Suntay v.

Suntay | 95 PHIL 500

FACTS:

1. Jose Suntay, a Filipino citizen and resident of the Philippines, died in Amoy, Fookien Province, China, leaving real and personal
properties in the Philippines and a house in Amoy and 9 children by the first marriage had with the late Manuela T. Cruz and
a child named Silvino by the second marriage had with Maria Natividad Lim Billian who survived him;
2. Intestate proceedings were instituted in the CFI Bulacan and after hearing letters of administration were issued to Apolonio
Suntay. After the latter's death Federico C. Suntay was appointed administrator of the estate;
3. On October 1934 the surviving widow filed a petition in the CFI of Bulacan for the probate of a last will and testament claimed
to have been executed and signed in the Philippines on November 1929 by the late Jose B. Suntay;
4. This petition was denied because of the loss of said will after the filing of the petition and before the hearing thereof and of the
insufficiency of the evidence to establish the loss of the said will;
5. After liberation, claiming that he had found among the files, records and documents of his late father a will and testament in
Chinese characters executed and signed by the deceased on 4 January 1931 and that the same was filed, recorded and probated
in the Amoy district court, Province of Fookien, China, Silvino Suntay filed a petition in the intestate proceedings praying for
the probate of the will executed in Amoy, Fookien, China.

ISSUE: Whether or not the will executed in Amoy, China may be probated in the Philippines

RULING: No. The fact that the municipal district court of Amoy, China, is a probate court must be proved. The law of China on
procedure in the probate or allowance of wills must also be proved. The legal requirements for the execution of a valid will in China in
1931 should also be established by competent evidence. There is no proof on these points.

In the absence of proof that the municipal district court of Amoy is a probate court and on the Chinese law of procedure in probate
matters, it may be presumed that the proceedings in the matter of probating or allowing a will in the Chinese courts are the same as those
provided for in our laws on the subject. It is a proceeding in rem and for the validity of such proceedings personal notice or by publication
or both to all interested parties must be made.

PCIB v. Escolin | 56 SCRA 265

FACTS:

1. In November 1952, Linnie Jane Hodges, an American citizen from Texas made a will. In May 1957, while she was domiciled
here in the Philippines (Iloilo City), she died;
2. In her will, she left all her estate in favor of her husband, Charles Newton Hodges. Linnie however also stated in her will that
should her husband later die, said estate shall be turned over to her brother and sister;
3. In December 1962, Charles died, it appears he was also domiciled here. Atty. Leon Gellada, the lawyer of Charles filed a
motion before the probate court (there was an ongoing probate on the will of Linnie) so that a certain Avelina Magno may be
appointed as the administratrix of the estate;
4. Magno was the trusted employee of the Hodges when they were alive. Atty. Gellada manifested that Charles himself left a will
but the same was kept in his vault or iron safe in his office. Hence, in the meantime, he’d like to have Magno appointed as
administratrix. Judge Venicio Escolin approved the motion;
5. Later, Charles’ will was found and so a new petition for probate was filed for the said will by the same lawyer, Atty. Gellada,
with a prayer for the issuance of letters of administration to the same Joe Hodges, alleged nephew of the deceased, albeit the
motion was followed on February 22, 1963 by a separate one asking that Atty. Fernando Mirasol be appointed as his co-
administrator;
6. Since said will basically covers the same estate, Magno, as admininistratrix of Linnie’s estate opposed the said petition;
7. Almost a year thereafter, after the co-administrators Joe Hodges and Fernando P. Mirasol were replaced by herein petitioner
PCIB as sole administrator, pursuant to an agreement of all the heirs of Hodges approved by the court;
8. However, Magno refused to turn over the estate to the newly appointed administrators contending that in her will, Linnie
wanted Charles to turn over the property to Linnie’s brother and sister and since that is her will, the same must be respected;
and that Linnie was a Texan at the time of her death—that under Article 16 of the Civil Code, successional rights are governed
by Linnie’s national law; that under Texas law, Linnie’s will shall be respected regardless of the presence of legitimes (Charles’
share in the estate);
9. PCIB argued that the law of Texas refers the matter back to Philippine laws because Linnie was domiciled outside Texas at the
time of her death (applying the renvoi doctrine).

ISSUE: Whether or not Texas Law should apply.

RULING: Question of foreign law governing matters in issue one of fact; Foreign law has to be proven. –The question of what are the
laws of Texas governing the matters in issue is, in the first instance, one of fact, not of law. Elementary is the rule that foreign laws may
not be taken judicial notice of and have to be proven like any other fact in dispute between the parties in any proceeding, with the rare
exception in instances when the said laws are already within the actual knowledge of the court, such as when they are well and generally
known or they have been actually ruled upon in other cases before it and none of the parties concerned do not claim otherwise.

Thus, the Supreme Court remanded the case back to the lower court. Both parties failed to adduce proof as to the law of Texas. The
Supreme Court held that for what the Texas law is on the matter, is a question of fact to be resolved by the evidence that would be
presented in the probate court.
Vallarta v. Court of Appeals | 150 SCRA 336

FACTS:

1. Rosalinda Cruz, the private offended party, and accused Victoria Vallarta are long-time friends and business acquaintances;
2. On November 20, 1968, Cruz entrusted to Victoria Vallarta seven pieces of jewelry.
3. In December of the same year, Vallarta decided to buy some items and issued a post-dated check in the amount of P5,000 dated
January 30, 1969.
4. Rosalinda Cruz deposited said check with the bank. However, upon presentment, the check was dishonored and Cruz was
informed that Vallarta's account had been closed.
5. Cruz apprised Vallarta of the dishonor and the latter promised to give another check. Later, Vallarta pleaded for more time.
Still later, she started avoiding Cruz. Hence, this criminal action was instituted.
6. Vallarta alleged that she could not be held criminally liable pursuant to the constitutional provision for non-imprisonment for
non-payment of debt.

ISSUE: Whether or not petitioner’s failure to pay the amount upon notice within 3 days by the bank constitute a prima facie evidence
of deceit, hence, holding her criminally liable under RA. 4885

RULING: Yes. Republic Act 4885 amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit; How
deceit established – Republic Act No. 4885, amending Art. 315 (2) (d), Revised Penal Code, establishes a prima facie evidence of deceit
upon proof that the drawer of the check failed to deposit the amount necessary to cover his check within three (3) days from receipt of
notice of dishonor for lack or insufficiency of funds.

Deceit presumed in case at bar. – Admittedly, (1) the check was dishonored as Vallarta's account had been earlier closed; (2) she was
notified by Cruz of the dishonor; and, (3) Vallarta failed to make it good within three days. Deceit is therefore presumed.

As to the contention of the non-imprisonment clause, it is still criminal fraud or deceit in the issuance of a check which is made
punishable under the Revised Penal Code, and not the non-payment of the debt.

People v. Carlos | 47 PHIL 626

FACTS:

1. Dr. Pablo Sityar performed a surgical operation for appendicitis and other ailments on Fausto Carlos’s wife. After the operation,
Carlos and his wife visited Dr. Sityar several times for the purpose of dressing the wounds;
2. During one of the visits to Dr. Sityar, the latter asked Carlos to buy some medicine. Carlos states that during his absence, Doctor
Sityar outraged the wife;
3. Carlos, while confined in PGH due to a stomach trouble, received a letter from Dr. Sityar asking the former to settle their
account for services rendered to the wife;
4. On May 1924, Carlos went to the clinic of Dr. Sityar and found the latter alone. Without any quarrel, Carlos attacked Dr. Sityar
with a fan-knife and stabbed him twice;
5. Dr. Sityar made an effort to escape but Carlos pursued him and inflicted another wound upon him. He died within a few minutes.
Carlos escaped but surrendered himself to the Constabulary at Malolos, Bulacan, in the evening of the following day;
6. Carlos admits that he killed Dr. Sityar but maintains that he did so in self-defense;
7. The CFI found Carlos guilty of murder due to presence of evident premeditation. This was sustained by taking into
consideration a letter written to Carlos by his wife and seized by the police in searching his effects on the day of his arrest. The
letter shows that the wife feared that Carlos contemplated resorting to physical violence in dealing with the deceased;
8. The defense argues that the letter was a privileged communication and therefore not admissible in evidence. Also, the letter
was obtained through a search for which no warrant appears to have been issued. The defense argues that documents obtained
by illegal searches are not admissible in evidence in a criminal case.

ISSUE: Whether or not the letter is admissible in evidence

RULING: No. Where a privileged communication from one spouse to another comes into the hands of a third party, whether legally or
not, without collusion and voluntary disclosure on the part of either spouses, the privilege is thereby extinguished and the communication,
if competent, becomes admissible. The illegality of the search and seizure must be directly litigated and established by a motion made
before trial for the return of the things seized in order that the communication be excluded in evidence. However, in case of letters, the
spouses must be given opportunity in the witness stand to assent to its contents.

A letter written by a wife to her husband is incompetent as evidence in a criminal case against the latter where there is no indication of
assent on his part to the statements contained in the letter. The letter may, however, be admissible to impeach the testimony of the wife
if she goes upon the witness-stand in the trial of the case, but she was not put on the witness stand and the letter was therefore not offered
for that purpose.

CFI decision is MODIFIED. Carlos is guilty of simple homicide.

US v. Antipolo | 37 PHIL 726

FACTS:

1. The appellant was prosecuted in the Court of First Instance of the Province of Batangas, charged with the murder of one
Fortunato Dinal;
2. The trial court convicted him of homicide and from that decision he was appealed;
 3. One of the errors assigned is based upon the refusal of the trial judge to permit Susana Ezpeleta, the widow of the man
whom the appellant is accused of having murdered, to testify as a witness on behalf of the defense concerning certain
alleged dying declarations;
4. Upon asking question to the witness, the fiscal objected stating that the wife is incompetent to testify under the rules and
procedure in either civil or criminal cases, unless it be with the consent of her husband, and as he is dead and cannot grant that
permission, it follows that this witness is disqualified from testifying in this case in which her husband is the injured party.;
5. Defense: The disqualification which the fiscal evidently had in mind relates only to cases in which a husband or wife of one of
the parties to a proceeding is called to testify; that the parties to the prosecution of a criminal case are the Government and the
accused; that, furthermore the marriage of Dinal to the witness having been dissolved by the death of her husband, she is no
longer his wife, and therefore not subject to any disqualification arising from the status of marriage.
6. Objection was sustained.
7. To this objection counsel took exception and made an offer to prove by the excluded witness the facts which he expected to
establish by her testimony.

ISSUE: Whether or not Suzana Ezpeleta is a competent witness

RULING: Yes. The widow of the deceased is a competent witness, in a prosecution for homicide, to testify on behalf of the defense or
the prosecution regarding dying declarations to her by the deceased concerning the cause of his death. Obviously, when a person at the
point of death as a result of injuries he has suffered makes a statement regarding the manner in which he received those injuries, the
communication so made is in no sense confidential. On the contrary, such a communication is made for the express purpose that it may
be communicated after the death of the declarant to the authorities concerned in inquiring into the cause of his death.

On grounds of public policy the wife cannot testify against her husband as to what came to her from him confidentially or by reason of
the marriage relation, but this rule does not apply to a dying communication made by the husband to the wife on the trial of the one who
killed him.

National Development Company v. Workmen’s Compensation Commission

FACTS:

1. Respondent Gertrudes Lucas Vda. de Raymundo filed a claim for workmen's compensation for the death of her husband, Luis
Raymundo averring that her husband was employed at the NDC for more than 12 years, his last designation being machine
tender in the Finishing Department; that his work consisted of lifting heavy loads, pushing a wagon loaded with dyed and wet
cloth and mixing chemicals for use in dyeing and printing textiles and that because of strenuous work done mostly at night and
because of exposure to sudden changes in temperature, her husband began to lose weight, complained of headaches and chest
pains and later spat blood; that on account of poor health, Luis Raymundo retired from the service of petitioner on May 6, 1953.
2. Eight months after, he died of pulmonary tuberculosis;
3. Petitioner filed its answer denying liability. It alleged that Luis Raymundo never contracted tuberculosis while in its employ
and that at any rate "tuberculosis is not an occupational disease incident and/or peculiar to the work of the claimant;
4. Hearings were held after which a decision was rendered ordering petitioner to pay to respondent sums of money;
5. On review, this decision was affirmed by the Workmen's Compensation Commission. In reaching this conclusion, the
Commission relied partly on the testimony of respondent and on the following:
Exhibit "E" — Death certificate which states that Luis Raymundo died on January 23, 1954 of pulmonary
tuberculosis.
Exhibit "F" — Affidavit of Dr. Crisanto S. Vito Cruz in which he states that he treated Luis Raymundo for
pulmonary tuberculosis from December, 1952 to January 22, 1954.
Exhibit "G" — Petitioner's letter, dated May 6, 1953, advising Luis Raymundo of the termination of his
employment;
6. Petitioner appealed to this Court. It contends that both respondent's testimony as well as Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" should have
been excluded, because the first is self-serving while the second are hearsays. Petitioner adds that while the death certificate
(Exh. "E") is admissible to prove the fact and date of death; it is not competent to prove the cause thereof;

ISSUE: Whether the evidence presented by respondent is admissible to render the award in her favor

RULING: Yes. Yes. The right of a party to be present and give evidence as provided in section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation
Act would be meaningless if it did not include the right to testify in his own behalf. The argument that the testimony of an interested
party is self-serving and therefore is inadmissible in evidence misses the essential nature of self-serving evidence and the ground for its
exclusion. Self-serving evidence is evidence made by a party out of court at one time; it does not include a party's testimony as a witness
in court. It is excluded on the same ground as any hearsay evidence that is the lack of opportunity for cross-examination by the adverse
party and on the consideration that its admission would open the door to fraud and to fabrication of testimony. On the other hand, a
party's testimony in court is sworn and affords the other party the opportunity for cross-examination.

Nor is there merit in the claim that Exhibits "E", "F" and "G" were erroneously admitted in evidence. While they may be hearsay by
common law rules of evidence, they are nevertheless admissible under section 49 of the Workmen’s Compensation Act. Aside from the
evidence objected to, there is some other substantial evidence supporting the award. There is in the record the testimony of Bienvenido
Dizon, a former co-employee of Luis Raymundo. There is likewise evidence of the payment of gratuity to Raymundo on account of his
illness. In addition, there is a presumption created by section 44 that Raymundo's illness was aggravated by the nature of his employment
and that Dr. Vito Cruz' affidavit that he treated Raymundo for tuberculosis is correct. This presumption is intended to reverse the burden
of proof and make it the duty of petitioner, as employer, to establish by substantial evidence, that the illness was not in fact aggravated
by the nature of the job. Petitioner has failed to overcome the evidence and presumptions in favor of respondent.
People v. Alegre | 94 SCRA 109

FACTS:

1. This case arose from the death of Adelina Sajo y Maravilla. According to the Necropsy Report, she died of asphyxia by manual
strangulation. Her bedroom was in "shambles," evidently indicating that it was ransacked. The drawers and several cabinets
were open, and some personal garments, handbags and papers were scattered on the floor;
2. No witness saw the commission of the crime. Appellant Ramiro Alegre, who was then living with relatives in one of the rented
rooms on the ground floor of the victim's house, was taken to the Pasay City police headquarters for investigation in connection
with the case, but was later released that same day for lack of any evidence implicating him in the crime;
3. Melecio Cudillan was apprehended in Tacloban City, Leyte, in the act of pawning a bracelet, one of the pieces of jewelry taken
from the victim. In explaining how he came into possession of the stolen pieces of jewelry, he admitted his participation in the
killing and robbery of Adlina Sajo. This appears in his extrajudicial confession before the police authorities of Tacloban City.
In this statement, which was written in the English language, Melecio Cudillan implicated Mario Comayas, Jesus Medalla
and Ramiro Alegre.
4. When arraigned, Mario Comayas, Jesus Medalla and Ramiro Alegre entered a plea of not guilty. The prosecution presented
nine (9) witnesses. None of them, however, testified on the actual commission of the crime. The recital of facts was based
principally and mainly on the extrajudicial confessions of Melecio Cudillan.

ISSUE: Whether or not the extra-judicial confession of the accused is admissible and has probative value against his co-accused.

RULING: No. Where there is no independent evidence of conspiracy, an accused’s extra-judicial confession cannot be used against
his co-accused. — The extrajudicial confession of Melecio Cudillan, on the basis of which the trial court was able to reconstruct how
Melecio Cudillan committed the crime in question, cannot be used as evidence and are not competent proof against appellants Ramiro
Alegre and Jesus Medalla, under the principle “res inter alias acta alteri nocere non debet,” there being no independent evidence of
conspiracy. As a general rule, the extrajudicial declaration of an accused, although deliberately made, is not admissible and does not
have probative value against his co-accused. It is merely hearsay evidence as far as the other accused are concerned. While there are
recognized exceptions to this rule, the facts and circumstances attendant in the case at bar do not bring it within the purview of such
exceptions.

US v. Tolosa | 5 PHIL 616

FACTS:

1. In the judgment appealed from the defendant was sentenced for the crime of homicide;
2. The Solicitor-General now asks this court to acquit the defendant on the ground that, in his opinion, the latter acted in self-
defense when he inflicted the wounds which caused the death of the deceased;
3. According to the testimony of the defendant during preliminary investigation which was corroborated by two eyewitnesses,
deceased unjustly and unlawfully attacked the defendant, striking him with his fist and kicking him until he, the defendant, fell
to the ground, and continuing the aggression with a heavy piece of bamboo with which he struck him several blows, as a result
of which he, the defendant, again fell to the ground. The defendant, seeking to save himself from a further attack with the piece
of bamboo, drew a pocketknife from his pocket and attacked the deceased, inflicting upon him the wounds which resulted in
his death a few hours later;
4. It appears from this testimony that this attack upon the defendant was not preceded by any provocation on his part. If this be
true, it would appear that this is a case of legitimate defense which exempts the defendant from all criminal liability.

ISSUE: Whether the testimony of the defendant, corroborated by eyewitnesses to the occurrence, is sufficient proof to be acquitted.

RULING: Yes. An admission by the defendant at the preliminary investigation that he inflicted upon the deceased the wounds in
question is not a confession of guilt in the legal sense of the word, and is not a plea of guilty but merely an admission that he was the
person who had inflicted upon the deceased the wounds in question. So clear is this that when the complaint was read to him after it had
been drawn up with all the necessary details of a formal charge, he pleaded not guilty to the crime set out in the complaint, admitting,
however, when he testified in his own behalf that he had inflicted the fatal wounds upon the deceased, but alleging that he did so in self-
defense and in order to repel the unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased.

Conviction for homicide cannot be had when the testimony of the defendant, corroborated by that of two eyewitnesses, shows that the
deceased unjustly and unlawfully attacked the defendant with a heavy piece of bamboo, and that, in order to save himself from further
grave injury, the defendant inflicted upon his aggressor wounds with a pocket knife, as a result of which the latter died.

People v. Ola | 152 SCRA 1

FACTS:

1. Senen Ola, was charged before the then CFI as the principal in the crime of Attempted Robbery with Homicide and
Unintentional Abortion. His co-accused, Jose Bustamante and Rustico Matimtim were charged only as accomplices;
2. In the Information, it was stated that Ola climb up and enter into the house of Lolita Muhi with the intention of committing
robbery but was unable to perform all acts which would produce the crime of robbery as a consequence by reason of the fact
that Lolita was awake and attempted to ask for help as a consequence of which, the accused Ola, taking advantage of his
superior strength and with a balded weapon, assault and stabbed Lolita who was pregnant causing her death and the abortion
of the foetus;
3. Upon arraignment. Ola pleaded not guilty. Bustamante pleaded guilty to the charge;
4. The accused-appellant in this case assails the judgment of conviction, first, upon the ground that the testimony of Jose
Bustamante comes from a polluted source, and therefore, must be subjected to careful scrutiny. Accused-appellant likewise
points out that the accomplice Matimtim repudiated his extrajudicial confession and declared that he was forced to sign the
 same. Finally, the defense argues that other than one testimony of Bustamante, there is no evidence positively Identifying the
accused-appellant as the author of the crime charged, hence his defense of alibi should have been given due significance.

ISSUES: (1) Whether an extrajudicial confession made by a co-accused, when subsequently repudiated, can still be used an evidence
against another accused.
(2) Whether the following circumstantial evidence, to wit: a footprint found near the stove in the kitchen of the victim's house, a hole in
the wall of said kitchen, the linear cuts or incisions found on Ola's index finger and mandible, and what the lower court considered as
the "dying gesture" of the victim, allegedly pointing to the general direction of " Ilaya, " where both the accused Bustamante and Ola
resided is sufficient to convict Ola.

RULINGS: (1) No. The extrajudicial statements of the accused Matimtim are inadmissible against the appellant Ola for being hearsay.
To buttress the testimony of Bustamante, the trial court deemed as corroborative evidence, the extrajudicial statements of the other
accomplice Rustico Matimtim, among others. The proper test in determining the corroboration of a testimony is to examine the other
evidence with a view to ascertain if these tend to connect the accused to the offense. With respect to the extrajudicial statements of
Matimtim implicating Ola, the trial court should have been guided by the settled rule that extrajudicial statements of an accused
implicating a co-accused may not be utilized against the latter unless repeated in open court.

In the instant case, the appellant never had an opportunity to cross-examine Matimtim on the latter's incriminating statements. Not only
were said statements not repeated in court, but they were repudiated by Matimtim during his testimony wherein he claimed that he was
prevailed upon by Bustamante to implicate Ola. The latter expressly denied the facts narrated in his confession which incriminate Ola.
This is not one of those instances when the extrajudicial statements of a co-accused might be taken into consideration in judging the
credibility of the testimony of an accomplice where certain conditions concur, such as: a) the statements are made by several accused;
b) the same are in all material respects Identical; and c) there could have been no collusion among the co-accused in making said
statements. These conditions do not obtain in the instant case, and therefore, said evidence cannot be considered even in the appreciation
of Bustamante's testimony.

(2) No. Circumstantial evidence may be characterized as that evidence which proves a fact or series of facts from which the facts in
issue may be established by inference. This Court cannot, by any stretch of imagination, infer from said evidence, the Identity of the
victim's assailant nor the actual participation of the appellant Ola in the crime charged.

The footprint allegedly found on the "abuhan" was never measured nor Identified as Ola's, or as of the same foot size as Ola's. The
prosecution failed to connect the wounds to the commission of the crime. Finally, the gesture of the dying woman too vague to be given
much probative value in determining the culpability of the appellant. The evidence comes to the courts couched in the witness' second
hand perception and possibly, imbued with his personal meanings and biases. This is what makes hearsay evidence objectionable.

As a matter of exception to the Hearsay Rule, statements made by the victim at the point of death which qualify as dying declarations
may be admitted by the courts. It is not clear from the decision under review whether the dying gesture was admitted as a dying
declaration. Without ruling on the admissibility of said evidence as a dying declaration, the Court find that such an equivocal act of
pointing with the hand does not in any way corroborate Bustamante's testimony on the identity of Ola as the victim's assailant.