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[ GR No. L-2990, Dec 17, 1951 ]

OSCAR ESPUELAS Y MENDOZA v. PEOPLE
90 Phil. 524

BENGZON, J.:

Article 142 of the Revised Penal Code punishes those who shall write, publish or circulate scurrilous libels against the Government of the Philippines or any of the duly
constituted authorities thereof or which suggest or incite rebellious conspiracies or riots or which tend to stir up the people against the lawful authorities or to disturb the
peace of t he community.
The appellant Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza was, after trial, convicted in the court of first instance of Bohol of a violation of the above article. The conviction was affirmed by the
Court of Appeals, because according to said court,

"About the time comprised between June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbiliran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it
to appear as if he were hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended from the limb of a tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel (Exhibits
A, C-1). After securing copies of his photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to several newspapers and weeklies of general circulation, (Exhibits C, F, G, H, I) not only in the
province of Bohol but also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a
fictitious suicide, Alberto Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note is hereunder reproduced:

"Dearest wife and children, bury me fire meters deep. Over my grave don't plant a cross or put floral wreaths, for I don't need them"

"Please don't bury me in a lonely place. Bury me in the Catholic cemetery. Although I have committed suicide, I still have the right to be buried among Christians"

"But don't pray for me. Don't remember me, and don't feel sorry. Wipe me out of your lives.

"My dear wife, if someone asks you why I committed suicide, tell them I did it because I was not pleased with the administration of Roxas. Tell the whole world about this.

"And if they ask why I did not like the administration of Roxas, point out to them the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalahaps. Tell them about Julio Guillen and the banditry
of Leyte.

"Dear wife, write to President Truman and Churchill. Tell them that here in the Philippines our government is infested with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.

"Teach our children to burn pictures of Roxas if and when they come across one"

"I committed suicide because I am ashamed, of our government under Roxas. I cannot hold high my brows to the world with this dirty government.

"I committed suicide because I have no power to put under Juez de Cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power. So, I sacrificed my own self."

The accused admitted the fact that he wrote the note or letter above quoted and caused its publication in the Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisaya, Lamdag and other local
periodicals and that he had impersonated one Alberto Reveniera by signing said pseudonymous name in said note or letter and posed himself as Alberto Reveniera in a picture
taken wherein he was shown hanging by the end of a rope tied to a limb of a tree."

The letter is a scurrilous libel against the Government.[1] It calls our government one of crooks and dishonest persons (dirty) infested with Nazis and Fascists i.e. dictators.

And the communication reveals a tendency to produce dissatisfaction or a feeling incompatible with the disposition to remain loyal to the government.[2]
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Writings which tend to overthrow or undermine the security of the government or to weaken the confidence of the people in the government are against the public peace, and
are criminal not only because they tend to incite to a breach of the peace but because they are conducive to the destruction of the very government itself (See 19 Am, Law Rep.
1511). Regarded as seditious libels they were the subject of criminal proceedings since early times in England. (V. op. cit.)

As explained by Patarson,[3] "* * * the great factors of government, consisting of the Sovereign, the Parliament, the ministers of state, the courts of justice, must all be
recognized as holding functions founded on sound principles and to be defended and treated with an established and wellnigh unalterable respect. Each of these great
institutions has peculiar virtues and peculiar weaknesses, but whether at any one time the virtue or the weakness predominates, there must be a certain standard of decorum
reserved for all. Each guarded remonstrance, each fiery invective, each burst of indignation must rest on some basis of respect and deference towards the depository, for the
time being, of every great constitutional function. Hence another limit of free speech and writing is sedition. And yet within that limit there is ample room and verge enough for
the freest use of the tongue and pen in passing strictures on the judgment and conduct of every constituted authority."

Naturally, when the people's share in the government was restricted, there was a disposition to punish even mild criticisms of the ruler or the departments of government. But
as governments grew to be more representative, the laws of sedition became less drastic and freedom of expression grew apace. Yet malicious endeavors to stir up public strife
continue to be prohibited.

The United States punished seditious utterances in the act of July 14, 1798 containing provisions parallel to our own article 142. Analogous prohibitions are found in the
Espionage Act of June 1917 and the Seditious Libel Amendment thereto in May, 1918.

Of course such legislation despite its general merit is liable to become a weapon of Intolerance constraining the free expression of opinion, or mere agitation for reform. But so
long as there is a sufficient safeguard by requiring intent on the part of the defendant to produce illegal action such legislation aimed at anarchy and radicalism presents largely
a question of policy. Our Legislature has spoken in Article 142 and the law must be applied.

In disposing of this appeal, careful thought had to be given to the fundamental right to freedom of speech. Yet the freedom of speech secured by the Constitution "does not
confer an absolute right to speak or publish without responsibility whatever one may choose." It is not "unbridled license that gives immunity for every possible use of
language and prevents the punishment of those who abuse this freedom." [4] So statutes against sedition have always been considered not violative of such fundamental
guaranty, although they should not be interpreted so as to unnecessarily curtail the citizen1s freedom of expression to agitate for institutional changes. [5]

Not to be restrained is the privilege of any citizen to criticise his government and government officials and to submit his criticism to the "free trade of ideas" and to plead for its
acceptance in "the competition of the market." However, let such criticism be specific and therefore constructive, reasoned or tempered, and not a contemptuous
condemnation of the entire government setup. Such wholesale attack is nothing less than an invitation to disloyalty to the government. In the article now under examination
one will find no particular objectionable actuation of the government. It is called dirty, it is called a dictatorship, it is called shameful, but no particular omissions or
commissions are set forth. Instead the article drips with malevolence and hate towards the constituted authorities. It tries to arouse animosity towards all public servants
headed by President Roxas whose pictures this appellant would burn and would teach the younger generation to destroy. Analysed for meaning and weighed in its
consequences the article cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade,
what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with its failure to particularise. When the use of irritating language centers not on per/uading
the readers but on creating disturbance, the rationale of free speech can not apply and the speaker or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels
against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The"Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer at least to the President,
his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives "dirty", Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally diracted. On this score alone the conviction could be upheld.[6]

As heretofore stated the publication suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up the people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke
violence from opposition groups who may seek to silence the writer. [7] Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to be its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to
illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds. [8]
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"The idea of violence pervades the whole letter" says Justice Parades of the Court of Appeals "The mere fact that a person was so disgusted with his "dirty government" to the
point of taking his own life, is not merely assign of disillusionment; it is a clear act to arouse its readers a sense of dissatisfaction against its duly constituted authorities. The
mention made in said letter of the situation in Central Luzon, the Hukbalah*RS, Julio Guillen and the banditry in Leyte, which are instances of flagrant and armed attacks
against the law and the duly constituted authorities, cannot but be interpreted by the reading public as an indirect justification of the open defiance by the Hukbalahaps against
the constituted government, the attempt against the life of President Roxas and the ruthless depredations committed by the bandits of Leyte, thus insinuating that a state of
lawlessness, rebellion and anarchy would be very much better than the maladministration of said President and his men.

To top it all, the appellant proclaimed to his readers that he committed suicide because he had "no power to put under juez de cuchillo all the Roxas people now in power"
Knowing, that the expression Juez de Cuchillo means to the ordinary layman as the Law of the Knife, a "summary and arbitrary execution by the knife", the idea intended by the
appellant to be conveyed was no other than bloody, violent and unpeaceful methods to free the government from the administration of Roxas and his men.

The meaning, intent and effect of the article involves maybe a question of fact, making the findings of the court of appeals conclusive upon us.[9]

Anyway, it is clear that the letter suggested the decapitation or assassination of all Roxas officials (at least members of the Cabinet and a majority of Legislators including the
Chief Executive himself). And such suggestion clinches the case against appellant.

In 1922 Isaac Perez of Sorsogon while discussing political matters with several persons in a public place uttered these words: "Filipinos must use bolos for cutting off Wood's
head referring to the then Governor-General, Leonard Wood. Perez was found guilty of inciting to sedition in a judgment of this court published in Volume 45 of the Philippine
Reports. That precedent is undeniably apposite. Note that the opinion was penned by Mr. Justice Malcolm probably the member who has been most outspoken on freedom of
speech. Adopting his own words we could say, "Here the person maligned by the accused is the Chief Eacecutive of the Philippine Islands. His official position, like the
Presidency of the United States and other high offices, under a democratic form of government, instead of affording immunity from promiscuous comment, seems rather to
invite abusive attacks. But in this instance, the attack on the President passes the furthest bounds of free speech and common decency. More than a figure of speech was
intended. There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to
remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws."

The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed with costs.

Pablo, Padilla, Montemayor, and Reyes JJ., concur.

DIGEST:

ESPUELAS VS PEOPLE
G.R. NO. L-2990
DECEMBER 17, 1951

Facts: On June 9 and June 24, 1947, both dates inclusive, in the town of Tagbilaran, Bohol, Oscar Espuelas y Mendoza had his picture taken, making it to appear as if he were
hanging lifeless at the end of a piece of rope suspended form the limb of the tree, when in truth and in fact, he was merely standing on a barrel. After securing copies of his
photograph, Espuelas sent copies of same to Free Press, the Evening News, the Bisayas, Lamdang of general circulation and other local periodicals in the Province of Bohol but
also throughout the Philippines and abroad, for their publication with a suicide note or letter, wherein he made to appear that it was written by a fictitious suicide, Alberto
Reveniera and addressed to the latter's supposed wife translation of which letter or note, stating his dismay and administration of President Roxas, pointing out the situation in
Central Luzon and Leyte, and directing his wife his dear wife to write to President Truman and Churchill of US and tell them that in the Philippines the government is infested
with many Hitlers and Mussolinis.
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Issue: Whether the accused is liable of seditious libel under Art. 142 of the RPC against the Government of the Philippines?

Held: Yes. The accused must therefore be found guilty as charged. And there being no question as to the legality of the penalty imposed on him, the decision will be affirmed
with costs.

Analyzed for meaning and weighed in its consequences, the article written bybthe accused, cannot fail to impress thinking persons that it seeks to sow the seeds of sedition
and strife. The infuriating language is not a sincere effort to persuade, what with the writer's simulated suicide and false claim to martyrdom and what with is failure to
particularize. When the use irritating language centers not on persuading the readers but on creating disturbances, the rationable of free speech cannot apply and the speaker
or writer is removed from the protection of the constitutional guaranty.

If it be argued that the article does not discredit the entire governmental structure but only President Roxas and his men, the reply is that article 142 punishes not only all libels
against the Government but also "libels against any of the duly constituted authorities thereof." The "Roxas people" in the Government obviously refer of least to the
President, his Cabinet and the majority of legislators to whom the adjectives dirty, Hitlers and Mussolinis were naturally directed. On this score alone the conviction could be
upheld.

Regarding the publication, it suggests or incites rebellious conspiracies or riots and tends to stir up people against the constituted authorities, or to provoke violence from
opposition who may seek to silence the writer. Which is the sum and substance of the offense under consideration.

The essence of seditious libel may be said to its immediate tendency to stir up general discontent to the pitch of illegal courses; that is to say to induce people to resort to
illegal methods other than those provided by the Constitution, in order to repress the evils which press upon their minds.
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US VS. FELIPE BUSTOS, ET AL

G.R. No. L-12592 March 8, 1918

In the latter part of 1915, numerous citizens of the Province of Pampanga assembled, and prepared and signed a petition to the Executive Secretary through the law office of
Crossfield and O'Brien, and five individuals signed affidavits, charging Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Pampanga, with malfeasance in office
and asking for his removal. Crossfield and O'Brien submitted this petition and these affidavits with a complaint to the Executive Secretary. The petition transmitted by these
attorneys was signed by thirty-four citizens apparently of considerable standing, including councilors and property owners (now the defendants), and contained the statements
set out in the information as libelous. Briefly stated the specific charges against the justice of the peace were.

1. That Francisca Polintan, desiring to make complaint against Mariano de los Reyes, visited the justice of the peace, who first told her that he would draw up complaint for P5;
afterwards he said he would take P3 which she paid; also kept her in the house for four days as a servant and took from her two chickens and twelve "gandus;"

2. That Valentin Sunga being interested in a case regarding land which was on trial before the justice of the peace, went to see the justice of the peace to ascertain the result of
the trial, and was told by the justice of the peace that if he wished to win he must give him P50. Not having this amount, Sunga gave the justice nothing, and a few days later
was informed that he had lost the case. Returning again to the office of the justice of the peace in order to appeal, the justice told him that he could still win if he would pay
P50;

3. That Leoncio Quiambao, having filed a complaint for assault against four persons, on the day of the trial the justice called him over to his house, where he secretly gave him
(Quiambao) P30; and the complaint was thereupon shelved.

The Executive Secretary referred the papers to the judge of first instance for the Seventh Judicial District requesting investigation, proper action, and report. The justice of the
peace was notified and denied the charges. The judge of first instance found the first count not proved and counts 2 and 3 established. In view of this result, the judge, the
Honorable Percy M. Moir, was of the opinion "that it must be, and it is hereby, recommended to the Governor-General that the respondent be removed from his position as
justice of the peace of Macabebe and Masantol, Province of Pampanga, and it is ordered that the proceedings had in this case be transmitted to the Executive Secretary."

In the CFI, not all the charges were proved. But, the judge still found him guilty.
Punsalan filed charges alleging that he was the victim of prosecution and one Jaime, an auxiliary justice, instigated the charges against him for personal reasons. He was
acquitted.
The complainants filed an appeal to the Governor General but it wasn’t acted upon.
Criminal action was instituted aganst the residents by Punsalan.
The CFI found almost all of the 34 defendants guilty and sentenced them to pay 10 pesos or suffer imprisonment in case of insolvency.
The defendants filed a motion for a retrial to retire the objection made by Punsalan. The trial court denied the motion. All except 2 of the defendants appealed.
Making assignments of error.

Issue:
Whether or not the defendants and appellants are guilty of a libel of Roman Punsalan, justice of the peace in Pampanga.

Held: Yes. Defendants acquitted.

Ratio:
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Freedom of speech was non existent in the country before 1900. There were small efforts at reform made by the La Solidaridad. The Malolos Constitution, on the other hand,
guaranteed freedom of speech.
During the U.S. period, President McKinley himself laid down the tenet Magna Charta of Philippine Liberty when he wrote, “that no law shall be passed abridging the freedom
of speech or of the press or of the rights of the people to peaceably assemble and petition the Government for a redress of grievances." This was in the Philippine Bill.

In the Amrican cases it was held, there were references to “public opinion should be the constant source of liberty and democracy.” It also said “the guaranties of a free speech
and a free press include the right to criticize judicial conduct. The administration of the law is a matter of vital public concern. Whether the law is wisely or badly enforced is,
therefore, a fit subject for proper comment. If the people cannot criticize a justice of the peace or a judge the same as any other public officer, public opinion will be effectively
muzzled. Attempted terrorization of public opinion on the part of the judiciary would be tyranny of the basest sort.”

“It is a duty which every one owes to society or to the State to assist in the investigation of any alleged misconduct. It is further the duty of all who know of any official
dereliction on the part of a magistrate or the wrongful act of any public officer to bring the facts to the notice of those whose duty it is to inquire into and punish them.”

The right to assemble and petition is the necessary consequence of republican institutions and the complement of the part of free speech. Assembly means a right on the part
of citizens to meet peaceably for consultation in respect to public affairs. Petition means that any person or group of persons can apply, without fear of penalty, to the
appropriate branch or office of the government for a redress of grievances. The persons assembling and petitioning must, of course, assume responsibility for
the charges made.
Public policy has demanded protection for public opinion. The doctrine of privilege has been the result of this. Privilged communications may in some instances afford an
immunity to the slanderer. Public policy is the “unfettered administration of justice.”

Privilege is either absolute or qualified. Qualified privilege is prima facie which may be lost by proof of malice. This is apparent in complaints made in good faith against a public
official’s conduct having a duty in the matter. Even if the statements were found to be false, the protection of privilege may cover the individual given that it was in good faith.
There must be a sense of duty and not a self-seeking motive.

A communication made bona fide upon any subject-matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which has a duty, is privileged, if made to a
person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it containedcriminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.
In the usual case malice can be presumed from defamatory words. Privilege destroys that presumption. The onus of proving malice then lies on the plaintiff. The plaintiff must
bring home to the defendant the existence of malice as the true motive of his conduct. Falsehood and the absence of probable cause will amount to proof of malice.

It is true that the particular words set out in the information, if said of a private person, might well be considered libelous per se. The charges might also under certain
conceivable conditions convict one of a libel of a government official. As a general rule words imputing to a judge or a justice of the peace dishonesty or corruption or
incapacity or misconduct touching him in his office are actionable. But as suggested in the beginning we do not have present a simple case of direct and vicious accusations
published in the press, but of charges predicated on affidavits made to the proper official and thus qualifiedly privileged. Express malice has not been proved by the
prosecution. Further, although the charges are probably not true as to the justice of the peace, they were believed to be true by the petitioners. Good faith surrounded their
action. Probable cause for them to think that malfeasance or misfeasance in office existed is apparent. The ends and the motives of these citizens— to secure the removal from
office of a person thought to be venal — were justifiable. In no way did they abuse the privilege. These respectable citizens did not eagerly seize on a frivolous matter but on
instances which not only seemed to them of a grave character, but which were sufficient in an investigation by a judge of first instance to convince him of their seriousness. No
undue publicity was given to the petition. The manner of commenting on the conduct of the justice of the peace was proper.
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PEOPLE VS. ISAAC PEREZ

G.R. No. L-21049 December 22, 1923

DOCTRINE:Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is
withinthe range of liberty of speech, unless the intention and effect be seditious. But when theintention and effect of the act is seditious, the constitutional guaranties of
freedom of speechand press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive measures designed to maintainthe prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the
constitution and the laws, and theexistence of the State.

Facts: Isaac Perez, the municipal secretary of Pilar, Sorsogon, and Fortunato Lodovice, a citizen of that municipality, happening to meet on the morning of April 1, 1992, in
the presidencia of Pilar, they became engaged in a discussion regarding the administration of Governor-General Wood, which resulted in Perez shouting a number of times:
"The Filipinos, like myself, must use bolos for cutting off Wood's head for having recommended a bad thing for the Filipinos, for he has killed our independence." Charged in the
Court of First Instance of Sorsogon with a violation of article 256 of the Penal Code having to do with contempt of ministers of the Crown or other persons in authority, and
convicted thereof, Perez has appealed the case to this court.

ISSUE:
WON Perez’s remarks is protected by the constitutional protection on freedom of speech.
Or WON the provisions of Act No. 292 should be interpreted so as to abridge the freedom of speech and the right of the people to peacebly assemble and petition the
Government for redress of grievances.

HELD:
No , it is not. Agreed with the lower court in its findings of facts but convicted the accused for violation of Act No.292 (Section 8)

RATIO DECIDENDI:
It is of course fundamentally true that the provisions of Act No. 292 must not be interpreted so as to abridge thefreedom of speech and the right of the people peaceably to
assemble and petition the Government for redress of grievances. Criticism is permitted to penetrate even to the foundations of Government.
Criticism, no matter how severe, on the Executive, the Legislature, and the Judiciary, is within the range of liberty of speech,unless the intention and effect be seditious. But
when the intention and effect of the act is seditious, theconstitutional guaranties of freedom of speech and press and of assembly and petition must yield to punitive
measuresdesigned to maintain the prestige of constituted authority, the supremacy of the constitution and the laws, and theexistence of the State.

In this instance, the attack on the Governor-General passes the furthest bounds of free speech was intended.There is a seditious tendency in the words used, which could easily
produce disaffection among the people and a state of feeling incompatible with a disposition to remain loyal to the Government and obedient to the laws.In the words of the
law, Perez has uttered seditious words. He has made a statement and done an act which tended toinstigate others to cabal or meet together for unlawful purposes. He has
made a statement and done an act whichsuggested and incited rebellious conspiracies. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to stir up the peopleagainst
the lawful authorities. He has made a statement and done an act which tended to disturb the peace of thecommunity and the safety or order of the Government. All of these
various tendencies can be ascribed to the action of Perez and may be characterized as penalized by section 8 of Act No. 292 as amended.
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RAFAEL S. MERCADO v. COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF RIZAL,

GR No. L-38753, 1982-08-25

FACTS:

There was first a motion to dismiss filed by petitioner Ramon Mercado on the ground of the telegram being a privileged communication.

It was denied by the lower court.

Thereafter through another counsel, came a motion to quash, alleging that the facts charged do not "constitute an offense." Again, it met with a denial. A motion for
reconsideration having proved futile, the present proceeding was instituted.

In the comment submitted, the stress was on the absence of any privilege, there being malice and bad faith. As stated therein: "The communication in issue was made by the
petitioner with evident malice and bad faith, a matter explicitly stated in the information filed with the respondent Court, and the pretense that it was made allegedly in line
with the President's appeal to give information on undesirable employees in the government service, cannot cover up such fact.

Malice in fact and bad faith on the part of the petitioner, and/or that he was motivated by vengeance and ill-will in making the said communication, is shown by, and can be
established by the prosecution thru the testimony of the private respondent and the following documentary evidence: a) On October 14, 1972, petitioner filed a letter-
complaint with the Chairman of the Board of Transportation, against the private respondent, for alleged grave violations of the Rep. Act No. 2260 and civil service rules [with a
true copy of the said complaint attached]; b) Fourteen (14) days after the filing of the aforementioned administrative complaint by petitioner against the private respondent,
the said petitioner sent the subject libelous telegram or communication to the Secretary of Public Works and Communication, which was indorsed for investigation to the said
Board of Transportation on October 31, 1972, by first indorsement of the said Department Secretary, dated Oct. 31, 1972 to the Chairman of the Board of Transportation [with
a true copy of the said first indorsement attached]; c) On November 23, 1972, the petitioner filed an amended administrative complaint against the private respondent with
the same Board of Transportation docketed therein as Adm. Case No. 72-1, charging the private respondent with dishonesty, pursuit of private business or corrupt practices,
and misconduct or discourtesy [with a true copy of the said amended complaint attached]; d) The private respondent, submitted her answer to the said administrative
charges, and after due hearing, the Board of Transportation rendered a decision on June 26, 1973, finding the herein private respondent as innocent of the charges, and
dismissing the complaint filed against her [with a true copy of the said decision attached]; e) On July 17, 1973 petitioner, as complainant therein, filed a motion for
reconsideration of the decision of the Board of Transportation, but the said Board, in an order issued on August 29, 1973, denied said motion for reconsideration for lack of
merit [with a copy of said order attached]; f) While the Administrative Case No. 72-1 was pending determination before the Board of Transportation, petitioner, to further
harrass and malign the good character and reputation of the private respondent, filed with the Constabulary Highway Patrol Group (CHPG), a complaint against the private
respondent and her husband Lorenzo M. Mercado accusing them of selling a Ford Willys engine, which was carnapped. The said office, however, after due hearing, issued a
resolution on February 9, 1973, recommending that the said case be closed for lack of evidence [with a copy of the said resolution attached]; g) Also during the pendency of
the administrative complaint filed by petitioner against the private respondent in the Board of Transportation, petitioner filed with the Criminal Investigation Service (CIS), PC,
Camp Crame, Quezon City, a complaint for corrupt practices against the private respondent; and after due investigation the CIS, in answer to the letter of private respondent's
counsel, dated March 24, 1973 [with a true copy attached], requesting information about the result of the said investigation, sent a letter to said counsel, dated March 27,
1973, advising him that the said case is considered closed for insufficiency of evidence [with a copy of the said letter attached]."

ISSUES:

The relevant question in this suit is whether or not the landmark case of United States v. Bustos,[1] enunciating the doctrine that the free speech and free press guarantees of
the Constitution constitute a bar to prosecutions for libel arising from a communication addressed to a superior complaining against the conduct of a subordinate, is impressed
with significance.

fundamental question raised as to whether or not the telegram being qualifiedly privileged should be the basis for the special civil action for certiorari, mandamus and
prohibition.
9

RULING:

In the light of the above pleadings, this Court after a careful study, holds that certiorari to annul the order denying the motion to quash as well as the motion for
reconsideration does not lie. Neither should respondent court be ordered to dismiss Criminal Case No. Q-2936, the criminal complaint for libel against petitioner. Nor should
the court be prohibited from hearing the aforesaid criminal action. This petition lacks merit.

United States v. Bustos,[4] as mentioned at the outset, is a landmark decision.

Justice Malcolm, however, is careful to point out that qualified privilege, and this is one such instance, The tenacity with which petitioner had pursued a course of conduct on
its face would seem to indicate that a doubt could reasonably be entertained as to the bona fides of petitioner. The prosecution should be given the opportunity then of
proving malice.

Respondents have in their favor a decision of this Court supporting their stand.

Principles:

a libel prosecution must likewise survive the test of whether or not the offending publication is within the guarantees of free speech and free press.

"'A communication made bona fide upon any subject matter in which the party communicating has an interest, or in reference to which he has a duty, is privileged, if made to
a person having a corresponding interest or duty, although it contained criminatory matter which without this privilege would be slanderous and actionable.'

"pertinent illustration of the application of qualified privilege," namely, "a complaint made in good faith and without malice in regard to the character or conduct of a public
official when addressed to an officer or a board having some interest or duty in the matter.

Even when the statements are found to be false, if there is probable cause for belief in their truthfulness and the charge is made in good faith, the mantle of privilege may still
cover the mistake of the individual.

The duty under which a party is privileged is sufficient if it is social or moral in its nature and this person in good faith believes he is acting in pursuance thereof although in fact
he is mistaken.

The rule is that if a party applies to the wrong person through some natural and honest mistake as to the respective functions of various officials such unintentional error will
not take the case out of the privilege."

In People v. Monton,[9] the question of whether or not a motion to quash based on a qualified privilege should be upheld was decided adversely against the claim of those
accused of libel.
10

[G.R. No. 107566. November 25, 2004]

BAGUIO MIDLAND COURIER, REPRESENTED BY ITS PRESIDENT AND GENERAL MANAGER, OSEO HAMADA AND CECILLE AFABLE, EDITOR-IN-CHIEF, petitioners, vs. THE COURT
OF APPEALS (FORMER SP, 6TH DIVISION) AND RAMON LABO, JR., respondents.
During the time material to this case, petitioner Oseo C. Hamada (Hamada) was the president and general manager of the Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., which
publishes the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly newspaper published and circulated in Baguio City and other provinces within the Cordillera region. He was also, at that time,
the business manager of said newsweekly. Petitioner Cecille Afable (Afable) was Baguio Midland Couriers editor-in-chief and one of its columnists who ran the column In and
Out of Baguio.
On the other hand, private respondent Ramon L. Labo, Jr., was among the mayoralty candidates in Baguio City for the 18 January 1988 local elections. [3] Prior to this, in
1984, private respondent had already embarked on a political career by running for a seat in the former Batasang Pambansa during which time he appointed a certain
Benedicto Carantes (Carantes) as his campaign manager. It appears that as part of the campaign propaganda for private respondent in the 1984 local elections, political ads
appeared in the various issues of Baguio Midland Courier and campaign paraphernalia were printed by Baguio Printing and Publishing Co., Inc., on his behalf.
Apart from his political endeavors, private respondent was also an active member of the civic group Lions Club having been elected governor of said organization in 1984,
1986, and 1988.
Before the 18 January 1988 local elections, petitioner Afable wrote in her column a series of articles dealing with the candidates for the various elective positions in
Baguio City. Quoted hereunder are excerpts from said articles, as well as the respective dates when they were published in the Baguio Midland Courier
January 3, 1988

. . . Of all the candidates for mayor, Labo has the most imponderables about him, people would ask, Can he read and write? Why is he always talking about his Japanese father-
in-law? Is he really a Japanese Senator or a barrio kapitan? Is it true that he will send P18 million aid to Baguio? Somebody wanted to put an advertisement of Labo in the
Midland Courier but was refused because he has not yet paid his account of the last time he was a candidate for Congress. We will accept all advertisements for him if he pays
his old accounts first.[4]

January 10, 1988

I heard that the Dumpty in the egg is campaigning for Cortes. Not fair. Some real doctors are also busy campaigning against Labo, because he has not also paid their medical
services with them. Since he is donating millions he should settle his small debts like the reportedly insignificant amount of P27,000 only. If he wins several teachers were
signifying to resign and leave Baguio forever, and Pangasinan will be the franca-liqua of Baguio.[5]

Claiming that the aforequoted portions of petitioner Afables column were tainted with malice, private respondent instituted separate criminal and civil actions for libel against
herein petitioners. In a resolution, dated 26 December 1988, the Department of Justice dismissed the criminal case due to insufficiency of evidence[6] while the civil suit was
raffled off to RTC, Branch 6, Baguio City.
0he article in 1uestion was pri"ileged and constituted fair comment on matters ofpublic interest. 0he decision, was, howe"er, re"ersed b! the appellate court. It declared that
themalicious nature of the article ma! be deduced from the fact that it was published in the BaguioMidland Courier a few da!s before the scheduled local elections and from
the st!le and tone of writing emplo!ed b! #fable.

Issue: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in holding that there was malice in publishing the article about Mr Labo.
11

Ruling:

Yes, the Court of appeals erred in its decision.The elements of libel are:
a) The imputation of a discreditable act or condition to another
b) publication of the imputation
c) identity of the person defamed and
d) existence of malice
The law presumes that every Defamatory imputation is malicious. However, malice is not presumed when the information is for public interest.
Mr. Labo was unable to prove that Afable’s column was tainted with actual malice. Afable’s article constituted a fair comment on a matter of public interest as it dealt with the
character of private respondent who was running for the top elective post in Baguio City. The column provided the public with information as regards Labo’s financial status
which was still unknown at that time. Indeed, the information might have dissuaded some members of the electorate from voting in favor of private respondent but such is the
inevitable result of the application of the law.

DIONISIO LOPEZ y ABERASTURI VS. PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES and SALVADOR G. ESCALANTE, JR.
G.R. No. 172203 February 14, 2011

FACTS: In the early part of November 2002, while exercising his official duties as Mayor of Cadiz City, private respondent saw billboards with the printed phrase CADIZ FOREVER with a blank
space before the word NEVER directly under said phrase. Those billboards were posted on the corner of Gustilo and Villena streets, in front of Cadiz Hotel and beside the old Coca-Cola warehouse
in Cadiz City. He became intrigued and wondered on what the message conveyed since it was incomplete.

Some days later, on November 15, 2002, private respondent received a phone call relating that the blank space preceding the word NEVER was filled up with the added words BADING AND
SAGAY. The next day, he saw the billboards with the phrase CADIZ FOREVER BADING AND SAGAY NEVER printed in full. Reacting and feeling that he was being maligned and dishonored with the
printed phrase and of being a tuta of Sagay, private respondent, after consultation with the City Legal Officer, caused the filing of a complaint for libel against petitioner.He claimed that the
incident resulted in mental anguish and sleepless nights for him and his family. He thus prayed for damages.
On December 17, 2003, the RTC rendered judgment convicting petitioner of libel. The trial court ruled that from the totality of the evidence presented by the prosecution vis-a-vis that of the
defense, all the elements of libel are present.
Petitioner appealed the Decision of the RTC to the CA which, as stated earlier, rendered judgment on August 31, 2005, affirming with modification the Decision of the RTC. Like the trial court, the
appellate court found the presence of all the elements of the crime of libel.
Disgruntled, petitioner is now before us via the instant petition.

HELD: A libel is defined as a public and malicious imputation of a crime or of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance tending to cause the
dishonor, discredit or contempt of a natural or juridicial person or to blacken the memory of one who is dead.[13] For an imputation to be libelous, the following requisites must concur: a) it must
be defamatory; b) it must be malicious; c) it must be given publicity and d) the victim must be identifiable.[14] Absent one of these elements precludes the commission of the crime of libel.

Although all the elements must concur, the defamatory nature of the subject printed phrase must be proved first because this is so vital in a prosecution for libel. Were the words imputed not
defamatory in character, a libel charge will not prosper. Malice is necessarily rendered immaterial.

An allegation is considered defamatory if it ascribes to a person the commission of a crime, the possession of a vice or defect, real or imaginary or any act, omission, condition, status or
circumstance which tends to dishonor or discredit or put him in contempt or which tends to blacken the memory of one who is dead. To determine whether a statement is defamatory, the
words used are to be construed in their entirety and should be taken in their plain, natural and ordinary meaning as they would naturally be understood by persons reading them, unless it
12

appears that they were used and understood in another sense.[15] Moreover, [a] charge is sufficient if the words are calculated to induce the hearers to suppose and understand that the person or
persons against whom they were uttered were guilty of certain offenses or are sufficient to impeach the honesty, virtue or reputation or to hold the person or persons up to public ridicule.[16]

Tested under these established standards, we cannot subscribe to the appellate courts finding that the phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND SAGAY NEVER tends to induce suspicion on private
respondents character, integrity and reputation as mayor of Cadiz City. There are no derogatory imputations of a crime, vice or defect or any act, omission, condition, status or circumstance
tending, directly or indirectly, to cause his dishonor. Neither does the phrase in its entirety, employ any unpleasant language or somewhat harsh and uncalled for that would reflect on private
respondents integrity. Obviously, the controversial word NEVER used by petitioner was plain and simple. In its ordinary sense, the word did not cast aspersion upon private respondents integrity
and reputation much less convey the idea that he was guilty of any offense. Simply worded as it was with nary a notion of corruption and dishonesty in government service, it is our considered
view to appropriately consider it as mere epithet or personal reaction on private respondents performance of official duty and not purposely designed to malign and besmirch his reputation and
dignity more so to deprive him of public confidence.

Truth be told that somehow the private respondent was not pleased with the controversial printed matter. But that is grossly insufficient to make it actionable by itself. [P]ersonal hurt or
embarrassment or offense, even if real, is not automatically equivalent to defamation,[19] words which are merely insulting are not actionable as libel or slander per se, and mere words of general
abuse however opprobrious, ill-natured, or vexatious, whether written or spoken, do not constitute bases for an action for defamation in the absence of an allegation for special damages. The
fact that the language is offensive to the plaintiff does not make it actionable by itself, as the Court ruled in MVRS Publications, Inc. v. Islamic Da Wah Council of the Phils., Inc.[20]

In criminal prosecutions, fundamental is the requirement that the elemental acts constituting the offense be established with moral certainty as this is the critical and only requisite to a finding of
guilt.[23] In this case, contrary to the conclusion of the trial court as affirmed by the appellate court, the prosecution failed to prove that the controversial phrase CADIZ FOREVER, BADING AND
SAGAY NEVER imputes derogatory remarks on private respondents character, reputation and integrity. In this light, any discussion on the issue of malice is rendered moot.

WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed Decision of the Court of Appeals dated August 31, 2005 in CA-G.R. CR No. 28175 is REVERSED and SET ASIDE and the petitioner
is ACQUITTED of the crime charged.

RE: PETITION FOR RADIO AND TELEVISION COVERAGE OF THE MULTIPLE MURDER CASES AGAINST MAGUINDANAO GOVERNOR ZALDY AMPATUAN, ET AL.,
June 14, 2011 A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC
FACTS:
On November 23, 2009, 57 people including 32 journalists and media practitioners were killed on their way to Shariff Aguak in Maguindanao. This tragic incident came to be
known as Maguindanao massacre´ spawned charges for 57 counts of murder and additional charges of rebellion against 197 accused, docketed as Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-
162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-10-162652-66, and Q-10-163766, commonly entitled People v. Datu Andal Ampatuan, Jr., et al. Following the transfer of venue and the
reraffling of the cases, the cases are being tried by Presiding Judge Jocelyn Solis-Reyes of Branch 221 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City. Almost a year later on
November 19 2010, the National Union of Journalists of the Philippines (NUJP), ABS-CBN Broadcasting Corporation, GMA Network Inc., relatives of the victims, individual
journalists from various media entities and members of the academe filed a petition before this court praying that live television and radio coverage of the trial in this criminal
cases be allowed, recording devises be permitted inside the court room to assist the working journalists, and reasonable guidelines be formulated to govern the broadcast
coverage and the use of devices. The Court docketed the petition as A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
President Benigno S. Aquino III, by letter of November 22, 2010 addressed to Chief Justice Renato Corona, came out in support of those who have petitioned this Court to
permit television and radio broadcast of the trial." The Court docketed the matter as A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC.
By separate Resolutions of November 23, 2010, the Court consolidated A.M. No. 10-11-7-SC with A.M. No. 10-11-5-SC.
13

Petitioners state that the trial of the Maguindanao Massacre cases has attracted intense media coverage due to the gruesomeness of the crime, prominence of the accused,
and the number of media personnel killed. They inform that reporters are being frisked and searched for cameras, recorders, and cellular devices upon entry, and that under
strict orders of the trial court against live broadcast coverage, the number of media practitioners allowed inside the courtroom has been limited to one reporter for each media
institution.
Hence, the present petitions which assert the exercise of right to a fair and public trial and the lifting of the absolute ban on live television and radio coverage of court
proceedings. They principally urge the Court to revisit the 1991 ruling in Re: Live TV and Radio Coverage of the Hearing of President Corazon C. Aquinos Libel Case and the 2001
ruling in Re: Request Radio-TV Coverage of the Trial in the Sandiganbayan of the Plunder Cases Against the Former President Joseph E. Estrada which rulings, they contend,
violate the doctrine that proposed restrictions on constitutional rights are to be narrowly construed and outright prohibition cannot stand when regulation is a viable
alternative.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the petition for radio and television coverage of the Maguindanao Massacre should be allowed

HELD:
The Court partially GRANTS pro hac vice petitioners’ prayer for a live broadcast of the trial court proceedings, subject to guidelines.
Respecting the possible influence of media coverage on the impartiality of trial court judges, petitioners correctly explain that prejudicial publicity insofar as it undermines the
right to a fair trial must pass the totality of circumstances test, applied in People v. Teehankee, Jr. and Estrada v. Desierto, that the right of an accused to a fair trial is not
incompatible to a free press, that pervasive publicity is not per se prejudicial to the right of an accused to a fair trial, and that there must be allegation and proof of the
impaired capacity of a judge to render a bias-free decision. Mere fear of possible undue influence is not tantamount to actual prejudice resulting in the deprivation of the right
to a fair trial.
On public trial, Estrada basically discusses:
An accused has a right to a public trial but it is a right that belongs to him, more than anyone else, where his life or liberty can be held critically in balance. A public trial aims to
ensure that he is fairly dealt with and would not be unjustly condemned and that his rights are not compromised in secrete conclaves of long ago. A public trial is not
synonymous with publicized trial; it only implies that the court doors must be open to those who wish to come, sit in the available seats, conduct themselves with decorum and
observe the trial process. In the constitutional sense, a courtroom should have enough facilities for a reasonable number of the public to observe the proceedings, not too
small as to render the openness negligible and not too large as to distract the trial participants from their proper functions, who shall then be totally free to report what they
have observed during the proceedings.
Compliance with regulations, not curtailment of a right, provides a workable solution to the concerns raised in these administrative matters, while, at the same time,
maintaining the same underlying principles upheld in the two previous cases.
The basic principle upheld in Aquino is firm ─ [a] trial of any kind or in any court is a matter of serious importance to all concerned and should not be treated as a means of
entertainment, and to so treat it deprives the court of the dignity which pertains to it and departs from the orderly and serious quest for truth for which our judicial
proceedings are formulated. The observation that massive intrusion of representatives of the news media into the trial itself can so alter and destroy the constitutionally
necessary atmosphere and decorum stands.
The Court had another unique opportunity in Estrada to revisit the question of live radio and television coverage of court proceedings in a criminal case. It held that the
propriety of granting or denying the instant petition involves the weighing out of the constitutional guarantees of freedom of the press and the right to public information, on
the one hand, and the fundamental rights of the accused, on the other hand, along with the constitutional power of a court to control its proceedings in ensuring a fair and
impartial trial In so allowing pro hac vice the live broadcasting by radio and television of the Maguindanao Massacre cases, the Court lays down the following guidelines toward
addressing the concerns mentioned in Aquino and Estrada:
14

(a) An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to live radio and television broadcasting.
(b) Media entities must file with the trial court a letter of application, manifesting that they intend to broadcast the audio-visual recording of the proceedings and that they
have the necessary technological equipment and technical plan to carry out the same, with an undertaking that they will faithfully comply with the guidelines and regulations
and cover the entire remaining proceedings until promulgation of judgment. No selective or partial coverage shall be allowed. No media entity shall be allowed to broadcast
the proceedings without an application duly approved by the trial court.
(c) A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and
zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled
only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court. The camera equipment should not produce or beam any distracting sound or light rays. Signal lights or
signs showing the equipment is operating should not be visible. A limited number of microphones and the least installation of wiring, if not wireless technology, must be
unobtrusively located in places indicated by the trial court.
The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial court on the physical set-up of the camera and equipment.
(d) The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the media entities shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical disturbance shall be
ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings and the exclusivity of the access to the media entities.
The hardware for establishing an interconnection or link with the camera equipment monitoring the proceedings shall be for the account of the media entities, which should
employ technology that can (i) avoid the cumbersome snaking cables inside the courtroom, (ii) minimize the unnecessary ingress or egress of technicians, and (iii) preclude
undue commotion in case of technical glitches.
If the premises outside the courtroom lack space for the set-up of the media entities facilities, the media entities shall access the audio-visual recording either via wireless
technology accessible even from outside the court premises or from one common web broadcasting platform from which streaming can be accessed or derived to feed the
images and sounds. At all times, exclusive access by the media entities to the real-time audio-visual recording should be protected or encrypted.
(e) The broadcasting of the proceedings for a particular day must be continuous and in its entirety, excepting such portions thereof where Sec. 21 of Rule 119 of the Rules of
Court[27] applies, and where the trial court excludes, upon motion, prospective witnesses from the courtroom, in instances where, inter alia, there are unresolved
identification issues or there are issues which involve the security of the witnesses and the integrity of their testimony (e.g., the dovetailing of corroborative testimonies is
material, minority of the witness). The trial court may, with the consent of the parties, order only the pixelization of the image of the witness or mute the audio output, or
both.
(f) To provide a faithful and complete broadcast of the proceedings, no commercial break or any other gap shall be allowed until the days proceedings are adjourned, except
during the period of recess called by the trial court and during portions of the proceedings wherein the public is ordered excluded.
(g) To avoid overriding or superimposing the audio output from the on-going proceedings, the proceedings shall be broadcast without any voice-overs, except brief annotations
of scenes depicted therein as may be necessary to explain them at the start or at the end of the scene. Any commentary shall observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the
contempt power of the court;
(h) No repeat airing of the audio-visual recording shall be allowed until after the finality of judgment, except brief footages and still images derived from or cartographic
sketches of scenes based on the recording, only for news purposes, which shall likewise observe the sub judice rule and be subject to the contempt power of the court;
(i) The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance
with law.
(j) The audio-visual recording of the proceedings shall be made under the supervision and control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency
requires, including the suspension or revocation of the grant of application by the media entities.
(k) The Court shall create a special committee which shall forthwith study, design and recommend appropriate arrangements, implementing regulations, and administrative
matters referred to it by the Court concerning the live broadcast of the proceedings pro hac vice, in accordance with the above-outlined guidelines. The Special Committee shall
15

also report and recommend on the feasibility, availability and affordability of the latest technology that would meet the herein requirements.It may conduct consultations with
resource persons and experts in the field of information and communication technology.
(l) All other present directives in the conduct of the proceedings of the trial court (i.e., prohibition on recording devices such as still cameras, tape recorders; and allowable
number of media practitioners inside the courtroom) shall be observed in addition to these guidelines.
RESOLUTION October 23, 2011
Petitioners Tiamzon and Legarta take issue on provisos (t), (g), and (h) of the enumerated guidelines in the June 14, 2011 Resolution and allege that these must be struck down
for being unconstitutional, as they constitute prior restraint on free expression because they dictate what media can and cannot report about the "Maguindanao massacre"
trial.
Accused Andal Ampatuan, Jr. (Ampatuan) also filed a Motion for Reconsideration dated June 27, 2011, alleging that the June 14, 2011 Resolution "deprives him of his rights to
due process, equal protection, presumption of innocence, and to be shielded from degrading psychological punishment."
This Court partially grants reconsideration of the June 14, 2011 Resolution and deny the Partial Motion for Reconsideration dated June 29, 2011 of petitioners Editha Mirandilla
Tiamzon and Glenna Legarta. The Court is now disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial of the "Maguindanao massacre" cases but is still allowing the filming of the
proceedings for (1) the real-time transmission to specified viewing areas, and (2) documentation.
In a constitutional sense, public trial is not synonymous with publicized trial. The right to a public trial belongs to the accused. The requirement of a public trial is satisfied by
the opportunity of the members of the public and the press to attend the trial and to report what they have observed. The accused's right to a public trial should not be
confused with the freedom of the press and the public's right to know as a justification for allowing the live broadcast of the trial. The tendency of a high profile case like the
subject case to generate undue publicity with its concomitant undesirable effects weighs heavily against broadcasting the trial. Moreover, the fact that the accused has legal
remedies after the fact is of no moment, since the damage has been done and may be irreparable. It must be pointed out that the fundamental right to due process of the
accused cannot be afforded after the fact but must be protected at the first instance
To address the physical impossibility of accommodating the large number of interested parties inside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, it is not necessary to allow the press
to broadcast the proceedings here and abroad, but the Court may allow the opening of closed-circuit viewing areas outside the courtroom where those who may be so minded
can come and watch the proceedings. Aside from providing a viewing area outside the courtroom in Camp Bagong Diwa, closed-circuit viewing areas can also be opened in
selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General Santos City where most of the relatives of the accused and the victims reside, enabling them to
watch the trial without having to come to Camp Bagong Diwa. These viewing areas will, at all times, be under the control of the trial court judges involved, subject to this
Court's supervision.
The disallowing the live media broadcast of the trial in Criminal Case Nos. Q-09-162148-72, Q-09-162216-31, Q-1 0-162652-66, and Q-10-163766 is subject to the following
guidelines on audio visual recording and streaming of the video coverage:
a.An audio-visual recording of the Maguindanao massacre cases may be made both for documentary purposes and for transmittal to specified closed-circuit viewing areas: (i)
outside the courtroom, within the Camp Bagong Diwa 's premises; and (ii) selected trial courts in Maguindanao, Koronadal, South Cotabato, and General Santos City where the
relatives of the accused and the victims reside. Said trial courts shall be identified by the Office of the Court Administrator. These viewing areas shall be under the control of
trial court judges involved, subject to this Court's supervision.
b. The viewing area will be installed to accommodate the public who want to observe the proceedings within the Camp Bagong Diwa premises. The streaming of this video
coverage within the different court premises in Mindanao will be installed so that the relatives of the parties and the interested public can watch the proceedings in real time.
c. A single fixed compact camera shall be installed inconspicuously inside the courtroom to provide a single wide-angle full-view of the sala of the trial court. No panning and
zooming shall be allowed to avoid unduly highlighting or downplaying incidents in the proceedings. The camera and the necessary equipment shall be operated and controlled
only by a duly designated official or employee of the Supreme Court.
d. The transmittal of the audio-visual recording from inside the courtroom to the closed-circuit viewing areas shall be conducted in such a way that the least physical
disturbance shall be ensured in keeping with the dignity and solemnity of the proceedings.
16

e. The Public Information Office and the Office of the Court Administrator shall coordinate and assist the trial courts involved on the physical set-up of the camera and
equipment.
f. The original audio-recording shall be deposited in the National Museum and the Records Management and Archives Office for preservation and exhibition in accordance with
law.
g. The audio-visual recording of the proceedings and its transmittal shall be made under the control of the trial court which may issue supplementary directives, as the exigency
requires, subject to this Court
h. In all cases, the witnesses should be excluded from watching the proceedings, whether inside the courtroom or in the designated viewing areas. The Presiding Judge shall
issue the appropriate orders to insure compliance with this directive and for the imposition of appropriate sanctions for its violation.

JOSE JESUS M. DISINI, JR., ET AL. v. THE SECRETARY OF JUSTICE, ET AL.,

G.R. No. 203335, FEBRUARY 18, 2014

FACTS:
Petitioners Jose Jesus M. Disini, Jr., Rowena S. Disini, Lianne Ivy P. Medina, Janette Toral and Ernesto Sonido, Jr., as taxpayers, file a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition under Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the petitioners seek to 1) nullify Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175, otherwise known as the
“Cybercrime Prevention Act of 2012” for violating the fundamental rights protected under the Constitution; and 2) prohibit the Respondents, singly and collectively, from
enforcing the afore-mentioned provisions of the Cybercrime Act.
Named as Respondents are the Secretary of Justice, the Secretary of the Interior and Local Government, the Executive Director of the Information Communications
Technology Office, the Chief of the Philippine National Police, and the Director of the National Bureau of Investigation.

ISSUES/GROUNDS:
1. Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of The Cybercrime Act violate the petitioners’ constitutionally protected rights to freedom of expression, due process, equal
protection, privacy of communications, as well as the Constitutional sanctions against double jeopardy, undue delegation of legislative authority and the right against
unreasonable searches and seizure;
o • Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act more than doubles the liability for imprisonment for any violation of existing penal laws are in violation of the
petitioners’ right against Double Jeopardy;
o • Section 12 of the Cybercrime Act, which permits the NBI and the PNP “with due cause” to engage in real time collection of traffic data without the benefit of
the intervention of a judge, violates the Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to be free from unreasonable searches and seizure as well as the right to
the privacy of communications;
o • Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act, which authorizes the Respondent Secretary of DOJ to block or restrict access to any content upon a prima facie finding
that the same violates the law, contains an undue delegation of legislative authority, infringes upon the judicial power of the judiciary, and violates the
Petitioners’ Constitutionally-protected right to due process and freedom of expression; and
o • Section 4(c)(4) defines libel as a cybercrime and in relation to Section 6 of the law increased the penalty from 6 months to 4 years and 2 months to the
greater period of 6 years to 10 years, infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. Under Section 12, a prima
facie finding by the Secretary of DOJ can trigger an order directed at service providers to block access to the said material without the benefit of a trial or a
conviction. Thus, RA 10175 infringes upon the right to freedom of expression and also restricts the freedom of the press. The increased penalties, plus the
ease by which allegedly libelous materials can be removed from access, work together as a “chilling effect” upon protected speech.
17

2. No other plain, speedy, or adequate remedy in the court of law, and that this Petition is therefore cognizable by the SC’s judicial power under Article VIII, Section 1 par.
2 of the Constitution and pursuant to Rule 65, Sec. 1 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended.

ARGUMENTS/DISCUSSIONS:
1. The Cybercrime Act Violates Free Speech:
o • imposes heavier penalties for online libel than paper-based libel; single act of online libel will result in two convictions penalized separately under the RP
and the Cybercrime Act;
o online libel under the Cybercrime Act will ensure the imprisonment of the accused and for a much longer period. Such changes will result in a chilling effect
upon the freedom of speech;
o • with the passage of the Cybercrime Act, Senator Vicente Sotto III’s earlier threat to criminally prosecute all bloggers and internet users who were critical of
his alleged plagiarism of online materials for use in his speech against the Reproductive Health Bill became real; threat of criminal prosecution under RA
10175 will work to preclude people such as Petitioners from posting social commentaries online, thus creating a “chilling effect” upon the freedom of
expression;
o • gives the DOJ Secretary blanket authority to restrain and block access to content whether authored by private citizens or the organized press sans any
hearing of any kind but merely upon a mere prima facie showing that a particular Internet article constitutes online libel;
o • respondents must demonstrate how the Cybercrime Act will fare under strict scrutiny
2. Sections 6 and 7 of the Cybercrime Act violate the Double Jeopardy and Equal Protection Clauses of the Constitution:
o • Persons who commit crimes using information and communication technologies (ICTs) face the possibility of being imprisoned more than double the
imprisonment laid down in the RPC or special law, simply by the passage of the Cybercrime Act;
o • the cybercrimes defined and punished under Section 6 of the Act are absolutely identical to the crimes defined in the RPC and special laws which raises the
possibility that an accused will be punished twice for the same offense in violation of the Constitution;
o • Congress created a class of offenders who commit crimes “by, through or with the use” of ICTs in violation of the equal protection clause
3. The Real Time Collection of Traffic Date Violate the Right to Privacy and the Right Against Unreasonable Searches and Seizure:
o • No compelling state interest that justifies real time collection of data; the authority vested on the Philippine National Police and the National Bureau of
Investigation to collect data is not bounded by any reasonable standard except “due cause” which presumably, the PNP and NBI will determine for itself;
o • While the privacy of suspected terrorists, through the Human Security Act, are protected by the intervention of the Court of Appeals
before surveillance operations are conducted, the privacy of all citizens may be infringed without judicial participation in the Cybercrime Act;
o • Neither the PNP nor the NBI is required to justify the incursion into the right to privacy;
o No limits imposed upon the PNP or the NBI since they can lawfully collect traffic data at all times without interruption;
o • No stated justification for this warrant-free unlimited incursion into the privacy of citizens
4. The Respondent DOJ Secretary’s Take Down Authority under Section 19 of the Cybercrime Act violates Due Process and is an Undue Delegation of Legislative Authority
o • The DOJ Secretary’s overwhelming powers to order the restriction or blocking of access to certain content upon a mere prima facie finding without any
need for a judicial determination is in clear violation of petitioners’ Constitutionally protected right to due process;
o • The Cybercrime Act contemplates that the respondent DOJ Secretary will be “judge, jury and executioner” of all cybercrime-related complaints;
o To consider that all penal provisions in all specials laws are cybercrimes under Section 6, it • follows that:
1. Complaints filed by intellectual property rights owners may be acted upon the Respondent DOJ Secretary to block access to websites and content
upon a mere prima facie showing of an infringement;
2. Foreign sites (e.g. Amazon.com) offering goods on retail to Philippine citizens may be blocked for violating the Retail Trade Law;
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3. Foreign service providers such as Skype may be blocked from offering voice services without securing a license from the National
Telecommunications Communication;
4. YouTube video may be blocked for presumably violating the IP Code.
o • The Cybercrime Act fails the two tests laid down by the Court in Abakada Guro Party List v. Purisima (GR No. 166715) to determine the validity of delegation
of legislative power: (1) the completeness test and (2) the sufficient standard test
1. Nowhere in the Cybercrime Act’s declaration of policy does it lay down the legislative policy with respect to the blocking of content. No limits upon
the takedown power of the respondent DOJ Secretary;
2. Prima facie standard is not enough to prevent the DOJ Secretary from exercising infinite discretion and becoming the supreme authority in the
Philippine Internet landscape.
PRAYER:
1. Declare null and void, for being unconstitutional, Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
2. Prohibit all Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175;
3. Issue a TRO enjoining the Respondents from implementing Sections 4(c)(4), 6, 7, 12 and 19 of RA 10175; and
4. Issue other reliefs, just and equitable in the premises.
5. The Supreme Court on Tuesday, February 18, upheld as constitutional most provisions of Republic Act 10175 or the Cybercrime Law, including online libel – subject to
one condition.
6. The High Court also struck down a provision of the law that gives the state the power to take down online content without a court warrant.
7. Seeking to strike a balance between fundamental freedoms and government control, the High Court decided on the constitutionality of Republic Act 10175 a little over
a year after oral arguments were heard on Jan 15, 2013.
8. Among the hotly-debated issues during the oral arguments was the law's provision on online libel. (READ: 'Libel gone is best-case scenario for SC cybercime ruling')
9. The Supreme Court decision, penned by Justice Roberto Abad, ruled online libel to be constitutional but with an exception – that is, in cases where it covers persons
other than the original author. Recipients of, and netizens who react to a potentially defamatory post, will not be covered by online libel.

Unconstitutional provisions
Three provisions were voted down as categorically unconstitutional:
 Section 4 (c)(3) which pertains to unsolicited commercial communications
 Section 12 which pertains to real-time collection of traffic data
 Section 19 which pertains to restricting or blocking access to computer data
The SC decided that Section 19 – granting power to the Department of Justice (DOJ) to restrict computer data on the basis of prima facie or initially observed evidence –
was not in keeping with the Constitution. The said automatic take-down clause is found in Section 19 of the cybercrime law.
Even the SOLICITOR General, in his defense of RA 10175, admitted before the SC that Section 19 is "constitutionally impermissible, because it permits a form of final
restraint on speech without prior judicial determination."
Section 12 would have allowed law enforcement authorities with due cause to collect or record by technical or electronic means "traffic data" in real time.
Section 4 (c)(3) of the law says that "the transmission of commercial electronic communication with the use of computer system which seek to advertise, sell, or offer
for sale products and services are prohibited" unless certain conditions – such as prior affirmative consent from the recipient – are met. This was ruled unconstitutional.
A separability clause contained in Section 29, Chapter VIII of the law allows the rest of the law to "remain in full force and effect" even if certain provisions are held invalid.
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Nuances in other provisions

Three other provisions were not struck down and remain in the law, but they will not apply in certain cases as decided by the SC. Among these provisions is online
libel, which is constitutional as far as the original author is concerned.
Section 5, which pertains to aiding or abetting the commission of a cybercrime and to the attempt to commit a cybercrime, was declared unconstitutional only in the
following cases: child pornography, unsolicited commercial communications (or spam), and online libel. Section 5 will apply to all other cybercrimes outlined in the law.
National Bureau of Investigation (NBI) Cybercrime Division Chief Ronald Aguto explained to Rappler that it will also be hard for both law enforcement and the prosecution to
prove the "attempt to commit a cybercrime."
Aiding a nd abetting the commission of a cybercrime, he added, might unduly cover certain players in the online industry.
Section 7, which pertains to liability of a cyber criminal under other laws, was declared unconstitutional only in the following cases: online libel and child pornography.
The SC cited the guarantee against double jeopardy or being punished more than once for the same offense – a guarantee outlined in the Constitution – in deciding on
Section 7.
Libel is punishable by Article 353 of the Revised Penal Code, while child pornography is punishable by RA 9775 or the Anti-Child Pornography Act.
A person convicted of libel or child pornography can only be punished once, under the coverage of a single law.

The Diocese of Bacolod, Represented by the Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.Navarra and the Bishop Himself in his Personal Capacity v. Commission onElections and the
Election Officer of Bacolod City, Atty. Mavil V.Majarucon

GR No. 205728

FACTS:
On February 2013, petitioners posted two (2) tarpaulins within the compound of San Sebastian Cathedral of Bacolod. Each tarpaulin was approximately 6×10 in size. They were
posted on the front walls of the cathedral within public view.

The first tarpaulin contains the message “IBASURA RH Law” referring to the Reproductive Health Law of 2012 or Republic Act No. 10354. The second tarpaulin is the subject of
the present case. This tarpaulin contains the heading “Conscience Vote” and lists candidates as either “(Anti-RH)/ Team Buhay” or “(Pro-RH)/Team Patay”.

The electoral candidates were classified according to their vote on the adoption of the RH Law. Those who voted for the passing of the law were classified by petitioners as
comprising “Team Patay,” while those who voted against it form “Team Buhay”:

TEAM BUHAY TEAM PATAY

Estrada, JV Angara, Juan Edgardo
Honasan, Gregorio Casiño, Teddy
Magsaysay, Mitos Cayetano, Alan Peter
Pimentel, Koko Enrile, Jackie
Trillanes, Antonio Escudero, Francis
Villar, Cynthia Hontiveros, Risa
*Party List Legarda, Loren
Party List Buhay Gabriela, Akbayan, Bayan Muna, Anak Pawis Party List Ang Pamilya
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Respondent Atty. Mavil V. Majarucon, as Election Officer of Bacolod City, issued a Notice to Remove Campaign Materials addressed to petitioner Most Rev. Bishop Vicente M.
Navarra, otherwise, COMELEC will be constrained to file an election offense against the petitioners.

ISSUE:
Whether the act of the COMELEC infringes the Freedom of Religion and Freedom of Speech.

HELD:
On Freedom of Religion. As aptly argued by COMELEC, the tarpaulin, on its face, “does not convey any religious doctrine of the Catholic church.” That the position of the
Catholic church appears to coincide with the message of the tarpaulin regarding the RH Law does not, by itself, bring the expression within the ambit of religious speech. On
the contrary, the tarpaulin clearly refers to candidates classified under “Team Patay” and “Team Buhay” according to their respective votes on the RH Law.
On Freedom of Speech. Embedded in the tarpaulin, are opinions expressed by petitioners. It is a specie of expression protected by our fundamental law. There are several
theories and schools of thought that strengthen the need to protect the basic right to freedom of expression.
First, this relates to the right of the people to participate in public affairs, including the right to criticize government actions. Speech that promotes dialogue on public affairs, or
airs out grievances and political discontent, should thus be protected and encouraged.
Second, free speech should be encouraged under the concept of a market place of ideas.
Third, free speech involves self-expression that enhances human dignity.
Fourth, expression is a marker for group identity.
Fifth, the Bill of Rights, free speech included, is supposed to “protect individuals and minorities against majoritarian abuses perpetrated through [the] framework [of
democratic governance]. ”
Lastly, free speech must be protected under the safety valve theory. In order to avoid this situation and prevent people from resorting to violence, there is a need for peaceful
methods in making passionate dissent. Free speech must, thus, be protected as a peaceful means of achieving one’s goal, considering the possibility that repression of
nonviolent dissent may spill over to violent means just to drive a point.
In the hierarchy of civil liberties, the rights of free expression and of assembly occupy a preferred position as they are essential to the preservation and vitality of our civil and
political institutions; and such priority “gives these liberties the sanctity and the sanction not permitting dubious intrusions.”