Journal of Early Modern

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Volume 2, Issue 2 (Fall 2013)

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JEMS 2 (2013), 2: 78–100

What are Human Beings? Essences and

Aptitudes in Spinoza’s Anthropology

Andrea Sangiacomo
University of Groningen

Until by dint of not following their own nature

they have no nature to follow.
J. Stuart Mill, On Liberty

Abstract: Spinoza deals with humans and “human essence” but it is not clear
how consistent his use of these notions is. The problem evoked by Spinoza’s
anthropology concerns in turn the status of singular versus general essences
and the relationship between those essences and their concrete condition of
existence. In this paper, I propose to distinguish between these levels in order
to argue that humanity exists insofar as different individuals can agree among
themselves and become adapted to each other to live and operate together.
Firstly, I examine Spinoza’s use of the term “aptus” in order to show that eter-
nal singular essences can exist in different ways according to the extent they
can be “adapted” to their environment, that is, to external causes. Secondly, I
claim that “human essence” has to be understood as a general essence which
therefore results from the “agreements” produced among certain singular es-
sences. Thirdly, I argue that, contrary to the remarkable interpretation provid-
ed by Valtteri Viljanen, this ontological picture cannot be explained only by
reference to formal causation but needs a genuine kind of efficient causation.
Keywords: Spinoza, anthropology, conatus, human essence, aptitudes, meta-
physics, causality, Valtteri Viljanen.

1. Looking for Humans

A recent trend in Spinoza scholarship has devoted much attention to the

concepts of power and activity. It is now apparently uncontroversial that these
concepts, together with the key doctrine of conatus, are the most original re-
sults of Spinoza’s philosophical enterprise. However, this agreement between
 What are Human Beings? 79

scholars ends when we face the problem of identifying the ontological ground
of Spinoza’s ontology of power. Here scholars are split into at least two main par-
ties. According to a well established tradition,1 the concept of power prevails over
the concept of essence: things are constituted in the relationship with other things;
their power depends on the encounter they have with external causes; and, last-
ly, their essence is a consequence of their whole history. Thus, in that view, the
essence of things follows from their existence rather than the contrary. On the
opposite side, Valtteri Viljanen has recently claimed that Spinoza’s concept of
power cannot be rightly understood without reconnecting it to a dynamic essen-
tialism.2 Viljanen reinforces this claim by arguing that the real kind of causation
at work within Spinoza’s ontology is the formal—i.e. emanative—causation,
rather than the efficient causation. In other words, things produce their effects
in the same way the properties of a triangle follow from its definition.3
I subscribe to Viljanen’s reading of Spinoza insofar as it concerns the role
of essences to ground their power. Indeed, Spinoza himself defines a thing as
active when it is the adequate cause of certain effects that can be adequately
understood through its nature or essence (E3Def1-2).4 Thus, it seems hard to
see how we can ascribe activity to a thing without presupposing a given es-
sence which does not depend, as such, on external causes but is rather a finite
expression of God’s infinite power sive essence (E1p34). However, following
Viljanen’s claim that formal-emanative causation is the true kind of causation
upon which Spinoza builds his metaphysics, we should conclude that exis-
tence adds nothing to individual natures. In that view, the concrete forms of
existence within which we constantly live and strive are nothing but greater
or smaller obstacles to a complete and self-determined realization of eternal
essences. Paradoxically, then, it is not clear why essences are brought into exis-
tence if existence adds nothing to their power. Why do they not simply exist
sub specie aeternitatis? Moreover, why does Spinoza devote the greatest part of

1
This line of interpretation is particularly linked with the Marxist readings of Spinoza,
such as that proposed by Althusser, for instance. Among its most recent supporters, cf. Mogens
Laerke, “Immanence et extériorité absolue: sur la théorie de la causalité et l’ontologie de la puis-
sance de Spinoza,” Revue philosophique de la France et de l’Étranger 134 (2009), pp. 169-190;
and Vittorio Morfino, Le temps de la multitude, Paris: Éditions Amsterdam, 2010.
2
Cf. Valtteri Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 2011. The importance of essences within Spinoza’s metaphysics was already claimed,
among others, by Alexandre Matheron, Individu et communauté chez Spinoza, Paris: De Minuit,
1969; Pascal Sévérac, Le devenir actif chez Spinoza, Paris: Honoré Champion, 2005; Jean Busse,
Le problème de l’essence de l’homme chez Spinoza, Paris: Publications de la Sorbonne, 2009.
3
Cf., in particular, Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, pp. 33-53.
4
In quoting Spinoza’s works, I use Baruch Spinoza, Complete Works, trans. by Samuel Shir-
ley, ed. by Micheal L. Morgan, Indianapolis: Hackett, 2002. Main abbreviations are E=Ethics,
P=proposition, S=scholium, C=corollary, Def=definition. For the Latin text I refer to Baruch
Spinoza, Spinoza Opera, im Auftrag der Heidelberg Akademie des Wissenschaften, hrsg. von C.
Gebhardt, 4 voll., Heidelberg: Carl Winter, 1925.
80 Andrea Sangiacomo

his energies to deepening the concrete way in which essences exist sub specie
durationis?
The hardest problem arises from the need to face two apparently con-
trasting claims that Spinoza seems to put forward. On the one hand, Spi-
noza often insists on the power of passions, on the importance of interactions
and relationships for the constitution of things and humans in particular. On
the other hand, his definition of activity and several metaphysical claims he
makes—particularly in part one, two and five of the Ethics—appear incon-
ceivable without presupposing some kind of essentialism.
In this paper I would like to find a third way to accommodate these oppo-
site instances. More precisely, I would like to argue that Spinoza actually de-
velops two different although related issues. I propose to distinguish between
the singular essences and the conditions under which these essences come to ex-
ist and act. While singular essences are eternally inscribed in God’s attributes,
the ways in which they come to exist are deeply dependent on the relationship
between the causal power expressed by the singular essences and their interac-
tion with other singular things, i.e., external causes.5
I suggest that Spinoza’s anthropology provides a particularly relevant case
study for addressing this issue. Indeed, Spinoza’s discussion of “human es-
sence” opens several questions: What is the relation between “human essence”

5
In my L’essenza del corpo. Spinoza e la scienza delle composizioni, Hildesheim, Zürich, New
York: G. Olms, 2013, I treat this point extensively, by reconstructing the seventeenth-century
scientific background to Spinoza’s mature ontology of activity. On the opposite side, Christo-
pher Martin, “The Framework of Essences in Spinoza’s Ethics,” British Journal for the History of
Philosophy 16 (2008), pp. 489-509, argues that, in Spinoza’s view, “formal” essences account for
general eternal species, while “actual” essences for concrete durational individuals. Accordingly,
Martin writes (p. 497): “this is the contrast between the two conceptions of modal essences – in-
dividualists hold that modal essences are unique and durational, specieists that they are common
and eternal.” However, this characterization might be misleading. The issue of eternity must not
be confused with that of generality vs. individuality. Several authors show a certain tendency to
conflate eternity and infinity, by arguing that “formal essences” should be equated with infinite
modes (see, for instance, Don Garrett, “Spinoza on the Essence of the Human Body and the Part
of the Mind That Is Eternal,” in Olli Koistinen (ed.), The Cambridge Companion to Spinoza’s Eth-
ics, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2009, pp. 285-302). However, Spinoza explicitly
says (E5p30s) that things can be actual not only because they exist sub specie durationis, but also
because they derive from the necessity of God’s nature (E1p16). But those things that derive
from God’s infinite nature are the infinite series of singular and finite things and not just general
essences or infinite modes. Accordingly, finite and singular essences must be truly eternal. This
does exclude that common essences can also have a place in Spinoza’s ontology. The discussion
developed in this paper aims at explaining how this is the case. The result, however, is that com-
mon essences should be considered derivative from singular essences, rather than the contrary. For
an overview of the problem of the essences of modes in Spinoza’s metaphysics, see Thomas Ward,
“Spinoza on the Essences of Mode,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 19 (2011), pp.
19-46, who provides further support to the claim that individual singular things have singular
and eternal essences.
 What are Human Beings? 81

and “singular essences”? Does the “human essence” perfectly define what hu-
mans can do? Do we have to understand anthropology as a kind of deduction
which would proceed from an adequate understanding of “human essence” to
its properties, that is, to what humans can or cannot do? In my view, because
we have to understand “human essence” as the consequence rather than the
condition of singular essences, we have to provide negative answers to these
last two questions.
To explain this claim, I will proceed as follows. In section two, I will ex-
amine Spinoza’s use of the term “aptus” in order to show that eternal singular
essences can exist in different ways according to the extent they can be “adapt-
ed” to their environment, that is, to external causes, which act upon them. In
section three, I claim that “human essence” has to be understood as a general
essence which therefore results from the “agreements” produced among cer-
tain singular essences. More precisely, “human essence” exists insofar as indi-
viduals reach a more or less greater agreement amongst themselves. In section
four, I will conclude by arguing that despite the remarkable interpretation
provided by Valtteri Viljanen, this ontological picture cannot be explained
only by reference to formal causation. On the contrary, Spinoza’s ontology
admits a genuine kind of efficient causation.

2. Essences and Aptitudes

It is generally acknowledged that Spinoza rejects the Aristotelian concept of

dynamis, that is, of power conceived as something that is not actual and needs
to be brought to actuality. Indeed, according to Spinoza, when we conceive
of something as possible we just have an inadequate knowledge of it.6 On the
contrary, what Spinoza means by “power” and “activity” is just the actual pro-
duction of effects, which follow from their adequate causes.7 The same equation
between reality and perfection (E2def6) means that things do not wait to achieve
a future perfection—presumably that indicated by their inner telos—but rather
are, at each moment, completely actualized and lacking nothing.
This position might seem to suggest that in Spinoza’s ontology there is no
room for any difference between essence and existence, in the sense that the
existence of a thing is always the actual and complete realization of all that is
included in the essence of that thing.8 However, I would contend that such
a conclusion does not follow from the elimination of the Aristotelian mean-
ing of dynamis. Behind the concept of dynamis, indeed, we can detect the
fundamental intuition that the way in which a thing exists crucially depends
on the causal relationships that the thing has with other things or the way it

6
Cf. TIE §53; E4def4.
7
Cf. E1p16, 34, 36; E3def1-2.
8
This is one of the fundamental claims in Morfino, Le temps de la multitude.
82 Andrea Sangiacomo

is affected by external causes. I intend to show that Spinoza endorses this general
intuition and attempts to reframe it while avoiding the Aristotelian teleological
way of approaching this issue.
In the physical excursus that follows proposition 13 of the second part of
the Ethics, Spinoza puts forward the guidelines of his own physical view. In
particular, he presents what he means by individual:

[W]hen a number of bodies of the same or different magnitude form close con-
tact with one another through the pressure of other bodies upon them, or if they
are moving at the same or different rates of speed so as to preserve an unvary-
ing relation of movement among themselves, these bodies are said to be united
with one another and all together to form one body or individual thing, which
is distinguished from other things through this union of bodies. (E2p13sDef )

From this definition, Spinoza argues that different kinds of individuals

can exist, from simpler ones to increasingly complex ones. In presenting this
overview of the nature of individuals, Spinoza seems concerned mostly with
grounding a peculiar aspect of the human body, that is, its flexibility concern-
ing its interaction with other bodies. Indeed, Spinoza ends up with a brief
sketch of a human individual:

[T]he human body is composed of very many individual parts of different

natures, each of which is extremely complex. Of the individual components
of the human body, some are liquid, some are soft, and some are hard. The in-
dividual components of the human body, and consequently the human body
itself, are affected by external bodies in a great many ways. The human body
needs for its preservation a great many other bodies, by which, as it were
[quasi], it is continually regenerated. […] The human body can move external
bodies and dispose them in a great many ways. (E2p13sPost1-4 & 6)

The human body can be rightly defined as a structure of activity,9 that is,
as a peculiar form of organization among parts or bodies. Indeed, what forms
a human body is not its matter but rather the way in which its parts fit and
interact together. A human body can be continuously regenerated without
losing its form. It can affect and be affected by other things without being
destroyed. However, Spinoza evidently needs to distinguish this form or or-
ganization—which at least can be viewed as a fixed ratio according to which
the constituents communicate their motions—and the concrete way in which
such a body is modified by external causes without losing that form.
I suggest that Spinoza’s use of the term “aptus” captures this difference.
This term expresses in Latin what is fit, suitable, convenient, and thus what is
able or well disposed to do something. The term can be commonly used for

9
See Busse, Le problème de l’essence de l’homme.
 What are Human Beings? 83

making comparisons between things or states more or less “aptae.” If we look

carefully at Spinoza’s use of “aptus” in the Ethics we can discover that speaking
of aptitudes implies always a certain ontological difference between an inner
essence and its actual causal efficacy.
Generally, Spinoza applies the term both to the human body and to the
human mind. For instance, he writes: “in proportion as a body is more apt
[aptius] than other bodies to act or be acted upon simultaneously in many
ways, so is its mind more apt [aptior] than other minds to perceive many
things simultaneously.” (E3p13s) In the very next proposition, Spinoza un-
derlines that this greater or smaller aptitude is due to the possibility of a more
or less convenient disposition of the human body: “the human mind is ca-
pable [apta] of perceiving a great many things, and this capacity will vary
[eo aptior] in proportion to the variety of states which its body can assume
[disponi potest].” (E2p14) This relationship between corporal aptitudes and
power of knowing adequately is exploited chiefly in the fifth part, where Spi-
noza demonstrates that: “he whose body is capable of the greatest amount of
activity [ad plurima aptum] has a mind whose greatest part is eternal.” (E5p39)
Indeed, the more the body increases its aptitudes, the more the mind increases
its power to know adequately according to common notions and we know
(E2p44c2) that adequate knowledge is eternal, that is, sub specie aeternitatis.10
Spinoza provides a fundamental application of this concept of aptitude,
having just explained that the adequate knowledge reached by reason is based
on common notions, that is, the adequate ideas of the properties that things
share.11 Indeed, he explicitly says: “the mind is more capable [eo aptior] of
perceiving things adequately in proportion as its body has more things in
common with other bodies.” (E2p40c) Evidently, there is a strong connection
between the body’s ability to act and the body’s convenience with external bod-
ies. The more the body is adapted to other bodies, the more it can produce its
effects without being disturbed or countered by those external bodies.
However, this aptitude to act in agreement with other bodies can also be
increased or decreased by external causes. As Spinoza states:

[T]hat which so disposes [disponit] the human body that it can be affected in
more ways, or which renders it capable [aptum] of affecting external bodies in
more ways, is advantageous to man, and proportionately more advantageous

10
In my “Adequate Knowledge and Bodily Complexity in Spinoza’s Account of Conscious-
ness,” Methodus 6 (2011), pp. 77-104, I have investigated the link between bodily complexity,
aptitudes to conceive of common notions and levels of consciousness.
11
Spinoza provides in E2p37-39 his theory of common notions and makes it clear (in
E2p39c) that such notions are the ideas of shared properties. To exemplify them, Spinoza quotes
the physical excursus, where we read: “all bodies agree in certain respects. Proof: all bodies agree
in this, that they involve the conception of one and the same attribute (Def. 1, II), and also in
that they may move at varying speeds.” (E2p13sL2)
84 Andrea Sangiacomo

as the body is thereby rendered more capable [aptius] of being affected in

more ways and of affecting other bodies in more ways. On the other hand,
that which renders the body less capable [minus aptum] in these respects is
harmful. (E4p38)

Spinoza invokes E2p14 for grounding this proposition, because what in-
creases the bodily aptitudes is advantageous to the human mind, and thus to
man. Yet, this passage shows that different aptitudes do not only depend on
structural differences between bodies, but also on the fact that the same body
might be more or less apt in different moments of time. For instance, compar-
ing the aptitudes of the mind to conceive of things during sleep or while being
awake, Spinoza states that “the mind is more apt [aptiorem] to regard this or
that object according as the body is more apt [aptius] to have arising in it the
image of this or that object.” (E3p2s)
Evidently, Spinoza’s dealing with aptitudes and their increase or decrease
following the disposition of the body, presupposes that the human body is not
always the same. More precisely, we have to admit that its physical structure
remains actually the same and that it is not destroyed by any increment or
decrement of its aptitudes. Hence, what changes is the way in which the same
body interacts with its environment, that is, with external bodies. The more
there is agreement between the human body and the external bodies, the more
the human body can produce its effects, that is, the human body is more apt
to do many actions. Conversely, the more there is disagreement between the
human body and the external ones, the more the external causes prevent the
human body from acting and tend instead to destroy it.
Therefore, the concept of aptitude does not refer to essence as such, but to
the way in which a certain given essence concretely exists. On the one hand,
this essence should be immutable and stable to allow a kind of permanence of
the individuum – for instance, its physical structure, in the case of bodies. On
the other hand, however, the causal environment in which the essence exists is
not always the same. Different external causes have different influences on the
same body. Changing the influences the body receives from the outside also
changes its greater or smaller aptitude to produce its effects. In other words,
at each moment the essence and the effects it can produce remain the same.
However, changing the environmental conditions, these effects are more or
less checked by external causes; thus, the aptitude of the thing to produce
these effects increases or decreases as well.
For instance, my body can move through space. Nevertheless, in order to
move, my body needs to regenerate several of its parts by taking some nourish-
ment. If I live in a flourishing environment where I can find a lot of different
aliments, my body can be regenerated and it improves its aptitude to move
anywhere. However, if I cannot find such aliments or if they are poisoned, my
body is prevented from finding a suitable way to renew its parts and I become
less adapted to move or I may even die.
 What are Human Beings? 85

From this overview, it follows that the concept of “aptus” implies several
connected meanings. On the one hand, it seems to mean “capax,” that is, “able”
or “disposed to do something.” On the other hand, it implies also a kind of
ontological convenience and agreement with the external things, which is the
general condition for producing actions. Indeed, the more the external causes
disagree in nature with my body, the more my body is prevented from pro-
ducing its effects or these effects are submerged by contrary effects. In the end,
the external causes can destroy my body if the disagreement between it and
them is such that my body can no longer exist in the same environment. Evi-
dently, this “agreement” or “convenience” with external causes is something
that can change over time, both because external causes are bound to change,
and because the effects produced by my own body can change the efficacy and
even the nature of its environment. It follows that a third derivative meaning
of “aptus” can be “adapted,” that is, the possibility for something to mutually
transform itself and other things to fit better with them. Therefore, aptitudes
vary in degrees, both in comparison with other bodies put in the same condi-
tions, and concerning the same body in different moments of time. In both
cases, the concept of aptitude conveys the extent to which a certain thing fits
well in its environment, that is, the degree of agreement between its effects
and those of the external causes.
Till now, however, we have seen Spinoza speaking of the human body and
the human mind without providing any specific account of what exactly con-
stitutes such humanity. From a certain point of view, indeed, what we have
just said seems to be valuable for every kind of thing and not just for humans.
In the next section, therefore, I would like to show how a better understand-
ing of the concept of “aptitude” enables us to solve this apparent paradox.

3. Becoming Humans

The main goal of Spinoza’s philosophy, and in particular of Spinoza’s ethics,

is to give a non-anthropocentric account of human beings. Consequently, the
first and the main occurrence in the Ethics of the expression “human essence”
(hominis essentia) is related to this very general ontological picture. At the begin-
ning of the second part, Spinoza assumes as an axiom that: “the essence of man
does not involve necessary existence.” (E2Ax1) He then goes on to show that
“the being of substance does not pertain to the essence of man,” (E2p10) from
which he infers as a corollary that “the essence of man is constituted by definite
modifications of the attributes of God” (E2p10c)—i.e. mind and body. More-
over, the third part of the Ethics integrates the further idea of conatus.12 Yet, the

12
Matheron, Individu et communauté, has provided the most developed attempt to recon-
struct Spinoza’s anthropology from his conatus theory. On this point, see also Daniel Garber,
“Descartes and Spinoza on Persistence and Conatus,” Studia Spinozana 10 (1994), pp. 43-67.
86 Andrea Sangiacomo

appetite could be considered the essence of man simply because “it is related to
mind and body together.” (E3p9s) Evidently, each thing has its proper kind of
conatus, but this does not mean that only humans have a conatus.
Apparently, thus, when Spinoza deals with human essence he never furnishes
a valid and univocal criterion in order to distinguish humans from non-humans.
Humans are not peculiar things in an infinite nature. Indeed, the possession of a
soul or a mind “applies to men no more than to other individuals, which are all
animate, albeit in different degrees.” (E2p13s)13 Also the possession of a conatus
or an appetite is a common feature, because every thing (res) “endeavors to persist
in its own being,” (E3p6) and could be affected in different ways. Even the fact
of being complex individuals does not make humans specials, because many
existing things must share the same degree of complexity, although in different
respects. Paradoxically, then, the concept of human essence becomes something
so general that it could be applied, in principle, to almost anything.14
However, this is not a paradox at all from Spinoza’s standpoint, insofar
as the philosophical program developed in the Ethics is a naturalistic one.
As he affirms explicitly in the Preface to the third part of the Ethics: “I shall
consider human actions and appetites just as if it were an investigation into
lines, planes, or bodies.” (E3Pref )15 This implies that Spinoza’s main concern

Moreover, Don Garret, “Spinoza’s Theory of Metaphysical Individuation,” in K. F. Barber & J.

J. E. Gracia (eds.), Individuation in Early Modern Philosophy: Descartes to Kant, Albany: State
University of New York Press, 1994, pp. 73-101; and Syliane Malinowski-Charles, Affects et
conscience chez Spinoza. L’automatisme dans le progrès éthique, Hildesheim, Zürich, New York:
G. Olms, 2004, have stressed that if humans might be distinguished from non-humans this
is not because they have a certain set of ontological proprieties—like having a mind or a co-
natus—but because they have a higher degree of these properties—like having a more evolved
mind or a more powerful conatus.
13
On Spinoza’s account of non-human minds, see Margaret D. Wilson, Ideas and Mecha-
nism, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1999, pp. 178-195, according to whom reason is
not a prerogative of humans, no more so than mind, conatus or complexity.
14
The difficulties of this topic were underlined in particular by French interpreters such
as Alexandre Matheron (e.g., “L’anthropologie spinoziste?,” Revue de Synthèse 89-91 (1978),
pp. 175-185). More recently, Lorenzo Vinciguerra, “Les trois liens anthropologiques. Prolé-
gomènes spinozistes à la question de l’homme,” L’Homme 191 (2009), pp. 7-26, has shown
that Spinoza’s anthropology deals in particular with what humans are not—i. e., they are not
substances, not distinguished by their possession of an intellect or a free will and so on—and
reveals that Spinoza’s positive conception of human beings is in terms of relational beings—i.
e., they exist in relation with their environment and are naturally sociable. Busse, Le problème
de l’essence de l’homme, has stressed the importance of Spinoza’s refusal to give a formal defini-
tion of the human being: indeed, according to Spinoza, humans have to be conceived not in
terms of gender and other specifications but as “structures of activity.” For an overview of the
nominalistic approach to this topic, cf. Lee C. Rice, “Tanquam Naturae Humanae Exemplar:
Spinoza on Human Nature,” Modern Schoolman: A Quarterly Journal of Philosophy 68 (1991),
pp. 291-303.
15
On the anti-anthropocentric anthropology developed by Spinoza, cf. Robert Misrahi,
“Système de la nature, anthropologie et conscience de soi,” La Nouvelle Critique 114 (1978),
 What are Human Beings? 87

is not about distinguishing humans from non-humans, but about defining

under what conditions several individuals can fit together and be considered
as a relatively uniform kind. Thus, humanity might be better understood not
as a property that specific individuals independently instantiate, but rather as
the way in which different individuals can be considered as parts of a certain
whole.
Spinoza himself furnishes a very formal definition for “being part”:16

[B]y coherence of parts I mean simply this, that the laws or nature of one part
adapts itself to [ita sese accomodat] the laws or nature of another part in such
wise that there is the least possible opposition between them. On the question
of whole and parts, I consider things as parts of a whole to the extent that their
natures adapt themselves to one another [quatenus earum natura invicem se
accommodat] so that they are in the closest possible agreement. Insofar as they
are different from one another, to that extent each one forms in our mind a
separate idea and is therefore considered as a whole, not a part. (Ep32)

According to Spinoza, therefore, “being part” means mainly an ontological

sharing and not a differentiation. When we consider two things as two parts
of a certain whole, we are considering what these things share and in what
way they adapt to each other. In so doing, we are not concerned with what
differentiates these two things. For this reason, when we consider a thing as a
part, we are not considering it as something separate from the whole to which
it belongs.17 Thus, different individuals are “parts” of the same whole insofar as

pp. 58-66; Bernard Rousset, “Homo homini deus. Anthropologie et humanisme dans une con-
ception spinoziste de l’être,” Cahiers de Fontenay 39-40 (1985), pp. 133-139; Paola De Cuz-
zani, “Une anthropologie de l’homme décentré,” Philosophiques 29 (2002), pp. 7-21; Yitzak
Melhamed, “Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism: An Outline,” in Justin Smith, Dario Perinetti and Car-
los Fraenkel (eds.), The Rationalists: Between Tradition and Innovation, Dordrecht, Heidelberg,
London, New York: Springer/Synthese, 2011, pp. 147-166.
16
Note that, over time, Spinoza seems to change his own account of the meaning of “being
part of,” by shifting from a reduction of mereology to a mere “being of reason” (as he does in
Short Treatise, part 1, ch. 2, §19) to a more complex and ontologically grounded position (as
found in the Ethics and in this letter). The philosophical consequences of Spinoza’s attempt to
define men as “parts of nature” rather than as finite substances, has been particularly stressed
by James Collins, Spinoza on Nature, Carbondale and Edwardsville: Southern Illinois Univer-
sity Press, 1984; Walter Bartuschat, Spinozas Theorie des Menschen, Hamburg: Meiner, 1992;
Geneviève Lloyd, Part of Nature. Self-Knowledge in Spinoza’s Ethics, Ithaca and London: Cornell
University Press, 1994.
17
On Spinoza’s mereology, cf. William Sacksteder, “Spinoza on Part and Whole: The Worm’s
Eye View,’ in R. W. Shahan & J. I. Biro (eds.), Spinoza: New Perspectives, Norman: University
of Oklahoma Press, 1978, pp. 139-159; Id., “Simple Wholes and Complex Parts,” Philosophy
and Phenomenological Research 45 (1985), pp. 393-406; Id., “Least Parts and Greatest Wholes.
Variations on a Theme in Spinoza,” International Studies in Philosophy 23 (1991), pp. 75-87.
An interesting reading of “have something in common” is provided by Diane Steinberg, “Spi-
noza’s Ethical Doctrine and the Unity of Human Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy
88 Andrea Sangiacomo

they share certain common laws, according to which each individual expresses
the same kind of nature, by producing the same effects.18 Now, we can consid-
er humanity as a peculiar kind of shared nature among different individuals.
In the fourth part of the Ethics, Spinoza explains:

[T]he more a thing is in agreement with our nature, the more advantageous it
is to us, that is, the more it is good; and, conversely, the more advantageous a
thing is to us, to that extent it is in more agreement with our nature. (E4p31c)
Insofar as men are assailed by emotions that are passive, they can be contrary
to one another. (E4p34)
Insofar as men live under the guidance of reason, to that extent only do they
always necessarily agree in nature. (E4p35)
There is no individual thing in the universe more advantageous to man than a
man who lives by the guidance of reason. (E4p35c)
Whatever is conducive to man’s social organization, or causes men to live in
harmony, is advantageous, while those things that introduce discord into the
state are bad. (E4p40)

When two human individuals agree in nature, such a nature is what we call
“human nature.” However, according to Spinoza, human individuals do not
always agree in nature or, rather, individuals of a certain kind do not always
agree in “human nature.” Indeed, they agree in human nature only insofar as
they are guided by reason. Hence, the possibility to act under the guidance of
reason seems to be one of the best candidates to explain what Spinoza prop-
erly understands by humanity.
Although such a definition might sound perfectly traditional, Spinoza re-
formulates it in a very specific way. Indeed, Spinoza does not conceive of
reason as a faculty, but rather as a kind of knowledge according to which the
mind is able to conceive of common notions. (E2p40s2) Thus, “reason” is
only a general term that refers to rational ideas, i.e., adequate ideas of com-
mon notions.19 However, as noted in the previous section, the human mind
conceives of a greater or smaller number of adequate ideas depending on its

22 (1984), pp. 303-324, although her interpretation has been challenged by Lee C. Rice, “Tan-
quam Naturae Humanae Exemplar.” It should be noted also that in an infinite nature there must
exist an infinite number of different kinds of wholes, to which things could pertain in different
respects. And it is exactly this infinite variety that allows Spinoza to admit, at the same time,
some aspects that are shared among things and others that are not shared. As Spinoza writes:
“I consider things as parts of a whole to the extent that their natures adapt themselves to one
another” (emphasis added), but this formulation allows us to suppose that things never adapt
themselves to one other completely, nor are they always completely contrary to one other in
nature. On this point, cf. also Vittorio Morfino, Le temps de la multitude.
18
This is also the general definition of the concept of law provided in TTP4, 1.
19
It should be remembered that Spinoza is deflationary concerning the mind’s faculties, cf.,
for instance, KV2, 16; E2p48-49 with S.
 What are Human Beings? 89

aptitude to know adequately. It follows that the possibility to act under the
guidance of reason is not an all-or-nothing affair. Rather, it comes in degrees,
that is, as a conatus20 of improving the power to know adequately.
Moreover, in the passages just quoted, humanity depends on two main
factors. First, an ontological disposition that makes it possible for different in-
dividuals to agree in nature because their essences are structurally similar. Sec-
ond, a specific aptitude that these different individuals have to agree among
themselves in certain conditions. While the first aspect depends on individual
essences (which are not supposed to change over the time), the second comes
in degrees, as Spinoza himself stresses by using expressions such as “insofar as”
(quatenus). Therefore, humanity itself becomes a matter of degrees.
Indeed, to act and operate while adapting themselves under the guidance
of reason, individuals must be physically conformed in a particular way. Their
bodies should be not only very complex (as described in E2p13s), but also
similar, that is, they should have similar needs and they should be able to pro-
duce similar effects to improve their power.21 Therefore, the essences of those
individuals can be viewed as disposed to agree. However, this does not imply
that they actually agree in every circumstance. In other words, essential disposi-
tions in themselves are not sufficient to have actual agreement in every circum-
stance, and thus, in that case, to have humans properly speaking. Rather, inso-
far as those individuals are completely checked by contrasting passions, they
cannot agree in nature and thus they are contrary to each other. Only insofar
as they are able to escape from the dominion of passions and live under the
guidance of reason do they become able to participate in a real community.
When two individuals strive to act under the guidance of reason, they act
under the guidance of common notions, that is, ideas that they share. The
conatus of each individual is thus oriented in the same direction. This is the
reason why “if two individuals of completely the same nature are combined,
they compose an individual twice as powerful as each one singly.” (E4p18s)
Moreover, it follows that the conatus oriented in such a way is identically

20
Cf. E4p26Dem: “the conatus to preserve itself is nothing but the essence of a thing (Pr.
7, III), which, insofar as it exists as such, is conceived as having a force to persist in existing
(Pr. 6, III) and to do those things that necessarily follow from its given nature (see Definition
of Appetite in Sch. Pr. 9, III). But the essence of reason is nothing other than our mind insofar
as it clearly and distinctly understands (see its Definition in sch. 2, Pr. 40, II). Therefore (Pr.
40, II), whatever we endeavor according to reason is nothing else but to understand.” Spinoza
explicitly makes a similar claim concerning the third kind of knowledge, when he demonstrates:
“the more capable the mind is [quo Mens aptior est] of understanding things by the third kind
of knowledge, the more it desires [eo magis cupit] to understand things by this same kind of
knowledge.” (E5p26)
21
Indeed, if the effect produced from one individual inevitably produces the destruction of
the other, these individuals cannot agree in nature. This is the reason why a man and a snake
cannot agree in nature, but also the reason why two men driven by passions are not adapted to
agree in nature.
90 Andrea Sangiacomo

oriented in each individual and in the resulting composed individual, that

is, is the same in the part and in the whole. Therefore, such a conatus expresses
a real convenience among those individuals, i.e., a shared property. The idea
resulting from this notion should be an adequate idea, i.e., a common notion
(E2p38-39), which expresses the possibility of those individuals to combine
their power under the guidance of reason. Thus, nothing seems to prevent us
from saying that, according to Spinoza, this common notion (i.e., the aptitude
of different individuals to act under the guidance of reason) is the very ground
of what we currently call humanity, that is, the adequate idea of human es-
sence. More precisely, only insofar as those individuals are under the guidance
of reason do they truly agree in nature. It follows that humanity exists insofar
as different individuals can agree among themselves and become adapted to
each other to live and operate together under the guidance of reason.22
Exactly because humanity, reason, activity and agreement are concepts that
come in degrees, it follows that individuals are never totally passive and they
always strive to improve their condition. In the same way in which action and
passion can coexist in the same individuum, rationality and imagination can
also coexist. A human who is guided mainly by imagination is therefore not
absolutely deprived of reason. Correspondingly, the free man or the wise man
is still under the dominion of passions, even if he is more adapted to face them
and counter their power. Therefore, claiming that humanity is a kind of ratio-
nal convenience does not exclude the greatest part of what we usually call men
just because they are mainly driven by passions and imagination. Rather, we
have to admit greater or smaller degrees of humanity. Indeed, insofar as such
individuals always strive to improve their condition and thus to agree under
the guidance of reason, they have to be considered humans, even if the level
of rationality they actually obtain is only very limited. Exactly because, in that
view, the instantiation of humanity depends on aptitudes, there is no trouble
in saying that individuals can be more or less human. Indeed, this means that
different individuals are more or less able to bring humanity to existence fol-
lowing the degree of the reciprocal agreement they are able to produce.23

22
Ariel Suhamy, La communication du bien chez Spinoza, Paris: Garnier Classique, 2010,
proposed one of the best inquiries concerning Spinoza’s account of general conditions and
different strategies for sharing the good amongst humans. In this sense, humanity has to be
conceived of as an aptitude.
23
Spinoza himself expressly acknowledges that not only desire is the very essence of man
(E3p9s), but also that different individuals can have different kinds of desires according to
their different essences and affective constitutions. See, for instance, E3p57s: “although each
individual lives content with the nature wherewith he is endowed and rejoices in it, that life
wherewith each is content and that joy are nothing other than the idea or soul [anima] of the
said individual, and so the joy of the one differs from the joy of another as much as the essence
of the one differs from the essence of the other. Finally, it follows from the preceding proposi-
tion that there is also no small difference between the joy which guides the drunkard and the
joy possessed by the philosopher.”
 What are Human Beings? 91

The fact that humanity has to be conceived of as an intensive concept im-

plies two major consequences. First, great attention has to be paid to the ways
in which individuals can increase their rationality. Accordingly, humanity
might also be represented by a model (exemplar) of human nature, which can
be approximated at different degrees by different individuals. Second, Spinoza
plainly acknowledges that, insofar as humanity depends on developing certain
aptitudes, it remains crucially dependent on the power of external causes. In
other words, although individuals are internally determined to strive to im-
prove their power and rationality, the success of their striving always depends
on fortune. I will briefly discuss these two points in turn.
Concerning the first point, because humanity comes in degrees, it is best
understood by focusing on its highest level, in order to evaluate how indi-
viduals can strive to reach it. Accordingly, Spinoza deals with the model of hu-
man nature as something that we can desire to reproduce.24 Using this model,
constructed through a rational knowledge of the nature of our affects, we can
judge what is truly “good” and what is truly “bad”:

[A]s for the terms “good” and “bad,” they likewise indicate nothing positive
in things considered in themselves, and are nothing but modes of thinking,
or notions which we form from comparing things with one another. For one
and the same thing can at the same time be good and bad, and also indiffer-
ent. […] However, although this is so, these terms ought to be retained. For
since we desire to form the idea of a man which we may look to as a model
of human nature [naturae humanae exemplar], we shall find it useful to keep
these terms in the sense I have indicated. So in what follows I shall mean by
“good” that which we certainly know to be the means for our approaching
nearer to the model of human nature that we set before ourselves, and by
“bad” that which we certainly know prevents us from reproducing the said
model. (E4Pref )

24
This concept (present also in TIE §§13-14) has been challenged by several interprets,
among whom Jonathan Bennett, A Study of Spinoza’s Ethics, Indianapolis: Hackett Publishing
Company, 1984, p. 296. In particular, Daniel Garber, “Dr. Fischelson’s Dilemma: Spinoza on
Freedom and Sociability,” in Yirmiyahu Yovel and Gideon Segal (eds.), Spinoza on Reason and
the “Free Man,” New York: Little Room Press, 2004, pp. 183-207, by linking the “model of
human nature” with the portrait of the “free man” that ends the Ethics, claims (pp. 190-191):
“perfect freedom and rationality seem inconsistent with what is also a rational need for other
people; if we seek perfect freedom, then it seems that we must give up other people, and if we
seek to unite with other people, then it appears that we cannot attain the true freedom and
rationality that, Spinoza says, we must seek.” In that sense, Garber seems to express critically
the same claim that Viljanen argues positively. The very ground of Garber’s critique is his as-
sumption that the “perfect free man” must be considered as a “perfect self-sufficient agent.”
However, it should be clear at this point why, in Spinoza’s system, such self-sufficiency can
never be reached nor truly desired. For further discussion on this point, see also Andrew Youpa,
“Spinoza’s Model of Human Nature,” Journal of the History of Philosophy 48 (2010), pp. 61-76.
92 Andrea Sangiacomo

As noted above (E4p31-40), Spinoza considers something to be “good” in-

sofar as it is conducive to acting under the guidance of reason. The description
of the free man provided in E4p67-73 is a very effective picture of the kind
of behaviors produced when an individual is completely guided by reason.
It is not by chance that these propositions are mostly devoted to the social
aptitudes of the free man, who knows how to behave with other men to face
passive affects and defend rational aptitudes. Also the strategies summarized
by Spinoza in E5p20s suggest how we can create habitudes which can support
rather than hinder our striving to become more and more rational, that is,
more adapted to agree in nature.25 In that sense, according to Spinoza, indi-
viduals are always perfect but, as humans, they are always perfectible. Insofar
as the conatus of each individual is oriented by the model of human nature,
those individuals necessarily operate under the guidance of reason and be-
come increasingly adapted to each other, that is, increasingly human.26
Concerning the second point, in this process much is due to the power
of external causes and circumstances rather than to the intrinsic power of
individuals. However, this is not a problem, because human essence, like any
other kind of essence, cannot exist by itself and it needs external causes to
be brought to existence.27 Those external causes, in this case, are singular in-

25
I explore the political consequences of these propositions of the Ethics in my Homo liber.
Verso una morale spinoziana, Milano: Mimesis, 2011.
26
Matthew Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom. Reason, Autonomy and the Good Life, Cam-
bridge: Cambridge University Press, 2011, p. 178, emphasizes that “the model of human na-
ture represents the greatest possible perfection of our nature, as revealed by reason: the most
powerful human possible. Given what would be involved in describing such a model, it is not
surprising that there is no simple summary of it. Rather, the task of developing and describing
the model should be understood as a project taken up by the entire Ethics. On this reading, the
free man [i.e., E4p67-73] is not irrelevant to Spinoza’s ethics, for it indicates reason’s guidance
and rational emotions, which figure importantly in his account of reason’s dictates and the
virtuous character […]. Nevertheless, the free man is not at the center of Spinoza’s ethics and
is even less important to his account of human freedom, which is concerned with necessarily
passive and finite beings.”
27
Further evidence for this reading can be obtained from consideration of a quite con-
troversial passage of the first part. Discussing the issue of God’s unicity, Spinoza comes to the
following example (E1p8s): “if a fixed number of individuals exist in Nature, there must neces-
sarily be a cause why those individuals and not more or fewer exist. If, for example, in Nature
twenty men were to exist […], in order to account for the existence of these twenty men, it will
not be enough for us to demonstrate the cause of human nature in general; it will furthermore
be necessary to demonstrate the cause why not more or fewer than twenty men exist, since […]
there must necessarily be a cause for the existence of each one. But this cause […] cannot be
contained in the nature of man, since the true definition of man does not involve the number
twenty. So […] the cause of the existence of these twenty men, and consequently of each one,
must necessarily be external to each one, and therefore we can reach the unqualified conclusion
that whenever several individuals of a kind exist, there must necessarily be an external cause for
their existence.” From this passage, we can infer that human nature is not the cause for the ex-
istence of a particular number of individuals. On the contrary, there must be an external cause
 What are Human Beings? 93

dividuals, who can be more or less able to agree with each other and then
instantiate humanity in existence.
In the TTP Spinoza probably gives the most emblematic example of this
view by describing the way in which Moses transformed a dispersed multitude
of individuals into the Hebrew nation:

[M]uch can be effected by human contrivance and vigilance to achieve secu-

rity and to avoid injuries from other men and from beasts. To this end, reason
and experience have taught us no surer means than to organize a society under
fixed laws, to occupy a fixed territory, and to concentrate the strength of all its
members into one body, as it were, a social body. However, a quite consider-
able degree of ability and vigilance is needed to organize and preserve a society,
and therefore that society will be more secure, more stable and less exposed
to fortune, which is founded and governed mainly by men of wisdom and
vigilance, while a society composed of men who lack these qualities is largely
dependent on fortune and is less stable. If the latter nevertheless endures for
some considerable time, this is to be attributed to some other guidance, not
its own. Indeed, if it overcomes great perils and enjoys prosperity, it cannot
fail to marvel at and worship God’s guidance (that is to say, insofar as God
acts through hidden external causes, and not through the nature and mind of
man); for what it has experienced is far beyond its expectation and belief, and
can truly be regarded even as a miracle. (TTP3, 5)

Following the reading provided above, the case of the Hebrews is not just
a case. Humanity itself exists insofar as certain individuals are able to adapt
to each other and overcome the disagreements between their singular natures
and their different passions. Indeed, even if passive affects as such remain
different from reason, there are certain affects that can support rationality.28
Indeed, passions might be used to promote forms of behaviors that more eas-
ily accommodate reason (e.g., by pushing a dispersed multitude to cohere in
a civil association). This way, certain passions (joyful affects, in particular) can
improve the power to act of certain individual bodies. The more the bodily
power increases, the more the mind power increases; but the power of the
mind is nothing but the capacity to conceive of adequate ideas, that is, to
conceive of things according to reason. Thus, whatever increases the bodily

that accounts for the existence of each of these individuals. However, if humanity is nothing
but a shared notion among individuals, this means that humanity exists insofar as different
individuals exist and agree in nature.
28
The better evidence is provided by the case of prophetic law discussed in the TTP. Indeed,
Spinoza observes that prophets are able to teach and convey the true divine law (which recom-
mends the knowledge of God and the golden rule prescribed also by reason), although they
are driven by imagination rather than by reason. Cf. for instance TTP1, 26; TTP7, 4 and 17;
TTP12, 7-8; TTP13, 8; TTP19, 3-4.
94 Andrea Sangiacomo

power also increases the mind’s power to follow reason’s guidance.29 Hence, al-
though passions are what produces the disagreement between individuals (by
determining them in different ways), they also play an important role in the
production of agreement (by determining them to follow a common path).
Indeed, insofar as acting under the guidance of reason is an aptitude that
might be more or less developed by certain individuals (as argued in this sec-
tion), and each aptitude crucially depends on the power of external causes
(as noted in the second section), it follows that the actual power that certain
individuals have to act under the guidance of reason also depends, on the ex-
ternal causes (i.e., passions) that influence them. Accordingly, humanity also
remains a matter of fortune, that is, of external causes, affects and passions.
Thus, although to produce humanity is not an impossible task, it might often
appear to be a true miracle.

4. Singular Essences, Common Essences and Causation

The previous discussion sheds new light on the debate about Spinoza’s
essentialism evoked at the beginning of this paper. We are allowed to distin-
guish between two kinds of essences, namely, singular and general essences.
Indeed, a singular thing necessarily has its singular essence. If we conceive of
this thing as a body, we can conceive of its essence as a particular structure
that can modify the attribute of extension in a certain way. Referring to the
definition of individuals, we can suppose that this essence corresponds to a
certain fixed ratio according to which, for instance, the parts of the composed
body communicate their movements to each other. Thanks to this structure,
this body can produce some effects that depend strictly on its being physically
constituted in such a way. For instance, all the activities described by Spinoza
in the postulates added to the physical excursus describe several fundamental
features of what are called human bodies.
But Spinoza’s ontology is not limited to singular essences. Human essence,
for instance, is a general essence that can be shared by different individual
things. General essences are not something that is potentially in singular es-
sences, in the Aristotelian sense. Rather, they are a different kind of essences
which can exist when singular things exist sub specie durationis in a certain
way. If singular essences do not exist in such a way, a certain general essence
does not exist simultaneously with the existence of those singular essences.
More properly, such a general essence seems to require two conditions to
be conceived. Firstly, it is necessary that a certain set of individual things are
shaped in such a way that they can produce effects able to support or im-
prove the power of each of those individuals. In other words, those individuals

29
For a more detailed account of this feedback mechanism and the use of passions in the
improvement of the ethical life, see Matthew Kisner, Spinoza on Human Freedom.
 What are Human Beings? 95

should be physically disposed to cohere with each other. A human body and a
rock are kinds of bodies too different in their respective structures for sharing
the general essence of humanity.30
However, to have a singular essence ontologically disposed to share effects and
to cohere with other singular essences is not enough to make something like hu-
manity exist simultaneously with those individuals. Indeed, human individuals
can disagree insofar as they are conducted by affects which are passive. Thus, to
transform a dispositional agreement into an actual agreement in nature, something
more is needed. Spinoza says that those individuals should live and operate under
the guidance of reason, that is, following the adequate knowledge of the common
notions they can share. Surely, a body that can convene only with a few other
bodies cannot adapt itself to different situations and thus can participate only in
relatively narrow kinds of communities. On the contrary, the more the singular
essence is able to convene with a lot of other things, the more this essence can
share with them its activity and then participate in larger kinds of communities.31
Hence, the more the body of each individual is ad plurima aptum, the more it will
easily cohere with the body of another individual of the same kind.
Yet, to be more aptum depends on the complex causal interplay that links
each singular thing to the external causes. General essences, thus, do not flow
from singular essences and are not embedded in them as some kind of prop-
erty which is just waiting to be deduced at a certain moment. Indeed, what
makes each individual human body ad plurima aptum is not just its own co-
natus. At least, each individual strives to reach the greatest convenience it can
reach with other bodies, in order to reduce the disagreements with external
causes and thus increase its power to act. However, as we noted at the end of
section three, external causes always play an important role in the shaping of
the environmental condition within which the individuals act and operate.
These remarks suggest that Viljanen’s claim, according to which Spinoza
refers mainly to formal causality, cannot be maintained. The model of formal
causality can work only if the effects produced are completely inscribed in
their cause. It is not by chance that the best example of this kind of causality
is the relationship between the properties of a triangle and its definition. The
obvious problem to face when we would claim that formal causation should

30
Actually, according to E4p37s1, animals are also too different from humans to be con-
venient with them. On that point, see Melhamed, “Spinoza’s Anti-Humanism,” pp. 163-164.
31
The main difference between general essences and generic essences as conceived by imag-
ination (E2p40s1), is that the former corresponds to shared properties among individuals,
while the latter derives from the confusion made by imagination between the images of several
individual things that the human mind is not able to distinguish sharply enough. Only in that
sense does Spinoza reject, in E2p40s1, the “universal” notion of “man.” Indeed, because such
“universals” are produced mainly by imagination and the imagination of each individual is af-
fected differently from the other, those notions are far from being shared and common, and thus
far from being adequate.
96 Andrea Sangiacomo

account for every kind of causal interaction is exactly how this kind of cau-
sation can explain passivity and heteronomy. Viljanen rightly addresses this
problem by looking at Spinoza’s concept of “constitution,” which expresses
something not so different from what we have seen “aptus” stands for. Then,
Viljanen argues:

[T]here is in fact an array of constitution/property structures for each individ-

ual; one of those structures, when the essence is constituted unaffected by external
causes (in such a case the individual would be completely self-determined), is
the ontologically privileged one corresponding to the essence/property structure of
the formal essence. […] The theory of constitution offers Spinoza the flexibility
required to account for change—the individual persists, but is being consti-
tuted in various ways. For each human being, of its innumerable constitutions
there is one which is ontologically privileged; it is the perfect way of being one
strives to attain as efficiently as one can—and would succeed in attaining, were
one’s power not always, to a certain extent, hindered. There is thus, I would
argue, a striving for an ‘autonomous constitution,’ a state in which everything
pertaining to us is self-determined. […] But how can any passion ‘follow from
our nature’ when it is by definition something for which external causes, too, are
causally responsible? I would suggest that the present interpretation offers us a
promising solution to this problem. […] With each constitution, we operate
in a particular way, desire some specific object (3p56). Given that striving is
our actual essence, when that essence is constituted anew the character of our
striving is, understandably enough, altered; in other words, essential causers
as we are, a change in our essence’s constitution results in change in causation.32

This attempt is surely clever but it seems inconsistent with Spinoza’s ac-
count of passions and aptitudes. Indeed, if we assume that “a change in our
essence’s constitution results in change in causation,” this should imply a
change in the kind of effects we produce under that constitution. But from
Spinoza’s taxonomy of passive emotions we know ad abundantiam that, under
the power of passions, we often produce effects that decrease our power to act
and, in some extreme cases, also destroy our existence. (E4p20s) From the
point of view of formal causation, this implies that the same essence can be
constituted in such a way that it can produce contradictory effects at different
times, which seems absurd.
However, this paradox does not concern the notion of constitution as such
but simply that of formal causation. In particular, formal causation seems to
require too strong a link between the effects produced and the thing’s essence,
while Spinoza’s ontology needs to allow a certain difference between those ef-
fects that are autonomously produced by the essential structure of the thing

32
Viljanen, Spinoza’s Geometry of Power, pp. 155-157, emphasis added.
 What are Human Beings? 97

and those that are produced by the thing insofar as its power is checked and
exploited by external causes.
After all, the property deduced from a definition does not add something
to the definition, but says something that the definition did not say expressly.
The process of deduction is needed precisely to make explicit all the notions
presupposed within a definition but that are still implicit in it. According to
that view, a formal cause contains in some sense in its power—taken here in
its Aristotelian meaning—what its effects will develop plainly. On the con-
trary, the efficient cause has a much poorer content. It simply always repro-
duces its own typical action, like a ball which strikes another ball and modifies
its movement.33 This is the reason why the same efficient cause can produce its
own effects in different contexts or why it can be exploited in different ways
by external causes.
Now, in E4p59, Spinoza demonstrates that “in the case of all actions to
which we are determined by a passive emotion, we can be determined thereto
by reason without that emotion.” This means that the action physically pro-
duced by a body under the power of a certain external cause, insofar as it
follows from the physical structure of such a body, can be produced also un-
der the guidance of reason, that is, autonomously and without the external
cause. The difference between producing such an action autonomously or
because forced by external causes lies in the fact that, insofar as the thing
acts autonomously, it strives to improve its own power, while insofar as the
thing acts under the power of external causes, these causes can exploit such a
power to improve their own conatus. In this second case, moreover, the thing
can be forced to use its own power to act in a way that can be detrimental to
the power of the thing itself. For that reason, in such circumstances, external
causes can exploit the power of the thing against the thing itself. Suicide rep-
resents the extreme case of this situation. (E4p20s)
Therefore, E4p59 clearly distinguishes between the action produced by
the thing itself, insofar as its physical structure is involved, and the use of this
action by external causes. To make this distinction, however, it is necessary to
assume a difference between the actions that follow from the thing’s essence,
as from their adequate cause, and the way in which these actions interact with
external causes, resulting in more or less capacity to improve the thing’s power.
This difference coincides with the difference between essence and aptitude we
drew in the discussion above.

33
This is also the reason why, in the Aristotelian framework, efficient causation was consid-
ered not sufficient to completely account for causal relationships and the reference to formal and
final causality was needed as well. But, again, this is exactly the reason why, in early modern
natural philosophy, the emphasis on efficient causation was taken as a deep subversion of the
Aristotelian account of causality. Paradoxically, modern natural philosophers preferred efficient
causation because it was blind and apparently the poorer form of causation recognized by the
tradition.
98 Andrea Sangiacomo

Nonetheless, E4p59 is not consistent with Viljanen’s assumption accord-

ing to which every effect produced by a thing is always a necessary conse-
quence of its essence—because every effect follows from the thing’s essence
like a property from the definition of a triangle. Indeed, in this case, it will be
impossible to produce the same action under the guidance of reason instead
of under the power of external causes—simply because these two situations
amount to two different kinds of effects. Rather, in this case we should assume
that the same essence produces different and even contradictory effects, which
is absurd. This is the reason why the formal causation reading is not able to ac-
count for Spinoza’s claim in E4p59s, which is the main ground for his strategy
to substitute passive affects with actives one.34
I avoid the thorny questions of whether and where formal causation might
find its place within Spinoza’s metaphysics. Here, I would merely claim that
formal causation cannot explain, contrary to Viljanen’s expectations, the very
fundamental problem of how eternal essences exist sub specie durationis and
thus how we can always be subject to passions. Specifically, it seems difficult
to read all we have said concerning “aptitudes” in terms of formal causal-
ity. Therefore, we have to recognize that Spinoza does not reduce causality
to its formal aspect but, following the majority of early modern natural phi-
losophers, accounts for natural phenomena—“human beings” included—in
terms of efficient causation.35
From the point of view of Spinoza’s anthropology, this reinforces the claim
upheld in this paper. Humanity, indeed, is just a consequence of how singular
things are able to agree and convene with each other. Humanity does not
flow from singular individuals disposed to become humans. On the contrary,
humanity is built up by those individuals insofar as they reach more and more
rational ways to agree together. This implies that humanity too is the result of
a conatus and, thus, always needs the help of fortune.

34
Viljanen quotes E4p59s (ivi, p. 165) only to insist on the power to act embedded in
physical structures, but he never discusses the whole context of E4p59. Later in the Ethics,
Spinoza will demonstrate also that “an affect which is a passion ceases to be a passion as soon
as we form a clear and distinct idea of it” (E5p3). On Spinoza’s strategy to transform passions
into actions, see Colin Marshall, “Spinoza on Destroying Passions with Reason,” Philosophy and
Phenomenological Research 85 (2012), pp. 139-160.
35
Andrea Sangiacomo, “Actions et qualités: prolégomènes pour une lecture comparée de
Boyle et Spinoza,” Bulletin de l’Association des Amis de Spinoza 42 (2012), pp. 3-36, argued
that Spinoza’s ontology of activity reframes on the ontological level a model of causation very
close to Boyle’s mechanical hypothesis about the production of qualities and their definition in
terms of dispositional powers of physical structures. Furthermore, it should be noted that in the
Cartesian milieu, an adequate cause was taken as a kind of efficient cause, as results from Antoine
Le Grand, Institutio Philosophiae secundum Principia D. Renati Descartes, London: J. Martyn,
1672, I, art. 9, §5, p. 26: “Causa efficiens est illa, quae rem alteram producit, quae multiplex est.
Totalis, seu adequate, ut Deum Adamum creans, quem sine alterius causae concurs produxit.”
 What are Human Beings? 99

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