Republic of the Philippines There shall be an independent Commission on Elections composed of a
SUPREME COURT Chairman and eight Commissioners who shall be natural-born citizens of
Manila
SECOND DIVISION
G.R. No. 100113 September 3, 1991
RENATO CAYETANO, petitioner,
vs.
CHRISTIAN MONSOD, HON. JOVITO R. SALONGA, COMMISSION
ON APPOINTMENT, and HON. GUILLERMO CARAGUE, in his
capacity as Secretary of Budget and Management, respondents.
Renato L. Cayetano for and in his own behalf.
Sabina E. Acut, Jr. and Mylene Garcia-Albano co-counsel for petitioner.
PARAS, J.:
We are faced here with a controversy of far-reaching proportions. While
ostensibly only legal issues are involved, the Court's decision in this case
would indubitably have a profound effect on the political aspect of our
national existence.
The 1987 Constitution provides in Section 1 (1), Article IX-C:
There shall be a Commission on Elections composed of a
Chairman and six Commissioners who shall be natural-born
citizens of the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at
least thirty-five years of age, holders of a college degree, and
must not have been candidates for any elective position in the
immediately preceding -elections. However, a majority thereof,
including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine Bar
who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
years. (Emphasis supplied)
The aforequoted provision is patterned after Section l(l), Article XII-C of
the 1973 Constitution which similarly provides:
the Philippines and, at the time of their appointment, at least thirty-five
years of age and holders of a college degree. However, a majority
thereof, including the Chairman, shall be members of the Philippine
Bar who have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.'
(Emphasis supplied)
Regrettably, however, there seems to be no jurisprudence as to what
constitutes practice of law as a legal qualification to an appointive office.
Black defines "practice of law" as:
The rendition of services requiring the knowledge and the
application of legal principles and technique to serve the interest
of another with his consent. It is not limited to appearing in court,
or advising and assisting in the conduct of litigation, but embraces
the preparation of pleadings, and other papers incident to actions
and special proceedings, conveyancing, the preparation of legal
instruments of all kinds, and the giving of all legal advice to
clients. It embraces all advice to clients and all actions taken for
them in matters connected with the law. An attorney engages in
the practice of law by maintaining an office where he is held out
to be-an attorney, using a letterhead describing himself as an
attorney, counseling clients in legal matters, negotiating with
opposing counsel about pending litigation, and fixing and
collecting fees for services rendered by his associate. (Black's
Law Dictionary, 3rd ed.)
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases in court. (Land
Title Abstract and Trust Co. v. Dworken, 129 Ohio St. 23, 193 N.E. 650)
A person is also considered to be in the practice of law when he:
... for valuable consideration engages in the business of advising
person, firms, associations or corporations as to their rights under
the law, or appears in a representative capacity as an advocate in
proceedings pending or prospective, before any court,
commissioner, referee, board, body, committee, or commission
constituted by law or authorized to settle controversies and there,
in such representative capacity performs any act or acts for the
purpose of obtaining or defending the rights of their clients under
the law. Otherwise stated, one who, in a representative capacity,
engages in the business of advising clients as to their rights
 under the law, or while so engaged performs any act or acts
either in court or outside of court for that purpose, is engaged in
the practice of law. (State ex. rel. Mckittrick v..C.S. Dudley and
Co., 102 S.W. 2d 895, 340 Mo. 852)
This Court in the case of Philippine Lawyers Association v.Agrava, (105
Phil. 173,176-177) stated:
The practice of law is not limited to the conduct of cases
or litigation in court; it embraces the preparation of pleadings and
other papers incident to actions and special proceedings, the
management of such actions and proceedings on behalf of clients
before judges and courts, and in addition, conveying. In general,
all advice to clients, and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law incorporation services,
assessment and condemnation services contemplating an
appearance before a judicial body, the foreclosure of a mortgage,
enforcement of a creditor's claim in bankruptcy and insolvency
proceedings, and conducting proceedings in attachment, and in
matters of estate and guardianship have been held to constitute
law practice, as do the preparation and drafting of legal
instruments, where the work done involves the determination by
the trained legal mind of the legal effect of facts and conditions. (5
Am. Jr. p. 262, 263). (Emphasis supplied)
Practice of law under modem conditions consists in no small part
of work performed outside of any court and having no immediate
relation to proceedings in court. It embraces conveyancing, the
giving of legal advice on a large variety of subjects, and the
preparation and execution of legal instruments covering an
extensive field of business and trust relations and other
affairs. Although these transactions may have no direct
connection with court proceedings, they are always subject to
become involved in litigation. They require in many aspects a
high degree of legal skill, a wide experience with men and affairs,
and great capacity for adaptation to difficult and complex
situations. These customary functions of an attorney or counselor
at law bear an intimate relation to the administration of justice by
the courts. No valid distinction, so far as concerns the question
set forth in the order, can be drawn between that part of the work
of the lawyer which involves appearance in court and that part
which involves advice and drafting of instruments in his office. It is
of importance to the welfare of the public that these manifold
customary functions be performed by persons possessed of
adequate learning and skill, of sound moral character, and acting
at all times under the heavy trust obligations to clients which rests
upon all attorneys. (Moran, Comments on the Rules of Court, Vol.
3 [1953 ed.] , p. 665-666, citing In re Opinion of the
Justices [Mass.], 194 N.E. 313, quoted in Rhode Is. Bar Assoc. v.
Automobile Service Assoc. [R.I.] 179 A. 139,144). (Emphasis
ours)
The University of the Philippines Law Center in conducting orientation
briefing for new lawyers (1974-1975) listed the dimensions of the practice
of law in even broader terms as advocacy, counselling and public
service.
One may be a practicing attorney in following any line of
employment in the profession. If what he does exacts knowledge
of the law and is of a kind usual for attorneys engaging in the
active practice of their profession, and he follows some one or
more lines of employment such as this he is a practicing attorney
at law within the meaning of the statute. (Barr v. Cardell, 155 NW
312)
Practice of law means any activity, in or out of court, which requires the
application of law, legal procedure, knowledge, training and experience.
"To engage in the practice of law is to perform those acts which are
characteristics of the profession. Generally, to practice law is to give
notice or render any kind of service, which device or service requires the
use in any degree of legal knowledge or skill." (111 ALR 23)
The following records of the 1986 Constitutional Commission show that it
has adopted a liberal interpretation of the term "practice of law."
MR. FOZ. Before we suspend the session, may I make a
manifestation which I forgot to do during our review of the
provisions on the Commission on Audit. May I be allowed to
make a very brief statement?
THE PRESIDING OFFICER (Mr. Jamir).
The Commissioner will please proceed.
MR. FOZ. This has to do with the qualifications of the members of
the Commission on Audit. Among others, the qualifications
provided for by Section I is that "They must be Members of the
 Philippine Bar" — I am quoting from the provision — "who have
been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years".
To avoid any misunderstanding which would result in excluding members
of the Bar who are now employed in the COA or Commission on
Audit, we would like to make the clarification that this provision on
qualifications regarding members of the Bar does not necessarily refer or
involve actual practice of law outside the COA We have to interpret this
to mean that as long as the lawyers who are employed in the COA are
using their legal knowledge or legal talent in their respective work within
COA, then they are qualified to be considered for appointment as
members or commissioners, even chairman, of the Commission on Audit.
This has been discussed by the Committee on Constitutional
Commissions and Agencies and we deem it important to take it up on the
floor so that this interpretation may be made available whenever this
provision on the qualifications as regards members of the Philippine Bar
engaging in the practice of law for at least ten years is taken up.
MR. OPLE. Will Commissioner Foz yield to just one question.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Is he, in effect, saying that service in the COA by a
lawyer is equivalent to the requirement of a law practice that is
set forth in the Article on the Commission on Audit?
MR. FOZ. We must consider the fact that the work of COA,
although it is auditing, will necessarily involve legal work; it will
involve legal work. And, therefore, lawyers who are employed in
COA now would have the necessary qualifications in accordance
with the Provision on qualifications under our provisions on the
Commission on Audit. And, therefore, the answer is yes.
MR. OPLE. Yes. So that the construction given to this is that this
is equivalent to the practice of law.
MR. FOZ. Yes, Mr. Presiding Officer.
MR. OPLE. Thank you.
... ( Emphasis supplied)
Section 1(1), Article IX-D of the 1987 Constitution, provides, among
others, that the Chairman and two Commissioners of the Commission on
Audit (COA) should either be certified public accountants with not less
than ten years of auditing practice, or members of the Philippine Bar who
have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
(emphasis supplied)
Corollary to this is the term "private practitioner" and which is in many
ways synonymous with the word "lawyer." Today, although many lawyers
do not engage in private practice, it is still a fact that the majority of
lawyers are private practitioners. (Gary Munneke, Opportunities in Law
Careers [VGM Career Horizons: Illinois], [1986], p. 15).
At this point, it might be helpful to define private practice. The term, as
commonly understood, means "an individual or organization engaged in
the business of delivering legal services." (Ibid.). Lawyers who practice
alone are often called "sole practitioners." Groups of lawyers are called
"firms." The firm is usually a partnership and members of the firm are the
partners. Some firms may be organized as professional corporations and
the members called shareholders. In either case, the members of the firm
are the experienced attorneys. In most firms, there are younger or more
inexperienced salaried attorneyscalled "associates." (Ibid.).
The test that defines law practice by looking to traditional areas of law
practice is essentially tautologous, unhelpful defining the practice of law
as that which lawyers do. (Charles W. Wolfram, Modern Legal
Ethics [West Publishing Co.: Minnesota, 1986], p. 593). The practice of
law is defined as the performance of any acts . . . in or out of court,
commonly understood to be the practice of law. (State Bar Ass'n v.
Connecticut Bank & Trust Co., 145 Conn. 222, 140 A.2d 863, 870 [1958]
[quoting Grievance Comm. v. Payne, 128 Conn. 325, 22 A.2d 623, 626
[1941]). Because lawyers perform almost every function known in the
commercial and governmental realm, such a definition would obviously
be too global to be workable.(Wolfram, op. cit.).
The appearance of a lawyer in litigation in behalf of a client is at once the
most publicly familiar role for lawyers as well as an uncommon role for
the average lawyer. Most lawyers spend little time in courtrooms, and a
large percentage spend their entire practice without litigating a case.
(Ibid., p. 593). Nonetheless, many lawyers do continue to litigate and the
litigating lawyer's role colors much of both the public image and the self
perception of the legal profession. (Ibid.).
In this regard thus, the dominance of litigation in the public mind reflects
history, not reality. (Ibid.). Why is this so? Recall that the late Alexander
SyCip, a corporate lawyer, once articulated on the importance of a lawyer
as a business counselor in this wise: "Even today, there are still
uninformed laymen whose concept of an attorney is one who principally
tries cases before the courts. The members of the bench and bar and the
informed laymen such as businessmen, know that in most developed
societies today, substantially more legal work is transacted in law offices
than in the courtrooms. General practitioners of law who do both litigation
and non-litigation work also know that in most cases they find themselves
spending more time doing what [is] loosely desccribe[d] as business
counseling than in trying cases. The business lawyer has been described
as the planner, the diagnostician and the trial lawyer, the surgeon. I[t]
need not [be] stress[ed] that in law, as in medicine, surgery should be
avoided where internal medicine can be effective." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
In the course of a working day the average general practitioner wig
engage in a number of legal tasks, each involving different legal
doctrines, legal skills, legal processes, legal institutions, clients, and other
interested parties. Even the increasing numbers of lawyers in specialized
practice wig usually perform at least some legal services outside their
specialty. And even within a narrow specialty such as tax practice, a
lawyer will shift from one legal task or role such as advice-giving to an
importantly different one such as representing a client before an
administrative agency. (Wolfram, supra, p. 687).
By no means will most of this work involve litigation, unless the lawyer is
one of the relatively rare types — a litigator who specializes in this work
to the exclusion of much else. Instead, the work will require the lawyer to
have mastered the full range of traditional lawyer skills of client
counselling, advice-giving, document drafting, and negotiation. And
increasingly lawyers find that the new skills of evaluation and mediation
are both effective for many clients and a source of employment. (Ibid.).
Most lawyers will engage in non-litigation legal work or in litigation work
that is constrained in very important ways, at least theoretically, so as to
remove from it some of the salient features of adversarial litigation. Of
these special roles, the most prominent is that of prosecutor. In some
lawyers' work the constraints are imposed both by the nature of the client
and by the way in which the lawyer is organized into a social unit to
perform that work. The most common of these roles are those of
corporate practice and government legal service. (Ibid.).
In several issues of the Business Star, a business daily, herein below
quoted are emerging trends in corporate law practice, a departure from
the traditional concept of practice of law.
We are experiencing today what truly may be called a
revolutionary transformation in corporate law practice. Lawyers
and other professional groups, in particular those members
participating in various legal-policy decisional contexts, are
finding that understanding the major emerging trends in
corporation law is indispensable to intelligent decision-making.
Constructive adjustment to major corporate problems of today
requires an accurate understanding of the nature and implications
of the corporate law research function accompanied by an
accelerating rate of information accumulation. The recognition of
the need for such improved corporate legal policy formulation,
particularly "model-making" and "contingency planning," has
impressed upon us the inadequacy of traditional procedures in
many decisional contexts.
In a complex legal problem the mass of information to be
processed, the sorting and weighing of significant conditional
factors, the appraisal of major trends, the necessity of estimating
the consequences of given courses of action, and the need for
fast decision and response in situations of acute danger have
prompted the use of sophisticated concepts of information flow
theory, operational analysis, automatic data processing, and
electronic computing equipment. Understandably, an improved
decisional structure must stress the predictive component of the
policy-making process, wherein a "model", of the decisional
context or a segment thereof is developed to test projected
alternative courses of action in terms of futuristic effects flowing
therefrom.
Although members of the legal profession are regularly engaged
in predicting and projecting the trends of the law, the subject of
corporate finance law has received relatively little organized and
formalized attention in the philosophy of advancing corporate
legal education. Nonetheless, a cross-disciplinary approach to
legal research has become a vital necessity.
Certainly, the general orientation for productive contributions by
those trained primarily in the law can be improved through an
early introduction to multi-variable decisional context and the
various approaches for handling such problems. Lawyers,
particularly with either a master's or doctorate degree in business
administration or management, functioning at the legal policy
level of decision-making now have some appreciation for the
concepts and analytical techniques of other professions which are
currently engaged in similar types of complex decision-making.
Truth to tell, many situations involving corporate finance problems
would require the services of an astute attorney because of the
complex legal implications that arise from each and every
necessary step in securing and maintaining the business issue
raised. (Business Star, "Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989,
p. 4).
In our litigation-prone country, a corporate lawyer is assiduously
referred to as the "abogado de campanilla." He is the "big-time"
lawyer, earning big money and with a clientele composed of the
tycoons and magnates of business and industry.
Despite the growing number of corporate lawyers, many people
could not explain what it is that a corporate lawyer does. For one,
the number of attorneys employed by a single corporation will
vary with the size and type of the corporation. Many smaller and
some large corporations farm out all their legal problems to
private law firms. Many others have in-house counsel only for
certain matters. Other corporation have a staff large enough to
handle most legal problems in-house.
A corporate lawyer, for all intents and purposes, is a lawyer who
handles the legal affairs of a corporation. His areas of concern or
jurisdiction may include, inter alia: corporate legal research, tax
laws research, acting out as corporate secretary (in board
meetings), appearances in both courts and other adjudicatory
agencies (including the Securities and Exchange Commission),
and in other capacities which require an ability to deal with the
law.
At any rate, a corporate lawyer may assume responsibilities other
than the legal affairs of the business of the corporation he is
representing. These include such matters as determining policy
and becoming involved in management. ( Emphasis supplied.)
In a big company, for example, one may have a feeling of being
isolated from the action, or not understanding how one's work
actually fits into the work of the orgarnization. This can be
frustrating to someone who needs to see the results of his work
first hand. In short, a corporate lawyer is sometimes offered this
fortune to be more closely involved in the running of the business.
Moreover, a corporate lawyer's services may sometimes be
engaged by a multinational corporation (MNC). Some large
MNCs provide one of the few opportunities available to corporate
lawyers to enter the international law field. After all, international
law is practiced in a relatively small number of companies and
law firms. Because working in a foreign country is perceived by
many as glamorous, tills is an area coveted by corporate lawyers.
In most cases, however, the overseas jobs go to experienced
attorneys while the younger attorneys do their "international
practice" in law libraries. (Business Star, "Corporate Law
Practice," May 25,1990, p. 4).
This brings us to the inevitable, i.e., the role of the lawyer in the
realm of finance. To borrow the lines of Harvard-educated lawyer
Bruce Wassertein, to wit: "A bad lawyer is one who fails to spot
problems, a good lawyer is one who perceives the difficulties, and
the excellent lawyer is one who surmounts them." (Business Star,
"Corporate Finance Law," Jan. 11, 1989, p. 4).
Today, the study of corporate law practice direly needs a "shot in
the arm," so to speak. No longer are we talking of the traditional
law teaching method of confining the subject study to the
Corporation Code and the Securities Code but an incursion as
well into the intertwining modern management issues.
Such corporate legal management issues deal primarily with
three (3) types of learning: (1) acquisition of insights into current
advances which are of particular significance to the corporate
counsel; (2) an introduction to usable disciplinary skins applicable
to a corporate counsel's management responsibilities; and (3) a
devotion to the organization and management of the legal
function itself.
These three subject areas may be thought of as intersecting
circles, with a shared area linking them. Otherwise known as
"intersecting managerial jurisprudence," it forms a unifying theme
for the corporate counsel's total learning.
Some current advances in behavior and policy sciences affect the
counsel's role. For that matter, the corporate lawyer reviews the
globalization process, including the resulting strategic
repositioning that the firms he provides counsel for are required to
make, and the need to think about a corporation's; strategy at
multiple levels. The salience of the nation-state is being reduced
as firms deal both with global multinational entities and
simultaneously with sub-national governmental units. Firms
increasingly collaborate not only with public entities but with each
other — often with those who are competitors in other arenas.
Also, the nature of the lawyer's participation in decision-making
within the corporation is rapidly changing. The modem corporate
lawyer has gained a new role as a stakeholder — in some cases
participating in the organization and operations of governance
through participation on boards and other decision-making roles.
Often these new patterns develop alongside existing legal
institutions and laws are perceived as barriers. These trends are
complicated as corporations organize for global operations. (
Emphasis supplied)
The practising lawyer of today is familiar as well with
governmental policies toward the promotion and management of
technology. New collaborative arrangements for promoting
specific technologies or competitiveness more generally require
approaches from industry that differ from older, more adversarial
relationships and traditional forms of seeking to influence
governmental policies. And there are lessons to be learned from
other countries. In Europe, Esprit, Eureka and Race are
examples of collaborative efforts between governmental and
business Japan's MITI is world famous. (Emphasis supplied)
Following the concept of boundary spanning, the office of the
Corporate Counsel comprises a distinct group within the
managerial structure of all kinds of organizations. Effectiveness of
both long-term and temporary groups within organizations has
been found to be related to indentifiable factors in the group-
context interaction such as the groups actively revising their
knowledge of the environment coordinating work with outsiders,
promoting team achievements within the organization. In general,
such external activities are better predictors of team performance
than internal group processes.
In a crisis situation, the legal managerial capabilities of the
corporate lawyer vis-a-vis the managerial mettle of corporations
are challenged. Current research is seeking ways both to
anticipate effective managerial procedures and to understand
relationships of financial liability and insurance considerations.
(Emphasis supplied)
Regarding the skills to apply by the corporate counsel, three
factors are apropos:
First System Dynamics. The field of systems dynamics has been
found an effective tool for new managerial thinking regarding both
planning and pressing immediate problems. An understanding of
the role of feedback loops, inventory levels, and rates of flow,
enable users to simulate all sorts of systematic problems —
physical, economic, managerial, social, and psychological. New
programming techniques now make the system dynamics
principles more accessible to managers — including corporate
counsels. (Emphasis supplied)
Second Decision Analysis. This enables users to make better
decisions involving complexity and uncertainty. In the context of a
law department, it can be used to appraise the settlement value
of litigation, aid in negotiation settlement, and minimize the cost
and risk involved in managing a portfolio of cases. (Emphasis
supplied)
Third Modeling for Negotiation Management. Computer-based
models can be used directly by parties and mediators in all lands
of negotiations. All integrated set of such tools provide coherent
and effective negotiation support, including hands-on on
instruction in these techniques. A simulation case of an
international joint venture may be used to illustrate the point.
[Be this as it may,] the organization and management of the legal
function, concern three pointed areas of consideration, thus:
Preventive Lawyering. Planning by lawyers requires special skills
that comprise a major part of the general counsel's
responsibilities. They differ from those of remedial law. Preventive
lawyering is concerned with minimizing the risks of legal trouble
and maximizing legal rights for such legal entities at that time
when transactional or similar facts are being considered and
made.
Managerial Jurisprudence. This is the framework within which are
undertaken those activities of the firm to which legal
consequences attach. It needs to be directly supportive of this
nation's evolving economic and organizational fabric as firms
change to stay competitive in a global, interdependent
environment. The practice and theory of "law" is not adequate
today to facilitate the relationships needed in trying to make a
global economy work.
Organization and Functioning of the Corporate Counsel's Office.
The general counsel has emerged in the last decade as one of
the most vibrant subsets of the legal profession. The corporate
counsel hear responsibility for key aspects of the firm's strategic
issues, including structuring its global operations, managing
improved relationships with an increasingly diversified body of
employees, managing expanded liability exposure, creating new
and varied interactions with public decision-makers, coping
internally with more complex make or by decisions.
This whole exercise drives home the thesis that knowing
corporate law is not enough to make one a good general
corporate counsel nor to give him a full sense of how the legal
system shapes corporate activities. And even if the corporate
lawyer's aim is not the understand all of the law's effects on
corporate activities, he must, at the very least, also gain a
working knowledge of the management issues if only to be able
to grasp not only the basic legal "constitution' or makeup of the
modem corporation. "Business Star", "The Corporate Counsel,"
April 10, 1991, p. 4).
The challenge for lawyers (both of the bar and the bench) is to
have more than a passing knowledge of financial law affecting
each aspect of their work. Yet, many would admit to ignorance of
vast tracts of the financial law territory. What transpires next is a
dilemma of professional security: Will the lawyer admit ignorance
and risk opprobrium?; or will he feign understanding and risk
exposure? (Business Star, "Corporate Finance law," Jan. 11,
1989, p. 4).
Respondent Christian Monsod was nominated by President Corazon C.
Aquino to the position of Chairman of the COMELEC in a letter received
by the Secretariat of the Commission on Appointments on April 25, 1991.
Petitioner opposed the nomination because allegedly Monsod does not
possess the required qualification of having been engaged in the practice
of law for at least ten years.
On June 5, 1991, the Commission on Appointments confirmed the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC. On June 18,
1991, he took his oath of office. On the same day, he assumed office as
Chairman of the COMELEC.
Challenging the validity of the confirmation by the Commission on
Appointments of Monsod's nomination, petitioner as a citizen and
taxpayer, filed the instant petition for certiorari and Prohibition praying
that said confirmation and the consequent appointment of Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections be declared null and void.
Atty. Christian Monsod is a member of the Philippine Bar, having passed
the bar examinations of 1960 with a grade of 86-55%. He has been a
dues paying member of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines since its
inception in 1972-73. He has also been paying his professional license
fees as lawyer for more than ten years. (p. 124, Rollo)
After graduating from the College of Law (U.P.) and having hurdled the
bar, Atty. Monsod worked in the law office of his father. During his stint in
the World Bank Group (1963-1970), Monsod worked as an operations
officer for about two years in Costa Rica and Panama, which involved
getting acquainted with the laws of member-countries negotiating loans
and coordinating legal, economic, and project work of the Bank. Upon
returning to the Philippines in 1970, he worked with the Meralco Group,
served as chief executive officer of an investment bank and subsequently
of a business conglomerate, and since 1986, has rendered services to
various companies as a legal and economic consultant or chief executive
officer. As former Secretary-General (1986) and National Chairman
(1987) of NAMFREL. Monsod's work involved being knowledgeable in
election law. He appeared for NAMFREL in its accreditation hearings
before the Comelec. In the field of advocacy, Monsod, in his personal
capacity and as former Co-Chairman of the Bishops Businessmen's
Conference for Human Development, has worked with the under
privileged sectors, such as the farmer and urban poor groups, in
initiating, lobbying for and engaging in affirmative action for the agrarian
reform law and lately the urban land reform bill. Monsod also made use
of his legal knowledge as a member of the Davide Commission, a quast
judicial body, which conducted numerous hearings (1990) and as a
member of the Constitutional Commission (1986-1987), and Chairman of
its Committee on Accountability of Public Officers, for which he was cited
by the President of the Commission, Justice Cecilia Muñoz-Palma for
"innumerable amendments to reconcile government functions with
individual freedoms and public accountability and the party-list system for
the House of Representative. (pp. 128-129 Rollo) ( Emphasis supplied)
Just a word about the work of a negotiating team of which Atty. Monsod
used to be a member.
In a loan agreement, for instance, a negotiating panel acts as a
team, and which is adequately constituted to meet the various
contingencies that arise during a negotiation. Besides top officials
of the Borrower concerned, there are the legal officer (such as the
legal counsel), the finance manager, and an operations
officer (such as an official involved in negotiating the contracts)
who comprise the members of the team. (Guillermo V. Soliven,
"Loan Negotiating Strategies for Developing Country Borrowers,"
Staff Paper No. 2, Central Bank of the Philippines, Manila, 1982,
p. 11). (Emphasis supplied)
After a fashion, the loan agreement is like a country's
Constitution; it lays down the law as far as the loan transaction is
concerned. Thus, the meat of any Loan Agreement can be
compartmentalized into five (5) fundamental parts: (1) business
terms; (2) borrower's representation; (3) conditions of closing; (4)
covenants; and (5) events of default. (Ibid., p. 13).
In the same vein, lawyers play an important role in any debt
restructuring program. For aside from performing the tasks of
legislative drafting and legal advising, they score national
development policies as key factors in maintaining their countries'
sovereignty. (Condensed from the work paper, entitled "Wanted:
Development Lawyers for Developing Nations," submitted by L.
Michael Hager, regional legal adviser of the United States Agency
for International Development, during the Session on Law for the
Development of Nations at the Abidjan World Conference in Ivory
Coast, sponsored by the World Peace Through Law Center on
August 26-31, 1973). ( Emphasis supplied)
Loan concessions and compromises, perhaps even more so than
purely renegotiation policies, demand expertise in the law of
contracts, in legislation and agreement drafting and in
renegotiation. Necessarily, a sovereign lawyer may work with an
international business specialist or an economist in the
formulation of a model loan agreement. Debt restructuring
contract agreements contain such a mixture of technical language
that they should be carefully drafted and signed only with the
advise of competent counsel in conjunction with the guidance of
adequate technical support personnel. (See International Law
Aspects of the Philippine External Debts, an unpublished
dissertation, U.S.T. Graduate School of Law, 1987, p. 321). (
Emphasis supplied)
A critical aspect of sovereign debt restructuring/contract
construction is the set of terms and conditions which determines
the contractual remedies for a failure to perform one or more
elements of the contract. A good agreement must not only define
the responsibilities of both parties, but must also state the
recourse open to either party when the other fails to discharge an
obligation. For a compleat debt restructuring represents a
devotion to that principle which in the ultimate analysis is sine qua
non for foreign loan agreements-an adherence to the rule of law
in domestic and international affairs of whose kind U.S. Supreme
Court Justice Oliver Wendell Holmes, Jr. once said: "They carry
no banners, they beat no drums; but where they are, men learn
that bustle and bush are not the equal of quiet genius and serene
mastery." (See Ricardo J. Romulo, "The Role of Lawyers in
Foreign Investments," Integrated Bar of the Philippine Journal,
Vol. 15, Nos. 3 and 4, Third and Fourth Quarters, 1977, p. 265).
Interpreted in the light of the various definitions of the term Practice of
law". particularly the modern concept of law practice, and taking into
consideration the liberal construction intended by the framers of the
Constitution, Atty. Monsod's past work experiences as a lawyer-
economist, a lawyer-manager, a lawyer-entrepreneur of industry, a
lawyer-negotiator of contracts, and a lawyer-legislator of both the rich and
the poor — verily more than satisfy the constitutional requirement — that
he has been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years.
Besides in the leading case of Luego v. Civil Service Commission, 143
SCRA 327, the Court said:
Appointment is an essentially discretionary power and must be
performed by the officer in which it is vested according to his best
lights, the only condition being that the appointee should possess
 the qualifications required by law. If he does, then the
appointment cannot be faulted on the ground that there are
others better qualified who should have been preferred. This is a
political question involving considerations of wisdom which only
the appointing authority can decide. (emphasis supplied)
No less emphatic was the Court in the case of (Central Bank v. Civil
Service Commission, 171 SCRA 744) where it stated:
It is well-settled that when the appointee is qualified, as in this
case, and all the other legal requirements are satisfied, the
Commission has no alternative but to attest to the appointment in
accordance with the Civil Service Law. The Commission has no
authority to revoke an appointment on the ground that another
person is more qualified for a particular position. It also has no
authority to direct the appointment of a substitute of its choice. To
do so would be an encroachment on the discretion vested upon
the appointing authority. An appointment is essentially within the
discretionary power of whomsoever it is vested, subject to the
only condition that the appointee should possess the
qualifications required by law. ( Emphasis supplied)
The appointing process in a regular appointment as in the case at bar,
consists of four (4) stages: (1) nomination; (2) confirmation by the
Commission on Appointments; (3) issuance of a commission (in the
Philippines, upon submission by the Commission on Appointments of its
certificate of confirmation, the President issues the permanent
appointment; and (4) acceptance e.g., oath-taking, posting of bond, etc. .
. . (Lacson v. Romero, No. L-3081, October 14, 1949; Gonzales, Law on
Public Officers, p. 200)
The power of the Commission on Appointments to give its consent to the
nomination of Monsod as Chairman of the Commission on Elections is
mandated by Section 1(2) Sub-Article C, Article IX of the Constitution
which provides:
The Chairman and the Commisioners shall be appointed by the
President with the consent of the Commission on Appointments
for a term of seven years without reappointment. Of those first
appointed, three Members shall hold office for seven years, two
Members for five years, and the last Members for three years,
without reappointment. Appointment to any vacancy shall be only
for the unexpired term of the predecessor. In no case shall any
Member be appointed or designated in a temporary or acting
capacity.
Anent Justice Teodoro Padilla's separate opinion, suffice it to say
that his definition of the practice of law is the traditional or
stereotyped notion of law practice, as distinguished from the
modern concept of the practice of law, which modern connotation
is exactly what was intended by the eminent framers of the 1987
Constitution. Moreover, Justice Padilla's definition would require
generally a habitual law practice, perhaps practised two or three
times a week and would outlaw say, law practice once or twice a
year for ten consecutive years. Clearly, this is far from the
constitutional intent.
Upon the other hand, the separate opinion of Justice Isagani Cruz states
that in my written opinion, I made use of a definition of law practice which
really means nothing because the definition says that law practice " . . . is
what people ordinarily mean by the practice of law." True I cited the
definition but only by way of sarcasm as evident from my statement that
the definition of law practice by "traditional areas of law practice is
essentially tautologous" or defining a phrase by means of the phrase
itself that is being defined.
Justice Cruz goes on to say in substance that since the law covers
almost all situations, most individuals, in making use of the law, or in
advising others on what the law means, are actually practicing law. In
that sense, perhaps, but we should not lose sight of the fact that Mr.
Monsod is a lawyer, a member of the Philippine Bar, who has been
practising law for over ten years. This is different from the acts of persons
practising law, without first becoming lawyers.
Justice Cruz also says that the Supreme Court can even disqualify an
elected President of the Philippines, say, on the ground that he lacks one
or more qualifications. This matter, I greatly doubt. For one thing, how
can an action or petition be brought against the President? And even
assuming that he is indeed disqualified, how can the action be
entertained since he is the incumbent President?
We now proceed:
The Commission on the basis of evidence submitted doling the public
hearings on Monsod's confirmation, implicitly determined that he
possessed the necessary qualifications as required by law. The judgment
rendered by the Commission in the exercise of such an acknowledged word. The procurator calmly replied: "Did any blade touch his skin? Did
power is beyond judicial interference except only upon a clear showing of any blood flow from his veins?" The procurator was clearly relying on the
a grave abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction. letter, not the spirit of the agreement.
(Art. VIII, Sec. 1 Constitution). Thus, only where such grave abuse of
discretion is clearly shown shall the Court interfere with the Commission's In view of the foregoing, this petition is hereby DISMISSED.
judgment. In the instant case, there is no occasion for the exercise of the
Court's corrective power, since no abuse, much less a grave abuse of SO ORDERED.
discretion, that would amount to lack or excess of jurisdiction and would
warrant the issuance of the writs prayed, for has been clearly shown.
Fernan, C.J., Griño-Aquino and Medialdea, JJ., concur.
Feliciano, J., I certify that he voted to dismiss the petition. (Fernan, C.J.)
Additionally, consider the following:
Sarmiento, J., is on leave.
(1) If the Commission on Appointments rejects a nominee by the
President, may the Supreme Court reverse the Commission, and
Regalado, and Davide, Jr., J., took no part.
thus in effect confirm the appointment? Clearly, the answer is in
the negative.

(2) In the same vein, may the Court reject the nominee, whom the
Commission has confirmed? The answer is likewise clear.

(3) If the United States Senate (which is the confirming body in

the U.S. Congress) decides to confirm a Presidential nominee, it
would be incredible that the U.S. Supreme Court would Separate Opinions
still reverse the U.S. Senate.

Finally, one significant legal maxim is:

We must interpret not by the letter that killeth, but by the spirit that
giveth life.
Take this hypothetical case of Samson and Delilah. Once, the procurator
of Judea asked Delilah (who was Samson's beloved) for help in capturing
Samson. Delilah agreed on condition that —
No blade shall touch his skin;
No blood shall flow from his veins.
When Samson (his long hair cut by Delilah) was captured, the procurator
placed an iron rod burning white-hot two or three inches away from in
front of Samson's eyes. This blinded the man. Upon hearing of what had
happened to her beloved, Delilah was beside herself with anger, and
fuming with righteous fury, accused the procurator of reneging on his
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras,
albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an
adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on
the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to
comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming
the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO
was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to
established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even
more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for
at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a
COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice"
refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
"practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs-
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments
in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative
of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People
vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to
 the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the
term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge
of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to
be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional
qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to
the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears
from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the
tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which
could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of
law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do
not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged
in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts.
As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I
must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must
differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the
discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to
the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was
that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted
by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why
we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this
Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been
found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason
is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as
they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law
only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating
such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main
source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law
as the "performance of any acts ... in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing.
The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually
every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not
earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some
law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten
years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed
in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied
in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and
the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers
and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed
10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr.
Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice
of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or
another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his
vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in
the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind
on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations
and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our
reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments
whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power
to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod
possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency
in management, educational background, experience in international
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity
and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us
is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional
duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He
is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm
with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has
not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged
one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in
his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that
period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies,
i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive
Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December
1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
 b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain
degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an
effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal
knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry,
civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even
an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-
defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in
the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court,
and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill.
282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving
of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
 People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they
should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should
also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were
rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was
not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer
to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts
for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he
said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a
dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't
recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he
finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate
broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate
contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no
doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated
or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more
especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act
for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional
agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word
is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him
as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his
services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb
"practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as
a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes
frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People
v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
 N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have
profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-
Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member
may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context
of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).
Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of
the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as
President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of
COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this
Court to obey its mandate.
I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed
grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.
I vote to GRANT the petition.
Bidin, J., dissent
Separate Opinions
NARVASA, J., concurring:
I concur with the decision of the majority written by Mr. Justice Paras,
albeit only in the result; it does not appear to me that there has been an
adequate showing that the challenged determination by the Commission
on Appointments-that the appointment of respondent Monsod as
Chairman of the Commission on Elections should, on the basis of his
stated qualifications and after due assessment thereof, be confirmed-was
attended by error so gross as to amount to grave abuse of discretion and
consequently merits nullification by this Court in accordance with the
second paragraph of Section 1, Article VIII of the Constitution. I therefore
vote to DENY the petition.
Melencio-Herrera, J., concur.
PADILLA, J., dissenting:
The records of this case will show that when the Court first deliberated on
the Petition at bar, I voted not only to require the respondents to
comment on the Petition, but I was the sole vote for the issuance of a
temporary restraining order to enjoin respondent Monsod from assuming
the position of COMELEC Chairman, while the Court deliberated on his
constitutional qualification for the office. My purpose in voting for a TRO
was to prevent the inconvenience and even embarrassment to all parties
concerned were the Court to finally decide for respondent Monsod's
disqualification. Moreover, a reading of the Petition then in relation to
established jurisprudence already showed prima facie that respondent
Monsod did not possess the needed qualification, that is, he had not
engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years prior to his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
After considering carefully respondent Monsod's comment, I am even
more convinced that the constitutional requirement of "practice of law for
at least ten (10) years" has not been met.
The procedural barriers interposed by respondents deserve scant
consideration because, ultimately, the core issue to be resolved in this
petition is the proper construal of the constitutional provision requiring a
majority of the membership of COMELEC, including the Chairman thereof
to "have been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years."
(Art. IX(C), Section 1(1), 1987 Constitution). Questions involving the
construction of constitutional provisions are best left to judicial resolution.
As declared in Angara v. Electoral Commission, (63 Phil. 139) "upon the
judicial department is thrown the solemn and inescapable obligation of
interpreting the Constitution and defining constitutional boundaries."
The Constitution has imposed clear and specific standards for a
COMELEC Chairman. Among these are that he must have been
"engaged in the practice of law for at least ten (10) years." It is the
bounden duty of this Court to ensure that such standard is met and
complied with.
What constitutes practice of law? As commonly understood, "practice"
refers to the actual performance or application of knowledge as
distinguished from mere possession of knowledge; it connotes
an active, habitual, repeated or customary action.1 To "practice" law, or
any profession for that matter, means, to exercise or pursue an
employment or profession actively, habitually, repeatedly or customarily.
Therefore, a doctor of medicine who is employed and is habitually
performing the tasks of a nursing aide, cannot be said to be in the
"practice of medicine." A certified public accountant who works as a clerk,
cannot be said to practice his profession as an accountant. In the same
way, a lawyer who is employed as a business executive or a corporate
manager, other than as head or attorney of a Legal Department of a
corporation or a governmental agency, cannot be said to be in the
practice of law.
As aptly held by this Court in the case of People vs. Villanueva:2
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State vs-
Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of
law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted as
customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public as a
lawyer and demanding payment for such services (State vs.
Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644,647.) ... (emphasis supplied).
It is worth mentioning that the respondent Commission on Appointments
in a Memorandum it prepared, enumerated several factors determinative
of whether a particular activity constitutes "practice of law." It states:
1. Habituality. The term "practice of law" implies customarily or
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People
vs. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Boyen, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Ney Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864).
2. Compensation. Practice of law implies that one must have
presented himself to be in the active and continued practice of the
legal profession and that his professional services are available to
the public for compensation, as a service of his livelihood or in
consideration of his said services. (People v. Villanueva, supra).
Hence, charging for services such as preparation of documents
involving the use of legal knowledge and skill is within the term
"practice of law" (Ernani Paño, Bar Reviewer in Legal and Judicial
Ethics, 1988 ed., p. 8 citing People v. People's Stockyards State
Bank, 176 N.B. 901) and, one who renders an opinion as to the
proper interpretation of a statute, and receives pay for it, is to that
extent, practicing law (Martin, supra, p. 806 citing Mendelaun v.
Gilbert and Barket Mfg. Co., 290 N.Y.S. 462) If compensation is
expected, all advice to clients and all action taken for them in
matters connected with the law; are practicing law. (Elwood
Fitchette et al., v. Arthur C. Taylor, 94A-L.R. 356-359)
3. Application of law legal principle practice or procedure which
calls for legal knowledge, training and experience is within the
term "practice of law". (Martin supra)
4. Attorney-client relationship. Engaging in the practice of law
presupposes the existence of lawyer-client relationship. Hence,
 where a lawyer undertakes an activity which requires knowledge
of law but involves no attorney-client relationship, such as
teaching law or writing law books or articles, he cannot be said to
be engaged in the practice of his profession or a lawyer (Agpalo,
Legal Ethics, 1989 ed., p. 30).3
The above-enumerated factors would, I believe, be useful aids in
determining whether or not respondent Monsod meets the constitutional
qualification of practice of law for at least ten (10) years at the time of his
appointment as COMELEC Chairman.
The following relevant questions may be asked:
1. Did respondent Monsod perform any of the tasks which are peculiar to
the practice of law?
2. Did respondent perform such tasks customarily or habitually?
3. Assuming that he performed any of such tasks habitually, did he do so
HABITUALLY FOR AT LEAST TEN (10) YEARS prior to his appointment
as COMELEC Chairman?
Given the employment or job history of respondent Monsod as appears
from the records, I am persuaded that if ever he did perform any of the
tasks which constitute the practice of law, he did not do so HABITUALLY
for at least ten (10) years prior to his appointment as COMELEC
Chairman.
While it may be granted that he performed tasks and activities which
could be latitudinarianly considered activities peculiar to the practice of
law, like the drafting of legal documents and the rendering of legal
opinion or advice, such were isolated transactions or activities which do
not qualify his past endeavors as "practice of law." To become engaged
in the practice of law, there must be a continuity, or a succession of acts.
As observed by the Solicitor General in People vs. Villanueva:4
Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the activeand continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.
ACCORDINGLY, my vote is to GRANT the petition and to declare
respondent Monsod as not qualified for the position of COMELEC
Chairman for not having engaged in the practice of law for at least ten
(10) years prior to his appointment to such position.
CRUZ, J., dissenting:
I am sincerely impressed by the ponencia of my brother Paras but find I
must dissent just the same. There are certain points on which I must
differ with him while of course respecting hisviewpoint.
To begin with, I do not think we are inhibited from examining the
qualifications of the respondent simply because his nomination has been
confirmed by the Commission on Appointments. In my view, this is not a
political question that we are barred from resolving. Determination of the
appointee's credentials is made on the basis of the established facts, not
the discretion of that body. Even if it were, the exercise of that discretion
would still be subject to our review.
In Luego, which is cited in the ponencia, what was involved was the
discretion of the appointing authority to choosebetween two claimants to
the same office who both possessed the required qualifications. It was
that kind of discretion that we said could not be reviewed.
If a person elected by no less than the sovereign people may be ousted
by this Court for lack of the required qualifications, I see no reason why
we cannot disqualified an appointee simply because he has passed the
Commission on Appointments.
Even the President of the Philippines may be declared ineligible by this
Court in an appropriate proceeding notwithstanding that he has been
found acceptable by no less than the enfranchised citizenry. The reason
is that what we would be examining is not the wisdom of his election but
whether or not he was qualified to be elected in the first place.
Coming now to the qualifications of the private respondent, I fear that
the ponencia may have been too sweeping in its definition of the phrase
"practice of law" as to render the qualification practically toothless. From
the numerous activities accepted as embraced in the term, I have the
uncomfortable feeling that one does not even have to be a lawyer to be
engaged in the practice of law as long as his activities involve the
application of some law, however peripherally. The stock broker and the
insurance adjuster and the realtor could come under the definition as
they deal with or give advice on matters that are likely "to become
involved in litigation."
The lawyer is considered engaged in the practice of law even if his main
occupation is another business and he interprets and applies some law
only as an incident of such business. That covers every company
organized under the Corporation Code and regulated by the SEC under
P.D. 902-A. Considering the ramifications of the modern society, there is
hardly any activity that is not affected by some law or government
regulation the businessman must know about and observe. In fact, again
going by the definition, a lawyer does not even have to be part of a
business concern to be considered a practitioner. He can be so deemed
when, on his own, he rents a house or buys a car or consults a doctor as
these acts involve his knowledge and application of the laws regulating
such transactions. If he operates a public utility vehicle as his main
source of livelihood, he would still be deemed engaged in the practice of
law because he must obey the Public Service Act and the rules and
regulations of the Energy Regulatory Board.
The ponencia quotes an American decision defining the practice of law
as the "performance of any acts . . . in or out of court, commonly
understood to be the practice of law," which tells us absolutely nothing.
The decision goes on to say that "because lawyers perform almost every
function known in the commercial and governmental realm, such a
definition would obviously be too global to be workable."
The effect of the definition given in the ponencia is to consider virtually
every lawyer to be engaged in the practice of law even if he does not
earn his living, or at least part of it, as a lawyer. It is enough that his
activities are incidentally (even if only remotely) connected with some
law, ordinance, or regulation. The possible exception is the lawyer whose
income is derived from teaching ballroom dancing or escorting wrinkled
ladies with pubescent pretensions.
The respondent's credentials are impressive, to be sure, but they do not
persuade me that he has been engaged in the practice of law for ten
years as required by the Constitution. It is conceded that he has been
engaged in business and finance, in which areas he has distinguished
himself, but as an executive and economist and not as a practicing
lawyer. The plain fact is that he has occupied the various positions listed
in his resume by virtue of his experience and prestige as a businessman
and not as an attorney-at-law whose principal attention is focused on the
law. Even if it be argued that he was acting as a lawyer when he lobbied
in Congress for agrarian and urban reform, served in the NAMFREL and
the Constitutional Commission (together with non-lawyers like farmers
and priests) and was a member of the Davide Commission, he has not
proved that his activities in these capacities extended over the prescribed
10-year period of actual practice of the law. He is doubtless eminently
qualified for many other positions worthy of his abundant talents but not
as Chairman of the Commission on Elections.
I have much admiration for respondent Monsod, no less than for Mr.
Justice Paras, but I must regretfully vote to grant the petition.
GUTIERREZ, JR., J., dissenting:
When this petition was filed, there was hope that engaging in the practice
of law as a qualification for public office would be settled one way or
another in fairly definitive terms. Unfortunately, this was not the result.
Of the fourteen (14) member Court, 5 are of the view that Mr. Christian
Monsod engaged in the practice of law (with one of these 5 leaving his
vote behind while on official leave but not expressing his clear stand on
the matter); 4 categorically stating that he did not practice law; 2 voting in
the result because there was no error so gross as to amount to grave
abuse of discretion; one of official leave with no instructions left behind
on how he viewed the issue; and 2 not taking part in the deliberations
and the decision.
There are two key factors that make our task difficult. First is our
reviewing the work of a constitutional Commission on Appointments
whose duty is precisely to look into the qualifications of persons
appointed to high office. Even if the Commission errs, we have no power
to set aside error. We can look only into grave abuse of discretion or
whimsically and arbitrariness. Second is our belief that Mr. Monsod
possesses superior qualifications in terms of executive ability, proficiency
in management, educational background, experience in international
banking and finance, and instant recognition by the public. His integrity
and competence are not questioned by the petitioner. What is before us
is compliance with a specific requirement written into the Constitution.
Inspite of my high regard for Mr. Monsod, I cannot shirk my constitutional
duty. He has never engaged in the practice of law for even one year. He
is a member of the bar but to say that he has practiced law is stretching
the term beyond rational limits.
A person may have passed the bar examinations. But if he has not
dedicated his life to the law, if he has not engaged in an activity where
membership in the bar is a requirement I fail to see how he can claim to
have been engaged in the practice of law.
Engaging in the practice of law is a qualification not only for COMELEC
chairman but also for appointment to the Supreme Court and all lower
courts. What kind of Judges or Justices will we have if there main
occupation is selling real estate, managing a business corporation,
serving in fact-finding committee, working in media, or operating a farm
with no active involvement in the law, whether in Government or private
practice, except that in one joyful moment in the distant past, they
happened to pass the bar examinations?
The Constitution uses the phrase "engaged in the practice of law for at
least ten years." The deliberate choice of words shows that the practice
envisioned is active and regular, not isolated, occasional, accidental,
intermittent, incidental, seasonal, or extemporaneous. To be "engaged" in
an activity for ten years requires committed participation in something
which is the result of one's decisive choice. It means that one is occupied
and involved in the enterprise; one is obliged or pledged to carry it out
with intent and attention during the ten-year period.
I agree with the petitioner that based on the bio-data submitted by
respondent Monsod to the Commission on Appointments, the latter has
not been engaged in the practice of law for at least ten years. In fact, if
appears that Mr. Monsod has never practiced law except for an alleged
one year period after passing the bar examinations when he worked in
his father's law firm. Even then his law practice must have been
extremely limited because he was also working for M.A. and Ph. D.
degrees in Economics at the University of Pennsylvania during that
period. How could he practice law in the United States while not a
member of the Bar there?
The professional life of the respondent follows:
1.15.1. Respondent Monsod's activities since his passing the Bar
examinations in 1961 consist of the following:
1. 1961-1963: M.A. in Economics (Ph. D. candidate), University of
Pennsylvania
2. 1963-1970: World Bank Group — Economist, Industry
Department; Operations, Latin American Department; Division
Chief, South Asia and Middle East, International Finance
Corporation
3. 1970-1973: Meralco Group — Executive of various companies,
i.e., Meralco Securities Corporation, Philippine Petroleum
Corporation, Philippine Electric Corporation
4. 1973-1976: Yujuico Group — President, Fil-Capital
Development Corporation and affiliated companies
5. 1976-1978: Finaciera Manila — Chief Executive Officer
6. 1978-1986: Guevent Group of Companies — Chief Executive
Officer
7. 1986-1987: Philippine Constitutional Commission — Member
8. 1989-1991: The Fact-Finding Commission on the December
1989 Coup Attempt — Member
9. Presently: Chairman of the Board and Chief Executive Officer
of the following companies:
a. ACE Container Philippines, Inc.
b. Dataprep, Philippines
c. Philippine SUNsystems Products, Inc.
d. Semirara Coal Corporation
e. CBL Timber Corporation
Member of the Board of the Following:
a. Engineering Construction Corporation of the Philippines
b. First Philippine Energy Corporation
c. First Philippine Holdings Corporation
 d. First Philippine Industrial Corporation
e. Graphic Atelier
f. Manila Electric Company
g. Philippine Commercial Capital, Inc.
h. Philippine Electric Corporation
i. Tarlac Reforestation and Environment Enterprises
j. Tolong Aquaculture Corporation
k. Visayan Aquaculture Corporation
l. Guimaras Aquaculture Corporation (Rollo, pp. 21-22)
There is nothing in the above bio-data which even remotely indicates that
respondent Monsod has given the lawenough attention or a certain
degree of commitment and participation as would support in all sincerity
and candor the claim of having engaged in its practice for at least ten
years. Instead of working as a lawyer, he has lawyers working for him.
Instead of giving receiving that legal advice of legal services, he was the
oneadvice and those services as an executive but not as a lawyer.
The deliberations before the Commission on Appointments show an
effort to equate "engaged in the practice of law" with the use of legal
knowledge in various fields of endeavor such as commerce, industry,
civic work, blue ribbon investigations, agrarian reform, etc. where such
knowledge would be helpful.
I regret that I cannot join in playing fast and loose with a term, which even
an ordinary layman accepts as having a familiar and customary well-
defined meaning. Every resident of this country who has reached the age
of discernment has to know, follow, or apply the law at various times in
his life. Legal knowledge is useful if not necessary for the business
executive, legislator, mayor, barangay captain, teacher, policeman,
farmer, fisherman, market vendor, and student to name only a few. And
yet, can these people honestly assert that as such, they are engaged in
the practice of law?
The Constitution requires having been "engaged in the practice of law for
at least ten years." It is not satisfied with having been "a member of the
Philippine bar for at least ten years."
Some American courts have defined the practice of law, as follows:
The practice of law involves not only appearance in court in
connection with litigation but also services rendered out of court,
and it includes the giving of advice or the rendering of any
services requiring the use of legal skill or knowledge, such as
preparing a will, contract or other instrument, the legal effect of
which, under the facts and conditions involved, must be carefully
determined. People ex rel. Chicago Bar Ass'n v. Tinkoff, 399 Ill.
282, 77 N.E.2d 693; People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901, and
cases cited.
It would be difficult, if not impossible to lay down a formula or
definition of what constitutes the practice of law. "Practicing law"
has been defined as "Practicing as an attorney or counselor at
law according to the laws and customs of our courts, is the giving
of advice or rendition of any sort of service by any person, firm or
corporation when the giving of such advice or rendition of such
service requires the use of any degree of legal knowledge or
skill." Without adopting that definition, we referred to it as being
substantially correct in People ex rel. Illinois State Bar Ass'n v.
People's Stock Yards State Bank, 344 Ill. 462,176 N.E. 901.
(People v. Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773, 776)
For one's actions to come within the purview of practice of law they
should not only be activities peculiar to the work of a lawyer, they should
also be performed, habitually, frequently or customarily, to wit:
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent's answers to questions propounded to him were
rather evasive. He was asked whether or not he ever prepared
contracts for the parties in real-estate transactions where he was
not the procuring agent. He answered: "Very seldom." In answer
to the question as to how many times he had prepared contracts
for the parties during the twenty-one years of his business, he
said: "I have no Idea." When asked if it would be more than half a
dozen times his answer was I suppose. Asked if he did not recall
making the statement to several parties that he had prepared
contracts in a large number of instances, he answered: "I don't
recall exactly what was said." When asked if he did not remember
saying that he had made a practice of preparing deeds,
mortgages and contracts and charging a fee to the parties
therefor in instances where he was not the broker in the deal, he
answered: "Well, I don't believe so, that is not a practice."
Pressed further for an answer as to his practice in preparing
contracts and deeds for parties where he was not the broker, he
finally answered: "I have done about everything that is on the
books as far as real estate is concerned."
xxx xxx xxx
Respondent takes the position that because he is a real-estate
broker he has a lawful right to do any legal work in connection
with real-estate transactions, especially in drawing of real-estate
contracts, deeds, mortgages, notes and the like. There is no
doubt but that he has engaged in these practices over the years
and has charged for his services in that connection. ... (People v.
Schafer, 87 N.E. 2d 773)
xxx xxx xxx
... An attorney, in the most general sense, is a person designated
or employed by another to act in his stead; an agent; more
especially, one of a class of persons authorized to appear and act
for suitors or defendants in legal proceedings. Strictly, these
professional persons are attorneys at law, and non-professional
agents are properly styled "attorney's in fact;" but the single word
is much used as meaning an attorney at law. A person may be an
attorney in facto for another, without being an attorney at law.
Abb. Law Dict. "Attorney." A public attorney, or attorney at law,
says Webster, is an officer of a court of law, legally qualified to
prosecute and defend actions in such court on the retainer of
clients. "The principal duties of an attorney are (1) to be true to
the court and to his client; (2) to manage the business of his client
with care, skill, and integrity; (3) to keep his client informed as to
the state of his business; (4) to keep his secrets confided to him
as such. ... His rights are to be justly compensated for his
services." Bouv. Law Dict. tit. "Attorney." The transitive verb
"practice," as defined by Webster, means 'to do or perform
frequently, customarily, or habitually; to perform by a succession
of acts, as, to practice gaming, ... to carry on in practice, or
repeated action; to apply, as a theory, to real life; to exercise, as
a profession, trade, art. etc.; as, to practice law or medicine,'
etc...." (State v. Bryan, S.E. 522, 523; Emphasis supplied)
In this jurisdiction, we have ruled that the practice of law denotes
frequency or a succession of acts. Thus, we stated in the case of People
v. Villanueva (14 SCRA 109 [1965]):
xxx xxx xxx
... Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary actions, a succession of acts of the same kind. In
other words, it is frequent habitual exercise (State v. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87
Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768). Practice of law to fall within the prohibition
of statute has been interpreted as customarily or habitually holding one's
self out to the public, as a lawyer and demanding payment for such
services. ... . (at p. 112)
It is to be noted that the Commission on Appointment itself
recognizes habituality as a required component of the meaning of
practice of law in a Memorandum prepared and issued by it, to wit:
l. Habituality. The term 'practice of law' implies customarilyor
habitually holding one's self out to the public as a lawyer (People
v. Villanueva, 14 SCRA 109 citing State v. Bryan, 4 S.E. 522, 98
N.C. 644) such as when one sends a circular announcing the
establishment of a law office for the general practice of law (U.S.
v. Noy Bosque, 8 Phil. 146), or when one takes the oath of office
as a lawyer before a notary public, and files a manifestation with
the Supreme Court informing it of his intention to practice law in
all courts in the country (People v. De Luna, 102 Phil. 968).
Practice is more than an isolated appearance, for it consists in
frequent or customary action, a succession of acts of the same
kind. In other words, it is a habitual exercise (People v.
Villanueva, 14 SCRA 1 09 citing State v. Cotner, 1 27, p. 1, 87
Kan, 864)." (Rollo, p. 115)
xxx xxx xxx
While the career as a businessman of respondent Monsod may have
profited from his legal knowledge, the use of such legal knowledge is
incidental and consists of isolated activities which do not fall under the
denomination of practice of law. Admission to the practice of law was not
required for membership in the Constitutional Commission or in the Fact-
Finding Commission on the 1989 Coup Attempt. Any specific legal
activities which may have been assigned to Mr. Monsod while a member
may be likened to isolated transactions of foreign corporations in the
Philippines which do not categorize the foreign corporations as doing
business in the Philippines. As in the practice of law, doing business also
should be active and continuous. Isolated business transactions or
occasional, incidental and casual transactions are not within the context
of doing business. This was our ruling in the case of Antam Consolidated,
Inc. v. Court of appeals, 143 SCRA 288 [1986]).

Respondent Monsod, corporate executive, civic leader, and member of

the Constitutional Commission may possess the background,
competence, integrity, and dedication, to qualify for such high offices as
President, Vice-President, Senator, Congressman or Governor but the
Constitution in prescribing the specific qualification of having engaged in
the practice of law for at least ten (10) years for the position of
COMELEC Chairman has ordered that he may not be confirmed for that
office. The Constitution charges the public respondents no less than this
Court to obey its mandate.

I, therefore, believe that the Commission on Appointments committed

grave abuse of discretion in confirming the nomination of respondent
Monsod as Chairman of the COMELEC.

I vote to GRANT the petition.

Bidin, J., dissent

Footnotes

1 Webster's 3rd New International Dictionary.

2 14 SCRA 109

3 Commission on Appointments' Memorandum dated 25 June

1991 RE: WHAT CONSTITUTES PRACTICE OF LAW, pp. 6-7.

4 14 SCRA 109.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1928 August 3, 1978
In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty.
MARCIAL A. EDILION (IBP Administrative Case No. MDD-1)
RESOLUTION
CASTRO, C.J.:
The respondent Marcial A. Edillon is a duly licensed practicing attorney in
the Philippines.
On November 29, 1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for
short) Board of Governors unanimously adopted Resolution No. 75-65 in
Administrative Case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the
removal of the name of the respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for
"stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues" to the IBP since the
latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice.
On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its then President Liliano B. Neri,
submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and approval,
pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP,
which reads:
.... Should the delinquency further continue until the
following June 29, the Board shall promptly inquire into
the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and
take whatever action it shall deem appropriate, including
a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal
of the delinquent member's name from the Roll of
Attorneys. Notice of the action taken shall be sent by
registered mail to the member and to the Secretary of the
Chapter concerned.
On January 27, 1976, the Court required the respondent to comment on
the resolution and letter adverted to above; he submitted his comment on
February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees
due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP
Board of Governors to reply to Edillon's comment: on March 24, 1976,
they submitted a joint reply.
Thereafter, the case was set for hearing on June 3, 1976. After the
hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in amplification
of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for
resolution.
At the threshold, a painstaking scrutiny of the respondent's pleadings
would show that the propriety and necessity of the integration of the Bar
of the Philippines are in essence conceded. The respondent, however,
objects to particular features of Rule of Court 139-A (hereinafter referred
to as the Court Rule) 1 — in accordance with which the Bar of the
Philippines was integrated — and to the provisions of par. 2, Section 24,
Article III, of the IBP By-Laws (hereinabove cited).
The authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll
of Attorneys is found in par. 2 Section 24, Article Ill of the IBP By-Laws
(supra), whereas the authority of the Court to issue the order applied for
is found in Section 10 of the Court Rule, which reads:
SEC. 10. Effect of non-payment of dues. — Subject to the
provisions of Section 12 of this Rule, default in the
payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant
suspension of membership in the Integrated Bar, and
default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for
the removal of the name of the delinquent member from
the Roll of Attorneys.
The all-encompassing, all-inclusive scope of membership in the IBP is
stated in these words of the Court Rule:
SECTION 1. Organization. — There is hereby organized
an official national body to be known as the 'Integrated
Bar of the Philippines,' composed of all persons whose
 names now appear or may hereafter be included in the
Roll of Attorneys of the Supreme Court.
The obligation to pay membership dues is couched in the following words
of the Court Rule:
SEC. 9. Membership dues. Every member of the
Integrated Bar shall pay such annual dues as the Board
of Governors shall determine with the approval of the
Supreme Court. ...
The core of the respondent's arguments is that the above provisions
constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is
being compelled, as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer
in good standing, to be a member of the IBP and to pay the
corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled
financial support of the said organization to which he is admittedly
personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the rights to liberty and
property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-
Laws are void and of no legal force and effect.
The respondent similarly questions the jurisdiction of the Court to strike
his name from the Roll of Attorneys, contending that the said matter is
not among the justiciable cases triable by the Court but is rather of an
"administrative nature pertaining to an administrative body."
The case at bar is not the first one that has reached the Court relating to
constitutional issues that inevitably and inextricably come up to the
surface whenever attempts are made to regulate the practice of law,
define the conditions of such practice, or revoke the license granted for
the exercise of the legal profession.
The matters here complained of are the very same issues raised in a
previous case before the Court, entitled "Administrative Case No. 526, In
the Matter of the Petition for the Integration of the Bar of the Philippines,
Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners." The Court exhaustively considered all
these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of
the Bar of the Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. The Court
there made the unanimous pronouncement that it was
... fully convinced, after a thoroughgoing conscientious
study of all the arguments adduced in Adm. Case No. 526
and the authoritative materials and the mass of factual
data contained in the exhaustive Report of the
Commission on Bar Integration, that the integration of the
Philippine Bar is 'perfectly constitutional and legally
unobjectionable'. ...
Be that as it may, we now restate briefly the posture of the Court.
An "Integrated Bar" is a State-organized Bar, to which every lawyer must
belong, as distinguished from bar associations organized by individual
lawyers themselves, membership in which is voluntary. Integration of the
Bar is essentially a process by which every member of the Bar is afforded
an opportunity to do his share in carrying out the objectives of the Bar as
well as obliged to bear his portion of its responsibilities. Organized by or
under the direction of the State, an integrated Bar is an official national
body of which all lawyers are required to be members. They are,
therefore, subject to all the rules prescribed for the governance of the
Bar, including the requirement of payment of a reasonable annual fee for
the effective discharge of the purposes of the Bar, and adherence to a
code of professional ethics or professional responsibility breach of which
constitutes sufficient reason for investigation by the Bar and, upon proper
cause appearing, a recommendation for discipline or disbarment of the
offending member. 2
The integration of the Philippine Bar was obviously dictated by overriding
considerations of public interest and public welfare to such an extent as
more than constitutionally and legally justifies the restrictions that
integration imposes upon the personal interests and personal
convenience of individual lawyers. 3
Apropos to the above, it must be stressed that all legislation directing the
integration of the Bar have been uniformly and universally sustained as a
valid exercise of the police power over an important profession. The
practice of law is not a vested right but a privilege, a privilege moreover
clothed with public interest because a lawyer owes substantial duties not
only to his client, but also to his brethren in the profession, to the courts,
and to the nation, and takes part in one of the most important functions of
the State — the administration of justice — as an officer of the
court. 4 The practice of law being clothed with public interest, the holder
of this privilege must submit to a degree of control for the common good,
to the extent of the interest he has created. As the U. S. Supreme Court
through Mr. Justice Roberts explained, the expression "affected with a
public interest" is the equivalent of "subject to the exercise of the police
power" (Nebbia vs. New York, 291 U.S. 502).
When, therefore, Congress enacted Republic Act No. 6397 5 authorizing
the Supreme Court to "adopt rules of court to effect the integration of the
Philippine Bar under such conditions as it shall see fit," it did so in the
exercise of the paramount police power of the State. The Act's avowal is
to "raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the administration
of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility more
effectively." Hence, the Congress in enacting such Act, the Court in
ordaining the integration of the Bar through its Resolution promulgated on
January 9, 1973, and the President of the Philippines in decreeing the
constitution of the IBP into a body corporate through Presidential Decree
No. 181 dated May 4, 1973, were prompted by fundamental
considerations of public welfare and motivated by a desire to meet the
demands of pressing public necessity.
The State, in order to promote the general welfare, may interfere with and
regulate personal liberty, property and occupations. Persons and
property may be subjected to restraints and burdens in order to secure
the general prosperity and welfare of the State (U.S. vs. Gomez Jesus,
31 Phil 218), for, as the Latin maxim goes, "Salus populi est supreme
lex." The public welfare is the supreme law. To this fundamental principle
of government the rights of individuals are subordinated. Liberty is a
blessing without which life is a misery, but liberty should not be made to
prevail over authority because then society win fall into anarchy
(Calalang vs. Williams, 70 Phil. 726). It is an undoubted power of the
State to restrain some individuals from all freedom, and all individuals
from some freedom.
But the most compelling argument sustaining the constitutionality and
validity of Bar integration in the Philippines is the explicit unequivocal
grant of precise power to the Supreme Court by Section 5 (5) of Article X
of the 1973 Constitution of the Philippines, which reads:
Sec. 5. The Supreme Court shall have the following
powers:
xxx xxx xxx
(5) Promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice, and
pro. procedure in all courts, and the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Bar ...,
and Section 1 of Republic Act No. 6397, which reads:
SECTION 1. Within two years from the approval of this
Act, the Supreme Court may adopt rules of Court to effect
the integration of the Philippine Bar under such conditions
as it shall see fit in order to raise the standards of the
legal profession, improve the administration of justice,
and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility
more effectively.
Quite apart from the above, let it be stated that even without the enabling
Act (Republic Act No. 6397), and looking solely to the language of the
provision of the Constitution granting the Supreme Court the power "to
promulgate rules concerning pleading, practice and procedure in all
courts, and the admission to the practice of law," it at once becomes
indubitable that this constitutional declaration vests the Supreme Court
with plenary power in all cases regarding the admission to and
supervision of the practice of law.
Thus, when the respondent Edillon entered upon the legal profession, his
practice of law and his exercise of the said profession, which affect the
society at large, were (and are) subject to the power of the body politic to
require him to conform to such regulations as might be established by the
proper authorities for the common good, even to the extent of interfering
with some of his liberties. If he did not wish to submit himself to such
reasonable interference and regulation, he should not have clothed the
public with an interest in his concerns.
On this score alone, the case for the respondent must already fall.
The issues being of constitutional dimension, however, we now concisely
deal with them seriatim.
1. The first objection posed by the respondent is that the Court is without
power to compel him to become a member of the Integrated Bar of the
Philippines, hence, Section 1 of the Court Rule is unconstitutional for it
impinges on his constitutional right of freedom to associate (and not to
associate). Our answer is: To compel a lawyer to be a member of the
Integrated Bar is not violative of his constitutional freedom to associate. 6
Integration does not make a lawyer a member of any group of which he is
not already a member. He became a member of the Bar when he passed
the Bar examinations. 7 All that integration actually does is to provide an
official national organization for the well-defined but unorganized and
incohesive group of which every lawyer is a ready a member. 8
Bar integration does not compel the lawyer to associate with anyone. He
is free to attend or not attend the meetings of his Integrated Bar Chapter
or vote or refuse to vote in its elections as he chooses. The only
compulsion to which he is subjected is the payment of annual dues. The
Supreme Court, in order to further the State's legitimate interest in
elevating the quality of professional legal services, may require that the
cost of improving the profession in this fashion be shared by the subjects
and beneficiaries of the regulatory program — the lawyers.9
Assuming that the questioned provision does in a sense compel a lawyer
to be a member of the Integrated Bar, such compulsion is justified as an
exercise of the police power of the State. 10
2. The second issue posed by the respondent is that the provision of the
Court Rule requiring payment of a membership fee is void. We see
nothing in the Constitution that prohibits the Court, under its constitutional
power and duty to promulgate rules concerning the admission to the
practice of law and the integration of the Philippine Bar (Article X, Section
5 of the 1973 Constitution) — which power the respondent acknowledges
— from requiring members of a privileged class, such as lawyers are, to
pay a reasonable fee toward defraying the expenses of regulation of the
profession to which they belong. It is quite apparent that the fee is indeed
imposed as a regulatory measure, designed to raise funds for carrying
out the objectives and purposes of integration. 11
3. The respondent further argues that the enforcement of the penalty
provisions would amount to a deprivation of property without due process
and hence infringes on one of his constitutional rights. Whether the
practice of law is a property right, in the sense of its being one that
entitles the holder of a license to practice a profession, we do not here
pause to consider at length, as it clear that under the police power of the
State, and under the necessary powers granted to the Court to
perpetuate its existence, the respondent's right to practise law before the
courts of this country should be and is a matter subject to regulation and
inquiry. And, if the power to impose the fee as a regulatory measure is
recognize, then a penalty designed to enforce its payment, which penalty
may be avoided altogether by payment, is not void as unreasonable or
arbitrary. 12
But we must here emphasize that the practice of law is not a property
right but a mere privilege, 13 and as such must bow to the inherent
regulatory power of the Court to exact compliance with the lawyer's public
responsibilities.
4. Relative to the issue of the power and/or jurisdiction of the Supreme
Court to strike the name of a lawyer from its Roll of Attorneys, it is
sufficient to state that the matters of admission, suspension, disbarment
and reinstatement of lawyers and their regulation and supervision have
been and are indisputably recognized as inherent judicial functions and
responsibilities, and the authorities holding such are legion. 14
In In Re Sparks (267 Ky. 93, 101 S.W. (2d) 194), in which the report of
the Board of Bar Commissioners in a disbarment proceeding was
confirmed and disbarment ordered, the court, sustaining the Bar
Integration Act of Kentucky, said: "The power to regulate the conduct and
qualifications of its officers does not depend upon constitutional or
statutory grounds. It is a power which is inherent in this court as a court
— appropriate, indeed necessary, to the proper administration of justice
... the argument that this is an arbitrary power which the court is
arrogating to itself or accepting from the legislative likewise misconceives
the nature of the duty. It has limitations no less real because they are
inherent. It is an unpleasant task to sit in judgment upon a brother
member of the Bar, particularly where, as here, the facts are disputed. It
is a grave responsibility, to be assumed only with a determination to
uphold the Ideals and traditions of an honorable profession and to protect
the public from overreaching and fraud. The very burden of the duty is
itself a guaranty that the power will not be misused or prostituted. ..."
The Court's jurisdiction was greatly reinforced by our 1973 Constitution
when it explicitly granted to the Court the power to "Promulgate rules
concerning pleading, practice ... and the admission to the practice of law
and the integration of the Bar ... (Article X, Sec. 5(5) the power to pass
upon the fitness of the respondent to remain a member of the legal
profession is indeed undoubtedly vested in the Court.
We thus reach the conclusion that the provisions of Rule of Court 139-A
and of the By-Laws of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines complained of
are neither unconstitutional nor illegal.
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is the unanimous sense of the
Court that the respondent Marcial A. Edillon should be as he is hereby
disbarred, and his name is hereby ordered stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys of the Court.
Fernando, Teehankee, Barredo, Makasiar, Antonio, Muñoz Palma,
Aquino, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez and Guerrero, JJ., concur.

Footnotes
1 Adopted in the Supreme Court's Resolution,
promulgated on January 9, 1973, ordaining the integration
of the Bar of the Philippines.
2 114 A.L.R. 101.
3 Memorandum of Authorities on the Constitutionality of
Bar Integration, cited in the Report of the Commission Bar
Integration on the Integration of the Philippine Bar, Nov.
30, 1972; see also Supreme Court Resolution of January
9, 1973, ordaining the integration of the Philippine Bar.
4 In re Integrating the Bar, 222 Ark 35, 259 S. W. 2d 114;
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d 902;
Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 134 Fla. 851,
186 So. 280: In re Edwards, 45 Idaho 676, 266 P. 665;
Commonwealth ex rel. Ward vs. Harrington, 266 Ky. 41
98 S. W. 2d 53; Ayres vs. Hadaway 303 Mich. 589, 6 N.
W. 2d 905; Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota,
216 Minn. 195; Petition for Integration of Bar of
Minnesota, 216 Minn. 195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; Clark vs.
Austin, 101 S. W. 2d 977; In Re Integration of Nebraska
State Bar Assn., 133 Neb. 283, 275 N. W. 265, 114
A.L.R. 151; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 291; Baker vs.
Varser, 240 N.C. 260, 82 S.E. 2d 90; In re Integration of
State Bar of Oklahoma, 185 Okla, 505, 95 P. 2d 113;
State ex rel. Rice vs. Cozad, 70 S. Dak. 193, 16 N. W. 2d
484; Campbell vs. Third District Committee of Virginia
State Bar, 179 Va. 244, 18 S. E. 2d 883; Lathrop vs.
Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d 404.
5 AN ACT PROVIDING FOR THE INTEGRATION OF
THE PHILIPPINE BAR AND APPROPRIATING FUNDS
THEREFOR, approved on September 17,1971.
6 In re Unification of New Hampsire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709;
In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4P. 2d 643; Lathrop vs.
Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230, 102 N. W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs.
Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6 L. ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826;
Railways Employes' Dept. vs. Hanson, 351 U. S. 225, 100
L. ed. 1112, 76 S. Ct. 714.
7 Diokno, Jose W., "Bar Integration — A Sword and a
Shield for Justice" (Manor Press, Q.C., 1962) p. 17.
8 Fellers James, "Integration of the Bar — Aloha!",
Journal of the Am. Judicature Society, Vol. 47, No. 11
(1964) p. 256. 9 Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,
102, N.W. 2d 404; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 367 U.S. 820, 6
L, ed. 2d 1191, 81 S. Ct. 1826.
9. Lathrop vs. Donohue, 10 Wis., 2d 230, 102, N.W. 2d
404; Lathrop vs. Donohue, 367 U.S. 820, 6L. ed. 2d 1191,
81 S. Ct. 1826.
10 Hill vs. State Bar of California, 97 P. 2d 236; Herron
vs. State Bar of California, 24 Cal. 53, 147 P. 2d 543;
Carpenter vs. State Bar of California, 211 Cal. 358, 295
P. 23; In re Mundy, 202 La. 41, 11 SO. 2d 398; In re
Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291; In re Platz, 60 Nev. 24,
108 P. 2d 858, In re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643;
Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P.
623.
11 Petition of Florida State Bar Association, 40 So. 2d
902; In re Integration of Bar of Hawaii, 432 P. 2d 887;
Petition for Integration of Bar of Minnesota, 216 Minn.
195, 12 N. W. 2d 515; In re Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291;
In re Unification of New Hampshire Bar, 248 A. 2d 709; In
re Gibson, 35 N. Mex. 550, 4 P. 2d 643; State Bar of
Oklahoma vs. McGhnee 148 Okla, 219, 298 P. 580;
Kelley vs. State Bar of Oklahoma, 148 Okla, 282, 298 P.
623; Lathrop vs. Donahue, 10 Wis. 2d 230,102 N. W. 2d
404.
12 In re Gibson, 4 P. 2d 643.
The following words of Justice Harlan are opposite: "The
objection would make every Governmental exaction the
material of a 'free speech' issue. Even the income tax
would be suspect. The objection would carry us to lengths
that have never been dreamed of. The conscientious
objector, if his liberties were to thus extended, might
refuse to contribute taxes in furtherance of war or of any
other end condemned by his conscience as irreligious or
immoral The right of private judgment has never yet been
exalted above the powers and the compulsion of the
agencies of Government." (Concurring opinion of
Harlan, J, joined by Frankfurter, J., in Lathrop vs.
Donahue, 367

U.S. 820, 6 L.ed. 21191, 81 S. Ct. 1826, citing Cardozo,

J. with Branders and Stone, JJ., concurring, in Hamilton
vs. Regents of Univ. of California, 293 U.S. 245, 79 L.ed.
343, 55 S. Ct. 197.)

13 Inre Scott, 53 Nev. 24, 292 P. 291.

14 Bar Flunkers Case, 50 O.G. 1602; In re Aguas, 1 Phil.

1, and others.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
July 30, 1979
PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE USE OF THE FIRM NAME
"SYCIP, SALAZAR, FELICIANO, HERNANDEZ & CASTILLO."
LUCIANO E. SALAZAR, FLORENTINO P. FELICIANO, BENILDO G.
HERNANDEZ. GREGORIO R. CASTILLO. ALBERTO P. SAN JUAN,
JUAN C. REYES. JR., ANDRES G. GATMAITAN, JUSTINO H.
CACANINDIN, NOEL A. LAMAN, ETHELWOLDO E. FERNANDEZ,
ANGELITO C. IMPERIO, EDUARDO R. CENIZA, TRISTAN A.
CATINDIG, ANCHETA K. TAN, and ALICE V. PESIGAN, petitioners.
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR AUTHORITY TO CONTINUE
USE OF THE FIRM NAME "OZAETA, ROMULO, DE LEON, MABANTA
& REYES." RICARDO J. ROMULO, BENJAMIN M. DE LEON, ROMAN
MABANTA, JR., JOSE MA, REYES, JESUS S. J. SAYOC, EDUARDO
DE LOS ANGELES, and JOSE F. BUENAVENTURA, petitioners.
RESOLUTION
MELENCIO-HERRERA, J.:ñé+.£ªwph!1
Two separate Petitions were filed before this Court 1) by the surviving
partners of Atty. Alexander Sycip, who died on May 5, 1975, and 2) by
the surviving partners of Atty. Herminio Ozaeta, who died on February
14, 1976, praying that they be allowed to continue using, in the names of
their firms, the names of partners who had passed away. In the Court's
Resolution of September 2, 1976, both Petitions were ordered
consolidated.
Petitioners base their petitions on the following arguments:
1. Under the law, a partnership is not prohibited from continuing its
business under a firm name which includes the name of a deceased
partner; in fact, Article 1840 of the Civil Code explicitly sanctions the
practice when it provides in the last paragraph that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The use by the person or partnership continuing the
business of the partnership name, or the name of a
deceased partner as part thereof, shall not of itself make
the individual property of the deceased partner liable for
any debts contracted by such person or partnership. 1
2. In regulating other professions, such as accountancy and engineering,
the legislature has authorized the adoption of firm names without any
restriction as to the use, in such firm name, of the name of a deceased
partner; 2 the legislative authorization given to those engaged in the
practice of accountancy — a profession requiring the same degree of
trust and confidence in respect of clients as that implicit in the
relationship of attorney and client — to acquire and use a trade name,
strongly indicates that there is no fundamental policy that is offended by
the continued use by a firm of professionals of a firm name which
includes the name of a deceased partner, at least where such firm name
has acquired the characteristics of a "trade name." 3
3. The Canons of Professional Ethics are not transgressed by the
continued use of the name of a deceased partner in the firm name of a
law partnership because Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
adopted by the American Bar Association declares that: têñ.£îhqwâ£
... The continued use of the name of a deceased or
former partner when permissible by local custom, is not
unethical but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use. ... 4
4. There is no possibility of imposition or deception because the deaths of
their respective deceased partners were well-publicized in all
newspapers of general circulation for several days; the stationeries now
being used by them carry new letterheads indicating the years when their
respective deceased partners were connected with the firm; petitioners
will notify all leading national and international law directories of the fact
of their respective deceased partners' deaths. 5
5. No local custom prohibits the continued use of a deceased partner's
name in a professional firm's name; 6 there is no custom or usage in the
Philippines, or at least in the Greater Manila Area, which recognizes that
the name of a law firm necessarily Identifies the individual members of
the firm. 7
6. The continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of
law partnerships has been consistently allowed by U.S. Courts and is an
accepted practice in the legal profession of most countries in the world.8
The question involved in these Petitions first came under consideration
by this Court in 1953 when a law firm in Cebu (the Deen case) continued
its practice of including in its firm name that of a deceased partner, C.D.
Johnston. The matter was resolved with this Court advising the firm to
desist from including in their firm designation the name of C. D. Johnston,
who has long been dead."
The same issue was raised before this Court in 1958 as an incident in G.
R. No. L-11964, entitled Register of Deeds of Manila vs. China Banking
Corporation. The law firm of Perkins & Ponce Enrile moved to intervene
as amicus curiae. Before acting thereon, the Court, in a Resolution of
April 15, 1957, stated that it "would like to be informed why the name of
Perkins is still being used although Atty. E. A. Perkins is already dead." In
a Manifestation dated May 21, 1957, the law firm of Perkins and Ponce
Enrile, raising substantially the same arguments as those now being
raised by petitioners, prayed that the continued use of the firm name
"Perkins & Ponce Enrile" be held proper.
On June 16, 1958, this Court resolved: têñ.£îhqwâ£
After carefully considering the reasons given by Attorneys
Alfonso Ponce Enrile and Associates for their continued
use of the name of the deceased E. G. Perkins, the Court
found no reason to depart from the policy it adopted in
June 1953 when it required Attorneys Alfred P. Deen and
Eddy A. Deen of Cebu City to desist from including in
their firm designation, the name of C. D. Johnston,
deceased. The Court believes that, in view of the
personal and confidential nature of the relations between
attorney and client, and the high standards demanded in
the canons of professional ethics, no practice should be
allowed which even in a remote degree could give rise to
the possibility of deception. Said attorneys are
accordingly advised to drop the name "PERKINS" from
their firm name.
Petitioners herein now seek a re-examination of the policy thus far
enunciated by the Court.
The Court finds no sufficient reason to depart from the rulings thus laid
down.
A. Inasmuch as "Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez and Castillo" and
"Ozaeta, Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta and Reyes" are partnerships, the
use in their partnership names of the names of deceased partners will
run counter to Article 1815 of the Civil Code which provides: têñ.£îhqwâ£
Art. 1815. Every partnership shall operate under a firm
name, which may or may not include the name of one or
more of the partners.
Those who, not being members of the partnership,
include their names in the firm name, shall be subject to
the liability, of a partner.
It is clearly tacit in the above provision that names in a firm name of a
partnership must either be those of living partners and. in the case of
non-partners, should be living persons who can be subjected to liability.
In fact, Article 1825 of the Civil Code prohibits a third person from
including his name in the firm name under pain of assuming the liability of
a partner. The heirs of a deceased partner in a law firm cannot be held
liable as the old members to the creditors of a firm particularly where they
are non-lawyers. Thus, Canon 34 of the Canons of Professional Ethics
"prohibits an agreement for the payment to the widow and heirs of a
deceased lawyer of a percentage, either gross or net, of the fees
received from the future business of the deceased lawyer's clients, both
because the recipients of such division are not lawyers and because
such payments will not represent service or responsibility on the part of
the recipient. " Accordingly, neither the widow nor the heirs can be held
liable for transactions entered into after the death of their lawyer-
predecessor. There being no benefits accruing, there ran be no
corresponding liability.
Prescinding the law, there could be practical objections to allowing the
use by law firms of the names of deceased partners. The public relations
value of the use of an old firm name can tend to create undue
advantages and disadvantages in the practice of the profession. An able
lawyer without connections will have to make a name for himself starting
from scratch. Another able lawyer, who can join an old firm, can initially
ride on that old firm's reputation established by deceased partners.
B. In regards to the last paragraph of Article 1840 of the Civil Code cited
by petitioners, supra, the first factor to consider is that it is within Chapter
3 of Title IX of the Code entitled "Dissolution and Winding Up." The
Article primarily deals with the exemption from liability in cases of a
dissolved partnership, of the individual property of the deceased partner
for debts contracted by the person or partnership which continues
the business using the partnership name or the name of the deceased
partner as part thereof. What the law contemplates therein is a hold-over
situation preparatory to formal reorganization.
Secondly, Article 1840 treats more of a commercial partnership with a
good will to protect rather than of a professional partnership, with no
saleable good will but whose reputation depends on the personal
qualifications of its individual members. Thus, it has been held that a
saleable goodwill can exist only in a commercial partnership and cannot
arise in a professional partnership consisting of lawyers. 9têñ.£îhqwâ£
As a general rule, upon the dissolution of a commercial
partnership the succeeding partners or parties have the
right to carry on the business under the old name, in the
absence of a stipulation forbidding it, (s)ince the name of
a commercial partnership is a partnership asset
inseparable from the good will of the firm. ... (60 Am Jur
2d, s 204, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
On the other hand, têñ.£îhqwâ£
... a professional partnership the reputation of which
depends or; the individual skill of the members, such as
partnerships of attorneys or physicians, has no good win
to be distributed as a firm asset on its dissolution,
however intrinsically valuable such skill and reputation
may be, especially where there is no provision in the
partnership agreement relating to good will as an asset. ...
(ibid, s 203, p. 115) (Emphasis supplied)
C. A partnership for the practice of law cannot be likened to partnerships
formed by other professionals or for business. For one thing, the law on
accountancy specifically allows the use of a trade name in connection
with the practice of accountancy.10 têñ.£îhqwâ£
A partnership for the practice of law is not a legal entity. It
is a mere relationship or association for a particular
purpose. ... It is not a partnership formed for the purpose
of carrying on trade or business or of holding
property." 11 Thus, it has been stated that "the use of a
nom de plume, assumed or trade name in law practice is
improper. 12
The usual reason given for different standards of conduct
being applicable to the practice of law from those
pertaining to business is that the law is a profession.
Dean Pound, in his recently published contribution to the
Survey of the Legal Profession, (The Lawyer from
Antiquity to Modern Times, p. 5) defines a profession as
"a group of men pursuing a learned art as a common
calling in the spirit of public service, — no less a public
service because it may incidentally be a means of
livelihood."
xxx xxx xxx
Primary characteristics which distinguish the legal
profession from business are:
1. A duty of public service, of which the emolument is a
byproduct, and in which one may attain the highest
eminence without making much money.
2. A relation as an "officer of court" to the administration
of justice involving thorough sincerity, integrity, and
reliability.
3. A relation to clients in the highest degree fiduciary.
4. A relation to colleagues at the bar characterized by
candor, fairness, and unwillingness to resort to current
business methods of advertising and encroachment on
their practice, or dealing directly with their clients. 13
"The right to practice law is not a natural or constitutional right but is in
the nature of a privilege or franchise. 14 It is limited to persons of good
moral character with special qualifications duly ascertained and
certified. 15 The right does not only presuppose in its possessor integrity,
legal standing and attainment, but also the exercise of a special
privilege, highly personal and partaking of the nature of a public trust." 16
D. Petitioners cited Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of the
American Bar Association" in support of their petitions.
It is true that Canon 33 does not consider as unethical the continued use
of the name of a deceased or former partner in the firm name of a law
partnership when such a practice is permissible by local custom but the
Canon warns that care should be taken that no imposition or deception is
practiced through this use.
It must be conceded that in the Philippines, no local custom permits or
allows the continued use of a deceased or former partner's name in the
firm names of law partnerships. Firm names, under our custom, Identify
the more active and/or more senior members or partners of the law
firm. A glimpse at the history of the firms of petitioners and of other law
firms in this country would show how their firm names have evolved and
changed from time to time as the composition of the partnership
changed. têñ.£îhqwâ£
The continued use of a firm name after the death of one
or more of the partners designated by it is proper only
where sustained by local custom and not where by
custom this purports to Identify the active members. ...
There would seem to be a question, under the working of
the Canon, as to the propriety of adding the name of a
new partner and at the same time retaining that of a
deceased partner who was never a partner with the new
one. (H.S. Drinker, op. cit., supra, at pp. 207208)
(Emphasis supplied).
The possibility of deception upon the public, real or consequential, where
the name of a deceased partner continues to be used cannot be ruled
out. A person in search of legal counsel might be guided by the familiar
ring of a distinguished name appearing in a firm title.
E. Petitioners argue that U.S. Courts have consistently allowed the
continued use of a deceased partner's name in the firm name of law
partnerships. But that is so because it is sanctioned by custom.
In the case of Mendelsohn v. Equitable Life Assurance Society (33
N.Y.S. 2d 733) which petitioners Salazar, et al. quoted in their
memorandum, the New York Supreme Court sustained the use of the
firm name Alexander & Green even if none of the present ten partners of
the firm bears either name because the practice was sanctioned by
custom and did not offend any statutory provision or legislative policy and
was adopted by agreement of the parties. The Court stated
therein: têñ.£îhqwâ£
The practice sought to be proscribed has the sanction of
custom and offends no statutory provision or legislative
policy. Canon 33 of the Canons of Professional Ethics of
both the American Bar Association and the New York
State Bar Association provides in part as follows: "The
continued use of the name of a deceased or former
partner, when permissible by local custom is not
unethical, but care should be taken that no imposition or
deception is practiced through this use." There is no
question as to local custom. Many firms in the city use the
names of deceased members with the approval of other
attorneys, bar associations and the courts. The Appellate
Division of the First Department has considered the
matter and reached The conclusion that such practice
should not be prohibited. (Emphasis supplied)
xxx xxx xxx
Neither the Partnership Law nor the Penal Law prohibits
the practice in question. The use of the firm name herein
is also sustainable by reason of agreement between the
partners. 18
Not so in this jurisdiction where there is no local custom that sanctions
the practice. Custom has been defined as a rule of conduct formed by
repetition of acts, uniformly observed (practiced) as a social rule, legally
binding and obligatory. 19 Courts take no judicial notice of custom. A
custom must be proved as a fact, according to the rules of evidence. 20 A
local custom as a source of right cannot be considered by a court of
justice unless such custom is properly established by competent
evidence like any other fact. 21 We find such proof of the existence of a
local custom, and of the elements requisite to constitute the same,
wanting herein. Merely because something is done as a matter of
practice does not mean that Courts can rely on the same for purposes of
adjudication as a juridical custom. Juridical custom must be differentiated
from social custom. The former can supplement statutory law or be
applied in the absence of such statute. Not so with the latter.
Moreover, judicial decisions applying or interpreting the laws form part of
the legal system. 22 When the Supreme Court in the Deen and Perkins
cases issued its Resolutions directing lawyers to desist from including the
names of deceased partners in their firm designation, it laid down a legal
rule against which no custom or practice to the contrary, even if proven,
can prevail. This is not to speak of our civil law which clearly ordains that
a partnership is dissolved by the death of any partner. 23 Custom which
are contrary to law, public order or public policy shall not be
countenanced. 24
The practice of law is intimately and peculiarly related to the
administration of justice and should not be considered like an ordinary
"money-making trade." têñ.£îhqwâ£
... It is of the essence of a profession that it is practiced in
a spirit of public service. A trade ... aims primarily at
personal gain; a profession at the exercise of powers
beneficial to mankind. If, as in the era of wide free
opportunity, we think of free competitive self assertion as
the highest good, lawyer and grocer and farmer may
seem to be freely competing with their fellows in their
calling in order each to acquire as much of the world's
good as he may within the allowed him by law. But the
member of a profession does not regard himself as in
competition with his professional brethren. He is not
bartering his services as is the artisan nor exchanging the
products of his skill and learning as the farmer sells wheat
or corn. There should be no such thing as a lawyers' or
physicians' strike. The best service of the professional
man is often rendered for no equivalent or for a trifling
equivalent and it is his pride to do what he does in a way
worthy of his profession even if done with no expectation
of reward, This spirit of public service in which the
profession of law is and ought to be exercised is a
prerequisite of sound administration of justice according
to law. The other two elements of a profession, namely,
organization and pursuit of a learned art have their
justification in that they secure and maintain that spirit. 25
In fine, petitioners' desire to preserve the Identity of their firms in the eyes
of the public must bow to legal and ethical impediment.
ACCORDINGLY, the petitions filed herein are denied and petitioners
advised to drop the names "SYCIP" and "OZAETA" from their respective
firm names. Those names may, however, be included in the listing of
individuals who have been partners in their firms indicating the years
during which they served as such.
SO ORDERED.
Teehankee, Concepcion, Jr., Santos, Fernandez, Guerrero and De
Castro, JJ., concur
Fernando, C.J. and Abad Santos, J., took no part.
Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them,
seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the
plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of
these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez
and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only
of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed
for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in
peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the
Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976,
prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name
notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta
and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law
Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and
that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an
institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership
of the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is
cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued
use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception
is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that
it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be)
that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are
dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had
customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and
to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected
and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding
the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention
of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
# Separate Opinions
FERNANDO, C.J., concurring:
The petitions are denied, as there are only four votes for granting them,
seven of the Justices being of the contrary view, as explained in the
plurality opinion of Justice Ameurfina Melencio-Herrera. It is out of
delicadeza that the undersigned did not participate in the disposition of
these petitions, as the law office of Sycip, Salazar, Feliciano, Hernandez
and Castillo started with the partnership of Quisumbing, Sycip, and
Quisumbing, the senior partner, the late Ramon Quisumbing, being the
father-in-law of the undersigned, and the most junior partner then,
Norberto J. Quisumbing, being his brother- in-law. For the record, the
undersigned wishes to invite the attention of all concerned, and not only
of petitioners, to the last sentence of the opinion of Justice Ameurfina
Melencio-Herrera: 'Those names [Sycip and Ozaeta] may, however, be
included in the listing of individuals wtes
AQUINO, J., dissenting:
I dissent. The fourteen members of the law firm, Sycip, Salazar,
Feliciano, Hernandez & Castillo, in their petition of June 10, 1975, prayed
for authority to continue the use of that firm name, notwithstanding the
death of Attorney Alexander Sycip on May 5, 1975 (May he rest in
peace). He was the founder of the firm which was originally known as the
Sycip Law Office.
On the other hand, the seven surviving partners of the law firm, Ozaeta,
Romulo, De Leon, Mabanta & Reyes, in their petition of August 13, 1976,
prayed that they be allowed to continue using the said firm name
notwithstanding the death of two partners, former Justice Roman Ozaeta
and his son, Herminio, on May 1, 1972 and February 14, 1976,
respectively.
They alleged that the said law firm was a continuation of the Ozaeta Law
Office which was established in 1957 by Justice Ozaeta and his son and
that, as to the said law firm, the name Ozaeta has acquired an
institutional and secondary connotation.
Article 1840 of the Civil Code, which speaks of the use by the partnership
of the name of a deceased partner as part of the partnership name, is
cited to justify the petitions. Also invoked is the canon that the continued
use by a law firm of the name of a deceased partner, "when permissible
by local custom, is not unethical" as long as "no imposition or deception
is practised through this use" (Canon 33 of the Canons of Legal Ethics).
I am of the opinion that the petition may be granted with the condition that
it be indicated in the letterheads of the two firms (as the case may be)
that Alexander Sycip, former Justice Ozaeta and Herminio Ozaeta are
dead or the period when they served as partners should be stated
therein.
Obviously, the purpose of the two firms in continuing the use of the
names of their deceased founders is to retain the clients who had
customarily sought the legal services of Attorneys Sycip and Ozaeta and
to benefit from the goodwill attached to the names of those respected
and esteemed law practitioners. That is a legitimate motivation.
The retention of their names is not illegal per se. That practice was
followed before the war by the law firm of James Ross. Notwithstanding
the death of Judge Ross the founder of the law firm of Ross, Lawrence,
Selph and Carrascoso, his name was retained in the firm name with an
indication of the year when he died. No one complained that the retention
of the name of Judge Ross in the firm name was illegal or unethical.
#Footnotestêñ.£îhqwâ£
1 See Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 5: see also
Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 3.
2 Citing Sec, 16-A, Public Act No. 3105, as amended by
Commonwealth Act No. 342; Sec. 39, Commonwealth Act
No. 294; Sec. 23, Republic Act No. 318; Sec. 39,
Republic Act No. 184.
3 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 7-8.
4 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 8-10; Petition of
Romulo, et al., pp. 3- 4.
5 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 13; Petition of
Romulo, et al., p. 4.
6 Petition of Romulo, et al., p. 4.
7 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., p. 11.
8 Memorandum of Salazar, et al., pp. 6-7 and pp. 16-18;
Petition of Romulo. et al., p, 5.
9 Seddal vs. Keating, 8 App. Div. 2d 44, 185 NYS 2d 630,
affd 7 NY 2d 846, 196 NYS 2d 986, 164 NE 2d 860.
10 Section 16-A, Commonwealth Act No. 342.
11 In re Crawford's Estate, 184 NE 2d 779, 783.
12 H.S. Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953), p. 206; see also
Canon 33, par. 2, Canons of Professional Ethics.
13 H.S, Drinker, Legal Ethics (1953) pp. 4-5.
14 7 C.J.S. 708.
15 Am Jur 270.
16 In re Lavine, 41 P2d 161, all cited in Martin, Legal and
Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed., p. 8.
17 Canons 1 to 32 which were adopted by the American
Bar Association in 1908 were also adopted by the
Philippine Bar Association in 1917. The American Bar
Association adopted Canons 33 to 45 in 1928, Canon 46
in 1933 and Canon 47 in 1937. On April 20, 1946, when
Canons 33 to 47 where already in effect, the Revised
Constitution of the Philippine Bar Association was
approved and it provided that the Association "adopts and
makes its own the Code of Ethics of the American Bar
Association." (Martin, Legal and Judicial Ethics, Fifth Ed.
p, 341).
18 33 N.Y.S. 2d 733, 734.
19 JBL Reyes & RC Puno, Outline of Philippine Civil Law.
Fourth Ed., Vol. I, p. 7
20 Article 12, Civil Code.
21 Patriarca vs. Orate, 7 Phil. 390, 395 (1907).
22 Art. 8, Civil Code

23 Art. 1830, Civil Code.

24 Art. 11, Civil Code.

25 Roscoe Pound, The Lawyer From Antiquity To Modern

Times, (1953), pp. 9-10.
 EN BANC
Responsibility;[2] and constitutes sufficient ground for his disbarment under

ROBERTO SORIANO, A.C. No. 6792 Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court.[3]
Complainant,
Present:
Panganiban, CJ,
Puno, Because of the failure of Atty. Dizon to submit his Answer to the
Quisumbing,
Ynares-Santiago, Complaint, the CBD issued a Notice dated May 20, 2004, informing him
Sandoval-Gutierrez,
Carpio, that he was in default, and that an ex-parte hearing had been scheduled
- versus - Austria-Martinez,
Corona, for June 11, 2004.[4]
Carpio Morales,
Callejo, Sr., After that hearing, complainant manifested that he was submitting the case
Azcuna,
Tinga, on the basis of the Complaint and its attachments.[5] Accordingly,
Chico-Nazario, and
Garcia, JJ the CBDdirected him to file his Position Paper, which he did on July 27,

Atty. MANUEL DIZON, Promulgated: 2004.[6] Afterwards, the case was deemed submitted for resolution.
Respondent. January 25, 2006
x---------------------------------------------------------------------------------x

On December 6, 2004, Commissioner Teresita J. Herbosa rendered

DECISION
her Report and Recommendation, which was later adopted and approved by
PER CURIAM:
the IBP Board of Governors in its Resolution No. XVI-2005-84 dated March 12,

Before us is a Complaint-Affidavit[1] for the disbarment of Atty. 2005.

Manuel Dizon, filed by Roberto Soriano with the Commission on Bar

Discipine (CBD) of the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP). Complainant In his Complaint-Affidavit, Soriano alleged that respondent had violated

alleges that the conviction of respondent for a crime involving moral Canon 1, Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional Responsibility; and that

turpitude, together with the circumstances surrounding the conviction, the conviction of the latter for frustrated homicide,[7] which involved moral

violates Canon 1 of Rule 1.01 of the Code of Professional turpitude, should result in his disbarment.
 The facts leading to respondents conviction were summarized by It was the prosecution witness, Antonio Billanes, who came to the

Branch 60 of the Regional Trial Court of Baguio City in this wise: aid of Soriano and brought the latter to the hospital. Because the bullet had

x x x. The accused was driving his brown Toyota lacerated the carotid artery on the left side of his neck,[9] complainant would
Corolla and was on his way home after gassing up in
preparation for his trip to Concepcion, Tarlac with his wife. have surely died of hemorrhage if he had not received timely medical
Along Abanao Street, a taxi driver overtook the car driven
by the accused not knowing that the driver of the car he assistance, according to the attending surgeon, Dr. Francisco Hernandez,
had overtaken is not just someone, but a lawyer and a
prominent member of the Baguio community who was Jr. Soriano sustained a spinal cord injury, which caused paralysis on the
under the influence of liquor. Incensed, the accused tailed
the taxi driver until the latter stopped to make a turn at [the] left part of his body and disabled him for his job as a taxi driver.
Chugum and Carino Streets. The accused also stopped his
car, berated the taxi driver and held him by his shirt. To
stop the aggression, the taxi driver forced open his door
causing the accused to fall to the ground. The taxi driver The trial court promulgated its Decision dated November 29, 2001.
knew that the accused had been drinking because he
smelled of liquor. Taking pity on the accused who looked On January 18, 2002, respondent filed an application for probation, which
elderly, the taxi driver got out of his car to help him get up.
But the accused, by now enraged, stood up immediately was granted by the court on several conditions. These included satisfaction
and was about to deal the taxi driver a fist blow when the
latter boxed him on the chest instead. The accused fell of the civil liabilities imposed by [the] court in favor of the offended party,
down a second time, got up again and was about to box
the taxi driver but the latter caught his fist and turned his Roberto Soriano.[10]
arm around. The taxi driver held on to the accused until he
could be pacified and then released him. The accused
went back to his car and got his revolver making sure that
the handle was wrapped in a handkerchief. The taxi driver According to the unrefuted statements of complainant, Atty. Dizon,
was on his way back to his vehicle when he noticed the
eyeglasses of the accused on the ground. He picked them who has yet to comply with this particular undertaking, even appealed the
up intending to return them to the accused. But as he was
handing the same to the accused, he was met by the barrel civil liability to the Court of Appeals.[11]
of the gun held by the accused who fired and shot him
hitting him on the neck. He fell on the thigh of the accused
so the latter pushed him out and sped off. The incident was
witnessed by Antonio Billanes whose testimony In her Report and Recommendation, Commissioner Herbosa
corroborated that of the taxi driver, the complainant in this
case, Roberto Soriano.[8] recommended that respondent be disbarred from the practice of law for

having been convicted of a crime involving moral turpitude.

 The commissioner found that respondent had not only been

convicted of such crime, but that the latter also exhibited an obvious lack Under Section 27 of Rule 138 of the Rules of Court, conviction for

of good moral character, based on the following facts: a crime involving moral turpitude is a ground for disbarment or suspension.

1. He was under the influence of liquor while driving his car; By such conviction, a lawyer is deemed to have become unfit to uphold the
2. He reacted violently and attempted to assault
Complainant only because the latter, driving a taxi, administration of justice and to be no longer possessed of good moral
had overtaken him;
3. Complainant having been able to ward off his attempted character.[13] In the instant case, respondent has been found guilty; and he
assault, Respondent went back to his car, got a
gun, wrapped the same with a handkerchief and stands convicted, by final judgment, of frustrated homicide. Since his
shot Complainant[,] who was unarmed;
4. When Complainant fell on him, Respondent simply conviction has already been established and is no longer open to question,
pushed him out and fled;
5. Despite positive identification and overwhelming the only issues that remain to be determined are as follows: 1) whether his
evidence, Respondent denied that he had shot
Complainant; crime of frustrated homicide involves moral turpitude, and 2) whether his
6. Apart from [his] denial, Respondent also lied when he
claimed that he was the one mauled by guilt warrants disbarment.
Complainant and two unidentified persons; and,
7. Although he has been placed on probation, Respondent
has[,] to date[,] not yet satisfied his civil liabilities to
Complainant.[12] Moral turpitude has been defined as everything which is done contrary to

justice, modesty, or good morals; an act of baseness, vileness or depravity

in the private and social duties which a man owes his fellowmen, or to
On July 8, 2005, the Supreme Court received for its final action the
society in general, contrary to justice, honesty, modesty, or good morals.[14]
IBP Resolution adopting the Report and Recommendation of the
The question of whether the crime of homicide involves moral
Investigating Commissioner.
turpitude has been discussed in International Rice Research Institute

(IRRI) v. NLRC,[15] a labor case concerning an employee who was

We agree with the findings and recommendations of
dismissed on the basis of his conviction for homicide. Considering the
Commissioner Herbosa, as approved and adopted by the IBP Board of
particular circumstances surrounding the commission of the crime, this
Governors.
Court rejected the employers contention and held that homicide in that

case did not involve moral turpitude. (If it did, the crime would have been
violative of the IRRIs Employment Policy Regulations and indeed a ground for
dismissal.) The Court explained that, having disregarded the attendant circumstances,
the employer made a pronouncement that was precipitate. Furthermore, it was not for
the latter to determine conclusively whether a crime involved moral turpitude. That
discretion belonged to the courts, as explained thus:
x x x. Homicide may or may not involve moral
turpitude depending on the degree of the crime. Moral
turpitude is not involved in every criminal act and is not
shown by every known and intentional violation of statute,
but whether any particular conviction involves moral
turpitude may be a question of fact and frequently depends
on all the surrounding circumstances. x x x.[16] (Emphasis
supplied)
In the IRRI case, in which the crime of homicide did not involve
moral turpitude, the Court appreciated the presence of incomplete self-
defense and total absence of aggravating circumstances. For a better
understanding of that Decision, the circumstances of the crime are quoted
as follows:
x x x. The facts on record show that Micosa [the IRRI
employee] was then urinating and had his back turned
when the victim drove his fist unto Micosa's face; that the
victim then forcibly rubbed Micosa's face into the filthy
urinal; that Micosa pleaded to the victim to stop the attack
but was ignored and that it was while Micosa was in that
position that he drew a fan knife from the left pocket of his
shirt and desperately swung it at the victim who released
his hold on Micosa only after the latter had stabbed him
several times. These facts show that Micosa's intention
was not to slay the victim but only to defend his person.
The appreciation in his favor of the mitigating
circumstances of self-defense and voluntary surrender,
plus the total absence of any aggravating circumstance
demonstrate that Micosa's character and intentions were
not inherently vile, immoral or unjust.[17]
The present case is totally different. As the IBP correctly found, the
circumstances clearly evince the moral turpitude of respondent and his
unworthiness to practice law.
Atty. Dizon was definitely the aggressor, as he pursued and shot
complainant when the latter least expected it. The act of aggression shown
by respondent will not be mitigated by the fact that he was hit once and his
arm twisted by complainant. Under the circumstances, those were
reasonable actions clearly intended to fend off the lawyers assault.
We also consider the trial courts finding of treachery as a further indication
of the skewed morals of respondent. He shot the victim when the latter was
not in a position to defend himself. In fact, under the impression that the
assault was already over, the unarmed complainant was merely returning
the eyeglasses of Atty. Dizon when the latter unexpectedly shot him. To
make matters worse, respondent wrapped the handle of his gun with a
handkerchief so as not to leave fingerprints. In so doing, he betrayed his
sly intention to escape punishment for his crime.
 All told, Atty. Dizon has shown through this incident that he is

The totality of the facts unmistakably bears the earmarks of moral wanting in even a basic sense of justice. He obtained the benevolence of

turpitude. By his conduct, respondent revealed his extreme arrogance and the trial court when it suspended his sentence and granted him probation.

feeling of self-importance. As it were, he acted like a god on the road, who And yet, it has been four years[21] since he was ordered to settle his civil

deserved to be venerated and never to be slighted. Clearly, his inordinate liabilities to complainant. To date, respondent remains adamant in refusing

reaction to a simple traffic incident reflected poorly on his fitness to be a to fulfill that obligation. By his extreme impetuosity and intolerance, as

member of the legal profession. His overreaction also evinced shown by his violent reaction to a simple traffic altercation, he has taken

vindictiveness, which was definitely an undesirable trait in any individual, away the earning capacity, good health, and youthful vigor of his victim.

more so in a lawyer. In the tenacity with which he pursued complainant, Still, Atty. Dizon begrudges complainant the measly amount that could

we see not the persistence of a person who has been grievously wronged, never even fully restore what the latter has lost.

but the obstinacy of one trying to assert a false sense of superiority and to exact

revenge. Conviction for a crime involving moral turpitude may relate, not to

the exercise of the profession of lawyers, but certainly to their good moral

It is also glaringly clear that respondent seriously transgressed character.[22] Where their misconduct outside of their professional dealings

Canon 1 of the Code of Professional Responsibility through his illegal is so gross as to show them morally unfit for their office and unworthy of

possession of an unlicensed firearm[18] and his unjust refusal to satisfy his the privileges conferred upon them by their license and the law, the court

civil liabilities.[19] may be justified in suspending or removing them from that office.[23]

He has thus brazenly violated the law and disobeyed the lawful orders of the

courts. We remind him that, both in his attorneys oath[20] and in the Code of
We also adopt the IBPs finding that respondent displayed an utter
Professional Responsibility, he bound himself to obey the laws of the land.
lack of good moral character, which is an essential qualification for the
privilege to enter into the practice of law. Good moral character includes at

least common honesty.[24]

Lawyers must be ministers of truth. No moral qualification for bar

membership is more important than truthfulness.[29] The rigorous ethics of

In the case at bar, respondent consistently displayed dishonest

the profession places a premium on honesty and condemns duplicitous

and duplicitous behavior. As found by the trial court, he had sought, with
behavior.[30] Hence, lawyers must not mislead the court or allow it to be

the aid of Vice-Mayor Daniel Farias, an out-of-court settlement with

misled by any artifice. In all their dealings, they are expected to act in good

complainants family.[25] But when this effort failed, respondent concocted

faith.

a complete lie by making it appear that it was complainants family that had

The actions of respondent erode rather than enhance public

sought a conference with him to obtain his referral to a neurosurgeon.[26]
perception of the legal profession. They constitute moral turpitude for

which he should be disbarred. Law is a noble profession, and the privilege

The lies of Atty Dizon did not end there. He went on to fabricate an
to practice it is bestowed only upon individuals who are competent

entirely implausible story of having been mauled by complainant and two intellectually,

academically and, equally important, morally. Because they are vanguards

other persons.[27] The trial court had this to say:
of the law and the legal system, lawyers must at all times conduct
The physical evidence as testified to by no less
than three (3) doctors who examined [Atty. Dizon] does not
themselves, especially in their dealings with their clients and the public at
support his allegation that three people including the
complainant helped each other in kicking and boxing him.
large, with honesty and integrity in a manner beyond reproach.[31]
The injuries he sustained were so minor that it is
improbable[,] if not downright unbelievable[,] that three
people who he said were bent on beating him to death
could do so little damage. On the contrary, his injuries
The foregoing abhorrent acts of respondent are not merely
sustain the complainants version of the incident particularly
when he said that he boxed the accused on the chest. x x
dishonorable; they reveal a basic moral flaw. Considering the depravity of
x.[28]
the offense he committed, we find the penalty recommended by the IBP practice of law. Sadly, herein respondent has fallen short of the exacting

proper and commensurate. standards expected of him as a vanguard of the legal profession.

In sum, when lawyers are convicted of frustrated homicide, the attending

The purpose of a proceeding for disbarment is to protect the circumstances not the mere fact of their conviction would demonstrate their

administration of justice by requiring that those who exercise this important fitness to remain in the legal profession. In the present case, the appalling

function be competent, honorable and reliable -- lawyers in whom courts vindictiveness, treachery, and brazen dishonesty of respondent clearly show his

and clients may repose confidence.[32] Thus, whenever a clear case of unworthiness to continue as a member of the bar.

degenerate and vile behavior disturbs that vital yet fragile confidence, we

shall not hesitate to rid our profession of odious members. WHEREFORE, RESPONDENT MANUEL DIZON is

hereby DISBARRED, and his name is ORDERED STRICKEN from the

We remain aware that the power to disbar must be exercised with Roll of Attorneys. Let a copy of this Decision be entered in his record as a

great caution, and that disbarment should never be decreed when any member of the Bar; and let notice of the same be served on the Integrated

lesser penalty would accomplish the end desired. In the instant case, Bar of the Philippines, and on the Office of the Court Administrator for

however, the Court cannot extend that munificence to respondent. His circulation to all courts in the country.

actions so despicably and wantonly disregarded his duties to society and

his profession. We are convinced that meting out a lesser penalty would SO ORDERED.

be irreconcilable with our lofty aspiration for the legal profession -- that

every lawyer be a shining exemplar of truth and justice.

We stress that membership in the legal profession is a privilege

demanding a high degree of good moral character, not only as a condition

precedent to admission, but also as a continuing requirement for the

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.C. No. 244 March 29, 1963
IN THE MATTER OF THE PETITION FOR DISBARMENT OF
TELESFORO A. DIAO,
vs.
SEVERINO G. MARTINEZ, petitioner.
BENGZON, C.J.:
After successfully passing the corresponding examinations held in 1953,
Telesforo A. Diao was admitted to the Bar.
About two years later, Severino Martinez charged him with having falsely
represented in his application for such Bar examination, that he had the
requisite academic qualifications. The matter was in due course referred
to the Solicitor General who caused the charge to be investigated; and
later he submitted a report recommending that Diao's name be erased
from the roll of attorneys, because contrary to the allegations in his
petition for examination in this Court, he (Diao) had not completed, before
taking up law subjects, the required pre-legal education prescribed by the
Department of Private Education, specially, in the following particulars:
(a) Diao did not complete his high school training; and
(b) Diao never attended Quisumbing College, and never obtained
his A.A. diploma therefrom — which contradicts the credentials
he had submitted in support of his application for examination,
and of his allegation therein of successful completion of the
"required pre-legal education".
Answering this official report and complaint, Telesforo A. Diao, practically
admits the first charge: but he claims that although he had left high
school in his third year, he entered the service of the U.S. Army, passed
the General Classification Test given therein, which (according to him) is
equivalent to a high school diploma, and upon his return to civilian life,
the educational authorities considered his army service as the equivalent
of 3rd and 4th year high school.
We have serious doubts, about the validity of this claim, what with
respondent's failure to exhibit any certification to that effect (the
equivalence) by the proper school officials. However, it is unnecessary to
dwell on this, since the second charge is clearly meritorious. Diao never
obtained his A.A. from Quisumbing College; and yet his application for
examination represented him as an A.A. graduate (1940-1941) of such
college. Now, asserting he had obtained his A.A. title from the Arellano
University in April, 1949, he says he was erroneously certified, due to
confusion, as a graduate of Quisumbing College, in his school records.
Wherefore, the parties respectfully pray that the foregoing stipulation of
facts be admitted and approved by this Honorable Court, without
prejudice to the parties adducing other evidence to prove their case not
covered by this stipulation of facts. 1äwphï1.ñët
This explanation is not acceptable, for the reason that the "error" or
"confusion" was obviously of his own making. Had his application
disclosed his having obtained A.A. from Arellano University, it would also
have disclosed that he got it in April, 1949, thereby showing that he
began his law studies (2nd semester of 1948-1949) six months before
obtaining his Associate in Arts degree. And then he would not have been
permitted to take the bar tests, because our Rules provide, and the
applicant for the Bar examination must affirm under oath, "That previous
to the study of law, he had successfully and satisfactorily completed the
required pre-legal education(A.A.) as prescribed by the Department of
Private Education," (emphasis on "previous").
Plainly, therefore, Telesforo A. Diao was not qualified to take the bar
examinations; but due to his false representations, he was allowed to
take it, luckily passed it, and was thereafter admitted to the Bar. Such
admission having been obtained under false pretenses must be, and is
hereby revoked. The fact that he hurdled the Bar examinations is
immaterial. Passing such examinations is not the only qualification to
become an attorney-at-law; taking the prescribed courses of legal study
in the regular manner is equally essential..
The Clerk is, therefore, ordered to strike from the roll of attorneys, the
name of Telesforo A. Diao. And the latter is required to return his lawyer's
diploma within thirty days. So ordered.
Padilla, Bautista Angelo, Labrador, Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera,
Paredes, Dizon, Regala and Makalintal, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
A.M. No. 1162 August 29, 1975
IN RE: VICTORIO D. LANUEVO, former Bar Confidant and Deputy
Clerk of Court, respondent.
A.C. No. 1163 August 29, 1975
IN RE: RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, 1971 Bar
Examinee, respondent.
A.M. No. 1164 August 29, 1975
IN RE: HON. BERNARDO PARDO, HON. RAMON PAMATIAN, ATTY.
MANUEL TOMACRUZ, ATTY. FIDEL MANALO and ATTY.
GUILLERMO PABLO, JR., Members, 1971 Bar Examining
Committee, respondent.
MAKASIAR, J.:
Administrative proceedings against Victorio D. Lanuevo — for
disbarment; Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang — for disbarment;
Hon. Bernardo Pardo, Hon. Ramon Pamatian, Atty. Manuel C. Tomacruz;
Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty. Fidel Manalo and Atty. Guillermo Pablo,
Jr. — for disciplinary action — for their acts and omissions during the
1971 Bar Examinations.
In his request dated March 29, 1972 contained in a confidential letter to
the Court for re-correction and re-evaluation of his answer to the 1971
Bar Examinations question, Oscar Landicho — who flunked in the 1971,
1968 and 1967 Bar Examinations with a grade of 70.5%, 65.35% and
67.55%, respectively — invited the attention of the Court to "The starling
fact that the grade in one examination (Civil Law) of at least one bar
candidate was raised for one reason or another, before the bar results
were released this year" (Confidential Letter, p. 2. Vol. I, rec.). This was
confirmed, according to him, by the Civil Law Examiner himself (Hon.
Ramon C. Pamatian) as well as by Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo. He
further therein stated "that there are strong reasons to believe that the
grades in other examination notebooks in other subjects also underwent
alternations — to raise the grades — prior to the release of the results.
Note that this was without any formal motion or request from the proper
parties, i.e., the bar candidates concerned. If the examiners concerned
reconsidered their grades without formal motion, there is no reason why
they may not do so now when proper request answer motion therefor is
made. It would be contrary to due process postulates. Might not one say
that some candidates got unfair and unjust treatment, for their grades
were not asked to be reconsidered 'unofficially'? Why the discrimination?
Does this not afford sufficient reason for the Court en banc to go into
these matters by its conceded power to ultimately decide the matter of
admission to the bar?" (p. 2, Confidential Letter, Vol. I, rec.).
Acting on the aforesaid confidential letter, the Court checked the records
of the 1971 Bar Examinations and found that the grades in five subjects
— Political Law and Public International Law, Civil Law, Mercantile Law,
Criminal Law and Remedial Law — of a successful bar candidate with
office code No. 954 underwent some changes which, however, were duly
initialed and authenticated by the respective examiner concerned.
Further check of the records revealed that the bar candidate with office
code No. 954 is one Ramon E. Galang, a perennial bar candidate, who
flunked in the 1969, 1966, 1964, 1963, and 1962 bar examinations with a
grade of 67.55%, 68.65%, 72.75%, 68.2%, 56.45% and
57.3%, respectively. He passed in the 1971 bar examinations with a
grade of 74.15%, which was considered as 75% by virtue of a Court of
74.15%, which was considered as 75% as the passing mark for the 1971
bar examinations.
Upon the direction of the Court, the 1971 Bar Examination Chairman
requested Bar Confidant Victorio D. Lanuevo and the five (5) bar
examiners concerned to submit their sworn statements on the matter,
with which request they complied.
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, said Bar
Confidant admitted having brought the five examination notebooks of
Ramon E. Galang, alias Ramon E. Galang, back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking, stating the circumstances
under which the same was done and his reasons for doing the same.
Each of the five (5) examiners in his individual sworn
statement admitted having re-evaluated and/or re-checked the notebook
involved pertaining to his subject upon the representation to him by Bar
Confidant Lanuevo that he has the authority to do the same and that the
examinee concerned failed only in his particular subject and/or was on
the borderline of passing.
Finding a prima facie case against the respondents warranting a formal
investigation, the Court required, in a resolution dated March 5, 1973, Bar
Confidant Victorio Lanuevo "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 34, rec.). Considering that the re-
evaluation of the examination papers of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang, was unauthorized, and therefore he did not obtain a passing
average in the 1971 bar examinations, the Court likewise resolved on
March 5, 1971 to requires him "to show cause within ten (10) days from
notice why his name should not be stricken from the Roll of
Attorneys" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 99, rec.). The five examiners
concerned were also required by the Court "to show cause within ten (10)
days from notice why no disciplinary action should be taken against
them" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 31, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz filed his answer on March 12, 1973 (Adm. Case
No. 1164, p. 70, rec.). while respondents Pardo, Pamatian, Montecillo,
Manalo and Lanuevo filed theirs on March 19, 1973 (Adm. Case No.
1162, pp. 60-63, 32-35, 40-41, 36-39 and 35-38, rec.). At the hearing on
August 27, 1973, respondent Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in
addition to, and in amplication of, his answer filed on March 19, 1973
(Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47, rec.). Respondent Galang filed his
unverified answer on March 16, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104,
rec.). He was required by the Court to verify the same and complaince
came on May 18, 1973 (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 106-110,) rec.).
In the course of the investigation, it was found that it was not respondent
Bernardo Pardo who re-evaluated and/or re-checked examination booklet
with Office Code No. 954 in Political Law and Public International Law of
examinee Ramon Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, but Guillermo Pablo,
Jr., examiner in Legal Ethics and Practical Exercise, who was asked to
help in the correction of a number of examination notebooks in Political
Law and Public International Law to meet the deadline for submission
(pp. 17-24, Vol. V, rec.). Because of this development, Atty. Guillermo
Pablo, Jr. was likewise included as respondent in Administrative Case
No. 1164. Hon. Bernardo Pardo remainded as a respondent for it was
also discovered that another paper in Political Law and Public
International Law also underwent re-evaluation and/or re-checking. This
notebook with Office Code No. 1662 turned out to be owned by another
successful candidate by the name of Ernesto Quitaleg. Further
investigation resulted in the discovery of another re-evaluation and/or re-
checking of a notebook in the subject of Mercantile Law resulting in the
change of the grade from 4% to 50% This notebook bearing Office Code
No. 110 is owned by another successful candidate by the name
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz and the latter's father
were summoned to testify in the investigation.
An investigation conducted by the National Bureau of Investigation upon
request of the Chairman of the 1971 Bar Examination Committee as
Investigation Officer, showed that one Romy Galang y Esguerra, alias
Ramon E. Galang, a student in the School of Law of Manuel L. Quezon
University, was, on September 8, 1959, charged with the crime of slight
physical injuries in the Municipal Court of Manila committed on Eufrosino
F. de Vera, another student of the same university. Confronted with this
information at the hearing of August 13, 1973 (Vol. V, pp. 20-21, 32,
rec.), respondent Galang declared that he does not remember having
been charged with the crime of slight physical injuries in that case. (Vol.
VI, pp. 45-60, rec.).
Respondent Galang, in all his application to take the bar examinations,
did not make mention of this fact which he is required under the rules to
do.
The joint investigation of all the cases commenced on July 17, 1973 and
was terminated on October 2, 1973. Thereafter, parties-respondents
were required to submit their memoranda. Respondents Lanuevo,
Galang and Pardo submitted their respective memorandum on November
14, 1973.
Before the joint hearing commenced, Oscar Landicho took up permanent
residence in Australia, where he is believed to be gainfully employed.
Hence, he was not summoned to testify.
At the joint investigation, all respondents, except respondent Pablo, who
offered as evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct
evidence only his oral testimony, submitted as their direct evidence the
affidavits and answers earlier submitted by them to the Court. The same
became the basis for their cross-examination.
In their individual sworn statements and answer, which they offered as
their direct testimony in the investigation conducted by the Court, the
respondent-examiners recounted the circumstances under which they re-
evaluated and/or re-checked the examination notebooks in question.
In His affidavit dated April 11, 1972, respondent Judge (later Associate
Justice of the Court of Appeals) Ramon C. Pamatian, examiner in Civil
Law, affirmed:
2. That one evening sometime in December last year,
while I was correcting the examination notebooks, Atty.
Lanuevo, Bar Confidant, explained to me that it is the
practice and the policy in bar examinations that he (Atty.
Lanuevo) make a review of the grades obtained in all
subjects and if he finds that candidate obtained an
extraordinary high grade in one subject and a rather low
one in another, he will bring back the latter to the
examiner concerned for re-evaluation and change of
grade;
3. That sometime in the latter part of January of this year,
he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation, because according to him the
owner of the paper is on the borderline and if I could
reconsider his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will
get passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%;
5. That only one notebook in Civil Law was brought back
to me for such re-evaluation and upon verifying my files I
found that the notebook is numbered '95;
6. That the original grade was 64% and my re-evaluation
of the answers were based on the same standard used in
the correction and evaluation of all others; thus, Nos. 3
and 4 with original grades of 7% each was reconsidered
to 10%; No. 5 with 4% to 5%; No. 7 with 3% to 5%; and
No. 8 with 8% to 10% (emphasis supplied).
His answer dated March 19, 1973 substantially reiterated his allegations
in his April 11, 1972 affidavit with following additional statements:
xxx xxx xxx
3. ... However the grades in Nos. 1, 2, 6, 9 and 10, were
not reconsidered as it is no longer to make the
reconsideration of these answers because of the same
evaluation and standard; hence, Nos. 1, 2 and 10
remainded at 5% and Nos. 6 and 9 at 10%;
4. That at the time I made the reconsideration of
examination booklet No. 951 I did not know the identity of
its owner until I received this resolution of the Honorable
Supreme Court nor the identities of the examiners in other
subjects;
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of the misrepresentation of said Atty. Lanuevo, based on
the following circumstances:
a) Since I started correcting the papers on
or about October 16, 1971, relationship
between Atty. Lanuevo and myself had
developed to the point that with respect to
the correction of the examination booklets
of bar candidates I have always followed
him and considered his instructions as
reflecting the rules and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court with respect to
the same; that I have no alternative but to
take his words;
b) That considering this relationship
and considering his misrepresentation to
me as reflecting the real and policy of the
Honorable Supreme Court, I did not
bother any more to get the consent and
permission of the Chairman of the Bar
Committee. Besides, at that time, I was
isolating myself from all members of the
Supreme Court and specially the
 chairman of the Bar Committee for fear
that I might be identified as a bar
examiner;
xxx xxx xxx
e) That no consideration whatsoever has been received
by me in return for such recorrection, and as proof of it, I
declined to consider and evaluate one booklet in
Remedial Law aforesaid because I was not the one who
made the original correction of the same (Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 32-35, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Then Assistant Solicitor General, now CFI Judge, Bernardo Pardo,
examiner in Political Law and Public International Law, confirmed in his
affidavit of April 8, 1972 that:
On a day or two after the Bar Confidant went to my
residence to obtain from me the last bag of two hundred
notebooks (bearing examiner's code numbers 1200 to
1400) which according to my record was on February 5,
1972, he came to my residence at about 7:30 p.m. riding
in a Vokswagen panel of the Supreme Court, with at least
two companions. The bar confidant had with him an
examinee's notebook bearing code number 661, and,
after the usual amenties, he requested me if it was
possible for me to review and re-examine the said
notebook because it appears that the examinee obtained
a grade of 57, whereas, according to the Bar Confidant,
the said examinee had obtained higher grades in other
subjects, the highest of which was 84, if I recall correctly,
in remedial law.
I asked the Bar Confidant if I was allowed to receive or re-
examinee the notebook as I had submitted the same
beforehand, and he told me that I was authorized to do so
because the same was still within my control and
authority as long as the particular examinee's name had
not been identified or that the code number decode and
the examinee's name was revealed. The Bar Confidant
told me that the name of the examinee in the case
present bearing code number 661 had not been identified
or revealed; and that it might have been possible that I
had given a particularly low grade to said examinee.
Accepting at face value the truth of the Bar Confidant's
representations to me, and as it was humanly possible
that I might have erred in the grading of the said
notebook, I re-examined the same, carefully read the
answer, and graded it in accordance with the same
standards I had used throughout the grading of the entire
notebooks, with the result that the examinee deserved an
increased grade of 66. After again clearing with the Bar
Confidant my authority to correct the grades, and as he
had assured me that the code number of the examinee in
question had not been decoded and his name known, ... I
therefore corrected the total grade in the notebook and
the grade card attached thereto, and properly initia(l)ed
the same. I also corrected the itemized grades (from item
No. 1 to item No. 10) on the two sets of grading sheets,
my personal copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant brought
with him the other copy thereof, and the Bar Confidant
brought with him the other copy the grading sheet" (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 58-59; rec.; emphasis supplied)
In his answer dated March 17, 1973 which he denominated as
"Explanation", respondent Bernardo P. Pardo adopted and replaced
therein by reference the facts stated in his earlier sworn statement and in
additional alleged that:
xxx xxx xxx
3. At the time I reviewed the examinee's notebook in
political and international law, code numbered 661, I did
know the name of the examinee. In fact, I came to know
his name only upon receipt of the resolution of March 5,
1973; now knowing his name, I wish to state that I do not
know him personally, and that I have never met him even
up to the present;
4. At that time, I acted under the impression that I was
authorized to make such review, and had repeatedly
asked the Bar Confidant whether I was authorized to
make such revision and was so assured of my authority
as the name of the examinee had not yet been decoded
or his identity revealed. The Bar Confidant's assurance
was apparently regular and so appeared to be in the
regular course of express prohibition in the rules and
guidelines given to me as an examiner, and the Bar
Confidant was my official liaison with the Chairman, as,
unless called, I refrained as much as possible from
frequent personal contact with the Chairman lest I be
identified as an examiner. ...;
5. At the time the Bar Confidant came to see me at about
7:30 o'clock in the evening at my residence, I felt it
inappropriate to verify his authority with the Chairman. It
did not appear to me that his representations were
unauthorized or suspicious. Indeed, the Bar Confidant
was riding in the official vehicle of the Supreme Court, a
Volkswagen panel, accompanied by two companions,
which was usual, and thus looked like a regular visit to me
of the Bar Confidant, as it was about the same hour that
he used to see me:
xxx xxx xxx
7. Indeed, the notebook code numbered 661 was still in
the same condition as when I submitted the same. In
agreeing to review the said notebook code numbered
661, my aim was to see if I committed an error in the
correction, not to make the examinee pass the subject. I
considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31, 1971, considering especially the
representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in remedial law, if I recall
correctly. Of course, it did not strike me as unusual that
the Bar Confidant knew the grades of the examinee in the
position to know and that there was nothing irregular in
that:
8. In political and international law, the original grade
obtained by the examinee with notebook code numbered
661 was 57%. After review, it was increased by 9 points,
resulting in a final grade of 66%. Still, the examinee did
not pass the subject, and, as heretofore stated, my aim
was not to make the examinee pass, notwithstanding the
representation that he had passed the other subjects. ...
9. I quite recall that during the first meeting of the Bar
Examiners' Committee consensus was that where an
examinee failed in only one subject and passed the rest,
the examiner in said subject would review the notebook.
Nobody objected to it as irregular. At the time of the
Committee's first meeting, we still did not know the names
of the candidates.
10. In fine, I was a victim of deception, not a party to it. It
had absolutely no knowledge of the motives of the Bar
Confidant or his malfeasance in office, and did not know
the examinee concerned nor had I any kind of contract
with him before or rather the review and even up to the
present (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 60-63; rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Manuel Tomacruz, examiner in Criminal Law, affirmed in his affidavit
dated April 12, 1972:
1. xxx xxx xxx
2. That about weekly, the Bar Confidant would deliver and
collect examination books to my residence at 951 Luna
Mencias, Mandaluyong, Rizal.
3. That towards the end when I had already completed
correction of the books in Criminal Law and was helping
in the correction of some of the papers in another subject,
the Bar Confidant brought back to me one (1) paper in
Criminal Law saying that that particular examinee had
missed the passing grade by only a fraction of a percent
and that if his paper in Criminal Law would be raised a
few points to 75%then he would make the general
passing average.
4. That seeing the jurisdiction, I raised the grade to 75%,
that is, giving a raise of, if I remember correctly, 2 or 3
points, initialled the revised mark and revised also the
mark and revised also the mark in the general list.
 5. That I do not recall the number of the book of the
examinee concerned" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 12, 1973, respondent Tomacruz stated that "I
accepted the word of the Bar Confidant in good faith and without the
slightest inkling as to the identity of the examinee in question who up to
now remains a total stranger and without expectation of nor did I derive
any personal benefit" (Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 70, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
Atty. Fidel Manalo, examiner in Remedial Law, stated in his affidavit
dated April 14, 1972, that:
xxx xxx xxx
2. Sometime about the late part of January or early part of
February 1972, Attorney Lanuevo, Bar Confidant of the
Supreme Court, saw me in my house at No. 1854
Asuncion Street, Makati, Rizal. He produced to me an
examinee's notebook in Remedial Law which I had
previously graded and submitted to him. He informed me
that he and others (he used the words "we") had reviewed
the said notebook. He requested me to review the said
notebook and possibly reconsider the grade that I had
previously given. He explained that the examine
concerned had done well in other subjects, but that
because of the comparatively low grade that I had given
him in Remedial Law his general average was short of
passing. Mr. Lanuevo remarked that he thought that if the
paper were reviewed I might find the examinee deserving
of being admitted to the Bar. As far as I can recall, Mr.
Lanuevo particularly called my attention to the fact in his
answers the examinee expressed himself clearly and in
good enough English. Mr. Lanuevo however informed me
that whether I would reconsider the grades I had
previously given and submitted was entirely within my
discretion.
3. Believing fully that it was within Mr. Lanuevo's authority
as Bar Confidant to address such a request to me and
that the said request was in order, I, in the presence of
Mr. Lanuevo, proceeded tore-read and re-evaluate each
and every item of the paper in question. I recall that in my
re-evaluation of the answers, I increased the grades in
some items, made deductions in other items, and
maintained the same grades in other items. However, I
recall that after Mr. Lanuevo and I had totalled the new
grades that I had given after re-evaluation, the total grade
increased by a few points, but still short of the passing
mark of 75% in my subject.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 74-75, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
In his answer (response) dated March 18, 1973, respondent Manalo
reiterated the contents of his sworn statement, adding the following:
xxx xxx xxx
5. In agreeing to re-evaluate the notebook, with resulted
in increasing the total grade of the examinee-concerned
in Remedial Law from 63.75% to 74.5%, herein
respondent acted in good faith. It may well be that he
could be faulted for not having verified from the Chairman
of the Committee of Bar Examiners the legitimacy of the
request made by Mr. Lanuevo. Herein respondent,
however, pleads in attenuation of such omission, that —
a) Having been appointed an Examiner for
the first time, he was not aware, not
having been apprised otherwise, that it
was not within the authority of the Bar
Confidant of the Supreme Court to request
or suggest that the grade of a particular
examination notebook be revised or
reconsidered. He had every right to
presume, owing to the highly fiduciary
nature of the position of the Bar Confidant,
that the request was legitimate.
xxx xxx xxx
c) In revising the grade of the particular
examinee concerned, herein respondent
carefully evaluated each and every
 answer written in the notebook. Testing
the answers by the criteria laid down by
the Court, and giving the said examinee
the benefit of doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only
in that particular subject that the said
examine failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee
deserved a higher grade than that
previously given to him, but that he did not
deserve, in herein respondent's honest
appraisal, to be given the passing grade of
75%. It should also be mentioned that, in
reappraising the answers, herein
respondent downgraded a previous rating
of an answer written by the examinee,
from 9.25% to 9% (Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 36-39, rec.; emphasis supplied).
Atty. Manuel Montecillo, examiner in Mercantile Law, affirmed in his
affidavit dated April 17, 1972:
xxx xxx xxx
That during one of the deliberations of the Bar Examiners'
Committee after the Bar Examinations were held, I was
informed that one Bar examinee passed all other subjects
except Mercantile Law;
That I informed the Bar Examiners' Committee that I
would be willing to re-evaluate the paper of this particular
Bar candidate;.
That the next day, the Bar Confidant handed to me a Bar
candidate's notebook (No. 1613) showing a grade of 61%;
That I reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating
the answers of this particular Bar candidate I decided to
increase his final grade to 71%;
That consequently, I amended my report and duly initialed
the changes in the grade sheet (Adm. Case No. 1164, p.
72, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Montecillo restated the
contents of his sworn statement of April 17, 1972, and
xxx xxx xxx
2. Supplementary to the foregoing sworn statement, I
hereby state that I re-evaluated the examination notebook
of Bar Candidate No. 1613 in Mercantile Law in absolute
good faith and in direct compliance with the agreement
made during one of the deliberations of the Bar
Examiners Committee that where a candidate fails in only
one subject, the Examiner concerned should make a re-
evaluation of the answers of the candidate concerned,
which I did.
3. Finally, I hereby state that I did not know at the time I
made the aforementioned re-evaluation that notebook No.
1613 in Mercantile Law pertained to bar examine Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, and that I have never
met up to this time this particular bar examinee (Adm.
Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his sworn statement dated April 12, 1972, Bar Confidant Lanuevo
stated:
xxx xxx xxx
As I was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the
record of ratings, I was impressed of the writing and the
answers on the first notebook. This led me to scrutinize all
the set of notebooks. Believing that those five merited re-
evalation on the basis of the memorandum circularized to
the examiners shortly earlier to the effect that
... in the correction of the papers,
substantial weight should then be given to
clarify of language and soundness of
reasoning' (par. 4),
I took it upon myself to bring them back to the respective
examiners for re-evaluation and/or re-checking.
 It is our experience in the Bar Division that immediately
after the release of the results of the examinations, we
are usually swarmed with requests of the examinees that
they be shown their notebooks. Many of them would copy
their answers and have them checked by their professors.
Eventually some of them would file motions or requests
for re-correction and/or re-evaluation. Right now, we have
some 19 of such motions or requests which we are
reading for submission to the Honorable Court.
Often we feel that a few of them are meritorious, but just
the same they have to be denied because the result of
the examinations when released is final and irrevocable.
It was to at least minimize the occurrence of such
instances that motivated me to bring those notebooks
back to the respective examiners for re-evaluation" (Adm.
Case No. 1162, p. 24, rec.; emphasis supplied).
In his answer dated March 19, 1973, respondent Lanuevo avers:
That he submitted the notebooks in question to the
examiners concerned in his hotest belief that the same
merited re-evaluation; that in so doing, it was not his
intention to forsake or betray the trust reposed in him as
bar confidant but on the contrary to do justice to the
examinee concerned; that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner, because the matter of whether or
not re-evaluation was inorder was left alone to the
examiners' decision; and that, to his knowledge, he does
not remember having made the alleged misrepresentation
but that he remembers having brought to the attention of
the Committee during the meeting a matter concerning
another examinee who obtained a passing general
average but with a grade below 50% in Mercantile Law.
As the Committee agreed to remove the disqualification
by way of raising the grade in said subject, respondent
brought the notebook in question to the Examiner
concerned who thereby raised the grade thus enabling
the said examinee to pass. If he remembers right, the
examinee concerned is one surnamed "de la Cruz" or
"Ty-de la Cruz".
Your Honors, respondent never entertained a notion that
his act would stir such serious charges as would tend to
undermine his integrity because he did it in all good faith.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 35, rec.; emphasis
supplied).
On August 27, 1973, during the course of the investigation, respondent
Lanuevo filed another sworn statement in addition to, and in amplification
of, his answer, stating:
xxx xxx xxx
1. That I vehemently deny having deceived the examiners
concerned into believing that the examinee involved failed
only in their respective subjects, the fact of the matter
being that the notebooks in question were submitted to
the respective examiners for re-evaluation believing in all
good faith that they so merited on the basis of the
Confidential Memorandum (identified and marked as Exh.
1-Lanuevo, particularly that portion marked as Exh. 1-a-
Lanuevo)which was circulated to all the examiners earlier,
leaving to them entirely the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order,
2. That the following coincidence prompted me to pry into
the notebooks in question:
Sometime during the latter part of January
and the early part of February, 1972, on
my way back to the office (Bar Division)
after lunch, I though of buying a
sweepstake ticket. I have always made it
a point that the moment I think of so
buying, I pick a number from any object
and the first number that comes into my
sight becomes the basis of the ticket that I
buy. At that moment, the first number that
I saw was "954" boldly printed on an
electrical contribance (evidently belonging
to the MERALCO) attached to a post
standing along the right sidewalk of P.
Faura street towards the Supreme Court
building from San Marcelino street and
almost adjacent to the south-eastern
corner of the fence of the Araullo High
School(photograph of the number '954',
the contrivance on which it is printed and
a portion of the post to which it is attached
is identified and marked as Exhibit 4-
Lanuevo and the number "954" as Exh. 4-
a-Lanuevo).
With this number (954) in mind, I
proceeded to Plaza Sta. Cruz to look for a
ticket that would contain such number.
Eventually, I found a ticket, which I then
bought, whose last three digits
corresponded to "954". This number
became doubly impressive to me because
the sum of all the six digits of the ticket
number was "27", a number that is so
significant to me that everything I do I try
somewhat instinctively to link or connect it
with said number whenever possible.
Thus even in assigning code numbers on
the Master List of examinees from 1968
when I first took charge of the
examinations as Bar Confidant up to
1971, I either started with the number "27"
(or "227") or end with said number. (1968
Master List is identified and marked as
Exh. 5-Lanuevo and the figure "27" at the
beginning of the list, as Exh. 5-a Lanuevo;
1969 Master List as Exh. 6-Lanuevo and
the figure "227" at the beginning of the list,
as Exh. 6-a-Lanuevo; 1970 Master List as
Exh. 7-Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the
beginning of the list as Exh. 7-a-Lanuevo;
and the 1971 Master List as Exh. 8-
Lanuevo and the figure "227" at the end of
the list as Exh. 8-a-Lanuevo).
The significance to me of this number (27)
was born out of these incidents in my life,
to wit: (a) On November 27, 1941 while
with the Philippine Army stationed at
Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva
Ecija, I was stricken with pneumonia and
was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result. As will be
recalled, the last Pacific War broke out on
December 8, 1941. While I was still
confined at the hospital, our camp was
bombed and strafed by Japanese planes
on December 13, 1941 resulting in many
casualties. From then on, I regarded
November 27, 1941 as the beginning of a
new life for me having been saved from
the possibility of being among the
casualties;(b) On February 27, 1946, I
was able to get out of the army byway of
honorable discharge; and (c) on February
27, 1947, I got married and since then we
begot children the youngest of whom was
born on February 27, 1957.
Returning to the office that same
afternoon after buying the ticket, I
resumed my work which at the time was
on the checking of the notebooks. While
thus checking, I came upon the notebooks
bearing the office code number "954". As
the number was still fresh in my mind, it
aroused my curiosity prompting me to pry
into the contents of the notebooks.
Impressed by the clarity of the writing and
language and the apparent soundness of
the answers and, thereby, believing in all
good faith on the basis of the
aforementioned Confidential
Memorandum (Exh. 1-Lanuevo and Exh.
1-a-Lanuevo) that they merited re-
evaluation, I set them aside and later on
took them back to the respective
examiners for possible review recalling to
them the said Confidential Memorandum
but leaving absolutely the matter to their
discretion and judgment.
3. That the alleged misrepresentation or deception could
have reference to either of the two cases which I brought
to the attention of the committee during the meeting and
which the Committee agreed to refer back to the
respective examines, namely:
(a) That of an examinee who obtained a
passing general average but with a grade
below 50% (47%) in Mercantile Law(the
notebooks of this examinee bear the
Office Code No. 110, identified and
marked as Exh. 9-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Mercantile Law bearing the
Examiner's Code No. 951 with the original
grade of 4% increased to 50% after re-
evaluation as Exh. 9-a-Lanuevo); and
(b) That of an examinee who obtained a
borderline general average of 73.15% with
a grade below 60% (57%) in one subject
which, at the time, I could not pinpoint
having inadvertently left in the office the
data thereon. It turned out that the subject
was Political and International Law under
Asst. Solicitor General Bernardo Pardo
(The notebooks of this examinee bear the
Office Code No. 1622 identified and
marked as Exh. 10-Lanuevo and the
notebook in Political and International Law
bearing the Examiner's Code No. 661 with
the original grade of 57% increased to
66% after re-evaluation, as Exh. 10-a-
Lanuevo). This notebook in Political and
International Law is precisely the same
notebook mentioned in the sworn
statement of Asst. Solicitor General
Bernardo Pardo(Exh. ------- Pardo).
4. That in each of the two cases mentioned in the next
preceding paragraph, only one (1) subject or notebook
was reviewed or re-evaluated, that is, only Mercantile Law
in the former; and only Political and International Law in
the latter, under the facts and circumstances I made
known to the Committee and pursuant to which the
Committee authorized the referral of the notebooks
involved to the examiners concerned;
5. That at that juncture, the examiner in Taxation even
volunteered to review or re-check some 19, or so,
notebooks in his subject but that I told the Committee that
there was very little time left and that the increase in
grade after re-evaluation, unless very highly substantial,
may not alter the outcome since the subject carries the
weight of only 10% (Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47,
rec.).
The foregoing last-minute embellishment only serves to accentuate the
fact that Lanuevo's story is devoid of truth. In his sworn statement of April
12, 1972, he was "led to scrutinize all the set of notebooks" of respondent
Galang, because he "was impressed of the writing and the answers on
the first notebook "as he "was going over those notebooks, checking the
entries in the grading sheets and the posting on the record of ratings." In
his affidavit of August 27, 1973, he stated that the number 954 on a
Meralco post provoked him "to pry into the contents of the notebooks" of
respondent Galang "bearing office code number '954."
Respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, asserted, among
others;
1. That herein respondent is not acquainted with former
BarConfidant Victorio Lanuevo and never met him before
except once when, as required by the latter respondent
submitted certain papers necessary for taking the bar
examinations.
xxx xxx xxx
4. That it has been the consistent policy of the Supreme
Court not to reconsider "failure" cases; after the official
release thereof; why should it now reconsider a "passing"
case, especially in a situation where the respondent and
the bar confidant do not know each other and, indeed,
met only once in the ordinary course of official business?
It is not inevitable, then, to conclude that the entire
situation clearly manifests a reasonable doubt to which
respondent is richly entitled?
5. That respondent, before reading a copy of this
Honorable Court's resolution dated March 5, 1973, had no
knowledge whatsoever of former Bar Confidant Victorio
Lanuevo's actuations which are stated in particular in the
resolution. In fact, the respondent never knew this man
intimately nor, had the herein respondent utilized anyone
to contact the Bar Confidant Lanuevo in his behalf.
But, assuming as true, the said actuations of Bar
Confidant Lanuevo as stated in the Resolution, which are
evidently purported to show as having redounded to the
benefit of herein respondent, these questions arise: First,
was the re-evaluation of Respondent's examination
papers by the Bar Examination Committee done only or
especially for him and not done generally as regards the
paper of the other bar candidates who are supposed to
have failed? If the re-evaluation of Respondent's grades
was done among those of others, then it must have been
done as a matter of policy of the Committee to increase
the percentage of passing in that year's examination and,
therefore, the insinuation that only respondent's papers
were re-evaluated upon the influence of Bar Confidant
Lanuevo would be unjustifiable, if not far fetched.
Secondly, is the fact that BarConfidant Lanuevo's
actuations resulted in herein Respondent's benefit an
evidence per se of Respondent's having caused
actuations of Bar confidant Lanuevo to be done in
former's behalf? To assume this could be disastrous in
effect because that would be presuming all the members
of the Bar Examination Committee as devoid of integrity,
unfit for the bar themselves and the result of their work
that year, as also unworthy of anything. All of these
inferences are deductible from the narration of facts in the
resolution, and which only goes to show said narration of
facts an unworthy of credence, or consideration.
xxx xxx xxx
7. This Honorable Tribunal's Resolution of March 5, 1973
would make this Respondent Account or answer for the
actuations of Bar Confidant Lanuevo as well as for the
actuations of the Bar Examiners implying the existence of
some conspiracy between them and the Respondent. The
evident imputation is denied and it is contended that the
Bar Examiners were in the performance of their duties
and that they should be regarded as such in the
consideration of this case.
xxx xxx xxx (Adm. Case No. 1163, pp. 100-104, rec.).
I
The evidence thus disclosed clearly demonstrates how respondent
Lanuevo systematically and cleverly initiated and prepared the stage
leading to the re-evalation and/or recorrection of the answers of
respondent Galang by deceiving separately and individually the
respondents-examiners to make the desired revision without prior
authority from the Supreme Court after the corrected notebooks had
been submitted to the Court through the respondent Bar Confidant, who
is simply the custodian thereof for and in behalf of the Court.
It appears that one evening, sometime around the middle part of
December, 1971, just before Christmas day, respondent Lanuevo
approached Civil Law examiner Pamatian while the latter was in the
process of correcting examination booklets, and then and there made the
representations that as BarConfidant, he makes a review of the grades
obtained in all subjects of the examinees and if he finds that a candidate
obtains an extraordinarily high grade in one subject and a rather low one
on another, he will bring back to the examiner concerned the notebook
for re-evaluation and change of grade(Exh. 2-Pamatian, Adm. Case No.
1164, pp. 55-56; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Sometime in the latter part of January, 1972, respondent Lanuevo
brought back to respondent-examiner Pamatian an examination booklet
in Civil Law for re-evaluation, representing that the examinee who owned
the particular notebook is on the borderline of passing and if his grade in
said subject could be reconsidered to 75%, the said examine will get a
passing average. Respondent-examiner Pamatian took respondent
Lanuevo's word and under the belief that was really the practice and
policy of the Supreme Court and in his further belief that he was just
manifesting cooperation in doing so, he re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the examinee's grade in said subject to 75% from 64%. The
particular notebook belonged to an examinee with Examiner's Code
Number 95 and with Office Code Number 954. This examinee is Ramon
E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang. Respondent Pamatian did not know
the identity of the examinee at the time he re-evaluated the said booklet
(Exhs. 1-Pamatian, 2-Pamatian, and 3-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 32-33, 55-56, 57; Vol. V, pp. 3-4, rec.).
Before Justice Pamatian made the revision, Examinee Galang failed in
seven subjects including Civil Law. After such revision, examinee Galang
still failed in six subjects and could not obtain the passing average of
75% for admission to the Bar.
Thereafter, about the latter part of January, 1972 or early part of
February, 1972, respondent Lanuevo went to the residence of
respondent-examiner Fidel Manalo at 1854 Asuncion Street, Makati,
Rizal, with an examinee's notebook in Remedial Law, which respondent
Manalo and previously corrected and graded. Respondent Lanuevo then
requested respondent Manalo to review the said notebook and possibly
to reconsider the grade given, explaining and representing that "they" has
reviewed the said notebook and that the examinee concerned had done
well in other subjects, but that because of the comparatively low grade
given said examinee by respondent Manalo in Remedial Law, the general
average of said examinee was short of passing. Respondent Lanuevo
likewise made the remark and observation that he thought that if the
notebook were reviewed, respondent Manalo might yet find the examinee
deserving of being admitted to the Bar. Respondent Lanuevo also
particularly called the attention of respondent Manalo to the fact that in
his answers, the examinee expressed himself clearly and in good
English. Furthermore, respondent Lanuevo called the attention of
respondent Manalo to Paragraph 4 of the Confidential Memorandum that
read as follows:
4. Examination questions should be more a test of logic,
knowledge of legal fundamentals, and ability to analyze
and solve legal problems rather than a test of memory; in
the correction of papers, substantial weight should be
given to clarify of language and soundness of reasoning.
Respondent Manalo was, however, informed by respondent Lanuevo that
the matter of reconsideration was entirely within his (Manalo's) discretion.
Respondent Manalo, believing that respondent Lanuevo, as Bar
Confidant, had the authority to make such request and further believing
that such request was in order, proceeded to re-evaluate the examinee's
answers in the presence of Lanuevo, resulting in an increase of the
examinee's grade in that particular subject, Remedial Law, from 63.25%
to 74.5%. Respondent Manalo authenticated with his signature the
changes made by him in the notebook and in the grading sheet. The said
notebook examiner's code number is 136, instead of 310 as earlier
mentioned by him in his affidavit, and belonged to Ramon E. Galang,
alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1 & 2- Manalo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
36-39, 74-75; Vol. V, pp. 50-53, rec.).
But even after the re-evaluation by Atty. Manalo, Examinee Galang could
not make the passing grade due to his failing marks in five subjects.
Likewise, in the latter part of January, 1972, on one occasion when
respondent Lanuevo went to deliver to respondent Guillermo Pablo, Jr. in
the latter's house a new batch of examination papers in Political Law and
Public International Law to be corrected, respondent Lanuevo brought
out a notebook in Political Law bearing Examiner's Code Number
1752 (Exh. 5-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 66, rec.), informing
respondent Pablo that particular examinee who owns the said
notebook seems to have passed in all other subjects except in Political
Law and Public International Law; and that if the said notebook would be
re-evaluated and the mark be increased to at least 75%, said examinee
will pass the bar examinations. After satisfying himself from respondent
that this is possible — the respondent Bar Confidant informing him that
this is the practice of the Court to help out examinees who are failing in
just one subject — respondent Pablo acceded to the request and thereby
told the Bar Confidant to just leave the said notebook. Respondent Pablo
thereafter re-evaluated the answers, this time with leniency. After the re-
evaluation, the grade was increased to 78% from 68%, or an increase of
10%. Respondent Pablo then made the corresponding corrections in the
grading sheet and accordingly initialed the charges made. This notebook
with Office Code Number 954 also belonged to Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang (Vol. V, pp. 43-46, rec.).
After the re-evaluation by Atty. Pablo, Jr., examinee Galang's general
average was still below the passing grade, because of his failing marks in
four subjects.
Towards the end of the correction of examination notebooks, respondent
Lanuevo brought back to respondent Tomacruz one examination booklet
in Criminal Law, with the former informing the latter, who was then
helping in the correction of papers in Political Law and Public
International Law, as he had already finished correcting the examination
notebooks in his assigned subject — Criminal Law — that the examinee
who owns that particular notebook had missed the passing grade by only
a fraction of a percent and that if his grade in Criminal Law would be
raised a few points to 75%, then the examinee would make the passing
grade. Accepting the words of respondent Lanuevo, and seeing the
justification and because he did not want to be the one causing the failure
of the examinee, respondent Tomacruz raised the grade from 64% to
75% and thereafter, he initialed the revised mark and also revised the
mark in the general list and likewise initialed the same. The examinee's
Examiner Code Number is 746 while his Office Code Number is 954. This
examinee is Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang (Exhs. 1, 2 & 3-
Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 65, 66 and 71; Vol. V, pp. 24-25,
60-61, rec.).
Respondent Tomacruz does not recall having been shown any memo by
respondent Lanuevo when the latter approached him for this particular
re-evaluation; but he remembers Lanuevo declaring to him that where a
candidate had almost made the passing average but had failed in one
subject, as a matter of policy of the Court, leniency is applied in reviewing
the examinee's notebook in the failing subject. He recalls, however, that
he was provided a copy of the Confidential Memorandum but this was
long before the re-evaluation requested by respondent Lanuevo as the
same was received by him before the examination period (Vol. V, p. 61,
rec.).
However, such revision by Atty. Tomacruz could not raise Galang's
general average to a passing grade because of his failing mark in three
more subjects, including Mercantile Law. For the revision of examinee
Galang's notebook in Mercantile Law, respondent Lanuevo neatly set the
last phase of his quite ingenious scheme — by securing authorization
from the Bar Examination Committee for the examiner in Mercantile Law
tore-evaluate said notebook.
At the first meeting of the Bar Examination Committee on February 8,
1972, respondent Lanuevo suggested that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed the rest, the examiner concerned would
review the notebook. Nobody objected to it as irregular and the
Committee adopted the suggestion (Exhs. A & B-Montecillo, Exh. 2-
Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 41, 72, 63; Vol. Vi, p. 16, rec.).
At a subsequent meeting of the Bar Examination Committee, respondent
Montecillo was informed by respondent Lanuevo that a candidate passed
all other subjects except Mercantile Law. This information was made
during the meeting within hearing of the order members, who were all
closely seated together. Respondent Montecillo made known his
willingness tore-evaluate the particular paper. The next day, respondent
Lanuevo handed to respondent Montecillo a bar candidate's notebook
with Examiner's Code Number 1613 with a grade of 61%. Respondent
Montecillo then reviewed the whole paper and after re-evaluating the
answers, decided to increase the final grade to 71%. The matter was not
however thereafter officially brought to the Committee for consideration
or decision (Exhs. A& B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 40-41, 70-
71; Vol. V, pp. 33-34, rec.).
Respondent Montecillo declared that without being given the information
that the particular examinee failed only in his subject and passed all the
others, he would not have consented to make the re-evaluation of the
said paper (Vol. V, p. 33, rec.).Respondent Montecillo likewise added that
there was only one instance he remembers, which is substantiated by his
personal records, that he had to change the grade of an examinee after
he had submitted his report, referring to the notebook of examinee
Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, with Examiner's Code
Number 1613 and with Office Code Number 954 (Vol. V, pp. 34-35, rec.).
A day or two after February 5, 1972, when respondent Lanuevo went to
the residence of respondent-examiner Pardo to obtain the last bag of 200
notebooks, respondent Lanuevo returned to the residence of respondent
Pardo riding in a Volkswagen panel of the Supreme Court of the
Philippines with two companions. According to respondent Lanuevo, this
was around the second week of February, 1972, after the first meeting of
the Bar Examination Committee. respondent Lanuevo had with him on
that occasion an examinee's notebook bearing Examiner's Code No.
661. Respondent Lanuevo, after the usual amenities, requested
respondent Pardo to review and re-examine, if possible, the said
notebook because, according to respondent Lanuevo, the examine who
owns that particular notebook obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which is 84% in Remedial Law. After clearing with
respondent Lanuevo his authority to reconsider the grades, respondent
Pardo re-evaluated the answers of the examine concerned, resulting in
an increase of grade from 57% of 66%. Said notebook has number 1622
as office code number. It belonged to examinee Ernesto Quitaleg (Exhs.
1 & 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 58-63; Vol. V, pp. 12-24, 29-30,
rec.).
II
Re: Administrative Case No. 1162, Victorio D. Lanuevo, respondent.
A
UNAUTHORIZED RE-EVALUATION OF THE ANSWERS OF EXAMINE
RAMON E. GALANG, alias ROMAN E. GALANG, IN ALL FIVE (5)
MAJOR SUBJECTS.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having requested on his own
initiative the five examiners concerned to re-evaluate the five notebooks
of Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, that eventually resulted in
the increase of Galang's average from 66.25% to the passing grade
74.15%, or a total increase of eight (8) weighted points, more or less, that
enabled Galang to hurdle the 1971 Bar examinations via a resolution of
the Court making 74% the passing average for that year's examination
without any grade below fifty percent (50%) in any subject. Galang
thereafter took his lawyer's oath. It is likewise beyond dispute that he had
no authority from the Court or the Committee to initiate such steps
towards the said re-evaluation of the answers of Galang or of other
examinees.
Denying that he made representations to the examiners concerned that
respondent Galang failed only in their respective subjects and/or was on
the borderline of passing, Respondent Lanuevo sought to justify his
actuations on the authority of the aforequoted paragraph 4 of the
Confidential Memorandum(Exhs. 1 and 1-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Cases Nos.
1162 & 1164, p. 51, Adm. Case No. 1162; Vol. VII, p. 4, rec.) distributed
to the members of the Bar Examination Committee. He maintains that he
acted in good faith and "in his honest belief that the same merited re-
evaluation; that in doing so, it was not his intention to forsake or betray
the trust reposed in him as BarConfidant but on the contrary to do justice
to the examinee concerned; and that neither did he act in a
presumptuous manner because the matter of whether or not re-
evaluation was in order was left alone to the examiners' decision ..." (Exh.
2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-37, rec.).
But as openly admitted by him in the course of the investigation, the said
confidential memorandum was intended solely for the examiners to guide
them in the initial correction of the examination papers and never as a
basis for him to even suggest to the examiners the re-evaluation of the
examination papers of the examinees (Vol. VII, p. 23, rec.). Any such
suggestion or request is not only presumptuous but also offensive to the
norms of delicacy.
We believe the Examiners — Pablo, Manalo, Montecillo, Tomacruz,
Pardo and Pamatian — whose declarations on the matter of the
misrepresentations and deceptions committed by respondent Lanuevo,
are clear and consistent as well as corroborate each other.
For indeed the facts unfolded by the declarations of the respondents-
examiners (Adm. Case No. 1164) and clarified by extensive cross-
examination conducted during the investigation and hearing of the cases
show how respondent Lanuevo adroitly maneuvered the passing of
examinee Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang in the 1971 Bar
Examinations. It is patent likewise from the records that respondent
Lanuevo too undue advantage of the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court and the Examiners implicit in his position as BarConfidant as
well as the trust and confidence that prevailed in and characterized his
relationship with the five members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who were thus deceived and induced into re-evaluating the
answers of only respondent Galang in five subjects that resulted in the
increase of his grades therein, ultimately enabling him to be admitted a
member of the Philippine Bar.
It was plain, simple and unmitigated deception that characterized
respondent Lanuevo's well-studied and well-calculated moves in
successively representing separately to each of the five examiners
concerned to the effect that the examinee failed only in his particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing. To repeat, the before the
unauthorized re-evaluations were made, Galang failed in the five (5)
major subjects and in two (2) minor subjects while his general average
was only 66.25% — which under no circumstances or standard could it
be honestly claimed that the examinee failed only in one, or he was on
the borderline of passing. In fact, before the first notebook of Galang was
referred back to the examiner concerned for re-evaluation, Galang had
only one passing mark and this was in Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises, a minor subject, with grade of 81%. The averages and
individual grades of Galang before and after the unauthorized re-
evaluation are as follows:
BAI
1. Political Law Public
International Law 68% 78% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points
BAI
Labor Laws and Social
Legislations 67% 67% = no re-
evaluation made.
2. Civil Law 64% 75% = 1 points
or 33 weighted points.
 Taxation 74% 74% = no re-
evaluation made.
3. Mercantile Law 61% 71% = 10 pts.
or 30 weighted points.
4. Criminal Law 64% 75% = 11 pts. or
22 weighted points.
5. Remedial Law 63.75% (64) 75.5% (75%) =
11 pts. or 44 weighted points.
Legal Ethics and Practical
Exercises 81% 81% = no re-
evaluation made.
————————————
General Weighted Averages 66.25% 74.15%
Hence, by the simple expedient of initiating the re-evaluation of the
answers of Galang in the five (5) subjects under the circumstances
already narrated, Galang's original average of 66.25% was increased to
74.15% or an increase of 7.9 weighted points, to the great damage and
prejudice of the integrity of the Bar examinations and to the disadvantage
of the other examinees. He did this in favor only of examinee Galang,
with the possible addition of examinees Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty
dela Cruz. But only one notebook was re-evaluated for each of the latter
who — Political Law and Public International Law for Quitaleg and
Mercantile Law for Ty dela Cruz.
The Office of the Bar Confidant, it must be stressed, has absolutely
nothing to do in the re-evaluation or reconsideration of the grades of
examinees who fail to make the passing mark before or after their
notebooks are submitted to it by the Examiners. After the corrected
notebooks are submitted to him by the Examiners, his only function is to
tally the individual grades of every examinee in all subjects taken and
thereafter compute the general average. That done, he will then prepare
a comparative data showing the percentage of passing and failing in
relation to a certain average to be submitted to the Committee and to the
Court and on the basis of which the Court will determine the passing
average, whether 75 or 74 or 73, etc. The Bar Confidant has no business
evaluating the answers of the examinees and cannot assume the
functions of passing upon the appraisal made by the Examiners
concerned. He is not the over-all Examiner. He cannot presume to know
better than the examiner. Any request for re-evaluation should be done
by the examinee and the same should be addressed to the Court, which
alone can validly act thereon. A Bar Confidant who takes such initiative,
exposes himself to suspicion and thereby compromises his position as
well as the image of the Court.
Respondent Lanuevo's claim that he was merely doing justice to Galang
without any intention of betraying the trust and confidence reposed in him
by the Court as Bar Confidant, can hardly invite belief in the fact of the
incontrovertible fact that he singled out Galang's papers for re-evaluation,
leaving out the papers of more than ninety (90) examinees with far better
averages ranging from 70% to 73.9% of which he was fully aware (Vol.
VI, pp. 46-47, 101, rec.), which could be more properly claimed as
borderline cases. This fact further betrays respondent Lanuevo's claim of
absolute good faith in referring back the papers of Galang to the
Examiners for re-evaluation. For certainly, as against the original
weighted average of 66.25% of Galang, there can hardly be any dispute
that the cases of the aforesaid more than ninety (90) examinees were
more deserving of reconsideration. Hence, in trying to do justice to
Galang, as claimed by respondent Lanuevo, grave injustice was inflicted
on the other examinees of the 1971 Bar examinations, especially the said
more than ninety candidates. And the unexplained failure of respondent
Lanuevo to apprise the Court or the Committee or even the Bar
Chairman of the fact of re-evaluation before or after the said re-
evaluation and increase of grades, precludes, as the same is inconsistent
with, any pretension of good faith.
His request for the re-evaluation of the notebook in Political Law and
International Law of Ernesto Quitaleg and the notebook in Mercantile Law
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz to give his actuations in the case of Galang a
semblance of impartiality, hoping that the over ninety examinees who
were far better situated than Galang would not give him away. Even the
re-evaluation of one notebook of Quitaleg and one notebook of Ty dela
Cruz violated the agreement of the members of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee to re-evaluate when the examinee concerned
fails only in one subject. Quitaleg and Ty dela Cruz failed in four (4) and
three (3) subjects respectively — as hereinafter shown.
The strange story concerning the figures 954, the office code number
given to Galang's notebook, unveiled for the first time by respondent
Lanuevo in his suplemental sworn statement(Exh. 3- Lanuevo, Adm.
Case No. 1162, pp. 45-47. rec.) filed during the investigation with this
Court as to why he pried into the papers of Galang deserves scant
consideration. It only serves to picture a man desperately clutching at
straws in the wind for support. Furthermore, it was revealed by
respondent Lanuevo for the first time only on August 27, 1973 or a period
of more than five 95) months after he filed his answer on March 19,
1973(Exh. 2-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162, pp. 35-36, rec.), showing
that it was just an after-thought.
B cover of the notebook of said examinee and the change is authenticated
REFERRAL OF EXAMINEE ALFREDO TY DELA CRUZ NOTEBOOK IN
MERCHANTILE LAW TO RAISE HIS GRADE OF 47% TO 50% TO
EXAMINER MANUEL MONTECILLO AND OF EXAMINEE ERNESTO
QUITALEG'S NOTEBOOK IN POLITICAL LAW TO EXAMINER
BERNARDO PARDO FOR RE-EVALUATION, RESULTING IN THE
INCREASE OF HIS GRADE IN THAT SUBJECT FROM 57% TO 66%.
Likewise, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo admitted having referred back
the aforesaid notebooks on Mercantile Law and Political Law respectively
of Alfredo Ty dela Cruz and Ernesto Quitaleg to the Examiners
concerned.
The records are not clear, however, under what circumstances the
notebooks of Ty dela Cruz and Quitaleg were referred back to the
Examiners concerned. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that these two
cases were officially brought to the Bar Examination Committee during its
first meeting (Vol. VI, pp. 50-51, rec.) and the latter decided to refer them
back to the Examiners concerned for re-evaluation with respect to the
case of Quitaleg and to remove the disqualification in the case of Ty dela
Cruz(Vol. VI, pp. 33-39, 84-86, rec.). Respondent Lanuevo further
claimed that the date of these two cases were contained in a sheet of
paper which was presented at the said first meeting of the Committee
(Vol. VI, pp. 39-43, 49-51, rec.). Likewise a record of the dates of every
meeting of the Committee was made by respondent Lanuevo (Vol. VI, p.
28, rec.). The alleged sheet containing the date of the two examinees
and record of the dates of the meeting of the Committee were not
presented by respondent Lanuevo as, according to him, he left them
inadvertently in his desk in the Confidential Room when he went on leave
after the release of the Bar results (Vol. VI, pp. 28, 41-45, rec.). It
appears, however, that the inventory conducted by officials of the Court
in the Confidential Room of respondent Lanuevo did not yield any such
sheet of record (Exh. X, Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 74, rec.; Vol. VIII, pp.
11-13, 20-22, 29-31, rec.).
Respondent Examiner Montecillo, Mercantile Law, maintained that there
was only one notebook in Mercantile Law which was officially brought to
him and this is substantiated by his personal file and record (Vol. VI, pp.
34-35, rec.). According to him, this notebook's examiner code number is
1613 (Vol. V, p.35, rec.) and is owned by Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman
E. Galang. It appears, however, that the original grade of 47% in
Mercantile Law of Ty dela Cruz was changed to 50% as appearing in the
with the initial of Examiner Montecillo. He was present when respondent
Lanuevo presented in evidence the notebook of Ty dela Cruz bearing
Examiner code number 951 and Office Code Number 110 as Exhibit 9-
Lanuevo in Administrative Case No. 1162, and the figures 47 crossed
out, replaced by the figures 50 bearing the initial of Examiner Montecillo
as Exhibit 9-a-Lanuevo (Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 48, rec.; Vol. VI, pp. 23-
24, Vol. VIII, p. 4, rec.); but Atty. Montecillo did not interpose any
objection to their admission in evidence.
In this connection, respondent Examiner Pardo testified that he
remembers a case of an examinee presented to the Committee, who
obtained passing marks in all subjects except in one and the Committee
agreed to refer back to the Examiner concerned the notebook in the
subject in which the examinee failed (Vol. V, pp. 15-16, rec.). He cannot
recall the subject, but he is certain that it was not Political Law (Vol. V, p.
16, rec.).Further, Pardo declared that he is not aware of any case of an
examinee who was on the borderline of passing but who got a grade
below 50% in one subject that was taken up by the Committee (Vol. V,
pp. 16-17, rec.).
Examiner Montecillo testified that it was the notebook with Examiner
Code Number 1613 (belonging to Galang) which was referred to the
Committee and the Committee agreed to return it to the Examiner
concerned. The day following the meeting in which the case of an
examinee with Code Number 1613 was taken up, respondent Lanuevo
handed him said notebook and he accordingly re-evaluated it. This
particular notebook with Office Code Number 954 belongs to Galang.
Examiner Tomacruz recalled a case of an examinee whose problem was
Mercantile Law that was taken up by the Committee. He is not certain of
any other case brought to the Committee (Vol. V, pp. 59-61, rec.). Pardo
declared that there was no case of an examinee that was referred to the
Committee that involved Political Law. He re-evaluated the answers of
Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law upon the representation made by
respondent Lanuevo to him.
As heretofore stated, it was this consensus at the meeting on February 8,
1972 of the members of the Committee that where an examinee failed in
only one subject and passed all the others, the Examiner in whose
subject the examinee failed should re-evaluate or recheck the notebook
(Vol. V, p. 16, rec.: Exh. 2-Pardo, allegation No. 9, Adm. Case No. 1164,
pp. 60-63, Exh. A-Montecillo, Allegation No. 2, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and Exh. B-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 72, rec.).
At the time the notebook of Ernesto Quitaleg in Political Law with a grade
of 57% was referred back to Examiner Pardo, said examinee had other
failing grades in three (3) subjects, as follows:
Labor Laws 3%
Taxation 69%
Mercantile Law 68%
Ernesto Quitaleg's grades and averages before and after the re-
evaluation of his grade in Political Law are as follows:
BA
Political Law 57% 66% = 9 pts. or 27
weighted points
Labor Laws 73% 73% = No reevaluation
Civil Law 75% 75% = "
Taxation 69% 69% = "
Mercantile Law 68% 68% = "
Criminal Law 78% 78% = "
Remedial Law 85% 85% = "
Legal Ethics 83% 83% = "
————————————————
Average (weighted) 73.15% 74.5%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27; Exhs. 10 and 10-A-Lanuevo, Adm. Case No. 1162,
rec.)
Alfredo Ty dela Cruz, at the time his notebook in Mercantile Law was
referred to Examiner Montecillo to remove the disqualification grade of
47% in said subject, had two (2) other failing grades. These are:
Political Law 70%
Taxation 72%
His grades and averages before and after the disqualifying grade was
removed are as follows:
BA
Political Law 70% 70% = No reevaluation
Labor Laws 75% 75% = "
Civil Law 89% 89% = "
Taxation 72% 72% = "
Mercantile Law 47% 50% = 3 pts. or 9
weighted points
Criminal Law 78% 78% = no reevaluation
Remedial Law 88% 88% = "
Legal Ethics 79% 79% = "
—————————————————
Weighted Averages 74.95% 75.4%
(Vol. VI, pp. 26-27, rec.).
The re-evaluation of the answers of Quitaleg in Political Law and the
answers of Ty dela Cruz in Mercantile Law, violated the consensus of the
Bar Examination Committee in February, 1971, which violation was due
to the misrepresentation of respondent Lanuevo.
It must be stated that the referral of the notebook of Galang in Mercantile
Law to Examiner Montecillo can hardly be said to be covered by the
consensus of the Bar Examination Committee because even at the time
of said referral, which was after the unauthorized re-evaluation of his
answers of four (4) subjects, Galang had still failing grades in Taxation
and Labor Laws. His re-evaluated grade of 74.5% in Remedial Law was
considered 75% under the Confidential Memorandum and was so
entered in the record. His grade in Mercantile Law as subsequently re-
evaluated by Examiner Montecillo was 71%.
Respondent Lanuevo is therefore guilty of serious misconduct — of
having betrayed the trust and confidence reposed in him as Bar
Confidant, thereby impairing the integrity of the Bar examinations and
undermining public faith in the Supreme Court. He should be disbarred.
As to whether Ernesto Quitaleg and Alfredo Ty dela Cruz should be
disbarred or their names stricken from the Roll of Attorneys, it is believed
that they should be required to show cause and the corresponding
investigation conducted.
III
Re: Administrative Case No. 1163, Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, respondent.
A
The name of respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang,
should likewise be stricken off the Roll of Attorneys. This is a necessary
consequence of the un-authorized re-evaluation of his answers in five(5)
major subjects — Civil Law, Political and International Law, Criminal Law,
Remedial Law, and Mercantile Law.
The judicial function of the Supreme Court in admitting candidates to the
legal profession, which necessarily involves the exercise of discretion,
requires: (1) previous established rules and principles; (2) concrete facts,
whether past or present, affecting determinate individuals; and (3) a
decision as to whether these facts are governed by the rules and
principles (In re: Cunanan — Flunkers' Petition for Admission to the Bar --
94 Phil. 534, 544-545). The determination of whether a bar candidate has
obtained the required passing grade certainly involves discretion (Legal
and Judicial Ethics, Justice Martin, 1969 ed., p. 13).
In the exercise of this function, the Court acts through a Bar Examination
Committee, composed of a member of the Court who acts as Chairman
and eight (8) members of the Bar who act as examiners in the eight (8)
bar subjects with one subject assigned to each. Acting as a sort of liaison
officer between the Court and the Bar Chairman, on one hand, and the
individual members of the Committee, on the other, is the Bar Confidant
who is at the same time a deputy clerk of the Court. Necessarily, every
act of the Committee in connection with the exercise of discretion in the
admission of examinees to membership of the Bar must be in
accordance with the established rules of the Court and must always be
subject to the final approval of the Court. With respect to the Bar
Confidant, whose position is primarily confidential as the designation
indicates, his functions in connection with the conduct of the Bar
examinations are defined and circumscribed by the Court and must be
strictly adhered to.
The re-evaluation by the Examiners concerned of the examination
answers of respondent Galang in five (5) subjects, as already clearly
established, was initiated by Respondent Lanuevo without any authority
from the Court, a serious breach of the trust and confidence reposed by
the Court in him as Bar Confidant. Consequently, the re-evaluation that
enabled respondent Galang to pass the 1971 Bar examinations and to be
admitted to the Bar is a complete nullity. The Bar Confidant does not
possess any discretion with respect to the matter of admission of
examinees to the Bar. He is not clothed with authority to determine
whether or not an examinee's answers merit re-evaluation or re-
evaluation or whether the Examiner's appraisal of such answers is
correct. And whether or not the examinee benefited was in connivance or
a privy thereto is immaterial. What is decisive is whether the proceedings
or incidents that led to the candidate's admission to the Bar were in
accordance with the rules.
B
Section 2 of Rule 138 of the Revised Rules of Court of 1964, in
connection, among others, with the character requirement of candidates
for admission to the Bar, provides that "every applicant for admission as
a member of the Bar must be ... of good moral
character ... and must produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
evidence of good moral character, and that no charges against him
involving moral turpitude, have been filed or are pending in any court in
the Philippines." Prior to 1964, or under the old Rules of Court, a bar
applicant was required to produce before the Supreme Court satisfactory
testimonials of good moral character (Sec. 2, Rule 127). Under both
rules, every applicant is duty bound to lay before the Court all his
involvement in any criminal case, pending or otherwise terminated, to
enable the Court to fully ascertain or determine applicant's moral
character. Furthermore, as to what crime involves moral turpitude, is for
the supreme Court to determine. Hence, the necessity of laying before or
informing the Court of one's personal record — whether he was criminally
indicted, acquitted, convicted or the case dismissed or is still pending —
becomes more compelling. The forms for application to take the Bar
examinations provided by the Supreme Court beginning the year 1965
require the disclosure not only of criminal cases involving moral turpitude
filed or pending against the applicant but also of all other criminal cases
of which he has been accused. It is of course true that the application
form used by respondent Galang when he took the Bar for the first time in
1962 did not expressly require the disclosure of the applicant's criminal
records, if any. But as already intimated, implicit in his task to show
satisfactory evidence or proof of good moral character is his obligation to
reveal to the Court all his involvement in any criminal case so that the
Court can consider them in the ascertainment and determination of his
moral character. And undeniably, with the applicant's criminal records
before it, the Court will be in a better position to consider the applicant's
moral character; for it could not be gainsaid that an applicant's
involvement in any criminal case, whether pending or terminated by its
dismissal or applicant's acquittal or conviction, has a bearing upon his
character or fitness for admission to the Bar. In 1963 and 1964, when
respondent Galang took the Bar for the second and third time,
respectively, the application form provided by the Court for use of
applicants already required the applicant to declare under oath that "he
has not been accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal
of any offense involving moral turpitude; and that there is no pending
case of that nature against him." By 1966, when Galang took the Bar
examinations for the fourth time, the application form prepared by the
Court for use of applicants required the applicant to reveal all his criminal
cases whether involving moral turpitude or not. In paragraph 4 of that
form, the applicant is required under oath to declare that "he has not
been charged with any offense before a Fiscal, Municipal Judge, or other
officer; or accused of, indicted for or convicted by any court or tribunal of
any crime involving moral turpitude; nor is there a pending case against
him" (Adm. Case No. 1163, p. 56, rec.). Yet, respondent Galang
continued to intentionally withhold or conceal from the Court his criminal
case of slight physical injuries which was then and until now is pending in
the City Court of Manila; and thereafter repeatedly omitted to make
mention of the same in his applications to take the Bar examinations in
1967, 1969 and 1971.
All told, respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E. Galang, is guilty
of fraudulently concealing and withholding from the Court his pending
criminal case for physical injuries in 1962, 1963, 1964, 1966, 1967, 1969
and 1971; and in 1966, 1967,1969 and 1971, he committed perjury when
he declared under oath that he had no pending criminal case in court. By
falsely representing to the Court that he had no criminal case pending in
court, respondent Galang was allowed unconditionally to take the Bar
examinations seven (7) times and in 1972 was allowed to take his oath.
That the concealment of an attorney in his application to take the Bar
examinations of the fact that he had been charged with, or indicted for,
an alleged crime, is a ground for revocation of his license to practice law
is well — settled (see 165 ALR 1151, 7 CJS 741). Thus:
[1] It requires no argument to reach the conclusion that
the respondent, in withholding from the board of law
examiners and from the justice of this court, to whom he
applied for admission, information respecting so serious a
matter as an indictment for a felony, was guilty of fraud
upon the court (cases cited).
[2] It is equally clear that, had the board of law examiners,
or the judge to whom he applied for admission, been
apprised of the true situation, neither the certificate of the
board nor of the judge would have been forthcoming
(State ex rel. Board of Law Examiners v. Podell, 207 N —
W — 709 — 710).
The license of respondent Podell was revoke and annulled, and he was
required to surrender to the clerk of court the license issued to him, and
his name was stricken from the roll of attorneys (p. 710).
Likewise in Re Carpel, it was declared that:
[1] The power to admit to the bar on motion is conferred in
the discretion of the Appellate Division.' In the exercise of
the discretion, the court should be informed truthfully and
frankly of matters tending to show the character of the
applicant and his standing at the bar of the state from
which he comes. The finding of indictments against him,
one of which was still outstanding at the time of his
motion, were facts which should have been submitted to
the court, with such explanations as were available.
Silence respecting them was reprehensible, as tending to
deceive the court (165 NYS, 102, 104; emphasis
supplied).
Carpel's admission to the bar was revoked (p. 105).
Furthermore, respondent's persistent denial of his involvement in any
criminal case despite his having been apprised by the Investigation of
some of the circumstances of the criminal case including the very name
of the victim in that case(he finally admitted it when he was confronted by
the victim himself, who was called to testify thereon), and his continued
failure for about thirteen years to clear his name in that criminal case up
to the present time, indicate his lack of the requisite attributes of honesty,
probity and good demeanor. He is therefore unworthy of becoming a
member of the noble profession of law.
While this aspect of the investigation was not part of the formal resolution
of the Court requiring him to explain why his name should not be stricken
from the Roll of Attorneys, respondent Galang was, as early as August,
1973, apprised of his omission to reveal to the Court his pending criminal
case. Yet he did not offer any explanation for such omission.
Under the circumstances in which respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias
Roman E. Galang, was allowed to take the Bar examinations and the
highly irregular manner in which he passed the Bar, WE have no other
alternative but to order the surrender of his attorney's certificate and the
striking out of his name from the Roll of Attorneys. For as WE said in Re
Felipe del Rosario:
The practice of the law is not an absolute right to be
granted every one who demands it, but is a privilege to be
extended or withheld in the exercise of sound discretion.
The standards of the legal profession are not satisfied by
conduct which merely enables one to escape the
penalties of the criminal law. It would be a disgrace to the
Judiciary to receive one whose integrity is questionable
as an officer of the court, to clothe him with all the
prestige of its confidence, and then to permit him to hold
himself as a duly authorized member of the bar (citing
American cases) [52 Phil. 399-401].
What WE now do with respondent Ramon E. Galang, alias Roman E.
Galang, in this present case is not without any precedent in this
jurisdiction. WE had on several occasions in the past nullified the
admission of successful bar candidates to the membership of the Bar on
the grounds, among others, of (a)misrepresentations of, or false
pretenses relative to, the requirement on applicant's educational
attainment [Tapel vs. Publico, resolution of the Supreme Court striking off
the name of Juan T. Publico from the Roll of Attorneys on the basis of the
findings of the Court Investigators contained in their report and
recommendation, Feb. 23, 1962; In re: Telesforo A. Diao, 7 SCRA 475-
478; (b) lack of good moral character [In re: Peralta, 101 Phil. 313-314];
and (c) fraudulent passing of the Bar examinations [People vs.
Romualdez -- re: Luis Mabunay, 57 Phil. 151; In re: Del Rosario, 52 Phil.
399 and People vs. Castro and Doe, 54 Phil. 42]. In the cases of
Romualdez (Mabunay) and Castro, the Court found that the grades of
Mabunay and Castro were falsified and they were convicted of the crime
of falsification of public documents.
IV
RE: Administrative Case No. 1164, Assistant Solicitor General Bernardo
Pardo (now CFI Judge), Judge Ramon Pamatian(Later Associate Justice
of the Court of Appeals, now deceased)Atty. Manuel G. Montecillo, Atty.
Fidel Manalo, Atty. Manuel Tomacruz and Atty. Guillermo Pablo, Jr.,
respondents.
All respondents Bar examiners candidly admitted having made the re-
evaluation and/or re-correction of the papers in question upon the
misrepresentation of respondent BarConfidant Lanuevo. All, however,
professed good faith; and that they re-evaluated or increased the grades
of the notebooks without knowing the identity of the examinee who
owned the said notebooks; and that they did the same without any
consideration or expectation of any. These the records clearly
demonstrate and WE are of the opinion and WE so declare that indeed
the respondents-examiners made the re-evaluation or re-correcion in
good faith and without any consideration whatsoever.
Considering however the vital public interest involved in the matter of
admission of members to the Bar, the respondents bar examiners, under
the circumstances, should have exercised greater care and caution and
should have been more inquisitive before acceding to the request of
respondent Bar Confidant Lanuevo. They could have asked the
Chairman of the Bar Examination Committee, who would have referred
the matter to the Supreme Court. At least the respondents-examiners
should have required respondent Lanuevo to produce or show them the
complete grades and/or the average of the examinee represented by
respondent Lanuevo to have failed only in their respective and particular
subject and/or was on the borderline of passing to fully satisfy
themselves that the examinee concerned was really so circumstances.
This they could have easily done and the stain on the Bar examinations
could have been avoided.
Respondent Bar examiners Montecillo, Pamatian, and Manalo claimed
and so declared under oath that the answers of respondent Galang really
deserved or merited the increased grades; and so with respondent Pardo
in connection with the re-evaluation of Ernesto Quitaleg's answers in
Political Law. With respect to respondents Tomacruz and Pablo, it would
appear that they increased the grades of Galang in their respective
subject solely because of the misrepresentations of Respondent
Lanuevo. Hence, in the words of respondent Tomacruz: "You brought to
me one paper and you said that this particular examinee had almost
passed, however, in my subject he received 60 something, I cannot
remember the exact average and if he would get a few points higher, he
would get a passing average. I agreed to do that because I did not wish
to be the one causing his failure. ..." (Vol. V, pp. 60-61, rec.; see also
allegations 3 and 4, Exh. 1-Tomacruz, Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 69, rec.;
emphasis ours). And respondent Pablo: "... he told me that this particular
examinee seems to have passed in allot her subject except this subject
and that if I can re-evaluate this examination notebook and increase the
mark to at least 75, this particular examinee will pass the bar
examinations so I believe I asked him 'Is this being done?' and he said
'Yes, that is the practice used to be done before to help out examinees
who are failing in just one subject' so I readily acceded to his request and
said 'Just leave it with me and I will try to re-evaluate' and he left it with
me and what i did was to go over the book and tried to be as lenient as I
could. While I did not mark correct the answers which were wrong, what I
did was to be more lenient and if the answers was correct although it was
not complete I raise the grade so I had a total of 78 instead of 68 and
what I did was to correct the grading sheet accordingly and initial the
changes" (Vol. V, pp. 44-45, rec.; emphasis supplied).
It could not be seriously denied, however, that the favorable re-
evaluations made by respondents Pamatian, Montecillo, Manalo and
Pardo notwithstanding their declarations that the increases in grades they
gave were deserved by the examinee concerned, were to a certain extent
influenced by the misrepresentation and deception committed by
respondent Lanuevo. Thus in their own words:
Montecillo —
Q And by reason of that information you
made the re-evaluation of the paper?
A Yeas, your Honor.
Q Would you have re-evaluated the paper
of your own accord in the absence of such
information?
A No, your Honor, because I have
submitted my report at that time" (Vol. V,
p. 33, rec.; see also allegations in
paragraphs 2, 3, 4 & 5, Affidavit of April
17, 1972, Exh. B-Montecillo; allegation
No. 2, Answer dated march 19, 1973, Exh.
A-Montecillo, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp.
40-41, and 72, rec.).
Pamatian —
3. That sometime in the later part of January of this year,
he brought back to me an examination booklet in Civil
Law for re-evaluation because according to him the owner
of the paper is on the borderline and if I could reconsider
his grade to 75% the candidate concerned will get
passing mark;
4. That taking his word for it and under the belief that it
was really the practice and policy of the Supreme Court to
do so and in the further belief that I was just manifesting
cooperation in doing so, I re-evaluated the paper and
reconsidered the grade to 75%; ..." (Exh. 2-Pamatian,
Adm. Case No. 1164, p. 55, rec.); and
5. That the above re-evaluation was made in good faith
and under the belief that I am authorized to do so in view
of them is representation of said Atty. Victorio Lanuevo,
..." (Exh. 1-Pamatian, Adm. Case No. 1164, pp. 33-34,
rec.).
Manalo —
(c) In revising the grade of the particular examinee
concerned, herein respondent carefully evaluated each
and every answer written in the notebook. Testing the
answer by the criteria laid down by the Court, and giving
the said examinee the benefit of the doubt in view of Mr.
Lanuevo's representation that it was only in that particular
subject that said examinee failed, herein respondent
became convinced that the said examinee deserved a
higher grade than that previously given him, but he did
not deserve, in herein respondent's honest appraisal, to
be given the passing grade of
75%. ..."(allegation 5-c, p. 38, Exh. 1-Manalo, rec.;
emphasis supplied).
Pardo —
... I considered it entirely humanly possible to have erred,
because I corrected that particular notebook on
December 31,1971, considering especially the
 representation of the Bar Confidant that the said
examinee had obtained higher grades in other subjects,
the highest of which was 84% in Remedial Law, if I recall
correctly. ... (allegation 7, Exh. 2-Pardo, Adm. Case No.
1164, p. 62, rec.; emphasis supplied).
With the misrepresentations and the circumstances utilized by
respondent Lanuevo to induce the herein examiners to make the re-
evaluation adverted to, no one among them can truly claim that the re-
evaluation effected by them was impartial or free from any improper
influence, their conceded integrity, honesty and competence
notwithstanding.
Consequently, Galang cannot justifiably claim that he deserved the
increased grades given after the said re-evaluations(Galang's memo
attached to the records, Adm. Case No. 1163).
At any rate, WE are convinced, in the light of the explanations of the
respondents-examiners, which were earlier quoted in full, that their
actuations in connection with the re-evaluation of the answers of Galang
in five (5) subjects do not warrant or deserve the imposition of any
disciplinary action. WE find their explanations satisfactory. Nevertheless,
WE are constrained to remind herein respondents-examiners that their
participation in the admission of members to the Bar is one impressed
with the highest consideration of public interest — absolute purity of the
proceedings — and so are required to exercise the greatest or utmost
case and vigilance in the performance of their duties relative thereto.
V
Respondent Atty. Victorio D. Lanuevo, in his memorandum filed on
November 14, 1973, claimed that respondent-examiner Pamatian "in
bringing up this unfounded cause, or lending undue assistance or support
thereto ... was motivated with vindictiveness due to respondent's refusal
to be pressured into helping his (examiner's) alleged friend — a
participant in the 1971 Bar Examinations whom said examiner named as
Oscar Landicho and who, the records will show, did not pass said
examinations (p. 9, Lanuevo's memo, Adm. Case No. 1162).
It must be stated that this is a very serious charge against the honor and
integrity of the late Justice Ramon Pamatian, who passed away on
October 18, 1973 and therefore cannot refute Lanuevo's insinuations.
Respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo did not bring this out during the
investigation which in his words is "essential to his defense. "His
pretension that he did not make this charge during the investigation when
Justice Pamatian was still alive, and deferred the filing of such charge
against Justice Pamatian and possibly also against Oscar Landicho
before the latter departed for Australia "until this case shall have been
terminated lest it be misread or misinterpreted as being intended as a
leverage for a favorable outcome of this case on the part of respondent
or an act of reprisal", does not invite belief; because he does not impugn
the motives of the five other members of the 1971 Bar Examination
Committee, who also affirmed that he deceived them into re-evaluating or
revising the grades of respondent Galang in their respective subjects.
It appears, however, that after the release of the results of the 1971 Bar
examinations, Oscar Landicho, who failed in that examinations, went to
see and did see Civil Law examiner Pamatian for the purpose of seeking
his help in connection with the 1971 Bar Examinations. Examiner
Pamatian advised Landicho to see the Chairman of the 1971 Bar
Examination Committee. Examiner Pamatian mentioned in passing to
Landicho that an examination booklet was re-evaluated by him
(Pamatian) before the release of the said bar results (Vol. V, pp. 6-7, rec).
Even though such information was divulged by respondent Pamatian
after the official release of the bar results, it remains an indecorous act,
hardly expected of a member of the Judiciary who should exhibit restraint
in his actuations demanded by resolute adherence to the rules of
delicacy. His unseemly act tended to undermine the integrity of the bar
examinations and to impair public faith in the Supreme Court.
VI
The investigation failed to unearth direct evidence that the illegal
machination of respondent Lanuevo to enable Galang to pass the 1971
Bar examinations was committed for valuable consideration.
A
There are, however, acquisitions made by Respondent Lanuevo
immediately after the official release of the 1971 Bar examinations in
February, 1972, which may be out of proportion to his salary as Bar
Confidant and Deputy Clerk of Court of the Supreme Court.
1. On April 5, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
acquired from the BF Homes, Inc. a house and lot with an
area of 374 square meters, more or less, for the amount
of P84,114.00. The deed of sale was dated March 5,
1972 but was notarized only on April 5, 1972. On the
same date, however, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
executed two (2)mortgages covering the said house and
lot in favor of BF Homes, Inc. in the total amount of
P67,291.20 (First mortgage — P58,879.80, Entry No.
90913: date of instrument — April 5, 1972, date of
inscription — April 20, 1972: Second mortgage —
P8,411.40, Entry No. 90914: date of instrument — April 5,
1972, date of inscription — April 20, 1972). [D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.]. Respondent Lanuevo paid as down payment
the amount of only P17,000.00, which according to him is
equivalent to 20%, more or less, of the purchase price of
P84,114.00. Respondent Lanuevo claimed that P5,000.00
of the P17,000.00 was his savings while the remaining
the P12,000.00 came from his sister in Okinawa in the
form of a loan and received by him through a niece before
Christmas of 1971 in dollars ($2000) [Vol. VII, pp. 41-48;
Vol. VIII, pp. 2-3, rec.]
It appears, however, that his alleged P5,000.00
savings and P12,000.00 loan from his sister; are not fully
reflected and accounted for in respondent's 1971
Statement of Assets and Liabilities which he filed on
January 17, 1972.
In said 1971 statement, respondent Lanuevo listed under
Assets a bank deposit in the amount of only P2,000.00. In
his 1972 statement, his bank deposit listed under Assets
was in the amount of P1,011.00, which shows therefore
that of the P2,000.00 bank deposit listed in his 1971
statement under Assets, only the amount of P989.00 was
used or withdrawn. The amount of P18,000.00 receivable
listed under Assets in his 1971 statement was not
realized because the transaction therein involved did not
push through (Statement of Assets and Liabilities of
respondent Lanuevo from 1965 to 1972; Vol. VIII, pp. 47-
48, rec.).
Likewise, the alleged December, 1971 $2000 loan of
respondent from his married sister in Okinawa is
extremely doubtful. In the first place, said amount of
$2000 (P12,000.00) is not reflected in his 1971Statement
of Assets and Liabilities filed on January 17, 1972.
Secondly, the alleged note which he allegedly received
from his sister at the time he received the $200 was not
even presented by respondent during the investigation.
And according to Respondent Lanuevo himself, while he
considered this a loan, his sister did not seriously
consider it as one. In fact, no mode or time of payment
was agreed upon by them. And furthermore, during the
investigation, respondent Lanuevo promised to furnish the
Investigator the address of his sister in Okinawa. Said
promise was not fulfilled as borne out by the records.
Considering that there is no showing that his sister, who
has a family of her own, is among the top earners in
Okinawa or has saved a lot of money to give to him, the
conclusion, therefore, that the P17,000.00 of respondent
Lanuevo was either an ill-gotten or undeclared income is
inevitable under the foregoing circumstances.
On August 14, 1972, respondent Lanuevo and his wife
mortgaged their BF Homes house and lot to the GSIS for
the amount of P65,000.00 (Entry No. 4992: August 14,
1972 — date of instrument; August 23, 1972 — date of
inscription). On February 28, 1973, the second mortgage
in favor of BF Homes, Entry No. 90914, was redeemed by
respondent and was subsequently cancelled on March
20,1973, Entry No. 30143. Subsequently, or on March 2,
1973 the first mortgage in favor of BF Homes, Entry No.
90913 was also redeemed by respondent Lanuevo and
thereafter cancelled on March 20, 1973, (See D-2 to D-4,
Vol. III, rec.). Hence, only the mortgage in favor of GSIS
remains as the encumbrance of respondent's house and
lot. According to respondent Lanuevo, the monthly
amortization of the GSIS mortgage is P778.00 a month,
but that since May of 1973, he was unable to pay the
same. In his 1972 Statement of Assets and Liabilities,
which he filed in connection with his resignation and
retirement (filed October 13, 1972), the house and lot
declared as part of his assets, were valued at
P75,756.90. Listed, however, as an item in his liabilities in
the same statement was the GSIS real estate loan in the
amount of P64,200.00 (1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities).
2. Listed as an asset in his 1972 Statement of Assets and
Liabilities is a 1956 VW car valued at P5,200.00. That he
 acquired this car sometime between January, 1972 and
November, 1972 could be inferred from the fact that no
such car or any car was listed in his statement of assets
and liabilities of 1971 or in the years previous to 1965. It
appears, however, that his listed total assets, excluding
receivables in his 1971 Statement was P19,000.00, while
in his 1972 (as of November, 1972) Statement, his listed
total assets, excluding the house and lot was
P18,211.00, including the said 1956 VW car worth
P5,200.00.
The proximity in point of time between the official release
of the 1971 Bar examinations and the acquisition of the
above-mentioned properties, tends to link or tie up the
said acquisitions with the illegal machination committed
by respondent Lanuevo with respect to respondent
Galang's examination papers or to show that the money
used by respondent Lanuevo in the acquisition of the
above properties came from respondent Galang in
consideration of his passing the Bar.
During the early stage of this investigation but after the Court had
informed respondent Lanuevo of the serious irregularities in the 1971 Bar
examinations alleged in Oscar Landicho's Confidential Letter and in fact,
after Respondent Lanuevo had filed on April 12, 1972 his sworn
statement on the matter, as ordered by the Court, respondent Lanuevo
surprisingly filed his letter or resignation on October 13, 1972 with the
end in view of retiring from the Court. His resignation before he was
required to show cause on March 5, 1973 but after he was informed of
the said irregularities, is indicative of a consciousness of guilt.
It must be noted that immediately after the official release of the results of
the 1971 Bar examinations, respondent Lanuevo went on vacation and
sick leave from March 16, 1972 to January 15, 1973, obtaining the case
value thereof in lump sum in the amount of P11,000.00. He initially
claimed at the investigation that h e used a part thereof as a down
payment for his BF Homes house and lot (Vol. VII, pp. 40-48, rec.), which
he bought on April 5, 1972.
Criminal proceedings may be instituted against respondent Lanuevo
under Section 3 (a & e) in relation to Section 9 of Republic Act No. 1379
(Anti-Graft Law) for:
(a) Persuading inducing or influencing another public
officer to perform an act constituting a violation of rules
and regulations duly promulgated by competent authority
or an offense in connection with the official duties of the
latter, or allowing himself to be presented, induced, or
influenced to commit such violation or offense.
xxx xxx xxx
(e) Causing any undue injury to any party, including the
Government, or giving any private party any unwarranted
benefits, advantage or preference in the discharge of his
official administrative or judicial functions through
manifest partiality, evidence bad faith or gross
inexcusable negligence. This provision shall apply to
officers and employees of offices or government
corporations charged with the grant of licenses or permits
or other concessions.
Section 8 of said Republic Act No. 3019 authorizes the dismissal or
removal of a public officer once it is determined that his property or
money "is manifestly out of proportion to his salary as such public officer
or employee and to his other lawful income and the income from
legitimately acquired property ... " (Sec. 2, Rep. Act 1379; Sec. 8, Rep.
Act 3019).
It should be stressed, however, that respondent Lanuevo's
aforementioned Statements of Assets and Liabilities were not presented
or taken up during the investigation; but they were examined as they are
part of the records of this Court.
B
There are likewise circumstances indicating possible contacts between
respondent Ramon E. Galang and/or his father and respondent Victorio
D. Lanuevo before the latter become the bar Confidant.
1. Respondent Ramon E. Galang was a beneficiary of the G.I Bill of
Rights educational program of the Philippine Veterans Board from his
high school days — 1951 to 1955 — up to his pre-law studies at the MLQ
Educational Institution (now MLQ University) — 1955 to 1958. From 1948
to 1958, respondent Victorio D. Lanuevo was connected with the
Philippine Veterans Board which is the governmental agency entrusted
with the affairs of our veterans including the implementation of the
Veterans Bill of Rights. From 1955 to 1958, Respondent Lanuevo
successively held the position of Junior Investigator, Veterans Claims
Investigator, Supervising Veterans Investigator and Veterans Claims
Investigator (Service Record, p. 9, Adm. Case No. 1162). During that
period of time, therefore, respondent Lanuevo had direct contacts with
applicants and beneficiaries of the Veterans Bill of Rights. Galang's
educational benefits was approved on March 16, 1954, retroactive as of
the date of waiver — July 31, 1951, which is also the date of filing (A, Vol.
IV, rec.).
It is alleged by respondent Ramon E. Galang that it was his father who all
the time attended to the availment of the said educational benefits and
even when he was already in Manila taking up his pre-law at MLQ
Educational Institution from 1955 to 1958. In 1955, respondent Galang
was already 19 years old, and from 1957 to 1958, he was employed as a
technical assistant in the office of Senator Roy (Vol. V, pp. 79-80, 86-87,
rec.).[Subsequently, during the investigation, he claimed that he was the
private secretary of Senator Puyat in 1957 (Vol. VI, pp. 12-13, rec.)]. It
appears, however, that a copy of the notice-letter dated June 28, 1955 of
the Philippine Veterans Board to the MLQ Educational Institution on the
approval of the transfer of respondent Galang from Sta. Rita Institute to
the MLQ Educational Institution effective the first semester of the school
year 1955-56 was directly addressed and furnished to respondent
Ramon E. Galang at 2292 Int. 8 Banal St., Tondo, Manila (A-12, Vol. IV,
rec.).
Respondent Ramon E. Galang further declared that he never went to the
Office of the Philippine Veterans to follow up his educational benefits and
claimed that he does not even know the location of the said office. He
does not also know whether beneficiaries of the G.I. Bill of Rights
educational benefits are required to go to the Philippine Veterans Board
every semester to submit their ratings (Vol. V, p. 86, rec.). But
respondent Galang admits that he had gone to the GSIS and City Court
of Manila, although he insists that he never bothered to take a look at the
neighboring buildings (Vol. V, pp. 93-94, rec.). The huge and imposing
Philippine Veterans Building is beside the GSIS building and is obliquely
across the City Court building.
2. Respondent Lanuevo stated that as an investigator in the Philippine
Veterans Board, he investigated claims for the several benefits given to
veterans like educational benefits and disability benefits; that he does not
remember, however, whether in the course of his duties as veterans
investigator, he came across the application of Ramon E. Galang for
educational benefits; and that he does not know the father of Mr. Ramon
E. Galang and has never met him (Vol. VII, pp. 28, 49, rec.).
3. Respondent Lanuevo, as a member of the USAFEE, belonged to the
91st Infantry operating at Zambales and then Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
shortly before the war (Vol. VII, pp. 48-49, rec.). Later he joined the
guerrilla movement in Samar.
He used to be a member of the Philippine Veterans Legion especially
while working with the Philippine Veterans Board(Vol. VII, p. 49, rec.).
He does not know the Banal Regiment of the guerrillas, to which
Galang's father belonged. During the Japanese occupation, his guerrilla
outfit was operating in Samar only and he had no communications with
other guerrilla organization in other parts of the country.
He attended meetings of the Philippine Veterans Legion in his chapter in
Samar only and does not remember having attended its meeting here in
Manila, even while he was employed with the Philippine Veterans Board.
He is not a member of the Defenders of Bataan and Corregidor (Vol. VII,
p.51, rec.).
On November 27, 1941, while respondent Lanuevo was with the
Philippine Army stationed at Camp Manacnac, Cabanatuan, Nueva Ecija,
he was stricken with pneumonia and was hospitalized at the Nueva Ecija
Provincial Hospital as a result and was still confined there when their
camp was bombed and strafed by Japanese planes on December 13,
1941 (Sworn statement of respondent Lanuevo dated August 27, 1973,
Adm. Case No. 1162, p. 46, rec.).
German Galang, father of respondent Galang, was a member of the
Banal Guerilla Forces, otherwise known as the Banal Regiment. He was
commissioned and inducted as a member thereof on January 16, 1942
and was given the rank of first lieutenant. His unit "was attached and
served into the XI-Corps, US Army; XIII-C US Army, 43rd Div., US Army,
stationed headquarters at Sta. Rosa, Nueva Ecija and with the 38th
Division, US army stationed at Corregidor in the mopping-up operations
against the enemies, from 9 May 1945 date of recognition to 31
December 1945, date of demobilization"(Affidavit of Jose Banal dated
December 22, 1947, Vol. IV, A-3, rec.).
It should be stressed that once the bar examiner has submitted the
corrected notebooks to the Bar Confidant, the same cannot be withdrawn
for any purpose whatsoever without prior authority from the Court.
Consequently, this Court expresses herein its strong disapproval of the
actuations of the bar examiners in Administrative Case No. 1164 as
above delineated.

WHEREFORE, IN ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1162, RESPONDENT

VICTORIO D. LANUEVO IS HEREBY DISBARRED AND HIS NAME
ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE ROLL OF ATTORNEYS; AND IN
ADMINISTRATIVE CASE NO. 1163, RESPONDENT RAMON E.
GALANG, alias Roman E. GALANG, IS HEREBY LIKEWISE
DISBARRED AND HIS NAME ALSO ORDERED STRICKEN FROM THE
ROLL OF ATTORNEYS.

Makalintal, C.J., Castro, Fernando, Barredo, Esguerra, Muñoz Palma and

Aquino, JJ., concur.

Teehankee, J., concurs in the result.

Antonio, J., is on official leave.

Concepcion and Martin, JJ., took no part.

 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila EN BANC
G.R. No. L-6784 March 12, 1954
NATIVIDAD MIRANDA, LUIS MIRANDA, PEDRO MIRANDA, RAMON
MIRANDA and FAUSTINO MIRANDA,petitioners,
vs.
DEPORTATION BOARD, respondent.
Jacobo Gonzales for petitioners.
Office of the Solicitor General Juan R. Liwag and Solicitor Felix V.
Makasiar for respondent.
BAUTISTA, ANGELO, J.:
This is a petition for a writ of habeas corpus seeking to restrain
respondent from hearing the Deportation case filed against petitioners
and, incidentally, to have an order issued requiring respondent to show
cause why petitioners should not be released on the ground of lack of
jurisdiction.
On November 17, 1952, petitioners were charged before the Deportation
Board with having entered the Philippines through fraud and
misrepresentation in that, being the children of Chinese parents, they
succeed in showing through misrepresentation that they are the
legitimate children of Faustino Miranda, a Filipino citizen, had with a
woman named Puy Siok and that, by reason of such misrepresentation,
they were landed in this country as children of a Filipino citizen. Because
of these charges, petitioners were arrested and detained at the detention
station of the Bureau of Immigration although later they were set liberty
upon posting a bond of P1,000 each.
On June 18, 1953, petitioners filed a motion to quash the case alleging
that they are Filipino citizens and, therefore, the Deportation Board has
no jurisdiction over them. The Deportation Board not only denied this
motion but set the case for hearing on July 7, 1953, whereupon petitioner
filed the present petition seeking the suspension of the hearing and their
release.
The main contention of petitioners is predicated upon the theory that the
jurisdiction of the Deportation Board is confined to persons who
are admittedly aliens and are found to be undesirable, and having alleged
that they are Filipino citizens, said Board has no jurisdiction to take
cognizance of the charges filed against them.
While the jurisdiction of the Deportation Board as an instrument of the
Chief Executive to deport undesirable aliens exists only when the person
arrested is an alien, however, the mere plea of citizenship does not divest
the Board of its jurisdiction over the case. Petitioners should make "a
showing that his claim is not frivolous" (Ng Fung Ho vs. White, 259 U.S.,
275), and must prove by sufficient evidence that they are Filipino citizens.
[Kessler vs. Strecker (1939) 307 U.S., 21, 35-36.] If such is the primary
duty of petitioners, it follows that the Deportation Board has the
necessary power to pass upon the evidence that may be presented and
determine in the first instance if petitioners are Filipino citizens or not.
This is inherent in, or essential to the efficient exercise of, the power of
the Deportation Board (Laurencio vs. Collector of Customs, 35 Phil., 37.)
It is not therefore correct to state that the question of citizenship should
be determined exclusively by the courts. As this Court ruled in a recent
case:
Resuelto por la Junta que tiene jurisdiccion, es obvio que debe
proseguir con el caso hasta su terminacion. Si la Junta halla
infundados los cargos de indeseabilidad del recurrente, el caso
habra terminado totalmente, pero si la halla indeseable, puede
apelar contra el fallo, y si la apelacion fracasa, entonces sera el
tiempo de considerar si demonstrando causa razonable debe
haber un juicio ulterior sobre la ciudadana filipina que alega
mediante habeas corpus. (Llanco vs. The Deportation Board,
G.R. No. L-6272, prom. February 22, 1954.)
The foregoing disposes of the claim relative to the illegality of petitioner's
confinement. With regard to the contention that the Deportation Board
has acted in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave abuse of discretion in
allowing the taking of a blood test upon the persons of petitioners to
prove that they are not Filipino citizens, the same need not now be
considered, it being a matter that said Board can look into in the exercise
its incidental power to pass upon the citizenship of petitioners.
Wherefore petition is denied, with costs against petitioners. The writ of
preliminary injunction issued against respondent is hereby dissolved.
Paras, C.J., Reyes, Pablo, Jugo, Bengzon, Labrador, Padilla,
Concepcion, Montemayor and Diokno, JJ., concur.
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-23959 November 29, 1971
PHILIPPINE ASSOCIATION OF FREE LABOR UNIONS (PAFLU),
ENRIQUE ENTILA & VICTORIANO TENAZAS petitioners,
vs.
BINALBAGAN ISABELA SUGAR COMPANY, COURT OF
INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, & QUINTIN MUNING respondents.
Cipriano Cid & Associates for petitioners.
Ceferino Magat and Manuel C. Gonzales for respondent Quintin Muning.
REYES, J.B.L., J.:
May a non-lawyer recover attorney's fees for legal services rendered?
This is the issue presented in this petition for review of an order, dated 12
May 1964, and the en banc resolution, dated 8 December 1964, of the
Court of Industrial Relations, in its Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo, granting
respondent Quintin Muning a non-lawyer, attorney's fees for professional
services in the said case.
The above-named petitioners were complainants in Case No. 72-ULP-
Iloilo entitled, "PAFLU et al. vs. Binalbagan Isabela Sugar Co., et al."
After trial, the Court of Industrial Relations rendered a decision, on 29
March 1961, ordering the reinstatement with backwages of complainants
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenazas. Said decision became final. On 18
October 1963, Cipriano Cid & Associates, counsel of record for the
winning complainants, filed a notice of attorney's lien equivalent to 30%
of the total backwages. On 22 November 1963, Atty. Atanacio Pacis also
filed a similar notice for a reasonable amount. Complainants Entila and
Tenazas on 3 December 1963, filed a manifestation indicating their non-
objection to an award of attorney's fees for 25% of their backwages, and,
on the same day, Quentin Muning filed a "Petition for the Award of
Services Rendered" equivalent to 20% of the backwages. Munings
petition was opposed by Cipriano Cid & Associates the ground that he is
not a lawyer.
The records of Case No. 72-ULP-Iloilo show that the charge was filed by
Cipriano Cid & Associates through Atty. Atanacio Pacis. All the hearings
were held in Bacolod City and appearances made in behalf of the
complainants were at first by Attorney Pacis and subsequently by
respondent Quintin Muning.
On 12 May 1964, the Court of Industrial Relations awarded 25% of the
backwages as compensation for professional services rendered in the
case, apportioned as follows:
Attys. Cipriano Cid & Associates
............................................. 10%
Quintin Muning
......................................................................... 10%
Atty. Atanacio Pacis
................................................................. 5%
The award of 10% to Quintin Muning who is not a lawyer according to the
order, is sought to be voided in the present petition.
Respondent Muning moved in this Court to dismiss the present petition
on the ground of late filing but his motion was overruled on 20 January
1965.1 He asked for reconsideration, but, considering that the motion
contained averments that go into the merits of the case, this Court
admitted and considered the motion for reconsideration for all purposes
as respondent's answer to the petitioner for review.2 The case was
considered submitted for decision without respondent's brief.3
Applicable to the issue at hand is the principle enunciated
in Amalgamated Laborers' Association, et al. vs. Court of Industrial
Relations, et al., L-23467, 27 March 1968,4 that an agreement providing
for the division of attorney's fees, whereby a non-lawyer union president
is allowed to share in said fees with lawyers, is condemned by Canon 34
of Legal Ethics and is immoral and cannot be justified. An award by a
court of attorney's fees is no less immoral in the absence of a contract, as
in the present case.
The provision in Section 5(b) of Republic Act No. 875 that —
In the proceeding before the Court or Hearing Examiner
thereof, the parties shall not be required to be
represented by legal counsel ...
is no justification for a ruling, that the person representing the party-
litigant in the Court of Industrial Relations, even if he is not a lawyer, is
entitled to attorney's fees: for the same section adds that —
it shall be the duty and obligation of the Court or Hearing
Officer to examine and cross examine witnesses on
behalf of the parties and to assist in the orderly
presentation of evidence.
thus making it clear that the representation should be exclusively
entrusted to duly qualified members of the bar.
The permission for a non-member of the bar to represent or appear or
defend in the said court on behalf of a party-litigant does not by itself
entitle the representative to compensation for such representation. For
Section 24, Rule 138, of the Rules of Court, providing —
Sec. 24. Compensation of attorney's agreement as to
fees. — An attorney shall be entitled to have and recover
from his client no more than a reasonable compensation
for his services, ...
imports the existence of an attorney-client relationship as a condition to
the recovery of attorney's fees. Such a relationship cannot exist unless
the client's representative in court be a lawyer. Since respondent Muning
is not one, he cannot establish an attorney-client relationship with
Enrique Entila and Victorino Tenezas or with PAFLU, and he cannot,
therefore, recover attorney's fees. Certainly public policy demands that
legal work in representation of parties litigant should be entrusted only to
those possessing tested qualifications and who are sworn, to observe the
rules and the ethics of the profession, as well as being subject to judicial
disciplinary control for the protection of courts, clients and the public.
On the present issue, the rule in American jurisdictions is persuasive.
There, it is stated:
But in practically all jurisdictions statutes have now been
enacted prohibiting persons not licensed or admitted to
the bar from practising law, and under statutes of this
kind, the great weight of authority is to the effect that
compensation for legal services cannot be recovered by
one who has not been admitted to practice before the
court or in the jurisdiction the services were rendered. 5
No one is entitled to recover compensation for services as
an attorney at law unless he has been duly admitted to
practice ... and is an attorney in good standing at the
time.6
The reasons are that the ethics of the legal profession should not be
violated;7 that acting as an attorney with authority constitutes contempt of
court, which is punishable by fine or imprisonment or both,8 and the law
will not assist a person to reap the fruits or benefit of an act or an act
done in violation of law;9 and that if were to be allowed to non-lawyers, it
would leave the public in hopeless confusion as to whom to consult in
case of necessity and also leave the bar in a chaotic condition, aside
from the fact that non-lawyers are not amenable to disciplinary
measures. 10
And the general rule above-stated (referring to non-
recovery of attorney's fees by non-lawyers) cannot be
circumvented when the services were purely legal, by
seeking to recover as an "agent" and not as an
attorney. 11
The weight of the reasons heretofore stated why a non-lawyer may not
be awarded attorney's fees should suffice to refute the possible argument
that appearances by non-lawyers before the Court of Industrial Relations
should be excepted on the ground that said court is a court of special
jurisdiction; such special jurisdiction does not weigh the aforesaid
reasons and cannot justify an exception.
The other issue in this case is whether or not a union may appeal an
award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of some
of its members. This issue arose because it was the union PAFLU, alone,
that moved for an extension of time to file the present petition for review;
union members Entila and Tenazas did not ask for extension but they
were included as petitioners in the present petition that was subsequently
filed, it being contended that, as to them (Entila and Tenazas), their 1 Rollo, page 37.
inclusion in the petition as co-petitioners was belated.
2 Rollo, page 62.
We hold that a union or legitimate labor organization may appeal an
award of attorney's fees which are deductible from the backpay of its 3 Rollo, page 75.
members because such union or labor organization is permitted to
institute an action in the industrial court, 12 on behalf of its members; and 4 22 SCRA, 1266.
the union was organized "for the promotion of the emloyees' moral, social
and economic well-being"; 13 hence, if an award is disadvantageous to its
5 4 A.L.R. 1088, Editorial note.
members, the union may prosecute an appeal as an aggrieved party,
under Section 6, Republic Act 875, which provides:
6 7 C.J.S 1022.
Sec. 6. Unfair Labor Practice cases — Appeals. — Any
person aggrieved by any order of the Court may appeal to 7 See also, Foundation Finance Co. vs. Robins, 153 So.
the Supreme Court of the Philippines ..., 833 179 La. 259, reversing (App) 149 So. 166.

since more often than not the individual unionist is not in a position to 8 Rule 71, Rules of Court.
bear the financial burden of litigations.
9 Harris v. Clark, 142 N.E. 881, 81 Ind. App. 494.
Petitioners allege that respondent Muning is engaged in the habitual
practice of law before the Court of Industrial Relations, and many of them 10 Harriman v. Straham, 33 P. 2d 1067, 47 Wyo. 208.
like him who are not licensed to practice, registering their appearances
as "representatives" and appearing daily before the said court. If true, this 11 4 A.L.R. 1089.
is a serious situation demanding corrective action that respondent court
should actively pursue and enforce by positive action to that purpose. But 12 NLU v. Dinglasan, L-7945, 23 March 1956, 52 O.G.
since this matter was not brought in issue before the court a quo, it may No. 4, 1933.
not be taken up in the present case. Petitioners, however, may file proper
action against the persons alleged to be illegally engaged in the practice 13 Section 1(a), Republic Act 875.
of law.

WHEREFORE, the orders under review are hereby set aside insofar as
they awarded 10% of the backwages as attorney's fees for respondent
Quintin Muning. Said orders are affirmed in all other respects. Costs
against respondent Muning.

Concepcion, C.J., Makalintal, Zaldivar, Castro, Fernando, Teehankee,

Barredo, Villamor and Makasiar, JJ. concur.

Footnotes
 Republic of the Philippines
SUPREME COURT
Manila
EN BANC
G.R. No. L-19450 May 27, 1965
THE PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee,
vs.
SIMPLICIO VILLANUEVA, defendant-appellant.
Office of the Solicitor General for plaintiff-appellee.
Magno T. Buese for defendant-appellant.
PAREDES, J.:
On September 4, 1959, the Chief of Police of Alaminos, Laguna, charged
Simplicio Villanueva with the Crime of Malicious Mischief before the
Justice of the Peace Court of said municipality. Said accused was
represented by counsel de officio but later on replaced by counsel de
parte. The complainant in the same case was represented by City
Attorney Ariston Fule of San Pablo City, having entered his appearance
as private prosecutor, after securing the permission of the Secretary of
Justice. The condition of his appearance as such, was that every time he
would appear at the trial of the case, he would be considered on official
leave of absence, and that he would not receive any payment for his
services. The appearance of City Attorney Fule as private prosecutor was
questioned by the counsel for the accused, invoking the case of Aquino,
et al. vs. Blanco, et al.,
L-1532, Nov. 28, 1947, wherein it was ruled that "when an attorney had
been appointed to the position of Assistant Provincial Fiscal or City Fiscal
and therein qualified, by operation of law, he ceased to engage in private
law practice." Counsel then argued that the JP Court in entertaining the
appearance of City Attorney Fule in the case is a violation of the above
ruling. On December 17, 1960 the JP issued an order sustaining the
legality of the appearance of City Attorney Fule.
Under date of January 4, 1961, counsel for the accused presented a
"Motion to Inhibit Fiscal Fule from Acting as Private Prosecutor in this
Case," this time invoking Section 32, Rule 27, now Sec. 35, Rule 138,
Revised Rules of Court, which bars certain attorneys from practicing.
Counsel claims that City Attorney Fule falls under this limitation. The JP
Court ruled on the motion by upholding the right of Fule to appear and
further stating that he (Fule) was not actually enagaged in private law
practice. This Order was appealed to the CFI of Laguna, presided by the
Hon. Hilarion U. Jarencio, which rendered judgment on December 20,
1961, the pertinent portions of which read:
The present case is one for malicious mischief. There being no
reservation by the offended party of the civil liability, the civil
action was deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal action.
The offended party had, therefore, the right to intervene in the
case and be represented by a legal counsel because of her
interest in the civil liability of the accused.
Sec. 31, Rule 127 of the Rules of Court provides that in the court
of a justice of the peace a party may conduct his litigation in
person, with the aid of an agent or friend appointed by him for
that purpose, or with the aid of an attorney. Assistant City
Attorney Fule appeared in the Justice of the Peace Court as an
agent or friend of the offended party. It does not appear that he
was being paid for his services or that his appearance was in a
professional capacity. As Assistant City Attorney of San Pablo he
had no control or intervention whatsoever in the prosecution of
crimes committed in the municipality of Alaminos, Laguna,
because the prosecution of criminal cases coming from Alaminos
are handled by the Office of the Provincial Fiscal and not by the
City Attornev of San Pablo. There could be no possible conflict in
the duties of Assistant City Attorney Fule as Assistant City
Attorney of San Pablo and as private prosecutor in this criminal
case. On the other hand, as already pointed out, the offended
party in this criminal case had a right to be represented by an
agent or a friend to protect her rights in the civil action which was
impliedly instituted together with the criminal action.
In view of the foregoing, this Court holds that Asst. City Attorney
Ariston D. Fule may appear before the Justice of the Peace Court
of Alaminos, Laguna as private prosecutor in this criminal case as
an agent or a friend of the offended party.
WHEREFORE, the appeal from the order of the Justice of the
Peace Court of Alaminos, Laguna, allowing the apprearance of
Ariston D. Fule as private prosecutor is dismissed, without costs.
The above decision is the subject of the instant proceeding.
The appeal should be dismissed, for patently being without
merits.1äwphï1.ñët

Aside from the considerations advanced by the learned trial judge,

heretofore reproduced, and which we consider plausible, the fallacy of
the theory of defense counsel lies in his confused interpretation of
Section 32 of Rule 127 (now Sec. 35, Rule 138, Revised Rules), which
provides that "no judge or other official or employee of the superior courts
or of the office of the Solicitor General, shall engage in private practice as
a member of the bar or give professional advice to clients." He claims
that City Attorney Fule, in appearing as private prosecutor in the case
was engaging in private practice. We believe that the isolated
appearance of City Attorney Fule did not constitute private practice within
the meaning and contemplation of the Rules. Practice is more than an
isolated appearance, for it consists in frequent or customary actions, a
succession of acts of the same kind. In other words, it is frequent habitual
exercise (State vs. Cotner, 127, p. 1, 87 Kan. 864, 42 LRA, M.S. 768).
Practice of law to fall within the prohibition of statute has been interpreted
as customarily or habitually holding one's self out to the public, as
customarily and demanding payment for such services (State vs. Bryan,
4 S.E. 522, 98 N.C. 644, 647). The appearance as counsel on one
occasion is not conclusive as determinative of engagement in the private
practice of law. The following observation of the Solicitor General is
noteworthy:

Essentially, the word private practice of law implies that one must
have presented himself to be in the active and continued practice
of the legal profession and that his professional services are
available to the public for a compensation, as a source of his
livelihood or in consideration of his said services.

For one thing, it has never been refuted that City Attorney Fule had been
given permission by his immediate superior, the Secretary of Justice, to
represent the complainant in the case at bar, who is a relative.

CONFORMABLY WITH ALL THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed

from should be, as it is hereby affirmed, in all respects, with costs against
appellant..

Bengzon, C.J., Concepcion, Reyes, J.B.L., Barrera, Dizon, Regala,

Makalintal, Bengzon, J.P., and Zaldivar, JJ., concur.
Bautista Angelo, J., took no part.
 SECOND DIVISION
To prove his claim, complainant cited the remarks made by respondent in
the course of the proceedings conducted on February 27, 2006 as
ATTY. MELVIN D.C. MANE, A.M. No. RTJ-08-2119
transcribed by stenographer Elenita C. de Guzman, viz:
Complainant, [Formerly A.M. O.C.A. IPI
No. 07-2709-RTJ]
COURT:
- versus - Present:
. . . Sir, are you from the College of Law of the
University of the Philippines?
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
JUDGE MEDEL ARNALDO B. BELEN, CARPIO MORALES,
ATTY. MANE:
REGIONAL TRIAL COURT, BRANCH TINGA,
No[,] [Y]our Honor[,]
36, CALAMBA CITY, VELASCO, JR., and
from Manuel L. Quezon University[,] [Y]our Honor.
Respondent. BRION, JJ.
COURT:
No, youre not from UP.
Promulgated:
June 30, 2008
ATTY. MANE:
I am very proud of it.
x--------------------------------------------------x
COURT:
Then youre not from UP. Then you cannot equate
yourself to me because there is a saying and I know this,
RESOLUTION
not all law students are created equal, not all law schools
are created equal, not all lawyers are created equal despite
what the Supreme Being that we all are created equal in
His form and substance.[2] (Emphasis supplied)
CARPIO MORALES, J.:

By letter-complaint dated May 19, 2006[1] which was received by the Office
Complainant further claimed that the entire proceedings were duly
of the Court Administrator (OCA) on May 26, 2006, Atty. Melvin D.C. Mane
recorded in a tape recorder by stenographer de Guzman, and despite his
(complainant) chargedJudge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen (respondent), Presiding
motion (filed on April 24, 2006) for respondent to direct her to furnish him
Judge of Branch 36, Regional Trial Court, Calamba City, of demean[ing],
with a copy of the tape recording, the motion remained unacted as of the
humiliat[ing] and berat[ing] him during the hearing on February 27, 2006 of
date he filed the present administrative complaint on May 26, 2006. He,
Civil Case No. 3514-2003-C, Rural Bank of Cabuyao, Inc. v. Samuel
however, attached a copy of the transcript of stenographic notes taken
Malabanan, et al in which he was counsel for the plaintiff.
on February 27, 2006.

In his Comments[3] dated June 14, 2006 on the complaint filed in
compliance with the Ist Indorsement dated May 31, 2006[4] of the OCA,
respondent alleged that complainant filed on December 15, 2005 an
Urgent Motion to Inhibit,[5] paragraph 3[6] of which was malicious and a
direct assault to the integrity and dignity of the Court and of the Presiding
Judge as it succinctly implied that [he] issued the order dated 27
September 2005 for [a] consideration other than the merits of the case. He
thus could not simply sit idly and allow a direct assault on his honor and
integrity.
On the unacted motion to direct the stenographer to furnish complainant
with a copy of the unedited tape recording of the proceedings, respondent
quoted paragraphs 4 and 3[7]of the motion which, to him, implied that the
trial court was illegally, unethically and unlawfully engaged in editing the
transcript of records to favor a party litigant against the interest of
[complainants] client.
Respondent thus claimed that it was on account of the two motions that he
ordered complainant, by separate orders dated June 5, 2006, to explain
within 15 days[8] why he should not be cited for contempt.
Complainant later withdrew his complaint, by letter of September
4, 2006,[9] stating that it was a mere result of his impulsiveness.
In its Report dated November 7, 2007,[10] the OCA came up with the
following evaluation:
. . . The withdrawal or desistance of a complainant from
pursuing an administrative complaint does not divest the
Court of its disciplinary authority over court officials and
personnel. Thus, the complainants withdrawal of the
instant complaint will not bar the continuity of the instant
administrative proceeding against respondent judge.
The issue presented before us is simple: Whether or not
the statements and actions made by the respondent judge
during the subject February 27, 2006 hearing constitute
conduct unbecoming of a judge and a violation of the Code
of Judicial Conduct.
After a cursory evaluation of the complaint, the
respondents comment and the documents at hand, we find
that there is no issue as to what actually transpired during
the February 27th hearing as evidenced by the
stenographic notes. The happening of the incident
complained of by herein complainant was never denied by
the respondent judge. If at all, respondent judge merely
raised his justifications for his complained actuations.
xxxx
. . . [A] judges official conduct and his behavior in the
performance of judicial duties should be free from the
appearance of impropriety and must be beyond reproach.
A judge must at all times be temperate in his
language. Respondent judges insulting
statements which tend to question complainants
capability and credibility stemming from the fact that
the latter did not graduated [sic] from UP Law school
is clearly unwarranted and inexcusable. When a judge
indulges in intemperate language, the lawyer can return
the attack on his person and character, through an
administrative case against the judge, as in the instant
case.
Although respondent judges use in intemperate language
may be attributable to human frailty, the noble position in
the bench demands from him courteous speech in and out
of the court.Judges are demanded to be always temperate,
patient and courteous both in conduct and language.
 law, it is more important that they should act and behave in
xxxx such manner that the parties before them should have
confidence in their impartiality.[11] (Italics in the original;
Judge Belen should bear in mind that all judges should emphasis and underscoring supplied)
always observe courtesy and civility. In addressing
counsel, litigants, or witnesses, the judge should avoid a
controversial tone or a tone that creates animosity. Judges
The OCA thus recommended that respondent be reprimanded for violation
should always be aware that disrespect to lawyers
generates disrespect to them. There must be mutual of Canon 3 of the Code of Judicial Conduct with a warning that a repetition
concession of respect. Respect is not a one-way ticket
of the same shall be dealt with more severely.[12]
where the judge should be respected but free to insult
lawyers and others who appear in his court. Patience is
an essential part of dispensing justice and courtesy is a
By Resolution of January 21, 2008,[13] this Court required the parties to
mark of culture and good breeding. If a judge desires not
to be insulted, he should start using temperate language manifest whether they were willing to submit the case for resolution on the
himself; he who sows the wind will reap a storm.
basis of the pleadings already filed. Respondent complied on February 26,
It is also noticeable that during the subject hearing, not only 2008,[14] manifesting in the affirmative.
did respondent judge make insulting and demeaning
remarks but he also engaged in unnecessary lecturing
and debating. . .

xxxx
The pertinent provision of the Code of Judicial Conduct reads:
Respondent should have just ruled on the propriety of the
motion to inhibit filed by complainant, but, instead, he opted
for a conceited display of arrogance, a conduct that falls
below the standard of decorum expected of a judge. If
respondent judge felt that there is a need to admonish
complainant Atty. Mane, he should have called him in his
chambers where he can advise him privately rather than
battering him with insulting remarks and embarrassing
questions such as asking him from what school he came
from publicly in the courtroom and in the presence of his
clients. Humiliating a lawyer is highly reprehensible.
It betrays the judges lack of patience and temperance. A
highly temperamental judge could hardly make decisions
with equanimity.
Thus, it is our view that respondent judge should shun from
lecturing the counsels or debating with them during court
hearings to prevent suspicions as to his fairness and
integrity. While judges should possess proficiency in law in
order that they can competently construe and enforce the
Rule 3.04. A judge should be patient, attentive, and
courteous to lawyers, especially the inexperienced, to
litigants, witnesses, and others appearing before the court.
A judge should avoid unconsciously falling into the attitude
of mind that the litigants are made for the courts, instead of
the courts for the litigants.
An author explains the import of this rule:
Rule 3.04 of the Code of Judicial Conduct mandates that a
judge should be courteous to counsel, especially to those
who are young and inexperienced and also to all those
others appearing or concerned in the administration of
justice in the court. He should be considerate of witnesses
and others in attendance upon his court. He should be
courteous and civil, for it is unbecoming of a judge to
utter intemperate language during the hearing of a
 case. In his conversation with counsel in court, a judge
should be studious to avoid controversies which are apt to
obscure the merits of the dispute between litigants and
lead to its unjust disposition. He should not interrupt
counsel in their arguments except to clarify his mind as to
their positions. Nor should he be tempted to
an unnecessary display of learning or premature
judgment.
A judge without being arbitrary, unreasonable or
unjust may endeavor to hold counsel to a proper
appreciation of their duties to the courts, to their clients and
to the adverse party and his lawyer, so as to enforce due
diligence in the dispatch of business before the court. He
may utilize his opportunities to criticize and correct
unprofessional conduct of attorneys, brought to his
attention, but he may not do so in an insulting
manner.[15] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)
The following portions of the transcript of stenographic notes, quoted
verbatim, taken during the February 27, 2006 hearing show that
respondent made sarcastic and humiliating, even threatening and boastful
remarks to complainant who is admittedly still young, unnecessary
lecturing and debating, as well as unnecessary display of learning:
COURT:
xxx
Sir do you know the principle or study the stare decisis?
ATTY. MANE:
Ah, with due respect your
COURT:
Tell me, what is your school?
ATTY. MANE:
I am proud graduate of Manuel L. Quezon University.
COURT:
Were you taught at the MLQU College of Law of the principle
of Stare Decisis and the interpretation of the
Supreme Court of the rules of procedure where
it states that if there is already a decision by the
Supreme Court, when that decision shall be
complied with by the Trial Court otherwise non-
compliance thereof shall subject the Courts to
judicial sanction,and I quote the decision. Thats
why I quoted the decision of the Supreme Court Sir,
because I know the problem between the bank and
the third party claimants and I state, The fair market
value is the price at which a property may be sold
by a seller, who is not compelled to sell, and bought
by a buyer, who is not compelled to buy. Sir, thats
very clear, that is what fair market value and that is
not assessment value. In fact even you say
assessment value, the Court further state, the
assessed value is the fair market value
multiplied. Not mere the basic assesses value. Sir
that is the decision of the Supreme Court, am I just
reading the decision or was I inventing it?
ATTY. MANE:
May I be allowed to proceed.
COURT:
Sir, you tell me. Was I inventing the Supreme Court
decision which I quoted and which you should have
researched too or I was merely imagining the
Supreme Court decision sir? Please answer it.
ATTY. MANE:
No your Honor.

COURT:
Please answer it.
xxxx
COURT:
Thats why. Sir second, and again I quote from your own
pleadings, hale me to the Supreme Court
otherwise I will hale you to the bar. Prove to me
that I am grossly ignorant or corrupt.
ATTY. MANE:
Your Honor when this representation, your Honor . . .
COURT:
No, sir.
ATTY. MANE:
Yes your Honor . . .
COURT:
No sir unless you apologize to the Court I will hale you to
the IBP Because hindi naman ako ganon. I am not
that vindictive but if this remains. You cannot take
cover from the instruction of your client because
even if the instruction of a client is secret. Upon
consideration, the language of the pleader must
still conform with the decorum and respect to the
Court. Sir, thats the rule of practice. In my twenty
(20) years of practice Ive never been haled by a
judge to any question of integrity. Because even if
I believed that the Court committed error in
judgment or decision or grave abuse of discretion,
I never imputed any malicious or unethical
behavior to the judge because I know and I believe
that anyone can commit errors. Because no one is
like God. Sir, I hope sir you understand that this
Court, this Judge is not God but this Judge is
human when challenge on his integrity and honor
is lodged. No matter how simple it is because that
is the only thing I have now.
Atty. Bantin, can you please show him my statement of
assets and liabilities?
ATTY. MANE:
I think that is not necessary your Honor.
COURT:
No counsel because the imputations are there, thats why I
want you to see. Show him my assets and
liabilities for the proud graduate of MLQU. Sir,
look at it. Sir, I have stock holdings in
the U.S. before I joined the bench. And it was very
clear to everyone, I would do everything not be
tempted to accept bribe but I said I have spent my
fifteen (15) years and thats how much I have
worked in fifteen (15) years excluding my wifes
assets which is more than what I have may be triple
of what I have. May be even four fold of what I
have. And look at my assets. May be even your
bank can consider on cash to cash basis my
personal assets. That is the reason I am telling you
Atty. Mane. Please, look at it. If you want I can
show you even the Income Tax Return of my wife
and you will be surprised that my salary is not even
her one-half month salary. Sir, she is the Chief
Executive Officer of a Multi-National Publishing
Company. Thats why I have the guts to take this
job because doon po sa salary niya umaasa na
lamang po ako sa aking asawa. Atty. Mane,
please you are still young. Other judges you would
already be haled to the IBP. Take that as a
lesson. Now that you are saying that I was wrong
in the three-day notice rule, again the Supreme
Court decision validates me, PNB vs. Court of
Appeals, you want me to cite the quotation again
 that any pleadings that do not conform with the
three-day notice rule is considered as useless
scrap of paper and therefore not subject to any
judicial cognizance. You know sir, you would say
but I was the one subject because the judge was
belligerent. No sir, you can go on my record and
you will see that even prior to my rulings on your
case I have already thrown out so many motion for
non-compliance of a three-day notice rule. If I will
give you an exception because of this, then I would
be looked upon with suspicion. So sir again, please
look again on the record and you will see how many
motions I threw out for non-compliance with the
three-day notice rule. It is not only your case sir,
because sir you are a practitioner and a proud
graduate of the MLQU which is also the Alma
Mater of my uncle. And I supposed you were
taught in thought that the three-day notice rule
is almost sacrosanct in order to give the other
party time to appear and plead. In all books,
Moran, Regalado and all other commentators
state that non-compliance with the three-day
notice rule makes the pleading and motion a
useless scrap of paper. If that is a useless
scrap of paper, sir, what would be my ground
to grant exception to your motion? Tell me.
xxxx
COURT:
Procedural due process. See. So please sir dont confuse
the Court. Despite of being away for twenty years
from the college of law, still I can remember my
rules, In your motion you said . . . imputing things
to the Court. Sir please read your
rules. Familiarize yourself, understand the
jurisprudence before you be the Prince Valiant
or a Sir Gallahad in Quest of the Holy Grail. Sir,
ako po ay mahirap na tao, karangalan ko lang po
ang aking kayang ibigay sa aking mga anak at iyan
po ay hindi ko palalampasin maski kanino pa. Sir,
have you ever heard of anything about me in this
Court for one year. Ask around, ask around. You
know, if you act like a duck, walk like a duck,
quack like a duck, you are a duck. But have you
ever heard anything against the court. Sir in a
judicial system, in a Court, one year is time enough
for the practitioner to know whether a judge is what,
dishonest; 2), whether the judge is incompetent;
and 3) whether the judge is just playing loco. And I
have sat hear for one year sir and please ask
around before you charge into the windmill. I am a
proud product of a public school system from
elementary to college. And my only, and my only,
the only way I can repay the taxpayers is a service
beyond reproach without fear or favor to
anyone. Not even the executive, not even the one
sitting in Malacanang, not even the Supreme Court
if you are right. Sir, sana po naman inyo ring
igalang ang Hukuman kasi po kami, meron nga po,
tinatanggap ko, kung inyo pong mamarapatin,
meron pong mga corrupt, maaari pong nakahanap
na kayo ng corrupt na Judge pero hindi po lahat
kami ay corrupt. Maaari ko rin pong tanggapin sa
inyong abang lingcod na merong mga Hukom na
tanga pero hindi po naman lahat kami ay
tanga. Ako po ay 8:30 or before ay nandito po ako
sa husgado ko. Aalis po ako dito sa hapon,
babasahin ko lahat ang kaso ko para ko po
malaman kung any po ang kaso, para po pagharap
ko sa inyo at sa publiko hindi po ako
magmumukhang tanga. Sir, please have the
decency, not the respect, not to me but to the
Court. Because if you are a lawyer who cannot
respect the Court then you have no business
appearing before the Court because you dont
believe in the Court system. Thats why one of my
classmates never appeared before Court because
he doesnt believe in that system. He would rather
stay in their airconditioned room because they say
going to Court is useless. Then, to them I salute, I
give compliment because in their own ways they
know the futility and they respect the Court, in that
futility rather than be a hypocrite. Atty. Mane hindi
mo ako kilala, Ive never disrespect the courts and
I can look into your eyes. Kaya po dito ko gusto
kasi di po ako dito nagpractice para po walang
 makalapit sa akin. Pero kung ako po naman ay
inyong babastusin ng ganyang handa po akong Alam mo Atty. Mane I know when one has to be vigilant
lumaban kahit saan, miski saan po. And you can and vigorous in the pursue of pride. But if you are
quote me, you can go there together to the vigilant and vigor, you should never crossed the
Supreme Court. Because the only sir, the only line.
treasure I have is my name and my integrity. I could
have easily let it go because it is the first time, but Sir, what is your interpretation to the first three
the second time is too much too soon. Sir, paragraphs?
masyado pong kwan yon, sinampal na po ninyo
ako nung primero, dinuran pa po ninyo ako ng ATTY. HILDAWA:
pangalawa. Thats adding insult to the injury
po. Hindi ko po sanagagawin ito pero ayan po ang There will be some . . .
dami diyang abugado. I challenge anyone to file a
case against me for graft and corruption, for COURT:
incompetence.
What sir?
xxxx
ATTY. HILDAWA:
COURT:
. . . indiscretion.
I will ask the lawyer to read the statement and if they
believe that you are not imputing any wrong doing COURT:
to me I will apologize to you.
Indiscretion. See, that is the most diplomatic word that an
Atty. Hildawa please come over. The Senior, I respect the old practitioner could say to the Court because of
old practitioner, whose integrity is unchallenged. respect.

Sir you said honest. Sir ganoon po ako. You still want to Sir, salamat po.
defend your position, so be it.
xxxx
Atty. Hildawa I beg your indulgence, I am sorry but I know
that you are an old practitioner hammered out by COURT:
years of practice and whose integrity by reputation
precedes you. Please read what your younger Kita po ninyo, iyan po ang matatandang
companero has written to this Honorable Court in abogado. Indiscretion na lang. Now you say that is
pleading and see for yourself the implications he your honest opinion and the old practitioner
hurled to the Court in his honest hammered through years of practice could only say
opinion. Remember he said honest.That indiscretion committed by this judge. Much more I
implication is your honest opinion of an implication who sits in this bench?
sir.
Now is that your honest opinion?[16] (Emphasis and
Sir 1, 2 and 3. Paragraphs 1, 2 and 3. If that is your honest underscoring supplied)
opinion. Remember the word you said honest
opinion.
 censure; (3) reprimand; and (4) admonition with warning, the Court
imposes upon him the penalty of reprimand.

The Court thus finds the evaluation by the OCA well-taken.

An alumnus of a particular law school has no monopoly of

knowledge of the law. By hurdling the Bar Examinations which this Court
WHEREFORE, respondent, Judge Medel Arnaldo B. Belen, Presiding
administers, taking of the Lawyers oath, and signing of the Roll of
Judge of the Regional Trial Court, Branch 36, Calamba City, is
Attorneys, a lawyer is presumed to be competent to discharge his functions
found GUILTY of conduct unbecoming of a judge and
and duties as, inter alia, an officer of the court, irrespective of where he
is REPRIMANDED therefor. He is further warned that a repetition of the
obtained his law degree. For a judge to determine the fitness or
same or similar act shall be dealt with more severely.
competence of a lawyer primarily on the basis of his alma mater is clearly
an engagement in an argumentum ad hominem.
SO ORDERED.
A judge must address the merits of the case and not on the person
of the counsel. If respondent felt that his integrity and dignity were being
assaulted, he acted properly when he directed complainant to explain why
he should not be cited for contempt. He went out of bounds, however,
when he, as the above-quoted portions of the transcript of stenographic
notes show, engaged on a supercilious legal and personal discourse.

This Court has reminded members of the bench that even on the face of
boorish behavior from those they deal with, they ought to conduct
themselves in a manner befitting gentlemen and high officers of the
court.[17]

Respondent having exhibited conduct unbecoming of a judge, classified

as a light charge under Section 10, Rule 140 of the Revised Rules of Court,
which is penalized under Section 11(c) of the same Rule by any of the
following: (1) a fine of not less than P1,000 but not exceeding P10,000; (2)