(Andrew Chesterman) On Definiteness - A Study With Special Reference To English and Finnish

This book proposes a new theory of definiteness in language.
It argues
that definiteness should be viewed as a cover-term comprising three
basic oppositions within the areas of familiarity (locatability),
quantity (inclusiveness) and generality (extensivity). Further, the
oppositions are not discrete but scalar, and lend themselves to
characterization in terms of fuzzy-set theory. Dr Chesterman
examines these themes, firstly by drawing on several traditions of
research on the rich system of articles in English, and then by looking
at how the concept of definiteness is realized in Finnish, a language
which has no articles and typically leaves definiteness to be inferred by
a variety of means.
On definiteness provides a thorough and sensitive discussion of an
intricate semantic problem. It highlights two important theoretical
points: the fuzziness of the linguistic concept of definiteness, and the
differences between languages in the ways in which they draw the lines
between syntax, semantics and pragmatics.
CAMBRIDGE STUDIES IN LINGUISTICS
General Editors: B. COMRIE, C. J. FILLMORE, R. LASS, D. LIGHTFOOT, J. LYONS,
P. R MATTHEWS, R. POSNER, S. ROMAINE, N. V. SMITH, N. VINCENT
On definiteness
In this series
20 JAMES FOLEY: Foundations of theoretical phonology

21 A. RADFORD: Italian syntax: transformational and relational grammar
22 DIETER W U N D E R L I C H : Foundations of linguistics*
23 DAVID w. L I G H T F O O T : Principles of diachronic syntax*
24 ANNETTE KARMILOFF-SMITH: A functional approach to child language*
25 PER LINELL: Psychological reality in phonology
26 CHRISTINE T A N Z : Studies in the acquisition of deictic terms
28 TORBEN THRANE: Referential-semantic analysis
29 TAMSIN D O N A L D S O N : Ngiyambaa
30 KRISTIAN ARNASON: Quantity in historical phonology
31 JOHN LAVER: The phonetic description of voice quality
32 PETER AUSTIN: A grammar of Diyari, South Australia
33 ALICE c. HARRIS: Georgian syntax
35 MARTIN ATKINSON: Explanations in the study of child language development*
36 SUZANNE FLEISCHMAN: The future in thought and language
37 JENNY CHESHIRE: Variation in an English dialect
38 WILLIAM A. FOLEY and ROBERT D. VAN VALIN J R : Functional syntax and universal
grammar*
39 MICHAEL A. COVINGTON: Syntactic theory in the High Middle Ages
40 KENNETH J. SAFIR: Syntactic chains
41 J. MILLER: Semantics and syntax
42 H. c. BUNT: Mass terms and model-theoretic semantics
43 HEINZ J. GIEGERICH: Metrical phonology and phonological structure
44 JOHN HAIMAN: Natural syntax
45 BARBARA M. HORVATH: Variation in Australian English: the sociolects of Sydney
46 GRANT GOODALL: Parallel structures in syntax: coordination, causatives, and restructuring
47 JOHN M. ANDERSON and COLIN J. EWEN: Principles of dependency phonology
48 BARBARA A. FOX: Discourse structure and anaphora
49 LAUREL J. BRINTON: The development of English aspectual systems
50 DONNA JO NAPOLI: Predication theory*
51 NOEL BURTON-ROBERTS: The limits to debate: a revised theory of semantic presupposition
52 MICHAEL s. ROCHEMONT and PETER w. C U L I C O V E R : English focus constructions and the
theory of grammar
53 P H I L I P CARR: Linguistic realities: an autonomist metatheory for the generative enterprise
54 EVE SWEETSER: From etymology to pragmatics: metaphorical and cultural aspects of
semantic structure
55 REGINA BLASS: Relevance relations in discourse: a study with special reference to Sissala
56 ANDREW CHESTERMAN: On definiteness: a study with special reference to English and
Finnish
Supplementary volumes
BRIAN D. JOSEPH: The synchrony and diachrony of the Balkan infinitive
ANNETTE SCHMIDT: Young people's Dyirbal: an example of language death from Australia
JOHN HARRIS: Phonological variation and change: studies in Hiberno-English
TERENCE MCKAY: Infinitival complements in German
STELLA MARIS BORTONI-RICARDO: The urbanization of rural dialect speakers: a socio-
linguistic study in Brazil
RUDOLF p. BOTHA: Form and meaning in word formation: a study of Afrikaans
reduplication
AYHAN AKSU-KOC: The acquisition of aspect and modality: the case of past reference in
Turkish
MICHEAL o SIADHAIL: Modern Irish: grammatical structure and dialectal variation
ANNICK DE HOUWER: The acquisition of two languages from birth: a case study
Earlier titles not listed are also available.
* Issued in hard covers and as a paperback
ON DEFINITENESS
A STUDY WITH SPECIAL REFERENCE
TO ENGLISH AND FINNISH
ANDREW CHESTERMAN
Lecturer in English, Department of English, University of Helsinki
The right of the

University of Cambridge
to print and sell
all manner of books
was granted by
Henry VIII in 1534.
The University has printed
and published continuously
since 1584.
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

CAMBRIDGE
NEW YORK PORT CHESTER
MELBOURNE SYDNEY
CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS
Cambridge, New York, Melbourne, Madrid, Cape Town, Singapore, Sao Paulo
Cambridge University Press
The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK
Published in the United States of America by Cambridge University Press, New York
www.cambridge.org
Information on this title: www.cambridge.org/9780521391948
© Cambridge University Press 1991
This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

and to the provisions of relevant collective licensing agreements,
no reproduction of any part may take place without
the written permission of Cambridge University Press.
First published 1991

This digitally printed first paperback version 2005
A catalogue recordfor this publication is available from the British Library
ISBN-13 978-0-521-39194-8 hardback

ISBN-10 0-521-39194-6 hardback
ISBN-13 978-0-521-02287-3 paperback

ISBN-10 0-521-02287-8 paperback
To David and Jean
in recognition
Contents
1 Introduction page 1
1.1 The realization of definiteness 1
1.2 The theoretical problems 2
1.3 The English problem 4
1.4 General outline 8
2 English articles: the research traditions 10
2.1 Background 10
2.2 The location theory 17
2.3 Extensivity 25
2.4 The bare plural 29
2.5 Generics 32
2.6 Conclusions 39
3 English article usage 41
3.1 Noun classes 41
3.2 How many articles? 44
3.3 Usage types 52
4 A unified description of the English articles 63

4.1 Oppositions 63
4.2 Sets and members 69
4.3 Applications 74
4.4 Further comments on the null form and extensivity 83
4.5 Conclusions 88
5 Finnish: no articles 90
5.1 Introducing Finnish 90
5.2 Data from translation 95
5.3 Inflection 98
5.4 Word order 100
5.5 Function words 102
5.6 Context 108
6 Finnish spesies 110
6.1 Early studies 110
6.2 Notive spesies and quantitative spesies 116
6.3 The quantitative status of non-divisibles 118
ix
Contents
6.4 Definite notive but indefinite quantitative spesies! 121

6.5 Word order 122
6.6 A spesies hierarchy? 125
6.7 Pragmatic constraints? 127
6.8 A single spesies after all? 129
6.9 A note on Finnish generics 130
6.10 Conclusions 132
7 The status of definiteness in Finnish 133
7.1 Divisibility and quantity 133
7.2 Case selection 138
7.3 Stress and word order 142
7.4 Function words 148
7.5 The relation between quantity and reference 154
7.6 Conclusions 158
8 English and Finnish contrasted 162
8.1 Towards a tertium comparationis 162
8.2 Correspondences 169
8.3 Some diachronic parallels 176
9 Wider perspectives 181

9.1 Definiteness 181
9.2 Reference 187
9.3 Language and logic 192
9.4 Grammar and pragmatics 196
9.5 A non-Aristotelian paradigm? 200
References 206
Author index 216
Subject index 219
A cknowledgemen ts
This book started life as a Ph.D. thesis for the University of Reading. I am
greatly indebted to the Finnish Academy for financial support, par-
ticularly for enabling me to spend a year full-time at the University of
Reading.
For academic advice and encouragement my thanks go to a number of
people: to Matti Rissanen and Ossi Ihalainen for several inspiring
discussions on little boys breaking windows and the presence of beer in the
fridge; to Matti Kilpio for lending me his expertise on Old English; to
Terho Itkonen for kindly reading and commenting on drafts of the
Finnish sections; to Pertti Hietaranta for insightful comments on Finnish
se; and to Lauri Carlson for pointing me in the right direction on fuzzy-
set theory. I have also benefited from the critical comments of three
anonymous readers for Cambridge University Press. Above all I must
thank Colin Biggs for his patience, thoroughness and encouragement at
Reading. Needless to say, my own obstinacy carries the responsibility for
this final version.
Several groups of Helsinki University English students have also
contributed, either knowingly or unknowingly, to my work, as have some
of my colleagues in the Helsinki English Department, by answering my
queries on borderline cases and invariably coming up with awkward
examples. Kiitos!
And finally, thank you to Marja and Sanja for helping to keep the
balance: without my Finnish-English family the whole project would
have been impossible.
The poem by Roy Hinks on page 205 is cited by kind permission of the
author.
1 Introduction
1.1 The realization of definiteness
The general structure and purpose of this study is Popperian. The

starting-point is neither a corpus of data nor a particular theoretical
position, but a problem, or rather a set of problems. My basic strategy is
first to describe the problems, then consider the solutions that have been
proposed to date. I then try to show in what respects these solutions are
inadequate, how they neglect or misinterpret certain kinds of data and
finally suggest my own analysis. In Popper's terms I thus proceed from
Problem to Hypothesis to Test to New Hypothesis (see Popper 1972). It
then remains to be seen what new problems and further, more refined,
hypotheses will follow from where this study leaves off.
The general issue is: what is definiteness? This is first of all a semantic,
conceptual question: what does the term 'definiteness' mean? Conse-
quently, and more specifically, we may ask: what does it mean to say that
something is definite or indefinite?
A second level of discussion then has to do with recognition: given a
definition of definiteness, definite and indefinite, how do we actually
recognize that something is definite or not? This is a matter of realization,
in two senses of the word. In linguistic terms, how is definiteness realized,
i.e. expressed? And in psycholinguistic terms, how does the hearer/reader
realize, or infer, that something is definite or not? In other words, what
needs to be examined is both how definiteness is encoded and how it is
decoded.
In outline, the main arguments are as follows. I shall claim that
definiteness is not a semantic primitive but a cover-term comprising a
number of oppositions which are more basic. This componential analysis
of definiteness shows that 'definite' and 'indefinite' are not merely polar
opposites, but qualitatively different concepts. Definiteness is not binary,
but composite; it is also scalar.
1
2 Introduction
I start with an analysis of the English articles, as prototypical

realizations of definiteness. I argue that the English article system consists
of five terms: the, a and unstressed some, as 'surface articles', plus two 'no
article' categories: zero (indefinite, with mass and plural) and null
(definite, with singular proper nouns and some singular count nouns).
Each of these five terms imposes a distinct meaning on the NP. As
expressed in the English articles, definiteness can be analysed as a matrix
of three binary features, which suffice to distinguish the five articles:
locatability in a shared set (having to do with familiarity), inclusiveness
(quantity), and extensivity (abstractness and generality). The first two
features are adapted from Hawkins' location theory, and the third is
based on Guillaume's analysis of the difference between any surface article
and no surface article. The description proposed is then placed in an
informal set-theoretical framework. It is general enough to account for
both referentials and non-referentials, and also incorporates a theory of
genericness as a non-uniform derived reading.
In order to examine the implications of this analysis for languages
which lack articles I then turn to Finnish, a language which has a very
different structure. Here, definiteness is expressed or inferred in a variety
of ways, via indications either of familiarity or of quantity. The various
methods constitute a hierarchy: inferences based on word order can be
overruled by the use of article-like function words or by certain case-
endings, but the predominant factor is context.
These detailed treatments of English and Finnish are then followed by
briefer references to studies of a number of other languages, which appear
to corroborate my general conclusions.
The arguments about the nature of definiteness are also of relevance to
some aspects of linguistic theory in general: the applicability (or otherwise)
of standard logic in linguistic analysis; the relation between grammar and
pragmatics; fuzzy grammar and prototype theory. I conclude with the
suggestion that linguistics needs a non-Aristotelian paradigm to cope with
fuzzy concepts such as definiteness.
1.2 The theoretical problems
We start, then, with the question: what is definiteness? Something

of the nature of this problem is illustrated by the following definition by
Kramsky (1972: 30) of what he calls 'determinedness': 'By the term
" determinedness" we understand the fact that nouns are classified
The theoretical problems 3
according to whether the content expressed by the noun is clear and

identifiable in a concrete way or not. In topical utterances [sic] this
category is realized in the positive case by "determinedness", in the
negative case by "indeterminedness'V Definitions of this kind are not
helpful. Kramsky evidently means that nouns are either determined or
undetermined in this way, but this does not amount to a definition of
definiteness or determinedness as such. Furthermore, his definition is
couched in terms that are themselves undefined. To say, for instance, that
a determined noun is one that is 'identifiable' is circular: it begs the
question of precisely what is meant by 'identifiable'. 'In a concrete way'
does not take us any closer - how would this be distinguished from an
'abstract' way? And what is meant by 'clear'? Is it really the content that
must be 'clear' in order for a noun to be determined? Precisely what is the
category that is 'realized by determinedness'? Is it not determinedness
itself which is the category in need of a definition? Indeed, in what sense
does it constitute a 'category' (whether universal or not) in the first place?
Related to this central question of definiteness are a number of other
issues which will also receive attention. One of these will obviously be
reference, which has traditionally posed a labyrinth of problems; however,
one of my points will be that definiteness cannot be restricted to matters
of reference alone. It will also become clear that reference, like definiteness,
is difficult to conceive of in any simple, unitary sense; rather, the term has
a wide and varied scope.
Another related problem concept is genericness, to which a good deal
of space is given. Again, I argue that this is a cover-term for a variety of
readings with different quantitative extensions. In particular, I argue that
the traditional view that the concept must be restricted to 'whole-species'
readings is mistaken. I also find it significant that in research on generics
appeal is often made to data of extraordinary dubiousness. Acceptability
judgements seem to vary enormously, not only regarding genericness but
also as regards basic grammaticality. Such discrepancies of opinion
among native speakers suggest that genericness is a particularly undefined
area of semantics.
Article-languages express definiteness through articles, but languages
lacking articles use a variety of other resources. A number of further
theoretical issues arise here. How do these other resources work? Are they
shared between unrelated languages? Is the definiteness they express
identical with that expressed by articles? What is the status of definiteness
as a universal category?
4 Introduction
Ultimately, these theoretical problems do not relate to one particular

model of grammar or another but to certain general characteristics of
linguistic theory as a whole. In particular, they have to do with the rather
limited degree to which language can be said to be a well-defined system,
with clear-cut categories and black-and-white distinctions. They are also
of relevance to the problem of the empirical status of linguistics as a
(possibly) cognitive science, although this last is an issue that lies beyond
the scope of the present study.
1.3 The English problem
1.3.1 A great deal has been written about definiteness in English. It

must be stressed at the outset, however, that I shall focus exclusively on
the articles, and omit consideration of definiteness elsewhere in the
grammar. It is via the articles that definiteness is quintessential^ realized,
and it is in analyses of the articles that the descriptive problems are most
clearly manifested. Moreover, it is largely on the basis of the evidence of
articles in article-languages that definiteness has been proposed at all as a
category in other languages. Since the articles constitute the prototypical
core of definiteness expression in English, an adequate description of this
core must be a necessary precondition for any more comprehensive
account of definiteness in English as a whole. However, any description of
this core should also be capable, in principle, of extension at least to other
determiners and quantifiers, as I shall seek to show.
The word-class ' articles' has been a puzzle to grammarians of English
right from the start. An extreme illustration is the view of Gardiner that
the articles are no more than 'useless ballast', 'old rubbish':
It is sometimes said that such relatively insignificant words [i.e. as the articles] are
grammatical tools. But the function of tools is to achieve some specific end. That
is precisely what, in many cases, the article does not do, or at all events does only
in a very slight and uncertain degree. Often it is mere useless ballast, a habit or
mannerism accepted by an entire speaking community. The accumulation of old
rubbish is so easy. (Gardiner 1932: 47. Cited in Hewson 1972: 78-9)
The word 'article' itself derives from the Greek arthron, which in Greek
covered relative pronouns and originally also personal pronouns. Latin,
however, had no articles, and because the early seventeenth-century
grammarians of English based their descriptions on Latin the English
articles presented a problem (see e.g. Michael 1970; Vorlat 1975). Most of
The English problem 5
them did not dare to recognize the articles as a separate part of speech,
and gave them a variety of descriptive labels such as 'nominal note',
'particle', 'sign of the substantive', 'sign corresponding to the Latin
cases', and later 'adjective'. For instance, Michael (1970: 351) quotes
from J. Clarke's Rational Spelling Book of 1772: 'As there is but one real
Case in our Tongue, viz. the Genitive... we are obliged to have Recourse
to Articles to decline our nouns.' It was understood that a was a weakened
form of the numeral one, and that the derived from the demonstrative that,
but there is very little analysis of the different functions of these forms.
The definite article the was said to 'individuate', and often implied
previous reference, while a was used with first mentions.
It is really not until Lowth (1762) that articles are taken as a separate
word-class in their own right. As such, Lowth was also interested in the
characteristics of this word-class as a whole, as well as the differences
between the articles. He wrote that the articles - i.e. the and a - are used
before nouns 'to shew how far their signification extends'. And: 'A
substantive without any article to limit it is taken in its widest sense'
(Lowth 1762: 15ff.: quoted in Michael 1970: 361). We shall have reason
to return to this insight later, and also to the connection between the
articles in English and case in other languages.
This kind of historical perspective illustrates how the early grammarians
looked at the English articles through Greek and Latin spectacles. At the
beginning they were not seen as a self-evident well-defined category native
to English itself.
1.3.2 As an illustration of the standard contemporary view of the

articles, and of the problems which arise from this view, I take the analysis
given in Quirk et al. (1985) as representative. This is summarized as
follows (1985: 265), for common nouns with 'specific reference' (as
opposed to 'generic reference').
DEFINITE INDEFINITE
Count Non-count Count Non-count
Singular the tiger the furniture a tiger (some) furniture
Plural the tigers (some) tigers
In addition, say the authors, the, a and 'the zero article' can be used for
generic reference, in contexts which vary to some extent for each of these
articles.
6 Introduction
Underlying this standard analysis are a number of assumptions which

are too rarely challenged (see also Chesterman 1990). Such assumptions
include the following:
(a) English has two articles proper, the and a; plus (sometimes)
unstressed some.
(b) The set of articles also includes the member 'no article', or 'zero
determination'. This is at least sometimes in free variation with
some in non-generic contexts.
(c) The distribution of the articles (and of' no article') is determined

by a combination of three binary oppositions: definite vs
indefinite, count vs non-count and singular vs plural.
(d) There is something called 'generic reference' which can be

expressed by the, a and zero.
(e) Proper names are a separate category, and do not take articles at
all in the singular.
There are problems with all these assumptions, which will be discussed
at length in subsequent sections. The main issues can be outlined as
follows.
Concerning assumption (a): What is the precise status of

unstressed some! Is it or is it not an article proper? On what criteria are
the articles proper to be defined? (See 3.2 below.)
Concerning assumption (b): What is the status of'no article'? If

it is indefinite, why do Quirk et al. also feel it necessary to refer (1985: 276)
to uses of 'the zero article with definite meaning'? (See 2.1.3, 3.2.) If, as
the chart above suggests, zero and some are (at least sometimes) in free
variation, why is it that they are not always? (See 2.4.)
Concerning assumption (c): A binary division of definite vs

indefinite suggests that, according to the chart, a, some and zero are all
indefinite 'in the same way', or at least subcategories of a single category
of indefiniteness; but is 'indefiniteness' a unitary concept? (See 4.1.)
Presumably not, since the overlap between some and zero is by no means
perfect. Compare (from Quirk et al. 1985) Tve just bought some melons /
^melons and They have become vegetarians / *some vegetarians. And if
zero is indefinite, again, how can it also have definite uses?
The English problem 1
Concerning assumption (d): Is 'generic reference' a unitary

concept? Again, presumably not, since not every 'generic' article can be
used in every generic context: *A tiger is becoming almost extinct. (See 2.5.)
Concerning assumption (e): It is surely a weakness of this

standard description that proper nouns are not incorporated into the
description in any systematic way. (See 4.4.)
Another severe drawback of this view is the enormous number of

exceptions it gives rise to, which plague not only learners of the language
but also grammarians and language teachers trying to make sense of the
article system. This standard analysis states that the distribution of the
articles is restricted in the first place by the class of the noun: only certain
nouns (count or non-count/mass) accept given articles. But consider the
wealth of 'exceptional usage' here. First, there is the generalization that
a only occurs with count nouns. Any other usage - such as a vicious anger,
a surprising determination - must therefore be somehow exceptional.
Second, since neither a nor the is supposed to occur with proper names,
uses like There was a Tom Jones on the phone for you are also exceptions,
together with the Freddie I knew, a second Milton, and even the River
Thames. Third, singular count nouns are not supposed to take 'no article',
and so the many uses where this happens are also relegated to the status
of exceptions or 'rather special uses'. Some examples are: captain of the
team, in bed, a girl of good family, on piano tonight we have..., a funny kind
of person, sailor he may be, but..., doctor will see you now, part is given
below. Exceptions such as these are significant because they all represent
productive types, not one-off uses. As exceptions, they are all in fact
counter-evidence to the standard rules.
One conclusion to be drawn from this is that it is not helpful to link
article usage too directly to noun class, and hence to the distinction
between count and non-count. The custom of so doing goes back at least
to Jespersen (1924), but there is another research tradition which starts
from the very opposite assumption: that, given an appropriate context,
almost any noun can occur with any article. One major source of this
tradition is the work of Guillaume (1919), which will be discussed further
in section 2.3 below. In this view, the likelihood of a given noun class
occurring with a given article is more a matter of statistics than syntax:
some article + noun combinations will occur more frequently than others
because certain types of context are, for pragmatic reasons, more
frequent. Thus in our culture dog is normally thought of as a discrete
8 Introduction
object and hence count, but in another culture some dog might denote
desirable food and thus become a mass noun. And imagine the giant in
' Jack and the Beanstalk' calling out' I smell boy!' Apart from the obvious
impossibility (for historical reasons, a deriving from one) of a + plural, the
exceptional cases would be no longer those with an unusual article, but
those nouns which consistently reject a given article. This rejection would
thus be the result of a clash between something in the meaning of the noun
in question and something in the meaning of the article. (This topic is
discussed further in 3.1.)
It seems, then, that the problem remains of producing a coherent
description of article usage in English, one that does not need to
incorporate such a host of exceptions. My own analysis (in chapter 4) will
seek to combine insights from several research traditions into a more
comprehensive theory of the articles than any of the traditions can provide
on its own.
1.4 General outline
The outline of the book is as follows. The main problems have

been sketched in preliminary terms in the present chapter. Chapters 2-4
deal with English. Chapter 2 is a critical review of the major research
traditions, and concludes with a statement of issues that remain
unresolved. Chapter 3 looks at English article usage in some detail,
focusing particularly on less common or so-called exceptional uses. It also
discusses the question of how many articles there actually are. Chapter 4
presents my own unified description of the English articles, based on a
componential analysis of deflniteness that incorporates three distinct
semantic or pragmatic oppositions. Deflniteness and indefiniteness are
thus taken as composite cover-terms for a complex of inter-related
distinctions, rather than labels for a single binary opposition. Deflniteness
itself is argued not to be a primary notion at all, but compositional. The
chapter includes brief indications of how the suggested description can be
usefully applied to some related issues, and ends with some speculation on
the possible explanatory value of two key concepts in the analysis.
Chapters 5-7 then look at Finnish. Chapter 5 introduces the language
and the kinds of data that are relevant to definiteness. Chapter 6
summarizes the Finnish research tradition on deflniteness from the
beginning of the century. Most of the significant work has been done in
response to a proposal by Siro in the 1960s, and the chapter accordingly
General outline 9
discusses this response in some detail, according to each particular line of

argument used. In chapter 7 I then develop my own analysis of the ways
in which definiteness can be expressed or inferred in Finnish. I also claim
that some of the ways traditionally proposed must be rejected, such as
stress and, to some extent, word order.
Chapter 8 has an explicitly contrastive focus. It lines up the analyses of
the two languages side by side and demonstrates the extent to which they
can both be stated in the same terms. This common descriptive
denominator is then used to establish a number of correspondences
between given structures in the two languages. The chapter also points out
several diachronic similarities in the historical development of some
English articles and some Finnish function words.
Chapter 9 discusses a number of wider theoretical issues arising from
the study. These partly have to do with the theory of definiteness and
reference in general. Similarities are noted with descriptions of definiteness
and/or reference in several other, unrelated, languages. Attention is
drawn to the fact that evidence from many languages suggests that both
definiteness and reference are scalar phenomena. This in turn has
implications for the relation between language and logic. The study also
illustrates how the borderline between grammar and pragmatics is drawn
differently in different languages. The evidence presented is thus pertinent
to the whole issue of the delimitation of grammar as what Levinson (1987)
calls 'frozen pragmatics'. Finally, a comparison is drawn between the
kind of fuzzy grammar that appears to be necessary for an analysis of
definiteness, and more general theoretical principles that seem to indicate
the existence of a new paradigm in linguistics.
2 English articles: the research
traditions
2.1 Background
2.1.1 This chapter brings together a wide range of research trends on

the articles. In the course of the discussion a number of questions will be
raised that do not yet seem to have been satisfactorily resolved, such as the
following: Is definiteness a simple binary opposition? What do 'definite'
and 'indefinite' mean? How many articles are there? What does 'no
article' mean? What is the individual meaning of each article? The
underlying theme of the chapter is that these questions can only be
answered adequately within a theory of the articles that will incorporate
insights from several research traditions into a coherent whole, for each of
the existing descriptions is in some way or other too restricted.
In very general terms, modern research into the English articles has
tended to fall into one of three broad types. One approach, starting with
Russell (1905), centres on the meaning of definiteness and the expression
of this meaning throughout the grammar. A second approach is illustrated
by studies in the generative tradition: here the concern is with the correct
derivation of the articles, the rules that will generate the correct article in
a given context. The third approach has been to start with the articles
themselves, their distribution and meaning, and also with the question of
which forms should actually count as articles. My main sources of
inspiration derive primarily from this third approach, and I shall
accordingly mention the first two research traditions only briefly.
The philosophical tradition starts from the opposition between definite
and indefinite reference. The meaning of the two terms of this opposition
may be preliminarily glossed as follows: a definite NP has a referent which
is assumed by the speaker to be unambiguously identifiable by the hearer
(in brief, a known or identifiable referent); and an indefinite NP has a
referent which is assumed by the speaker not to be unambiguously
identifiable by the hearer (i.e. a new, or unknown, referent). Precisely what
'definite' or 'identifiable' mean has been the subject of much debate,
10
Background 11
particularly since Russell (1905), who argued that a definite description

such as the king of France involves the assertion both that the referent in
question exists and that it is unique. Much of this discussion has been
restricted to singular count nouns, focusing on the opposition between the
and a: Evans (1982), for instance, states at the outset of his study of the
varieties of reference that he will use ' singular term' interchangeably with
'referring expression'. This is one reason for the preoccupation with
uniqueness in this line of investigation, for the concept of uniqueness is
not so easily applicable to mass nouns and plurals. Thus Strawson (1950),
in his reply to Russell, speaks of the presuppositions of existence and
uniqueness involved in definite descriptions. Similarly, Searle (1969)
postulates two axioms which must hold for a speech act of definite
reference to be successful, the first of which closely follows Strawson:
Axiom of existence: there must exist one and only one object to which the
speaker's utterance of the expression applies.
Axiom of identification: the hearer must be given sufficient means to identify the
object from the speaker's utterance of the expression. (Searle 1969: 82)
A key term here is 'identify'. In the light of examples such as I have no
idea who the author is it is clear that' identify' is not being used here in the
strict sense of 'know the name of, but in some looser sense such as
'know which author is intended'. Furthermore, it is the hearer's ability
- more accurately, the speaker's assumption of the hearer's ability - to
identify the referent, not the speaker's, which makes the use of the
appropriate.
Much of the philosophical literature has been concerned to explicate the
relation between definiteness and reference. However, it is well known that
both definite and indefinite NPs may also be non-referential. Donnellan
(1966) observed that definite NPs such as the murderer in (1) are
ambiguous between attributive and referential readings:
(1) The murderer of Smith must be insane.
Furthermore, predicate nouns, which are also non-referential (see J. Lyons
1977: 177ff.), can also be both definite or indefinite. Declerck (1986)
discusses these in some detail, and makes the point that an adequate
theory of definiteness should be able to explain the different articles
occurring with non-referential NPs such as the following, neither of which
establishes a discourse referent in the sense of L. Karttunen (1976), i.e. a
referent that can subsequently be referred to by an anaphoric definite
description:
12 The research traditions
(2) John is a good man.

(3) John is the acme of courtesy.
Definiteness is not just a matter of reference.
Studies in the transformational tradition are also mainly based on the
semantic opposition of definite / indefinite, supplemented of course by
± count and + singular. Some also include ± specific (e.g. Stockwell,
Schachter and Partee 1973). Most of the research has dealt with the
derivation of the and a. One suggestion has been that the definite article
can be derived from an underlying restrictive relative clause (Vendler
1967; Robbins 1968). Another has been that it can be derived from a
previous indefinite article (e.g. Annear 1967). Perlmutter (1970) proposes
the numeral one as a source for the indefinite article a, and any as a source
for generic indefinites. Other derivational arguments concern the status of
the articles themselves. Postal (1970a) wished to derive surface pronouns
from deep-structure articles or article-like elements. Sommerstein (1972)
took the opposite view; and see also Lyons (1975). It has been argued (e.g.
by Grannis 1972) that the flaw in all such analyses is their inability to
incorporate situational pragmatic information (such as a speech-act
approach would include). Recent work on the so-called Definiteness
Effect is referred to in section 7.3.4 below, and also commented on in
9.3.2.
I now turn in more detail to the major studies taking the articles
themselves as the starting-point.
2.1.2 Christophersen's classic study (1939) starts with a discussion of

Jespersen's 'thing-words' or 'countables', and 'mass-words'. Both classes
contain both 'material' and 'immaterial' words: street, idea; water,
knowledge. Christophersen agrees with this classification but finds the
terms themselves unsatisfactory (' Many people object to calling something
so spiritual as love " a mass"' (1939: 26)). Instead, he proposes the terms
'unit-word' and 'continuate-word', which have the advantage of being
more neutral as regards material and immaterial nouns. In addition to the
obvious distributional differences of the articles with these two groups of
words, Christophersen also comments on what he calls the psychological
equivalent of the distinction:
A unit-word calls up the idea of something regarded as single and complete in
itself, an individual or unit belonging to a class of similar objects. It is viewed as
a point. A continuate-word represents something apprehended as continuous and
extending indefinitely in space and time. Parts of it may be circumscribed with
precise limits having a definite shape, but the object as such is still viewed as
Background 13
continuous. The shape is due exclusively to the outer mould; the part marked off
does not become a unit, a member of a class. (1939: 26)
This is an important insight, although stated in very vague terms. We shall

have cause to return to it later.
Christophersen adds that a given word may occur as either a unit- or a
continuate-word in different contexts (cf. a cake, some cake). For
Christophersen, this shows that the two groups are not absolute, but only
'represent different modes of apprehension' (1939: 27). And: 'the
transition of a word from one group to another is an extremely common
phenomenon' (ibid.).
Christophersen's analysis of the and a gives each of them a characteristic
meaning, yet these meanings are different in kind, not mutual opposites.
The is the article of familiarity, and a the article of unity. 'Familiarity' is
explained as follows: 'The article the brings it about that to the potential
meaning (the idea) of the word is attached a certain association with
previously acquired knowledge, by which it can be inferred that only one
definite individual is meant. This is what is understood by familiarity"
(1939: 72). (In this form, the definition obviously applies to singular unit-
words only.) Christophersen then acknowledges that, strictly speaking,
familiarity is not always an accurate term: 'Though the previously
acquired knowledge may relate to the very individual meant, yet it is often
only indirectly that one is familiar with what is denoted by the word. It
may be something else that one is familiar with, but between this
"something" and the thing denoted there must be an unambiguous
relation' (1939: 73). So after mentioning a book we can talk of the author,
since we know that a book has an author.
Thus defined, familiarity is an extremely loose concept, covering
disparate instances ranging from a mental image of' the exact individual
that the speaker is thinking o f (1939: 28) to a familiarity with ' something
else' that is indirectly but unambiguously associated with the referent.
However, the main criticism of this concept of familiarity has been that,
although it covers a very wide range of uses, there still remain uses that do
not seem to be 'familiar' in the sense Christophersen defines. These
apparent counter-examples are almost invariably structures with
restrictive postmodifiers, such as the following:
(4) We heard the cry of a jackal.

(5) The paper today has a lurid account of the crimes of someone called
Haggerty.
(6) Fred has come to the conclusion that articles are a pseudo-category.
If we compare (4), for example, with We heard a cry of a jackal, it is difficult

to say in what way the version with the cry renders this noun familiar. In
both cases it is stated to be a jackal's cry, and in both cases the jackal itself
is not identifiable. The definite article seems to do no more than place the
cry rather more clearly within a deictic context, relating it to we and the
relevant time and place. In this sense the cry perhaps seems to give
marginally more information than does a cry, but it is certainly debatable
whether this is a matter of familiarity. I return to this matter later, in 4.3.3.
One explanation of such examples would be that the definite article here
has cataphoric, not anaphoric reference, and that the traditional focus on
previous mention or previously established knowledge is misplaced.
Christophersen himself (1939: 37-8) rejects this explanation in view of the
fact that beside the man I met in the street we also have, in different
contexts, a man I met in the street, so that it cannot be the modifier that
necessarily creates the basis of familiarity for the. His own explanation is
that the article modifies the whole of the following NP, not just the head-
noun. In Jespersen's terms, the junction of a primary (headword) and a
secondary (postmodifier) constitutes a primary in relation to the article.
However, although it is clear that the contrast between the man I met and
a man I met can be explained well enough in terms of the presence or
absence of previous knowledge of a meeting having taken place, the same
is not true of (4)-(6). All are possible first mentions, not implying any
necessary previous information; additionally, the corresponding versions
with a/some are somewhat less likely in (4) and (5) and ungrammatical in
(6).
The article a, in Christophersen's theory, denotes unity. It is said to be
neutral with regard to familiarity (1939: 74), not 'unfamiliar'. He
illustrates such neutral contexts as follows:
(7) I wonder if you have come across a fellow called James Birch. We
were at Eton together.
(8) His father is an MP.
Christophersen says of (7) that 'it is about one definite person which the
speaker knows and which he supposes the hearer too to know'. But
whether or not the speaker knows the referent is irrelevant: it is the
hearer's assumed knowledge that matters. It may even be that the hearer
does not in fact know James Birch - but this is Christophersen's point: a
fellow may or may not be 'familiar'.
Of (8) Christophersen observes that his father presupposes definiteness
and familiarity, and 'the talk can therefore only be of one definite M.P.'.
Background 15
This is a misleading comment. The NP in question is an MP, not his

father. And more importantly, because an MP is a predicate noun it does
not refer (see e.g. Ihalainen 1974: J. Lyons 1977: 177ff.). On the other
hand, if this is what Christophersen is in fact getting at - i.e. that not all
uses of the indefinite article are with unfamiliar referents - then the point
holds.
What Christophersen is basically arguing here is that a is not the
opposite of the but a different kind of animal altogether. Although the
may also show unity (with a singular count noun), and even marks a
'weaker unity' with continuates - i.e. a limitation of the concept - the and
a nevertheless have fundamentally different kinds of meanings: familiarity
and unity.
Jespersen's analysis of the English articles (1949) is also based on this
notion of familiarity. The major difference is that Jespersen treats it as a
scalar phenomenon, ranging from complete familiarity (e.g. John) to
complete unfamiliarity (e.g. a drink, milk) (1949: 437). The is placed in the
intermediate stage of'nearly complete familiarity'. How we are to tell the
difference between 'complete' and 'nearly complete' familiarity is not
clear, however.
The familiarity aspect of Christophersen's theory is based on what he
calls the determination theory of the articles (i.e. determined vs
undetermined). However, a second cornerstone of his analysis is what he
refers to as the actualization theory of the articles. The gist of this is that
when an article is added 'a substantive, from being the name of a mere
idea, is turned into the name of something actual and real' (1939: 54).
Thus house is only a concept, the name of a class of individuals, whereas
a house or the house refer to a real, actual house.
The actualization theory starts with what articles have in common, not
with the differences between them. It observes that any article seems to
change the meaning of the noun in a certain sense,' actualizing' the basic
concept in question so that it is no longer merely 'in the abstract'. In
Christophersen's analysis both the and a actualize a noun by setting
conceptual limits to it: 'to receive an article a word must stand for
something viewed as having precise limits' (1939: 69). Thus cake, with the
zero article (no article), is opposed to both a cake and the cake, in that the
latter two refer to particular limited instances of the general concept
'cake'.
The only true polar opposition in Christophersen's theory is thus
between any article and no article. It must be stressed that an analysis
along these lines is fundamentally different from the view according to
which the zero article is merely the mass and plural equivalent of a. A
major source here for Christophersen is the work of Guillaume; I shall
return to the actualization theory, and Guillaume's version of it in
particular, in a later section (2.3).
2.1.3 Yotsukura (1970) adopts a structuralist mode of analysis. She is

not so much concerned with the meaning of the articles (except for
concrete vs abstract) as with their compatibility with a delicate
classification of NP types, based on a corpus. A significant aspect of the
study is that she does not restrict the category of article to the and a alone.
In the first place, she includes unstressed some as an article, on the grounds
that, for instance, most informants give There are some boys there as the
most obvious plural equivalent of There is a boy there.
In the second place, she finds it necessary to separate two types of NP
occurring with no (visible) article. What is generally known as the zero
article is the form used before indefinite mass and plural nouns, as in / like
cheese. But she shows that there is distributional evidence also for a
second 'no-article' form, as used, for example, before singular proper
nouns: / like London. The nub of this evidence is the difference in
acceptability between the two forms when the NP in question has a
postmodifying restrictive relative clause:
(9) *I like London that the tourists see.

(10) I like the London that the tourists see.
(11) I like cheese that is made of goat's milk.
The point is that the form occurring with singular proper nouns cannot
occur in conjunction with a restrictive relative but must be replaced by the.
The zero article, on the other hand, is perfectly acceptable in such contexts
(1970: 11). In order to distinguish conveniently between these two types
of' no-article' NP I shall henceforth refer to the traditional indefinite form
of mass and plural nouns as the zero form; and the other type, exemplified
by singular proper nouns, I shall call the null form.
In support of the view that the zero and null forms are distinct
Yotsukura also cites Palmer (1939: 54), who distinguished between 'the
alogistic indefinite article' (i.e. zero) and 'cases in which no article
(alogistic, or other) is used at all'. More recently, Sloat (1969: 26) has
argued that proper nouns are no more than a special subclass of common
nouns, characterized by the fact that 'they require a zero allomorph of
The location theory 17
unstressed the when singular and when not preceded by a restrictive

adjective or followed by a restricted relative clause'. 'A zero allomorph of
the' - i.e. the null form - is thus distinct from what is normally referred to
as the indefinite zero article. The same point is also made by Kahiza (1963,
1968); and see also Seppanen and Seppanen (1986).
Yotsukura also notes that the null form is not restricted to singular
proper nouns alone, but also occurs with some singular common nouns in
certain contexts. At least, the restrictive test would suggest this: consider
examples such as the following.
(12) a. Part is given here.
(12) b. *Part we have so far discussed is given here.
(12)c. The part we have so far discussed is given here.
(13) a. Word has come that the Pope has died.
(13)b. *Word that came yesterday was that the Pope has died.
(13)c. The word that came yesterday was that the Pope has died.
As with singular proper nouns, a postmodifying restrictive relative clause
rejects the null form and requires the.
Yotsukura's classification of nouns thus divides them up according to
which of five 'forms' they can take: the, a, unstressed some, zero and null.
Only three of these forms are actually realized - 1 shall call them surface
articles: the, a and unstressed some.
2.2 The location theory
2.2.1 Christophersen's concept of familiarity is redefined in terms of

speech-act theory in Hawkins (1978). Hawkins' analysis of the articles the,
a and unstressed some (he has little to say about the zero and null forms)
has two components. The first is pragmatic, and is essentially a more
explicit version of Christophersen; the second is logical.
Hawkins refines the concept of familiarity in three main ways. In the
first place, he puts it within a speech-act approach, which allows an
explicit specification of the roles of both speaker and hearer in acts of
definite or indefinite reference. Secondly, he introduces the notion of a
shared set, as a more precise way of defining the associated ' something
else' that the hearer is assumed to be familiar with. And thirdly, Hawkins
claims that his analysis is more adequate than Christophersen's because it
can also account for apparent counter-examples to the familiarity theory:
Hawkins' theory, which he calls the location theory, is therefore in
principle more general as well as more explicit.
According to Hawkins (1978: 167), the speaker performs the following

acts when using the:
He (a) introduces a referent (or referents) to the hearer; and (b) instructs the hearer
to locate the referent in some shared set of objects... and he (c) refers to the totality
of the objects or mass within the set which satisfy the referring expression.
I will take act (a) as read for the moment and focus on act (b) first. A
'shared set' in this sense is to be understood as follows. Physical and
mental objects occur in sets of different kinds, and if both speaker and
hearer share knowledge that a given referent is located in a given set, this
set is a shared set (see in particular 1978: 130). Examples of such shared
sets, corresponding to usage types of the, are:
(a) previous discourse between speaker and hearer;
(b) the immediate situation of utterance;
(c) the larger situation of shared general knowledge;
(d) the associates of the referent.
These types are illustrated by (14)—(17):
(14) Fred was discussing an interesting book in his class. I went to discuss
the book with him afterwards.
(15) Pass me the bucket please.
(16) I'll see you in the pub tonight.
(17) Fred has written a book. The title is 'Zen for Beginners'.
The speech acts for indefinite reference are (1978: 187):
[The speaker] (a) introduces a referent (or referents) to the hearer; and (b) refers
to a proper subset, i.e. not-all, of the potential referents of the referring expression.
The significant thing about this formulation is that it does not contain a
counterpart of speech act (b) for definite reference: in the case of indefinite
reference the hearer is not instructed not to locate the referent(s) in a
shared set. Rather, the speech act of indefinite reference is uncommitted
in this respect (see 1978: 187, 191). In (18), for instance, the referent must
be located in a shared set:
(18) Bill lost afingerin the war.
That is, the pragmatically most salient reading is 'one of Bill's fingers'.
(For the notion of salience see especially Lewis (1973: 112ff., and 1979).
Lewis stresses that salience is a relative concept, relative to the point of
view of the speaker at a given time. It can easily be shifted as the discourse
proceeds.) On the other hand, in (19) the referent is not locatable in any
shared set:
(19) Bill found a ten-pound note yesterday.
Whether or not an indefinite referent is locatable in a shared set is thus a
matter of the pragmatics of the sentence: non-locatability is not a defining
feature of a or some. This position is strikingly similar to Christophersen's:
as we saw, familiarity is neutral with respect to a. Indefinites, then, are the
unmarked form, while definite descriptions follow more restricted
pragmatic conditions.
Hawkins argues that his formulation of the meaning of the articles can
also account for what he presents as counter-examples to Christophersen's
theory. However, I do not think he is entirely fair to Christophersen here.
The counter-examples are all 'unfamiliar' (first-mention) uses of the
definite article. Hawkins groups them as follows:
Establishing relative clauses
(20) What's wrong with Bill?-Oh, the woman he went out with last night
was nasty to him.
Associative clauses (actually phrases)
(21) I remember the beginning of the war very well.
NP-complements
(22) Bill is amazed by the fact that there is so much life on earth.
Nominal modifiers
(23) I don't like the colour aubergine.
'Unexplanatory' modifiers
(24) My wife and I share the same secrets.
Hawkins' own explanations of these are interesting. With the exception
of (24), all the examples are of postmodified nouns. These are only
counter-examples to Christophersen, therefore, if familiarity is taken in
the strict sense of previously established knowledge. But on this level they
are equally counter-examples to Hawkins' own theory, for ' shared sets' in
the strict sense are also established by previously acquired, already
existing knowledge. So what Hawkins has to do is to relax the definition
of a shared set in order to allow it to include sets which are actually
established on the basis of information that comes after the mention of the
noun in question, albeit within the total definite NP.
Now the nature of this information, which thus justifies the definite
article, appears to vary greatly both in degree and in kind. In (21)—(23) the
postmodifier gives enough information for the hearer to identify
completely which referent {beginning, fact, colour) is meant. In (24) the

modifier serves to locate 'my wife's secrets' within the set of'my secrets':
both sets of secrets are in fact identical. But the only information the
hearer has is that these two sets are identical - the secrets themselves are
not identified. In (20) the information constituting the shared set may be
even further removed from the referent of the woman: what speaker and
hearer must share here is not necessarily the identity of the woman in
question but merely the understanding that she is 'placed in relation' (as
Hawkins puts it) to Bill, who is himself an already known individual.
But if, in any context, the requisite knowledge is not in fact shared, the
definite reference may be queried or rejected not just in the more
peripheral cases like (20) - ' Oh, I didn't know Bill went out with anyone
last n i g h t ' - b u t also in clearer cases like Christophersen's example the
man I met mentioned above - 'Oh, I didn't know you had met anyone'.
That some degree of information must be established in these examples,
and thus rendered 'shared' simultaneously with its actual utterance, is
evident from the fact that if the modifiers are removed from (20)-(24) all
the sentences are unacceptable as first mentions, for they then contain no
familiarity-establishing information at all and the definite article thus has
no justification.
It is, therefore, not just Christophersen's familiarity which is a loose
concept; Hawkins' shared set must also be stretched to include a
surprising range of'things shared'. (See also Thrane 1980: 185ff.)
The main difference, then, between the first-mention uses of the and the
other ' normal' uses is whether or not the knowledge of a shared set is
established before the mention of the noun in question. As C. Lyons
(1980) points out, however, Hawkins is not entirely consistent in this
respect, since it is not only these 'unfamiliar' uses that function in this
way. Hawkins accepts that introductory frames like (25) may have first-
mention definites:
(25) This is the steering-wheel (said in a car).
But there are also situational and associative anaphoric uses where the
hearer does not know the relevant association beforehand, such as (26):
(26) Beware of the dog.
On a notice, (26) would inform a reader of the existence of a dog in the
vicinity: the utterance itself would establish the relevant knowledge of the
situational set. Similarly:
(27) Any guest at a Finnish summer cottage will invariably be invited to

try the sauna.
Sentence (27) would be a perfectly acceptable first-mention definite,

informing the hearer of an association he need not already be aware of,
viz. that Finnish summer cottages have saunas.
If it is objected that the hearer could nevertheless reject the definite
reference in (26) and (27) and ask or wonder 'What dog?' or 'I didn't
know Finnish cottages had saunas', then the same objection holds for
many of Hawkins' own 'unfamiliar' uses, as Lyons illustrates. We saw
above that (20) may be questioned in this way. Similarly, a hearer may
reply to (23): 'I didn't know aubergine was a colour.' And other examples
of associative clauses (phrases) and NP-complements may equally well be
queried - the following are from Lyons.
(28) I always read the sports page of the Financial Times from beginning
to end. ( - But I didn't know it had a sports page.)
(29) People are often surprised by the fact that Oliver Cromwell was half-
Eskimo on his mother's side. ( - I s that really a fact?)
Hawkins' solution is to relax the definition of a shared set, so as to make

it independent, in principle, of previously existing knowledge. He does not
do so explicitly, however, and confusingly chooses to continue to use the
term 'previous discourse set' even for the 'unfamiliar' uses of the (because
he claims these latter are transformational derivations of a previous
mention using an indefinite article - see 1978: 146). Nowhere does he offer
a precise definition of a shared set, being content to give examples of what
may constitute such a set.
The crucial point, nevertheless, is that all uses of the tell the hearer that
the referent is in some shared set, which may be as precise as a set of
objects or entities, or as imprecise as a sufficient amount of relevant
information. The main advantage of this part of Hawkins' analysis is thus
that the concept of a shared set is general enough to cover both previous-
mention and first-mention uses of the. For convenience, I shall henceforth
refer to this facet of the meaning of the as ' locatability'; that is, it shows
that the referent is locatable in some kind of shared set. (This is very
similar to Thome's (1972) gloss of the as 'which is there': 'there' is now
specified as the shared set, and the referent is deictically located.)
A final point: note that a locatable referent is not equivalent to an
identifiable one, in the sense in which definiteness was preliminarily glossed
earlier. If Fred breaks a finger, I can normally locate the finger as being
one of the set on Fred's hand, but I cannot identify which finger is being
referred to. Locatability is only one condition of identifiability. The other,
in Hawkins' analysis, is inclusiveness, to which I now turn.
2.2.2 The background to the notion of inclusiveness is to be found in

the criticism of Russell's uniqueness requirement for definite reference:
this works for singular count nouns (and for singular proper names), but
is less applicable to definite mass nouns and plurals. A generalization is
needed that will account for all uses of the, not just count singular usage.
One suggestion (Bartsch 1973) is that uniqueness should be understood as
a property of sets, not individuals; count singular nouns are simply sets
that happen to have only one member. Sharvy (1980) argues that the
relevant generalization is in fact ' totality': the indicates that its referent
(singular or plural) is being referred to in its totality. Hawkins' proposal
is to set up an opposition between ' inclusiveness' and ' exclusiveness' to
account for the logical meaning differences between the and a/some. This
is stated explicitly in his speech acts of definite and indefinite reference
quoted above: when using the the speaker ' refers to the totality of the
objects or mass within this [i.e. the shared] set which satisfy the referring
expression' (1978: 167); and when using an indefinite article he 'refers to
a proper subset, i.e. not-all, of the potential referents of the referring
expression' (1978: 187).
The evidence for this logical opposition may be illustrated with
examples like the following:
(30) Bring in the wickets after the game.
(31) Bring the sand in.
(32) Bring the car in.
These are understood to refer to all the relevant wickets and sand; in the
case of (32) 'all' just happens to be equivalent to 'one'. Hawkins also
shows that the exclusiveness of indefinite reference provides a good
explanation of the ungrammaticality of sentences with a necessary reading
which conflicts with the exclusiveness of an indefinite article:
(33) *Fred lost a head during the war.
Since Fred has only one head, the exclusiveness of a head is odd, implying
that there were also other heads (which Fred did not lose). If anything, this
would have to mean that there were a number of other people's heads
involved, which Fred was responsible for, and that he lost one of these. On
the other hand, (34) is quite normal:
(34) Fred lost a leg/a finger during the war.
This is grammatical because it is possible to refer to ' not-all' the legs or

fingers of a person: there exists at least one leg or finger which the speaker
excludes from the reference.
Hawkins feels that in certain contexts this exclusiveness condition of
indefinite reference does not always hold. These include contexts with have
and be and other 'set-existential' verbs (1978: 221), which define existence
within a set. Examples:
(35) I have a head.

(36) There is a head on my body.
(37) Do you remember the other day I was talking about a student called
Smith?
The reason for the apparent inapplicability of the exclusiveness condition

here is a pragmatic one (1978: 223): 'if one is actually defining the objects
which exist in some set, then it is misleading not to specify the full quantity
of the relevant objects'. (I return to the status of these apparent exceptions
below, in 3.3.)
Hawkins' claim that the logical meaning of the is inclusiveness, a reference

to 'all', has not gone unchallenged. It has been argued (e.g. Burton-
Roberts 1981) that one can refer to a plurality without necessarily
referring to all the members of that plurality. Burton-Roberts gives several
examples where, as he puts it, the reference is to a set rather than to all
individual members of a set:
(38) The clouds are hiding the moon.

(39) The Americans have reached the moon.
None of these examples necessarily has a paraphrase (on the same

reading) with 'all'. Indeed, (38) has a ready paraphrase with the pronoun
some: some of the clouds. But, as Burton-Roberts agrees, what this shows
is not that inclusiveness is an irrelevant notion but that it is not to be
correlated with universal quantification. The same point is made by Van
Langendonck (1979), who prefers to speak of ' quasi-plurality' in such
cases as (38). The precise quantificational interpretation of definite plural
(and definite mass) NPs may in fact vary quite considerably, depending on
the pragmatics of the situation. For Van Langendonck this is a
consequence of the inherent fuzziness of plural or non-divisible reference:
the boxes and the water are, he suggests, examples of fuzzy sets - an idea
I shall return to later. For Lewis (1973, 1979), the references in (38) and
(39) would be to all the salient referents, not 'all' the referents per se.
A second criticism of the inclusiveness idea is that it makes the definite
article appear very different from demonstratives (see e.g. Cruse 1980; C.
Lyons 1980). This is because stressed demonstratives are exclusive, not
inclusive, and unstressed demonstratives are neutral in this respect.
Stressed demonstratives are thus like the indefinite article rather than like
the, which appears an odd conclusion. However, Hawkins does show
(1978: 149ff.) that there are in fact a large number of contexts where
demonstratives cannot replace the, which suggests that they are actually
rather more different than is perhaps assumed.
2.2.3 The first part of Hawkins' speech acts for the use of both definite
and indefinite articles states that in each case the speaker introduces a
referent or referents to the hearer. Hawkins is in fact concerned exclusively
with reference. Such an approach must be inadequate for a theory of the
articles as a whole, for it is well known that both the and a (and zero) can
also be used non-referentially. The basic insights of the location theory
have been applied to non-referential NPs by Declerck (1986). Declerck
points out first that the inclusive/exclusive distinction holds equally well
for predicate NPs such as the following:
(40) John is the victim of his own generosity.

(41) John is a victim of his own generosity.
In (41), but not in (40), it is implied that there are also other victims of
John's generosity.
Declerck then states the difference between referential and non-
referential definiteness as follows. For referential NPs the semantic
difference between definite and indefinite is that definite NPs are both
'uniquely identifiable' and inclusive (or at least conversationally
implicated to be inclusive), whereas indefinite NPs are neither. For non-
referential NPs, such as predicate NPs, the semantic difference has to do
with whether or not the NP represents a property which is 'uniquely
determining', i.e. ascribed uniquely to the NP in question. Thus the
difference between John and Bill are good players and John and Bill are the
good players is that in the latter sentence the property NP the good players
denotes the complete set of good players in the relevant context, which is
not the case for the indefinite NP good players. A 'uniquely determining
property' is of course the non-referential equivalent of inclusive reference.
Extensivity 25
In other words, whereas referential definiteness involves both the notion

of 'unique identifiability' and inclusiveness, «o«-referential definiteness
can be accounted for in terms of inclusiveness alone.
It is of course well established that definiteness - both formal and
semantic - is more than just a matter of reference. However, to distinguish
between referential and non-referential definiteness in this way is to throw
away the benefits which the location theory provides. One advantage of
Hawkins' analysis is precisely that it replaces the traditional, rather
inexplicit, notion of identifiability with the combination of locatability
and inclusiveness. The theory is thus an explication of what is meant by
identifiability, which is in part defined in terms of inclusiveness. The
distinction Declerck is attempting to make thus turns out to be spurious:
referential deflnites are 'uniquely identifiable' (i.e. inclusive and locatable)
and inclusive. Non-referential deflnites are 'uniquely determining' (i.e.
inclusive). So both deflnites are inclusive, but referential definites are also
locatable. Similarly, referential indefinites are not 'uniquely identifiable'
(i.e. they are exclusive but + locatable, according to Hawkins); and non-
referential indefinites are not 'uniquely determining' (i.e. they are
exclusive). If the difference is not the presence or absence of inclusiveness,
then, does it have to do with locatability? The answer is no. Definite non-
referential NPs are also locatable in almost exactly the sense described by
Hawkins for referential definites. Consider Declerck's own examples.
(42) John is the acme of courtesy.
(43) These copiers are no longer the machines they used to be.
Both these are examples of postmodified NPs, where the postmodifier
itself provides the location, the shared set, for the definite NP. The only
difference in the locatability of such NPs is that they do not have locatable
referents. For, being non-referential, they do not refer. What Declerck is
saying here, then, boils down to no more than the observation that
referential NPs refer and non-referential ones do not.
However, it is of interest to note that the inclusiveness/exclusiveness
opposition does seem to carry over to non-referential nouns.
2.3 Extensivity
2.3.1 There is another, somewhat neglected line of research into the

articles which is based on an opposition scarcely touched on by the
location theory: that between any surface article and no surface article,
where ' no surface article' includes both zero and what I have referred to
as the null form. A major source of this kind of analysis is the work of
Guillaume (1919, 1945), whose general approach to the problem of the
articles is very different from those mentioned so far. (See also Curat
1985.) Although it has clearly influenced Christophersen, Guillaume's
theory seems to be relatively unfamiliar: Hawkins, for instance, has no
mention of it.
Guillaume's theory of language is a ' psychometrical' one. It starts with
what are posited to be psychological, cognitive mechanisms which govern
man's dialogue with the universe, both as he is confronted by it and as he
confronts it himself. (For a recent account, see Hewson 1972.) Guillaume's
work on the articles (for French) formed a major part of his theory, and
was elegantly, if apologetically, summarized by Bodelsen (in the latter's
review of Jespersen) in the following simile (Bodelsen 1949: 285-6):
Language is like a room. The ceiling represents the world of abstract conceptions,
the floor that of concrete reality. Under the ceiling hang a number of balloons;
they are the words as they exist in language (as opposed to speech), and a
dictionary is in fact a plan of the ceiling with its crowd of balloons. In order to
make those balloons which represent substantives available in speech they must be
brought down to thefloor.This is done by attaching to each of them a weight, and
this weight is an article. Those which represent proper names need no weight,
because they are always on the floor.
Bodelsen is here referring to a distinction which Guillaume, following

Saussure, makes between the nom en puissance and the nom en effet. The
nom en puissance is an element of langue, while the nom en effet belongs to
discours. Paraphrasing, we may say that the former represents the most
abstract, general sense of a concept, and the latter represents a concept
actualized in use.
One modification that needs to be made for English is that common
nouns with no surface article may also be 'available in speech', but in
what we may preliminarily characterize as an abstract or general sense: Life
is short as opposed to the life of Shakespeare, travel by bus as opposed to
miss the bus, etc.
Guillaume's approach is applied to English in some detail by Hewson
(1972), primarily in respect of the opposition between zero and a/the. The
zero article signifies that a noun is being used in its most abstract sense:
strictly speaking, it signifies that the significate has a scope equal to its
potential. Adding an article (here, the or a) gives this concept form and
presents it as a distinct entity or set of entities. The choice between zero
and a surface article is thus primary: only after this can the appropriate
choice be made between the and a.
Extensivity 27
The dimension along which zero differs from a/the is one of extensivity,
in Guillaume's terminology. This is not to be confused with extension.
Hewson illustrates the difference as follows (1972: 49):
Extension concerns range of quantity and refers to amount included in the
signiflcate (external view); extensivity is a range of quality and refers to the extent
of dematerialization of the signiflcate (internal view). To include wolf in the notion
dog is to enlarge its extension, but not necessarily its extensivity. To evolve from
dog a more abstract notion of doggishness is to enlarge the extensivity but not
necessarily the extension.
Extensivity is an extremely abstract notion, and appears in a number of

different guises in the work of other scholars. We have already mentioned
Christophersen's acknowledgement of the influence of what he calls the
actualization theory on his own work. Hjelmslev (1928) took a similar
view: the article marks concretization, the difference between concrete and
abstract. Both definite and indefinite (surface) articles are morphemes of
concretization. And Bodelsen (1949: 285) is making essentially the same
point when he suggests that both articles {a and the) contain an element
of'quantitative presence', being opposed in this respect to the zero article.
So in (44)
(44) You and I have been digging up gold here for years
the absence of the before gold is because, although ' the gold would be
familiar enough to both speakers', the word is not being used to refer to
concrete, quantitative presence. Compare Where is the gold?
A more recent version of this distinction is that of Chafe (1970: 186ff.),
who speaks of the contrast between 'the general substance water' or 'the
entire class of elephants', and 'some particular water or some particular
elephant or elephants'. In the former case we have zero, in the latter some,
a or the. He also phrases the opposition as 'the totality of a substance or
class vs an instance of the substance or a member of the class'.
Christophersen himself rejects Guillaume's theory (which he calls the
substantiation theory, a version of the actualization theory) as such
because, he says, it was devised for French and does not apply so well to
English. This is because, although abstract ideas (with zero) lack
'substance', nevertheless continuous objects with zero (e.g. cheese) - and
also proper names - have substance. In French, such continuous objects
(though not proper names) would take an article. To be fair, Guillaume's
subject is indeed the solution of the article problem in French; yet his
basic insight is applicable to English, as Hewson shows. Christophersen's
characterization of the zero article clearly derives from Guillaume: 'a
continuate-ward in zero form stands for a general idea about a continuous

object... The same is true of [zero] plurals... No idea of precise limits is
present to the mind at the use of such words. There is no thought of a
quantitative limitation' (1939: 73).
2.3.2 There is an interesting additional aspect to Guillaume's notion of

extensivity. The less difference in extensivity there is between an idea {nom
en puissance) and its realization {nom en effet), the less likely it is that a
given word will take a surface article. To take an example, nature in
English (in the sense 'flora and fauna') is such an intrinsically abstract
concept that we find it almost impossible to conceive of it in anything less
extensive than its full abstract sense, and so we do not find *the nature or
*some nature. Another example is mankind. On the other hand, a concept
like cake has a greater range of extensivity, from abstract cake to concrete
a cake, the cake, some cake.
Now, an obvious type of substantive with no difference in extensivity
between idea and realization is a proper name; and singular proper names
do not normally have surface articles. Guillaume does not make an overt
distinction between zero and null. Indeed, he points out that all nouns
without surface articles are those which ' allow the fewest possibilities of
variation during the passage of the general idea deposited in the treasure
of the language [langue], towards the more actual and less general idea
required by speech [discours]' (1919: 21, my translation; see also Hewson
1972: 76). Both zero and null indicate that the noun has maximum
extensivity. In this respect, then, zero and null are similar: in neither case
is the reference to anything less than the maximum potential scope of the
noun. And in Guillaume's terms this is the motivation for the absence of
a surface article in both cases, since one function of any surface article is
precisely to particularize, to make it possible to refer to a concept in a
restricted sense.
Christophersen does not separate zero and null with common nouns,
incorporating both usages under zero. This means that his zero article has
to cover an odd range of uses (see 1939: 81), some with 'substance' and
some without. ' Substance' as Christophersen understands it is clearly not
a helpful notion here. The fact that both zero and null indicate maximum
extensivity makes them similar in this one respect; but in other respects
they are certainly different, one occurring only with indefinite plural and
mass nouns and the other only with singular proper nouns and certain
count singular common nouns.
The bare plural 29
What seems like another version of the parameter of extensivity appears

in a study by Allen and Hill (1979). They discuss the difference between
what they call a zero (in fact what I have called null) and the in uses such
as next Monday versus the next Monday. They argue that the form with
no surface article signals reference to the 'coding locus', where the
participants are already deictically anchored: next Monday from this here-
and-now. The use of the indicates a 'predicated locus': the next Monday
from there-and-then. The usage with no surface article is thus deictically
closer to the speaker; compare (45) and (46).
(45) He said he would come next Monday.
(46) He said he would come the next Monday.
The first means 'next Monday from today, i.e. the time of utterance'; the
second means 'the next Monday after his saying when he would come'.
Put another way, the coding locus is the insider's view, and the predicated
locus is the outsider's one, where the insiders are the actual participants
in the speech situation.
Although outside the mainstream of definiteness and article studies,
Guillaume's approach is particularly interesting for two reasons. It
addresses itself to a problem too often neglected, viz. what all surface
articles seems to have in common as opposed to 'no article'. And it also
offers some explanation of why articles are used. (Guillaume's analysis of
the functional differences between the definite and indefinite surface
articles is in effect well within more traditional views, and I shall not
discuss it separately.) Finally, it is instructive to set Guillaume's views
alongside those of the early English grammarians such as Lowth, who saw
any surface article as limiting the signification of the noun (see above, 1.3).
2.4 The bare plural
It is frequently held that the zero article is ' merely' the plural and
mass equivalent of the indefinite article a, alternating in many contexts
with unstressed some. There is, however, a considerable body of evidence
against such a view, discussed most notably by Carlson. Carlson (1977)
argues in some detail, first, that zero + plural (what he calls the bare
plural) is not the plural of a.
Carlson's strategy is to list a number of structures in which a and the
zero plural are shown to have different semantic properties, over and
above the difference of number. Most of the differences he shows are
differences in the scope of the existential or universal quantifiers. To take

just one example: sentence (47) is ambiguous with respect to the relative
scopes of the two quantifiers.
(47) Everyone read a book on caterpillars.
On one reading, everyone read a different book and the universal
quantifier has the wider scope:
(47) a. (Vx) (Person (x)->(3y) (Book (y) & x read y))
On the other reading, everyone read the same book and the existential
quantifier has the wider scope:
(47) b. (3y) (Vx) (Book (y) & (Person (x)-*x read y))
But the corresponding version with the zero plural has no such ambiguity,
for there is no reading where the existential quantifier has the wider scope:
(48) Everyone read books on caterpillars.
The semantic properties of (47) and (48) are thus different. (With some
books, however, the ambiguity is preserved.)
Another difference has to do with specific/non-specific readings. Thus,
(49) is ambiguous between these two:
(49) Minnie wishes to talk with a young psychiatrist.
However, (50) is not ambiguous: only the non-specific reading is possible.
(50) Minnie wishes to talk with young psychiatrists.
(Again, the version with some young psychiatrists retains the ambiguity.)
A third type of difference has to do with anaphoric processes. An
indefinite singular noun may have two anaphoric pronomial correlates: it
or one:
(51) Kelly is seeking a unicorn, and Millie is seeking // too.
(52) Kelly is seeking a unicorn, and Millie is seeking one too.
In (51) Kelly and Millie must be seeking the same specific unicorn; but in
(52) they may be looking for different unicorns. But now consider (53):
(53) Queenie is seeking unicorns, and Phil is seeking them too.
Although them is the plural of it, it is not the case here that Queenie and
Phil are looking for the same unicorns: only the opaque reading holds, in
which Queenie and Phil are ' engaged in some general activity of unicorn-
seeking'.
The bare plural 31
Evidence of this kind, then, leads Carlson to claim that zero + plural is
not the plural of a, but something qualitatively different. His second
argument is that the so-called 'indefinite plural' zero and the generic
plural zero are one and the same thing. This implies that it is not the case
that zero + plural NPs are always ambiguous between generic and non-
generic, or between universal and existential, readings. (I return to
generics below, in 2.5.) Interesting data in favour of a unitary, non-
ambiguous description of the zero plural are examples where each of the
so-called different readings of zero may stand in anaphoric relationship
with each other, such as (54) and (55).
(54) Mick traps lemmings [non-generic, according to Carlson at least] even
though he knows full well that they [generic] are protected by law.
(55) Lemmings [generic] are protected by law, but Mick goes ahead and
traps them [non-generic] anyway.
Finally, Carlson suggests that what all types of zero + plural NPs have
in common is that they are proper names of kinds of things. He points out
that the zero plural occurs in several structures where the noun kind can
also be used:
(56) Abner repairs cars/ this kind of car for a living.
(57) Cats were /This kind of animal was seen everywhere.
Structures with kind have the same scope readings as the zero plural:
(58) Everyone saw this kind of animal.
In (58), that is, everyone saw different individual animals: compare (48)
above. And similarly for anaphoric phenomena:
(59) Harriet caught this kind of animal yesterday, and Max caught it (or:
them) earlier today.
Compare (60):
(60) Harriet caught cats yesterday, and Max caught them earlier today.
In neither (59) nor (60) are the same individuals being caught by both
Harriet and Max.
Carlson also cites other evidence all pointing in the same direction: the
bare plural 'acts as the proper name of a kind'. It is the context, and the
context only, that selects an appropriate reading for the bare plural:
generic or existential. For instance, adjectives denoting more or less
temporary states, such as drunk, awake, force an existential reading in
sentences such as (61) and (62).
(61) Dentists were drunk.

(62) Frogs were awake.
But adjectives denoting more or less permanent properties force a generic
reading in such contexts:
(63) Dentists were tall.

(64) Frogs are clever.
Carlson has little to say here about the use of zero with mass terms; but,
mutatis mutandis, indefinite mass terms appear to behave in the same way
as bare plurals, as one would expect. Compare:
(65) Everyone collected honey, (not ambiguous, not the same particles of
honey)
(66) Queenie is bringing whisky, and Phil is bringing it too. (only the
reading ' general activity of whisky-bringing')
(67) Abdul drinks gin, even though he knows full well that it is banned in
his country, (non-generic - generic)
(68) Gin is banned in his country, but Abdul goes ahead and drinks it
anyway, (generic - non-generic)
(69) Abner digs coal for a living, (cf. (56))
(70) Coal was seen everywhere, (cf. (57))
I think any comprehensive description of the articles and also
genericness will have to take account of the evidence presented in
Carlson's work. It is clearly no longer adequate to treat the zero article as
a plural/mass equivalent of a: neither is it merely an alternative variant
of some.
2.5 Generics
2.5.1 A major tradition of research into article usage is that on

genericness. It is of course clear that the possibility and precise nature of
a generic reading does not depend on the articles alone, but also on a
variety of contextual factors such as aspect, frequency adverbs, the
semantic class of the verb and so on (see e.g. Lawler 1972; Ihalainen 1974;
N. V. Smith 1975). As Nunberg and Pan (1975: 412) put it: 'generic
messages are derived by inferences from the use of certain articles in certain
contexts'. (And see also Seppanen 1984.)
However, a discussion of such contextual factors lies outside the scope
of the present study. Here I wish to consider two central problematic
issues in the debate on genericness, which have a direct bearing on a
Generics 33
description of the articles. The first is the slipperiness of the term 'generic'
itself, and the consequent difficulty of understanding the notion as a
simple binary opposition of ± generic. The second is the way each so-
called generic article seems to impart to the generic reading of the NP a
particular nuance of its own.
In the first place there is disagreement about what constitutes a generic
NP or a possible generic structure a priori. Doubts have been raised about
the possible generic status of the + plural NPs (Burton-Roberts 1976;
Quirk et al. 1985), the zero article (Burton-Roberts 1981) and a (Jespersen
1949). There have also been queries about the possibility of a generic
reading for certain given structures: thus C. S. Smith (1964: 52) claims
that 'the in object position is not taken as generic if the subject
nounphrase is a proper name'. Other studies have refuted such doubts and
queries (see e.g. N. V. Smith 1975; Burton-Roberts 1981).
There have also been surprisingly many differences of opinion on
individual readings of genericness, and appeals to some extremely
borderline data. Consider the following examples cited in N. V. Smith
(1975):
(71) The idea is more perfect than the object, (generic for Vendler (1968:
20), 'dubious' for Smith)
(72) A beaver built dams in prehistoric times, (generic for Smith,
unacceptable on a generic reading for Perlmutter (1970))
(73) Time elapses more quickly in old age than in childhood, (non-generic
for Smith, generic for me)
(74) Ideas are alien to the undergraduate, (non-generic for Smith, generic
for me)
(75) A toad, the scholar is being fascinated by these days, (grammatical
and generic for Smith, starred for me)
(76) The true lover kisses whenever the opportunity presents itself, (starred
by Smith, grammatical and generic for me)
Such acceptability disagreements seem to indicate not only that
genericness is understood in different ways, but also that in this area as a
whole native speakers tend to find it difficult to agree on binary
judgements of genericness or grammaticality. One might also conclude that
maybe genericness is not amenable to a binary analysis (i.e. ± generic) in
the first place.
For those who do take genericness to be a binary feature, a basic line
of argument has been whether the feature is syntactic or semantic. Studies
by Postal (1970a) and Robbins (1968) take generic to be a syntactic feature,
occurring in syntactic rules. However, the majority view has more recently
been that the feature is part of semantics: see e.g. C. S. Smith (1964),
Jackendoff (1972), Ihalainen (1974). An additional argument has been
that this semantic feature ' generic' is not present in deep structure but is
derived from the surface structure: i.e. that the most fruitful approach is
that of interpretive semantics (Jackendoff 1972; Ihalainen 1974; N. V.
Smith 1975; Nunberg and Pan 1975).
However, there are a number of well-known factors which seem to
militate against taking 'generic' as a unified phenomenon at all, in
addition to the acceptability differences mentioned above. First, the so-
called generic articles the, a and zero have different distributions: they are
not in free variation. These differences are partly syntactic, as shown in the
examples with class predicates in (77).
(77) a. The dodo is extinct.
(77) b. Dodos are extinct.
(77) c. *A dodo is extinct.
There are also generic sentences without class predicates where all these
three forms are grammatical, but cannot be given the same combination
of readings:
(78) a. The dodo likes peanuts, (generic or non-generic)
(78) b. Dodos like peanuts, (generic only)
(78) c. A dodo likes peanuts, (generic or non-generic)
On the basis of evidence such as this some have posited two different
types of generic sentence (e.g. N. V. Smith 1975), one with a class
predicate and one without. It also seems that the precise nature of the
generic interpretation may be affected by the intrinsic meaning of the
article concerned. I now turn in more detail to the way in which each of
the so-called generic articles has been analysed.
2.5.2 The zero article. It is well known that most generic sentences
cannot be properly formulated in terms of the universal quantifier and
that a weaker formulation is necessary. Thus, for the zero article it has
been suggested that the relevant quantifier is in general or generally (Biggs
1978). This approach shifts attention from the NP itself to the verb or the
whole sentence, and is thus comparable to attempts to construe generic
sentences in terms of a 'generic verb' such as tend (see Lawler 1972). So
(79) can be paraphrased as (80):
(79) In general, dodos like peanuts.
(80) Dodos tend to like peanuts.
Generics 35
(Another paraphrase might of course be Dodos like peanuts most of the

time.) If we now characterize the NP itself, rather than the verb or the
whole sentence, this amounts to something like (81):
(81) Most dodos like peanuts.

Compare the proposal in Lawler (1973) of a generic quantifier with the
meaning 'practically all', quite distinct from the standard universal
quantifier. But while most is more satisfactory than all or any for some
generic sentences, it is inappropriate in others:
(82) Oil floats on water.
All, not most oil, floats. So perhaps a closer formulation would be 'at least
most'.
Generic a. Generic a has commonly been associated with paraphrases

involving any (see Perlmutter (1970), who argues that it should actually be
derived from any). However, it has been pointed out in several studies (e.g.
N. V. Smith 1975) that the distributions of generic a and any do not
always coincide. Any often seems too strong a gloss for generic a. Perhaps,
as was the case with generic zero, the interpretation needs to be weakened
slightly, to, for instance, something like 'a typical X'. Such a reading
would go some way towards explaining starred sentences like *A dodo is
extinct, which should hold for a whole species (or subspecies - see below),
not just the typical members or a typical member. Also,' typical' provides
a very natural paraphrase for a sentence with generic your, as in:
(83) Now, take your professor, for instance. He never goes on strike, does
he? Not like your print-worker, eh?
Both Christophersen and Hawkins take generic a as coinciding with

non-specific a: the reference is to a class as represented by a random one
of its members. But this is not quite right; a generic reading must
sometimes be distinguished from a non-specific one, as Burton-Roberts
(1981) shows with the following example:
(84) An Indian smokes a pipe every night.

An Indian could be specific, non-specific or generic. Furthermore, a
generic reading perhaps also needs to be distinguished from what Grannis
(1973) calls a selective reading, which is non-specific but not equivalent to
any, as in:
(85) The empress wants a new elephant, but she can't find one that pleases
her.
Burton-Roberts (1976) proposes a common deep structure for generic a
and the copula a (as in John is a scientist). Generic a would thus be quite
different from generic zero, and from generic the.
Generic the. The problematic form here is generic the-\- plural NP.
The disagreement about the generic status of this form clearly stems from
the way 'generic' is defined. Where the definite article is concerned this is
usually in terms of a genus of some sort, a species. Thus the horse can refer
to the species 'horse'. Those who deny the possibility of a generic
the + plural are therefore taking the view that, by definition, there can be
no more than one 'horse' genus. However, there is a sense in which this
is not the case - and it is in precisely this sense that generic the + plural is
used. The sense is, of course, 'types, subspecies of a genus'. The reference
is to a sub-genus, at a lower level of generality than the superordinate
genus; but it is none the less a genus of a kind, since it is at a higher, more
general level than the individual horse. So if the + singular can refer to a
single species, the-\- plural can, as we would expect, refer to more-than-one
species: in this case, however, the species are hyponyms of the higher-
order species.
Consider first examples such as the following:
(86) Among the lizards, iguanas are the most popular as a local food.
The most obvious reading here is 'family of lizard-types', 'species (pi.) of
lizard'. Given the inclusiveness of the we would also expect the reference
to be to all the types of lizards, and it is thus semantically equivalent to
(generic) the lizard, since a (higher) genus includes all its subspecies.
Compare (87), from Burton-Roberts (1981):
(87) Bjorn wants to gather statistics on at least three whales that are
threatened with extinction. Ideally, the whales should all be most
numerous in the same part of the world.
Here the only possible reading for generic the whales is 'kinds of whale',
with the indicating all the members of a set of subspecies. In this case the
set is not equivalent in scope to generic the whale, however, because the
NP the whales is implicitly modified restrictively by which Bjorn wants to
gather statistics on. This interpretation of generic the + plural also carries
over to examples where a normally mass noun is converted to a plural
count. Consider the following:
Generics 37
(88) He likes wine.

(89) He collects/tastes wines.
(90) He likes the wines of this shop.
The only reading of wines / the wines in (89) and (90) is ' types, brands of
wine'. Example (90) in fact comes from Quirk et al. (1972), who say that
the NP here illustrates something they call 'limited generic reference'. It
is exactly parallel to the whales above except that the restrictive modifier
is actually present. The + plural can thus have a generic reading, if
'reference to a set of subspecies' counts as generic reference.
Notice now that also generic a can give the reading ' subspecies, type': this
is in fact a possible reading for a dodo is extinct; see also the 'selective'
reading in (85) above, implying 'a certain ideal type', and examples like
(91):
(91) Lars wants to study a deer that abounds in southern Africa but is
rare in the north. (Burton-Roberts 1981)
Being exclusive in Hawkins' sense, a indicates the existence also of other
types of dodo/deer. And the same 'type' or 'subset' reading may also
hold for the + singular NP:
(92) The horse known as Przewalski's horse comes from Mongolia.
If we carry this line of enquiry further it appears that even unstressed
some can be used in this way, in some rather restricted contexts. This of
course goes right against the view that unstressed some cannot be generic,
but, again, it all depends what you mean by 'generic'. Consider these
examples:
(93) Celia is campaigning about some seals. They are the kinds that are
found in Newfoundland and Alaska, and they are dying out at an
alarming rate.
(94) Continued destruction of the rainforest will lead to the extermination
of some rare insects.
Sentence (94) illustrates how certain adjectives - those which predicate a
property of a group or class - also force a ' type' reading.
Allowing a generic the + plural therefore seems to mean also allowing a
generic some + plural, in some contexts at least, since both are acceptable
if a subspecies reading is possible. The established solution, of course, is
to reject all such readings, as not being generic in the 'proper' sense of the
word. Yet the only difference between the 'whole genus' and the 'type' or
'subspecies' readings is in fact a hierarchical one. The higher term is
accepted as generic and the lower terms (usually) rejected, although both
are referring at a higher level of abstraction than the particular. In the
absence of an explicit and agreed definition of'generic', the 'subspecies'
readings remain borderline cases - and hence critical for any definition.
2.5.3 The dichotomy between ' whole genus' and ' subspecies' readings
is not the only indication that genericness is not a simple unitary
phenomenon. There is also evidence suggesting that, in some cases at least,
it may be understood more as a cline. To illustrate this I return to the
interpretation of the generic zero article, already touched on above. We
have data such as the following:
(95) Bachelors are not married.
(96) Horses are mammals.
(97) Dodos eat peanuts.
(98) Italians make fine furniture.
(99) Finns always do well in ski-jumping competitions.
These are all traditionally taken as generic sentences with generic subjects.
In each case something appears to be predicated of a whole genus. Yet the
precise quantitative interpretation of the subject NPs varies along a cline
from 'all' to 'a few'. Example (95) is analytic, and applies without
exception to all bachelors. Example (96) is an essential proposition
applying to all horses. The truth values of (95) and (96) would therefore
be altered, logically, by the occurrence of a single counter-example. The
truth value of (97) would not be so altered, since (97) need only apply to
dodos in general, most dodos. Sentence (98) is not predicated of all
Italians; indeed it is actually predicated of a rather small subset of Italians,
viz. the furniture-makers. Sentence (99) has an even more limited
reference: not to Finns in general but to Finnish ski-jumpers, and only to
the cream of these, perhaps only two or three individuals. The appropriate
quantifier in each case is thus determined pragmatically (see also Carlson
1977; Kleiber 1985).
Genericness is thus not a clear-cut unitary phenomenon, but rather

seems to be more of a cover-term for a variety of 'non-particular' kinds
of readings. To define genericness is to define what all such readings have
in common. One well-known definition is that of Dahl (1975), who
characterizes all generic expressions as 'law-like, or nomic statements';
the form of this generalization, however, shows that it is more readily
applicable to what Dahl calls generic tense than to generic NPs.
Conclusions 39
A particularly interesting more recent proposal for a definition is that

of Galmiche (1985), who argues that generic readings are based on two
distinct intuitions. Intuition A is that generics do not refer to individual
particulars, i.e. that they are non-referring in this sense. Intuition B is that
some property is being predicated of a whole genus. Such a view should
also allow for the possibility of generic ' type, subspecies' readings, which
we have seen are crucial to an understanding of generic NPs, since they
certainly conform to Intuition A. (Galmiche himself treats such readings
as exceptions, although they share with whole-genus readings the
acceptability of a class predicate.)
Although, therefore, articles alone are not responsible for genericness,
any theory of the articles must be able in principle to show how the
particular meaning of a given article can give rise to a generic
interpretation in an appropriate context.
2.6 Conclusions
The foregoing survey of the main research traditions makes it

clear that no unified theory of the English articles is yet available. Indeed,
despite the amount written on the subject, certain fundamental issues still
remain open. One is the matter of genericness, discussed above. Another
is the definition of definiteness itself.
Although most studies define definiteness in terms of reference, such a
definition is inadequate to cover all uses of the articles, since it leaves out
of account non-referential usage. So either definiteness is more than a
question of reference, or else the articles have to do with more than just
definiteness.
Further, definiteness is mostly seen as a binary opposition, + definite or
+ determined. Against this, however, there have been several proposals
for analysing the concept not in binary terms but as a scalar phenomenon.
We have already mentioned Jespersen's scale of familiarity. A more
detailed scale of degrees of determination was also given for French by de
la Grasserie (1896), with a total of thirteen degrees ranging from
maximally indeterminate, article-less Homme (as in // est homme) through
un homme and Thomme to maximally determinate and also article-less
proper names. And Bolinger (1977: 118ff.) also incorporates the idea of a
scale of definiteness in his discussion of existential there + BE: this structure
is commonplace at the more indefinite end of the scale but comparatively
rare at the more definite end.
The idea that the meaning of the articles can be analysed as a single
polar opposition has also been criticized from another point of view. Even
if it is granted that 'definite' is the polar opposite of 'indefinite', it is not
equally clear-cut that the is the polar opposite of a, or even of a + zero. 1
Thorne (1972) argues that the difference between the and a is not actually
+ definite at all, since the two are not likes: the is a deictic expression
meaning 'which is there', whereas a is historically derived from a numeral.
(See also J. Lyons 1975.) Moreover, it is a fact that if zero or some (or
both) are included there are more indefinite articles than definite ones. It
has often been observed that indefiniteness is a more complex pheno-
menon than its apparent opposite: thus J. Lyons (1977: 188) would rather
use 'non-definite', reserving 'indefinite' for a subset of 'non-definite'
NPs.
This leads to a further unresolved issue: the articles as a syntactic
category. There is still no agreement on how this category should be
delimited: some studies assume two articles, the and a; others include
zero; others include unstressed some; and still others distinguish between
zero and null forms. The question of the number of articles has a direct
bearing on the matter raised above: if there is an article system
comprising, say, as many as five members, a single semantic opposition
will not suffice to separate them all. Alongside the traditional opposition
of ± definite, then, there seems good reason also to consider other possible
oppositions, such as 'surface article' vs 'no surface article'.
The preceding review has also touched occasionally on another
significant point: the relation between logic, as represented, for example,
by the universal quantifier, and pragmatics, as represented by normal
article usage. With respect to the notion of inclusiveness, and again in the
quantificational interpretation of certain generic NPs, it was apparent that
an analysis in purely logical terms would leave much article usage
unaccounted for.
1
For experimental evidence in support of this very point, see Garton (1983), who argues
that a child's use of the articles a and the must be seen as part of a total system of
determination, not as a simple binary contrast.
3 English article usage
3.1 Noun classes
A comprehensive description of the articles must obviously

incorporate answers to the following two questions:
(a) Which kinds of nouns may in principle take which article(s)?
(b) Under what circumstances may - or must - a given noun or noun
type take a given article?
For any given noun, that is, we must be able to specify first which articles
are possible out of context, and then which of the possible articles is the
appropriate one within a given context.
The first of these questions has to do with the classification of noun
types. Before considering the distribution of the articles in context, then,
a brief discussion of the relevant noun classes will be in order.
What modern standard grammars (such as Quirk et al. 1972, 1985) refer
to as the count/mass distinction derives largely from the ideas of scholars
such as Jespersen and Christophersen. Jespersen (1949) distinguished
'mass-words' from 'unit-words' on the grounds that mass-words take
both the zero article and the, whereas unit-words (in the singular) cannot
take zero; both these are distinct from proper names, which take (what he
called) zero only. Earlier (in volume II), Jespersen had used the terms
'countables' and ' uncountables': i.e. the opposition was then defined
semantically, having to do with whether or not a given concept could be
counted. Christophersen, as mentioned above, prefers 'continuate-word'
to 'mass-word', but his version of the classification is essentially the same.
The trouble with this classification is that, denned in relation to co-
occurrence constraints with articles, it is by no means watertight. From a
purely formal point of view, a appears in complementary distribution to
zero, but the is used in both groups (of common nouns). Thus,
Christophersen (1939: 26n.) acknowledges that it may often be impossible
41
to decide (out of context, at least) whether a noun with the is a unit-word

or a continuate-word. An example would be the cake, in contexts like Did
you like the cake?
Jespersen also had reservations about the classification, and changed his
mind between volume II and volume VII (p. 438) about the status of this
wine in sentences like This wine is different from the one we had yesterday.
In volume VII he classifies this wine as a countable. Presumably he would
say the same about the wine in a similar context.
As we noted earlier, Christophersen (1939: 27) explicitly allowed that
unit-words and continuate-words were not absolute classes, and that
words were commonly transferred from one group to another. (So we
have, for instance, a hair as a unit-word and hair as a continuate.) Hence
the difficulty of classifying the cake or the hair. He suggests that the two
groups actually represent ' different modes of apprehension'; in this he
comes close to Guillaume's view. Guillaume would have said that unit-
words and continuate-words are merely different uses of a given nom en
puissance. (Both scholars are evidently using the term 'word' in different
ways; but I shall not go into this point here.)
The overlap between these two classes is extensive: consider the
innumerable set of nouns that can take either a or zero, depending on the
context: breakfast, chalk, coffee, experience, life, man, stone, wind, etc. In
spite of this, the establishment of the two groups inevitably makes the
overlapping cases into some kind of exceptions: some words are of this
class, others of that, but some may belong to both classes.
In accordance with this division, dictionaries such as the Oxford
advanced learner's dictionary classify most nouns as [C] if countable and
[U] if uncountable (mass). The notes explain that nouns marked [U]
cannot 'normally' take a, nor a plural form. Presumably, therefore, nouns
marked [C] cannot 'normally' take 'no article' in the singular. Any usage
that goes against these norms is thus held to be exceptional. The trouble
with this is that, in addition to the many words that can be both [C] and
[U], there are an awful lot of exceptions even with words that supposedly
belong to one class only. Consider the following cases of mass [U] nouns
nevertheless occurring with a:
(1) The Belgian rider showed a grit and a determination that left his rivals
standing.
(2) He came to find in her a love/an envy/a beauty/a daring he had never
suspected.
(3) This is a very special honey.
Noun classes 43
All these represent a 'type' reading-a 'type' of grit, envy, honey, etc.
Then there are 'exceptions' showing singular count nouns [C] with 'no
article'. (The Advanced learner's dictionary does not bother to mark
common concrete nouns with a [C], but we may certainly take nouns such
as the following as being standard examples of [C] nouns.) Some
examples:
(4) ' I smell mouse,' said the cat.

(5) Jenkins never got even a sight of goal in the first half, (sports
commentator)
(6) ' Patients who come in on ambulance are sent into [operating] theatre.'
(attested from a hospital nurse; for an explanation see 4.4.2.)
I disregard here cases like by train, where train would presumably be

reclassified as [U]. This is presumably also the case with (4), but if the same
is done for examples like (5) and (6) the classification becomes completely
vacuous, being nothing but a post hoc labelling: if there is 'no article',
what looks like a singular count noun must in fact be a mass noun. The
same point applies to (l)-(3), if these nouns are simply reclassified here as
countables.
An alternative classification could be derived from Guillaume, and
would take exactly the opposite view. It would start with the notion that
all nouns may potentially occur with any article (depending on the
context). The exceptions would then be not the overlapping cases as
before, but those nouns which consistently rejected & given article.
Whereas the standard analysis takes nouns such as table, furniture as
typical, because they fall exclusively into one class or another, the
alternative view would take nouns like coffee as typical, because they can
occur with any article. We might then be able to infer something about the
meaning of each article by considering the nouns each was always
incompatible with: the evident ungrammaticality of *a furniture, for
instance, would thus be due to an incompatibility between the meaning of
a and some part of the meaning of furniture.
Very few nouns indeed appear to reject the in all contexts: two are
nature (' flora and fauna') and mankind. Both these are abstract words of
an extreme generality, a notion that therefore seems incompatible with the
meaning of the. Those that reject a in all contexts are all plural nouns
(naturally, considering the historical source of a), together with mass
nouns that, for some reason or other, will not allow a 'type' reading (*a
furniture, *a weather). It seems that any singular count noun, or singular
proper noun, can take a if an appropriate context is found; for proper

nouns this also means invoking the ' type' reading:
(7) He described a Paris/a Finland I had never experienced.
(8) The 1980s saw the rise of a new social Darwinism in the USA and
Britain.
(9) Is she really a Rosenberg? (i.e. the 'type' of person with this
surname)
The situation with' no article' is more complex. If' no article' means the
indefinite mass/plural zero article, it must logically be rejected by singular
count nouns like chair. On the other hand, what is still often called the
zero article nevertheless does occur before a great many such nouns. Quirk
et al. (1985: 276ff.) give a long list of types of count singular common
noun which take what they call 'the zero article with definite meaning'.
Examples include be captain, in bed, by bus, have lunch, arm in arm. Such
uses are said to occur 'only in rather special circumstances'.
A further group of singular nouns that are said to take 'no article' are
proper nouns (without a restrictive modifier). However, here too there are
a host of well-known exceptions: Lake Windermere, Mount Everest but
the River Thames, the Baltic Sea, etc.
All in all, there are so many ' exceptional' uses of ' no article' (to be
examined in more detail below) that some significant generalizations seem
to be being badly missed. As was mentioned in the previous chapter,
several studies have argued for two distinct forms of 'no article'. Before
proceeding further, therefore, we must now consider in more detail the
question of how many members the set of articles actually consists of.
3.2 How many articles?
3.2.1 Although we can start with the and a, it is already clear that the
paradigm is not complete with these alone.
In the first place, there is good reason to include unstressed some
(together" with its non-assertive variant any, which I shall assume here to
be transformationally related; this is undoubtedly something of a
simplification, however, for the relation between some and any is a complex
one - see Sahlin 1979). (Henceforth, unless otherwise specified, some will
mean this unstressed some pronounced /S9m/ or /sm/.) The status of this
some is rather controversial. Neither Christophersen (1939) nor Jespersen
(1949) take it as an article, and it is commonly classed as a quantifier. On
the other hand, others (Gleason 1961; Kahiza 1963; Yotsukura 1970;
How many articles! 45
Hawkins 1978) do include some as an article. Kaluza takes it as the

plural/mass equivalent of a, and Hawkins refers to it explicitly as an
indefinite article (1978: 11). Quirk et al. (1985) also include the form in
their table of NPs showing specific reference. This some has also been
called the partitive article (e.g. by Palmer 1939: 54), a term which neatly
captures its apparently borderline status between articles and quantifiers.
The obvious reason for including some is its perfectly complementary
distribution vis-a-vis (typical) a, occurring before plural and mass nouns,
but not singular count nouns. We have also seen that it patterns exactly
with a (but not with zero) in contexts such as those involving complex
quantifier scope discussed by Carlson (1977; see above, 2.4).
One reason why the form has sometimes not been treated as an article
may well be that its inclusion makes it impossible to reduce the semantic
oppositions within the system to definite vs indefinite alone, since this will
not separate some from zero. However, the conclusion to be drawn is not
necessarily that some does not belong with the articles, but that this single
semantic opposition will not suffice.
3.2.2 A second problem is the status of the form 'no article'. Either
explicitly or implicitly the 'zero article' is invariably included in the
paradigm. We therefore seem to be dealing with an underlying system in
which not every term has a surface realization.
We find 'no article' in the following cases:
(a) with indefinite plurals and mass nouns (olives, cheese);
(b) with proper names in the singular (John, Helsinki);
(c) with some count singular common nouns in certain 'idiomatic'
structures (at church, hand in hand, etc.).
Group (b) is interesting in that it comprises proper nouns only in the
singular. Proper nouns in the plural behave like plural common nouns:
being definite, they take the (the Robinsons, the Cyclades). Group (c)
includes an apparently rather motley set of uses where the article is said
to be ' omitted'; further examples are:
(10) Come along, boy.
(11) What about question seven?
(12) Breakfast is ready.
(13) He spent four years in prison.
Maintaining that the ' no article' in these three groups is one and the same
form in each case produces an awkward problem. Consider the

incompatibility between groups (a) and (b): the nouns in the former group
are indefinite, while those in the latter are definite. Thus, in the possessive
structure illustrated below, which only allows definite NPs in subject
position, proper nouns line up as expected with the, while indefinite nouns
preceded by ' no article' behave like a and some and are ungrammatical.
(14) The dog is John's.

(15) Fido is John's.
(16) *A dog is John's.
(17) *Some dogs are John's, (where some is /sm/)
(18) *Dogs are John's.
(19) * Whisky is John's.
The one ' no article' form therefore has to be both definite and indefinite.
In the second place, there is a striking similarity between groups (b) and
(c): in both groups the nouns are invariably singular, whether proper
nouns or common count nouns. The traditional solution is to regard
proper nouns as being outside the system proper, and examples like those
in group (c) are classified as exceptional. However, a better hypothesis
might be that we have not one but two non-realized forms: one definite
and one indefinite. (As mentioned in the previous chapter, I reserve the
term 'zero' for the traditional indefinite article before mass and plural
nouns, and the term 'null form' for the form that occurs before singular
proper names.)
We have already noted (2.1.3) the point made by Yotsukura and others
that proper names only take the when they occur with a restrictive
modifier. And the null form is unlike the, a, some and zero in being the
only one that cannot occur with a restrictive relative clause: singular
proper nouns are the only ones that need to add the. Thus:
(20) I seem to have mislaid the book/a book/some books I bought

yesterday.
(21) People who live in glasshouses...
(22) Cheese (which is) made of goat's milk is incredibly healthy.
(23) A John Smith I used to know once said that...
But:
(23)a. *John Smith I used to know once said that...
(24) He's not the John Smith I used to know.
But:
(24)a. *He's not John Smith I used to know.
Sentences (21) and (22) have the head-noun preceded by the indefinite zero
article and are grammatical. In sentences (23) and (24) the proper name
behaves differently, being preceded not by zero but by the null article.
Basically, the reason for the ungrammaticality of (23a) and (24a) is of
course that a proper name is presupposed to have (pragmatically) unique
reference, and it is this which rules out the restrictive modifying clause.
As we saw, Yotsukura extended the range of the null form to cover also
certain uses of common nouns such as part, word, particularly when
occurring in subject position. The examples of 'no article' in group (c)
listed above also behave exactly like proper nouns in this respect,
suggesting that they too are preceded not by zero but by null.
(10)a. *Come along, boy who said that.

(1 l)a. *What about question seven you answered before, then?
(12)a. * Breakfast you asked for is ready.
(13)a. *He spent four years in prison where Fred works.
All these are all right with the.

I shall henceforth assume, therefore, that what we may call the article
paradigm does have two unrealized forms. One of these is traditionally
called the zero article, and we may correspondingly refer to the other as
the null article, on the understanding that both these designations are
ultimately shorthand descriptive devices to distinguish conveniently
between classes of NP. One problem this raises is how to tell one form
from the other. Part of the answer is simple: if the noun is a count singular
noun, the ' no article' form will be called the null form; and if the noun
is a count plural or mass noun the form will be the zero form. The only
ambiguous forms remaining, therefore, will be singular nouns (with 'no
article') which could be either count or mass (e.g., out of context, cake);
but this situation is no worse than it is in the traditional classification, for
singular nouns with the can also be either count or mass (cf., out of
context, the cake).
From one point of view, both 'no article' forms could be said to
represent a single ' unmarked' category vis-a-vis the three' marked' surface
articles: I return to this view in chapter 9. At this point, however, I wish
to stress the theoretical advantages to be gained from discerning two
distinct patterns of usage within the total 'no article' range. It will be
possible to treat both proper nouns and common nouns in a unified
manner; and we shall be able to make sense of a great number of uses
traditionally considered to be exceptional.
3.2.3 We may also consider one other candidate for membership of the
article set: the word one. Halliday and Hasan (1976: 100) call this an
indefinite article, although they do not take the articles to constitute a
word-class proper, but part of the class of determiners. They argue that,
like many other determiners, the indefinite article can occur elliptically
and function as head of a nominal group, as in (26), which parallels (25):
(25) I'd like some coffee. - Then make some.

(26) I'd like a cup of coffee. - Then pour yourself one.
One in (26) is said to be merely the form which a takes when functioning
in elliptical structures. Similarly, it is also an article, because it is the
corresponding form of the.
However, to extend the article category to words that can function as
headwords only confuses the issues. In (25) the two some's are different
items, the first unstressed and the second stressed. The first one is an
article, I have agreed, but it does not follow that the stressed item is as well
simply because its orthographical form is the same. Nor are one and it
articles because they can stand for article + noun in elliptical structures.
They are pronouns. Whether or not pronouns are derivable from deep-
structure articles, as Postal (1970a) has argued, is irrelevant here: I am not
concerned with the possible transformational derivations of pronouns or
articles, but with their surface-structure distribution. While acknowl-
edging that the category 'article' is a slippery one, I shall adhere to the
traditional view that articles, however they are actually defined or derived,
are at least forms that occur prenominally, not as heads.
From now on, therefore, we shall be interested primarily in five forms
of the NP: with the, a, unstressed some, zero and null. Strictly speaking,
of course, there are only four actual forms, since zero and null appear as
identical. But I shall assume that there are five terms within the paradigm.
3.2.4 The question now arises of whether these five terms constitute a
well-defined system or whether they are more like an open set. We have
already seen that there is disagreement about how many members the
category comprises, and that we lack defining characteristics of article
status. (See also Sorensen 1959.) If the articles are a well-defined system
we should expect clear borderlines between, for instance, articles and
pronouns, articles and other determiners, and articles and quantifiers. But
these borderlines actually appear rather fuzzy.
Ability to stand as a headword will serve to separate articles from
pronouns in English, but the test does not work so well for certain other
languages, such as Finnish and Polish, where what are normally pronouns
may occur prenominally in some structures. I return to this in the
discussion of Finnish below.
The borderline between determiners as a whole and quantifiers appears
at first sight to be clear-cut. Determiners answer the question 'Which X ? '
while quantifiers answer the question 'How much/many X ? ' On both
sides we have paradigm cases {this, that; the cardinal numerals), but
around these we nevertheless find more peripheral items. One example is
all. Normally classified as a quantifier, in certain contexts it can also
function as a determiner. Thus J. Lyons (1977: 456) notes that 'Which
sweets do you what?' can be answered by 'All of them.' Stressed some
also seems to straddle the borderline (1977: 455). In contrast with others
it behaves like a determiner: some people do this, others do that. Yet in
contrast with all it is a quantifier: some children like mustard, but all
children like ice-cream. Similarly, any has functions some of which are
article-like and others quantifier-like (see Sahlin 1979). And notice too the
hybrid form many a.
Furthermore, recall in this context that of the five items we are dealing
with, one derives historically from a demonstrative and another from the
numeral one.
Separating the articles from demonstratives is also a tricky business,
particularly in view of the origin of the. Kramsky (1972: 33) suggests that
a demonstrative historically became a genuine article only when it could
be used generically. If the possibility of generic reference is taken as a
criterion for the articles in general, only the, a and zero are clear
candidates. However, I have argued above (2.5) that a lot depends on how
'generic' is itself defined; if it is held to include reference to a subspecies,
then unstressed some is also an article, at least sometimes. Moreover, if the
subspecies reading is accepted as generic, we also have generic contexts for
this and that: This/That beaver is mainly found in Canada. And similarly
for these/those.
Kramsky (1972: 33, 63) also proposes a second kind of distinction
between articles and demonstratives, this time a semantic one. The article,
he says, modifies the essential meaning of the noun internally, while a
demonstrative merely points. This is very vague. In Guillaume's terms, I
am equally restricting the extensivity of the noun whether I say the beaver
or this beaver, as opposed to plain beaver.
A more explicit attempt to define a dividing line is made by Hawkins
(1978). Both the and demonstratives are said to introduce a referent to the
hearer, but with demonstratives there is a matching constraint rather than
a location constraint. The matching constraint is formulated as follows

(1978: 152): the hearer is instructed to match the linguistic referent 'with
some identifiable object, where identifiability means either (i) visible in the
situation or (ii) known on the basis of previous mention in discourse'.
Hawkins makes much of the condition that the referent must be visible,
but this requirement is wrongly stated. It is not just via sight but via any
sense that the referent must be perceptible: (27) and (28) are quite
appropriate even if uttered by a blind speaker to a blind hearer.
(27) Listen to this next bit/that voice!
(28) Just taste/smell/touch this bit\
In fact, 'perceptible' must be given an even wider reading than this.
Consider (29):
(29) What do you think of this idea: let's take them all fishing.
Here the speaker introduces a referent which is made identifiable
cataphorically, not on the basis of previous mention; moreover, the
referent is not perceptible in any physical sense. Hawkins' own example
(1978: 152) is oddly similar (the noun is, admittedly, audible, but not
visible), and thus seems to contradict his own point:
(30) Fleet Street has been buzzing with this rumour that the prime minister
is going to resign.
The matching constraint, as formulated by Hawkins, is thus too strong.
Hawkins himself points out that the contexts where demonstrative usage
does not overlap with that of articles are primarily larger situation uses
(31), introductory (first-mention) visible situation uses (32) and associative
anaphoric uses (33). It is surely here that we should look for a
distinguishing feature for demonstratives.
(31) Til see this town clerk about it. (said nowhere near the town clerk)
(32) *Here is/This is this goosh-injecting tyroid. (as a first mention)
(33) *Fve just bought a book. This author is a friend of mine.
I suggest that the unacceptability of sentences such as (31) and (32) derives
not from the violation of Hawkins' matching constraint but from the
fundamental inherent meaning of the demonstratives. This/these is a
deictic form marked [ + proximate], while that/those is [ — proximate].
Sentence (31) is unacceptable because the context stipulates that the town
clerk is not proximate, and this clashes with this. The same sentence with
that town clerk would be acceptable if the official in question is a known
referent, but not as a first mention. Hawkins in fact seems to overlook the
[ +proximate] feature altogether, appearing to accept data such as (34)
which I would certainly query (see Hawkins 1978: 103).
(34) ??Pass me this bucket, please.
I find this unacceptable because of the clash between this ([ +proximate])
and pass me, which implies that whatever is to be passed is precisely not
proximate. The utterance would only be acceptable if there were a time
difference between the temporal reference of pass and that of the utterance
itself: Pass me this bucket when I have climbed up the ladder. Compare Pass
me that bucket, which is fine. (See also Thrane 1980: 199.)
Sentence (32) seems to fail for a different reason: the second this is
redundant, because the initial here /this is already marked for [ + proxi-
mate].
Sentence (33) is unacceptable because this/that is too specific to carry
any associative links. This author is presented, pointed to, in isolation, as
it were, unconnected with any previous mention of a book. The only
possible previous mention would be of the identical referent, not just one
associated with it: Once upon a time there was an author. This
author ...With respect to (33), then, Hawkins' general point is correct in
that the use of this/ that instructs the hearer to focus on some particular
object, rather than relate the referent to an association set. A
demonstrative marks a referent as an individual in itself, unrelated to any
set of which it might be a member.
Notwithstanding this distinction, however, there is obviously a good
deal of overlap between article and demonstrative usage. One reason for
this is undoubtedly to be found in the historical origins of the (surface)
articles. The forms the, a and some are the result of a converging historical
development involving both demonstratives and quantifiers. But a second
reason surely lies in the conceptual relations between the two groups. As
we have seen, certain notions of quantity seem to be inherent in the notion
of identifiability. Indeed, aspects of quantity seem basic to reference as a
whole: consider the early preoccupation with uniqueness.
I think it follows that it would be highly unlikely for the articles to
constitute a totally distinct well-defined system of their own, divorced
from other markers of reference and quantity. Rather, they seem to form
some kind of interface between the two.
3.3 Usage types
3.3.1 We can now examine the kinds of contexts in which the, a, some,
zero and null occur. With respect to the and a the basic facts are well
known, and I shall therefore devote more attention to apparent exceptions
to the standard generalizations. I also discuss a number of uses and
examples that appear to be exceptions but turn out not to be. I start with
the.
As mentioned above, most studies are concerned with the referential
uses of the articles. For the the main referential usage types are
summarized by Hawkins (after Christophersen and Jespersen) as follows.
Anaphoric use
(35) Bill was working at a lathe the other day. All of a sudden the machine
stopped turning.
(36) Bill swore. The oath embarrassed his mother.
Immediate-situation use
(37) Pass me the bucket, please.
Larger-situation use
(38) Let's go to the pub.
(39) The planets circle the sun.
Associative anaphoric use
(40) The man drove past our house in a car. The exhaust fumes were
terrible.
Unfamiliar (introductory, first-mention) use (most of these have cataphoric
reference; see also above, 2.2)
(41) I remember the beginning of the war very well.
As Hawkins points out, in order for the to be appropriate in the

situational uses it is not necessary for the hearer to be able to identify the
referent by name: all that is required is that he may reasonably be assumed
to understand that, for example, the pub means 'the local pub', 'the one
down the road'. In Hawkins' terms, the referent must be locatable in a
shared set. We have also noted (see also C. G. Lyons 1980) that contrary
to Hawkins' claims both situational uses may simultaneously inform the
hearer that a given referent exists in a given shared set: it is not necessary
for the hearer to have previous information of this. The only difference
between the two types is thus one of degree: in one the situation is
immediate, often visible, and in the other it is wider, more general.
A further referential usage type distinguished by Quirk et al. (1985) is
Usage types 53
'sporadic reference', where the reference is to an institution of human

society, as in enjoy the theatre, on the radio, take the bus, in the post. There
is also what Quirk et al call the 'logical' use of the, with referents whose
uniqueness is due to logical meaning: the first, the last, the next, the only,
the same, the best, the largest, etc.
Two further obvious uses are:
Non-referential use
(42) John was the chairman.
(43) You really are the limit.
(44) He's always playing the fool.
Generic use
(45) The horse is a useful animal.
Hawkins argues that all referential (and generic) uses of the are of
inclusive reference, i.e. to all the relevant set. However, as we have already
seen, there appear to be a good many exceptions to this generalization.
(Cf. The Americans have reached the moon, etc.: see 2.2.)
A number of other interesting 'exceptions' deserve to be mentioned at
this point. In all these, although the would be expected, it does not - or
need not - occur. One is the well-known narrative introduction sequence
noted already by Christophersen, where this is preferred:
(46) Once upon a time there was a king. This king had three daughters.
The explanation for this appears to lie in Hawkins' matching constraint
for demonstratives (see above, 3.2.4). Being a stronger constraint than
locatability, it seems to focus attention on the referent in isolation from its
surroundings: the emphasis is on the feature [ + proximate], which takes
priority here as the previous mention (a king) is so close. The acceptability
of this will therefore decrease as the distance between it and the previous
mention increases. Compare also the use of this at the beginning of jokes,
where the feature [ + proximate] is all-important: Well, there was this
bishop, see...
Another untypical usage is found in contexts of 'logically unique'
reference which nevertheless appear with a or the indefinite zero article.
(47) A first attempt was made / First attempts were made by Jones in 1932.
(48) I would still like to make a last comment.
(49) Best results were achieved by M and N.
However, by far the largest group of exceptions is where an expected
(and possible) the before a count singular is replaced by null. As already
mentioned, this is common in 'idiomatic' usage. Some of these uses are

non-referential, such as (50), and are thus excluded from referential
theories of the articles.
(50) She is now (the) captain of the team.
But others are clearly referential, and thus pose problems for theories such
as Hawkins'. Some examples are:
(51) Lunch is ready, (unless lunch is taken as a mass noun here)
(52) Doctor will see you now. (said by the receptionist)
(53) Commentary is by NN. (TV Times, at the end of programme notes
not written in note-form)
(54) The matter was fully discussed in Cabinet, (said by the prime minister)
(55) Biggest reason for this cutback is...more efficient aircraft. (Guardian)
(56) Total population is now 4.8 million.
In all these the is (at least) equally acceptable, but existing descriptions
offer no principled explanation of why the null form is also possible in
such cases: they are simply 'institutional uses', 'fixed phrases' or
'exceptions'.
Alongside this variation with null we also find a good deal of variation
between the and zero, such as:
(57) The discussion/Discussion of the issue continued for several hours.
Slightly more surprisingly, there are also examples like (58), from the
middle of an article (in Newsweek) on white emigration from South
Africa; we find:
(58) Business executives... have made up the bulk of departing whites.
By all the standard rules for article usage we would have expected the
departing whites (unless this latter is seen as a contrastive alternative - ' not
the departing blacks'; but this would be inappropriate in this context).
The reference is clearly anaphoric, to a previously introduced group of
referents who are undoubtedly assumed to be familiar to the hearer; and
yet zero is perfectly acceptable.
Finally, we note that proper nouns can take the in some contexts: when
the noun is plural (the Himalayas), or when a singular noun has a
restrictive modifier (the young Sibelius). Also the names of rivers, seas,
oceans and canals take the (the River Thames, the Indian Ocean, the Kiel
Canal). These uses are 'exceptional' in that singular proper nouns
normally take null.
Usage types 55
3.3.2 Some examples were mentioned above where the varies with null.
(There is also some dialectal variation, e.g. between British and American
English, but I disregard this here.) But there are many more cases where
null is the only alternative. Quirk et al. (1985) list the following main types
(for British English).
Institutions of human life and society: be in bed, go to church
Means of transport and communication: go by bus, by post
Times of day and night: at dawn
Seasons: in spring
Meals: dinner is served
Illnesses: diabetes, measles
Parallel structures: face to face
Fixed prepositional phrases: in turn, out of step
To these we may also add vocatives {come along, boy); certain structures
with postmodifying numerals and the like (book six, part B); normally
count nouns in a 'mass' sense (a shred of carpet, a girl of good family);
count singular nouns occurring in a 'kind-of context (what kind of
house?, that type of book, a better class of person)', musical instruments in
some contexts (play lead guitar, on piano). And note also such examples as
(5) and (6) above.
It is also striking that Quirk et al. (1985) themselves often use the null
article instead of the when referring to the zero article:
(59) More freely, zero article may be used in front of fixed phrases
such as... (p. 270)
(60) They have zero article when they are connected with a point of
time...(p. 292)
Null is also normally used before singular proper names, with some
exceptions. When a singular proper name behaves as a common noun
(and no longer 'names', therefore) a is used (a second Milton). And as we
have seen, proper nouns with restrictive modification must take any article
other than null (the Reading I knew as a boy). Again as mentioned above,
a number of geographical names do not take the expected null, but the
(rivers, seas, canals). I discuss the null form in further detail below, in 4.4.
3.3.3 A and some do not require that their referent(s) must be located
in a shared set. In (61) the referents in question are non-locatable, and are
introduced into the discourse for the first time.
(61) John has just bought a computer/some bees.
This represents the basic usage type for a and some. But such' quantitative'
contexts are less acceptable with zero:
(62) ?John has just bought honey/bees.
Zero is typically found in generic or 'categorial' contexts (the term is from
Quirk et al. 1985), where the concept of a specific, though undefined,
quantity is lacking:
(63) John loves bees.
(64) This is made of plastic.
(Compare also the use of zero in de dicto contexts like What I wanted was
parrots, not carrots; I said it was soap the dog ate, not soup.)
A and zero are also commonly used non-referentially, but (unstressed)
some is not:
(65) He must be a fool.
(66) As a foreigner, what do you think?
(67) They must befools (*some fools).
(68) As foreigners (*some foreigners), what do you think?
I now turn to consider a number of exceptions or special cases of
indefinite-article usage. Notice first that a and some must in fact be
uncommitted as regards locatability in a shared set, rather than non-
locatable. Thus, even if a referent does happen to be in a shared set it does
not follow that the is obligatory: the speaker may nevertheless choose to
introduce the referent as if it was not so located (Hawkins 1978: 195). This
is the explanation for the use of a in contexts such as (69), where a couple
are reflecting on an event they both participated in when their car got
stuck on a level crossing (Hawkins 1978: 193ff.):
(69) There we were, completely helpless, when a nice friendly policeman
came rushing to the scene...
The essential criterion for the referential use of a and some, therefore,
is not uncommittedness with regard to locatability in a shared set, but the
exclusiveness of the reference: they both imply that there exists at least one
other referent that could potentially be referred to by the same expression.
Usage types 57
This component of meaning in fact also allows a consistent explanation

for what Hawkins himself regards as exceptions to the exclusiveness
condition. He says (1978: 221 ff.) that indefinites with have, be and 'set-
existential ' verbs can also be inclusive. His examples include:
(70) I have a head.
(71) There is a prime minister of/in England.
(72) Do you remember the other day I was talking about a student called
Smith!
Hawkins is of the opinion that these indefinite descriptions (and
corresponding ones with some) have inclusive reference, since 'if one is
actually defining the objects which exist in some set, then it is misleading
not to specify the full quantity of the relevant objects' (1978: 223).
However, it seems to me that Hawkins is weakening his own point (about
the exclusiveness of a and some) unnecessarily here. Certainly, if indeed I
am talking of my own body - presumably the most likely context - 1 can
have no more than one head; similarly, England can have no more than
one prime minister, and I could well have been talking about a contextually
unique student called Smith. But, contrary to Hawkins' claim, such
contexts also presuppose that there do exist other heads, etc. The point is
that they exist elsewhere 'in the world'. The relevant set, out of which the
indefinite NP selects a subset, is e.g. 'all heads': I have just one member
of this set, but there do exist other members. Set-existential contexts
simply relate referents to much larger sets. In fact, each context determines
its own set of referents pragmatically. Compare:
(73) I broke a finger.
Here, the finger will normally be understood to be one of the ten belonging
to me - a pragmatically very restricted set - unless the context specifies
otherwise. But now consider a situation where two children are playing
with, say, various broken dolls. Scattered around the floor are bits and
pieces of all kinds. Suddenly, as they try to reconstruct the figures, one
child says (73). In this context this would have to mean one member of the
set consisting of all the dolls' finger-parts. Set-existential contexts, on the
other hand, require the set to be of maximum scope - hence the oddness
(in normal usage) of (74):
(74) *I have the head.
At this point I return for a moment to Hawkins' examples of some with
set-existential verbs. One is / have some hands. I find this a very
questionable utterance (outside contexts such as the doll-construction

type, above), much less acceptable than / have hands with the zero article.
The normal context is in fact one of inalienable possession, a structure
which seems to reject some fairly consistently. Consider the following:
(75) She has (*some) brown eyes, (*some) hair and (*some) dimples.
(76) The table has (*some) oak legs.
ill) He who has (*some) ears, let him hear.
In inalienable-possession structures, then, both a and zero occur, but some
is shunned. Nevertheless, some is often possible when a larger quantity of
possessed objects seems to be implied: / still have some ( = /sm/, i.e.
unstressed) teeth left. Perhaps the larger number makes the use of some
pragmatically more reasonable: a genuine partial quantity can be
imagined, unlike, say, for ears.
3.3.4 Let us now take up a different matter. We have already mentioned

(3.1) that a can be used with many modified mass nouns in a 'type'
reading (like a good education). The possibility of this reading also
explains the use of a with modified uniques, such as:
(78) A pale moon rose through the clouds.
(79) The sun shone down from a deep blue sky.
And note also:
(80) a good 4 per cent/a niggardly three dollars a week
With respect to the occurrence of a with modified abstract nouns, it has
been suggested (Quirk et al. 1985: 287) that one condition for this
exceptional usage is that the noun should refer to 'a quality or other
abstraction which is attributed to a person'. But this seems an unnecessary
restriction, since we also find such examples as
(81) The dog showed an unusual intelligence.
(82) The building had a lightness and an elegance which enchanted him.
(83) The car boasted an Italian styling.
In a different way, restrictive modifiers also complicate the analysis of
examples like (72) above. The modifier here reduces the number of
relevant referents to one, but the head-noun itself is exclusive. This also
explains another of Hawkins' exceptions: he says (1978: 225-7) that in the
following examples the indefinite NPs are neutral with respect to
exclusiveness - i.e. not necessarily exclusive:
Usage types 59
(84) What's wrong with Mary? Oh, a man she went out with last night was
nasty to her.
(85) There is a gentleman who wants to see you.
Both these first introduce an entity 'exclusively' from sets consisting of

'all men', 'all gentlemen', and this entity is then modified. Whether or not
the referent of the whole NP is exclusive is a matter of pragmatics.
Hawkins is of the opinion that (84) is neutral in this respect, since Mary
may or may not have gone out with other men. But this ambiguity is
simply due to the lack of any context. If we know, for instance, that
Mary's profession involves her in entertaining several men each evening,
the reading is unambiguously exclusive. But whether the reading of the
whole NP is exclusive or not, the head-noun itself is exclusive.
This view is contrary to that of Hawkins, who claims that exclusiveness
' normally' covers the whole of the NP: indefinite NPs with restrictive
modifiers presuppose that 'there do exist other objects satisfying both
noun and modifier' (1978: 224). This would explain the oddness of * IFred
lost a right leg in the war. Fred has only one right leg, although he has more
than one leg.
The effect of modification is taken up again in the following chapter,
but it is worth pointing out here that Hawkins appears forced to take the
view he does because he sees inclusiveness/exclusiveness solely in terms of
reference. To be sure, the modified NP as a whole has a single referent in
the examples we are considering; but, as we have seen, both definiteness
and inclusiveness/exclusiveness have to do with more than reference.
3.3.5 As noted by Declerck (1986), the exclusiveness of a also carries

over to non-referential usage. John is an idiot also allows the existence of
other idiots. The corresponding plural, however, has zero, not some:
(86) John and Jane are idiots/*some idiots.
An interesting problem case brought up by Declerck shows non-

referential the appearing where at first sight we might expect exclusive a:
(87) Don't tell me you're the brother of that idiot!

(88) The accident was not the fault of the organizers.
Neither of these necessarily requires an inclusiveness reading: that idiot

might well have several brothers, and the organizers might also have made
other mistakes, says Declerck. But in fact they are not particularly
exceptional. As regards (87) a crucial point is the scope of the set which
is denoted, apparently inclusively (hence the). The relevant set of brothers
does seem to be a set of one for the speaker, even though this may not
objectively be true. Declerck writes that it is not 'asserted' that there is
only one brother; no, but it does not need to be. The speaker merely needs
to assume that such a set exists: strictly speaking, of course, the speaker
assumes that the hearer assumes this. (Additionally, one might also query
Declerck's inclusion of the example as a predicational sentence. It fails one
of the tests she herself proposes for such sentences (1986: 28), since the
predicate nominal here cannot involve a comparison or modification of
degree.)
As regards (88) it is not 'asserted' that the organizers 'made only one
mistake' (1986: 35); on the contrary, it is not asserted that they made any
mistake at all. The explanation for (88) lies in the nature of the word fault
itself. It is a peculiar lexeme, in that in the sense meant h e r e -
'responsibility' rather than 'error' - it behaves like a mass noun: there is
no plural equivalent, nor one with a. Moreover, there is not even a form
with unstressed some. It thus makes no sense to speak of the organizers
having committed one or more mistakes; the meaning here is 'the
responsibility of the organizers', parallel to other abstract mass nouns like
'the carelessness of the organizers'. What is asserted, then, is that the
accident was not part of this responsibility, and the responsibility (the
fault) is indeed inclusive.
3.3.6 As discussed earlier, a and zero can also be used in generic

contexts.
(89) A lion is a noble beast.
(90) Lions are noble beasts.
Generic a remains exclusive, with the reference being to 'any' lion. One
piece of evidence for this is the impossibility of class predicates, which
must normally be attributed inclusively to whole classes:
(91) *A lion is numerous in these parts.
The inclusiveness or exclusiveness of the zero article varies with the
context, as we have already seen (above, 2.5). In (90) it is inclusive, clearly
meaning 'all' lions. Interestingly, its inclusiveness can even be affected by
intonation: Hawkins gives the following example from Bolinger (1975).
(92) Who chews Feenamint? Well, ATHLETES chew Feenamint.
Usage types 61
A rising intonation at the end favours an exclusive interpretation.

The fact that zero may be inclusive or exclusive whereas some is only
exclusive is also illustrated by non-generic contexts that require an
inclusive reading: as expected, such contexts reject some. Consider:
(93) There was (*some) water all over the floor.

(94) Reagan seems to see (*some) communists everywhere.
In these it seems to be the ' total' readings implied by all and everywhere
that rule out exclusive some. We thus have further evidence that zero and
some are by no means always in free variation.
Finally, if generic readings include 'subspecies' readings, we have
already noted (2.5) that some can be used generically in this sense. Recall
(95):
(95) Celia is campaigning about some seals. They are the kinds that are
found in Newfoundland and Alaska, and they are dying out at an
alarming rate.
3.3.7 In the foregoing sections we have reviewed the major usage types
of the five items we are interested in, and also considered some significant
exceptions. Some of these exceptions turned out not to be so exceptional
after all, but others must be taken account of by any theory of the articles.
One way of treating exceptions is to relegate them to the periphery: the
description is then said to cover 'normal' or 'stereotypical' usage, and
exceptions are held to be idiomatic diversions from the norm. Of course,
the more exceptions a description can cover, the better. From this point
of view, the long lists of uses where, contrary to the generalizations made
by the description, neither the nor a occur before a count singular noun,
for instance, are signs of an inadequate theory.
A more satisfactory method of accounting for exceptions is to take
them actually as counter-evidence, and adjust the theory accordingly. One
proposal which does just this is that of Declerck (1986), who argues that
formal definiteness should be distinguished from semantic definiteness.
Forms which must otherwise be regarded as exceptions, therefore, since
they show, for example, a (formally) definite NP behaving as if it were
indefinite, become evidence in favour of this distinction. (Most of
Declerck's examples involve possessives, and I shall not comment on them
here.) The disadvantage of this solution is that, with respect to the articles
at least, a single realized surface form (e.g. the) is said to correspond
potentially to two diametrically opposed semantic elements ([ +definite]

and [ — definite]). This is, theoretically, somewhat inelegant. An alternative
approach, which sets out to include both referential and non-referential
usage and to account for a large number of so-called exceptions, is
proposed in the following chapter.
4 A unified description of the
English articles
4.1 Oppositions
4.1.1 At this point it will be useful to step back for a moment and
review the major points that have so far emerged. They can be summarized
as follows.
(a) Standard descriptions of the articles have too many exceptions,
particularly regarding the cases where the is said to be omitted
before count singulars, and where a can be used before mass
nouns. Proper nouns are also held to be outside the article system
proper.
(b) Generic NPs with different articles do not have uniform readings,
and the term ' generic' itself lacks a unitary definition.
(c) There is good evidence that nouns with ' no article' fall into two
distinct types: indefinite mass and plural nouns on the one hand,
and count singular nouns (and singular proper names) on the
other.
(d) It is not a priori clear what the category 'article' comprises. In
addition to NPs with the, a and some, there is reason to claim that
there are also two distinct types of NP which are not preceded by
any realized surface article: these we have called the zero and null
forms.
(e) ' Definiteness' and ' indefiniteness' are not simple polar opposites.
Indefiniteness is particularly complex, in that the distribution and
meaning of a, some and zero are not adequately explained merely
in terms of the features [ +count] and [ +singular]. In particular,
zero and some are by no means always in free variation.
(f) To the extent that definiteness concerns the articles, it is not a
matter of reference alone. A full description of the articles must
also include non-referential uses.
63
64 A unified description
(g) Relevant semantic oppositions within the concept of referential

definiteness are: locatability in a shared set, and inclusiveness vs
exclusiveness.
(h) A third relevant opposition is the semantic implication of using

any surface article vs none, i.e. zero or null. This has been referred
to as the opposition of limited vs unlimited extensivity.
Let us now return to these three oppositions and the relations between
them, and the way in which pragmatic factors affect their formulation.
4.1.2 First of all, locatability as originally formulated by Hawkins

(1978) applies to referents being locatable or not. But as we have seen, a
generalization in terms of reference will not cover all uses of the articles,
unless the concept of reference is substantially revised. Declerck (1986: 30)
says that non-referential predicate NPs 'denote a property'. Yet there
seems to be no term that will cover both 'referent' and 'property'.
(' Denotation' must be rejected on the grounds that proper nouns do not
denote, and we would also like to include these in the description.) In
generalizations intended to cover both referential and non-referential
usage, therefore, it will be more appropriate to speak not of referents
alone but of 'referents and/or properties'.
A second modification of the locatability idea has to do with the
hearer's acceptance of the locatability of a definite description. In an
earlier section (2.2) mention was made of C. G. Lyons' (1980) criticism of
the notion with respect to some of Hawkins' 'unfamiliar' uses. Lyons
pointed out that in several first-mention uses of the definite article the
speaker informs the hearer of the existence of a shared set in which the
referent is to be located, rather than assumes that the hearer already has
this knowledge. Lyons' conclusion was in fact that there were two distinct
levels of acceptability, one primary (based on previous knowledge) and
one secondary (where the utterance itself establishes the shared set). I do
not find this distinction very persuasive, however. If it exists at all, it is far
from being a black-and-white one. A hearer's acceptance of an
'unfamiliar' first-mention the will vary enormously according to context
and hearer. If I know nothing much about Cromwell I can reject the
definite description in... the fact that Cromwell was half Eskimo on his
mother's side, but a historian of the period might well accept it without
question. But - and this is my point here - such fuzziness applies not only
to these 'unfamiliar' uses but to all uses of the. Depending on the context,
we can surely always find some hearer who might reject a definite
Oppositions 65
reference. Even if I say Put it on the table, an uncomprehending hearer

might nevertheless reply What table ? Similarly, if I do not know that a car
has a steering-wheel I can query the association between a car and the
steering-wheel. Any use of the can be inappropriate - it just depends
whom you are talking to, precisely because the appropriateness or
otherwise of the is defined with relation to the hearer, not the speaker
alone. There is, then, a cline of acceptability regarding all definite
reference. The notion of locatability is firmly anchored in the speech
situation.
A further point: locatability, as shown by Hawkins and as modified
above, is a necessary condition for the, but its absence is not a necessary
condition for a or some, which may or may not be locatable. However, this
neutrality does not seem to apply to the zero article, which must thus be
distinguished yet again from the other two indefinite articles. Alongside
the locatable a and some in Fred lost a leg / some fingers in the war we do
not find (1):
(1) *Fred lostfingers/hair in the war.
Compare this with (2), where the nouns are not locatable: no shared sets
of any kind are available.
(2) Fred lost millions/money in the war.
The same is true of generic contexts such as (3) - they can only be non-
loca table.
(3) Oil floats on water.
The null article is different. Since this is the form occurring before
singular proper names we would expect it to be definite and thus resemble
the as regards locatability. Proper names are in fact locatable precisely
because they are names: their referents are locatable within the shared set
of experience common to both speaker and hearer, provided that both
participants actually know the name in question. First-mention usage,
such as an introductory This is NN, is equivalent to what Hawkins calls
the introductory visible-situation usage of the: the hearer is told the name
of an individual in the shared situation. Compare This is the steering-
wheel. Count singular common nouns preceded by null in a vocative
context are directly comparable to names, and are obviously locatable in
the same way (Come along, boy; Yes, father). In such examples as by train,
at church the basis for the necessary shared set lies in the hearer's assumed
familiarity with modes of transport, institutions and the like. They are
thus parallel to larger-situation uses of the like the pub, the sun. And in
Breakfast is ready / Go to bed the shared set is easily recognizable in the
immediate situation. Uses of null can thus be based on the immediate or
larger situation, but there do not seem to be equivalent uses based on
anaphora or association.
Admittedly, this explanation of certain uses of null does not have
predictive validity: given a noun used with null, it suggests a reason why
this is possible; but it does not enable us to predict exactly which nouns
will behave in this way.
4.1.3 The second opposition was inclusive vs exclusive reference, which

we can now extend to include inclusively vs exclusively predicated
properties. As formulated by Hawkins this generalization is too strict,
since apparent counter-examples are abundant (see above, 2.2). Granted
that Hawkins' basic insight here is a valid one, there are in principle two
ways in which the description can be adjusted to account for the counter-
evidence.
One is to introduce the idea of a default reading, which will hold unless
circumstances indicate otherwise. It is thus the context, and the hearer's
general knowledge and common sense, that ultimately determine the
appropriate reading. The effect of this is to subordinate the logical aspect
of the meaning of the articles to the pragmatic aspect: in cases of conflict
between the two, pragmatics takes priority. (As in, e.g., The person who
brought the wickets in after the game left one on the pitch) If usage appears
to conflict with the logical meaning, then, either the circumstances of the
usage are somehow exceptional, or else the logical meaning is not as it first
seemed. Which leads to the second possible way of modifying Hawkins'
basic insight.
Hawkins presents inclusiveness and exclusiveness in absolute, logical
terms: all vs not-all. This solution raises major issues about the relation
between logic and natural language, some of which I discuss in a later
chapter (9.3). The particular point that needs to be made here, however,
is that Hawkins' formulation fails to account for some counter-examples
precisely because his logical all is the universal quantifier and nothing
weaker. But it is evident that the all incorporated within the meaning of
the is not always the universal quantifier, but is often more like what we
might call a pragmatic all, meaning ' all with respect to the relevant intents
and purposes', 'more or less all'. Recall such examples as:
Oppositions 67
(4) There are cracks in the paving stones. (Burton-Roberts 1981)
For (4) to be true there do not have to be cracks in all the paving stones,
only in most of them - or at least in a relevantly large number of them.
And there are also examples where the universal-quantifier reading is not
just unnecessary but actually impossible:
(5) The chickens laid only three eggs this morning.

In (5) it is the whole set of chickens that is meant, not each chicken
individually; and in (6) the subject NP is similarly understood to be
representative of a whole set. Reference is thus being made collectively,
not distributively, and is thus equivalent to reference to a mass. Compare
Ifs the cops! (collectively, not 'logically all' the cops) and Ifs the police!
(as a mass - and, here too, not 'logically all' of it).
Even with definite plurals that are clearly distributive, it is still not the
case that the reference always has to be to all the members. Bierwisch
(1971), for example, observes that a sentence like The boys hit the girls can
be true even if very few of the boys hit very few of the girls. He suggests
that we need to resort to the pragmatics of the sentence in order to
determine the quantity of individuals concerned, and the relevant quantity
may in fact vary from 'all' even to 'one'. For the sentence to be true it is
only required that there be 'enough' individuals to allow the predication
to hold for the whole set, for the relevant purposes. (See also Nunberg and
Pan 1975; and above, 2.5, on a similar point concerning generic readings.)
Inclusiveness is thus better defined as incorporating a pragmatic all, not
a logical one; it means something like 'enough to justify the use of all for
the purpose in hand'.
This pragmatic sense of all is also evident even in some contexts where
the lexical item all itself is used, as in The baby was crying all night, where
all night probably means 'what seemed like all night', 'most of the night'.
Both of the above-mentioned modifications need to be made to
Hawkins' formulation of the inclusiveness vs exclusiveness opposition.
Although it is undoubtedly a relevant one, it is not equivalent to the
presence or absence of a strictly logical universal quantifier. Moreover, it
is one that provides an unmarked or default reading only, which can be
overruled if the pragmatics of the situation demands.
Hawkins discusses the opposition mainly in relation to the vs a and
some. He also points out, as we have noted, that the inclusiveness or
otherwise of the zero article is not marked either way a priori but is
entirely determined by the context. In some contexts, where an exclusive
reading is appropriate, both some and zero will be acceptable.
As for the null article: when occurring before singular proper nouns it
must be interpreted inclusively. The relevant sets to which reference is
made just happen to be one-member sets. So John means 'the one person
called John who is unique in the given pragmatic context'. The same claim
can reasonably be made when null is used before singular count common
nouns, as in by train, in prison. These references are inclusive in the sense
that train and prison are understood as abstract 'institutions' comprising
all trains, all prisons. To say that someone came by train or is in prison is
not to imply the existence of other trains or prisons. True, it implies the
existence of other modes of transport or residence; but these will not be
referents which satisfy the expressions train or prison.
4.1.4 Let us now sum up the distribution of the articles across the three
oppositions we have introduced, in the form of a feature matrix. The
features show how the interpretation of an NP varies according to the
article it occurs with. With respect to extensivity, the features are absolute:
either a surface article is present or it is not. But the other two oppositions
are ultimately pragmatic: [±locatable] and [ +inclusive] indicate prag-
matically determined default values; and [ +inclusive] is defined with
reference to a pragmatic all, not a logical one. (The sense of 'pragmatic'
here can be glossed as 'context-bound'. The distinction between
pragmatics and syntax/semantics is discussed further in 9.4 below.)
Locatable Inclusive Limited extensivity

zero — + —
some ± — +
a ± — +
the + + +
null + +
It will be noticed that each article has a different configuration of values

except for a and some, which appear identical; but they are both
distinguished from zero, which is thus shown to be neither the mass/plural
equivalent of a nor in free variation with some. The differences between
zero and the null form are also illustrated. The three oppositions appear
to be of very different kinds. However, a convenient way of relating them
is readily available within the framework of set theory.
Sets and members 69
4.2 Sets and members
4.2.1 A distinction must first be made between two types of sets. The
existence of both types is already implied in Hawkins' speech-act
formulation of definite and indefinite reference. On the one hand, there are
'sets of entities' in which definite (and some indefinite) referents are
locatable; these are Hawkins' shared sets, and may comprise an enormous
variety of things, concepts, information, etc. Thus the steering-wheel is to
be located in the set of entities associated with a car. I shall refer to these
sets as 'entity sets'.
On the other hand, we also have what we may call 'referent sets', in
terms of which the inclusive/exclusive opposition is defined. (Strictly
speaking, these should be called 'referent and/or property sets', in order
to include non-referential usage. However, it will be convenient here to
present the description first in terms of reference and make the necessary
adjustments for non-referentiality where required.) The reference is
inclusive if it refers to the totality of the objects ' satisfying the referring
expression'. So the wheels, as a referring expression, must refer to all the
pragmatically relevant wheels: its inclusiveness has nothing to do with the
relation between the wheels and the other bits of the car, but with the total
quantity of the wheels themselves.
These two types of sets are potentially in a relationship of inclusion:
referent sets may be locatable (by the hearer) within entity sets. The
referent set the wheels is located within the entity set 'car-components'.
The applicability of set theory to the description of inclusiveness is well
illustrated in a simple notation proposed by Lyttle (1974). Let U denote
the 'universe' of a lexeme, i.e. the sum of a lexeme's potential referents
within a given situation of utterance, the whole of a referent set. This
universe comprises two subsets: actualized referents, i.e. the referents
actually being referred to, represented by r; and unactualized, potential
referents, making up the complementary subset r'. So:
The subset r' may or may not be empty. In the case of inclusive reference
r' is empty and U will therefore be equivalent to r. For exclusive reference
r' is non-empty and U is not equal to r.
The referent set U may comprise a mass, a unit or several units. If it
consists of a single unit, U is a one-member set and r' is automatically
empty.
The articles a and some mark a member or a subset (respectively) of a

set in which r' is non-empty. So in I bought a pen the article indicates that
the referent is a member of the referent set {pens}, which also contains
other members than the one referred to. To see how this view can be
applied to non-referential NPs, consider singular indefinite predicate
nouns such as a teacher in He is a teacher. Following Declerck (1986) we
can say that the predicate NP here denotes a property that is not
attributed only to the person referred to by the subject but is also
applicable to others: other people are also teachers. An obvious
paraphrase is: he is a member of the set {teachers}.
The use of the indicates that r' is ('pragmatically speaking') empty - a
generalization that covers not only singular count nouns but also definite
plurals and definite mass nouns. The qualification 'pragmatically
speaking', which specifies the sense in which inclusive reference means
'all', thus implies that referent sets are sometimes fuzzy. The before a
count singular noun indicates only that the referent set in question is a
one-member set, and so r' must automatically be empty. Referent sets are
defined pragmatically, so that the table is normally just as unique in
context as the sun.
4.2.2 To show how the notion of extensivity can be fitted into this
framework I return to the work by Carlson (1977) discussed earlier (2.4).
Carlson had argued that the bare plural 'acts as the proper name of a
kind'. Now, what is a 'kind' if not a set? 'A proper name of a kind' is
surely no more than the name of a set. It denotes the set as a whole, rather
than as the totality of its members. (Compare Quirk et al. (1985: 275),
who speak of the zero article as indicating a 'category'.)
Carlson himself, in a later article (1982: 154ff.), explicitly rejects this
interpretation of his 'kind'. The first reason he gives for this is that such
a solution would compromise the axiom of extensionality: it would allow
the existence of' intensionally different but extensionally identical terms
denoting the same kind'. His examples are 'unicorns and dodos', 'animals
with hearts and animals with livers'. But it is surely not the case that
unicorns and dodos, for instance, refer to the same 'kind' at all. The fact
that the real-world extensions of both terms are identical - i.e. none - is
irrelevant. The terms are intensionally different because they denote
different 'kinds'.
His second reason for rejecting a treatment in terms of sets is that there
appear to be several predicates which apply to extensional sets in toto, but
not necessarily to 'kinds'. One such is intransitive meet, as in (7) and (8):
Sets and members 71
(7) Several dozen soldiers met near the fort.

(8) Mary, Bill, Max and Alvin met and asked one another questions.
In both these, all members of the relevant set must participate for the
sentence to be true. But this is not the case, Carlson argues, with 'kinds'
(i.e. with bare plurals):
(9) People meet at Al's for food and conversation.
(10) Wolves meet and mate in the late winter.
Carlson observes that these latter examples do not require that all people
or wolves need to participate for the sentences to be true.
As we have seen, it is indeed the context that determines whether the
preferred reading for a bare plural is to be 'all' or 'some'. However, what
these examples show is not necessarily t h a t ' kinds' are not equivalent to
sets; rather, they show that the sets we are interested in are not necessarily
logically 'total'. That is, in natural language (as opposed to logic) one can
correctly refer collectively to a set without necessarily having to refer to
each and every member of that set distributively, as we have already
observed. We can thus say that Carlson's ' kinds' are, at least sometimes,
sets that are fuzzy - which is what we would expect anyway. For instance,
Carlson's example (9) above manifestly does not refer to logically all
people. It actually refers to something like 'Al's typical customers', and
gives a reason for their choice of Al's. Similarly, (10) seems to refer to
' typical wolves'. Untypical people or wolves might well behave differently.
But the notion of what is typical cannot be well defined, and so the set is
fuzzy.
A second context where sets seem to behave differently from Carlson's
'kinds' is conjoined sets of names. Carlson claims that these must
'represent a set', but that they do not accept certain predicates that are
quite grammatical with 'kinds'. Thus:
(11) *Fido, Rover, Spot and Morris are common/widespread/rare.
(12) Terriers/ Long-haired bulldogs/Dogs called Fido are
common/widespread/rare.
However, the difference between these two can be accounted for equally
well in terms of the different way reference is made to the sets in question.
The conjoined names in (11) actually define the set by naming each of its
members. The bare plurals in (12), on the other hand, do not name each
or any of the members of the set, but name the set itself. The fact that Fido
and his friends in (11) may constitute o r ' represent' a set is irrelevant; they
are presented merely as a list of named individuals, whereas predicates of
the type in question can only co-occur with named sets.
Contrary to Carlson's view, then, it does seem possible to treat nouns

with the zero article as naming a set, with the proviso that this set may be
read as fuzzy in certain contexts. One interesting aspect of this view is that
'kinds' may also name subsets of a set, as in This (kind of) animal is found
in Newfoundland: recall the argument that generic reference may also be
made to a ' type' of a given higher genus.
The set-naming characteristic of zero is most transparent in its (non-
referential) use in classificatory definitions such as the following (compare
He is a teacher, above):
(13) It/This is bran.

(14) They/Those are zebras.
The function of such definitions is explicitly to state the class or set to

which the entity or entities in question belong. The entities referred to by
the subject pronouns are defined as being a part of, or members of, the sets
{bran}, {zebras}. Significantly, unstressed some is not normally used in
such structures:
(13) a. *It/*This is some bran.

(14) a. *They/*Those are some zebras.
Examples with an adjective, such as Those are some cute zebras, may be
exceptions to this generalization for some speakers. A general exception
is when the set is modified by a possessive, as in (15):
(15) They/These are some friends of mine.
This structure may be paraphrased as: these are members of a set X, which
set is further specified as being definite - i.e. the set {my friends}. The
members of the set are not identified, but the set to which they belong is.
Compare, with a stressed some:
(16) These are some of my friends.
NPs preceded by what I have called the null article can also be seen to
name a set. The only difference is that this set appears in some sense as a
one-member set, since null only occurs with singular count and proper
nouns. And because in one-member sets r' must be empty, and U therefore
equals r (see 4.2.1 above), a reference to the set is equivalent to a reference
Sets and members 73
to its single member. The proper name John, therefore, refers in context
to a set consisting of one (pragmatically unique) member. Carlson quotes
Postal (1969) on one striking similarity between bare plurals (i.e. zero) and
proper names (i.e. null) that has a direct bearing on this point. The
similarity is manifested in the 'so-called' construction: 1
(17) Slim is so-called because of his slender build.
(18) Cardinals are so-called because of their colour.
Other articles and quantifiers are excluded from this structure (with the
sole exception of generic singular the). The reason is that the structure has
to do overtly with the name of a set, and therefore accepts the two articles,
null and zero, that have precisely this meaning. (The acceptability of the
generic The cardinal is so-called because ...is presumably due to an
underlying structure something like the set [cardinal] is...) Carlson takes
the similarity between (17) and (18) to show that zero + plural is the
'proper name' of a 'kind'. I think it also supports the notion that both
zero and null name sets.
Further, recall the 'exceptional' use of null in 'kind-of contexts: what
kind of house, that type of book, etc. This type of structure explicitly relates
the subset ('kind, type') in question to a higher-order set {house, book),
which can thus be named without a surface article. (The possibility of what
kind of a house does not eliminate the need to explain why the null form
is also acceptable here.)
4.2.3 Let us now gloss the way each of the five articles affects the
meaning of its noun as follows:
a(n) NP: one member of a referent set;

some NP: not-all (members) of a referent set;
the NP: (pragmatically) all (the members) of a locatable referent
set (where 'locatable' means 'locatable in a shared entity set');
null NP: a locatable, one-member referent set itself;
zero NP: a referent set itself (which must not be a one-member
set).
1
This is not counter-evidence to my argument that zero and null are two separate items.
As we saw earlier, zero and null differ in many important respects; nevertheless, there is
one characteristic that they share, and that is unlimited extensivity. For two syntactic items
to be distinct they do not have to differ on all possible parameters. Compare zero and
some, which are also similar in some respects but different in others.
The key terms here are: referent set (or 'property set' for non-
referentials), member, one-member set, locatable set, all vs not-all. Using
these terms we can now specify how the articles are related to certain other
quantifiers. Thus, the only difference between a and one of the is that in
the latter case the referent set must be locatable. Similarly, whereas
unstressed some means ' not-all (members) of a referent set which may or
may not be locatable', stressed some of the means 'not-all (members) of
a referent set which must be locatable'.
Since the is glossed a s ' (pragmatically) all (the members)' it is equivalent
to all of the or all the; but each of these is distinct from all, for this means
'all (the members) of a Hcw-locatable set'. Compare also many/few men
and many/few of the men.
An analysis of the articles in these terms thus has the merit of making
fairly explicit the relation between the articles and certain other quantifiers.
It also shows why zero and some are not in free variation, and, since each
of the indefinite articles is glossed differently, explicates the different
senses of'indefinite'. (Van Langendonck (1980) also makes use of a set-
theoretical approach in distinguishing various types of indefinites, partly
according to whether the set itself is, as he puts it, assumed or
presupposed.) Furthermore, the opposition between definite and indefinite
is shown not to be one of simple polarity. The interpretation of' all' in
pragmatic terms permits an explanation of the exceptions to Hawkins'
inclusiveness. The extension of the concept of a referent set to include
properties makes the description general enough to cover also non-
referential usage. The establishment of the null article allows us to extend
the description to cover singular proper nouns, and also many
'exceptional' uses: see below, 4.4.
The analysis also sheds interesting light on a number of other issues,
some of which will be taken up in the following section (4.3).
4.3 Applications
4.3.1 To account for the interpretation of NPs in generic contexts the

glosses given above can be further elaborated as follows, to indicate how
particular kinds of generic readings can be derived from the basic
meanings of the articles themselves.
A marks 'one member of a set'. This member is most commonly an
individual particular, which may be specific (19) or non-specific (20).
Applications 75
(19) Fred found an otter in his garden the other night.

(20) Have you ever seen an otter?
In generic contexts this individual is given the reading 'typical member',
and thus comes to represent the genus, as in (21). (See also Galmiche
(1985), who speaks of the standard or stereotype of a genus.)
(21) An otter lives almost exclusively on fish.
In certain generic contexts a can also mark a subset or type:
(22) Fred is writing his thesis on an otter which is found in northern
Canada and some parts of Devon.
This subset is thus a type of otter. Vis-a-vis the set as a whole, subsets
behave like individuals; and in this subset use a can also occur non-
generically with nouns that are normally mass nouns (a nice wine).
All uses of a are exclusive, and r' is non-empty: there also exist other
otters or subsets (types) of otters.
The indicates 'all (members) of a locatable set'. This basic meaning
remains constant, but the extension (not extensivity!) of the set may vary.
At its most limited, the extension may be no more than a single individual
particular - a one-member set - or a group of particulars. But in generic
contexts the extension expands. First, in the case of a one-member set the
one member may be a subset rather than an individual (23). Or the
reference may be to a set of subsets (24).
(23) The pony found in Hampshire is the New Forest pony.

(24) The ponies native to Scotland are the Shetland and Highland breeds.
In each of these examples the extension of the subject NPs is less than the
extension of the set {ponies}. The 'set of subsets' reading may also hold for
nouns that are normally mass nouns but appear in the plural (the wines of
France).
Second, in other generic contexts the with a singular count noun again
indicates the totality of a set, but in this case the extension is maximum,
and in fact identical with the extension of the set out of which non-generic
a selects a member. That is, the extension of the otter in (25) is identical
with the extension of the set {otters} from which an otter (non-generic)
selects a single individual.
(25) The otter is a dying species.

As we have seen, however, this 'totality' must often be taken in a
pragmatic sense. In (26), for example, which lacks a class predicate, the
extension of the otter does not have to be logically equivalent to that of
the set {otters}.
(26) The otter is a much-loved animal.
Generic singular the functions in the same way as non-generic the with
uniques: cf. the otter and the earth. The genus marked by generic the is
identifiable by virtue of being known to be unique - we know there is only
one (higher) genus otter - in just the same way as the earth is uniquely
identifiable.
As noted above (2.5), the generic status of the + plural has been disputed.
However, there can be virtually no difference in extension between an
inclusive reference to all members of a set {the + plural) and a reference to
the set itself. Indeed, it is to be expected that variation will occur here, as
between Germans and the Germans, for instance. The reason for the
variation (noted above, 3.3.1) is precisely this similarity of extension
between these two forms.
Generic readings with the, then, involve changes in the extension of the
NP. In each case the choice of interpretation between individual(s),
subset(s) and maximum-extension set (i.e. whole genus) is determined by
the context.
As regards the zero article, we have already seen that it 'names' a set.
In this sense it is thus the generic article par excellence: the article of
generality. We have also noted that its usage is not uniform: the extension
of its NP is determined pragmatically, on the basis of the context. In other
words, what is left to the context is whether the NP is inclusive or
exclusive. In some generic contexts the extension of the set covers the
whole genus (27), while in others the extension is less than maximum (28):
(27) Insects have six legs.

(28) Dogs are friendly creatures.
In (28) we are referring to the whole genus collectively, by naming the

appropriate set, even though the predication does not necessarily hold for
each and every member of the set distributively. The borderline between
non-universal generics like (28) and non-generics like (29) is not always a
clear one.
(29) There are scratches on the window.

Applications 11
In both (28) and (29) the reference is (or may be) to less than the total
extension of the set (i.e. it is exclusive): (28) allows for the existence of the
odd unfriendly dog, and (29) allows other scratches to exist elsewhere.
True, (29) has a paraphrase with unstressed some while (28) does not, a
test which has traditionally been held to distinguish between generic and
non-generic; but we have seen that this test is an unsatisfactory one, both
because some does occur in some (' type') generic contexts, and because we
find a great variety of extensions within generic readings.
In short: the zero article in any usage simply indicates a set, or category
as Quirk et al. (1985: 275) put it, and its generic use is 'no more than a
special variant of this categorial meaning'.
As regards unstressed some, one reason why it is traditionally denied a
generic meaning (see e.g. Postal 1970b: 459) is that it does not occur outside
a strictly referential context, where ' referential' means ' having reference
to individual particulars'; in other words, unstressed some forces a specific
interpretation (see also Ihalainen 1974: 10). We may also compare this
restriction to the non-occurrence of some in contexts of inalienable
possession (*She has some brown eyes): the possessed NPs here seem to
denote properties rather than referents proper. However, it has already
been argued above that unstressed some does have a generic use in some
contexts in which it must refer more generally than to a number of
individuals. With a normally mass noun appearing in the plural some
must be read as 'some types of X ' (some wines); and the same is
occasionally true of plural count nouns in generic contexts, such as (30).
(30) Harriet is studying some horses - the Polish Arab and the Shagya
Arab in particular.
The subset or 'type' reading of some is more commonly found in

conjunction with a modifier specifying the type in question:
(31) There are some Arab horses which are not recognized as pure breeds.
In (31) the some may be stressed, but it may also be unstressed with a stress
e.g. on the first are. Unstressed some in this reading is the plural of the
'type' reading of a, and is also exclusive.
The null article, logically, does not have a separate generic reading: it
refers only to a pragmatically unique one-member set, and there is no
higher-level genus available, no greater extension.
Our set-theoretical analysis of the articles shows, then, that a full theory
of genericness can in principle be based on the particular kind of meaning

that each article imparts to its NP. Genericness does not turn out to be a
unitary concept, but one involving a number of separate facets which are
determined both by the different articles themselves and by the particular
context. Indeed, the specification of what exactly constitutes a ' generic
context', i.e. one which forces or allows a generic reading of some kind or
another, must be one of the major goals of a theory of genericness.
However, such an undertaking lies beyond the scope of the present study.
Finally, I note that a rather different set-theoretical analysis of generics is

proposed by Werth (1980) and followed by Robberecht (1983). Here, all
generics are said to contain a 'totality' feature meaning 'all of (set)', and
the precise sense of this feature is then 'fine-tuned' by the particular
determiner used: generic the + singular means 'whole set', generic zero
'every member of set' and generic a 'one member of set'. (Somewhat
confusingly, Werth then goes on to claim that generic a is not a true
generic after all but non-specific; one therefore wonders why he deems it
necessary to endow it with a totality feature in the first place, and how this
could possibly be compatible with the sense 'one member of set'.) Werth's
analysis of generic the and zero is thus almost the exact opposite of my
own. But his description has two weaknesses. Firstly, he formulates the
totality feature as the universal quantifier, which we have seen is too
strong for many sentences with generic readings - and particularly for
many sentences with generic zero, contrary to Werth's gloss of its
meaning. And secondly, in characterizing the sense of generic the as
'whole set' rather than 'every member of set' Werth misinterprets
Hawkins' notion of inclusiveness, to which he refers as evidence. For the
sense in which inclusiveness is understood by Hawkins, and also in the
present study, is that it precisely does denote 'every member', i.e.
(pragmatically) 'all' of a set, as opposed to 'not-all' the members: the
meaning of inclusiveness is in fact exactly the one attributed by Werth to
generic zero! Hawkins' use of the notion of totality does not imply
reference to a whole set qua set, as Werth seems to assume.
4.3.2 Another area of syntax where the kind of analysis I am using

brings interesting insights is that of anaphora. A basic distinction here is
that between strict anaphora or coreference as in (32), and lexical
reference or anaphora of sense as in (33). (See e.g. Gross 1973; Harma
1983.)
Applications 79
(32) Oscar found a good reference but then forgot to include it.
(33) Oscar found a good reference, and Joe found one too.
Both the antecedent noun phrases here introduce a discourse referent in

the sense of L. Karttunen (1976), but the anaphoric relations in the two
sentences differ. In (32) the pronoun it refers to the same entity as the
preceding NP, the same member of the referent set. In (33) the pronoun
one does not refer to the same member, but to another unspecified member
of the same set.
Interestingly, however, this difference between it and one is not always
maintained. In certain structures it also functions like one, referring to a
non-identical member of the set. One such structure is illustrated by the
so-called paycheque sentences first introduced by L. Karttunen (1969):
(34) The man who gave his paycheque to his wife was wiser than the man
who gave it to his mistress.
(Similar examples with the mass/plural equivalents of it/one were

mentioned in the course of the discussion of Carlson (1977), above, 2.4.)
This 'sloppy identity' (see Ross 1967, and e.g. Reinhart 1983) is a problem
in the theory of anaphora because it (or its mass/plural equivalents)
cannot refer to the same entity as the antecedent NP. In (34) it can be
replaced by his, his one or one. There thus seems to be a fuzzy boundary
here between the uses of it and one. The example uses it in a non-typical
way, but is nevertheless acceptable. However, the two readings - identical
member versus same set - are of course quite distinct. (See also the
discussion of 'donkey sentences' in Geach (1982: 117ff.), such as Every
man who owns a donkey beats it.) Most theories of anaphora are restricted
to coreference (see e.g. Bosch 1983), i.e. reference to identical members,
and it is for this reason that paycheque sentences appear to be problematic.
But they are in fact examples of anaphora of sense, despite the it. Many
quantifiers are also used in this way, to refer back to an identical set:
(35) Fred took some notes, and Henry took a few / one or two / a
couple I lots too.
(36) Bill took some wine, and Joan took a little / lots / a fair bit too.
Finally, the distinction between set and member also applies exactly to
an observation made by Chafe (1976). Chafe argues that givenness of
information and definiteness of the referent do not necessarily go hand in
hand, but that all four combinations are possible: given and definite, given
and indefinite, new and definite, new and indefinite. However, not all these
combinations are equally likely. In particular, the combination of given
information but indefinite referent is a rare one. Chafe's example is:
(37) (I saw an eagle this morning.) - Sally saw one too.
One is indefinite here since the particular eagle Sally saw is not identifiable.
But the hearer can identify the set to which what she saw belongs: {eagles}.
What is known information here is thus precisely the set.
4.3.3 A set-theoretical description also accounts in a logical way for

some of the effects of modification on the reference of an NP. Non-
restrictive modification is always inclusive vis-a-vis the modified noun:
consider (38)-(40).
(38) Sam bought a picture, which he then hung in his kitchen.
(39) Some drawings, which looked as if they might be valuable, were found
in the attic.
(40) Tom collects stamps, which he then sells to charity.
Here, the head-nouns themselves are referred to exclusively: there exist
other pictures, drawings, stamps. So these NPs denote subsets of the
relevant referent sets. But the non-restrictive modifier applies in each case
inclusively, to all the members of the subset, even if the subset contains
only one member (38). In this latter case to say that the non-restrictive
modifier refers inclusively is in fact redundant, since there is only one
picture being referred to anyway. But both (39) and (40) illustrate the
point well: there are no other drawings referred to in the discourse
situation which were possibly valuable, no other stamps which are sold by
Tom for charity.
With definite NPs the reference is already inclusive: cf. (41) and (42).
(41) The president /Witherspoon, who looked tired, spoke for an hour.
(42) The listeners, who had been waiting for some time, grew impatient.
Restrictive modification shows a different pattern. It applies exclusively,
to not-all the potential referents of the unmodified NP. Restrictive
modification in fact creates a subset. Thus red tables is a subset of the set
{tables} (more strictly, it is the intersection between the set {tables} and the
set {red things}), and any reference to the subset red tables assumes the
existence of other tables, i.e. other members or subsets of the set {tables}.
However, the reference to the subset itself, the modified NP, may be
inclusive or exclusive, depending on the preceding article. With the
definite article the the reference to the subset is inclusive, and the modifier
Applications 81
serves to identify the member(s) of the subset: the red table, the ice on the
roads. On the other hand, with the articles a and some, which are marked
for exclusiveness, the reference does not permit such an identification. As
is the case with unmodified nouns, all that is specified here is the set or
subset to which the items belong. The modifier serves to classify the
referent(s); i.e. it defines a subset, as in a red table, some pots with labels on.
These subsets may also contain other referents, i.e. there may also exist
other red tables, other pots with labels on. Further, the set itself is
assumed to contain other entities than those specified by the subset - i.e.
other tables, other pots.
The zero article can be either inclusive or exclusive with respect to the
subset defined by the modified NP (cf. 2.4, 2.5). Thus (43) is inclusive, (44)
exclusive.
(43) Sick whales yield no blubber.

(44) The police fought with demonstrators carrying placards.
It is worth observing here that ^/-phrases are no different from other

restrictive modifiers as regards their effect on the headword. It is
frequently said that a postmodifying ^/-phrase tends to require the before
the head-noun: the geography of Finland, the end of a long day, the
supporters of the movement. While this is statistically the case, no doubt
because the is about three times more frequent than a anyway (see e.g.
Yotsukura 1970: 56), the generalization must nevertheless be seen in the
light of an abundance of examples where the head-noun has an indefinite
article: as a matter of fact, a history of nineteenth-century furniture, some
refugees of doubtful origin, a member of the Cabinet, etc. In both the
definite and indefinite groups here the restrictive modifier establishes a
subset, as usual. The difference between the two is that the examples where
the head-noun takes the are inclusive and those with indefinite head-nouns
are exclusive, again as usual (see Klegr 1984). That is, in the former group
the subsets have either one member only or are denoted in their entirety:
a long day has only one end, all the supporters are meant and so on. The
modifier thus serves to identify the referent of the head-noun and hence
justify the use of the before the head-noun. In the indefinite group, on the
other hand, the subsets also contain other members (or parts) than those
referred to: there are also assumed to exist other histories of nineteenth-
century furniture, other refugees of doubtful origin, etc. The modifier does
not identify the headword, but only places it within a subset - i.e. classifies
it.
In this context, notice that modifiers with an explicitly classifying

meaning tend to reject the, precisely as we would expect: * the features of
this kind, *the steel of this type. Compare also *the similar point, where a
classifying modifier again rejects the, and *a same point / *same points,
where an overtly identifying modifier rejects an indefinite article.
This analysis also provides an explanation for the difference between
examples like the cry of a jackal and a cry of a jackal, introduced above
in 2.1.2. It seems that the version with the cry is parallel to examples like
the end of a long day: i.e. the assumption is that, as a day has only one end,
so a jackal has only one (typical) cry and the reference is thus inclusive.
On the other hand, the version with a cry suggests that a jackal has several
cries and this is only one of them. Such an explanation agrees with the
observation that in contexts of the form NPl + of+NP2 findef.J which
seem to presuppose that only one (typical) NP1 is possible or likely for the
given indefinite NP2, an indefinite article is somewhat less acceptable
before NP1:
(45) We heard the ( ?a) rattle of a machine-gun.

(46) There was the (?a) tinkle of a glass breaking.
The implication is that machine-guns and breaking glasses have only one
(typical) sound.
As noted above-see (43) and (44)-the zero article may be either
exclusive or inclusive, depending on the context, and this applies equally
to ^/-phrases:
(47) Important issues of government policy were discussed, (i.e. some such
issues - exclusive)
(48) People of that persuasion should be banned, (i.e. all such people -
inclusive)
We have seen above (3.3) that restrictive modification with singular

proper nouns and with mass nouns gives rise to various exceptional uses
of the articles, particularly a. A unified explanation can now be provided
for these. With singular proper nouns the effect of a is to deny the proper
noun its unique status, to render it merely one member of a set: to call
someone a real Sherlock Holmes, for instance, is to place them within a
class of person ('good detectives') which also includes other members. In
exactly the same way, the use of a with modified mass nouns also induces
a 'type' reading (an impressive elegance-'elegance of an impressive
kind'). The modification specifies the 'type' or subset in question, and the
The null form and extensivity 83
indefinite article gives the 'one-member' interpretation. This reading for

mass nouns does not occur without modification, since in that case the
subset would remain unspecified and the structure would make no sense.
Such an analysis also applies to exceptional uses of logically unique
modifiers like a first attempt and the like (see 3.3.1): the meaning has to
be 'an attempt of the "first" type', i.e. 'one of the first attempts'. In all
these, then, the apparent conflict between the 'one-of-a-set' meaning of
the indefinite article and the 'unique' or 'mass' sense of the NP forces a
' type' reading: what at first looked like a set, one-member or otherwise,
turns out necessarily to be a subset.
Singular proper names with the have the same 'type' reading; the
difference is that here the reference is inclusive, as usual. The young
Shakespeare is a 'type' or 'aspect' of Shakespeare, although this
Shakespeare subset has only one member. Compare, for mass nouns, the
most perfect elegance, the grossest insensitivity, etc., where the superlatives
provide a logical uniqueness: it is implied that there is only one 'most
perfect' kind of elegance, only one 'grossest' kind of insensitivity.
4.4 Further comments on the null form and extensivity
4.4.1 I now turn to consider a number of more tentative questions

having to do with the explanatory value of what I have called the null
form. It has been defined as the form occurring before singular proper
nouns and some singular count nouns. It indicates that its NP has
unlimited extensivity (i.e. names a set) and is inclusive.
Now, it is precisely this conjunction of null with singular count or
proper nouns that would seem to account for its being interpreted as
definite. If maximum extensivity is only applicable to one single entity (e.g.
Shakespeare), this entity must be (situationally) unique and hence
identifiable. But if maximum extensivity applies to a mass or plural term
(beer, bottles) there are no such identifiable referents. Further, note that a
restrictive modifier on a proper noun necessarily denies the maximum-
extensivity reading, and so null gives way to the: the Shakespeare of the
later plays. Here there also exist other Shakespeares (such as the early
one), and so the noun no longer functions as a uniquely determining
proper name: it is no longer the case that there is only one Shakespeare
for the maximum extensivity to apply to.
The observation that null + NP names a set furnishes some explanation
for uses like on foot, by plane, on holiday, like father like son. These can
also be interpreted as naming a set, a category, rather than referring to a

particular member of a set. One is not referring, that is, to any specific or
even non-specific foot, plane, etc., but to these concepts in a more abstract
sense. (See also Robberecht 1983: 69.) In Guillaume's terms, a set is of
greater extensivity than one or some of its members, greater even than all
its members taken as members.
One structure that seems to agree well with these admittedly somewhat
speculative comments is the use of the null form illustrated in (49):
(49) Let's have a look at that wound then, if wound it is - it looks more
like a scratch to me.
Notice that the equivalent with a, which is presumably what we would
expect on the model of if it is a wound, is ungrammatical or at least much
less acceptable:...*if a wound it is. The structure is certainly marked
stylistically, but it is not unproductive. Compare e.g. (50) and (51):
(50) That's a funny tram - if tram it is / if tram it be / if tram (la tram) is
what you call it.
(51) Son-in-law he may be / he may call himself, but I'm not having him in
this house.
What this structure seems to be doing is foregrounding (syntactically
fronting) the label or name given to the concept or object in question, so
that the noun is used in a very abstract sense indeed. The meaning is
approximately: if (or even if) this noun is the correct name for the entity
concerned. In other words, the structure queries the name of the set, in the
sense explicated above.
4.4.2 Consider now the variation between null and the, and recall the
distinction made in this respect by Allen and Hill (1979), discussed above
in 2.3. The indicated the outsider's view, the predicated locus (the next
Monday), while null indicated the insider's view, the coding locus (next
Monday). And recall also Jespersen's 'complete familiarity' (corre-
sponding to null) and' nearly complete familiarity' (the). Such observations
suggest that null is somehow 'even more definite' than the. This hints at
a possible explanation for much 'exceptional' usage: forms with null
would be conceptually closer and therefore also conceptually clearer to
the speaker. Since one function of the is precisely to delimit a concept,
such a function would be redundant in the case of concepts which were
adequately delimited already.
If this is so, we have an explanation for the possible use of null with
noun complements which 'name a unique role or task' (Quirk et al. 1985:
276). Where the role is known to be unique, the is unnecessary: compare
Joe was best man (a unique role at a wedding) and Joe was the best man
for the job; Jane is secretary (unique role in a committee) and Jane is a
secretary. A similar reasoning may underlie the use of null in structures
like book six, part B: because the head-noun is already identified uniquely
by the postmodification, the would be redundant.
A usage of a different kind discussed by Hewson (1972: 20) is the
variation between null and the in the names of buildings. We say
Buckingham Palace but the Mariinsky Palace, for instance. Hewson
suggests that more familiar buildings already have a clearly defined
conceptual outline and so the is not needed. This seems to account well for
the tendency to use the with foreign buildings, but cannot of course be the
only relevant factor. The historical origin of the form also plays a part, as
where a modifier becomes a head in the absence of the original head-noun
(the Union (Building), the Albert (Hall)). The will also remain if the name
is still thought of as modifier + noun (the Festival Hall).
Another example of the same tendency is to be found in the way some
proper names are treated by non-natives of the culture in question. As a
long-time resident of Helsinki, and therefore an 'insider', I find myself
referring in English to the daily newspaper with the null article: Helsingin
Sanomat. But newcomers to the country are more likely to say the
Helsingin Sanomat. Recollect also some of the uses mentioned earlier
(chapter 3), such as Commentary is by NN, on guitar, come in on
ambulance, get a sight of goal, discussed in Cabinet, and Quirk et al.'s use
of zero article. All these can easily be seen to display the 'insider's locus'
Their acceptability thus depends partly on who says them, on whether the
speaker is an insider or not.
It must be stressed again that although the generalization that null
indicates an insider's locus seems to be a useful one, and indeed suggests
an explanation for this usage, it does not account for all cases, neither does
it allow reliable predictions to be made. Thus, although we have the
nurse's Doctor will see you now, there is no equivalent sentence with dentist
or lawyer. This may be because Doctor is also a title and the other two not.
(The fact that Doctor is a title cannot be the whole explanation, though,
since we also need to know why and when it is preferred to the equally
grammatical the doctor: the notion of the insider's locus does provide one
explanation for this variation.)
An interesting consequence of this view is that we might expect certain

uses of the to give way in time to null, as the concept in question became
'completely familiar' to a wider range of'insiders'. The would tend to be
increasingly dropped. An odd piece of circumstantial evidence that this
does happen is to be found in the tendency of innovative American
journalists to omit the rather more often than their more conservative
British counterparts. (See, e.g., Seppanen 1982.)
Another facet of the difference between the and null has to do with why
certain types of proper nouns take the while others take null. We have the
River Thames, the Pacific Ocean, but Lake Geneva, Mount Everest, George
Street. Hewson (1972: 108-11) makes the point that nouns of this type
that take null are (almost all) those which represent 'entities that have
distinctive exterior form', a complete external boundary. They therefore
need no surface article because the significate itself already has a clear
external form. There is already a one-to-one relation between the nom en
puissance and the nom en effet. They are thus exactly parallel to proper
names such as John. The geographical names that take the, on the other
hand, have (almost all) an exterior boundary that can be argued to be
incomplete in some way. A river, for example, has a beginning and an end
that are, in a sense, formless: a few drops rising from beneath the ground,
or even a stream, do not yet constitute a river; similarly, the boundary
lines at the mouth of a river cannot be drawn with the same kind of
precision that we can apply to the end-point of a street, for instance. This
latter group is thus not ' limited' a priori and so needs the to give the
significate the necessary form. Exceptions to this generalization do occur,
but in these cases there are usually historical reasons for the difference.
Thus in the Labrador the the is accounted for by the fact that the Labrador
was originally short for the Labrador coast. Other exceptions are direct
translations, such as The Hague.
While such explanations may seem unduly speculative, there does seem
to be something in them. It is a reasonable assumption that the various
occurrences of null have something in common, although it is difficult to
state precisely what this shared semantic feature is. Part of the difficulty
lies in the pragmatic basis of all article usage, with its inherent fuzziness
and variation. And part is due to the extreme abstractness of concepts like
extensivity which tend to defy exact formulation. But this should not
detract from the insight itself underlying the generalization that
Guillaume, Hewson and others are getting at.
4.4.3 The notions of the null article and extensivity are also interesting
with respect to the historical development of the English articles. This
history is well known (see e.g. Christophersen 1939; Rissanen 1967), and
my intention here is no more than to show briefly how the null article
seems to fit in.
Proto-Germanic had no articles, it seems (see e.g. Hewson 1972: 15-16).
It was not until the Old English period that the first signs of a definite
article appear. Before this period, then, there was only 'no article'
formally. Unquantified nouns were thus 'unlimited' unless preceded by a
demonstrative. As Christophersen puts it (1939: 82), no overt formal
distinction was made between general appellatives and proper names. The
extensivity of the noun, then, was limited by means of the case system: as
is well known, it is when case systems decline that articles begin to appear.
During the Old English period the definite article se develops gradually
from the demonstrative. Christophersen describes this stage as a one-
article system, with se contrasting with (his) zero. The uses of this zero, as
he lists them, are: (a) for the idea of something without substance or
unity; (b) for a continuous object without familiarity; (c) for a unital
object without familiarity; (d) for proper names. This gives his Old
English zero a very wide range of functions indeed: he is in fact obliged
to admit that this explanation of (his) zero form may also be a
compromise, with a meaning consisting both of an indefinite sense and a
definite one. The distinction between my zero and null is therefore a
helpful one here: uses (a) and (b), and presumably also (c), come under
zero, whereas (d) represents null. It thus seems that within the uses
covered by zero no distinction is yet made between limited and unlimited
extensivity. This distinction appears first within the usage covered by null,
in that null splits into null plus se. Indeed, this order is the one we would
logically expect: definites are psychologically more immediate, more the
object of attention, than indefinites.
The indefinite article a develops later, during the Middle English period,
from a weakened form of the numeral an. Here too the development is a
gradual one. If we paraphrase Christophersen's usage types of the modern
a as (a) specific, (b) non-specific and (c) generic, we can say that the use
of the original an as an article first appeared in the first of these uses and
then spread through the other two in order (see also Rissanen 1967:
269ff.). At first both an and sum were used thus, but an had superseded
sum by the twelfth century. The zero article, then, gradually splits into
zero versus an plus sum, showing the introduction of the extensivity

distinction for indefinites.
The modern term ' indefinite' is thus a conflation of a number of aspects
of meaning, including 'general' (unlimited), 'one' and 'any one'.
'Indefinite' is actually rather an unhelpful term, and is not simply the
opposite of definite, as we have argued earlier. The modern definite and
indefinite (surface) articles have arisen in quite distinct ways, incorporating
two distinct solutions to the problem of the increasing generality
(extensivity) of the noun as the case-endings were lost. The (diachronically)
first solution was to limit by means of reference (' that entity'), and the
second was to do so by means of quantity {'one entity').
A number of conclusions may be drawn from this state of affairs. First, the
extensivity opposition is a helpful descriptive tool. Second, in the light of
this long historical development we would expect to find, as indeed we do,
that there remain fuzzy borderlines between articles and demonstratives,
articles and quantifiers. And third, since the problem of uncontrolled
extensivity is not a language-specific one, we may expect other languages
to exhibit similar solutions. In particular, since the cases themselves will
serve adequately to limit the extensivity, we might expect that (a)
languages with complex case systems will be less likely to have articles,
and (b) when articles arise they may well develop from a demonstrative
and/or a numeral.
4.5 Conclusions
This description of the English articles has emphasized several

points. I have argued that the article paradigm actually contains five
members, including both zero and null. To distinguish these satisfactorily
the traditional opposition of definite vs indefinite has been analysed here
as a composite of three more primitive semantic oppositions. One has to
do with the relation of the NP to its context of use: locatability. Another
is an opposition of quantity: all vs not-all. Both these have been discussed
at length in terms of Hawkins' location theory; yet if the description is
also to account for the kinds of usage with 'no article' a third opposition
must be incorporated, which, following Guillaume and Hewson, I have
called limited vs unlimited extensivity.
The combination of these three oppositions allows a number of
important descriptive statements to be demonstrated. It becomes possible
Conclusions 89
to specify what all the surface articles have in common as opposed to ' no
article'. The two types of 'no article' can be distinguished, and zero is
shown to be neither simply the mass/plural equivalent of a nor always a
variant of unstressed some. 'Indefinite' thus has several distinct senses.
Many 'exceptional uses' can also be given a natural explanation,
particularly those involving the null form.
The three oppositions were linked within a single informal set-
theoretical framework. It was also shown that the set of articles themselves
is a fuzzy one, extending ultimately to overlap with other quantifiers and
determiners.
The analysis also seems helpful to the description of generics, and
provides a straightforward explanation for some phenomena of anaphora
and modification.
Of the recurring themes of the discussion, three in particular are worth
recalling at this point. First, the way in which pragmatic factors impinge
upon article usage, as regards the speaker's and hearer's understanding of
both locatability and inclusiveness: when there is a conflict between a
pragmatic interpretation and a strictly logical one, pragmatics takes
precedence. Second, the way in which article usage is closely tied up with
matters of quantity over and above those of reference (or non-reference):
indeed, the notions of reference and quantity seem inextricably inter-
twined. And third, the way in which apparently unitary concepts like
'generic', 'definite' and 'indefinite' turn out to be better analysed as more
complex composites.
5 Finnish: no articles
5.1 Introducing Finnish
We have now arrived at a number of conclusions about the

analysis of definiteness in English, as expressed in article usage. On the
assumption that the foregoing discussion also has implications for the
understanding of definiteness more generally, I now turn to examine the
nature of definiteness in a genetically unrelated language, Finnish. Finnish
has no articles, and thus no equivalent way of expressing definiteness.
Rather, definiteness in Finnish is often left to be inferred, in a variety of
ways.
The present chapter first introduces certain features of Finnish grammar
which will be relevant to the ensuing discussion, and then takes up a
number of preliminary matters concerning the Finnish data. (For a recent
English-language description of Finnish, see Karlsson 1987.)
5.1.1 Finnish is a highly agglutinative language, with a complex

morphology and fifteen cases. Since all Finnish examples to follow will be
given a partial gloss as well as a translation, it will be useful to list the cases
here, together with an indication of their meaning.
Case Abbreviation Approximate meaning

nominative NOM subject
accusative ACC object
genitive GEN possession
partitive PART partitiveness
inessive INE 'in'
elative ELA 'out o f
illative ILL ' into'
adessive ADE 'at, on'
ablative ABL ' from'
allative ALL 'to'
essive ESS 'as'
90
Introducing Finnish 91
translative TRA 'to', 'becoming'

abessive ABE ' without'
instructive INS (various)
comitative COM ' with'
Other abbreviations that will be used are:
IMP imperative
Q interrogative particle
EMP emphatic particle
NEG negation verb
1, 2, 3 1st, 2nd, 3rd persons
SG/PL singular/plural
Capitals will be used to mark sentence stress when necessary.

The most relevant cases for definiteness are nominative, accusative and
partitive. The nominative is morphologically unmarked in the singular and
takes the ending -t in the plural. It is the unmarked case for subject nouns.
The accusative has three syntactically determined morphological forms
(0, -n, -i)\ the details of their distribution will not concern us (see
Hakulinen and Karlsson 1975), but broadly speaking 0 or -n mark the
singular and -t the plural. (Morphologically, the accusative endings
overlap with those of the nominative, and also the genitive singular -n.)
The accusative is one possible case for object nouns. Thus e.g.:
(1) Pojat ostivat auton.

boys-NOM bought car-ACC
' The boys bought a/the car.'
(2) Mies osti autot.
man-NOM bought cars-ACC
' The man bought the cars.'
The partitive has several morphologically determined forms: -a ~ -a,

-ta~-td, -tta~-tta in the singular and -a~-d, -ta~-ta in the
plural. (Finnish has vowel harmony, so that most endings have both a
back vowel and a front vowel variant.) It has the widest range of functions
of any Finnish case (see especially Denison 1957; Itkonen 1976a). The
particular uses that we shall need to consider are where it marks certain
kinds of subject, object or predicate complement, as in:
(3) Kaapissa on olutta.

cupboard-INE is beer-PART
' In the cupboard there is some beer.'
(4) Joimme olutta.

drank-1 PL beer-PART
' We drank some beer.'
(5) Se on olutta.
it-NOM is beer-PART
' It is beer.'
A partitive subject typically marks a sentence as being existential (as in

(3)), in which case the subject noun is usually in clause-final position and
the verb invariably singular, even with plural subjects.
A direct object may be partitive for any of three reasons. First, the
partitive is the obligatory object case after a negative verb:
(6) Poika ei ostanut autoa.

boy-NOM NEG-3SG bought car-PART
'The boy did not buy a/the car.'
Second, the partitive marks the object of an irresultative verb, i.e. one
whose action is not regarded as complete, or as effecting a permanent
change of state in the object. Some verbs are intrinsically irresultative (e.g.
those expressing an emotion - see example (7)), while others are used in
both resultative and irresultative senses, expressing a distinction often
corresponding to perfective vs imperfective aspect:
(7) Mina rakastan sinua.

I-NOM love you-PART
' I love you.'
(8) Henry rakensi talon.
Henry built house-ACC
'Henry built a/the house." (resultative)
(9) Henry rakensi taloa.
Henry built house-PART
'Henry was building a/the house.' (irresultative)
Third, the partitive marks the object for partial quantity, i.e. a quantity
which also allows the possible existence of a (contextually) relevant
additional quantity, as Itkonen (1980) puts it. Compare:
(10) Ostin omenat.

bought-1SG apples-ACC
'I bought the apples' - i.e. all of them, a total quantity
(11) Ostin omenoita.
bought-1SG apples-PART
'I bought some apples' - i.e. there were others I did not buy.
Introducing Finnish 93
partitive (see (6))
total quantity partial quantity partitive (see (7))
accusative (see (10)) partitive (see (11))

Figure 5.1 Conditions for a partitive object
The partitive is in fact the main case of the object: any of these reasons
for a partitive overrules the other option, the accusative. (Relative case
frequencies are: for subject - partitive 5 per cent, nominative 70 per cent,
genitive 3 per cent, clausal subjects, etc. 22 per cent; for object - partitive
44 per cent, accusative 33 per cent, other 23 per cent (Hakulinen and
Karlsson 1979: 182).) Furthermore, the three conditions for a partitive
object themselves form a hierarchy: the negative condition is the strongest
and partial quantity is the weakest, in the sense illustrated in figure 5.1.
Thus, for example, an object can only show partial quantity if the verb is
affirmative and also resultative.
5.1.2 One further concept that needs to be introduced is that of

divisibility. All Finnish NPs are either divisible or non-divisible. A non-
divisible noun is one whose referent is an individual unit, which can be
multiplied but not divided (and still be designated by the same noun, that
is): i.e. singular count nouns likepoika 'boy'. Singular proper names are
also non-divisible. A divisible NP has a conceptually divisible referent -
a sub-part of the referent may still be designated by the same noun.
Divisible NPs are either mass nouns like vesi 'water' or plural count nouns
likepojat 'boys'. As with the count/mass distinction in English, however,
divisibility is not ascribed to the surface form of a word: many words can
be used in either a divisible or a non-divisible sense. The divisibility
distinction thus exactly matches the normal distribution of some and a(n)
in English: compare a beer (non-divisible), some beer (divisible) and some
beers (divisible). The crucial point with respect to definiteness in Finnish
is that only divisible NPs may express the distinction between total and
partial quantity: more accurately, only divisible NPs have the potential of
expressing partial quantity, via the partitive case. (Compare in (non-
cannibalistic) English the ungrammaticality of, e.g., *some boy (where
some is unstressed).) A non-divisible NP in the partitive must therefore be
taking this ending for reasons other than quantity.
There are a number of problems with the concept of divisibility that will
be taken up in due course. It is, for example, recognized that there are
many plurale tantum forms which are morphologically plural but
nevertheless conceptually non-divisible, such as sakset 'scissors', kasvot
'face'. However, the non-occurrence of partitive non-divisibles except for
reasons other than quantity means that, for instance, the choice of case for
the object is actually more complex than shown in figure 5.1. Divisibility
is a fourth relevant condition, since only divisible NPs can show the
opposition of quantity.
Predicate nouns take the partitive if they express partial quantity and
are thus divisible; otherwise they take the nominative:
(12) Henry on mies.
Henry is man-NOM
4
Henry is a man.'
(13) Paitani on villaa.
shirt-my-NOM is wool-PART
4
My shirt is (made) of wool.'
(14) He ovat opettajia.
they-NOM are teachers-PART
' They are teachers.'
5.1.3 Finnish has no morphologically marked future tense. The simple
present is usually used also when reference is to future time. Thus, for
instance, a simple present resultative verb with a non-divisible object in
the accusative will normally be interpreted as referring to the future:
(15) Ostan auton.
buy-lSG car-ACC
4
1 will buy a car.'
And as noted above, aspectual readings may also often be inferred from
the case-ending of the object (cf. (8) and (9) above). The NP with its cases
thus carries a heavy informational load in Finnish.
Data from translation 95
5.1.4 Since subject and object are marked by case endings, word order
in Finnish is thus normally free to express theme-rheme relations and
emphasis. (For the details, see Vilkuna 1989.) Compare:
(16) (What did Henry buy?) Henry osti auton.

Henry bought car-ACC
' Henry bought a car.'
(17) (Who bought the car?) Auton osti Henry.
car-ACC bought Henry
' The car was bought by Henry / It was Henry who bought the car.'
5.1.5 Finally, as will have become evident from the examples above,
Finnish has no articles. Definiteness may be expressed or inferred by a
variety of heterogeneous means, or not at all. The problem is thus to
determine what these means are (and how to find them), how they interact
and what kind of status the category of definiteness can be said to have in
Finnish.
5.2 Data from translation
Investigating the category of definiteness in non-article-bearing

languages incorporates a number of intrinsic difficulties. Wexler (1976)
argues that speakers of Finnish, for instance, who also have a knowledge
of an article-bearing language like English will be 'more sensitive' to the
expression of determinedness in their native language than will mono-
lingual speakers, because they will be aware of a 'lexical gap' in Finnish.
One conclusion to be drawn from this, not overtly mentioned by Wexler,
would be that a research method using (Finnish) native-speaker intuition
as a data source would be unreliable, unless the informants were
preselected to be purely monolingual. Such a selection process would
probably turn out to be theoretically impossible, since Finland is officially
a bilingual country and everyone has had to learn at least some Swedish
- and Swedish is an article-bearing language.
One way around this difficulty would seem to be to start from certain
syntactic structures in a language where the awareness of determinedness
is assumed to be more explicit: that is, start with, for example, the English
articles and look at their translation equivalents in the other language.
Wexler rejects this approach, on the grounds that if we take articles in an
article-bearing language as our point of departure 'we are liable to ignore
those syntactic means available to a non-article-bearing language for

expressing determinedness which happen not to be expressed by the article
in any article-bearing language' (1976: 37). A further drawback of such an
approach would be 'the tendency to ascribe unjustifiably functions from
[the article-bearing language] to the grammar of the non-article-bearing
language' (1976: 38).
However, the method rejected by Wexler is in fact the one I shall take.
(It is also the one he himself seems to follow in practice, at least to some
extent.) His first objection to it may be answered as follows: by making the
English articles - i.e. a syntactic category - the predefined point of
departure, I hereby make it clear at the outset that I intend to limit the
study to precisely those means of expression in Finnish which do
correspond to the articles; I do not intend to pursue the notion of
determinedness elsewhere in Finnish grammar. Of course, definiteness has
to do with more than just the articles in English, too; but, as explained
earlier, I take them as being the most stereotypical realizations of this
semantic category, on which the present study will focus. Nevertheless, it
must be acknowledged that such a framework may well lead to an analysis
of Finnish that is to some extent a biased one, perhaps reflecting
idiosyncrasies of English article usage that do not always correspond
exactly to that of other article-bearing languages. (For an example, see 6.9
below.)
Wexler's second objection may stand as a warning. In the present
chapter the aim is merely to illustrate some of the various phenomena of
Finnish grammar which appear - at least occasionally - to correlate with
the English articles, and hence qualify as relevant data for a study of
definiteness in Finnish. The question of the functions of these phenomena,
and the extent to which they may be said to overlap with those of the
articles, will be taken up in chapter 7.
I shall thus be using translations as a source of data. All translations are
necessarily directional, however, and, as Wexler implies, one's view of the
target language will undoubtedly be influenced by the source language. In
order to counteract this bias as far as possible, I examine translations in
both directions. With translations from Finnish to English the question is:
what cues are there in the Finnish that tell the translator which article to
use? Translations from English to Finnish, on the other hand, can be used
as corroborative evidence: given a particular English article, what does
the Finnish translator typically do?
Both oral translations from informants and published written ones are
Data from translation 97
used. At first sight this may seem to lessen the validity of the work. After
all, oral language has at its disposal more channels of information (stress,
intonation, etc.), and can draw upon a much wider context of situation.
A written text, on the other hand, must be more self-contained and
operates under stricter constraints. However, I consider it essential to
include oral data, for two main reasons. First, the expression of
definiteness in Finnish, as we shall see, is in some respects in a state of flux:
while some means are well established in the standard language, others are
only beginning to spread, and precisely these are at present most evident
in the colloquial spoken language. The second reason is related to this: it
will become evident that the Finnish expression of definiteness is often
influenced by stylistic and sociolinguistic factors, such as register,
formality and medium (spoken vs written). If the study were restricted to
the standard written language alone, many relevant observations would
be missed.
Many of the examples come from a short story entitled ' Kampa' (' The
comb') by Veijo Meri (in Tilanteita, 1962), together with its published
translation by Mary and Herbert Lomas (1981: 94-7).
A data-gathering method based on translated texts, whether written or
oral, undeniably has certain built-in limitations. In particular, it relies for
its validity on a concept that can ultimately only be defined operationally:
the concept of translation equivalence (see, e.g., Krzeszowski 1971, 1984).
In the final analysis, a translation is counted as equivalent if judged to be
so by a competent bilingual, or by several such. But a translation may not
only be judged equivalent or non-equivalent; it may also be agreed to be
only one possible (equivalent) one, with perhaps a number of other
versions equally possible. Furthermore, a translation that is equivalent
may nevertheless be non-comparable from the point of view of the method
being advocated here: for instance, a source-language NP may not be
translated as an NP at all. However, for the present purpose these
limitations are not serious ones: translations that are inadequate for one
reason or another can be omitted or commented on separately. In effect,
then, I shall accept translation data as being relevant if the versions in the
two languages are what Krzeszowski (1984: 304) calls 'semanto-
syntactically equivalent', that is, if they are 'the closest approximations to
grammatical word-for-word translations [or] their synonymous para-
phrases'.
We can now take a preliminary, pretheoretical look at three
grammatical 'media' (see, e.g., Lado 1957), in order to see what kind of
data an analysis of Finnish definiteness will need to cover. We start with

inflection, and continue with word order and function words. For reasons
that will become apparent later (7.3), I leave the fourth medium,
intonation and stress, out of account at this point. Because I am looking
at links between Finnish and the English articles, I omit consideration of
quantified nouns (with a couple of exceptions), nouns with other
determiners such as demonstratives, and nouns preceded by a possessive.
5.3 Inflection
In Finnish-English translations some sources of some English

articles can be traced back to the partitive vs nominative/accusative
opposition mentioned above (5.1), with some or zero corresponding to the
partitive. For example:
(18)a. Jos randien paalla on lunta...

if shoe-edges-GEN on is snow-PART
(18)b. 'If there's snow round the edges of the shoes...' (Meri)1
The literal meaning of partitive lunta is 'some (quantity) of snow'; the

translator might perhaps have chosen some snow, but the would be
incorrect. Similarly, (19) translates with some or zero, and (20) with zero
only:
(19) He heittivat kivid.

they-NOM threw stones-PART
' They threw (some) stones.'
(20) Nama ovat tyhmid kysymyksid.
these-NOM are stupid-PART-PL questions-PART
' These are stupid questions.'
The partitive in (19) shows that the reference is not to a known totality of
stones; in the same way, in (20) the partitive indicates that the total set of
stupid questions is not exhausted by the ones referred to. In both
examples, then, a translation with the would not be equivalent, and the
partitive demands an indefinite. In addition, the nouns in question here in
1
Published or otherwise attested translations are marked (a) and (b). Here, (a) is Meri's
original and (b) is the Lomas' translation.
Inflection 99
(18)—(20) are either mass or plural-i.e. divisible. In equivalent trans-

lations, then, an unqualified partitive NP (where the partitive marks
partial quantity) does not correspond to the or a.
Another source for the zero article can be a Finnish nominative or
accusative (21), especially in generic or inalienable-possession readings
(22-3):
(21) Ostin eilen uudet verhot.

bought-1SG yesterday new-ACC-PL curtains-ACC
'Yesterday I bought new curtains.'
(22) hot pojat eivat itke.
big-NOM-PL boys-NOM NEG-3PL cry
'Big boys don't cry.'
(23) Hanella on vihredt silmdt.
he/she-ADE is green-NOM-PL eyes-NOM
'He/She has green eyes.'
Nominative or accusative may correlate with the, a or zero, but not with
some except in some all-new sentences such as (24) (originally noted by
Eliot (1890) in the first English-language grammar of Finnish):
(24) Varkaat varastivat tavarani.

thieves-NOM stole things-ACC-my
' Some thieves stole my things.'
This sentence could occur in a context such as 'What happened?' The

(divisible) subject noun is both new information and indefinite, and (in
such a context) could not be translated with the. The grammatical reason
why the partitive could not be used here is that a partitive subject must
take an intransitive verb (Itkonen 1953). Eliot (1890: 122) comments: 'the
mere fact of any word being the subject to a transitive verb implies that
the whole or a definite part of the subject is regarded as acting.' Hence the
nominative, as a mark of this totality.
In a different, i.e. not all-new context, (24) could be translated with a
definite subject noun, which would then refer to already mentioned
referents (e.g. after 'What did the thieves do next?'). Yet the only way of
telling whether this subject noun is definite or indefinite is the context:
there is nothing in the structure itself that indicates this, for it would be
identical in both kinds of context.
There are also a number of other particular inflectional cues of
definiteness: these will be introduced later.
5.4 Word order
The relevant data here mainly concern postverbal subjects,

preverbal objects and preverbal predicate complements. Postverbal
subjects are typically translated with an indefinite article (unless they are
marked in some other way as definite - see the following section):
(25)a. Kerran tuli junaan arpakauppias.

once came train-ILL lottery-seller-NOM
(25)b. ' Once a chap selling lottery tickets got on the train.' (Meri)
Similarly, a preverbal subject (if not otherwise marked as indefinite) is

normally translated with a definite article. Sentence (26) occurs in context
shortly after (25), and refers to the same man:
(26)a. Riihimaella mies jai junasta.

Riihimaki-ADE man-NOM left train-ELA
(26)b. ' The man got off at Riihimaki.'
Unless there are indications to the contrary, then, these constitute

unmarked readings for subjects in pre- and postverbal position.
This generalization is confirmed by translations into Finnish, where the
translator frequently has to change the word order to preserve the
appropriate definiteness reading. The following examples are from the
Finnish translation (1979) of Beatrix Potter's The tale of Mr Jeremy
Fisher.
(27)a. A great big water-beetle came up underneath the lily leaf.

(27)b. Lumpeenlehden alia ui iso vesikuoriainen.
lily-leaf-GEN under swam big-NOM water-beetle-NOM
(28)a. A great big enormous trout came up.
(28)b. Pintaan viuhahti jdttildislohi.
surface-ILL splashed giant-trout-NOM (literally: 'salmon')
As soon as the referent has been introduced it is free to take clause-initial

position. The almost immediate continuation of (28) in the Finnish is (29):
(29) Sitten lohi teki tayskaannoksen ja sukelsi lammen pohjaan.

then trout-NOM made full-turn-ACC and dived pond-GEN bottom-
ILL
The original English i s : ' And then it turned and dived down to the bottom
of the pond.'
Word order 101
However, although this tendency for new, indefinite referents to avoid

clause-initial position is undoubtedly a strong one, it is not without its
exceptions. The following example is also from the Potter story:
(30)a. And a shoal of other little fishes put their heads out, and laughed at
Mr J.F.
(30)b. Parvi muita pikkukaloja nauroi Jeremiaalle vedesta pain naamaa.
shoal-NOM other-PART-PL small-fishes-PART laughed J.-ALL
water-EL A towards face-PART
Clause-initial position here has been taken by an indubitably indefinite

noun. This is because parvi' shoal' belongs to a class of'group' nouns (or
'typical partitives'-Quirk et al. 1972) which appear in two kinds of
modifying structures. The one illustrated here, where the group word is
followed by the headword in the partitive, corresponds to an indefinite
NP. The alternative structure has the group word preceded by a genitive
headword, as in pikkukalojen parvi, which would be translated as 'the
shoal of little fish'. Compare, for example, joukko (nom. sg.) sotilaita
(part, pi.) 'a group of soldiers' and sotilaiden (gen. pi.) joukko (nom. sg.)
'the group of soldiers'. This is as we would expect: unless there are
indications to the contrary, nouns premodified by a genitive in the
determiner position are normally read as definite (cf. Hakulinen and
Karlsson 1979: 116-17). Compare e.g. kirjan (gen. sg.) vdri 'the colour of
the book', eldmdn (gen. sg.) alku 'the beginning of life'. Example (30b) is
yet another indication of the link between the partitive and indefiniteness:
it is the case here, not the clause-initial position, that indicates whether the
subject NP is definite or not.
Preverbal - i.e. topicalized - objects are marked structures, whose
function is to move the emphasis away from the object and onto the verb
or postposed subject, the new information (see 7.3 below). Almost
invariably, preposed objects are definite (see Ihalainen 1980, discussed
below, 6.5). A typical example is (31):
(31) Arvostelun kirjoitti toimittaja.

review-ACC wrote editor-NOM
' The review was written by the editor.'
Predicate nouns may be definite or indefinite if they are postverbal.

Preverbal predicate complements tend to appear in the essive case, which
has the approximate meaning of 'temporary state', and translate as
definite NPs:
(32) Sihteerind toimi Virtanen.

secretary-ESS functioned Virtanen-NOM
4
The secretary was Virtanen.'
(This use of the essive can therefore also be seen as another inflectional
indication of definiteness.)
5.5 Function words
5.5.1 The third area of Finnish grammar to be considered here is that

of function words, by which I mean words such as definite and indefinite
pronouns that are used prenominally, as determiners. The items in
question are se 'it', and ne 'they' for definite reference; and yksi 'one',
joku 'some, someone', jokin 'some, something', eras 'a certain' and
occasionally muuan 'a certain' for indefinite reference. I exclude here the
demonstratives tdma 'this' and tuo 'that', since their normal translation
equivalents are not articles but demonstratives in English. I also exclude
quantifiers.
The use of these function words is certainly spreading in Finnish,
particularly in the colloquial register. It will be useful to distinguish three
ways in which these words are used. One is, strictly speaking, non-
functional from the definiteness point of view: the words are added as
fillers, or merely to emphasize a reading that is already clear. These
examples are from Meri's story:
(33)a. Niiden taytyy huomata asken junaan nousseet joistakin pikku

seikoista.
they-GEN must to-notice just train-ILL got-on-ones some-ELA small
facts-EL A
(33)b. 'I'm sure there are little details which give the game away to
conductors, they know who's just got on.'
(This is a very free translation of the sentence, but the translation little
details is correct: the Finnish joistakin (ela. pi. of jokin 'some') rules out
a definite NP. Some little details would also be a possible equivalent.)
(34)a. Halusin tietaa, oliko se kadonnut kampa todella siella miehen

uppslaagissa.
wanted-1SG to-know was-Q it-NOM lost-NOM comb-NOM really
there man-GEN turn-up-INE
(34)b. ' I wanted to know if the [lost] comb was really in his turn-up.'
(Se reinforces the fact that the comb is a known referent.)
Function words 103
Occasionally, appropriate translation equivalents are other determiners

than articles (e.g. this, that, stressed some), and I accordingly disregard
those here.
The second kind of usage is a functional one, in that without the
function word the definiteness reading would be different-or would
probably be different. Some examples follow, from the same text and its
translation.
(35)a. Heti oven takana rappukaytavassa hanelta putosi se pullo.
at-once door-GEN behind staircase-INE he-ABL dropped it-NOM
bottle-NOM
(35)b. 'He'd just stepped out onto the staircase when he dropped the bottle.'
The bottle in question has been previously mentioned, and so might be
assumed to be a known referent on the basis of the context; nevertheless,
being a clause-final subject (the Finnish structure is: from him - dropped
-bottle) it risks being read as indefinite unless se is added. The se
disambiguates. (See also Markkanen 1985.)
(36)a. Esine oli se kultainen maisterinsormus.
thing-NOM was it-NOM gold-NOM ring-NOM
(36)b. 'The tiny object was the gold ring.'
Again, the ring has been previously mentioned; but without se there is the
risk of an indefinite reading for this clause-final complement.
(37)a. Todennakoisesti han etsi sitd kampaa.
probably he-NOM looked-for it-PART comb-PART
(37)b. 'It was pretty clear that he was looking for that comb.'
The comb would be equally acceptable: it has been previously mentioned,
but omitting sitd (part. sg. of se) in front of this postverbal object would
make a 'same-referent' reading less likely.
The third type of usage is what we might call a grammatical one, in that
if the function word is omitted the sentence is ungrammatical. One
example of this is the use of se or its plural ne before a clause-final definite
antecedent of an ettd 'that' clause, as in (38).
(38)a. Oli siita se hyoty, etta han saattoi lopettaa etsimisen.
was it-ELA it-NOM advantage-NOM that he/she-NOM could to-stop
looking-for-ACC
(38)b. 'That at least had the advantage that she stopped looking for the
ring.'
If se is omitted here, the sentence is ungrammatical as it stands; hyoty
'advantage, use' would then have to be partitive. Another example of a

grammatically necessary se is illustrated in (39), where se is required
before the definite antecedent of a postposed restrictive relative clause (see
Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979: 125-6).
(39) Sitd asiaa ei tarvitse esitella ruususeppeleen sisassa, jota mina

mainostan.
it-PART thing-PART NEG-3SG need to-present rose-garland-GEN
inside which-PART I advertise
'What I am advertising does not need to be presented in a garland of
roses.'
If sitd (part. sg. of se) is omitted the sentence is ungrammatical, for the
relative clause then needs to be placed immediately after its antecedent.
5.5.2 The claim that the definiteness of an NP is often left to be inferred

from word order is, in spite of the odd exception, well established.
Particularly persuasive evidence in favour of it comes from an examination
of the contexts where the Finnish translator has felt compelled to insert a
prenominal function word to ensure the correct definiteness reading,
especially when a definite NP acts as the headword of a restrictive relative
clause. The following examples are typical. Informants were asked to
translate various simple sentences containing the NP the book you had
yesterday. The NP thus had to be given a definite reading. In one of the
sentences this NP appeared in clause-initial position (40a), and translation
(40b) was unanimously agreed to be the obvious correct one:
(40)a. The book you had yesterday was the wrong one.
(40)b. Kirja, joka sinulla oli eilen, oli vaara.
book-NOM which-NOM you-ADE was yesterday was wrong-NOM
(Finnish makes no difference in punctuation between restrictive and non-

restrictive relative clauses: a comma is used in both.) No-one suggested
that it would be necessary to add se here. But when the NP appeared in
clause-final position it was agreed that something would probably be
added, in natural informal speech at least.
(41)a. Is this the book you had yesterday?

(41)b. Onko tama se kirja, joka sinulla oli eilen?
is-Q this-NOM it-NOM book-NOM which-NOM you-ADE was
yesterday
An alternative here was sama kirja 'the same book'.

Function words 105
It must nevertheless be acknowledged that the usage displays a good deal

of variance here. The structure of the Finnish relative clause above, joka
sinulla oil eilen 'which you had yesterday', is such that the relative
pronoun joka is nominative and the subject of the clause. Relative clauses
where the relative pronoun is not in the nominative, but where the
antecedent noun is still definite, provide data that are less clear-cut.
Sentences like (42) and (43) also translate with no function word added,
although se is still judged acceptable in colloquial speech.
(42)a. I met the man you saw yesterday.

(42)b. Tapasin miehen/sen miehen, jonka nait eilen.
met-lSG man-ACC / it-ACC man-ACC who-ACC saw-2SG
yesterday
(43)a. In came the man you saw yesterday.
(43)b. Sisaan tuli mies/se mies, jonka nait eilen.
in came man-NOM / it-NOM man-NOM who-ACC saw-2SG
yesterday
On the other hand, (44) and (45), with the same relative clause, are
somewhat less natural with no function word.
(44)a. Is he the man you saw yesterday?

(44)b. Onko han se mies/lmies, jonka nait eilen?
is-Q he-NOM it-NOM man-NOM / man-NOM who-ACC saw-2SG
yesterday
(45)a. He is not the man you saw yesterday.
(45)b. Han ei ole se mies/lmies, jonka nait eilen.
he NEG-3SG be it-NOM man-NOM / man-NOM who-ACC saw-
2SG yesterday
It must be stressed, however, that the presence or absence of se in such

sentences is not so much a question of grammaticality as one of formality
level. Informants felt that they would usually say se in normal speech, and
would indeed prefer it there, but that they would try to avoid it in careful
formal writing.
We have so far been dealing with contexts where the addition of se (or
its plural ne) seems to be necessary or at least preferable to ensure a
definite reading. I now turn to examples where an indefinite function word
is added to ensure an indefinite reading. Most of these require a clause-
initial noun to be indefinite, and translations offered invariably use an
indefinite function word before the clause-initial noun, or else shift the
noun to a postverbal position.
(46)a. A man once wrote a book called X.

(46)b. Muuan/yksi/erds mies kirjoitti kerran kirjan nimelta X.
a-certain / one / a-certain man-NOM wrote once book-ACC name-
ABLX
(47)a. Some students were asking for you.
(47)b. Jotkut opiskelijat kyselivat sinua.
some-NOM students-NOM asked you-PART
(48)a. Some books were lost.
(48)b. Joitakin kirjoja katosi.
some-PART books-PART disappeared
Another possible translation is Kirjoja oli kadonnut, with no indefinite
function word added: this shows that the fact that the subject noun is
partitive is guarantee enough of its indefiniteness.
These examples show that clause-initial nouns are not felt to be
indefinite unless there is some particular indication of this, such as
partitive case or an indefinite function word. There only seems to be one
context where unmarked clause-initial nouns are understood as indefinite,
and this is the all-new contexts mentioned earlier. However, there seem to
be some very subtle distinctions going on here, since not even all all-new
contexts are covered by this generalization. Compare the following, as all-
new answers to the question 'What happened?' with indefinite subjects.
(49) *Poika rikkoi ikkunan.
boy-NOM broke window-ACC
' A boy broke a window.'
(50) Joku poika rikkoi ikkunan.
some-NOM boy-NOM broke window-ACC
' A boy broke a window.'
(51) Pikkupoika rikkoi ikkunan.
small-boy-NOM broke window-ACC
'A little boy broke a window.'
The semantic difference between (49) and (51) seems to be that breaking
windows is seen as possible typical ('pseudo-generic') behaviour of little
boys, as stealing is of thieves, but that window-breaking is not typical of
boys per se. The indefinite function word thus becomes necessary to
preserve an indefinite reading, as in (50).
An obvious example of an all-new context is the register of newspaper
headlines, and here, as we might expect, we do find instances of clause-
initial indefinites that are not explicitly marked as such. Consider (52):
(52) Nuori lappalaistytto teki ennatyksen korkeushypyssa.
young-NOM Lapp-girl-NOM broke record-ACC high-jump-INE
'A young Lapp girl broke the high-jump record.'
Function words 107
It is as if the context itself leads the reader to expect all-new utterances,

and so enables him to provide the correct indefinite reading for the clause-
initial noun. If the register is different, and the context is not, for example,
a headline, an indefinite function word would have to be added - Eras
nuori lappalaistytto...
We also find examples of indefinite function words being used to ensure
an indefinite reading for oblique nouns - i.e. those not in a subject, object
or complement case. The following illustrate the point:
(53)a. You can give it to a friend (if you don't want it yourself).
(53)b. Voit antaa sen jollekin ystdvdlle.
can-2SG to-give it-ACC some-ALL friend-ALL
(54)a. I gave it to a friend.
(54)b. Annoin sen eraalle/yhdelle ystdvdlle.
gave-lSG it-ACC a-certain-ALL / one-ALL friend-ALL
5.5.3 One point that has recurred several times in the above discussion
is that there are a number of stylistic factors that influence the expression
of definiteness. One such factor is the level of formality: function words
are more frequent in less formal texts, and more frequent in speech than
in writing. Another stylistic factor is register: in certain registers, such as
headlines, function words are notable by their absence (as are articles in
English).
A third aspect of style is the purely evaluative one: many Finns seem to
feel that the use of function words like se, joku and yksi prenominally is
somehow 'not good style' and should be avoided if possible. This feeling
probably goes back to the traditional teaching of Finnish at school, which
would tend to stress that this usage was 'not native', being a result of
Swedish or English influence. Several of my informants commented that
they would use se in natural colloquial speech, but perhaps in careful
written language they would try to avoid it and use, e.g., sama 'same'
instead. (In colloquial speech both se and sama may even occur together:
se sama kirja 'the same book'.) However, against this evaluative attitude
one should bear in mind that the very earliest texts of written Finnish
made frequent use of se and also yksi 'one'. The first translation of the
Bible into Finnish, in the sixteenth century, is a good illustration of this.
Its (main) translator, the reformer Agricola, most probably used existing
German and Swedish translations as aids, which is one reason for the
abundance of these 'pseudo-articles'. Later translations then tended to
drop them. A brief example, from Luke 1: the Authorized Version has
108 Finnish', no articles
'There was in the days of Herod, the king of Judaea, a certain priest
named Zacharias.' Agricola had (55a), and the standard 1938 translation
has (55b).
(55)a. Oli Herodesen Judea Kuninga aicana yksi pappi Zacharais nimelde.
was Herod-GEN Judea king-NOM time-ESS one-NOM priest-NOM
Zacharias name-ABL
(55)b. Herodeksen, Juudean kuninkaan, aikana oli pappi, nimelta Sakarias.
Herod-GEN Judea-GEN king-GEN time-ESS was priest-NOM name-
ABL Sakarias
A few lines later, after the introduction of the angel, the Authorized
Version has: 'but the angel said unto him'. Agricola has (56a) and the
modern translation (56b).
(56)a. Mutta se Engeli sanoi hanelle.
but it-NOM angel-NOM said he-ALL
(56)b. Mutta enkeli sanoi hanelle.
but angel-NOM said he-ALL
5.6 Context
Function words, and certain cases in certain uses thus provide

relevant data for an analysis of definiteness, and word order also seems to
be involved: unless there are indications to the contrary, it appears that
the default reading for a clause-initial noun is definite, and for a clause-
final one indefinite.
In many contexts, however, it is a combination of cues that suggests the
equivalent article, not one cue alone. The interaction between word order
and case seems particularly relevant in this respect.
It will have become manifest that the overriding consideration is most
often the context itself, both textual and situational. It is almost always
the context to which resort must be made in the translation of oblique
nouns, and of nouns that are in the partitive for reasons other than
quantity. It is also often context alone that determines whether a Finnish
noun in the nominative/accusative is translated as definite or indefinite, if
this is not inferrable from the word order. Stylistic aspects of the
sociolinguistic context, such as formality and register, can also influence.
If the context is situational rather than explicitly textual, the choice of
article becomes a pragmatic one, and opinions may well differ on occasion
as to what the most appropriate reading should be. For instance, Meri's
story ' The comb' refers at one point to a situation in which a group of
Context 109
students are wondering whether to give their teetotal professor a bottle of

wine as his raffle prize or something else instead, and there then occurs the
following clause:
(57) Ajattelivat antaa kuraattorin huoneen poytdlampun.
thought-3PL to-give student-president-GEN room-GEN lamp-ACC
The published translation is: ' they thought of giving him a table lamp
from the student president's room'. The choice of the indefinite a table
lamp appears to imply that, in the translators' opinion, the student
president's room would presumably have contained more than one table
lamp; yet one might equally well argue that the table lamp would be more
appropriate, since the room probably had one desk in it, the student
president's desk, and one lamp on this desk - desks do not usually have
more than one lamp. These are purely pragmatic considerations, and there
is no clue of any kind in the text itself.
We are now in a position to turn to the Finnish research traditions and

examine how this wide range of data has been analysed and what
theoretical conclusions have been drawn.
6 Finnish spesies
6.1 Early studies
The general category of definiteness first appears in Finnish

grammar under the name of spesies 'species', a term introduced by
Noreen (1904). (See Hirvonen 1980 and Vahamaki 1980 for general
surveys.) Noreen had distinguished three categories of spesies for Swedish,
which he called definite, indefinite and general. The Finnish Language
Commission adopted the term spesies in their influential 1915 report, but
defined the category as having only two members: definite and indefinite.
Nouns whose referents were known or previously mentioned were said to
have definite spesies, and nouns with referents which were unknown or not
previously mentioned had indefinite spesies (Kielioppikomitean mietinto 6,
1915: 38). 'Known' was later redefined to include 'known by virtue of the
situation'.
From the start it was clear that 'in Finnish there is no one way of
expressing the category of spesies which could be compared e.g. to the
articles of many Indo-European languages' (Ahlman 1928: 134; my
translation). Research therefore focused on discovering the range of
grammatical devices which could be used to express this opposition of
known vs unknown referent. The research strategy was basically what
Catford (1965) would later call commutation: a given syntactic feature of
a Finnish sentence was varied, resulting in two different English, German
or Swedish translations, one with a definite and one with an indefinite
article. A motley selection of minimal pairs resulted. However, as the
examples below show, many of the proposed pairs were not in fact
minimal ones, since one syntactic change (e.g. case) often necessarily
triggers off another (e.g. concord or word order). The main early
suggestions were as follows (see, e.g., Ahlman 1928; L. Hakulinen 1946;
Ikola 1954, 1964):
(a) Nominative vs partitive case (for subjects)
110
Early studies 111
(1) Vieraat tulivat vastaan.

guests-NOM came-3PL against
' The guests came to meet us.'
(2) Vieraita tuli vastaan.
guests-PART came-3SG against
'Guests came to meet us.'
(b) Nominative vs genitive case (subjects in some impersonal

structures and participial structures)
(3) Kirjeen piti tulla minulle.
letter-GEN should to-come me-ALL
4
The letter was supposed to come to me.'
(4) Minulle piti tulla kirje.
me-ALL should to-come letter-NOM
'I was supposed to get a letter.'
(c) Accusative vs partitive case (objects)

(5) Luin kirjat.
read-lSG (past tense) books-ACC
'I read the books.'
(6) Luin kirjoja.
read-lSG (past tense) books-PART
'I read books/some books'
(d) Elative vs partitive case (in certain quantifier structures - those
that Quirk et al. (1972) call 'typical or general partitives')
(7) pala juustosta
piece-NOM cheese-ELA
' a piece of the cheese'
(8) pala juustoa
piece-NOM cheese-PART
' a piece of cheese'
(9) puolet kirjasta
half-NOM-PL book-ELA
'half of the book'
(10) puoli kirjaa
half-NOM-SG book-PART
'half a book'
(In the latter pair the difference of definiteness is also shown by the case
contrast on the noun puoli; yet the plural form in (9) has a singular
meaning, and may be seen as exceptional.)
(e) Number concord after a subject preceded by a cardinal numeral

(11) Kolme akselivaltaa olivat jo ratkaisseet kantansa.
three axis-state-PART had-3PL already decided-PL position-ACC-their
112 Finnish spesies
' The three axis states had already decided on their position.'
(12) Kolme liittolaisvaltaa oli jo ratkaissut kantansa.
three allied-state-PART had 3-SG already decided-SG position-ACC-their
' Three allied states had already decided on their position.'
(f) Word order (mostly, preverbal vs postverbal subject)

(13) Ukko oli tuvassa.
old-man-NOM was cottage-INE
' The old man was in the cottage.'
(14) Tuvassa oli ukko.
cottage-INE was old-man-NOM
'In the cottage was an old man.'
(g) Stress (marking the psychological predicate)

(15) UKKO oli tuvassa.
' An OLD MAN was in the cottage.' (i.e. indefinite despite preverbal
position)
(h) Function words (pronouns used as determiners: se 'it, that', ne

'they, those\joku 'some, someone'; also yksi 'one' and eras 'a
certain')
(16) Se mies tuli.
it-NOM man-NOM came
' The I That man came.'
(17) Joku mies tuli.
some-NOM man-NOM came
'A man came.'
(i) The situation or context alone (particularly, but not only, in

oblique cases)
A representative study belonging to this early tradition is Wexler (1976).

Despite its later date, there is scarcely any reference to the work of Finnish
scholars since the 1950s. A major source for Wexler appears to be
Kramsky (1972), who in turn bases his comments for Finnish on L.
Hakulinen (1946). Wexler's paper deserves discussion in some detail, since
it is a good illustration of the difficulties inherent in this kind of
contrastive research.
Wexler's subject is the non-lexical expression of determinedness in
Russian and Finnish. (I postpone comments on Russian until 9.1.2
below.) He does not define precisely what he means by determinedness,
being content merely to refer to Kramsky's somewhat inconclusive
remarks on the subject (Kramsky 1972: 30, 44, 55). However, he states
Early studies 113
explicitly that he does not take this category as being restricted a priori to
whatever is expressed by articles in languages such as English, since this
would be to ignore means of expression of determinedness which did not
correlate with the presence or absence of a (surface) article in English.
In fact, Wexler's theoretical position here appears to be untenable. If
there is no a priori definition of determinedness, and if articles in the
article-bearing language are not taken as a starting point, there is surely
no way at all of deciding what it is that one is looking for in the non-
article-bearing language. As we might expect, in practice Wexler simply
has to base his investigation on translations of sentences with different
English articles; yet the inclusion of one or two examples without
corresponding article differences raises doubts about how he wishes to
understand the notion of determinedness. From the various Finnish
devices he lists, however, it becomes clear that he is not restricting the
concept to what is traditionally known as definite vs indefinite reference.
He also includes the idea of 'approximate quantitative indefiniteness'
(1976: 37). Furthermore, he is at pains to point out that many of the
means of expression operate in conjunction with other means, and may
also have other functions which overlap with the expression of
determinedness.
Wexler lists the following devices for the expression of determinedness
in Finnish.
(a) Case selection of objects (partitive vs accusative; in accordance with

older Finnish grammars he does not use the term ' accusative' but speaks
instead of the nominative and genitive forms, which have identical
endings). See (5) and (6) above.
(b) Case selection of subjects (nominative vs partitive). Wexler explains

that subjects 'denoting a substance' (i.e. that are divisible) express
'partiality, incompleteness and, by implication, indeterminedness' in the
partitive, and 'totality, completeness and determinedness' in the nomi-
native. Again, quite what is meant by (in)determinedness is not made
explicit. See (1) and (2) above.
Wexler also observes that the (in)determinedness of a subject as
expressed by case is neutralized by the 'determiners' se 'it, that' and ne
'they, those'. A noun phrase preceded by one of these is thus interpreted
as being determined, regardless of its case: the meaning is then ' all of that
type' vs ' some of that type':
114 Finnish spesies
(18) Se maito on poydalla.

it-NOM milk-NOM is table-ADE
' That (lot of) milk is (all) on the table.'
(19) Sitd maitoa on poydalla.
it-PART milk-PART is table-ADE
'There is (some of) that (kind of) milk on the table.'
(c) Selection of verb form: third-person plural active with omitted

pronoun subject vs the so-called passive ( = impersonal) form. Wexler's
inclusion of this ' opposition' is a further indication of how wide-ranging
is the concept of determinedness with which he is operating. The choice
here is between 'determined "they" (i.e. a specific group) and indeter-
mined "they" (in the sense "one", people in general)' (1976: 57). His
examples are:
(20) (He) puhuvat suomea Suomessa.
(they-NOM) speak-3PL Finnish-PART Finland-INE
' They (those people) speak Finnish (when) in Finland.'
(21) Suomessa puhutaan suomea.
Finland-INE one-talks Finnish-PART
'In Finland they speak Finnish.'
This means of expression of (Wexler's) determinedness is the only one in
his list for which his English equivalents do not display a difference of
article. Its inclusion here is also problematic in other ways. The passive
form is in fact not restricted to a ' they' reading at all (see Hakulinen and
Karlsson 1979: 254), but often includes the speaker as well, as in (22):
(22) Menna'dn pubiin.
one-goes pub-ILL
'Let's go to the pub.'
Furthermore, although (22) could be uttered with reference to an
undetermined group, it would be equally appropriate uttered with
reference to a restricted, specific and determined group such as the
speaker's wife plus himself.
The main difficulty here, however, is to see how Wexler's use of
' determined' in this context can be equated with his use of the same word
with respect to his other examples. Without a definition, even an
operational one, of determinedness we have no criteria for deciding
whether a given opposition actually has to do with determinedness or not.
Wexler also avoids saying anything specific about the relation between
what is actually expressed by the syntax and what may be inferred about
Early studies 115
the determinedness of an NP. Referring to the possibility of selecting the

partitive for divisible subject nouns, he says 'we suspect that the main
function of case choice in subjects is to distinguish between partial and
whole subjects; it is in the guise of the partial-whole dichotomy that the
speaker may also be able to imply, in addition, indetermined versus
determined subjects respectively' (1976: 58). But he does not specify what
'in the guise o f is supposed to mean.
(d) Word order:
(i) preverbal vs postverbal subjects; his examples are similar to (13)

and (14) above.
(ii) order of numerals and noun phrases:

(23) Suomen neljd edustajaa menestyivat hyvin.
Finland-GEN four representative-PART-SG succeeded-3PL well
'The four representatives of Finland did well.' (implication: the group
consisted altogether of four representatives - Wexler's comment)
(24) Neljd Suomen edustajaa menestyi hyvin.
four Finland-GEN representative-PART-SG succeeded-3SG well
'Four representatives of Finland did well.' (implication: there were
more than four [Finnish] representatives in the group - Wexler's
comment again, based on the normal reading, where Neljd is more
stressed than Suomen)
In (23) the verb menestyivat is plural, while in (24) menestyi is singular. In

fact the presence or absence of concord alone will lead to different
translation equivalents in English, as was illustrated above in (11) and
(12). Wexler gives (23) and (24) as an example of a syntactic means of
expressing determinedness available to a non-article-bearing language
which happens not to be expressed by the article in any article-bearing
language (1976: 37). But this is misleading: Wexler's own translations do
precisely show that these two can be glossed with different articles in
English {the vs zero).
Wexler also mentions subject-predicate agreement, which we have
already noted. As regards stress, he says that at present its role in
expressing determinedness is unclear.
To sum up: Wexler is well aware of the way the various Finnish
syntactic means he is interested in have what appear to be overlapping
functions. He concludes that neither Finnish nor Russian has a specific
category of determinedness, and also that both these non-article-bearing
116 Finnish spesies
languages reveal a number of similarities in their inventories of non-lexical

means for expressing determinedness. Of these, only word order might, he
says, be considered potentially universal.
Wexler's study thus illustrates some of the conceptual problems in this
area of Finnish syntax. In particular, it shows how questions of
definiteness are intimately bound up with matters of quantity in Finnish.
6.2 Notive spesies and quantitative spesies
Not all the proposals of these early studies were unanimously accepted. In
particular, queries were raised on whether spesies really was expressed by
stress, whether it necessarily had anything to do with the distinction
between psychological subject and predicate, and whether it was in fact
expressed by word order (e.g. Linden 1947; Sadeniemi 1949; Ikola 1954).
Thus, for instance, a noun might be stressed and in clause-final position
but nevertheless be definite, i.e. have a known referent:
(25) Tupaan tuli ISANI.

cottage-ILL came father-my-NOM
'Into the cottage came MY FATHER.'
The degree of conceptual confusion even led Penttila (1955) to suggest an

intermediate category of ' half-definite' for such cases as (26):
(26) Koivussa on isot lehdet.

birch-INE is-3SG big-NOM-PL leaves-NOM
'The birch has big leaves'
However, it was not until a proposal was made by Siro (1957, 1964) that
some degree of agreement was reached. Siro's analysis remains open to
criticism in some respects, as we shall see, but it is the one on which
present-day standard grammars are mainly based (e.g. Hakulinen and
Karlsson 1979). Siro argued that there were two semantically distinct
types of spesies, each with its own means of expression. Quantitative
spesies indicated whether or not the noun denoted a partial (' indefinite')
or total ('definite') amount, and this was shown by the opposition
between the partitive on the one hand and the nominative or accusative
on the other. Notive spesies had to do with whether the noun had a known
or unknown referent, and was expressed by stress (or word order),
function words or the situation or context alone. (The term notive is not
a synonym for 'notional', but has become a technical term in Finnish
Notive and quantitative spesies 117
studies for (roughly speaking) the ' familiarity' sense of definiteness; a

more precise definition will emerge in due course.) Siro's suggestion is thus
based both on Noreen's original notion of spesies and on the clear
evidence that the partitive vs nominative/accusative opposition relates in
some way to the use of articles in, for example, English. Siro's analysis
means that a noun may therefore be ± quantitatively definite and ±
notively definite. The following examples are from Hakulinen and
Karlsson(1979: 132):
(a) Definite quantitative and definite notive spesies
(27) Maito on kannussa.
milk-NOM is jug-INE
' The milk is in the jug.'
(28) Autot ovat kadulla.
cars-NOM are street-ADE
' The cars are in the street.'
(b) Definite quantitative but indefinite notive spesies
(29) Minulla on uudet hampaat.
I-ADE is new-NOM-PL teeth-NOM
'I have new teeth.' (i.e. a whole new set of teeth)
(c) Indefinite quantitative but definite notive spesies
(30) Sita maitoa on kannussa.
it-PART milk-PART is jug-INE
'Some of the/that milk is in the jug.'
(31) Niitd autoja on kadulla.
they-PART cars-PART is street-ADE
'Some of the/those cars are in the street.'
(d) Indefinite quantitative and indefinite notive spesies
(32) Kannussa on maitoa.
jug-INE is milk-PART
'There is {some) milk in the jug.'
(33) Kadulla on autoja.
street-ADE is cars-PART
'There are {some) cars in the street.'
Research on definiteness in Finnish since Siro has largely taken the
form of a critique of the proposed two kinds of spesies, and of the relations
between them. The main problems have to do with the sentence types
listed under (b) ( = Penttila's ' half-definite') and (c) above, and on the
expression of notive spesies in general. I review this later research in terms
of the particular problems and arguments discussed, in the following
sections.
118 Finnish spesies
6.3 The quantitative status of non-divisibles
According to the majority view of divisibility (e.g. Itkonen

1976a), quantitative spesies only applies to NPs that are divisible: because
non-divisibles are wholes rather than quantities, the quantity distinction
does not apply. That is, such nouns cannot take the partitive for quantity
reasons. However, there are alternative views of non-divisibles, which
imply a slightly different interpretation of quantitative spesies. One
alternative analysis assumes that non-divisibles are intrinsically ' total' in
quantity: thus Hakulinen and Karlsson (1979: 132) include the following
example, which is said to display indefinite notive spesies (clause-final
position) but definite quantitative spesies (nominative case):
(34) Kadulla on auto.

street-ADE is car-NOM
'In the street is a car.'
Similarly, on this analysis the subject in (35) is said to be definite both

notively and quantitatively:
(35) Auto on kadulla.

car-NOM is street-ADE
' The car is in the street.'
Deciding between these two competing analyses becomes particularly

significant in the case of nominative plural nouns in existential or
possessive structures, where they typically occur in clause-final position
and with a singular verb. Much discussed illustrative examples are:
(36) Koulussa on huonot opetusvdlineet.

school-INE is bad-NOM-PL teaching-aids-NOM
'The school has bad teaching-aids'
(37) Suomessa on kylma't talvet.
Finland-INE is cold-NOM-PL winters-NOM
'Finland has cold winters'
And recall (38) ( = 2 9 ) :

I-ADE is new-NOM-PL teeth-NOM
'I have (a) new {set of) teeth.'
The question is whether such nominative plural nouns are to be regarded

as divisible, and therefore, on the traditional view, as having definite
Non-divisibles 119
quantitative spesies; or are they non-divisible plurale tantum nouns, in

which case the traditional quantity distinction does not apply? Siro (1957)
took these NPs to be divisible, showing total quantity. Itkonen (1976a,
1980), on the other hand, argues that such noun phrases in fact denote a
non-divisible whole, a set thought of as a single unit, and therefore
quantitative spesies does not apply. Evidence for this view, he argues, is
the fact that kaikki 'all', which would indicate a divisible and thus total
noun, cannot be inserted here. A second test is the case of the predicative
adjective with such NPs: with singular non-divisible subject nouns a
predicative adjective is nominative (39), but with divisible total subjects
the adjective is partitive ((40) and (41)):
(39) Auto oli uusi.

car-NOM was new-NOM
' The car was new.'
(40) Autot oli vat uusia.
cars-NOM were new-PART-PL
'The cars were new'.
(41) Vesi oli kylmdd.
water-NOM was cold-PART
'The water was cold'
NPs such as those in (36)-(38) behave like the non-divisible noun in (39)
and not like the divisibles in (40) and (41):
(42) Koulun opetusvalineet olivat uudet.

school-GEN teaching-aids-NOM were new-NOM-PL
'The school's teaching-aids were new.'
(43) Suomessa talvet ovat kylmdt.
Finland-INE winters-NOM are cold-NOM-PL
'In Finland the winters are cold'
(44) Hampaani ovat uudet.
teeth-my-NOM are new-NOM-PL
'My teeth are new.'
This then supports Itkonen's claim that such NPs are non-divisible wholes
rather than divisible and total quantities.
Vilkuna (1980), however, takes still another position. She rejects
Itkonen's test with kaikki 'all' on the grounds that the impossibility of
inserting the word in such sentences as (36)—(38) is due to the (notive)
indefiniteness of the NPs here, not to their supposed non-divisibility. She
treats both non-divisible nominative plurals and divisible nominative
plurals as 'series' (1980: 102). This allows her to state a generalization
120 Finnish spesies
about all NPs in the nominative plural - i.e. that they all imply a total
quantity as opposed to a partial one. We shall have reason to return to
Vilkuna's view below, 7.1.2.
Two further points need to be made here. First, precisely the same
problem of analysis occurs with some accusative plural nouns, as in:
bought-1SG yesterday new-ACC-PL curtains-ACC
'Yesterday I bought new curtains.'' (i.e. a whole new set)
And second, with subject nouns it seems to be a significant fact that the
verb is typically in the singular. (This would be normal if the subject noun
were partitive.) G. Karlsson (1962) has argued that it is precisely the lack
of concord here that causes the subject NP to be interpreted as notively
indefinite, in contexts where the notive definiteness is not otherwise clear.
Compare the following pair, where the subject noun is a plurale tantum:
(46) Tanaan on arpajaiset.
today is lottery-NOM-PL
'Today there is a lottery.''
(47) Tanaan ovat arpajaiset.
today are lottery-NOM-PL
'Today is the lottery.'
Karlsson also draws attention to the fact that there is nevertheless a good
deal of acceptable variation as regards the concord in such sentences if the
notive definiteness is already clear from the context: in (48), for instance,
both singular and plural verb are equally acceptable.
(48) Handle tuli/tulivat vedet silmiin.
he/she-ALL came-3SG/came-3PL waters-NOM eyes-ILL
'Water came into his/her eyes.'
For Karlsson such variation is only possible if the subject is in clause-final
position: a nominative plural, notively definite clause-initial subject must
take a plural verb. But in fact, in colloquial speech in particular, a singular
verb may also occur here. Alongside Karlsson's example (49) we may also
attest sentences such as (50).
(49) Korvat menivdt minulta lukkoon.
ears-NOM went-3PL I-ABL lock-ILL
'My ears got blocked.'
(50) Korvat meni lukkoon.
ears-NOM went-3SG lock-ILL
'My ears got blocked.'
Definite notive but indefinite quantitative spesies? 121
The range of interpretational disagreement concerning quantitative

spesies is also illustrated by Karlsson's view that some clause-final
nominative plural NPs are actually quantitatively /^definite, despite their
case-ending. Some of his examples are:
(51) Nyt jo nakyy selvdt merkit siita, etta...
now already is-visible clear-NOM-PL signs-NOM it-ELA that...
'Now (there) are to be seen clear signs that...'
(52) Siihen on pdtevdt syyt.
it-ILL is good-NOM-PL reasons-NOM
'There are good reasons for that.'
(53) Ruoasta oli vain rippeet jaljella.
food-ELA was only scraps-NOM left
'Of the food there were only scraps left.'
Karlsson's reading of these NPs as quantitatively indefinite is perhaps

influenced by the fact that they translate as indefinites in, for example,
English; but despite this they are nevertheless in the nominative here,
which raises serious doubts about his interpretation.
Yet another surprising interpretation is that of Tuomikoski (1969: 31),
who appears to take some of the clause-final subject nouns in examples
like (36)—(38) as notively definite as well as quantitatively definite.
Finally, if Itkonen's analysis is adopted, and the plurale tantum concept
is in effect extended to cover any case where a plural noun denotes
something that can be conceived of as a single collective unit and thus
non-divisible, the repercussions for the description of spesies will be
considerable. For if sentences like (36)—(38), showing an apparent
combination of indefinite notive and definite quantitative spesies, are in
fact to be construed as having non-divisible subjects with quantitative
spesies no longer being applicable, it would follow that Siro's con-
figuration of notively indefinite but quantitatively definite spesies would
not be a possible one at all. I come back to this issue in chapter 7.
6.4 Definite notive but indefinite quantitative spesiesl
A second problematic configuration in Siro's model is where the

NP is said to be notively definite but quantitatively indefinite. The classical
example is Siro's (54):
(54) Taman sarjan osia on sitojalla.
this-GEN series-GEN-SG parts-PART is binder-ADE
' Some parts of this series are at the binder's.'
122 Finnish spesies
Siro (1964) had argued that osia ' some parts' was notively definite because
of the preceding genitive and the clause-initial position, but quantitatively
indefinite because of the partitive. It has since been pointed out
(Tuomikoski 1969; Chesterman 1977; Vahamaki 1977; Itkonen 1980;
Vilkuna 1980) that osia cannot in fact be notively definite because we do
not know which parts are concerned: we can identify the set (' the parts of
this series') but not the particular referents within it. The examples quoted
above (5.2) from Hakulinen and Karlsson (1979) are similar:
(30) Sit a maitoa on kannussa.:

it-PART milk-PART is jug-INE
'Some of the/that milk is in the jug.'
(31) Niitd autoja on kadulla.
'Some of the /those cars are in the street.'
In neither case can we identify the actual referent(s), only the set to which
the referent or referents belong: some (unstated) members or part of an
identified set (that is, identifiable to the hearer).
A crucial test case is a sentence like (55):
(55) (Missa on olutta?) - Sitd on jaakaapissa.

(where is beer-PART) - it-PART is fridge-INE
'(Where is there some beer?) - There is some in the fridge.'
Sitd (partitive singular of se 'it') is a pronoun and so definite notively, but

it does show partial quantity. Nevertheless, the underlying meaning of sitd
is exactly parallel to the previous examples. It literally means 'some of it':
the it is a known referent (the beer), but not the some (a part of the beer).
The conclusion to be drawn here is therefore that the combination of
notively definite but quantitatively indefinite spesies logically cannot
occur, if whatever is quantitatively indefinite must have the same
extension as whatever is notively definite. And as Vilkuna (1980: 70)
observes, it therefore follows that Siro's two types of definiteness cannot
be mutually independent as his analysis suggests.
6.5 Word order
It is commonly argued that word order is one means of expressing

definiteness, specifically notive spesies, in Finnish (e.g. L. Hakulinen 1946;
Holman 1975; Batori 1978; A. Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979; Ondracek
Word order 123
1985; Vilkuna 1989). As we have seen (6.4), the view is usually based on
the normal preferred interpretations of the definiteness of NPs depending
on whether they occur before or after the verb. Opinion has not been
unanimous, however. It has been pointed out, for instance (Linden 1947,
1969; Ikola 1954), that clause-final subjects do not necessarily have
indefinite notive spesies:
(56) Tuvassa oli isdsi.

cottage-INE was father-your-NOM
4
In the cottage was your father'
With respect to clause-initial nouns, one of the most explicit claims is

that of Ihalainen (1980), who postulates a No Initial Indefinite Constraint
to account for the interpretation of first-mention preverbal NPs in
phonologically unmarked sentences. (Ihalainen deals in particular with
Finnish 'passive' sentences: the structure is really an impersonal one,
where the agent is left unspecified and the meaning is approximately
'someone + V P \ ) Thus in (57) pullo 'bottle' cannot be interpreted as
indefinite:
(57) Pullo rikottiin.

bottle-ACC one-broke
' The bottle was broken.'
The natural Finnish equivalent of A bottle was broken would be a different

structure, designed to get pullo after the verb:
(58) Siella rikottiin pullo.

there one-broke bottle-ACC
'A bottle was broken there.'
Or
(59) Joku rikkoi pullon.

someone-NOM broke bottle-ACC
'Someone broke a bottle.'
The situation is similar for the Finnish equivalents of English agentless

passives: the closest equivalent is a reversed-roles structure with postposed
subject, as in (60):
(60) Talon rakensi Henry,

house-ACC built Henry
' The house was built by Henry.'
124 Finnish spesies
Ihalainen shows that the Finnish equivalents of English indefinite objects

cannot be shifted to initial position in such structures. The Finnish for (61) -
(61) (What was the programme?)-Well, a sonata was played by Henry
and...
- would have to be formally different, such as:
(61) a. Siella oli sonaatti, jonka soitti Henry, ja...
there was sonata-NOM which-ACC played-3SG Henry and
' There was a sonata, which was played by Henry, and...
But not:
(61) b. *Sonaatin soitti Henry ja...
sonata-ACC played-3 SG Henry and
because the clause-initial object here would be read as definite. Ihalainen
notes that this No Initial Indefinite Constraint also seems to hold for some
other sentence types in Finnish.
The relation between definiteness and word order is often discussed in
terms of theme and rheme. Batori (1978), for instance, says that it follows
from the usual definitions of theme and rheme that the theme of a clause
represents something that is in some sense definite, although an NP in the
rheme does not have to be correspondingly indefinite. See also Holman
(1975). Batori observes, moreover, that this relation between theme/rheme
and definiteness is not something specific to Finnish but is found in many
languages which lack articles.
Vilkuna (1980) takes a rather more cautious view of the relation
between spesies and word order. She agrees that in many contexts word
order can influence a probable definiteness reading, but shows that an
identical word order can nevertheless be compatible with a contrary
reading if the context so requires. Compare the following:
(62) Laatikossa oli nukke.
box-INE was doll-NOM
'In the box was a doll'
(63) (I looked for my doll and my teddy everywhere. It finally occurred to
me that they might be in their proper place, the play-box, so I looked
there)
Laatikossa olikin nukke.
box-INE was-EMP doll-NOM
' The doll WAS in the box.'
Vilkuna also argues that different stress relations may have a bearing on
the definiteness reading of an NP, even when the word order is the same;
one of her examples is the following (slightly adapted here):
A spesies hierarchy? 125
(64) (Anne's boyfriend Jacques bought a diamond necklace but lost it -)

a. - ennen kuin ehti antaa lahjan armaalleen.
before managed-3SG to-give present-ACC sweetheart-his-ALL
'-before he could give the present to his sweetheart.'
b. - ennen kuin ehti antaa lahjan ARMAALLEEN.
' - before he could give the present to his sweetheart.'
She points out here that a stress on armaalleen ' to his sweetheart' gives the
impression that this person is not Anne, the girl previously mentioned,
and says that this shows how a marked stress can thus influence an
indefiniteness reading. However, it is clear that whether the NP in
question is stressed or not it must in fact be definite (regardless of whether
the referent here is identical to that previously mentioned) because of the
possessive suffix corresponding to his. The example illustrates the way in
which the concept of spesies can easily become blurred. Indeed, Vilkuna's
conclusion (1980: 254) is that if there is a relationship between spesies and
word order it may well be because the notion of spesies may be subsumed
within that of given/new information, although this latter concept
comprises much more than just definiteness.
It would seem, in short, that although in some isolated contexts the
relation between word order and spesies appears at first sight to be
straightforward, it is a relationship that can fairly easily be altered if the
surrounding context is changed. This suggests that the link between the
two is actually rather an indirect one - a point that will be taken up in
more detail below (7.3). Furthermore, there is some confusion about the
relation between spesies and stress, and how it relates to the information
structure of the clause.
One way of describing the role of word order and its place among other
means of expression of definiteness is in terms of a hierarchy, as proposed
in Chesterman (1977), which I summarize in the following section.
6.6 A spesies hierarchy?
Chesterman (1977) outlines the restrictions on the expression of

quantitative spesies (see the notes on the partitive above, 5.1), and
distinguishes three main ways in which notive spesies is expressed in
Finnish: word order, function words and context alone. The problem is
how to account for the numerous examples where the expected reading is
made inappropriate. The reading based on word order is false, for
instance, in examples such as the following:
126 Finnish spesies
(65) Ovella oli Pauli/isdsi.

door-ADE was Pauli/father-your-NOM
'At the door was Pauli/your father'
(66) Ovella on se mies taas.
door-ADE is it-NOM man-NOM again
'At the door is that man again.'
(67) Joku mies on ovella.
someone-NOM man-NOM is door-ADE
'A/Some man is at the door.'
So the subjects in (65) and (66) are definite despite rheme position, and
that of (67) indefinite despite theme position. And recall also contexts like
(63) above, which force a definite reading regardless of word order.
Similarly, nouns which are normally contextually definite, such as
proper nouns, can also be made indefinite by the addition of an indefinite
function word, as in (68):
(68) Joku Pauli on ovella.

someone-NOM Pauli is door-ADE
' Some Pauli or other/Someone who says his name is Pauli is at the
door.'
Examples such as these suggest that these means of expressing notive

definiteness are not of equal strength, as it were: function words can
overrule other means (as in (66)-(68)), and thus stand highest in the
hierarchy; and nouns that are normally intrinsically definite, like proper
nouns and situationally determined uniques (i.e. what were loosely
referred to as nouns whose definiteness was 'expressed by context'),
remain definite even if they occur postverbally, in the rheme (as in (63) and
(65)). Word order thus seems the weakest of these three methods.
In this earlier paper I also rejected two of Siro's combinations of notive
and quantitative spesies - the two that have been discussed above in 6.3
and 6.4: quantitatively definite but notively indefinite, and quantitatively
indefinite but notively definite. The first was rejected, following Itkonen,
on the grounds that the NPs in question were conceptually non-divisible
and thus quantitative spesies, in the sense understood by Itkonen, did not
apply; and the second for the reason presented above in 6.4. I then
claimed that, where it was applicable (i.e. with divisible nouns only), the
quantitative spesies in this sense in fact entailed the notive spesies, since
there was no case in which the definiteness value of the notive spesies could
run contrary to the quantitative one. This therefore allowed the possibility
Pragmatic constraints? 127
of reducing the description of spesies to a single category, with the case

opposition of ± partitive as the strongest means of expression, at the top
of the hierarchy.
This line of argument aroused some response in the literature,
particularly in contributions by Hoover (1984) and Itkonen (1980). I
discuss these in the next two sections.
6.7 Pragmatic constraints?
Hoover (1984) takes issue with a number of points raised in

Chesterman (1977). Her main claim is that definiteness in fact has no
automatic correlates in Finnish, and that both word order and case-
endings (i.e. + partitive) are determined not by definiteness but by
pragmatic constraints such as topicality, emphasis and information
structure. While I agree that a definiteness reading derived from word
order may be overruled, for example by contextual and/or pragmatic
factors (as demonstrated above, 6.6), Hoover's claim that such pragmatic
constraints also affect the use of the partitive is flawed by misreadings of
the data. Arguing against my earlier suggestion that notive spesies can be
inferred from quantitative spesies with divisible nouns she gives two
apparent counter-examples, both of which are misunderstood. The first is
(69):
(69) Hammensin keittoa joka kymmenes minuutti.

stirred-1SG soup-PART every tenth minute
'I stirred the soup every ten minutes.'
Of this she says: 'According to Chesterman's view, keittoa expresses
indefinite quantitative spesies (partial quantity) and should thus imply
indefinite notive spesies (an unknown referent). However, keittoa in the
above sentence can hardly be anything but known to the participants;
thus, it is notively definite' (1984: 195). What Hoover fails to notice,
however, is that hdmmentda 'to stir' is an intrinsically irresultative verb,
and requires a partitive object invariably (see the notes on Finnish
grammar in 5.1). There is therefore no alternative with the accusative
available and quantitative spesies does not apply. Keittoa is probably
notively definite, yes, since it is situationally determined; but this is not an
argument against inferring notive from quantitative spesies since the
quantity is not marked here in the first place.
Hoover's second counter-example is the following pair:
128 Finnish spesies
(70) Poydalla on virvokkeita.

table-ADE is refreshments-PART
'On the table there are some refreshments'
(71) Virvokkeet ovat poydalla.
refreshments-NOM are table-ADE
' The refreshments are on the table.'
If the notive spesies can be inferred from the quantitative, virvokkeita in
(70) should be notively indefinite. This is disputed by Hoover on the
following grounds (1984: 195): 'in both sentences... the referent of the
noun is known (notively definite) by virtue of the immediate situation... or
the cultural context... Virvokkeita is in the partitive case not because of
the amount involved but because of the sentence-final position which in
turn is determined by the focal importance of the element as new
information.' This view is wrong on two counts. First, whether or not the
presence of the refreshments is known and obvious to the participants is
irrelevant: the sentence functions most likely as an invitation to eat or
drink, and therefore introduces the refreshments as a new discourse topic;
we infer from this that the noun is notively /^definite, as Hoover's own
translation again shows {some refreshments). Second, the partitive in (70)
cannot be determined by the word order, but has its usual meaning of
' partial quantity': it allows the existence of other refreshments elsewhere,
in contrast to the nominative in (71), which specifies all the (contextually
relevant) refreshments. That the partitive is not caused by word order can
be shown very simply by an example such as (72), which has the same
information structure as (70) but a nominative, not a partitive:
(72) Ikkunassa on uudet lasit.
window-INE is new-NOM-PL glasses-NOM
'The window has new panes of glass' (i.e. a whole new set, all the
panes are new)
Hoover's conclusion is that definiteness in Finnish is a pragmatic
consequence of a number of different factors, rather than a syntactic
category per se. Definiteness is 'a derivative function which can only be
attributed to languages with an overt article system' (1984: 202). We shall
have reason to return to this general conclusion below (7.6). Hoover's
paper also raises the problem of distinguishing between spesies and
information structure and between a correlation relationship and a cause-
and-effect relationship: it is true, for instance, that a partitive subject often
(in unmarked structures) correlates with clause-final position; yet this is
not to say that the partitive is caused by this word order.
A single spesies after all? 129
6.8 A single spesies after all?
Taking a slightly different approach, Itkonen (1980) comes out in

support of the idea of a single category of spesies, but not quite as
suggested in Chesterman (1977). With German as his immediate language
of comparison, he starts by showing the relevance of the divisibility
distinction to the distribution of the German articles, as follows:
Non-divisible Divisible Divisible

whole (sg.) quantity (sg.) quantity (pi.)
Indefinite ein Auto Wasser Autos
Definite das Auto das Wasser die Autos
This shows that for indefinite German nouns the use or non-use of an
article depends on the divisibility of the noun rather than its singular/
plural status. Divisibles (i.e. quantities) take no article if indefinite and an
article if definite. Indefinite quantities, whether singular (mass nouns) or
plural, allow the possibility of a (contextually relevant) surplus quantity:
this is Itkonen's gloss of the notion of partial quantity. Definite divisibles
denote maximum quantities, with no implied surplus.
Itkonen goes on to show that for Finnish the corresponding distinction
between definite and indefinite is marked by case ( + partitive), but only
for divisibles and only for certain categories of noun phrase (see 5.1). The
picture for Finnish is thus, at first sight, the following:
Non-divisible Divisible Divisible

whole (sg.) quantity (sg.) quantity (pi.)
vettd (part.) autoja (part.)
Indefinite { auto (nom.)
' water' 'cars'
1 'car' or
Definite 1 auton (ace.) vesi (nom.) or autot (nom.
veden (ace.) or ace.)
If this description were correct it would be possible to predict the Finnish

case ( + partitive) on the basis of the German article, but as Itkonen
observes, this does not always work because of the many examples in
which a German indefinite plural corresponds to a Finnish nominative or
accusative, not the expected partitive. These examples are of the type
discussed above in 6.3, with an apparent combination of Siro's definite
quantitative and indefinite notive spesies such as (73):
(73) Koivuun tuli isot lehdet.
birch-ILL came-3SG big-NOM-PL leaves-NOM
'Die Birke bekam grosse Blatter./The birch tree got big leaves?
130 Finnish spesies
As mentioned above (6.3), Itkonen argues that these NPs are actually
pluralia tanta and so non-divisible wholes rather than divisible quantities;
quantitative spesies therefore does not apply. He agrees that Siro's other
problematic combination, of definite notive but indefinite quantitative
spesies, is also impossible (see 6.4). It follows from this that for divisibles
the two kinds of spesies therefore always coincide, and so ' it is redundant
to speak of two kinds of definiteness' (1980: 38). The Finnish system then
becomes symmetrical, with both wholes and quantities appearing in both
singular and plural, as illustrated below.
Non-divisible Divisible Non-divisible Divisible
(sg.) (sg.) (pi) (pl.)
Indefinite part. part.
I nom. or ace. |nom. or ace.
Definite nom. or ace. nom. or ace.
In Finnish, then, only divisibles are marked for definiteness or
indefiniteness. The category 'non-divisible plural' in the diagram indicates
the plurale tantum nouns, which are relatively infrequent and therefore
marked. Itkonen feels that for the singular it is the divisibles that are
correspondingly the marked category.
Itkonen's analysis thus reduces definiteness in Finnish to what can be
expressed morphologically, by case. Alongside this view comes the
suggestion (e.g. in Itkonen 1976a) that quantitative spesies, expressed by
case, is none other than a form of grammatical quantification. This
argument is developed in some detail by Larjavaara (1988), who proposes
various mathematical-logical operations which generate a number of
types of indefinite ('quantitatively open') and definite ('closed') expres-
sions involving the partitive/non-partitive opposition. While it may be an
advantage to be able to formalize quantitative spesies as part of the system
of quantification in Finnish, such an analysis will not suffice to cover all
relevant aspects of definiteness - provided of course that definiteness is
indeed taken to encompass more than matters of quantity alone, as Siro
had argued. A more comprehensive approach is still needed.
6.9 A note on Finnish generics
Before drawing some conclusions concerning the research on

spesies I take a brief look here at Finnish generics. There has not been a
great deal published on this topic (see Ikola 1964; 118ff.; Vilkuna 1980:
chapter 5), but it will be useful to survey the basic facts in outline.
Finnish generics 131
The first point to be made is that the assigning of a generic reading to

an NP is decided entirely on context: there are no special morphological
or syntactic markers, for any structure with a generic reading could be
given a non-generic one if the context were changed appropriately. The
second point is that partitive nouns cannot be generic: of the cases we are
concerned with, then, only nominative and accusative NPs can be generic.
In Siro's terms, therefore, generic NPs are quantitatively definite (or else
non-divisible). These points are illustrated by the following examples:
(74) Susi soi leivan.

wolf-NOM ate bread-ACC
'The wolf ate the bread.' (non-generic)
(75) Susi syo veljensakin.
wolf-NOM eats brother-his-ACC-EMP
'The IA wolf even eats/will even eat his brother.' (generic)
(76) Metsassa ulvoo susia.
forest-INE howl-3SG wolves-PART
'In the forest (some) wolves howl.' (non-generic)
(77) Sudet ovat petoelaimia.
wolves-NOM are beasts-of-prey-PART
' Wolves are beasts of prey.' (generic)
(78) Suomen sudet ovat metsaelaimia.
Finland-GEN wolves-NOM are forest-animals-PART
'Finnish wolves/The wolves ofFinland are forest animals.' (generic)
Example (78) is counted as generic at least by Hakulinen and Karlsson

(1979: 132); it refers in fact to a subset of the whole genus-see the
discussion above, 2.5.
Note now that an example such as (77), although quantitatively
definite, has an English equivalent with an indefinite article. Is it then
notively indefinite despite its clause-initial position? If so, it would be
another example of the problem combination (quantitatively definite but
notively indefinite) discussed at some length above (6.3, 6.8); would it then
also have to be called diplurale tantuml It seems that some other solution
must be called for. Examples such as (77) are not often found in the
literature on spesies, perhaps because the equivalent German NP could
also take a definite article and thus correspond as normal to the Finnish
nominative. That is, the German for (77) could be either Wolfe sind
Raubtiere or Die Wolfe sind Raubtiere: there seems to be some acceptable
variation between the definite and indefinite forms in German generics.
But English has to have an indefinite article here. This provides a neat
illustration of one of the difficulties of describing definiteness in Finnish:
132 Finnish spesies
are subject NPs like that of (77) in fact (notively) definite because they
could be so in German (and occur in clause-initial position), or indefinite
because they would be so in English? What you see in a second language
partly depends on what language you are looking from.
This problem notwithstanding, the above kind of data must obviously
be incorporated somehow into a description of Finnish definiteness.
(Genericness in Finnish has also been studied in relation to generic tense
and the third-person verb with an omitted subject or object (Hakulinen
and Karttunen 1973), but such work lies outside the scope of the present
topic.)
6.10 Conclusions
The first and most obvious conclusion to be drawn from this

review is that spesies remains a confusing concept. It has largely been
imposed on Finnish grammar from outside, and there is a good deal of
disagreement about exactly what it means and how it is expressed, if at all.
From now on, therefore, I shall on the whole avoid the term spesies.
It is also obvious that there is an extremely wide variety of phenomena
in Finnish which can be said to correspond in some sense to the English
articles; yet the nature of this correspondence seems to vary considerably.
Part of the variation in the sense of'correspondence' is due to the blurring
of the distinction between the notions 'express' and 'make it possible to
infer'. To say that a particular device in Finnish 'expresses definiteness'
seems sometimes to mean no more than 'allows the hearer to infer the
definiteness or indefiniteness of an N P \
On the other hand, it has at least become clear that, as in English,
matters of reference in Finnish are closely linked to matters of quantity,
although the precise nature of the relationship between the two still
remains to be specified. Another problematic relationship is that between
quantity and divisibility.
As regards the distinction between known and unknown referents, the
situation in Finnish is particularly confused with respect to word order,
context and the role of pragmatic factors such as emphasis and
information structure.
The following chapter now sets out to pull these various threads
together into a coherent analysis of the status of definiteness in Finnish as
a whole.
7 The status of definiteness in
Finnish
7.1 Divisibility and quantity
7.1.1 I start by reconsidering the basic notions of divisibility and

quantity in Finnish.
At first sight the divisibility distinction in Finnish appears straight-
forward, separating singular count nouns from plural count and mass
nouns. Yet certain definiteness readings remain problematic. Because
divisibility is a semantic concept many nouns can be used in both divisible
and non-divisible senses, as in English: for instance kakku 'cake'. In its
divisible usage the word will allow the expression of partitive quantity, but
in its non-divisible use it will not. In this latter usage, a partitive would
have some other cause, not partial quantity. Recall examples such as the
following:
(1) Pesimme autoa.

washed-1 PL car-PART
' We were washing the/a car.'
Auto is non-divisible, and the partitive signifies irresultative action; the

definiteness of the car is determined by the context.
(2) Naimme juustoa.

saw-1 PL cheese-PART
' We saw some cheese.'
The verb is resultative and juusto is divisible: it must therefore be read as

some cheese, indefinite. But now consider (3):
(3) Soimme kakkua.

ate-1 PL cake-PART
Kakku can be divisible or non-divisible, so that three readings are possible

(out of context, of course):
133
134 Definiteness in Finnish
(a) Non-divisible, partitive due to irresultative verb: 'We were eating

a/the cake.'
(b) Divisible, partitive marking partial quantity; verb resultative:

'We ate (some) cake.'
(c) Divisible, but with partitive marking irresultative verb. The

inference is then that the quantity of the affected object is partial:
'We were eating (some) cake.'
We have, then, some instances of inevitably ambiguous readings

between divisible and non-divisible, and this ambiguity must also affect
the definiteness reading. Recourse is naturally made to the context, but it
is important to note that the syntax alone gives no clues in such cases.
Another, theoretically more serious problem arising from the notion of
divisibility is the interpretation of certain plural nouns that denote
something like a set-as-a-whole (introduced above in 6.3). (There do not
seem to be corresponding problems with mass nouns, i.e. there are no
mass nouns that are claimed to be non-divisible.) A typical example is:

bought-1SG yesterday new curtains-ACC
'Yesterday I bought new curtains.'
We noted that opinions differed as to whether NPs such as the object noun
in (4) were divisible or not. Since only quantities can be divisible, we may
infer that underlying the varying interpretations here there lie differing
concepts of quantity in Finnish, and how quantity is to be ascertained
syntactically.1
7.1.2 There appear to be three distinct views of quantity in Finnish. It

is the discrepancy between these views that explains the divergent
interpretations of data such as (4) above.
The first view, the traditional one, holds that divisibility - and hence a
reading of quantity - is to be defined in terms of formal tests such as the
possibility of inserting kaikki'aW if the quantity is total, and the existence
of a corresponding predicate complement in the nominative (not partitive)
1
Variant views of quantity are of course not peculiar to Finnish alone. There is variation
(partly idiolectal) in English, for instance, with collectives like committee, audience, which
occur with both singular and plural verbs.
Divisibility and quantity 135
if the subject noun is nominative. (See 5.3 above.) On these grounds, non-
divisible plurals like the object in (4) are not quantities, and nor are
singular non-divisibles.
The second view (e.g. Vilkuna 1980) holds that non-divisible plurals are
also quantities in a sense, in that both nominative/accusative divisibles
and nominative/accusative non-divisible plurals can be seen as 'series',
complete sets, of entities; this, then, contrasts with the partitive, meaning
'an unlimited, random set'. In other words, this view stresses that both
divisible and non-divisible plurals are 'total', in a way that partitives are
not. Furthermore, it is not just divisible plurals that display an opposition
between nominative/accusative and partitive; non-divisible plurals also
have corresponding versions with a partitive. The only difference is that,
by the traditional definition, if these NPs are in the partitive they are no
longer non-divisible but, by definition, divisible. Compare (4) with (5):
(5) Ostin eilen uusia verhoja.
bought-1SG yesterday new-PART-PL curtains-PART-PL
4
Yesterday I bought some new curtains.'
Formally, then, both divisible and non-divisible plural nominative/
accusative NPs allow an alternative with a partitive.
The third view (e.g. Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979) extends the notion
of quantity even further, to include also singular non-divisibles. But here
there is a difference: there is no possibility of an alternative with a partitive
(i.e. with a partitive of quantity). If singular non-divisibles like auto 'car'
are quantities, they are 'fixed quantities', intrinsically 'total' in some
sense of the word.
These three views each make the quantity vs non-quantity distinction
across various classes of nouns in different ways, as illustrated below,
where 'yes' means 'are quantities' and ' n o ' means 'are not quantities'.
Non- Non-
Divisibles divisible divisible
Criterion (mass + pi.) plurals singulars
(a) Formal tests of divisibility yes no no
are positive
(b) Quantity opposition (nom./ yes yes no
ace. vs part.) possible
(c) Implication of totality in yes yes yes
nom. /ace.
The most logical position here appears to be the middle one, (b).
Position (a) makes the notion of quantity dependent on that of divisibility,
which seems like putting the cart before the horse. On the other hand,
position (c) is surely potentially vacuous: if any concept, any noun, even
count singulars, can be said to be a quantity, there are therefore no nouns
which are not quantities and there is no point making any distinction at
all. From the point of view of definiteness the crucial criterion here is the
possibility of an opposition between nominative/accusative and partitive.
True, this opposition is sometimes at odds with the traditional view (a) of
divisibility, in that some nominative/accusative plurals are non-divisible
whereas all partitives are divisible. But this is a secondary, semantic
distinction, which can be made additionally where necessary. I shall
henceforth take both divisibles and non-divisible plurals to be quantities,
both allowing a distinction to be expressed between total and partial
quantity.
7.1.3 It must now be pointed out that the range of senses in which a
noun is taken as ' total', and thus does not appear in the partitive, is a wide
one. Its widest extension is illustrated by generic NPs, as in (6):
(6) Varkaat ovat ovelia.
thieves-NOM are cunning-PART-PL
' Thieves are cunning.'
'Total' here has the approximate meaning 'all Ns that exist, have existed
or will exist'. A narrower extension is shown in the non-generic example
(7), which refers to 'all' of a particular, relevant group of thieves,
previously mentioned.
(7) Varkaat olivat tulleet yolla.
thieves-NOM had come night-ADE
' The thieves had come in the night.'
Two further possible restrictions on the sense of' total' have to do with
certain grammatical restrictions on the use of the partitive: this case
cannot mark the subject of a transitive verb, nor the subject of a non-
existential intransitive verb. One could argue that because these are purely
grammatical restrictions the whole total/partial distinction is irrelevant
here. On the other hand, one might expect that such restrictions at least
correlate with limitations of a semantic nature. For instance, recall the
example discussed earlier and given below as (8):
' Some thieves stole my things.'
Divisibility and quantity 137
Here the subject is 'total' in the sense that the whole of the subject
performs the action in question. This means that, on this view, Finnish
sometimes has to make distinctions of totality that are irrelevant in
English. Consider also the following example: (9a) is the original English.
(9)a. This summer shop windows are adorned with satirical
posters ...(Guardian, 23 August 1975.)
The published Finnish translation uses a reversed-roles structure to

translate the passive, with a preposed object and a postposed subject; but
note the cases:
(9)b. Tana kesana kauppojen ndyteikkunoita koristavat satiiriset
julisteet... (Helsingin Sanomat 3 September 1975.)
this-ESS summer-ESS shops-GEN windows-PART decorate-3PL
satirical-NOM-PL posters-NOM-PL...
The object appears in the partitive, corresponding to shop windows; but
the subject is nominative, corresponding to satirical posters, because the
verb is transitive. Both NPs have the zero article in English, but Finnish
has to make one total and one partial.
The converse situation also occurs, where Finnish uses the same ' total'
form for NPs which would be treated differently in English. The following
example has a nominative subject because the verb is transitive, and an
accusative object to indicate total quantity:
(10) Aatteelliset vastakohtaisuudet ovat rajayttaneet olemattomiin sisaisen
yhteenkuuluvuuden tunteet kaikkien puolueiden piirissa.
ideological-NOM-PL conflicts-NOM have exploded-3PL oblivion-ILL
internal-GEN-SG solidarity-GEN-SG feelings-ACC all-GEN parties-
GEN circles-INE
' Ideological conflicts have blown into oblivion the feelings of internal
solidarity within all (political) parties.'
The subject here is scarcely felt to be generic, 'total', in English; on the
other hand, the object is inclusive in Hawkins' (1978) sense and thus is in
some way 'total'.
Furthermore, it is not only the nominative subjects of transitive verbs
that exhibit this kind of 'limited' totality. The same is true of the
nominative subject of an intransitive verb in sentences like (11) (from
Vilkuna 1980: 107), where the sense of a total, restricted set is a very loose
one indeed; so loose, in fact, that a partitive subject would be also
acceptable here. (The clause is existential, and the partitive would actually
be the unmarked form, with a singular verb.)
(11) Viime yona nain unta, etta apinat hyppivat poydallani.

last night saw-lSG dream-PART that monkeys-NOM jumped-3PL
table-ADE-my
'Last night I dreamt that monkeys were jumping on my table.'
In Vilkuna's analysis, the NP apinat represents a series or set seen in its
totality, yet this totality can mean no more here than ' all the monkeys in
my dream'. Note too that the clause is all-new, and the NP in question is
referentially indefinite.
A final instance of the Finnish tendency to extend the concept of totality
is provided by the following example, corresponding pragmatically to the
English Would you like some coffeel
(12) Maistuisiko kahvil
would-taste-3SG-Q coffee-NOM
While the Finnish is not, strictly speaking, a true translation equivalent of
the English (the two sentences are n o t ' semanto-syntactically equivalent'
in Krzeszowski's (1984) sense - see 5.2 above), it is nevertheless interesting,
from the semantic point of view, that the Finnish uses a nominative here.
A corresponding version with a partitive kahvia 'some coffee' would be
ungrammatical, because the sentence is not existential. It is as if the
Finnish is asking a question about generic coffee, coffee in general, rather
than about a particular quantity of coffee; this generic reading of coffee
is not precluded by the conditional tense of the verb, as it would be in
English. Compare the English Do you like coffee?, which is clearly generic.
It seems, then, that although the distinction between total and partial
readings is expressed formally in an unambiguous way, the concept of
totality is semantically rather a slippery one, with a wide range of
appropriate extensions.
7.2 Case selection
7.2.1 Clearly, the key case as regards definiteness in Finnish is the

partitive. The trouble is that this case has the widest range of functions of
any Finnish case, and the marking of partial quantity is only one of these.
Indeed, the marking of partial quantity is in fact the least of the partitive
functions, in that the case is only free to mark this if it has not already
been selected for other reasons: e.g. to mark the object of an irresultative
verb (see the notes on Finnish in 5.1). If the partitive is already present for
some other reason, the quantity of a divisible noun must be inferred
Case selection 139
indirectly. Recall the discussion on divisibility in 7.1.1 above: out of

context, a sentence like (13) has three possible readings depending on
whether the noun is taken as divisible or non-divisible and the verb
resultative or irresultative.
(13) Soimme kakkua.
ate-1 PL cake-PART
' We were eating a/the cake / we ate some cake / we were eating
(some) cake.'
Logically enough, with an object read as divisible an irresultative reading
for the verb tends to produce a partial quantity reading for the object,
since if the action is incomplete then the part of the object affected must
also be incomplete. The interpretation of (13) would then be 'We were
eating (some) cake.'
The question now arises of how Finnish would express the specifically
definite reading (14a):
(14)a. We were eating the cake.
The answer is that Finnish would probably insert a function word - se9
part, sitd- to ensure that cake is interpreted as a known referent:
(14)b. Soimme sitd kakkua
ate-1 PL it-PART cake-PART
Mutatis mutandis the same point holds for negative sentences: here too
the quantity distinction is nullified in the object, and a function word is
used if it is necessary to specify a known - specific - divisible referent:
(15) En ostanut sitd kakkua.
NEG-1SG bought it-PART cake-PART
'I didn't buy the cake.'
However, it will have become clear that the main functions of the
partitive are not entirely unrelated. In particular, quantity and aspect
often seem linked. Indeed, some scholars (e.g. Dahl and Karlsson 1975)
have suggested that the quantity opposition might actually be a special
manifestation of the basic aspectual distinction and thus secondary to it,
at least for unquantified NPs. This is an idea I shall not pursue, since I am
not primarily concerned with aspect but with different readings of NPs
themselves.
The partitive case derives originally from a Uralic suffix with an ablative
meaning, signifying 'movement away from'. As Denison (1957) empha-
sizes, this original locative meaning has given rise to a great many
apparently diverse functions - there are several others that I have not
touched on at all, since they do not relate directly to the theme of the
present study. Denison concludes that the essence of the present-day
partitive is 'the implication of indefiniteness and incompleteness' (1957:
262). Similarly, Toivainen (1985) sums up the basic function of the case as
the expression ofvajaus, which may be translated 'deficiency, incomplete-
ness'. The 'movement away from' has in time become 'a state of not being
whole, complete'. At its extreme, this is evident in the object of a negative
verb, of which no part is affected by the action of the verb. Objects of
irresultative verbs are affected, but not wholly. And partial quantities are
by definition incomplete. But it must be emphasized that the sense in
which partitives are indefinite is purely a quantitative one. The partitive
does not have anything directly to do with the distinction between known
and unknown referents. The relation between quantity and reference will
be discussed in a later section, 7.5.
7.2.2 The selection of other cases relates only sporadically to

definiteness. Nouns in oblique cases tend to be read as definite more often
than indefinite, but this is only a tendency. We have also noted that certain
'measure' (or 'partitive') structures allow definite and indefinite alterna-
tives (see 6.1). The definiteness readings of these structures are consistent
with the generalizations (including the aforementioned tendency regarding
oblique nouns) that we have so far made: the partitive is associated with
indefiniteness, a prenominal genitive with definiteness, and the elative case
(being oblique) with definiteness. Recall examples such as the following:
(16)a. pals, juustoa

piece-NOM cheese-PART
' a piece of cheese'
b. pala juustosta
piece-NOM cheese-ELA
'a piece of the cheese'
(17)a. sotilaiden joukko
soldiers-GEN group-NOM
' the group of soldiers'
b. joukko sotilaita
group-NOM soldiers-PART
' a group of soldiers'
Case selection 141
(Interestingly, the elative has taken over the original partitive function of
'movement away from, out of, but not its connotations of indeflniteness.
The case can be seen as a secondary one made up of the partitive ending
-ta/ — td plus the extra element -s- (see Denison 1957: 257).)
A potentially problematic case opposition is one that has been mentioned

earlier but not yet discussed: that between nominative and genitive in
some necessive and participial structures such as examples (18)—(21):
(18) Kirjeen piti tulla minulle.
letter-GEN should to-come I-ALL
' The letter was supposed to come to me.'
(19) Minulle piti tulla kirje.
I-ALL should to-come letter-NOM
'I was supposed to get a letter.'
(20) Kalle uskoi karhun olevan pesassa.
Kalle-NOM believed bear-GEN being den-INE
'Kalle believed the bear was in the den.'
(21) Kalle uskoi pesassa olevan karhu.
Kalle-NOM believed den-INE being bear-NOM
'Kalle believed there was a bear in the den.'
Examples (20) and (21) are from Hakulinen and Karlsson (1975), but
many native speakers reject (21) altogether. In fact, particularly in the
participial structures the usage is very unstable (see Itkonen 1976b;
Hakulinen and Karlsson 1979: 362ff.). It appears that several other
factors govern the selection of nominative vs genitive case, such as
topicalization, active or passive voice and even the semantics of the verb.
Yet none of these factors has given rise to a uniform usage. Rather than
assign the different definiteness readings of (at least) (18) and (19) to case
selection, then, it would seem more likely that they have to do with the
different positions of the nouns in question, one clause-initial and the
other clause-final. Using a corpus of over 10,000 clauses, Hakulinen,
Karlsson and Vilkuna (1980: 126) found that genitive subjects occur
almost without exception in clause-initial position (97 per cent of all
occurrences). It is thus this association between genitive subject and
clause-initial position that seems to account for the tendency to interpret
such subjects as definite. Other matters concerning word order are taken
up in the following section.
7.3 Stress and word order
7.3.1 Several scholars have suggested that one means of expressing the
difference between known and unknown referent is stress (L. Hakulinen
1946; Siro 1964; Enkvist 1975). The following pair is typical of the
examples cited. (Capitals mark sentence stress.)
(22) Ukko oli tuvassa.
' The old man was in the cottage.'
'An OLD MAN was in the cottage.'
The argument for the indefiniteness of the subject in (23) rests on the
notion of psychological predicate: since the psychological predicate denotes
new information, and new information is expressed by stress, therefore
stress indicates an indefinite noun. Siro (1964) in fact ends up by equating
his notive spesies distinction with the psychological subject/predicate
distinction. And Enkvist (1975: 79) states explicitly that notive spesies
' closely resembles' the definitions of theme and rheme that are based on
the difference between given and new information. However, I shall argue
that definiteness is in fact quite distinct from information structure.
In the first place, it is an oversimplification to assume that stressed
elements always coincide with new information. As e.g. Szwedek (1986)
shows, not all elements of new information are necessarily stressed,
although all elements that are stressed are new information. Suppose, for
instance, that (24) is an answer to the question 'What did you do
yesterday?'
(24) I was buying BOOKS.
Both buying and books are new information here, but only books has to
be stressed.
Secondly, the speaker alone decides what is to be new information,
whereas the knownness or otherwise of the referent is both speaker- and
hearer-oriented. Moreover, there are many nouns that have intrinsically
known referents - i.e. intrinsically definite NPs - and these can all be
allocated new-information value by the speaker just as freely as indefinite
nouns:
(25) PEKKA oli tuvassa.
Pekka was cottage-INE
'PEKKA was in the cottage.'
Stress and word order 143
Pekka (a proper name) is new information and stressed, but has

nevertheless a known referent. A noun can also be made definite by the
addition of se ' i t ' and still be new information:
(26) Se UKKO oli tuvassa taas.

it-NOM old-man-NOM was cottage-INE again
' The I That OLD MAN was in the cottage again.'
In fact, of course, any constituent of an utterance can be stressed,

contrastively if necessary, as new information, although sentence stress
does seem to be primarily associated with nominals (Szwedek 1986).
I have so far been talking here of definite referents and the possibility
of making them new information. In the case of unknown referents,
however, it may appear at first sight that the two categories (definiteness
and information) can be merged, for are not unknown referents always
new information and stressed? Unknown referents are logically unlikely
to be known information, to be sure; but consider examples like the
following.
(27) Joku oli kaapissa.

someone-NOM was cupboard-INE
'Someone was in the cupboard.'
(28) Jotain oli vialla.
something-NOM was wrong
'Something was wrong.'
The subject NPs in these all-new sentences are unknown referents, yet they
are not stressed, not because they are known information but because the
point of the sentence - the real new information - lies elsewhere. (See (24)
above.) Information structure is thus in principle independent of the
knownness of referents, indeed of referents at all. A similar point is made
by Allerton (1978), who distinguishes beween 'newsvalue givenness'
(realized by stress and intonation) and ' constituent givenness' (realized by
the use of proforms and definite NPs). ' Newsworthiness' might in fact be
a better term than new information, since information that may actually
be known to the hearer or recoverable from the context, and known by the
speaker to be known to the hearer, may still be stressed as newsworthy:
(29) Why don't you say something? You've got a TONGUE!
And as mentioned earlier (4.3.2), Chafe (1976) too shows that givenness
and definiteness can co-occur in any of the four possible combinations:

given and definite, given and indefinite, new and definite, new and
indefinite.
Information structure, however difficult it may be to define the concept
of information itself (see, e.g., Dahl 1976; Prince 1981), is independent of
referent structure. But how, then, are we to account for (23)?

'An OLD MAN was in the cottage.'
The answer is that if this sentence is taken out of context the definiteness
of the subject is in fact ambiguous. A previous mention of an old man, or
a situationally known one, would make the noun definite. The translation
given of (23) is simply the first that comes to mind, due to the statistical
tendency for unknown referents to be typically stressed, as new
information, unless there is evidence to the contrary. We could call this the
unmarked case, the default value. But the conclusion that must be drawn
is nevertheless that stress itself does not express definiteness directly. (See
also Ikola 1954: 241; and Chesterman 1987.)
7.3.2 I now return to Ihalainen's No Initial Indefinite Constraint, since

it is the most specific of the various claims that have been made about the
relation between definiteness and word order in Finnish. Notice first of all
that there is no corresponding 'No clause-final definite constraint'. And
recall the point made in the previous section, viz. that new information,
stressed, can relate to either known or unknown referents, whereas given
information is normally associated with known referents. Now in
phonologically unmarked sentences given information occurs clause-
initially and new information clause-finally. It therefore follows that
clause-initial NPs will tend to be definite because they tend to be given
information; clause-final NPs may vary more freely between definite and
indefinite referents.
Ihalainen is careful to keep the concepts of givenness and definiteness
distinct (1980: 59). When discussing (30) as a possible counter-example to
his constraint -
(30) Rahaa tarvitaan tahan projektiin.

money-PART one-needs this-ILL project-ILL
'Money is needed for this project.'
- he says that rahaa is in clause-initial position not because it is definite

but because it is given information: the sentence answers the question

'Why is money needed?' It does not, therefore, violate the constraint
because the principle is restricted to 'nouns that introduce a discourse
topic, i.e. to nouns that represent new information' (1980: 64).
However, what this example - together with Ihalainen's own ex-
planation - seems to reveal is that the constraint is actually concerned
with information structure rather than definiteness per se. What it predicts
is that in phonologically unmarked sentences the clause-initial position
tends to reject new information. In other words, Finnish is a topic-
oriented language rather than a subject-oriented one. Given information,
which normally takes clause-initial position, is indeed almost always
related to definite nouns, but sentences like (30) show that the combination
of given information and indefinite referent does occur. And we have
already seen other examples where a clause-initial noun representing new
information is made indefinite, e.g. by a function word or an indefinite
quantifier:
(31) Joku mies on ovella.

some-NOM man-NOM is door-ADE
'A man is at the door.'
(32) Pala leipdd olisi hyva
piece-NOM bread-PART would-be good-NOM
'A piece of bread would be good.'
True, these would have a stress on the subject, which would exclude them
from Ihalainen's constraint if it only holds for phonologically unmarked
sentences. (Sentences with contrastive stress may have initial indefinites,
as Ihalainen acknowledges: Talon rakensi HENRY (house-ACC built
Henry) 'It was HENRY who built a house / the house.') Other apparent
exceptions are all-new sentences such as newspaper headlines, and those
with a generic or at least non-specific (as also (32)) subject. (Generics
would presumably also be excluded from the constraint because they do
not involve particular referents.)
(33) Suomalaispoika kuoli Alpeilla.

Finnish-boy-NOM dies Alps-ADE
' A Finnish boy died in the Alps.' (Equivalent English headline:
' Finnish boy dies...')
(34) Tyytyvdinen kissa kehraa.
contented-NOM cat-NOM purrs
'A contented cat purrs.'
Compare this with the 'quasi-generic' example already mentioned a

number of times:

'Some thieves stole my things.'
Evidence such as this suggests that the No Initial Indefinite Constraint

is another example of what I have called a default reading: it holds unless
there is evidence to the contrary. Such evidence may be supplied by an
indefinite function word, a special (all-new) context, generics and
sometimes also case (see the partitive in (30) and (32)).
Clause-initial partitives, however, are a distinct minority. Hakulinen,
Karlsson and Vilkuna (1980: 126) calculate that less than a quarter of
partitive subjects occur clause-initially. Their normal position is clause-
final, giving the stereotypical structure for an existential sentence in
Finnish (see Schlachter 1958; Itkonen 1974-5): i.e. location - intransitive
verb - partitive subject.
7.3.3 The influence of word order is often discussed in terms of theme

and rheme. But here too there is confusion about the status of information
structure. Among the many conflicting definitions of theme and rheme
(see, e.g., Allerton 1978; Enkvist 1984) two main types can be
distinguished. One is based on information structure, variously under-
stood (e.g. Firbas 1964), and one on purely positional criteria (e.g.
Halliday 1967).
If theme and rheme are defined informationally, we are back again at
the stress argument (7.3.1): new information is (mostly) stressed, given
information is unstressed and usually relates to definite referents; but
stress itself does not mark definiteness.
Even with a positional definition of theme and rheme, the most that can
be said is that unmarked themes, because they are clause-initial, represent
the slot where given information (and hence usually definite NPs) tends to
occur.
In an earlier paper (Chesterman 1977) I suggested that word order
(positional theme and rheme) could be said to express definiteness unless
there was evidence to the contrary. This observation must now be
reformulated. It is not the case that word order expresses definiteness,
even if there is no counter-evidence; rather, the definiteness of an NP can
sometimes be inferred from word order, in the following way. Unmarked
word order exhibits a typical distribution of given and new information,
with given information occurring clause-initially. Given information is

typically associated with definite referents, and therefore clause-initial
nouns will normally be interpreted as definite. Similarly, but less
predictably, new information seems to be associated more often with
unknown referents than with known referents (see Szwedek 1986: 97rT.),
and so clause-final referents tend to be interpreted as indefinite unless
there is evidence to the contrary. The word order thus provides default
values for nouns occurring in the (positional) theme and rheme; but the
definiteness can by no means always be inferred in this way, since the
inference is only a probabilistic one.
The reason why definiteness can sometimes be inferred from in-
formation structure is that there is a partial overlap between the factors
underlying each. One of the causes of a noun being definite is previous
contextual mention, and if a referent has already been mentioned in a
discourse it may normally be assumed to constitute part of given
information. Context is a factor that is relevant both to definiteness and
information structure. Yet nouns can be definite for other reasons than
previous mention, so the correlation between the two oppositions is not
perfect.
The inference from word order to definiteness may fail in one of two
ways. First, the presence of evidence to the contrary will overrule it: such
evidence may be the overt marking of definiteness by means of a function
word, or by virtue of a noun being situationally known or unique (such
as aurinko 'the sun'). And second, if the clause is structurally or
phonologically marked the normal expectations of the positions of given
and new information are overthrown, and definiteness can no longer be
inferred on this basis. An example is all-new clauses such as (33)—(35),
where there is no given information available to fill the clause-initial slot.
7.3.4 The contrasts and correspondences between Finnish and English

in this area of syntax will be taken up below, in chapter 8, but a brief
comment is in order here on the relation between definiteness and word
order in the two languages. The situation in Finnish, as outlined above, is
clearly reminiscent of the so-called Definiteness Effect in English. This
states that existential sentences of the type On the table {there) was a cat
normally exclude a clause-final definite NP. This is such a strong tendency
that the ability of an NP to occur in this position is sometimes taken as a
test of the NP's definiteness or indefiniteness. (See Milsark 1977;
Woisetschlaeger 1983; Safir 1985; and the papers in Reuland and ter
Meulen 1987; also 9.3.2 below.)
However, many counter-examples of the tendency have been put

forward (e.g. by Holmback 1984), and it seems that indefiniteness alone is
not the only criterion for allowing NPs in the position in question.
Holmback argues that definites can also occur in such structures if they
are explicitly shown to be inclusive (in Hawkins' sense), e.g. by an already
existing modifier, as in In the hall {there) was the man of my dreams, There
is the only unicorn in captivity in the garden, There was the smell of pot all
over the apartment.
However, it is not simply that these NPs must already be contextually
inclusive; the point seems to be that they must be contextually already
definite. That is, definites which can occur clause-finally in English
existential structures are in fact precisely those that are predetermined to
be definite by the context: in other words, no definite/indefinite opposition
is possible in such contexts. The context - i.e. here the modifiers - provides
'evidence to the contrary', overruling the normal expectations of an
/^definite NP in an existential sentence. Now recall examples like In the
cottage {there) was your father, which were discussed above (see 6.5): even
in clause-final position these do not, in Finnish, receive an indefinite
reading. On the other hand, NPs which in Finnish would normally receive
an indefinite reading in an existential sentence (or the like), i.e. those
which are not otherwise inferred to be definite, are precisely those which
the English structure rejects if they are definite: e.g. Puutarhassa oli mies
'In the garden (there) was a [*the] man.'
In other words, the definiteness effect works the same way in both
languages. NPs which must intrinsically have a contextually definite
reading (in the sense just described) are accepted as definites in clause-final
position in these sentences, while NPs which are not already contextually
definite are rejected in English and given an indefinite reading in Finnish.
Word order thus has some influence on definiteness readings in both
languages, but not a paramount one.
7.4 Function words
7.4.1 We have seen (in 5.5) that certain Finnish function words often
express the definiteness or indefiniteness of an NP overtly, and may even
overrule the (in)definiteness reading that was inferrable from the word
order. The most frequent of these function words is se, which has the
primary meaning 'it', together with its plural ne 'they'. Let us now
Function words 149
examine the kinds of contexts in which it can occur prenominally,

especially in colloquial speech.
The most obvious of these contexts are anaphoric, with se/ne marking
a noun that has been previously mentioned in the discourse. The following
two examples are from oral data discussed in Lepasmaa (1978):
(36) -Taal oli paljo rottia ja--tuol oli semmonen puine roskalaatikko ja me
tiesimme et ne rotat oli siella--et me, yleensa jahtasimme myos niitd
rottia--')6ka meni kalikalla ja--kilkutteli sitd roskalaatikkoa
'-There were a lot of rats here and--over there there was a wooden
rubbish bin and we knew that the rats were there--that we, usually
we went hunting the rats-- someone got a stick and--banged the
rubbish bin with it'
The first mention of the rats and the rubbish bin here have no prenominal
se or ne, but subsequent mentions do: ne rotat (nom. pi.), niitd rottia (part,
pi.), sitd roskalaatikkoa (part. sg.). This is typical. The anaphoric reference
may also be a looser one, to a previously mentioned state of affairs:
(37) Mina olin hyvin huono voimistelija... en tieda mista se haluttomuus

johtui.
'1 was a very bad gymnast... I don't know' - (what-ELA it-NOM
unwillingness-NOM came-3SG) - 'from what the unwillingness came.'
Here there is no previous mention of the noun haluttomuus 'unwill-

ingness ', but se is nevertheless used because this particular concept or state
of affairs has already been introduced.
We have also noted examples where se is used cataphorically,
particularly before the antecedent of a restrictive relative clause, or a
postmodifying ettd 'that' clause, as in (38):
(38) Siina on se hyvdpuoli, etta...

there is it-NOM good-NOM side-NOM that...
'It has the advantage that...'
Se can also be used exophorically to indicate referents in the immediate

situation, as in (39):
(39) Anna se kirja tanne.

give-IMP it-ACC book-ACC here
'Give (me) the/that book here.'
It can even be used, again colloquially, before proper nouns:

(40) Sitten se Pekka sanoi, etta...

then it-NOM Pekka said that...
' Then Pekka said that
And it is also found with logically definite NPs, as in (41):
(41) Tama on se ensimmdinen miljaardianti.

this-NOM is it-NOM first milliard-issue-NOM
'This is the first milliard (mark) issue (of shares).' (newspaper
advertisement)
However, se/ne is less likely to be used before nouns that are unique and
definite in what Hawkins (1978) calls the larger situation; that is, before
the Finnish equivalents of nouns like the sun, etc. And it is rare before
nouns that are definite by association with a previously mentioned noun:
(42) Tama on hyva kirja. 'This is a good book.' -

a. *Se kirjoittaja on tanskalainen.
it-NOM author-NOM is Danish
' The author is Danish.'
b. ISilld kirjoittajalla on loistava tyylitaju.
it-ADE author-ADE is excellent-NOM style-sense-NOM
' The author has an excellent sense of style.'
c. Sitd kirjoittajaa on kuitenkin arvosteltu...
it-PART author-PART one-has however criticized
'The author has nevertheless been criticized...'
Se/ne is also not used before 'first-mention definites' that are not made
familiar cataphorically:
(43) *Vaimolla ja minulla on ne samat salaisuudet.

wife-ADE and I-ADE is they-NOM same secrets-NOM
'My wife and I have the same secrets.''
Thus, (44) below cannot mean 'I do not like the colour purple\ i.e. in
general, but would have to refer to a particular shade of purple, one that
was in the immediate situation or that had already been mentioned in the
discourse:
(44) En pida siita purppuravarista.

NEG-1SG like it-ELA purple-colour-ELA
'I don't like that purple colour.'
These restrictions on the use of se/ne seem to suggest that its meaning,
when used prenominally, is primarily a demonstrative one. In its
Function words 151
anaphoric, cataphoric and exophoric uses it has a 'pointing' function,

either back in the text, forward in the text, or to the immediate situation.
Where a demonstrative is inappropriate, se/ne is not used. This conclusion
is also reinforced by the fact that se/ne is not used before non-referential
noun phrases:
(45) *Suunnitelma oli se typeryyden huippu.

plan-NOM was it-NOM stupidity-GEN height-NOM
'The plan was the height of stupidity.'
And neither is it normally used with generic NPs:
(46) *Silld hevosella on nelja jalkaa.

it-ADE horse-ADE is four legs
4
The horse (generic) has four legs.'
Similarly, (47) -
(47) Ihmiset menevat usein siihen pubiin perjantaisin.

people-NOM go-3PL often it-ILL pub-ILL on-Fridays
'People often go to the/that pub on Fridays.'
- can only have the reading 'that particular known pub', not 'pubs / the
pub generically, as an institution'.
There is one further complicating factor concerning the status and use
of se that needs to be mentioned. Despite the generalizations made above,
it does occasionally occur colloquially in ways that seem exceptional, in
that they do show se with larger-situation uniques or generics. Typical
examples are:
(48) Kyllapas se kuu paistaa kauniisti.

yes-EMP it-NOM moon-NOM shines beautifully
' The moon really does shine beautifully.'
(49) On se hevonen tarkea elain.
is it-NOM horse-NOM important animal-NOM
' The horse certainly is an important animal.'
However, se is not functioning as an article here but as a pragmatic

particle - note the added emphasis in the translations. There are several
such particles in Finnish, and their precise meaning is often difficult to pin
down; they seem in general to strengthen the utterance in some way, and
perhaps discourage hearer disagreement. (See F. Karttunen 1975.) This
rather different status of se in examples such as (48) and (49) is indicated
in particular by the fact that in this usage it does not occur in clause-initial
position, but is preceded by a stressed constituent. This may require
subject-verb inversion, as in (49), and also (50) and (51):
(50) Paistaa se pdivd viela huomennakin.
shines-3SG it-NOM day-NOM still tomorrow-EMP
'The day will shine tomorrow, too.' (i.e. 'Tomorrow is another day.')
This pragmatic particle se can even be non-adjacent to its NP:
(51) Tulee se viela sinunkin vuorosi.
comes-3SG it-NOM still your-EMP turn-NOM-your
' Your turn will come one day.'
The partitive form of se - sitd - has also developed into an invariant
pragmatic particle in its own right (A. Hakulinen 1975). This particle
function of se (and sitd) should nevertheless be kept distinct from its
article-like function (but see Markkanen 1985 on 'emotional deixis').
7.4.2 Apart from demonstratives proper, se/ne is the only prenominal

function word of this kind that marks definite nouns; with indefinite
nouns, on the other hand, we find more variety. The numeral yksi' one'
is used to mark indefinites that are specific. The indefinite adjectives eras
and muuan, both meaning 'a certain', also mark specific nouns, usually
known to the speaker but not to the hearer. The pronoun joku ' someone'
(with the corresponding jokin ' something') is used in the sense ' some'
with either specific or non-specific nouns, but in both cases it implies that
the referent is unknown to the speaker as well as the hearer. Compare the
following (see Harma 1983: 192):
(52) Pekka osti yhden / erddn kirjan.
Pekka bought one-ACC / a-certain-ACC book-ACC
'Pekka bought a {certain) book.'
(53) Pekka osti jonkin kirjan.
Pekka bought some-ACC book-ACC
'Pekka bought a book' (specific, but I do not know which one)
(54) Pekka haluaisi ostaa jonkin kirjan.
Pekka would-like to-buy some-ACC book-ACC
'Pekka would like to buy a book.' (non-specific, perhaps any one will
do)
In addition to these differences, of grammatical class and also of
semantics, these indefinite function words are also stylistically non-
equivalent, in that muuan is distinctly more formal than the others, even
archaic. Eras, too, is more formal than yksi and joku.
Function words 153
None of these are normally used generically. Yksi (colloquially yks)

may very occasionally be used non-referentially in informal speech:
(55) Sa oot kylla yks idiootti.

you-NOM are yes one-NOM idiot-NOM
'You really are an idiot.'
Yks also seems to have an intensifying function here.
7.4.3 Whether one calls these function words articles proper or not
depends of course on one's definition of articles. Szwedek (1975),
discussing corresponding function words in Polish, argues that if a
function word must be added to get a given reading it can then be
considered a substitute article. By this criterion the Finnish forms are
sometimes articles and sometimes not, since they are by no means always
compulsory. Korchmaros (1983) suggests that only when a class of
morphemes develops whose primary function is the indication of
definiteness (as opposed, say, to having a more general deictic function)
can we speak of a genuine article category; and this is not yet true of
Finnish. Yet another test that has been proposed for article status is
whether the candidate items can also be used generically; as we have seen,
this is not the case for the Finnish function words in question.
Since the usage of these words is clearly more restricted than that of
articles, both functionally and stylistically, it would be more accurate to
call them embryo articles. In a paper discussing the probable future
development of the Finnish language, F. Karlsson (1975) suggests that it
is precisely se and yksi that come closest to the articles of, for example,
English, and that these two forms will very likely continue to spread in
Finnish, under the influence of the informal spoken language (and also, no
doubt, the increasing influence of English itself). One sign of this might be
the evident possibility of yksi also with plurals, so that it would
occasionally approach the usage of a plural indefinite article as well, as in:
(56) Tulin hakemaan yksid papereita, unohtui aamulla.

came-lSG to-fetch one-PART-PL papers-PART-PL was-forgotten-
3SG morning-ADE
'I came to fetch some papers, (I) forgot them in the morning.'
The present stage of the progress of these forms towards article status
may be gauged both from their generality in speech and from the contexts
in which they are felt to be well-nigh compulsory, even in a more formal
register. For se/ne, as we have seen, these are primarily anaphoric and
cataphoric contexts, and more frequently with clause-final definite nouns.
Se also appears to be necessary if divisible partitive objects must be made
unambiguously definite: recall examples like (57).
(57) Soimme sit a kakkua.
ate-1 PL it-PART cake-PART
'We were eating the cake.' (e.g. that special cake we both know
about)
The indefinite function words are felt to be necessary particularly in
clause-initial position if there is the risk that a noun there will otherwise
be read as definite (see 5.5).
A final comment: apparently the further east one goes among the
Baltic-Finnic languages and dialects, the rarer this article-like usage of
function words is (Terho Itkonen, personal communication, 1987). This
might indicate a decreasing degree of influence from major article-bearing
languages such as the Germanic and Romance families, plus perhaps a
concomitant increasing influence from article-less Russian.
7.5 The relation between quantity and reference
7.5.1 The various devices I have been discussing in Finnish grammar

fall into two distinct classes. Some of them have to do with the quantity
(partial or total) of the noun: the partitive case, the nominative and
accusative cases; in a different sense the function word yksi' one' also has
to do with quantity. Others are concerned with the reference of the noun,
i.e. whether the referent is assumed to be known or unknown to the
hearer: word order, the function words se/nejoku, eras, muuan. Attention
was first drawn to the distinction between these two oppositions by Siro in
the 1950s (see above, 6.2). While there has been considerable disagreement
over Siro's actual analysis of the oppositions, as we have seen in chapter
6, there can be little doubt that his basic insight is correct.
Theoretically, if the two oppositions (quantity and reference) are
distinct, we would expect it to be possible to describe their mutual
relationship in terms of a two-by-two matrix, thus:
Known referent Unknown referent
Total quantity A B
Partial quantity C D
This formulation (which is basically Siro's) assumes that all (quantity)
Quantity and reference 155
nouns participate in both oppositions: that is, none of the cells ABCD are
empty. For cells A and D the situation is not disputed: cell A is illustrated
by the subject noun in (58) and cell D by that in (59).
(58) Opiskelijat olivat myohassa.

students-NOM were late
' The students were late.'
(59) Pihalla oli opiskelijoita.
yard-ADE was students-PART
'There were students in the yard.'
As discussed earlier, the problem cells have traditionally been B (see 6.3)
and C (see 6.4). Preconceptions about how the data should be interpreted
have usually led to the rejection of cells B and C, as representing
impossible combinations. However, let us now approach the issue from a
different angle, and reconsider the status of these cells.
Cell B has been rejected on the grounds that possible candidate NPs are
not divisible and therefore not quantities at all. As I argued in 7.1, such
a view takes divisibility as the primary term and quantity as secondary. It
would surely seem more logical to take quantity as primary and divisibility
as secondary: of nouns that are quantities, some are divisible and some
not. Quantity NPs can be defined quite simply as those which are either
mass nouns or plurals; they therefore denote either mass quantities (sand)
or count quantities (grains). Their divisibility status is irrelevant to the
matrix. From this point of view, cell B is represented by the clause-final
NPs in examples like:

'Yesterday I bought new curtains'
I-ADE is new teeth-NOM
'I have new teeth?
It must nevertheless be noted that there do not seem to be corresponding

examples with mass nouns in this cell. The reason for this appears to be
that while the nominative or accusative plural may denote the totality of
a restricted set or series of plural referents, as in (60) and (61), a total
restricted set thought of as a collective mass concept usually has a different
morphological form in Finnish, the ending -sto/sto. This form denotes a
mass concept, but is itself a count noun and so not a quantity in the sense
defined above. For instance, the Finnish for an item of furniture is
huonekalu, with the usual nominative/accusative plural huonekalut; the

collective form is huonekalusto, meaning 'a set of furniture'. Consider now
what happens when we translate WI bought new furniture' into Finnish.
We get either (62) or (63):
(62) Ostin uudet huonekalut.
bought- 1SG new-ACC-PL pieces-of-furniture-ACC
(63) Ostin uuden huonekaluston.
bought-1SG new-ACC-SG set-of-furniture-ACC
The object in (62) is a plural quantity and thus belongs in cell B, but the
object in (63) is a singular count noun, which also has a plural: compare
(64):
(64) Ostin uudet huonekalustot.
bought-1SG new-ACC-PL sets-of-furniture-ACC
'I bought new sets offurniture' (e.g. one for each room)
Example (64) also belongs in cell B, but (63) does not, since singular count
nouns are excluded.
7.5.2 Let us now reconsider cell C. A typical candidate for membership

in this cell is the subject NP in (65):
(65) Niita autoja on kadulla.
'Some of the/those cars are in the street.'
The widely accepted argument against the possibility of combining a
partial quantity with a known referent is that in such cases the referent is
not in fact known after all. In (65) the hearer is assumed to know which
set the cars in question belong to, but he cannot identify the actual
members of the set which are being referred to. This is transparent in the
English translation: some of the cars. Cell C thus seems different in kind
from the others, in that a distinction must be made between sets and
members.
But a similar kind of analysis is in fact easily applicable to all the cells,
as follows:
cell A: all (members) of a known set;
cell B: all (members) of a new set (i.e. new in the discourse);
cell C: some members/part of a known set;
cell D: some members/part of a new set.
Quantity and reference 157
Consider now one further means of expressing definiteness in Finnish,

which has been briefly mentioned (6.1) but not yet discussed: the number
of the verb after a numeral subject. An example:
(66) Kolme akselivaltaa olivat jo ratkaisseet kantansa.

three axis-state-PART had-PL already decided-PL position-ACC-their
' The three axis states had already decided on their position.'
(67) Kolme liittolaisvaltaa oli jo ratkaissut kantansa.
three allied-state-PART had-SG already decided-SG position-ACC-their
' Three allied states had already decided on their position.'
We can paraphrase (66) as 'all the three axis states', and (67) as 'some -
three - of the allied states'. Sentence (66) thus belongs in cell A and (67)
in cell C. The difference between the two is a quantity one, not one of
reference. As regards the number of the verb, (67) represents the norm
following a subject preceded by a cardinal number. The plural verb in (66)
thus suggests that the significant aspect of the subject noun here is not that
there were three axis states but that all the axis states had decided, so that
the sentence is indeed parallel to others in cell A which have a plural
subject and a plural verb, such as (58).
In this context, recall also the quasi-minimal pair cited by Wexler (1976)
(see above, 6.1):
(68) Suomen neljd edustajaa menestyivat hyvin.

Finland-GEN four representative-PART succeeded-3PL well
' The four representatives of Finland did well.'
(69) Neljd Suomen edustajaa menestyi hyvin.
four Finland-GEN representative-PART succeeded-3SG well
'Four representatives of Finland did well.'
The difference in quantity is expressed in the verb, which is plural in (68)

and thus implies 'all', but singular in (69), implying 'some'. The word-
order difference ('Finland's four representatives' vs 'four Finnish
representatives') does not reflect definiteness as such, but merely the
different scope of the numeral in each case. In (68) its scope is subordinate
to that of the preceding modifier - hence the reading that Finland had no
other representatives - while in (69) its scope is the whole of the subject
NP and the existence of other representatives is thus allowed.
7.5.3 If none of the cells in the matrix are empty, in accordance with the
analysis presented above, there are of course no general inferences to be
made from one opposition to another. That is, the quantity value cannot
be inferred from the reference value, and vice versa. The only inferences
that are possible are those covering a subset of all NPs (see also
Chesterman 1977). This subset comprises NPs that are divisible in the
traditional sense (see 7.1 above).
The first possible inference is a statistical one. Divisible nouns that are
quantitatively total will normally be inferred to be referentially definite.
The exceptions to this tendency are similar to the exceptions to the No
Initial Indefinite Constraint: generics, quasi-generics, all-new contexts and
the like. This inference is thus another example of a default reading: nouns
that are both divisible and total will be read as definite unless circumstances
indicate the contrary. The reasoning behind this inference is presumably
that if a quantity is known to be total it must also (normally) be
referentially known a priori.
The second inference is a logical one: if a divisible noun is marked for
partial quantity, the interpretation must be that the referents themselves
are referentially indefinite, even though the set to which they belong may
be known.
Both these inferences are from quantity to reference, not the other way
round. This is of course because the quantity of non-oblique nouns is
overtly marked in Finnish, whereas referential definiteness is seldom
expressed directly.
7.6 Conclusions
7.6.1 First of all, it must be appreciated that for a great many Finnish
NPs there is no syntactic marker of any kind which would indicate
definiteness or indefiniteness. In these cases recourse must be had to the
context; or, more accurately, in these cases it is not necessary to mark
(in)definiteness at all on the NP itself. The data available for an analysis
of definiteness in Finnish are thus only a subset of all NPs, and rather a
limited subset, too. It is principally this fact that leads to the generally
accepted view (e.g. Vilkuna 1980: 246) that definiteness is not a syntactic
category in Finnish, in the sense that Finnish lacks features whose explicit
function is solely to express definiteness. However, it does not follow from
this that whatever status definiteness has in Finnish, it can be subsumed
under the given/new distinction, which seems to be Vilkuna's view. Recall
the argument presented in 7.3: the (in)definiteness of referents cannot be
made identical to information structure.
Furthermore, a careful distinction must be preserved between means of
Conclusions 159
expressing definiteness, and ways in which definiteness may be inferred.

The expression of definiteness is speaker-determined, but inferring is
something the hearer does. And inferences need not always be correct. A
blurring of this distinction has tended to lead to a misunderstanding of the
relation between the definiteness status of particular referents on the one
hand, and textual features such as information structure on the other.
The decision on whether definiteness is a category of Finnish or not
actually depends on how the concept of definiteness is defined.
Throughout this study I have been arguing that definiteness is not a simple
category. It is not a matter of reference alone, but also comprises aspects
of quantity. And quantity is certainly an important category in Finnish,
even though by no means every noun in a text is marked as total or partial.
The referential aspect of definiteness is clearly less central in Finnish. It
can often be expressed overtly (function words), but this is seldom
compulsory; referential definiteness is usually left to be inferred from
contextual factors.
If definiteness is taken as a superordinate category, then we can say that
one of its components is a relevant syntactic category in Finnish, although
the superordinate concept itself is lacking. This must be our first major
conclusion.
A second conclusion is, as Vilkuna also points out, that although the
various grammatical devices we have examined are often related to
definiteness in some way, none of them express definiteness explicitly as a
primary function. In each case the expression (or inference) of definiteness
overlaps with other functions. Thus the partitive can show partial
quantity, and referential indefiniteness may be inferred from this, but the
partitive also has several other, more frequent functions. Word order is
primarily an expression of information structure or thematic relations,
although referential (in)definiteness can often be inferred from it.
Similarly, for the function words we have discussed, the referential
(in)definiteness follows as a consequence of their primary meanings as
indefinite adjectives, demonstratives, a numeral.
7.6.2 Another major conclusion derives from the notion of a default

reading, introduced at several points in the foregoing discussion. This
means that a given type of NP will be read as referentially definite or
indefinite unless circumstances indicate the contrary. The necessity of
introducing default readings into the description of definiteness in Finnish
suggests that the various means whereby definiteness is expressed or
inferred are not of equal strength: some take precedence over others. The
various means thus constitute a hierarchy (also discussed, with a slightly
different analysis, in Chesterman 1977; see 6.6 above). It is this hierarchy
(of referential definiteness) that explains many of the apparently
exceptional examples I have cited.
At the lowest, weakest end of the hierarchy we have word order as an
expression of information structure, which may allow a correct inference
of definiteness or indefiniteness. Yet these inferences are overruled by any
of the means occurring higher up the hierarchy.
The next lowest level contains nouns that are normally 'intrinsically'
definite, such as uniques (aurinko 'the sun') and proper nouns. These
remain definite regardless of their position or their status as new or given
information - unless there are other means present of a higher priority.
Above these intrinsic definites we have function words, which can
change readings derived from the lower levels. For instance, an indefinite
function-word can change the status of a proper noun (joku Pauli' some
Pauli or other'), or of a noun that is normally unique {eras pddministeri
'a prime minister', i.e. not the present one of the country in question).
Function words also overrule inferences from word order - see in
particular 5.5.
Readings based on function words can themselves sometimes be
overruled by case: the partitive (of quantity) rules out a referential
definiteness reading. Thus niitd autoja (part, pi) ('some of the/those cars')
has referents that are indefinite in the sense that the hearer cannot identify
which actual cars are being referred to; he can only identify the set (' the
cars') to which the referents belong. This principle also accounts for some
of the exceptions to the No Initial Indefinite Constraint. Examples like
(70) show clause-initial position taken by a partitive noun, which rules out
a definite referent.
(70) Rahaa tarvitaan tahan projektiin.
money-PART one-needs this-ILL project-ILL
'Money is needed for this project.'
Recall also examples like (71), where there is also a partitive noun, this
time quantified by a nominative.
(71) Joukko sotilaita / Parvi pikkukaloja ilmestyi.
group-NOM soldiers-PART / shoal-NOM little-fishes-PART appeared
4
A group of soldiers / A shoal of little fish appeared.'
Similarly, we have seen that divisible nouns in the nominative or
Conclusions 161
accusative are normally definite. The exceptions to this generalization -

generics, all-new contexts - illustrate that the ultimate arbiter of definite-
ness in Finnish is indeed context. It is to context - situational and textual
- that we need to appeal when determining the definiteness of the subjects
in examples like (72) and (73), which must be indefinite despite their case.
(73) Nain unta, etta apinat hyppivat poydallani.
saw-lSG dream-PART that monkeys-NOM jumped-3PL table-ADE-
my
4
1 dreamt that monkeys were jumping on my table.'
Context also overrules a reading based on the word order of an isolated
sentence, such as the pairs so often discussed in the literature:
(74) Ukko on tuvassa.
old-man-NOM is cottage-INE
' The old man is in the cottage.'
(75) Tuvassa on ukko.
cottage-INE is old-man-NOM
'In the cottage is an old man'
That is, the inferences from word order here only hold if these sentences
are in effect decontextualized; a previously mentioned or otherwise known
old man will remain definite in (75) despite the noun's clause-final position
as new information.
8 English and Finnish contrasted
8.1 Towards a tertium comparationis
8.1.1 I have so far been discussing English and Finnish separately,

partly in terms of the respective research traditions in the two languages
(chapters 2 and 6). My own conclusions have also been stated
independently for each language (chapters 4 and 7). It will now be
instructive to set the two descriptions side by side. A unified analysis of
definiteness in both languages would make explicit any correspondences
between the two, and also raise hypotheses about the theory of definiteness
in general (a topic to be taken up in chapter 9).
But before we proceed to a contrastive analysis a general caveat is in
order. Throughout this study - and even more so in the present chapter
- 1 make one assumption which should now be made explicit: I have
implicitly 'reified' definiteness. That is, I have been taking definiteness as
some kind of independent 'phenomenon' (albeit a composite one), which
manifests itself in various ways in different languages. The implication has
been that definiteness is a potential semantic universal. At the level of
analysis at which I am operating I hold this assumption to be valid and
helpful. But beneath this abstraction there lies an issue that marks
practically any linguistic argument: the relation between the technical
linguistic terms (such as ' definite') and the empirical reality they purport
to describe. The terms themselves are necessary abstractions, loose
notional labels covering data that may well be ultimately sui generis in any
given language. The terms are conceptual tools only, not part of the
reality-to-be-described. And even as tools, grammatical categories seem
ultimately ineffable - see Halliday (1988).
With this reservation in mind, we can now turn to another conceptual
tool, the notion of the tertium comparationis. This is defined in contrastive
analysis as a shared common denominator in terms of which the
comparison can be carried out. Without such a third term there can be no
motivation for a contrastive analysis at all, for one does not set out to
162
Towards a tertium comparationis 163
compare entities that have absolutely nothing in common. James (1980:

169) makes this point with exemplary clarity as follows:
How does one set about comparing anything? The first thing we do is make sure
that we are comparing like with like: this means that the two (or more) entities to
be compared, while differing in some respect, must share certain attributes. This
requirement is especially strong when we are contrasting, i.e. looking for
differences, since it is only against a background of sameness that differences are
significant, (emphasis original)
James' stress on both differences and sameness is important here. In
contrastive analysis, that is, a ' background of sameness' is the sine qua
non for any justifiable, systematic study of contrasts. More generally, in
any comparison between languages, both ' sameness' and contrasts will be
sought. The tertium comparationis is thus the ' set of samenesses' against
which contrasts can be stated. In the absence of this background,
contrasts are no more than arbitrary, unmotivated and unrelated
statements, such as 'X is blue but Y has legs'.
The kind of tertium comparationis used will depend on the nature of
each analysis. Contrastive analysis in fact makes use of various types of
third term, some based on formal correspondence, others on semantic
equivalence, and others on still other criteria (see especially Krzeszowski
1984). As mentioned in 6.1 above, the ultimate justification for relating a
given English sentence to a given Finnish one in this study has been
Krzeszowski's 'semanto-syntactic equivalence'. This is thus the type of
tertium comparationis that has been used. However, it has not yet been
possible to state its content or composition in any detail. In some
contrastive studies it is possible to state the tertium comparationis in
advance, such as those contrasting a given formal structure or operation.
However, in others the third term is not explicitly given a priori in this
way, but must be sought via the process of analysis itself; and this has
been the case with the present study. Since the expression of definiteness
in English and Finnish is so different, the present analysis has been obliged
first to examine each language separately before attempting to formulate
whatever common denominators the two descriptions may share. Before
we arrive at this formulation, which will therefore allow us to state a
number of correspondences between the two languages, let us first review
some striking general similarities which have become manifest in the
descriptions themselves.
In the first place, both descriptions have found it necessary to analyse
definiteness in terms of components; in neither case is definiteness taken
as an elemental term. For English, three components were suggested:

extensivity, locatability and inclusiveness. For Finnish the component
oppositions were ± identifiable referent and ± total quantity.
Secondly, in addition to the definite/indefinite opposition the dis-
tribution of the English articles is also partly determined by the distinction
between count and mass. In Finnish too a secondary distinction also plays
a role in the syntax of the Finnish noun - divisible vs non-divisible. These
two distinctions are clearly related. Non-divisible is, with a few exceptions,
equivalent to count singular, and divisible to count plural and mass.
Indeed, divisibility accounts more economically for the distribution of a vs
some or zero than + count does, because the further opposition of
singular/plural is then unnecessary:
indefinite non-divisible a
indefinite divisible some or zero
Interestingly enough, the distinction Bloomfield (1933: 204-5) makes
between bounded and unbounded nouns is very similar. Bloomfield
states that bounded nouns are such that 'the specimens cannot be
subdivided or merged', whereas unbounded nouns are such that 'the
specimens can be subdivided or merged'. Bounded nouns require a
determiner (i.e. a or the) in the singular, but unbounded nouns require one
for the definite category only (i.e. the; they appear with zero when
indefinite).
However, it should be pointed out that divisibility in Finnish is
ultimately a pragmatic concept (see e.g. Vilkuna 1980). Given an
appropriate context a divisible noun can be read as non-divisible, just as
mass nouns can be converted to count ones: kolme puuroa 'three
porridges', i.e. three helpings of porridge. The converse is also true: non-
divisibles can be read as divisible on occasion, as in (1).
(1) Venettd nakyi niemen takaa.

boat-PART was-seen peninsula-GEN behind
'A/The boat was seen behind the peninsula.' (i.e. literally: part of a
boat, not the whole outline of one)
A third feature of the two descriptions is the necessity of introducing the

notion of what I called a default reading. That is, a reading that holds true
only unless circumstances do not indicate a contrary reading. In English
default readings often apply in the interpretation of the inclusiveness of
definite nouns: they are inclusive unless the context requires otherwise
(recall examples such as The man who took the wickets in forgot one). In
Finnish default readings are frequent in the interpretation of the
identifiability of referents: for instance, a clause-initial referent will be
read as definite unless, for example, context explicitly requires an
indefinite reading. It is interesting to note that the default readings in both
languages relate to what seems to be the 'weaker' component of
definiteness in each case: in English quantity is less central than reference,
whereas in Finnish quantity is the more central concept.
Fourthly, in addition to the need to incorporate pragmatic, contextual
factors into the description, we have also seen (7.3.4) that in some respects
also a textual factor such as word order can have a similar 'definiteness
effect' on the reading of an NP in each language.
Finally, both descriptions have occasionally needed to have recourse to
concepts that are scalar rather than absolute. Genericness in English
seems to be essentially a scalar concept, with a wide range of possible
extension, and so does totality in Finnish.
8.1.2 Let us now compare the components of definiteness in English

and Finnish in more detail, still remaining at the level of the descriptions
themselves. The most obvious point is that Finnish has no equivalent to
the notion of extensivity: that is, it does not use surface articles to
distinguish between limited and unlimited extensivity. This is of course
tantamount to saying that Finnish does not have articles, but it also
suggests one reason why this is so: extensivity is limited, albeit in a
different way, by the complex case system. (We may also speculate that the
spread of the various embryo articles in Finnish is related to the ongoing
gradual weakening of the case system, particularly in colloquial speech -
see F. Karlsson 1975.)
It is this major difference as regards extensivity that accounts for the
main learning difficulty experienced by Finns seeking to master the
English article system. Even for advanced learners the most difficult
problem is not which surface article to put, but whether to put one at all
- i.e. precisely the limited vs unlimited extensivity distinction. The most
frequent error categories for university students of English are incorrect
addition of the, omission of the and incorrect addition of a (Herranen
1978; Sajavaara 1983).1
1
Zehler and Brewer (1982) also mention the over-extended use of the as the main article
error type among native-speaking children beyond the initial developmental stages, before
final mastery of article usage.
8.1.3 I turn next to the relation between locatability and referent

identifiability. (In this context I omit separate discussion of non-referential
NPs, which do not seem to constitute an independent syntactic category
in Finnish that would be significant to the description of definiteness. As
argued above for English (e.g. 2.2.3 and 4.1.2), an analysis similar to that
for referentials also applies to non-referentials if these are seen as denoting
properties.) Recall first that the original definition of Finnish spesies was
in terms of known vs unknown referents; Siro was later to call this aspect
of definiteness notive spesies, as we have seen (6.2). This definition
seems equivalent to traditional definitions of English definiteness as
having to do with hearer-identifiable or familiar referents. For English, as
Hawkins (1978) has shown, this definition gives rise to a requirement that
is too strict to cover all uses of the, since some uses are ' unfamiliar' (see
above, 2.2). Hence the need to relax the requirement somewhat and
reformulate it as locatability in a shared set. In Finnish this particular
theoretical difficulty does not arise, since there are no a priori definite
articles whose wider-than-expected distribution is thus to be accounted
for. This means that the concept of a known (identifiable) referent is
actually a narrower one than the concept of a locatable referent. That is
to say, the set of locatable referents includes both all known ones and
some unknown ones. Thus in (2) below, for both Finnish and English,
Henry's lost limbs are locatable (within the shared set of entities belonging
to Henry); but they are not actually identifiable: we do not know which
leg or fingers he lost, only that they were his own.
(2) Henry menetti jalan/sormia sodassa.

Henry-NOM lost leg-ACC/fingers-PART war-INE
'Henry lost a leg/somefingersin the war.'
Identifiable referents thus form only a subset of locatable referents, as
illustrated below:
locatable non-locatable
identifiable non-identifiable
However, in the approach taken by Hawkins and which I am largely

following, identifiability is not reduced to locatability alone. Locatability
is a necessary, but not a sufficient, condition for identifiability, for the
other necessary condition is inclusiveness (see 2.2 above, plus the
modifications argued for in 4.1). Hawkins' general point is in fact that

identifiability equals locatability plus inclusiveness. If either of these
conditions is lacking we do not get the (or null). Hence the indefinite
articles in the English of (2), where the inclusiveness condition does not
hold. And hence also the impossibility of the where the reference is taken
to be inclusive but the locatability condition fails, as in the generic (3):
(3) Apples/*The apples are good for you.
It appears possible, then, to account for identifiability in terms of two
distinct concepts, one of which - inclusiveness - has to do with quantity.
8.1.4 However, we have already introduced a quantity opposition of a

different kind in Finnish: total vs partial. We now need, therefore, to
probe a little further into the relation between quantity and inclusiveness.
We have seen that divisible nouns in Finnish may show an opposition
between total and partial quantity. When applied to divisible (i.e. mass
plus plural) nouns in English this corresponds exactly to Hawkins'
inclusive vs exclusive reference. Partial quantity is defined as a quantity
which allows the existence of a surplus quantity, just as exclusive reference
refers to not-all the referents of the referring expression.
But with non-divisible singular nouns there is no such correspondence.
I have argued (7.1) that such NPs are not quantities in any useful sense of
the word, and therefore neither total nor partial. Yet such nouns may
nevertheless be either inclusive or exclusive in English {the cat vs a cat).
There is thus a mismatch between the two descriptions here: whereas
English uses two terms, inclusive vs exclusive, Finnish actually makes use
of three: total, partial and 'inapplicable'.
One source of this mismatch is that the concept' total' has been used in
two different senses. In the sense 'inclusive', total means 'all the
referents/entities/mass in question', 'all of a set'; the referents etc. are
viewed externally, in terms of their relation to other referents. On the
other hand, when the term ' total' is applied to singular non-divisibles we
view the referent internally, as it were: it is 'total', 'whole' with respect to
itself, not with respect to other members of a set. In this latter sense, any
singular non-divisible is a one-member set itself, which cannot be further
divided into members.
A somewhat different view of the totality of non-divisible singulars is
argued in Barrett (1953). Discussing nouns preceded by what I have called
the null form of the article, such as proper nouns, he writes that so long
as implications of uniqueness are retained these nouns are analogous to

total divisibles. Thus John is said to refer to 'the whole of the mass known
uniquely as John, just as patience in its Total aspect refers to the whole of
the (figurative) mass known uniquely as patience' (1953: 141). In terms of
the semantic oppositions I have been discussing, Barrett is confusing
± total with + limited extensivity. Singular proper nouns are not masses;
like other NPs preceded by the null form, they lack a surface article
because they are concepts used in their maximum scope, with a one-to-one
relation between the nom en puissance and the nom en effet. What I have
referred to as limited or unlimited extensivity has nothing to do with the
size (total or partial) of a quantity.
How then are we to relate inclusiveness and quantity ? This can be done
quite simply in terms of two semantic-pragmatic features. Let us first of
all denote inclusiveness as the feature [ + all]; the feature is a pragmatic
one rather than a strictly logical one (see 9.3), and means 'refers
(pragmatically) to all the members or parts of a referent set' (see 4.2.3).
The feature is a binary one, with exclusiveness marked correspondingly as
[ — all]. The second feature is also binary, and is needed to account both
for the divisibility distinction in Finnish and for the distribution of a
versus some and zero in English; I shall formulate it as [±one], which
means ' ± a single member of a referent set' (see 4.2.3 again), i.e. it marks
a singular count (non-divisible) or proper noun. The combination of
[ + all] and [ + one] therefore indicates a one-member set (see also Chomsky
1975; Fodor and Sag 1982). (In this analysis, generic nouns with a are still
[ + one], but the single member then has the sense 'typical member' - see
4.3.1.)
These two features can show how inclusiveness and quantity are linked,
and also resolve the ambiguity within the concept 'total'. For the feature
[ + all] marks any inclusive noun, whereas singular non-divisible nouns are
precisely those with the feature [ + one]. Total quantities in the Finnish
sense are marked not only as [ + all] but also as [ — one], whereas for
inclusiveness the feature [±one] is not relevant. The two features thus
separate our three major classes of nouns as follows:
[all] [one]
divisible (total, inclusive) + —
divisible (partial, exclusive) — —
non-divisible singular (inclusive) -I- +
non-divisible singular (exclusive) — +
non-divisible plural (total, inclusive) + —
Correspondences 169
8.1.5 Let us now return to the question of identifiability. We saw that

this can be defined in terms of locatability and inclusiveness. Inclusiveness
is represented by the feature [ + all]. It follows that an identifiable NP is
one with the features [ + all] and [ + locatable], which is in effect what
Hawkins argues. Like [±all], the locatability feature is also a funda-
mentally pragmatic one: shared entity sets are, in the last resort, defined
pragmatically (see 4.2.1).
Both descriptions have also needed to make use of the feature [±one],
which seems to be the only one of these that is purely semantic (context-
independent), as opposed to pragmatic (context-bound). In addition,
English has needed one feature - extensivity - which is not relevant to
Finnish.
The tertium comparationis for an analysis of definiteness in English and
Finnish thus turns out to be a set of three components of meaning:
formulated as binary features these are [±locatable], [±all] and [±one].
The following section now describes the correspondences that can be set
up between the syntactic realizations of these components in the two
languages.
8.2 Correspondences
8.2.1 The foregoing chapters have shown that there are few direct links
between a given English article and specific features of Finnish syntax; in
Finnish-English translation, for instance, a particular syntactic feature
might rule out certain articles, but often leave a choice of two or more. We
can nevertheless now explore the possibility of establishing links at a more
abstract level, via the shared semantic-pragmatic components introduced
in the previous section. The correspondences cannot be set up via
individual components, however, but via given combinations of com-
ponents. The general form of the argument is therefore as follows: a given
combination of components will be realized as X in Finnish and as Y in
English. Both X and Y may consist of a set of variants rather than a single
syntactic realization. Although I shall use the term ' realize' to denote the
relation between the components and the surface syntax, it should be
borne in mind that, for Finnish in particular, the term may be somewhat
misleading at times; this is because Finnish often leaves certain aspects of
definiteness to be inferred, rather than expresses them directly, as was
pointed out in chapter 7.
Table 8.1 Possible configurations of tertium comparationis features
[locatable] |all] |one] Divisibility + Identifiable
(a) + + non-divisible sg. — ident

(b) + - - divisible — ident
(c) + + - divisible + ident
(d) + + + non-divisible sg. + ident
(e) - - + non-divisible sg. — ident
(0 - - - divisible — ident
(g) - + - divisible, non-divisible pi. — ident
(h) - + +
Table 8.2 Tertium comparationis features as realized in Finnish and

English
Finnish English
Case + ident [locatable] [all] [one] Article
(a) nom./acc. — ident + + a

(b) part. — ident + - - some
(c) nom./acc. + ident + + - the
(d) nom./acc. + ident + + + the, null
(e) nom./acc. — ident — - + a
(0 part. — ident — - - some, zero
(g) nom./acc. — ident — zero
Let us start by listing the possible configurations of the three features

in question (see table 8.1). (Extensivity is omitted here, since it is not part
of the tertium comparationis.) Alongside each configuration I note the
divisibility status of a noun which would represent the configuration,
together with a reminder of whether the noun in question would denote
an identifiable referent or not, marked as + ident or —ident.
A few comments are in order. As explained above (8.1.3-5), nouns with
identifiable referents are marked for both [ +locatable] and [ + all].
Identifiable referents may of course be either divisible or non-divisible, but
note that the table of configurations has no place for an identifiable non-
divisible plural: this reflects the absence of this combination in Finnish,
for identifiable plural nouns are always divisible.
Singular non-divisibles are marked with [ + one]; [ — one] therefore
Correspondences 171
marks either a divisible noun or a non-divisible plural noun. The

combination [H- all] [ + one] marks a one-member set; if a set is known to
be a one-member set it must be locatable, and so configuration (h)
logically has no realization.
8.2.2 We can now align both languages alongside the same set of
features. Table 8.2 omits configuration (h). It includes only the articles for
English (not other determiners, which can also realize certain combin-
ations of features, as may be derived from the glosses given in 4.2.3). The
articles here thus represent possible realizations of the various con-
figurations in English. For Finnish, two parameters are noted. One is case,
by which I mean the quantity opposition between partitive and
nominative/accusative (where this is expressed). The other is marked
simply as ±ident; this means either that the referent will be indicated
overtly to be identifiable, by any of the means discussed in chapter 7; or
else that it will normally be inferred to be identifiable, for instance via
word order, in the way made explicit above (chapter 7). I now comment
on each configuration in turn, and illustrate each correspondence with a
few examples.
Configurations (a) and (b) represent the minority group of indefinites
that are locatable: non-divisibles in (a) and divisibles in (b). The example
given above will serve to illustrate:
(2) Henry menetti jalan/sormia sodassa.

Henry-NOM lost leg-ACC/fingers-PART war-INE
'Henry lost a leg /some fingers in the war.'
Configuration (c) represents definite divisibles:
(4) Kirjat ovat poydalla.

books-NOM are table-ADE
4
The books are on the table.'
(5) Hunaja on poydalla.
honey-NOM is table-ADE
4
The honey is on the table.'
Configuration (d) represents definite non-divisible singulars; these can

either be singular common nouns or singular proper nouns:
(6) Kirja on poydalla.

book-NOM is table-ADE
4
The book is on the table.'
(7) Pekka on taalla.
' Pekka is here.'
Configurations (e) and (f) represent the majority group of indefinites,

which are non-locatable; those of (e) are non-divisible, those of (f)
divisible:
(8) Poydalla oli kirja.

table-ADE was book-NOM
'On the table was a hook.''
(9) Poydalla oli kirjoja.
table-ADE was books-PART
'On the table were {some) books'
Configuration (g) is the most varied one, and also the most interesting.
In the first place it includes generic divisibles:
(10) Kirjat ovat kalliita.

books-NOM are expensive-PART-PL
'Books are expensive.'
These are appropriately characterized as [ + all] (but recall again that the
all is a loose, pragmatic one, to allow for variation in extension), but they
are not locatable. These generics are thus classified as indefinite, in that
their referents are not identifiable. Singular generics, which would appear
with the or a in English, are not differentiated structurally in Finnish; their
generic readings are thus due only to a particular kind of context. Singular
generics therefore have no separate place in the table. English definite
plural generics {the Germans), subspecies generics with some, and even
indefinite plural generics with zero also share configurations with other
structures. This is in accordance with the general analysis of genericness
presented in 4.3.1, in which it was argued that genericness is not a uniform
category.
Configuration (g) also includes the non-divisible Finnish plurals that
have been the subject of so much debate in the literature (see 5.3). Familiar
examples are

I-ADE is new teeth-NOM
'I have new teeth.'
(12) Koulussa on huonot opetusvdlineet.
school-INE is bad teaching-aids-NOM
'The school has bad teaching-aids'
Correspondences 173

'I bought new curtains yesterday.'
As we have noted, Finnish examples such as (11) and (12) are either
existential or possessive structures, where the nominative NP (marking
that which exists or is possessed) appears in clause-final position, as new
information. The fact that they have the same configuration as generics
and all translate with the zero article is striking. I have argued above
(4.2.2) that the zero article names a set, and it would seem that this rather
abstract quality is something that these Finnish NPs also share. With
respect to the possessive structure, for instance, it is perhaps significant
that the non-divisible examples are of possession which seems more
inalienable - cf. She has red hair/blue eyes as opposed to She has some fine
pictures/some French money. When the possession is alienable, i.e. less
permanent, less nomically true (Dahl 1975), we no longer get zero and the
Finnish also changes. Suppose, for instance, that Aunt Alice comes
running in shouting excitedly:
(14) I've got/I have the new teeth at last! (i.e. the set I have been talking
about/applying for for months)
In Finnish this would have to be translated with a function word in order

to preserve the alienable reading (compare (11) above):
(14) a. Vihdoinkin minulla on ne uudet hampaatl

at-last I-ADE is they-NOM new teeth-NOM
Example (14) thus belongs to configuration (c), not (g): the referents are
locatable.
A non-divisible object NP in examples like (13) also normally appears
in clause-final position as new information, and it too translates as zero.
The fact that all of (10)—(13) translate as zero, an indefinite article, may
have been the original reason behind the argument that quantitative
spesies does not apply here (see e.g. Itkonen 1980), for if it does apply it
is odd that the total quantity does not correlate with a definite English
article. However, the occurrence of the is not determined by total quantity
alone but also by locatability, and these examples are of referents that are
inferred to be non-locatable since they occur in the rheme, as new
information.
Depending on how certain forms are analysed, there do seem to be one

or two exceptions regarding configuration (g), having to do with the
sentence type discussed earlier with a nominative subject of a transitive
verb (5.3, 7.1.3). In our oft-quoted (15), for instance,
the subject noun is [ —locatable], since the utterance is all-new; the noun
is also plural, i.e. [ — one]. But whereas Finnish marks it as [ + all], English
has [ — all]. (Recall the comments on 'totality' in 7.1.3.)
On the other hand, the table of configurations has no difficulty
accounting for other all-new sentences with an initial indefinite (which,
being stressed, would fall outside the scope of the No Initial Indefinite
Constraint). Recall (16):
(16) Nain unta, etta apinat hyppivat pyodallani.
saw-lSG dream-PART that monkeys-NOM jumped-3PL table-ADE-
my
'I dreamt that monkeys were jumping on my table.'
Finnish sees the subject noun here as [ + all]. English may agree, but since
the zero article can be either [ + all], or [ — all] the noun may also be seen
as [ — all]: some monkeys would also be a possible translation in this
context.
The table also explicates two other points that have been made in the
course of the analysis of Finnish definiteness. It shows how it is justifiable
to infer referential definiteness from quantity, in the case of divisible
nouns which are not generic and not in all-new contexts (see 6.6).
Configuration (c) shows divisible nouns marked for [ + all]; they are also
locatable and thus identifiable. Configurations (b) and (f) show divisible
nouns marked for [ — all]; regardless of their locatability they are therefore
not identifiable, since identifiability requires both [ + all] and [ +locatable].
Configuration (g), with generic plurals, is the exception.
And secondly, table 8.2 illustrates why it was necessary to reject the
combination of identifiable referent plus partial quantity (see 6.4). Recall
the example tamdn sarjan am* 'some parts of this series'. The combination
in question must be impossible, if both features are to be attributed to the
same set, i.e. osia 'some parts' (part. pi.). Since identifiability is analysed
as incorporating the feature [H-all], it would be quite simply contradictory
to combine this with a partial quantity, i.e. [ — all]. As argued in 7.5, the
Correspondences 175
only way this combination works is if the features are taken to apply to
different sets: in that case the superordinate set {this series) is identifiable,
because of the demonstrative, but the actual parts {osia) referred to are
not. To be sure, the referents of osia here are locatable (within the shared
set comprising this series); the noun therefore represents configuration (b).
8.2.3 The configurations (a-g) thus explicate correspondences between

Finnish and English definiteness. This has proved to be the only level of
analysis at which such correspondences can be stated. Yet even here the
correspondences are imperfect in several ways.
First of all, the configurations of features have realizations in the two
languages that are of different levels of specificity. For English the links
are made directly with discrete items of surface syntax, articles, one of
which must occur with the vast majority of NPs in a text. But for Finnish
the surface realizations cannot be stated so explicitly. As we have seen, not
every NP can be marked for quantity, and so this feature [ ± all] is often
left unrealized. The second link is not made with surface syntax at all, but
with a further semantic feature, identifiability. This in turn may be realized
in a variety of ways in syntax, or it may be left to be inferred indirectly,
for example from context. It is not possible to predict, on the basis of the
components of the tertium comparationis alone, precisely how the feature
of identifiability will be realized or inferred in a given instance. At least,
it is not possible to predict this with anything like the same degree of
certainty with which we can predict the use of a given article in English;
predictions for Finnish would have to be probabilistic at best, of the form:
a noun marked for the components of configuration C is more likely than
not to occur in sentence position P/is more likely than not to be preceded
by a function word if it occurs in position P in a clause structure of type
T; and so on. A major reason for this discrepancy between the kinds of
predictions possible for the two languages is of course that in Finnish the
predictions are complicated by the fact that several other considerations
are involved as well, such as style (colloquial or not), information
structure, context and situation of utterance. A further complicating
factor is, as I have mentioned, the fact that identifiability is often not
'realized' at all, but left to be inferred. Some of the more general
implications of this will be taken up in 9.4 below.
At a theoretical level, the kinds of correspondences that it has been
possible to formulate therefore look as in Figure 8.1.
FINNISH ENGLISH
present absent realised inferred articles

as a, b, c ... via x, y, z ...
A
quantity case-marking identifiability
tertium comparationis
components
Figure 8.1: Bird's-eye view of the distribution of shared com-

ponents of definiteness in Finnish and English.
8.3 Some diachronic parallels
8.3.1 Although the main concern of the present study is a synchronic

analysis of definiteness, it is nevertheless of interest to note some striking
diachronic parallels between the development of the articles in English
and the increasingly article-like use of function words in Finnish.
As regards indefinite articles, it is well established that Old English an
and sum were first used in an article-like way with NPs having specific
reference, then later with non-specific or non-referring NPs, and lastly
with generic NPs (see e.g. Siisskand 1935; Christophersen 1939). The
indefinite Finnish function words we have been considering occur
primarily with specific NPs, not with generics, and only rarely with non-
referring NPs (see 5.5 and 7.4 above). Rissanen (1988) shows that a further
relevant factor accounting for the distribution of the early English
indefinite articles is that of topic-marking. An and sum are used to mark
the real topic of discourse; they are only optional at this early stage before
new nouns which are not destined to become significant topics. Compare
(17) and (18):
(17) )?a com sum wudewe...on j>aere ylcan nihte

' then came a widow... on that same night' (iElfric: Lives of the
Saints)
Diachronic parallels 177
(18) & nam linen hmgel & begyrde hyne

' and took a linen towel and girded himself (West Saxon Gospels,
John 13.4)
In (17) a widow is introduced as a new discourse topic, and we may expect

the text to go on to tell more about her. In (18), on the other hand, a linen
towel is, although specific, not a discourse topic: we do not expect further
information about the towel but about the actions of the man who took
it.
Of particular contrastive interest is Rissanen's point that 'in the course
of the Old English period the "indefinite article" became virtually
obligatory in contexts in which a new topic was introduced as the subject
of the sentence, particularly if this word preceded the predicate verb'
(1988: 298). An example is (19):
(19) J>aet waes sanctus Stephanus wundra sum ]?aet an plegende cild arn
under waenes hweowol ond weard sona dead.
4
That was one of the miracles of St Stephen that a playing child ran
under the wheel of a cart and died immediately.' (Martyrology 1)
This usage corresponds exactly to the Finnish tendency to use an

indefinite function word with a clause-initial indefinite noun to ensure an
indefinite reading (see 5.5).
The indefinite article is not usual in Old English with generic nouns, so
that (20) represents normal usage:
(20) Assa is stunt nyten.

' An I The ass is a stupid animal.' (^Elfric: Homilies)
This example also shows that an indefinite (surface) article was not yet
compulsory before non-referring nouns {stunt nyten).
Referring to the evidence in Susskand's quantificational study, Rissanen
argues that the development of the indefinite article spread 'in a wave-like
fashion' through the following categories in order:
(a) specific individualizing reference (i.e. topic-marking);

(b) specific non-individualizing reference (i.e. not topic-marking);
(c) non-specific, non-generic reference; non-referring NPs;
(d) generic reference.

Rissanen also points out how closely this development seems to be

reflected in the spread of indefinite function words in Finnish. As we have
seen, yksi or joku are common, especially in colloquial speech, in NPs with
indefinite specific reference. Furthermore, he observes that the use of yksi
' one' is less likely if the NP is not to become a discourse topic: it would
thus be less likely in (21) than in (22):
(21) Nain kadulla (yhden) pojan, joka pelasi jalkapalloa.

saw-lSG street-ADE (one-ACC) boy-ACC who-NOM played
football-PART
'I saw in the street a boy who was playing football.'
Possible continuation: parents should tell their kids not to play in the
street. That is, the boy himself is not the topic of discourse.
(22) Nain kadulla yhden pojan, jota en ollut tavannut vuosiin.

saw-lSG street-ADE one-ACC boy-ACC who-PART NEG-1SG had
met years-ILL
'I saw in the street a boy that I had not met for years.'
Possible continuation: it was young Pekka Lahtinen, who used to live next
door. Evidence of this kind, in addition to the data discussed in the
preceding chapters, thus suggests that the present-day colloquial usage of
Finnish indefinite function words is already firmly established for category
(a) above, less common for category (b), distinctly rare for category (c)
and still non-existent for category (d); yet the general direction of
development seems the same.
8.3.2 There are also parallels between the rise of the definite article in
English and the spreading use of se in Finnish. Kisbye (1972) describes the
earliest usage of the definite article as anaphoric, with the definite NP
referring back to an identical previous mention:
(23) )>2L Eadmund clypode aenne bisceop pe him ]?a gehendost waes... ]?a
forhtode se bisceop.
'Then Edmund summoned a bishop who was nearest at hand...then
the bishop was afraid.' (^lfric: Lives of the Saints)
Later, in what Kisbye calls stage II of the development, the article is used
for nouns that are 'implicitly familiar' in various ways, as illustrated by
the following examples.
Diachronic parallels 179
(24) (an) cyning... se cebeling

' a king... the prince'
(25) men ne cunnon secgean to sode... hwa pcem hlceste onfeng
4
people cannot say for certain... who received the cargo' {Beowulf)
(26) Gehiere, ge ceasterwaran!... Se bcepstede is open.
'Hear, you citizens!... The baths are open.' (Apollonius of Tyre)
In (24) the anaphoric reference is no longer to an identical noun; in (25)
the referent is familiar by association with the preceding account of the
funeral preparations (the cargo is the corpse, buried at sea); and in (26) it
is assumed to be familiar on the grounds of general personal experience.
Kisbye also observes that the demonstrative heritage of se, apparent in
these examples, is also evident in contexts where se + noun is followed by
a restrictive relative clause (27) - a context in which we have noted that
Finnish se is especially common (5.5).
(27) he eode on pone weg ]?e him getaeht waes
' he went the way which was shown him' {Apollonius of Tyre)
With generic nouns Old English usage was very unsettled; the definite
article does not appear regularly with such nouns until later (see also
Mustanoja 1960).
The spread of Finnish se suggests a similar progression. At the present
time it is primarily used in a demonstrative function (see 7.4.1), most
frequently either anaphoric or cataphoric. Although it can be used
colloquially before proper nouns (a usage also found occasionally in Old
English - Kisbye (1972: 2)), it is not yet found with unique common
nouns like aurinko 'the sun', nouns that are definite only by association,
or generics.
These diachronic similarities are not really surprising, in view of the

common origins of the English articles and the most common Finnish
function words. For both languages the definite forms derive from a
demonstrative and the indefinite ones from the numeral one or an
indefinite pronoun. The progression is thus from individualized, concrete
instances to more generalized uses.
Yet the progression is a gradual one: there is no obvious point at which
it can be said that the form in question suddenly acquires article status.
Unless, that is, we simply say that the form is only an article when it is
normal with generic nouns (this would assume that if the form is used with
generic nouns it will also be used with non-generics, note). This is a
criterion that has often been put forward. It would indicate, for instance,
that some is only a borderline English article since it is used only rarely
with generics (see 3.2.1 and 2.5.2 above). However, as I have sought to
show in 2.5, generic nouns do not form a well-defined class but are a very
fuzzy set. I have furthermore argued (3.2) that the English articles
themselves are also a fuzzy set, overlapping with both quantifiers and
demonstratives. 'Article status' should therefore not be taken to be an
absolute, non-gradable concept.
9 Wider perspectives
9.1 Definiteness
9.1.1 This final chapter will examine a number of more general

theoretical implications arising from the present study. The first of these
has to do with the theory of definiteness as a whole.
The analysis of definiteness I have put forward is a componential one.
That is, it argues that definiteness is not a primitive, unitary concept, but
is itself analysable into components. In both languages one such
component has to do with quantity: quantity ( + all) is thus seen as a
primary term, and definiteness as a secondary one. Another component
(locatability) has to do partly with what has loosely been termed reference
(but see below, 9.2). A further component which is relevant to definiteness
in English is extensivity, which roughly means the degree of abstraction or
generality of a concept (see 2.3).
These components are of rather different kinds, partly pragmatic and
partly semantic (see 9.4 below). In Hawkins' (1978) location theory, which
has been a major source of inspiration for the present study, definiteness
is also seen componentially, in terms of locatability and inclusiveness.
Hawkins sees locatability as a pragmatic feature and inclusiveness as
semantic. However, I have shown (2.2.2) that inclusiveness is also largely
a matter of pragmatics. The only component that one might argue to be
purely semantic is extensivity, which is not included in Hawkins' analysis
at all.
The pragmatic elements in this set of components account to some
extent for the degree of acceptable variation in article usage. No two
speakers will have universes of discourse or experience that are exactly
equivalent.
One question raised by this componential analysis is how it accounts for
the traditional binary distinction between definite and indefinite. I have
been speaking of zero, a and some as indefinite articles in English, and of
181
the and the null form as definite. But the analysis has shown that there are
in fact significant differences between all the articles. This is particularly
the case with indefinites, which prove to be more complex and more varied
in both English and Finnish (see also J. Lyons 1977: 178). It is notably not
the case, for instance, that nouns preceded by the different indefinite
articles in English are all 'indefinite' in the same way. The main difference
is one of extensivity, between zero on the one hand and the two indefinite
surface articles on the other. Moreover, the precise nature of the
indefiniteness of a and some is influenced by the different co-occurrence
restrictions of these articles with singular, plural and mass nouns. Put
informally, the difference between pens and a pen/some pens is that pens
is indefinite in the sense of being general, vague, as in they sell pens;
whereas the other two are indefinite in the sense of the hearer not knowing
(or needing to know) which pen or pens, as in I gave her a pen/some pens.
Similarly, the and the null form also express different nuances of
definiteness. The fact that null occurs only with singular count and proper
nouns emphasizes the uniqueness of these one-member sets, and their
definiteness follows as a logical consequence of this uniqueness. The
article the, on the other hand, still retains something of its demonstrative
origin, and the definiteness here derives from the deictic indication that
'that thing there' is meant.
This in turn leads to the conclusion that definiteness is ultimately not a
binary phenomenon at all, but a scalar one (see also the studies cited in
sections 2.1.2 and 2.6, above). The five English articles we have been
considering appear to fall into a specific order on a scale of definiteness,
as follows:
most indefinite most definite

zero some a the null
Null may be judged more definite than the on the grounds of its ' insider
locus' sense (see 2.3.2 and 4.4.2). A is less indefinite than some or zero
because of its quantity element: a single item is quantitatively 'more
definite' than an unspecified quantity. And any quantity (some) is more
definite, in the sense of more concrete, than a non-quantified abstract
(zero). At each end of the scale there are no surface articles; these are only
needed for the intermediary stages, where (one might speculate) the
various gradations of definiteness are less obvious. In this sense, then,
both zero and null are 'unmarked'. In other words, it is pragmatically
unnecessary to mark forms which are already ' conceptually clear' in some
relevant sense. To say that an article is 'definite' or 'indefinite' thus
Definiteness 183
implies a conceptual division between a and the on this scale; and I have
of course been making implicit use of such a division throughout this
study. Yet this should not blind us to the fact that the underlying
phenomenon actually appears to be more of a continuum.
This scalar notion of definiteness emerges in a different way from the
Finnish analysis, particularly from the necessity to introduce default
readings: it appeared that some definiteness markers were more dominant
than others. Furthermore, we saw that function words were often used to
'strengthen' a reading of definite or indefinite (5.5).
A further implication of the analysis of English was that the articles
themselves do not constitute a well-defined system, but merge with other
determiners and quantifiers. That this is so is also evident from the
historical development of the articles, from their gradual (and presumably
still continuing) progress towards more article-like status. Thus, on the
generic test at least, some is at the present stage of development somewhat
less article-like than a or the. In Finnish, too, the expression (or inference)
of definiteness by no means takes place via a well-defined system, but in
very heterogeneous ways.
If definiteness is a cline, and if there are more than two articles, it does
not make much sense to speak of a definite article being 'in opposition to'
an indefinite article. Rather, each of the English article forms should be
treated more as an independent semantic marker, imparting a particular
facet of meaning of its NP. Each article form has a different set of
semantic/pragmatic components. 'Definite' and 'indefinite' are merely
convenient but superficial terms for two different clusters of articles; yet
the articles within each cluster are not equivalent, and the clusters
themselves are not simple 'opposites'.
Some of these general conclusions and implications concerning the
theory of definiteness are corroborated by studies of other languages. By
way of illustration I comment briefly below on some work done on
Russian, Polish, Hungarian, Street Hebrew, and Turkish and Persian.
9.1.2 Some similarities between Finnish and Russian in the expression

of definiteness are discussed in the paper by Wexler (1976) already
mentioned (6.1). Like Finnish, Russian (which has no articles) can mark
definiteness on some object NPs by means of case, by the opposition
between accusative (for definite) and genitive (for indefinite). However,
the case of the object apparently shows a good deal of idiolectal variation.
Furthermore, the definiteness reading expressed by the case marking can
in certain circumstances be overruled or 'neutralized' (Wexler's term). In
other words, the case-induced reading is what I have called a default one.
Similarly, some types of subject NP can show a corresponding opposition
between nominative (definite) and genitive (indefinite). Word order is also
used, as in Finnish; and as in Finnish the definiteness inferrable from
word order can be overruled if the context so determines. For instance, a
situationally unique and previously mentioned noun will remain definite
regardless of a clause-final position.
Dahl and Karlsson (1975) also draw attention to the similar functions
of the Finnish partitive and the Russian genitive. The selection of both
cases (on objects) is governed by the same semantic factors - aspect,
negation and quantity - although there are differences in the way these are
weighted in the two languages. In conclusion, Dahl and Karlsson note
that a similar kind of opposition, between partitive/genitive and
nominative/accusative, is also found with some variation in Estonian,
Latvian, Lithuanian and Polish. These are genetically unrelated but
geographically contiguous languages around the Baltic, and even prompt
speculation about a ' Sprachbund' in this area.
The expression of definiteness in Polish is discussed in detail in Szwedek

(1975). The main similarities with the present study are as follows. Polish
has no articles proper and so, like Finnish, makes use of a variety of
methods to ensure that an NP is read as definite or indefinite, particularly
via the use of prenominal pronouns and word order. (Stress and
intonation are also mentioned; my reservations on this score were
summarized in 7.3 above, and see also Chesterman (1987).) The
demonstrative pronoun ten 'this' and the indefinite pronoun jakis 'some'
seem to be used in ways that are in some respects strikingly similar to
corresponding function words in Finnish. In some contexts, says Szwedek,
they are obligatory if a given definiteness reading is to be ensured. For
instance, a clause-initial noun would be normally read as definite unless an
indefinite pronoun is added. Similarly, 'a definite pronoun is necessary
before a noun in sentence-final position if the noun is to be interpreted as
coreferential' (1975: 125). This is obviously due to the effect of word order
and information structure: as for Finnish, sentence-final elements are
more likely to be read as new information, and sentence-initial elements
are typically given information, thus often allowing the (in)definiteness of
the NP to be inferred.
Studies of definiteness in Hungarian, which has both a definite and an

indefinite article, show two particular similarities with the present analysis.
Definiteness 185
First, Orosz (1969) and Stephanides (1974) both analyse definiteness

partly in terms of quantity: Stephanides makes use of a feature [ ± total]
for uncountable nouns. Second, Orosz also uses totality of reference as a
criterion for setting up three levels of definiteness - in other words,
definiteness is here a matter of degree. Hungarian definiteness is also seen
in terms of several degrees by Hetzron (1970), who places 'unique
identification' at the most definite end of the scale, and distinguishes this
from 'referential identification' of various types (such as previous
mention). Hetzron's scale is constructed differently from that proposed
above in 9.1.1, but it is striking that the syntax of the data he is examining
(non-verbal sentences) seems to require an analysis of definiteness that is
not simply the usual binary opposition.
Givon (1981) gives a description of the use of the numeral 'one' as an

indefinite marker in colloquial Israeli Hebrew that shows a number of
parallels with the Finnish analysis above. Street Hebrew uses the numeral
with a certain subset of referential nouns: those which are introduced as
salient discourse topics; but it is not used with nouns that are either non-
referential or not salient. (See Rissanen's comments on topic-markedness
in 8.3.1 above.) In the latter case, with no numeral, the non-salience of a
referent means that 'pragmatically its exact identity is incidental to the
communication. Rather its type membership or generic properties is
the gist of the communication' (Givon 1981: 36). In other words, the
distinction here is that between a salient member of a set and any member
of a salient set (compare Lewis 1973, 1979). Givon shows that the same
distinction holds for the equivalent of the plural 'some', and illustrates
with examples from several types of non-referential or non-salient
contexts where the numeral (or' some') is not used. He suggests that Street
Hebrew represents the first stage in a language-universal process in which
the numeral 'one' gradually becomes an indefinite article. Finnish seems
to be another such language, although the process here has perhaps gone
slightly further than in Street Hebrew, in that the numeral is already
occasionally found with non-referentials (although not yet with generics)
- see 7.4. The developmental stages suggested by Givon are close to those
proposed by Rissanen (1988) for English. The numeral first appears with
discourse-salient referential indefinites, then with other referential, then
spreads through various non-referential uses until it is finally used with all
indefinite singular nouns, generics included, as in English. As Givon
comments (1981: 35), it is striking that the earliest stage is also found in
all Creoles, which is suggestive evidence of the universality of the process.
As to the question of why the numeral ' one' should be so universally

chosen to mark indefinite singulars, Givon suggests that it is because it
both implies (originally) existence/referentiality and also implies 'one of
a set': it is therefore ideally suited to mark a new referent which is first
identified to the hearer by its 'generic/connotative properties', as one of
an existing type, but not as one which is uniquely identifiable yet.
What Givon refers to as salience is called 'relevance of referent

identification' by Comrie (1981) in his discussion of accusative marking in
Turkish and Persian. The description of his data also appears to require
a relativistic notion of definiteness, definiteness as a continuum or
multilevelled hierarchy. The levels proposed by Comrie for these languages
are manifestly similar to the diachronic stages mentioned above, and are
summarized thus (1981: 129; square brackets added):
At one extreme [I] we have complete identifiability of the referent; further down
the hierarchy [II] we have partial identifiability (definite superset) [that is, an
unidentifiable member of an identifiable set]; and further down still [III] we have
indication that identification of the referent is relevant [i.e. salient]; at the bottom
[IV], identification of the referent is neither possible nor relevant. If we then
compare accusative case marking in Persian and Turkish with definiteness (say,
the occurrence of the definite article with common nouns) in English, then we see
that the same parameter is involved throughout, only the cut-off points are
different in the various languages.
Now recall the two-by-two matrix illustrating the two kinds of

definiteness in Finnish (see 7.5). Recall in particular the problems
discussed in connection with cell C (partial quantity plus known referent).
The resolution of the problems, I suggested, lay in a set-theoretical
analysis: cell C represented some members /part of a known set. Singular
non-divisibles were excluded from the matrix, since they were not
quantities. However, notice that indefinite singulars are nevertheless
members of sets, and we thus arrive at an analysis which is exactly
equivalent to Comrie's stage which I have marked as II, above: one
member of a known set. (In terms of the English analysis (see 4.2.3), this
in turn reminds us of the difference between a (' one member of a referent
set, which set may or may not be locatable') and one of the ('one member
of a locatable referent set').)
The four Finnish cells thus seem to represent points on a scale of
definiteness as follows, beginning with the most definite.
Reference 187
cell A: all (members) of a known set (Comrie's stage I);

cell C: some members/part (or one member) of a known set (II);
cell B: all (members) of an unknown set (III and IV);
cell D: some members/part (or one member) of an unknown set
(III and IV).
No distinction is made here between Comrie's stages III and IV.
9.1.3 The link between word order and definiteness in Finnish has been
discussed at several points (6.5, 7.3). Ihalainen's No Initial Indefinite
Constraint in fact seems to be a manifestation of a general characteristic
shared by a good many languages. Clark (1978) analyses typical
existential, locative and possessive constructions across thirty languages,
and concludes that the relations between them can be accounted for by
two general discourse rules, one of which is that definite nominals tend to
precede indefinites (the other being that animates precede inanimates). In
existential sentences, for instance, where the locative phrase is typically
definite, the indefinite subject nominal occurs after it almost without
exception. Clark concludes (1978: 99): 'Word order plays an essential role
in indicating definiteness', and speaks of' an apparently general restriction
on —definite nominals being introduced as the first item in an utterance'.
In 7.3 above I presented my reservations about the claim that word
order 'indicates' definiteness, and discussed the precise nature of the
relation between word order and definiteness. It is nevertheless interesting
to note that a similar relation also appears to hold in many other
languages.
9.2 Reference
9.2.1 As an area of semantics, definiteness obviously overlaps with a
variety of syntactic and other semantic phenomena (some of which are
discussed in Givon 1978); this we have seen particularly in relation to the
Finnish data. Related areas include demonstratives, quantifiers, anaphora,
pronominal reference, case, word order, stress, information structure and
functional sentence perspective - to mention only some which have been
touched on at various points. Yet perhaps the most closely related topic
is that of reference, to which definiteness has traditionally been tied. I have
argued above (2.2.3) that definiteness is not only a matter of reference, but
the general analysis of definiteness presented does have some interesting
18 8 Wider perspectives
repercussions for a theory of reference. Although a full treatment of

reference would be beyond the scope of the present work, there are a
number of points that should be raised which stem directly from the
preceding account of definiteness.
In the first place, like definiteness, reference is not a clear-cut concept.
The paradigm case of reference is definite concrete singular count nouns,
for it is here that the original deictic sense of the word - ' pointing' - is at
its clearest. Hence the traditional focus on singular definite descriptions,
and also on proper names. However, when we move into indefinites,
particularly into mass and plural nouns, the term ' reference' is less clear.
A further complication is introduced by Givon (1978: 296), who proposes
the category 'non-definite' (apparently illustrated by He bought shirts and
He went to the movies) which is 'somewhere in the middle between "non-
referential" and "referential-indefinite"'. This category would thus seem
to be neither referential nor non-referential. Givon's gloss suggests that in
fact this category is no more than what others call non-specific: 'while
logically a particular individual or individuals are taken to exist, their
actual identity is not an essential part of the message' (1978: 296;
emphasis original). Yet the existence of this midway category, whatever
one calls it, implies that reference might also be something of a cline, just
as definiteness was argued to be above. As Searle also acknowledges
(1969: 28), reference is indeed a slippery term.
The ' non-specific' category itself also appears to be a heterogeneous
one. This appearance is partly due to the inconsistent way the terms
'specific' and 'non-specific' are used in the literature, just as 'generic' is
- see 2.5. The simplest view is found, for example, in Quirk et al. (1972),
where reference, both definite and indefinite, is classified as either
'specific' or 'generic'. (I have also spoken occasionally of 'generic
reference' in this study, but it must be stressed that for some linguists this
term is an impossibility. Certainly, generic reference is 'reference' in a
rather different sense from the stereotypical definite singular reference.)
J. Lyons (1977: 187-8) takes a rather different view of' specific vs non-
specific ': he doubts whether non-specific indefinites can be called referring
expressions at all, although he declines to say outright that they are not.
For him they are evidently classic examples of a genuine borderline case
- compare Givon's non-definites above. (Lyons also talks of non-definites,
but in a different sense.)
More important than such terminological discrepancies is the evidence
that the category 'non-specific' really is a mixed bag. One proposal has
Reference 189
been that the category should be split up into non-specifics proper and
'selectives' (see, e.g., Grannis 1973), which cannot be paraphrased with
any. the example quoted above in 2.5.2 was
(1) The empress wants a new elephant, but she can't find one that pleases
her.
The required reading here is a 'type' one: the empress cannot find an
elephant of the type she wants, although the assumption is that the set
comprising this type is not empty.
This might suggest an analysis of reference and specificity along the
lines of that given above (4.3.1) for generics, in terms ranging from
individuals to subspecies to species. At one end of the continuum we
would have definite singular specific reference. Then come indefinite
specifics, followed by non-specifics, selectives (subclass, type) and finally
generics (whole species). (See also Fiengo (1987) for a similar view of
specificity as a cline.) What are traditionally called non-referential
definites would not all fit into this continuum so neatly, but many seem
like the definite equivalents of a selective reading. Consider examples like
(2) and (3):
(2) She is the perfect secretary, (i.e. 'the perfect type')

(3) She is the absolute limit, (read as ' a certain type of person')
Even Donnellan's attributive readings might be brought under this head.

In (4), for instance, we know the type ( = the type of person who would
kill Smith) but (on the attributive reading) not the person's identity:
(4) Smith's murderer/ The man who killed Smith must be insane.
We can 'refer' to individuals, and many assume we can 'refer' to whole

species (generic reference). Can we also 'refer' to types? It would seem
that we can, at least in some sense. And it is exactly in the words 'in some
sense' that the crux of the problem lies. As with the definiteness cline, the
cut-off point between the two poles, here 'referential' and 'non-
referential', would be difficult to place with any precision.
However, the situation is made even more complex by the fact that,
unlike the case with definiteness, it is not clear that the reference
continuum is in fact a linear cline at all; between 'clearly referential' and
'clearly non-referential' we find not so much an ordered gradient as a
mixed cluster of NP types, criss-crossed by several distinctions:
specific vs non-specific;
individual vs type-reading vs whole species (generic) reading;
count vs mass;
singular vs plural;
definite vs indefinite.
A maximally referential NP appears to be one that is marked for all the

leftmost alternatives in the above list - this gives the prototypical examples
of the philosophical literature on e.g. the king of France. Other alternatives
all seem to reduce the ' referentiality' in one way or another. The more
rightmost alternatives are present, the less clearly referential an NP is. If
definite singular reference is the prototype case, then, 'referentiality'
seems to diffuse outwards from this core along not one but several
parameters.
A further implication of the foregoing analysis of definiteness and the

English articles arises from the point (discussed in 2.2.3) that definiteness,
as seen in the distribution of the articles, cannot be described in terms of
reference (in the traditional sense of 'having a referent or referents')
alone: we also need to include some notion of, as Declerck (1986) puts it,
'properties', which can also be denoted by an NP, either inclusively or
exclusively. As a term upon which a description of definiteness can be
based, then, 'reference' is both too vague (slippery) and too narrow. The
general analysis of definiteness I have been putting forward would require
a different concept of'reference'. One alternative view of reference which
would be more compatible with the above analysis of definiteness is that
proposed by Thrane (1980), which I comment on briefly below.
9.2.2 Thrane's study is too wide-ranging to be adequately summarized

in the present context, but I would like to draw attention to a number of
his general points which bear a striking resemblance to my own approach
to definiteness.
To start with, he takes a much broader view of reference than is
customary, based on the referential function of language as a whole. He
thus speaks not of reference but of'referentiality'. Every occurrence of an
NP is a 'referential expression' defined as 'an expression by the
employment of which we may speak about objects, persons, substances,
Reference 191
occurrences, emotions, places, etc' (1980: 39). Referential expressions

may not necessarily be 'referring' in the traditional sense, then: Thrane's
category includes, for example, predicate nouns.
Referential expressions have referential functions. A referential function
is, roughly speaking, one by means of which a linguistic sign ' establishes
locations for the assignment of things' (1980: 47). Such locations are
basically of two kinds: categorial {That is a tiger) and spatio-temporal
(The tiger bit me). The difference between these two types of location also
partly accounts for that between specific and non-specific reference, but
there is a 'systematic vacillation' (1980: 172) between the two.
As regards definiteness and indefiniteness, neither of these are seen as
semantically primitive notions. Thrane's analysis of these is basically a
componential one, but within a rather different framework from mine.
Furthermore, 'the notions of definiteness and indefiniteness are only
partly isomorphic with what I consider the basic referential distinctions,
the notions of partitiveness, of categorial distinctions, and of spatio-
temporal location' (1980: 158). These basic distinctions are reflected in
Thrane's four types of'referential phrase', differentiated by their 'central
concerns', as follows (1980: 71-2):
generic: central concern is the categorial location;
individuative: central concern is the spatio-temporal location;
presentative: central concern is 'all';
partitive: central concern is 'some'.
Quantity, as 'all' vs 'some', is thus a fundamental element of the
theory. More generally, in his application of set theory (e.g. as 'location'
in various ' categories') the notion of a ' type' (or ' subset') is a crucial one
(see my discussion of generics, 2.5 and 4.3.1). And finally, several of the
basic distinctions are relative rather than absolute - see, for instance, the
formulation of the types of referential phrase, above, in terms of the
central concern of each: this does therefore not exclude the presence of
other concerns as well. This relativity is also evident in the fuzzy edges of
categories like 'specific' and 'non-specific'.
' Fuzzy categories' suggest the necessity of a fuzzy logic to cope with
them. This topic is taken up in the following sections.
9.3 Language and logic
9.3.1 The relation between formal logic and linguistic analysis is an

enormously complex one with an extensive literature, and I shall do no
more here than touch on certain issues having to do with definiteness and
its description.
The basic assumption upon which the application of logic to linguistics
rests is of course the belief that logic sets out to capture the laws of
thought, and that precisely these laws (in the form of semantic
representations) underlie the structure of language. However, the aims of
logic and linguistics differ fundamentally (see Hogg 1977, and especially
Lakoff 1987). Logic is a theoretical science, but linguistics is (or at least
purports to be) an empirical one. Furthermore, while it is clear that many
areas of semantic structure are indeed amenable to a strictly logical
analysis, there are nevertheless other areas where the application of a
logical symbolism seems rather to distort the facts.
The use of logic to represent semantic structure is particularly apparent
in the work of generative semanticists such as Lakoff (e.g. 1971). Carden
states the generative semanticist position quite explicitly: he refers (1976:
3) to words like and, all and not as 'the English translations of logical
elements'. In a similar way, it is sometimes simply assumed that the
(English) articles are no more than the natural-language expressions of
logical quantifiers. For Fiengo (1974), for instance, the meaning of the
articles the, a, some and zero is basically accounted for in terms of three
oppositions: ± specific, ± individualized, and existential versus universal
quantifier. A and some are characterized by 3, and both the and zero by
V. Fiengo's analysis is taken up by Woisetschlaeger (1983), who
summarizes it as follows.
iiuwa.
-ind + ind
V 3 V 3
+ specific the some (the) a
— specific zero some the a
Woisetschlaeger observes that the cell I have circled also covers singular
proper names, and so it should read the plus zero - i.e., in my terms, the
plus null. He then suggests that the matrix can be simplified to a single
distinction: that between the universal and existential quantifiers:
V: the plus zero (plus my null);
3: a plus some.
Language and logic 193
One disadvantage of this analysis appears to be the fact that, as we have

seen, zero is also used non-inclusively, i.e. in contexts where the universal
quantifier is quite overtly inappropriate (e.g. There were sheep in the field).
However, what is striking here is the readiness to reduce article usage to
such simple logic in the first place. Chomsky (1975: 101) also appears
content to define the meaning of the as universal quantification tout court.
The inappropriateness of using the universal quantifier in the analysis
of natural language has become manifest at several points in this study.
We have seen that the inclusiveness of the must often be read as pragmatic
rather than strictly logical (see 2.2.2). For instance:
Similarly, there are many generic contexts in which a logical 'all' does not
give a good reading (see 2.5.2), but which require a less-than-universal
interpretation, such as 'all the saliently relevant ones'. Recall, e.g.:
(6) Finns always do well in ski-jumping competitions.
In Finnish, too, we have seen several instances of the need to interpret the
notion of totality in a less-than-universal way (7.1.3). In contexts such as
these it is manifestly not the case that the referent of the NP in question
has an extension equivalent to that of the universal quantifier. In other
contexts where the NP is inclusive, however, the universal quantifier seems
appropriate:
(7) Bachelors are not married.
Non-generic examples of the, too, often carry a strictly logical reading of

'all', although not one that could be said to involve the universal
quantifier:
(8) Bring in the wickets after the game.
Given that some contexts accept a logical ' all' and others do not, two
solutions suggest themselves. Either we make a formal distinction between
these two types of context, or else we need a new kind of quantifier for 'all'
in natural language. The first solution has the advantage of making a well-
defined class of contexts on one side of the divide, where the universal
quantifier is appropriate; but it leaves the other side as a cline or squish,
ranging from some to most or nearly all. (See the discussion of generics, 2.5
and 4.3.1.) The first solution thus solves only half the problem. The second
solution, which therefore seems more justifiable, would be to reject the
universal application of the universal quantifier to the analysis of' all' in
natural language. Instead, it would posit a cline covering the whole range
from some to 'logically all', leaving the actual quantificational in-
terpretation to be determined by each individual context. ' Allness' would
thus be an area of semantics where it is not helpful to apply standard logic.
Indeed, it would seem to illustrate very precisely the general claim made
by Strawson (1950: 344) that 'neither Aristotelian nor Russellian rules
give the exact logic for any expression of ordinary language; for ordinary
language has no exact logic'.
9.3.2 The above reservations concern above all the oversimplified

applications of standard first-order logic, and particularly one of its
quantifiers. It must be acknowledged, however, that there has been
interesting work on definiteness based on the logic of so-called generalized
quantifiers (see, e.g., Barwise and Cooper 1981, following on from
Montague 1974).
However, this work has been less relevant for the present study. It is
largely concerned with the Definiteness Effect (see 7.3.4 above). That is,
the aim is to define, logically, the class of all NPs that can occur or are
blocked in a predetermined structure or structures. The approach is thus
quite different from the one I have been following. For English, I have
started with the articles and examined their meaning and distribution with
different noun classes, whereas, for example, Keenan (1987) is interested
in the whole range of NPs that can naturally occur in typically definite or
indefinite contexts, and has relatively little to say about the articles
themselves. Further, although Keenan here sets out to provide a semantic
definition of 'indefinite NP', what he actually does is to define the class of
NPs that can occur in a particular context - existential there. He in fact
defines 'existential NP', and thus equates 'existential' with 'indefinite'.
Definite NPs occurring in the said structure are therefore problematic, and
he must also exclude indefinite NPs that do not have an existential
reading. The class of NPs he defines is thus in one sense wider, and in
another sense more restricted, than the phenomena I have been focusing
on.
Nevertheless, some of the contributions in this field do appear to link
up with some of my own conclusions. For instance, de Jong (1987) also
argues that definiteness is not a semantic primitive itself, but is
Language and logic 195
compositional, although her analysis of its composite features is quite

different from mine. One of her two features relates to the acceptability of
NPs in the existential there structure, and the other to their acceptability
in the partitive of structure. Both these are traditional tests of
(in)definiteness, yet the classes of NPs thus defined do not quite coincide
- which is de Jong's point.
Safir (1987) suggests a formal explanation for the Definiteness Effect in
terms of Government-Binding Theory, but in the light of a number of
awkward exceptions he is forced to conclude (1987: 97, n. 23) that 'there
can be no syntactic definition of the class of NPs that can count as definite
with respect to the DE [Definiteness Effect]' (emphasis added).
An exclusive focus on syntactic, logical or semantic models of
explanation would seem to be an inadequate approach to the analysis of
(in)definiteness - at least from the point of view adopted in the present
study. A more applicable logical approach would need to be pragmatically
based, such as the file-change semantics proposed by Heim (1982), which
recasts the traditional familiarity theory in a logical format. (Dubois
(1980) also uses the notion of files to trace identity marking through a
discourse, but without using formal logic.) Yet this would also be less
appropriate for the present study, since my primary interest (for English)
has been on the articles themselves rather than (in)definite NPs in general.
Alternatively, we might appeal to some kind of inherently fuzzy logic,
which might take account of the essentially pragmatic facets of
definiteness.
9.3.3 The need for a fuzzy logic in linguistics is a reflection of the more
general non-exactness that is increasingly seen to hold between knowledge
or theory and the facts of reality. The mathematical formalization of fuzzy
sets was pioneered by Zadeh (1965); for more recent work see, for
example, Lakoff (1972, 1973), Kandel (1986), Zimmerman (1985).
Whereas in traditional logic an element x either belongs to a set A or
does not, in fuzzy logic this membership (JI) is a matter of degree, so that
aA (x) denotes the degree of membership of the element x in the set A.
Traditional logic is thus a special case, where |i happens to be either 0 or
1. In the formalization, then, each element appears together with its degree
of membership, for example as an ordered pair.
I suggested above (9.1) that our five English articles could be thought
of as representing a scale of definiteness. Assume now, for the sake of
convenience, that they are spaced along this scale at points designated as
0, 0*2, 0-4, 0*8, and 1. In fuzzy-logical terms, let this scale represent degree
of membership of the set A {definiteness markers}. The set can then be
defined as follows:
A = {zero/0 + some/0-2 + a/0-4 + the/O-% + null/1}
The complementary set A' - {indefiniteness markers} - would of course
be:
{null/0 + the/0-2 + a/0-6 + some/OS + zero/1}
One can furthermore define subsets according to a given criterial degree
oe of membership of a set A. Thus, if a = 0-5, then for our set
A0.5 = {the, null}
and the complementary set A' is
A'0.5 = {a, some, zero}

An analysis of definiteness along these lines is semantically much more
delicate than an undifferentiated binary split between definite and
indefinite. Of course, we so far lack empirical evidence for the actual
numerical values of membership degree, and it is likely that these values
themselves are intrinsically imprecise. Fuzziness is no doubt recursive.
Any boundary introduced at any level of linguistic analysis seems to some
extent arbitrary. Yet even though the application of fuzzy logic does no
more than (temporarily) postpone the introduction of non-fuzzy
arbitrariness one stage deeper, it nevertheless appears to offer a more
realistic picture, corresponding better to the actual pragmatics of
definiteness.1
9.4 Grammar and pragmatics
9.4.1 The relation between syntax and pragmatics is as vexed an issue

as that between syntax and semantics. The original distinction by Morris
(1938)-syntax as concerning the relations between signs themselves,
pragmatics as the study of the relations of signs to interpreters - can now
serve only as a general guideline, for the question is a complex one. A
more recent study (Levinson 1983) starts with the broad assumption that
1
See Giotta (1986) for a fuzzy-set analysis of the French articles. A similar approach to
English adverbial categorization is taken by Soini (1988).
Grammar and pragmatics 197
pragmatics is the study of language usage, but here again precise

definitions are hard to pin down. Levinson suggests that if semantics is
taken in the narrow sense of truth-conditional semantics only, then
pragmatics might be defined as meaning minus semantics; but by no
means all linguists would accept such a limited role for semantics. In fact,
the border between semantics and pragmatics seems to depend less on the
definition of pragmatics itself than on the definition and scope of
semantics: pragmatics is then the rag-bag of bits of meaning that are left
over, including presuppositions, felicity conditions, conversational implic-
ature and inferences of various kinds.
A key notion in Levinson's analysis of pragmatics is the concept of
defeasibility, deriving originally from Grice (1975). If, for example, an
inference is defeasible, it can be cancelled if the context so requires, as an
inductive argument can be defeated by counter-evidence. Most pragmatic
inferences are defeasible, precisely because they are context-sensitive:
context can therefore overrule them on occasion. For example, regret is a
factive verb and thus normally triggers the presupposition that the
proposition expressed in its complement is true. But this presupposition
can be cancelled, as in (9) (from Levinson 1983: 210):
(9) John didn't regret losing the game, because in fact he won.
If pragmatic bits of meaning, being thus defeasible, are context-bound,
semantic meaning can be characterized as context-independent and in this
sense invariant. Now, it has been one of the themes of the present study
to show that definiteness is both semantic and pragmatic (see also
Holmback (1982) for a different approach leading to a similar conclusion).
At several points it has been necessary to appeal to the idea of a default
reading, or to the overruling influence of context; and in terms of the
Grice/Levinson analysis, a default reading is precisely one that is
defeasible. There have also been other stages in the argument where the
concept of defeasibility has been intrinsically present. It will be helpful to
summarize these points briefly here, for they constitute an explication of
exactly where the understanding of definiteness needs to have recourse to
pragmatic factors, and thus illustrate how the whole concept of
definiteness seems to straddle the borderline between semantics and
pragmatics. (At the same time, it should of course be recalled that
definiteness also involves a number of clearly syntactic factors, discussed,
for example, in chapter 7 for Finnish.)
9.4.2 With regard to the analysis of definiteness in English, defeasibility

occurs most obviously in the interpretation of the inclusiveness or
exclusiveness (in Hawkins' sense) of NPs (see 2.2.2). Thus, a definite NP
will be assumed to have inclusive reference, i.e. to refer to 'all', unless
circumstances indicate the contrary. Inclusiveness can be explicitly denied,
for instance, as in I swept the floor but not all of it; I ate the grapes but not
all of them. It can also be cancelled implicitly: recall examples such as The
Americans have reached the moon: obviously, not all Americans can be
meant here, and so the normal assumption of inclusiveness is cancelled by
the context. The most that could be said is that the reference is to all the
salient Americans. The notion of salience itself (see 2.2.1) is also
pragmatically based, being tied to the point of view of the speaker at a
given point in the discourse.
Appeal must also be made to pragmatics in the definition of a shared
set (see 2.2.1): ultimately, whether a referent is counted as existing in a
shared set or not is determined by the total context (cotext plus situation).
This is particularly apparent in the assigning of the feature [ ± locatability
(in a shared set)] to indefinite nouns: compare Bill lost a finger (locatable)
and Bill found a pound (non-locatable). In terms of defeasibility, we can
say that, in contrast to definites (which are always locatable), indefinites
are non-locatable unless the context determines otherwise.
I have also argued that genericness is partly a pragmatic issue (2.5): a
generic reading will result if certain syntactic and semantic features co-
occur with certain contextual features. The articles themselves do not
express generic reference, but a generic reading is derived by inference
from the context in which the articles are used. This conclusion can also
be conveniently stated in terms of the defeasibility principle: an NP will
be read as non-generic unless contextual features lead to a generic reading.
In Finnish, the relation between word order and definiteness (5.4, 7.3.2)
has been explained in terms of default readings: a noun in a given position
will normally be read as definite or indefinite unless there are indications
to the contrary. True, some of these contrary indications may be purely
syntactic (e.g. the presence of function words); but some are contextual.
Word order thus allows inferences on definiteness that are defeasible. I
have also argued (7.3.1) that, with regard to stress, the statistical tendency
for unknown referents to be typically stressed often allows similar
inferences on definiteness, but that such inferences are also defeasible
(default values) because stress does not express definiteness directly.
My conclusion (7.6.2) that all the means of expression/interpretation of
Grammar and pragmatics 199
definiteness in Finnish formed a hierarchy is also based implicitly on the

defeasibility principle. Readings at the bottom end of the hierarchy will be
cancelled if features are present from higher up; and the highest feature of
all is context, which takes precedence over any other indication.
In more general terms we have also seen that the role of context, and
hence of the pragmatic principle of defeasibility, differs in significance in
the two languages. Recall the kind of correspondences that were set up
between Finnish and English in 8.2.3 above. In English there is a direct
link between the components of the tertium comparationis and their
expression (i.e. the articles); but in Finnish the link is indirect and
incomplete. Predictions about how Finnish will express definiteness
cannot be so specific as those for English. The contrast between the two
languages at this point illustrates exactly a crucial aspect of the relation
between grammar and pragmatics which has been the subject of recent
work, for example by Levinson, on which I conclude with a brief
comment.
9.4.3 In an article on anaphora (1987), Levinson discusses the

distribution of' the burden of account' between grammar and pragmatics
in different languages. It appears that anaphora must be given a pragmatic
account in some languages, while in others it is a syntactic matter.
Levinson suggests that grammar may in fact be 'frozen pragmatics' (1987:
428) - i.e. some languages encode into the grammar general pragmatic
principles that other languages leave ungrammaticalized. 'What is
preferred interpretation in one language may be grammar in another'
(ibid.). Where anaphora is ungrammaticalized there nevertheless exist
'patterns of preferred interpretation' (i.e. on whether there is coreference
or not between two NPs). Yet both grammaticalized and ungram-
maticalized anaphora are based on a shared pragmatic source. The
pragmatic source Levinson proposes for anaphora is based on what he
calls the Informativeness Principle, which is derived from Grice's Quantity
Maxim: do not make your contribution more informative than is
required, or 'say as little as necessary'. The corollary of this maxim, for
the recipient, is that he has to correspondingly amplify the speaker's
utterance by making certain assumptions about matters the speaker leaves
unspecified. For instance, the recipient will assume that 'stereotypical
relations obtain between referents and events', and he will assume
referential parsimony (i.e. he will prefer coreferential readings where these
are feasible).
Within English this Informativeness Principle might be invoked to

account for the way in which the two extremes of the definiteness scale are
morphologically unmarked. The (in)definiteness of extreme cases can be
assumed to be more easily inferred, and so needs no overt marker. In
Gricean terms, then, the application of the Quantity Maxim to article
usage would be: use surface articles only when you need to.
The Informativeness Principle also allows a pragmatic formulation of
the difference in the ways definiteness is interpreted in English and
Finnish. The two languages make different decisions as to 'how much
information' is required to be grammatically encoded, although the basic
principles underlying the interpretation are shared (see the shared
components of the tertium comparationis). In terms of the Informativeness
Principle the situation is as follows. From the speaker's point of view, in
English it is necessary to provide (via the grammar) more information
than in Finnish; the cut-off point for what constitutes 'minimum
information' is thus higher (more) for English than for Finnish, and the
English speaker's burden is heavier. From the recipient's point of view,
however, the opposite is the case: the burden placed on pragmatic
assumptions is greater for the Finn, who is given less overt grammatical
information to go on. In Levinson's terms, he has more 'enriching' to do,
more amplification, than the English recipient.
So if grammar is indeed 'frozen pragmatics', it appears to freeze in
different languages at different temperatures. And one area where this is
most evident is precisely the expression of definiteness.
9.5 A non-Aristotelian paradigm?
9.5.1 It will have been noticed that the general analysis of definiteness
proposed in this study is not bound to any particular grammatical model,
such as transformational grammar. Rather, the analysis is at a
pretheoretical level, dealing with aspects of semantics, pragmatics and
formal distribution which would need to be taken account of in any
adequate grammatical theory. The only evident bias, manifest in the form
of the componential analysis suggested, is towards a model that is
semantically based, not one with an exclusively syntactic deep structure.
At this pre- or metatheoretical level, however, the analysis and the
evidence it is based on does seem to favour certain kinds of theories or
grammatical models, as opposed to certain other kinds. In other words, it
draws attention to certain aspects of language use and language structure
A non-Aristotelian paradigm? 201
which require for their treatment a theory conforming to a number of

specific conditions. Grammatical theories that would conform to these
conditions would in several respects be radically different from most of
those presently available. In fact, we might even speak of a general
paradigm shift (in the sense of Kuhn 1970), or at least for the necessity of
such a shift. There are already, I think, some signs that such a shift is
under way. For convenience, I shall call this shift one from Aristotelian to
non-Aristotelian linguistics, following Korzybski (1933 (1948)).
Korzybski argues that the Aristotelian system, which has served so well
for over 2,000 years, is now outdated and must be replaced by a 'saner'
way of analysing the modern world. In order to illustrate the main
differences between what he calls the Old Aristotelian Orientations and
the New General Semantic Non-Aristotelian Orientations, he lists a total
of fifty-two points, covering topics as diverse as Einstein's relativity
theory, psychosomatic integration and linguistics. Some of these are of
direct relevance to my present argument, and I summarize them as follows
(Korzybski 1933 (1948): xxv-xxvii; see especially his points 5, 6, 7, 8, 21
and 22).
(a) In contrast to Aristotelian two-valued orientations, the non-

Aristotelian paradigm is characterized by degree orientations, an
infinite-valued flexibility. There is no two-valued certainty or
truth value.
(b) In the non-Aristotelian paradigm, 'allness' is not absolute, for

there is a built-in indefiniteness in everything. A corollary is that
no two events or phenomena can ever be identical in 'all'
respects.
(c) In the non-Aristotelian paradigm no event or phenomenon

should be conceived of in isolation from an infinite number of
environmental factors.
(d) Language structure (and other structures) cannot be reduced to a

set of discrete, finite, atomized elements.
9.5.2 There are a number of issues in the present study that have a
direct bearing on the above points. Several concepts that have arisen in the
course of this analysis of definiteness show the inadequacy of
'Aristotelian' thinking as Korzybski summarizes it.
First, we have seen that Hawkins' concept of inclusiveness is ultimately
a pragmatic one. 'Total' sets often turn out to be fuzzy, rather than
logically 'total'. And with regard to exclusiveness, as Vilkuna (1980)
points out, it is not so much the case that i t ' asserts not-all'; it merely does
not assert all. (Hawkins himself does not use the term 'assert' in this
context; rather, he speaks of 'referring' to the totality of objects (1978:
167) or to 'not-all' of the potential referents (1978: 187).) We have also
seen that the concept of totality in Finnish has woolly edges. And in both
languages generic reference has a wide range of interpretation: the
reference is by no means always to 'all' of a species (see in particular 2.5
and 4.3.1).
Second, a number of concepts that we have examined have turned out
not to be two-value, black-and-white ones, but scalar. These include
definiteness itself (see 9.1) and also reference (see 9.2): the evidence
suggests that both these are semantic continua. Neither is the whole
matter of countability a clear-cut issue. We have noted that most nouns
can shift from one category to another, and that in fact the nouns which
cannot do so are rather a minority. But there are also nouns which seem
to be neither exclusively count nor exclusively mass, at least on well-
established syntactic criteria. That is, there are nouns which are count on
one criterion but mass on another. For example, the noun say, as in have
a say, is count because it takes a, yet it has no plural, like a mass noun (the
workers should also have their say/*says). Compare also idiomatic usages
like lend a hand: in a plural context we do not get *they all lent their hands,
but they all lent a hand. Such idioms of course count as fixed usage, yet
they do seem to occupy a mid-position between count and mass.
Another concept that also seems to be ultimately scalar is that of the
shared set, in Hawkins' sense (see 2.2.1). It is well-nigh impossible to state
a priori the point at which a set is no longer shared but non-shared: rather,
there is a gradient between the two extremes. At the syntactic level, the
category 'article' itself also appears not to be a well-defined one (see
3.2.4).
Third, as was discussed above in 9.4, it has become clear throughout
this study that pragmatic factors - deriving from the environment of the
phenomenon under study-are of paramount importance in the in-
terpretation of definiteness. In particular, recall again the concept of the
default reading, which was introduced at several points (e.g. 4.1.3, 7.3,
7.6.2) in order to account for the overriding influence of contextual or
situational features which take precedence over a definiteness interpret-
ation based on syntactic features alone.
A non-Aristotelian paradigm ? 203
9.5.3 It was Sapir (1921: 39) who famously stated that 'all grammars
leak'. There actually seem to be two distinct kinds of leakage. One kind
is purely distributional, and is familiar from acceptability and quantific-
ational studies: there are many structures which are acceptable or
preferred for some speakers yet unacceptable or borderline for others. The
other type is more relevant to the present argument: we could call it
'intrinsic leakage'. By this I mean that the very distinctions and categories
of the theoretical description of the grammatical system itself are not
clear-cut but fuzzy, and necessarily so, because of the intrinsic nature of
the system being described. This intrinsic leakage is the kind that underlies
non-Aristotelian linguistics.
An early argument along such non-Aristotelian lines appears in
Hockett's The state of the art (1968), a critique of early transformational
grammar. Hockett's major point was that language is not a well-defined
system, and therefore not amenable to the kind of mathematical analysis
Chomsky had in mind at that time.
Non-Aristotelian ideas are most evident in the work of Ross and Lakoff
dating from the early seventies. In 1972 Ross introduced the concept of
the linguistic ' squish' to describe the kind of fuzzy overlap that occurred
between apparently discrete syntactic categories such as verb and
adjective. And with Lakoff (1973) 'fuzzy grammar' enters linguistic
terminology. Lakoff s summary there of Ross's work is worth citing: the
similarities with Korzybski's summary of his non-Aristotelian ideas are
striking. In Lakoff s words, Ross's general results are as follows (Lakoff
1973: 271):
(i) Rules of grammar do not simply apply or fail to apply; rather they apply
to a degree.
(ii) Grammatical elements are not simply members or nonmembers of
grammatical categories; rather they are members to a degree.
(iii) Grammatical constructions are not simply islands or nonislands; rather
they may be islands to a degree.
(iv) Grammatical constructions are not simply environments or non-
environments for rules; rather they may be environments to a degree.
(v) Grammatical phenomena form hierarchies which are largely constant
from speaker to speaker, and in many cases, from language to language.
(vi) Different speakers (and different languages) will have different ac-
ceptability thresholds among these hierarchies.
Conclusions of this kind show an awareness of both distributional and

intrinsic leakage. (We find similar ideas in the kind of variation analysis
pioneered by Labov - see e.g. Labov 1972.) Lakoff goes on to develop his
notion of fuzzy grammar with relation to the fuzzy sets of fuzzy logic (e.g.
Lakoff 1987). It would seem that this is the direction in which linguistics
will need to develop, particularly if it seeks to underline its status as an
empirical science. And this brings me to the last major point I wish to
raise.
9.5.4 One way of characterizing a fuzzy set is in terms of the notion of

characteristic function, which is itself a matter of degree (see Lakoff 1987).
Characteristic functions are stereotypical, prototypical ones. And in fact
many of the syntactic and semantic phenomena we have been considering
can best be seen in terms of prototypes. Take the articles themselves, for
instance. We can distinguish certain stereotypical articles, but other forms
seem more peripheral, at least on some criteria. Thus the and a are
prototype articles, with, for example, some being less so. Similarly,
prototypical reference is the traditional singular definite reference, while
generic reference is peripheral.
This approach has obvious links with (and derives from) the work of
Rosch on natural categories in the psychology of perception (see, e.g.,
Rosch (1973) for one of the first statements of this idea). Rosch analysed,
for example, the perception of colour, and concluded that 'perceptually
salient natural categories' were easier to learn than colours of a peripheral
category (such as green-blue). In other words, the salient natural
categories were psychologically 'real'.
From the contrastive point of view, the prototype approach implies that
many, if not most, contrastive analyses will need to be based on gradient
definitions of equivalence and congruence (see Krzeszowski 1986 for an
example). Contrasts and similarities can be set up between prototype
structures or concepts, but the situation may well be different at points
nearer the periphery. Furthermore, there may also be differences in the
degree of 'peripherally' accepted in each language for a given item. That
is, where one language may have a relatively tight scatter of instances
around a central prototypical core, another may display a looser, more
diffuse set of instances of the same concept. We see something of this kind
in the contrastive analysis of English/Finnish definiteness: the expression
of this concept is much more diffuse in Finnish.
I will not enter here into the debate on whether linguistics is or is not
an empirical science. Yet one thing seems clear. If Rosch is right, and our
cognitive categories do take the form of prototypes with woolly edges,
A non-Aristotelian paradigm ? 205
linguistics must come to terms with this if it truly seeks to describe what
is in the mind of the speaker. A major recent statement along these lines
is Lakoff (1987).
9.5.5 In a sense, then, definiteness is something intrinsically indefinite.

In other words, the turns out to be, as Halliday (1988: 35) puts it, 'another
ineffable category in the grammar of English'. Perhaps this is as it should
be. As a brief envoi I append the following poem by Roy Hinks,2 entitled
'Articles'.
Articles
'The' is the word
that hammers
importance onto
rigid fact and
fixes to it
the burden of being
absolute. Nothing
is infinite or free
when made definite
by the article 'The'.
I prefer things
to have wings
and to be preceded
by an indefinite -
' A ' in this life is more
appropriate -
it allows for
a saving of face
and fallibility. An
' A ' puts man
in his place.
2
First published in Country Life, 1979.
References
Ahlman, E. 1928. Spesieksen ilmaisemisesta suomessa. Virittdjd 32: 134-6.

Allen, R. L. and C. A. Hill 1979. Contrast between 0 and the in spatial and
temporal predication. Lingua 48: 123-46.
Allerton, D. J. 1978. The notion of'givenness' and its relations to presupposition
and to theme. Lingua 44: 133-68.
Annear, S. 1967. Relative clauses and conjunctions. Working Papers in Linguistics
No. 1, 80-99. Ohio: Ohio State University.
Barrett, D. 1953. Totality and determination I: the undetermined noun.
Neuphilologische Mitteilungen 54: 134-^4-4.
Bartsch, R. 1973. The syntax and semantics of number and numbers. In J. Kimball
(ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol. II, 51-93. New York: Seminar Press.
Barwise, J. and R. Cooper 1981. Generalized quantifiers and natural language.
Linguistics and Philosophy 4: 159-219.
Batori, I. S. 1978. Aktuaali lauseen jasentyminen ja suomen sanajarjestys II.
Virittaja%2\ 1-22.
Bierwisch, M. 1971. On classifying semantic features. In D. D. Steinberg and L.
A. Jakobovits (eds.), Semantics: an interdisciplinary reader in philosophy,
linguistics and psychology, 410-35. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Biggs, C. 1978. Generic generalizations. In W. U. Dressier and W. Meid (eds.),
Proceedings of the twelfth International Congress of Linguists, 169-72.
Innsbrucker Beitrage zur Sprachwissenschaft. Innsbruck: Institut fur Sprach-
wissenschaft der Universitat Innsbruck.
Bloomfield, L. 1933. Language. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Bodelsen, C. A. 1949. Review of O. Jespersen, A modern English grammar on
historical principles, Part VII. English Studies 30: 281-7.
Bolinger, D. 1975. A postscript to Postal on the article. Modern Language Journal
59 (4): 181-5.
1977. Meaning and form. London: Longman.
Bosch, P. 1983. Agreement and anaphora. A study of the role of pronouns in syntax
and discourse. London and New York: Academic Press.
Burton-Roberts, N. 1976. On the generic indefinite article. Language 52 (2):
427-48.
1981. Review of J. Hawkins, Definiteness and indefiniteness. Language 57 (1):
191-6.
Carden, G. 1976. English quantifiers. Logical structure and linguistic variation. New
York: Academic Press.
206
References 207
Carlson, G. N. 1977. A unified analysis of the English bare plural. Linguistics and
Philosophy 1 (3): 413-56.
1982. Generic terms and generic sentences. Journal of Philosophical Logic 11:
145-81.
Catford, J. C. 1965. A linguistic theory of translation. London: Oxford University
Press.
Chafe, W. L. 1970. Meaning and the structure of language. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
1976. Givenness, contrastiveness, definiteness, subjects, topics and points of
view. In C. N. Li (ed.), Subject and topic, 25-55. New York: Academic Press.
Chesterman, A. 1977. Definiteness in Finnish. Papers and Studies in Contrastive
Linguistics 7: 111-20.
1987. Review of A. Szwedek, A linguistic analysis of sentence stress. Neuphilo-
logische Mitteilungen 83 (3): 354-9.
1990. The English articles: questions, some answers and a suggestion, Acta
Universitatis Nicolai Copernici - English Studies 1: 53-74.
Chomsky, N. 1975. Questions of form and interpretation. Linguistic Analysis 1
(1): 75-109.
Christophersen, P. 1939. The articles. A study of their theory and use in English.
Copenhagen: Munksgaard.
Clark, E. V. 1978. Locationals: existential, locative, and possessive constructions.
In J. H. Greenberg (ed.), Universals of human language, Vol. IV: Syntax,
85-126. Stanford, Calif.: Stanford University Press.
Comrie, B. 1981. Language universals and linguistic typology. Oxford: Blackwell.
Cruse, D. A. 1980. Review of J. Hawkins, Definiteness and indefiniteness. Journal
of Linguistics 16 (2): 308-16.
Curat, H. 1985. Les theories psychometriques de l'article. Revue Quebecoise de
Linguistique 4 (2-3): 9-20.
Dahl, 6 . 1975. On generics. In E. L. Keenan (ed.), Formal semantics of natural
language, 99-111. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1976. What is new information? In N. E. Enkvist and V. Kohonen (eds.),
Reports on text linguistics: approaches to word order, 37-49. Abo: Abo
Akademi.
Dahl, 6 . and F. Karlsson 1975. Verbal aspects and object marking: a comparison
between Finnish and Russian. Logical Grammar Reports 17, University of
Goteborg.
Declerck, R. 1986. Two notes on the theory of definiteness. Journal of Linguistics
22(1): 25-39.
Denison, N. 1957. The partitive in Finnish. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Tiedeakatemian
Toimituksia B108.
Donnellan, K. 1966. Reference and definite descriptions. Philosophical Review 75:
281-304.
Dubois, J. 1980. Beyond definiteness: the trace of identity in discourse. In W. L.
Chafe (ed.), The pear stories. Cognitive, cultural and linguistic aspects of
narrative production, 203-74. Norwood, New Jersey: Ablex.
Eliot, C. N. E. 1890. A Finnish grammar. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Enkvist, N. E. 1975. Tekstilingvistiikan peruskdsitteitd. Helsinki: Gaudeamus.
208 References
1984. Contrastive linguistics and text linguistics. In Fisiak (ed.) 1984: 45-67.
Evans, G. 1982. The varieties of reference. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
Fiengo, R. W. 1974. Semantic conditions on surface syntax. Ph.D thesis, MIT,
Cambridge, Mass.
1987. Definiteness, specificity and familiarity. Linguistic Inquiry 18 (1): 163-6.
Firbas, J. 1964. On defining the theme in functional sentence analysis. Travaux
linguistiques de Prague 1: 276-80.
Fisiak, J. (ed.) 1984. Contrastive linguistics. Prospects and problems. Berlin:
Mouton.
Fodor, J. D. and I. A. Sag 1982. Referential and quantificational indefinites.
Linguistics and Philosophy 5 (3): 355-98.
Galmiche, M. 1985. Phrases, syntagmes et articles generiques. In M. Galmiche
and G. Kleiber (eds.), Generique et genericite. Langages 79, Paris: Larousse.
Gardiner, A. H. 1932. The theory of speech and language. Oxford: Clarendon.
Garton, A. F. 1983. An approach to the study of determiners in early language
development. Journal of Psycholinguistic Research 12 (5): 513-25.
Geach, P. T. 1962. Reference and generality. Ithaca: Cornell University Press.
Giotta, F. A. 1986. The article system of French and fuzzy semantic models. Ph.D
thesis, University of California, Davis.
Givon, T. 1978. Definiteness and referentiality. In J. Greenberg (ed.), Universals of
human language, Vol. IV: Syntax, 291-330. Stanford: Stanford University.
1981. On the development of the numeral 'one' as an indefinite marker. Folia
Linguist ica Historic a 2: 35-53.
Gleason, H. A. 1961. An introduction to descriptive linguistics (revised edition).
New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Grannis, O. 1972. The definite article conspiracy in English. Language Learning 22
(2): 275-89.
1973. The indefinite article in English. Linguistische Berichte 24: 29-34.
Grasserie, R. de la 1896. De Particle. Memoires de la Societe de Linguistique de
Paris IX. 285-322, 381-94.
Grice, H. P. 1975. Logic and conversation. In J. Cole and J. L. Morgan (eds.),
Syntax and semantics, Vol. Ill: Speech acts, 41-58. New York: Academic
Press.
Gross, M. 1973. On grammatical reference. In F. Kiefer and N. Ruwet (eds.),
Generative grammar in Europe, 203-17. Dordrecht: Reidel.
Guillaume, G. 1919. Le probleme de Particle et sa solution dans la languefrancaise.
Paris: Hachette.
1945. La question de Particle. Francais Moderne 13: 70-82.
Hakulinen, A. 1975. Suomen sitd: pragmatiikan heijastuma syntaksissa.
Sananjalka 17: 25-41.
Hakulinen, A. and F. Karlsson 1975. Suomen akkusatiivi: funktionaalinen
nakokulma. Virittdjd 79: 339-63.
1979. Nykysuomen lauseoppia. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
Hakulinen, A., F. Karlsson and M. Vilkuna 1980. Suomen tekstilauseidenpiirteitd:
kvantitatiivinen tutkimus. Helsinki: University of Helsinki, Department of
General Linguistics Publications no. 6.
Hakulinen, A. and L. Karttunen 1973. Missing persons: on generic sentences in
References 209
Finnish. In C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark and A. Weister (eds.), Papers from

the ninth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 157-71.
Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Hakulinen, L. 1946. Suomen kielen rakenne ja kehitys, Vol. II. Helsinki: Otava.
Halliday, M. A. K. 1967. Notes on transitivity and theme in English. Journal of
Linguistics 3: 37-81; 199-244.
1988. On the ineffability of grammatical categories. In J. D. Benson, M. J.
Cummings and W. S. Greaves (eds.). Linguistics in a systemic perspective,
27-51. Amsterdam: Benjamins.
Halliday, M. A. K. and R. Hasan 1976. Cohesion in English. London: Longman.
Harma, J. 1983. Remarks on pronominal reference and definiteness in French and
Finnish. Jyvdskyld Cross-Language Studies 10: 185-201.
Hawkins, J. 1978. Definiteness and indefiniteness. A study in reference and
grammaticality prediction. London: Croom Helm.
Heim, I. R. (1982). The semantics of definite and indefinite noun phrases. Ph.D
thesis, University of Massachusetts.
Herranen, T. 1978. Errors made by Finnish university students in the use of the
English article system. Jyvdskyld Contrastive Studies 6: 74-95.
Hetzron, R. 1970. Nonverbal sentences and degrees of definiteness in Hungarian.
Language 46 (4): 899-927.
Hewson, J. 1972. Article and noun in English. The Hague: Mouton.
Hirvonen, I. 1980. Spesieksen kategoria suomen kielen kuvauksessa. Sananjalka
22: 71-86.
Hjelmslev, L. 1928. Principes de grammaire generale. Copenhagen: Host & Son.
Hockett, C. F. 1968. The state of the art. The Hague: Mouton.
Hogg, R. M. 1977. English quantifier systems. Amsterdam: North-Holland.
Holman, E. 1975. Teema/reema-rakenne ja suomen sanajarjestys. Virittdjd 79:
279-87.
Holmback, H. K. 1982. The interpretation of definite and indefinite descriptions.
Ph.D thesis, University of South California.
1984. An interpretive solution to the definiteness effect problem. Linguistic
Analysis 13 (3): 195-215.
Hoover, A. 1984. Pragmatic constraints of case and word order in Finnish:
implications on definiteness. In J. Drogo, V. Mishra and D. Testen (eds.),
Papers from the twentieth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society,
192-202. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Ihalainen, O. K. 1974. On the modality of English noun phrases, with special
reference to genericity. Ph.D thesis, University of Wisconsin-Madison.
1980. Some remarks on word order and definiteness in Finnish and English.
Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics 11: 59-68.
Ikola, O. 1954-7. Suomen lauseopin ongelmia. Virittdjd 58: 2 0 9 ^ 5 ; 59: 319-32;
60: 334-53; 61: 287-96.
1964. Lauseopin kysymyksid. Helsinki: Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
Itkonen, T. 1953. 'Konetta seuraa hoito-ohjeet.' Virittdjd 57: 144-6.
1974-5. Ergatiivisuutta suomessa. Virittdjd 78: 379-98; 79: 31-65.
1976a. Erddn sijamuodon ongelmia. Suomalainen Tiedeakatemia - Esitelmat ja
Poytakirjat 1974.
210 References
1976b. Syntaktisten vaikutusyhteyksien luonteesta. Virittdjd 80: 52-81.

1980. Spesies suomessa ja germaanisissa kielissa. Virittdjd 84: 27-38.
Jackendoff, R. 1972. Semantic interpretation in generative grammar. Cambridge,
Mass.: MIT Press.
James, C. 1980. Contrastive analysis. Harlow: Longman.
Jespersen, O. 1924. Philosophy of grammar. London: Allen and Unwin.
1949. A modern English grammar on historical principles, part VII: Syntax.
London: Allen and Unwin.
Jong, F. M. G. de 1987. The compositional nature of (in)definiteness. In Reuland
and ter Meulen (eds.) 1987: 270-85.
Kaluza, H. 1963. Teaching the English article to speakers of Slavic. Language
Learning 12: 113-24.
1968. Proper names and articles in English. IRAL 6: 361-6.
Kandel, A. 1986. Fuzzy mathematical techniques with applications. Reading,
Mass.: Addison-Wesley.
Karlsson, F. 1975. Suomen kielen tulevaisuus. Sananjalka 17: 51-66.
1987. Finnish grammar (second edition). Helsinki: Werner Soderstrom.
Karlsson, G. 1962. Uber den Numerus des finnischen Pradikats in
Existentialsatzen mit pluralischem Nominativsubjekt. Suomalais-Ugrilaisen
Seuran Toimituksia 125: 195-217.
Karttunen, F. 1975. Functional constraints in Finnish syntax. In R. E. Grossman,
L. J. San and T. J. Vance (eds.), Papers from the parasession on functionalism,
Chicago Linguistic Society, 232-43. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Karttunen, L. 1969. Pronouns and variables. In R. I. Binnick, A. Davison, G. M.
Green and J. L. Morgan (eds.), Papers from the fifth regional meeting of the
Chicago Linguistic Society, 108-16. Chicago: University of Chicago.
1976. Discourse referents. In J. D. McCawley (ed.), Syntax and Semantics, Vol.
VII, 363-85. New York: Academic Press.
Keenan, E. L. 1987. A semantic definition of' indefinite N P \ In Reuland and ter
Meulen (eds.) 1987: 286-317.
Kielioppikomitean mietinto n:o 6 1915. Helsinki.
Kisbye, T. 1972. An historical outline of English syntax, Vol. II. Aarhus:
Akademisk Boghandel.
Klegr, A. 1984. Hawkins' Location Theory and the use of articles in ^/-genitive
headnouns. Philologia Pragiensia 27 (1): 23-32.
Kleiber, G. 1985. Du cote de la genericite verbale: les approches quantifica-
tionelles. In M. Galmiche and G. Kleiber (eds.), Generique et genericite.
Langages 79, Paris: Larousse.
Korchmaros, V. M. 1983. Definiteness as semantic content and its realization in
grammatical form. Studia Uralo-Altaica, Attila Josef University, Szeged.
Korzybski, A. 1933; 3rd edition 1948. Science and sanity. Lakeville, Connecticut:
The International Non-Aristotelian Library Publishing Company / Institute
of General Semantics.
Kramsky, J. 1972. The article and the concept of definiteness in language. The
Hague: Mouton.
Krzeszowski, T. P. 1971. Equivalence, congruence and deep structure. In G.
References 211
Nickel (ed.), Papers in contrastive linguistics, 37—48. Cambridge: Cambridge

University Press.
1984. Tertium comparationis. In Fisiak (ed.) 1984: 301-12.
1986. Prototypes and equivalence. Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics
21: 5-20.
Kuhn, T. S. 1970. The structure of scientific revolutions. Chicago: University of
Chicago Press.
Labov, W. 1972. Sociolinguistic patterns. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
Press.
Lado, R. 1957. Linguistics across culture. Ann Arbor: University of Michigan
Press.
Lakoff, G. 1971. On generative semantics. In D. D. Steinberg and L. A. Jakobovits
(eds.), Semantics: an interdisciplinary reader in philosophy, linguistics and
psychology, 232-96. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1972. Hedges: a study in meaning criteria and the logic of fuzzy concepts. In P.
M. Peranteau, J. L. Levi and G. C. Phares (eds.), Papers from the eighth
regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic Society, 183-228. Chicago: Chicago
Linguistic Society.
1973. Fuzzy grammar and the performance/competence terminology game. In
C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark and A. Weiser (eds.), Papers from the ninth
Linguistic Society.
1987. Women, fire, and dangerous things. What categories reveal about the mind.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Larjavaara, M. 1988. Suomen kvantitatiivinen spesies. Virittdjd 92: 469-503.
Lawler, J. 1972. Generic to a fault. In P. M. Peranteau, J. L. Levi and G. C.
Phares (eds.), Papers from the eighth regional meeting of the Chicago
Linguistic Society, 247-58. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
1973. Tracking the generic toad. In C. Corum, T. C. Smith-Stark and A. Weiser
(eds.), Papers from the ninth regional meeting of the Chicago Linguistic
Society, 320-31. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Lepasmaa, A.-L. 1978. Tunnettuuden ilmaisemisesta Helsingin puhekielessa.
Unpublished pro gradu dissertation, University of Helsinki.
Levinson, S. C. 1983. Pragmatics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1987. Pragmatics and the grammar of anaphora. Journal of Linguistics 23 (2):
379-434.
Lewis, D. 1973. Counterfactuals. Oxford: Blackwell.
1979. Scorekeeping in a language game. Journal of Philosophical Logic 8:
339-59.
Linden, E. 1947. Suomen kielen sanajarjestyksesta. Virittdjd 51: 324-34.
1969. Suomen kielen sanajarjestysuudistuksesta ja sen toteuttamisesta
kaytannossa. Virittdjd 73: 105-16.
Lomas, M. and H. Lomas 1981. The comb. (Translation of Kampa, by Veijo
Meri.) Books from Finland 3, 94-7.
Lowth, R. 1762. A short introduction to English grammar. London.
212 References
Lyons, C. G. 1980. The meaning of the English definite article. In Van der Auwera
(ed.) 1980: 81-95.
Lyons, J. 1975. Deixis as the source of reference. In E. L. Keenan (ed.), Formal
semantics of natural language, 61-83. Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press.
1977. Semantics. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Lyttle, E. G. 1974. A grammar of subordinate structures in English. The Hague:
Mouton.
Markkanen, R. 1985. 'This', 'that', 'it' vs. 'tama', 'tuo', 'se'. In her
Cross-language studies in pragmatics (Jyvaskyla Cross-Language Studies
11), 65-83. Jyvaskyla: University of Jyvaskyla.
Meri, V. 1962. Tilanteita. Keuruu: Otava.
Michael, I. 1970. English grammatical categories and the tradition to 1800.
Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Milsark, G. 1977. Toward an explanation of certain peculiarities in the existential
construction in English. Linguistic Analysis 3: 1-30.
Montague, R. 1974. The proper treatment of quantification in ordinary English.
In R. Thomason (ed.), Formal philosophy, 247-70. New Haven, Conn.: Yale
University Press.
Morris, C. 1938. Foundations of the theory of signs. In O. Neurath, R. Carnap
and C. Morris (eds.), International encyclopaedia of unified science, 77-138.
Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Mustanoja, T. F. 1960. A Middle English syntax, Part I. Helsinki: Societe
Neophilologique.
Noreen, A. 1904. Vdrt sprdk. Lund: Gleerups.
Nunberg, G. and C. Pan 1975. Inferring quantification in generic sentences. In R.
E. Grossman, L. J. San and T. J. Vance (eds.) Papers from the eleventh
Linguistic Society.
Ondracek, J. 1985. On determination in English and Italian as compared with
Finnish and Czech. Brno Studies in English 16: 85-107.
Orosz, R. A. 1969. The category of definiteness and its structural correlates in
English and Hungarian. Ph.D thesis, Indiana University.
Palmer, H. E. 1939. A grammar of spoken English on a strictly phonetic basis
(second edition). Cambridge: Heffer.
Penttila, A. 1955. Myontolauseen subjektin totaalisuudesta ja partiaalisuudesta.
Virittaja 59: 148-60.
Perlmutter, D. M. 1970. On the article in English. In M. Bierwisch and K. E.
Heidolph (eds.), Progress in linguistics, 233-48. The Hague: Mouton.
Popper, K. 1972. The logic of scientific discovery (third edition). London:
Hutchinson. (Translated from Logik der Forschung, 1935.)
Postal, P. M. 1969. Anaphoric islands. In R. I. Binnick, A. Davison, G. M. Green
and J. L. Morgan (eds.), Papers from the fifth regional meeting of the Chicago
Linguistic Society, 205-39. Chicago: University of Chicago.
1970a. On the so-called 'pronouns' in English. In R. A. Jacobs and P. S.
Rosenbaum (eds.), Readings in English transformational grammar, 56-82.
Waltham, Mass.: Ginn.
References 213
1970b. On coreferential complement subject deletion. Linguistic Inquiry 1 (4):

439-500.
Potter, B. 1979. Jeremias Rimppakinttu. (Translation by R. Mattila of The tale of
Mr Jeremy Fisher.) Helsinki: Otava.
Prince, E. F. 1981. Toward a taxonomy of given-new information. In P. Cole
(ed.), Radical pragmatics, 223-55. New York: Academic Press.
Quirk, R., S. Greenbaum, G. N. Leech and J. Svartvik 1972. A grammar of
contemporary English. London: Longman.
1985. A comprehensive grammar of the English language. London: Longman.
Reinhart, T. 1983. Anaphora and semantic interpretation. London: Croom Helm.
Reuland, E. J. and A. G. B. ter Meulen (eds.) 1987. The representation of
(in)definiteness. Cambridge, Mass.: MIT Press.
Rissanen, M. 1967. The uses of one in Old and Early Middle English. Memoires de
la Societe Neophilologique de Helsinki 31. Helsinki: Modern Language
Society.
1988. Where philology and linguistics meet: reference, (in)deflniteness and Old
English sum. In D. Kastovsky and G. Bauer (eds.), Luick revisited, 295-310.
Tubingen: Gunter Narr.
Robberecht, P. 1983. Towards a pedagogical grammar of determiners: a
contrastive approach. Papers and Studies in Contrastive Linguistics 17: 61-77.
Robbins, B. L. 1968. The definite article in English transformations. The Hague:
Mouton.
Rosch, E. 1973. Natural categories. Cognitive Psychology 4: 328-50.
Ross, J. R. 1967. Constraints on variables in syntax. Ph.D thesis, MIT, Cambridge,
Mass.
1972. The category squish: Endstation Hauptwort. In P. M. Peranteau, J. N.
Levi and G. C. Phares (eds.), Papers from the eighth regional meeting of the
Chicago Linguistic Society, 316-28. Chicago: Chicago Linguistic Society.
Russell, B. 1905. On denoting. Mind 14: 476-93.
Sadeniemi, M. 1949. Hyvaa vapaata suomea. Virittajd 53: 340-5.
Safir, K. J. 1985. Syntactic chains. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
1987. What explains the Definiteness Effect? In Reuland and ter Meulen (eds.)
1987: 71-97.
Sahlin, E. 1979. 'Some' and'any' in spoken and written English. Studia Anglistica
Upsaliensia 38. Uppsala: Almqvist and Wiksell.
Sajavaara, K. 1983. The article errors of Finnish learners of English. In C.-C. Elert
and A. Seppanen (eds.), Finnish-English language contact: papers from a
workshop. Umea Papers in English 4, 72-87. Umea: University of Umea.
Sapir, E. 1921. Language. New York: Harcourt Brace.
Schlachter, W. 1958. Partitiv und Inkongruenz beim Subjekt des Finnischen.
Finnisch-Ugrische Forschungen 33: 3-95.
Searle, J. 1969. Speech acts. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Seppanen, A. 1982. Restrictive modification and article usage with English proper
names. Umea Papers in English 1: 1-27.
1984. The generic indefinite article in English. A re-examination. Studia
Linguistica (Lund) 38 (2): 99-117.
214 References
Seppanen, A. and R. Seppanen 1986. Notes on quantifiers and definiteness in

English. Studia Neophilologica (Goteborg) 58 (2): 169-87.
Sharvy, R. 1980. A more general theory of definite descriptions. Philosophical
Review 89: 607-24.
Siro, P. 1957. Suomen kielen subjektista kielen rakenteen osana. Virittdjd 61:
181-90.
1964. Suomen kielen lauseoppi. Helsinki. Tietosanakirja Oy.
Sloat, C. 1969. Proper nouns in English. Language 45 (1): 26-30.
Smith, C. S. 1964. Determiners and relative clauses in a generative grammar of
English. Language 40 (1): 37-52.
Smith, N. V. 1975. On generics. Transactions of the Philological Society, 2 7 ^ 8 .
Soini, A. 1988. Fuzzy models for linguistic categories. In V. Rosen (ed.), Papers
from the tenth Scandinavian conference of linguistics, Vol. II. 246-60.
Department of Linguistics and Phonetics, University of Bergen.
Sommerstein, A. H. 1972. On the so-called definite article in English. Linguistic
Inquiry 3 (2): 197-209.
Sorensen, H. S. 1959. The function of the definite article in modern English.
English Studies 40: 401-20.
Stephanides, E. 1974. A contrastive study of the English and Hungarian article.
Budapest: Linguistics Institute of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences.
Stockwell, R. P., P. Schachter and B. H. Partee 1973. The major syntactic
structures of English. New York: Holt, Rinehart and Winston.
Strawson, P. F. 1950. On referring. Mind 59: 320-44.
Siisskand, P. 1935. Geschichte des unbestimmten Artikels im Alt- und
Fruhmittelenglischen. Halle/Saale: Niemeyer.
Szwedek, A. 1975. A contrastive analysis of reference in English and Polish.
Bydgoszcz: WSP.
1986. A linguistic analysis of sentence stress. Tubingen: Gunter Narr.
Thorne, J. P. 1972. On the notion 'definite'. Foundations of Language 8: 562-8.
Thrane, T. 1980. Referential-semantic analysis. Aspects of a theory of linguistic
reference. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Toivainen, J. 1985. Partitiivin syntaksi. Turun yliopiston suomalaisen ja yleisen
kielitieteen laitoksen julkaisuja 25. Turku: University of Turku.
Tuomikoski, R. 1969. Asemoisilmaustemme luohittelusta. Suomi 114, 4. Helsinki:
Suomalaisen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
Vahamaki, K. B. 1977. On textual functions of existential sentences in Finnish. In
R. T. Harms and L. Karttunen (eds.), Papers from the Transatlantic Finnish
Conference, 151-64. University of Texas in Austin.
1980. Spesieksen asema suomen kielen kuvauksessa. Fennistica 2. Abo: Abo
Akademi.
Van der Auwera, J. (ed.) 1980. The semantics of determiners. London: Croom
Helm.
Van Langendonck, W. 1979. Definiteness as an unmarked category. Linguistische
Berichte 63: 33-55.
1980. Indefinites, exemplars and kinds. In Van der Auwera (ed.) 1980: 211-31.
Vendler, Z. 1967. Singular terms. In his Linguistics in philosophy, 33-69. Ithaca:
Cornell University Press.
References 215
1968. Adjectives and nominalizations. Papers on Formal Linguistics No. 5. The

Hague: Mouton.
Vilkuna, M. 1980. Referenssi ja spesies suomenkielisten tekstien tulkinnassa.
Unpublished licentiate dissertation, University of Helsinki.
1989. Free word order in Finnish. Its syntax and discourse functions. Helsinki:
Suomen Kirjallisuuden Seura.
Vorlat, E. 1975. The development of English grammatical theory 1586-1737.
Leuven: Leuven University Press.
Werth, P. 1980. Articles of association: determiners and context. In Van der
Auwera (ed.) 1980: 250-89.
Wexler, P. 1976. On the non-lexical expression of determinedness (with special
reference to Russian and Finnish). Studia Linguistica (Lund) 30 (1): 34—67.
Woisetschlaeger, E. 1983. On the question of deflniteness in 'An old man's book'.
Linguistic Inquiry 14 (1): 137-54.
Yotsukura, S. 1970. The articles in English: a structural analysis of usage. The
Hague: Mouton.
Zadeh, L. 1965. Fuzzy sets. Information and Control 8: 338-53.
Zehler, A. M. and W. F. Brewer 1982. Sequence and principles in article system
use: an examination of a, the and null acquisition. Child Development 53 (5):
1268-74.
Zimmerman, H.-J. 1985. Fuzzy set theory - and its applications. Hingham, Mass.:
Kluwer-Nijhoff.
Author index
Agricola, 107f. Fiengo, R. W., 189, 192

Ahlman, E., 110 Firbas, J., 146
Allen, R. L., 29, 84 Fodor, J. D., 168
Allerton, D. J., 143, 146
Annear, S., 12 Galmiche, M , 39, 75
Gardiner, A. H., 4
Barrett, D., 167f. Garton, A. F., 40n.
Bartsch, R., 22 Geach, P. T., 79
Barwise, J., 194 Giotta, F. A., 196n.
Batori, I. S., 122, 124 Givon, T., 185f., 187f.
Bierwisch, M., 67 Gleason, H. A., 44
Biggs, C , 34 Grannis, O., 12, 35, 189
Bloomfield, L., 164 Grasserie, R. de la, 39
Bodelsen, C. A., 26, 27 Grice, H. P., 197, 200
Bolinger, D., 39, 60 Gross, M., 78
Bosch, P., 79 Guillaume, G., 2, 7, 16, 26f., 43, 49, 84,
Brewer, W. F., 165n. 86, 88
Burton-Roberts, N., 23f., 33, 35, 36, 67
Hakulinen, A., 91, 93, 101, 104, 114, 116f.,
Carden, G., 192 118, 122, 131, 132, 135, 141, 146, 152
Carlson, G. N., 29f., 38, 45, 70f., 79 Hakulinen, L., 110, 112, 122, 142
Catford, J. C , 110 Halliday, M. A. K., 48f., 146, 162, 205
Chafe, W. L., 27, 79f., 143 Harma, J., 78, 152
Chesterman, A., 6, 122, 125f., 129, 144, Hasan, R., 48f.
146, 158, 160, 184 Hawkins, J., 2, 17f., 26, 35, 37, 45, 52f.,
Chomsky, N., 168, 193, 203 56f., 58f., 61, 64, 65f., 69, 74, 78, 88,
Christophersen, P., 12f., 17f., 26, 28, 35, 137, 147, 150, 166f., 181, 197, 201 f.
41f., 44, 52f., 87, 176 Heim, I. R., 195
Clark, E. V., 187 Herranen, T., 165
Clarke, J., 5 Hetzron, R., 185
Comrie, B., 186f. Hewson, J., 4, 26f., 85f., 86, 88
Cooper, R., 194 Hill, C. A., 29, 84
Cruse, D. A., 24 Hinks, R., 205
Curat, H., 26 Hirvonen, I., 110
Hjelmslev, L., 27
Dahl, 6., 38, 139, 144, 173, 184 Hockett, C. F., 203
Declerck, R., 11, 24f., 59f., 64, 70, 190 Hogg, R. M., 192
Denison, N., 91, 139f. Holman, E., 122, 124
Donnellan, K., 11, 189 Holmback, H. K., 148, 197
Dubois, J., 195 Hoover, A., 127f.
Eliot, C. N. E., 99 Ihalainen, O. K., 32, 34, 77, 123, 144f.,

Enkvist, N. E., 142, 146 187
Evans, G., 11 Ikola, O., 110, 116, 123, 130, 144
216
Author index 217
Itkonen, T., 91, 92, 99, 118, 119f., 122, Palmer, H. E., 16, 45
127, 129f., 141, 146, 154, 173 Pan, C , 32, 34, 67
Partee, B. H., 12
Jackendoff, R., 34 Penttila, A., 116, 117
James, C , 163 Perlmutter, D. M., 12, 33, 35
Jespersen, O., 7, 12, 15, 26, 33, 41f., 44, Popper, K., 1
52,84 Postal, P. M., 12, 33, 48, 73f., 77
Jong, F. M. G. de, 194 Potter, B., 100
Prince, E. F., 144
Kahiza, H., 17, 44f.
Kandel, A., 195 Quirk, R., 5f., 33, 37, 41, 44f., 52f., 55f.,
Karlsson, F., 90f., 93, 101, 104, 114, 116f., 58, 70, 77, 84f., 100, 111, 188
118, 122, 131, 135, 139, 141, 146,
153, 165, 184 Reinhart, T., 79
Karlsson, G., 120f. Reuland, E. J., 147
Karttunen, F., 151 Rissanen, M., 87, 176f., 185
Karttunen, L., 11, 79, 132 Robberecht, P., 78, 84
Keenan, E. L., 194 Robbins, B. L., 12, 33
Kisbye, T., 178f. Rosch, E., 204
Klegr, A., 81 Ross, J. R., 79, 203
Kleiber, G., 38 Russell, B., 10f., 22
Korchmaros, V. M., 153
Korzybski, A., 201f. Sadeniemi, M., 116
Kramsky, J., 2f., 49, 112 Safir, K. J., 147, 194f.
Krzeszowski, T. P., 97, 138, 163, Sag, I. A., 168
204 Sahlin, E., 44, 49
Kuhn, T. S., 201 Sajavaara, K., 165
Sapir, E., 203
Labov, W., 204 Saussure, F. de, 26
Lado, R., 97 Schachter, P., 12
Lakoff, G., 192, 195, 203f. Schlachter, W., 146
Larjavaara, M., 130 Searle, J., 11, 188
Lawler, J., 32, 34f. Seppanen, A., 17, 32, 86
Lepasmaa, A.-L., 149 Seppanen, R., 17
Levinson, S. C , 9, 196f., 199f. Sharvy, R., 22
Lewis, D., 18, 24, 185 Siro, P., 8, 116f., 118f., 121f., 126, 129f.,
Linden, E., 116, 123 131, 142f., 154f., 166
Lomas, M. and H., 97f. Sloat, C , 16
Lowth, R., 5, 29 Smith, C. S., 34
Lyons, C. G., 20f., 24, 52, 64 Smith, N. V., 32, 34
Lyons, J., 11, 12, 40,49, 182, 188 Soini, A., 196n.
Lyttle, E. G., 69f. Sommerstein, A. H., 12
Sorensen, H. S., 48
Markkanen, R., 103, 152 Stephanides, E., 185
Meri, V., 97f. Stockwell, R. P., 12
Meulen, A. G. B. ter, 147 Strawson, P. F., 11, 194
Michael, I., 4 Siisskand, P., 176f.
Milsark, G., 147 Szwedek, A., 142, 147, 153, 184
Montague, R., 194
Morris, C , 196 Thorne, J. P., 21,40
Mustanoja, T. F., 179 Thrane, T., 20, 51, 190f.
Toivainen, J., 140
Noreen, A., 110, 117 Tuomikoski, R., 121 f.
Nunberg, G., 32, 34, 67
Vahamaki, K. B., 110, 122
Ondracek, J., 122 Van Langendonck, W., 23, 74
Orosz, R. A., 185 Vendler, Z., 12, 33
218 Author index
Vilkuna, M., 95, 119, 123, 124f., 130, 133, Yotsukura, S., 16f., 44, 46f., 81
137f., 141, 146, 158f., 164, 201
Vorlat, E., 4 Zadeh, L., 195
Zehler, A. M., 165n.
Werth, P., 78 Zimmerman, H.-J., 195
Wexler, P., 95f., 112f., 157, 183f.
Woisetschlaeger, E., 147, 192
Subject index
a: with mass nouns, 7, 42f., 58f; with coding locus, 29, 84, 182
proper nouns, 7, 44; not the singular concord (Finnish), 11 If., 115, 120, 157
of zero, 29f.; generic use, 35f., 60f., context, 106, 108f., 112, 143, 159f., 161,
74f.; usage types, 56f.; analysed 198; see also all-new
componentially, 68; meaning glossed, count, non-count/mass, 7f., 12f., 32, 4If.,
73f.; see also articles, count, 83, 93, 164; see also divisibility
definiteness, inclusiveness, locatability,
modification, unity default reading, 66, 144, 158f., 164, 198
accusative (Finnish), see case defeasibility, 197f.
actualization theory, 15, 28 definiteness: as compositional, If., 68,
all, see inclusiveness, logic, quantity 163f., 168f., 181f., 191, 194f.; as a
all-new (contexts), 99, 106, 143, 145 scale, 15,39, 182, 186f., 195f.; as
anaphora, 13, 31, 52, 54, 78f., 149f., 154, inferred, 1, 132, 146f., 158, 175f;
179, 199 reified, 162, see also articles, context,
any, 35, 44, 49 extensivity, function words,
articles: as a word class, 2, 4f., 41f., 48f., locatability, inclusiveness, inflection,
18If.; traditional analysis, 5f.; reference, word order; as a hierarchy
philosophical approach, lOf.; TG in Finnish, 2, 125f., 159f.; status in
approach, 12; structuralist approach, Finnish, 133f., 158f.
16f.; generic uses, 33f., 74f., see also definiteness effect, 147f., 165, 194f.
genericness; concerning noun classes, demonstratives, 24, 49f., 53
41f.; rejected, 8, 28, 43; how many?, determination theory, 15
40, 44f.; oppositions, 63f., determinedness, 2f., 95f., 11 If.
summarized, 68; described set- divisibility, 93, 118f., 126, 129f., 133f.,
theoretically, 69f.; historical 138f., 155f., 164, 167f.
development, 86f., 176f.;
correspondence with Finnish cases, entity set, 69
98f., 138f., 169f.; with Finnish word equivalence, 97, 138, 163
order, 100f., 122f., 142f.; with Finnish Estonian, 184
function words, 102f., 112, 148f.; in 'exceptional' usage, 7, 53f., 58f., 83f.
Finnish?, 153f.; see also a, null, some, exclusiveness, see inclusiveness
the, zero article existential sentence, 92, 136, 146, 147,
173, 194
Baltic-Finnic languages, 154 extensivity, 2, 25, 68, 70f., 83f., 165; see
also null, zero article
case (Finnish): cases listed, 90f.; extension, 27, 75, 136, 172
nominative/accusative, 91, 98f., 11 Of.,
113f., 116f., 129f., 133f., 154f., 169f.; familiarity, 13f., 17f.; see also unfamiliar
partitive, 91f., 98f., 110f., 113f., 116f., uses
121f., 127f., 133f., 138f., 154f., 160, Finnish: as a non-article-bearing language,
169f., see also divisibility; oblique, 90f., 110f., 158f.; generics, 130f.;
107, 11 If., 140f. correspondences with English articles,
cataphoric reference, 14, 149f., 154 95f., 169f.; see also case, concord,
219
220 Subject index
context, definiteness, divisibility, nom en effet / en puissance, 26, 28, 168

function words, information structure, nominative/accusative (Finnish), see case
measure structures, participial non-Aristotelian paradigm, 2, 200f.
structures, passive, plurale tantum non-referential uses, 11, 24, 54, 56, 59,
nouns, quantity, resultative, spesies, 151, 166
stress, stylistic factors, theme and notive spesies, see spesies
rheme, word order null article, 16, 45f., 48, 55f., 65f., 84f.,
first-mention usage, see unfamiliar uses 182; distinct from zero, 16f., 48;
French, 26, 27 contrasted with the, 29, 84f.; analysed
function words (Finnish), 102f., 112, 126, componentially, 68; as naming a set,
139, 148f., 152f., 160, 178f. 72f., 83; meaning glossed 73, 83f.; see
fuzziness, 2, 23, 49, 71f., 79, 89, 180, 191, also articles, definiteness, extensivity
195f., 203f.
oblique case (Finnish), see case
genericness, 3, 5f., 3If., 32f., 49, 60f., 74f., ^/-phrases, 13f., 8If.
99, 130f., 136f., 151, 153, 172, 177, Old English, 86f., 176f.
198 one, 48, 79
German, 107, 110, 129, 131
Greek, 4f. participial structures (Finnish), 111, 141
partitive (Finnish), see case
Hebrew, 185f. passive (Finnish), 114
Hungarian, 184f. Persian, 185
plurale tantum nouns (Finnish), 94, 119,
identifiability, 3, 10, 21f., 24f., 83, 122, 121f., 131
166f., 169f., 176 Polish, 49, 153, 184
inalienable possession, 58, 77, 99, 173 pragmatics, 9, 17f., 23, 40, 58f., 68, 75f.,
inclusiveness, 2, 18, 22f., 24f., 59f., 61, 89, 109, 127f., 151, 164, 168, 181,
66f., 69, 80f., 167f., 181, 198 196f.
indefiniteness, see definiteness predicated locus, 29, 84
inflection, see case, concord proper names/nouns, 6f., 16f., 28, 44f.,
information structure, 142f., 160 55f., 83f., 84f., 126, 192
Informativeness Principle, 199f. Proto-Germanic, 87
insider's view, see coding locus prototype, 204f.
kinds, 3If., 70f. quantification, quantifiers, 23, 30, 35, 49,

130, 160, 192f.
Latin, 4f. quantitative spesies, see spesies
Latvian, 184 quantity (total vs partial), 98, 118, 128f.,
Lithuanian, 184 133f., 154f., 160, 164, 166f.; see also
locatability, 2, 17f., 24f., 56f., 64f., 68, divisibility, partitive, spesies
166f., 168, 181f., 198, 202
location theory, 2, 17f. reference, 3, 10f., 18f., 24f., 52f., 59f., 64,
logic, 41, 66f., 71, 89, 130, 158, 192f.; see 69f., 78f., 154f., 187f.
also quantification referent set, 69, 168
resultative/irresultative, 93, 127, 133f.,
marked vs unmarked, 47, 130, 200 139
mass, see count Russian, 112, 154, 183f.
measure ('partitive') structures (Finnish),
101, 111, 140 salience, 19, 24, 198
Middle English, 87 scope, 30f.
modification, 13f., 19f., 58f., 80f. selective reading, 35, 189
set-existential verbs, 23, 57
no article, 6f., 16f., 28f., 45f., 83f.; see also set theory, 69f., 195f.
extensivity shared set, see locatability
No Initial Indefinite Constraint, 123f., some (unstressed): different from zero, 6,
144f., 158, 160, 187 29f., 56, 61, 74; as an article, 6, 16,
Subject index 221
44f., 179; usage types, 19, 56f.; theme and rheme, 125, 146f.
generic, 37, 61, 77; analysed total, see case, inclusiveness, quantity
componentially, 68; meaning glossed, transformational generative grammar, 12
73f.; see also articles, definiteness, Turkish, 186
inclusiveness, locatability, type reading, 36f., 43, 58, 61, 77, 82f.,
modification 189
specific vs non-specific, 12, 29f., 35, 152,
188f. unfamiliar uses (of the), 19f., 52, 64f., 150,
spesies, 110f., 116f., 129f., 131f., 142, 166, 166
173 uniqueness, 11, 22
stress, 112, 116, 142f., 198 unity, 13f.
stylistic factors (Finnish), 97, 105f., 152
subset/subspecies reading, see type reading word order, 95, 100f., 104f., 112, 115f.,
surface article, 2, 17, 26f., 40 122f., 125f., 128, 142f., 159f., 187, 198
Swedish, 95, 107, 110
zero article: distinct from null, 16f., 47;
tertium comparationis, 162f., 169, 175f., bare plural, 29f., 70f.; generic use,
199 3If., 34, 60f., 76; variation with the,
the: usage types, 18f., 52f.; contrasted with 54; usage types, 56; analysed
null, 29, 84f.; generic use, 35f., 74f.; componentially, 68; as naming a set,
analysed componentially, 68; meaning 70f., 173; non-locatable, 65; meaning
glossed, 73f.; see also articles, glossed, 73, 83f.; see also articles,
definiteness, familiarity, inclusiveness, definiteness, extensively, inclusiveness,
locatability, modification, proper locatability, modification, some
names/nouns, unfamiliar uses

(Andrew Chesterman) On Definiteness - A Study With Special Reference To English and Finnish

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

(Andrew Chesterman) On Definiteness - A Study With Special Reference To English and Finnish

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

This book proposes a new theory of definiteness in language.

20 JAMES FOLEY: Foundations of theoretical phonology

The right of the

CAMBRIDGE UNIVERSITY PRESS

Cambridge University Press

The Edinburgh Building, Cambridge CB2 2RU, UK

This publication is in copyright. Subject to statutory exception

First published 1991

A catalogue recordfor this publication is available from the British Library

ISBN-13 978-0-521-39194-8 hardback

ISBN-13 978-0-521-02287-3 paperback

4 A unified description of the English articles 63

6.4 Definite notive but indefinite quantitative spesies! 121

9 Wider perspectives 181

1.1 The realization of definiteness

The general structure and purpose of this study is Popperian. The

I start with an analysis of the English articles, as prototypical

1.2 The theoretical problems

We start, then, with the question: what is definiteness? Something

according to whether the content expressed by the noun is clear and

Ultimately, these theoretical problems do not relate to one particular

1.3 The English problem

1.3.1 A great deal has been written about definiteness in English. It

1.3.2 As an illustration of the standard contemporary view of the

Underlying this standard analysis are a number of assumptions which

(c) The distribution of the articles (and of' no article') is determined

(d) There is something called 'generic reference' which can be

Concerning assumption (a): What is the precise status of

Concerning assumption (b): What is the status of'no article'? If

Concerning assumption (c): A binary division of definite vs

Concerning assumption (d): Is 'generic reference' a unitary

Concerning assumption (e): It is surely a weakness of this

Another severe drawback of this view is the enormous number of

1.4 General outline

The outline of the book is as follows. The main problems have

discusses this response in some detail, according to each particular line of

2.1.1 This chapter brings together a wide range of research trends on

particularly since Russell (1905), who argued that a definite description

(2) John is a good man.

2.1.2 Christophersen's classic study (1939) starts with a discussion of

This is an important insight, although stated in very vague terms. We shall

(4) We heard the cry of a jackal.

If we compare (4), for example, with We heard a cry of a jackal, it is difficult

This is a misleading comment. The NP in question is an MP, not his

2.1.3 Yotsukura (1970) adopts a structuralist mode of analysis. She is

(9) *I like London that the tourists see.

unstressed the when singular and when not preceded by a restrictive

2.2 The location theory

2.2.1 Christophersen's concept of familiarity is redefined in terms of

According to Hawkins (1978: 167), the speaker performs the following

completely which referent {beginning, fact, colour) is meant. In (24) the

(27) Any guest at a Finnish summer cottage will invariably be invited to

Sentence (27) would be a perfectly acceptable first-mention definite,

Hawkins' solution is to relax the definition of a shared set, so as to make

2.2.2 The background to the notion of inclusiveness is to be found in

(34) Fred lost a leg/a finger during the war.

This is grammatical because it is possible to refer to ' not-all' the legs or

(35) I have a head.

The reason for the apparent inapplicability of the exclusiveness condition

Hawkins' claim that the logical meaning of the is inclusiveness, a reference

(38) The clouds are hiding the moon.

None of these examples necessarily has a paraphrase (on the same

(40) John is the victim of his own generosity.