ParadigmShift: An ImmodestProposal

Patrick McEvoy-Halston
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9712576

Philosophy220
Dr. JeffreyFoss
June4,2001
 I

I am not convincedby Kuhn's argumentthatscientistsshouldrelinquishtheir belief

that they aregettingcloserandcloserto an objective,complete,true accountof nature.
Kuhn offersus a new paradigmto understandscientificrevolutions,which emphasizes
discontinuity,andthe lossesalongwith the gainsof new scientificparadigms.He tells us
that acceptinga new paradigmis a matterof persuasiono
andthoughthereareaspectsof
his argumentthat arepersuasive--for
instancehis ability to tolerateliving in a universe
which is not ultimatelyunderstandable--on
the whole,I do not find his argument
persuasive.I sensedin it a "dishonest"quality (which I will laterdetail),which inspired
paradigmsimilarin structureto his, but which does
a successfulsearchfor a conce,ptual
not maketruth (fundamentaluniversallaws) seemnecessarilyforeverbeyondhuman
apprehension (evenif we cannotknow, assumingthey exist,andwe find them,that there I q ,
'
f*
themas'the endof thejourney''). At the endof t
is somethingthat clearlydistinguishes
readinghis piece,I cannotsay,though,that I ful!*:"SL9-ry*puld be dismissed--I
actuallywould preferthat scientistsnot needfor their researdhto be aboutfinding final,

purposes,may be counterproductive.Kuhn believesthat the cure,ntscientificquest

becauseit cannotbe rcalized,but he therebyleavesus with the
shouldbe abandoned
implicit corollarythat shouldhis own paradigmnot standthe testof time, thenscientists
shouldcontinueasthey hadpreviouslytoward a "goal setby naturein advance"(Kuhn
197A,l7l; salvation?).Kuhn's attentionto thelimitationsof text-booklearningin
productivescientificcommunity--
whenusedin supportof a nevertheless
science--even
comparedwith the breadthof sourceshe seesusedin history philosophy,ffid the social
sciences,is wonderfulammunitionfor a humanistargumentagainsta strict diet of text-
book learningfor any student,includingwould-bescientists.Also, the implicit valueof
in his proposalthat scienceshouldconcern
the importanceof our own lives, suggested
itself with solvingcurrent,relevantproblems,is too valid to leaveto the tnrth-valueof his
own paradigmof scientificdevelopmentfor scientists(andus) to considera fundamental
re-orientationtowardshow they (we) conceiveof the scientificenterprise.
Kuhn startsoff on the wrongfoot by not explicitly acknowledgingthe paradigmatic
 2

flavour of his own theory. He is arguingagainst"the mostprevalentcontemporary

interpretationof the natureandfunctionof scientifictheory[thattheoriesare
fundamentallycompatible]. . . [becauseit] would restrictthe rangeandmeaningof an
acceptedtheoryso that it couldnot possiblyconflict with anylatertheorythatmade
predictionsaboutsomeof the samenaturalphenomena"(98). He arguesagainstthis
leavesscientistsimmuneto
contemporary"paradigm"by suggestingits consequences--it
attack--but,also,andmoreimportantly,by attemptingto provethathis own accountof
lIf ^Ur-L
scientificrevolutions,producingincompatibletheories,is morein line with historical "
|
andcompatibility. He is attemptinga
truth thantheoriesemphasizingcontinuity
paradigmshift of his own; but he leavesto us the responsibilityto recognizehis argument
as such. Thushe offersus: The Structureof ScientificRevolutions,andnot: A Paradigm
of the Structureof ScientificRevolutions.
Why doesthis maffer? Becauseif we considerhis theoryasa paradigmwe aremore
likely to testif what he saysaboutparadigmsof scienceappliesto his own paradigmof
the natureof scientificrevolutions.A scientificparadigm,saysKuhn, cannotbe tnre
because:(l) it alwaysoverreaches,
natureat somepoint startsintroducinganomalies
which the paradigmcannotaccountfor, andwhich eventuallyleadto new paradigmsto
accountfor them1'(2) becausea shift in paradigmalwaysinvolvesa shift in emphasis;
what waspreviouslyemphasized,
apparently,becomesmerelythe subjectof sub-
specialtiesof a new science.The lossis substantial:with Newton'ssizes,shapes,
positions,andmotions,w€ loseAristotle'scolours,tastes,andweights(10a). Therefore,
arguesKuhn, "sinceno paradigrneversolvesall the problemsit definesandsinceno two
paradigmsleaveall the sameproblemsunsolved"(110),scientifictruth is alwaysa
relativething. He proposesthat scientistsspendtheir time consideringwhich problems
they shouldbe working on, andnot on animpossiblequestfor the holy grail of ssientific ./
research:an all inclusive,fiaal accormtofnature's laws. Yet if we considerhis own ( ,r/ |
theory a paradigrnwe may not be of the mind to considerhis "lruths" asconclusive! )"
t I
perhapsfacts,anomalies,will appearin the historical record
Perhapsheis ove,rreaching;
f
that do not accordwell with his theory. We might imaginebeing drawq after fubn's ,t pf
of materialbodies,previouslydiscarded,were
theory is displaced,much asessences
popularizedagainwith Newton,to theoriesof scientific theoreticaldevelopmen!which
 3

emphasizecompatibilityandprogressivedevelopment!
Theremay be a reasonwhy we shouldnot considerwhat Kuhn saysis true of
scientificparadigmsasalsoholdingtrue for theorieswhich accountfor the natureof
scientificparadigms,but onedoesnot cometo mind. Kuhn doessuggestthatthereis
somethingdistinctiveaboutscientificparadigmsthat maynot hold true for other
paradigms--political
science;art;etc.--buthe alsotells us thatwhat he hasto sayabout
scientificparadigms"are constitutiveof natureaswell" (110). Moreover,his theorysure
"looks" awfully paradigm-like.I_tappegrscompfgjgqqdfinal, He makesthe prevlotls
" rx-'-,{^-
A
theory
withitsemphasis
oncompatible uffiriiffiffiCmy4###ffi6
chang,
progressiveflavour of his own theory. He evenhighlightsa role for thosewho adopthis
theorywhich looks a lot like the role of scientistsduringthe paradignphase:fill in the
gaps. He asks:"What mustnature,includingffiffi, be like in orderthat sciencebe
possibleat all? Why shouldscientificcommunitiesbe ableto reacha firm consensus
endureacrossoneparadigmchange
unattainablein otherfields? Why shouldconsensus
after another?" (173). In other words, we should pursue solving problems which do not
challengehis paradigm, but follow, and remain to be explored, after ;t ; f
""""0r;;;.
offering us, then, a paradigm characteristically similar to a scientific paradigrn?--if it
walks like a duck, and talks like a duck . . . But by not explicitly addressingthis

*1 possibility, I ignsepossiblemanipulatio-n,andaf,', therefore,lesslikely to be seduced

/
(persuaded)by his theory. I on-o J " ar^-
t
'&"'
1 {" 72a,i-,,r-
--Jf-- |'-,.}' ,I}o
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Kuhn, thoug[ ifpresenting us witl a paradigm,is offering us onewhich, apparently

doeszot lose somethingsubstantialasit displacesits predecessor--after
all, his
apparentlydoesnot. Kuhn is not telling us that that shifting our focus away from the
consistent,accumulativenatureof scientific conceptualdevelopmentacrosstime, is a
way to hig iglrt the equallyvalid conceptualizationof the history of science's
discontinuity. No, Kuhn is tellingus that thereis no strchconsistency--itis a fallacy
(apparently)ofthose accustomedto imaginingprogressasaxiomaticallyattachedto
/1
definitions of the scientific enterprise.Kuhn's theoryintegratesall the "f_:cts:of fte ( ,^\ ,
previousmodel,rejectshow they were conceptualized,andadvancesto (tp9;pcount of
science'sdevelopment.Yet if this holdstrue for Kuhn's intellectualjoumey, is he right
that it doesnot hold true for scienceaswell? In orderto be persuadedby Kubn that
 4

scienceoughtto abandonits questfor truths,it is very importantthat we accepthis

I
I premisethat,at leastastar
/-
asscientificparadignsareconcerned,
thereis no logical
4 --'- r1./ u)
l.iryI*y#:*.e. something importantmustbeleft out)between successivescientific
! theories.Why? Because movement fromparadigm to paradigm mightthent::-
6
progressive,i.e., asunqualified,meaningfulgrowth. If correct,thenthe scientific I fJ
\
enterprisewould structurallylook very muchlike it washeadingtowardssomething--
perhapseventhe truth. Onecouldarguethatthis would not happenin any case,that the
progressionis infinite, that natureis ever-shifting,or too complexfor human
but it would be a hardercaseto make--ffid,likely, would be less
understanding,
persuasiveto the reader. Graphically,it is easyto imagineprogressivestagesleading
someplaceimportante.g.,a stairwayto heaven;an escalatorto the top of the building;the
upwarddevelopmentof the backbonefrom apeto homosapiens,a child into andadult
etc. In fact, Kuhn might be well advisednot to havethe word progress,with its
associativemeanitrgs,anywherenearour cognitivepalettefor seriousconsideration.
andthis couldleadus to a "weak link" in his
With progress,thereis emancipation,
theoreticalconstruction: will thepasthold truefor thq futgrer
,D"L"tr
J.- f,-,
,i-$ r '-" *,.-.lS- "'',,,'"*.
,?4-. -). c,fiil /, { "$
--...- ei*--Q-t['rt

Kuhn tells us that "[t]hough logical inclusifg4gs.s_iemains a permissibleview of the

scientifictheories,it is a historicalimplausibility"(98;my
relationbetweensuccessive
emphasis).What,though,aboutthe future? Kuhn is telling us that scientistsshould
abandontheir questfor truth becausethe historicaltrendamountsto a universalconstant:
we canexpectmoreof the same.Anyonegroundedin the philosophyof scienceknows
that Kuhn is not the f,rst sp-ectrulL f94!hto frighten scientistsinto rememberingtheir
t^^..t'U/*{-aXJ.6^,1 :
(supposed)humanimderfedtAbili$;
=-> Humeis also usedto provethat what holdstrue for
z.---",-{-L? $.JE
sciencetoday,may not tomorrow(or'eventh-edeit instant!). Now anhonestphilosopher
of science,who doesnot takespecialandparticularpleasurein humblingthe scientific '
enterprise,will admitthat if Humecanbe usedto scoldscience,he canalsobe usedto p'o.r*
scoldthosewho meanto humblescienceaswell. So let us imagine,inspiredby Hume,a J
conversationwith Kuhn: "Sure,Kuhn, I'll agreethat everythingyou tell us aboutthe
historyof scienceholdstrue,but tomorrow,you cannotproveto me that sciencewill not
turn into a pink, fluffy bunny!" No doubthis responsecouldonly be: " (sigh) . . . I
cannotdisproveyour contention,thereforethe universeno longermakessenseto me."
 5

Maybenot. Hume'spoint aboutthe natureof inductionbelongsin the "imagineyour a

brain in a vat" sortof philosophy:to the lay personit holdsno morelastingpersuasive
effectthana magician'stricks--youforgetaboutit onceyou areoutsidethe magician's
"/
tent. Kuhn's argument,though,wffi widely readandaccepted.But you canstill use
Hume to counteractKuhn's attemptto draw our attentionto the historical past,and
addressthe possibilitythat whatholdstrue for the pastdoesnot necessarilyhold tnre for
the future. I canimaginea historicalparadigmcomposedof stages,similar in manyways
in form andin characterto Kuhn's, but which endsin a final stagethat persiststhereafter
without muchchange.This is Piaget'smodelof the natureof humancognitive
development.
Piagettells us that we all go throughvariouscognitive,revolutionary,schematicshifts
througlrthe 'history" of our lives. It is not death,however,which terminatesthe
sequence.Instead,duringadolescence,
we enter
I
rA', th-l*ig,ytrich is with us thereafter.Beforereachingformal operations,andthinking in,
say,the onalmode,a child doesnot know sheis thinkingirrationallyor overly
{teoperati
self-centerbd.r'Heis, ratheramanifestinga type of thinkingwhich precedes. . . the
of log*al opry&n" (Hundert1989,ll2). If we wereto imaginethe latest
appearance
scientificparadigmasequivalentto an intermediate(preoperational;
concrete)phaseof
Piaget's"paradigm"we might imaginethat a scientificparadigmequivalentto Piaget's
final formal operationalphaselies ahead.Therearereasons,pro andcon, for arguingthe
relevanceof this analogy. I will startwith an argumentin supportof its relevance.
Therearestriking similaritiesbetweenthe two theories.Both Piagetand Kuhn are
interestedin cognitive"map-making"(Kuhn 109). Kuhn mentions,specifically,the
cognitivefunctionsof paradigms(109). Paradigmsoffer scientistsa mapwith which to
determinewhat "naturedoesanddoesnot containandaboutthe waysin which those
entitiesbehave"( I 09). And they offer directionsfor map-making:the gestaltof theories,
methodsandstandards neededto determinethe legitimacyof problemsandsolutions
(109). With Piaget,a cognitiveschemais characterrzedasa " 'mobile frame'
appliedto variouscontents"(Hundert1l0) of the world that determines,to
successively
someextent,what a person"sees." Both Kuhn andPiagetmakethis point: a scientific
paradigm,or a cognitiveschema,generallyfinds what it expectsto find. This is why
 6

Kuhn tell us that "cumulativeacquisitionof novelty is not only rare in fact but
improbablein principle" (96),andthat "[t]he manwho is strivingto solvea problem
definedby existingknowledgeandtechniqueis not,just looking around. . . [: he] knows
what he wantsto achieve,andhe designshis insbumentsanddirectshis thoughts
accordingly' (96). EdwardHunderttells us that,accordingto Piaget,"oncea concept. . .
is constructed,
it is appliedto experience. . . : it is immediatelyexternalizedso that it
4
appearsto thesubjectas a perceptuallygivenproperty of theobjectand independent
of
.L
thesubject'sown mentalactivity" [la; emphasisin original).Both Kuhn andPiaget
imaginethough,that natureeventuallythrowsup challengesto existingparadigms,or
schemas,which accumulate, a revolution(Kuhn) or
andwhich eventuallynecessitate
revolution-likeaccoillmodation(Piaget):a radicalreorientationin waysof mappingthe
world which accountfor the anomalies.Beforeandafterthis occurs,for Kuhn, the
scientificcommunitygoesaboutthe assuredbusinessof dealingeffectivelyand
efficiently with problemsat hand(64),while, for Piaget,childrengo abouthappilyand
effectivelyassimilatingtheir worlds. With the shift, however,for both theorists,you are
left with scientists,for Kuhn, andchildren,for Piaget,who havetroubleunderstanding
thoseoutsideof their paradigmor schema.Thuswe learnfrom Kuhn, that scientific
communitiesendup "talk[ing] througheachother" (109),andfrom developmental
that childrenaheador behindtheir peersin termsof cognitivephasewill
psychologrsts
havedifficultybeingunderstood,orunderstandingtheirpeerS.wu--l-
Thereare,however,severalsignificantwaysin which the two theoriesdiffer: (
of cognitiveschemasareintegrativeand
Piaget,contraKuhn, believesthatthe succession
progressive.Childrenmovefroman..inabilitytoexperiencethereversibm
{'
statesof affairs" (HundertI 18; emphasisin original)to beingableto do so. Onemight
imaginethat it might be neatto be ableto go back andno longerbe ableto ableto
experiencethe world this way,but what we havelost is an inability todo something, 0 lL
ratherthana capacityto view the world in a profitableway. (2) Piaget'sschsmasare
reversibilityof emphasisovertime--soif a
irreversible,whereasKuhn emphasizes
scienceemphasizesessentialessences,thendiscardsthem,atsomelaterpointth"ym
once againbeembraced.(3) Piaget'smodelhighlightssignificantchangeassomething
that a changein
that occursduringa person'slifetime,whereasKuhn emphasizes
paradigmcanonly be adoptedby a different generationof scientists,i.e., Piaget'smodel
is l,amarckianwhile Kuhn's is Darwinianin nature.(4) Finally, Piaget'sfinal schemaof
forrnal relationsis not really abouta capacityto und€rstandthe natureof the world, i.e.,
the truth,brtt, instead,involvesa capacityto useour "concrete"knowledgeof the 'teal"
world to imaginenew truths. Hoa*gljflr be analogousto the scientific enterpriseof
uncoveringtruths,the wisdom o2rctrKubn hopeshis thesiscalls into question?I
believethat the first tlree differencesbaween PiagetandKuhn amountto arguments
againstacc€pfingKuhn's prerrisethat tuth for€verlies outsidescientists'grasp,andthe
last one canbe usedto arguethat, nonetheless,
Kuhn-so long asthe readerhasbeen
seduced,persuaded,by my listing of the similaritiesbetweenthe theoriststo imagine
them asmodelsin competitionwith one another-is riglrt that this scieotific questfor huth
interfereswith bett€rprojects.
Is Kulur correctthat scientific paradigmsareneith€rintegrativenor progressivgin
the sensethat they leavevery importantways of understandingthe world out from
paradign to paradigm.?I am not c€rtain;but if we arenot looking at the pastwith Kuhn's
map in mind, perhapswe will begin to noticethe kind of integrativeprogressionhe
claimsdoesnot exist. For instance,Kuhn drawsour attentionto extrernereluctanceof
'lrofessionals" (171; scientists?)to acc€ptDarwin's theory. The oneideathat was

particularly unappealingto themwasDarwin's ideaofnatural selection:it seemedto

leaveno role for a supremeartificer working with a plan towardsa goal. Kuhn is both
using natural selectionto demonshatethe difficulty scieirtistshaveswitchingparadigms,
and also asa model with which to comparehis own model of scientific rwolution:UJr(
He tells us that "the resolutionofrevolutions is the selectionby conflict within the
scientific communityof the fittest way to practicefuture science"(172). This fitness,he
qualifies earlier,must me€ttwo all-importantconditions: "First, the new candidate
tparadigrn]must seernto resolvesone outstaadingandgenerallyrecognizedproblem
that canbe met in no other way. Second,the new paradip. mustpromiseto preservea
relatively largepart ofthe concreteproblern-solvingability that hasaccruedto science
I
througbits predecessors"(169).That is it. Yet Kuhn is telling us that wen after
r'
selectionbecamethe paradign for most scientists,therestill existsa needW n" 7 |9\ D Pn
rtheirthinking!
/t)
( S"""4
^)"
,*L-
 I

Is it possiblethat a third requirementmustbe met for a paradigmto be adoptedby a

new generationof scientists:it mustU_"*t"ti""Ary p*.t"Utrt The qeryral impression
t\/t L
you get from Kuhn is that drring the revolutionarystage,variouspowersgo at it, and
with the victor goesthe prize of establishingtheir modelasthebasisfor the next
paradigm. So you might haveLatitudinariansin favourof Newton'smodelbecausethey
seeit asa modelof the universewhich is a goodmatchfor their own desirefor a society
maintainingsocialstability,andcommerce(Jacob
predicatedon curbingself-interests,
a generationof
1976,142). They win the revolution,andwe thenhave,supposedly,
scientistswho arenot by natureall that concernedwhetherthe paradigmaticscientific
modelthey usematcheswell with their own religion,say--theyjust want a model,an!
model,that seemsto explainthe universealongUlth the anomaliesunaccounted for by
.-,'.--\ tsA -
the lastparadigm,so they canproceed,irt neuter;l]pfa$hion (not Popper'sbold scientists
here!),abouttheir monkishbusinessof mappingthe details. The model"chosen"may
indeedhavebeenoneof manypossibilities,but oncedecided,it obstructsfrom view
otherpossiblemodelsthat lost thebattlefor hegemonyduringthe revolutionaryphase.
two usefulgoals:(l) He hasus imagining
For his purposes,Kuhn therebyaccomplishes
that it is impossiblefor datato be "explained"by only oneparadigm--there
existsanother
out there,thoughno longervisible,thatwould do thejob equallyaswell. (2) Thoughhe
(e.9.,'opreserve
insiststhat the paradigmadoptedmuststill fulfill certainrequirements a
throughits
largepart of the concreteproblem-solvingability thathasaccruedto scie,nce
(169))in orderto be acceptedby a scientificcoilrmunity(which is what he
predecessors'n
saysdistinguishesscientificrevolutionsfrom political revolutions),this qualification,
thoughimportant,still seemsto leaveto powerpolitics a gooddealof maneuveringroom
heighteningthe senseof subjectivityand
in the sort of modelthey couldherald--thereby
decreasingthe senseof objectivity we associatewith scientific paradigm "progression"
tirde. But Kutrn offers us an anomalyto his own theorythat oncea paradign is
W
adopted,othersby andlarge slip from view. Kuhn in fact emphasizes that evenwell after
Newton'stheoriesashaving
Einstein,ffiffiy scientistshavenot beenquick to understand
beenproven'\rrong" (99; his word) bVEinstein. This is maddeningto Kuhn, becauseit
is well pasttime for themto havedoneso! "Wakeup, the paradigmhasshifted!" The
{
Newton'stheoriesas
casecouldbe madethat Kuhn is not right that Einsteinestablished
-Y
 9

beingfundamentallywrong;but evenif this is the case,perhapswe shouldconsider

whetherthereis somethingaboutthe Einsteinianuniversewhich may not be palatable
evento a new generationof scientistswho havenot grownup with Newton'stheories.
If we canimaginethat a scientificparadigmmustbe "emotionallt'' acceptable(e.g.,
mustleaveroom for God;mustleaveroom for primacyof "man", etc.)to a generationof
scientistsfor it to reign asthe modelof choice,which mustbe factoredin whenaccessing
why a particularparadigm'\rins" ttle battle during the revolutionaryphaseandwhy it is
acceptedthereafter,(i.e., let[ not be intimidatedby currentintellectualhendsto meekly
acceptthat the powerful few really areresponsiblefor the naflre of the socialworld we
live in. The powerof our leadersmight be proportionalto needwe feel for powerful
peopleto 'hold the world up"--the"Queenbee,may reallybe the slaveof the sister-
t\ .(
workerbees;"the "dog may really waghis own tail", etc.)thenperhapswe couldlook at \''
the natureof the paradigmacceptedasa way to gaugethe emotionalstateof a generation
(*'
of scientists.Therein,might therebe signsof a kind of realprogressin the scientific 1
enterprise,which Kuhn's mapdoesnot show? Beforebriefly pursuingthis possibility,to
help further makethe point that paradigmsmight be metaphorswith an emotionalaswell
I
asa logical character(Abram 1991),I will pursuean example,which, I think, might be
especiallyrelevantto my reader.
Assumethat anomaliesappearin our currentscientificrecord*@ull t"1.,
the new, say,dinosaurfossilsdiscovereddateasbeingonly a couplethousandyearsold.
We recheckall our previousfossil finds anddiscoverthat theynow showthe samething:
it appearsthat all thesefossilsareremainsof animalsthatperishedat exactlythe same
time, andnot so long ago. Shouldwe imagine,then,that while the currentgenerationof
scientistswould not accepttheseanomaliesasanomalies(asKuhn would haveus
imagine),that, somehow,the next generationof scientistswould acceptthe datawithin a
new paradigmeventhoughit couldnot helpbut be a very goodfit for fundamental
Christianwaysof conceivingour universe?I, myself,havedifficulty imaginingwhere
thesescientistswould comefrom--surelythey would not be the sonsanddaughtersof
most living scientists!If therewas a revolution(with MichaelRuseasGeneraltelling his
fortunately,would be badly
forcesto fight on!), I would guessthat the fundamentalists,
outnumberedandoutgunnedin countrieswith the fire-powerto matter(the American
 t0

RepublicanPartyalwaysdistancesitself from its fundamentalelementslest it neverwin a

populatingthis post-revolutionary
nationalelection),so I cannotimaginefundamentalists
paradigmstage.My bestguessis the likely outcomewould be fortuitousto anyone

JL'
\,{
(' 'l
hopingscientistsstopchasingdownnature'sfiuths: I picturea new generationof
potentialscientistspreferringfi,garativetruthsto literal ones--"allthe world really is a
stage,you know; anyonewho asksto seethe wood andnailsis nothingbut an annoying
JN fuddy-duddy,or worse,a subversive!"
MichaelRusein his article"DarwinismDefended"(1982)tells us, with greatpassion,
not only that creationismdoesnot accountfor the "facts,"but that,if a creationist
paradigmprevailed,it would stifle the scientificenterpriseofaccumulatin$truths--no
smallthing,because - wtrifi"ttiffifshes
for Ruse,it is thescientificenterprise usfrom <a
\- *-.
thebrutes" (327).Hetellsusthat: UJ {
"-

Humanbeingshaveffiffiy, many failings. In a centurywhich hasseenboth

Auschwitz andHiroshima"I needhardlydwell on them. And yet, for all this,
thereis somethingnobleabouthumanity. We may be little higherthanthe apes.
We arealsolittle lower thanthe angels.We striveto live, ffid thuswe produce
our technology.But, mandoesnot live by breadalone:he producesart, and
literature,ffid knowledge,for its own sake.Perhapsthemodelof the double
helix will lead,throughrecombinantDNA techniques,to greattechnologtcal
advances.But, themodelin itselfis a thing of beauty,ffid an inspiring
testamentto humanachievement. (327;my emphasis)

For thosewho arefamiliar with Ruse,this maybe a stretch,but imaginehim asthe basis
for our conceptualmodelof the "scientist." Now revisit Kuhn's thesis. You might
wonderif Kuhn's scientists,thoughfitting a popularimageof a scientistasdetachedand
unemotional,might be somewhat'trnreal." Ruse,powerfrrlly,is telling us of the
importanceto him of modelsasthingsof beauty. They seemto havenearreligious
significance:they arepart of mans'"salvation." Might this havebeentrue for scientists
(-
throughouthistory andif so,arescientistssomalleablethat they arecapableof
imagininganymodelthey aredeeplyimmersedin this way? If Newton'smodelallowed
no conceivablerole, or place,whatsoever,for God,yet still accountedfor anomalies

* tripping up the previousparadigm,would theNewtonianmodelappearasa thing of

i;' beautyto scientistsaftera paradigmshift to Newton'stheorf Possibly,perhaps,all that

is requiredis an intermediategenerationto strugglewith this, to be followedby a
 ll

generationof scientistswho canmove from teleologicaltheories,to nahral selection,

leadingto subsequentoneswho eventuallyconceiveofuniverses,like StephenHawking
does,without a beginning without a prime mover,andwithout themselvesbeing
different in temperamentfrom scientistswho previouslyneededa fwfiwnental placefor
God in their paradigrnaticuniverse. But perhaps,instead,the uncertaintyofthe truth-
value of rftrsaccountofthe history of sciencegeneratesenoughdissonanceto requireour
further attention,andprompt our firther inquiry, beforecategorizingit astruth.
Is it possiblethat we humansarematuringover time? The psychiatristCasper
Schmidtbelieves(also seedeMause1982)that:
[a]s in the casewith the Copemicanrevolution,with the Darwiniantheory of
evolutionarychange,and,most recenfly,with Freudianpsychology(eachof
which constitutesan assaulton the omnipotenceandgrandiosityofthe infant in
eachofus), eachpersonon earthhasto work througheachofthese rwolutions
themselves.The closerto hometheseschemesreach,the more difficult they are
to acceptandinteglate. Thus,morepeopleacceptthe Copemicanrevolution
than the Darwinian, andthe hardestpill of all to swallow
- is the onethat sayswe
arenot themastersin our own minds."(1981,339)t

Lovelock's theory, for examplg of a living motherEarth,Gaia,t;)b us that we arenot 4

, ,{
-..- ---
masters- 4ginds-instead,we areGaia'smind, so we Cfodd'<lirectour (her)
i4.e'tr1qr1m f 4"
- .. . -2
mind to Gaia'spurposes(1991,l9). Scientists,
scholars,oftenhotly disagreewith
-,4oll
Invelock's largerclaims. JamesKirchner,for example,hasa difficult time swallowing fv.-
this particularaspectof the Gaiathesis,thoughnot so for David Abram. Are we
witnessingtemperamentaldifferencesbetweenthe two men,which explainswhy
Kirchner, acmrding to Abram,prefersa mechanisticmodel,while Abram prefersan
ecologicalepistemologf Abram tells us that'[w]hen the naturalworld is conceivedas
a machine,the humanmind necessmilyretainsa godlike position outsideof that world.
It is this privileged position,the licenseit givesus for the possession,
mastery,and
control ofnature, that makesus so reluctantto drop the mechanicalmetaphot''(68). But

t
I find this theory suggestive,though I do not accept that being able to imagine oneself as something's
"servant/slave" necessarily proves your maturity--the opposite may be true: these days scientists never seem to tire
telling us we are really automatons, perhapsbecausethey secretly enjoy imagining thernselvesas exceptions to the
rule?
 t2

if only we coulddo so,because"this humanprivilegecomesat the expenseof our

perceptualexperience"(68). Abram,like Schmidt,imaginesthe stumblingblock to
paradigmchangeto be a matterof giving up seeminglychildishimpulses.It is beyond
this paperto document,andbeyondmy meansto evenconduct,a historicalinvestigation
of my own to seeif thereis the gradualmaturityovertime of the scientificcommunity
that Schmidtbelievesis a true accountof thehistoricalrecord. However,thesesortsof
arebeginningto percolate(seedeMause2001?;GreenspanlggT.2
speculations
Emotionalprogressdoesseemplausibleenougha theoryto me,that Kuhn would haveto
the emotionalappealof paradignsto help persuademe that what is lost
haveaddressed
from oneparadigmto anotherparadigmis not someof its "childish" appeal.3As it is,
grvenmy awareness it seemsasjustifiableto usePiaget'smodelof
of counter-arguments,
the maturingmind to understandscience'shistory,asto useKuhn's.
Are scientificparadigmsmeaningfullyunderstoodasreversible,so that what wasonce
emphasizedanddropped,will be the subjectof attentionof a laterparadigm?As

' Don Lepan(1995),in fact, inspiredby Piaget,looksto literatureto seeif thereactuallyis an increasein
"cognitive sophistication"in the writings of the "giants of literature" acrosstime. He finds them:
Shakespeare, HaroldBloom andhis "Inventionof the Human"be damned!,is dethroned.Shakespeare
with his "one hundredandone derogatorywordsappliedto women" is gettinga hard time from feminist
critics aswell. And my professorof EnglishHistory,JohnMoneynsurprisedme (andhimselfactually)last
semester,by askinghimself out loud if theremight "in a very real sense"be a quantumleap with Jane
Austin in the range,and subtlety,of emotionsexplored. Thoughbeginningto wobble,ffid perhaps
contraryto what is found in the science,the currenthegemonicparadigmin the humanitiesfavours
relativity, and enjoysscoffing at thosewho believethat "progress'ncanbe somethingmore thanan
ideological,power-saturated, construct(oh, if only we couldbe Uebermenschen like them,andseebeyond
our ideologicalfog asthey areableto do!)

' SandraHarding(1991)believesthatthe ability for scienceto producereliableexplanations dependson

the social conditionsof the time. I haveto admit a strongattractionto the ideathat the natureof the social
conditions,the natureof any particularculture,dependsalmostentirely on the amountof warm interactions
the aggregateof peoplehad, in particularwith their mothers,duringtheir childhoods(seedeMause1982,
2001?;andGreenspan1997). For an accountof culturesasnot beingsui genesis,thattakeson the
tautologicalideathat "the cultural and socialelementsthat mold the individual precedethe individual and
areexternalto the individual" (ToobyandCosmides1992,26), seethebrilliant book soonto be published
by Lloyd deMause(untitled,thoughpossiblyThe EmotionalLife of Nations,publishingdate2001?;
anotheralternativeis to visit www.psychohistory.com).
 t3

mentioned,Kuhn tells us that with Newtonianism,scienceencountered

a "genuine
reversiontoascholasticstandard"(105;my emphasis)."Innateattractionsand
repulsionsjoined size,shape,positionandmotionasphysicallyimeducibleprimary
propertiesof matter"(105-106;my emphasis).Without Kulur's mapin our mind,
guidingour historicalsearch,this, too, might be suspect.In Abram's essay,"The
Mechanicalandthe Organic",he tells us that scienceis betterunderstood,as a whole,as
aspassiveandbarren(67). Newton,accordingto Abram,is not to
imaginingsubstances
but ashavingplayeda part in
be seenasbringingbackAristotilean-likeessences,
severingthe link betweenscienceandalchemicalmagic,by 'hid[ing] andvery publicly
deny[ing]the vastalchemicalresearches that occupiedhim throughouthis life" (67). He
is part of the distancingof sciencefrom a otiew of the materialworld, of matteritself, as
a locusof subtlepowersandimmanentforces,a dynamicnetworkof invisible sympathies
andantipathies"(67).For Abram,it is the currentgenerationof scientistswho must
reversetheir currentcourse,andimagine,with the help of a new ecologicalparadigm,a
oncemore,becausethis to datehasnot beenpart of the
world alive with essences
sequentialhistoryof science.Again, asI do not know historywell enoughto know
p fto the historical record--Kuhn's or Abram's--and as I
havetroublesufficienttyprrffiling myselfthatboth theories*" lilnty r\th* ol,*nyuy
to be fiue (thoughthis may be the case),Kuhn hasnot persuaded
me of the tendencyof
;*d;r to reversethemselvesin importantways(andthereforenot be a progressive
stage-likeprocessakin to Piaget'scognitiveschemas)acrosstime.
Kuhn's theoryoffersus scientistsasmenwho are"rigrd", unchangng--leavingit to
of scientistsfrom paradigmto paradigm.He
the processof selectionto movegenerations
tells us that scientifictrainingis suchthat:
[I]t is not well designedto producethe manwho will easilydiscovera fresh
approach.But so long a6somebodyappearswith a new candidatefor paradigm-
-usuallya youngman onenewto the field--thelossdueto rigidity accrues
9f
only the individual. Give,na generationin which to effect change,individual
rigidity is compatiblewith a communitythat canswitch from paradigmto
paradigmwhenthe occasiondemands. (166)
(
Is therea necessaryconflict betweenkhrpigid scientistsandPiaget'sgrowingchildren
andadolescents?It is possibleto imagineboth modelsascomplernentary.Justasin

4"
I
I
 t4

science,asyou movefrom physics,to chemirtry,to biology you do not necessarily

expectthe "rules" to remainconstant;theremay arcal sensethat what appliesto children
andadolescents
doesnot applyto the creativeworld of adultscientists.Yet not all of
Kuhn's scientistsaresorigid. In fact,thoseyoungerscientists,or new onesto the field
that Kuhn refersto, arenot simply"fresh"--theyarecreativegeniuses.They do not
commandmuchof Kuhnosattention,perhapsbecauselike Darwin their role is secondary
to "[n]atureitself . . . lundermining]professionalsecurityby makingprior achievements
v\
seemproblematic"(l69),but theymuststill transcendthe paradigmthat will be left .,t\
behindby way of incorporatinganomalieswithin a newparadigmof their own c:reation.
Thesegeniuses,in fact, seemto do what Piagetrury&gql_gpgatiqgs permit everyoneto
,v
be ableto do: to transcendeverydaymodelsof experience.The otherscientistsare
?
presentedby Kuhn almostasPiagetimaginestheprevious
tt
is obviousandremarkable.Accordingto Kuhn,
stage--asoperating.The resernblance
( .$
"the new paradigmmustpromiseto presewea relativelylargepart of the concrete
iJ r{
problem-solvingability thathasaccruedto sciencethroughits predecessors"(169;
my t"S
ernphasis).Fortunately,this is all but certainbecause"[n]ovelty for its own sakeis not a d-t
desideratumin the sciencesasit is in somanyothercreativefields" (169),so "new Tri
\.Y
paradigms. . . usuallypreservea greatdealof the rnoffiutt
achievementandthey alwayspermit additiogrdl besides"
concrei,ieisoblem-solutions
''.-*r;.r- --
J*,.;.,;- *_*-\
(169;my ernphasis).
For us to acceptKuhn thesis,it is importantthatwe not considertoo closelythe
possibilitythat a changein the way scientistsaretaughtmight producescientistswho are
eithercapableof bold imaginings,and/orcapableof moving from paradigmto paradigm
within their lifetimes,ffid remaina scientificcommunity.Why? Becausepart of the
persuasiveappealof Kuhn's theoryis the consistencyof the modelhe proposes.It is the
proposedconsistencyof the pastrecordof science,with its inevitablefutureothat informs
Kuhn's suggestionthat scientistsabandontheir questfor tnrth. It helpsthat his scientists
asbeingfundamentallylimited--notPopper'sadvenfurousexplorersof
arecharacterrzed
the unknown,but thosefollowing in their wake,making all the observationsthat the
explorerscouldnot becauseof the "newness"of their enterprise,while haversinga route
previouslylaid down ffid, therefore,safe. To helppersuadeus to adapthis own
 15

paradigm,an imageof the timid, limited scientistis an idealimpressionto leaveus with,

becauseif scientistscanbe bold, capableof integratingdifferent,new paradigms,with
relish,thennaturedoesnot aseasilyseemassomething.rogreat that it lies forever
,
beyondour apprehension.It is importantthat,comparedto scientistscautiouslylimipwl
its (her) God-likeability
data,natureeventuallydemonstrates
themselvesto assenrbling
to subvertany paradigmscientistshavecraftedto "cage" it (her). And there ls something
of JackNicholson'scry: "Truth--youcan't handlethe truth!" (my gratefulthanksto
JeffreyFossfor this) which informsKuhn's thesis,thatmanyof us might be pre-disposed
to associateascharacteristicof the humancondition. His modelmight even"fit" our
own critical self-evaluation.Subliminallypersuasive
then? Thereasontherearenow so
manyKuhniansaboutthesedays? I think so;but a problememergesfor Kuhn's
paradigmto havereal lastingpowerin the future,i4 with the help of a countermodel,we
canimaginethe possibility,soto speak,of a scientificcommunityof "JackNicholsons"
who can handlethe truthl
stayingpowerwhose
Thereis an old conceptualparadigmwhich hashadconsiderable
accuracyandsenseof inevitabilitymustalsobe challengedsothat we do not grveKuhn's
modelmorepersuasivepowerthanit deserves.That is the idea asCharlesPierce,for
example,offersus, of the greatfew amongstthemediocremany:

But [even]in the mostpriest-riddenstatessomeindividualswill be foundwho

areraisedabovethat condition[unableto put two andtwo together].Thesemen
possessa wider sortof socialfeeling;they seethatmenin othercountriesandin
other ageshaveheld to very different doctrinesfrom thosewhich they
themselveshavebeenbroughtup to believe;andthey cannothelp seeingthat it
is the mereaccidentof their havingbeentaughtastheyhave,andof their having
beensurroundedwith the mannersandassociationsthey have,that hascaused
themto believeasthey do.(1971:1877,37).

A scientificcommunitycomposedof manymenandwomensimilarin characterto

Pierce'sgreatrr*,-6@st be up to the taskof finding, and'handling", nahue'sbuths-
-if in fact thereis any suchthing. In fact,Kuhn,by drawingour attentionto the causeof
the likelihood of us
scientists'limited nature--theirstifling education--increases
consideringthis very possibility:a communityof "formal operation"superstarscientists!
Would sucha communityfind universaltruths? Maybethey could--butit would not
 t6

be their primary concern.Formaloperations,"[r]atherthanfinding in practicalprobr*t

instancesof the constancies
of the real world . . . [involves]apply[ing]the algebraof
I
/ btL
formal thought/o situationswhich havenot yet arisen"(Hundert124). The biologist
\
Brian Goodwin,influencedby Piaget,explainswhatthis would meanfor life forms:
[A]ppropriate(geneticallyadapted)organismscanbe generated by eithera
responseto a new environmentalchallenge,a hereditarystatearisingby some
meansandresultingin an appropriateorganismicform for that environment;or
spontaneous reorgantzationswithin the hereditaryconstraintscanoccur,
producingorganismswith new morphologiesandbehaviourpatternswhich must
theneitherdiscoveror createappropriateenvironments. ($-5a; my emphasis)

Imaginethis communityof scientistsasa newkind of life form, which ratherthanusing

sciencesimply to betterhelpus adaptto nature,or to solverelevantproblemsasKuhn
hopes it would, focuses on creating its own preferred surround, its own "nafire."
ideamight soundunnaturalso perhapsI will sayinsteadthat this communitymight
The
N€
concernitself with creatingits own'tnnature."
monsfrousone.
No, I like my idea"so I will not let it seemlike a Frankesteinian
asnaturalmagicians
Instead,I will suggestthat scientistsshouldimaginethernselves
oncemore (asAbram recoilrmends).Kuhn is right, scientistsshouldreconsidertrying to
find out universallaws astheir primarygoal,but so thatthey caninsteadrefocus
themselveson a new one:help (please!please!)makethe universemore enchanting.
They could,of course,continueseekingout currentpropertiesof the naturaluniverse
(while it lasts)if it expandstheir tool kit; certainlyhelp us solvethe utilitarianproblemof
thengetto the importantbusinessof makinga
bringingaboutwidespreadhappiness;
moon out of greencheese,riversthat flow chocolate,anda "gravity''that works asit does
now, but only while you arereally atfractedto somethingelse(onceyour heartcommits
to anotheryou canmove (upwards!downwards!sideways!)on). Scientistslike this
would needan imaginationmorethanthey would needa methodology.So they would
haveto mix their textbook(BasicToolsto Re-Makethe Universe:the Scienceof
Generatology)learning,with a goodmix of fantasyandfun. I would recommendthey
takeat leastasmanyhistory,andenglishclassesasthey do scienceones. Psychology,
too--if they canget throughall the "neurons"and"gay matter"to humanist
psychologistslike Carl Rogers.Finally, they couldtakephilosophycourses--especially
 T7

Jeffiey Foss's: theywould learnwhat it really meansto be subvertthe naturalorderof

things. L+ftr.|^{ *F- .^;J ,*.A,^&,
d--'
{)
Soundgood? I think so. Soundlike a "childish" regression?I do not think so: a child
might preferhis/trerprivate fantasyto "reality'', andanimism,aspleasantasit seemsto
the modernreader,might amotrntto unhealthyprojections,butpreferring natureas
mundaneis not an indicationof one'smaturity. Only a senile,old fool insiststhat what
now "is" is alsonecessarilywhat "ought" to be. (We miglrt,like Bill Clinton,alsoquibble
aboutwhat the right definition of "is" is). Kuhn knows this, but his cormter-offeris too
mundane,too modest. Instead,how aboutyoujoin me, dearreader,alongwith all the
otherffi89r,wizards,andwitches(lions andtigersandbears,oh my!) who will
fashioninga goldenbrick roadto a tnrly brave,new
accompanyus, andcomme,nce
world!

, t )
 Bibliography

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SchneiderandPenelopeBoston,eds,Scientistson Gaia,Cambridge:MIT Press,1991.

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Greenspan,Stanley. Growth of theMind: and theEndangeredOrigins of Intelligence, AddisonWesley,

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andPenelopeBoston,Eds,Scientistson Gaia,Cambridge:MIT Press,1991.

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