Behind the extravagant hype of an Israeli-Saudi 'courtship', Israel is setting the price for

Riyadh to go nuclear.

The exaggerated reports and rumours about ever-closer ties are trial balloons: Jerusalem
is signalling its reluctant assent to Riyadh obtaining a nuclear deterrent – but at a high
price
Victor Kattan | Feb. 13, 2018 | 1:14 PM
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What is the true state of Israel’s relations with Saudi Arabia? How much of the more
expansive claims about warming ties exaggeration, even disinformation - and who's pushing
it? And what if the real stumbling block between the two countries isn't just the Palestinian
issue - but something even more explosive?

The coverage of Israel’s "budding" relationship with Saudi Arabia, now a constant stream,
hasn't lost its power to surprise. Most recently, it was suggested one key element of the
Arab boycott of Israel was potentially on its way out, when reports emerged that flights to
and from Israel by Air India, and perhaps even El Al, may be allowed to fly over Saudi
airspace, despite a pro-forma denial from Saudi Arabia’s Civil Aviation Authority.
Before that, there was the story about a purported secret visit to Israel by a Saudi prince;
a public meeting at a New York City synagogue between Prince Turki bin Faisal al Saud,
formerly director of Saudi Arabia’s intelligence service, and Efraim Halevy, formerly director
of the Mossad; an exclusive interview given by Israel’s chief of staff Gadi Eisenkot to the
privately owned Saudi newspaper Elaph.

What are we to make of all these stories and why are they being published now?
What seems incontrovertible is that there is indeed a warming of relations between Israel
and some Gulf states; there are business ties; Saudi bloggers who express admiration for
Israel, once taboo, are tolerated.

Yet many of the more extensive "bromance" rumors are at best speculative, and they
certainly do not mean that Israel and Saudi Arabia are on the verge of establishing
diplomatic relations.

On the surface, the same central obstacle remains: Israel’s unresolved dispute with the
Palestinians.

Prince Turki has made it plain – including in the Haaretz op-ed he wrote in 2014 – that Israel
would have to reach an agreement with the Palestinians based on the Arab Peace
Initiative before diplomatic relations between Israel and Saudi Arabia can be established.
This position has been serially repeated by Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Minister Adel al-Jubeir,
including in an interview he gave FRANCE 24 last December, when he stated that the idea
there was any other path to normalization with Israel was "just nonsense."
Prince Turki published an article in Arabic and in English sharply criticizing President Trump
for unilaterally recognizing Jerusalem as Israel's capital. The Saudi Royal Court published a
statement as soon as the announcement was made condemning it in absolute terms. Saudi
Arabia voted in favor of resolutions condemning that recognition at the Arab League, at the
Organization of Islamic Cooperation, and at the UN.

It is often said that Israel and Saudi Arabia have a mutual interest in containing Iran’s
hegemonic ambitions in the region, and that, along with an energetic new crown prince,
fear of Iranian hegemony is fuelling Saudi-Israel ties.

Indeed, Israel's chief of staff has volunteered that Israel was "ready to exchange experiences
with Saudi Arabia and other moderate Arab countries and exchange intelligence information
to confront Iran."

But it would be worth retaining some scepticism as to some of these stories' 'natural'
conclusion - an incipient Israeli-Saudi alliance - not least when many originate (primarily) in
Israel, Iran, and Qatar, by media conglomerates owned by Qatar and Iran, or by
businessmen with ties to the Muslim Brotherhood.

Take the Iran and Qatar sources first: It isn't surprising that those countries, with whom
Saudi Arabia has no diplomatic relations and are regularly described as "enemies" in the
Saudi media, would want to undermine Saudi Arabia’s standing in the Arab world by
publishing stories that Riyadh is "collaborating" with Israel to undermine the Palestinian
cause.

That sourcing might explain why veteran Saudi observers aren't buying the bromance
narrative. Following the reports about Saudi airspace opening to Israel flights, Saudi
columnist Abdulrahman Al-Rashed explained that there was "no political logic in preventing
the world’s civilian aircraft from crossing Saudi airspace, with the exception of three
countries – Israel, Qatar, and Iran."

And what is Israel's interest in boosting the narrative? It seems very possible that Israel has
a greater interest than Saudi Arabia in forging close relations to contain Iran, and
is exaggerating the extent of its relationship with Riyadh.

That exaggeration is intended to boost Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's ongoing

efforts to turn the API on its head – so that Israel would gain regional recognition before any
negotiations with the Palestinians take place. As one Israeli commentator put it, Netanyahu
hopes "Israel’s nascent rapprochement with certain Sunni Arab states could eventually lead
to those states pressur[ing] the Palestinians into the concessions required to reach a peace
deal."

However, a shared interest in containing Iran, and the Palestinian issue, doesn’t tell the
whole story of the push-pull relationship between Saudi Arabia and Israel.
The real stumbling block between the two countries isn't just the Palestinian issue. The
elephant in the relationship, which is far less often mentioned, is Saudi Arabia's pursuit of
nuclear power.
Israel is currently fighting a political battle in Washington to stop the U.S. from letting
Riyadh develop its own nuclear energy program that would allow it to enrich uranium that
could be used to develop a bomb.

Israel has good reason to be concerned. According to reports, the Trump administration
might be willing to lower certain safeguards that prevent U.S. companies from sharing
sensitive nuclear technology with Saudi Arabia for fear that it might be used to develop
weapons. This administration might not insist on the same precautions that Obama did in its
nuclear cooperation agreement with Abu Dhabi, for example, which forfeited its right to
enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.

In its negotiations with the U.S., Saudi Arabia is not backing down from its demand to enrich
uranium under its planned civilian nuclear program – using, ironically, as its rationale, the
conditions of the Joint Comprehensive Plan of Action, in which Iran has been allowed to
enrich uranium. Prince Turki has made it clear, more than once, that should Iran acquire
nuclear weapons, Saudi Arabia and other GCC countries would look at all available options
to meet the potential threat, including the acquisition of nuclear weapons.
The only snag for Saudi Arabia is the U.S. Congress, because this is where Israel has
influential friends. Even if a deal is reached between Saudi Arabia and the Trump
administration, Congress could either block the deal or add clauses preventing the U.S. from
selling Saudi Arabia technology needed to enrich uranium or reprocess plutonium.
It is more than possible that through its media campaign, Israel is sending a signal to Riyadh
that it understands very well Saudi Arabia's desire for a nuclear deterrent regarding Iran -
but there's a price to be paid for Israel reducing the level of its direct and indirect opposition
in Congress to an independent Saudi nuclear capability.
What Israel appears to be saying to Saudi Arabia, via a variety of trial balloons, is that if
Riyadh wants Israel’s help with obtaining support from Congress, then Israel wants
something in return: Jerusalem, overflight rights for Israeli aircraft, direct military
cooperation and intelligence exchanges, lucrative business deals for Israeli companies in
Saudi Arabia, and so on.

The publication of stories about Israel’s ever-closer relationship with Saudi Arabia, which are
then magnified by media conglomerates in Qatar and Iran, is certainly one way of ensuring
that the messages are received loud and clear.

Saudi Arabia would likely have anticipated that Congress could give them trouble as it has
done before.

But this time things might be different - and these changes might scupper Israel's strategy.
A deal between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia could aid the ailing U.S. nuclear industry and have
wider benefits for corporate America. Moreover, the U.S. does not have a monopoly on
nuclear technology.

Crown Prince Mohammed Bin Salman has already visited Moscow and signed agreements
with Russia to build 16 nuclear reactors by 2030. Saudi Arabia already has nuclear related
understandings with China, France, Pakistan, South Korea, and Argentina. One expert has
even suggested that Pakistan could assist Saudi Arabia by supplying Riyadh with sensitive
equipment, materials, and the expertise that would aid Riyadh with enrichment or
processing.

Riyadh is also expanding research at the King Abdullah City for Atomic and Renewable
Energy and developing a cadre of nuclear scientists. Saudi Arabia is home to large uranium
deposits that could be extracted with the appropriate technology.

Obviously, Riyadh would prefer Washington’s blessing and support in developing its nuclear
energy program within the rules of the global nonproliferation treaty rather than having to
develop the program clandestinely with the aid of other states. Israel senses this, and would
be willing to help Riyadh, but has set the price high.

Israel would far prefer a covert alliance with Saudi Arabia to contain Iran over the U.S.
allowing Riyadh to develop an independent nuclear deterrent. But Jerusalem is working to
prepare for both eventualities. Whether that strategy will work remains to be seen.
But should the Iran deal blow up on Trump's watch, and Tehran acquires the capability to
develop a weapon, no one should underestimate Riyadh’s resolve for self-preservation.

Victor Kattan is Senior Research Fellow at the Middle East Institute of the National University
of Singapore and an Associate Fellow at the Faculty of Law. Twitter: @VictorKattan