Professional Documents
Culture Documents
SUPREME COURT
Manila On March 23, 2006, Rosalie Jaype-Garcia (private respondent) filed, for herself and in behalf
of her minor children, a verified petition6 (Civil Case No. 06-797) before the Regional Trial
EN BANC Court (RTC) of Bacolod City for the issuance of a Temporary Protection Order (TPO) against
her husband, Jesus C. Garcia (petitioner), pursuant to R.A. 9262. She claimed to be a victim of
G.R. No. 179267 June 25, 2013 physical abuse; emotional, psychological, and economic violence as a result of marital
infidelity on the part of petitioner, with threats of deprivation of custody of her children and
of financial support.7
JESUS C. GARCIA, Petitioner,
vs.
THE HONORABLE RAY ALAN T. DRILON, Presiding Judge, Regional Trial Court-Branch 41, Bacolod Private respondent's claims
City, and ROSALIE JAYPE-GARCIA, for herself and in behalf of minor children, namely: JO-ANN,
JOSEPH EDUARD, JESSE ANTHONE, all surnamed GARCIA, Respondents. Private respondent married petitioner in 2002 when she was 34 years old and the former was
eleven years her senior. They have three (3) children, namely: Jo-Ann J. Garcia, 17 years old,
DECISION who is the natural child of petitioner but whom private respondent adopted; Jessie Anthone J.
Garcia, 6 years old; and Joseph Eduard J. Garcia, 3 years old.8
PERLAS-BERNABE, J.:
Private respondent described herself as a dutiful and faithful wife, whose life revolved around
her husband. On the other hand, petitioner, who is of Filipino-Chinese descent, is dominant,
Hailed as the bastion of Christianity in Asia, the Philippines boasts of 86.8 million Filipinos- or
controlling, and demands absolute obedience from his wife and children. He forbade private
93 percent of a total population of 93.3 million – adhering to the teachings of Jesus
respondent to pray, and deliberately isolated her from her friends. When she took up law, and
Christ.1 Yet, the admonition for husbands to love their wives as their own bodies just as Christ
even when she was already working part time at a law office, petitioner trivialized her
loved the church and gave himself up for her2 failed to prevent, or even to curb, the
ambitions and prevailed upon her to just stay at home. He was often jealous of the fact that
pervasiveness of violence against Filipino women. The National Commission on the Role of
his attractive wife still catches the eye of some men, at one point threatening that he would
Filipino Women (NCRFW) reported that, for the years 2000-2003, "female violence comprised
have any man eyeing her killed.9
more than 90o/o of all forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported
cases were committed by the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in
partners."3 Things turned for the worse when petitioner took up an affair with a bank manager of
Robinson's Bank, Bacolod City, who is the godmother of one of their sons. Petitioner admitted
to the affair when private respondent confronted him about it in 2004. He even boasted to
Thus, on March 8, 2004, after nine (9) years of spirited advocacy by women's groups, Congress
the household help about his sexual relations with said bank manager. Petitioner told private
enacted Republic Act (R.A.) No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and
respondent, though, that he was just using the woman because of their accounts with the
Their Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties Therefor,
bank.10
and for Other Purposes." It took effect on March 27, 2004.4
Petitioner's infidelity spawned a series of fights that left private respondent physically and
R.A. 9262 is a landmark legislation that defines and criminalizes acts of violence against
emotionally wounded. In one of their quarrels, petitioner grabbed private respondent on both
women and their children (VAWC) perpetrated by women's intimate partners, i.e, husband;
arms and shook her with such force that caused bruises and hematoma. At another time,
former husband; or any person who has or had a sexual or dating relationship, or with whom
petitioner hit private respondent forcefully on the lips that caused some bleeding. Petitioner
the woman has a common child.5 The law provides for protection orders from the barangay
sometimes turned his ire on their daughter, Jo-Ann, who had seen the text messages he sent
and the courts to prevent the commission of further acts of VAWC; and outlines the duties
to his paramour and whom he blamed for squealing on him. He beat Jo-Ann on the chest and
and responsibilities of barangay officials, law enforcers, prosecutors and court personnel,
slapped her many times. When private respondent decided to leave petitioner, Jo-Ann begged
social workers, health care providers, and other local government officials in responding to
her mother to stay for fear that if the latter leaves, petitioner would beat her up. Even the
complaints of VAWC or requests for assistance.
small boys are aware of private respondent's sufferings. Their 6-year-old son said that when
he grows up, he would beat up his father because of his cruelty to private respondent.11
A husband is now before the Court assailing the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 as being
violative of the equal protection and due process clauses, and an undue delegation of judicial
All the emotional and psychological turmoil drove private respondent to the brink of despair.
power to barangay officials.
On December 17, 2005, while at home, she attempted suicide by cutting her wrist. She was
found by her son bleeding on the floor. Petitioner simply fled the house instead of taking her
to the hospital. Private respondent was hospitalized for about seven (7) days in which time ownership"), this is to allow the Petitioner (private respondent herein) to enter the
petitioner never bothered to visit, nor apologized or showed pity on her. Since then, private conjugal dwelling without any danger from the Respondent.
respondent has been undergoing therapy almost every week and is taking anti-depressant
medications.12 After the Respondent leaves or is removed from the conjugal dwelling, or anytime
the Petitioner decides to return to the conjugal dwelling to remove things, the
When private respondent informed the management of Robinson's Bank that she intends to Petitioner shall be assisted by police officers when re-entering the family home.
file charges against the bank manager, petitioner got angry with her for jeopardizing the
manager's job. He then packed his things and told private respondent that he was leaving her The Chief of Police shall also give the Petitioner police assistance on Sunday, 26
for good. He even told private respondent's mother, who lives with them in the family home, March 2006 because of the danger that the Respondent will attempt to take her
that private respondent should just accept his extramarital affair since he is not cohabiting children from her when he arrives from Manila and finds out about this suit.
with his paramour and has not sired a child with her.13
b) To stay away from the petitioner and her children, mother and all her household
Private respondent is determined to separate from petitioner but she is afraid that he would help and driver from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall not enter the gate of the
take her children from her and deprive her of financial support. Petitioner had previously subdivision where the Petitioner may be temporarily residing.
warned her that if she goes on a legal battle with him, she would not get a single centavo.14
c) Not to harass, annoy, telephone, contact or otherwise communicate with the
Petitioner controls the family businesses involving mostly the construction of deep wells. He is Petitioner, directly or indirectly, or through other persons, or contact directly or
the President of three corporations – 326 Realty Holdings, Inc., Negros Rotadrill Corporation, indirectly her children, mother and household help, nor send gifts, cards, flowers,
and J-Bros Trading Corporation – of which he and private respondent are both stockholders. In letters and the like. Visitation rights to the children may be subject of a modified
contrast to the absolute control of petitioner over said corporations, private respondent TPO in the future.
merely draws a monthly salary of ₱20,000.00 from one corporation only, the Negros Rotadrill
Corporation. Household expenses amounting to not less than ₱200,000.00 a month are paid
d) To surrender all his firearms including a .9MM caliber firearm and a Walther PPK
for by private respondent through the use of credit cards, which, in turn, are paid by the same
and ordering the Philippine National Police Firearms and Explosives Unit and the
corporation together with the bills for utilities.15
Provincial Director of the PNP to cancel all the Respondent's firearm licenses. He
should also be ordered to surrender any unlicensed firearms in his possession or
On the other hand, petitioner receives a monthly salary of ₱60,000.00 from Negros Rotadrill control.
Corporation, and enjoys unlimited cash advances and other benefits in hundreds of thousands
of pesos from the corporations.16 After private respondent confronted him about the affair,
e) To pay full financial support for the Petitioner and the children, including rental of
petitioner forbade her to hold office at JBTC Building, Mandalagan, where all the businesses of
a house for them, and educational and medical expenses.
the corporations are conducted, thereby depriving her of access to full information about said
businesses. Until the filing of the petition a quo, petitioner has not given private respondent
an accounting of the businesses the value of which she had helped raise to millions of pesos.17 f) Not to dissipate the conjugal business.
Action of the RTC of Bacolod City g) To render an accounting of all advances, benefits, bonuses and other cash he
received from all the corporations from 1 January 2006 up to 31 March 2006, which
himself and as President of the corporations and his Comptroller, must submit to
Finding reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the private
the Court not later than 2 April 2006. Thereafter, an accounting of all these funds
respondent and her children exists or is about to recur, the RTC issued a TPO18 on March 24,
shall be reported to the court by the Comptroller, copy furnished to the Petitioner,
2006 effective for thirty (30) days, which is quoted hereunder:
every 15 days of the month, under pain of Indirect Contempt of Court.
i) The petitioners (private respondents herein) are given the continued use of the d) Deliver full financial support of Php200,000.00 and Php50,000.00 for rental and
Nissan Patrol and the Starex Van which they are using in Negros Occidental. Php25,000.00 for clothes of the three petitioners (sic) children within 24 hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, otherwise be declared in
j) The petitioners are given the continued use and occupation of the house in indirect contempt of Court;
Parañaque, the continued use of the Starex van in Metro Manila, whenever they go
to Manila. e) That respondent surrender his two firearms and all unlicensed firearms to the
Clerk of Court within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by
k) Respondent is ordered to immediately post a bond to keep the peace, in two his counsel;
sufficient sureties.
f) That respondent shall pay petitioner educational expenses of the children upon
l) To give monthly support to the petitioner provisionally fixed in the sum of One presentation of proof of payment of such expenses.23
Hundred Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 150,000.00) per month plus rental expenses of
Fifty Thousand Pesos (Php 50,000.00) per month until the matter of support could Claiming that petitioner continued to deprive them of financial support; failed to faithfully
be finally resolved. comply with the TPO; and committed new acts of harassment against her and their children,
private respondent filed another application24 for the issuance of a TPO ex parte. She alleged
Two days later, or on April 26, 2006, petitioner filed an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-Parte inter
Motion for Renewal of the TPO21 seeking the denial of the renewal of the TPO on the grounds
that it did not (1) comply with the three-day notice rule, and (2) contain a notice of hearing. alia that petitioner contrived a replevin suit against himself by J-Bros Trading, Inc., of which
He further asked that the TPO be modified by (1) removing one vehicle used by private the latter was purportedly no longer president, with the end in view of recovering the Nissan
respondent and returning the same to its rightful owner, the J-Bros Trading Corporation, and Patrol and Starex Van used by private respondent and the children. A writ of replevin was
(2) cancelling or reducing the amount of the bond from ₱5,000,000.00 to a more manageable served upon private respondent by a group of six or seven policemen with long firearms that
level at ₱100,000.00. scared the two small boys, Jessie Anthone and Joseph Eduard.25
Subsequently, on May 23, 2006, petitioner moved22 for the modification of the TPO to allow While Joseph Eduard, then three years old, was driven to school, two men allegedly
him visitation rights to his children. attempted to kidnap him, which incident traumatized the boy resulting in his refusal to go
back to school. On another occasion, petitioner allegedly grabbed their daughter, Jo-Ann, by
On May 24, 2006, the TPO was renewed and extended yet again, but subject only to the the arm and threatened her.26 The incident was reported to the police, and Jo-Ann
following modifications prayed for by private respondent: subsequently filed a criminal complaint against her father for violation of R.A. 7610, also
known as the "Special Protection of Children Against Child Abuse, Exploitation and
Discrimination Act."
a) That respondent (petitioner herein) return the clothes and other personal
belongings of Rosalie and her children to Judge Jesus Ramos, co-counsel for
Petitioner, within 24 hours from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his Aside from the replevin suit, petitioner's lawyers initiated the filing by the housemaids working
counsel, otherwise be declared in Indirect Contempt of Court; at the conjugal home of a complaint for kidnapping and illegal detention against private
respondent. This came about after private respondent, armed with a TPO, went to said home
to get her and her children's belongings. Finding some of her things inside a housemaid's
b) Respondent shall make an accounting or list of furniture and equipment in the
(Sheryl Jamola) bag in the maids' room, private respondent filed a case for qualified theft
conjugal house in Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City within 24 hours
against Jamola.27
from receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel;
On August 23, 2006, the RTC issued a TPO,28 effective for thirty (30) days, which reads as
c) Ordering the Chief of the Women's Desk of the Bacolod City Police Headquarters
follows:
to remove Respondent from the conjugal dwelling within eight (8) hours from
receipt of the Temporary Protection Order by his counsel, and that he cannot return
until 48 hours after the petitioners have left, so that the petitioner Rosalie and her Respondent (petitioner herein), Jesus Chua Garcia, is hereby:
1) Prohibited from threatening to commit or committing, personally or through Rosalie J. Garcia, who shall affix her signature in the presence of the Register of
another, acts of violence against the offended party; Deeds, due to the fear of petitioner Rosalie that her signature will be forged in order
to effect the encumbrance or sale of these properties to defraud her or the conjugal
2) Prohibited from harassing, annoying, telephoning, contacting or otherwise partnership of gains.
communicating in any form with the offended party, either directly or indirectly;
In its Order29 dated September 26, 2006, the trial court extended the aforequoted TPO for
3) Required to stay away, personally or through his friends, relatives, employees or another ten (10) days, and gave petitioner a period of five (5) days within which to show cause
agents, from all the Petitioners Rosalie J. Garcia and her children, Rosalie J. Garcia's why the TPO should not be renewed, extended, or modified. Upon petitioner's
three brothers, her mother Primitiva Jaype, cook Novelita Caranzo, driver Romeo manifestation,30 however, that he has not received a copy of private respondent's motion to
Hontiveros, laundrywoman Mercedita Bornales, security guard Darwin Gayona and modify/renew the TPO, the trial court directed in its Order31 dated October 6, 2006 that
the petitioner's other household helpers from a distance of 1,000 meters, and shall petitioner be furnished a copy of said motion. Nonetheless, an Order32 dated a day earlier,
not enter the gate of the subdivision where the Petitioners are temporarily residing, October 5, had already been issued renewing the TPO dated August 23, 2006. The pertinent
as well as from the schools of the three children; Furthermore, that respondent shall portion is quoted hereunder:
not contact the schools of the children directly or indirectly in any manner including,
ostensibly to pay for their tuition or other fees directly, otherwise he will have xxxx
access to the children through the schools and the TPO will be rendered nugatory;
x x x it appearing further that the hearing could not yet be finally terminated, the Temporary
4) Directed to surrender all his firearms including .9MM caliber firearm and a Protection Order issued on August 23, 2006 is hereby renewed and extended for thirty (30)
Walther PPK to the Court; days and continuously extended and renewed for thirty (30) days, after each expiration, until
further orders, and subject to such modifications as may be ordered by the court.
5) Directed to deliver in full financial support of Php200,000.00 a month and
Php50,000.00 for rental for the period from August 6 to September 6, 2006; and After having received a copy of the foregoing Order, petitioner no longer submitted the
support in arrears from March 2006 to August 2006 the total amount of required comment to private respondent's motion for renewal of the TPO arguing that it
Php1,312,000.00; would only be an "exercise in futility."33
6) Directed to deliver educational expenses for 2006-2007 the amount of Proceedings before the CA
Php75,000.00 and Php25,000.00;
During the pendency of Civil Case No. 06-797, petitioner filed before the Court of Appeals (CA)
7) Directed to allow the continued use of a Nissan Patrol with Plate No. FEW 508 a petition34 for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698), with prayer for injunction and
and a Starex van with Plate No. FFD 991 and should the respondent fail to deliver temporary restraining order, challenging (1) the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 for being
said vehicles, respondent is ordered to provide the petitioner another vehicle which violative of the due process and the equal protection clauses, and (2) the validity of the
is the one taken by J Bros Tading; modified TPO issued in the civil case for being "an unwanted product of an invalid law."
8) Ordered not to dissipate, encumber, alienate, sell, lease or otherwise dispose of On May 26, 2006, the appellate court issued a 60-day Temporary Restraining Order36 (TRO)
the conjugal assets, or those real properties in the name of Jesus Chua Garcia only against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders pursuant thereto.
and those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of the Petitioner Rosalie J.
Garcia and respondent have an interest in, especially the conjugal home located in Subsequently, however, on January 24, 2007, the appellate court dismissed36 the petition for
No. 14, Pitimini St., Capitolville Subdivision, Bacolod City, and other properties which failure of petitioner to raise the constitutional issue in his pleadings before the trial court in
are conjugal assets or those in which the conjugal partnership of gains of Petitioner the civil case, which is clothed with jurisdiction to resolve the same. Secondly, the challenge to
Rosalie J. Garcia and the respondent have an interest in and listed in Annexes "I," "I- the validity
1," and "I-2," including properties covered by TCT Nos. T-186325 and T-168814;
of R.A. 9262 through a petition for prohibition seeking to annul the protection orders issued
9) Ordered that the Register of Deeds of Bacolod City and E.B. Magalona shall be by the trial court constituted a collateral attack on said law.
served a copy of this TEMPORARY PROTECTION ORDER and are ordered not to allow
the transfer, sale, encumbrance or disposition of these above-cited properties to
His motion for reconsideration of the foregoing Decision having been denied in the
any person, entity or corporation without the personal presence of petitioner
Resolution37 dated August 14, 2007, petitioner is now before us alleging that –
The Issues Family Courts have authority and jurisdiction to consider the constitutionality of a statute.
I. At the outset, it must be stressed that Family Courts are special courts, of the same level as
Regional Trial Courts. Under R.A. 8369, otherwise known as the "Family Courts Act of 1997,"
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN DISMISSING THE PETITION ON THE THEORY THAT THE family courts have exclusive original jurisdiction to hear and decide cases of domestic violence
ISSUE OF CONSTITUTIONALITY WAS NOT RAISED AT THE EARLIEST OPPORTUNITY AND THAT, against women and children.42 In accordance with said law, the Supreme Court designated
THE PETITION CONSTITUTES A COLLATERAL ATTACK ON THE VALIDITY OF THE LAW. from among the branches of the Regional Trial Courts at least one Family Court in each of
several key cities identified.43 To achieve harmony with the first mentioned law, Section 7 of
R.A. 9262 now provides that Regional Trial Courts designated as Family Courts shall have
II.
original and exclusive jurisdiction over cases of VAWC defined under the latter law, viz:
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED SERIOUS ERROR IN FAILING TO CONCLUDE THAT R.A.
SEC. 7. Venue. – The Regional Trial Court designated as a Family Court shall have original and
9262 IS DISCRIMINATORY, UNJUST, AND VIOLATIVE OF THE EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE.
exclusive jurisdiction over cases of violence against women and their children under this law.
In the absence of such court in the place where the offense was committed, the case shall be
III. filed in the Regional Trial Court where the crime or any of its elements was committed at the
option of the complainant. (Emphasis supplied)
THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED GRAVE MISTAKE IN NOT FINDING THAT R.A. 9262 RUNS
COUNTER TO THE DUE PROCESS CLAUSE OF THE CONSTITUTION. Inspite of its designation as a family court, the RTC of Bacolod City remains possessed of
authority as a court of general original jurisdiction to pass upon all kinds of cases whether civil,
IV. criminal, special proceedings, land registration, guardianship, naturalization, admiralty or
insolvency.44 It is settled that RTCs have jurisdiction to resolve the constitutionality of a
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN NOT FINDING THAT THE LAW DOES VIOLENCE TO THE statute,45 "this authority being embraced in the general definition of the judicial power to
POLICY OF THE STATE TO PROTECT THE FAMILY AS A BASIC SOCIAL INSTITUTION. determine what are the valid and binding laws by the criterion of their conformity to the
fundamental law."46The Constitution vests the power of judicial review or the power to
declare the constitutionality or validity of a law, treaty, international or executive agreement,
V. presidential decree, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation not only in this Court, but in
all RTCs.47 We said in J.M. Tuason and Co., Inc. v. CA48 that, "plainly the Constitution
THE COURT OF APPEALS SERIOUSLY ERRED IN NOT DECLARING R.A. No. 9262 AS INVALID AND contemplates that the inferior courts should have jurisdiction in cases involving
UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT ALLOWS AN UNDUE DELEGATION OF JUDICIAL POWER TO constitutionality of any treaty or law, for it speaks of appellate review of final judgments of
THE BARANGAY OFFICIALS.38 inferior courts in cases where such constitutionality happens to be in issue." Section 5, Article
VIII of the 1987 Constitution reads in part as follows:
The Ruling of the Court
SEC. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following powers:
Before delving into the arguments propounded by petitioner against the constitutionality of
R.A. 9262, we shall first tackle the propriety of the dismissal by the appellate court of the xxx
petition for prohibition (CA-G.R. CEB-SP. No. 01698) filed by petitioner.
2. Review, revise, reverse, modify, or affirm on appeal or certiorari, as the law or the Rules of
As a general rule, the question of constitutionality must be raised at the earliest opportunity Court may provide, final judgments and orders of lower courts in:
so that if not raised in the pleadings, ordinarily it may not be raised in the trial, and if not
raised in the trial court, it will not be considered on appeal.39 Courts will not anticipate a a. All cases in which the constitutionality or validity of any treaty, international or executive
question of constitutional law in advance of the necessity of deciding it.40 agreement, law, presidential decree, proclamation, order, instruction, ordinance, or regulation
is in question.
In defending his failure to attack the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 before the RTC of Bacolod
City, petitioner argues that the Family Court has limited authority and jurisdiction that is xxxx
"inadequate to tackle the complex issue of constitutionality."41
We disagree.
Thus, contrary to the posturing of petitioner, the issue of constitutionality of R.A. 9262 could (a) Facts undisputed and admitted;
have been raised at the earliest opportunity in his Opposition to the petition for protection
order before the RTC of Bacolod City, which had jurisdiction to determine the same, subject to (b) Factual and legal issues to be resolved;
the review of this Court.
(c) Evidence, including objects and documents that have been marked and will be
Section 20 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the Rule on Violence Against Women and Their Children, presented;
lays down a new kind of procedure requiring the respondent to file an opposition to the
petition and not an answer.49 Thus:
(d) Names of witnesses who will be ordered to present their direct testimonies in
the form of affidavits; and
SEC. 20. Opposition to petition. – (a) The respondent may file an opposition to the petition
which he himself shall verify. It must be accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall
(e) Schedule of the presentation of evidence by both parties which shall be done in
show cause why a temporary or permanent protection order should not be issued.
one day, to the extent possible, within the 30-day period of the effectivity of the
temporary protection order issued. (Emphasis supplied)
(b) Respondent shall not include in the opposition any counterclaim, cross-claim or third-party
complaint, but any cause of action which could be the subject thereof may be litigated in a
To obviate potential dangers that may arise concomitant to the conduct of a hearing when
separate civil action. (Emphasis supplied)
necessary, Section 26 (b) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC provides that if a temporary protection
order issued is due to expire, the trial court may extend or renew the said order for a period of
We cannot subscribe to the theory espoused by petitioner that, since a counterclaim, cross- thirty (30) days each time until final judgment is rendered. It may likewise modify the
claim and third-party complaint are to be excluded from the opposition, the issue of extended or renewed temporary protection order as may be necessary to meet the needs of
constitutionality cannot likewise be raised therein. A counterclaim is defined as any claim for the parties. With the private respondent given ample protection, petitioner could proceed to
money or other relief which a defending party may have against an opposing party.50 A cross- litigate the constitutional issues, without necessarily running afoul of the very purpose for the
claim, on the other hand, is any claim by one party against a co-party arising out of the adoption of the rules on summary procedure.
transaction or occurrence that is the subject matter either of the original action or of a
counterclaim therein.51Finally, a third-party complaint is a claim that a defending party may,
In view of all the foregoing, the appellate court correctly dismissed the petition for prohibition
with leave of court, file against a person not a party to the action for contribution, indemnity,
with prayer for injunction and temporary restraining order (CA-G.R. CEB - SP. No. 01698).
subrogation or any other relief, in respect of his opponent's claim.52As pointed out by Justice
Petitioner may have proceeded upon an honest belief that if he finds succor in a superior
Teresita J. Leonardo-De Castro, the unconstitutionality of a statute is not a cause of action that
court, he could be granted an injunctive relief. However, Section 22(j) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC
could be the subject of a counterclaim, cross-claim or a third-party complaint. Therefore, it is
expressly disallows the filing of a petition for certiorari, mandamus or prohibition against any
not prohibited from being raised in the opposition in view of the familiar maxim expressio
interlocutory order issued by the trial court. Hence, the 60-day TRO issued by the appellate
unius est exclusio alterius.
court in this case against the enforcement of the TPO, the amended TPOs and other orders
pursuant thereto was improper, and it effectively hindered the case from taking its normal
Moreover, it cannot be denied that this issue affects the resolution of the case a quo because course in an expeditious and summary manner.
the right of private respondent to a protection order is founded solely on the very statute the
validity of which is being attacked53 by petitioner who has sustained, or will sustain, direct
As the rules stand, a review of the case by appeal or certiorari before judgment is prohibited.
injury as a result of its enforcement. The alleged unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262 is, for all
Moreover, if the appeal of a judgment granting permanent protection shall not stay its
intents and purposes, a valid cause for the non-issuance of a protection order.
enforcement,55 with more reason that a TPO, which is valid only for thirty (30) days at a
time,56 should not be enjoined.
That the proceedings in Civil Case No. 06-797 are summary in nature should not have deterred
petitioner from raising the same in his Opposition. The question relative to the
The mere fact that a statute is alleged to be unconstitutional or invalid, does not of itself
constitutionality of a statute is one of law which does not need to be supported by
entitle a litigant to have the same enjoined.57 In Younger v. Harris, Jr.,58 the Supreme Court of
evidence.54 Be that as it may, Section 25 of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC nonetheless allows the
the United States declared, thus:
conduct of a hearing to determine legal issues, among others, viz:
Federal injunctions against state criminal statutes, either in their entirety or with respect to
SEC. 25. Order for further hearing. - In case the court determines the need for further hearing,
their separate and distinct prohibitions, are not to be granted as a matter of course, even if
it may issue an order containing the following:
such statutes are unconstitutional. No citizen or member of the community is immune from
prosecution, in good faith, for his alleged criminal acts. The imminence of such a prosecution
even though alleged to be unauthorized and, hence, unlawful is not alone ground for relief in victims. This includes the men, children, live-in, common-law wives, and those related with the
equity which exerts its extraordinary powers only to prevent irreparable injury to the plaintiff family.65
who seeks its aid. (Citations omitted)
xxx
The sole objective of injunctions is to preserve the status quo until the trial court hears fully
the merits of the case. It bears stressing, however, that protection orders are granted ex parte Wednesday, January 14, 2004
so as to protect women and their children from acts of violence. To issue an injunction against
such orders will defeat the very purpose of the law against VAWC.
xxxx
Notwithstanding all these procedural flaws, we shall not shirk from our obligation to
The President Pro Tempore. x x x
determine novel issues, or issues of first impression, with far-reaching implications. We have,
time and again, discharged our solemn duty as final arbiter of constitutional issues, and with
more reason now, in view of private respondent's plea in her Comment59 to the instant Also, may the Chair remind the group that there was the discussion whether to limit this to
Petition that we should put the challenge to the constitutionality of R.A. 9262 to rest. And so women and not to families which was the issue of the AWIR group. The understanding that I
we shall. have is that we would be having a broader scope rather than just women, if I remember
correctly, Madam sponsor.
Intent of Congress in enacting R.A. 9262.
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President.
Petitioner claims that since R.A. 9262 is intended to prevent and criminalize spousal and child
abuse, which could very well be committed by either the husband or the wife, gender alone is As a matter of fact, that was brought up by Senator Pangilinan during the interpellation
not enough basis to deprive the husband/father of the remedies under the law.60 period.
A perusal of the deliberations of Congress on Senate Bill No. 2723,61 which became R.A. 9262, I think Senator Sotto has something to say to that.
reveals that while the sponsor, Senator Luisa Pimentel-Ejercito (better known as Senator Loi
Estrada), had originally proposed what she called a "synthesized measure"62 – an Senator Legarda. Mr. President, the reason I am in support of the measure. Do not get me
amalgamation of two measures, namely, the "Anti-Domestic Violence Act" and the "Anti- wrong. However, I believe that there is a need to protect women's rights especially in the
Abuse of Women in Intimate Relationships Act"63 – providing protection to "all family domestic environment.
members, leaving no one in isolation" but at the same time giving special attention to women
as the "usual victims" of violence and abuse,64 nonetheless, it was eventually agreed that men As I said earlier, there are nameless, countless, voiceless women who have not had the
be denied protection under the same measure. We quote pertinent portions of the opportunity to file a case against their spouses, their live-in partners after years, if not decade,
deliberations: of battery and abuse. If we broaden the scope to include even the men, assuming they can at
all be abused by the women or their spouses, then it would not equalize the already difficult
Wednesday, December 10, 2003 situation for women, Mr. President.
Senator Pangilinan. I just wanted to place this on record, Mr. President. Some women's groups I think that the sponsor, based on our earlier conversations, concurs with this position. I am
have expressed concerns and relayed these concerns to me that if we are to include domestic sure that the men in this Chamber who love their women in their lives so dearly will agree
violence apart from against women as well as other members of the household, including with this representation. Whether we like it or not, it is an unequal world. Whether we like it
children or the husband, they fear that this would weaken the efforts to address domestic or not, no matter how empowered the women are, we are not given equal opportunities
violence of which the main victims or the bulk of the victims really are the wives, the spouses especially in the domestic environment where the macho Filipino man would always feel that
or the female partners in a relationship. We would like to place that on record. How does the he is stronger, more superior to the Filipino woman.
good Senator respond to this kind of observation?
xxxx
Senator Estrada. Yes, Mr. President, there is this group of women who call themselves "WIIR"
Women in Intimate Relationship. They do not want to include men in this domestic violence. The President Pro Tempore. What does the sponsor say?
But plenty of men are also being abused by women. I am playing safe so I placed here
members of the family, prescribing penalties therefor and providing protective measures for
Senator Estrada. Mr. President, before accepting this, the committee came up with this bill Senator Estrada. The amendment is accepted, Mr. President.
because the family members have been included in this proposed measure since the other
members of the family other than women are also possible victims of violence. While women The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection?
are most likely the intended victims, one reason incidentally why the measure focuses on
women, the fact remains that in some relatively few cases, men also stand to be victimized
xxxx
and that children are almost always the helpless victims of violence. I am worried that there
may not be enough protection extended to other family members particularly children who
are excluded. Although Republic Act No. 7610, for instance, more or less, addresses the Senator Sotto. x x x May I propose an amendment to the amendment.
special needs of abused children. The same law is inadequate. Protection orders for one are
not available in said law. The President Pro Tempore. Before we act on the amendment?
I am aware that some groups are apprehensive about granting the same protection to men, Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
fearing that they may use this law to justify their abusive behavior against women. However,
we should also recognize that there are established procedures and standards in our courts The President Pro Tempore. Yes, please proceed.
which give credence to evidentiary support and cannot just arbitrarily and whimsically
entertain baseless complaints.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President, I am inclined to believe the rationale used by the distinguished
proponent of the amendment. As a matter of fact, I tend to agree. Kung may maaabuso, mas
Mr. President, this measure is intended to harmonize family relations and to protect the malamang iyong babae kaysa sa lalake. At saka iyong mga lalake, puwede na talagang magulpi
family as the basic social institution. Though I recognize the unequal power relations between iyan. Okey lang iyan. But I cannot agree that we remove the children from this particular
men and women in our society, I believe we have an obligation to uphold inherent rights and measure.
dignity of both husband and wife and their immediate family members, particularly children.
Senator Sotto. Mr. President. Senator Sotto. – more than the women, the children are very much abused. As a matter of
fact, it is not limited to minors. The abuse is not limited to seven, six, 5-year-old children. I
have seen 14, 15-year-old children being abused by their fathers, even by their mothers. And
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, with the permission of the other senators. it breaks my heart to find out about these things.
Senator Sotto. Yes, with the permission of the two ladies on the Floor. Because of the inadequate existing law on abuse of children, this particular measure will
update that. It will enhance and hopefully prevent the abuse of children and not only women.
The President Pro Tempore. Yes, Sen. Vicente C. Sotto III is recognized.
SOTTO-LEGARDA AMENDMENTS
Senator Sotto. I presume that the effect of the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda
would be removing the "men and children" in this particular bill and focus specifically on Therefore, may I propose an amendment that, yes, we remove the aspect of the men in the
women alone. That will be the net effect of that proposed amendment. Hearing the rationale bill but not the children.
mentioned by the distinguished sponsor, Sen. Luisa "Loi" Ejercito Estrada, I am not sure now
whether she is inclined to accept the proposed amendment of Senator Legarda.
Senator Legarda. I agree, Mr. President, with the Minority Leader.
I am willing to wait whether she is accepting this or not because if she is going to accept this, I
will propose an amendment to the amendment rather than object to the amendment, Mr. The President Pro Tempore. Effectively then, it will be women AND CHILDREN.
President.
Senator Sotto. Yes, Mr. President.
xxxx
Senator Estrada. It is accepted, Mr. President.
The President Pro Tempore. Is there any objection? [Silence] There being none, the I. R.A. 9262 rests on substantial distinctions.
amendment, as amended, is approved.66
The unequal power relationship between women and men; the fact that women are more
It is settled that courts are not concerned with the wisdom, justice, policy, or expediency of a likely than men to be victims of violence; and the widespread gender bias and prejudice
statute.67 Hence, we dare not venture into the real motivations and wisdom of the members against women all make for real differences justifying the classification under the law. As
of Congress in limiting the protection against violence and abuse under R.A. 9262 to women Justice McIntyre succinctly states, "the accommodation of differences ... is the essence of true
and children only. No proper challenge on said grounds may be entertained in this proceeding. equality."70
Congress has made its choice and it is not our prerogative to supplant this judgment. The
choice may be perceived as erroneous but even then, the remedy against it is to seek its A. Unequal power relationship between men and women
amendment or repeal by the legislative. By the principle of separation of powers, it is the
legislative that determines the necessity, adequacy, wisdom and expediency of any law.68 We
According to the Philippine Commission on Women (the National Machinery for Gender
only step in when there is a violation of the Constitution. However, none was sufficiently
Equality and Women's Empowerment), violence against women (VAW) is deemed to be
shown in this case.
closely linked with the unequal power relationship between women and men otherwise
known as "gender-based violence". Societal norms and traditions dictate people to think men
R.A. 9262 does not violate the guaranty of equal protection of the laws. are the leaders, pursuers, providers, and take on dominant roles in society while women are
nurturers, men's companions and supporters, and take on subordinate roles in society. This
Equal protection simply requires that all persons or things similarly situated should be treated perception leads to men gaining more power over women. With power comes the need to
alike, both as to rights conferred and responsibilities imposed. The oft-repeated disquisition in control to retain that power. And VAW is a form of men's expression of controlling women to
the early case of Victoriano v. Elizalde Rope Workers' Union69 is instructive: retain power.71
The guaranty of equal protection of the laws is not a guaranty of equality in the application of The United Nations, which has long recognized VAW as a human rights issue, passed its
the laws upon all citizens of the state. It is not, therefore, a requirement, in order to avoid the Resolution 48/104 on the Declaration on Elimination of Violence Against Women on
constitutional prohibition against inequality, that every man, woman and child should be December 20, 1993 stating that "violence against women is a manifestation of historically
affected alike by a statute. Equality of operation of statutes does not mean indiscriminate unequal power relations between men and women, which have led to domination over and
operation on persons merely as such, but on persons according to the circumstances discrimination against women by men and to the prevention of the full advancement of
surrounding them. It guarantees equality, not identity of rights. The Constitution does not women, and that violence against women is one of the crucial social mechanisms by which
require that things which are different in fact be treated in law as though they were the same. women are forced into subordinate positions, compared with men."72
The equal protection clause does not forbid discrimination as to things that are different. It
does not prohibit legislation which is limited either in the object to which it is directed or by Then Chief Justice Reynato S. Puno traced the historical and social context of gender-based
the territory within which it is to operate. violence and developments in advocacies to eradicate VAW, in his remarks delivered during
the Joint Launching of R.A. 9262 and its Implementing Rules last October 27, 2004, the
The equal protection of the laws clause of the Constitution allows classification. Classification pertinent portions of which are quoted hereunder:
in law, as in the other departments of knowledge or practice, is the grouping of things in
speculation or practice because they agree with one another in certain particulars. A law is not History reveals that most societies sanctioned the use of violence against women. The
invalid because of simple inequality. The very idea of classification is that of inequality, so that patriarch of a family was accorded the right to use force on members of the family under his
it goes without saying that the mere fact of inequality in no manner determines the matter of control. I quote the early studies:
constitutionality. All that is required of a valid classification is that it be reasonable, which
means that the classification should be based on substantial distinctions which make for real
Traditions subordinating women have a long history rooted in patriarchy – the institutional
differences; that it must be germane to the purpose of the law; that it must not be limited to
rule of men. Women were seen in virtually all societies to be naturally inferior both physically
existing conditions only; and that it must apply equally to each member of the class. This Court
and intellectually. In ancient Western societies, women whether slave, concubine or wife,
has held that the standard is satisfied if the classification or distinction is based on a
were under the authority of men. In law, they were treated as property.
reasonable foundation or rational basis and is not palpably arbitrary. (Emphasis supplied)
The Roman concept of patria potestas allowed the husband to beat, or even kill, his wife if she
Measured against the foregoing jurisprudential yardstick, we find that R.A. 9262 is based on a
endangered his property right over her. Judaism, Christianity and other religions oriented
valid classification as shall hereinafter be discussed and, as such, did not violate the equal
towards the patriarchal family strengthened the male dominated structure of society.
protection clause by favoring women over men as victims of violence and abuse to whom the
State extends its protection.
English feudal law reinforced the tradition of male control over women. Even the eminent Other studies fill in the rest of this troubling picture. Physical violence is only the most visible
Blackstone has been quoted in his commentaries as saying husband and wife were one and form of abuse. Psychological abuse, particularly forced social and economic isolation of
that one was the husband. However, in the late 1500s and through the entire 1600s, English women, is also common.
common law began to limit the right of husbands to chastise their wives. Thus, common law
developed the rule of thumb, which allowed husbands to beat their wives with a rod or stick Many victims of domestic violence remain with their abusers, perhaps because they perceive
no thicker than their thumb. no superior alternative...Many abused women who find temporary refuge in shelters return to
their husbands, in large part because they have no other source of income... Returning to
In the later part of the 19th century, legal recognition of these rights to chastise wives or one's abuser can be dangerous. Recent Federal Bureau of Investigation statistics disclose that
inflict corporeal punishment ceased. Even then, the preservation of the family was given more 8.8 percent of all homicide victims in the United States are killed by their spouses...Thirty
importance than preventing violence to women. percent of female homicide victims are killed by their male partners.
The metamorphosis of the law on violence in the United States followed that of the English Finally in 1994, the United States Congress enacted the Violence Against Women Act.
common law. In 1871, the Supreme Court of Alabama became the first appellate court to
strike down the common law right of a husband to beat his wife: In the International front, the women's struggle for equality was no less successful. The United
States Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights affirmed the equality of all
The privilege, ancient though it may be, to beat one's wife with a stick, to pull her hair, choke human beings. In 1979, the UN General Assembly adopted the landmark Convention on the
her, spit in her face or kick her about the floor, or to inflict upon her like indignities, is not now Elimination of all Forms of Discrimination Against Women (CEDAW). In 1993, the UN General
acknowledged by our law... In person, the wife is entitled to the same protection of the law Assembly also adopted the Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women. World
that the husband can invoke for himself. conferences on the role and rights of women have been regularly held in Mexico City,
Copenhagen, Nairobi and Beijing. The UN itself established a Commission on the Status of
As time marched on, the women's advocacy movement became more organized. The Women.
temperance leagues initiated it. These leagues had a simple focus. They considered the evils of
alcoholism as the root cause of wife abuse. Hence, they demonstrated and picketed saloons, The Philippines has been in cadence with the half – and full – steps of all these women's
bars and their husbands' other watering holes. Soon, however, their crusade was joined by movements. No less than Section 14, Article II of our 1987 Constitution mandates the State to
suffragette movements, expanding the liberation movement's agenda. They fought for recognize the role of women in nation building and to ensure the fundamental equality before
women's right to vote, to own property, and more. Since then, the feminist movement was on the law of women and men. Our Senate has ratified the CEDAW as well as the Convention on
the roll. the Rights of the Child and its two protocols. To cap it all, Congress, on March 8, 2004,
enacted Rep. Act No. 9262, entitled "An Act Defining Violence Against Women and Their
The feminist movement exposed the private invisibility of the domestic violence to the public Children, Providing for Protective Measures for Victims, Prescribing Penalties therefor and for
gaze. They succeeded in transforming the issue into an important public concern. No less than other Purposes." (Citations omitted)
the United States Supreme Court, in 1992 case Planned Parenthood v. Casey, noted:
B. Women are the "usual" and "most likely"
In an average 12-month period in this country, approximately two million women are the
victims of severe assaults by their male partners. In a 1985 survey, women reported that victims of violence.
nearly one of every eight husbands had assaulted their wives during the past year. The
[American Medical Association] views these figures as "marked underestimates," because the At the time of the presentation of Senate Bill No. 2723, official statistics on violence against
nature of these incidents discourages women from reporting them, and because surveys women and children show that –
typically exclude the very poor, those who do not speak English well, and women who are
homeless or in institutions or hospitals when the survey is conducted. According to the AMA,
x x x physical injuries had the highest number of cases at 5,058 in 2002 representing 55.63% of
"researchers on family violence agree that the true incidence of partner violence is probably
total cases reported (9,903). And for the first semester of 2003, there were 2,381 reported
double the above estimates; or four million severely assaulted women per year."
cases out of 4,354 cases which represent 54.31%. xxx (T)he total number of women in
especially difficult circumstances served by the Department of Social Welfare and
Studies on prevalence suggest that from one-fifth to one-third of all women will be physically Development (DSWD) for the year 2002, there are 1,417 physically abused/maltreated cases
assaulted by a partner or ex-partner during their lifetime... Thus on an average day in the out of the total of 5,608 cases. xxx (T)here are 1,091 DSWD cases out of a total number of
United States, nearly 11,000 women are severely assaulted by their male partners. Many of 3,471 cases for the first semester of 2003. Female violence comprised more than 90% of all
these incidents involve sexual assault... In families where wife beating takes place, moreover,
child abuse is often present as well.
forms of abuse and violence and more than 90% of these reported cases were committed by From the initial report to the police through prosecution, trial, and sentencing, crimes against
the women's intimate partners such as their husbands and live-in partners.73 women are often treated differently and less seriously than other crimes. This was argued by
then United States Senator Joseph R. Biden, Jr., now Vice President, chief sponsor of the
Recently, the Philippine Commission on Women presented comparative statistics on violence Violence Against Women Act (VAWA), in defending the civil rights remedy as a valid exercise
against women across an eight-year period from 2004 to August of 2011 with violations under of the U.S. Congress' authority under the Commerce and Equal Protection Clauses. He
R.A. 9262 ranking first among the different VAW categories since its implementation in stressed that the widespread gender bias in the U.S. has institutionalized historic prejudices
2004,74 thus: against victims of rape or domestic violence, subjecting them to "double victimization" – first
at the hands of the offender and then of the legal system.79
Table 1. Annual Comparative Statistics on Violence Against Women, 2004 - 2011*
Our own Senator Loi Estrada lamented in her Sponsorship Speech for Senate Bill No. 2723 that
"(w)henever violence occurs in the family, the police treat it as a private matter and advise the
*2011 report covers only from January to August
parties to settle the conflict themselves. Once the complainant brings the case to the
prosecutor, the latter is hesitant to file the complaint for fear that it might later be withdrawn.
Source: Philippine National Police – Women and Children Protection Center (WCPC) This lack of response or reluctance to be involved by the police and prosecution reinforces the
escalating, recurring and often serious nature of domestic violence."80
On the other hand, no reliable estimates may be obtained on domestic abuse and violence
against men in the Philippines because incidents thereof are relatively low and, perhaps, Sadly, our own courts, as well, have exhibited prejudices and biases against our women.
because many men will not even attempt to report the situation. In the United Kingdom, 32%
of women who had ever experienced domestic violence did so four or five (or more) times,
In a recent case resolved on March 9, 2011, we fined RTC Judge Venancio J. Amila for Conduct
compared with 11% of the smaller number of men who had ever experienced domestic
Unbecoming of a Judge. He used derogatory and irreverent language in reference to the
violence; and women constituted 89% of all those who had experienced 4 or more incidents of
complainant in a petition for TPO and PPO under R.A. 9262, calling her as "only a live-in
domestic violence.75Statistics in Canada show that spousal violence by a woman against a man
partner" and presenting her as an "opportunist" and a "mistress" in an "illegitimate
is less likely to cause injury than the other way around (18 percent versus 44 percent). Men,
relationship." Judge Amila even called her a "prostitute," and accused her of being motivated
who experience violence from their spouses are much less likely to live in fear of violence at
by "insatiable greed" and of absconding with the contested property.81 Such remarks betrayed
the hands of their spouses, and much less likely to experience sexual assault. In fact, many
Judge Amila's prejudices and lack of gender sensitivity.
cases of physical violence by a woman against a spouse are in self-defense or the result of
many years of physical or emotional abuse.76
The enactment of R.A. 9262 aims to address the discrimination brought about by biases and
prejudices against women. As emphasized by the CEDAW Committee on the Elimination of
While there are, indeed, relatively few cases of violence and abuse perpetrated against men in
Discrimination against Women, addressing or correcting discrimination through specific
the Philippines, the same cannot render R.A. 9262 invalid.
measures focused on women does not discriminate against men.82Petitioner's
contention,83 therefore, that R.A. 9262 is discriminatory and that it is an "anti-male,"
In a 1960 case involving the violation of a city ordinance requiring drivers of animal-drawn "husband-bashing," and "hate-men" law deserves scant consideration. As a State Party to the
vehicles to pick up, gather and deposit in receptacles the manure emitted or discharged by CEDAW, the Philippines bound itself to take all appropriate measures "to modify the social and
their vehicle-drawing animals in any public highways, streets, plazas, parks or alleys, said cultural patterns of conduct of men and women, with a view to achieving the elimination of
ordinance was challenged as violative of the guaranty of equal protection of laws as its prejudices and customary and all other practices which are based on the idea of the inferiority
application is limited to owners and drivers of vehicle-drawing animals and not to those or the superiority of either of the sexes or on stereotyped roles for men and women."84 Justice
animals, although not utilized, but similarly pass through the same streets. Puno correctly pointed out that "(t)he paradigm shift changing the character of domestic
violence from a private affair to a public offense will require the development of a distinct
The ordinance was upheld as a valid classification for the reason that, while there may be non- mindset on the part of the police, the prosecution and the judges."85
vehicle-drawing animals that also traverse the city roads, "but their number must be negligible
and their appearance therein merely occasional, compared to the rig-drawing ones, as not to II. The classification is germane to the purpose of the law.
constitute a menace to the health of the community."77 The mere fact that the legislative
classification may result in actual inequality is not violative of the right to equal protection, for
The distinction between men and women is germane to the purpose of R.A. 9262, which is to
every classification of persons or things for regulation by law produces inequality in some
address violence committed against women and children, spelled out in its Declaration of
degree, but the law is not thereby rendered invalid.78
Policy, as follows:
III. The classification is not limited to existing D. "Economic abuse" refers to acts that make or attempt to make a woman financially
dependent which includes, but is not limited to the following:
conditions only, and apply equally to all members
1. withdrawal of financial support or preventing the victim from engaging
Moreover, the application of R.A. 9262 is not limited to the existing conditions when it was in any legitimate profession, occupation, business or activity, except in
promulgated, but to future conditions as well, for as long as the safety and security of women cases wherein the other spouse/partner objects on valid, serious and
and their children are threatened by violence and abuse. moral grounds as defined in Article 73 of the Family Code;
R.A. 9262 applies equally to all women and children who suffer violence and abuse. Section 3 2. deprivation or threat of deprivation of financial resources and the right
thereof defines VAWC as: to the use and enjoyment of the conjugal, community or property owned
in common;
x x x any act or a series of acts committed by any person against a woman who is his wife,
former wife, or against a woman with whom the person has or had a sexual or dating 3. destroying household property;
relationship, or with whom he has a common child, or against her child whether legitimate or
illegitimate, within or without the family abode, which result in or is likely to result in physical, 4. controlling the victims' own money or properties or solely controlling
sexual, psychological harm or suffering, or economic abuse including threats of such acts, the conjugal money or properties.
battery, assault, coercion, harassment or arbitrary deprivation of liberty. It includes, but is not
limited to, the following acts:
It should be stressed that the acts enumerated in the aforequoted provision are attributable
to research that has exposed the dimensions and dynamics of battery. The acts described here
A. "Physical Violence" refers to acts that include bodily or physical harm; are also found in the U.N. Declaration on the Elimination of Violence Against Women.90 Hence,
the argument advanced by petitioner that the definition of what constitutes abuse removes
B. "Sexual violence" refers to an act which is sexual in nature, committed against a woman or the difference between violent action and simple marital tiffs is tenuous.
her child. It includes, but is not limited to:
There is nothing in the definition of VAWC that is vague and ambiguous that will confuse
a) rape, sexual harassment, acts of lasciviousness, treating a woman or her petitioner in his defense. The acts enumerated above are easily understood and provide
child as a sex object, making demeaning and sexually suggestive remarks, adequate contrast between the innocent and the prohibited acts. They are worded with
sufficient definiteness that persons of ordinary intelligence can understand what conduct is from violence, to prevent their abduction by the perpetrator and to ensure their financial
prohibited, and need not guess at its meaning nor differ in its application.91 Yet, petitioner support."97
insists92that phrases like "depriving or threatening to deprive the woman or her child of a legal
right," "solely controlling the conjugal or common money or properties," "marital infidelity," The rules require that petitions for protection order be in writing, signed and verified by the
and "causing mental or emotional anguish" are so vague that they make every quarrel a case petitioner98 thereby undertaking full responsibility, criminal or civil, for every allegation
of spousal abuse. However, we have stressed that the "vagueness" doctrine merely requires a therein. Since "time is of the essence in cases of VAWC if further violence is to be
reasonable degree of certainty for the statute to be upheld – not absolute precision or prevented,"99 the court is authorized to issue ex parte a TPO after raffle but before notice and
mathematical exactitude, as petitioner seems to suggest. Flexibility, rather than meticulous hearing when the life, limb or property of the victim is in jeopardy and there is reasonable
specificity, is permissible as long as the metes and bounds of the statute are clearly ground to believe that the order is necessary to protect the victim from the immediate and
delineated. An act will not be held invalid merely because it might have been more explicit in imminent danger of VAWC or to prevent such violence, which is about to recur.100
its wordings or detailed in its provisions.93
There need not be any fear that the judge may have no rational basis to issue an ex parte
There is likewise no merit to the contention that R.A. 9262 singles out the husband or father order. The victim is required not only to verify the allegations in the petition, but also to attach
as the culprit. As defined above, VAWC may likewise be committed "against a woman with her witnesses' affidavits to the petition.101
whom the person has or had a sexual or dating relationship." Clearly, the use of the gender-
neutral word "person" who has or had a sexual or dating relationship with the woman
The grant of a TPO ex parte cannot, therefore, be challenged as violative of the right to due
encompasses even lesbian relationships. Moreover, while the law provides that the offender
process. Just like a writ of preliminary attachment which is issued without notice and hearing
be related or connected to the victim by marriage, former marriage, or a sexual or dating
because the time in which the hearing will take could be enough to enable the defendant to
relationship, it does not preclude the application of the principle of conspiracy under the
abscond or dispose of his property,102 in the same way, the victim of VAWC may already have
Revised Penal Code (RPC). Thus, in the case of Go-Tan v. Spouses Tan,94 the parents-in-law of
suffered harrowing experiences in the hands of her tormentor, and possibly even death, if
Sharica Mari L. Go-Tan, the victim, were held to be proper respondents in the case filed by the
notice and hearing were required before such acts could be prevented. It is a constitutional
latter upon the allegation that they and their son (Go-Tan's husband) had community of
commonplace that the ordinary requirements of procedural due process must yield to the
design and purpose in tormenting her by giving her insufficient financial support; harassing
necessities of protecting vital public interests,103among which is protection of women and
and pressuring her to be ejected from the family home; and in repeatedly abusing her
children from violence and threats to their personal safety and security.
verbally, emotionally, mentally and physically.
It should be pointed out that when the TPO is issued ex parte, the court shall likewise order
R.A. 9262 is not violative of the
that notice be immediately given to the respondent directing him to file an opposition within
due process clause of the Constitution.
five (5) days from service. Moreover, the court shall order that notice, copies of the petition
and TPO be served immediately on the respondent by the court sheriffs. The TPOs are initially
Petitioner bewails the disregard of R.A. 9262, specifically in the issuance of POs, of all effective for thirty (30) days from service on the respondent.104
protections afforded by the due process clause of the Constitution. Says he: "On the basis of
unsubstantiated allegations, and practically no opportunity to respond, the husband is
Where no TPO is issued ex parte, the court will nonetheless order the immediate issuance and
stripped of family, property, guns, money, children, job, future employment and reputation,
service of the notice upon the respondent requiring him to file an opposition to the petition
all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what happened."95
within five (5) days from service. The date of the preliminary conference and hearing on the
merits shall likewise be indicated on the notice.105
A protection order is an order issued to prevent further acts of violence against women and
their children, their family or household members, and to grant other necessary reliefs. Its
The opposition to the petition which the respondent himself shall verify, must be
purpose is to safeguard the offended parties from further harm, minimize any disruption in
accompanied by the affidavits of witnesses and shall show cause why a temporary or
their daily life and facilitate the opportunity and ability to regain control of their life.96
permanent protection order should not be issued.106
"The scope of reliefs in protection orders is broadened to ensure that the victim or offended
It is clear from the foregoing rules that the respondent of a petition for protection order
party is afforded all the remedies necessary to curtail access by a perpetrator to the victim.
should be apprised of the charges imputed to him and afforded an opportunity to present his
This serves to safeguard the victim from greater risk of violence; to accord the victim and any
side. Thus, the fear of petitioner of being "stripped of family, property, guns, money, children,
designated family or household member safety in the family residence, and to prevent the
job, future employment and reputation, all in a matter of seconds, without an inkling of what
perpetrator from committing acts that jeopardize the employment and support of the victim.
happened" is a mere product of an overactive imagination. The essence of due process is to
It also enables the court to award temporary custody of minor children to protect the children
be found in the reasonable opportunity to be heard and submit any evidence one may have in
support of one's defense. "To be heard" does not only mean verbal arguments in court; one
may be heard also through pleadings. Where opportunity to be heard, either through oral Petitioner argues that "by criminalizing run-of-the-mill arguments, instead of encouraging
arguments or pleadings, is accorded, there is no denial of procedural due process.107 mediation and counseling, the law has done violence to the avowed policy of the State to
"protect and strengthen the family as a basic autonomous social institution."109
It should be recalled that petitioner filed on April 26, 2006 an Opposition to the Urgent Ex-
Parte Motion for Renewal of the TPO that was granted only two days earlier on April 24, 2006. Under Section 23(c) of A.M. No. 04-10-11-SC, the court shall not refer the case or any issue
Likewise, on May 23, 2006, petitioner filed a motion for the modification of the TPO to allow thereof to a mediator. The reason behind this provision is well-explained by the Commentary
him visitation rights to his children. Still, the trial court in its Order dated September 26, 2006, on Section 311 of the Model Code on Domestic and Family Violence as follows:110
gave him five days (5) within which to show cause why the TPO should not be renewed or
extended. Yet, he chose not to file the required comment arguing that it would just be an This section prohibits a court from ordering or referring parties to mediation in a proceeding
"exercise in futility," conveniently forgetting that the renewal of the questioned TPO was only for an order for protection. Mediation is a process by which parties in equivalent bargaining
for a limited period (30 days) each time, and that he could prevent the continued renewal of positions voluntarily reach consensual agreement about the issue at hand. Violence, however,
said order if he can show sufficient cause therefor. Having failed to do so, petitioner may not is not a subject for compromise. A process which involves parties mediating the issue of
now be heard to complain that he was denied due process of law. violence implies that the victim is somehow at fault. In addition, mediation of issues in a
proceeding for an order of protection is problematic because the petitioner is frequently
Petitioner next laments that the removal and exclusion of the respondent in the VAWC case unable to participate equally with the person against whom the protection order has been
from the residence of the victim, regardless of ownership of the residence, is virtually a "blank sought. (Emphasis supplied)
check" issued to the wife to claim any property as her conjugal home.108
There is no undue delegation of
The wording of the pertinent rule, however, does not by any stretch of the imagination judicial power to barangay officials.
suggest that this is so. It states:
Petitioner contends that protection orders involve the exercise of judicial power which, under
SEC. 11. Reliefs available to the offended party. -- The protection order shall include any, some the Constitution, is placed upon the "Supreme Court and such other lower courts as may be
or all of the following reliefs: established by law" and, thus, protests the delegation of power to barangay officials to issue
protection orders.111 The pertinent provision reads, as follows:
xxxx
SEC. 14. Barangay Protection Orders (BPOs); Who May Issue and How. – Barangay Protection
(c) Removing and excluding the respondent from the residence of the offended party, Orders (BPOs) refer to the protection order issued by the Punong Barangay ordering the
regardless of ownership of the residence, either temporarily for the purpose of protecting the perpetrator to desist from committing acts under Section 5 (a) and (b) of this Act.1âwphi1 A
offended party, or permanently where no property rights are violated. If the respondent must Punong Barangay who receives applications for a BPO shall issue the protection order to the
remove personal effects from the residence, the court shall direct a law enforcement agent to applicant on the date of filing after ex parte determination of the basis of the application. If
accompany the respondent to the residence, remain there until the respondent has gathered the Punong Barangay is unavailable to act on the application for a BPO, the application shall be
his things and escort him from the residence; acted upon by any available Barangay Kagawad. If the BPO is issued by a Barangay Kagawad,
the order must be accompanied by an attestation by the Barangay Kagawad that the Punong
Barangay was unavailable at the time of the issuance of the BPO. BPOs shall be effective for
xxxx
fifteen (15) days. Immediately after the issuance of an ex parte BPO, the Punong Barangay or
Barangay Kagawad shall personally serve a copy of the same on the respondent, or direct any
Indubitably, petitioner may be removed and excluded from private respondent's residence, barangay official to effect its personal service.
regardless of ownership, only temporarily for the purpose of protecting the latter. Such
removal and exclusion may be permanent only where no property rights are violated. How
The parties may be accompanied by a non-lawyer advocate in any proceeding before the
then can the private respondent just claim any property and appropriate it for herself, as
Punong Barangay.
petitioner seems to suggest?
Judicial power includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle actual controversies involving
The non-referral of a VAWC case
rights which are legally demandable and enforceable, and to determine whether or not there
to a mediator is justified.
has been a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of
any branch or instrumentality of the Government.112 On the other hand, executive power "is
generally defined as the power to enforce and administer the laws. It is the power of carrying
the laws into practical operation and enforcing their due observance."113
As clearly delimited by the aforequoted provision, the BPO issued by the Punong Barangay or, Republic of the Philippines
in his unavailability, by any available Barangay Kagawad, merely orders the perpetrator to SUPREME COURT
desist from (a) causing physical harm to the woman or her child; and (2) threatening to cause Manila
the woman or her child physical harm. Such function of the Punong Barangay is, thus, purely
executive in nature, in pursuance of his duty under the Local Government Code to "enforce all EN BANC
laws and ordinances," and to "maintain public order in the barangay."114
G.R. No. 170139 August 5, 2014
We have held that "(t)he mere fact that an officer is required by law to inquire into the
existence of certain facts and to apply the law thereto in order to determine what his official
SAMEER OVERSEAS PLACEMENT AGENCY, INC., Petitioner,
conduct shall be and the fact that these acts may affect private rights do not constitute an
vs.
exercise of judicial powers."115
JOY C. CABILES, Respondent.
In the same manner as the public prosecutor ascertains through a preliminary inquiry or
DECISION
proceeding "whether there is reasonable ground to believe that an offense has been
committed and the accused is probably guilty thereof," the Punong Barangay must determine
reasonable ground to believe that an imminent danger of violence against the woman and her LEONEN, J.:
children exists or is about to recur that would necessitate the issuance of a BPO. The
preliminary investigation conducted by the prosecutor is, concededly, an executive, not a This case involves an overseas Filipino worker with shattered dreams. It is our duty, given the
judicial, function. The same holds true with the issuance of a BPO. facts and the law, to approximate justice for her.
We need not even belabor the issue raised by petitioner that since barangay officials and We are asked to decide a petition for review1 on certiorari assailing the Court of Appeals’
other law enforcement agencies are required to extend assistance to victims of violence and decision2 dated June 27, 2005. This decision partially affirmed the National Labor
abuse, it would be very unlikely that they would remain objective and impartial, and that the RelationsCommission’s resolution dated March 31, 2004,3declaring respondent’s dismissal
chances of acquittal are nil. As already stated, assistance by barangay officials and other law illegal, directing petitioner to pay respondent’s three-month salary equivalent to New Taiwan
enforcement agencies is consistent with their duty to enforce the law and to maintain peace Dollar (NT$) 46,080.00, and ordering it to reimburse the NT$3,000.00 withheld from
and order. respondent, and pay her NT$300.00 attorney’s fees.4
Conclusion Petitioner, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency, Inc., is a recruitment and placement
agency.5 Responding to an ad it published, respondent, Joy C. Cabiles, submitted her
Before a statute or its provisions duly challenged are voided, an unequivocal breach of, or a application for a quality control job in Taiwan.6
clear conflict with the Constitution, not merely a doubtful or argumentative one, must be
demonstrated in such a manner as to leave no doubt in the mind of the Court. In other words, Joy’s application was accepted.7 Joy was later asked to sign a oneyear employment contract
the grounds for nullity must be beyond reasonable doubt.116 In the instant case, however, no for a monthly salary of NT$15,360.00.8 She alleged that Sameer Overseas Agency required her
concrete evidence and convincing arguments were presented by petitioner to warrant a to pay a placement fee of ₱70,000.00 when she signed the employment contract.9
declaration of the unconstitutionality of R.A. 9262, which is an act of Congress and signed into
law by the highest officer of the co-equal executive department. As we said in Estrada v. Joy was deployed to work for TaiwanWacoal, Co. Ltd. (Wacoal) on June 26, 1997.10 She alleged
Sandiganbayan, 117 courts must assume that the legislature is ever conscious of the borders that in her employment contract, she agreed to work as quality control for one year.11 In
and edges of its plenary powers, and passed laws with full knowledge of the facts and for the Taiwan, she was asked to work as a cutter.12
purpose of promoting what is right and advancing the welfare of the majority.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agencyclaims that on July 14, 1997, a certain Mr. Huwang from
We reiterate here Justice Puno's observation that "the history of the women's movement Wacoal informedJoy, without prior notice, that she was terminated and that "she should
against domestic violence shows that one of its most difficult struggles was the fight against immediately report to their office to get her salary and passport."13 She was asked to "prepare
the violence of law itself. If we keep that in mind, law will not again be a hindrance to the for immediate repatriation."14
struggle of women for equality but will be its fulfillment."118 Accordingly, the constitutionality
of R.A. 9262 is, as it should be, sustained.
WHEREFORE, the instant petition for review on certiorari is hereby DENIED for lack of merit.
Joy claims that she was told that from June 26 to July 14, 1997, she only earned a total of The National Labor Relations Commission awarded respondent only three (3) months worth of
NT$9,000.15 According to her, Wacoal deducted NT$3,000 to cover her plane ticket to salaryin the amount of NT$46,080, the reimbursement of the NT$3,000 withheld from her,
Manila.16 and attorney’s fees of NT$300.46
On October 15, 1997, Joy filed a complaint17 with the National Labor Relations Commission The Commission denied the agency’s motion for reconsideration47 dated May 12, 2004
against petitioner and Wacoal. She claimed that she was illegally dismissed.18 She asked for through a resolution48 dated July 2, 2004.
the return of her placement fee, the withheld amount for repatriation costs, payment of her
salary for 23 months as well as moral and exemplary damages.19 She identified Wacoal as Aggrieved by the ruling, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency caused the filing of a
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’s foreign principal.20 petition49 for certiorari with the Court of Appeals assailing the National Labor Relations
Commission’s resolutions dated March 31, 2004 and July 2, 2004.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency alleged that respondent's termination was due to her
inefficiency, negligence in her duties, and her "failure to comply with the work requirements The Court of Appeals50 affirmed the decision of the National Labor Relations Commission with
[of] her foreign [employer]."21 The agency also claimed that it did not ask for a placement fee respect to the finding of illegal dismissal, Joy’s entitlement to the equivalent of three months
of ₱70,000.00.22 As evidence, it showedOfficial Receipt No. 14860 dated June 10, 1997, worth of salary, reimbursement of withheld repatriation expense, and attorney’s fees.51 The
bearing the amount of ₱20,360.00.23 Petitioner added that Wacoal's accreditation with Court of Appeals remanded the case to the National Labor Relations Commission to address
petitioner had already been transferred to the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc. the validity of petitioner's allegations against Pacific.52 The Court of Appeals held, thus:
(Pacific) as of August 6, 1997.24 Thus, petitioner asserts that it was already substituted by Although the public respondent found the dismissal of the complainant-respondent illegal, we
Pacific Manpower.25 should point out that the NLRC merely awarded her three (3) months backwages or the
amount of NT$46,080.00, which was based upon its finding that she was dismissed without
Pacific Manpower moved for the dismissal of petitioner’s claims against it.26 It alleged that due process, a finding that we uphold, given petitioner’s lack of worthwhile discussion upon
there was no employer-employee relationship between them.27 Therefore, the claims against the same in the proceedings below or before us. Likewise we sustain NLRC’s finding in regard
it were outside the jurisdiction of the Labor Arbiter.28 Pacific Manpower argued that the to the reimbursement of her fare, which is squarely based on the law; as well as the award of
employment contract should first be presented so that the employer’s contractual obligations attorney’s fees.
might be identified.29 It further denied that it assumed liability for petitioner’s illegal acts.30
But we do find it necessary to remand the instant case to the public respondent for further
On July 29, 1998, the Labor Arbiter dismissed Joy’s complaint.31 Acting Executive Labor Arbiter proceedings, for the purpose of addressing the validity or propriety of petitioner’s third-party
Pedro C.Ramos ruled that her complaint was based on mereallegations.32 The Labor Arbiter complaint against the transferee agent or the Pacific Manpower & Management Services, Inc.
found that there was no excess payment of placement fees, based on the official receipt and Lea G. Manabat. We should emphasize that as far as the decision of the NLRC on the
presented by petitioner.33 The Labor Arbiter found unnecessary a discussion on petitioner’s claims of Joy Cabiles, is concerned, the same is hereby affirmed with finality, and we hold
transfer of obligations to Pacific34 and considered the matter immaterial in view of the petitioner liable thereon, but without prejudice to further hearings on its third party complaint
dismissal of respondent’s complaint.35 against Pacific for reimbursement.
Joy appealed36 to the National Labor Relations Commission. WHEREFORE, premises considered, the assailed Resolutions are hereby partly AFFIRMED in
accordance with the foregoing discussion, but subject to the caveat embodied inthe last
In a resolution37 dated March 31, 2004, the National Labor Relations Commission declared sentence. No costs.
that Joy was illegally dismissed.38 It reiterated the doctrine that the burden of proof to show
that the dismissal was based on a just or valid cause belongs to the employer.39 It found that SO ORDERED.53
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to prove that there were just causes for
termination.40 There was no sufficient proofto show that respondent was inefficient in her Dissatisfied, Sameer Overseas Placement Agency filed this petition.54
work and that she failed to comply with company requirements.41 Furthermore, procedural
dueprocess was not observed in terminating respondent.42
We are asked to determine whether the Court of Appeals erred when it affirmed the ruling of
the National Labor Relations Commission finding respondent illegally dismissed and awarding
The National Labor Relations Commission did not rule on the issue of reimbursement of her three months’ worth of salary, the reimbursement of the cost ofher repatriation, and
placement fees for lack of jurisdiction.43 It refused to entertain the issue of the alleged attorney’s fees despite the alleged existence of just causes of termination.
transfer of obligations to Pacific.44 It did not acquire jurisdiction over that issue because
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to appeal the Labor Arbiter’s decision not to rule
on the matter.45
Petitioner reiterates that there was just cause for termination because there was a finding of First, established is the rule that lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the contract is
Wacoal that respondent was inefficient in her work.55 made) governs in this jurisdiction. There is no question that the contract of employment in
this case was perfected here in the Philippines. Therefore, the Labor Code, its implementing
Therefore, it claims that respondent’s dismissal was valid.56 rules and regulations, and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.Furthermore, settled is
the rule that the courts of the forum will not enforce any foreign claim obnoxious to the
forum’s public policy. Herein the Philippines, employment agreements are more than
Petitioner also reiterates that since Wacoal’s accreditation was validly transferred to Pacific at
contractual in nature. The Constitution itself, in Article XIII, Section 3, guarantees the special
the time respondent filed her complaint, it should be Pacific that should now assume
protection of workers, to wit:
responsibility for Wacoal’s contractual obligations to the workers originally recruited by
petitioner.57
The State shall afford full protection to labor, local and overseas, organized and unorganized,
and promote full employment and equality of employment opportunities for all.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency’spetition is without merit. We find for respondent.
It shall guarantee the rights of all workers to selforganization, collective bargaining and
I
negotiations, and peaceful concerted activities, including the right to strike in accordance with
law. They shall be entitled to security of tenure, humane conditions of work, and a living wage.
Sameer Overseas Placement Agency failed to show that there was just cause for causing Joy’s Theyshall also participate in policy and decision-making processes affecting their rights and
dismissal. The employer, Wacoal, also failed to accord her due process of law. benefits as may be provided by law.
Indeed, employers have the prerogative to impose productivity and quality standards at ....
work.58 They may also impose reasonable rules to ensure that the employees comply with
these standards.59 Failure to comply may be a just cause for their dismissal.60 Certainly,
This public policy should be borne in mind in this case because to allow foreign employers to
employers cannot be compelled to retain the services of anemployee who is guilty of acts that
determine for and by themselves whether an overseas contract worker may be dismissed on
are inimical to the interest of the employer.61 While the law acknowledges the plight and
the ground of illness would encourage illegal or arbitrary pretermination of employment
vulnerability of workers, it does not "authorize the oppression or self-destruction of the
contracts.66 (Emphasis supplied, citation omitted)
employer."62 Management prerogative is recognized in law and in our jurisprudence.
Even with respect to fundamental procedural rights, this court emphasized in PCL Shipping
This prerogative, however, should not be abused. It is "tempered with the employee’s right to
Philippines, Inc. v. NLRC,67 to wit:
security of tenure."63Workers are entitled to substantive and procedural due process before
termination. They may not be removed from employment without a validor just cause as
determined by law and without going through the proper procedure. Petitioners admit that they did notinform private respondent in writing of the charges against
him and that they failed to conduct a formal investigation to give him opportunity to air his
side. However, petitioners contend that the twin requirements ofnotice and hearing applies
Security of tenure for labor is guaranteed by our Constitution.64
strictly only when the employment is within the Philippines and that these need not be strictly
observed in cases of international maritime or overseas employment.
Employees are not stripped of their security of tenure when they move to work in a different
jurisdiction. With respect to the rights of overseas Filipino workers, we follow the principle of
The Court does not agree. The provisions of the Constitution as well as the Labor Code which
lex loci contractus.Thus, in Triple Eight Integrated Services, Inc. v. NLRC,65 this court noted:
afford protection to labor apply to Filipino employees whether working within the Philippines
or abroad. Moreover, the principle of lex loci contractus (the law of the place where the
Petitioner likewise attempts to sidestep the medical certificate requirement by contending contract is made) governs in this jurisdiction. In the present case, it is not disputed that the
that since Osdana was working in Saudi Arabia, her employment was subject to the laws of the Contract of Employment entered into by and between petitioners and private respondent was
host country. Apparently, petitioner hopes tomake it appear that the labor laws of Saudi executed here in the Philippines with the approval of the Philippine Overseas Employment
Arabia do not require any certification by a competent public health authority in the dismissal Administration (POEA). Hence, the Labor Code together with its implementing rules and
of employees due to illness. regulations and other laws affecting labor apply in this case.68 (Emphasis supplied, citations
omitted)
Again, petitioner’s argument is without merit.
By our laws, overseas Filipino workers (OFWs) may only be terminated for a just or authorized
cause and after compliance with procedural due process requirements.
Article 282 of the Labor Code enumerates the just causes of termination by the employer. The pre-determined standards that the employer sets are the bases for determining the
Thus: probationary employee’s fitness, propriety, efficiency, and qualifications as a regular
employee. Due process requires that the probationary employee be informed of such
Art. 282. Termination by employer. An employer may terminate an employment for any of the standards at the time of his or her engagement so he or she can adjusthis or her character or
following causes: workmanship accordingly. Proper adjustment to fit the standards upon which the employee’s
qualifications will be evaluated will increase one’s chances of being positively assessed for
regularization by his or her employer.
(a) Serious misconduct or willful disobedience by the employee of the lawful orders
of his employer or representative in connection with his work;
Assessing an employee’s work performance does not stop after regularization. The employer,
on a regular basis, determines if an employee is still qualified and efficient, based on work
(b) Gross and habitual neglect by the employee of his duties;
standards. Based on that determination, and after complying with the due process
requirements of notice and hearing, the employer may exercise its management prerogative
(c) Fraud or willful breach by the employee of the trust reposed in him by his of terminating the employee found unqualified.
employer or duly authorized representative;
The regular employee must constantlyattempt to prove to his or her employer that he or she
(d) Commission of a crime or offense by the employee against the person of his meets all the standards for employment. This time, however, the standards to be met are set
employer or any immediate member of his family or his duly authorized for the purpose of retaining employment or promotion. The employee cannot be expected to
representatives; and meet any standard of character or workmanship if such standards were not communicated to
him or her. Courts should remain vigilant on allegations of the employer’s failure to
(e) Other causes analogous to the foregoing. communicatework standards that would govern one’s employment "if [these are] to discharge
in good faith [their] duty to adjudicate."73
Petitioner’s allegation that respondentwas inefficient in her work and negligent in her
duties69 may, therefore, constitute a just cause for termination under Article 282(b), but only In this case, petitioner merely alleged that respondent failed to comply with her foreign
if petitioner was able to prove it. employer’s work requirements and was inefficient in her work.74 No evidence was shown to
support such allegations. Petitioner did not even bother to specify what requirements were
The burden of proving that there is just cause for termination is on the employer. "The not met, what efficiency standards were violated, or what particular acts of respondent
employer must affirmatively show rationally adequate evidence that the dismissal was for a constituted inefficiency.
justifiable cause."70 Failure to show that there was valid or just cause for termination would
necessarily mean that the dismissal was illegal.71 There was also no showing that respondent was sufficiently informed of the standards against
which her work efficiency and performance were judged. The parties’ conflict as to the
To show that dismissal resulting from inefficiency in work is valid, it must be shown that: 1) position held by respondent showed that even the matter as basic as the job title was not
the employer has set standards of conduct and workmanship against which the employee will clear.
be judged; 2) the standards of conduct and workmanship must have been communicated
tothe employee; and 3) the communication was made at a reasonable time prior to the The bare allegations of petitioner are not sufficient to support a claim that there is just cause
employee’s performance assessment. for termination. There is no proof that respondent was legally terminated.
This is similar to the law and jurisprudence on probationary employees, which allow Petitioner failed to comply with
termination ofthe employee only when there is "just cause or when [the probationary the due process requirements
employee] fails to qualify as a regular employee in accordance with reasonable standards
made known by the employer to the employee at the time of his [or her] engagement."72 Respondent’s dismissal less than one year from hiring and her repatriation on the same day
show not onlyfailure on the partof petitioner to comply with the requirement of the existence
However, we do not see why the application of that ruling should be limited to probationary of just cause for termination. They patently show that the employersdid not comply with the
employment. That rule is basic to the idea of security of tenure and due process, which are due process requirement.
guaranteed to all employees, whether their employment is probationary or regular.
A valid dismissal requires both a valid cause and adherence to the valid procedure of
dismissal.75 The employer is required to give the charged employee at least two written
notices before termination.76 One of the written notices must inform the employee of the Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of
particular acts that may cause his or her dismissal.77 The other notice must "[inform] the damages under this section shall be paid within four (4) months from the approval of the
employee of the employer’s decision."78 Aside from the notice requirement, the employee settlement by the appropriate authority.
must also be given "an opportunity to be heard."79
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
Petitioner failed to comply with the twin notices and hearing requirements. Respondent defined by law or contract, the workers shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his
started working on June 26, 1997. She was told that she was terminated on July 14, 1997 placement fee with interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired
effective on the same day and barely a month from her first workday. She was also repatriated portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired
on the same day that she was informed of her termination. The abruptness of the termination term, whichever is less.
negated any finding that she was properly notified and given the opportunity to be heard. Her
constitutional right to due process of law was violated. ....
II (Emphasis supplied)
Respondent Joy Cabiles, having been illegally dismissed, is entitled to her salary for the Section 15 of Republic Act No. 8042 states that "repatriation of the worker and the transport
unexpired portion ofthe employment contract that was violated together with attorney’s fees of his [or her] personal belongings shall be the primary responsibility of the agency which
and reimbursement of amounts withheld from her salary. recruited or deployed the worker overseas." The exception is when "termination of
employment is due solely to the fault of the worker,"80 which as we have established, is not
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042,otherwise known as the Migrant Workers and Overseas the case. It reads: SEC. 15. REPATRIATION OF WORKERS; EMERGENCY REPATRIATION FUND. –
Filipinos Act of1995, states thatoverseas workers who were terminated without just, valid, or The repatriation of the worker and the transport of his personal belongings shall be the
authorized cause "shall be entitled to the full reimbursement of his placement fee with primary responsibility of the agency which recruited or deployed the worker overseas. All
interest of twelve (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the unexpired portion of his costs attendant to repatriation shall be borne by or charged to the agency concerned and/or
employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever its principal. Likewise, the repatriation of remains and transport of the personal belongings of
is less." a deceased worker and all costs attendant thereto shall be borne by the principal and/or local
agency. However, in cases where the termination of employment is due solely to the fault of
Sec. 10. MONEY CLAIMS. – Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor the worker, the principal/employer or agency shall not in any manner be responsible for the
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and repatriation of the former and/or his belongings.
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after filing of the
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law ....
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
moral, exemplary and other forms of damages. The Labor Code81 also entitles the employee to 10% of the amount of withheld wages as
attorney’s feeswhen the withholding is unlawful.
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provisions [sic] shall be incorporated The Court of Appeals affirmedthe National Labor Relations Commission’s decision to award
in the contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. respondent NT$46,080.00 or the threemonth equivalent of her salary, attorney’s fees of
The performance bond to be filed by the recruitment/placementagency, as provided by law, NT$300.00, and the reimbursement of the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary, which answered for
shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If her repatriation.
the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the
We uphold the finding that respondent is entitled to all of these awards. The award of the
corporation orpartnership for the aforesaid claims and damages.
three-month equivalent of respondent’s salary should, however, be increased to the amount
equivalent to the unexpired term of the employment contract.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract
and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a
In Serrano v. Gallant Maritime Services, Inc. and Marlow Navigation Co., Inc.,82 this court ruled
foreign country of the said contract.
that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is
less"83 is unconstitutional for violating the equal protection clause and substantive due
process.84
A statute or provision which was declared unconstitutional is not a law. It "confers no rights; it Overseas Employment Program and from recruiting and hiring Filipino workers until and
imposes no duties; it affords no protection; it creates no office; it is inoperative as if it has not unless it fully satisfies the judgement award.
been passed at all."85
Noncompliance with the mandatory periods for resolutions of case providedunder this section
We are aware that the clause "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, shall subject the responsible officials to any or all of the following penalties:
whichever is less"was reinstated in Republic Act No. 8042 upon promulgation of Republic Act
No. 10022 in 2010. Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 provides: (a) The salary of any such official who fails to render his decision or resolution within
the prescribed period shall be, or caused to be, withheld until the said official
Section 7.Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042, as amended, is hereby amended to read as complies therewith;
follows:
(b) Suspension for not more than ninety (90) days; or
SEC. 10. Money Claims.– Notwithstanding any provision of law to the contrary, the Labor
Arbiters of the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC) shall have the original and (c) Dismissal from the service with disqualification to hold any appointive public
exclusive jurisdiction to hear and decide, within ninety (90) calendar days after the filing of the office for five (5) years.
complaint, the claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship or by virtue of any law
or contract involving Filipino workers for overseas deployment including claims for actual,
Provided, however,That the penalties herein provided shall be without prejudice to any
moral, exemplary and other forms of damage. Consistent with this mandate, the NLRC shall
liability which any such official may have incured [sic] under other existing laws or rules and
endeavor to update and keep abreast with the developments in the global services industry.
regulations as a consequence of violating the provisions of this paragraph. (Emphasis supplied)
The liability of the principal/employer and the recruitment/placement agency for any and all
Republic Act No. 10022 was promulgated on March 8, 2010. This means that the
claims under this section shall be joint and several. This provision shall be incorporated in the
reinstatement of the clause in Republic Act No. 8042 was not yet in effect at the time of
contract for overseas employment and shall be a condition precedent for its approval. The
respondent’s termination from work in 1997.86 Republic Act No. 8042 before it was amended
performance bond to de [sic] filed by the recruitment/placement agency, as provided by law,
byRepublic Act No. 10022 governs this case.
shall be answerable for all money claims or damages that may be awarded to the workers. If
the recruitment/placement agency is a juridical being, the corporate officers and directors and
partners as the case may be, shall themselves be jointly and solidarily liable with the When a law is passed, this court awaits an actual case that clearly raises adversarial positions
corporation or partnership for the aforesaid claims and damages. in their proper context before considering a prayer to declare it as unconstitutional.
Such liabilities shall continue during the entire period or duration of the employment contract However, we are confronted with a unique situation. The law passed incorporates the exact
and shall not be affected by any substitution, amendment or modification made locally or in a clause already declared as unconstitutional, without any perceived substantial change in the
foreign country of the said contract. circumstances.
Any compromise/amicable settlement or voluntary agreement on money claims inclusive of This may cause confusion on the part of the National Labor Relations Commission and the
damages under this section shall be paid within thirty (30) days from approval of the Court of Appeals.At minimum, the existence of Republic Act No. 10022 may delay the
settlement by the appropriate authority. execution of the judgment in this case, further frustrating remedies to assuage the wrong
done to petitioner.
In case of termination of overseas employment without just, valid or authorized cause as
defined by law or contract, or any unauthorized deductions from the migrant worker’s salary, Hence, there is a necessity to decide this constitutional issue.
the worker shall be entitled to the full reimbursement if [sic] his placement fee and the
deductions made with interest at twelve percent (12%) per annum, plus his salaries for the Moreover, this court is possessed with the constitutional duty to "[p]romulgate rules
unexpired portion of his employment contract or for three (3) months for every year of the concerning the protection and enforcement of constitutional rights."87 When cases become
unexpired term, whichever is less. mootand academic, we do not hesitate to provide for guidance to bench and bar in situations
where the same violations are capable of repetition but will evade review. This is analogous to
In case of a final and executory judgement against a foreign employer/principal, it shall be cases where there are millions of Filipinos working abroad who are bound to suffer from the
automatically disqualified, without further proceedings, from participating in the Philippine lack of protection because of the restoration of an identical clause in a provision previously
declared as unconstitutional.
In the hierarchy of laws, the Constitution is supreme. No branch or office of the government We reiterate our finding in Serrano v. Gallant Maritime that limiting wages that should be
may exercise its powers in any manner inconsistent with the Constitution, regardless of the recovered by anillegally dismissed overseas worker to three months is both a violation of due
existence of any law that supports such exercise. The Constitution cannot be trumped by any process and the equal protection clauses of the Constitution.
other law. All laws must be read in light of the Constitution. Any law that is inconsistent with it
is a nullity. Equal protection of the law is a guarantee that persons under like circumstances and falling
within the same class are treated alike, in terms of "privileges conferred and liabilities
Thus, when a law or a provision of law is null because it is inconsistent with the enforced."97 It is a guarantee against "undue favor and individual or class privilege, as well as
Constitution,the nullity cannot be cured by reincorporation or reenactment of the same or a hostile discrimination or the oppression of inequality."98
similar law or provision. A law or provision of law that was already declared unconstitutional
remains as such unless circumstances have sochanged as to warrant a reverse conclusion. In creating laws, the legislature has the power "to make distinctions and classifications."99
We are not convinced by the pleadings submitted by the parties that the situation has so In exercising such power, it has a wide discretion.100
changed so as to cause us to reverse binding precedent.
The equal protection clause does not infringe on this legislative power.101 A law is void on this
Likewise, there are special reasons of judicial efficiency and economy that attend to these basis, only if classifications are made arbitrarily.102 There is no violation of the equal protection
cases. The new law puts our overseas workers in the same vulnerable position as they were clause if the law applies equally to persons within the same class and if there are reasonable
prior to Serrano. Failure to reiterate the very ratio decidendi of that case will result in the grounds for distinguishing between those falling within the class and those who do not fall
same untold economic hardships that our reading of the Constitution intended to avoid. within the class.103 A law that does not violate the equal protection clause prescribesa
Obviously, we cannot countenance added expenses for further litigation thatwill reduce their reasonable classification.104
hardearned wages as well as add to the indignity of having been deprived of the protection of
our laws simply because our precedents have not been followed. There is no constitutional
A reasonable classification "(1) must rest on substantial distinctions; (2) must be germane to
doctrine that causes injustice in the face of empty procedural niceties. Constitutional
the purposes of the law; (3) must not be limited to existing conditions only; and (4) must apply
interpretation is complex, but it is never unreasonable.
equally to all members of the same class."105
Thus, in a resolution88 dated October 22, 2013, we ordered the parties and the Office of the
The reinstated clause does not satisfy the requirement of reasonable classification.
Solicitor General to comment on the constitutionality of the reinstated clause in Republic Act
No. 10022.
In Serrano, we identified the classifications made by the reinstated clause. It distinguished
between fixed-period overseas workers and fixedperiod local workers.106 It also distinguished
In its comment,89 petitioner argued that the clause was constitutional.90 The legislators
between overseas workers with employment contracts of less than one year and overseas
intended a balance between the employers’ and the employees’ rights by not unduly
workers with employment contracts of at least one year.107 Within the class of overseas
burdening the local recruitment agency.91 Petitioner is also of the view that the clause was
workers with at least one-year employment contracts, there was a distinction between those
already declared as constitutional in Serrano.92
with at least a year left in their contracts and those with less than a year left in their contracts
when they were illegally dismissed.108
The Office of the Solicitor General also argued that the clause was valid and
constitutional.93 However, since the parties never raised the issue of the constitutionality of
The Congress’ classification may be subjected to judicial review. In Serrano, there is a
the clause asreinstated in Republic Act No. 10022, its contention is that it is beyond judicial
"legislative classification which impermissibly interferes with the exercise of a fundamental
review.94
right or operates to the peculiar disadvantage of a suspect class."109
On the other hand, respondentargued that the clause was unconstitutional because it
Under the Constitution, labor is afforded special protection.110 Thus, this court in Serrano,
infringed on workers’ right to contract.95
"[i]mbued with the same sense of ‘obligation to afford protection to labor,’ . . . employ[ed] the
standard of strict judicial scrutiny, for it perceive[d] in the subject clause a suspect
We observe that the reinstated clause, this time as provided in Republic Act. No. 10022, classification prejudicial to OFWs."111
violates the constitutional rights to equal protection and due process.96 Petitioner as well as
the Solicitor General have failed to show any compelling changein the circumstances that
We also noted in Serranothat before the passage of Republic Act No. 8042, the money claims
would warrant us to revisit the precedent.
of illegally terminated overseas and local workers with fixed-term employment werecomputed
in the same manner.112 Their money claims were computed based onthe "unexpired portions
of their contracts."113 The adoption of the reinstated clause in Republic Act No. 8042 We also find that the classificationsare not relevant to the purpose of the law, which is to
subjected the money claims of illegally dismissed overseas workers with an unexpired term of "establish a higher standard of protection and promotion of the welfare of migrant workers,
at least a year to a cap of three months worth of their salary.114 There was no such limitation their families and overseas Filipinos in distress, and for other purposes."124 Further, we find
on the money claims of illegally terminated local workers with fixed-term employment.115 specious the argument that reducing the liability of placement agencies "redounds to the
benefit of the [overseas] workers."125
We observed that illegally dismissed overseas workers whose employment contracts had a
term of less than one year were granted the amount equivalent to the unexpired portion of Putting a cap on the money claims of certain overseas workers does not increase the standard
their employment contracts.116 Meanwhile, illegally dismissed overseas workers with of protection afforded to them. On the other hand, foreign employers are more incentivizedby
employment terms of at least a year were granted a cap equivalent to three months of their the reinstated clause to enter into contracts of at least a year because it gives them more
salary for the unexpired portions of their contracts.117 flexibility to violate our overseas workers’ rights. Their liability for arbitrarily terminating
overseas workers is decreased at the expense of the workers whose rights they violated.
Observing the terminologies used inthe clause, we also found that "the subject clause creates Meanwhile, these overseas workers who are impressed with an expectation of a stable job
a sub-layer of discrimination among OFWs whose contract periods are for more than one overseas for the longer contract period disregard other opportunities only to be terminated
year: those who are illegally dismissed with less than one year left in their contracts shall be earlier. They are left with claims that are less than what others in the same situation would
entitled to their salaries for the entire unexpired portion thereof, while those who are illegally receive. The reinstated clause, therefore, creates a situation where the law meant to protect
dismissed with one year or more remaining in their contracts shall be covered by the them makes violation of rights easier and simply benign to the violator.
reinstated clause, and their monetary benefits limited to their salaries for three months
only."118 As Justice Brion said in his concurring opinion in Serrano:
We do not need strict scrutiny to conclude that these classifications do not rest on any real or Section 10 of R.A. No. 8042 affects these well-laid rules and measures, and in fact provides a
substantial distinctions that would justify different treatments in terms of the computation of hidden twist affecting the principal/employer’s liability. While intended as an incentive
money claims resulting from illegal termination. accruing to recruitment/manning agencies, the law, as worded, simply limits the OFWs’
recovery in wrongfuldismissal situations. Thus, it redounds to the benefit of whoever may be
Overseas workers regardless of their classifications are entitled to security of tenure, at least liable, including the principal/employer – the direct employer primarily liable for the wrongful
for the period agreed upon in their contracts. This means that they cannot be dismissed dismissal. In this sense, Section 10 – read as a grant of incentives to recruitment/manning
before the end of their contract terms without due process. If they were illegally dismissed, agencies – oversteps what it aims to do by effectively limiting what is otherwise the full
the workers’ right to security of tenure is violated. liability of the foreign principals/employers. Section 10, in short, really operates to benefit the
wrong party and allows that party, without justifiable reason, to mitigate its liability for
wrongful dismissals. Because of this hidden twist, the limitation ofliability under Section 10
The rights violated when, say, a fixed-period local worker is illegally terminated are neither
cannot be an "appropriate" incentive, to borrow the term that R.A. No. 8042 itself uses to
greater than norless than the rights violated when a fixed-period overseas worker is illegally
describe the incentive it envisions under its purpose clause.
terminated. It is state policy to protect the rights of workers withoutqualification as to the
place of employment.119 In both cases, the workers are deprived of their expected salary,
which they could have earned had they not been illegally dismissed. For both workers, this What worsens the situation is the chosen mode of granting the incentive: instead of a grant
deprivation translates to economic insecurity and disparity.120 The same is true for the that, to encourage greater efforts at recruitment, is directly related to extra efforts
distinctions between overseas workers with an employment contract of less than one year undertaken, the law simply limits their liability for the wrongful dismissals of already deployed
and overseas workers with at least one year of employment contract, and between overseas OFWs. This is effectively a legally-imposed partial condonation of their liability to OFWs,
workers with at least a year left in their contracts and overseas workers with less than a year justified solely by the law’s intent to encourage greater deployment efforts. Thus, the
left in their contracts when they were illegally dismissed. incentive,from a more practical and realistic view, is really part of a scheme to sell Filipino
overseas labor at a bargain for purposes solely of attracting the market. . . .
For this reason, we cannot subscribe to the argument that "[overseas workers] are contractual
employeeswho can never acquire regular employment status, unlike local workers"121 because The so-called incentive is rendered particularly odious by its effect on the OFWs — the
it already justifies differentiated treatment in terms ofthe computation of money claims.122 benefits accruing to the recruitment/manning agencies and their principals are takenfrom the
pockets of the OFWs to whom the full salaries for the unexpired portion of the contract
rightfully belong. Thus, the principals/employers and the recruitment/manning agencies even
Likewise, the jurisdictional and enforcement issues on overseas workers’ money claims do not
profit from their violation of the security of tenure that an employment contract embodies.
justify a differentiated treatment in the computation of their money claims.123 If anything,
Conversely, lesser protection is afforded the OFW, not only because of the lessened recovery
these issues justify an equal, if not greater protection and assistance to overseas workers who
afforded him or her by operation of law, but also because this same lessened recovery renders
generally are more prone to exploitation given their physical distance from our government.
a wrongful dismissal easier and less onerous to undertake; the lesser cost of dismissing a II. With regard particularly to an award of interest in the concept of actual and compensatory
Filipino will always bea consideration a foreign employer will take into account in termination damages, the rate of interest, as well as the accrual thereof, is imposed, as follows:
of employment decisions. . . .126
1. When the obligation is breached, and it consists in the payment of a sum of
Further, "[t]here can never be a justification for any form of government action that alleviates money, i.e., a loan or forbearance of money, the interest due should be that which
the burden of one sector, but imposes the same burden on another sector, especially when may have been stipulated in writing. Furthermore, the interest due shall itself earn
the favored sector is composed of private businesses suchas placement agencies, while the legal interest from the time it is judicially demanded. In the absence of stipulation,
disadvantaged sector is composed ofOFWs whose protection no less than the Constitution the rate of interest shall be 6% per annum to be computed from default, i.e., from
commands. The idea thatprivate business interest can be elevated to the level of a compelling judicial or extrajudicial demand under and subject to the provisions of Article 1169
state interest is odious."127 of the Civil Code.
Along the same line, we held that the reinstated clause violates due process rights. It is 2. When an obligation, not constituting a loan or forbearance of money, is breached,
arbitrary as it deprives overseas workers of their monetary claims without any discernable an interest on the amount of damages awarded may be imposed at the discretion of
valid purpose.128 the court at the rate of 6% per annum. No interest, however, shall be adjudged on
unliquidated claims or damages, except when or until the demand can be
Respondent Joy Cabiles is entitled to her salary for the unexpired portion of her contract, in established with reasonable certainty. Accordingly, where the demand is established
accordance with Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042. The award of the three-month with reasonable certainty, the interest shall begin to run from the time the claim is
equivalence of respondent’s salary must be modified accordingly. Since she started working made judicially or extrajudicially (Art. 1169, Civil Code), but when such certainty
on June 26, 1997 and was terminated on July 14, 1997, respondent is entitled to her salary cannot be so reasonably established at the time the demand is made, the interest
from July 15, 1997 to June 25, 1998. "To rule otherwise would be iniquitous to petitioner and shall begin to run only from the date the judgment of the court is made (at which
other OFWs, and would,in effect, send a wrong signal that principals/employers and time the quantification of damages may be deemed to have been reasonably
recruitment/manning agencies may violate an OFW’s security of tenure which an employment ascertained). The actual base for the computation of legal interest shall, in any case,
contract embodies and actually profit from such violation based on an unconstitutional be on the amount finally adjudged. 3. When the judgment of the court awarding a
provision of law."129 sum of money becomes final and executory, the rate of legal interest, whether the
case falls under paragraph 1 or paragraph 2, above, shall be 6% per annum from
such finality until its satisfaction, this interim period being deemed to be by then an
III
equivalent to a forbearance of credit.
On the interest rate, the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas Circular No. 799 of June 21, 2013, which
And, in addition to the above, judgments that have become final and executory prior to July 1,
revised the interest rate for loan or forbearance from 12% to 6% in the absence of
2013, shall not be disturbed and shall continue to be implemented applying the rate of
stipulation,applies in this case. The pertinent portions of Circular No. 799, Series of 2013, read:
interest fixed therein.131
The Monetary Board, in its Resolution No. 796 dated 16 May 2013, approved the following
revisions governing the rate of interest in the absence of stipulation in loan contracts, thereby
amending Section 2 of Circular No. 905, Series of 1982: Circular No. 799 is applicable only in loans and forbearance of money, goods, or credits, and in
judgments when there is no stipulation on the applicable interest rate. Further, it is only
applicable if the judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013.132
Section 1. The rate of interest for the loan or forbearance of any money, goods or credits and
the rate allowed in judgments, in the absence of an express contract as to such rateof interest,
shall be six percent (6%) per annum. We add that Circular No. 799 is not applicable when there is a law that states otherwise. While
the Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas has the power to set or limit interest rates,133 these interest
rates do not apply when the law provides that a different interest rate shall be applied. "[A]
Section 2. In view of the above, Subsection X305.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Banks and
Central Bank Circular cannot repeal a law. Only a law can repeal another law."134
Sections 4305Q.1, 4305S.3 and 4303P.1 of the Manual of Regulations for Non-Bank Financial
Institutions are hereby amended accordingly.
For example, Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 provides that unlawfully terminated
overseas workers are entitled to the reimbursement of his or her placement fee with an
This Circular shall take effect on 1 July 2013.
interest of 12% per annum. Since Bangko Sentral ng Pilipinas circulars cannotrepeal Republic
Act No. 8042, the issuance of Circular No. 799 does not have the effect of changing the
Through the able ponencia of Justice Diosdado Peralta, we laid down the guidelines in interest on awards for reimbursement of placement fees from 12% to 6%. This is despite
computing legal interest in Nacar v. Gallery Frames:130
Section 1 of Circular No. 799, which provides that the 6% interest rate applies even to It may be argued, for instance, that the foreign employer must be impleaded in the complaint
judgments. as an indispensable party without which no final determination can be had of an action.137
Moreover, laws are deemed incorporated in contracts. "The contracting parties need not The provision on joint and several liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of
repeat them. They do not even have to be referred to. Every contract, thus, contains not only 1995 assures overseas workers that their rights will not be frustrated with these
what has been explicitly stipulated, but the statutory provisions that have any bearing on the complications. The fundamental effect of joint and several liability is that "each of the debtors
matter."135 There is, therefore, an implied stipulation in contracts between the placement is liable for the entire obligation."138 A final determination may, therefore, be achieved even if
agency and the overseasworker that in case the overseas worker is adjudged as entitled to only oneof the joint and several debtors are impleaded in an action. Hence, in the case of
reimbursement of his or her placement fees, the amount shall be subject to a 12% interest per overseas employment, either the local agency or the foreign employer may be sued for all
annum. This implied stipulation has the effect of removing awards for reimbursement of claims arising from the foreign employer’s labor law violations. This way, the overseas workers
placement fees from Circular No. 799’s coverage. are assured that someone — the foreign employer’s local agent — may be made to answer for
violationsthat the foreign employer may have committed.
The same cannot be said for awardsof salary for the unexpired portion of the employment
contract under Republic Act No. 8042. These awards are covered by Circular No. 799 because The Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 ensures that overseas workers have
the law does not provide for a specific interest rate that should apply. recourse in law despite the circumstances of their employment. By providing that the liability
of the foreign employer may be "enforced to the full extent"139 against the local agent,the
In sum, if judgment did not become final and executory before July 1, 2013 and there was no overseas worker is assured of immediate and sufficientpayment of what is due them.140
stipulation in the contract providing for a different interest rate, other money claims under
Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 shall be subject to the 6% interest per annum in Corollary to the assurance of immediate recourse in law, the provision on joint and several
accordance with Circular No. 799. liability in the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 shifts the burden of going
after the foreign employer from the overseas worker to the local employment agency.
This means that respondent is also entitled to an interest of 6% per annum on her money However, it must be emphasized that the local agency that is held to answer for the overseas
claims from the finality of this judgment. worker’s money claims is not leftwithout remedy. The law does not preclude it from going
after the foreign employer for reimbursement of whatever payment it has made to the
employee to answer for the money claims against the foreign employer.
IV
A further implication of making localagencies jointly and severally liable with the foreign
Finally, we clarify the liabilities ofWacoal as principal and petitioner as the employment agency
employer is thatan additional layer of protection is afforded to overseas workers. Local
that facilitated respondent’s overseas employment.
agencies, which are businesses by nature, are inoculated with interest in being always on the
lookout against foreign employers that tend to violate labor law. Lest they risk their reputation
Section 10 of the Migrant Workers and Overseas Filipinos Act of 1995 provides that the or finances, local agenciesmust already have mechanisms for guarding against unscrupulous
foreign employer and the local employment agency are jointly and severally liable for money foreign employers even at the level prior to overseas employment applications.
claims including claims arising out of an employer-employee relationship and/or damages.
This section also provides that the performance bond filed by the local agency shall be
With the present state of the pleadings, it is not possible to determine whether there was
answerable for such money claims or damages if they were awarded to the employee.
indeed a transfer of obligations from petitioner to Pacific. This should not be an obstacle for
the respondent overseas worker to proceed with the enforcement of this judgment. Petitioner
This provision is in line with the state’s policy of affording protection to labor and alleviating is possessed with the resources to determine the proper legal remedies to enforce its rights
workers’ plight.136 against Pacific, if any.
In overseas employment, the filing of money claims against the foreign employer is attended V
by practical and legal complications.1âwphi1 The distance of the foreign employer
alonemakes it difficult for an overseas worker to reach it and make it liable for violations of
Many times, this court has spoken on what Filipinos may encounter as they travel into the
the Labor Code. There are also possible conflict of laws, jurisdictional issues, and procedural
farthest and mostdifficult reaches of our planet to provide for their families. In Prieto v.
rules that may be raised to frustrate an overseas worker’sattempt to advance his or her
NLRC:141
claims.
The Court is not unaware of the many abuses suffered by our overseas workers in the foreign Republic of the Philippines
land where they have ventured, usually with heavy hearts, in pursuit of a more fulfilling future. SUPREME COURT
Breach of contract, maltreatment, rape, insufficient nourishment, sub-human lodgings, insults Manila
and other forms of debasement, are only a few of the inhumane acts towhich they are
subjected by their foreign employers, who probably feel they can do as they please in their EN BANC
own country. Whilethese workers may indeed have relatively little defense against
G.R. No. 189028 July 16, 2013
exploitation while they are abroad, that disadvantage must not continue to burden them
when they return to their own territory to voice their muted complaint. There is no reason NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE VIRGILIO ALMARIO, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR LITERATURE
why, in their very own land, the protection of our own laws cannot be extended to them in full BIENVENIDO LUMBERA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING) BENEDICTO CABRERA,
measure for the redress of their grievances.142 NATIONAL ARTIST FOR VISUAL ARTS (SCULPTURE) NAPOLEON ABUEVA, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR
VISUAL ARTS (PAINTING AND SCULPTURE) ARTURO LUZ, NATIONAL ARTIST FOR PRODUCTION
But it seems that we have not said enough. DESIGN SALVADOR BERNAL, UNIVERSITY PROFESSOR EMERITUS GEMINO ABAD, DEAN MARVIC
M.V.F. LEONEN (UP COLLEGE OF LAW), DEAN DANILO SILVESTRE (UP COLLEGE OF
We face a diaspora of Filipinos. Their travails and their heroism can be told a million times ARCHITECTURE), DEAN ROLAND TOLENTINO (UP COLLEGE OF MASS COMMUNICATION), PROF.
over; each of their stories as real as any other. Overseas Filipino workers brave alien cultures JOSE DALISAY, DR. ANTON JUAN, DR. ALEXANDER CORTEZ, DR. JOSE NEIL GARCIA, DR. PEDRO
and the heartbreak of families left behind daily. They would count the minutes, hours, days, JUN CRUZ REYES, PROF. JOSE CLAUDIO GUERRERO, PROF. MICHAEL M. COROZA, PROF. GERARD
months, and years yearning to see their sons and daughters. We all know of the joy and LICO, PROF. VERNE DE LA PENA, PROF. MARIAN ABUAN, PROF. THEODORE O. TE, DR. CRISTINA
sadness when they come home to see them all grown up and, being so, they remember what PANTOJA-HIDALGO, PROF. JOSE WENDELL CAPILI, PROF. SIR ANRIAL TIATCO, PROF. NICOLO DEL
their work has cost them. Twitter accounts, Facetime, and many other gadgets and online CASTILLO, PROF. HORACIO DUMANLIG, PROF. DANTON REMOTO, PROF. PRISCELINA
applications will never substitute for their lost physical presence. PATAJOLEGASTO, PROF. BELEN CALINGACION, PROF. AMIEL Y. LEONARDIA, PROF. VIM NADERA,
PROF. MARILYN CANTA, PROF. CECILIA DELA PAZ, ROF. CHARLSON ONG, PROF. CLOD MARLON
YAMBAO, PROF. KENNETH JAMANDRE, PROF. JETHRO JOAQUIN, ATTY. F.D. NICOLAS B. PICHAY,
Unknown to them, they keep our economy afloat through the ebb and flow of political and ATTY. ROSE BEATRIX ANGELES, MR. FERNANDO JOSEF, MS. SUSAN S. LARA, MR. ALFRED YUSON,
economic crises. They are our true diplomats, they who show the world the resilience, MS. JING PANGANIBANMENDOZA, MR. ROMULO BAQUIRAN, JR., MR. CARLJOE JAVIER, MS.
patience, and creativity of our people. Indeed, we are a people who contribute much to the REBECCA T. ANONUEVO, MR. JP ANTHONY D. CUNADA, MS. LEAH NAVARRO, MR. MARK MEILLY,
provision of material creations of this world. MR. VERGEL O. SANTOS, MR. GIL OLEA MENDOZA, MR. EDGAR C. SAMAR, MS. CHRISTINE
BELLEN, MR. ANGELO R. LACUESTA, MS. ANNA MARIA KATIGBAKLACUESTA, MR. LEX LEDESMA,
This government loses its soul if we fail to ensure decent treatment for all Filipinos. We default MS. KELLY PERIQUET, MS. CARLA PACIS, MR. J. ALBERT GAMBOA, MR. CESAR EVANGELISTA
by limiting the contractual wages that should be paid to our workers when their contracts are BUENDIA, MR. PAOLO ALCAZAREN, MR. ALWYN C. JAVIER, MR. RAYMOND MAGNO GARLITOS,
breached by the foreign employers. While we sit, this court will ensure that our laws will MS. GANG BADOY, MR. LESLIE BOCOBO, MS. FRANCES BRETANA, MS. JUDITH TORRES, MS.
reward our overseas workers with what they deserve: their dignity. JANNETTE PINZON, MS. JUNE POTICAR-DALISAY, MS. CAMILLE DE LA ROSA, MR. JAMES
LADIORAY, MR. RENATO CONSTANTINO, JR., and CONCERNED ARTISTS OF THE PHILIPPINES
Inevitably, their dignity is ours as weil. (CAP), Petitioners,
vs.
THE EXECUTIVE SECRETARY, THE SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT OF BUDGET AND
WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED. The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with
MANAGEMENT, THE CULTURAL CENTER OF THE PHILIPPINES, THE NATIONAL COMMISSION ON
modification. Petitioner Sameer Overseas Placement Agency is ORDERED to pay respondent
CULTURE AND THE ARTS, MS. CECILE GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, MR. CARLO MAGNO JOSE
Joy C. Cabiles the amount equivalent to her salary for the unexpired portion of her
CAPARAS,1 MR. JOSE MORENO, MR. FRANCISCO MANOSA, AND ALL PERSONS, PUBLIC AND
employment contract at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of this judgment.
PRIVATE, ACTING UNDER THEIR INSTRUCTIONS, DIRECTION, CONTROL AND SUPERVISION IN
Petitioner is also ORDERED to reimburse respondent the withheld NT$3,000.00 salary and pay
RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE ORDER OF THE NATIONAL ARTIST AND THE RELEASE
respondent attorney's fees of NT$300.00 at an interest of 6% per annum from the finality of
OF FUNDS IN RELATION TO THE CONFERMENT OF THE HONORS AND PRIVILEGES OF THE ORDER
this judgment.
OF NATIONAL ARTISTS ON RESPONDENTS GUIDOTE-ALVAREZ, CAPARAS, MORENO AND
MANOSA, Respondents.
The clause, "or for three (3) months for every year of the unexpired term, whichever is less" in
Section 7 of Republic Act No. 10022 amending Section 10 of Republic Act No. 8042 is declared DECISION
unconstitutional and, therefore, null and void.
LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:
SO ORDERED.
Art has traditionally been viewed as the expression of everything that is true, good and have significantly contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and
beautiful. As such, it is perceived to evoke and produce a spirit of harmony. Art is also arts."8
considered as a civilizing force, a catalyst of nation-building. The notion of art and artists as
privileged expressions of national culture helped shape the grand narratives of the nation and As both the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA have been mandated by law to promote,
shared symbols of the people. The artist does not simply express his/her own individual develop and protect the Philippine national culture and the arts, and authorized to give
inspiration but articulates the deeper aspirations of history and the soul of the people.2 The awards to deserving Filipino artists, the two bodies decided to team up and jointly administer
law recognizes this role and views art as something that "reflects and shapes values, beliefs, the National Artists Award.9 Thereafter, they reviewed the guidelines for the nomination,
aspirations, thereby defining a people’s national identity."3If unduly politicized, however, art selection and administration of the National Artists Award. Pursuant to their respective
and artists could stir controversy and may even cause discord, as what happened in this case. powers to draft and promulgate rules, regulations and measures to guide them in their
deliberations in the choice of National Artists, the CCP and NCCA adopted the following
The Antecedents revised guidelines in September 200710:
On April 27, 1972, former President Ferdinand E. Marcos issued Proclamation No. 10014 and, 4.1. The National Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) shall plan,
upon recommendation of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP), organize and implement the Order of National Artists in coordination with
created the category of Award and Decoration of National Artist to be awarded to Filipinos the Cultural Center of the Philippines (CCP).
who have made distinct contributions to arts and letters. In the same issuance, Fernando
Amorsolo was declared as the first National Artist. 4.2. It shall enlist the support and cooperation of private sector experts
from the various fields of art to ensure that the awards are implemented
On May 15, 1973, Proclamation No. 11445 was issued. It amended Proclamation No. 1001 "by in a successful and impartial manner.
creating a National Artists Awards Committee" that would "administer the conferment of the
category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists. The Committee, composed of 4.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall commission art experts to
members of the Board of Trustees of the CCP, was tasked to "draft the rules to guide its form a Special Research Group who shall verify information submitted on
deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body nominees and provide essential data.
of work in the arts and letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized."
They shall be selected for their specialization and familiarity with the
The authority of the National Artists Awards Committee to administer the conferment of the works and accomplishments of nominated artists.
National Artist Award was again reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 2086 issued on June 7,
4.4. The Special Research Group shall be composed of ten (10) to twenty
1973.
(20) members who have expertise in one or more fields or disciplines.
On April 3, 1992, Republic Act No. 7356, otherwise known as the Law Creating the National
4.5. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be created before
Commission for Culture and the Arts, was signed into law. It established the National
or during the nomination period. It is tasked to screen nominees and
Commission for Culture and the Arts (NCCA) and gave it an extensive mandate over the
recommend to the NCCA and CCP Boards the candidates for the Order of
development, promotion and preservation of the Filipino national culture and arts and the
National Artists. It shall be composed of highly regarded peers, scholars,
Filipino cultural heritage. The NCCA was tasked with the following:
(including cultural philosophers and historians), academicians,
Sec. 8. The Commission. – A National Commission for Culture and Arts is hereby created to researchers, art critics, and other knowledgeable individuals. A wider age-
formulate policies for the development of culture and arts; implement these policies in range of experts who would have first-hand knowledge of achievements
coordination with affiliated cultural agencies; coordinate the implementation of programs of of nominees shall be considered.
these affiliated agencies; administer the National Endowment Fund for Culture and Arts
4.6. The selection of the members of the National Artist Award Council of
(NEFCA); encourage artistic creation within a climate of artistic freedom; develop and
Experts shall be based on the following criteria:
promote the Filipino national culture and arts; and preserve Filipino cultural heritage. The
Commission shall be an independent agency. It shall render an annual report of its activities (a) should have achieved authority, credibility and track record
and achievements to the President and to Congress. in his field(s) of expertise;
Among the specific mandates of the NCCA under Republic Act No. 7356 is to "extend (b) should have extensive knowledge in his field(s) and his views
recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services to artists and cultural on Philippine art and culture must be national in perspective;
groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural legacy." 7 In connection with this
mandate, the NCCA is vested with the power to "advise the President on matters pertaining to (c) should be a recognized authority in the study or research of
culture and the arts, including the creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who Philippine art and culture;
(d) must be willing to devote sufficient time and effort to the 5.5 Artists who enjoy broad acceptance through:
work of the Council;
5.5.1. prestigious national and/or international recognition, such
(e) must be willing to sign a non-disclosure statement in order to as the Gawad CCP Para sa Sining, CCP Thirteen Artists Award and
safeguard the confidentiality of the deliberations; NCCA Alab ng Haraya
(f) must not have been convicted with finality of any crime by a 5.5.2. critical acclaim and/or reviews of their works
court of justice or dismissed for cause by any organization,
whether public or private. 5.5.3. respect and esteem from peers.
4.7. The National Artist Award Council of Experts shall be composed of a 6. NOMINATION PROCEDURE
maximum of seven (7) members each of the seven (7) areas/disciplines.
6.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of
The living National Artists will automatically become members in addition
nominations through media releases and letters to qualified organizations.
to the forty-nine (49) selected members. These members will constitute
the first deliberation panel and will be invited to evaluate the nominations 6.2. Candidates may be nominated under one or more of the following
and materials submitted by the Special Research Group. categories:
4.8. Any member of the Council of Experts who is nominated or related to 6.2.1. Dance – choreography, direction and/or performance.
a nominee up to the fourth degree of consanguinity or affinity shall inhibit
himself/herself from the deliberation process. Likewise, any member may 6.2.2. Music – composition, direction, and/or performance.
decline to participate in the deliberation for any reason or may be
removed for just cause upon recommendation to the NCCA Board by at 6.2.3. Theater – direction, performance and/or production design.
least two thirds (2/3) of the members; in which case, the National Artist 6.2.4. Visual Arts – painting, sculpture, printmaking, photography,
Award Secretariat shall again select the replacements for those who installation art, mixed media works, illustration, comics/komiks, graphic
decline or resigned until the first deliberation panel is completed. arts, performance art and/or imaging.
4.9. The list of nominated members of the National Artist Award Council 6.2.5. Literature – poetry, fiction (short story, novel and play); non-fiction
of Experts shall be reviewed by the National Artist Award Secretariat as (essay, journalism, literary criticism and historical literature).
needed, for purposes of adding new members or replacements.
6.2.6. Film and Broadcast Arts – direction, writing, production design,
4.10. The members of the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall cinematography, editing, camera work, and/or performance.
serve for a fixed term of three (3) years.
6.2.7. Architecture, Design and Allied Arts – architecture design, interior
5. CRITERIA FOR SELECTION design, industrial arts design, landscape architecture and fashion design.
The Order of National Artists shall be given to: 6.3. Nominations for the Order of National Artists may be submitted by
5.1 Living artists who are Filipino citizens at the time of nomination, as government and non-government cultural organizations and educational
well as those who died after the establishment of the award in 1972 but institutions, as well as private foundations and councils.
were Filipino citizens at the time of their death. 6.4. Members of the Special Research Group, as well as agencies attached
5.2 Artists who through the content and form of their works have to the NCCA and CCP shall not submit nominations.
contributed in building a Filipino sense of nationhood. 6.5. NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP
5.3. Artists who have pioneered in a mode of creative expression or style, officers and staff are automatically disqualified from being nominated.
thus, earning distinction and making an impact on succeeding generations 6.6. Nominations shall be accepted only when these are submitted in
of artists. writing and with proper supporting documentation, as follows:
5.4. Artists who have created a substantial and significant body of works 6.6.1. A cover letter signed by the head or designated
and/or consistently displayed excellence in the practice of their art form representative of the nominating organization.
thus enriching artistic expression or style.
The cover letter shall be accompanied by a Board Resolution 7.4. The first deliberation panel (Council of Experts) shall be intra-
approving the nominee concerned with the said resolution disciplinary. The panelists shall be grouped according to their respective
signed by the organization President and duly certified by the fields of expertise or disciplines to shortlist the nominees in their
Board Secretary. disciplines or categories for presentation to the second deliberation panel.
6.6.2. A duly accomplished nomination form; 7.5. The second deliberation panel shall be composed of a different set of
experts from the first deliberation panel three (3) experts each of the
6.6.3. A detailed curriculum vitae of the nominee; seven (7) areas/discipline and may include members from varying
backgrounds such as critics and academicians. The achievements of each
6.6.4. A list of the nominee’s significant works categorized
shortlisted nominee shall be presented by one designated member of
according to the criteria;
Council of Experts. Then panel deliberates and ranks the shortlisted
6.6.5. The latest photograph (color or black and white) of the nominees according to the order of precedence following the set criteria
nominee, either 5" x 7" or 8" x 11"; of the Order of National Artists. In extreme cases, the Second Deliberation
may add new names to the lists.
6.6.6. Pertinent information materials on the nominee’s
significant works (on CDs, VCDs and DVDs); 7.6. The second deliberation panel may recommend not to give award in
any category if no nominee is found deserving. The number of awardees
6.6.7. Copies of published reviews; shall also depend on the availability of funds. All decisions and
recommendations shall be in writing.
6.6.8. Any other document that may be required.
7.7. The recommendations from the Second Deliberation Panel of the
6.7. Nominations received beyond the announced deadline for the National Artist Award Council of Experts shall then be presented to the
submission of nominations shall not be considered. joint boards of NCCA and CCP for final selection. The presentors shall
6.8. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall announce the opening of prepare their presentation in writing together with an audio-visual
nominations through media releases. presentation or powerpoint presentation. Written interpellations/opinions
will be accepted from selected critics. The review shall be based on the
6.9. All inquiries and nominations shall be submitted to ranking done by the Second Deliberation. The voting shall be across
disciplines. The National Artists will be given the option whether to vote
The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT on all categories or on his/her particular discipline.
Office of the Artistic Director Cultural Center of the Philippines Roxas Boulevard, 1300 Pasay 7.8. Proxy votes will not be allowed in the Selection Process. Designation
City or The NATIONAL ARTIST AWARD SECRETARIAT Office of the Deputy Executive Director of permanent representatives of agencies should be made at the outset to
National Commission for Culture and the Arts 633 General Luna Street, Intramuros, Manila make them regular Board members of NCCA and thus, may be allowed to
cast votes.
7. SCREENING AND SELECTION PROCESS
7.9. The list of awardees shall be submitted to the President of the
7.1. The National Artist Award Secretariat shall pre-screen the nominees
Republic of the Philippines for confirmation, proclamation and conferral.
based on technical guideline items 5.1, 6.2, 6.3, 6.4, 6.5 and 6.6. The pre-
screening shall not be based on the accomplishments and merits of the 8. PRESENTATION OF THE AWARDS
nominee.
8.1. The Order of National Artists shall not be conferred more frequently
7.2. The Special Research Group shall accomplish its task within six (6) than every three (3) years.
months. The main objective is to verify the validity of the data, and
evaluate the quality, true value and significance of works according to the 8.2. The Order of National Artists shall be conferred by the President of
criteria. It shall come up with the updated and comprehensive profiles of the Philippines on June 11 or any appropriate date in fitting ceremonies to
nominees reflecting their most outstanding achievements. be organized by the National Artist Secretariat.
7.3. The National Artist Award Secretariat will meet to review the list of 8.3. The medallion of the Order of National Artists and citation shall be
nominees for oversights. Consequently, deserving nominees shall be given to the honoree during the conferment ceremony. The cash award of
added to the list. ₱100,000.00 in cheque shall be given immediately after the ceremony or
at another time and place as requested by the honoree.
8.4. A posthumous conferral consisting of the medallion and citation shall Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
be given to the family or legal heir/s of the honoree. The cash award of
₱75,000.00 in cheque shall be given to the honoree’s legal heir/s or a All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on
representative designated by the family immediately after the ceremony Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall
or at another time and place as requested by the family. (Emphases process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on
supplied.) Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
In 1996, the NCCA and the CCP created a National Artist Award Secretariat composed of the The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
NCCA Executive Director as Chairperson, the CCP President as Vice-Chairperson, and the NCCA that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has
Deputy Executive Director, the CCP Vice-President/Artistic Director, the NCCA National Artist not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
Award Officer and the CCP National Artist Award Officer as members. They also centralized standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for
with the NCCA all financial resources and management for the administration of the National conferment shall be made.
Artists Award. They added another layer to the selection process to involve and allow the
The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in
participation of more members of the arts and culture sector of the Philippines in the
the highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards.
selection of who may be proclaimed a National Artist.
(Emphasis supplied.)
On September 19, 2003, Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, entitled Establishing the Honors
Executive Order No. 435, s. 2005, entitled Amending Section 5(IV) of Executive Order No. 236
Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of Honors Conferred and for Other
Entitled "Establishing the Honors Code of the Philippines to Create an Order of Precedence of
Purposes, was issued. The National Artists Award was renamed the Order of National Artists
Honors Conferred and for Other Purposes" was subsequently issued on June 8, 2005. It
and raised to the level of a Cultural Order, fourth in precedence among the orders and
amended the wording of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, on the Order of National Artists
decorations that comprise the Honors of the Philippines. Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003,
and clarified that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of the
recognizes the vital role of the NCCA and the CCP in identifying Filipinos who have made
Order of National Artists."
distinct contributions to arts and letters and states that the National Artist recognition is
conferred "upon the recommendation of the Cultural Center of the Philippines and the Controversy Surrounding the 2009
National Commission for Culture and the Arts."12 Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, further Order of National Artists
created a Committee on Honors to "assist the President in evaluating nominations for
recipients of Honors,"13 including the Order of National Artists, and presidential awards. The Petitioners alleged that on January 30, 2007, a joint meeting of the NCCA Board of
Committee on Honors has been allowed to "authorize relevant department or government Commissioners and the CCP Board of Trustees was held to discuss, among others, the
agencies to maintain Honors and/or Awards Committees to process nominations for Honors evaluation of the 2009 Order of National Artists and the convening of the National Artist
and/or Presidential Awards."14 In this connection, Section 2.4(A) of the Implementing Rules Award Secretariat. The nomination period was set for September 2007 to December 31, 2007,
and Regulations15 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, states: which was later extended to February 28, 2008. The pre-screening of nominations was held
from January to March 2008.16
2.4: Awards Committees
On April 3, 2009, the First Deliberation Panel met.17 A total of 87 nominees18 were considered
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various during the deliberation and a preliminary shortlist19 of 32 names was compiled.
awards committees in the various units of the government service.
On April 23, 2009, the Second Deliberation Panel purportedly composed of an entirely new set
A. The Committee on Honors of Council of Experts met and shortlisted 13 out of the 32 names in the preliminary
shortlist.20 On May 6, 2009, the final deliberation was conducted by the 30-member Final
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the
Deliberation Panel comprised of the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA Board of
following:
Commissioners and the living National Artists.21 From the 13 names in the second shortlist, a
The Executive Secretary, Chairman final list of four names was agreed upon.22 The final list, according to rank, follows:
The Secretary of Foreign Affairs, Vice-Chairman Name Art Field/Category Number of Votes
erico Aguilar-Alcuaz Visual Arts 15 According to respondents, the aforementioned letter was referred by the Office of the
President to the Committee on Honors. Meanwhile, the Office of the President allegedly
On May 6, 2009, a letter, signed jointly by the Chairperson of the NCCA, Undersecretary Vilma received nominations from various sectors, cultural groups and individuals strongly endorsing
Labrador, and the President and Artistic Director of the CCP, Mr. Nestor Jardin, was sent to the private respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas, Francisco Mañosa and
President.23 The letter stated, thus: Jose Moreno. The Committee on Honors purportedly processed these nominations and
invited resource persons to validate the qualifications and credentials of the nominees.25
May 6, 2009
The Committee on Honors thereafter submitted a memorandum to then President Gloria
Her Excellency GLORIA MACAPAGAL-ARROYO Macapagal-Arroyo recommending the conferment of the Order of National Artists on the four
President of the Philippines recommendees of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, as well as on private respondents Guidote-
Malacañan Palace, Manila Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. Acting on this recommendation, Proclamation No.
1823 declaring Manuel Conde a National Artist was issued on June 30, 2009. Subsequently, on
Subject: 2009 Order of National Artist Awardees
July 6, 2009, Proclamation Nos. 1824 to 1829 were issued declaring Lazaro Francisco, Federico
Dear President Arroyo: AguilarAlcuaz and private respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno,
respectively, as National Artists. This was subsequently announced to the public by then
We are respectfully submitting a recommendation of the NCCA Board of Trustees and CCP Executive Secretary Eduardo Ermita on July 29, 2009.26
Board of Trustees for the Proclamation of the following as 2009 Order of National Artists:
Convinced that, by law, it is the exclusive province of the NCCA Board of Commissioners and
1. Mr. MANUEL CONDE+ (Posthumous) – Film and Broadcast Arts the CCP Board of Trustees to select those who will be conferred the Order of National Artists
and to set the standard for entry into that select group, petitioners instituted this petition for
2. Dr. RAMON SANTOS – Music prohibition, certiorari and injunction (with prayer for restraining order) praying that the Order
of National Artists be conferred on Dr. Santos and that the conferment of the Order of
3. Mr. LAZARO FRANCISCO+ (Posthumous) – Literature
National Artists on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno be enjoined
4. Mr. FEDERICO AGUILAR-ALCUAZ – Visual Arts and declared to have been rendered in grave abuse of discretion.27
The above persons were identified by experts in the various fields of arts and culture, In a Resolution28 dated August 25, 2009, the Court issued a status quo order29 enjoining
including living National Artists. An intensive selection process was observed following "public respondents" "from conferring the rank and title of the Order of National Artists on
established practice. In the past, awards were presented by the President at a Ceremony held private respondents; from releasing the cash awards that accompany such conferment and
at the Malacañan Palace followed by a program called "Parangal" at the Cultural Center of the recognition; and from holding the acknowledgment ceremonies for recognition of the private
Philippines. We also propose to continue with past practice of celebrating the life and works of respondents as National Artists."
the four (4) Order of National Artists through an exhibit that will open and a commemorative
What is the nature and scope of the power of the President to confer the Order of the
publication that will be released on the day of the proclamation.
National Artists and how should it be exercised? This is the essential issue presented in this
We respectfully suggest, subject to Her Excellency’s availability, that the Proclamation be on case. It will determine whether the proclamation of respondents as National Artists is valid.
June 11, 2009, if possible at the Malacañan Palace. Preliminary procedural issues on the standing of the petitioners and the propriety of the
remedies taken,30 however, call for resolution as a prerequisite to the discussion of the main
Thank you for your kind attention. question.
(Sgd.) A perusal of the pleadings submitted by the petitioners reveals that they are an aggrupation of
VILMA L. LABRADOR at least three groups, the National Artists, cultural workers and academics, and the Concerned
Chairman Artists of the Philippines (CAP). The National Artists assert an "actual as well as legal interest in
National Commission for Culture and the Arts maintaining the reputation of the Order of National Artists."31 In particular, they invoke their
right to due process not to have the honor they have been conferred with diminished by the
(Sgd.) irregular and questionable conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
NESTOR O. JARDIN Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. For petitioners, this would adversely affect their right to live a
meaningful life as it detracts not only from their right to enjoy their honor as a fruit of their Respondent Caparas further argues that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are
lifelong labor but also from the respect of their peers.32 improper as the act sought to be enjoined – the declaration of respondents Guidote-Alvarez,
Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists – had already been consummated. In
The cultural workers, academics and CAP claim to be Filipinos who are deeply concerned with particular, respondent Caparas was already proclaimed National Artist through Proclamation
the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage. As taxpayers, they are No. 1827 issued on July 6, 2009.38
concerned about the use of public monies for illegal appointments or spurious acts of
discretion.33 On the merits, respondent Caparas contends that no grave abuse of discretion attended his
proclamation as National Artist. The former President considered the respective
All of the petitioners claim that former President Macapagal-Arroyo gravely abused her recommendations of the NCCA and the CCP Boards and of the Committee on Honors in
discretion in disregarding the results of the rigorous screening and selection process for the eventually declaring him (Caparas) as National Artist. The function of the NCCA and the CCP
Order of National Artists and in substituting her own choice for those of the Deliberation Boards is simply to advise the President. The award of the Order of National Artists is the
Panels. According to petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National Artists is not exclusive prerogative of the President who is not bound in any way by the recommendation of
absolute but limited. In particular, her discretion on the matter cannot be exercised in the the NCCA and the CCP Boards. The implementing rules and regulations or guidelines of the
absence of or against the recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP. In adding the names of NCCA cannot restrict or limit the exclusive power of the President to select the recipients of
respondents Caparas, Guidote-Alvarez, Mañosa and Moreno while dropping Dr. Santos from the Order of National Artists.39
the list of conferees, the President’s own choices constituted the majority of the awardees in
utter disregard of the choices of the NCCA and the CCP and the arts and culture community For her part, in a letter40 dated March 11, 2010, respondent Guidote-Alvarez manifested that
which were arrived at after a long and rigorous process of screening and deliberation. she was waiving her right to file her comment on the petition and submitted herself to the
Moreover, the name of Dr. Santos as National Artist for Music was deleted from the final list Court’s discretion and wisdom.
submitted by the NCCA and the CCP Boards without clearly indicating the basis thereof. For
petitioners, the President’s discretion to name National Artists cannot be exercised to defeat Respondent Mañosa manifested that his creations speak for themselves as his contribution to
the recommendations made by the CCP and NCCA Boards after a long and rigorous screening Filipino cultural heritage and his worthiness to receive the award. Nonetheless, he expressed
process and with the benefit of expertise and experience. The addition of four names to the his conviction that the Order of National Artists is not a right but a privilege that he would
final list submitted by the Boards of the CCP and the NCCA and the deletion of one name from willingly relinquish should he be found not worthy of it.41
the said list constituted a substitution of judgment by the President and a unilateral
Respondent Moreno did not file any pleading despite being given several opportunities to do
reconsideration without clear justification of the decision of the First, Second and Final
so. Hence, the Court dispensed with his pleadings.42
Deliberation Panels composed of experts.34
In a Resolution dated July 12, 2011, this Court gave due course to the petition and required
Petitioners further argue that the choice of respondent GuidoteAlvarez was illegal and
the parties to file their respective memoranda.43 Respondent Caparas filed his memorandum
unethical because, as the then Executive Director of the NCCA and presidential adviser on
on September 8, 2011,44 the CCP filed its memorandum on September 19, 2011,45 respondent
culture and arts, she was disqualified from even being nominated.35 Moreover, such action on
Mañosa on September 20, 2011,46 and the Office of the Solicitor General filed a manifestation
the part of the former President constituted grave abuse of discretion as it gave preferential
stating that it is adopting its comment as its memorandum on September 21,
treatment to respondent Guidote-Alvarez by naming the latter a National Artist despite her
2011.47 Respondent Moreno failed to file a Memorandum, hence, the Court resolved to
not having been nominated and, thus, not subjected to the screening process provided by the
dispense with the same.48Petitioners filed their Memorandum on May 14, 2012.49
rules for selection to the Order of National Artists. Her inclusion in the list by the President
represented a clear and manifest favor given by the President in that she was exempted from On the other hand, the original position of the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) was similar
the process that all other artists have to undergo. According to petitioners, it may be said that to that of respondent Caparas.50 In a subsequent manifestation,51 however, the OSG stated
the President used a different procedure to qualify respondent Guidote-Alvarez. This was that the current Board of Commissioners of the NCCA agree with the petitioners that the
clearly grave abuse of discretion for being manifest and undue bias violative of the equal President cannot honor as a National Artist one who was not recommended by the joint
protection clause.36 Boards of the NCCA and the CCP. The implementing rules and regulations of Executive Order
No. 236, s. 2003, recognized the binding character of the recommendation of the NCCA and
Respondent Caparas refutes the contention of the petitioning National Artists and insists that
the CCP Boards and limited the authority of the Committee on Honors to the determination
there could be no prejudice to the latter. They remain to be National Artists and continue to
that (1) there has been no grave abuse of discretion on the part of the NCCA and the CCP
receive the emoluments, benefits and other privileges pertaining to them by virtue of that
Boards in making the nomination, and (2) the nominee is in good standing. Where a
honor. On the other hand, all the other petitioners failed to show any material and personal
nomination meets the said two criteria, a recommendation to the President to confer the
injury or harm caused to them by the conferment of the Order of National Artists on
award shall be made.52
respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The rule on standing may not be
relaxed in favor of the petitioners as no question of constitutionality has been raised and no The OSG further argued that, while the President exercises control over the NCCA and the
issue of transcendental importance is involved.37 CCP, the President has the duty to faithfully execute the laws, including the NCCA-CCP
guidelines for selection of National Artists and the implementing rules of Executive Order No.
236, s. 2003. Moreover, the laws recognize the expertise of the NCCA and the CCP in the arts Artists without regard to the stringent screening and rigorous selection process established by
and tasked them to screen and select the artists to be conferred the Order of National Artists. the NCCA and the CCP will diminish, if not negate, the exclusive nature of the said Order. It will
Their mandate is clear and exclusive as no other agency possesses such expertise.53 unduly subject the selection and conferment of the Order of National Artists to politics rather
than to principles and procedures. It will subvert the transparent and rigorous process and
The OSG also assailed the former President’s choice of respondent Guidote-Alvarez for being allow entry to the exclusive Order of National Artists through a secret backdoor of lobbying,
contrary to Republic Act No. 7356.54 Section 11 of the said law provides: back channeling and political accommodation.
Sec. 11. Membership Restrictions. – During his/her term as member of the Commission, a Among the other petitioners, Prof. Gemino Abad presents a unique valid personal and
Commissioner shall not be eligible for any grant, or such other financial aid from the substantial interest. Like respondents Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, he was among the 87
Commission as an individual: Provided, however, That he/she may compete for grants and nominees for the 2009 Order of National Artists. Like respondent Moreno, he made it to the
awards on the same level as other artists one (1) year after his/her term shall have expired. preliminary shortlist. As he did not make it to the second shortlist, he was not considered by
the Final Deliberation Panel, more so by the former President.
The omission of the word "award" in the first portion of the above provision appears to be
unintentional as shown by the proviso which states that a member may compete for grants It should be recalled too that respondent Guidote-Alvarez was disqualified to be nominated
and awards only one year after his or her term shall have expired. As such, respondent for being the Executive Director of the NCCA at that time while respondents Mañosa and
Guidote-Alvarez is restricted and disqualified from being conferred the 2009 Order of National Caparas did not make it to the preliminary shortlist and respondent Moreno was not included
Artists.55 in the second shortlist. Yet, the four of them were treated differently and considered
favorably when they were exempted from the rigorous screening process of the NCCA and the
The Court’s Ruling
CCP and conferred the Order of National Artists. The Committee on Honors and the former
Standing of the Petitioners President effectively treated respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as a
preferred class. The special treatment accorded to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
Standing is the determination of whether a specific person is the proper party to bring a Mañosa and Moreno fails to pass rational scrutiny.60 No real and substantial distinction
matter to the court for adjudication.56 The gist of the question of standing is whether a party between respondents and petitioner Abad has been shown that would justify deviating from
alleges such personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to assure that concrete the laws, guidelines and established procedures, and placing respondents in an exceptional
adverseness which sharpens the presentation of issues upon which the court depends for position. The undue classification was not germane to the purpose of the law. Instead, it
illumination of difficult constitutional questions.57 contradicted the law and well-established guidelines, rules and regulations meant to carry the
law into effect. While petitioner Abad cannot claim entitlement to the Order of National
The parties who assail the constitutionality or legality of a statute or an official act must have a Artists,61 he is entitled to be given an equal opportunity to vie for that honor. In view of the
direct and personal interest. They must show not only that the law or any governmental act is foregoing, there was a violation of petitioner Abad’s right to equal protection, an interest that
invalid, but also that they sustained or are in immediate danger of sustaining some direct is substantial enough to confer him standing in this case.
injury as a result of its enforcement, and not merely that they suffer thereby in some
indefinite way. They must show that they have been or are about to be denied some right or As regards the other concerned artists and academics as well as the CAP, their claim of deep
privilege to which they are lawfully entitled or that they are about to be subjected to some concern for the preservation of the country’s rich cultural and artistic heritage, while laudable,
burdens or penalties by reason of the statute or act complained of.58 falls short of the injury in fact requirement of standing. Their assertion constitutes a
generalized grievance shared in a substantially equal measure by all or a large class of
In this case, we find that the petitioning National Artists will be denied some right or privilege citizens.62 Nor can they take refuge in their status as taxpayers as the case does not involve
to which they are entitled as members of the Order of National Artists as a result of the any illegal appropriation or taxation. A taxpayer’s suit is proper only when there is an exercise
conferment of the award on respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. In of the spending or taxing power of the Congress.63
particular, they will be denied the privilege of exclusive membership in the Order of National
Artists. Nonetheless, as a reading of the petition shows that it has advanced an issue which deserves
the attention of this Court in view of its seriousness, novelty and weight as precedent, it
In accordance with Section 2(a)59 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003, the Order of National behooves the Court to relax the rules on standing and to resolve the issue presented before
Artists is "an exclusive association of honored individuals." To ensure the exclusivity of the it.64 Moreover, this issue is of paramount interest,65 which further justifies a liberal stance on
membership in the Order, a rigid nomination and screening process has been established with standing.
different sets of renowned artists and respected art critics invited to sit as the Council of
Experts for the First and Second Deliberation Panels. Moreover, all living National Artists are Propriety of the Remedies
given a voice on who should be included in their exclusive club as they automatically become
members of the Final Deliberation Panel that will vote on who should be included in the final The present action is a petition for prohibition, certiorari, injunction, restraining order and all
list to be submitted to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists. To allow other legal, just and equitable reliefs.
the untrammeled discretion and authority of the President to confer the Order of National
It has been held that the remedies of prohibition and injunction are preventive and, as such, Nevertheless, the President’s discretion on the matter is not totally unfettered, nor the role of
cannot be availed of to restrain an act that is already fait accompli.66 Where the act sought to the NCCA and the CCP Boards meaningless.
be prohibited or enjoined has already been accomplished or consummated, prohibition or
injunction becomes moot.67 Discretion is not a free-spirited stallion that runs and roams wherever it pleases but is reined
in to keep it from straying. In its classic formulation, "discretion is not unconfined and vagrant"
Nevertheless, even if the principal issue is already moot, this Court may still resolve its merits but "canalized within banks that keep it from overflowing."78
for the future guidance of both bench and bar. Courts will decide a question otherwise moot
and academic if it is "capable of repetition, yet evading review."68 The President’s power must be exercised in accordance with existing laws. Section 17, Article
VII of the Constitution prescribes faithful execution of the laws by the President:
It is an opportune time for the Court to assert its role as republican schoolmaster,69 a teacher
in a vital national seminar.70 There are times when the controversy is of such character that, to Sec. 17. The President shall have control of all the executive departments, bureaus and offices.
prevent its recurrence and to assure respect for constitutional limitations, this Court must He shall ensure that the laws be faithfully executed. (Emphasis supplied.)
pass on the merits of a case.71 This is one such case. More than being a teaching moment, this
The President’s discretion in the conferment of the Order of National Artists should be
is not the first time that the Order of National Artists was conferred in the manner that is
exercised in accordance with the duty to faithfully execute the relevant laws. The faithful
being assailed in this case.72 If not addressed here and now, there is great probability that the
execution clause is best construed as an obligation imposed on the President, not a separate
central question involved in this case will haunt us again in the future. Every President may
grant of power.79 It simply underscores the rule of law and, corollarily, the cardinal principle
invoke absolute presidential prerogative and thrust upon us National Artists after his or her
that the President is not above the laws but is obliged to obey and execute them.80 This is
own heart, in total disregard of the advise of the CCP and the NCCA and the voice of the
precisely why the law provides that "administrative or executive acts, orders and regulations
community of artists, resulting to repeated episodes of indignation and uproar from the artists
shall be valid only when they are not contrary to the laws or the Constitution."81
and the public.
In this connection, the powers granted to the NCCA and the CCP Boards in connection with
Furthermore, if not corrected, such an act would give rise to mischief and dangerous
the conferment of the Order of National Artists by executive issuances were institutionalized
precedent whereby those in the corridors of power could avoid judicial intervention and
by two laws, namely, Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973 and Republic Act No.
review by merely speedily and stealthily completing the commission of an illegality.73
7356. In particular, Proclamation No. 1144 dated May 15, 1973 constituted the CCP Board as
In any event, the present petition is also for certiorari and there is no procedural bar for the the National Artists Awards Committee and tasked it to "administer the conferment of the
Court to pass upon the question of whether the proclamations of respondents Guidote- category of National Artist" upon deserving Filipino artists with the mandate to "draft the rules
Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists were attended by grave abuse of to guide its deliberations in the choice of National Artists":
presidential discretion.
Proclamation No. 1001 dated April 27, 1972, creating the Award and Decoration of National
Limits of the President’s Discretion Artist, is hereby amended by creating a National Artists Awards Committee, hereinafter to
administer the conferment of the category of National Artist upon those deserving thereof.
The respective powers of the CCP Board of Trustees and of the NCCA Board of Commissioners The Committee, which shall be composed of members of the Board of Trustees of the Cultural
with respect to the conferment of the Order of National Artists are clear. They jointly Center of the Philippines, shall organize itself immediately and shall draft the rules to guide its
administer the said award and, upon their recommendation or advice, the President confers deliberations in the choice of National Artists, to the end that those who have created a body
the Order of National Artists. of work in the arts and in letters capable of withstanding the test of time will be so recognized.
(Emphases supplied.)
To "recommend" and to "advise" are synonymous. To "recommend" is "to advise or
counsel."74 To "advise" is "to give an opinion or counsel, or recommend a plan or course of The authority of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee was
action; also to give notice. To encourage, inform or acquaint."75 "Advise" imports that it is reiterated in Presidential Decree No. 208 dated June 7, 1973.
discretionary or optional with the person addressed whether he will act on such advice or
not.76 This has been clearly explained in Cojuangco, Jr. v. Atty. Palma77: The function of the CCP Board of Trustees as National Artists Awards Committee has been
recognized under Republic Act No. 7356:
The "power to recommend" includes the power to give "advice, exhortation or indorsement,
which is essentially persuasive in character, not binding upon the party to whom it is made." Sec. 18. The National Cultural Agencies. – The [NCCA] shall coordinate with the national
(Emphasis supplied.) cultural agencies including but not limited to the Cultural Center of the Philippines, the
Institute of Philippine Languages, the National Historical Institute, the National Library, the
Thus, in the matter of the conferment of the Order of National Artists, the President may or National Museum, the Records Management and Archives Office. However, they shall
may not adopt the recommendation or advice of the NCCA and the CCP Boards. In other continue operating under their respective charters or as provided by law where provisions
words, the advice of the NCCA and the CCP is subject to the President’s discretion. therein are not inconsistent with the provisions of this Act. They shall serve as the national
repository and/or showcase, as the case may be, of the best of Philippine culture and arts. For
this purpose, these agencies shall submit periodic reports, including recommendations to the The existing modalities of the NCCA for selecting recipients for the Order of National Artists,
[NCCA]. (Emphasis supplied.) and the Gawad sa Manlilikha ng Bayan, and of the NAST for selecting recipients of the Order of
National Scientists, shall remain in force. (Emphases supplied.)
On the other hand, the NCCA has been given the following mandate in connection with the
conferment of cultural or arts awards: Section 2.4(A) of the same implementing rules further states:
Sec. 12. Mandate. – The Commission is hereby mandated to formulate and implement policies 2.4: Awards Committees
and plans in accordance with the principles stated in Title 1 of this Act.
There shall be two types of awards committees: the Committee on Honors and the various
(a) To encourage the continuing and balanced development of a pluralistic culture awards committees in the various units of the government service.
by the people themselves, it shall:
A. The Committee on Honors
xxxx
The Committee on Honors serves as a National Awards Committee. It is composed of the
(4) extend recognition of artistic achievement through awards, grants and services following:
to artists and cultural groups which contribute significantly to the Filipino’s cultural
legacy; The Executive Secretary, Chairman
Sec. 13. Powers and Functions. – To carry out its mandate, the Commission shall Head, Presidential Management Staff, member
exercise the following powers and functions:
Presidential Assistant for Historical Affairs, member
xxxx
Chief of Presidential Protocol, member
(j) advise the President on matters pertaining to culture and the arts, including the
Chief of Protocol, DFA, member
creation of a special decoration or award, for persons who have significantly
contributed to the development and promotion of Philippine culture and arts; All nominations from the various awards committees must be submitted to the Committee on
Honors via the Chancellery of Philippine Orders and State Decorations. The Chancellery shall
(k) promulgate rules, regulations and undertake any and all measures as may be
process nominations for the consideration of the Committee on Honors. The Committee on
necessary to implement this Act. (Emphases supplied.)
Honors shall screen and recommend these nominations to the President.
By virtue of their respective statutory mandates in connection with the conferment of the
The Committee on Honors shall, as a general rule, serve as a screening committee to ensure
National Artist Award, the NCCA and the CCP decided to work together and jointly administer
that nominations received from the various awards committees meet two tests: that there has
the National Artist Award. They reviewed the guidelines for the nomination, selection and
not been an abuse of discretion in making the nomination, and that the nominee is in good
administration of the National Artist Award, created a National Artist Award Secretariat,
standing. Should a nomination meet these criteria, a recommendation to the President for
centralized all financial resources and management for the administration of the National
conferment shall be made.
Artist Award, and added another layer to the selection process so that more members of the
arts and culture sector of the Philippines may be involved and participate in the selection of The President of the Philippines takes the recommendations of the Committee on Honors in
National Artists. the highest consideration when making the final decision on the conferment of awards.
(Emphasis supplied.)
We have held that an administrative regulation adopted pursuant to law has the force and
effect of law.82 Thus, the rules, guidelines and policies regarding the Order of National Artists Pursuant to the above provision of the implementing rules of Executive Order No. 236, s.
jointly issued by the CCP Board of Trustees and the NCCA pursuant to their respective 2003, the authority of the Committee on Honors is limited to determining whether the
statutory mandates have the force and effect of law. Until set aside, they are binding upon nominations submitted by a particular awards committee, in this case, the joint NCCA and CCP
executive and administrative agencies,83 including the President himself/herself as chief Boards, have been tainted by abuse of discretion, and whether the nominees are in good
executor of laws. In this connection, Section 2.5(A) of the Implementing Rules and standing. Should the nominations meet these two criteria, the Committee on Honors shall
Regulations84 of Executive Order No. 236, s. 2003 provides: make a recommendation to the President for conferment of the Order of National Artists.
2.5: General Guidelines for Awards Committees In view of the various stages of deliberation in the selection process and as a consequence of
his/her duty to faithfully enforce the relevant laws, the discretion of the President in the
A. National Orders of Cultural and Scientific Merit
matter of the Order of National Artists is confined to the names submitted to him/her by the
NCCA and the CCP Boards. This means that the President could not have considered While the Court invalidates today the proclamation of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
conferment of the Order of National Artists on any person not considered and recommended Mañosa and Moreno as National Artists, such action should not be taken as a pronouncement
by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. That is the proper import of the provision of Executive Order on whether they are worthy to be conferred that honor. Only the President, upon the advise
No. 435, s. 2005, that the NCCA and the CCP "shall advise the President on the conferment of of the NCCA and the CCP Boards, may determine that. The Court simply declares that, as the
the Order of National Artists." Applying this to the instant case, the former President could not former President committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing Proclamation Nos. 1826 to
have properly considered respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno, as 1829 dated July 6, 2009, the said proclamations are invalid. However, nothing in this Decision
their names were not recommended by the NCCA and the CCP Boards. Otherwise, not only should be read as a disqualification on the part of respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas,
will the stringent selection and meticulous screening process be rendered futile, the Mañosa and Moreno to be considered for the honor of National Artist in the future, subject to
respective mandates of the NCCA and the CCP Board of Trustees under relevant laws to compliance with the laws, rules and regulations governing said award.
administer the conferment of Order of National Artists, draft the rules and regulations to
guide its deliberations, formulate and implement policies and plans, and undertake any and all WHEREFORE, the petition is hereby GRANTED in PART. Proclamation Nos. 1826 to 1829 dated
necessary measures in that regard will also become meaningless. July 6, 2009 proclaiming respondents Cecile Guidote-Alvarez, Carlo Magno Jose Caparas,
Francisco Mañosa, and Jose Moreno, respectively, as National Artists are declared INVALID
Furthermore, with respect to respondent Guidote-Alvarez who was the Executive Director of and
the NCCA at that time, the Guidelines expressly provides:
SET ASIDE for having been issued with grave abuse of discretion.
6.5 NCCA and CCP Board members and consultants and NCCA and CCP officers and staff are
automatically disqualified from being nominated.85 SO ORDERED.
Respondent Guidote-Alvarez could not have even been nominated, hence, she was not
qualified to be considered and conferred the Order of National Artists at that time. The
President’s discretion on the matter does not extend to removing a legal impediment or
overriding a legal restriction.
From the foregoing, the advice or recommendation of the NCCA and the CCP Boards as to the
conferment of the Order of National Artists on Conde, Dr. Santos, Francisco and Alcuaz was
not binding on the former President but only discretionary or optional for her whether or not
to act on such advice or recommendation. Also, by virtue of the power of control, the
President had the authority to alter or modify or nullify or set aside such recommendation or
advice. It was well within the President’s power and discretion to proclaim all, or some or even
none of the recommendees of the CCP and the NCCA Boards, without having to justify his or
her action. Thus, the exclusion of Santos did not constitute grave abuse of discretion on the
part of the former President.
There is grave abuse of discretion when an act is (1) done contrary to the Constitution, the law
or jurisprudence or (2) executed whimsically, capriciously or arbitrarily, out of malice, ill will or
personal bias.86
There was a violation of the equal protection clause of the Constitution87 when the former
President gave preferential treatment to respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and
Moreno.1âwphi1 The former President’s constitutional duty to faithfully execute the laws and
observe the rules, guidelines and policies of the NCCA and the CCP as to the selection of the
nominees for conferment of the Order of National Artists proscribed her from having a free
and uninhibited hand in the conferment of the said award. The manifest disregard of the
rules, guidelines and processes of the NCCA and the CCP was an arbitrary act that unduly
favored respondents Guidote-Alvarez, Caparas, Mañosa and Moreno. The conferment of the
Order of National Artists on said respondents was therefore made with grave abuse of
discretion and should be set aside.
Republic of the Philippines The petitioners are members of the lower courts who feel that their official functions as
SUPREME COURT judges will be prejudiced by the above-named measures. The National Land Registration
Manila Authority has taken common cause with them insofar as its own activities, such as sending of
requisite notices in registration cases, affect judicial proceedings. On its motion, it has been
EN BANC allowed to intervene.
The petition assails the constitutionality of R.A. No. 7354 on the grounds that: (1) its title
embraces more than one subject and does not express its purposes; (2) it did not pass the
required readings in both Houses of Congress and printed copies of the bill in its final form
G.R. No. 105371 November 11, 1993
were not distributed among the members before its passage; and (3) it is discriminatory and
encroaches on the independence of the Judiciary.
THE PHILIPPINE JUDGES ASSOCIATION, duly rep. by its President, BERNARDO P. ABESAMIS, Vice-
President for Legal Affairs, MARIANO M. UMALI, Director for Pasig, Makati, and Pasay, Metro
We approach these issues with one important principle in mind, to wit, the presumption of
Manila, ALFREDO C. FLORES, and Chairman of the Committee on Legal Aid, JESUS G.
the constitutionality of statutes. The theory is that as the joint act of the Legislature and the
BERSAMIRA, Presiding Judges of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 85, Quezon City and Branches
Executive, every statute is supposed to have first been carefully studied and determined to be
160, 167 and 166, Pasig, Metro Manila, respectively: the NATIONAL CONFEDERATION OF THE
constitutional before it was finally enacted. Hence, unless it is clearly shown that it is
JUDGES ASSOCIATION OF THE PHILIPPINES, composed of the METROPOLITAN TRIAL COURT
constitutionally flawed, the attack against its validity must be rejected and the law itself
JUDGES ASSOCIATION rep. by its President. REINATO QUILALA of the MUNICIPAL TRIAL CIRCUIT
upheld. To doubt is to sustain.
COURT, Manila; THE MUNICIPAL JUDGES LEAGUE OF THE PHILIPPINES rep. by its President,
TOMAS G. TALAVERA; by themselves and in behalf of all the Judges of the Regional Trial and
Shari'a Courts, Metropolitan Trial Courts and Municipal Courts throughout the I
Country, petitioners,
vs. We consider first the objection based on Article VI, Sec. 26(l), of the Constitution providing
HON. PETE PRADO, in his capacity as Secretary of the Department of Transportation and that "Every bill passed by the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be
Communications, JORGE V. SARMIENTO, in his capacity as Postmaster General, and the expressed in the title thereof."
PHILIPPINE POSTAL CORP., respondents.
The purposes of this rule are: (1) to prevent hodge-podge or "log-rolling" legislation; (2) to
prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of which the title
gives no intimation, and which might therefore be overlooked and carelessly and
CRUZ, J.: unintentionally adopted; and (3) to fairly apprise the people, through such publication of
legislative proceedings as is usually made, of the subject of legislation that is being considered,
in order that they may have opportunity of being heard thereon, by petition or otherwise, if
The basic issue raised in this petition is the independence of the Judiciary. It is asserted by the
they shall so desire.1
petitioners that this hallmark of republicanism is impaired by the statute and circular they are
here challenging. The Supreme Court is itself affected by these measures and is thus an
interested party that should ordinarily not also be a judge at the same time. Under our system It is the submission of the petitioners that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 which withdrew the
of government, however, it cannot inhibit itself and must rule upon the challenge, because no franking privilege from the Judiciary is not expressed in the title of the law, nor does it reflect
other office has the authority to do so. We shall therefore act upon this matter not with its purposes.
officiousness but in the discharge of an unavoidable duty and, as always, with detachment and
fairness. R.A. No. 7354 is entitled "An Act Creating the Philippine Postal Corporation, Defining its
Powers, Functions and Responsibilities, Providing for Regulation of the Industry and for Other
The main target of this petition is Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 as implemented by the Purposes Connected Therewith."
Philippine Postal Corporation through its Circular No.
92-28. These measures withdraw the franking privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of The objectives of the law are enumerated in Section 3, which provides:
Appeals, the Regional Trial Courts, the Metropolitan Trial Courts, the Municipal Trial Courts,
and the Land Registration Commission and its Registers of Deeds, along with certain other The State shall pursue the following objectives of a nationwide postal
government offices. system:
a) to enable the economical and speedy transfer of mail and other postal act. Thus, it is proper to create in the same act the machinery by which
matters, from sender to addressee, with full recognition of their privacy or the act is to be enforced, to prescribe the penalties for its infraction, and
confidentiality; to remove obstacles in the way of its execution. If such matters are
properly connected with the subject as expressed in the title, it is
b) to promote international interchange, cooperation and understanding unnecessary that they should also have special mention in the title
through the unhampered flow or exchange of postal matters between (Southern Pac. Co. v. Bartine, 170 Fed. 725).
nations;
This is particularly true of the repealing clause, on which Cooley writes: "The repeal of a
c) to cause or effect a wide range of postal services to cater to different statute on a given subject is properly connected with the subject matter of a new statute on
users and changing needs, including but not limited to, philately, transfer the same subject; and therefore a repealing section in the new statute is valid,
of monies and valuables, and the like; notwithstanding that the title is silent on the subject. It would be difficult to conceive of a
matter more germane to an act and to the object to be accomplished thereby than the repeal
of previous legislations connected therewith."4
d) to ensure that sufficient revenues are generated by and within the
industry to finance the overall cost of providing the varied range of postal
delivery and messengerial services as well as the expansion and The reason is that where a statute repeals a former law, such repeal is the effect and not the
continuous upgrading of service standards by the same. subject of the statute; and it is the subject, not the effect of a law, which is required to be
briefly expressed in its title.5 As observed in one case,6 if the title of an act embraces only one
subject, we apprehend it was never claimed that every other act which repeals it or alters by
Sec. 35 of R.A. No. 7354, which is the principal target of the petition, reads as follows:
implication must be mentioned in the title of the new act. Any such rule would be neither
within the reason of the Constitution, nor practicable.
Sec. 35. Repealing Clause. — All acts, decrees, orders, executive orders,
instructions, rules and regulations or parts thereof inconsistent with the
We are convinced that the withdrawal of the franking privilege from some agencies is
provisions of this Act are repealed or modified accordingly.
germane to the accomplishment of the principal objective of R.A. No. 7354, which is the
creation of a more efficient and effective postal service system. Our ruling is that, by virtue of
All franking privileges authorized by law are hereby repealed, except those its nature as a repealing clause, Section 35 did not have to be expressly included in the title of
provided for under Commonwealth Act No. 265, Republic Acts Numbered the said law.
69, 180, 1414, 2087 and 5059. The Corporation may continue the franking
privilege under Circular No. 35 dated October 24, 1977 and that of the
II
Vice President, under such arrangements and conditions as may obviate
abuse or unauthorized use thereof.
The petitioners maintain that the second paragraph of Sec. 35 covering the repeal of the
franking privilege from the petitioners and this Court under E.O. 207, PD 1882 and PD 26 was
The petitioners' contention is untenable. We do not agree that the title of the challenged act
not included in the original version of Senate Bill No. 720 or House Bill No. 4200. As this
violates the Constitution.
paragraph appeared only in the Conference Committee Report, its addition, violates Article VI,
Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution, reading as follows:
The title of the bill is not required to be an index to the body of the act, or to be as
comprehensive as to cover every single detail of the measure. It has been held that if the title
(2) No bill passed by either House shall become a law unless it has passed
fairly indicates the general subject, and reasonably covers all the provisions of the act, and is
three readings on separate days, and printed copies thereof in its final
not calculated to mislead the legislature or the people, there is sufficient compliance with the
form have been distributed to its Members three days before its passage,
constitutional requirement. 2
except when the President certifies to the necessity of its immediate
enactment to meet a public calamity or emergency. Upon the last reading
To require every end and means necessary for the accomplishment of the general objectives of a bill, no amendment thereto shall be allowed, and the vote thereon
of the statute to be expressed in its title would not only be unreasonable but would actually shall be taken immediately thereafter, and the yeas and nays entered in
render legislation impossible. 3 As has been correctly explained: the Journal.
The details of a legislative act need not be specifically stated in its title, but The petitioners also invoke Sec. 74 of the Rules of the House of Representatives, requiring that
matter germane to the subject as expressed in the title, and adopted to amendment to any bill when the House and the Senate shall have differences thereon may be
the accomplishment of the object in view, may properly be included in the settled by a conference committee of both chambers. They stress that Sec. 35 was never a
subject of any disagreement between both Houses and so the second paragraph could not such official assurances from a coordinate department of the government, to which we owe,
have been validly added as an amendment. at the very least, a becoming courtesy.
While it is true that a conference committee is the mechanism for compromising differences The third and most serious challenge of the petitioners is based on the equal protection
between the Senate and the House, it is not limited in its jurisdiction to this question. Its clause.
broader function is described thus:
It is alleged that R.A. No. 7354 is discriminatory because while withdrawing the franking
A conference committee may, deal generally with the subject matter or it privilege from the Judiciary, it retains the same for the President of the Philippines, the Vice
may be limited to resolving the precise differences between the two President of the Philippines; Senators and Members of the House of Representatives, the
houses. Even where the conference committee is not by rule limited in its Commission on Elections; former Presidents of the Philippines; the National Census and
jurisdiction, legislative custom severely limits the freedom with which new Statistics Office; and the general public in the filing of complaints against public offices and
subject matter can be inserted into the conference bill. But occasionally a officers.10
conference committee produces unexpected results, results beyond its
mandate, These excursions occur even where the rules impose strict The respondents counter that there is no discrimination because the law is based on a valid
limitations on conference committee jurisdiction. This is symptomatic of classification in accordance with the equal protection clause. In fact, the franking privilege has
the authoritarian power of conference committee (Davies, Legislative Law been withdrawn not only from the Judiciary but also the Office of Adult Education, the
and Process: In a Nutshell, 1986 Ed., p.81). Institute of National Language; the Telecommunications Office; the Philippine Deposit
Insurance Corporation; the National Historical Commission; the Armed Forces of the
It is a matter of record that the conference Committee Report on the bill in question was Philippines; the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee; the City and
returned to and duly approved by both the Senate and the House of Representatives. Provincial Prosecutors; the Tanodbayan (Office of Special Prosecutor); the Kabataang
Thereafter, the bill was enrolled with its certification by Senate President Neptali A. Gonzales Barangay; the Commission on the Filipino Language; the Provincial and City Assessors; and the
and Speaker Ramon V. Mitra of the House of Representatives as having been duly passed by National Council for the Welfare of Disabled Persons.11
both Houses of Congress. It was then presented to and approved by President Corazon C.
Aquino on April 3, 1992. The equal protection of the laws is embraced in the concept of due process, as every unfair
discrimination offends the requirements of justice and fair play. It has nonetheless been
Under the doctrine of separation powers, the Court may not inquire beyond the certification embodied in a separate clause in Article III Sec. 1., of the Constitution to provide for a more,
of the approval of a bill from the presiding officers of Congress. Casco Philippine Chemical Co. specific guaranty against any form of undue favoritism or hostility from the government.
v. Gimenez7 laid down the rule that the enrolled bill, is conclusive upon the Judiciary (except in Arbitrariness in general may be challenged on the basis of the due process clause. But if the
matters that have to be entered in the journals like the yeas and nays on the final reading of particular act assailed partakes of an unwarranted partiality or prejudice, the sharper weapon
the to cut it down is the equal protection clause.
bill).8 The journals are themselves also binding on the Supreme Court, as we held in the old
(but still valid) case of U.S. vs. Pons,9 where we explained the reason thus: According to a long line of decisions, equal protection simply requires that all persons or
things similarly situated should be treated alike, both as to rights conferred and
To inquire into the veracity of the journals of the Philippine legislature responsibilities imposed, 12 Similar subjects, in other words, should not be treated differently,
when they are, as we have said, clear and explicit, would be to violate so as to give undue favor to some and unjustly discriminate against others.
both the, letter and spirit of the organic laws by which the Philippine
Government was brought into existence, to invade a coordinate and The equal protection clause does not require the universal application of the laws on all
independent department of the Government, and to interfere with the persons or things without distinction. This might in fact sometimes result in unequal
legitimate powers and functions, of the Legislature. protection, as where, for example, a law prohibiting mature books to all persons, regardless of
age, would benefit the morals of the youth but violate the liberty of adults. What the clause
Applying these principles, we shall decline to look into the petitioners' charges that an requires is equality among equals as determined according to a valid classification. By
amendment was made upon the last reading of the bill that eventually became R.A. No. 7354 classification is meant the grouping of persons or things similar to each other in certain
and that copies thereof in its final form were not distributed among the members of each particulars and different from all others in these same particulars. 13
House. Both the enrolled bill and the legislative journals certify that the measure was duly
enacted i.e., in accordance with Article VI, Sec. 26(2) of the Constitution. We are bound by
What is the reason for the grant of the franking privilege in the first place? Is the franking If the problem of the respondents is the loss of revenues from the franking privilege, the
privilege extended to the President of the Philippines or the Commission on Elections or to remedy, it seems to us, is to withdraw it altogether from all agencies of government, including
former Presidents of the Philippines purely as a courtesy from the lawmaking body? Is it those who do not need it. The problem is not solved by retaining it for some and withdrawing
offered because of the importance or status of the grantee or because of its need for the it from others, especially where there is no substantial distinction between those favored,
privilege? Or have the grantees been chosen pell-mell, as it were, without any basis at all for which may or may not need it at all, and the Judiciary, which definitely needs it. The problem
the selection? is not solved by violating the Constitution.
We reject outright the last conjecture as there is no doubt that the statute as a whole was In lumping the Judiciary with the other offices from which the franking privilege has been
carefully deliberated upon, by the political departments before it was finally enacted. There is withdrawn, Section 35 has placed the courts of justice in a category to which it does not
reason to suspect, however, that not enough care or attention was given to its repealing belong. If it recognizes the need of the President of the Philippines and the members of
clause, resulting in the unwitting withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Judiciary. Congress for the franking privilege, there is no reason why it should not recognize a similar
and in fact greater need on the part of the Judiciary for such privilege. While we may
We also do not believe that the basis of the classification was mere courtesy, for it is appreciate the withdrawal of the franking privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines
unimaginable that the political departments would have intended this serious slight to the Ladies Steering Committee, we fail to understand why the Supreme Court should be similarly
Judiciary as the third of the major and equal departments the government. The same treated as that Committee. And while we may concede the need of the National Census and
observations are made if the importance or status of the grantee was the criterion used for Statistics Office for the franking privilege, we are intrigued that a similar if not greater need is
the extension of the franking privilege, which is enjoyed by the National Census and Statistics not recognized in the courts of justice.
Office and even some private individuals but not the courts of justice.
(On second thought, there does not seem to be any justifiable need for withdrawing the
In our view, the only acceptable reason for the grant of the franking privilege was the privilege from the Armed Forces of the Philippines Ladies Steering Committee, which, like
perceived need of the grantee for the accommodation, which would justify a waiver of former Presidents of the Philippines or their widows, does not send as much frank mail as the
substantial revenue by the Corporation in the interest of providing for a smoother flow of Judiciary.)
communication between the government and the people.
It is worth observing that the Philippine Postal Corporation, as a government-controlled
Assuming that basis, we cannot understand why, of all the departments of the government, it corporation, was created and is expected to operate for the purpose of promoting the public
is the Judiciary, that has been denied the franking privilege. There is no question that if there service. While it may have been established primarily for private gain, it cannot excuse itself
is any major branch of the government that needs the privilege, it is the Judicial Department, from performing certain functions for the benefit of the public in exchange for the franchise
as the respondents themselves point out. Curiously, the respondents would justify the extended to it by the government and the many advantages it enjoys under its
distinction on the basis precisely of this need and, on this basis, deny the Judiciary the franking charter.14Among the services it should be prepared to extend is free carriage of mail for
privilege while extending it to others less deserving. certain offices of the government that need the franking privilege in the discharge of their
own public functions.
In their Comment, the respondents point out that available data from the Postal Service Office
show that from January 1988 to June 1992, the total volume of frank mails amounted to We also note that under Section 9 of the law, the Corporation is capitalized at P10 billion
P90,424,175.00. Of this amount, frank mails from the Judiciary and other agencies whose pesos, 55% of which is supplied by the Government, and that it derives substantial revenues
functions include the service of judicial processes, such as the intervenor, the Department of from the sources enumerated in Section 10, on top of the exemptions it enjoys. It is not likely
Justice and the Office of the Ombudsman, amounted to P86,481,759. Frank mails coming that the retention of the franking privilege of the Judiciary will cripple the Corporation.
fromthe Judiciary amounted to P73,574,864.00, and those coming from the petitioners
reached the total amount of P60,991,431.00. The respondents' conclusion is that because of At this time when the Judiciary is being faulted for the delay in the administration of justice,
this considerable volume of mail from the Judiciary, the franking privilege must be withdrawn the withdrawal from it of the franking privilege can only further deepen this serious problem.
from it. The volume of judicial mail, as emphasized by the respondents themselves, should stress the
dependence of the courts of justice on the postal service for communicating with lawyers and
The argument is self-defeating. The respondents are in effect saying that the franking privilege litigants as part of the judicial process. The Judiciary has the lowest appropriation in the
should be extended only to those who do not need it very much, if at all, (like the widows of national budget compared to the Legislative and Executive Departments; of the P309 billion
former Presidents) but not to those who need it badly (especially the courts of justice). It is budgeted for 1993, only .84%, or less than 1%, is alloted for the judiciary. It should not be hard
like saying that a person may be allowed cosmetic surgery although it is not really necessary to imagine the increased difficulties of our courts if they have to affix a purchased stamp to
but not an operation that can save his life. every process they send in the discharge of their judicial functions.
We are unable to agree with the respondents that Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 represents a G.R. No. 129118 July 19, 2000
valid exercise of discretion by the Legislature under the police power. On the contrary, we find
its repealing clause to be a discriminatory provision that denies the Judiciary the equal AGRIPINO A. DE GUZMAN, JR., NARCISO M. ARABE, LETICIA T. ENDOMA, ARISTIDES A. RAMOS,
protection of the laws guaranteed for all persons or things similarly situated. The distinction PANCHO M. RIVERA, TERESITA A. DE CASTRO, CANDIDA C. HABANA, AZUCENA C. FALCON,
made by the law is superficial. It is not based on substantial distinctions that make real MARIA LUZ P. CAEDO, YOLANDA V. RIO, RUBEN S. ANIEVAS, LELISA L. SANCHEZ, VILLARDO A.
differences between the Judiciary and the grantees of the franking privilege. TRINIDAD, ENRIQUE CH. ZUNIGA, ROMEO A. GONZALES, CASIANO G. ATUEL, JR., GEMMA L.
BANARES, PERFECTO T. CAMPOS, ARNULFO A. AGUILAR, RUDOLPH R. MELON, MAGDALENA M.
This is not a question of wisdom or power into which the Judiciary may not intrude. It is a LAO, MARINA GERONA, FLORIANA O. DE GUIA, EMETERIO B. BRUCAL, NILDA C. CONCHA,
matter of arbitrariness that this Court has the duty and power to correct. YOLANDA P. FERMA, TEOTISTA C. ANGKIKO, FRANCISCO V. TRIAS, JENELYN E. ESTERNON,
MILAGROS M. ABELLAR, ALICIA T. MOJICA, ELVIRA E. BAYBAY, PRICILLA P. GOLFO, ELISEA M.
IV HIERCO, TERESITA L. DIMACUHA, MYRNA GUILLERMO, GRACIANO R. SAMELA, JR., NIMFA M.
LAGASCA, JOSEFINA P. JARENO, NORMA V. ORDENES, FRANCISCO T. SERVANDO, VIOLETA M.
ANONUEVO, ALFREDO O. BAYANI, MARIO J. RAMOS, EME FEROLINO, LEONIDES P. COMIA,
In sum, we sustain R.A. No. 7354 against the attack that its subject is not expressed in its title
MILAGROS E. GENEBLAZO, LORNA L. MENORCA, REYNALDO DE LA CRUZ, ROMULO A. FAZ,
and that it was not passed in accordance with the prescribed procedure. However, we annul
LIMUEL G. GADO, REY G. FABELLA, DOMINGUITO G. TACASA, IMELDA R.B. ROTONI, TITA FOJA,
Section 35 of the law as violative of Article 3, Sec. 1, of the Constitution providing that no
NOEMI F. CASTRO, LILIA B. CAWALING, ROBERT A. REYES, CONCEPCION H. PARRENO, SERAFIN L.
person shall "be deprived of the equal protection of laws."
OLMEDO, ADOLFO L. ALLAN, PROSPERO D. CASTRO, ROSELLER C. GAPULAO, GLICERIO B.
LAURENTE, BERNICE E. BERNABE, ADINA L. FERNANDEZ, ANITA M. PAALAN, ROSA P. PINOON,
We arrive at these conclusions with a full awareness of the criticism it is certain to provoke. INOCENCIA P. DANGUE, JULITA E. MENDOZA, ELENA O. RAMOS, GENE BE BARTE, FLORENCIA Z.
While ruling against the discrimination in this case, we may ourselves be accused of similar MAGANITO, PABLO A. ARGA, PEDRO S. LUNA, CARMELITA P. LAUREL, VICTORINO I. MARASIGAN,
discrimination through the exercise of our ultimate power in our own favor. This is inevitable. ROMEO M. MENDOZA, JUAN C. MALABANAN, MANUEL B. ABRELI, JOSEPH T. MACAHIYA,
Criticism of judicial conduct, however undeserved, is a fact of life in the political system that LEONOR P. ARADA, JULIA G. PEREZ, MODESTO M. VILLADELREY, ARNULFO Y. FAJILAN, MARLON
we are prepared to accept.. As judges, we cannot debate with our detractors. We can only P. HERRERA, JAIME A. BISCOCHO, MICHAEL D. CASTILLO, MILAGROS H. BAYLOSIS, ARSENIO T.
decide the cases before us as law imposes on us the duty to be fair and our own conscience GUSTE, ALFREDO V. ORAYANI, DANTE A. PENAMANTE, ROMEO A. DE CHAVEZ, MANUEL M.
gives us the light to be right. ILAGAN, ALFREDO O. MANZA, JR., DOMINGO B. GUNIO, FIDEL V. PALERACIO, VICENTE V. DEL
MORO, JUSTINO R. DEQUILLA, ERNESTO A. RUZOL, ROMEO D. DELGADO, ERLINDA P. MAGSINO,
ACCORDINGLY, the petition is partially GRANTED and Section 35 of R.A. No. 7354 is declared VERONICA R. CAMBRONERO, NORMA A. DEQUINA, WELLIE R. RAVINA, CORAZON T. LOPEZ,
UNCONSTITUTIONAL. Circular No. 92-28 is SET ASIDE insofar as it withdraws the franking REMEDIOS R. QUIZON, LORETA E. VERGARA, MELECIA M. ASTRERA, VICENTA R. SAMANTE,
privilege from the Supreme Court, the Court of Appeals, the Regional trail Courts, the HELEN M. CUENTO-BUENDICHO, ANICIA V. MORALES, RISALINA C. GONZALES, ROSARIO
Municipal trial Courts, and the National Land Registration Authority and its Register of Deeds CHARITO R. PABELLON, LOLITA L. MALADAGA, MAXIMO A. GLINDO, WILFREDO A. RODELAS,
to all of which offices the said privilege shall be RESTORED. The temporary restraining order CELSO O. ROGO, RAMON C. VALENCIA, FELIPE R. FRANDO, ADEN B. DUNGO, OFELIA N. QUIBEN,
dated June 2, 1992, is made permanent. LIGAYA S. VALENZUELA, EUNICE S. FAMILARIN, MARCELA DE LEON, ADELA M. JAMILLA, RENY
ABLES, ADELA E. FABERES, ALICIA P. BALDOMAR, EDNA C. GARCIA, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO,
SO ORDERED. ELOISA P. TORRENO, CHARITO M. LACAMENTO, CLARENCIA M. AQUINO, HILDA DIMALANTA,
ELSIE SIBAL, PURIFICACION TANGONAN, AMELITA FERNANDEZ, TEDDY C. MARIANO, LORETO
SANGGALANG, GERARDO GONZALES, FEDERICO ONATE, JR., ARTURO BALIGNASAY, FELIX M.
CABARIOS, JR., NORBERTO PUNZALAN, JAIME G. ALCANTARA, ERNESTO VILLANUEVA,
ESTANISLAO SANCHEZ, ADORACION L. PINEDA, LUCILA S. DUNGCA, ADELAIDA B.
LAOIJINDANUM, ROLANDO A. BALUYUT, FRANCISCO M. DAVID, LEONELLE S. MENDOZA, MA.
LUZ A. BASILIO, NESTOR J. TIMBANG, HILDA P. DIZON, EMMANUEL E. IGNACIO, RAMON S.
ABELLA, JOSELITO MATIAS, HEZEQUIAS B. GALANG, ERLINDA C. ZAPATA, IMELDA R.
MANALASTAS, PEDRO L. PALO, AURECIO C. TRASPE, JOSEPHINE GALANG, FLORINDA R.
MADULID, MAGDALENA W. SADI, NYDIA V.A. BOLISAY, PRESENTACION A. PALOM, ANTONIO B.
ANCHETA, MACARIO L. SADI, PACIFICO E. GISAPON, FELICIANO C. CRUZ, IMELDA A. QUIMEL,
LINDA D. SANDOVAL, MARILOU R. ORTIZ, NORMA F. SANTOS, MAGPAYO V. ABESAMIS,
BONIFACIO B. VILLAFLOR, DANIEL O. TABIOS, CONSTANTE T. CATRIZ, JESUS E. ALICANTE,
FEDERICO SACLAYAN, JR., NOLY G. UMINGA, FE FRAELI L. DE GUZMAN, RODRIGO S. WYCOCO,
JOVEN HERMOGENES, RODOLFO D. BANAWA, ABELARDO O. CAPANZANA, ERNESTO Q.
TIONGSON, ROSANNA CRUZ, OSCAR C. ONGOCO, CONSUELO A. KABIGTING, JULITA V. "SEC. 44. Reassignment of Election Officers. - No Election Officer shall hold office in a
PASTELERO, ARSENIA V. BONDOC, ISIDRO A. TOMAS, ANGELINA V. GARRIDO, CONSOLACION N. particular city or municipality for more than four (4) years. Any election officer who, either at
LABOG, ELENITA A. RIVERA, SOCORRO NOCES, RODOLFO GALLARDO, CARMENCITA M. ONGEO, the time of the approval of this Act or subsequent thereto, has served for at least four (4)
CAMILO L. SEDURIFA, ARLEEN VIC B. OCHANDRA, EDGARDO E. APOSTOL, CLOTILDE C. CANETE, years in a particular city or municipality shall automatically be reassigned by the Commission
ALEJANDRO B. DEL AGUA, PILAR R. BUENO, TEODOICO C. MAGALLANES, PETRONIO N. PIANGCO, to a new station outside the original congressional district."
JR., JOSE M. FLORENDO, BIBIANO A. CAGNAN, ALICIA A. TUBI, RODOLFO C. NATAN, JAIME B.
MENDONEZ, EDILBERTO EDANG, ROSENDA T. JENOVEVA, VEDASTO B. ELIZAN, JR., MILAGROS P. By virtue of the aforequoted provision of law, the Commission on Elections (COMELEC)
DE LUNA, ATILANO L. ISAAC, CORAZON L. J. PEPITO, LUCILA S. PINEDA, ROCHE B. CERRO, promulgated Resolution Nos. 97-00021 and 97-06102 for the implementation thereof.
JOCELYN KL. LIBUT, REMBERTO L. GUTIERREZ, NAZARIO A. TRASMONTE, REYNALDO O. Thereafter, the COMELEC issued several directives3reassigning the petitioners, who are either
MACARAT, FLORENCIA M. MALIBAGO, IMELDA G. TUYAY, JUAN A. GIBA, JR., JOSE M. CAPACITE, City or Municipal Election Officers, to different stations.
ARCITA M. GARCIA, ANGEL G. DACUNO, RITA M. BEDIANG, RENATO L. CANDIDO, NESTORIO B.
BOCO, JONATHAN C. AMBIDA, MONICA MACABARE, BENITO A. MONTALLANA, CLOTILDE C.
Aggrieved by the issuance of the aforesaid directives and resolutions, petitioners found their
APURA-VALDEMORO, CIRIACO J. ARCENO, PABLO L. FORMARAN, JR., PROSPERO S. OLMEDO,
way to this Court via the present petition assailing the validity of Section 44 of RA 8189,
IGNACIO V. CASCANO, SERAFIN L. CLUTARIO, ARTURO L. DIN, JUCHITA C. SY, RODOLFO L.
contending that:
ASUERO, PIO T. PORTES, MARILOU F. TAMAYO, MILAGROS P. LAMBINO, ESTANISLAO A. ESPINA,
RENERIO D. ENGO, FERNANDO A. MOSCARE, CONCHITA A. PICARDAL, ELIAS T. TURLA,
BONIFACIO T. LIM, JOSEFINA A. AGUILAR, ANTONIO O. TEPACE, GAVINO S. ASOTES, RENE P. I
MAGBUTAY, NICOLAS C. UY, JR., JESUS B. LAVA, SENORA C. CALAGOS, RAFAEL A. PAYOD,
MACARIO L. CIEGO, SALVADOR T. CRUZ, VIRGINIA V. BESAS, RAUL S. FIGUERDA, EDGAR R. DELOS SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE ‘EQUAL PROTECTION CLAUSE’
REYES, TERESO R. ROSEL, JOSE J. MABANGUE, PRIMO D. PALOMO, JOHN C. YANGZON, ROMULO ENSHRINED IN THE CONSTITUTION;
D. JABON, FIDENCIO Z. LA TORRE, JR., LETICIA R. MACARIOLA, CARLOS P. VARELA, JR., ANTONIO
L. PEDRAZA, SALVACION A. LAMBAN, LINO L. JAPSON, EUNIA H. VACAL, ANTONIO F. VALDEZ, II
NATIVIDAD E. PRADO, LORENZO C. MERKA, GAUDIOSO A. RUEGO, ETERIO Z. ABOCEJO,
DEMETRIA O. COROLLO, MARIA S. OBEN, ARTHUR V. LEYSON, PEDRO L. AVILA, DOMINADOR S.
RODILLA, MARCIAL MAGPATOC, FEDERICO D. BARCELON, EVANGELINE DELA ROSA, ELENO GIL, SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 VIOLATES THE CONSTITUTIONAL GUARANTEE ON
ARSENIA GARCIA, HUMILDA ALICUM, DIOSDADO CAS, ABRAHAM MASAOY, SAMUEL ORALLO, SECURITY OF TENURE OF CIVIL SERVANTS;
AMELIA OLORES, CANDIDO URBANO, LOURDES FRIAS, ROEL SORIANO, EMELDA AGUSTIN,
PAQUITO SORIANO, GERMAN BALOLONG, BENJAMIN C. ROSARIO, EFREN BUYA, LEONIDA III
LEGASPI, TOMAS ABELLA, JR., JOVENCIA CANTO, JUAN DACONO, MIGUEL BAUTISTA, LORNA
PASCUAL, FERDINAND BRAGANZA, PRISCILLA PEREZ, ALMA LUZ SORIANO, JUAN VALENCIA, JR., SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONSTITUTES A DEPRIVATION OF PROPERTY
JULIAN APOSTOL, ROSARIO GUICO, BONITA VIDAL, GUIA GARCIA, LEOCADIO GINEZ, CATALINA WITHOUT DUE PROCESS OF LAW;
BANEZ, VERONICA TABILIN, ELVIRA CALSADO, ALIPIO LOPEZ, JOSEPHINE MALANA, PIO
ANONUEVO, ELMA DEL ROSARIO, RUFINO FLORES, ANTONIO ORDONEZ, CARMEN CLAVERIA,
IV
ESTRELLA RAMOS, petitioners,
vs.
COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS, respondent. SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 UNDERMINES THE CONSTITUTIONAL INDEPENDENCE
OF COMELEC AND COMELEC’S CONSTITUTIONAL AUTHORITY TO NAME, DESIGNATE AND
APPOINT AND THEN REASSIGN AND TRANSFER ITS VERY OWN OFFICIALS AND EMPLOYEES;
DECISION
V
PURISIMA, J.:
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 CONTRAVENES THE BASIC CONSTITUTIONAL PRECEPT
At bar is a petition for certiorari and prohibition with urgent prayer for the issuance of a writ
[Article VI, SECTION 26(1), Phil. Constitution] THAT EVERY BILL PASSED BY CONGRESS SHALL
of preliminary injunction and temporary restraining order, assailing the validity of Section 44
EMBRACE ONLY ONE SUBJECT WHICH MUST BE EXPRESSED IN THE TITLE THEREOF; and
of Republic Act No. 8189 (RA 8189) otherwise known as "The Voter’s Registration Act of
1996".
VI
RA 8189 was enacted on June 10, 1996 and approved by President Fidel V. Ramos on June 11,
1996. Section 44 thereof provides:
SECTION 44 OF REPUBLIC ACT NO. 8189 IS VOID FOR FAILURE TO COMPLY WITH THE Moreover, to require the COMELEC to reassign all employees (connected with the registration
CONSTITUTIONAL REQUIREMENT [ARTICLE VI, SECTION 26 (2)] OF THREE READINGS ON of voters) who have served at least four years in a given city or municipality would entail a lot
SEPARATE DAYS AND DISTRIBUTION OF PRINTED COPIES IN ITS FINAL FORM THREE DAYS of administrative burden on the part of the COMELEC.
BEFORE ITS PASSAGE.
Neither does Section 44 of RA 8189 infringe the security of tenure of petitioners nor unduly
Petitioners’ contentions revolve on the pivotal issue, whether Section 44 of RA 8189 is valid deprive them of due process of law. As held in Sta. Maria vs. Lopez.6
and constitutional.
"xxx the rule that outlaws unconsented transfers as anathema to security of tenure applies
The petition is barren of merit. Section 44 of RA 8189 enjoys the presumption of validity, and only to an officer who is appointed - not merely assigned - to a particular station. Such a rule
the Court discerns no ground to invalidate it. does not pr[o]scribe a transfer carried out under a specific statute that empowers the head of
an agency to periodically reassign the employees and officers in order to improve the service
Petitioners theorize that Section 44 of RA 8189 is violative of the "equal protection clause" of of the agency. xxx" (italics supplied)
the 1987 Constitution because it singles out the City and Municipal Election Officers of the
COMELEC as prohibited from holding office in the same city or municipality for more than four The guarantee of security of tenure under the Constitution is not a guarantee of perpetual
(4) years. They maintain that there is no substantial distinction between them and other employment.1âwphi1 It only means that an employee cannot be dismissed (or transferred)
COMELEC officials, and therefore, there is no valid classification to justify the objective of the from the service for causes other than those provided by law and after due process is
provision of law under attack. accorded the employee. What it seeks to prevent is capricious exercise of the power to
dismiss. But, where it is the law-making authority itself which furnishes the ground for the
The Court is not persuaded by petitioners’ arguments. The "equal protection clause" of the transfer of a class of employees, no such capriciousness can be raised for so long as the
1987 Constitution permits a valid classification under the following conditions: remedy proposed to cure a perceived evil is germane to the purposes of the law.
1. The classification must rest on substantial distinctions; Untenable is petitioners’ contention that Section 44 of RA 8189 undermines the authority of
COMELEC to appoint its own officials and employees. As stressed upon by the Solicitor
General, Section 44 establishes a guideline for the COMELEC to follow. Said section provides
2. The classification must be germane to the purpose of the law;
the criterion or basis for the reassignment or transfer of an election officer and does not
deprive the COMELEC of its power to appoint, and maintain its authority over its officials and
3. The classification must not be limited to existing conditions only; and employees. As a matter of fact, the questioned COMELEC resolutions and directives illustrate
that it is still the COMELEC which has the power to reassign and transfer its officials and
4. The classification must apply equally to all members of the same class.4 employees. But as a government agency tasked with the implementation and enforcement of
election laws, the COMELEC is duty bound to comply with the laws passed by Congress.
After a careful study, the ineluctable conclusion is that the classification under Section 44 of
RA 8189 satisfies the aforestated requirements. The independence of the COMELEC is not at issue here. There is no impairment or
emasculation of its power to appoint its own officials and employees. In fact, Section 44 even
The singling out of election officers in order to "ensure the impartiality of election officials by strengthens the COMELEC’s power of appointment, as the power to reassign or transfer is
preventing them from developing familiarity with the people of their place of assignment" within its exclusive jurisdiction and domain.
does not violate the equal protection clause of the Constitution.
Petitioners’ contention that Section 44 has an isolated and different subject from that of RA
In Lutz vs.Araneta,5 it was held that "the legislature is not required by the Constitution to 8189 and that the same is not expressed in the title of the law, is equally untenable.
adhere to a policy of ‘all or none’". This is so for underinclusiveness is not an argument against
a valid classification. It may be true that all the other officers of COMELEC referred to by The objectives of Section 26(1), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, that "[e]very bill passed by
petitioners are exposed to the same evils sought to be addressed by the statute. However, in the Congress shall embrace only one subject which shall be expressed in the title thereof",
this case, it can be discerned that the legislature thought the noble purpose of the law would are:
be sufficiently served by breaking an important link in the chain of corruption than by breaking
up each and every link thereof. Verily, under Section 3(n) of RA 8189, election officers are the 1. To prevent hodge-podge or log-rolling legislation;
highest officials or authorized representatives of the COMELEC in a city or municipality. It is
safe to say that without the complicity of such officials, large scale anomalies in the
registration of voters can hardly be carried out.
2. To prevent surprise or fraud upon the legislature by means of provisions in bills of
which the titles gave no information, and which might therefore be overlooked and
carelessly and unintentionally adopted; and
Section 26(1) of Article VI of the 1987 Constitution is sufficiently complied with where, as in
this case, the title is comprehensive enough to embrace the general objective it seeks to
achieve, and if all the parts of the statute are related and germane to the subject matter
embodied in the title or so long as the same are not inconsistent with or foreign to the general
subject and title.8 Section 44 of RA 8189 is not isolated considering that it is related and
germane to the subject matter stated in the title of the law. The title of RA 8189 is "The
Voter’s Registration Act of 1996" with a subject matter enunciated in the explanatory note as
"AN ACT PROVIDING FOR A GENERAL REGISTRATION OF VOTERS, ADOPTING A SYSTEM OF
CONTINUING REGISTRATION, PRESCRIBING THE PROCEDURES THEREOF AND AUTHORIZING
THE APPROPRIATION OF FUNDS THEREFOR." Section 44, which provides for the reassignment
of election officers, is relevant to the subject matter of registration as it seeks to ensure the
integrity of the registration process by providing a guideline for the COMELEC to follow in the
reassignment of election officers. It is not an alien provision but one which is related to the
conduct and procedure of continuing registration of voters. In this regard, it bears stressing
that the Constitution does not require Congress to employ in the title of an enactment,
language of such precision as to mirror, fully index or catalogue, all the contents and the
minute details therein.9
As regards the issue raised by petitioners - whether Section 44 of RA 8189 was enacted in
accordance with Section 26 (2), Article VI of the 1987 Constitution, petitioners have not
convincingly shown grave abuse of discretion on the part of Congress. Respect due to co-equal
departments of the government in matters entrusted to them by the Constitution, and the
absence of a clear showing of grave abuse of discretion suffice to stay the judicial hand.11
WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED; and the constitutionality and validity of Section 44 of
RA 8189 UPHELD. No pronouncement as to costs.
SO ORDERED.