Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20

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Trends in Neuroscience and Education

journal homepage: www.elsevier.com/locate/tine

Review article

Embodiment theory and education: The foundations of cognition in

perception and action
Markus Kiefer n, Natalie M. Trumpp
University of Ulm, Department of Psychiatry, Ulm, Germany

a r t i c l e i n f o abstract

Article history: Recent theories propose that cognition is embodied in the sense that it is critically based on
Received 29 June 2012 reinstatements of external (perception) and internal states (proprioception) as well as bodily actions
Accepted 10 July 2012 that produce simulations of previous experiences. The present article provides a comprehensive
overview of the latest research on embodied cognition in the domains of event memory, memory for
Keywords: concrete, abstract and number concepts as well as reading and writing. Psychological and neuroscien-
Embodiment tific research shows that these important cognitive functions are essentially grounded in action and
Grounded cognition perception as a function of experience. Embodied cognition research has important implications for
Memory organization education because it highlights the relevance of appropriate sensory and motor interactions during
Learning
learning for the efficient development of human cognition.
Teaching
& 2012 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.

Contents

1. Introduction . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
2. Embodiment of reading and writing . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
3. Embodiment of memory for events . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16
4. Embodiment of conceptual memory for objects. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
5. Embodiment of conceptual memory for numbers . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
6. Conclusion . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Acknowledgments . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20
References . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

1. Introduction bassoon may be differentially efficient in supporting learning. It

would be therefore important to know which method has the
Consider a classroom situation, in which a teacher wants to most beneficial effects and why. Although at a first glance this
introduce an unfamiliar musical instrument, a bassoon, to her or problem appears to touch only practical considerations, its solu-
his students. She or he has several possibilities for teaching the tion deeply concerns fundamental issues about the nature of
relevant information. For instance (i) the teacher can describe the human cognition, which have been the subject of philosophical
shape, the material, the sound, the use, etc. of this musical reflections for more than two thousand years (for an overview,
instrument. (ii) The teacher could show a movie demonstrating see [45]). In the last decades, psychological and neuroscientific
the physical properties, the sound and the use of a bassoon. (iii) research now allows answering many longstanding questions
The teacher could take the students to an orchestra where they objectively by measuring behavioral performance and brain
can observe a musician playing the bassoon, and can touch or play activity during cognitive experiments.
the bassoon themselves. These different methods to teach a At the heart of the past and the current debates is the question
whether or not cognition is essentially grounded in our senses
and in our actions with the environment [30]. Traditionally,
n
Correspondence to: University of Ulm, Department of Psychiatry, Section for cognition is assumed to involve neuro-cognitive systems that
Cognitive Electrophysiology, Leimgrubenweg 12, 89075 Ulm, Germany.
Tel.: þ49 731 500 61532; fax: þ 49 731 500 61542.
are different from the perceptual or motor brain systems and code
E-mail address: Markus.Kiefer@uni-ulm.de (M. Kiefer). knowledge in an abstract-symbolic format, in which original
URL: http://www.uni-ulm.de/~mkiefer/ (M. Kiefer). modality-specific sensory–motor information is lost [1,42,43,51].

2211-9493/$ - see front matter & 2012 Elsevier GmbH. All rights reserved.
http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.tine.2012.07.002
16 M. Kiefer, N.M. Trumpp / Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20
Challenging this classical view, recent theories of embodied
cognition, which are also known as ‘‘grounded’’ or ‘‘situated’’
cognition theories (for a differentiation of these terms, see [21])
have emerged in several disciplines of the cognitive sciences
[3,14,25,26,31,40,52]. Embodiment theories, which receive
increasing empirical support from behavioral and neuroscientific
studies (for an overview, see [21,22]), propose close links between
the sensory and motor brain systems on the one hand and
cognition on the other hand. Cognition and thinking is critically
based on a reinstatement of external (perception) and internal
states (proprioception, emotion and introspection) as well as
bodily actions that produce simulations of previous experiences.
These simulations of previous sensory–motor experiences [2] are
often unconscious, but can be measured with behavioral or
neuroscientific experimental techniques (see Box 1). The present
article provides a comprehensive overview of the latest research
on embodied cognition in several cognitive domains and dis-
cusses important implications for learning and teaching.
Box 1–Methods for testing embodied cognition theory
Embodied cognition theory assumes that cognition is essen-
tially carried out in the sensory and motor brain systems.
Neurophysiological recording techniques provide direct evi-
dence for the involvement of modality-specific sensory and
motor systems during cognitive tasks, a critical prediction of
embodied cognition theory. Neuroimaging studies using
positron emission tomography (PET) or functional magnetic
resonance imaging (fMRI) as well as measurements of
electrical brain activity with electroencephalogram (EEG) or
magnetoencephalogram (MEG) are therefore highly valuable
sources of evidence. Neuroimaging techniques such as PET
and fMRI provide precise information where in the brain
cognitive processing takes place with a spatial resolution of a
few millimeters (Fig. 1A). As the physiological signal used in
neuroimaging techniques to detect brain activation is coupled
to relatively slow changes in cerebral blood flow (e.g., level of
blood oxygenation), the resolution for determining the time
course of brain activity is in the range of several seconds and
therefore quite poor. Recordings of electrical brain activity
from the intact scalp, in contrast, allow tracking the time
course of brain activity with a high temporal resolution in the
range of milliseconds and are therefore an ideal tool to
monitor the working brain online (Fig. 1B). However, scalp
recordings of brain activity have a low spatial resolution and
allow to localize brain activity only in the range of about one
(MEG) or several centimeters (EEG).
Neuroimaging and electrophysiological studies only pro-
vide correlational information and cannot answer the ques-
tion whether activity in sensory or motor cortex is necessary
for carrying out a cognitive task. This issue can be addressed
by behavioral experiments in healthy participants and brain
damaged patients. In behavioral experiments using priming
or interference paradigms, a previous activation of sensory or
action-related representations modulates subsequent perfor-
mance in cognitive tasks, in particular when the correspond-
ing sensory or motor information is highly relevant to the
target concept (Fig. 1C). If sensory or motor stimulation
influences performance, it can be concluded that this given
cognitive function is causally linked to sensory–motor
representations. Perhaps the most convincing tests for the
causal role of modality-specific cortex are neuropsychological
studies in brain-damaged patients with focal lesions to
sensory or motor cortex (Fig. 1D). If brain damage to
modality-specific cortex selectively impairs performance in a
cognitive task, for which a particular sensory or motor
modality should be task-relevant, the causality of this
modality-specific cortical area for a particular cognitive
domain is demonstrated.
2. Embodiment of reading and writing
Writing is a manual sensory–motor skill, which requires the
acquisition and storage of complex motor programs. For reading, its
grounding in the sensory–motor systems is less obvious, because
reading is typically considered to be purely perceptual (e.g., [33]).
However, the embodiment theory predicts that reading is influenced
by writing techniques because the motor programs and sensory
experiences during writing (e.g., forming specific letters and words
with a pen) are assumed to be implicitly activated during reading. As
a consequence, our habitual writing techniques should affect reading
performance. It is particularly important to consider this possible
relation between reading and writing because nowadays digital
writing devices associated with the use of computers, mobile phones
or Personal Digital Assistants, PDA, have frequently replaced writing
by hand (for an overview, see [29]). The sensory–motor experiences
during handwriting (haptic, motor, visual, etc.) are quite different
from those during typewriting or mouse clicking on digital devices. In
particular, handwriting requires carefully reproducing the shape of
each letter, whereas in typewriting no such grapho-motor component
is present. Given that children in our present days may learn writing
by typing on a computer or mobile phone much before they master
handwriting, it is important to know how this dramatic change in
writing habits in the digital age affects reading performance [29]. In
line with the embodiment theory, several training studies in pre-
school children and adults showed that handwriting training of new
letters gave rise to a better letter recognition in a subsequent test
than typing training. Furthermore, handwriting improved discrimina-
tion performance between real letters and their corresponding mirror
images. This demonstrates that handwriting, which links rich
sensory–motor representations to perceptual letter shapes, improves
subsequent reading performance compared with typewriting. In line
with this interpretation, neuroimaging studies showed that visual
recognition of letters only activated motor regions of the brain when
letters were trained by handwriting, but not when they were trained
by typewriting. These effects for handwriting vs. typewriting are very
similar to the action effects on training new concepts described
below. They confirm the assumption that sensory–motor experiences
must be meaningfully related to the learning target (here shaping a
letter by writing vs. pressing a key associated with a letter) to result
in stronger sensory–motor memory traces that facilitate learning.
3. Embodiment of memory for events
Past events such as incidences associated with our last birthday
are stored in episodic memory, the long-term memory system for
events [50]. When we recall these events, we reactivate stored
sensory–motor experiences collected during the initial learning
episode and not only abstract-symbolic verbal knowledge [12]. These
reactivations of acquired sensory–motor memory traces are not
epiphenomenal, but are essential for memory performance. The so-
called enactment effect nicely illustrates the importance of rich
sensory–motor experiences [10]: Participants remembered a list of
action verbs better when they performed the corresponding actions
in the learning phase compared with a condition when they simply
read the words [11]. Observing others, who performed the action, also
improved subsequent memory compared with reading, but was
inferior to self-performed actions [46]. Hence, the direct sensory–
motor experience during learning has the most beneficial effect on
subsequent recall. Neurophysiological recordings of brain activity
during memory recall revealed an activation of motor areas only for
self-performed actions during learning [15,46] suggesting that action
representations established during word learning were reactivated
and facilitated memory retrieval. Reactivations of stored experiences
in modality-specific brain areas (i.e. areas specifically engaged in
 M. Kiefer, N.M. Trumpp / Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20 17

Fig. 1. Methods for testing embodied cognition theory. (A) Neuroimaging—functional magnetic resonance imaging (fMRI). In a conceptual task, participants were shown
words denoting objects, for which acoustic features are highly relevant (e.g., sound-related concepts such as ‘‘telephone’’) and control words denoting objects with low
relevance of acoustic features among pronounceable, but meaningless pseudowords [23]. Participants had to visually recognize words in a word/pseudoword decision task
(lexical decision). In a perceptual task, participants listened to real object sounds (e.g., the ringing sound of a telephone). Increased activation to words with acoustic
conceptual features (conceptual processing) overlaps with brain activation during listening to real sounds (sound perception) in left posterior superior and middle
temporal gyrus. Modified after Kiefer et al. [23]. Reprinted with permission. (B) Electrophysiology—event related potential (ERP) recordings. As in the fMRI experiment
above, participants were presented with words referring to objects with high relevance of acoustic features and with control words [23]. Left: Event-related scalp
potentials to words with vs. without acoustic features at central electrodes reveal an onset of activity differences at about 150 ms as shown by the arrow. The early onset of
the effect suggests that activity in auditory brain areas indexes rapid access to acoustic conceptual features rather than late imagery. Right: Brain electrical sources of scalp
ERPs. Maps of cortical currents reveal strongest cortical currents (visualized in blue color) in and close to left posterior temporal cortex as in the fMRI experiment.
Modified after Kiefer et al. [23]. Reprinted with permission. (C) Behavioral experiments—priming. Left: Action priming paradigm [16]. A movie showing a hand action (e.g.,
using a staple gun) is followed either by an object affording a similar, congruent action or a dissimilar, incongruent action. Right: Observing congruent action movies
facilitates subsequent recognition of target pictures in a picture–word matching task as shown by the higher recognition accuracy. This demonstrates that action
representations have a functional role in conceptual processing. Modified after [16]. Reprinted with permission. (D) Neuropsychology—effect of brain lesion. Left: Patient
JR with damage to auditory association areas in posterior temporal cortex was tested with regard to his ability to process sound-related concepts [49]. He had to perform
lexical decisions on words with acoustic features as in the fMRI experiment described in (A). Right: Patient JR committed more errors for processing words with acoustic
features than for processing control words suggesting that auditory association cortex has a causal role in representing sound-related concepts. Modified after Trumpp
et al. [49]. Reprinted with permission. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
18 M. Kiefer, N.M. Trumpp / Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20

perception or action) during memory retrieval are not only observed
for self-performed actions, but also for sensory information associated
with the learning episode: Retrieving visual information (shape of
objects) activated visual brain areas [44] whereas retrieving acoustic
information (sound of objects) activated auditory brain areas [54].
This shows that episodic memory is multimodal in its essence
because it is based on a reinstatement of sensory and motor
experiences [12]. Establishing the relevant sensory and motor mem-
ory traces during learning therefore improves subsequent memory
performance compared with pure verbal learning.
4. Embodiment of conceptual memory for objects
Concepts held in semantic long-term memory [50] include the
sum of our sensory and motor experiences with the environment
in a categorial fashion [22]. For instance, the concept ‘‘bassoon’’
includes the information that a bassoon has a long shape, is made
of wood, produces sound, is winded, etc. It is an important question
whether even concepts, the abstract constituents of thought, are
grounded in perception and action. Neuroimaging results (for an
overview see, [20,22,41]) have provided converging evidence on
the differential involvement of sensory–motor brain areas in the
processing of words and concepts of different kinds (e.g., vision-
related concepts vs. action-related concepts). They demonstrated
activation in sensory–motor brain areas in a range of conceptual
tasks (e.g., [18,32,47]). In fact, conceptual and perceptual proces-
sing functionally and neuroanatomically overlaps in sensory brain
regions [23]: Visual recognition of words denoting objects, for
which acoustic features are highly relevant (e.g., sound-related
concepts such as ‘‘telephone’’), ignited cell assemblies in left
posterior superior and middle temporal gyri (pSTG/MTG) that were
also activated by sound perception (Fig. 1A,B,D).
These conceptual memory traces in sensory–motor areas are
established through the learning-based formation of cortical cell
assemblies as a direct consequence of the experience with the
referent. One line of evidence comes from training studies on the
experience-dependent acquisition of concepts for novel objects

Fig. 2. Experience-dependent embodiment of object concepts in the sensory–motor areas. (A) Examples of the novel 3D objects (‘nobjects’), for which conceptual knowledge was
acquired during training, and demonstrations of the different training conditions. Top: Actions associated with the detail feature in the pantomime training group. Bottom: Pictures
highlighting the detail feature to be pointed to in the pointing training group. (B) Minimum norm source estimates obtained from scalp ERPs at test during a categorization task after
training. Shown are difference maps between the pantomime and the pointing condition at 117 ms after picture onset. Activity close to the premotor cortex (yellow circle) was
greater in the pantomime group. (For interpretation of the references to color in this figure legend, the reader is referred to the web version of this article.)
Modified after Kiefer et al. [24]. Reprinted with permission.

Fig. 3. Experience-dependent embodiment of number concepts. Intercultural differences in finger counting habits affect processing of number concepts [9]. Top: German
finger counting system involving unimanual signs for numbers up to five and bimanual signs for numbers larger than five. Bottom: Chinese finger counting system
involving unimanual symbolic signs for numbers up to nine. Finger signs are depicted from the signer’s perspective. For further details see the text.
Modified after Domahs et al. [9]. Reprinted with permission.
 M. Kiefer, N.M. Trumpp / Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20
[19,24,53]. For instance, human participants learned concepts of
novel objects (‘nobjects’) under different training conditions [24]:
Participants either made an action pantomime towards a detailed
feature of the novel object, which signaled a specific object function,
or pointed to it (Fig. 2A). At test, only in the pantomime group, in
which a meaningful action was performed towards the object during
training, early activation in frontal motor regions and later activation
in occipito-parietal visual-motor regions was found during concep-
tual processing indicating that action representations essentially
constitute the concept (Fig. 2B). In the pointing training group, in
which the action during training was not meaningfully related to the
object, this sensory–motor activity was absent suggesting that
concepts were not grounded in action.
The second line of evidence comes from studies investigating
experience-dependent formation of conceptual representations in
experts with real objects. For instance, only professional musi-
cians, but not musical laypersons activate auditory association
cortex when accessing conceptual knowledge about musical
instruments [17]. Together with similar expertise studies [5,28],
these findings confirm that the grounding of concepts in the
sensory–motor circuits of the brain is experience-dependent and
the result of repeated meaningful interactions with the referent. If
this experience is lacking, concepts are less rich and are mainly
based on verbal associations [48]: When confronted with the
name ‘‘bassoon’’, for instance, a musical layperson may be able to
retrieve other words typically co-occurring with the word ‘‘bas-
soon’’ such as ‘‘musical instrument’’, ‘‘orchestra‘‘ or ‘‘violin’’
without having a clear grasp what a bassoon really is.
5. Embodiment of conceptual memory for numbers
While the embodiment of object concepts may be intuitive to
some extent, it is less obvious how abstract concepts such as
numbers, which do not have a clear physical referent, are grounded
in perception and action. Nevertheless, several lines of evidence
show that processing number concepts (e.g., knowing that 6 is
greater than 4) involves the sensory–motor systems similar to
concrete object concepts. Firstly, accessing number magnitude
depends on a mental number line, which resembles visuo-spatial
representations. At a subjective level, people frequently arrange
numbers in a spatial layout, for instance, in form of a line with the
lower numbers on the left and the higher numbers on the right [7].
Behavioral number comparison experiments (e.g., deciding, which
digit is larger, 6 or 2) provide objective evidence for the existence of
an analog mental number line that has a logarithmic scale similar to
the mental representation of the size or intensity of sensory stimuli
[34]. Furthermore, neuroimaging studies consistently showed that
the number magnitude is represented in a parietal area (intrapar-
ietal sulcus), which is also involved in processing space [34,39].
Secondly, in addition to visuo-spatial representation, numbers are
grounded in the motor system, particularly in hand actions (see also
[27]). Most impressively, finger counting systems used in childhood
to learn numbers still play a role in adults when they process
numbers: Intercultural studies showed that reaction times in a
number comparison experiment are strongly influenced by the
finger counting habits typically used in a given culture [9]. Only in
German participants with unimanual finger counting habits for
numbers up to five and bimanual habits for numbers greater than
five number comparisons were slower when they involved numbers
both below and above five, i.e. numbers that require one vs. two
hands in the German finger counting system (Fig. 3). In Chinese
participants with a unimanual symbolic finger counting system for
these numbers, this effect was absent. In line with developmental
studies demonstrating the importance of finger recognition in
childhood for later arithmetic abilities [35], this study shows that
19
fairly abstract number concepts are at least partially rooted in our
motor experiences. Hence, number concepts appear to be embodied
in both visuo-spatial and action-related representations. Explicitly
training children in finger counting as well as in spatial analogs of
numerosities accelerates learning numbers and has beneficial effects
on the subsequent mathematical performance even in their later
school or professional career (see, [13]).
6. Conclusion
According to the latest research, cognition is grounded in
perception and action in its essence suggesting that even the
most complex thoughts are sense-based and not abstract-
symbolic (for abstract concepts see Box 2). There are examples
from many cognitive domains showing that appropriate sensory–
motor experiences are necessary for human cognition to develop
at the highest level. Embodied cognition theory is therefore
naturally highly relevant for many issues associated with educa-
tion [36]: Knowing the fundamental mechanisms underlying
human cognition helps educational practitioners and policy
makers as well as learners to design learning environments that
optimally fit to the functioning of the mind. Embodied cognition
theory highlights the relevance of sensory–motor interactions
Box 2–Are abstract concepts embodied?
By definition, abstract concepts do not refer to physical
objects with which one can interact. It is therefore hard to
imagine how abstract concepts, including social terms
(‘‘justice’’, ‘‘freedom’’), scientific expressions (‘‘gravitation’’,
‘‘quantum ergodicity’’) but also inner state terms (‘‘desire’’,
‘‘pity’’), could be grounded in the sensory and motor brain
systems. Above, it was already described how fairly abstract
number concepts are embodied in perception and action. In
the following, it is shown that embodied theory is also able to
account for the representation of other abstract concepts
suggesting that the classically proposed dichotomy between
so-called concrete and abstract concepts [37] does not exist:
According to embodied cognition theory, abstract concepts
are embedded into concrete situations that express the
content of the abstract concept [4,21,22]. These situations,
in turn, can be experienced and ground abstract concepts in
perception and action. In addition, abstract concepts such as
‘‘guilt’’ or ‘‘freedom’’ are typically strongly associated with
specific emotions and internal states. For instance, the word
‘‘guilt’’ may refer to a situation, in which an individual causes
an accident, in which a child was seriously injured. Within this
context, the concept ‘‘guilt’’ is defined by sensory and action
properties of the accident situation as well as by emotional
states of the accident perpetrator derived from introspection.
Like for concrete concepts, embodied cognition theory
proposes that exactly this reactivation of sensory, motor
and emotional experiences constitute the meaning of an
abstract concept such as ‘‘guilt’’. If this foundation in
sensory–motor and emotional experiences is missing, one
cannot really grasp the meaning of the concept. In line with
an embodiment view, there are anecdotic reports that famous
scientists such as Kekulé, who discovered the ring-shaped
Benzene formula, first had a visual image of a snake that had
seized hold of its own tail in mind before writing down the
formula [6]. Furthermore, individuals frequently described
concrete situations when thinking of the content of abstract
concepts [4]. Recent neuroimaging studies confirmed this
observation and found activation in sensory–motor as well as
in emotional brain regions during the processing of abstract
concepts [38,55]. Despite this supportive evidence, the
grounding of abstract concepts in sensory–motor, emotional
and introspective brain circuits has to be further elucidated.
20 M. Kiefer, N.M. Trumpp / Trends in Neuroscience and Education 1 (2012) 15–20
with our environment during learning resulting in more endur-
able and – perhaps most important – in richer knowledge.
Consider the example of learning a bassoon at the beginning:
According to a symbolic view of cognition, it would be sufficient for
the teacher to verbally describe the shape, the sound, the material,
etc. of a bassoon in a written text, perhaps complemented by a
picture. A direct experience with the object is not necessary. Accord-
ing to embodiment theories, rich knowledge about the unfamiliar
bassoon can only be acquired when the students can see, hear, touch
and act on the bassoon. A pure verbal description should result in
impoverished, less durable knowledge. Similarly, learning predomi-
nantly from digital media with reduced possibilities of meaningful
sensory–motor interactions results in vague or even distorted con-
cepts about the world (for a similar discussion, see [8,29,36]).
Impoverished knowledge, which is not appropriately grounded in
perception and action, is illustrated by anecdotic reports of basic
world knowledge of primary school students: They answer the
teacher’s question ‘‘Where does milk come from?’’ with ‘‘From the
supermarket’’. As human cognition is the basis for communication,
planning, problem solving and action, rich embodied knowledge
about the functioning of our physical and social world is highly
important for the development of our societies.
Acknowledgments
This research was supported by a grant of the German
Research Community (DFG Ki 804/5-1) to MK.
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