moreover, the jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman should not be equated with the limited
authority of the Special Prosecutor under Section 11 of RA 6770. The Office of the Special
Prosecutor is merely a component of the Office of the Ombudsman and may only act under the
supervision and control and upon authority of the Ombudsman. Its power to conduct preliminary
investigation and to prosecute is limited to criminal cases within the jurisdiction of the
Sandiganbayan. Certainly, the lawmakers did not intend to confine the investigatory and
prosecutory power of the Ombudsman to these types of cases. The Ombudsman is mandated by law
to act on all complaints against officers and employees of the government and to enforce their
administrative, civil and criminal liability in every case where the evidence warrants. To carry out
this duty, the law allows him to utilize the personnel of his office and/or designate any fiscal, state
prosecutor or lawyer in the government service to act as special investigator or prosecutor to assist
in the investigation and prosecution of certain cases. Those designated or deputized to assist him
work under his supervision and control. The law likewise allows him to direct the Special
prosecutor to prosecute cases outside the Sandiganbayans jurisdiction in accordance with Section
11(4c) of RA 6770.
We, therefore, hold that the Ombudsman has authority to investigate and prosecute Criminal
Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) against respondents in the RTC, Branch 19 of Digos, Davao Del Sur
even as this authority is not exclusive and is shared by him with the regular prosecutors.
WHEREFORE, the order, dated October 7, 2000, of the Regional Trial Court, branch 19 of
Digos, Davao del Sur is SET ASIDE and Criminal Case Nos. 374(97) to 385(97) are hereby
REINSTATED and the Regional Trial Court is ORDERED to try and decide the same.
SO ORDERED.
19. Fuentes v. Ombudsman, G.R. No. 124295, October 23, 2001
The case is a petition1 for certiorari assailing the propriety of the Ombudsman's action investigating
petitioner for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3(e).2
On August 23, 1995, we promulgated a decision in Administrative Matter No. RTJ-94-1270.3 The
antecedent facts are as follows:
"x x x [P]ursuant to the government's plan to construct its first fly-over in Davao City, the
Republic of the Philippines (represented by DPWH) filed an expropriation case against the
owners of the properties affected by the project, namely, defendants Tessie Amadeo,
Reynaldo Lao and Rev. Alfonso Galo. The case was docketed as Special Civil Case No. 22,052-
93 and presided by Judge Renato A. Fuentes.
"The government won the expropriation case. x x x
"As of May 19, 1994, the DPWH still owed the defendants-lot owners, the total sum of
P15,510,415.00 broken down as follows:
Dr. Reynaldo Lao – P 489,000.00

Tessie P. Amadeo – P 1,094,200.00
245
Rev. Alfonso Galo - P

13,927,215.00
"In an order dated April 5, 1994, the lower court granted Tessie Amadeo's motion for the
issuance of a writ of execution against the DPWH to satisfy her unpaid claim. The Order was
received by DPWH (Regional XI) through its Legal Officer, Atty. Warelito Cartagena. DPWH's
counsel, the Office of the Solicitor General, received its copy of the order only on May 10,
1994.
"On April 6, 1994, Clerk of Court Rogelio Fabro issued the corresponding Writ of Execution.
On April 15, 1994, the writ was served by respondent Sheriff Paralisan to the DPWH-Region
XI (Legal Services) through William Nagar.
"On May 3, 1994, respondent Sheriff Paralisan issued a Notice of Levy, addressed to the
Regional Director of the DPWH, Davao City, describing the properties subject of the levy as
'All scrap iron/junks found in the premises of the Department of Public Works and
Highways depot at Panacan, Davao City'x x x.
"The auction sale pushed through on May 18, 1994 at the DPWH depot in Panacan, Davao
City. Alex Bacquial emerged as the highest bidder. x x x Sheriff Paralisan issued the
corresponding certificate of sale in favor of Alex Bacquial. x x x
"Meanwhile, Alex Bacquial, together with respondent Sheriff Paralisan, attempted to

withdraw the auctioned properties on May 19, 1994. They were, however, prevented from
doing so by the custodian of the subject DPWH properties, a certain Engr. Ramon Alejo,
Regional Equipment Engineer, Regional Equipment Services, DPWH depot in Panacan,
Davao City. Engr. Alejo claimed that his office was totally unaware of the auction sale, and
informed the sheriff that many of the properties within the holding area of the depot were
still serviceable and were due for repair and rehabilitation.
"On May 20, 1994, Alex Bacquial filed an ex-parte urgent motion for the issuance of a 'break
through' order to enable him to effect the withdrawal of the auctioned properties. The
motion was granted by Judge Fuentes on the same date.
"On May 21, 1994, Alex Bacquial and Sheriff Paralisan returned to the depot, armed with the
lower court's order."4
Thus, Bacquial succeeded in hauling off the scrap iron/junk equipment in the depot, including the
repairable equipment within the DPWH depot. He hauled equipment from the depot for five
successive days until the lower court issued another order temporarily suspending the writ of
execution it earlier issued in the expropriation case and directing Bacquial not to implement the
writ.5
However, on June 21, 1994, the lower court issued another order upholding the validity of the writ
of execution issued in favor of the defendants in Special Civil Case No. 22, 052-93.6
On the basis of letters from Congressman Manuel M. Garcia of the Second District of Davao City and
Engineer Ramon A. Alejo, the Court Administrator, Supreme Court directed Judge Renato A. Fuentes
and Sheriff Norberto Paralisan to comment on the report recommending the filing of an
246
administrative case against the sheriff and other persons responsible for the anomalous
implementation of the writ of execution. Also, on September 21, 1994, the Department of Public
Works and Highways, through the Solicitor General, filed an administrative complaint against
Sheriff Norberto Paralisan for conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the service, in violation of
Article IX, Section 36 (b) of P. D. No. 807.7
After considering the foregoing facts, on August 23, 1995, the Supreme Court promulgated a
decision, the dispositive portion of which states:
"IN VIEW WHEREOF, respondent NORBERTO PARALISAN, Sheriff IV, Regional Trial Court
(Branch XVII), Davao City, is declared guilty of conduct prejudicial to the best interest of the
service, in violation of Section 36 (b), Article IX of PD 807. Accordingly, respondent sheriff is
DISMISSED from the service, with forfeiture of all retirement benefits and accrued leave
credits and with prejudice to reemployment in any branch or instrumentality of the
government, including government-owned or controlled corporations. The office of the
Court Administrator is directed to conduct an investigation on Judge Renato Fuentes and to
charge him if the result of the investigation so warrants. The Office of the Solicitor General is
likewise ordered to take appropriate action to recover the value of the serviceable or
repairable equipment which were unlawfully hauled by Alex Bacquial."8 (italics ours)
On January 15, 1996, Director Antonio E. Valenzuela (hereafter, Valenzuela) of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao recommended that petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes be charged before
the Sandiganbayan with violation of Republic Act No. 3019, Section 3 (e) and likewise be
administratively charged before the Supreme Court with acts unbecoming of a judge.9
On January 22, 1996, Director Valenzuela filed with the Office of the Deputy Ombudsman for
Mindanao a criminal complaint10 charging Judge Rentao A. Fuentes with violation of Republic Act
No. 3019, Section 3 (e).
On February 6, 1996, the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao through Graft Investigation Officer II
Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray issued an order directing petitioner to submit his counter-affidavit within
ten days.11
On February 22, 1996, petitioner filed with the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao a motion to
dismiss complaint and/or manifestation to forward all records to the Supreme Court.12
On March 15, 1996, Graft Investigation Officer Marivic A. Trabajo-Daray denied the motion of
petitioner.13
Hence, this petition.14
The issue is whether the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation of acts of a judge in the exercise
of his official functions alleged to be in violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act, in the
absence of an administrative charge for the same acts before the Supreme Court.
Petitioner alleged that the respondent Ombudsman-Mindanao committed a grave abuse of

discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction when he initiated a criminal complaint against
petitioner for violation of R.A. No. 3019, Section 3 [e]. And he conducted an investigation of said
247
complaint against petitioner. Thus, he encroached on the power of the Supreme Court of
administrative supervision over all courts and its personnel.
The Solicitor General submitted that the Ombudsman may conduct an investigation because the
Supreme Court is not in possession of any record which would verify the propriety of the issuance
of the questioned order and writ. Moreover, the Court Administrator has not filed any
administrative case against petitioner judge that would pose similar issues on the present inquiry
of the Ombudsman-Mindanao.
We grant the petition.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the Ombudsman Act of 1989, provides:
"Sec. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. - The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the
following powers, functions and duties: (1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on
complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public officer or employee, office or
agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper or inefficient. It
has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and, in the exercise of
this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory agency of
Government, the investigation of such cases."15
xxx xxx xxx
"Section 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority, Exceptions.- The Office of the
Ombudsman shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the
Government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including members of the
Cabinet, local government, government-owned or controlled corporations and their
subsidiaries, except over officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over Members
of Congress, and the Judiciary."16 (underscoring ours)
Thus, the Ombudsman may not initiate or investigate a criminal or administrative complaint before
his office against petitioner judge, pursuant to his power to investigate public officers. The
Ombudsman must indorse the case to the Supreme Court, for appropriate action.
Article VIII, Section 6 of the Constitution exclusively vests in the Supreme Court administrative
supervision over all courts and court personnel, from the Presiding Justice of the Court of Appeals
to the lowest municipal trial court clerk.17
Hence, it is the Supreme Court that is tasked to oversee the judges and court personnel and take the
proper administrative action against them if they commit any violation of the laws of the land. No
other branch of government may intrude into this power, without running afoul of the
independence of the judiciary and the doctrine of separation of powers.18
Petitioner's questioned order directing the attachment of government property and issuing a writ
of execution were done in relation to his office, well within his official functions. The order may be
erroneous or void for lack or excess of jurisdiction. However, whether or not such order of
execution was valid under the given circumstances, must be inquired into in the course of the
judicial action only by the Supreme Court that is tasked to supervise the courts. "No other entity or
official of the Government, not the prosecution or investigation service of any other branch, not any
248
functionary thereof, has competence to review a judicial order or decision--whether final and
executory or not--and pronounce it erroneous so as to lay the basis for a criminal or administrative
complaint for rendering an unjust judgment or order. That prerogative belongs to the courts
alone."19
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The Ombudsman is directed to dismiss the case and refer
the complaint against petitioner Judge Renato A. Fuentes to the Supreme Court for appropriate
action.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
20. Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005
This petition for review on certiorari seeks to reverse and set aside the decision[1] dated August 28,
2003 and the resolution[2] dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals[3]in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264
which affirmed with modification public respondents (1) Joint Resolution dated January 22, 1999,
which ordered, among other things, petitioners suspension for one (1) year for conduct prejudicial
to the service; and (2) Order dated February 8, 2000, as reiterated in a Memorandum dated March
17, 2000, which denied petitioners motion for reconsideration but reduced his suspension to nine
(9) months without pay. The Court of Appeals modified the above issuances by further reducing
petitioners suspension from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.[4]
Petitioner Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma is the Chairman of the First Division of the Board of Special
Inquiry (BSI) of the Bureau of Immigration and Deportation (BID). In a letter-complaint filed by
Augusto Somalio with the Fact Finding and Intelligence Bureau (FIIB) of the Office of the
Ombudsman, an investigation was requested on alleged anomalies surrounding the extension of the
Temporary Resident Visas (TRVs) of two (2) foreign nationals. The FIIB investigation revealed
seven (7) other cases of TRV extensions tainted with similar irregularities.
As a result, the FIIB, as nominal complainant, filed before the Administrative Adjudication Bureau
(AAB) of the Office of the Ombudsman a formal complaint against herein petitioner. Also charged
administratively were Atty. Arthel Caronongan and Ma. Elena P. Ang, Board Member and Executive
249
Assistant, respectively, in petitioners division. With respect to petitioner, the complaint was treated
as both a criminal and an administrative charge and docketed as OMB-0-98-0214 (criminal aspect),
for nine (9) counts of violation of the Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act and for falsification of
public documents, and OMB-ADM-0-98-0038 (administrative aspect), for nine (9) counts of
Dishonesty, Grave Misconduct, Falsification of Public Documents and Gross Neglect of Duty.
The complaint against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang alleged the following illegal acts: (a)
irregularly granting TRVs beyond the prescribed period; and (b) using recycled or photocopied
applications for a TRV extension without the applicants affixing their signatures anew to validate
the correctness and truthfulness of the information previously stated therein. Specifically,
petitioner and Caronongan allegedly signed the Memorandum of Transmittal to the Board of
Commission (BOC) of the BID, forwarding the applications for TRV extension of several aliens
whose papers were questionable.
In a Joint Resolution[5] dated January 22, 1999, Graft Investigation Officer Marlyn M. Reyes resolved
the administrative cases filed against petitioner, Caronongan and Ang, as follows:
WHEREFORE, foregoing considered, it is respectfully recommended that:
1. Respondent ATTY. RONALDO P. LEDESMA be SUSPENDED from the

service for one (1) year for Conduct Prejudicial to the Interest of the
Service;
2. The instant case against ATTY. ARTHEL B. CARONONGAN be DISMISSED,
the same having been rendered moot and academic; and
3. The instant case against respondent MA. ELENA P. ANG be DISMISSED for
lack of sufficient evidence.
SO RESOLVED.[6]
Respondent Assistant Ombudsman Abelardo L. Aportadera, Jr. reviewed the Joint Resolution which
was approved by respondent Ombudsman Desierto on December 29, 1999.[7]
In the meantime, on July 9, 1999, respondent Ombudsman approved a Resolution[8] dated

June 22, 1999 of Graft Investigation Officer Marilou B. Ancheta-Mejica, dismissing
the criminal charges against petitioner for insufficiency of evidence.[9]
250
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration[10] in the administrative case alleging that the BOC
which reviews all applications for TRVs extension, approved the TRVs in question, hence, petitioner
argued that it effectively declared the applications for extension regular and in order and waived
any infirmity thereon.
In an Order[11] dated February 8, 2000, Graft Officer Reyes recommended the denial of the motion
for reconsideration which was approved by respondent Ombudsman on March 24, 2000 but
reduced the period of suspension from one (1) year to nine (9) months without pay.
On April 13, 2000, petitioner filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, which included a
prayer for the issuance of a writ of preliminary prohibitory mandatory injunction and/or
temporary restraining order to enjoin public respondents from implementing the order of
suspension. The Court of Appeals issued the TRO on April 19, 2000.
In its Decision dated August 28, 2003, the Court of Appeals affirmed petitioners suspension but
reduced the period from nine (9) months to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay.[12]
With the denial of his motion for reconsideration, petitioner filed the instant petition for review on
the following grounds:
I.
IN PROMULGATING ITS ASSAILED DECISION, RESPONDENT COURT OF

APPEALS MANIFESTLY OVERLOOKED THE FOLLOWING RELEVANT FACTS AND
MATTERS WHICH, IF PROPERLY CONSIDERED, WOULD HAVE JUSTIFIED A
DIFFERENT CONCLUSION IN FAVOR OF PETITIONER:
...
II.
THE PRONOUNCEMENT OF RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS THAT THE

FINDING OF THE OMBUDSMAN IS NOT MERELY ADVISORY ON THE BUREAU OF
IMMIGRATION (BI) IS CONTRARY TO THE PERTINENT PROVISION OF THE 1987
CONSTITUTION AND APPLICABLE DECISIONS OF THE HONORABLE COURT.
251
III.
RESPONDENT COURT OF APPEALS ALSO FAILED TO CONSIDER THAT THE

OMBUDSMANS RESOLUTION FINDING PETITIONER ADMINISTRATIVELY LIABLE
CONSTITUTES AN INDIRECT ENCROACHMENT INTO THE POWER OF THE BUREAU
OF IMMIGRATION OVER IMMIGRATION MATTERS.[13]
The petition lacks merit.
Petitioner insists that it was the BOC which approved the questioned applications for the extension
of the TRVs. He denies that he misled or deceived the BOC into approving these applications and
argues that the BOC effectively ratified his actions and sanctioned his conduct when it approved the
subject applications. Petitioner adds that he acted in good faith and the government did not suffer
any damage as a result of his alleged administrative lapse.
We are not persuaded. In his attempt to escape liability, petitioner undermines his position in the
BID and his role in the processing of the subject applications. But by his own admission,[14] it
appears that the BSI not only transmits the applications for TRV extension and its supporting
documents, but more importantly, it interviews the applicants and evaluates their papers before
making a recommendation to the BOC. The BSI reviews the applications and when it finds them in
order, it executes a Memorandum of Transmittal to the BOC certifying to the regularity and
propriety of the applications.
In Arias v. Sandiganbayan,[15] we stated that all heads of offices have to rely to a reasonable
extent on their subordinates. Practicality and efficiency in the conduct of government business
dictate that the gritty details be sifted and reviewed by the time it reaches the final approving
authority. In the case at bar, it is not unreasonable for the BOC to rely on the evaluation and
recommendation of the BSI as it cannot be expected to review every detail of each application
transmitted for its approval. Petitioner being the Chairman of the First Division of the BSI has direct
supervision over its proceedings. Thus, he cannot feign ignorance or good faith when the
irregularities in the TRV extension applications are so patently clear on its face. He is principally
252
accountable for certifying the regularity and propriety of the applications which he knew were
defective.
Petitioner could not validly claim that he was singled out for prosecution. It is of record that
administrative cases were also filed against Caronongan and Ang, but extraneous circumstances
rendered the case against Caronongan moot while the case against Ang was dismissed because it
was proven that she merely implemented the approved decision of the BOC.
Equally untenable is the contention that the BOCs approval of the defective applications for TRV
extension cured any infirmities therein and effectively absolved petitioners administrative lapse.
The instant administrative case pertains to the acts of petitioner as Chairman of the First Division of
the BSI in processing nine (9) defective applications, independent of and without regard to the
action taken by the BOC. It does not impugn the validity of the TRV extensions as to encroach upon
the authority of the BID on immigration matters. The main thrust of the case is to determine
whether petitioner committed any misconduct, nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeasance in the
performance of his duties.
Anent the second and third grounds, petitioner essentially puts in issue the import of the
Ombudsmans findings. Petitioner questions the Court of Appeals pronouncement that the findings
of the Ombudsman may not be said to be merely recommendatory upon the Immigration
Commissioner. He argues that to uphold the appellate courts ruling expands the authority granted
by the Constitution to the Office of the Ombudsman and runs counter to prevailing jurisprudence
on the matter, particularly Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.[16] Petitioner submits that the
Ombudsmans findings that the TRV applications were illegal constitutes an indirect interference by
the Ombudsman into the powers of the BOC over immigration matters.
We do not agree. The creation of the Office of the Ombudsman is a unique feature of the 1987
Constitution.[17] The Ombudsman and his deputies, as protectors of the people, are mandated to act
promptly on complaints filed in any form or manner against officers or employees of the
Government, or of any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned
253
or controlled corporations.[18] Foremost among its powers is the authority to investigate and
prosecute cases involving public officers and employees, thus:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public official, employee, office or agency, when such act or omission
appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.
Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, was passed into law on
November 17, 1989 and provided for the structural and functional organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. RA 6770 mandated the Ombudsman and his deputies not only to act promptly on
complaints but also to enforce the administrative, civil and criminal liability of government officers
and employees in every case where the evidence warrants to promote efficient service by the
Government to the people.[19]
The authority of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations as in the present
case is settled.[20] Section 19 of RA 6770 provides:
SEC. 19. Administrative Complaints. The Ombudsman shall act on all

complaints relating, but not limited to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;
(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agencys functions,
though in accordance with law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of
facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper
purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.
254
The point of contention is the binding power of any decision or order that emanates from
the Office of the Ombudsman after it has conducted its investigation. Under Section 13(3) of Article
XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers,
functions, and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or
employee at fault, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine,
censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith. (Emphasis
supplied)
Petitioner insists that the word recommend be given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsmans action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect,
citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,[21] thus:
... Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the
Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section
13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can
only recommend the removal of the public official or employee found to be at fault,
to the public official concerned.[22]
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the
word recommend must be taken in conjunction with the phrase and ensure compliance
therewith. The proper interpretation of the Courts statement in Tapiador should be that the
Ombudsman has the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or
employee at fault, and direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement
the penalty imposed. In other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsmans
functions and not its jurisdiction.

255
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a
literal interpretation of the subject constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading
of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to
present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that
made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is
unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations, as what precisely is
before us in this case. Hence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe
from judicial examination.
The provisions of RA 6770 support public respondents theory. Section 15 is substantially
the same as Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution which provides for the powers, functions and
duties of the Ombudsman. We draw attention to subparagraph 3, to wit:
SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties. The Office of the Ombudsman shall
have the following powers, functions and duties:
...
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public
officer or employee at fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty
required by law, and recommend his removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure,
or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or enforce its disciplinary
authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by any
officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or
who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground
for disciplinary action against said officer; (Emphasis supplied)
We note that the proviso above qualifies the order to remove, suspend, demote, fine,
censure, or prosecute an officer or employee akin to the questioned issuances in the case at bar.
That the refusal, without just cause, of any officer to comply with such an order of the Ombudsman
to penalize an erring officer or employee is a ground for disciplinary action, is a strong indication
that the Ombudsmans recommendation is not merely advisory in nature but is actually mandatory
256
within the bounds of law. This should not be interpreted as usurpation by the Ombudsman of the
authority of the head of office or any officer concerned. It has long been settled that the power of
the Ombudsman to investigate and prosecute any illegal act or omission of any public official is not
an exclusive authority but a shared or concurrent authority in respect of the offense charged. [23]By
stating therefore that the Ombudsman recommends the action to be taken against an erring officer
or employee, the provisions in the Constitution and in RA 6770 intended that the implementation of
the order be coursed through the proper officer, which in this case would be the head of the BID.
It is likewise apparent that under RA 6770, the lawmakers intended to provide the Office of
the Ombudsman with sufficient muscle to ensure that it can effectively carry out its mandate as
protector of the people against inept and corrupt government officers and employees. The Office
was granted the power to punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court.[24] It was
given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies (with the exception only of impeachable officers,
members of Congress and the Judiciary).[25] Also, it can preventively suspend any officer under its
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants.[26]
The foregoing interpretation is consistent with the wisdom and spirit behind the creation of
the Office of the Ombudsman. The records of the deliberations of the Constitutional
Commission[27] reveal the following:
MR. MONSOD:
Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of
the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates
into a prosecution arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a
chance, with prestige and persuasive powers, and also a chance to really
function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, The
Assembly, as it may see fit, may have to give additional powers to the
257
Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure Ombudsman a chance

under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO:
Madam President, what I am worried about is if we create a constitutional

body which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive
powers, we might be raising the hopes of our people too much and then
disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD:
I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO:
Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?[28]
MR. MONSOD:
Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee
report which recommended the approval of the 27 resolutions for the
creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but notwithstanding the explicit
purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law the last one, P.D.
No. 1630did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan, ...
...
MR. MONSOD: (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople):
May we just state that perhaps the honorable Commissioner has looked at it
in too much of an absolutist position, The Ombudsman is seen as a civil
advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not against
the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other
things. On the other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor
to the President, as if he is being brought up to the same level as the
President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to

say that we are promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are
also saying that he can exercise such powers and functions as may be provided
by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of Commissioner
Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we
leave it up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to
designate what powers the Ombudsman need in order that he be more
effective. This is not foreclosed.
258
So, his is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an

irreversible disability. (Emphasis supplied)[29]
It is thus clear that the framers of our Constitution intended to create a stronger and more effective
Ombudsman, independent and beyond the reach of political influences and vested with powers that
are not merely persuasive in character. The Constitutional Commission left to Congress to empower
the Ombudsman with prosecutorial functions which it did when RA 6770 was enacted. In the case
of Uy v. Sandiganbayan,[30] it was held:
Clearly, the Philippine Ombudsman departs from the classical Ombudsman

model whose function is merely to receive and process the peoples complaints
against corrupt and abusive government personnel. The Philippine Ombudsman, as
protector of the people, is armed with the power to prosecute erring public officers
and employees, giving him an active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft
and corrupt practices and such other offenses that may be committed by such
officers and employees. The legislature has vested him with broad powers to enable
him to implement his own actions. ...[31]
In light of the foregoing, we hold that the Court of Appeals did not commit any error in finding the
petitioner guilty of conduct prejudicial to the interest of the service and reducing petitioners period
of suspension to six (6) months and one (1) day without pay, taking into account the education and
length of service of petitioner.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition is DENIED. The Decision dated August 28, 2003 and the
Resolution dated January 15, 2004 of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 58264 are AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.
21. Estarija v. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652 (2006)
Ombudsman; Public Officers; Administrative Law; Appeals; Factual findings of the Office of the
Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive, and such findings made by an
259
administrative body which has acquired expertise are accorded not only respect but even finality.—
In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion. Further, precedents tell us that the factual findings of the Office of
the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive, and such findings made
by an administrative body which has acquired expertise are accorded not only respect but even
finality.
Same; Same; Words and Phrases; Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite
rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer, and
when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established
rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.—Misconduct is a
transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly, unlawful behavior
or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption, clear intent to violate
the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the public officer shall be liable for
grave misconduct. We are convinced that the decision of the Ombudsman finding petitioner
administratively liable for grave misconduct is based on substantial evidence. When there is
substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman’s decision, that decision will not be overturned.
Same; Same; Same; The term dishonesty implies disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud,
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity,
_______________
* EN BANC.
653
VOL. 492, JUNE 26, 2006
653
Estarija vs. Ranada
lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle, lack of fairness and straightforwardness,

disposition to defraud, deceive or betray.—The same findings sustain the conclusion that Estarija is
guilty of dishonesty. The term dishonesty implies disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud,
untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of honesty, probity or integrity in principle, lack of fairness
and straight-forwardness, disposition to defraud, deceive or betray. Patently, petitioner had been
dishonest about accepting money from DPAI.
Same; Same; Judicial Review; Requisites; The earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is
to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was
not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not
considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.—When the issue of unconstitutionality of
a legislative act is raised, the Court may exercise its power of judicial review only if the following
requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and controversy; (2) a personal and
substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question; (3) the exercise of judicial
260
review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional question raised is the very
lis mota of the case. For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law
requires that the question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest opportunity.
In Matibag v. Benipayo, 380 SCRA 49 (2002), we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a
constitutional issue is to raise it in the pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the
same, such that, if it was not raised in the pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be
considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
Same; Same; Same; Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the
constitutionality of a law.—In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act
No. 6770 in his motion for the reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the
Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when
petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals,
which is the competent court, the constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time.
Furthermore, this Court may determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a
constitutional issue may be passed upon.
654
654
Estarija vs. Ranada
Same; Same; Same; Ombudsman Act (R.A. No. 6770); In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress
deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public
officers and employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring
accountability in public office.—Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural
organization of the Office of the Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately
endowed the Ombudsman with the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and
employees to make him a more active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in
public office. Moreover, the legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable
him to implement his own actions.
Same; Same; Same; R.A. No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987
Constitution to give Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely
persuasive in character.—In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 437 (2005), we held that Rep.
Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave
Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in
character. Thus, in addition to the power of the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct
investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the Ombudsman with the power to punish for
contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his authority pending an investigation when
the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive
officials of the government and its subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies except members of
Congress and the Judiciary. We also held in Ledesma that the statement in Tapiador v. Office of the
Ombudsman, 379 SCRA 322 (2002), that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at
best, merely an obiter dictum and cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court.
261
Same; Same; Same; Same; Under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman
has the constitutional power to directly remove from government service an erring public official
other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.—The Constitution does not restrict the powers
of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to
enact a law that would spell out the powers of the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act
No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to
sanction
655
VOL. 492, JUNE 26, 2006
655
Estarija vs. Ranada
erring officials and employees, except members of Congress, and the Judiciary. To conclude, we
hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The
powers of the Ombudsman are not merely recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render
this constitutional body not merely functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic
Act No. 6770 and the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly
remove from government service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the
Judiciary.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of Appeals.
E.C. De Vera & F.A.D. De Vera Law Offices for petitioner.
Office of Legal Affairs for Ombudsman.
Raul O. Tolentino for respondent E. Ranada.
QUISUMBING, J.:
This petition for review on certiorari assails the February 12, 2003 Decision1 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62557 which affirmed the October 2, 2000 Decision2 of the Office of the
Ombudsman-Mindanao in OMB-MIN-ADM-98-183.
The facts are as follows:
On August 10, 1998, respondent Edward F. Ranada, a member of the Davao Pilots Association, Inc.
(DPAI) and Davao Tugboat and Allied Services, Inc., (DTASI) filed an administrative complaint for
Gross Misconduct before the Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao, against petitioner Cap-
_______________
262
1 Rollo, pp. 49-60. Penned by Associate Justice Josefina Guevara-Salonga, with Associate Justices
Marina L. Buzon, and Danilo B. Pine concurring.
2 Id., at pp. 153-165.
656
656
Estarija vs. Ranada
tain Edgardo V. Estarija, Harbor Master of the Philippine Ports Authority (PPA), Port of Davao, Sasa,
Davao City.3
The complaint alleged that Estarija, who as Harbor Master issues the necessary berthing permit for
all ships that dock in the Davao Port, had been demanding monies ranging from P200 to P2000 for
the approval and issuance of berthing permits, and P5000 as monthly contribution from the DPAI.
The complaint alleged that prior to August 6, 1998, in order to stop the mulcting and extortion
activities of Estarija, the association reported Estarija’s activities to the National Bureau of
Investigation (NBI). On August 6, 1998, the NBI caught Estarija in possession of the P5,000 marked
money used by the NBI to entrap Estarija.
Consequently, the Ombudsman ordered petitioner’s preventive suspension4 and directed him to
answer the complaint. The Ombudsman filed a criminal case docketed as Criminal Case No. 41,464-
98, against Estarija for violation of Republic Act No. 3019, The Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act,
before the Regional Trial Court of Davao City, Branch No. 8.5
In his counter-affidavit6 and supplemental counter-affidavit,7 petitioner vehemently denied

demanding sums of money for the approval of berthing permits. He claimed that Adrian Cagata, an
employee of the DPAI, called to inform him that the DPAI had payables to the PPA, and although he
went to the association’s office, he was hesitant to get the P5,000 from Cagata because the
association had no pending transaction with the PPA. Estarija claimed that Cagata made him believe
that the money was a partial remittance to the PPA of the pilotage fee for July 1998 representing
10% of the
_______________
3 Rollo, pp. 46-47.
4 CA Rollo, pp. 65-67.
5 Id., at p. 120.
6 Rollo, pp. 74-93.
7 Id., at pp. 118-128.
657
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657
Estarija vs. Ranada
monthly gross revenue of their association. Nonetheless, he received the money but assured Cagata
that he would send an official receipt the following day. He claimed that the entrapment and the
subsequent filing of the complaint were part of a conspiracy to exact personal vengeance against
him on account of Ranada’s business losses occasioned by the cancellation of the latter’s sub-agency
agreement with Asia Pacific Chartering Phils., Inc., which was eventually awarded to a shipping
agency managed by Estarija’s son.
On August 31, 2000, the Ombudsman rendered a decision8 in the administrative case, finding
Estarija guilty of dishonesty and grave misconduct. The dispositive portion reads:
“WHEREFORE, premises considered, there being substantial evidence, respondent EDGARDO V.

ESTARIJA is hereby found guilty of Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct and is hereby DISMISSED
from the service with forfeiture of all leave credits and retirement benefits, pursuant to Section
23(a) and (c) of Rule XIV, Book V, in relation to Section 9 of Rule XIV both of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987 (Executive Order No. 292). He is
disqualified from re-employment in the national and local governments, as well as in any
government instrumentality or agency, including government owned or controlled corporations.
This decision is immediately executory after it attains finality. Let a copy of this decision be entered
in the personal records of respondent EDGARDO V. ESTARIJA. PPA Manager Manuel C. Albarracin is
hereby directed to implement this Office Decision after it attains finality.
SO DECREED.”9
Estarija seasonably filed a motion for reconsideration.10 Estarija claimed that dismissal was
unconstitutional since the Ombudsman did not have direct and immediate power to remove
government officials, whether elective or appointive, who are not removable by impeachment. He
maintains that
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8 Id., at pp. 153-165.
9 Id., at pp. 164-165.
10 Id., at pp. 166-182.
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Estarija vs. Ranada

264
under the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman’s administrative authority is merely

recommendatory, and that Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as “The Ombudsman Act of
1989,” is unconstitutional because it gives the Office of the Ombudsman additional powers that are
not provided for in the Constitution.
The Ombudsman denied the motion for reconsideration in an Order11 dated October 31, 2000.
Thus, Estarija filed a Petition for Review with urgent prayer for the issuance of a temporary
restraining order and writ of preliminary prohibitory injunction before the Court of Appeals. The
Court of Appeals, on February 12, 2003, dismissed the petition and affirmed the Ombudsman’s
decision.
The Court of Appeals held that the attack on the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 was
procedurally and substantially flawed. First, the constitutionality issue was belatedly raised in the
motion for reconsideration of the decision of the Ombudsman. Second, the petitioner was unable to
prove the constitutional breach and failed to overcome the presumption of constitutionality in favor
of the questioned statute.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision of the Ombudsman, holding that receiving extortion
money constituted dishonesty and grave misconduct. According to the Court of Appeals, petitioner
failed to refute the convincing evidence offered by the complainant. Petitioner presented affidavits
executed by the high-ranking officials of various shipping agencies which were found by the Court
of Appeals to be couched in general and loose terms, and according to the appellate court, could not
be given more evidentiary weight than the sworn testimonies of complainant and other witnesses
that were subjected to cross-examination.
Petitioner filed a motion for reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied the same for lack of
merit. Hence, the instant petition assigning the following errors:
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11 Id., at pp. 183-188.
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(A) That certain basic factual findings of the Court of Appeals as hereunder specified, are not borne
by any substantial evidence, or are contrary to the evidence on record, or that the Court of Appeals
has drawn a conclusion or inference which is manifestly mistaken or is based on a misappreciation
of the facts as to call for a corrective review by this Honorable Supreme Court;
(B) That Republic Act No. 6770, otherwise known as the “Ombudsman’s Act of 1989,” is
unconstitutional, or that the Honorable OMBUDSMAN does not have any constitutional direct and
immediate power, authority or jurisdiction to remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure, herein
Petitioner and all other government officials, elective or appointive, not removable by
impeachment, consistent with Sec. 13, par. No. (3), Art. XI, of the 1987 Philippine Constitution.
265
(C) That corollary to, or consistent with, the aforecited Second Reason, said REPUBLIC ACT No.
6770, as amended, is constitutionally impaired and invalid insofar as it is inconsistent with, or
violative of, the aforecited constitutional provisions (Sec. 13, No. 3, Art. XI).
(D) That the issue of “jurisdiction” or constitutionality or validity of a law, statute, rule or regulation
can be raised at any stage of the case, even by way of a motion for reconsideration after a decision
has been rendered by the court or judicial arbiter concerned.
(E) That the DECISION of the Court of Appeals is contrary to jurisprudential law, specifically to the
ruling of this Honorable SUPREME COURT in the case of “Renato A. Tapiador, Petitioner versus
Office of the Ombudsman and Atty. Ronaldo P. Ledesma, Respondents, G.R No. 129124” decided on
March 15, 2002.
(F) That assuming arguendo that the Honorable OMBUDSMAN does have such direct constitutional
power to remove, suspend, etc. government officials not removable by impeachment, the DECISION
rendered in said case OMB-MIN-ADM-98-[183], finding Petitioner “guilty of Dishonesty and Grave
Misconduct” and directing his “dismissal from the service, with forfeiture of all leave credits and
retirement benefits x x x,” is still contrary to law and the evidence on
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record, or, at the very least, the charge of “Dishonesty” is not included in RANADA’s administrative
complaint and absolutely no evidence was presented to prove “Dishonesty” and the complaint
which was limited to “[Grave] Misconduct” only;
(G) That further assuming arguendo that Petitioner is subject to direct administrative disciplinary
authority by the Honorable OMBUDSMAN whether under the Constitution or RA 6770, and
assuming that he is “guilty” of “Dishonesty and Grave Misconduct”, the Court of Appeals violated
Sec. 25 of R.A. 6770 for not considering and applying, several mitigating circumstances in favor of
Petitioner and that the penalty (of dismissal with loss of benefits) imposed by OMBUDSMAN is
violative of Sec. 25, of R.A. 6770 and is too harsh, inhumane, violative of his human dignity, human
rights and his other constitutional right not to be deprived of his property and/or property rights
without due process, is manifestly unproportionate to the offense for which Petitioner is being
penalized, and, should, therefore, be substantially modified or reduced to make it fair, reasonable,
just, humane and proportionate to the offense committed. (Emphasis supplied).12
Essentially, the issues for our resolution are: First, Is there substantial evidence to hold petitioner
liable for dishonesty and grave misconduct? Second, Is the power of the Ombudsman to directly
remove, suspend, demote, fine or censure erring officials unconstitutional?
On the first issue, petitioner claims that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals are not
supported by substantial evidence, and that the Court of Appeals misappreciated the facts of the
case.
Petitioner contends that he cannot be liable for grave misconduct as he did not commit extortion.
He insists that he was merely prodded by Adrian Cagata to receive the money.
He claims that as a bonded official it was not wrong for him to receive the money and he had
authority to assist the agency
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12 Id., at pp. 17-18.
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in the collection of money due to the agency, e.g. payment for berthing permits. Moreover, he
argues that the signing of berthing permits is only ministerial on his part and he does not have
influence on their approval, which is the function of the berthing committee. Consequently, he
avers, it makes no sense why he would extort money in consideration of the issuance of berthing
permits.
We note that indeed petitioner has no hand in the approval of berthing permits. But, it is
undisputed that he does decide on the berthing space to be occupied by the vessels. The berthing
committee likewise consults him on technical matters. We note, too, that he claims he was only
instructed to receive the money from Cagata, yet he admits that there was no pending transaction
between the PPA and the DPAI.
In his Comment, the Ombudsman, through the Solicitor General, counters that petitioner raised
questions of facts which are not reviewable by this Court. He argued that contrary to the
petitioner’s claim, the judgment of guilt for dishonesty and grave misconduct was based on the
evidence presented. Petitioner was caught red-handed in an entrapment operation by the NBI.
According to the Ombudsman, the entrapment of the petitioner met the test for a valid entrapment
i.e. the conduct of the law enforcement agent was not likely to induce a normally law-abiding
person, other than one who is ready and willing to commit the offense. The presumption in
entrapment is that a law abiding person would normally resist the temptation to commit a crime
that is presented by the simple opportunity to act unlawfully. Entrapment is contingent on the
accused’s predisposition to commit the offense charged, his state of mind, and his inclination before
his exposure to government agents. Thus, entrapment is not made ineffectual by the conduct of the
entrapping officers. When Estarija went to the office of Adrian Cagata to pick up the money, his
doing so was indicative of his willingness to commit the crime.
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Estarija vs. Ranada
In an administrative proceeding, the quantum of proof required for a finding of guilt is only
substantial evidence, that amount of relevant evidence which a reasonable mind might accept as
adequate to justify a conclusion.13 Further, precedents tell us that the factual findings of the Office
of the Ombudsman when supported by substantial evidence are conclusive,14 and such findings
267
made by an administrative body which has acquired expertise are accorded not only respect but
even finality.15
As shown on the records, Estarija called the office of the DPAI and demanded the payment of the
monthly contribution from Captain Zamora. Captain Zamora conveyed the demand to Ranada who
in turn reported the matter to the NBI. Thereafter, an entrapment operation was staged. Adrian
Cagata called Estarija to confirm the payment, and that the money was already available at their
office. Accordingly, Estarija went to the DPAI office and collected the P5,000 marked money. Upon
departure of Estarija from the office, the NBI operatives frisked him and recovered the P5,000
marked money.
We are unconvinced by Estarija’s explanation of his conduct. He does not deny that he went to the
DPAI office to collect the money and that he actually received the money. Since there was no
pending transaction between the PPA and the DPAI, he had no reason to go to the latter’s office to
collect any money. Even if he was authorized to assist in the collection of money due the agency, he
should have issued an official receipt for the transaction, but he did not do so. All told, we are
convinced that there is substantial evidence to hold petitioner liable for grave misconduct.
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13 Avancena v. Liwanag, A.M. No. MTJ-01-1383, July 17, 2003, 406 SCRA 300, 303.
14 Republic Act No. 6770 (1989), Sec. 27(2).
15 Advincula v. Dicen, G.R. No. 162403, May 16, 2005, 458 SCRA 696, 712.
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Misconduct is a transgression of some established and definite rule of action, more particularly,
unlawful behavior or gross negligence by a public officer. And when the elements of corruption,
clear intent to violate the law or flagrant disregard of established rule are manifest, the public
officer shall be liable for grave misconduct.16 We are convinced that the decision of the
Ombudsman finding petitioner administratively liable for grave misconduct is based on substantial
evidence. When there is substantial evidence in support of the Ombudsman’s decision, that decision
will not be overturned.17
The same findings sustain the conclusion that Estarija is guilty of dishonesty. The term dishonesty
implies disposition to lie, cheat, deceive, or defraud, untrustworthiness, lack of integrity, lack of
honesty, probity or integrity in principle, lack of fairness and straightforwardness, disposition to
defraud, deceive or betray.18 Patently, petitioner had been dishonest about accepting money from
DPAI.
Now, the issue pending before us is: Does the Ombudsman have the constitutional power to directly
remove from government service an erring public official?
268
At the outset, the Court of Appeals held that the constitutional question on the Ombudsman’s power
cannot be entertained because it was not pleaded at the earliest opportunity. The Court of Appeals
said that petitioner had every opportunity to raise the same in his pleadings and during the course
of the trial. Instead, it was only after the adverse decision of the Ombudsman that he was prompted
to assail the power of the Ombudsman in his motion for reconsideration. The Court of Appeals held
that the constitutional issue was belatedly
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16 Bureau of Internal Revenue v. Organo, G.R. No. 149549, February 26, 2004, 424 SCRA 9, 16.
17 Morong Water District v. Office of the Deputy Ombudsman, G.R. No. 116754, March 17, 2000,
328 SCRA 363, 373.
18 Philippine Amusement and Gaming Corporation v. Rilloraza, G.R. No. 141141, June 25, 2001, 359
SCRA 525, 540.
664
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Estarija vs. Ranada
raised in the proceedings before the Ombudsman, thus, it cannot be considered on appeal.
When the issue of unconstitutionality of a legislative act is raised, the Court may exercise its power
of judicial review only if the following requisites are present: (1) an actual and appropriate case and
controversy; (2) a personal and substantial interest of the party raising the constitutional question;
(3) the exercise of judicial review is pleaded at the earliest opportunity; and (4) the constitutional
question raised is the very lis mota of the case.19
For our purpose, only the third requisite is in question. Unequivocally, the law requires that the
question of constitutionality of a statute must be raised at the earliest opportunity. In Matibag v.
Benipayo,20 we held that the earliest opportunity to raise a constitutional issue is to raise it in the
pleadings before a competent court that can resolve the same, such that, if it was not raised in the
pleadings before a competent court, it cannot be considered at the trial, and, if not considered in the
trial, it cannot be considered on appeal.
In Matibag, President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo appointed, ad interim, Alfredo L. Benipayo as

Chairman of the Commission on Elections (COMELEC). Ma. J. Angelina G. Matibag was the Director
IV of the Education and Information Department (EID) but Benipayo reassigned her to the Law
Department. Matibag sought reconsideration of her relief as Director of the EID and her
reassignment to the Law Department. Benipayo denied her request for reconsideration.
Consequently, Matibag appealed the denial of her request to the COMELEC en banc. In addition,
Matibag filed a complaint against Benipayo before the Law Department for violation of the Civil
Service Rules and election laws. During the pendency of her complaint before the Law Department,
Mati-
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19 Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895, June 15, 2004, 432 SCRA 136, 140.
20 G.R. No. 149036, April 2, 2002, 380 SCRA 49.
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bag filed a petition before this Court assailing the constitutionality of the ad interim appointment of
Benipayo and the other COMELEC Commissioners. We held that the constitutional issue was raised
on time because it was the earliest opportunity for pleading the constitutional issue before a
competent body.
In the case of Umali v. Guingona, Jr.,21 the question of the constitutionality of the creation of the
Presidential Commission on Anti-Graft and Corruption (PCAGC) was raised in the motion for
reconsideration after the Regional Trial Court of Makati rendered a decision. When appealed, the
Court did not entertain the constitutional issue because it was not raised in the pleadings in the
trial court. In that case, the Court did not exercise judicial review on the constitutional question
because it was belatedly raised and not properly pleaded, thus, it cannot be considered by the Court
on appeal.
In this case, petitioner raised the issue of constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 in his motion for the
reconsideration of the Ombudsman’s decision. Verily, the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction to
entertain questions on the constitutionality of a law. Thus, when petitioner raised the issue of
constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770 before the Court of Appeals, which is the competent court, the
constitutional question was raised at the earliest opportune time. Furthermore, this Court may
determine, in the exercise of sound discretion, the time when a constitutional issue may be passed
upon.22
In assailing the constitutionality of Rep. Act No. 6770, petitioner contends that the Ombudsman has
only the powers enumerated under Section 13,23 Article XI of the Constitution;
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21 G.R. No. 131124, March 29, 1999, 305 SCRA 533.
22 Matibag v. Benipayo, supra note 20 at p. 65.
23 Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
employee, office or agency,
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Estarija vs. Ranada
and that such powers do not include the power to directly remove, suspend, demote, fine, or
censure a government official. Its power is merely to recommend the action to the officer
concerned. Moreover, petitioner, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman,24 insists that
although the Constitution provides that the Ombudsman can promulgate its own rules of
_______________
when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust, improper, or inefficient.

(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
duties.
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
(5) Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
(8) Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
24 G.R. No. 129124, March 15, 2002, 379 SCRA 322.
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procedure and exercise other powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided by
law, Sections 15,25
271
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25 SEC. 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act: Provided, That the refusal by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or discharge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against
said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the
Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public:
Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
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Estarija vs. Ranada
21,26 2227 and 2528 of Rep. Act No. 6770 are inconsistent with
_______________
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
records;
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(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein.
The Ombudsman shall give priority to complaints filed against high ranking government officials
and/or those occupying supervisory positions, complaints involving grave offenses as well as
complaints involving large sums of money and/or properties.
26 SEC. 21. Officials Subject To Disciplinary Authority; Exceptions.—The Office of the Ombudsman
shall have disciplinary authority over all elective and appointive officials of the Government and its
subdivisions, instrumentalities and agencies, including Members of the Cabinet, local government,
government-owned or controlled corporations and their subsidiaries, except over officials who may
be removed only by impeachment or over Members of Congress, and the Judiciary.
27 SEC. 22. Investigatory Power.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the power to investigate
any serious misconduct in office allegedly committed by officials removable by impeachment, for
the purpose of filing a verified complaint for impeachment, if warranted. In all cases of conspiracy
between an officer or employee of the government and a private person, the Ombudsman and his
Deputies shall have jurisdiction to include such private person in the investigation and proceed
against such private person as the evidence may warrant. The officer or employee and the private
person shall be tried jointly and shall be subject to the same penalties and liabilities.
28 SEC. 25. Penalties.—(1) In administrative proceedings under Presidential Decree No. 807, the
penalties and rules provided therein shall be applied.
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Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution because the power of the Ombudsman is merely to
recommend appropriate actions to the officer concerned.
For the State, the Solicitor General maintains that the framers of the 1987 Constitution did not
intend to spell out, restrictively, each act which the Ombudsman may or may not do, since the
purpose of the Constitution is to provide simply a framework within which to build the institution.
In addition, the Solicitor General avers that what petitioner invoked was merely an obiter dictum in
the case of Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman.
We find petitioner’s contentions without merit. Among the powers of the Ombudsman enumerated
in Section 13, Article XI of the Constitution are:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
273
1. Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
inefficient.
2. Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the Government,
or any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as of any government owned or
controlled corporation with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by
law, or to stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties.
3. Direct the Officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public official or employee at
fault, and recommend his
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(2) In other administrative proceedings, the penalty ranging from suspension without pay for one
year to dismissal with forfeiture of benefits or a fine ranging from five thousand pesos (P5,000.00)
to twice the amount malversed, illegally taken or lost, or both at the discretion of the Ombudsman,
taking into consideration circumstances that mitigate or aggravate the liability of the officer or
employee found guilty of the complaint or charges.
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Estarija vs. Ranada
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith.
4. Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, and report any
5. Request any government agency for assistance and information necessary in the discharge of its
6. Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
7. Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud, and corruption in the
8. Promulgate its rules of procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions or
duties as may be provided by law.
Rep. Act No. 6770 provides for the functional and structural organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman. In passing Rep. Act No. 6770, Congress deliberately endowed the Ombudsman with
the power to prosecute offenses committed by public officers and employees to make him a more
active and effective agent of the people in ensuring accountability in public office.29 Moreover, the
legislature has vested the Ombudsman with broad powers to enable him to implement his own
actions.30
In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,31 we held that Rep. Act No. 6770 is consistent with the intent of the
framers of the 1987 Constitution. They gave Congress the discretion to give the
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274
29 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. Nos. 105965-70, March 20, 2001, 354 SCRA 651, 660.
30 Id., at p. 666.
31 G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 437.
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Ombudsman powers that are not merely persuasive in character. Thus, in addition to the power of
the Ombudsman to prosecute and conduct investigations, the lawmakers intended to provide the
Ombudsman with the power to punish for contempt and preventively suspend any officer under his
authority pending an investigation when the case so warrants. He was likewise given disciplinary
authority over all elective and appointive officials of the government and its subdivisions,
instrumentalities and agencies except members of Congress and the Judiciary.
We also held in Ledesma that the statement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman that made
reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and cannot be cited
as a doctrinal declaration of this Court.32
Lastly, the Constitution gave Congress the discretion to give the Ombudsman other powers and
functions. Expounding on this power of Congress to prescribe other powers, functions, and duties
to the Ombudsman, we quote Commissioners Colayco and Monsod during the interpellation by
Commissioner Rodrigo in the Constitutional Commission of 1986 on the debates relative to the
power of the Ombudsman:
MR. RODRIGO: Let us go back to the division between the powers of the Tanodbayan and the
Ombudsman which says that:
The Tanodbayan . . . shall continue to function and exercise its powers as provided by law, except
those conferred on the office of the Ombudsman created under this Constitution.
The powers of the Ombudsman are enumerated in Section 12.
MR. COLAYCO: They are not exclusive.
MR. RODRIGO: So, these powers can also be exercised by the Tanodbayan?
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32 Id., at p. 449.
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Estarija vs. Ranada
MR. COLAYCO: No, I was saying that the powers enumerated here for the Ombudsman are not
exclusive.
MR. RODRIGO: Precisely, I am coming to that. The last of the enumerated functions of the
Ombudsman is: “to exercise such powers or perform such functions or duties as may be provided
by law.” So, the legislature may vest him with powers taken away from the Tanodbayan, may it not?
MR. COLAYCO: Yes.
MR. MONSOD: Yes.
xxxx
MR. RODRIGO: And precisely, Section 12(6) says that among the functions that can be performed by
the Ombudsman are “such functions or duties as may be provided by law.”
xxx
MR. COLAYCO: Madam President, that is correct.
MR. MONSOD: Madam President, perhaps it might be helpful if we give the spirit and intendment of
the Committee. What we wanted to avoid is the situation where it deteriorates into a prosecution
arm. We wanted to give the idea of the Ombudsman a chance, with prestige and persuasive powers,
and also a chance to really function as a champion of the citizen.
However, we do not want to foreclose the possibility that in the future, the Assembly, as it may see
fit, may have to give additional powers to the Ombudsman; we want to give the concept of a pure
Ombudsman a chance under the Constitution.
MR. RODRIGO: Madam President, what I am worried about is, if we create a constitutional body
which has neither punitive nor prosecutory powers but only persuasive powers, we might be
raising the hopes of our people too much and then disappoint them.
MR. MONSOD: I agree with the Commissioner.
MR. RODRIGO: Anyway, since we state that the powers of the Ombudsman can later on be
implemented by the legislature, why not leave this to the legislature?
MR. MONSOD: Yes, because we want to avoid what happened in 1973. I read the committee report
which recommended
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the approval of the 27 resolutions for the creation of the office of the Ombudsman, but
notwithstanding the explicit purpose enunciated in that report, the implementing law—the last
one, P.D. No. 1630—did not follow the main thrust; instead it created the Tanodbayan (2 record,
270-271). (emphasis supplied)
xxxx
MR. MONSOD (reacting to statements of Commissioner Blas Ople): May we just state that perhaps
the [H]onorable Commissioner has looked at it in too much of an absolutist position. The
Ombudsman is seen as a civil advocate or a champion of the citizens against the bureaucracy, not
against the President. On one hand, we are told he has no teeth and he lacks other things. On the
other hand, there is the interpretation that he is a competitor to the President, as if he is being
brought up to the same level as the President.
With respect to the argument that he is a toothless animal, we would like to say that we are
promoting the concept in its form at the present, but we are also saying that he can exercise such
powers and functions as may be provided by law in accordance with the direction of the thinking of
Commissioner Rodrigo. We did not think that at this time we should prescribe this, but we leave it
up to Congress at some future time if it feels that it may need to designate what powers the
Ombudsman need in order that he be more effective. This is not foreclosed.
So, this is a reversible disability, unlike that of a eunuch; it is not an irreversible disability
(emphasis supplied).33
Thus, the Constitution does not restrict the powers of the Ombudsman in Section 13, Article XI of
the 1987 Constitution, but allows the Legislature to enact a law that would spell out the powers of
the Ombudsman. Through the enactment of Rep. Act No. 6770, specifically Section 15, par. 3, the
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33 Acop v. Office of the Ombudsman, G.R. Nos. 120422 and 120428, September 27, 1995, 248 SCRA
566, 576-579.
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Estarija vs. Ranada
lawmakers gave the Ombudsman such powers to sanction erring officials and employees, except
members of Congress, and the Judiciary.34 To conclude, we hold that Sections 15, 21, 22 and 25 of
Republic Act No. 6770 are constitutionally sound. The powers of the Ombudsman are not merely
recommendatory. His office was given teeth to render this constitutional body not merely
277
functional but also effective. Thus, we hold that under Republic Act No. 6770 and the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman has the constitutional power to directly remove from government
service an erring public official other than a member of Congress and the Judiciary.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The assailed Decision dated February 12, 2003 of the Court of
Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 62557 and Resolution dated July 28, 2003 are hereby AFFIRMED.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Panganiban (C.J.), Puno, Sandoval-Gutierrez, Carpio, Austria-Martinez, Corona, Carpio-Morales,

Callejo, Sr., Azcuna, Tinga, Chico-Nazario, Garcia and Velasco, Jr., JJ., concur.
Ynares-Santiago, J., On Leave.
Petition denied, assailed decision and resolution affirmed.
Notes.—Before the respondent in an action for recovery of unexplained wealth under R.A. 1379 can
be required to submit counter-affidavits and other supporting documents, the complainant must
first submit his affidavit and those of his witnesses. (Olivas vs. Office of the Ombudsman [Deputy
Ombudsman-AFP], 239 SCRA 283 [1994])
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34 Supra, note 26.
675
VOL. 492, JUNE 26, 2006
675
Provost vs. Court of Appeals
The Supreme Court has sole authority to review the Ombudsman’s resolutions in criminal cases, on
pure questions of law, while appeals from decisions of the Office of the Ombudsman in
administrative disciplinary cases should be taken to the Court of Appeals under the provisions of
Rule 43 of the 1997 Revised Rules of Civil Procedure. (Lanting vs. Ombudsman, 458 SCRA 93
[2005])
——o0o—— Estarija vs. Ranada, 492 SCRA 652, G.R. No. 159314 June 26, 2006
22. Ombudsman v. Masing, 542 SCRA 253 (2008)
Intervention; Ombudsman; Allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the

sound discretion of the court after consideration of the appropriate circumstances; Rule 19 of the
Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice; Intervention by the Office of the Ombudsman may be allowed
278
where the rulings of the Court of Appeals adversely affected the former’s all-important jurisdiction,
the rulings having serious consequences on its effectiveness as the body charged by the
Constitution with the prosecution of officials and employees of the government suspected of
violating our laws on graft and corruption.—We have ruled however that allowance or
disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the sound discretion of the court after
consideration of the appropriate circumstances. Rule 19 of the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure
whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and completely available for justice. Its
purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote the administration of justice. Thus,
interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed period in the Rule in the higher
interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford indispensable parties, who have not
been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has been rendered by the trial court,
_______________
* FIRST DIVISION.
254
254
Office of the Ombudsman vs. Masing
when the petition for review of the judgment was already submitted for decision before the
Supreme Court, and even where the assailed order has already become final and executory. In Lim
v. Pacquing, 240 SCRA 649 (1995), the motion for intervention filed by the Republic of the
Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to settle once and for
all the substantive issues raised by the parties. In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of
Appeals adversely affected the all-important jurisdiction of the Office of the Ombudsman. The
rulings aggrieved the Office of the Ombudsman for they have serious consequences on its
effectiveness as the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of officials and
employees of the government suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption.
Administrative Law; Office of the Ombudsman; Ombudsman Act of 1989 (R.A. No. 6770); The
manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative
disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations—unlike the Ombudsman-like
agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and
recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file
and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in
cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is
intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices
and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.—In fine, the manifest intent of the
lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full administrative disciplinary authority
in accord with the constitutional deliberations. Unlike the Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the
powers of which extend to no more than making findings of fact and recommendations, and the
Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution who may file and prosecute criminal, civil
or administrative cases against public officials and employees only in cases of failure of justice, the
279
Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role
in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt practices and other offenses committed by
public officers and employees. The Ombudsman is to be an “activist watchman,” not merely a
passive one. He is vested with broad powers to enable him to implement his own actions.
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VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008
255
Same; Same; Same; Obiter Dictum; The statement in Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379
SCRA 322 (2002), that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter
dictum and cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of the Supreme Court nor is it safe from
judicial examination; The Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or
prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually
mandatory, though implementation of the order imposing the penalty is to be coursed through the
proper officer.—Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the Ombudsman are mere
recommendations, and that he may not directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials
and employees, citing Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, 379 SCRA 322 (2002) where the
following statement is found, viz.: x x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner was
administratively liable, the Ombudsman has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the
government service, more particularly from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph
(3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of
the public official or employee found to be at fault, to the public official concerned. The foregoing is
now a settled issue. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals, 465 SCRA 437 (2005), we explained Tapiador
and ruled categorically that: x x x We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several
reasons militate against a literal interpretation of the subject Constitutional provision. Firstly, a
cursory reading of Tapiador reveals that the main point of the case was the failure of the
complainant therein to present substantial evidence to prove the charges of the administrative
case. The statement that made reference to the power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an
obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient explanation, is susceptible to varying
interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal declaration of this Court nor is it safe
from judicial examination. (emphases ours) We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v.
Laja, 488 SCRA 574 (2006), where we emphasized that “the Ombudsman’s order to remove,
suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee is not merely advisory or
recommendatory but is actually mandatory.” Implementation of the order imposing the penalty is,
however, to be coursed through the proper officer.
Same; Same; Same; Magna Carta for Public School Teachers (R.A. No. 4760); Code of Conduct and
Ethical Standards for Public
256
256

280
Officials and Employees (R.A. No. 6713); The ruling in Fabella v. Court of Appeals, 282 SCRA 256
(1997), does not apply where the charges against the public school teachers are for violations of
R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials
and Employees.—Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in
Fabella were charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative
proceedings initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac
were administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees,
failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct,
discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents’
conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption.
Same; Same; Administrative Complaints; The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct
administrative investigations is beyond cavil as Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the
Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints.—The authority of the Office of
the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond cavil. As the principal and
primary complaints and action center against erring public officers and employees, it is mandated
by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution. In conjunction therewith, Section 19 of
R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on all administrative complaints.
Statutory Construction; It is basic that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning
by a law of earlier enactment; The statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 “reflects the
legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in connection
with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers” should be construed as referring
only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations conducted by the
Department of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).—It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents
to contend that
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257
R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers
and prescribes an exclusive procedure in administrative investigations involving them. R.A. No.
4670 was approved on June 18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the
people in a plebiscite in 1987 while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic
that the 1987 Constitution should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment.
The 1987 Constitution and R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the
Ombudsman to act on complaints against all public officials and employees, with the exception of
officials who may be removed only by impeachment or over members of Congress and the
281
Judiciary. If an issue should ever arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by implication are not favored,
and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or
inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 “reflects
the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers” should be construed
as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations
conducted by the DECS.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS in the Supreme Court. Certiorari.
Cheryll Ann C. Chamen for Paul L. Cansino, et al.
Cariaga Law Offices for Florita Masing and Jocelyn A. Tayactac.
PUNO, C.J.:
These cases involve the issue of whether the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school
teachers and employees, or merely recommend appropriate disciplinary action to the Department
of Education, Culture and Sports (DECS).
In G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165731, respondent Florita A. Masing was the former Principal of the
Davao City Integrated
258
258
Special School (DCISS) in Bangkal, Davao City. Respondent Jocelyn A. Tayactac was an office clerk in
the same school. In 1997, respondents were administratively charged before the Office of the
Ombudsman for Mindanao for allegedly collecting unauthorized fees, failing to remit authorized
fees, and to account for public funds. The cases were docketed as follows:
1. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193 for grave misconduct and neglect of duty, against respondent Masing
only;
2. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-249 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and a
schoolteacher;
3. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondents Masing and
Tayactac, and several schoolteachers;
4. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 for violation of Republic Act No. 6713, against respondent Masing and
several schoolteachers.
The complainants were parents of children studying at the DCISS, among whom were the
petitioners in G.R. No. 165731, namely, Paul L. Cansino, Felicidad Mojica, Venerando Mojica, and
Ricarte L. Mamparo.
282
On July 2, 1998, respondents filed a motion to dismiss on the ground that the Ombudsman has no
jurisdiction over them. Respondents alleged that the DECS has jurisdiction over them which shall
exercise the same through a committee to be constituted under Section 9 of Republic Act (R.A.) No.
4670, otherwise known as the “The Magna Carta for Public School Teachers.” The motion was
denied, as well as respondents’ motion for reconsideration.
On June 30, 2000, the Ombudsman for Mindanao rendered a joint decision finding respondents
Masing and Tayactac guilty, the dispositive portion of which reads:
“WHEREFORE, PREMISES CONSIDERED, this Office finds substantial evidence that:
1. Respondent Florita Masing is guilty of gross misconduct, neglect of duty and violation of Section
4, paragraphs (a), (b), and (c)
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259
of RA 6713 in relation to the collection of unauthorized fees, nonremittance of authorized fees and
failure to account for public funds; and of misconduct in relation to the complaint of Felicidad
Mojica, and she is hereby DISMISSED FROM [THE] SERVICE with all the accessory penalties
including forfeiture of retirement benefits and disqualification from holding public office; and
2. Respondent Jocelyn Tayactac is guilty of simple neglect of duty, and is hereby suspended for a
period of six (6) months. A repetition of the same offense will be met with stiffer penalty. x x x x”1
Respondents filed a motion for reconsideration which the Ombudsman denied in an Order dated
September 26, 2000. Respondents sought recourse to the Court of Appeals via a petition for review
under Rule 43 of the Rules of Court, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No. 61993. On February 27, 2004, the
Court of Appeals granted the petition, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, the joint decision of June 30, 2000 and the Order of September 26, 2000 are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE; and Administrative Cases Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MINADM-
97-249, OMB-MIN-ADM-97-253, and OMB-MIN-ADM-97-254 of the Office of the Ombudsman-
Mindanao are hereby DISMISSED.
The IMMEDIATE REINSTATEMENT of the petitioners with full backwages and other benefits is
further ORDERED in the interest of justice.”2
On April 13, 2004, the Office of the Ombudsman, which was not impleaded as respondent in the
cases, filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration.3 The Court of Appeals denied
the omnibus motion on the grounds that (1) intervention is not proper because it is sought by the
quasi-judicial body whose judgment is on appeal, and (2) intervention, even if permissible, is
belated un-
283
_______________
1 CA Rollo (CA-G.R. SP No. 61993), pp. 37-55.
2 Rollo (G.R. No. 165416), pp. 66-78, and Rollo (G.R. No. 165731), pp. 40-52.
3 Rollo (G.R. No. 165416), pp. 86-123.
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260
der Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court.4 Hence, the petition before us by the Office of the
Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165416.
The complainant-parents filed their own petition for review of the Court of Appeals’ decision dated
February 27, 2004, docketed as G.R. No. 165731.
In G.R. No. 165584, respondent Florita A. Masing faced yet another administrative case before the
Office of the Ombudsman-Mindanao filed by Erlinda P. Tan.5 The charges were oppression, serious
misconduct, discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or
disability due to immoral or vicious habits.
As in the other administrative cases, respondent Masing filed a motion to dismiss on the ground
that the Office of the Ombudsman has no jurisdiction over the case. The motion was denied, as well
as respondent’s motion for reconsideration.
On December 27, 1999, the Ombudsman for Mindanao found respondent Masing guilty as charged
and ordered her suspension for six (6) months without pay. The DECS Regional Director, Regional
Office No. XI, was ordered to implement the decision upon its finality.
Respondent Masing filed a petition for review with the Court of Appeals, docketed as CA-G.R. SP No.
58735. On July 31, 2003, the Court of Appeals set aside the assailed Ombudsman decision, viz.:
“WHEREFORE, finding merit in the herein petition, the same is hereby given due course and the
decision of the agency a quo in Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-282 is hereby SET ASIDE, and peti
_______________
4 Resolution dated September 27, 2004, id., at pp. 82-83, and Rollo (G.R. No. 165731), pp. 54-55.
5 Docketed as Administrative Case No. OMB-MIN-ADM-97282.
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tioner is further declared as entitled to her salary which she failed to receive during the period of
her flawed suspension.”6
The Office of the Ombudsman filed an Omnibus Motion to Intervene and for Reconsideration which
the Court of Appeals denied in its Resolution dated September 30, 2004.7 Hence, this petition by
the Office of the Ombudsman, docketed as G.R. No. 165584.
We consolidated G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165584 in our Resolution dated November 9, 2005. G.R. No.
165731 was consolidated per Resolution dated June 21, 2006.
The Office of the Ombudsman contends8—
I.
THE x x x COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE ABUSE OF DISCRETION AND IGNORED THE
CLEAR LANGUAGE OF THE CONSTITUTION, LAW AND JURISPRUDENCE WHEN IT RULED THAT
PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS NO AUTHORITY TO DISCIPLINE ERRING
MEMBERS OF THE DEPARTMENT OF EDUCATION, CULTURE AND SPORTS (DECS), THIS
CONSIDERING THAT:
(A) THE TAPIADOR [TAPIADOR VS. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN, 379 SCRA 322 (2002)] CASE
CITED BY THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO IS NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER
DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO DECIDENDI;
(B) THE FABELLA [FABELLA VS. COURT OF APPEALS, 282 SCRA 256 (1997)] CASE, WHICH
INVOLVED AN ILLEGAL CONSTITUTION OF AN INVESTIGATING COMMITTEE IN THE DECS, IS NOT
APPLICABLE TO THE DISCIPLINARY CASE AGAINST PRIVATE RESPONDENTS
_______________
6 Rollo (G.R. No. 165584), pp. 76-84.
7 Id., at pp. 86-88.
8 The quoted contentions are a summary of the contentions presented by the Office of the
Ombudsman in its memoranda submitted in G.R. Nos. 165416 and 165584.
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262
PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND OFFICE CLERK OF THE DECS;

285
(C) SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS) HAS
NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPALS, TEACHERS AND EMPLOYEES, LIKE HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENTS, TO THE LIST OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED
FROM THE OMBUDSMAN’S ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE
SUBSEQUENT 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE
OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY;
(D) THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE PETITIONER
OMBUDSMAN OVER PRIVATE RESPONDENTS, A PUBLIC SCHOOL PRINCIPAL AND AN OFFICE
CLERK OF THE DECS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC ACT
NO. 6770 (THE OMBUDSMAN ACT OF 1989) AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE, CANNOT BE
SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 (MAGNA CARTA FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
TEACHERS); AND
(E) THE POWER OF THE OMBUDSMAN TO DISCIPLINE PUBLIC SERVANTS NOT EXEMPTED FROM
ITS JURISDICTION AND TO IMPLEMENT ITS JUDGMENTS HAS BEEN AFFIRMED IN LEDESMA VS.
COURT OF APPEALS, G.R. NO. 161629, 29 JULY 2005.9
(F) THE OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN HAS CONCURRENT INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY
AUTHORITY WITH THE DECS OVER PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS, INCLUDING HEREIN PRIVATE
RESPONDENT MASING, AS THERE IS SIMPLY NO REPUGNANCE BETWEEN THE LAWS
CONFERRING INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION ON THE OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN (ART. XI, 1987 CONSTITUTION AND R.A. 6770) AND THE LAWS CONFERRING THE
SAME INVESTIGATIVE AND DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION TO DECS (R.A. 4670 [MAGNA CARTA
FOR PUBLIC SCHOOL
_______________
9 Rollo (G.R. No. 165416), pp. 192-193.
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263
TEACHERS] AND P.D. 807, NOW BOOK V OF E.O. 292 [CIVIL SERVICE LAW]).10
II.
CONTRARY TO THE APPELLATE COURT A QUO’S RULING, THE PETITIONER OFFICE OF THE
OMBUDSMAN TIMELY AND RIGHTFULLY FILED ITS OMNIBUS MOTION TO INTERVENE AND FOR
RECONSIDERATION ON A PATENTLY ERRONEOUS DECISION OF THE COURT OF APPEALS WHICH
HAS NOT YET ATTAINED FINALITY.11
The petitioners in G.R. No. 165731 contend—
I.
TAPIADOR V. OFFICE OF THE OMBUDSMAN (379 SCRA 322) CITED BY THE COURT OF APPEALS IS
NOT APPLICABLE, AS THE TAPIADOR OBITER DICTUM CAN NEVER BE CITED AS A VALID RATIO
DECIDENDI. MOREOVER, THE TAPIADOR RULING HAS EFFECTIVELY BEEN ABANDONED BY THE
HONORABLE SUPREME COURT WHEN IT UPHELD THE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY OF THE
286
OMBUDSMAN IN SUBSEQUENT CASES EVEN AS TAPIADOR FAILED TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE
PROPER CONSTITUTIONAL AND STATUTORY BASES OF THE OMBUDSMAN’S DISCIPLINARY
POWER OVER ALL APPOINTIVE AND ELECTIVE PUBLIC OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES.
II.
TO INSIST THAT PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS PURSUANT TO THE RULING IN FABELLA V. COURT
OF APPEALS (G.R. NO. 110379, 28 NOVEMBER 1997) CAN ONLY BE PROCEEDED AGAINST
ADMINISTRATIVELY THROUGH THE “COMMITTEE” UNDER SECTION 9 OF R.A. NO. 4670 WOULD
BE AN UNDUE, UNWARRANTED AND INVALID “CLASSIFICATION” BY JUDICIAL FIAT OF A
CERTAIN GROUP OF PUBLIC SERVANTS WHICH IS VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION
CLAUSE
_______________
10 Rollo (G.R. No. 165584), p. 201.
11 Rollo (G.R. No. 165416), p. 193, and Rollo (G.R. No. 165584), p. 202.
264
264
OF THE CONSTITUTION. MOREOVER, THE SAID LAW DOES NOT CONFER JURISDICTION ON THE
“COMMITTEE.”
III.
SECTION 9 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670 HAS NOT ADDED PUBLIC SCHOOL TEACHERS TO THE LIST
OF SPECIAL PRIVILEGED CLASSES OF PUBLIC SERVANTS EXEMPTED FROM THE OMBUDSMAN’S
ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY AUTHORITY UNDER THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, AND ANY SUCH
INTERPRETATION SUFFERS FROM THE VICE OF UNCONSTITUTIONALITY.
IV.
THE CONCEDED ADMINISTRATIVE DISCIPLINARY JURISDICTION OF THE OMBUDSMAN OVER THE

HEREIN RESPONDENTS, WHICH IS FULLY SUPPORTED BY THE 1987 CONSTITUTION, REPUBLIC
ACT NO. 6770 AND EXISTING JURISPRUDENCE CANNOT BE SUPPLANTED BY SECTION 9 OF
REPUBLIC ACT NO. 4670.
In sum, the pivotal issues are (1) whether the Office of the Ombudsman may intervene and seek
reconsideration of the adverse decisions rendered by the Court of Appeals, and (2) whether the
Office of the Ombudsman may directly discipline public school teachers and employees.
First, the procedural issue. The Office of the Ombudsman was not allowed by the Court of Appeals
to intervene because (1) the motions to intervene were filed after the decisions have already been
287
rendered in CA-G.R. SP Nos. 58735 and 61993, and (2) the Office of the Ombudsman was the
quasijudicial body which rendered the impugned decisions.
Section 2, Rule 19 of the Rules of Court provides that a motion for intervention may be filed before
rendition of judgment, viz.:
“SECTION 2. Time to intervene.—The motion to intervene may be filed at any time before rendition
of judgment by the trial court. A copy of the pleading-in-intervention shall be attached to the
motion and served on the original parties.” (emphasis ours)
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We have ruled however that allowance or disallowance of a motion for intervention rests on the
sound discretion of the court12 after consideration of the appropriate circumstances.13 Rule 19 of
the Rules of Court is a rule of procedure whose object is to make the powers of the court fully and
completely available for justice.14 Its purpose is not to hinder or delay but to facilitate and promote
the administration of justice.15 Thus, interventions have been allowed even beyond the prescribed
period in the Rule in the higher interest of justice. Interventions have been granted to afford
indispensable parties, who have not been impleaded, the right to be heard even after a decision has
been rendered by the trial court,16 when the petition for review of the judgment was already
submitted for decision before the Supreme Court,17 and even where the assailed order has already
become final and executory.18 In Lim v. Pacquing,19 the motion for intervention filed by the
Republic of the Philippines was allowed by this Court to avoid grave injustice and injury and to
settle once and for all the substantive issues raised by the parties.
In the cases at bar, the rulings of the Court of Appeals adversely affected the all-important
jurisdiction of the Office of
_______________
12 Heirs of Geronimo Restrivera v. De Guzman, G.R. No. 146540, July 14, 2004, 434 SCRA 456.
13 See Mago v. Court of Appeals, 363 Phil. 225, 233; 303 SCRA 600, 608 (1999).
14 Manila Railroad Company v. Attorney-General, 20 Phil. 523, 529 (1911). See also Director of
Lands v. Court of Appeals, No. L45168, September 25, 1979, 93 SCRA 238, 246 and Mago v. Court of
Appeals, supra at p. 234; p. 609.
15 Manila Railroad Company v. Attorney-General, supra at p. 530.
16 Tahanan Development Corporation v. Court of Appeals, 203 Phil. 652; 118 SCRA 273 (1982).
17 Director of Lands v. Court of Appeals, supra.

288
18 Mago v. Court of Appeals, supra note 13.
19 310 Phil. 722; 240 SCRA 649 (1995).
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266
the Ombudsman. The rulings aggrieved the Office of the Ombudsman for they have serious
consequences on its effectiveness as the body charged by the Constitution with the prosecution of
officials and employees of the government suspected of violating our laws on graft and corruption.
In Civil Service Commission v. Dacoycoy,20 we recognized the standing of the Civil Service
Commission (CSC) to appeal a decision of the Court of Appeals which reversed its decision finding
Dacoycoy guilty of nepotism and ordering his dismissal from the service. Although the CSC was the
quasijudicial body which rendered the decision appealed to the Court of Appeals, it became the
party aggrieved or adversely affected by its decision which “seriously prejudices the civil service
system.”21 In Constantino-David v. PangandamanGania,22 we likewise ruled that the CSC may seek
a review of decisions of the Court of Appeals that are detrimental to its constitutional mandate as
the central personnel agency of the government.23
However, rather than remand the cases at bar to the Court of Appeals for a ruling on the merits of
the Ombudsman’s motions for reconsideration, we shall resolve the legal issues involved in the
interest of speedy justice.
The authority of the Ombudsman to act on complaints filed against public officers and employees is
explicit in Article XI, Section 12 of the 1987 Constitution, viz.:
“The Ombudsman and his Deputies, as protectors of the people, shall act promptly on complaints
filed in any form or manner against public officials or employees of the Government, or any
subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, including government-owned or controlled
corporations, and
_______________
20 366 Phil. 86; 306 SCRA 425 (1999).
21 Id., at p. 104; p. 437.
22 456 Phil. 273; 409 SCRA 80 (2003).
23 Id., at p. 291; p. 91.
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shall, in appropriate cases, notify the complainants of the action taken and the result thereof.”
(emphasis ours)
Article XI, Section 13 of the same Constitution delineates the powers, functions and duties of the
Ombudsman as follows:
“(1) Investigate on its own, or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any public official,
inefficient.
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any public official or employee of the
duties.
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as may be
provided by law, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts and transactions
entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or properties, to the
Commission on Audit for appropriate and report any irregularity action.
(6) Publicize matters covered by its investigation when circumstances so warrant and with due
prudence.
(8) Promulgate its rules and procedure and exercise such other powers or perform such functions
or duties as may be provided by law.”
268
268
The enumeration of these powers is non-exclusive.24 Congress enacted R.A. No. 6770,25 otherwise
known as The Ombudsman Act of 1989, on November 17, 1989 giving the Office such other powers
that it may need to efficiently perform the task given by the Constitution,26 viz.:
“Section 15. Powers, Functions and Duties.—The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following
290
(1) Investigate and prosecute on its own or on complaint by any person, any act or omission of any
public officer or employee, office or agency, when such act or omission appears to be illegal, unjust,
improper or inefficient. It has primary jurisdiction over cases cognizable by the Sandiganbayan and,
in the exercise of this primary jurisdiction, it may take over, at any stage, from any investigatory
agency of the Government, the investigation of such cases;
(2) Direct, upon complaint or at its own instance, any officer or employee of the Government, or of
any subdivision, agency or instrumentality thereof, as well as any government-owned or controlled
corporations with original charter, to perform and expedite any act or duty required by law, or to
stop, prevent, and correct any abuse or impropriety in the performance of duties;
(3) Direct the officer concerned to take appropriate action against a public officer or employee at
fault or who neglects to perform an act or discharge a duty required by law, and recommend his
removal, suspension, demotion, fine, censure, or prosecution, and ensure compliance therewith; or
enforce its disciplinary authority as provided in Section 21 of this Act; Provided, That the refusal by
any officer without just cause to comply with an order of the Ombudsman to remove, suspend,
demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee who is at fault or who neglects to
perform an act or dis
_______________
24 See Acop v. The Office of the Ombudsman, 318 Phil. 673; 248 SCRA 566 (1995).
25 Entitled “An Act Providing for the Functional and Structural Organization of the Office of the
Ombudsman,” and approved on November 17, 1989.
26 Buenaseda v. Flavier, G.R. No. 106719, September 21, 1993, 226 SCRA 645.
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VOL. 542, JANUARY 22, 2008
269
charge a duty required by law shall be a ground for disciplinary action against said officer;
(4) Direct the officer concerned, in any appropriate case, and subject to such limitations as it may
provide in its rules of procedure, to furnish it with copies of documents relating to contracts or
transactions entered into by his office involving the disbursement or use of public funds or
properties, and report any irregularity to the Commission on Audit for appropriate action;
responsibilities, and to examine, if necessary, pertinent records and documents;
(6) Publicize matters covered by is investigation of the matters mentioned in paragraphs (1), (2),
(3) and (4) hereof, when circumstances so warrant and with due prudence: Provided, That the
Ombudsman under its rules and regulations may determine what cases may not be made public:
Provided, further, That any publicity issued by the Ombudsman shall be balanced, fair and true;
(7) Determine the causes of inefficiency, red tape, mismanagement, fraud and corruption in the
Government, and make recommendations for their elimination and the observance of high
standards of ethics and efficiency;
(8) Administer oaths, issue subpoena and subpoena duces tecum, and take testimony in any
records;
291
(9) Punish for contempt in accordance with the Rules of Court and under the same procedure and
(10) Delegate to the Deputies, or its investigators or representatives such authority or duty as shall
ensure the effective exercise or performance of the powers, functions, and duties herein or
hereinafter provided;
(11) Investigate and initiate the proper action for the recovery of ill-gotten and/or unexplained
wealth amassed after February 25, 1986 and the prosecution of the parties involved therein. x x x
x”27
_______________
27 Section 15, R.A. No. 6770.
270
270
In fine, the manifest intent of the lawmakers was to bestow on the Office of the Ombudsman full
administrative disciplinary authority in accord with the constitutional deliberations.28 Unlike the
Ombudsman-like agencies of the past the powers of which extend to no more than making findings
of fact and recommendations, and the Ombudsman or Tanodbayan under the 1973 Constitution
who may file and prosecute criminal, civil or administrative cases against public officials and
employees only in cases of failure of justice, the Ombudsman under the 1987 Constitution and R.A.
No. 6770 is intended to play a more active role in the enforcement of laws on anti-graft and corrupt
practices and other offenses committed by public officers and employees.29 The Ombudsman is to
be an “activist watchman,” not merely a passive one.30 He is vested with broad powers to enable
him to implement his own actions.31
Respondents, however, insist that the findings of the Ombudsman are mere recommendations, and
that he may not directly impose administrative sanctions on public officials and employees, citing
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman 32 where the following statement is found, viz.:
“x x x x Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner was administratively liable, the Ombudsman
has no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly
from his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987
Constitution, the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee
found to be at fault, to the public official concerned.”
_______________
28 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 92.
29 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, 407 Phil. 154; 354 SCRA 651 (2001).
30 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28, at p. 119, citing from II RECORD No.
6, SENATE 181 (August 2, 1988).
292
31 Uy v. Sandiganbayan, supra at p. 172; p. 666.
32 429 Phil. 47; 379 SCRA 322 (2002).
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The foregoing is now a settled issue. In Ledesma v. Court of Appeals,33 we explained Tapiador and
ruled categorically that:
“x x x x Under Section 13(3) of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution, it is provided:
Section 13. The Office of the Ombudsman shall have the following powers, functions, and duties:
...
compliance therewith. (Emphasis supplied)
Petitioner insists that the word “recommend” be given its literal meaning; that is, that the
Ombudsman’s action is only advisory in nature rather than one having any binding effect, citing
Tapiador v. Office of the Ombudsman, thus:
. . . Besides, assuming arguendo, that petitioner were administratively liable, the Ombudsman has
no authority to directly dismiss the petitioner from the government service, more particularly from
his position in the BID. Under Section 13, subparagraph (3), of Article XI of the 1987 Constitution,
the Ombudsman can only “recommend” the removal of the public official or employee found to be
at fault, to the public official concerned.”
For their part, the Solicitor General and the Office of the Ombudsman argue that the word
“recommend” must be taken in conjunction with the phrase “and ensure compliance therewith.”
The proper interpretation of the Court’s statement in Tapiador should be that the Ombudsman has
the authority to determine the administrative liability of a public official or employee at fault, and
direct and compel the head of the office or agency concerned to implement the penalty imposed. In
other words, it merely concerns the procedural aspect of the Ombudsman’s functions and not its
jurisdiction.
_______________
33 G.R. No. 161629, July 29, 2005, 465 SCRA 437.
272
272
293
We agree with the ratiocination of public respondents. Several reasons militate against a literal
interpretation of the subject Constitutional provision. Firstly, a cursory reading of Tapiador reveals
that the main point of the case was the failure of the complainant therein to present substantial
evidence to prove the charges of the administrative case. The statement that made reference to the
power of the Ombudsman is, at best, merely an obiter dictum and, as it is unsupported by sufficient
explanation, is susceptible to varying interpretations x x x x [h]ence, it cannot be cited as a doctrinal
declaration of this Court nor is it safe from judicial examination.” (emphases ours)
We reiterated this ruling in Office of the Ombudsman v. Laja,34 where we emphasized that “the
Ombudsman’s order to remove, suspend, demote, fine, censure, or prosecute an officer or employee
is not merely advisory or recommendatory but is actually mandatory.”35 Implementation of the
order imposing the penalty is, however, to be coursed through the proper officer.36 Recently, in
Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals,37 we also held—
‘While Section 15(3) of RA 6770 states that the Ombudsman has the power to “recommend x x x
removal, suspension, demotion x x x” of government officials and employees, the same Section
15(3) also states that the Ombudsman in the alternative may “enforce its disciplinary authority as
provided in Section 21” of RA 6770.’ (emphasis supplied)
_______________
34 G.R. No. 169241, May 2, 2006, 488 SCRA 574. See also Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 160675, June 16, 2006, 491 SCRA 92; Barillo v. Gervacio, G.R. No. 155088, August
31, 2006, 500 SCRA 561; and Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 167844,
November 22, 2006, 507 SCRA 593.
35 Id., at p. 583.
36 Office of the Ombudsman v. Madriaga, G.R. No. 164316, September 27, 2006, 503 SCRA 631.
37 G.R. No. 168079, July 17, 2007; 527 SCRA 798.
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273
Finally, respondent Masing contends that she may be administratively dealt with only by following
the procedure prescribed in Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 or the The Magna Carta for Public School
Teachers. She cites Fabella v. Court of Appeals.38
Section 9, R.A. No. 4670 provides—

294
“Section 9. Administrative Charges.—Administrative charges against a teacher shall be heard

initially by a committee composed of the corresponding School Superintendent of the Division or a
duly authorized representative who should at least have the rank of a division supervisor, where
the teacher belongs, as chairman, a representative of the local or, in its absence, any existing
provincial or national teachers’ organization and a supervisor of the Division, the last two to be
designated by the Director of Public Schools. The Committee shall submit its findings, and
recommendations to the Director of Public Schools within thirty days from the termination of the
hearings; Provided, however, That where the school superintendent is the complainant or an
interested party, all the members of the committee shall be appointed by the Secretary of
Education.”
In Fabella, several public schoolteachers were administratively charged by then DECS Secretary
Isidro Cariño for taking part in mass actions in violation of civil service laws and regulations. A
committee was constituted to hear the charges. The teachers assailed the procedure adopted by the
committee in a petition for certiorari filed before the Regional Trial Court of Quezon City. In
affirming the regional trial court’s decision which declared illegal the constitution of the committee,
we ruled—
“x x x x Section 9 of RA 4670 x x x reflects the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate
set of procedural requirements in connection with administrative proceedings involving public
schoolteachers. x x x [R]ight to due process of law requires compliance with these requirements
laid down by RA 4670.”39
_______________
38 346 Phil. 940; 282 SCRA 256 (1997).
39 Id., at p. 956; p. 270.
274
274
Fabella, however, does not apply to the cases at bar. The public schoolteachers in Fabella were
charged with violations of civil service laws, rules and regulations in administrative proceedings
initiated by the DECS Secretary. In contrast, herein respondents Masing and Tayactac were
administratively charged in letter-complaints duly filed before the Office of the Ombudsman for
Mindanao. The charges were for violations of R.A. No. 6713, otherwise known as the Code of
Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and Employees, collecting unauthorized fees,
failure to remit authorized fees, failure to account for public funds, oppression, serious misconduct,
discourtesy in the conduct of official duties, and physical or mental incapacity or disability due to
immoral or vicious habits. In short, the acts and omissions complained of relate to respondents’
conduct as public official and employee, if not to outright graft and corruption.
295
The authority of the Office of the Ombudsman to conduct administrative investigations is beyond
cavil.40 As the principal and primary complaints and action center41 against erring public officers
and employees, it is mandated by no less than Section 13(1), Article XI of the Constitution.42 In
conjunction therewith, Section 19 of R.A. No. 6770 grants to the Ombudsman the authority to act on
all administrative complaints,43 viz.:
“Sec. 19. Administrative complaints.—The Ombudsman shall act on all complaints relating, but not
limited, to acts or omissions which:
(1) Are contrary to law or regulation;

_______________
40 Office of the Ombudsman v. Court of Appeals, supra note 28, at p. 111.
41 Department of Justice v. Liwag, G.R. No. 149311, February 11, 2005, 451 SCRA 83, 97.
42 Id.
43 Id.
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275
(2) Are unreasonable, unfair, oppressive or discriminatory;

(3) Are inconsistent with the general course of an agency’s functions, though in accordance with
law;
(4) Proceed from a mistake of law or an arbitrary ascertainment of facts;
(5) Are in the exercise of discretionary powers but for an improper purpose; or
(6) Are otherwise irregular, immoral or devoid of justification.”
Section 23(1) of the same law provides that administrative investigations conducted by the Office of
the Ombudsman shall be in accordance with its rules of procedure and consistent with due process.
It is erroneous, therefore, for respondents to contend that R.A. No. 4670 confers an exclusive
disciplinary authority on the DECS over public school teachers and prescribes an exclusive
procedure in administrative investigations involving them.44 R.A. No. 4670 was approved on June
18, 1966. On the other hand, the 1987 Constitution was ratified by the people in a plebiscite in 1987
while R.A. No. 6770 was enacted on November 17, 1989. It is basic that the 1987 Constitution
should not be restricted in its meaning by a law of earlier enactment. The 1987 Constitution and
R.A. No. 6770 were quite explicit in conferring authority on the Ombudsman to act on complaints
against all public officials and employees, with the exception of officials who may be removed only
by impeachment or over members of Congress and the Judici-
_______________
296
44 The term “teacher” as used in the Act includes not only those engaged in classroom teaching but
also all other persons performing supervisory and/or administrative functions in all schools,
colleges and universities operated by the Government or its political subdivisions; but not including
school nurses, school physicians, school dentists, and other school employees, and the professorial
staff of state colleges and universities.
276
276
ary.45 If an issue should ever arise, therefore, it should rather be whether the 1987 Constitution
and R.A. No. 6770 have abrogated R.A. No. 4670. However, repeals by implication are not favored,
and courts have the duty to harmonize, so far as it is practicable, apparently conflicting or
inconsistent provisions. Therefore, the statement in Fabella that Section 9 of R.A. No. 4670 “reflects
the legislative intent to impose a standard and a separate set of procedural requirements in
connection with administrative proceedings involving public schoolteachers” should be construed
as referring only to the specific procedure to be followed in administrative investigations
conducted by the DECS.
IN VIEW WHEREOF, the petitions are GRANTED. The assailed Decisions of the Court of Appeals
dated February 27, 2004 and July 31, 2003, as well as its Resolutions dated September 27, 2004 and
September 30, 2004, in CA-G.R. SP No. 61993 and CA-G.R. SP No. 58735, respectively, are
REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Joint Decision dated June 30, 2000 of the Office of the Ombudsman
for Mindanao in Administrative Case Nos. OMB-MIN-ADM-97-193, OMB-MINADM-97-249, OMB-
MIN-ADM-97-253 and OMB-MIN-ADM97-254 and its Decision dated December 27, 1999 in
OMBMIN-ADM-97-282, as well as its orders denying reconsideration, are REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Sandoval-Gutierrez, Corona, Azcuna and Leonardo-De Castro, JJ., concur.
Petitions granted, judgments and resolutions reversed and set aside.
Notes.—The Supreme Court will not interfere with the Ombudsman’s exercise of his
constitutionally mandated investigatory and prosecutory powers—it is beyond the ambit of
_______________
45 Section 21, R.A. No. 6770.
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297
Central Cement Corporation vs. Mines Adjudication Board
the Supreme Court to review the exercise of discretion of the Ombudsman in prosecuting or
dismissing a complaint filed before it. (Loquias vs. Office of the Ombudsman, 338 SCRA 62 [2000])
The Office of the Ombudsman was envisioned by the Constitution to serve as the principal and
primary complaints and action center for the aggrieved layman baffled by the bureaucratic maze of
procedures, and for this purpose, it was granted more than the usual powers given to prosecutors.
Visà-vis other prosecutors, the exercise by the Ombudsman of its power to investigate public
officials is given preference over other bodies. (Department of Justice vs. Liwag, 451 SCRA 83
[2005]) Office of the Ombudsman vs. Masing, 542 SCRA 253, G.R. No. 165416, G.R. No. 165584, G.R.
No. 165731 January 22, 2008
Power Congressional Oversight
23. Macalintal v. Comelec 405 SCRA 693-733 (pay close attention to CJ Puno’s opinion)
Confronting us is an undesignated petition1 filed by Atty. Romulo B. Macalintal (Atty. Macalintal),

that questions the constitution of the Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET) as an illegal and
unauthorized progeny of Section 4,2 Article VII of the Constitution:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose.
While petitioner concedes that the Supreme Court is "authorized to promulgate its rules for the
purpose," he chafes at the creation of a purportedly "separate tribunal" complemented by a budget
allocation, a seal, a set of personnel and confidential employees, to effect the constitutional
mandate. Petitioner’s averment is supposedly supported by the provisions of the 2005 Rules of the
Presidential Electoral Tribunal (2005 PET Rules),3 specifically:
(1) Rule 3 which provides for membership of the PET wherein the Chief Justice and the
Associate Justices are designated as "Chairman and Members," respectively;
(2) Rule 8(e) which authorizes the Chairman of the PET to appoint employees and
confidential employees of every member thereof;
(3) Rule 9 which provides for a separate "Administrative Staff of the Tribunal" with the
appointment of a Clerk and a Deputy Clerk of the Tribunal who, at the discretion of the PET,
may designate the Clerk of Court (en banc) as the Clerk of the Tribunal; and
(4) Rule 11 which provides for a "seal" separate and distinct from the Supreme Court seal.
Grudgingly, petitioner throws us a bone by acknowledging that the invoked constitutional provision
does allow the "appointment of additional personnel."
Further, petitioner highlights our decision in Buac v. COMELEC4 which peripherally declared that
"contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original
298
jurisdiction of the PET, x x x in the exercise of quasi-judicial power." On this point, petitioner
reiterates that the constitution of the PET, with the designation of the Members of the Court as
Chairman and Members thereof, contravenes Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, which
prohibits the designation of Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law
to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as directed in our Resolution dated April 6, 2010, filed a
Comment5thereon. At the outset, the OSG points out that the petition filed by Atty. Macalintal is
unspecified and without statutory basis; "the liberal approach in its preparation x x x is a violation
of the well known rules of practice and pleading in this jurisdiction."
In all, the OSG crystallizes the following issues for resolution of the Court:
WHETHER x x x PETITIONER HAS LOCUS STANDI TO FILE THE INSTANT PETITION.
II
WHETHER x x x THE CREATION OF THE PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS

UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF PARAGRAPH 7, SECTION 4 OF ARTICLE VII OF
THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.
III
WHETHER x x x THE DESIGNATION OF MEMBERS OF THE SUPREME COURT AS MEMBERS OF THE

PRESIDENTIAL ELECTORAL TRIBUNAL IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL FOR BEING A VIOLATION OF
SECTION 12, ARTICLE VIII OF THE 1987 CONSTITUTION.6
In his Reply,7 petitioner maintains that:
1. He has legal standing to file the petition given his averment of transcendental importance
of the issues raised therein;
2. The creation of the PET, a separate tribunal from the Supreme Court, violates Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution; and
3. The PET, being a separate tribunal, exercises quasi-judicial functions contrary to Section
12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
We winnow the meanderings of petitioner into the singular issue of whether the constitution of the
PET, composed of the Members of this Court, is unconstitutional, and violates Section 4, Article VII
and Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution.
But first, we dispose of the procedural issue of whether petitioner has standing to file the present
petition.
The issue of locus standi is derived from the following requisites of a judicial inquiry:
299
1. There must be an actual case or controversy;
2. The question of constitutionality must be raised by the proper party;
3. The constitutional question must be raised at the earliest possible opportunity; and
4. The decision of the constitutional question must be necessary to the determination of the
case itself.8
On more than one occasion we have characterized a proper party as one who has sustained or is in
immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a result of the act complained of. 9 The dust has long
settled on the test laid down in Baker v. Carr:10 "whether the party has alleged such a personal stake
in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete adverseness which sharpens the
presentation of issues upon which the court so largely depends for illumination of difficult
questions."11 Until and unless such actual or threatened injury is established, the complainant is not
clothed with legal personality to raise the constitutional question.
Our pronouncements in David v. Macapagal-Arroyo12 illuminate:
The difficulty of determining locus standi arises in public suits. Here, the plaintiff who asserts a
"public right" in assailing an allegedly illegal official action, does so as a representative of the
general public. He may be a person who is affected no differently from any other person. He could
be suing as a "stranger," or in the category of a "citizen," or "taxpayer." In either case, he has to
adequately show that he is entitled to seek judicial protection. In other words, he has to make out a
sufficient interest in the vindication of the public order and the securing of relief as a" citizen" or
"taxpayer."
xxxx
However, to prevent just about any person from seeking judicial interference in any official policy
or act with which he disagreed with, and thus hinders the activities of governmental agencies
engaged in public service, the United States Supreme Court laid down the more stringent "direct
injury" test in Ex Parte Levitt, later reaffirmed in Tileston v. Ullman. The same Court ruled that for a
private individual to invoke the judicial power to determine the validity of an executive or
legislative action, he must show that he has sustained a direct injury as a result of that action, and it
is not sufficient that he has a general interest common to all members of the public.
This Court adopted the "direct injury" test in our jurisdiction. In People v. Vera, it held that the
person who impugns the validity of a statute must have "a personal and substantial interest in the
case such that he has sustained, or will sustain direct injury as a result." The Vera doctrine was
upheld in a litany of cases, such as, Custodio v. President of the Senate, Manila Race Horse Trainers’
Association v. De la Fuente, Pascual v. Secretary of Public Works and Anti-Chinese League of the
Philippines v. Felix.
However, being a mere procedural technicality, the requirement of locus standi may be waived by
the Court in the exercise of its discretion. This was done in the 1949 Emergency Powers Cases,
Araneta v. Dinglasan, where the "transcendental importance" of the cases prompted the Court to act
liberally. Such liberality was neither a rarity nor accidental. In Aquino v. Comelec, this Court
resolved to pass upon the issues raised due to the "far-reaching implications" of the petition
300
notwithstanding its categorical statement that petitioner therein had no personality to file the suit.
Indeed, there is a chain of cases where this liberal policy has been observed, allowing ordinary
citizens, members of Congress, and civic organizations to prosecute actions involving the
constitutionality or validity of laws, regulations and rulings.
xxxx
By way of summary, the following rules may be culled from the cases decided by this Court.
Taxpayers, voters, concerned citizens, and legislators may be accorded standing to sue, provided
that the following requirements are met:
(1) cases involve constitutional issues;
(2) for taxpayers, there must be a claim of illegal disbursement of public funds or that the
tax measure is unconstitutional;
(3) for voters, there must be a showing of obvious interest in the validity of the election law
in question;
(4) for concerned citizens, there must be a showing that the issues raised are of
transcendental importance which must be settled early; and
(5) for legislators, there must be a claim that the official action complained of infringes upon
their prerogatives as legislators.
Contrary to the well-settled actual and direct injury test, petitioner has simply alleged a generalized
interest in the outcome of this case, and succeeds only in muddling the issues. Paragraph 2 of the
petition reads:
2. x x x Since the creation and continued operation of the PET involves the use of public funds and
the issue raised herein is of transcendental importance, it is petitioner’s humble submission that, as
a citizen, a taxpayer and a member of the BAR, he has the legal standing to file this petition.
But even if his submission is valid, petitioner’s standing is still imperiled by the white elephant in
the petition, i.e., his appearance as counsel for former President Gloria Macapagal-Arroyo
(Macapagal-Arroyo) in the election protest filed by 2004 presidential candidate Fernando Poe, Jr.
before the Presidential Electoral Tribunal,13 because judicial inquiry, as mentioned above, requires
that the constitutional question be raised at the earliest possible opportunity.14Such appearance as
counsel before the Tribunal, to our mind, would have been the first opportunity to challenge the
constitutionality of the Tribunal’s constitution.
Although there are recognized exceptions to this requisite, we find none in this instance. Petitioner
is unmistakably estopped from assailing the jurisdiction of the PET before which tribunal he had
ubiquitously appeared and had acknowledged its jurisdiction in 2004. His failure to raise a
seasonable constitutional challenge at that time, coupled with his unconditional acceptance of the
Tribunal’s authority over the case he was defending, translates to the clear absence of an
indispensable requisite for the proper invocation of this Court’s power of judicial review. Even on
this score alone, the petition ought to be dismissed outright.
301
Prior to petitioner’s appearance as counsel for then protestee Macapagal-Arroyo, we had occasion
to affirm the grant of original jurisdiction to this Court as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal in the
auspicious case of Tecson v. Commission on Elections.15 Thus -
Petitioners Tecson, et al., in G.R. No. 161434, and Velez, in G.R. No. 161634, invoke the provisions of
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution in assailing the jurisdiction of the
COMELEC when it took cognizance of SPA No. 04-003 and in urging the Supreme Court to instead
take on the petitions they directly instituted before it. The Constitutional provision cited reads:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns, and qualifications of the President or Vice-President, and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The provision is an innovation of the 1987 Constitution. The omission in the 1935 and the 1973
Constitution to designate any tribunal to be the sole judge of presidential and vice-presidential
contests, has constrained this Court to declare, in Lopez vs. Roxas, as "not (being) justiciable"
controversies or disputes involving contests on the elections, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President. The constitutional lapse prompted Congress, on 21 June 1957, to enact
Republic Act No. 1793, "An Act Constituting an Independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try,
Hear and Decide Protests Contesting the Election of the President-Elect and the Vice-President-Elect of
the Philippines and Providing for the Manner of Hearing the Same." Republic Act 1793 designated the
Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court to be the members of the tribunal.
Although the subsequent adoption of the parliamentary form of government under the 1973
Constitution might have implicitly affected Republic Act No. 1793, the statutory set-up, nonetheless,
would now be deemed revived under the present Section 4, paragraph 7, of the 1987 Constitution.
Former Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno, in his separate opinion, was even more categorical:
The Court is unanimous on the issue of jurisdiction. It has no jurisdiction on the Tecson and Valdez
petitions. Petitioners cannot invoke Article VII, Section 4, par. 7 of the Constitution which provides:
"The Supreme Court, sitting en banc shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice President and may promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The word "contest" in the provision means that the jurisdiction of this Court can only be invoked
after the election and proclamation of a President or Vice President. There can be no "contest"
before a winner is proclaimed.16
Similarly, in her separate opinion, Justice Alicia Austria-Martinez declared:
G.R. Nos. 161434 and 161634 invoke the Court’s exclusive jurisdiction under the last paragraph of
Section 4, Article VII of the 1987 Constitution. I agree with the majority opinion that these petitions
should be dismissed outright for prematurity. The Court has no jurisdiction at this point of time to
entertain said petitions.
The Supreme Court, as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal (PET), the Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET)
and House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal (HRET) are electoral tribunals, each specifically
and exclusively clothed with jurisdiction by the Constitution to act respectively as "sole judge of all
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contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications" of the President and Vice-President,
Senators, and Representatives. In a litany of cases, this Court has long recognized that these
electoral tribunals exercise jurisdiction over election contests only after a candidate has already
been proclaimed winner in an election. Rules 14 and 15 of the Rules of the Presidential Electoral
Tribunal provide that, for President or Vice-President, election protest or quo warranto may be
filed after the proclamation of the winner.17
Petitioner, a prominent election lawyer who has filed several cases before this Court involving
constitutional and election law issues, including, among others, the constitutionality of certain
provisions of Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9189 (The Overseas Absentee Voting Act of 2003),18 cannot
claim ignorance of: (1) the invocation of our jurisdiction under Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution; and (2) the unanimous holding thereon. Unquestionably, the overarching framework
affirmed in Tecson v. Commission on Elections19 is that the Supreme Court has original jurisdiction
to decide presidential and vice-presidential election protests while concurrently acting as an
independent Electoral Tribunal.
Despite the foregoing, petitioner is adamant on his contention that the provision, as worded, does
not authorize the constitution of the PET. And although he concedes that the Supreme Court may
promulgate its rules for this purpose, petitioner is insistent that the constitution of the PET is
unconstitutional. However, petitioner avers that it allows the Court to appoint additional personnel
for the purpose, notwithstanding the silence of the constitutional provision.
Petitioner’s pastiche arguments are all hurled at the Court, hopeful that at least one might possibly
stick. But these arguments fail to elucidate on the scope of the rules the Supreme Court is allowed to
promulgate. Apparently, petitioner’s concept of this adjunct of judicial power is very restrictive.
Fortunately, thanks in no part to petitioner’s opinion, we are guided by well-settled principles of
constitutional construction.
Verba legis dictates that wherever possible, the words used in the Constitution must be given their
ordinary meaning except where technical terms are employed, in which case the significance thus
attached to them prevails. This Court, speaking through former Chief Justice Enrique Fernando, in
J.M. Tuason & Co., Inc. v. Land Tenure Administration20 instructs:
As the Constitution is not primarily a lawyer’s document, it being essential for the rule of law to
obtain that it should ever be present in the people’s consciousness, its language as much as possible
should be understood in the sense they have in common use. What it says according to the text of
the provision to be construed compels acceptance and negates the power of the courts to alter it,
based on the postulate that the framers and the people mean what they say. Thus these are cases
where the need for construction is reduced to a minimum.
However, where there is ambiguity or doubt, the words of the Constitution should be interpreted in
accordance with the intent of its framers or ratio legis et anima. A doubtful provision must be
examined in light of the history of the times, and the condition and circumstances surrounding the
framing of the Constitution.21 In following this guideline, courts should bear in mind the object
sought to be accomplished in adopting a doubtful constitutional provision, and the evils sought to
be prevented or remedied.22 Consequently, the intent of the framers and the people ratifying the
constitution, and not the panderings of self-indulgent men, should be given effect.
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Last, ut magis valeat quam pereat – the Constitution is to be interpreted as a whole. We intoned
thus in the landmark case of Civil Liberties Union v. Executive Secretary:23
It is a well-established rule in constitutional construction that no one provision of the Constitution

is to be separated from all the others, to be considered alone, but that all the provisions bearing
upon a particular subject are to be brought into view and to be so interpreted as to effectuate the
great purposes of the instrument. Sections bearing on a particular subject should be considered and
interpreted together as to effectuate the whole purpose of the Constitution and one section is not to
be allowed to defeat another, if by any reasonable construction, the two can be made to stand
together.
In other words, the court must harmonize them, if practicable, and must lean in favor of a
construction which will render every word operative, rather than one which may make the words
idle and nugatory.
We had earlier expounded on this rule of construction in Chiongbian v. De Leon, et al., 24 to wit:
[T]he members of the Constitutional Convention could not have dedicated a provision of our
Constitution merely for the benefit of one person without considering that it could also affect
others. When they adopted subsection 2, they permitted, if not willed, that said provision should
function to the full extent of its substance and its terms, not by itself alone, but in conjunction with
all other provisions of that great document.
On its face, the contentious constitutional provision does not specify the establishment of the PET.
But neither does it preclude, much less prohibit, otherwise. It entertains divergent interpretations
which, though unacceptable to petitioner, do not include his restrictive view – one which really
does not offer a solution.
Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, the provision under scrutiny, should be read with other
related provisions of the Constitution such as the parallel provisions on the Electoral Tribunals of
the Senate and the House of Representatives.
Before we resort to the records of the Constitutional Commission, we discuss the framework of
judicial power mapped out in the Constitution. Contrary to petitioner’s assertion, the Supreme
Court’s constitutional mandate to act as sole judge of election contests involving our country’s
highest public officials, and its rule-making authority in connection therewith, is not restricted; it
includes all necessary powers implicit in the exercise thereof.
We recall the unprecedented and trailblazing case of Marcos v. Manglapus:25
The 1987 Constitution has fully restored the separation of powers of the three great branches of
government. To recall the words of Justice Laurel in Angara v. Electoral Commission, "the
Constitution has blocked but with deft strokes and in bold lines, allotment of power to the
executive, the legislative and the judicial departments of the government." Thus, the 1987
Constitution explicitly provides that "[t]he legislative power shall be vested in the Congress of the
Philippines" [Art. VI, Sec. 1], "[t]he executive power shall be vested in the President of the
Philippines" [Art. VII, Sec. 1], and "[t]he judicial power shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in
such lower courts as may be established by law" [Art. VIII, Sec. 1]. These provisions not only
establish a separation of powers by actual division but also confer plenary legislative, executive and
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judicial powers subject only to limitations provided in the Constitution. For as the Supreme Court in
Ocampo v. Cabangis pointed out "a grant of the legislative power means a grant of all legislative
power; and a grant of the judicial power means a grant of all the judicial power which may be
exercised under the government."
The Court could not have been more explicit then on the plenary grant and exercise of judicial
power. Plainly, the abstraction of the Supreme Court acting as a Presidential Electoral Tribunal
from the unequivocal grant of jurisdiction in the last paragraph of Section 4, Article VII of the
Constitution is sound and tenable.
The mirabile dictu of the grant of jurisdiction to this Court, albeit found in the Article on the
executive branch of government, and the constitution of the PET, is evident in the discussions of the
Constitutional Commission. On the exercise of this Court’s judicial power as sole judge of
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, and to promulgate its rules for this purpose, we
find the proceedings in the Constitutional Commission most instructive:
MR. DAVIDE. On line 25, after the words "Vice-President," I propose to add AND MAY
PROMULGATE ITS RULES FOR THE PURPOSE. This refers to the Supreme Court sitting en banc.
This is also to confer on the Supreme Court exclusive authority to enact the necessary rules while
acting as sole judge of all contests relating to the election, returns and qualifications of the
President or Vice-President.
MR. REGALADO. My personal position is that the rule-making power of the Supreme Court with
respect to its internal procedure is already implicit under the Article on the Judiciary; considering,
however, that according to the Commissioner, the purpose of this is to indicate the sole power of
the Supreme Court without intervention by the legislature in the promulgation of its rules on this
particular point, I think I will personally recommend its acceptance to the Committee.26
xxxx
MR. NOLLEDO. x x x.
With respect to Sections 10 and 11 on page 8, I understand that the Committee has also created an
Electoral Tribunal in the Senate and a Commission on Appointments which may cover membership
from both Houses. But my question is: It seems to me that the committee report does not indicate
which body should promulgate the rules that shall govern the Electoral Tribunal and the
Commission on Appointments. Who shall then promulgate the rules of these bodies?
MR. DAVIDE. The Electoral Tribunal itself will establish and promulgate its rules because it is a
body distinct and independent already from the House, and so with the Commission on
Appointments also. It will have the authority to promulgate its own rules.27
On another point of discussion relative to the grant of judicial power, but equally cogent, we listen
to former Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
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MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two
parties. This is a judicial power.
MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare
who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are
essentially justiciable questions.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the
time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be
going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.28
Echoing the same sentiment and affirming the grant of judicial power to the Supreme Court, Justice
Florenz D. Regalado29 and Fr. Joaquin Bernas30 both opined:
MR. VILLACORTA. Thank you very much, Madam President.
I am not sure whether Commissioner Suarez has expressed his point. On page 2, the fourth
paragraph of Section 4 provides:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc, shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
May I seek clarification as to whether or not the matter of determining the outcome of the contests
relating to the election returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President is purely a
political matter and, therefore, should not be left entirely to the judiciary. Will the above-quoted
provision not impinge on the doctrine of separation of powers between the executive and the
judicial departments of the government?
MR. REGALADO. No, I really do not feel that would be a problem. This is a new provision
incidentally. It was not in the 1935 Constitution nor in the 1973 Constitution.
MR. VILLACORTA. That is right.
MR. REGALADO. We feel that it will not be an intrusion into the separation of powers guaranteed to
the judiciary because this is strictly an adversarial and judicial proceeding.
MR. VILLACORTA. May I know the rationale of the Committee because this supersedes Republic Act
7950 which provides for the Presidential Electoral Tribunal?
FR. BERNAS. Precisely, this is necessary. Election contests are, by their nature, judicial. Therefore,
they are cognizable only by courts. If, for instance, we did not have a constitutional provision on an
electoral tribunal for the Senate or an electoral tribunal for the House, normally, as composed, that
cannot be given jurisdiction over contests.
So, the background of this is really the case of Roxas v. Lopez. The Gentleman will remember that in
that election, Lopez was declared winner. He filed a protest before the Supreme Court because
there was a republic act which created the Supreme Court as the Presidential Electoral Tribunal.
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The question in this case was whether new powers could be given the Supreme Court by law. In
effect, the conflict was actually whether there was an attempt to create two Supreme Courts and the
answer of the Supreme Court was: "No, this did not involve the creation of two Supreme Courts, but
precisely we are giving new jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, as it is allowed by the Constitution.
Congress may allocate various jurisdictions."
Before the passage of that republic act, in case there was any contest between two presidential
candidates or two vice-presidential candidates, no one had jurisdiction over it. So, it became
necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to constitutionalize
what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers because the power
being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.31
Unmistakable from the foregoing is that the exercise of our power to judge presidential and vice-
presidential election contests, as well as the rule-making power adjunct thereto, is plenary; it is not
as restrictive as petitioner would interpret it. In fact, former Chief Justice Hilario G. Davide, Jr., who
proposed the insertion of the phrase, intended the Supreme Court to exercise exclusive authority to
promulgate its rules of procedure for that purpose. To this, Justice Regalado forthwith assented and
then emphasized that the sole power ought to be without intervention by the legislative
department. Evidently, even the legislature cannot limit the judicial power to resolve presidential
and vice-presidential election contests and our rule-making power connected thereto.
To foreclose all arguments of petitioner, we reiterate that the establishment of the PET simply
constitutionalized what was statutory before the 1987 Constitution. The experiential context of the
PET in our country cannot be denied.32
Consequently, we find it imperative to trace the historical antecedents of the PET.
Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7 of the 1987 Constitution is an innovation. The precursors of the
present Constitution did not contain similar provisions and instead vested upon the legislature all
phases of presidential and vice-presidential elections – from the canvassing of election returns, to
the proclamation of the president-elect and the vice-president elect, and even the determination, by
ordinary legislation, of whether such proclamations may be contested. Unless the legislature
enacted a law creating an institution that would hear election contests in the Presidential and Vice-
Presidential race, a defeated candidate had no legal right to demand a recount of the votes cast for
the office involved or to challenge the ineligibility of the proclaimed candidate. Effectively,
presidential and vice-presidential contests were non-justiciable in the then prevailing milieu.
The omission in the 1935 Constitution was intentional. It was mainly influenced by the absence of a
similar provision in its pattern, the Federal Constitution of the United States. Rather, the creation of
such tribunal was left to the determination of the National Assembly. The journal of the 1935
Constitutional Convention is crystal clear on this point:
Delegate Saguin. – For an information. It seems that this Constitution does not contain any
provision with respect to the entity or body which will look into the protests for the positions of the
President and Vice-President.
President Recto. – Neither does the American constitution contain a provision over the subject.
Delegate Saguin. – But then, who will decide these protests?

307
President Recto. – I suppose that the National Assembly will decide on that.33
To fill the void in the 1935 Constitution, the National Assembly enacted R.A. No. 1793, establishing
an independent PET to try, hear, and decide protests contesting the election of President and Vice-
President. The Chief Justice and the Associate Justices of the Supreme Court were tasked to sit as its
Chairman and Members, respectively. Its composition was extended to retired Supreme Court
Justices and incumbent Court of Appeals Justices who may be appointed as substitutes for ill,
absent, or temporarily incapacitated regular members.
The eleven-member tribunal was empowered to promulgate rules for the conduct of its
proceedings. It was mandated to sit en banc in deciding presidential and vice-presidential contests
and authorized to exercise powers similar to those conferred upon courts of justice, including the
issuance of subpoena, taking of depositions, arrest of witnesses to compel their appearance,
production of documents and other evidence, and the power to punish contemptuous acts and
bearings. The tribunal was assigned a Clerk, subordinate officers, and employees necessary for the
efficient performance of its functions.
R.A. No. 1793 was implicitly repealed and superseded by the 1973 Constitution which replaced the
bicameral legislature under the 1935 Constitution with the unicameral body of a parliamentary
government.
With the 1973 Constitution, a PET was rendered irrelevant, considering that the President was not
directly chosen by the people but elected from among the members of the National Assembly, while
the position of Vice-President was constitutionally non-existent.
In 1981, several modifications were introduced to the parliamentary system. Executive power was
restored to the President who was elected directly by the people. An Executive Committee was
formed to assist the President in the performance of his functions and duties. Eventually, the
Executive Committee was abolished and the Office of Vice-President was installed anew.
These changes prompted the National Assembly to revive the PET by enacting, on December 3,
1985, Batas Pambansa Bilang (B.P. Blg.) 884, entitled "An Act Constituting an Independent
Presidential Electoral Tribunal to Try, Hear and Decide Election Contests in the Office of the
President and Vice-President of the Philippines, Appropriating Funds Therefor and For Other
Purposes." This tribunal was composed of nine members, three of whom were the Chief Justice of
the Supreme Court and two Associate Justices designated by him, while the six were divided equally
between representatives of the majority and minority parties in the Batasang Pambansa.
Aside from the license to wield powers akin to those of a court of justice, the PET was permitted to
recommend the prosecution of persons, whether public officers or private individuals, who in its
opinion had participated in any irregularity connected with the canvassing and/or accomplishing of
election returns.
The independence of the tribunal was highlighted by a provision allocating a specific budget from
the national treasury or Special Activities Fund for its operational expenses. It was empowered to
appoint its own clerk in accordance with its rules. However, the subordinate officers were strictly
employees of the judiciary or other officers of the government who were merely designated to the
tribunal.
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After the historic People Power Revolution that ended the martial law era and installed Corazon
Aquino as President, civil liberties were restored and a new constitution was formed.
With R.A. No. 1793 as framework, the 1986 Constitutional Commission transformed the then
statutory PET into a constitutional institution, albeit without its traditional nomenclature:
FR. BERNAS. x x x.
x x x. So it became necessary to create a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. What we have done is to

constitutionalize what was statutory but it is not an infringement on the separation of powers
because the power being given to the Supreme Court is a judicial power.34
Clearly, petitioner’s bete noire of the PET and the exercise of its power are unwarranted. His
arguments that: (1) the Chief Justice and Associate Justices are referred to as "Chairman" and
"Members," respectively; (2) the PET uses a different seal; (3) the Chairman is authorized to
appoint personnel; and (4) additional compensation is allocated to the "Members," in order to
bolster his claim of infirmity in the establishment of the PET, are too superficial to merit further
attention by the Court.
Be that as it may, we hasten to clarify the structure of the PET as a legitimate progeny of Section 4,
Article VII of the Constitution, composed of members of the Supreme Court, sitting en banc. The
following exchange in the 1986 Constitutional Commission should provide enlightenment:
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you. Let me proceed to line 23, page 2, wherein it is provided, and I quote:
The Supreme Court, sitting en banc[,] shall be the sole judge of all contests relating to the election,
returns and qualifications of the President or Vice-President.
Are we not giving enormous work to the Supreme Court especially when it is directed to sit en banc
as the sole judge of all presidential and vice-presidential election contests?
MR. SUMULONG. That question will be referred to Commissioner Concepcion.
MR. CONCEPCION. This function was discharged by the Supreme Court twice and the Supreme
Court was able to dispose of each case in a period of one year as provided by law. Of course, that
was probably during the late 1960s and early 1970s. I do not know how the present Supreme Court
would react to such circumstances, but there is also the question of who else would hear the
election protests.
MR. SUAREZ. We are asking this question because between lines 23 to 25, there are no rules
provided for the hearings and there is not time limit or duration for the election contest to be
decided by the Supreme Court. Also, we will have to consider the historical background that when
R.A. 1793, which organized the Presidential Electoral Tribunal, was promulgated on June 21, 1957,
at least three famous election contests were presented and two of them ended up in withdrawal by
the protestants out of sheer frustration because of the delay in the resolution of the cases. I am
referring to the electoral protest that was lodged by former President Carlos P. Garcia against our
"kabalen" former President Diosdado Macapagal in 1961 and the vice-presidential election contest
filed by the late Senator Gerardo Roxas against Vice-President Fernando Lopez in 1965.
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MR. CONCEPCION. I cannot answer for what the protestants had in mind. But when that protest of
Senator Roxas was withdrawn, the results were already available. Senator Roxas did not want to
have a decision adverse to him. The votes were being counted already, and he did not get what he
expected so rather than have a decision adverse to his protest, he withdrew the case.
xxxx
MR. SUAREZ. I see. So the Commission would not have any objection to vesting in the Supreme
Court this matter of resolving presidential and vice-presidential contests?
MR. CONCEPCION. Personally, I would not have any objection.
MR. SUAREZ. Thank you.
Would the Commissioner not consider that violative of the doctrine of separation of powers?
MR. CONCEPCION. I think Commissioner Bernas explained that this is a contest between two
parties. This is a judicial power.
MR. SUAREZ. We know, but practically the Committee is giving to the judiciary the right to declare
who will be the President of our country, which to me is a political action.
MR. CONCEPCION. There are legal rights which are enforceable under the law, and these are
essentially justiciable questions.
MR. SUAREZ. If the election contest proved to be long, burdensome and tedious, practically all the
time of the Supreme Court sitting en banc would be occupied with it considering that they will be
going over millions and millions of ballots or election returns, Madam President.
MR. CONCEPCION. The time consumed or to be consumed in this contest for President is dependent
upon they key number of teams of revisors. I have no experience insofar as contests in other offices
are concerned.
MR. SUAREZ. Although there is a requirement here that the Supreme Court is mandated to sit en
banc?
MR. CONCEPCION. Yes.
MR. SUAREZ. I see.
MR. CONCEPCION. The steps involved in this contest are: First, the ballot boxes are opened before
teams of three, generally, a representative each of the court, of the protestant and of the
"protestee." It is all a questions of how many teams are organized. Of course, that can be expensive,
but it would be expensive whatever court one would choose. There were times that the Supreme
Court, with sometimes 50 teams at the same time working, would classify the objections, the kind of
problems, and the court would only go over the objected votes on which the parties could not agree.
So it is not as awesome as it would appear insofar as the Court is concerned. What is awesome is the
cost of the revision of the ballots because each party would have to appoint one representative for
every team, and that may take quite a big amount.
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MR. SUAREZ. If we draw from the Commissioner’s experience which he is sharing with us, what
would be the reasonable period for the election contest to be decided?
MR. CONCEPCION. Insofar as the Supreme Court is concerned, the Supreme Court always manages
to dispose of the case in one year.
MR. SUAREZ. In one year. Thank you for the clarification.35
Obvious from the foregoing is the intent to bestow independence to the Supreme Court as the PET,
to undertake the Herculean task of deciding election protests involving presidential and vice-
presidential candidates in accordance with the process outlined by former Chief Justice Roberto
Concepcion. It was made in response to the concern aired by delegate Jose E. Suarez that the
additional duty may prove too burdensome for the Supreme Court. This explicit grant of
independence and of the plenary powers needed to discharge this burden justifies the budget
allocation of the PET.
The conferment of additional jurisdiction to the Supreme Court, with the duty characterized as an
"awesome" task, includes the means necessary to carry it into effect under the doctrine of necessary
implication.36 We cannot overemphasize that the abstraction of the PET from the explicit grant of
power to the Supreme Court, given our abundant experience, is not unwarranted.
A plain reading of Article VII, Section 4, paragraph 7, readily reveals a grant of authority to the
Supreme Court sitting en banc. In the same vein, although the method by which the Supreme Court
exercises this authority is not specified in the provision, the grant of power does not contain any
limitation on the Supreme Court’s exercise thereof. The Supreme Court’s method of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, through the PET, is actually a derivative of the
exercise of the prerogative conferred by the aforequoted constitutional provision. Thus, the
subsequent directive in the provision for the Supreme Court to "promulgate its rules for the
purpose."
The conferment of full authority to the Supreme Court, as a PET, is equivalent to the full authority
conferred upon the electoral tribunals of the Senate and the House of Representatives, i.e., the
Senate Electoral Tribunal (SET) and the House of Representatives Electoral Tribunal
(HRET),37 which we have affirmed on numerous occasions.38
Particularly cogent are the discussions of the Constitutional Commission on the parallel provisions
of the SET and the HRET. The discussions point to the inevitable conclusion that the different
electoral tribunals, with the Supreme Court functioning as the PET, are constitutional bodies,
independent of the three departments of government – Executive, Legislative, and Judiciary – but
not separate therefrom.
MR. MAAMBONG. x x x.
My questions will be very basic so we can go as fast as we can. In the case of the electoral tribunal,
either of the House or of the Senate, is it correct to say that these tribunals are constitutional
creations? I will distinguish these with the case of the Tanodbayan and the Sandiganbayan which
are created by mandate of the Constitution but they are not constitutional creations. Is that a good
distinction?
311
xxxx
MR. MAAMBONG. Could we, therefore, say that either the Senate Electoral Tribunal or the House
Electoral Tribunal is a constitutional body?
MR. AZCUNA. It is, Madam President.
MR. MAAMBONG. If it is a constitutional body, is it then subject to constitutional restrictions?
MR. AZCUNA. It would be subject to constitutional restrictions intended for that body.
MR. MAAMBONG. I see. But I want to find out if the ruling in the case of Vera v. Avelino, 77 Phil. 192,
will still be applicable to the present bodies we are creating since it ruled that the electoral
tribunals are not separate departments of the government. Would that ruling still be valid?
MR. AZCUNA. Yes, they are not separate departments because the separate departments are the
legislative, the executive and the judiciary; but they are constitutional bodies.39
The view taken by Justices Adolfo S. Azcuna40 and Regalado E. Maambong41 is schooled by our
holding in Lopez v. Roxas, et al.:42
Section 1 of Republic Act No. 1793, which provides that:
"There shall be an independent Presidential Electoral Tribunal x x x which shall be the sole judge of
all contests relating to the election, returns, and qualifications of the president-elect and the vice-
president-elect of the Philippines."
has the effect of giving said defeated candidate the legal right to contest judicially the election of the
President-elect of Vice-President-elect and to demand a recount of the votes case for the office
involved in the litigation, as well as to secure a judgment declaring that he is the one elected
president or vice-president, as the case may be, and that, as such, he is entitled to assume the duties
attached to said office. And by providing, further, that the Presidential Electoral Tribunal "shall be
composed of the Chief Justice and the other ten Members of the Supreme Court," said legislation has
conferred upon such Court an additional original jurisdiction of an exclusive character.
Republic Act No. 1793 has not created a new or separate court. It has merely conferred upon the
Supreme Court the functions of a Presidential Electoral Tribunal. The result of the enactment may
be likened to the fact that courts of first instance perform the functions of such ordinary courts of
first instance, those of court of land registration, those of probate courts, and those of courts of
juvenile and domestic relations. It is, also, comparable to the situation obtaining when the
municipal court of a provincial capital exercises its authority, pursuant to law, over a limited
number of cases which were previously within the exclusive jurisdiction of courts of first instance.
In all of these instances, the court (court of first instance or municipal court) is only one, although
the functions may be distinct and, even, separate. Thus the powers of a court of first instance, in the
exercise of its jurisdiction over ordinary civil cases, are broader than, as well as distinct and
separate from, those of the same court acting as a court of land registration or a probate court, or as
a court of juvenile and domestic relations. So too, the authority of the municipal court of a
provincial capital, when acting as such municipal court, is, territorially more limited than that of the
312
same court when hearing the aforementioned cases which are primary within the jurisdiction of
courts of first instance. In other words, there is only one court, although it may perform the
functions pertaining to several types of courts, each having some characteristics different from
those of the others.
Indeed, the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals and courts of first instance, are vested with
original jurisdiction, as well as with appellate jurisdiction, in consequence of which they are both
trial courts and, appellate courts, without detracting from the fact that there is only one Supreme
Court, one Court of Appeals, and one court of first instance, clothed with authority to discharge said
dual functions. A court of first instance, when performing the functions of a probate court or a court
of land registration, or a court of juvenile and domestic relations, although with powers less broad
than those of a court of first instance, hearing ordinary actions, is not inferior to the latter, for one
cannot be inferior to itself. So too, the Presidential Electoral Tribunal is not inferior to the Supreme
Court, since it is the same Court although the functions peculiar to said Tribunal are more limited in
scope than those of the Supreme Court in the exercise of its ordinary functions. Hence, the
enactment of Republic Act No. 1793, does not entail an assumption by Congress of the power of
appointment vested by the Constitution in the President. It merely connotes the imposition of
additional duties upon the Members of the Supreme Court.
By the same token, the PET is not a separate and distinct entity from the Supreme Court, albeit it
has functions peculiar only to the Tribunal. It is obvious that the PET was constituted in
implementation of Section 4, Article VII of the Constitution, and it faithfully complies – not
unlawfully defies – the constitutional directive. The adoption of a separate seal, as well as the
change in the nomenclature of the Chief Justice and the Associate Justices into Chairman and
Members of the Tribunal, respectively, was designed simply to highlight the singularity and
exclusivity of the Tribunal’s functions as a special electoral court.
As regards petitioner’s claim that the PET exercises quasi-judicial functions in contravention of
Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution, we point out that the issue in Buac v.
COMELEC43 involved the characterization of the enforcement and administration of a law relative to
the conduct of a plebiscite which falls under the jurisdiction of the Commission on Elections.
However, petitioner latches on to the enumeration in Buac which declared, in an obiter, that
"contests involving the President and the Vice-President fall within the exclusive original
jurisdiction of the PET, also in the exercise of quasi-judicial power."
The issue raised by petitioner is more imagined than real. Section 12, Article VIII of the Constitution
reads:
SEC. 12. The Members of the Supreme Court and of other courts established by law shall not be
designated to any agency performing quasi-judicial or administrative functions.
The traditional grant of judicial power is found in Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution which
provides that the power "shall be vested in one Supreme Court and in such lower courts as may be
established by law." Consistent with our presidential system of government, the function of
"dealing with the settlement of disputes, controversies or conflicts involving rights, duties or
prerogatives that are legally demandable and enforceable" 44 is apportioned to courts of justice.
With the advent of the 1987 Constitution, judicial power was expanded to include "the duty of the
courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving rights which are legally demandable and
enforceable, and to determine whether or not there has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting
313
to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of any branch or instrumentality of the

Government."45 The power was expanded, but it remained absolute.
The set up embodied in the Constitution and statutes characterizes the resolution of electoral
contests as essentially an exercise of judicial power.1avvphi1
At the barangay and municipal levels, original and exclusive jurisdiction over election contests is
vested in the municipal or metropolitan trial courts and the regional trial courts, respectively.
At the higher levels – city, provincial, and regional, as well as congressional and senatorial –
exclusive and original jurisdiction is lodged in the COMELEC and in the House of Representatives
and Senate Electoral Tribunals, which are not, strictly and literally speaking, courts of law. Although
not courts of law, they are, nonetheless, empowered to resolve election contests which involve, in
essence, an exercise of judicial power, because of the explicit constitutional empowerment found in
Section 2(2), Article IX-C (for the COMELEC) and Section 17, Article VI (for the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals) of the Constitution. Besides, when the COMELEC, the HRET, and the SET decide
election contests, their decisions are still subject to judicial review – via a petition for certiorari
filed by the proper party – if there is a showing that the decision was rendered with grave abuse of
discretion tantamount to lack or excess of jurisdiction.46
It is also beyond cavil that when the Supreme Court, as PET, resolves a presidential or vice-
presidential election contest, it performs what is essentially a judicial power. In the landmark case
of Angara v. Electoral Commission,47Justice Jose P. Laurel enucleated that "it would be
inconceivable if the Constitution had not provided for a mechanism by which to direct the course of
government along constitutional channels." In fact, Angara pointed out that "[t]he Constitution is a
definition of the powers of government." And yet, at that time, the 1935 Constitution did not
contain the expanded definition of judicial power found in Article VIII, Section 1, paragraph 2 of the
present Constitution.
With the explicit provision, the present Constitution has allocated to the Supreme Court, in
conjunction with latter’s exercise of judicial power inherent in all courts,48 the task of deciding
presidential and vice-presidential election contests, with full authority in the exercise thereof. The
power wielded by PET is a derivative of the plenary judicial power allocated to courts of law,
expressly provided in the Constitution. On the whole, the Constitution draws a thin, but,
nevertheless, distinct line between the PET and the Supreme Court.
If the logic of petitioner is to be followed, all Members of the Court, sitting in the Senate and House
Electoral Tribunals would violate the constitutional proscription found in Section 12, Article VIII.
Surely, the petitioner will be among the first to acknowledge that this is not so. The Constitution
which, in Section 17, Article VI, explicitly provides that three Supreme Court Justices shall sit in the
Senate and House Electoral Tribunals, respectively, effectively exempts the Justices-Members
thereof from the prohibition in Section 12, Article VIII. In the same vein, it is the Constitution itself,
in Section 4, Article VII, which exempts the Members of the Court, constituting the PET, from the
same prohibition.
We have previously declared that the PET is not simply an agency to which Members of the Court
were designated. Once again, the PET, as intended by the framers of the Constitution, is to be an
institution independent, but not separate, from the judicial department, i.e., the Supreme Court.
McCulloch v. State of Maryland49 proclaimed that "[a] power without the means to use it, is a
314
nullity." The vehicle for the exercise of this power, as intended by the Constitution and specifically
mentioned by the Constitutional Commissioners during the discussions on the grant of power to
this Court, is the PET. Thus, a microscopic view, like the petitioner’s, should not constrict an
absolute and constitutional grant of judicial power.
One final note. Although this Court has no control over contrary people and naysayers, we reiterate
a word of caution against the filing of baseless petitions which only clog the Court’s docket. The
petition in the instant case belongs to that classification.
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. Costs against petitioner.
SO ORDERED.

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1

Definitions: Administrative Law and Administrative Agencies

1. Pangasinan Transportation Co. v. PSC, 70 PHIL 221 (1940)

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PETITION for review on certiorari.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the court.

C. de G. Alvear for petitioner. Evaristo R. Sandoval for respondent.

The petitioner has been engaged for the past twenty

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

"El Presidente Pro Tempore. Que dice el Comité?

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

Moreover, Commonwealth Acts Nos. 146 and 454 are not

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

PHILIPPINE REPORTS ANNOTATED

VOL. 70, JUNE 26, 1940

Pangasinan Trans. Co. vs. Public Service Commission

Sec. 4. Reference of doubtful matters to Commissioner of Land Registration. — When the

4. Garcia v. Macaraig, 39 SCRA 106 (1972)

VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

Constitutional law; Separation of powers; Judges performing non-judicial function cannot be

ADMINISTRATIVE COMPLAINT in the Supreme Court.

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

"Charges Have No Basis—

"It is respectfully submitted that—

VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

Castro and Teehankee, JJ., took no part.

Makasiar, J., concurs with the opinion of Mr. Justice Fernando.

VOL. 39, MAY 31, 1971

Garcia vs. Macaraig, Jr.

FERNANDO, J., concurring:

SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED