ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 1

Mckee vs. IAC

FACTS: A cargo truck and a Ford Escort were traveling in opposite directions.
When the car was 10 meters away from the bridge, 2 boys suddenly darted into
the car’s lane. The car driver blew the horn, swerved to the left and entered the
truck’s lane. He then switched on the headlights, braked, and attempted to return
to his lane. Before he could do so, his car collided with the truck.

ISSUE: WON there was an efficient intervening cause – YES.

HELD: Although it may be said that the act of the car driver, if at all negligent,
was the initial act in the chain of events, it cannot be said that the same caused
the eventual injuries and deaths because of the occurrence of a sufficient
intervening event, the negligent act of the truck driver, which was the actual
cause of the tragedy. It was the truck driver’s subsequent negligence in failing to
take the proper measure and degree of care necessary to avoid the collision,
which was the proximate cause of the tragedy.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 2

Consolidated Bank and Trust Co. vs. CA

Last Clear Chance Doctrine is NOT applicable in culpa contractual

FACTS:
· LC Diaz had a savings account with Solidbank.
· After messenger of LC Diaz deposited amount, it took so long so he had to
leave the passbook
· Turns out that the passbook was given to somebody else (not the messenger or
any employee of LC Diaz) and was able to withdraw
P300,000.00 from its account.
· Thus, LC Diaz filed this case for the recovery of sum of money against
Solidbank
· CA: found that Solidbank was negligent and it had the last clear chance to avoid
the injury if it had only called up LC Diaz to verify
the withdrawal

RATIO:
· In this case, Solidbank is liable for breach of contract due to negligence or culpa
contractual
· The bank is under the obligation to treat the accounts of its depositors with
meticulous care, always having in mind the fiduciary
nature of their relationship. However, in this case, they failed to do this.
· Solidbank was supposed to return the passbook only to the depositor or his
authorized representative, but here, Solidbank through teller gave it to someone
else
· Solidbank breached its contractual obligation to return the passbook only to the
authorized representative of LC Diaz
· Thus, Solidbank was negligent in not returning the passbook to messenger of
LC Diaz

 proximate cause
· CA wrongly applied the doctrine of last clear chance…
· Last Clear Chance Doctrine is not applied in this case because Solidbank is
liable for breach of contract due to negligence in the
performance of contractual obligation to LC Diaz
· This case of culpa contractual, where neither the contributory negligence of
plaintiff nor his last clear chance to avoid the loss,
would exonerate the defendant from liability
· Such contributory negligence or last clear chance by the plaintiff merely serves
to reduce the recovery of damages by the plaintiff but does not exculpate the
defendant from his breach of contract

 LC Diaz guilty of contributory negligence in allowing withdrawal slip signed by

its authorized signatories to fall into the hands of an impostor and so liability of
Solidbank should be reduced.—40-60
- LCCD not applied

NOTES:
 Last clear chance is applied in order to establish proximate cause. However in
culpa contractual, what needs to be established is the breach in contract not the
presence of proximate cause thus the last clear chance doctrine is not applicable
to culpa contractual.
 Compared with PBC v CA – last clear chance doctrine was applied since they
based their cause on culpa aquilana.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 3

COCA-COLA BOTTLERS PHILIPPINES, INC. v. CA (1993)

FACTS:
The private respondent in this case was the owner of a school canteen that
sold soft drinks (including Coke and Sprite) and other goods to both students and
the public. One day she received some complaints from parents that the Coke
and Sprite soft drinks she sold contained fiber-like matter and other foreign
substances or particles. Testing done by the Department of Health confirmed the
presence of these substances. As a consequence of that discovery, her sales
severely plummeted, eventually costing her her job and shop.
She demanded payment of damages from the petitioner which the latter
refused.
The petitioner anchored its arguments on failure of the private respondent
to exhaust administrative remedies and prescription. The private respondent
contended that her complaint was one for damages which did not involve
administrative action and that her cause of action was based on an injury to
plaintiff’s right which can be brought within four years pursuant to Article 1146 of
the Civil Code.
The trial court granted the petitioner’s motion to dismiss, reasoning that the
complaint was based on a contract and not a quasi-delict.
The Court of Appeals annulled the trial court’s orders, ruling that
petitioner’s complaint was based on a quasi-delict and not for a breach of
warranty. The action had not prescribed yet.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the action for damages should be treated as one for breach
of implied warranty against hidden defects or merchantability or one for quasi-
delict

RULING:
The action is one for quasi-delict.
The allegations in the complaint, that there was reckless and negligent
manufacture of “adulterated food items intended to be sold for public
consumption” on the part of petitioner, supported the public respondent’s
conclusion that the cause of action was based on a quasi-delict.
The vendee’s remedies against a vendor with respect to the warranties
against hidden defects of or encumbrances upon the thing sold are not limited to
those prescribed in Article 1567 of the Civil Code. The vendor could likewise be
liable for quasi-delict under Article 2176 of the Civil Code, and an action based
thereon may be brought by the vendee.
As a general rule, a pre-existing contract between the parties bars the
applicability of the law on quasi-delict. An exception to the rule is that the liability
itself may be deemed to arise from quasi-delict, such as the acts which break the
contract.
The Court has repeatedly held in past cases that the existence of a
contract between the parties does not bar the commission of a tort by the one
against the other and the consequent recovery of damages therefor.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 4

Taylor vs. Meralco

David Taylor was a 15 year old boy who spent time as a cabin boy at sea; he was
also able to learn some principles of mechanical engineering and mechanical
drawing from his dad’s office (his dad was a mechanical engineer); he was also
employed as a mechanical draftsman earning P2.50 a day – all said, Taylor was
mature well beyond his age.
One day in 1905, he and another boy entered into the premises of Manila Electric
power plant where they found 20-30 blasting caps which they took home. In an
effort to explode the said caps, Taylor experimented until he succeeded in
opening the caps and then he lighted it using a match which resulted to the
explosion of the caps causing severe injuries to his companion and to Taylor
losing one eye.
Taylor sued Manila Electric alleging that because the company left the caps
exposed to children, they are liable for damages due to the company’s
negligence.
ISSUE: Whether or not Manila Electric is liable for damages.
HELD: No. The SC reiterated the elements of quasi delict as follows:
(1) Damages to the plaintiff.
(2) Negligence by act or omission of which defendant personally, or some
person for whose acts it must respond, was guilty.
(3) The connection of cause and effect between the negligence and the damage.
In the case at bar, it is true that Manila Electric has been negligent in disposing
off the caps which they used for the power plant, and that said caps caused
damages to Taylor. However, the causal connection between the company’s
negligence and the injuries sustained by Taylor is absent. It is in fact the direct
acts of Taylor which led to the explosion of the caps as he even, in various
experiments and in multiple attempts, tried to explode the caps. It is from said
acts that led to the explosion and hence the injuries.
Taylor at the time of the accident was well-grown youth of 15, more mature both
mentally and physically than the average boy of his age; he had been to sea as a
cabin boy; was able to earn P2.50 a day as a mechanical draftsman thirty days
after the injury was incurred; and the record discloses throughout that he was
exceptionally well qualified to take care. The evidence of record leaves no room
for doubt that he well knew the explosive character of the cap with which he was
amusing himself. The series of experiments made by him in his attempt to
produce an explosion admit of no other explanation. His attempt to discharge the
cap by the use of electricity, followed by his efforts to explode it with a stone or a
hammer, and the final success of his endeavors brought about by the
applications of a match to the contents of the cap, show clearly that he knew
what he was about. Nor can there be any reasonable doubt that he had reason to
anticipate that the explosion might be dangerous.
“The just thing is that a man should suffer the damage which comes to him
through his own fault, and that he cannot demand reparation therefor from
another.”
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 5

Vergara v. CA

Facts:

A vehicular accident occurred on August 5, 1979, when Martin Belmonte, while

driving a cargo truck belonging to petitioner Vicente Vergara, rammed the store-
residence of private respondent Amadeo Azarcon, causing damage assessed at
P53,024.22. The trial court rendered decision in favor of private respondent,
ordering the petitioner to pay, jointly and severally with Traveller’s Insurance and
Surety Corporation, the following: (a) P53,024.22 as actual damages; (b)
P10,000.00 as moral damages; (c) P10,000.00 as exemplary damages; and (d)
the sum of P5,000.00 for attorney's fees and the costs. The insurance company
was sentenced to pay to the petitioner the following: (a) P50,000.00 for third
party liability under its comprehensive accident insurance policy; and (b)
P3,000.00 for and as attorney's fees. The Court of Appeals affirmed the decision
in toto; hence, this instant petition for certiorari.

Issue:

Whether the petitioner is guilty of quasi-delict

Held:

It was established by competent evidence that the requisites of a quasi-delict are

present in the case at bar. These requisites are: (1) damages to the plaintiff; (2)
negligence, by act or omission, of which defendant, or some person for whose
acts he must respond, was guilty; and (3) the connection of cause and effect
between such negligence and the damages. The fact of negligence may be
deduced from the surrounding circumstances thereof. According to the police
report, "the cargo truck was travelling on the right side of the road going to Manila
and then it crossed to the center line and went to the left side of the highway; it
then bumped a tricycle; and then another bicycle; and then said cargo truck
rammed the store warehouse of the plaintiff." According to the driver of the cargo
truck, he applied the brakes but the latter did not work due to mechanical defect.
Contrary to the claim of the petitioner, a mishap caused by defective brakes can
not be consideration as fortuitous in character. Certainly, the defects were
curable and the accident preventable.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 6

Elcano vs. Hill

FACTS: Reginald Hill was a married minor living and getting subsistence from his
father, co-defendant Marvin. He killed Agapito Elcano, son of petitioners, for
which he was criminally prosecuted. However, he was acquitted on the ground
that his act was not criminal because of "lack of intent to kill, coupled with
mistake." Subsequently, petitioners filed a civil action for recovery of damages
against defendants, which the latter countered by a motion to dismiss.

ISSUE: W/N there is a cause of action against Reginald’s father, Marvin

HELD: Marvin Hill is vicariously liable. However, since Reginald has come of age,
as a matter of equity, the former’s liability is now merely subsidiary.
Under Art. 2180, the father and in case of his death or incapacity, the mother, are
responsible for the damages caused by the minor children who live in their
company. Applied in this case, Reginald, although married, was living with his
father and getting subsistence from him at the time of the killing. The joint and
solidary liability of parents with their offending children is in view of the parental
obligation to supervise minor children in order to prevent damage to third persons

NOTES: - Ruling that father has become only subsidiary liable

since he has come of age was wrong since they based his age at time of the
decision and not at the time of the offense.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 7

Bernabe Castillo Et Al V. Hon. Court Of Appeals, Et Al (1989)

G.R. No. 48541 August 21, 1989

Lessons Applicable: Quasi-delict (Torts and Damages)

FACTS:
• Barnabe Castillo's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:00 p.m.)
• Bernabe Castillo was driving his jeep on the right lane of the McArthur
Highway with Generosa Castillo, his wife, father Serapion Castillo, seated
in front and Eulogio Castillo, then a minor child at the rate of 25 kms/hr
• Juanito Rosario, with his wife, Cresencia Rosario drove his car speeding
and oncoming the same lane for the purpose of overtaking a cargo truck
• To evade collission, Bernabe swerved his jeep hard right and the car
rested on the shoulder of the right lane as the jeep's rear left wheel was on
the road, leaving short tiremarks behind it while the rear left long tire-marks
• The jeep suffered a shattered windshield, pushed-in radiator. The left mid-
portion of its bumper badly dented. The car had a flat tire on its right front
wheel; its right fender badly dented as the headlamp on top of it. The
bumber stooped downward.
• Bernabe's patella on his right knee was fractured and he suffered serious
physical injuries, in other parts of his body. Serapion Castillo whose head
crushed through the windshield and was nearly beheaded, while the other
two passengers suffered multiple slight and less serious injuries.
• Juanito Rosario's Version (May 2, 1965, 2:30 p.m.)
• He was about to overtake a slow cargo truck but due to a flat tire, he
parked his car on the left shoulder of the road
• as he was about to get off to fix the flat tire, the car was suddenly bumped
by the jeep driven by Bernabe from the opposite direction
• In the criminal case, Juanito was acquited from the crime for reckless
imprudence on the ground that his guilt has not been proved beyond
reasonable doubt
• Court held that the collision was not due to the negligence of Juanito
Rosario but it was Castillo's own act of driving the jeep to the shoulder of
the road where the car was is the proximate cause of the collision
• CA affirmed CFI: Dismissed the case against Juanito as well as the
counterclaim against Bernabe

ISSUE: W/N the negligence of Juanito can make him civilly liable despite being
acquitted from his criminal charges

HELD: YES.
• Since the civil action is predicated upon Juanito Rosario's alleged
negligence which does not exist, it follows that his acquittal in the criminal
action, which is already final, carried with it the extinction of civil
responsibility arising therefrom
• findings of facts by the Court of Appeals are conclusive and not reviewable
by the Supreme Court
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 8

Jarantilla vs. CA | Regalado G.R. No. 80194, March 21, 1989 | 171 SCRA 429

FACTS
Jose Kuan Sing was side-swiped by a vehicle in the evening of July 7, 1971 i n
lznart Street, Iloilo City. Said vehicle which figured in the mishap, a Volkswagen
car, was then driven by petitioner Edgar Jarantilla and that private respon dent
sustained physical injuries as a consequence.
• Jarantilla was accordingly ch arged before the then City Court of Iloilo for
serious physical injuries thru re ckless imprudence in Criminal Case No. 47207.
Sing, as the complaining witness t herein, did not reserve his right to institute a
separate civil action and he in tervened in the prosecution of said criminal case
through a private prosecutor.
• Jarantilla was acquitted in said criminal case "on reasonable doubt".
• Sing filed another complaint against the petitioner in the former CFI of Iloilo,
docketed therein as Civil Case No. 9976, and which civil action involved the
same subject matter and act complained of in Criminal Case No. 47027
• Jarantilla alleged as defenses that the Sing had no cause of action and, , that
the latter' s cause of action, if any, is barred by the prior judgment in Criminal
Case No. 47207 in as much as when said criminal case was instituted the civil
liability was also deemed instituted since therein plaintiff failed to reserve the civil
aspect.
• After trial, the court below rendered judgment on May 23, 1977 in favor of Sing.
Hence, this appeal by Jarantilla.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

• W/N Sing can institute a separate action for civil damages based on the same
act without reserving such right to institute such action in the criminal case

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI

Sing can file a separate civil action for damages despite failure to reserve such
right in t he previous criminal case
• Apropos to such resolution is the settled rule that the same act or omission can
create two kinds of liability on the part of the offender, that is, civil liability ex
delicto and civil liability ex quasi delicto. Since the same negligence can give rise
either to a delict or crime or to a quasi-delict or tort, either of these two types of
civil liability may be enforced against the culprit, subject to the caveat under
Article 2177 of the Civil Code t hat the offended party cannot recover damages
under both types of liability.
• In the case under consideration, Sing participated and intervened in the
prosecution of the criminal suit against Jarantilla. Under the present
jurisprudential milieu, where the trial court acquits the accused on reasonable
doubt, it could very well make a pronounce ment on the civil liability of the
accused and the complainant could file a petition for mandamus to compel the
trial court to include such civil liability in the judgment of acquittal. Sing, filed a
separate civil aciton after such acquittal. This is allowed under Article 29 of the
Civil Code. In Lontoc vs. MD Transit & Taxi Co., Inc., et al.: “In view of the fact
that the defendant-appellee de la Cruz was acquitted on the ground that his guilt
was not proven beyond reasonable doubt the plaintiff-appellant has the right to
institute a separate civil action to recover damages from the defendants-
appellants. The well settled doctrine is that a person, while not criminally liable
may still be civilly liable.
The judgment of acquittal extinguishes the civil liability of the accused only when
it includes a declaration that the facts from which the civil liability might arise did
not exist.
When the accused in a criminal prosecution is acquitted on the ground that his
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 9

guilt has not been proved beyond reasonable doubt, a civil action for damages
for the same act or omission may be instituted. Such action requires only a
preponderance of evidence . The civil liability sought to be recovered through the
application of Article 29 is no longer t hat based on or arising from the criminal
offense. Under such circumstances, the acquittal of the accused foreclosed the
civil liability based on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code which presupposes
the existence of criminal liability or requires a conviction of the offense charged.
Divested of its penal element by such acquittal, the causative act or omission
becomes in effect a quasidelict, hence only a civil action based thereon may be
instituted or prosecuted thereafter, which action can be proved by mere
preponderance of evidence. Complementary t o such considerations, Article 29
enunciates the rule, as already stated, that a civil action for damages is not
precluded by an acquittal on reasonable doubt f or the same criminal act or
omission. Since this action is based on a quasi-delict, the failure of the
respondent to reserve his right to file a separate civil case and his intervention in
the criminal case did not bar him from filing such separate civil action for
damages.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 10

RAFAEL REYES TRUCKING CORPORATION VS PEOPLE OF THE

PHILIPPINES and ROSARIO DY (for herself and behalf of the minors Maria
Luisa, Francis Edward, Francis Mark and Francis Rafael, all surnamed Dy)

Facts:
-Appeal via certiorari
-On October 10, 1989, Patricio Durian, Provincial Prosecutor of Isabela filed in
the RTC of Isabela an information charging Romeo Dunca y Tumol with reckless
imprudence resulting in double homicide and damage to property.
-On June 20, 1989, in Cauayan, Isabela, Dunca being the driver and person-in-
charge of a White Trailer Truck Tractor with Plate No. N2A-867 registered in the
name of Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation, with a load of 2,000 cases of empty
bottles of beer grande.
-Dunca was driving the said vehicle along the National Highway of Brgy. Tagaran
in Cauayan bound to San Fernando Pampanga. The truck approached a
damaged portion of the road covering the full width of the truck’s right lane. The
surfaces of the road were uneven because of potholes of about 5-6 inches deep.
-Domingo, Dunca’s pahinante, narrated that they used to evade the rough road
by taking the other lane, but at that moment, seeing the incoming vehicle, they
had to run over it and caused the truck to bounce wildly.
-Dunca lost control of the wheels and the truck swerved and said trailer truck hit
and bump a Nissan Pick-up bearing Plate No. BBG-957 driven by Feliciano
Balcita and Francisco Dy, Jr. which caused the death of Balcita and Dy and
damages to their heirs.
-Accused entered a plea of not guilty upon arraignment. The offended parties
made a reservation to file a separate civil action against the accused.
-They also filed a complaint against Rafael Reyes Trucking Corpo as employer of
Tumol based on quasi delict.
-The respondents withdrew the reservation to file a separate civil action against
the accused and manifested that they would prosecute the civil aspect ex delicto
in the criminal action. However, they did not withdraw the separate civil action
based on quasi delict against petitioner as employer arising from the same act or
omission of the accused driver.
-the trial court consolidated both criminal and civil cases and conducted a joint
trial of the same.
-Trial court rendered a joint decision finding Dunca guilty beyond reasonable
doubt
of the crime of Double Homicide through Reckless Imprudence with violation of
the
Motor Vehicle Law (Rep. Act No. 4136).

-He was also ordered to indemnify the Heirs of Francisco Dy. Jr. in the amount of
P3,000,000.00 as compensatory damages, P1,000,000.00 as moral damages,
and P1,030,000.00 as funeral expenses;
-plaintiff was ordered in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424 to pay the defendant therein
actual damages in the amount of P84,000.00; and Ordering the dismissal of the
complaint in Civil Case No. Br. 19-424.
-Petitioner and accused filed a notice of appeal and the private respondents
moved for amendment of the joint decision to hold the petitioner subsidiarily
liable for the damages in the event of insolvency of the accused which was
granted by the court.
-Petitioner filed a supplemental notice of appeal from the supplemental decision.
-During the pendency of the appeal, the accused jumped bail and fled to another
country. CA dismissed the appeal of the accused in the criminal case.
-CA rendered a decision affirming the decision of RTC so petitioner filed for MR.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 11

CA denied the MR of the petitioner for lack of merit.

ISSUES:
-May petitioner as owner of the truck involved in the accident be held subsidiarily
liable for the damages awarded to the offended parties in the criminal action
against
the truck driver despite the filing of a separate civil action by the offended parties
against the employer of the truck driver?

-May the Court award damages to the offended parties in the criminal case
despite the filing of a civil action against the employer of the truck driver; and in
amounts exceeding that alleged in the information for reckless imprudence
resulting
in homicide and damage to property?

HELD:
-The SC granted the petition, ordering the cases to be remanded to the RTC for
the determination of the civil liability of the petitioner as the employer of the
accused.

-In negligence cases, the aggrieved has the option between (1) an action to
enforce civil
liability arising from crime under Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code (CIVIL
LIABLITY EX DELICTO); and (2) a separate action for quasi delict under Article
2176 of the Civil Code. (CIVIL LIABILITY QUASI DELICTO). Once the choice is
made, he cannot avail of the other remedy because he may not recover
damages twice for the same negligent act or omission of the accused in keeping
with rule against double recovery.

-in this case, the parties elected to file a separate civil action for damages against
the petitioner as employer of the accused based on quasi delict based on Art.
2176 in relation to 2180 of NCC which only necessitates a preponderance of
evidence.

-Here, the liability of the employer is direct and primary, subject to the defense of
due diligence in the selection and supervision of the employee. The enforcement
of the judgment against the employer in an action based on Article 2176 does not
require the employee to be insolvent since the nature of the liability of the
employer with that of the
employee is solidary.

-The second, predicated on Article 103 of the Revised Penal Code, provides that
an employer may be held subsidiarily civilly liable for a felony committed by his
employee in the discharge of his duty. This liability attaches when the employee
is convicted of a crime done in the performance of his work and is found to be
insolvent that renders him unable to properly respond to the civil liability
adjudged.

-Rafael Reyes Trucking Corporation can not be held subsidiarily liable because
of the filing of the separate civil action based on quasi delict against it. In view of
the reservation to file, and the subsequent filing of the civil action for recovery of
civil liability, the same was not instituted with the criminal action. Such separate
civil action was for recovery of damages under Article 2176 of the Civil Code,
arising from the same act or omission of the accused.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 12

-Pursuant to Rule 111 of Rules of Criminal Procedure, when private respondents,

reserved the right to file the separate civil action, they waived other available civil
actions predicated on the same act or omission.

-CA and RTC erred in holding the accused civilly liable, and petitioner-employer
of the accused subsidiarily liable for damages arising from crime (ex delicto) in
the criminal action as the offended parties in fact filed a separate civil action
against the employer based on quasi delict resulting in the waiver of the civil
action ex delicto.

-It might be argued that private respondents as complainants in the criminal case
withdrew the reservation to file a civil action against the driver (accused) and
manifested that they would pursue the civil liability of the driver in the criminal
action. However, the withdrawal is ineffective to reverse the effect of the
reservation earlier made because private respondents did not withdraw the civil
action against petitioner based on quasi delict. In such a case, it is clear that the
reservation to file or the filing of a separate civil action results in a waiver of other
available civil actions arising from the same act or omission of the accused. The
rationale behind this rule is the avoidance of multiple suits between the same
litigants arising out of the same act or omission of the offender.

-The trial court erred in awarding civil damages in the criminal case and in
dismissing the civil action. Apparently satisfied with such award, private
respondent did not appeal from the dismissal of the civil case. However,
petitioner did appeal. Hence, this case should be remanded to the trial court so
that it may render decision in the civil case awarding damages as may be
warranted by the evidence.

-the award of damages in the criminal case was improper because the civil action
for the recovery of civil liability was waived in the criminal action by the filing of a
separate civil action against the employer. The action for recovery of civil liability
is not included therein, but is covered by the separate civil action filed against the
petitioner as employer of the accused truck-driver.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 13

AVELINO CASUPANAN and ROBERTO CAPITULO (petitioners)

vs.

MARIO LLAVORE LAROYA (respondent)

FACTS:

Two vehicles, one driven by respondent Laroya and the other owned by
petitioner Capitulo and driven by petitioner Casupanan, figured in an accident.
This prompted the filing of two cases before the MCTC of Capas Tarlac: 1st – a
criminal case for reckless imprudence resulting to damage to property filed by
respondent against Casapunan; 2nd – a civil case arising from a quasi-delict filed
by the petitioners against the respondent. The civil case was filed pending
preliminary investigation on the criminal case. Respondent as defendant in the
civil case filed a motion to dismiss on ground of forum shopping due pendency of
the criminal case. The MCTC granted the motion for dismissal on basis of forum
shopping. Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration on the ground that a
separate civil action may be instituted separately and independently from the
criminal case. MCTC denied the motion. Thereafter, petitioners filed a petition for
Certiorari before Capas RTC to assail MCTC’s Order, however the RTC
dismissed the same for lack of merit. Hence, a petition for Review on Certiorari
before the Court.

ISSUE:

Whether or not an accused in a pending criminal case for reckless imprudence

can validly file, simultaneously and independently, a separate civil action for
quasi-delict against the private complainant in the criminal case.

HELD:

YES. The right of the accused to file a separate civil action for quasi-delict is akin
to the right of the offended party to file an independent civil action pursuant to
Section 1 of Rule 111. Under the said rule, the independent civil action in Articles
32, 33, 34 and 2176 of the Civil Code is not deemed instituted with the criminal
action but may be filed separately by the offended party even without reservation.
The commencement of the criminal action does not suspend the prosecution of
the independent civil action under these articles of the Civil Code. The
suspension in Section 2 of the present Rule 111 refers only to the civil action
arising from the crime, if such civil action is reserved or filed before the
commencement of the criminal action. Thus, the offended party can file two
separate suits for the same act or omission. The first a criminal case where the
civil action to recover civil liability ex-delicto is deemed instituted, and the other a
civil case for quasi-delict – without violating the rule on non-forum shopping. The
two cases can proceed simultaneously and independently of each other. The
commencement or prosecution of the criminal action will not suspend the civil
action for quasi-delict. The only limitation is that the offended party cannot
recover damages twice for the same act or omission of the defendant.

Similarly, the accused can file a civil action for quasi-delict for the same act or
omission he is accused of in the criminal case. This is expressly allowed in
paragraph 6, Section 1 of the present Rule 111 which states that the counterclaim
of the accused may be litigated in a separate civil action. This is only fair for two
reasons. First, the accused is prohibited from setting up any counterclaim in the
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 14

civil aspect that is deemed instituted in the criminal case. The accused is
therefore forced to litigate separately his counterclaim against the offended party.
If the accused does not file a separate civil action for quasi-delict, the prescriptive
period may set in since the period continues to run until the civil action for quasi-
delict is filed. Second, the accused, who is presumed innocent, has a right to
invoke Article 2177 of the Civil Code, in the same way that the offended party can
avail of this remedy which is independent of the criminal action. To disallow the
accused from filing a separate civil action for quasi-delict, while refusing to
recognize his counterclaim in the criminal case, is to deny him due process of
law, access to the courts, and equal protection of the law.

Thus, the civil action based on quasi-delict filed separately by Petitioners is

proper.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 15

SANTOS vs. PIZARRO 465 SCRA 232 (July 29, 2005)

Facts: In April 1994, Viron Transit driver Sibayan was charged with reckless
imprudence resulting to multiple homicide and multiple physical injuries for which
Sibayan was eventually convicted in December 1998. As there was a reservation
to file a separate civil action, no pronouncement of civil liability was made by the
MCTC. In October 2000 Santos filed a complaint for damages against Sibayan
and Rondaris, the president and chairman of Viron Transit. Viron Transit
moved for the dismissal of the complaint citing, among others,
prescription alleging that actions based on quasi delict prescribe in 4 years from
the accrual of the cause of action.

Held: Petitioners expressly made a reservation of their right to file a separate civil
action as a result of the crime committed by Sibayan. On account of this
reservation the MCTC did not make any pronouncement as to the latter’s civil
liability. Although there were allegations of negligence on the part of Sibayan and
Viron Transit, such does not necessarily mean that petitioners were pursuing a
cause of action based on quasi delict, considering that at the time of the filing of
the complaint, the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already prescribed.
Besides,in cases of negligence, the offended party has the choice between an
action to enforce liability arising from crime under the Revised Penal Code and
an action for quasi delict under the CivilCode. An act or omission causing
damage to another may give rise to 2 separate civil liabilities on the part of the
offender, i.e.
(1) civil liability ex delicto, under Article 100 of the RPC; and
(2)independent civil liabilities (a) not arising from an act or omission complained
of as a felony,e.g., culpa contractual or obligations arising from law under Article
31 of the Civil Code,intentional torts under Articles 32 and 34, and culpa
aquiliana under Article 2176 of the CivilCode; or (b) where the injured party is
granted a right to file an action independent and distinct from the criminal
proceedings. While the cause of action ex quasi delicto had already
prescribed, petitioners can still pursue the remaining avenue opened for them by
their reservation, i.e., the surviving cause ofaction ex delicto. This is so because
the prescription of the action ex quasi delicto does not operate as a bar to an
action to enforce the civil liability arising from crime especially as thelatter action
had been expressly reserved. We held that the dismissal of the action based on
culpa aquiliana is not a bar to the enforcement of the subsidiary liability of the
employer. Once there is a conviction for a felony, final in character, the employer
becomes subsidiarily liable if the commission of the crime was in discharge of the
duties of the employees. This is so because Article 103 of the RPC operates the
controlling force to obviate the possibility of the aggrieved party being deprived of
indemnity even after the rendition of a final judgment convicting the employee.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 16

Manliclic v. Calaunan
Ponente: Chico-Nazario
Third Division
Nature: Petition for review on certiorari

FACTS:
1. The vehicles involved in this case are: (1) Philippine Rabbit Bus owned by
petitioner PRBLI and driven by petitioner Mauricio Manliclic; and (2) owner-type
jeep owned by respondent Modesto Calaunan and driven by Marcelo Mendoza
2. At approximately Kilometer 40 of the North Luzon Expressway in Barangay
Lalangan, Plaridel, Bulacan, the two vehicles collided.
The front right side of the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear left side of the jeep
causing the latter to move to the shoulder on the right and then fall on a ditch
with water resulting to further extensive damage.
Respondent suffered minor injuries while his driver was unhurt.
3. By reason of such collision, a criminal case was filed charging petitioner
Manliclic with Reckless Imprudence Resulting in Damage to Property with
Physical Injuries.
4. Subsequently on 2 December 1991, respondent filed a complaint for damages
against petitioners Manliclic and PRBLI
5. The criminal case was tried ahead of the civil case.
6. When the civil case was heard, counsel for respondent prayed that the
transcripts of stenographic notes (TSNs) of the testimonies in the criminal case
be received in evidence in the civil case in as much as these witnesses are not
available to testify in the civil case.
7. The versions of the parties are summarized by the trial court as follows:

Respondent’s version:
According to the respondent and his driver, the jeep was cruising at the speed of
60 to 70 kilometers per hour on the slow lane of the expressway when the
Philippine Rabbit Bus overtook the jeep and in the process of overtaking the
jeep, the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the rear of the jeep on the left side.
At the time the Philippine Rabbit Bus hit the jeep, it was about to overtake the
jeep. In other words, the Philippine Rabbit Bus was still at the back of the jeep
when the jeep was hit.
Fernando Ramos corroborated the testimony of and Marcelo Mendoza. He said
that he was on another jeep following the Philippine Rabbit Bus and the jeep of
plaintiff when the incident took place. He testified that the jeep of plaintiff swerved
to the right because it was bumped by the Philippine Rabbit bus from behind.

Petitioner’s version:
The petitioner explained that when the Philippine Rabbit bus was about to go to
the left lane to overtake the jeep, the latter jeep swerved to the left because it
was to overtake another jeep in front of it.
Petitioner PRBLI maintained that it observed and exercised the diligence of a
good father of a family in the selection and supervision of its employee
8. RTC ruled in favor of the respondent. CA found no reversible error and
affirmed the RTC’s decision.

ISSUES:
1. Whether the TSNs from the criminal case may be admitted in evidence for the
civil case.
2. Whether the petitioner, Manliclic, may be held liable for the collision and be
found negligent notwithstanding the declaration of the CA in the criminal case
that there was an absence of negligence on his part.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 17

3. Whether the petitioner, PRBLI, exercised due diligence and supervision of its
employee.
HELD: The petitioner, Manliclic, is civilly liable for the damages for his negligence
or reckless imprudence based on quasi-delict. The PRBLI is held solidarily liable
for the damages caused by the petitioner Manliclic’s negligence.

1. Admissibility of the TSNs

Petitioner’s contention:
The TSNs should not be admitted to evidence for failure to comply with the
requisites of Sec. 47, Rule 130 of the ROC
The petitioner, PRBLI, had no opportunity to cross examine the witnesses
because the criminal case was filed exclusively against Manliclic.
Admission of the TSNs will deprive the petitioner of due process.
Court:
The testimonies are still admissible on the ground that the petitioner failed to
object on their admissibility.
Failure to object to the inclusion of the evidence is a waiver on the provision of
the law.
In addition, the petitioner even offered in evidence the TSN containing the
testimony of Ganiban.
The court disagrees that it would deprive the petitioner of due process. For the
failure of the petitioner to object at the proper time, it waived its right to object for
the non compliance with the ROC.

2. Civil liability arising from crime v. Quasi-delict/Culpa Acquiliana

Petitioner:
The version of the petitioner deserves more credit as the petitioner was already
acquitted by the CA of the charge of Reckless imprudence resulting in damage to
property with physical injuries.
Court:
From the complaint, it can be gathered that the civil case for damages was one
arising from or based on quasi-delict: Petitioner Manliclic was sued for his
negligence or reckless imprudence in causing the collision, while petitioner
PRBLI was sued for its failure to exercise the diligence of a good father in the
selection and supervision of its employees
it appears that petitioner Manliclic was acquitted not on reasonable doubt, but on
the ground that he is not the author of the act complained of which is based on
Section 2(b) of Rule 111 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure which reads:
(b) Extinction of the penal action does not carry with it extinction of the civil,
unless the extinction proceeds from a declaration in a final judgment that the fact
from which the civil might arise did not exist.

In spite of said ruling, petitioner Manliclic can still be held liable for the mishap.
The afore-quoted section applies only to a civil action arising from crime or ex
delicto and not to a civil action arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.
The extinction of civil liability referred to in the quoted provision, refers
exclusively to civil liability founded on Article 100 of the Revised Penal Code,
whereas the civil liability for the same act considered as a quasi-delict only and
not as a crime is not extinguished even by a declaration in the criminal case that
the criminal act charged has not happened or has not been committed by the
accused.

In sum, the court distinguished civil liability arising from a crime and that arising
from quasi-delict:
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 18

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM A CRIME

(a) if an accused is acquitted based on reasonable doubt on his guilt, his civil
liability arising from the crime may be proved by preponderance of evidence only.
(b) if an accused is acquitted on the basis that he was not the author of the act or
omission complained of (or that there is declaration in a final judgment that the
fact from which the civil might arise did not exist), said acquittal closes the door
to civil liability based on the crime or ex delicto.

CIVIL LIABILITY ARISING FROM QUASI-DELICT

A quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana is a separate legal institution under the Civil
Code with a substantivity all its own, and individuality that is entirely apart and
independent from a delict or crime.
The same negligence causing damages may produce civil liability arising from a
crime under the Penal Code, or create an action for quasi-delicts or culpa extra-
contractual under the Civil Code. The acquittal of the accused, even if based on
a finding that he is not guilty, does not carry with it the extinction of the civil
liability based on quasi delict.
civil liability arising from quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana, same will not be
extinguished by an acquittal, whether it be on ground of reasonable doubt or that
accused was not the author of the act or omission complained of (or that there is
declaration in a final judgment that the fact from which the civil liability might arise
did not exist).
An acquittal or conviction in the criminal case is entirely irrelevant in the civil
case based on quasi-delict or culpa aquiliana.

The petitioners urge the court to give more credence to their version of the story
however, as they constitute a question of fact, it may not be raised as a subject
for a petition for review. Findings of the trial court and appellate court are binding
on the Supreme Court.
The testimony of the petitioner about the jeep of the respondent overtaking
another vehicle in the criminal case was not consistent with what he gave to the
investigator which is evidently a product of an after-thought
If one would believe the testimony of the defendant, Mauricio Manliclic, and his
conductor, Oscar Buan, that the Philippine Rabbit Bus was already somewhat
parallel to the jeep when the collision took place, the point of collision on the jeep
should have been somewhat on the left side thereof rather than on its rear.
Furthermore, the jeep should have fallen on the road itself rather than having
been forced off the road.

3. PRBLI’s liability
Under Article 2180 of the New Civil Code, when an injury is caused by the
negligence of the employee, there instantly arises a presumption of law that there
was negligence on the part of the master or employer either in the selection of
the servant or employee, or in supervision over him after selection or both.
The liability of the employer under Article 2180 is direct and immediate; it is not
conditioned upon prior recourse against the negligent employee and a prior
showing of the insolvency of such employee. Therefore, it is incumbent upon the
private respondents to prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of
a family in the selection and supervision of their employee.

Petitioner’s contention:
PRBLI maintains that it had shown that it exercised the required diligence in the
selection and supervision of its employees
In the matter of selection, it showed the screening process that petitioner
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 19

Manliclic underwent before he became a regular driver.

As to the exercise of due diligence in the supervision of its employees, it argues
that presence of ready investigators is sufficient proof that it exercised the
required due diligence in the supervision of its employees
Court:
In the selection of prospective employees, employers are required to examine
them as to their qualifications, experience and service records. In the supervision
of employees, the employer must formulate standard operating procedures,
monitor their implementation and impose disciplinary measures for the breach
thereof.
As the negligence of the employee gives rise to the presumption of negligence
on the part of the employer, the latter has the burden of proving that it has been
diligent not only in the selection of employees but also in the actual supervision
of their work.
The trial court found that petitioner PRBLI exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in the selection but not in the supervision of its employees
it seems that the Philippine Rabbit Bus Lines has a very good procedure of
recruiting its driver as well as in the maintenance of its vehicles. There is no
evidence though that it is as good in the supervision of its personnel.
no evidence introduced that there are rules promulgated by the bus company
regarding the safe operation of its vehicle and in the way its driver should
manage and operate the vehicles
no showing that somebody in the bus company has been employed to oversee
how its driver should behave while operating their vehicles
The presence of ready investigators after the occurrence of the accident is not
enough. Same does not comply with the guidelines set forth with regard to the
supervision.
Regular supervision of employees, that is, prior to any accident, should have
been shown and established.
the lack of supervision can further be seen by the fact that there is only one set of
manual containing the rules and regulations for all the drivers
For failure to adduce proof that it exercised the diligence of a good father of a
family in the selection and supervision of its employees, petitioner PRBLI is held
solidarily responsible for the damages caused by petitioner Manliclic’s
negligence.

DISPOSITIVE:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the instant petition for review is DENIED.

The decision of the Court of Appeals is AFFIRMED with the MODIFICATION that
(1) the award of moral damages shall be reduced to P50,000.00; and (2) the
award of exemplary damages shall be lowered to P50,000.00.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 20

Franco vs. IAC | G.R. No. 71137 October 5, 1989 |

FACTS
• Yulo was driving a Franco Bus when he swerved to the opposite lane to avoid
colliding with a parked truck. The Franco Bus took the lane of an incoming Isuzu
Mini Bus driven by Lugue. The two vehicles collided, resulting in the deaths of
both drivers and two passengers of the Mini Bus. The owner of the Isuzu Mini
Bus, the wife of one of the passengers who died, and the wife of the driver of the
Mini Bus filed an action for damages against Mr. and Mrs. Franco, owners of the
Franco Transportation Company.
• The spouses set up the defense that they exercised the diligence of a good
father of a family in selecting and supervising their employees, including the
deceased driver. The RTC held that this defense of due diligence could not be
invoked by the spouses since the case was one for criminal negligence
punishable under Article 102 and 103 of the Revised Penal Code and not from
Article 2180 o f the Civil Code. It held the spouses liable for damages to the
family of the de ceased. The CA agreed with the lower court.

ISSUES & ARGUMENTS

• W/N spouses Franco, as employer, may invoke the defense of diligence of a
good father of a family in denying their liabilities against the victims.

HOLDING & RATIO DECIDENDI YES . The action is predicated upon quasi
delict, not upon crime. Hence, the defense of due diligence can be invoked by
the defendants. However, in this case, the spouses were not able to prove such
due diligence. Therefore, they are liable for damages under Article 2180 of the
Civil Code.
• Distinction should be made between the subsidiary liability of the employer
under the RPC and the employer’s primary liability under the Civil Code, which is
quasi delictual or tortious in character. The first type of liability is governed by
Articles 102 and 103 of the RPC, which provide that employers have subsidiary
civil liability in default of their employees who commit felonies in the discharge of
their duties. The second kind is governed by Articles 2176, 2177, and 2180 of the
Civil Code on the vicarious liability of employers for those damages caused by
their employees acting within the scope of their assigned tasks. In this second
kind, the employer’s liability ceases upon proof that he observed all the diligence
of a good father of a family to prevent damage.

Under Article 103 of the RPC, the liability of the employe r is subsidiary to the
liability of the employee. Before the employer’s subsidiary liability may be
proceeded against, it is imperative that there should be a criminal action where
the employee’s criminal negligence are proved. Without such criminal action
being instituted, the employer’s liability cannot be predicated under Article 103.

In this case, there was no criminal action instituted because the driver who
should stand as accused died in the accident. Therefore, there is no basis for the
employer’s subsidiary liability, without the employee’s primary liability. It follows
that the liability being sued upon is based not on crime, but on culpa aquiliana,
where the defense of the exercise of the diligence of a good father of a family
may be raised by the employer. The employers are liable since they failed to
prove that they exercised the diligence of a good father of a fam ily in selecting
and/or supervising the driver. They admitted that the only kind of supervision
given to the drivers referred to the running time between the terminal points of
the line. They only had two inspectors whose duties were only ticket inspections.
There is no evidence that they were really safety inspectors.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 21

Cerezo vs. Tuazon

TORTS: Presumption of Negligence: Employer's Vicarious Liability v. Subsidiary

Liability

FACTS:

Noontime, June 26, 1993 -- A Country Bus Lines passenger bus collided with a
tricycle in Pampanga. The driver of the tricycle Tuazon filed a complaint for
damages against Mrs. Cerezo, the owner of the bus lines, her husband, Atty.
Cerezo, and bus driver Foronda.

According to the facts alleged in the complaint, Tuazon was driving on the proper
lane. There was a "Slow Down" sign which Foronda ignored. After the complaint
was filed, alias summons was served upon the person of Atty. Cerezo, the Tarlac
Provincial Prosecutor.

In their reply, Mrs. Cerezo contended that the trial court did not acquire
jurisdiction because there was no service of summons on Foronda. Moreover,
Tuazon failed to reserve his right to institute a separate civil action for damages
in the criminal action.

ISSUE:

Whether or not Mrs. Cerezo is liable for damages

HELD:

Mrs. Cerezo's contention is wrong. Tuazon's case is not based on criminal law
but on quasi-delict under the Civil Code.

The same negligent act may produce civil liability arising from a delict under Art.
103, RPC, or may give rise to an action for quasi-delict under Art. 2180, C.C. An
aggrieved party may choose between the two remedies. An action based on
quasi-delict may proceed independently from the criminal action. There is,
however, a distinction between civil liability arising from a delict and civil liability
arising from a quasi-delict. The choice of remedy whether to sue for a delict or a
quasi-delict, affects the procedural and jurisdictional issues of the action.

Tuazon's action is based on quasi-delict under Art. 2180: Employer's liability.

Foronda is not an indispensable party, contrary to Mrs. Cerezo's contention. An

indispensable party is one whose interest is affected by the court's action in the
litigation, and without whom no final resolution of the case is possible. However,
Mrs. Cerezo's liability as an employer in action for quasi-delict is not only
solidary, it is also primary and direct.

The responsibility of two or more persons who are liable for a quasi-delict is
solidary. Where there is a solidary liability on the part of the debtors, as in this
case, each debtor is liable for the entire obligation. Hence, each debtor is liable
to pay for the entire obligation in full. There is no merger or renunciation of rights,
but only mutual representation. Where the obligation of the parties is solidary,
either of the parties is indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party
because complete relief is available from either. Therefore, jurisdiction over
Foronda is not even necessary as Tuazon may collect from Mrs. Cerezo alone.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 22

Moreover, an employer's liability based on a quasi-delict is primary and direct,

while the employer's liability based on a delict is merely subsidiary. The words
"primary and direct," as contrasted with "subsidiary," refers to the remedy
provided by law for enforcing the obligation rather than to the character and limits
of the obligation. Although liability under Art. 2180 originates from the negligent
act of the employee, the aggrieved party may sue the employer directly. When an
employee causes damage, the law presumes that the employer has himself
committed an act of negligence in not preventing or avoiding the damage. This is
the fault that the law condemns. While the employer is civilly liable in a subsidiary
capacity for the employee's criminal negligence, the employer is also civilly liable
directly and separate for his own civil negligence in failing to exercise due
diligence in selecting and supervising his employee. The idea that the employer's
liability is wholly subsidiary is wrong.

The action can be brought directly against the person responsible (for another)
without including the author of the act. The action against the principal is
accessory in the sense that it implies the existence of a prejudicial act committed
by the employee, but is not subsidiary in the sense that it cannot be instituted till
after the judgment against he author of the act or at least, that it is subsidiary to
the principal action; action for responsibility (of the employer) is in itself a
principal action.

In contrast, an action based on a delict seeks to enforce the subsidiary liability of

the employer for the criminal negligence of the employee as provided in Art. 103,
RPC. To hold the employer liable in a subsidiary capacity under a delict, the
aggrieved party must initiate a criminal action where the employee's delict and
corresponding primary liability are established. If the present action proceeds
from a delict, then the trial court's jurisdiction over Foronda is necessary.

However, the action filed by Tuazon was based on a quasi-delict, which is

separate and independent from an action based on a delict. Hence, there was no
need to reserve the filing of a separate civil action. The purpose of allowing the
filing the of an independent action based on quasi-delict against the employer is
to facilitate the remedy for civil wrongs.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 23

PHILIPPINE SCHOOL OF BUSINESS ADMINISTRATION VS. COURT OF

APPEALS, HON. REGINA ORDOÑEZ-BENITEZ, SEGUNDA R. BAUTISTA, and
ARSENIA D. BAUTISTA,
February 4, 1992

FACTS: Carlitos Bautista was a third year student at the Philippine School of
Business Administration. Assailants, who were not members of the schools
academic community, while in the premises of PSBA, stabbed Bautista to death.
This incident prompted his parents to file a suit against PSBA and its corporate
officers for damages due to their alleged negligence, recklessness and lack of
security precautions, means and methods before, during and after the attack on
the victim.

The defendants filed a motion to dismiss, claiming that the compliant states no
cause of action against them based on quasi-delicts, as the said rule does not
cover academic institutions. The trial court denied the motion to dismiss. Their
motion for reconsideration was likewise dismissed, and was affirmed by the
appellate court. Hence, the case was forwarded to the Supreme Court.

ISSUE: Whether or not PSBA is liable for the death of the student.

RULING: Because the circumstances of the present case evince a contractual

relation between the PSBA and Carlitos Bautista, the rules on quasi-delict do not
really govern. A perusal of Article 2176 shows that obligations arising from quasi-
delicts or tort, also known as extra-contractual obligations, arise only between
parties not otherwise bound by contract, whether express or implied. However,
this impression has not prevented this Court from determining the existence of a
tort even when there obtains a contract.

Article 2180, in conjunction with Article 2176 of the Civil Code, establishes the
rule in in loco parentis. Article 2180 provides that the damage should have been
caused or inflicted by pupils or students of the educational institution sought to be
held liable for the acts of its pupils or students while in its custody. However, this
material situation does not exist in the present case for, as earlier indicated, the
assailants of Carlitos were not students of the PSBA, for whose acts the school
could be made liable. But it does not necessarily follow that PSBA is absolved
form liability.

When an academic institution accepts students for enrollment, there is

established a contract between them, resulting in bilateral obligations which both
parties is bound to comply with. For its part, the school undertakes to provide the
student with an education that would presumably suffice to equip him with the
necessary tools and skills to pursue higher education or a profession. This
includes ensuring the safety of the students while in the school premises. On the
other hand, the student covenants to abide by the school's academic
requirements and observe its rules and regulations.

Failing on its contractual and implied duty to ensure the safety of their student,
PSBA is therefore held liable for his death. Petition denied.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 24

Singson vs BPI

23 SCRA 1117

FACTS: Singson, was one of the defendants in a civil case, in which judgment
had been rendered sentencing him and his co-defendants therein Lobregat and
Villa-Abrille & Co., to pay a sum of money to the plaintiff therein. Said judgment
became final and executory as only against Ville-Abrille for its failure to file an
appeal. A writ of garnishment was subsequently served upon BPI — in which the
Singsons had a current account — insofar as Villa-Abrille’s credits against the
Bank were concerned.

Upon receipt of the said Writ of Garnishment, a clerk of the bank, upon reading
the name of the Singson in the title of the Writ of Garnishment as a party
defendants, without further reading the body and informing himself that said
garnishment was merely intended for the deposits of defendant Villa-Abrille &
Co., et al, prepared a letter informing Singson of the garnishment of his deposits
by the plaintiff in that case.

Subsequently, two checks issued by the plaintiff Julian C. Singson, one in favor
of B. M. Glass Service and another in favor of the Lega Corporation, were
dishonored by the bank. B. M. Glass Service then wrote to Singson that the
check was not honored by BPI because his account therein had already been
garnished and that they are now constrained to close his credit account with
them.

Singson wrote to BPI, claiming that his name was not included in the Writ of
Execution and Notice of Garnishment, which was served upon the bank. The
defendants lost no time to rectify the mistake that had been inadvertently
committed.

Thus this action for damages.

ISSUE: WON the existence of a contract between the parties bars a plaintiff’s
claim for damages based on torts?

HELD: NO. The existence of a contract between the parties does not bar the
commission of a tort by the one against the order and the consequent recovery of
damages therefore. Indeed, this view has been, in effect, reiterated in a
comparatively recent case. Thus, in Air France vs. Carrascoso, involving an
airplane passenger who, despite his first-class ticket, had been illegally ousted
from his first-class accommodation and compelled to take a seat in the tourist
compartment, was held entitled to recover damages from the air-carrier, upon the
ground of tort on the latter’s part, for, although the relation between a passenger
and a carrier is “contractual both in origin and nature … the act that breaks the
contract may also be a tort”.

In view, however, of the facts obtaining in the case at bar, and considering,
particularly, the circumstance, that the wrong done to the plaintiff was remedied
as soon as the President of the bank realized the mistake he and his subordinate
employee had committed, the Court finds that an award of nominal damages —
the amount of which need not be proven — in the sum of P1,000, in addition to
attorney’s fees in the sum of P500, would suffice to vindicate plaintiff’s rights.
ELS: Torts Case Digests 1st Page Twenty19 25

Air France v Carrascoso

Facts:
Air France issued to Carrascoso, a civil engineer, a 1st class round trip ticket
from Manila - Rome. During the stopover at Bangkok, the Manager of Air France
forced plaintiff to vacate the 1st class seat because there was a "white man" who
had better right to the seat.

As a result, he filed a suit against Air France where the CFI Manila granted him
moral and exemplary damages.

Issue:
Whether or not Carrascoso was entitled to the 1st class seat and consequently,
whether or not he was entitled to the damages awarded.

Held:
Yes to both.
To achieve stability in the relation between passenger and air carrier, adherence
to the ticket issued is desirable. Quoting the court, "We cannot understand how a
reputable firm like Air France could have the indiscretion to give out tickets it
never meant to honor at all. It received the corresponding amount in payment of
the tickets and yet it allowed the passenger to be at the mercy of its employees.
It is more in keeping with the ordinary course of business that the company
should know whether or not the tickets it issues are to be honored or not."

Evidence of bad faith was presented without objection on the part of the
Carrascoso. In the case, it could have been easy for Air France to present its
manager to testify at the trial or secure his deposition but defendant did neither.
There is also no evidence as to whether or not a prior reservation was made by
the white man.

The manager not only prevented Carrascoso from enjoying his right to a 1st
class seat, worse he imposed his arbitrary will. He forcibly ejected him from his
seat, made him suffer the humiliation of having to go to tourist class just to give
way to another passenger whose right was not established. Certainly, this is bad
faith.

Passengers do not contract merely for transportation. They have a right to be

treated by the carrier's employees with kindness, respect, courtesy and due
consideration. They are entitled to be protected against personal is conduct,
injurious language, indignities and abuse from such employees. Any
discourteous conduct on the part of employees towards a passenger gives the
latter an action for damages against the carrier.

Exemplary damages were also awarded. The manner of ejectment fits into the
condition for exemplary damages that defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent,
reckless, oppressive or malevolent manner.

*Bad Faith - state of mind affirmatively operating with furtive design or with some
motive of self-interest or ill will or for ulterior purpose